text:
    Steven TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Robert J. KILROY, Respondent.
    No. 75131
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 15, 2019
    Schuetze & McGaha, P.C.
    Atkin Winner & Sherrod
    Robert Winner, Ltd.
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
   This is an appeal from a district court amended judgment awarding attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.

In June 2008, appellant Steven Taylor pulled over his semi-trailer in the emergency lane on the US-95 to investigate whether his cargo load was securely fastened. After a pickup truck unexpectedly cut into respondent Robert Kilroy's lane, Kilroy crashed into the back of Taylor's trailer and was severely injured. Taylor sued Kilroy for negligence in January 2009, followed by Kilroy's countersuit for the same in May 2010. Following a trial in 2013, a jury returned a verdict for Kilroy, but finding each party 50% liable. Both parties moved for a new trial based on the jury's failure to follow instructions on damages, and the district court ordered a new trial limited to damages. After Taylor's unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeals challenging the district court's order directing a new trial as to damages only, Taylor v. Kilroy , Docket No. 64293 (Order of Affirmance, Sept. 30, 2015), the parties stipulated to binding arbitration on damages. The arbitration panel awarded Kilroy $3,379,146.88, finding Kilroy sustained $6,758,293.76 in damages, then deducting that amount based on the comparative 50/50 fault found by the jury. Judgment was entered on the arbitration award, and Kilroy moved for an amended judgment as well as attorney fees, costs, and interest. In an amended judgment, the district court awarded Kilroy $505,413 in attorney fees, $117,465.76 in costs, and $1,429,938.41 in interest on past damages. Taylor appeals.

Standing to appeal

Kilroy moved to dismiss this appeal, contending Taylor lacks standing because the district court found Taylor's insurance carrier, Maxum Specialty Insurance Group, responsible for the amended judgment and for attorney fees, costs, and the interest on past damages.

Pursuant to NRAP 3A, "[a] party has the right to appeal when the party is aggrieved by a final, appealable judgment or order." Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp ., 129 Nev. 300, 303, 300 P.3d 724, 726 (2013). "[T]his court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only where the appeal is brought by an aggrieved party." Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg , 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994) (emphasis omitted). "[A] party is aggrieved when a judgment causes a 'substantial grievance,' such as the denial of some personal or property right." Jacinto , 129 Nev. at 303, 300 P.3d at 726. A grievance is substantial when "the district court's decision imposes an injustice, or illegal obligation or burden, on the party, or denies the party an equitable or legal right." Matter of T.L ., 133 Nev. 790, 792, 406 P.3d 494, 496 (2017).

Below, Maxum moved to interplead funds, naming itself in the case caption as plaintiff-interpleader and requesting, in part, an order allowing its policy limits of $1 million to be interplead and deposited with the district court. Taylor joined Kilroy in opposing Maxum's motion. Maxum contended it did not put the issue of Taylor's insurance contract before the court by seeking to interplead the $1 million to satisfy part of the arbitration judgment entered against Taylor. The district court disagreed with Maxum, holding attorney fees, costs, and interest on the entire judgment recoverable under the supplemental payments portion of Taylor's insurance contract with Maxum.

The district court's amended judgment does not hold Taylor personally responsible for the judgment owed to Kilroy; however, that order references previous rulings that do hold Taylor responsible, and it does not specifically relieve Taylor of any obligation to pay Kilroy should Maxum fail to do so. As a result of this ambiguity and because the amended judgment does not specifically prohibit Kilroy from enforcing the judgment against Taylor, Kilroy's motion to dismiss is denied. Taylor has standing to appeal the district court's amended judgment because that order does not absolve Taylor of liability.

Inadmissible references to settlement

Taylor argues Kilroy's repeated references to inadmissible evidence in violation of NRAP 16(h) and NMR 11(A) compel setting aside the district court amended judgment granting fees and prejudgment interest to Kilroy. Findings of fact are given deference and will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision , 129 Nev. 99, 105, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (2013).

