author: BRODY, Justice.

text:
    Gordon SYLTE, an individual; Susan Goodrich, an individual; John Sylte, an individual; and Sylte Ranch Limited Liability Company, an Idaho limited liability company, Petitioners-Appellants, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES and Gary Spackman, in his capacity as the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, Respondents-Respondents on Appeal, and Twin Lakes Improvement Association, Mary A. Alice, Mary F. Anderson, Mary F. Anderson, et al., Debra Andrews, John Andrews, Matthew A. Bafus, Charles & Ruth Benage, Arthur Chetlain, Jr., Clarence & Kurt Geiger Familes, Mary K. Collins / Bosch Properties, Sandra Cozzetto, Wes Crosby, James Curb, Maureen Devitis, Don Ellis, Susan Ellis, Scott Erickson, Joan Freije, Amber Hatrock, Barbara Herr, Wendy & James Hilliard, Pat & Denise Hogan, Steven & Elizabeth Holmes, Leif Houkam, Donald Jayne, Douglas I. & Bertha Mary Jayne, Terry Kiefer, Michael Knowles, Adam Kremin, Robert Kuhn, Rene Lacroix, Joan Lake-Ommen, Larry D. & Janice A. Faris Living Trust, Terry Laliberte, Patrick E. Miller, William H. Minarte, Angela Murray, David R. Nipp, John Nooney, Steve & Pam Rodgers, Kimberli Roth, David & Lori Schafer, Darwin R. Schultz, Molly Seaburg, Hal Sunday, TCRV LLC, Twin Lakes, LLC, Rick & Corrinne Van Zandt, Gerald J. Weller, Bruce & Jamie Wilson, David Ziuchkovski, Paul Finman, and Twin Lakes Flood Control District No. 17, Intervenors-Respondents on Appeal.
    Docket No. 46062
    Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2019 Term.
    Filed: June 14, 2019
    Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants. Michael P. Lawrence argued.
    Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Idaho Department of Water Resources. Kristina Fugate argued.
    Parsons Behle & Latimer, Boise, for respondents-intervenors Twin Lakes Improvement Association, et al. Norman M. Semanko argued.
    Barker Rosholt Simpson, LLP, Boise, for respondent-intervenor Twin Lakes Flood Control District No. 17. Albert P. Barker argued.
   BRODY, Justice.

This appeal concerns the distribution of water to water right 95-0734 in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin. Sylte Ranch, LLC, is the current claimant on water right 95-0734, which dates from the year 1875 and provides natural flow stockwater from Rathdrum Creek. On September 20, 2016, Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) issued a letter of instructions to the local watermaster in response to a complaint that he was releasing storage water from Twin Lakes contrary to the 1989 Final Decree that established all existing rights to Twin Lakes' surface waters, tributaries, and outlets. These instructions led Sylte to file a Petition for Declaratory Ruling, arguing that IDWR should set aside and reverse the instructions because they improperly limited water right 95-0734 to Twin Lakes' natural tributary inflow. Twin Lakes Improvement Association, et al., and Twin Lakes Flood Control District intervened in the case. Following cross motions for summary judgment, IDWR issued a Final Order, in which it upheld the instructions and granted intervenors' motion for summary judgment. Sylte then sought judicial review and the district court affirmed IDWR's Final Order. Sylte timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the district court's determination to uphold IDWR's Final Order because the instructions complied with the plain language of the 1989 Final Decree.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Twin Lakes, formerly known as Fish Lakes, is a body of water consisting of two lakes connected by a man-made channel that was constructed in the early 1900s. The water flows from the upper lake into the lower lake. Fish Creek is the major inlet of the lakes while Rathdrum Creek is the only outlet. This water system lies in mountainous timberland, about three miles north of Rathdrum, Idaho and at the foot of the Selkirk Mountains. In 1906, a dam and outlet structure were constructed at the outlet of Lower Twin Lake, just above Rathdrum Creek.

A general adjudication rights to the use of surface waters in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin, including its tributaries and outlets, began in 1975. Following a trial, District Judge Richard Magnuson issued a Memorandum Decision (February 22, 1989) and Final Decree (April 19, 1989, hereinafter the "Final Decree") as part of the general adjudication. The Final Decree includes a list of all existing rights to Twin Lakes' surface waters, tributaries, and outlets as of May 23, 1977. More specifically, the Final Decree provides the following pertinent conclusions of law:

An appropriator is entitled to maintenance of the stream conditions substantially as they were at the time the appropriator made his or her appropriation, if a change in the stream conditions would interfere with the proper exercise of the water right.
Only two waters identified herein, Nos. 95-0973 and 95-0974, are entitled to store water and to make beneficial use of stored waters in Twin Lakes. All other water rights with source of Twin Lakes tributary to Rathdrum Creek are direct flow water rights and are entitled to divert, on the basis of priority, a combined rate of flow equal to the inflow to the lakes. Stated in another manner, direct flow water rights can be utilized to divert from Twin Lakes only if the diversions do not injure the storage water rights in Twin Lakes.
From November 1 of each year until March 31 of the next year, the two storage water rights enable Twin Lakes to be filled to the level of 10.4 feet on the Staff Gauge. From April 1 to October 31 of each year, the rights to fill the lakes is superseded by the right of existing and future direct flow water rights to divert natural inflows to the lakes. Thus from April 1 to October 31 of each year the level of Twin Lakes will decrease due to evaporation and seepage losses, during the periods when direct flow water rights divert the natural inflows.
The priority system of water rights within the Twin Lakes - Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin applies to all water rights on sources that are hydraulically connected. For example, an early priority right on Rathdrum Creek is senior to a later priority water right on Fish Creek.
When seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes, no water will be released from the lakes to satisfy downstream water rights, with the exception of Water Right No. 95-0734. When this occurs, Water Right No. 95-0734 and water rights that divert from Twin Lakes and from the tributaries to Twin Lakes may divert the natural flow, but not the stored waters, on the basis of water right priority.

The Final Decree established only two storage water rights in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin, which are water rights 95-0973 and 95-0974. "All other water rights that divert from Twin Lakes are direct flow water rights," which "utilize the flows passing through the lake and are established on a priority basis." While there is natural lake storage, the Final Decree established that "no water right has been developed for the use of this water because it provides a base for the overlying storage rights." Twin Lakes Improvement Association owns the storage water right for water located between the Staff Gauge height of 0.0 and 6.4 feet (right no. 95-0974) in the amount of 5,360 acre-feet. The second storage water right is for water located between the Staff Gauge height of 6.4 and 10.4 feet (right no. 95-0973). While the Final Decree determined the Bureau of Reclamation owned this water right in 1989, the Bureau of Reclamation subsequently conveyed its interest in this right to Twin Lakes Flood Control District.

