author: POHLMAN, Judge:

text:
    STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Chad Everett MORRISON, Appellant.
    No. 20170885-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed April 4, 2019
    Dayna Moore, Attorney for Appellant
    Simarjit S. Gill and Ann P. Boyle, Provo, Attorneys for Appellee
    Judge Jill M. Pohlman authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Michele M. Christiansen Forster concurred.
    Opinion
   POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 As part of a criminal sentence, a defendant may be ordered to make restitution for any pecuniary damages proximately caused by his crime. Chad Everett Morrison, after pleading guilty to assaulting his roommate (Roommate), was ordered to pay Roommate's moving expenses and lost wages. But Roommate was already planning on moving, and a private investigator testified that Roommate was let go from a temporary assignment a day after the assault due to a reduced workload. Morrison now appeals, contending that these facts demonstrate that the moving expenses and lost wages were not proximately caused by his crime. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 29, 2016, Morrison pushed Roommate into a wall and punched him several times. In the altercation, a television was destroyed, and a dresser and a nightstand were damaged. The State charged Morrison with assault and criminal mischief.

¶3 Morrison pled guilty to assault, and in exchange the State dismissed the criminal mischief charge. Morrison stipulated, however, to paying restitution-which was thought to be no more than $ 500 based on the charging document-on the dismissed criminal mischief charge. After sentencing, the State filed a motion for restitution in the amount of $ 6,818.42. Morrison disputed that figure, and the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate restitution amount.

¶4 At the hearing, Roommate testified that he had "to move as a result" of the assault. Expenses for the move included $ 35 for an application fee, $ 200 for a security deposit, $ 333.25 for the services of a professional moving company, and $ 70.28 for one month's increased rent.

¶5 On cross-examination, Roommate conceded that he and his girlfriend (Girlfriend) "had planned to leave before [the assault] happened." According to his testimony, Roommate and Girlfriend "really wanted [their] own place" and had told Morrison that they "planned to move in the next couple of months." Because Girlfriend was pregnant, Roommate hired a professional moving company that "moved everything." When asked whether he tried to "rent a truck" in order to move himself, Roommate responded, "No. There was me and a pregnant female to move an entire apartment, so ...."

¶6 Roommate also testified that he "missed work" due to the assault. Roommate worked with a staffing agency and requested reimbursement for a total of ten days of lost wages, explaining that four days were used to "recover[ ] from the assault itself" and the "six additional days" were for "moving, finding apartments and making sure [they] had a place to live come the first of the month." Roommate testified that he was told by the staffing agency to take "as much time as [he] needed to get everything figured out." On cross-examination, Roommate testified that he had a temporary position through the staffing agency at a company (the Company). But Roommate also testified that he was "supposed to get hired on there" permanently and that "[b]ecause [he] was unable to show up for those four days," the Company "decided that [it was not] going to move forward with [his] contract."

¶7 The defense called a private investigator who testified that he spoke with the staffing agency and that Roommate's temporary position at the Company was terminated "early because of workload." The investigator testified that Roommate's temporary position "ended on September 30th of 2016 ... because they ran out of work or they didn't need an extra person."

¶8 The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. As for the moving costs, the court found that although Roommate and Girlfriend "were planning to move anyway," Morrison's assault "caused the victim and his girlfriend to move earlier than planned" and "that it is difficult and more expensive to be forced to relocate early rather than as planned." It then found the $ 35 application fee, the $ 200 security deposit, the $ 333.25 professional-movers expense, and the $ 70.28 increased-rent expense were reasonable. It calculated the total amount of moving expenses to be $ 638.53.

¶9 As for lost wages, the court found that there was some "indication [that Roommate] would have been able to work somewhere else even if the job was terminated" at the Company. The court also found that Roommate "testified that he was hired by the staffing agency and worked regularly and that he did not work for four days because of [Morrison's] actions." The court found that the cost of missing four days of work was $ 464. Adding all the damages together, and finding that Morrison was able to pay, the court ordered complete and court-ordered restitution in the amount of $ 1,397.43.

¶10 Morrison appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Morrison contends that "neither the assault nor the dismissed criminal mischief charge was the proximate cause" of Roommate's move or termination from his temporary work assignment. He therefore asserts that the district court erred in awarding damages for Roommate's moving expenses and lost wages. An appellate court "will not disturb a district court's restitution determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, ¶ 25, 416 P.3d 1132 (cleaned up). We have discerned an abuse of discretion when the district court granted the victim "a windfall" by, for example, failing to limit restitution "to that amount which is necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by the defendant." State v. England , 2017 UT App 170, ¶ 15, 405 P.3d 848 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶12 "When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, ... the court shall order that the defendant make restitution" to the victims of his crime. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016) (emphasis added). Restitution comes in two forms: complete and court-ordered. Id. § 77-38a-302(2). Court-ordered restitution is primarily concerned with what the defendant is able to pay, but complete restitution means the "restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant ." Id. § 77-38a-302(2), (5) (emphasis added). And the terms "resulted in" and "caused by the defendant" in section 77-38a-302 refer to proximate cause. State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, ¶¶ 32, 39, 416 P.3d 1132.

¶13 Proximate cause includes but-for causation (that is, factual causation), but it requires "some greater level of connection between the act and the injury than mere 'but for' causation." Raab v. Utah Ry. , 2009 UT 61, ¶ 23, 221 P.3d 219 ; see also State v. Oliver , 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 21, 427 P.3d 495. It also requires foreseeability; indeed, the general test for proximate cause "is whether under the particular circumstances the defendant should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm." State v. Becker , 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 13, 427 P.3d 306 (cleaned up). In restitution cases, the burden is on the State to prove proximate cause. See id. ¶ 12 ; Oliver , 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 22, 427 P.3d 495 ; see also State v. Trujillo , 2017 UT App 151, ¶ 7, 405 P.3d 745 ("It is the State's burden to prove that the victim has suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of the defendant's criminal activities." (cleaned up) ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, 416 P.3d 1132.

¶14 Morrison contends that the State did not meet its burden to prove his actions were the proximate cause of either (1) Roommate's moving expenses or (2) Roommate's lost wages. We agree in part with the first contention but reject the second.

