text:
    2002 UT 24
    Melvin SPEARS, Sandy Spears, Freddie Martinez, Karen Martinez, Cliff Ruben, Tonja Ruben, Wayne D. Lewis, Miriam Lewis, Heidi Thomas, and Wayne V. Reynolds, Individuals, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Edward C. WARR and Hazel Warr, Defendants and Appellants.
    No. 20000435.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 8, 2002.

      Anthony L. Rampton, Marci Batty Re-chtenbach, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
    Denise A. Dragoo, Todd M. Shaughnessy, Erik G. Davis, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
   WILKINS, Justice.

1 1 This case involves a dispute over irrigation water rights, particularly whether water rights were paid for as part of a transfer of land and should have been conveyed, or whether the water rights were promised to be transferred as a separate transaction for additional consideration. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs paid for the water rights at the time they paid for the lots, and that the parties agreed that the water rights would be transferred subsequent to the land transaction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2 On appeal from a bench trial, "findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, ¶ 2, 20 P.3d 882. Accordingly, we relate the facts granting due deference to the trial court's resolution of factual disputes. Tanner, 2001 UT 18 at ¶ 2, 20 P.3d 332.

T3 This dispute arises from the sale of land by defendants Edward C. Warr and Hazel Warr ("the Warrs"). The Warrs purchased approximately 110 acres of land in Tooele County, subdivided it, and then sold five-acre parcels. Plaintiffs Melvin and Sandy Spears, Freddie and Karen Martinez, Heidi Jo Thomas, and Wayne V. Reynolds purchased their lots directly from the Warrs. The other plaintiffs, Wayne D. and Miriam Lewis and Clifford and Tonja Ruben did not receive title directly from the Warrs. Instead, the Lewises received their lot from Howard and Lora Lee Crittenden, who purchased the lot from the Warrs; and the Rubens, although they bargained with the Warrs, received their lot from Cathy Warr Johnson who received the lot from the Warrs.

T4 In addition to the land, the Warrs also owned a 40% interest in irrigation water from Rose Spring that they planned to use to irrigate the subdivision. Their use of the water was protested by a neighbor, Max Bleazard. Bleazard filed suit in April 1987, and in defense of that claim, the Warrs filed an affidavit, which states:

3. We filed [an application] with the Utah State Engineer to change the point of diversion, place and nature of use ... to facilitate the use of such water for irrigation, domestic and stock watering uses on our property and on the Rocky Top Subdivision....
8. We subdivided and platted the Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of selling platted plots with water developed from our interest in the Rose Spring, in reliance on the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision of November 2, 1984.
9. We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rocky Top Subdivision upon our representation that gravity flow irrigation water would be provided to such lots from our interest in the Rose Spring.
10. Due to the pending quiet title action concerning the Rose Spring filed by Dale Max Bleazard, J.N. Ward Engineering has been unable to construct the planned metering and diversion system for the Rose Spring and we have been unable to provide gravity flow irrigation water through such facilities to the Rocky Top Subdivision.

At some point the Warrs received rights to ©.99 cfs or 24.8% of the flow" of the spring.

T5 From 1986 to 1997, the plaintiffs received title to their respective lots by warranty deed. During the negotiating process each plaintiff understood, based on the Warrs' representations to them, that irrigation water rights were included as part of the purchase price of the lots However, the deeds conveying title to the lots did not convey irrigation water rights. According to the Warrs, irrigation water rights were not paid for as part of the purchase price of the lots because they were not part of the agreement, and, consequently, not conveyed at the time of closing because ownership of the water was in dispute with Bleazard. Regardless, after the lots were purchased, plaintiffs repeatedly asked why the water rights had not yet been provided. In response, the Warrs indicated that the water rights could not yet be transferred because of the Bleazard dispute, because the pipeline was not yet finished, or because the deeds were still being prepared. Nevertheless, pri- or to 1995, the Warrs assured plaintiffs that they intended to provide the water as soon as possible.

T6 After the Bleazard dispute was, to a certain extent, resolved, the Warrs began installing an underground pipeline to channel the Rose Spring irrigation water to the lots. Some of the plaintiffs helped pay for and participated in the physical installation: of part of the pipeline. Then, in 1994, after the Warrs had entered into a conditional agreement with Bleazard, they began conveying water rights to their children who owned lots in the subdivision. Though the Warrs conveyed deeds for water to their children, they did not convey deeds to the plaintiffs. Instead, the Warrs requested additional money, $2,500 to $5,000, to deed plaintiffs the irrigation water rights. The plaintiffs, however, refused to pay additional money for the water rights, contending instead that they had already paid for the irrigation water rights as part of the purchase price of their lots.

17 On September 4, 1996, the Warrs sought an extension of time from the State Engineer to put the water to beneficial use, and in so doing stated:

We are in the process of upgrading the "source" water line in order to use 100 percent of water rights. We need additional time to accomplish upgrading the source line (currently 4") to a new 12" line. The line is estimated to be approximately one mile in length requiring upgrade. The "place of use" water lines have been developed.

On September 28, 1998, the Warrs sought another extension of time from the State Engineer. In support of their request they stated:

Some water being used through railroad pipeline. Larger line from Rose Spring may be needed to convey all water under this change. Am currently pursuing change applications to take some water from wells in leu of springs. Additional time is needed to fully develop water from spring or transfer rights to the wells.

18 Plaintiffs filed suit in January 1999, claiming specific performance, demanding that the Warrs convey irrigation water rights to them, and alternatively requesting damages. Following a three-day bench trial in March 2000, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs, ordering the Warrs to convey to plaintiffs by quitclaim deed "sufficient water from their interest in the Rose Spring to irrigate each of their five-acre lots, i.e., 0.079 cfs for each lot." Defendants appeal.

T9 The essence of the Warrs' argument is that they never intended, nor did the parties agree, that irrigation water rights would be conveyed as part of the original land transaction. The Warrs claim they intended to obtain rights to the irrigation water later, after the Bleazard litigation was resolved, and then convey the water rights by another deed for an additional sum. The plaintiffs maintain that they and the Warrs understood that the purchase price of the lots included irrigation water rights, and they relied on the Warrs' representations to provide water when they bought their lots. In presenting their positions, the parties have raised a number of legal issues which we address in resolving this appeal: (1) whether the merger doctrine applies, particularly whether the warranty deeds conveying the land were an integration of the parties' agreements and extinguished any other oral agreements conveying irrigation water rights; (2) if the warranty deeds constitute the parties' integrated agreements, whether parol evidence, evidence of other agreements entered into prior to conveyance of the deed, should have been excluded; (8) whether the statute of frauds, Utah Code Aun. §§ 25-5-1 to -9 (1998), bars enforcement of any oral contracts regarding water rights between the parties, or whether the statute of frauds is inapplicable because plaintiffs undertook acts of part performance; (4) whether defendant Edward Warr could convey the interest his wife Hazel Warr had in the irrigation water rights as her agent, and if Edward had no authority to do so, whether Hazel, because of her actions, is estopped from claiming Edward could not convey the rights; (5) whether the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996), or whether the discovery rule tolls the statute; (6) whether the Lewises' alleged lack of contractual privity prevents them from suing the Warrs; and (7) whether the trial judge's award of an amount of water, as opposed to a percentage of water flow from a spring, was error. We address each issue in turn.

ANALYSIS

I. MERGER DOCTRINE

T10 The Warrs argue that under the merger doctrine, the warranty deeds transferring title to the lots to the plaintiffs extinguished any oral contracts between the Warrs and the plaintiffs regarding water. The Warrs assert that warranty deeds are, as a matter of law, final integrated agreements to convey property, and therefore any alleged agreement regarding the irrigation water rights is unenforceable if not conveyed by deed. The Warrs maintain that the plaintiffs have no claim to the irrigation water because the warranty deeds did not convey irrigation water rights. The plaintiffs counter that, based upon the collateral rights exception to the merger doctrine, the merger doctrine is inapplicable. They argue that because the parties did not intend performance of their agreement to be complete upon execution of the deed-the Warrs intended to deliver the irrigation rights later-the irrigation water was not part of the subject matter of the land title transaction, and the exception applies. The Warrs contend that the collateral rights exception cannot apply here because oral terms relating to title cannot be collateral.