In Kilroy's motion for attorney fees and subsequent amendments to that motion, Kilroy noted Maxum did not offer him anything at the mandatory settlement conference that took place when the underlying action was first on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Taylor objected to these references as violating NRAP 16(h) and NMR 11(A)'s rules on confidentiality of settlement negotiations. The district court explicitly stated it would not consider anything that occurred during the mandatory settlement conferences. The district court additionally rejected Taylor's contention that the references to the conferences tainted the record beyond repair. We do not consider the parties' arguments as to whether Kilroy violated rules of confidentiality or whether these references to the settlement conferences prejudiced Taylor because the district court did not consider the references. Setting aside Kilroy's award of attorney fees and prejudgment interest is not warranted, based upon the district court's explicit rejection of inadmissible references.

Attorney fees, costs, and interest pursuant to NRCP 68

Finally, Taylor argues the district court abused its discretion in awarding Kilroy attorney fees, costs, and interest under NRCP 68, challenging the district court's ruling as to the second and third factors under Beattie v. Thomas , 99 Nev. 579, 668 P.2d 268 (1983). Under Beattie, a district court must consider the following when evaluating a request for attorney fees pursuant to NRCP 68 : (1) whether the claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the offeror's good faith offer of judgment was reasonable in amount and in timing; (3) whether the offeree's rejection of this offer was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror were justified and reasonable. Id. at 588-89, 668 P.2d at 274.

We review an award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc ., 130 Nev. 67, 80, 319 P.3d 606, 615 (2014). Fees awarded under NRCP 68 are discretionary so long as the Beattie factors are properly weighed. Bidart v. American Title Ins. Co. , 103 Nev. 175, 179, 734 P.2d 732, 735 (1987). NRCP 68 awards will be overturned on appeal only if the district court was arbitrary or capricious in its evaluation of the Beattie factors. Schouweiler v. Yancey Co ., 101 Nev. 827, 833, 712 P.2d 786, 790 (1985).

In November 2010, Kilroy made a formal offer of judgment of Taylor's policy limit of $1 million; Taylor rejected it. Kilroy's motion for attorney fees, costs, and interest was premised upon this rejection following the jury verdict and arbitration award in his favor. The district court explicitly considered all four Beattie factors, finding: (1) Kilroy filed his counterclaim against Taylor in good faith; (2) Kilroy's offer of judgment was reasonable in amount and in timing; (3) Taylor's rejection of Kilroy's offer of judgment was grossly unreasonable; and (4) the attorney fees requested by Kilroy's attorneys were reasonable based on consideration of the factors under Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank , 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969). As to Taylor's challenges to the district court's findings, the district court specifically noted it considered both the reasonableness of Kilroy's offer and whether Taylor's rejection of that offer was grossly unreasonable based on the information known to the parties at the time the offer was made. Taylor has not demonstrated that the district court's consideration of these issues was arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion, as the district court properly weighed the Beattie factors. See Bidart , 103 Nev. at 179, 734 P.2d at 735.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

      Taylor's request for affirmative relief should this court find merit to Kilroy's standing argument is denied, as Taylor's request was conditioned on this court's conclusion he lacked standing.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ronel Denair PANKEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 79041
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 15, 2019
    Ronel Denair Pankey
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Washoe County District Attorney
    ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
    This is a pro se appeal from an order dismissing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, Judge.
    This court's preliminary review of this appeal reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, the district court served notice of entry of the order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 1, 2018. Appellant did not file the notice of appeal, however, until June 17, 2019, well after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period prescribed by NRAP 4(b). "[A]n untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court." Lozada v. State , 110 Nev. 349, 352, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994). Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we
    ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.


text:
    Creighton J NADY, Appellant, v. Michael MURRAY; and Michael Reno, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Respondents.
    No. 77050
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 12, 2019
   Rodriguez Law Offices, P.C.

Premier Legal Group

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC/Las Vegas

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court summary judgment and various post-judgment orders. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge.