¶15 First, we conclude that although the evidence supports the district court's finding that Morrison's assault caused Roommate to move earlier than planned, the court erred in deciding that Morrison's assault proximately caused all of Roommate's moving expenses. As an initial matter, the district court did not exceed its discretion in finding that Roommate and Girlfriend expedited their move by one month. According to Roommate's testimony, even before the assault he and Girlfriend were planning "to move in the next couple of months."

¶16 But even though the move was accelerated due to the assault, the pecuniary harm must be tied to the expedited nature of the move. The $ 35 application fee and $ 200 security deposit do not have any connection to the earlier-than-planned move. Roommate's own testimony provided that he and Girlfriend were "planning to move anyway." And there was no evidence connecting the need to pay an application fee or security deposit to Morrison's actions, or suggesting that Roommate would not have incurred those expenses had he moved a month later, as expected. Similarly, the $ 333.25 spent on professional movers is unconnected to the expedited moving date. The district court found that Roommate "had to hire assistance" because Girlfriend "was pregnant and unable to help in the move." But there was no evidence presented at the restitution hearing that, had Roommate moved as planned, he would not have hired the moving company in any event.

¶17 Had the State presented evidence that connected these expenses to the expedited nature of the move, we would likely reach a different result. But because there was no evidence tying these expenses to Roommate's need to move a month sooner than planned, there is no basis in the evidence to conclude that the expenses were proximately caused by the assault. Thus, the court speculated without a sufficient evidentiary basis that Roommate incurred the application fee, security deposit, and professional-movers expense as a result of Morrison's actions. See State v. Cristobal , 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16, 238 P.3d 1096 ("When the evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than speculation ...."). Consequently, in awarding pecuniary damages for these expenses, the district court granted Roommate "a windfall" and therefore exceeded its discretion. See State v. England , 2017 UT App 170, ¶ 15, 405 P.3d 848 (cleaned up); see also State v. Brown , 2009 UT App 285, ¶¶ 11-12, 221 P.3d 273 (reversing a restitution award for moving expenses when there was no evidence of a causal connection between the defendant's crime and the victim's relocation), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ogden , 2018 UT 8, 416 P.3d 1132.

¶18 The court, however, properly awarded pecuniary damages of $ 70.28 for one month's increased rent. As the district court recognized, Roommate's request for only one month's additional rent was an "acknowledgment that [Roommate and Girlfriend] would have moved in a month." But unlike the other expenses, there was evidence to support the court's conclusion that this increased rent was proximately caused by the expedited nature of the move. While living with Morrison, Roommate paid $ 500 a month in rent. After the move, Roommate paid $ 570.28 for the first month's rent at Girlfriend's and his new apartment. Had Roommate and Girlfriend moved as planned one month later, Roommate might have saved the increased rent. And it was foreseeable that attacking Roommate, who was already considering moving, would prompt Roommate to expedite his move to a new apartment with potentially higher rent. See Becker , 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 13, 427 P.3d 306.

¶19 Second, we conclude that the district court did not exceed its discretion in determining that Morrison's assault proximately caused Roommate's lost wages for four days. Granted, there was limited evidence given by Roommate at the restitution hearing that he lost his job at the Company due to missing four days of work after the assault. And the private investigator hired by Morrison presented evidence impeaching Roommate's narrative. But the district court did not have to accept the impeachment evidence. "Credibility determinations are within the province of the [district court]" because a district court "is uniquely equipped to make factual findings based exclusively on oral testimony due to [its] opportunity to view the witnesses firsthand, to assess their demeanor and to consider their testimonies in the context of the proceedings as a whole." Kidd v. Kidd , 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 34, 321 P.3d 200 (cleaned up); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4) (stating that a "reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses").

¶20 Roommate testified that he "missed work" due to his injuries from the assault and that he was told by the staffing agency to take "as much time as [he] needed to get everything figured out." He also testified that he was "supposed to get hired on" at the Company, but due to missing work-with the staffing agency's approval-the Company decided not "to move forward with [his] contract." And even if Roommate was terminated early from his temporary assignment with the Company due to "workload," Roommate testified that he was placed at the Company by a staffing agency. The district court used these facts to infer that Roommate "would have been able to work somewhere else even if the job [at the Company] was terminated." That was a reasonable inference based on Roommate's testimony.

¶21 Morrison challenges this conclusion, asserting that the district court incorrectly "shifted the burden" to him in finding that Roommate "would have been able to work somewhere else" when the State did not provide any specific evidence on this point. Not so. Roommate testified that he was placed by a staffing agency and "missed work," and the court inferred that the staffing agency, who had told Roommate to take the time he needed to recover, would have placed him somewhere else. If there were truly no work for Roommate, he would not have needed the staffing agency's blessing to take time off. Thus, the court did not shift the burden. It simply made a reasonable inference to find that the State had met its burden.

¶22 Further, the district court credited Roommate's testimony, but it did not blindly follow it. Roommate testified that he missed four days to "recover[ ] from the assault itself" and six additional days "making sure [he and Girlfriend] had a place to live." The court stated that it was "struggling with the six additional days" but found the four days used "to heal" was reasonable. It therefore limited its restitution order to the four days Roommate testified he missed because of Morrison's assault. Because the district court "is uniquely equipped to make factual findings based exclusively on oral testimony," it did not exceed its discretion in awarding Roommate his lost wages. Kidd , 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 34, 321 P.3d 200 (cleaned up).

CONCLUSION

¶23 The district court did not err in awarding Roommate $ 70.28 for one month's increased rent and $ 464 for four days' lost wages. But we reverse the district court's award of restitution for a $ 35 housing application fee, a $ 200 security deposit, and a $ 333.25 professional-movers expense. Because Morrison does not challenge the restitution award of $ 150 for a broken television and $ 144.90 for a damaged nightstand, we remand to the district court to reduce the restitution order to $ 829.18, the amount that covers the pecuniary harm proximately caused by Morrison's crime.

      Morrison initially failed to respond to the State's motion for restitution, and the district court ordered Morrison to pay the full amount requested by the State. The court later granted his motion to vacate the restitution order, and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing.

      Morrison makes no distinction between damages that were proximately caused by the assault as opposed to criminal mischief. Thus, we also make no distinction and, for simplicity, refer to the assault and the criminal mischief charges collectively as "assault," unless context suggests otherwise.

      Roommate paid $ 500 a month while living with Morrison. The first month's rent at his new apartment was $ 570.28.