11 Whether we even address this issue, however, depends on whether the issue was adequately preserved for appeal. That is, "[the] trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs claim, as a preliminary matter, that the issue was not sufficiently raised before the trial court and preserved for appeal. The Warrs claim the issue was adequately preserved simply because the trial court ruled on it. We agree. By ruling on the question, the trial court demonstrated that the issue was brought to its attention, and the issue has been sufficiently preserved for our review.

112 The standard of review we apply here is a correctness standard. The applicability of the merger doctrine, that is, whether the warranty deeds conveying the lots to the plaintiffs were integrations of the parties' agreements that extinguished any other oral agreements - regarding - irrigation - water rights, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, and we afford no deference to the trial court. 'See Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62, 19, 987 P.2d 30; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986).

118 The merger doctrine, as a general rule, declares " 'that on delivery and acceptance of a deed the provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance are deemed extinguished or superseded by the deed." " Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 19, 987 P.2d 30 (quoting Secor, 716 P.2d at 792). The doctrine applies "when the acts to be performed by the seller in a contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer." Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). "Execution and delivery of a deed by the seller then usually constitute full performance [by the seller], and acceptance of the deed by the buyer manifests [the buyer's] acceptance of that performance even though the estate conveyed may differ from that promised in the antecedent agreement." Id. As a result, where the acts to be performed by the seller in a contract relate to the delivery of title, the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms are extinguished and unenforceable. Id.

114 There are certain exceptions to the application of the merger doctrine, however. Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 19, 987 P.2d 30; Secor, 716 P.2d at 793. Under the collateral rights exception, if the original contract calls for performance of some act that is collateral to the conveyance of title, the contractual obligations are not extinguished, but instead survive the deed. Stubbs, 567 P.2d at 169, construed in Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 30, and Secor, 716 P.2d at 793. The question, therefore, is whether the agreement to convey irrigation water rights was collateral to the agreement to convey title.

115 "Whether the terms of the contract are collateral, or are part of the obligation to convey and therefore unenforceable after delivery of the deed, depends to a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto." Stubbs, 567 P.2d at 169, cited in Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 30. "When seller's performance is intended by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full performance on the part of the seller, absent some manifest intent to the contrary." Stubbs, 567 P.2d at 169-70, quoted in Dansie, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 30.

1 16 We conclude that the collateral rights exception applies here. Arguably the deeds could have conveyed irrigation water rights, with the Warrs perfecting ownership in the Bleazard litigation later, then having title pass to the plaintiffs through the doctrine of after-acquired title. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2000). However, it is undisputed by the parties that the Warrs planned on conveying title to the plaintiffs after the delivery of the deeds to the lots. More importantly, the trial judge found that "the Warranty Deeds ... were not intended to be a complete integration of the parties' understanding." Thus, the intent of the parties as determined by the trial judge was to finalize the irrigation water bargain after title to the lots had been delivered. Specifically, the Warr's performance, delivery of the irrigation water rights, was intended by the parties to take place at some time after the delivery of the deed. Moreover, unlike Dan-sie where residential property covenants and restrictions, matters that burden the title, were not collateral because they related to the same subject matter as the deed, 1999 UT 62 at ¶ 21, 987 P.2d 30, in this case the irrigation water rights are not necessarily appurtenant to the lots but are separate rights, distinct from the subject matter of the deed, that the parties planned to have transferred by a subsequent deed at a later date. As a result, the collateral rights exception applies, meaning the merger doctrine does not extinguish the irrigation water agreement. The trial court did not err in concluding that the merger doctrine did not extinguish the agreement for irrigation water rights.

II. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

117 The Warrs claim the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the oral assurances made by the Warrs to provide the plaintiffs with irrigation water be-ecause, they assert, the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence relating to any oral agreements formed prior to the transfer of the deeds. The plaintiffs argue that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable here because the rule applies only where the parties execute a writing, and no writing regarding irrigation water rights was executed, or necessary to enforee the contract in question. Additionally, claim the plaintiffs, evidence relevant to the question of whether the warranty deeds were integrated agreements is admissible, and because the evidence received pertained to whether the warranty deeds were integrations of the parties' entire agreement, the trial court did not err.

118 Although the parol evidence rule developed at common law as a principle of contract interpretation and is not a creature of the formal rules of evidence, as its name suggests, it functions as a rule of evidence. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 a. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Because the determination of whether to admit parol evidence is a question of law, we review for correctness; but at the same time, because a trial court must consider facts offered by the parties regarding whether they adopted a writing or writings as a complete integration of their agreement, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard of review for these subsidiary factual determinations. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (" '[Wlhether evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for correctness, incorporating a "clearly erroneous" standard of review for subsidiary factual determinations.' " (citation omitted)).

119 "The general rule is that in the absence of fraud, an apparently complete and certain agreement which the parties have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement; and that parol evidence of contemporaneous [or prior] conversations, representations or statements will not be received for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written agreement." Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981) (citing BT. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec. Corp., 82 Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933)). This general rule applies only to integrated contracts, though. Id. Thus, when presented with a written agreement that one of the parties insists is an integration, the court must consider whether the agreement is, in fact, integrated. " "In determining the issue of the completeness of the integration in writing, evidence extrinsic to the writing itself is admissible ... to show the cireumstances under which the agreement was made and the purpose for which the instrument was executed." " St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d at 1194 (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lents, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972)).

{ 20 In the instant case, the trial court was presented with a writing or writings that one of the parties insisted was an integration: The Warrs contended that the deeds conveying the subdivided lots to the plaintiffs were integrations of the parties' agreements; the plaintiffs disagreed. Consequently, in considering whether the deeds were, in fact, integrations of the parties' agreements, extrinsic parol evidence was admissible to determine whether the parties adopted the warranty deeds as a final expression of their agreements. Indeed, in evaluating the circumstances under which the agreements for irrigation water were made and the purpose for which deeds were executed, the court was required to admit and consider extrinsic par-ol evidence. The trial court determined that "the Warranty Deeds by which the Plaintiffs' lots were conveyed were not intended to be a complete integration of the parties' understanding." We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting parol evidence to determine that the parties did not adopt the warranty deeds as final expressions of their agreements regarding the irrigation water.

III. STATUTE OF FRAUDS

21 The Warrs insist the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 to -9 (1998), bars enforcement of the plaintiffs alleged contracts for irrigation water rights because, they claim, the contracts are for a real property interest. They note that section 25-5-1 requires interests in real property to be conveyed by "act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing," and claim that because the irrigation water rights were never conveyed by deed, the plaintiffs have no such rights. The plaintiffs contend that their claims are not barred because the statute of frauds is inapplicable due to the doctrine of part performance. The Warrs counter that the equitable doctrine of part performance does not take the parties outside of the statute of frauds because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated sufficient part performance. They claim the alleged part performance, the purchase of the lots, is not "exclusively referable" to the contracts for water, and, therefore, the part performance exception to the statute of frauds does not apply.

122 Generally, a conveyance of real property is within the statute of frauds and unenforceable absent a writing. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). "However, the doctrine of part performance allows a court of equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding the statute [of frauds]." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1998) ("Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof."). The question, therefore, is whether the oral agreement pertaining to the irrigation water rights was partially performed by the plaintiffs.

123 In previous cases involving the part performance exception to the statute of frauds, we have articulated the following standard of review:

In an equity review of facts if the record shows a fair preponderance, or even if the evidence is balanced evenly, the trial court finding should be sustained. If the evidence is so vague and uncertain that the finding is obviously erroneous, there may be a new finding on review.

Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (1956), quoted in Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275. The applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. However, because a trial court must consider facts offered by the parties regarding part performance of the agreement, we follow the above-articulated standard of review for these subsidiary factual determinations and will reverse only " '[ilf the evidence is so vague and uncertain that the finding is obviously erroneous." " Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275 (quoting Randall, 6 Utah 2d at 23, 305 P.2d at 483).

$24 The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows:

[1] the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate. Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer exclusively to the contract.

Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275 (quoting Randall, 6 Utah 2d at 24, 305 P.2d at 484). We have also indicated that evidence of partial performance must be "strong," Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275, and we expressed the preference for "acts-oriented rather than word-oriented" ey-idence, id. at 275-76. In explaining the significance of exclusively referable part performance evidence, we stated:

"[Alets of part performance must be exelu-sively referable to the contract in that the possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements made by him [or her] must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists. The reason for such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the contract, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his [or her] position to his prejudice...."

Scholl, 678 P.2d at 277 (quoting In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (1954)) (alterations in original). We also explained, however, that under certain cireum-stances the exclusively referable requirement may be relaxed. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 277-78. "[TJhe more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts." Id. at 278.

25 In the instant case, we conclude that the plaintiffs' performance removed the oral agreements from the statute of frauds. First, the oral contract and its terms are clear and definite. The trial court determined that "[the inclusion of irrigation water in the purchase price of the plaintiffs' lots was a basis of the bargain [to purchase the lots]." Despite the fact that the parties' testimony regarding the irrigation water contracts conflicts (plaintiffs claim they paid for the water as part of the purchase price of the lots while the Warrs claim the water had to be bought for an additional sum), the trial court expressly noted, "The terms of the oral contracts were clear and definite, and Plaintiffs undertook acts of part performance which removed the oral contracts from the statute of frauds." (Emphasis added.) The trial court further noted that "(there is also overwhelming independent evidence of the oral contracts in the affidavit filed by the Warrs in the Bleazard litigation, the representations made by the Warrs in their dealings with the Tooele Planning Commission, and the representations made by the Warrs in their communications with the State Engineer." For these reasons the trial court concluded that the exclusively referable requirement was relaxed. The Warrs have not persuaded us that the trial court's conclusion that the terms of the agreements-asserting that the plaintiffs paid for the irrigation water rights as part of the purchase price of the lots-are not clear and definite.

1 26 Second, the acts done in performance of the contract are equally clear and definite. The trial court found that the parties paid money for the irrigation water at the time they paid for their lots. Payment of additional consideration for the irrigation water rights constitutes performance of the plaintiffs' contractual obligation.

T 27 Third, the plaintiffs' acts were done in reliance on the contract. The plaintiffs paid for the irrigation water rights in reliance on the Warrs' representation that deeds to the water rights would be delivered. Payment of funds for the water rights would not have been made had the oral agreements not existed. Moreover, failure by the Warrs to perform their obligation would result in fraud on the plaintiffs who paid for the water rights. Inasmuch as the trial court's findings articulate conclusive and direct proof of the oral contracts for irrigation water, the exclusively referable requirement was appropriately relaxed by the trial court.

128 Finally, the Warrs have not persuaded us that the 'evidence regarding the terms of the parties' agreements for irrigation water is so vague and uncertain that the trial court's conclusion that the terms of the contract were clear and definite is obviously erroneous. To the contrary, the evidence as found supports the trial court's determination that the Warrs agreed to provide irrigation water to the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs paid for the water as part of the purchase price of their respective lots. As a result, we affirm the trial court's determination that the oral contracts for irrigation water were outside of the statute of frauds based on the doctrine of part performance.

IV. AGENCY

129 The Warrs argue that any sale of irrigation water was void without Hazel Warr's approval. They claim that because Hazel "is a joint owner of the Irrigation Water with Edward Warr, the water cannot be conveyed without her authority." The Warrs claim Hazel never authorized anyone to sell or convey her interest, and therefore those who allegedly promised the plaintiffs the water rights, Edward and Clayton Warr (the Warrs' son), lacked authority to sell Hazel's interest. Plaintiffs argue that Edward and Clayton had both actual and apparent authority to act as Hazel's agents and to sell her interest in the irrigation water. They argue that Hazel testified that Clayton was authorized to act on her behalf (actual authority), and they claim she made manifestations to third persons that they were her agents (apparent authority). Plaintiffs further assert that Hazel is estopped from arguing that she is not bound by promises made to the plaintiffs by her husband because she ratified the representations by remaining silent. The Warrs claim that any ratification cannot be inferred from silence because the law requires a writing to enforce agreements for property rights such as irrigation water rights and therefore any ratification of Edward's actions by Hazel must have been in writing.

130 We find this contention of the Warrs to be meritless. First, Hazel Warr herself was involved in the sale of the lots and negotiated with the plaintiffs regarding the irrigation water rights and price to be paid for the lots. Hazel herself testified that she discussed irrigation water rights with the plaintiffs when they bought the lots. Hazel testified that she was involved in negotiations with the Thomases. The Martinezes testified that she negotiated with them when they purchased their lot, and Wayne Reynolds testified that he negotiated the price of his lot with both Hazel and Edward. The Rubens also testified that Hazel was present when they negotiated the price for their lot, and Hazel testified that she signed documents on behalf of her husband in the sale to the Rubens. The Warrs' own affidavit submitted to the district court in the Bleazard litigation stated that "we filed an application," "we subdivided and platted," and "we have sold six of the eleven lots." Given Hazel Warr's first-hand involvement in the negotiations and sale of the lots, we conclude it is unnecessary to analyze whether Edward acted as her agent.

V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

131 The Warrs argue the four-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996), bars plaintiff's suit. The plaintiffs counter that the statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule. According to the plaintiffs, the Warrs misled them into believing they were trying to satisfy their obligation to provide irrigation water, thereby tolling the statute. Plaintiffs contend they had no reason to know they had a cause of action against the Warrs until late 1995 when they discovered the Warrs were not going to perform their alleged obligation of providing irrigation water. The Warrs respond that the statute is not tolled by the discovery rule because plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence to discover their cause of action.

132 The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness. See, eg., Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Sys. LC., 2000 UT 84, 12 P.3d 577; Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869-70 (Utah 1990). However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination-the point at which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of fact. See, eg., Sevy v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1998) ("The point at which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury is a question of fact.") Accordingly, we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries.

183 "Generally, a cause of action accrues 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.' " Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)). Thus, "statutes of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998). In certain instances, however, the discovery rule tolls the limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered. Id. at 50-51. The discovery rule applies:

(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the case presents exceptional cireumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 888 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (footnote citations omitted). "Under the discovery rule, ° "the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." ' " Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51 (quoting O'Neal v. Div. of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Utah 1991) (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86)).

34 Plaintiffs' complaint alleges breach of oral contract and requests specific performance, or, in the alternative, damages. The limitations period for bringing a claim for breach of an oral contract is four years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1996). Plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 25, 1999. Essential to our decision, therefore, is when the last event necessary to complete the cause of action for breach of contract occurred, i.e., when plaintiffs were on notice that the Warrs were not going to provide irrigation water as agreed. If this event occurred four years or more prior to when the complaint was filed, we must determine whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations.

T 35 The statute of limitations for plaintiffs' breach of contract action began to run in late 1995. The trial court found that "[iIn late 1995, the Warrs began contacting the plaintiffs and informing them that they could now have their quitclaim deeds to the water rights, but that they would have to pay between $2,500 and $5,000 for them." Thus, the plaintiffs knew or should have known that the Warrs were not going to deliver the irrigation water rights as promised, thereby breaching the agreement, as of "late 1995," when the Warrs demanded that plaintiffs pay additional consideration for the water.