Sylte Ranch, LLC, is the current claimant of water right 95-0734, which provides natural flow stockwater from Rathdrum Creek to 300 head of stock. This water right has a maximum rate of 0.07 cubic feet per second (cfs) and a maximum amount of 4.10 acre feet per annum (AFA). Gordon Sylte, Susan Goodrich, John Sylte, and Sylte Ranch, LLC, (collectively, "Sylte"), brought this appeal against IDWR to request the court set aside and reverse IDWR's instructions to their local watermaster, arguing that IDWR improperly limited water right 95-0734 to Twin Lakes' natural tributary inflow.

Sylte's water right was established in 1875 when the water system's natural condition provided "sufficient direct flow water in Rathdrum Creek ... to provide 0.07 cfs to the appropriator on a continuous year-round basis." However, in 1989 Judge Magnuson noted in his memorandum decision that "the natural state of Rathdrum Creek in 1875 was definitely not the same as the natural state in 1906 or now." Inflow to Twin Lakes changed since 1875 as a result of climate changes, logging operations' effects on the timber canopy and drainage basin, and the constructions of the dam and outlet structure in 1906. As a result, since 1906, there have been periods when seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the natural tributary inflow. Neither Sylte nor its predecessors ever appealed, or otherwise challenged, the Final Decree.

On September 20, 2016, IDWR issued a letter (hereinafter "the Instructions") to the WD 95C Watermaster in response to a complaint that he was releasing storage water from Twin Lakes contrary to the Final Decree. The contested provisions in the Instructions state:

4) From April 1 to October 31 of each year, the watermaster will measure the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes (weekly) and allow diversion of up to that amount by the direct flow water rights on the basis of water right priority. See Decree at Conclusion of Law 12.
5) From April 1 to October 31 each year, when seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes (as determined by decreasing lake level), no water will be released from the lakes to satisfy Rathdrum Creek water rights, except for water right no. 95-734. Decree at Conclusions of Law 12, 14; Memorandum Decision at 12-13. When this occurs, all or a portion of the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes, as measured by the watermaster, can be released to satisfy delivery of water right no. 95-734 with 0.07 cfs at the legal point of diversion. If all of the natural inflow must be released to satisfy water right no. 95-734, the watermaster shall curtail all junior direct flow water rights. If only a portion of the inflow is released to satisfy water right no. 95-734, the watermaster shall satisfy water rights that divert from Twin Lakes and its tributaries using the remainder of the natural flow, on the basis of water right priority.
6) From April 1 to October 31 of each year, when seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes do not exceed the total natural tributary inflow (as determined by steady or increasing lake level), the watermaster shall distribute the total natural tributary inflow to water rights that divert from Twin Lakes and its tributaries and Rathdrum Creek on the basis of water right priority. See Decree at Conclusions of Law 12, 14.
7) If release of all of the natural tributary inflow does not satisfy delivery of water right no. 95-734 within a 48-hr period, the watermaster shall consult with the Department's Northern Regional Manager or designated Department representative, regarding determination of a futile call with respect to delivery of water right no. 95-734. The Department's Northern Regional Manager will issue written notice to the watermaster regarding the futile call determination. A futile call determination will result in non-delivery of water right no. 95-734.

On February 16, 2017, Sylte filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling, asking IDWR to reverse and set aside the Instructions. Sylte argued the Instructions improperly limited the distribution of water right 95-0734 to the "natural tributary inflow," which is contrary to the 1989 Memorandum Decision and Final Decree, as well as the prior appropriation doctrine set forth in article XV, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution. Other water right claimants in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin intervened in this action: Twin Lakes Improvement Association and Twin Lakes Flood Control District, both of which own the only two storage water rights in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin. Multiple other water users with flow rights also joined Twin Lakes Improvement Association as intervenors.

Following cross motions for summary judgment, IDWR issued its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment; Order Amending Instructions; Order Vacating Hearing Dates and Schedule (hereinafter "Final Order") on September 6, 2017, which found the Instructions to be consistent with the Final Decree. In its Final Order, IDWR also amended the Instructions to add the following underlined language: " ... all or a portion of the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes, as measured by the watermaster, can be released to satisfy delivery of water right no. 95-734 with 0.07 cfs at the legal point of diversion, unless or until the maximum annual diversion volume of 4.1 acre feet has been delivered." IDWR granted Intervenors' motion for summary judgment and denied Sylte's request to reverse and set aside the Instructions. Sylte then petitioned for judicial review.

The case was assigned to the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court pursuant to this Court's Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009. The district court also granted two motions to intervene on November 6, 2017, thereby permitting Twin Lakes Improvement Association, et al., and Twin Lakes Flood Control District to intervene in this case. Sylte argued that the Final Order is contrary to the Final Decree and Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine, and asked the district court to set aside the Final Order.

On April 11, 2018, the district court affirmed the Final Order. The court determined the Final Decree's language was unambiguous and the Instructions complied with its plain language. The court also found that Sylte's argument "assumes and requires the release of the lakes' stored waters to satisfy the right when the amount of natural tributary inflow is insufficient"-a course barred by the plain language of the decree. In addition, the doctrine of res judicata barred Sylte from arguing that the Final Decree was contrary to the doctrine of prior appropriation.

Sylte then filed a Petition for Rehearing, arguing that IDWR's additional language in the Instructions-"unless or until the maximum annual diversion volume of 4.1 acre feet has been delivered"-should be stricken. Sylte argued IDWR added that language sua sponte after the record and briefing were complete, which left Sylte with no chance to address the issue and thereby prejudiced Sylte's due process rights. The district court denied Sylte's Petition for Rehearing, concluding that Sylte "had both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of a 4.1 acre-foot limitation in the prior adjudication." Sylte timely appealed to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district court acts in an appellate capacity under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, this Court reviews the decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues. City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 305, 396 P.3d 1184, 1187 (2017) (citation omitted). However, this Court also reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Id. An agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, while questions of law are freely reviewed. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The primary inquiry in this appeal is the interpretation of Judge Magnuson's 1989 Final Decree. No party actually challenges the Final Decree. Instead, each side presents a different interpretation of the Final Decree's language to determine whether it conflicts with the Instructions issued by IDWR in September of 2016. We agree with the district court that the Instructions complied with the plain language of the Final Decree.

A. The Instructions complied with the plain language of the Final Decree.

Sylte contends it is entitled to Twin Lakes' "natural, pre-dam outflow to Rathdrum Creek," and that amount should not be restricted to the natural tributary inflow. In comparing Twin Lakes' hydrology to a bathtub, Sylte argues that it is entitled to the "natural flow" of water that progresses through the water system and out the 'drain' to Rathdrum Creek, including the "natural lake storage," on a continuous year-round basis. Both IDWR and Interveners argue that the Final Decree's plain language expressly prohibits Sylte from appropriating stored waters and-as a direct flow water right holder-Sylte can only appropriate the natural tributary inflow. Neither party argues that the Final Decree is ambiguous, but each has constructed a different interpretation of its language. The district court determined that Sylte's argument was untenable because it "assumes and requires the release of the lakes' stored water to satisfy the right when the amount of natural tributary inflow is insufficient." This analysis is correct.