      The district court stated at the hearing that "most the wages, or the moving expenses are reasonable, and [it was] not struggling with those." The court did struggle, however, "with the six additional days" requested by Roommate. The prosecutor agreed that the six additional days were not allowed under the statute but argued that "even when [the] Defense filed their objection [to the restitution amount,] ... they acknowledged that the four days was probably reasonable."

      This amount included $ 150 for a broken television and $ 144.90 to replace Roommate's damaged nightstand. Morrison does not challenge those portions of the decision.

      We also note that although there was limited evidence presented at the restitution hearing on this point, such paucity is at least partly attributable to Morrison. In his motion seeking to vacate the district court's original restitution order, Morrison conceded that "restitution is ... appropriate for the four days [Roommate] was unable to work." The State contends that Morrison invited any error by making this concession. At the restitution hearing, however, Morrison argued that all of Roommate's lost wages were "too attenuated" and were "not appropriate." With this clarification, we conclude that Morrison did not "encourage[ ] the trial court to make an erroneous ruling," see State v. McNeil , 2016 UT 3, ¶ 17, 365 P.3d 699, because it would have been clear to the court after the hearing that Morrison was not stipulating to four days' worth of lost wages. But Morrison's initial concession, though not inviting the court to err, did lull the State into thinking that reimbursement for four days of lost wages was not going to be a point of contention or require much evidence. The State argued at the hearing that "even when [the] Defense filed their objection and asked to ... set the hearing they acknowledged that the four days was probably reasonable." Thus, the limited evidence presented by (continued...) the State is understandable, and the district court did not exceed its discretion in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence that was available.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HAGEN, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    UTAH LEGAL CLINIC, Appellant, v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and State Records Committee of the State of Utah, Appellees.
    No. 20170362-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed April 11, 2019
    Angela H. Elmore, Attorney for Appellant
    Catherine L. Brabson, Salt Lake City, and Margaret D. Plane, Attorneys for Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation
    Judge Diana Hagen authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.
    Opinion
   HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Utah Legal Clinic (ULC) appeals the denial of its petition to set aside the final decision and order of the State Records Committee (the Committee) denying ULC's appeal from a records request under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-101 to -901 (LexisNexis 2016). In the GRAMA request at issue, ULC requested that Salt Lake City Corporation (the City) disclose all records from the City Prosecutor's Office relating to the criminal prosecution of a ULC client. In response to the request, the City declined to turn over certain records it determined to be protected attorney-client communications and attorney work product. See id. § 63G-2-305(17)-(18) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). On review, the district court balanced ULC's stated public interest in exposing misconduct by the chief city prosecutor in its client's criminal case with the City's interest in protecting prosecutor communications relating to threatened litigation and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Because the district court correctly determined that the public interest in favor of disclosing the records was not equal to or greater than the City's interest in nondisclosure, we affirm its denial of ULC's petition to set aside the Committee's final decision and order.

BACKGROUND

Criminal Charges

¶2 In July 2013, Trenton Mellen was pulled over by a Salt Lake City police officer after failing to stop or yield at a stop sign. Based on the officer's observations and Mellen's performance on a field sobriety test, Mellen was arrested and charged by the City with driving under the influence, driving with an expired driver license, and failure to stop or yield at a stop sign. Mellen was subjected to a blood test, which revealed that he had low levels of Trazodone, an anti-depressant and sleep aid, in his system at the time of his arrest. After he received the report, Mellen provided letters to the City from two of his doctors, in which the doctors explained that Mellen took therapeutic levels of Trazodone to treat a medical condition and that they did not believe he ever abused the drug. Neither letter expressly stated that the drug did not impair Mellen's driving.

¶3 In April 2014, after learning from the toxicologist that the level of Trazodone in Mellen's blood was therapeutic but could still impair his driving, the City offered to dismiss the driving under the influence charge if Mellen would plead guilty to being an incapable driver and failure to stop at a stop sign. In an email to the City, Mellen's attorney characterized the offer as "offensive" and stated that she and Mellen intended to "fight this as long as we have to in order to get the desired result." Mellen filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood test and in July 2014, the justice court granted Mellen's suppression motion, determining after an evidentiary hearing that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him. Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-7-118, which entitles prosecutors to a hearing de novo on a "pretrial order excluding evidence," the City appealed this ruling to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(5)(f) (LexisNexis 2018). After the de novo hearing, the district court determined that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mellen and remanded the case back to the justice court. See id. § 78A-7-118(6).

¶4 Following the remand, trial was set for April 2015. Two weeks before the trial date, Mellen provided the City with notice that an expert would testify that the Trazodone "did not influence or impair [Mellen's] driving." The City dismissed Mellen's charges without prejudice before trial.

Civil Lawsuit

¶5 Throughout the proceedings, Mellen maintained that he was not guilty of driving under the influence and had only performed poorly during the field sobriety test due to a prior brain injury. During the traffic stop, Mellen told the officer that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Both Mellen's mother and his uncle also spoke to the officer before Mellen's arrest and confirmed that Mellen had some physical disabilities, but that he had driven without incident since he was old enough to drive.

¶6 Mellen's uncle later contacted the Salt Lake City Council, expressing general concern about the way the City was handling Mellen's case and specific concern about the policies of the chief city prosecutor at that time-Padma Veeru-Collings. Mellen's mother also contacted the Salt Lake City Council by email and expressed similar concerns. She concluded her email to the city council by stating that "it ha[d] come to [her] attention that there is a potential class action suit by and for the disabled and [a local newspaper was] planning an article on [Veeru-Collings]" and that she "would like to see this avoided." In August 2014, while the issue of probable cause was pending in the district court, a local newspaper did publish an article that included information about Mellen's case. The article criticized Veeru-Collings's management of Salt Lake City prosecutors and their continued pursuit of charges against Mellen. Alleging prosecutorial conduct in Mellen's case and one other, the article suggested that prosecutors under Veeru-Collings's supervision were prohibited from exercising discretion in dismissing cases, making plea offers, and pursuing less severe punishments for defendants.