136 Inasmuch as the plaintiffs filed their complaint in January 1999, and the trial court found that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that the Warrs were not going to deliver the irrigation water rights as promised in late 1995, the plaintiffs filed their complaint within the four year period. We therefore need not determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled for plaintiffs' breach of contract action.

VI PRIVITY

T37 The Warrs argue the Lewises lack privity of contract to sue the Warrs. They argue the quitclaim deed from the Critten-dens to the Lewises is not an assignment of rights, and therefore, the Lewises have no contractual claim against the Warrs. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that the Lewises are successors to the Crittenden's claims because the Crittendens, by quitelaim deed, conveyed all of their interests in the irrigation water to the Lewises.

1 38 Whether the Lewises received, by assignment, the Crittendens' contractual claim to the irrigation water rights is a question of law that we review for correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for these subsidiary factual determinations. See, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107-08 (Utah 1991).

139 An assignment is interpreted as is any other contract. Id. at 108. "In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, 112, 40 P.3d 599. When presented with a written instrument, we look first to the four corners of the agreement to determine the parties' intentions. Id. If the language within the four corners in unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language. Id. If the instrument is ambiguous, the court may look to extrinsic evidence. Id.

140 The Lewis-Crittenden deed is unambiguous. We note again that in October 1997, the Lewises purchased their lot from the Crittendens who initially purchased it from the Warrs. Supra, n. 6. Later, in December 1999, the Lewises bargained for and received, by quitclaim deed, not only all water rights which the Lewises had "appurtenant to or associated with" the lot but also any contractual claims the Crittendens had against the Warrs. The Lewis-Crittenden deed reads, in relevant part:

[The Crittendens], Grantors, hereby quitclaim all Grantors' right, title and interest, in any and all water or water rights, including without limitation, all wells, springs, ditches and reservoirs, appurtenant to or associated with that certain real property ... whether decreed or unde-creed, tributary or nontributary, surface or underground, appropriated or unappropriated, and all shares of stock in any water company, and all well permits, water services, contracts, and other evidences of any such water rights, to [the Lewises].

(Emphasis added.) It is clear that the deed assigned to the Lewises the Crittenden's contractual interest in the irrigation water rights. Accordingly, the Lewises are entitled to bring against the Warrs any contractual action the Crittenden's could have brought, including the instant claim for the irrigation water rights.

VII, TRIAL - COURTS - JUDGMENT AWARDING AN AMOUNT OF WATER VERSUS A PERCENTAGE OF FLOW

41 The Warrs argue that the trial court's judgment requiring them to convey to plaintiffs by quitclaim deed "sufficient water from their interest in the Rose Spring to irrigate each of their five-acre lots, ie., 0.079 efs for each lot" is unreasonable because they cannot guarantee they will be able to provide this amount of water each season. Plaintiffs counter that the judgment was not excessive. Plaintiffs assert that based on the testimony offered at trial, the amount ordered will reasonably irrigate five acres, as the plaintiffs were promised when they purchased their respective lots, sufficient water to irrigate their land.

142 "Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense of justice and good conscience of the court, and accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in [the trial court's] determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment should be entered...." Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981); see also LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Morris, 624 P.2d at 684.

148 Plaintiffs request specific performance; their complaint requests "an Order of specific performance requiring the Warrs to convey to plaintiffs their respective shares (7.5 cfs.) of the Subject Water and to complete the delivery system from Rose Spring to the Rocky Top Subdivision." In awarding to plaintiffs "sufficient water ... to irrigate each of their five-acre lots, i.e., 0.079 efs for each lot," the trial court considered what it determined the Warrs' contracted to provide plaintiffs, testimony from a professional engineer regarding how much water would be needed to irrigate five acres, and deeds the Warrs had prepared to convey the water rights. The trial court found that "[the Plaintiffs established that the Warrs intended, marketed, and sold the Plaintiffs' lots in the Rocky Top Subdivision with irrigation water sufficient to irrigate five acres," and that "the irrigation water rights were to be included in the price of the lots." Mr. Vern Loveless, a professional engineer, testified that .079 cfs of water would irrigate four and three-quarters acres; the remaining quarter acre would be maintained with non-irrigation water. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that "[the amount of water necessary to irrigate five acres is .079 efs, or twenty acre feet." Finally, the deeds prepared by the Warrs indicate that they intended to convey "seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12998 which represents 0.0079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs." (Emphasis added). Even though awarding a percentage of flow may seem sensible, given this information weighed by the trial court, we cannot say that the trial judge exceeded the permitted seope of discretion in granting specific performance and in entering the judgment it did.

CONCLUSION

I 44 The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

1 45 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice DURRANT concur in Justice WILKINS opinion.

      . - The trial court found that "the Warrs sold Lot 8 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to Gary R. Thomas and Heidi Jo Thomas ... [but][tlhe Warranty Deed conveying Lot 8 listed only Gary Thomas as a grantee...." Heidi Thomas is the party in interest because, although the lot was initially conveyed to her former husband, Gary Thomas, he conveyed his interest in the lot to her as part of their divorce decree.

      . The Rubens' lot was deeded to them by the Warrs' daughter, Cathy Warr, who held title to the property. However, the Rubens' dealt with Edward and Hazel Warr, who represented that they were the sellers and that irrigation water would be provided as part of the purchase price of the lot.

      . Although Bleazard's complaint against the Warrs was dismissed on October 9, 1990, it was dismissed without prejudice, and Bleazard continued to threaten the Warrs with legal action until approximately 1993.

      . Melvin Spears, Freddie Martinez, Wayne Reynolds, and Hazel Warr all testified that sometime in 1995 the Warrs offered to sell the irrigation water quitclaim deeds to the plaintiffs. Ms. Thomas testified that it was in October 1995, when Ms. Warr told her that the irrigation water quitclaim deeds would cost an additional $2,500 and Ms. Thomas replied that she "was willing to pay the costs that were incurred in doing the paperwork [of preparing the deeds], but [the Warrs] didn't tell [her] that there was going to be a $2,500 cost on this." The Rubens learned from Ms. Thomas sometime later that the Warrs were requesting $2,500 for the deeds.

      . Howard Crittenden, the initial owner of the Lewises' lot, was asked by Mr. Warr to pay an additional $2,500 for the water rights. The Crit-tendens objected to paying an initial amount for a deed, believing that the water rights were included in the price of the lot. The Crittendens sold the lot to Wayne D. and Miriam Lewis in 1997. Later, in 1999, the Lewises received, by quitclaim deed, any and all water rights which the Lewises had in the lot,
      The Warrs never contacted the Rubens about the purchase of quitclaim deeds. Regardless, the Rubens learned of the Warrs' plan from Heidi Thomas and never paid additional money to the Warrs for a quitclaim deed to the water rights.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DURRANT, Justice. WILKINS, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    2002 UT 29
    STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Patrick William CASEY, Defendant and Appellee, M.R. By and Through His Guardian, Cynthia F. Casey, Appellant.
    No. 20001067.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 12, 2002.

      Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Walter F. Budgen, Jr.
    Tara L. Isaacson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
    Paul G. Cassell, Douglas E. Beloof, Gina MecClard, for appellant.
   DURRANT, Justice.

11 The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court deprived MR., a victim of sexual abuse, of his constitutional and statutory right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing. At that hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemean- or. He had previously been charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, and had pleaded not guilty. The reduction in the charge was the result of a plea bargain negotiated between defendant and the State. Prior to the change of plea hearing, M.R.'s mother had advised the prosecutor of M.R.'s and her own desire to make a statement to the court. M.R. and his mother both attended this hearing and, during a recess, M.R.'s mother reiterated to the prosecutor that she and M.R. wished to be heard. The prosecutor did not, however, advise the court of this request. In addition, neither M.R. nor his mother petitioned the court directly for an opportunity to speak. Unaware of M.R.'s request to be heard, the court accepted the defendant's guilty plea to the reduced charge and set the matter for sentencing.