"Upon entry of a final decree, the director shall administer the water rights by distributing water in accordance with the final decree and with title 42, Idaho Code." I.C. § 42-1413(2). When interpreting a final decree, this Court applies the same rules of interpretation as to contracts. City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188 (2017) ; A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dep't Of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 523, 284 P.3d 225, 248 (2012). "A decree is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Spackman, 162 Idaho at 306, 396 P.3d at 1188. However, if it is unambiguous, a water decree's meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of the decree's words. Id. ; Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155 Idaho 604, 606, 315 P.3d 792, 794 (2013). Like a contract, this Court will read the decree "as a whole and will give meaning to all of its terms to the extent possible." Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Crowley , 124 Idaho 132, 138, 857 P.2d 611, 617 (1993).

The Final Decree is not ambiguous. Its language clearly separates two types of water rights in the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin: storage water rights and direct flow water rights. Only two storage rights exist in Twin Lakes, with the Final Decree recognizing that "no water right has been developed" for the use of natural lake storage. All other rights in this water system are direct flow rights.

Sylte does not claim either of the two storage rights in Twin Lakes, which automatically makes its right a direct flow right under the Final Decree. Accordingly, its water right "utilize[s] the flows passing though the lake and [is] established on a priority basis." However, Sytle's argument effectively equates "natural flow" with a "natural storage" right when the Final Decree clearly established "[o]nly two waters identified herein, Nos. 95-0973 and 95-0974, are entitled to store water and to make beneficial use of stored waters in Twin Lakes." As a flow right user, Sylte is entitled to water that naturally flows through the Twin Lakes to Rathdrum Creek. In keeping Sylte's bathtub analysis, he is entitled to the water that flows through the tap and out the drain, but not to the stored water blocks within the tub. Those rights were claimed by other parties in the Final Decree and are the only rights entitled to make beneficial use of the stored waters in Twin Lakes.

If Sylte's water right was determined only by the outflow, Sylte could tap into the stored water rights between the Staff Gauge height of 0 and 10.4 feet in years where tributary inflow is insufficient to satisfy Sylte's right. In those conditions there would simply be no other water source available to release and satisfy Sylte's right from Rathdrum Creek. Nevertheless, releasing storage water is expressly barred by the Final Decree:

When seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the total natural tributary inflow to Twin lakes, no water will be released from the lakes to satisfy downstream water right, with the exception of Water Right No. 95-0734. When this occurs, Water Right No. 95-0734 and water rights that divert flow from Twin Lakes and from the tributaries to Twin Lakes may divert the natural flow, but not the stored waters, on the basis of water right priority.

As determined by the district court and IDWR, this provision gives Sylte's water right a unique administrative status to protect the 1875 water right from increased seepage and evaporation created by the 1906 dam and outlet structure. In other words, Sylte is entitled to divert the natural tributary inflow, but not the stored waters, regardless of seepage and evaporation losses. This is a unique protection to Sylte's right. All other direct flow rights are limited to the natural tributary inflows "less evaporation and seepage from Twin Lakes." However, Sylte is still limited to the waters "from the source of their appropriation," which is Rathdrum Creek. This language does not provide releases of the lake's storage waters to create sufficient outflow to satisfy Sylte's right.

Therefore the Final Decree does not provide access to "natural storage water," as Sylte contends. The stored waters are already appropriated, making them unavailable for redistribution to satisfy Sylte's natural flow water right. See Washington Cnty. Irr. Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 389, 43 P.2d 943, 945 (1935) ("After the water was diverted from the natural stream and stored in the reservoir, it was no longer 'public water' subject to diversion and appropriation under the provisions of the Constitution."); see also Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res. , 143 Idaho 862, 879, 154 P.3d 433, 450 (2007) ("when water is stored, it becomes 'the property of the appropriators ... impressed with the public trust to apply it to a beneficial use.' ") (quoting Talboy, 55 Idaho at 389, 43 P.2d at 945 ).

The Instructions are in harmony with the Final Decree. The Instructions generally prohibit the watermaster from releasing water to satisfy Rathdrum Creek water rights when seepage and evaporation losses exceed the natural tributary inflow, while still upholding the exception carved out for Sylte and giving it priority over junior rights.

B. The futile call doctrine's application to water right 95-0734 does not violate the Final Decree.

Sylte argues that the futile call procedure in the Instructions violates the Final Decree because the delivery of water to Sylte's right is not limited by the natural tributary inflow. IDWR maintains that Sylte is entitled to tributary inflow, not stored waters, and, consequently, the Instructions' futile call procedure conforms to the Final Decree.

The futile call doctrine in Idaho "embodies a policy against the waste of irrigation water." Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 739, 552 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1976) ; see also Hill v. Green, 47 Idaho 157, 274 P. 110, 110-11 (1928). Generally, this doctrine provides

if ... seepage, evaporation, channel absorption or other conditions beyond the control of the appropriators the water in the stream will not reach the point of the prior appropriator in sufficient quantity for him to apply it to beneficial use, then a junior appropriator whose diversion point is higher on the stream may divert the water.

Gilbert, 97 Idaho at 739, 552 P.2d at 1224. The Instructions provide the following futile call procedure:

If release of all of the natural tributary inflow does not satisfy delivery of water right no. 95-734 within a 48-hr period, the watermaster shall consult with the Department's Northern Regional Manager or designated Department representative, regarding determination of a futile call with respect to delivery of water right no. 95-734. The Department's Northern Regional Manager will issue written notice to the watermaster regarding the futile call determination. A futile call determination will result in non-delivery of water right no. 95-734.

As explained in Section A, calculating the natural tributary inflow conforms with the Final Decree's plain language because it determines the amount of water that can be released to satisfy Sylte's right without tapping into Twin Lakes' storage water. This futile call procedure complies with the Final Decree and Idaho water law, and it does not unlawfully prioritize junior users over Sylte's water right. Junior users could only gain delivery where the release of the tributary inflow could not satisfy Sylte's delivery within a 48 hour period and only after the watermaster consults with the designated IDWR representative. This conforms with the Gilbert requirements for a futile call.

C. IDWR did not substantially prejudice Sylte by (1) reviewing documents outside the agency record, or by (2) adding volume limitation language to the Instructions.