¶7 In April 2016, represented by ULC, Mellen filed a notice of claim against the City and four current and former city prosecutors, including Veeru-Collings. The claim alleged that the City, through its employees, engaged in malicious prosecution "when it caused [Mellen] to be prosecuted with malice and without probable cause," engaged in retaliatory prosecution against Mellen "for his participation in the [local newspaper] article," and violated Mellen's constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Records Request

¶8 A few months before filing the notice of claim on Mellen's behalf, ULC made a GRAMA request that the City provide "[a]ny and all emails sent or received by" any "employee or agent of [the City] ... from July 1, 2013 until today that reference Trenton Mellen" or his justice court or district court cases. The City processed and granted ULC's request in part, providing some records but declining to produce others because it determined that they were prepared "for, or in anticipation of, litigation or a judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceeding." See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(18) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).

¶9 ULC appealed the City's incomplete release of records to the Committee, arguing that the City misclassified the unreleased records as protected under Utah Code subsections 63G-2-305(17)-(18) and that even if the records were properly classified, "public interest in the disclosure of these documents heavily outweighs the[ir] restriction" because the public has a "very strong" interest "in exposing unethical and potentially tortious actions within the City Prosecutor's office." After in camera review of the records at issue, the Committee denied ULC's appeal, determining that the City had properly classified the records as protected and should not be required to produce them.

¶10 ULC filed a petition for judicial review of the Committee's determination and the district court held a bench trial on the matter. At trial, ULC argued that there was a strong public interest "in maintaining a public trust with the prosecutor's office," in ensuring "that taxpayer money is not used in such a manner that wastes valuable resources," and in ensuring "that prosecutors retain the ability to use discretion," all of which favored disclosure. In support of this argument, ULC pointed to the local newspaper article and anonymous comments about it that had been posted online, statements from city prosecutors in emails sent to Mellen's defense counsel, and statements from Veeru-Collings to Mellen's uncle. ULC also submitted affidavits from Mellen and his mother. Mellen and his mother described the negative impact that Mellen's case had on their lives and requested that the records be released so that they could understand what motivated the City to prosecute Mellen. According to ULC, this evidence supports the assertion that "there was concern in the community regarding [Veeru-Collings's] office" that demonstrates a public interest in disclosure of the records.

¶11 The City argued that the evidence did not support a substantial public interest in disclosure. It asserted that based on the evidence submitted at trial, ULC was instead requesting disclosure of the records on behalf of Mellen in order to use them in his civil case against Veeru-Collings and other city prosecutors. It claimed ULC was "asking the Court to turn over emails for at least one express purpose, of attacking the folks involved in [the City Prosecutor's Office] communication[s]." The City also offered the testimony of one of the city prosecutors who had been named in Mellen's notice of claim. He testified that there would be a chilling effect if a prosecutor's "thoughts, mental impressions and conclusions about a case could later serve as the basis of a civil suit against them."

¶12 After taking the evidence submitted at trial under advisement and reviewing the records in camera, the district court concluded both that the records contained protected attorney-client communications and attorney work product and that "the interest favoring restriction of access to the subject documents in this case outweighs the public interest favoring access." In support of this conclusion, the court found that the fact that ULC had filed a notice of civil claim against Veeru-Collings and three other City prosecutors on behalf of Mellen and that Veeru-Collings had left the City before ULC requested the records weighed against ULC's stated public interest. As a result, the court determined that "ULC's records request [was] largely an end run around the discovery rules and the protection of the attorney-client and work product privileges that would apply in the civil litigation." The court also found "that ULC's motivation for the records request is to question the Prosecutor's Office's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion in [Mellen's criminal case]." In other words, "the [court found] that ULC's stated public interest is secondary to [Mellen's] personal interest in the records." Ultimately, "the fact that a civil action against [the City] has been threatened weighs heavily in favor of the [City's] interest favoring restriction of access, especially where the content of the protected documents-the prosecutors' exercise of their prosecutorial discretion-is at the heart of the threatened civil litigation." Accordingly, the court dismissed ULC's petition to set aside the Committee's final decision and order.

¶13 ULC appeals the district court's conclusion that it failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than the interest favoring restriction of access.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 ULC contends that the district court erred in deciding that the City's interest in nondisclosure outweighed the public interest in access because it improperly weighed general policy interests and wrongly considered the private benefit to Mellen of disclosure. "Because balancing competing interests is a fact-intensive and inherently discretionary task, we review the district court's decision [about the balance of policy interests] for abuse of discretion." Schroeder v. Utah Attorney Gen.'s Office , 2015 UT 77, ¶ 17, 358 P.3d 1075 (quotation simplified). However, to the extent that ULC contends that the district court misapplied the legal standard in conducting the balancing test by considering irrelevant interests, "we review its decision for correctness." Id.

ANALYSIS

¶15 Utah's GRAMA statutory framework is designed to balance "the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business," Deseret News Publ'g Co. v. Salt Lake County , 2008 UT 26, ¶ 13, 182 P.3d 372, with privacy rights relating to personal information collected by the government and "the public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access to certain records ... for the public good," Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-102(2) (LexisNexis 2016). Under this framework, "[a] record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute" and "[e]very person has the right to inspect [the record] free of charge." Id. § 63G-2-201(1)-(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). But when government records are properly classified into a category of record that is designated by statute as "protected," see, e.g. , id. § 63G-2-305(17) - (18), the records "may be ordered to be disclosed ... only if the person or party seeking disclosure of the record has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than the interest favoring restriction of access," id. § 63G-2-406(1) (LexisNexis 2016).

¶16 Because ULC does not dispute that the records at issue were properly classified as protected, it has the burden to show that the public interest in releasing the records is equal to or greater than the City's interest in nondisclosure. To determine whether ULC met this burden, the district court was required to weigh and consider "the various interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure and nondisclosure." Id. § 63G-2-404(7)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Generally, we will not "second-guess [a] district court's decision [under this section] so long as it considers all legally relevant factors and reaches a conclusion permitted by law." Schroeder v. Utah Attorney Gen.'s Office , 2015 UT 77, ¶ 49, 358 P.3d 1075 (quotation simplified). In balancing "the various interests and public policies," the court must conduct an analysis of the parties' specific interests, "not a general analysis of competing public policies." Id. ¶ 57. In other words, "the [court's] balancing analysis under GRAMA must be tethered to the specific interests of the parties and the particularized application of the relevant public policies at issue." Id. ¶ 51.