When initial review of the docketing statements and the documents before this court revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, this court ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, it appeared that the district court's summary judgment order severed respondents' claims against appellant and stayed those claims. Thus, the district court's severance created two separate actions, and although the challenged order may have been final as to respondents' claims against A Cab, LLC, respondents' claims against appellant appeared to remain pending below such that no final judgment had been entered against appellant. See Valdez v. Cox Commc'ns Las Vegas, Inc., 130 Nev. 905, 336 P.3d 969 (2014) (explaining that severance creates two separate actions for the purposes of appeal); Lee v. GNLV Corp ., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (defining a final judgment). Additionally, if no final judgment had been entered against appellant, it did not appear that the post-judgment orders would be appealable as special orders after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8).

In response to the order to show cause, appellant concedes "as the record now stands," that there is no judgment against appellant and the appeal should be dismissed. As it appears that no final judgment has been entered against appellant, and no other statute or court rule appears to allow an appeal from the order challenged in this appeal, see Brown v. MHC Stagecoach , 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) ("We may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule."), this court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, and

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.

      A Cab's appeal was previously dismissed pursuant to operation of the automatic bankruptcy stay. A Cab , LLC v. Murray , Docket No. 77050 (Order, May 7, 2019).

      Appellant contests whether the district court's severance was proper.

      This court declines appellant's request to dismiss this appeal based on appellant's contention that the district court's severance was ineffective.


text:
    VENETIAN CASINO RESORT, LLC, d/b/a Palazzo Casino Resort, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge, Respondents, and John Anderson, an Individual, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 77087
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 12, 2019
    Messner Reeves LLP
    Roberts Stoffel Family Law Group
    Hofland & Tomsheck
    ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
    This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenges a district court order denying a motion to dismiss or for partial summary judgment in a tort action.
    Having reviewed the petition, answer thereto, reply, and supporting documents, we conclude that our extraordinary and discretionary intervention is not warranted. See NRS 34.160 ; NRS 34.170 ; Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841, 844 (2004) (stating that an appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy precluding writ relief and recognizing that petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that writ relief is warranted); Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 113 Nev. 1343, 1344-45, 950 P.2d 280, 281 (1997) (observing that this court generally will not consider writ petitions challenging orders denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment); Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d. 849, 851 (1991) (observing that issuance of the writ is subject to this court's discretion). To the extent that petitioner argues that this petition presents an opportunity to clarify whether punitive damages may be awarded for tort claims sounding in negligence, that issue will be better presented for this court's consideration after development of the factual record in the district court. Insofar as petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition, petitioner provides no cogent argument regarding that relief, and we need not consider it. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Accordingly, we
    ORDER the petition DENIED.