2 Following this change of plea hearing, M.R.'s mother, acting on behalf of MR., obtained legal assistance and filed two motions to set aside the plea bargain. In response, the State and defendant filed separate motions to strike M.R.'s pleadings. At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard from M.R. and his mother regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain, and permitted argument from M.R.'s counsel. Thereafter, the court "informally reopen[ed] the plea for the purpose of [accepting M.R.'s and his mother's] testimony." The court then accepted the testimony that it had just heard. Having accepted M.R's and his mother's testimony, the court "reaffirm[ed defendant's] plea at the class A level." The court then denied both of M.R.'s pending motions and sentenced defendant to eight months in jail on the class A misdemeanor charge. Based on these facts, we conclude that M.R. was initially denied his right to be heard at the change of plea hearing in violation of the Utah Constitution and related statutes, but that the court thereafter remedied this violation by reopening the change of plea hearing and receiving testimony from M.R. and his mother, and permitting argument from M.R.'s counsel. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

T3 On November 3, 1999, the Tooele County Attorney's Office charged defendant with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in violation of section 76-5-404.1(8) of the Utah Code. Following a preliminary hearing in which both the victim, M.R., and his mother testified, the district court bound defendant over for trial.

4 A few weeks later the prosecutor handling defendant's case sent M.R.'s mother a letter explaining that defendant had requested a plea bargain. After receiving this letter, M.R.'s mother, according to her affidavit, met with the prosecutor and obtained an assurance that the first degree felony charge would not be reduced due to the strong evidence of guilt compiled against defendant.

T5 Nevertheless, the prosecutor subsequently offered to reduce the first degree felony charge to lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, in return for a guilty plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1999). M.R.'s mother, upon learning of the State's extension of this offer and defendant's acceptance, contacted the prosecutor and expressed a desire to tell the district court how her family, including MR., felt about the proposed plea. The prosecutor advised her to attend the change of plea hearing scheduled for October 24, 2000.

I. CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING

T6 M.R. and his mother appeared at this change of plea hearing as directed. At a recess during this proceeding, M.R.'s mother approached the prosecutor, objected to the reduced charge, and reiterated M.R.'s, and her own, desire to make a statement. She later testified that she believed the prosecutor was going to inform the district court of her request. Acknowledging that he did not know that M.R. had a right to be heard either directly or through his legal guardian, the prosecutor maintained the following: (1) he did not intentionally deprive M.R. of his right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing, (2) he did not tell M.R.'s mother she and MR. had no right to testify at the plea hearing, and (8) he told M.R.'s mother that she would eventually have an opportunity to address the court in the pre-sentence report and at the sentencing hearing.

17 Notwithstanding his conversations with M.R.'s mother, the prosecutor did not inform the district court that M.R. and his mother had requested to be heard at the change of plea hearing. MR. and his mother also failed to bring the issue to the court's attention. The court therefore proceeded with defendant's change of plea hearing unaware of M.R.'s request. Noting the "dramatic" reduction in the charge, the court refused to be limited to the four-month sentence recommended in the stipulated plea agreement. The State and defendant responded to the court's concern by agreeing to delete the stipulated sentence provision. The court then accepted defendant's guilty plea to the class A misdemeanor charge and set the matter for sentencing.

II. SENTENCING HEARING

1 8 Subsequently, M.R.'s mother, acting on behalf of MR., obtained legal assistance and filed two motions with the district court: a motion for a misplea and a motion to reject the plea bargain. In response, the prosecutor and defendant filed separate motions to strike M.R.'s pleadings, claiming that M.R. lacked standing to set aside the plea because he was not a party to the criminal proceeding.

T9 Without ruling on whether M.R. had standing to challenge defendant's guilty plea, the district court held defendant's sentencing hearing on November 27, 2000. At the start of this hearing, M.R.'s counsel moved the court to set aside the accepted plea. The court initially questioned whether M.R. had the right to be heard but then allowed MR. and his mother to testify regarding the propriety of the plea bargain. Despite its reservations, the court also permitted extensive argument from M.R.'s counsel.

[10 M.R. and his mother testified that the court should have rejected the plea bargain. Specifically, M.R. declared, "I don't think it's right that [defendant] gets that less of a plea agreement because [of] what he's donel[.] He's done it to me ... and ... he's hurt my whole family." M.R.'s mother testified that "the [cJourt should reject the plea bargain [because] a misdemeanor sentence dfid] not truly reflect the seriousness of the offenses committed by [defendant] the same way that a felony conviction would." She further averred that she believed the prosecutor was going to inform the court of M.R.'s, and her own, desire to make a statement at defendant's change of plea hearing. She also stated that she did not know she could interrupt the change of plea hearing and address the court directly.

{11 After M.R. and his mother had testified, the district court turned its attention to M.R.'s attorney and inquired whether MR. was entitled to use counsel to assert his right to be heard. In response to the court's query, M.R.'s counsel argued that the Vice-tims' Rights Amendment of the Utah Constitution placed M.R. on equal footing with defendant and envisioned that MR. could employ an attorney in exercising his legal rights. M.R.'s counsel then argued that (1) MR. had the right to be heard before the court's acceptance of defendant's plea, (2) M.R.'s right to be heard had been violated, and (3) the court should grant a misplea and hear from MR. before accepting any subsequent plea between the State and defendant. The prosecutor and defendant both objected, asserting that M.R. lacked standing to challenge the accepted plea and that the prosecutor had discretion to determine how defendant's case was negotiated.

{12 Following these objections, the district court noted that it had not been previously informed by M.R. or his representative, ie., his mother, that MR. desired to be heard at the change of plea hearing. Despite this lack of notification, the court decided to "informally" reopen the plea hearing in order to accept the testimony that it had just heard from MR. and his mother. Having accepted this testimony, the court "reaffirm[(ed defendant's] plea at the class A level." The court then denied both of M.R.'s pending motions, sentenced defendant to eight months in jail on the class A misdemeanor charge, and fined him.

III. CLAIMS ON APPEAL

113 MR. immediately appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified M.R.'s appeal to us, concluding that a "petition for writ of certiorari would likely be ... granted [because] resolution of the case ha[d] potentially broad-reaching impact." See Utah R.App. P. 43(c)(1).

14 On appeal, M.R., by and through his legal guardian, contends that (1) he had the right to seek appellate review of the district court's adverse rulings on his two motions, (2) he had the right to be heard through counsel with respect to legal issues related to the constitutional and statutory rights afforded him as a victim, (8) he had a constitutional and statutory right to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain, (4) he properly invoked his right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing by submitting a request to the prosecutor, and (5) the court, through the negligence of the prosecutor, denied him his right to be heard by accepting the plea bargain without hearing from him.

€ 15 The State agrees with M.R. on several issues, including the following: (1) a crime victim may seek appellate review of decisions affecting his or her rights as a victim, (2) a crime victim may employ counsel in exercising his or her constitutional and statutory rights, and (8) a erime victim has a constitutional and statutory right to be heard upon request at a change of plea hearing. The State argues, however, that M.R. waived his right to be heard when he failed to assert this right at the change of plea hearing. The State also maintains that the court cured any violation by "informally reopen[ing]" defendant's plea, accepting the testimony regarding the propriety of the plea that had been offered earlier in the sentencing hearing by M.R. and his mother, allowing argument by M.R.'s counsel, and reaffirming the plea at the class A misdemeanor level. Further, the State asserts that even if M.R.'s right to be heard was violated, a misplea is not an available remedy under sections 77-38-11 and T7--38-12 of the Rights of Crime Victims Act.