¶17 Our supreme court has defined the contours of the GRAMA balancing analysis on only one occasion. In Schroeder , the court determined that the district court had failed to focus on the "specific interests for and against" disclosing the records and had therefore applied "an improper legal standard" and abused its discretion. Id. ¶ 57. Applying the proper standard, the court held that the records should be disclosed. Id. ¶ 60. The work product records at issue in Schroeder related to a public corruption investigation of the Ogden mayor's office, which was alleged to have "solicited and then diverted thousands of dollars" from a non-profit formed by the mayor to local political campaigns. Id. ¶¶ 5, 58. The court observed that "[t]hese allegations, if true, indicate[d] that an elected official breached the public trust by soliciting funds under false pretenses to benefit political allies" and that, because the non-profit used a shell entity to divert the funds, the scheme was "largely hidden from the public." Id. ¶ 58. As a result, the court determined that disclosure of the attorney work product records would serve the "particularly weighty" right of the public to know "whether their elected officials engaged in unethical, and potentially criminal, activity." Id. The government's interest in protecting attorney work product, on the other hand, was "far less compelling" because the investigation had been closed for several years and thus any interest the government had "in maintaining state prosecutors' zone of privacy to effectively litigate the case [had] diminished substantially." Id. ¶ 59. Upon properly balancing these two interests, our supreme court determined that the public's right to access the records clearly outweighed the government's interest in nondisclosure. Id. ¶ 60.

¶18 The balancing analysis conducted by the district court here comports with the principles of Schroeder and the statutory requirements of GRAMA. The district court found that ULC's specific interest in gaining access to the records "is to obtain evidence to use in [Mellen's] threatened civil litigation" against employees of the City and "to question the Prosecutor's Office's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion in [Mellen's criminal case]." The district court noted that ULC had not alleged "widespread corruption by public officials" at the City Prosecutor's Office. Instead, ULC took issue with Veeru-Collings's management style and the amount of discretion she gave her subordinates to dismiss cases "in the interests of justice." The court determined that the "presence of media coverage" was not "all too significant" in weighing the public interest as it was Mellen's counsel who "initiated the coverage." Moreover, given that Veeru-Collings no longer worked for the City and there were no allegations that the Prosecutor's Office was "currently engaged in the type of conduct described in the [local newspaper] article or ... believed to have occurred in [Mellen's criminal case]," the disclosure would not address any ongoing concerns about the manner in which public officials were discharging their duties. Given that "ULC's allegations [were] mainly limited to [Mellen's criminal case]," the court concluded that "[t]he public interest advanced by ULC is weak."

¶19 The district court weighed this weak public interest against the City's interest in "the ability of the Prosecutor's Office to function in ongoing matters" through written communication without "the attorneys' thoughts, mental impressions and conclusions about a case" later serving "as the basis for a civil suit against them." It determined that "[t]he vast majority of the protected documents are e-mail communications" that "largely reflect the exercise of the attorneys' prosecutorial discretion in [Mellen's criminal case] or seeking legal advice related to [ULC's] threatened litigation." Although the City's interest in protecting the "state prosecutors' zone of privacy to effectively litigate the [criminal] case [had] diminished substantially," see Schroeder , 2015 UT 77, ¶ 59, 358 P.3d 1075, the City retained an "important interest" in protecting the information contained in records "where ULC seeks to use that information in a suit against [the City] and the very attorneys that were involved in the protected communications." Thus, the district court considered the specific interests of the parties and "the particularized application of the relevant public policies at issue" before determining that public policy weighed against disclosure. See id.

¶20 ULC nevertheless contends that the district court improperly weighed the City's general policy interest in avoiding a chilling effect on written communication between prosecutors. But in making this argument, ULC fails to point to where in the district court's findings of fact and order of dismissal the court relied on the City's general policy interests. Indeed, what the court actually found was that credible testimony from the City's witness supported the finding that "releasing attorney-to-attorney communication that reveal prosecutors' mental impressions and core work product in [Mellen's criminal case] would be particularly chilling where the party seeking disclosure (Mr. Mellen) intends to use the records against the very attorney (and their client) involved in the communications." (Emphasis added.) Rather than undermining the court's analysis, these findings tether its analysis to "the specific interests of the parties and the particularized application of the relevant public policies at issue." See id.

¶21 Furthermore, ULC's argument fails to recognize that under Utah Code section 63G-2-406(1), the court may order protected records released only "if the person or party seeking disclosure of the record has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than the interest favoring restriction of access." Based on evidence ULC presented at trial, including the affidavits of Mellen and his mother and the newspaper article that was initiated by Mellen's counsel, the court determined that the public interest ULC advanced was "weak." The court also observed that ULC had not "identified any particularized interest applicable to this case that would not be present any other time a criminal defendant who is dissatisfied with his prosecution seeks to unearth evidence of ill-intent by scouring the prosecutor's e-mails." (Emphasis added.) Under GRAMA, the district court was not required to decide whether the City had shown an interest equal to or greater than the interest put forward by ULC in order to conclude that ULC was not entitled to disclosure of the records. Instead, once it determined that the records were properly classified as protected-a determination that ULC does not challenge-the court was required to determine whether ULC had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its stated public interest in access was equal to or greater than the City's interest in nondisclosure. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-406(1) (LexisNexis 2016). The district court found that ULC had failed to make this showing. Based on the particular interests put forward by both parties and the record before us, we cannot say that the court exceeded its discretion in doing so.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The district court did not exceed its discretion when it balanced the specific interests of ULC and the City for and against disclosure of the protected records and determined that ULC had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its interest in disclosure outweighed the City's interest in protecting attorney-client communications and attorney work product. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant time do not differ in any way material to our analysis from those now in effect, we cite to the current version of the Utah Code for convenience.

      ULC does not ask us to review the district court's determination that the records were correctly classified as protected but only whether, assuming the records were properly classified, the district court properly balanced the relevant policy interests.