text:
    IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF K. Alexandra MONACO, Esq., Bar No. 9253
    No. 78882
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 15, 2019
    K. Alexandra Monaco
    Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada
    Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada
    ORDER REJECTING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT
    This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that this court approve, pursuant to SCR 113, a conditional guilty plea in exchange for a stated form of discipline for attorney Alexandra Monaco. Under the agreement, Monaco admitted to violating RPC 1.1 (competence), RPC 1.3 (diligence), RPC 1.4 (communication), RPC 1.5 (fees), RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), RPC 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), RPC 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants), and RPC 8.1 (bar admission and disciplinary matters). She agreed to a six-month-and-one-day suspension, stayed for one year, subject to certain conditions.
    Monaco admitted to the facts and violations as part of her guilty plea agreement. Thus, the record establishes that Monaco violated the above-listed rules by falsely informing clients that she had filed their immigration paperwork, failing to communicate with clients, charging excessive fees, failing to hold client money in trust, refusing to return files or unearned fees after terminating representation, improperly supervising a nonlawyer assistant, and failing to respond to the bar's request for information when investigating clients' grievances against Monaco. The issue for this court is whether the agreed-upon discipline is sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession. See State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne , 104 Nev. 115, 213, 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988) (explaining the purpose of attorney discipline). In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." In re Discipline of Lerner , 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).
    Monaco admitted to engaging in a pattern of neglect and causing injury or potential injury to a client. Monaco's clients, who are immigrants and therefore vulnerable clients, could have been harmed when Monaco did not timely file their immigration paperwork and did not inform them of her failure to do so. There was also serious harm caused by the excessive and/or unearned fees that Monaco charged her clients especially considering that it does not appear Monaco ever returned those fees. The baseline sanction before considering aggravating or mitigating factors is suspension. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards , Standard 4.42(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2018) (providing that suspension is appropriate when "a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client"). The record supports the panel's finding of three aggravating factors (pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law) and five mitigating factors (absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems, timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct, character or reputation, and physical disability).
    Considering all four factors, we conclude that the agreed-upon discipline is insufficient to serve the purpose of attorney discipline. As stated above, Monaco's actions caused serious injury, with the potential for additional and/or unknown serious injury, to a vulnerable client population. Aside from directing Monaco to refund $899.99 to one set of clients and requiring the return of excessive filing fees, the conditional guilty plea agreement does not provide for any manner of restitution of the unearned fees that these clients would likely avail themselves of. While the State Bar often requires an attorney to agree to binding fee dispute arbitration when the disciplinary matter includes fee issues, that the clients in this matter are immigrants should have been taken into account by the State Bar when crafting the conditional guilty plea agreement. We consider it unlikely that many, if any, of Monaco's clients included in the conditional guilty plea agreement would seek fee dispute arbitration. Thus, the conditions imposed on Monaco's suspension do not adequately protect the public. See Claiborne , 104 Nev. at 213, 756 P.2d at 527-28. Accordingly, we reject the conditional guilty plea. Any future conditional guilty plea agreement should require Monaco to return any unearned fees to her clients and, if those clients cannot be located, she can pay those fees to the State Bar's Clients' Security Fund.
    It is so ORDERED.

      At the hearing on the conditional guilty plea agreement, counsel for the State Bar told the hearing panel the bar "d[id] not have any facts to support any actual injury in these cases, but the potential was certainly there for serious injury." The facts included in the conditional guilty plea agreement suggest, however, that Monaco retained unearned fees.

      We are cognizant of Monaco's health and other personal issues, but one of the main purposes of attorney discipline is to protect the public. See Claiborne , 104 Nev. at 213, 756 P.2d at 527-28.


text:
    Bradley R. SCHILLER, Appellant, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California Corporation, Respondent.
    Bradley R. Schiller, Appellant, v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, a California Corporation, Respondent.
    No. 72906 No. 74853
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED JULY 15, 2019
    Richard L. Elmore, Chtd.
    Fidelity National Law Group/Las Vegas
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
   Consolidated appeals from district court orders dismissing a complaint and denying NRCP 60(b) relief in a contract action. Ninth Judicial District Court, Douglas County; Thomas W. Gregory and Nathan Tod Young, Judges.

Appellant Bradley Schiller argues that the district court erred in (1) granting respondent Fidelity National Title Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and (2) denying Schiller's NRCP 60(b) motion for relief from the final judgment. We affirm.

The district court did not err by dismissing Schiller's complaint

Schiller purchased what had been represented as, and what he thought was, a lakefront home on Lake Tahoe. He later discovered that the property was not lakefront. In Milligan-Tahoe, LLC v. Douglas County , Docket No. 46015 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding, Nov. 21, 2007), as corrected (Feb. 25, 2008), a case to which Schiller was not a party, we determined that, based on a dedication in the subdivision plat, Douglas County owned a strip of land separating Schiller's property (among others') from the shoreline. After respondent Fidelity National Title Insurance Company denied Schiller's claim for his property's reduced value, Schiller sued Fidelity, alleging breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims based on his contention that his title insurance policy covered lakefront property. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Schiller's insurance policy did not cover the alleged loss.

"This court reviews a district court's decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) rigorously, with all alleged facts in the complaint presumed true and all inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff." Fitzgerald v. Mobile Billboards , LLC, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 416 P.3d 209, 210 (2018). A complaint should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [him] to relief." Id. at 210-11 (alterations in original) (quoting Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008) ). "The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a legal question, which we review de novo." Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Coregis Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 548, 553, 256 P.3d 958, 961 (2011).

Schiller's policy described the insured interest by reference to the subdivision plat:

PARCEL 1
Lots 2 and 3, in Block A, as set forth on map of LINCOLN PARK, filed for record in the office of the County Recorder of Douglas County, State of Nevada, on September 7, 1921, as Document No. 305, Douglas County Nevada Records.
"Excepting any portion of the above described property lying below the 6229.00 foot level of Lake Tahoe and also excepting any artificial accretions to said land waterward of said land or natural ordinary high water or, if lake level has been artificially lowered. Excepting any portion below such elevation as may be established as the boundary by boundary line agreement with the State or by quiet title action in which the State is a party."

The subdivision plat was therefore part of the policy no less so than its text. See Round Mountain Mining Co. v. Round Mountain Sphinx Mining Co., 36 Nev. 543, 558, 138 P. 71, 76 (1914) (holding that reference to a plat map in the description of a grant of land fully incorporates the plat into the grant); 1 Joyce Palomar, Recorded plats , Patton and Palomar on Land Titles § 119 (3d ed. 2018) ("Where a plat is incorporated by reference in a deed, the plat and the words and marks on it are as much a part of the grant or deed and as controlling as if those descriptive features were written on the face of the deed.") (emphasis added).

Schiller's complaint alleges that the plat shows the property (lots 2 and 3) extending to the lakeshore. He argues alternatively on appeal that the plat does not indicate at all where the actual waterline was when Schiller purchased his property. However, the meaning and effect of an unambiguous plat are questions of law, not triable issues of fact. See City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza , 129 Nev. 1, 7, 293 P.3d 860, 863-64 (2013) ("The interpretation of an instrument allegedly creating an easement is a question of law that we review de novo."); accord, e.g., Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 268 P.3d 1159, 1163 (Idaho 2012) ("[W]hen deciding whether a dedication occurred, plats are to be interpreted like deeds.").

The subdivision plat distinctly depicts a strip of land, designated 18 feet wide, separating lots 2 and 3 (Schiller's land) from the meander line (Lake Tahoe). See Michelsen v. Harvey , 107 Nev. 859, 861, 822 P.2d 660, 661 (1991) ("[A] meander line is a series of short, straight lines used to approximate the water's curved edge ...."). The location of the meander line relative to Schiller's land is significant: "It has frequently been held, both by the federal and state courts, that such meander lines are intended for the purpose of bounding and abutting the lands granted upon the waters whose margins are thus meandered, and that the waters themselves constitute the real boundary." Hardin v. Jordan , 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891) ; see, e.g ., Michelsen , 107 Nev. at 862-63, 822 P.2d at 662-63 (holding that reference to a meander line in a deed's property description indicates that the grantor intended to convey land abutting the actual watercourse). Because the plat indicates that Schiller's land is not bounded by the meander line, but rather by a line 18 feet landward of the meander line, Schiller's insured interest is not waterfront. See, e.g., Christensen v. Mikell, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694 (S.C. 1996) (title insurance company did not breach contract where the policy did not refer to the parcel at issue).

Schiller points to the additional language in the property description, "[e]xcepting any portion of [lots 2 and 3] lying below the 6229.00 foot level of Lake Tahoe," and argues that the policy therefore covers all land above that elevation, or is at least ambiguous. This contention is incorrect. The reference to "the above-described property" limits the scope of coverage with respect to lots 2 and 3 ; it does not expand coverage beyond the boundaries of lots 2 and 3. To the extent Schiller suggests that the actual water line could have bounded lots 2 and 3 when Schiller purchased the policy, we conclude that there is no triable issue of fact here.

Schiller cannot rely on the actual water boundary because it "can be made a matter of record only by recording the plat or field note of ...a survey." 1 Joyce Palomar, Grants pursuant to United States survey -Meander lines as boundaries , 1 Patton & Palomar on Land Titles § 117 (3d ed.). "The choice of whether or not to obtain a survey," however, "belongs to the insured"-not the insurer. See 1 Joyce Palomar, Title Ins. L. § 7:8 (West 2018 ed.) ("Title insurers have no duty to obtain a survey in connection with the issuance of a title insurance policy."). Schiller did not elect to commission or record any survey before purchasing the property. The 1921 plat therefore controls the policy's definition of insured interest. See Kepler-Fleenor , 268 P.3d at 1163 ("If a plat [is] unambiguous[ ] ..., the plain language of the instrument controls [,]" and "extrinsic evidence ... [is] inadmissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the instrument's terms."). Because neither the plat nor textual description identifies Schiller's insured interest as having a water boundary, Schiller's insured interest was not waterfront; any possible unrecorded facts to the contrary would be of no avail, for the policy's description is unambiguous.

Schiller argues that this conclusion improperly superimposes onto Schiller's insurance contract the outcome of Milligan-Tahoe, which this court decided after Schiller bought the policy. The subdivision plat, however, was recorded in 1921, irrevocably dedicating the challenged strip of land to the public. Shearer v. City of Reno, 36 Nev. 443, 447, 136 P. 705, 707 (1913) ; see also Carson City v. Capital City Entm't, Inc., 118 Nev. 415, 421, 49 P.3d 632, 635 (2002) ("A dedication is a gift of land by the owner for an appropriate public use, such as a street."). Once recorded, the dedication vested fee to the designated land, subject to a public easement, in Douglas County. Milligan-Tahoe, LLC v. Douglas Cty., Docket No. 46015 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding, Nov. 21, 2007), as corrected (Feb. 25, 2008) (holding that the beach road was statutorily dedicated); see Capital City Entm't , 118 Nev. at 421, 49 P.3d at 635 ("A statutory dedication operates by way of grant, vesting in the municipality the fee for public use."); see also NRS 278.390 ("Title to property dedicated or accepted for streets and easements passes when the final map is recorded."). Milligan-Tahoe merely echoed what took lawful effect in 1921, when the plat was recorded.

We reject Schillers other arguments. Schiller's reliance on policy exceptions to create an ambiguity as to the policy's coverage is unconvincing and unreasonable. We also reject any argument that the challenged strip of land constituted an easement-the record does not support such an interpretation. It is also of no avail that Fidelity provided a different map than the 1921 plat with Schiller's policy. The policy's reference to and incorporation of the plat is plain, and the plat is a publicly-available record. Finally, a title insurance policy does not insure against losses due to a seller's misrepresentations or a buyer's failed expectations. See Barlow Burke, Title Insurance Defined, L. Title Ins. § 2.01 (3d ed.) ("For instance, a covenant in an insured's deed may be covered, but representations by a vendor to an insured during the course of a purchase about the covenant are not."). It was Schiller's duty to confirm that the advertised land was waterfront. See Land Baron Inv., Inc. v. Bonnie Springs Family LP , 131 Nev. 686, 693-97, 356 P.3d 511, 517-19 (2015) (holding that a commercial buyer of real property assumed the risk of mistake as to whether the purchased land was accessible and included water rights).

Schiller's title insurance policy was unambiguous as to what the policy insured. As plainly stated in the description of the insured interest, Schiller's policy covered no more than title to lots 2 and 3 as they were represented on the 1921 plat. And as plainly represented on the controlling 1921 plat, lots 2 and 3 did not have a water boundary. Schiller's insured interest was therefore not waterfront. The district court therefore properly dismissed Schiller's complaint, and we affirm that order. See Fitzgerald , 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 416 P.3d at 210-11 ; Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins . Co., 127 Nev. 156, 162, 252 P.3d 668, 672 (2011) ("If a provision in an insurance contract is unambiguous, a court will interpret and enforce it according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms.").

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Schiller's NRCP 60(b) motion for relief from the final judgment

Schiller argues that he is entitled to NRCP 60(b) relief due to undisclosed bias of the presiding judge. Specifically, Schiller alleges that the judge failed to disclose his marriage to a Douglas County representative who Schiller claims publicly accosted him at a community meeting in the aftermath of Milligan-Tahoe. The district court denied the motion as untimely and on its merits, and Schiller appealed. Without addressing the merits of Schiller's consolidated appeals, this court vacated the district court's order denying Rule 60(b) relief so a different district court judge could decide the motion in the first instance. On limited remand, the district court again denied the motion. The district court reasoned that Schiller had constructive notice of the presiding judge's marriage from the outset of the case, and that Schiller's motion was therefore untimely, regardless of its posture. The district court also concluded that there were insufficient objective indicia of bias to conclude that the district court was actually biased against Schiller.

As written at the time relevant to this proceeding, NRCP 60(b) allowed a court to relieve a party from a final judgment when the movant shows such relief is warranted due to "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; [or] (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." NRCP 60(b). Subsection c provides that "[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time-and for reasons (1) [and] (2), ... no more than 6 months after the date of the proceeding or the date of service of written notice of entry of the judgment or order, whichever date is later." NRCP 60(c)(1). "Generally, we review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) for an abuse of discretion." Ford v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co ., 131 Nev. 526, 528, 353 P.3d 1200, 1202 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[T]he Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) sets forth not only ethical requirements for judges, but can also provide a substantive basis for judicial disqualification." Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 121 Nev. 251, 257, 112 P.3d 1063, 1067 (2005). "[I]f new grounds for a judge's disqualification are discovered after the time limits in NRS 1.235(1) have passed, then a party may file a motion to disqualify based on [the NCJC] as soon as possible after becoming aware of the new information." Id. at 260, 112 P.3d at 1069 (emphasis added); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that FRCP 60(b) allows parties to seek a judge's disqualification after entry of an order or judgment); Draggin'Y Cattle Co. v. Addink, 371 P.3d 970, 975 (Mont. 2016) ("[A] party may and ordinarily should raise disqualification issues discovered after an order or final judgment as a motion for relief from judgment in accordance with [Montana's equivalent of NRCP 60(b) ].").

The record establishes that Schiller had constructive notice of the presiding judge's marriage from the outset of the case-the Douglas County representative and the judge had the same last name, and their marriage was a matter of public record. Because Schiller had the information he claims warrants disqualification since the beginning of the case, and because he did not seek disqualification until after the court entered a final judgment in the matter, Schiller did not move to disqualify the presiding judge "within a reasonable time," as is required by NRCP 60(b), or "as soon as possible," as is required by Towbin Dodge , 121 Nev. at 260, 112 P.3d at 1069. Cf. Snyder v. Viani, 112 Nev. 568, 572, 916 P.2d 170, 172 (1996), as amended (May 9, 1996) ("This court has established that if a party or his/her attorney has constructive notice of a judge's interest or relationship before a case is decided and does not object," a bias challenge on that basis is waived.); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins . Co., 105 Nev. 237, 259, 774 P.2d 1003, 1019 (1989) ("We have previously held that time limitations on a challenge to a district judge's impartiality are not extended for litigants who knew or should have known the necessary facts at an earlier date."), abrogated on other grounds by Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 114 Nev. 690, 705, 962 P.2d 596, 606 (1998).

We also note that disqualification is not warranted in this case given its procedural posture. An order dismissing a complaint "is subject to a rigorous standard of review on appeal," Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 227, 181 P.3d at 672 (quoting Seput v. Lacayo, 122 Nev. 499, 501, 134 P.3d 733, 734 (2006) ), and "the need for disqualification decreases by the extent to which the judge's rulings in the case are limited to purely legal matters," United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 10 (Ct. App. 1985). The presiding judge had no opportunity to act as factfinder, or rule on evidentiary or other discretionary matters and its substantive rulings and conclusions were all subject to this court's independent review. This obviated any threat or doubt that the case would be decided by bias rather than merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schiller's NRCP 60(b) motion. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

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