{16 Defendant asserts that M.R. lacks standing to seek appellate review on all of these issues. Like the State, he also claims that the Utah Code precludes us from declaring a misplea. He further alleges that even if the declaration of a misplea is an available remedy under the Utah Code, such a declaration would violate the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution.

T 17 We conclude that M.R. was entitled to appellate review of the district court's rulings related to his right to be heard. We further hold that MR., as the victim of a crime, had both a constitutional and statutory right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing and that he properly invoked this right by informing the prosecutor that he desired to be heard. Finally, we conclude that the court remedied its initial violation of M.R.'s right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing by reopening the plea hearing and receiving testimony from MR. and his mother, and by permitting argument from M.R.'s counsel.

ANALYSIS

I. THE VICTIMS RIGHTS AMENDMENT, THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT

[ 18 In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted the Victims' Rights Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-87-1 to -5 (1999). This statute included, among other things, a bill of rights for victims, id. § 77-87-38, and declared that these rights must be "protected in a manner no less vigorous than protections afforded criminal defendants." Id. § 77T-37-1. The Utah Legislature then passed the Victims' Rights Amendment, which was ratified by Utah citizens on November 8, 1994, and took effect on January 1, 1995. Utah Const. art. I, § 28 compiler's notes. This constitutional amendment bestowed specific rights upon crime victims and gave the Utah Legislature the power to "enforce and define [its terms] by statute." Acting pursuant to this authority, the Utah Legislature subsequently enacted the Rights of Crime Victims Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38-1 to -14 (1999 & Supp. 2001). This act elaborated upon the rights afforded crime victims under the Victims' Rights Amendment and defined several terms included in the amendment. Id.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

119 Because this appeal asks us to analyze one of the rights afforded crime vice-tims (ie., M.R.'s right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing), we are called upon to interpret the meaning of the Victims' Rights Amendment, the Victims' Rights Act, and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. Because interpreting the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code presents questions of law, we review these questions for correctness and give no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. See Cache County v. Property Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996).

III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

120 In accordance with the analytical hierarchy relative to constitutions and statutes, we first examine the textual language of the Victims Rights Amendment and look secondly to the Victims' Rights Act and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. In construing the Victims' Rights Amendment, we initially scrutinize the plain meaning of the constitutional provision. See Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ¶ 13, 17 P.3d 1125. We need not inquire beyond the plain meaning of the amendment unless we find it ambiguous. Id. Our inquiry is similar in reviewing the Victims' Rights Act and the Rights of Crime Victims Act. See State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 7, 31 P.3d 528. As with our constitutional analysis, we look first to the plain meaning of the statutes and go no further unless they are ambiguous. See id.

IV. MR. HAD THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ADVERSE RULINGS RELATED TO HIS MOTION FOR A MISPLEA AND HIS MOTION TO REJECT THE PLEA BARGAIN

121 Applying the principles outlined above, we first address whether M.R. had the right to appeal the district court's rulings regarding his right to be heard. The Vice-tims' Rights Amendment does not address the question of M.R.'s right to appeal decisions impacting his right to be heard. The Rights of Crime Victims Act is on point, however, and we conclude that M.R. had the right to seek appellate review pursuant to the plain meaning of that statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-88-11(2)(b)(c) (1999).

122 We resolve this issue under a plain meaning analysis for two reasons. First, subsection 77-88-11(2)(b) explicitly provides that "[aldverse rulings on ... a motion or request brought by a victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime may be appealed under the rules governing appellate actions, provided that no appeal shall constitute grounds for delaying any criminal ... proceeding." Id. § T7-38-11(2)(b). Second, subsection 77-88-11(2)(c) of the Utah Code declares that "(aln appellate court shall review all such properly presented issues, including issues that are capable of repetition but would otherwise evade review." Id. § 7i-38-11@2)(c). In short, these two provisions demonstrate (1) that crime victims possess the right to appeal rulings on motions related to their rights as a victim and (2) that an appellate court must review appeals of such a nature. According ly, M.R.'s appeal is properly before us.

V. MR. POSSESSED A CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE HEARD UPON REQUEST AT IMPORTANT CRIMINAL JUSTICE HEARINGS

A. Defendant's Change Of Plea Hearing Constituted An - Important Criminal Justice Hearing Under Both The Utah Constitution And The Utah Code

123 We next address whether M.R. had the right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing. We conclude that he did, upon request, have such a right pursuant to the plain meaning of the Victims' Rights Amendment and subsections 77-38-4(1) and Ti-38-2(5)(c) of the Rights of Crime Victims Act.

1 24 In pertinent part, the Victims' Rights Amendment states as follows:

(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of crimes have [the right]:
(b) Upon request, to be ... heard at important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person or through a lawful representative, onee a criminal information or indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court.]

Utah Const. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (emphasis added). Using comparable language, section Ti-38-4 of the Rights of Crime Victims Act similarly declares that "[the victim of a crime shall have ... the right to be heard at important eriminal . justice hearings...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-88-4(1) (1999).

1 25 Given that both the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code grant crime vice-tims the right to be heard at "important criminal justice hearings," the question that arises is what constitutes an "important criminal justice hearing" under the Victims' Rights Amendment and the Utah Code. Seetion 77-38-2 of the Rights of Crime Victims Act answers this question with respect to both the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code; it defines "important criminal justice hearings" involving the disposition of charges in this way:

For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah - Constitution{,][iImportant - eriminal justice hearings ... means the following proceedings in felony eriminal cases ...: any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges against a defendant [except for] unanticipated proceedings to take an admission or a plea of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed or any plea taken at an initial appearance.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-88-2(5)(c) (1999). Thus, the plain language of the statute defines "important criminal justice hearings" as any proceeding involving the disposition of felony charges against a defendant, with two notable exceptions: (1) a plea taken at an initial appearance and (2) a proceeding in which a defendant accepts responsibility for all of the charges previously filed. Id.

126 Here, the change of plea hearing conducted by the district court fell within the definition of an important criminal justice hearing because it disposed of a first degree felony charge filed against defendant in return for a guilty plea on a class A misdemeanor. Further, neither exception applied because the hearing was not an initial appearance and the defendant did not accept responsibility for the first degree felony charge previously filed. Accordingly, M.R.'s constitutional and statutory right to be heard upon request at important criminal justice hearings included the right to be heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing.

B. MR. Invoked His Right To Be Heard At Defendant's Change Of Plea Hearing By Informing The Prosecutor That He Wished To Speak

127 While it is clear that the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code afforded MR. the right to be heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing, see Part V(A) supra, neither the constitution nor the code mandates how M.R.'s request must be submitted. Relying on the Victims' Rights Act and the Rights of Crime Victims Act, MR. argues that a request to be heard at a plea hearing suffices if it is submitted either to the district court or to the prosecutor. The State contends that the two statutes require a crime victim to petition the court directly. After examining the relevant constitutional and statutory authority, we are satisfied that a victim's right to be heard at a plea hearing is triggered where a request has been submitted to the prosecutor handling the case.

128 We begin our analysis with the Vice-tims' Rights Amendment. This constitutional provision merely notes that the right to be heard is activated "upon request." Utah Const. art. I, § 28(b). Unlike the previous constitutional language we have analyzed, we find this language ambiguous and undefined. We thus "consider all other relevant factors." In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable David S. Young, 1999 UT 6, ¶ 15, 976 P.2d 581. In particular, we seek guidance from the statutes related to the Victims' Rights Amendment (Le., the Victims' Rights Act and the Rights of Crime Victims Act). Cf. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 867 (Utah 1996).