      ULC also argues that the district court erred by considering as part of its analysis of the parties' interests the "personal or private benefit" Mellen might gain if the records were disclosed. We disagree with ULC's characterization of the district court's analysis. The district court did not conclude that ULC was not entitled to disclosure of the records because Mellen's civil action might benefit from their release. Rather, the district court determined that the fact that Mellen and ULC were threatening "litigation over the very substance of the subject records" undermined ULC's contention that there was a public interest in disclosure beyond the general interest of "any ... criminal defendant who is dissatisfied with his prosecution." Ultimately, it was ULC's failure "to meet its burden to demonstrate that the public's interest in disclosure is at least equal to [the City's] interest in restricting access," not any prospective benefit to Mellen, that led the court to conclude the records should not be disclosed.


author: HARRIS, Judge:

text:
    James B. LAYTON, Petitioner, v. LABOR COMMISSION, Workers Compensation Fund, Winkel Distributing Company, and Federated Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.
    No. 20180074-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed April 18, 2019
    Benjamin T. Davis and Stony V. Olsen, Attorneys for Petitioner
    Hans M. Scheffler, Attorney for Respondents Workers Compensation Fund and Winkel Distributing Company
    Ford G. Scalley and Joseph A. Skinner, Attorneys, Salt Lake City, for Respondents Winkel Distributing Company and Federated Mutual Insurance Company
    Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Jill M. Pohlman concurred.
    Opinion
   HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 In administrative proceedings before the Labor Commission of Utah (the Commission), James B. Layton sought workers compensation benefits for lower back problems that he attributes to four separate workplace incidents, all of which occurred while he was employed by Winkel Distributing Company (Winkel). The Commission awarded Layton benefits for the first three incidents, but it denied benefits for the fourth (the 2015 Incident). In denying the fourth claim, the Commission determined that Layton had not proved that his injuries were legally caused by the 2015 Incident. Layton now seeks judicial review of that decision, and we decline to disturb it.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Over a period of eight years, Layton worked for Winkel as a beer delivery driver, a job that often required Layton to lift heavy kegs of beer. During this time span, Layton injured himself in four separate workplace incidents-each involving his lower back-while in the course of making beer deliveries.

¶3 The first injury occurred in April 2007, when Layton, while holding a door closed with his left hand, used his right hand to lower a 120-pound beer keg approximately three feet to the ground. During the process, Layton felt a sharp pain in the middle of his back. He visited a doctor that same day, and was diagnosed with "a lumbar sprain /strain with muscle spasms, radiculopathy and left leg pain." Layton underwent twelve chiropractic treatments, after which he noted "no back pain and only some persistent muscle tightness." Later that year, Layton visited another doctor with a complaint of numbness in his leg; the doctor performed a physical exam but did not find any issues. Then, in November of that same year, a spine x-ray was taken that revealed "mild to moderate rotoscoliosis." Layton reported that, while his left leg symptoms had resolved, he was still experiencing pain in his lower back. Despite weekly medication treatments, Layton continued to experience lower back pain while sitting for long periods of time.

¶4 The second injury occurred in July 2010, when Layton lifted a 120-pound beer keg into his truck. As he was lifting the keg, he twisted his body and felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He visited another doctor and was again diagnosed with a lumbar strain. A lumbar spine x-ray taken the following week revealed "mild degenerative changes at L4-L5."

¶5 The third injury occurred in December 2012, when Layton slipped on ice and fell while in the process of transferring a forty-pound mini keg from his delivery truck to a hand truck. During the fall, Layton felt immediate pain in his lower back, which he later described as being "constant, mild in severity, moderate in intensity, sharp, throbbing, aching and stabbing." A lumbar spine x-ray taken after the incident revealed "disc osteophytes of L4-5 and L5-S1 consistent with degenerative disc disease [ (DDD) ]," a preexisting condition in which pain is caused by a spinal disc that loses integrity. The injury was diagnosed as a "lumbar strain." Layton was prescribed medication and underwent seventeen chiropractic treatments.

¶6 The fourth injury-the 2015 Incident-occurred in January 2015, when Layton lifted an 18-pack case of beer, weighing approximately nineteen pounds, off a chest-height stack. After lifting the case with his arms outstretched in front of his torso, Layton began to pull the case toward his chest, at which point he felt "an immediate electrical sensation travel down his back" and into his legs, causing him to fall to the ground where he was immobilized for a number of minutes.

¶7 Following the 2015 Incident, Layton visited a number of doctors seeking treatment for his lower back. In February 2015, a lumbar spine MRI revealed a number of problems, all of which "would be consistent with limited [DDD] of the lumbar spine." After reviewing the MRI, Layton's doctor recommended against surgery and diagnosed him with "chronic back pain, stenosis at L4-5, and disc herniations." In May 2015, a medical consultant for WCF Mutual Insurance Company (WCF)-Winkel's insurance carrier for the first three incidents-evaluated Layton's case. The consultant, a medical doctor, opined that the 2015 Incident "resulted in an acute injury" and that the first three incidents had caused injuries that were "temporary aggravations" of Layton's DDD.

¶8 During the next few months, Layton's symptoms did not improve and he continued to manage his pain by taking pain medication and receiving "medial-branch blocks on the left side of his lumbar spine." Although the treatments provided some relief, they did not completely eliminate the pain. In August 2015, Layton's primary care provider, a family-practice physician assistant, opined that the 2015 Incident contributed to Layton's lower back condition. He further opined that "a preexisting condition contributed to" Layton's 2015 injury. He referred Layton to a neurosurgeon who concluded that conservative care of Layton's back had failed and that surgery was necessary to treat his DDD. Layton underwent surgery to treat his lumbar spine in October 2015.

¶9 Following the surgery, in July 2016, Federated Mutual Insurance Company (Federated)-Winkel's insurance carrier for the 2015 Incident-referred Layton to its medical consultant for a second evaluation. This consultant, a doctor in neurology and psychiatry, opined that the 2015 Incident "was a temporary aggravation" of Layton's "preexisting lumbar spine condition." He explained that Layton's October 2015 surgery had not been necessary, industrially speaking, because the 2015 injury was "temporary in nature." He also noted that the 2015 injury "had improved 70% by March 2015," and that another doctor had described Layton's injury as "mild" in April 2015. In October 2016, WCF referred Layton's case to yet another medical consultant, this one a doctor of occupational medicine, for a third evaluation. He concluded that the first three industrial incidents medically caused Layton to suffer lower back strains. He also opined that the 2015 Incident "did not result in any new injury" to Layton and that the lumbar spine surgery in October 2015 "was not necessary on an industrial basis."

¶10 In January 2016, Layton filed a claim seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained in all four workplace incidents. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), after which the ALJ ordered that the medical issues be referred to an impartial medical panel (the Panel) for consideration.