Sylte contends that IDWR's (1) review of documents outside the agency record and (2) added volume limitation to the Instructions both substantially prejudiced its rights by denying Sylte notice and the opportunity to address each issue. IDWR argues the references outside the record constituted harmless error while Sylte had notice of the volume limitation in the administrative proceeding. The district court determined that Sylte's substantial rights were not prejudiced by either issue, and that Sylte failed to show a prejudicial error. We agree.

1. Reviewing documents outside the agency record did not prejudice Sylte's substantial rights.

Sylte cites to IDWR's rules, which state that "[o]fficial notice may be taken of any facts that could be judicially noticed in the courts of Idaho and of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge." IDAPA 37.01.01.602. In addition, "[p]arties must be given an opportunity to contest and rebut the facts or material officially noticed." Id. However, Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act mandates that "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." I.C. § 67-5279(4).

The Final Order quoted two documents from the Twin Lakes general adjudication, including an objection submitted by Sylte's predecessor and IDWR's Notice of Entry of Final Decree. Both of these documents were used by IDWR to state that Sylte (through its predecessor) had made the same argument before Judge Magnuson and lost. While IDWR likely committed error by considering and citing to these documents in its Final Order, it still did not prejudice Sylte's substantial rights because the Instructions were consistent with the plain language of the Final Decree. As the district court determined, IDWR would have reached the same result even without the documents. Moreover, the error did not endure into the appellate process because an appellate court reviews a final water decree's plain language freely as a question of law. See Spackman, 162 Idaho at 306, 396 P.3d at 1188 ; Sky Canyon Properties, LLC, 155 Idaho at 606, 315 P.3d at 794. Thus, while there was an error by denying Sylte notice and an opportunity to rebut the use of these documents, we will affirm the agency action because it did not prejudice Sylte's substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4).

2. Adding the volume limitation language to the Instructions did not prejudice Sylte's rights.

In its Final Order, IDWR amended the Instructions to add the following underlined language: " ... all or a portion of the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes, as measured by the watermaster, can be released to satisfy delivery of water right no. 95-734 with 0.07 cfs at the legal point of diversion, unless or until the maximum annual diversion volume of 4.1 acre feet has been delivered." This is consistent with the Final Decree, which established Sylte's right with a maximum rate of 0.07 cfs and a maximum amount of 4.10 AFA. Because the Final Decree declared Sylte's right with that annual volume limitation, Idaho law requires the right to be administered with that limitation. I.C. § 42-1413(2). The additional language did not prejudice Sylte's rights because the information was known throughout the proceedings. Indeed, the 4.10 AFA annual diversion volume was listed in the agency record and on the decreed right itself as a key element of the water right. IDWR's sua sponte addition of that language into the Instructions could not implicate Sylte's due process rights when Sylte was aware that IDWR must administer its right with the 4.10 AFA limitation, as required by the Final Decree.

In addition, Sylte argues that there is a distinction between "diverting" and "delivering water"-namely, that Sylte is entitled to have water delivered to its point of diversion "on a continuous year-round basis, only to be curtailed when the right has diverted the volume limit in priority." Sylte cites no authority for this distinction, and the district court held that it was a "distinction without a difference." IDWR confirmed at the district court hearing that the amount of water "delivered" is determined by the amount diverted and used by Sylte, not the amount of water flowing past Sylte's headgate. Sylte offers no evidence IDWR has, is, or will administer the water right in a manner contrary to the Final Decree's plain language or inconsistent with the decreed amount of 4.10 AFA. In other words, Sylte offers no support that its rights were prejudiced by the additional language instructing the watermaster to administer Sylte's right according to the Final Decree's annual diversion volume of 4.10 AFA. Therefore we affirm the district court's determination that Sylte's rights were not prejudiced.

D. No party is entitled to attorney fees.

Sylte, Twin Lakes Improvement Association, and Twin Lakes Flood Control District all argue they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. IDWR does not request any fees-it only argues against an award of attorney fees to Sylte. Sylte and the Intervenors cite to Idaho Code section 12-117 (1) and (2) as the basis for their entitlement to attorney fees. It states:

(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it prevailed.

I.C. § 12-117 (1) - (2).

While intervenors may request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117, this statute still requires an entity and a state agency to be adverse parties. Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284, 233 P.3d 721, 731 (2010) ("The statute requires that the person and the state agency be adverse parties."). See also City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 310-11, 396 P.3d 1184, 1192-93 (2017) (entitling an intervenor-coalition to attorney fees against City of Blackfoot); Neighbors for Pres. of Big & Little Creek Cmty. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Payette Cnty., 159 Idaho 182, 191, 358 P.3d 67, 76 (2015) (denying attorney fees to an intervenor that was not adverse to the county, which made the decision being appealed). While section 12-117 has changed over the years, the operative language on adverse parties has not. The statute still requires an entity and state agency to be adverse parties for an award of attorney fees. I.C. § 12-117 (1).

Here, the Intervenors prevailed on the issues but they were not adverse to IDWR. Indeed, the Intervenors sought to enforce IDWR's final determinations against Sylte. In addition, Sylte presented a legitimate question for the Court to address on the interpretation of the Final Decree and the lawfulness of IDWR's actions concerning Sylte's water right. Therefore, none of the parties is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's decision to uphold IDWR's Final Order and decline to make an award of attorney fees. Costs to Intervenors and IDWR on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and MOELLER concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BEVAN, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    Brent AUSTIN, Claimant-Respondent, v. BIO TECH NUTRIENTS, Employer, and Employers Compensation Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Appellants.
    Docket No. 46081
    Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, May 2019 Term.
    Opinion Filed: June 17, 2019
    Gardner Law Office, Boise, attorneys for Appellants. Michael McPeek argued.
    Ruchti & Beck Law Offices, Pocatello, attorneys for Respondent. Joel A. Beck argued.
   BEVAN, Justice

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a worker's compensation case. The dispute is whether Brent Austin filed a timely complaint for additional benefits with the Idaho Industrial Commission when it was filed more than a year after his employer, Bio Tech Nutrients, and its surety, Employers Compensation Insurance Company, (collectively "Defendants") stopped paying worker's compensation benefits. The Commission held that the one-year statute of limitations to file a complaint was tolled because the Defendants did not send a Notice of Claim Status ("NOCS") when they submitted Austin's final payment; as such, the Commission concluded Austin's complaint was timely filed. We affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 20, 2008, Austin was injured in the course of his employment with Bio Tech Nutrients. Austin received medical treatment from November 21, 2008, through June 20, 2014. From June 9, 2012, through July 18, 2014, Austin received temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits. On June 20, 2014, Dr. Fellars performed an independent medical evaluation and determined Austin had reached maximum medical improvement.