129 The Victims' Rights Act states that "[vlictims ... have [the] right to be informed and assisted as to their role in the criminal justice process[, and a/ll criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide this information and assistance." - Utah Code Ann. § 77-87-8(1)(b) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Victims' Rights Act declares that "[vlictims ... have a right to clear explanations regarding relevant legal proceedings[, and a/ll criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide these explanations." - Id. § Ti-37-8(1)(c) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). Because prosecutors are a component of the eriminal justice system and the Victims' Rights Act applies to "all erimi-nal justice agencies," the aforementioned duties necessarily fall upon prosecutors. Id. § Ti-87T-3(1)(b)-(c). - Hence, we conclude that prosecutors must "assist" victims in exercising their right to be heard at plea hearings and provide them with "clear explanations regarding [such] proceedings." Id.

§$30 We further conclude that a prosecutor's obligation to provide "assistance" to the victim should mean, at a minimum, that a victim may submit a request to be heard at a plea hearing to a prosecutor and expect that the request will be forwarded to the court. Likewise, a prosecutor's obligation to provide a "clear explanation" of events occurring at a plea hearing should mean that a victim can rely on a prosecutor's statement indicating he or she will convey a request to be heard to the district court. We therefore hold that a victim may deliver a request to be heard at a plea hearing to a prosecutor and that a prosecutor receiving such a request must convey it to the court.

€31 This conclusion is supported by the text of the Rights of Crime Victims Act because that statute, while explicitly mandating direct requests in some instances, does not require direct requests to be heard at plea hearings. For example, a victim's request to be heard at an accused's initial appearance is predicated expressly upon delivering a "request to the judge hearing the matter." Utah Code Ann. § 77-88-4(1) (1999). This same section, however, conveys a broad right to be heard at various legal proceedings-including plea hearings-without mentioning how the request to be heard must be made. Id. Had the Utah Legislature intended to require victims to petition the district court directly in order to invoke their right to be heard at plea hearings, it could have inserted the phrase, "upon request to the judge," into that sentence as well. Cf State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App. 309, 4 46, 989 P.2d 1091 (concluding that, due to the placement of the word "intentionally," the Utah Legislature intended to modify only one verb rather than the entire sentence). We conclude that by electing not to incorporate this phrase when referring to plea hearings the Legislature implicitly authorized other methods of delivering requests to be heard. Accordingly, the language of the Rights of Crime Victims Act contradicts the State's theory that requests to be heard at a plea hearing must be delivered directly to the district court."

132 In addition to having a duty to convey requests to be heard under the Vice-tims' Rights Act and the Rights of Crime Victims Act, prosecutors also have a duty to convey requests to be heard as officers of the court. Prosecutors must convey such requests because they are obligated to alert the court when they know that the court lacks relevant information. Cf. Clingman v. State, 23 P.3d 27, 29 (Wyo.2001). This duty, which is incumbent upon all attorneys, is magnified for prosecutors because, as our case law has repeatedly noted, prosecutors have unique responsibilities. See, eg., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ¶ 24 n. 8, 974 P.2d 269. Specifically, a prosecutor is a minister of justice, id., possessing "duties that rise above those of privately employed attorneys." - State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 131, 992 P.2d 951. The prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win ... but that justice shall be done." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992).

133 In light of the fact that prosecutors must defend and uphold the State's interest in procuring justice, they have an obligation to ensure that the constitutional rights of crime victims are honored and protected. In fact, the Victimg' Rights Act explicitly declares that the rights extended to crime victims "are to be honored and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than protections afforded criminal defendants." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1 (1999). Accordingly, as an officer of the court, a prosecutor must convey a victim's request to be heard at a change of plea hearing.

134 It is undisputed by the parties to this appeal that M.R.'s mother, acting on behalf of MR., informed the prosecutor that M.R. wished to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing. It is also undisputed that the prosecutor did not convey this request to the district court. Consistent with our foregoing analysis, we conclude that the prosecutor failed to satisfy the obligations imposed upon him by the Victims' Rights Act, the Rights of Crime Victims Act, and his position as an officer of the court.

I 35 To begin with, as a representative of a criminal justice ageney, the prosecutor violated M.R.'s rights under the Victims' Rights Act (1) by failing to "assist" him in exercising his right to be heard and (2) by failing to provide him with a "clear explanation" regarding the events transpiring at defendant's change of plea hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 7i-87-3(1)(b)-(c) (1999). The prosecutor violated both of these statutory duties when he implied that he would convey M.R.'s request to be heard to the district court and then failed to do so.

136 Moreover, given that the prosecutor received M.R.'s request to be heard and subsequently made no effort to alert the district court, the prosecutor's conduct violated the Rights of Crime Victims Act. That statute, by requiring direct requests to the court at initial appearances but not requiring such direct requests at plea hearings, implicitly authorized requests to be heard at plea hearings to be delivered to prosecutors.

T37 Lastly, the prosecutor breached his duty as an officer of the court because he failed to bring relevant information to the court's attention. See Clingman, 23 P.3d at 29. Fully aware of M.R.'s desire to speak at defendant's change of plea hearing, the prosecutor did not inform the court that M.R. had invoked his constitutional and statutory right to be heard. We therefore conclude that M.R. properly submitted his request to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing to the prosecutor.

VI. THE DISTRICT COURT REMEDIED THE VIOLATION OF M.R'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD

138 Based on the prosecutor's failure to relay M.R.'s request to be heard, the district court initially deprived MR. of his right to speak at the change of plea hearing. At defendant's sentencing hearing, however, the court learned of M.R.'s earlier desire to be heard. The court then permitted MR. and his mother to take the stand and testify regarding the appropriateness of defendant's plea bargain. The court also permitted extensive argument by M.R.'s counsel. Restricted in no respect by the court, all three individuals claimed that the plea bargain should have been rejected. After hearing this testimony and argument, the court "informally" reopened defendant's change of plea hearing and accepted the testimony that it had just heard from MR. and his mother. The court then reaffirmed defendant's plea at the Class A level."

139 By taking these steps, the district court remedied its initial denial of M.R.'s right to be heard. Our conclusion is based on the following rationale First, we note that the plea was subject to review up until the time of sentencing. See Ostler, 2001 UT 68 at ¶10, 31 P.3d 528 (noting that "it makes no sense to deprive the district court of the power to review a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and sentence."). Accordingly, in exercising its power to reopen the plea, the court permitted MR. to be heard at a time when he could have persuaded the court to reject the proposed ples. Second, the record clearly demonstrates that the court reaffirmed the plea only after having accepted M.R.'s and his mother's testimony, and permitting argument by his counsel.

140 Thus, although MR. was entitled to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing, we conclude that he has enjoyed the fruits of the right he now claims he was denied. Accordingly, we hold that the district court, to its credit, cured the error initially committed at the change of plea hearing and honored M.R.'s right to be heard as soon as it discovered M.R. wished to be heard.

CONCLUSION

141 We conclude that M.R. (1) had the right to appeal the district court's rulings related to his right to be heard, (2) had the right to be heard upon request at defendant's change of plea hearing, and (8) properly invoked his right to be heard by informing the prosecutor he wished to speak. We further conclude that, although the prosecutor failed to convey M.R.'s request to the court and this failure initially deprived MR. of his right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing, the court subsequently remedied the error. The court did so by reopening the plea hearing, accepting unrestricted testimony and argument, and reaffirming the plea. We therefore affirm the decision below.

1142 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, and Justice DURHAM concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.

WILKINS, Justice,

concurring:

148 I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court's action only because the conflict between two constitutional principles gives us no other choice. At the time the motion was made, however, the trial court could have, and under the mandate of our constitution should have, granted M.R.'s motion for a misplea.

144 I fully agree with the analysis set forth in the majority opinion leading to the conclusions that MR. was entitled to appellate review of the district court's adverse rulings, and that, as a victim of crime, he had both a constitutional and statutory right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing. I also agree fully that MR., in informing the prosecutor of his desire to be heard, did everything necessary to properly invoke his right. However, I believe that when the trial court was finally informed of M.R.'s desire to be heard, it was clearly insufficient for the trial court to "informally" reopen the change of plea hearing and "consider" M.R.'s concerns before summarily reaffirming the "accepted" plea. Doing so merely compounded the error invited by the prosecution in failing to promptly inform the court of M.R.'s initial request to be heard at the change of plea hearing.