¶11 The Panel was comprised of two medical doctors, one a doctor in occupational medicine and the other a general surgeon. After examining Layton and reviewing his medical records, the Panel determined that Layton had suffered lower back strains as a result of each incident. However, the Panel also determined that Layton suffers from DDD "as an underlying preexisting condition," and that Layton's DDD "was not the result of any of the four back injuries," although it acknowledged that "those injuries may have temporarily aggravated the preexisting DDD."

¶12 Layton objected to the Panel's final report, but the ALJ overruled the objection and admitted the report into evidence. Relying on both the Panel's report and the other evidence in the record, including the medical opinions of numerous physicians, the ALJ concluded that Layton suffers from DDD that was not caused by any of his industrial incidents, stating that "no evidence demonstrates that [Layton's] preexisting condition is attributable to his industrial injuries." Indeed, the ALJ found that Layton's preexisting DDD instead had contributed to at least his 2010, 2012, and 2015 industrial injuries. Therefore, under applicable Utah law, to receive compensation for these injuries, Layton was required to make a heightened showing in order to prove that his injuries were legally caused by the incidents (rather than by his preexisting condition). The ALJ then determined that Layton could make the heightened showing for the first three industrial incidents, but that he had not done so with regard to the 2015 Incident. Accordingly, the ALJ awarded Layton compensation for injuries sustained in the first three incidents, but not for injuries sustained in the fourth.

¶13 Layton appealed the ALJ's decision regarding the 2015 Incident to the Commission. Despite prevailing on his claims regarding the first three incidents, Layton asked the Commission to reverse the ALJ's decision regarding the 2015 Incident, because it prevented him from obtaining compensation for ongoing care and treatment, including the October 2015 surgery, of his DDD. In his appeal to the Commission, Layton conceded that he had been suffering from a preexisting condition at the time of the 2015 Incident, and did not claim to be able to prove legal causation under the higher standard. But he argued, among other things, that he could demonstrate causation under the usual standard, and asserted that the ALJ erred in requiring him to make the heightened showing with regard to the 2015 Incident. After review, the Commission concluded that the issue of legal causation was dispositive of Layton's 2015 claim and that the ALJ had applied the correct standard to that claim. Given Layton's acknowledgment that he was unable to prove legal causation under the heightened standard, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision to deny Layton's claim for compensation stemming from the 2015 Incident. Shortly thereafter, Layton filed a motion for reconsideration of the Commission's decision, which the Commission denied.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 Layton now seeks judicial review of the Commission's decision, and he asks us to set aside its determination that the 2015 Incident was not compensable due to lack of legal causation. Although Layton concedes that he cannot show legal causation under the higher standard, he contends that the Commission erred in its decision to apply the higher standard, and therefore it erroneously concluded that his injuries were not legally caused by the 2015 Incident. As we explain below, the question about which standard to apply-the usual one or the heightened one-is driven by a factual inquiry, namely, whether Layton's DDD was caused by any of the four workplace incidents. The Commission answered that factual question in the negative, crediting the Panel's finding that Layton's DDD "was not the result of any of the four back injuries." We afford "substantial deference" to the Commission's factual findings, and will not disturb them unless Layton "demonstrates that a finding is not supported by substantial evidence." Danny's Drywall v. Labor Comm'n , 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 11, 339 P.3d 624 (quotation simplified). "In conducting a substantial evidence review, we do not reweigh the evidence and independently choose which inferences we find to be the most reasonable." Id. (quotation simplified). Rather, we defer to the Commission's findings "because when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the fact-finder's province to draw the inferences and resolve these conflicts." Id. (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶15 Layton's argument that the Commission erred is premised on his contention that the Commission applied the wrong standard for evaluating legal causation when it determined that the 2015 Incident was not compensable. Layton asserts that the Commission should have applied the regular legal causation standard to evaluate the incident, rather than the higher standard that it applied. The applicable legal causation standard in workers' compensation cases depends on whether the injured worker suffers from a preexisting condition and, if so, whether that preexisting condition was caused by a previous workplace accident. We must therefore determine whether the Commission correctly concluded that Layton suffers from a preexisting condition that was not caused by any of the industrial incidents.

¶16 In Utah, workers injured by an industrial "accident arising out of and in the course of" their employment are entitled to workers' compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1) (LexisNexis 2015). By its plain language, the statute provides that an injury is compensable only if the injured worker can prove both that the injury was "by accident" and that there is "a causal connection between the injury and the employment." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n , 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986). "In this context, causation is a two-fold concept encompassing both medical causation and legal causation," Murray v. Labor Comm'n , 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 7, 271 P.3d 192, and the injured worker "must supply proof of both" in order to succeed on his claim, Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n , 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

¶17 In this case, the "by accident" and medical causation components are not at issue: no party contests the fact that the 2015 Incident was an "accident," or that Layton can demonstrate that his injuries were medically caused, at least in part, by the 2015 Incident. The only contested issue-and the one upon which the Commission found against Layton-is whether Layton satisfied his burden of proving that his injuries were legally caused by the 2015 Incident. To meet the legal causation requirement, an injured worker must show that the injury for which he or she is seeking compensation "arose out of or in the course of employment." Allen , 729 P.2d at 25. Determining legal causation can be difficult in cases "where the employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition." Id.

¶18 In light of this difficulty, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted an approach to determine legal causation that "is dependent on whether a claimant has a preexisting condition," Fred Meyer v. Industrial Comm'n , 800 P.2d 825, 829 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the holding in Allen ), as well as on whether the claimant was subjected to extraordinary exertion at work, see Allen , 729 P.2d at 25-26. The Allen court noted that "[j]ust because a person suffers [from] a preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation," and made clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable." Id. at 25 (quotation simplified). The court then articulated a standard to ensure that a claimant's recovery for aggravation of a preexisting condition would be limited to situations where the "lighting up" was clearly due to workplace demands rather than to day-to-day wear and tear. Id. (stating that its standard was intended to "eliminat[e] claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work"). Under this framework,

[t]o meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life.

Id. The court summarized its test as follows: "[W]here the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient." Id. at 26.

¶19 In Fred Meyer , this court held that Allen 's heightened legal causation standard applies only if the preexisting condition in question was not itself caused by a separate previous workplace injury. See Fred Meyer , 800 P.2d at 830 (stating that "[t]he Allen test was not meant to disqualify workers from recovering when their workplace-related preexisting conditions are subsequently aggravated by the same workplace"). For instance, in Fred Meyer the Commission determined, as a factual matter, that the claimant's preexisting condition was caused by a previous accident at the same workplace, and on those facts, this court held that the claimant did not need to meet Allen 's heightened standard for demonstrating legal causation. Id. at 829-30. Thus, the question we must confront is whether, as a factual matter, Layton's DDD was caused by one or more of Layton's previous workplace incidents, or whether Layton's DDD was caused by factors unrelated to his work. See id. at 828 (analyzing first the question of the source of the preexisting condition).

¶20 Layton asserts that "it is abundantly clear" that he did not have a preexisting condition prior to the first incident. He also asserts that any preexisting condition he may have had was the result of his prior industrial incidents. In support of his position he points to x-rays, taken after both the first and second incidents, which show signs of the preexisting condition only after the second incident, as well as the medical opinion of one doctor who opined that Layton did not suffer from a preexisting condition at the time of the first incident.

¶21 The question of whether Layton's DDD was caused by any of his workplace incidents is a factual question and, on such questions, we accord substantial deference to the Commission's factual findings. Cook v. Labor Comm'n , 2013 UT App 286, ¶ 10, 317 P.3d 464. We will not disturb the Commission's factual findings "if [they are] based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Id. (quotation simplified). Here, the Commission made a specific finding, relying upon the Panel's opinion and other evidence, that "Layton's prior work injuries did not contribute to his underlying degenerative condition."

¶22 In order to prevail on his challenge to that factual finding, Layton must convince us that the Commission's finding was not "based on substantial evidence." Id. In an attempt to make this showing, Layton correctly points out that there were several pieces of evidence that support his position, including the opinions of a physician assistant and a doctor, and he continually emphasizes that evidence while attempting to downplay the fact that the record contains significant medical evidence to the contrary.

¶23 For example, among other things, the Commission based its determination on the findings contained in the Panel's report, which concluded that Layton suffered from preexisting DDD that had not been caused by the incidents. As noted, the Panel report relied on by the Commission was prepared after the Panel, comprised of two impartial doctors, examined Layton, reviewed all of his medical records, and evaluated his relevant medical history. The Commission also evaluated the specific evidence on which Layton relies, including the opinion of the physician assistant, and determined that it was less convincing than the Panel's report.

¶24 In particular, the Commission found the Panel's opinion persuasive in light of the evidence that Layton's initial 2007 work injury was "a muscle strain" and that there had not been "any indication that it affected the underlying degenerative condition in his lumbar spine." And, as the Panel explained, DDD may be caused by "simple wear and tear, or may have a traumatic cause. However, it rarely starts from a major trauma such as a car accident or heavy lifting. It is most likely due to a low energy injury to the disc that progresses with time." In addition, Layton's radiologic studies, performed from 2001 to 2012, also support this conclusion because they "demonstrated progressive development of DDD." Finally, the Commission found that the Panel's opinion was "supported by the evidence in the record" and was "the product of a thorough, well-reasoned, impartial, and collegial review of all of [Layton's] relevant medical history." In contrast, the Commission concluded that the medical opinion of Layton's physician assistant was less credible than the Panel's opinion because the physician assistant "has less specific training than the panel members on the medical aspects of [Layton's] claim."

¶25 Because the evidence was conflicting, the Commission might conceivably have reached a different result. But where the evidence is conflicting, the Commission as factfinder was tasked with finding facts and choosing between conflicting evidence. And here, the Commission's finding is amply supported by evidence in the record, including the Panel's report. In light of this abundant evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Layton suffered from a non-industrial preexisting condition, Layton has not met his burden of persuading us not to defer to the Commission's factual finding. We therefore credit the Commission's finding that Layton's preexisting DDD was not caused by any of his industrial injuries.

¶26 Because we uphold the Commission's factual finding that Layton suffers from a non-industrial preexisting condition, Layton must meet the higher legal causation standard set forth in Allen in order to successfully demonstrate that his injuries were legally caused by the 2015 Incident. See 729 P.2d at 25-26 ; Fred Meyer , 800 P.2d at 829-30.

¶27 Unfortunately for Layton, there is no dispute about whether he can meet the higher Allen standard for the 2015 Incident: he acknowledges that he cannot, because Layton's actions in lifting the case of beer in January 2015 did not constitute unusual or extraordinary exertion. We therefore have no choice but to conclude that the Commission correctly applied Allen 's legal causation standard to the facts of this case. See 729 P.2d at 25-26. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Commission's determination that Layton did not prove legal causation for the 2015 Incident.

CONCLUSION

¶28 The Commission's factual finding that Layton suffered from a preexisting condition that was not caused by his industrial incidents was supported by substantial evidence and is entitled to deference. Because Layton suffered from a non-industrial preexisting condition, he was required to satisfy the higher Allen standard for legal causation. By his own admission, Layton cannot meet that standard on the facts of the 2015 Incident, and we therefore decline to disturb the Commission's decision not to award him compensation for injuries sustained in that incident.

      Although there was conflicting testimony regarding whether Layton suffered from DDD at the time of the 2007 incident, the ALJ deemed the distinction unimportant as Layton could easily prove legal causation for this incident using either the regular standard or the higher standard. See infra ¶ 18.

      As we explain below, this higher standard is required by our supreme court's decision in Allen v. Industrial Commission , 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), in which the court held that "where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation." Id. at 25-26.

      Medical causation requires the claimant to show that the injury was caused by work-related exertions. Cox v. Labor Comm'n , 2017 UT App 175, ¶ 15, 405 P.3d 863. Here, neither side disputes that Layton's injuries were at least partially caused by work-related exertions, namely, lifting and transporting beer while working for Winkel. Accordingly, it is not necessary to interpret or apply the medical causation test articulated in Cox . See id. ¶ 20 (holding that "to recover for a medical condition, a claimant must show that (1) the industrial accident contributed in any degree to the claimant's condition, such as by aggravating a preexisting condition, and (2) the aggravation is permanent, i.e., the claimant's medical condition never returned to baseline, meaning the claimant's condition immediately before the accident"). We therefore decline Respondents' invitation to use this case to "clarify" certain aspects of our ruling in Cox , and we leave any such questions to a future case in which the issue is squarely presented and fully briefed.