On July 18, 2014, Defendants sent a NOCS to Austin that informed him his TTD benefits would stop immediately because of Dr. Fellars' determination Austin had reached maximum medical improvement. Even so, the NOCS explained that Dr. Fellars rated Austin's permanent partial impairment ("PPI") at 11% of the whole person, which correlated to $ 18,694.50. The Defendants were to make bi-weekly payments beginning August 1, 2014, until the award was paid in full. The NOCS also included the disclaimer that "[t]his impairment rating does not settle your claim. However, MMI [Maximum Medical Improvement] means no further treatment is recommended which is likely to improve your industrial condition." (Emphasis in original). A copy of Dr. Fellars' medical report was attached to the July 18, 2014, NOCS.

Despite what was said in the NOCS, Austin's PPI benefits began on July 19, 2014, and continued until June 22, 2015, when the Surety issued Austin a check for $ 2,379.30. The remittance advice attached to this check indicated a payment description of "Permanent Partial Scheduled/Impairment" and included a comment of "PPI Final Payment." The June 22, 2015, check cleared the Surety's bank on July 10, 2015. The Defendants did not send Austin, nor file with the Commission, any NOCS or other written form of notice about Austin's "final payment" of PPI benefits.

On July 20, 2016, Austin filed a worker's compensation complaint seeking medical benefits for chronic pain treatment, another surgery, and TTD benefits. In the complaint Austin also reserved the right to bring claims for additional PPI and permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement. On July 26, 2016, Defendants filed an answer and asserted that Austin's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations of Idaho Code section 72-706(3).

The proceedings were bifurcated and the parties submitted the sole issue of whether Austin's complaint was timely filed with the Commission. The crux of the issue was whether the Defendants had to provide a new NOCS with Austin's final payment. The Commission referred the matter to a Referee. Austin argued that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-604 because Defendants failed to file a NOCS as required by section 72-806. The Referee recommended that Austin's complaint was not timely. The Referee determined the Defendants did not have to send Austin a NOCS with his final payment for PPI benefits because his level of benefits did not change; the benefits simply went from being prospective to being realized. The Referee concluded that since no notice was required, the tolling provisions of Idaho Code section 72-604 did not apply, and Austin's complaint was untimely because it was filed more than a year after he received his last payment of income benefits.

The Commission declined to adopt the Referee's recommendation and entered its own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order in which it concluded that Austin's complaint was timely filed. The Commission held that Idaho Code section 72-806 required the Defendants to submit a NOCS with the last check for Austin's PPI payments, and that its failure to do so tolled the one-year statute of limitations based on the provisions of section 72-604. The Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Commission denied. The Defendants filed a permissive appeal to this Court.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the Commission erred when it held the Defendants were required to provide a NOCS when Austin's final PPI payment was issued.

2. Whether the Commission erred in determining that the Defendants' failure to issue a NOCS when Austin's payments were terminated constituted a "willful act" under Idaho Code section 72-604.

3. Whether the Defendants substantially complied with Idaho Code section 72-806 and if so, whether that substantial compliance excuses any technical violation of the statute.

4. Alternatively, whether Austin's complaint was timely because it was filed within one year of the date that the July 18, 2014, NOCS conveyed the last payment of income benefits would occur.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts on appeal are not disputed. "When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review over questions of law." Atkinson v. 2M Co., Inc., 164 Idaho 577, 580, 434 P.3d 181, 184 (2019) (quoting Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc. , 141 Idaho 450, 453, 111 P.3d 135, 138 (2005) ).

V. ANALYSIS

This case hinges on the interpretation and application of three statutes: Idaho Code sections 72-706, 72-604, and 72-806. Idaho Code section 72-706(3) provides: "the claimant shall have one (1) year from the last payment of income benefits within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing for additional income benefits." I.C. § 72-706(3). Section 72-604 tolls the time for a claimant to seek compensation "[w]hen the employer has knowledge of an occupational disease, injury, or death and willfully fails or refuses to file the report as required by ... section 72-806, Idaho Code." I.C. § 72-604. Section 72-806 pertains to the NOCS requirements and provides:

A workman shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition including, but not limited to, the denial, reduction or cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level of compensation benefits to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled. If any change in compensation benefits is based upon a medical report or medical reports from any physician or any other practitioner of the healing arts, a copy of such report shall be attached to the written notice which the workman shall receive. The industrial commission shall by rule and regulation, determine by whom the notice shall be given and the form for such notice. In the absence of a rule governing a particular situation, the employer's insurer, or in the case of self-insurers, the employer, shall be responsible for giving the notice required herein.

I. C. § 72-806. This notice must be provided in a format substantially similar to IC Form 8. IDAPA 17.02.08.061.

A. The Commission properly held that the Defendants were required to provide a NOCS when the final PPI payment was sent to Austin.

As noted, a claimant must generally file a claim for additional income benefits within one year from the last payment of income benefits. I.C. § 72-706(3). Austin did not file a complaint until July 20, 2016, more than a year after he received the last payment of PPI benefits on June 22, 2015. Even so, the Commission held that Austin's complaint was timely because Idaho Code section 72-806 required the Defendants to send a NOCS with the final payment, and that the failure to do so tolled the statute of limitation in section 72-706(3). See I.C. § 72-604 ("[w]hen the employer has knowledge of an occupational disease, injury, or death and willfully fails or refuses to file the report as required by ... section 72-806, Idaho Code, the limitations prescribed in ... section 72-706, Idaho Code, shall not run against the claim of any person seeking compensation until such report or notice shall have been filed.").

The Defendants acknowledge that the notice required by section 72-806 was never filed with the Commission. Still, the Defendants urge that notice under section 72-806 was not required because Austin's level of compensation did not change when he received his final PPI payment. Instead, Austin's level of compensation was for a fixed amount as identified in the July 18, 2014, NOCS. The final payment merely accelerated the payment stream originally identified in the July 18 NOCS. Defendants claim the July 18 NOCS notified Austin of both the initiation and cessation of the finite award. The Defendants allege the Commission erred when it failed to distinguish between a type of benefit that is fixed, such as PPI or PPD, and one not fixed, such as TTD.

Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of a statute. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2009). When interpreting the Worker's Compensation Act, this Court "liberally construe[s] its provisions in favor of the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated." Id.

Idaho Code section 72-806 provides:

A workman shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition including, but not limited to, the denial, reduction or cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level of compensation benefits to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled.

I.C. § 72-806. The worker's compensation "statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings." Wernecke, 147 Idaho at 282, 207 P.3d at 1013. Id. Yet the Court must also "give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." Id.

"Change" is defined as "the act or instance of making or becoming different." Change, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY , 285 (2001). "Cessation" is defined as "a ceasing; an end." Cessation, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY , 281 (2001). Black's Law Dictionary defines "affect" as "to produce an effect on; to influence in some way." Affect, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY , 65 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, section 72-806 can be read to require that a worker receive notice if his status becomes different due to the ending of monetary benefits, if that directly or indirectly influences the amount of benefits he is either currently or ultimately entitled to.

The Commission concluded that the statutory scheme did not appear to endorse the Defendants' argument that the different types of payments should be treated differently under section 72-806. Indeed, all that is required is "any change of status or condition, including ... cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level of compensation benefits to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled." I.C. § 72-806. The Commission found that Austin's level of benefits was affected because he had been receiving periodic payments of PPI benefits, and he received no further payments after the June 22, 2015, final payment. We agree. Austin's status changed when the Defendants sent his final payment of PPI benefits on June 22, 2015-no matter if Austin had previously been informed that the benefits would end-because the true ending date for his benefits changed. The importance of notice informing Austin of his amended status is highlighted by the fact that the Defendants ended Austin's payments before their scheduled date by issuing a final lump-sum payment accounting for seven weeks of benefits. This change "affect[ed] the level of compensation benefits to which [Austin] might presently or ultimately be entitled" because the change altered the one-year statute of limitations for Austin to pursue additional benefits, leading to the dispute before this Court today. I.C. § 72-706(3). As a result, we affirm the Commission's determination that the Defendants were required by Idaho Code section 72-806 to provide a NOCS within fifteen days of the final PPI payment.

B. The Commission properly held that Bio Tech's failure to issue a NOCS with the final payment constituted a "willful" violation under Idaho Code section 72-604.

Next, the Defendants argue that the Commission wrongly determined that the Defendants had "willfully" failed to provide a NOCS with the final payment because the Commission failed to consider whether there were lawful grounds to excuse the Surety's failure to file a NOCS. The defendants argued that their substantial compliance with section 72-806 was enough to legally excuse the Defendants' failure to file a formal NOCS.

This Court has not construed "willful" for purposes of the tolling provision of Idaho Code section 72-604 in the context of a failure to issue proper notice under Idaho Code section 72-806. That said, we have considered whether conduct was willful in other contexts involving worker's compensation law. In Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes , we considered whether the claimant willfully withheld a material fact to obtain unemployment insurance benefits. 99 Idaho 754, 589 P.2d 89 (1979). There we recognized that through the legislature's presumed knowledge of the Court's prior interpretations of willful, that the meaning is "intended to disqualify those claimants who purposefully, intentionally, consciously, or knowingly fail to report a material fact, not those whose omission is accidental because of negligence, misunderstanding or other cause." Id. at 761, 589 P.2d at 96. More recently, we explained that willfulness is "a willingness to commit the act, '[i]t does not require any intent to violate the law.' " Current v. Wada Farms P'ship, 162 Idaho 894, 899, 407 P.3d 208, 213 (2017) (quoting Bell v. Idaho Dep't of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 747, 339 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2014) ). As a result, "willfully" is synonymous with "intentionally," "designedly," or "without lawful excuse," and therefore not accidental. Bell, 157 Idaho at 747, 339 P.3d at 1151 (quoting Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d at 96 ). Stated another way, even one who "consciously or knowingly" commits an act has done so "willfully." See Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761, 589 P.2d at 96.

The Commission did not initially address the Defendants' argument that their conduct was not "willful"; however, in denying the Defendants' motion for reconsideration, the Commission noted:

[A] finding of willfulness is implicit in our finding that the plain language of the statute requires a NOCS upon the cessation of any class of benefits. Therefore, we specifically conclude that Defendants' failure was willful as anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-604.

The Commission's conclusion accords with how this Court has interpreted "willfully" in the context of worker's compensation law. Willfulness does not require an intent to commit wrongdoing, but simply a "willingness to commit the act." Current, 162 Idaho at 899, 407 P.3d at 213. The Defendants are not claiming that they "accidentally" failed to include a NOCS with the final payment; rather, the Defendants' argument is that they did not have to provide any notice at that time. Defendants were aware of the requirement to provide Austin a NOCS form based on having done so on July 18, 2014. The Defendants' failure to provide another notice when Austin's payments ceased earlier than originally specified was done willfully under the statute. Thus, we affirm the Commission's decision that the Defendants "willfully" chose to send the June 22, 2015, final payment without a NOCS. If a surety willfully fails to provide a required NOCS, the one-year limitation of Idaho Code section 72-706(3) is tolled until a notice is filed. I.C. § 72-604. We hold that Austin's complaint was timely filed.

C. The Defendants did not substantially comply with the NOCS requirements of Idaho Code section 72-806.

Defendants assert that they substantially complied with the NOCS requirements of Idaho Code section 72-806, and that substantial compliance is legally enough to excuse the Surety's failure to file an IC Form 8 NOCS when Austin received his final PPI payment under the tolling provision of Idaho Code section 72-604.

The Idaho Administrative Code provides insight for our analysis of this question. The following parameters for a valid notice under Idaho Code section 72-806 require:

01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of statute or condition, including, but not limited to, whenever there is an acceptance, commencement, denial, reduction, or cessation of medical or monetary compensation benefits to which the worker might presently or ultimately be entitled. ...
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given by: the surety if the employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer if the employer if self-insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance.
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given in a format substantially similar to IC Form 8, available from the Commission and posted on the Commission's website at www.iic.idaho.gov.
04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is based on a medical report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice.
05. Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, and the worker's attorney, if the worker is represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker. The party giving notice may supply the copy to the Industrial Commission in accordance with the Commission's rule on electronic submission of documents.

IDAPA 17.02.08.061.

For these reasons, a NOCS must be "given in a format substantially similar to IC Form 8, available from the Commission and posted on the Commission's website at www.iic.idaho.gov." IDAPA 17.02.08.061. IC Form 8 includes the following preliminary information: the name of the injured worker; his or her social security number; the worker's address, including city, state, and zip code; the date of the injury; the name of the employer; and the name of the insurance company. If the notice is informing the claimant that benefit payments will be stopped, it must also include the effective date and reason.

The Commission declined to rule on whether the Defendants substantially complied with the notice requirements of section 72-806 but noted "the check did contain most of the information provided in [IC] Form 8, but not in the same formatting." We disagree and do not find that the June 20, 2015 check substantially complied with the notice requirements of IC Form 8. First, the check did not explain that the reason for the "PPI Final Payment" was that the $ 18,694.50 amount was paid in full. Second, the check was dated June 22, 2015, but it reflected that the payment was "through July 3, 2015." It is unclear where the Defendants arrived at the July 3, 2015, date. The July 18, 2014, NOCS indicated that payments were to begin on August 1, 2014. If the Defendants had paid Austin 55 weeks of benefits for his 11% impairment rating those benefits would have ended on August 21, 2015. The Defendants began making payments two weeks early, on July 19, 2014, which means Austin's benefits should have terminated on August 8, 2015. Thus, even though the Defendants paid seven weeks of benefits with the final check, Austin's benefits should have been through August 8, 2015, not July 3, 2015. These inconsistencies make it unclear what effective date payments were considered to have stopped in order to allow Austin the ability to determine the correct statute of limitation. Finally, the Defendants were also required to provide a copy of the notice to the Commission and failed to do so. IDAPA 17.02.08.061.

Since the Defendants did not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 72-806 by their failure to provide all of the material information IC Form 8 requires when benefits are stopped (the effective date and the reason), we do not reach the issue of whether substantial compliance with the notice requirements under different facts could negate a finding that there was a "willful" violation for tolling Idaho Code section 72-604. The Defendants' actions here do not reach that threshold, even if substantial compliance could be a proper consideration in another case.

In addition, because we affirm the Commission's decision that Austin's complaint was timely, we do not reach Austin's alternative argument that the complaint was timely because it was filed within one year of the date that the July 18, 2014, NOCS indicated the last payment of income benefits would occur.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Commission's decision is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Austin.

Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and MOELLER concur.

      Idaho Code section 72-806 requires that a workman "receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition. ..." The Idaho Administrative Rules ensure that the worker receives such notice in a timely manner by mandating that "[a]ny notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed within ten (10) days. ..." IDAPA 17.02.08.061.03. See infra , p. 267.


text:
    STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John LEE, aka Kane W. Grzebielski, Defendant-Appellant.
    Docket Nos. 44330 44496 44753 44754
    Court of Appeals of Idaho.
    Filed: February 14, 2019 Petition for Review Denied July 9, 2019
    Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
    Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
    LORELLO, Judge In these consolidated appeals, John Lee, aka Kane W. Grzebielski, appeals from his judgment of conviction for three counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated battery (Docket No. 44330); the district court's order denying Lee's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (Docket No. 44330); four civil judgments for fines imposed pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307 (Docket No. 44496); an order denying Lee's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentences (Docket No. 44753); and an order denying Lee's motion to release evidence (Docket No. 44754) . Lee asserts that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) his concurrent fixed life sentences for three counts of first degree murder are excessive and that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences; and (3) the district court erred in entering judgments of $5000 for fines imposed pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. We affirm the order denying Lee's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and dismiss Lee's remaining appeals.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    John Lee shot and killed his mother, his landlord, and the manager of a fast food restaurant. Lee also shot and wounded another individual who was in the landlord's office when Lee killed his landlord. Following the murders and aggravated battery, Lee fled to a nearby state where he was apprehended after he crashed his vehicle during a police pursuit. Following Lee's arrest, law enforcement found over $11,000 in cash in Lee's vehicle.
    The State charged Lee with three counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated battery. Pursuant to a written I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, Lee entered Alford pleas to all charged counts. The plea agreement included the following provision regarding sentencing:
    That the State and [Lee] agree that the appropriate disposition of this matter is as follows: [Lee] will be sentenced to the Idaho Department of Correction on each count and that those sentences will run concurrently. Each party reserves the right to argue for what actual fixed and indeterminate periods of confinement they deem to be appropriate and the decision on such is left to the sound discretion of the Court.
    The plea agreement also included a waiver provision, which reads that Lee "understands that he has a right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court herein, and the right to seek a modification or reduction of sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and hereby freely and voluntarily waives such appeal and I.C.R. 35 rights." In light of the plea agreement, the State filed a notice pursuant to I.C. § 18-4004A indicating it did not intend to seek the death penalty.
    The district court accepted Lee's Alford pleas, imposed a fixed life sentence for each of the murder charges and fifteen years fixed for the aggravated battery charge, and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $5000 to the victims or victim representatives for each of the four charges and entered a separate judgment for each victim. Lee filed a notice of appeal from his judgment of conviction (Docket No. 44330) and a separate, single notice of appeal referencing the four civil judgments (Docket No. 44496). The State moved to dismiss the appeal in Docket No. 44330, asserting Lee waived his right to appeal the judgment as part of the plea agreement. Lee objected to the State's motion, asserting that his appeal waiver could only be enforced if the record showed the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Lee contended that, under that standard, the State's motion to dismiss the appeal was premature because it was filed prior to preparation of the clerk's record and transcripts. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal in Docket No. 44330.
    Lee subsequently filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for a reduction of his sentences and a motion to release evidence. The district court denied both motions. Lee then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the district court also denied. Lee appeals the denial of all three motions.

      Although Lee filed an appeal from the order denying his motion to release evidence, he does not identify any issues on appeal related to that order as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4), nor does the body of his brief identify any error in relation to that order. The failure of an appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of the issue from appeal. State v. Crowe , 131 Idaho 109, 111, 952 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1998). This rule may be relaxed, however, where the issue is argued in the briefing and citation to authority is provided. Id . A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko , 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Lee's appeal from the order denying his motion to release evidence is therefore dismissed.

      See North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

   II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman , 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera , 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas

Lee contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The State responds that the evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that Lee's guilty pleas were voluntary is substantial and that Lee's claim fails under the facts and the law. We hold that Lee has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that a plea may be withdrawn after sentencing only to correct manifest injustice. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will be granted only to correct manifest injustice. State v. Flowers , 150 Idaho 568, 571, 249 P.3d 367, 370 (2011) ; State v. Heredia , 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, then manifest injustice will be established as a matter of law. State v. Thomas , 154 Idaho 305, 307, 297 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2013). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to a jury trial, to confront accusers, and to refrain from self-incrimination; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer , 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976).

Lee filed his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas five months after judgment was entered. Thus, the manifest injustice standard applies. In his motion, Lee argued that he was "not in the right state of mind" when he accepted the plea agreement or at the time of sentencing. Lee elaborated that "noises" impacted his decision-making to the extent he did not feel he had "free will." In a supporting affidavit, Lee also asserted that he told a member of his defense team that he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas, that guards and other people were "pressuring" and "torturing" him to confess or accept a plea deal, and that he believed his attorneys should have withdrawn his pleas and had him medicated so he could make "rational decisions." The State filed an objection to Lee's motion to which Lee filed a response.

The district court appointed new counsel to represent Lee on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the hearing, numerous witnesses testified, including four psychologists, the two defense attorneys who represented Lee through sentencing, one law enforcement officer, two jailers from the county jail where Lee was incarcerated prior to sentencing, and the presentence investigator. One of the psychologists who testified was retained by Lee to conduct a retrospective competency evaluation to determine whether Lee's guilty pleas were voluntary. That psychologist testified that Lee's guilty pleas were not voluntary due to Lee's psychiatric condition. According to Lee's psychological expert, Lee's guilty pleas were involuntary due to his belief that he was being "persecuted and tormented by his jailers" to plead guilty or commit suicide and due to Lee's hypersensitivity to sounds and his auditory hallucinations. The remaining witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing were called by the State in support of its position that Lee was competent to plead guilty and that his guilty pleas were entered voluntarily.

The district court issued a written decision denying Lee's motion, concluding Lee failed to show manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court identified the following reasons in support of its conclusion: (1) the evidence of Lee's guilt was "overwhelming"; (2) the plea agreement was "extremely favorable" to Lee and he received the benefit of his bargain under the agreement; and (3) the expert opinion testimony Lee offered at the evidentiary hearing was unpersuasive and contradicted by the other experts, Lee's defense team, and the court's own observations of and interactions with Lee.

On appeal, Lee argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the district court failed to exercise reason in determining Lee's guilty pleas were voluntary. Lee acknowledges that the "record is clear" that the district court inquired into whether Lee's guilty pleas were free and voluntary and that the district court was accurate in finding that Lee is intelligent, astute, and had an above average understanding of the proceedings. Lee, however, contends that his intelligence and his level of understanding are of "very little, if any, importance" to whether his pleas were voluntary. According to Lee, his guilty pleas were not voluntary because they were entered while he was an untreated schizophrenic with Asperger's Syndrome who "pled guilty to get out of the Latah County jail where he believed he was removed of his free will." Lee argues that this Court "must look at this case standing in the shoes of an irrational man who truly, but falsely, believed that his jailers were actively tormenting him, goading him to commit suicide." Lee cites no authority to support the proposition that the applicable legal standard requires a trial court to consider Lee's claim from his "shoes" or that his own false beliefs constitute coercion. A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly induced by ignorance, fear, or fraud. State v. Hanslovan , 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008). We are not persuaded that the false beliefs Lee identified subsequent to his guilty pleas constitute the type of coercion that rendered his guilty pleas involuntary, notwithstanding the district court's compliance with I.C.R. 11 and the evidence supporting the district court's express findings regarding voluntariness. Moreover, Lee's argument ignores the district court's conclusion that the expert testimony Lee proffered at the evidentiary hearing was not persuasive. It is well settled that credibility determinations are within the province of the district court. This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flowers , 131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645, 647 (Ct. App. 1998).

As Lee concedes, his guilty pleas were taken in compliance with the due process standards set forth in I.C.R. 11(c)(2). The district court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Lee prior to accepting his guilty pleas. As part of that colloquy, the district court asked Lee if anyone had intimidated or threatened Lee or anyone close to him in order to get him to plead guilty. Lee responded, "No, Your Honor." The district court also asked Lee whether he understood the meaning of the words "freely" and "voluntarily" and whether he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. Lee answered "Yes, Your Honor" to each of these questions. Lee's post-sentencing claim that his guilty pleas were coerced and not freely and voluntarily entered is contradicted by the record made at the time those pleas were entered. See State v. Lavy , 121 Idaho 842, 844-45, 828 P.2d 871, 873-74 (1992) (holding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to withdraw a guilty plea where, in order to believe the defendant's assertions on appeal, the trial court would have to ignore the record and the defendant's own statements regarding the plea agreement). Furthermore, the district court found that none of the evidence presented at the hearing on Lee's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas demonstrated otherwise. We therefore reject Lee's argument that the district court failed to exercise reason in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

B. Sentence Reviews and Order Denying I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentences

Lee also challenges his concurrent fixed life sentences, claiming that the sentences are excessive and that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion. The State responds that, because Lee waived his right to appeal his sentences as part of his plea agreement (including the right to seek Rule 35 relief), Lee's appeal related to his sentences should be dismissed. Lee acknowledges his appellate waiver, but claims the waiver was involuntary for the same reasons he claims his guilty pleas were involuntary. We agree with the State.

A defendant may waive his right to appeal as part of a plea agreement. State v. Murphy , 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). A waiver of a right to appeal contained in a plea agreement will be upheld if the record shows the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. Lee's plea agreement included the provision that Lee "understands that he has a right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court herein, and the right to seek a modification or reduction of sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and hereby freely and voluntarily waives such appeal and I.C.R. 35 rights." Because Lee's challenge to the validity of his appellate waiver relies on the merits of his challenge to his guilty pleas, which we have rejected, his claim that his appeal waiver was invalid must also fail. Lee's appeal of his sentences is therefore dismissed.

C. Civil Judgments for Fines Imposed Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307

Lee contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a $5000 fine for two of the murder counts and the aggravated battery count to which Lee pled guilty. Specifically, Lee argues that: (1) the fine for the murder alleged in Count III was improper because "the mental/emotional damage to the victim representative was mitigated by other factors"; (2) the fine for the murder alleged in Count IV was improper because the victim's daughter had a "strained relationship" with the victim; and (3) the fine for the aggravated battery was improper because the victim had insurance coverage and "will likely make a full recovery and be able to support himself." The State responds that Lee's challenges to the fines are encompassed within his appellate waiver and, as such, Lee's appeal from the civil judgments should be dismissed. We dismiss Lee's appeal from the civil judgments entered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307.

As an initial matter, we note that, unlike with his sentencing claims, Lee does not acknowledge his appellate waiver in relation to his challenge to the civil judgments. Nor did Lee file a reply to address the State's argument that the fines reflected in the civil judgments were encompassed within his appellate waiver. Although it is not entirely clear whether the fines were contemplated as part of the appellate waiver, we need not resolve that question in this case because we dismiss the related appeal for different reasons.

The fines imposed by the district court are authorized by I.C. § 19-5307 and may be imposed at the district court's discretion. On appeal, Lee does not recite the abuse of discretion standard (or any standard of review) in relation to the district court's imposition of the challenged fines. Failure to address this multi-tiered inquiry renders Lee's challenge to those fines fatally deficient. See State v. Kralovec , 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2017). Lee's challenge is also fatally deficient because he has failed to cite any authority to support his assertions that the fines were improper. See Zichko , 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. Therefore, Lee's appeal from the civil judgments is dismissed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Lee has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Therefore, the district court's order denying Lee's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is affirmed. Because Lee waived his right to appeal his sentences or request Rule 35 relief, his appeals challenging his sentences as excessive and challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion are dismissed. Lee's challenge to the civil judgments entered for fines imposed pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307 is also dismissed because Lee has failed to identify how the district court abused its discretion in imposing the fines and has failed to cite any authority to support his challenge to those fines. Lee's appeal from the denial of his motion to release evidence is also dismissed as Lee failed to list this as an issue in his briefing and did not cite any argument or authority.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY concur.

      The district court also concluded it would be an injustice to allow Lee to withdraw his guilty pleas.

      Lee does not challenge the concurrent fifteen-year sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to aggravated battery.

      Dismissal of the appeal in Docket No. 44496 includes the order imposing a $5000 fine for the murder charge alleged in Count I because Lee also failed to present any argument or authority challenging the fine ordered for Count I.