1 45 As we today hold, M.R. clearly had a constitutional right to speak prior to the acceptance of the change of plea in this case. Under our decision in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 10, 31 P.3d 528, defendant's plea had not yet been finally accepted at the time the trial court became aware of M.R.'s desire to be heard on the matter. The correct course would have been for the trial court to reopen the hearing, after notice to all concerned.

146 The constitutional provisions granting M.R. his right to be heard, however, also limit this right. Subsection (2) of the Vie-tims' Rights Amendment, Article I, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution, specifically prohibits construing the rights afforded MR. in such a way as to provide "relief from any criminal judgment." The defendant's plea, once accepted by the court and sentence imposed, is a criminal judgment. Consequent ly, onee the trial court accepted defendant's plea and entered the judgment of sentence on the plea, M.R.'s rights as a victim could not result in the "misplea" MR. sought. Only while the plea was still not final, that is, prior to the entry of sentence, could M.R.'s motion for misplea have been granted on the basis of M.R. having been denied his constitutional right to speak at the change of plea hearing.

T47 A second difficulty is created by the provisions of the Rights of Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-88-11(2)(1999), that authorize appellate review of an adverse ruling by the trial court on M.R.'s motions, but specifically provide that no such appeal "shall constitute grounds for delaying any criminal ... proceeding." § 77-38-11(2)(b). When juxtaposed with the rights of the criminal defendant to a speedy trial and the necessity to move forward with the criminal process despite an otherwise valid appeal by a victim, appellate relief for MR. is a practical impossibility. Moreover, the same statute limits M.R.'s remedies to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and writ of mandamus. § 77-38-11(1)(@). If the eriminal action proceeds, and if the victim is denied his or her constitutional right to address the court, the victim has little hope of a meaningful remedy. While the criminal proceeding moves forward, the victim denied rights may seek only an injunction or writ of mandamus that will preserve the right to speak if such an appeal can be filed, perfected, heard, and decided before entry of the criminal judgement. This will often not be the case. This was clearly not the case in M.R.'s situation.

148 So, our hands are tied by the same constitutional and statutory provisions that gave M.R. his right to be heard in the first place. We cannot order the plea "undone" once the sentence and judgment have been entered by the trial court. We cannot impose any corrective action on the failure of the prosecutor to inform the court of the request to speak, or the failure of the trial court to fully reconsider the change of plea, with all due formality, thereby according M.R. his constitutional right to actually be heard.

[ 49 As it works in practice, the right of a victim to be heard at a change of plea hearing is fragile at best, and may be made illusory by the intentional or unintentional mishandling of the situation by the prosecutor or the trial court, all without meaningful remedy. Perhaps the legislature may find it wise to reconsider the provisions of the statute addressing appellate review of the denial of a victim's request to assert the rights granted by the Victims' Rights Amendment. There may be other cireamstances under which those rights may be just as easily and negligently denied as were M.R.'s in this case.

      . For the purposes of this appeal, we assume that the prosecutor received the request to be heard from M.R.'s mother at defendant's change of plea hearing. We make this assumption because none of the parties to this appeal disputes this claim and the prosecutor admitted in a letter that he was "cognizant" of the fact that M.R.'s mother wished to address the court at defendant's change of plea hearing.

      . - Although the prosecutor moved to strike M.R.'s pleadings, he later moved to reopen the plea hearing.

      . As part of her argument that the plea bargain should be rejected, M.R.'s mother discussed the impact defendant's abuse had on M.R. and the effect defendant's conduct had on her three other children.

      . Defendant asserts in his brief that he has served the sentence imposed by the district court. Neither the State nor M.R. disputes this assertion. We therefore presume it to be true.

      . Although Article I, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution is titled "Declaration of the rights of crime victims," it is commonly referred to as the Victims' Rights Amendment. In full, the Victims' Rights Amendment declares as follows:
      (1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
      (a) To be treated with fairness, respect,; and dignity, and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process;
      (b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and
      (c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply to capital cases or situations involving privileges.
      (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal judgment.
      (3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
      (4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section by statute.
      Utah Const. art. I, § 28.

      . Utah is one of many states that afford rights to crime victims. In the early 1970's, a victims' rights movement spread across the United States and focused on integrating victims of crimes into the criminal justice process. Ex Parte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212, 540 S.E.2d 81, 83 (2000). Responding to this movement, many legislatures across the country enacted statutes affording victims a voice at critical stages of the criminal justice process. Id. (citing Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, New Eng. J. On Crim. & Civ. Confinement 21 (Winter 1999)).

      . Article I Section 28 of the Utah Constitution gives "[the [Utah] Legislature ... the power to enforce and define [the Victims' Rights Amendment] by statute." Utah Const. art. I, § 28(4).

      . Subsection 77-38-2(5) of the Rights of Crime Victims Act delineates other proceedings that qualify as important criminal justice hearings. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(5)(a), (b), (d)-(g).

      . In relevant part, subsection 77-38-4(1) of the Utah Code states as follows:
      The victim of a crime shall have ... the right to be heard at the important criminal ... justice hearings provided in Subsections 77-38-2(5)(b), (c), (d), and (£), and upon request to the judge hearing the matter, the right to be present and heard at the initial appearance of the person suspected of committing the conduct or criminal offense against the victim on issues relating to whether to release a defendant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur.
      Utah Code Aun. § 77-38-4(1) (1999).

      . A second section in the Rights of Crime Victims Act similarly requires that certain requests be delivered to the district court. Subsection 77-38-4(8) provides that "[if the victim of a crime is a person who is in custody ... the right to be heard ... shall be exercised by submitting a written statement to the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(8) (1999). The Utah Legislature therefore evinced a clear intent to require victims to petition the court directly in two separate contexts but chose not to impose a similar requirement with respect to a victim's right to be heard at plea hearings.

      . As part of the disposition of this case, M.R. urges us to order the redrafting of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and mandate that district courts ask whether a victim wishes to be heard at plea hearings. We note that it is sound judicial practice for a judge to inquire into the victim's desires at plea hearings, but decline to require such a question under rule 11.

      . At the sentencing hearing, the district court made the following remarks:
      [I have] heard from the victim and ... been informed by the victim and the victim's representative, i.e., the victim's mother, that [I] was not informed of the desire or request of the victim to be heard at the time the plea was taken. [I] will informally reopen the plea for the purpose of hearing that testimony, which I've already heard. . .. [I] find[ ] that the prosecutor should have, does have and did have in this case ... discretion in his negotiations with the defense attorney. They entered into that agreement with sound legal considerations that they alone basically negotiated.... [I now] accept[] and reaffirm[] the plea at the Class A level and den[y] any request to the contrary.

      . In this appeal, M.R. asks us to hold that he had the right to speak through counsel at the change of plea hearing. We need not reach this question because (1) the district court did, in fact, permit M.R.'s counsel to speak at that hearing, and (2) neither the State nor the defendant has challenged the district court's decision. Accordingly, there is no bona fide dispute regarding this issue, and it is not ripe for review. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995) (explaining that we do not examine controversies that have not "yet sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." (internal quotation omitted)). We therefore decline to address it.

      . Because the district court upheld M.R.'s right to be heard in the present case, we decline to address what remedies are available for the hypothetical denial of a victim's right to be heard. We do note, however, that the Utah Legislature established a framework in which only three remedies were provided for the violation of a victim's right: injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and writ of mandamus. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-11(1)-(2)G) (1999). Absent from this list is the right to obtain a declaration of a misplea. Moreover, even if the declaration of a misplea were assumed to be an available remedy, such a declaration would raise constitutional issues regarding the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution.