source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BRYNER, Justice. MATTHEWS, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Robert MALABED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, Defendant-Appellant. Morris David Welch, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. North Slope Borough, Defendant-Appellant. Charles Michael Emerson, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. North Slope Borough, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. S-9808.
    Supreme Court of Alaska.
    May 16, 2003.

      William B. Schendel, Schendel & Callahan, Fairbanks, and Kenneth L. Covell, Law Offices of Kenneth L. Covell, Fairbanks, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    David C. Crosby, David C. Crosby, P.C., Juneau, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Robert A. Royce, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Amicus Curiae Alaska State Commission for Human Rights.

      David S. Case, Landye Bennett Blumstein, LLP, Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Alaska Federation of Natives.
    Before: FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and CARPENETI, Justices.
   OPINION

BRYNER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to this court, asking whether a North Slope Borough ordinance enacting a hiring preference in favor of Native Americans violates state or local law. Article I, section 1, of the Alaska Constitution provides that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law." This provision binds local units of Alaska government, including boroughs, to govern equally and in the interest of all Alaskans. We hold that the borough lacks a legitimate governmental interest to enact a hiring preference favoring one class of citizens at the expense of others; its ordinance therefore violates the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.

II FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1997 the North Slope Borough enacted an ordinance that creates a mandatory preference for hiring, promoting, transferring, and reinstating Native Americans in borough government employment. The current version of the preference extends to all Native American applicants who are minimally qualified or meet most minimum job requirements and can meet the remaining requirements during their probationary period of employment; for purposes of the preference, "Native American" is defined to include any person belonging to an Indian tribe under federal law. The ordinance provides:

The granting of employment preference to Native Americans. The preference shall apply to hirings, promotions, transfers, and reinstatements. A Native American applicant who meets the minimum qualifications for a position shall be selected, and where there is more than one Native American applicant who meets the minimum qualifications for a position, the best qualified among these shall be selected. In instances where a Native American applicant meets most of the minimum qualifications for the position and can, during the probationary period, meet the minimum qualifications, that person will be given employment preference. If, at the end of the probationary period, all the minimum qualifications have not been met, the individual may be granted a three-month extension of the probationary period, on a one time basis, by the supervisor. If the person given employment preference is not able to meet the minimum qualifications at the end of the probationary period, he or she will be dismissed from employment and the position will be re-posted. A Native American is a person belonging to an Indian tribe as defined in 25 U.S.C. Section 8703(10).[]

The borough enacted this preference after a study of economic conditions showed that the Native American population within the borough, specifically the resident Inupiat Eskimos, was both underemployed and earning substantially less money per capita than borough residents of other races. As the area's largest local employer, the borough consulted with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to determine whether the borough might qualify for an exemption from federal equal employment opportunity laws. Specifically, the borough asked about an exemption under section 703(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 703(i) exception), which excludes hiring preferences favoring Native Americans working on or near Indian reservations from the strictures of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 708(i) exception states:

Nothing contained in this subchapter [sub-chapter e of 42 U.S.C. § 2000] shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.[]

The commission responded that, in its view, the 703) exeeption's reference to "any business or enterprise" extended to the borough, allowing it to adopt a hiring preference in favor of Native Americans without violating Title VII's equal employment opportunity provisions, assuming that the borough met the exception's other requirements. After receiving this response, the borough assembly enacted the hiring preference by an ordinance passed in February 1997; the borough implemented the preference later that year.

Robert Malabed, Morris David Welch, and Charles Emerson (collectively Malabed) individually filed suit against the borough in federal district court, asserting that they were non-Native applicants for borough employment and had been passed over for jobs in favor of lower-ranked Native American applicants. The suits claimed that the borough's Native American hiring preference violates state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection, the Alaska Human Rights Act, federal civil rights laws, and the borough's charter. The district court granted summary judgment to Malabed, declaring that the preference violated the borough's charter and federal equal protection. The borough appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which has certified the following question:

Is North Slope Borough Code § 2.20.150(A)(27), granting employment preferences to Native Americans in borough hiring, impermissible under local law, state statutory law, or the Alaska Constitution?

III. DISCUSSION

A. Overview of State Constitutional Issues

As already mentioned, Article I, seetion 1, of the Alaska Constitution guarantees equal protection, providing that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law." In addition, Article I, section 3, of the Alaska Constitution categorically prohibits discrimination based on race or national origin: "No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin." The legislature implemented these provisions in part by enacting the Alaska Human Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin, and AS 29.20.6830, which specifically prohibits Alaska's municipalities-including home rule municipalities like the North Slope Borough-from engaging in racial and national origin discrimination.: In recognition of these requirements, the borough's charter itself prohibits these forms of discrimination. "No person may be discriminated against in any borough employment because of race, age, color, political or religious affiliation, or [national] origin."

Relying on these provisions, Malabed argues that the borough's hiring preference adopts a racial classification or, alternatively, a classification based on national origin, in violation of the Alaska Constitution. The borough responds by denying that its preference uses a race-conscious classification; instead, the borough insists, the preference adopts a well-accepted and constitutionally permissible political classification based on membership in federally recognized tribes. In advancing this argument, the borough relies chiefly on Morton v. Mancari.

In Mancari the Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference for hiring and promoting Native Americans within the BIA. Several non-Native American employees challenged the preference, arguing that the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act had repealed the BIA's statutory authority to grant hiring preferences to Native Americans and that the preference amounted to invidious racial discrimination in violation of their Fifth Amendment due process rights. But the Court found that Congress had not repealed the BIA's authority to prefer Native Americans in hiring. And after analyzing the unique historical relationship between the federal government and Native Americans, the Court concluded that the preference was not only not invidious racial discrimination but was not based on race at all.

The Court pointed out that the disputed BIA preference applied only to members of federally recognized tribes and thus exeluded many individuals who were racially Native American. Noting the "unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and the BIA's special interest in furthering Native American self-government, the Court held that the hiring preference was "reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonra-cially based goal."

Assuming for present purposes that the borough's ordinance reflects this kind of political classification and does not discriminate on the basis of race, the ordinance might avoid problems with the Alaska Constitution's bar against racial discrimination. But the political nature of the classification would not necessarily insulate the ordinance from Malabed's equal protection challenge. For the borough, unlike the BIA in Mancart, has no obvious governmental interest, as a borough, in furthering Native American self-government; and Native Americans have no explicitly established "unique legal status" under borough law, as Mancari found them to have under federal law. Given these disparities between federal and local law, the legitimacy of the borough's hiring preference as a political classification is less apparent than the legitimacy of the BIA's hiring preference in Mancari. We must therefore consider whether the ordinanee's ostensibly political lines discriminate in a way that offends the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.

B. Alaska's Three-Step Equal Protection Standard

We have long recognized that the Alaska Constitution's equal protection clause affords greater protection to individual rights than the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. To implement Alaska's more stringent equal protection standard, we have adopted a three-step, sliding-scale test that places a progressively greater or lesser burden on the state, depending on the importance of the individual right affected by the disputed classification and the nature of the governmental interests at stake: first, we determine the weight of the individual interest impaired by the classification; second, we examine the importance of the purposes underlying the government's action; and third, we evaluate the means employed to further those goals to determine the closeness of the means-to-end fit.

1. Step 1: individual interests affected by the preference

To determine how the borough's hiring preference fares under this standard, we begin by considering the importance of the individual interests implicated by the preference. Here, the borough's hiring preference impairs Malabed's right to seek and obtain employment in his profession. Under similar cireumstances, we have declared the right to employment to be an important right. In State, Departments of Transportation & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc., we reviewed an equal protection challenge to an Alaska statute that provided hiring preferences to residents of economically distressed zones for employment on public works projects. A contractor building a road for the state challenged the preference as a violation of Alaska equal protection. Addressing the first step of Alaska's three-step analysis, we held that the "right to engage in an economic endeavor within a particular industry is an 'important' right for state equal protection purposes."

Here, because the individual interest affected is almost identical to the one we considered in Emserch-the right to seek and obtain employment in one's profession-the interest is important for equal protection purposes; its impairment therefore requires us to give close serutiny to the borough's hiring preference:

Close serutiny of enactments impairing the important right to engage in economic endeavor requires that the state's interest underlying the enactment be not only legitimate, but important, and that the nexus between the enactment and the important interest it serves be close.

2. Step 2; importance and legitimacy of borough's interests in the preference

a. The borough's interest in the preference is not legitimate under En-serch.

In the second part of the equal protection analysis we consider the borough's interests, asking whether it had important and legitimate reasons to adopt the hiring preference. The borough offers several reasons supporting its ordinance: reducing unemployment of the largest group of unemployed borough residents-Inupiat Eskimos; strengthening the borough's economy; and training its workforce. But we found comparable governmental interests insufficient in Emserch. There the state tried to establish an important and legitimate governmental interest by arguing that the challenged hiring preference reduced unemployment, remedied social harms resulting from chronic unemployment, and assisted economically disadvantaged residents. Though acknowledging these interests as important, we found them to be illegitimate because they favored one class of Alaskans over another:

While 'these goals are important, they conceal the underlying objective of economically assisting one class over another. We have held that this objective is illegitimate. In Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 710 (Alaska 1975), we ruled that "discrimination between residents and nonresidents based solely on the object of assisting the one class over the other economically cannot be upheld under ... the . equal protection clause[ ]." While that case involved discrimination between state residents and nonresidents, the principle is equally applicable to discrimination among state residents. We conclude that the disparate treatment of unemployed workers in one region in order to confer an economic benefit on similarly-situated workers in another region is not a legitimate legislative goal.[]

Here, as in Enserch, it might seem that "[t]his conclusion essentially ends our ingqui-ry." But the borough nevertheless claims a special interest in preferring to hire Native Americans (an interest not present in En-serch ). It theorizes that this interest flows from a specific congressional mandate-the Civil Rights Act's 703(i) exeeption-or from a more general duty to comply with federal policies adopted for the benefit of Native Americans. Alternatively, the borough asks us to find an implied grant of power in the Alaska Constitution giving it a trust-like interest in legislating for the benefit of Alaska Natives. But as we explain below, these alleged sources do not give the borough the legitimate interest it claims.

b. The Alaska Constitution does not give the borough a legitimate interest in adopting the preference.

We reject at the outset the notion that the Alaska Constitution radiates implied guardianship powers allowing the state or its boroughs to treat Alaska Natives as if they were wards. To be sure, the United States Supreme Court has recognized implied powers in the United States Constitution that allow Congress broad latitude to legislate on behalf of Native Americans. The borough reasons that the Alaska Constitution must implicitly grant parallel powers to state and municipal governments. But the federal government's implied powers spring directly from the express powers granted to Congress in the United States Constitution's Indian Commerce and Treaty clauses:

The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 8, provides Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce with the Indian Tribes," and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the source of the Government's power to deal with the Indian tribes.[]

In contrast to the federal constitution's provisions dealing with Indian tribes, the Alaska Constitution includes no provisions authorizing state action regarding Alaska Natives and so grants no express powers from which implied powers could arise. Indeed, the only provision of the Alaska Constitution that addresses the state's relations with Alaska Natives is article XII, section 12, which effectively disavows any state authority comparable to the federal government's, protective powers. Thus, article XII, section 12, expressly disclaims all "right or title in or to any property, including fishing rights, the right or title to which may be held by or for any Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut, or community thereof," and further specifies "that, unless otherwise provided by Congress, the property, as described in this section, shall remain subject to the absolute disposition of the United States." To the extent that the Alaska Constitution implies anything concerning the state's relations with Alaska Natives, then, it mirrors the constitutional drafters' . well-recognized desire to treat Alaska Natives like all other Alaska citizens. The Alaska Constitution thus implies nothing that would give the borough a legitimate interest in enacting the disputed preference.

c. The 708(i) exception does not give the borough a legitimate interest in adopting the preference.

The borough next contends that the Civil Rights Act's 7030) exception gives it a legitimate interest in enacting the challenged preference. We agree in theory that Congress can create specific mandates or interests empowering states or units of local government to legislate on behalf of Native Americans without creating suspect classifications. Yet such mandates or interests have been found to arise in two relatively narrow situations: in the first, the state acts under a particularized, state-specific congressional delegation of jurisdiction; in the see-ond, the state acts to accommodate federal supremacy in the field by enforcing congres-sionally created federal obligations toward Indian tribes that the federal government would otherwise enforce on its own. The borough's reliance on the Civil Rights Act's 703(i) exception presents little in common with these situations.

Preliminarily, we note that the disputed ordinance itself raises serious questions concerning its compliance with the federal ex-eeption's purpose. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interprets the 708(i) exception to sanction preferences only to Native - Americans generally, not to Native Americans of a particular tribe. The body of the borough's ordinance nominally conforms to the 708(i) exception, extending the hiring preference to all "Native Americans," a term that the ordinance defines to include all persons belonging to Indian tribes as defined under federal law. But the ordinance's prefatory, "Whereas," clauses repeatedly and unequivocally declare that its actual purpose is to benefit the North Slope Borough's "Inupiat Eskimos," who comprise the majority of the borough's citizens.

Unlike the term "Native American," "Inu-piat Eskimo" does not appear to be defined anywhere as requiring tribal membership or any other arguably political status; indeed, it does not appear to describe any particular Indian tribe. And because the class defined by the statement of purposes extends only to Inupiat Eskimos residing in the North Slope Borough, the class that the ordinance intends to prefer is far narrower than the one defined in the 703(i) exception-members of all federally recognized Indian tribes. Because the ordinance expressly professes an intent to benefit a class defined by borough residency and race, its nominally political preference in favor of all Native Americans could be construed as a proxy for an illegitimate race-conscious purpose.

However, we need not decide the case on this basis. For even assuming that the ordinance was properly enacted for its nominal purpose and thus satisfies the 708(i) exception's letter and spirit, we conclude that the borough fails to pinpoint any legitimate governmental interest in enacting a hiring preference in reliance on that exception. The borough's position that the 708(i) exeeption is its legitimate interest strains too hard to extract an affirmative mandate from a law that simply creates an exception.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination in employment practices, including racially discriminatory hiring practices. The 708(i) exception appears in a section entitled "unlawful employment practices." The exeeption's primary effect is to exclude employers located on or near a reservation from various equal employment requirements of the Civil Rights Act that govern "otherwise-unlawful preferential treatment given to Native Americans in certain employment[.]" The exception does not create a hiring program; it does not mandate that any preferences be granted; it does not require any particular action or specify negative consequences for any inaction; and it does not purport to endorse-nor does it imply endorsement of-any particular preference by any particular employer in any particular location. Hence, although the 708(i) exception undoubtedly reflects Congress's strong desire to encourage preferences under the exception's specified circumstances, its mechanism is fundamentally passive: instead of actively creating employer interests, it presupposes that those interests already exist or will be offered elsewhere.

Though similar to the present case in certain respects, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Livingston v. Ewing does not support the proposition that the 708(i) exception creates a broad enough interest to allow state and local government action. There, the Tenth Circuit allowed the City of Sante Fe to restrict vendors of handcrafted jewelry within the grounds of the Museum of New Mexico and the Palace of the Governors to members of Native American tribes, declaring that the 708(i) exception was sufficiently broad to sustain the preference. In so doing, the court read Morton v. Mancari as holding that an employment preference is "not to be considered racial discrimination of the type generally proseribed" when it turns on "the unique legal status of Indians under federal law ... and the assumption of guardian-ward status to legislate specially on behalf of Indian tribes." Applying this interpretation, the court found Mancari to be a "very strong precedent for upholding the grant of the exclusive right to the Indians in the present case based on the employment statute in § 2000e-2() [the 703(i) exeeption]."

The Tenth Cireuit's ruling is distinguishable from this case for important reasons. The plaintiffs in Livingston did not challenge the city's actions under state constitutional law-they based their challenge strictly on the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. Unsurprisingly, then, the claim in Livingston gave the Tenth Cireuit no reason to look beyond the "unique legal status of Indians under federal law" -a status that exists and creates strong federal interests independently of the 708(i) exception. Moreover, the state interest furthered by the preference in Livingston was a strong and specific interest in preserving New Mexico's historical and cultural traditions: the preference only extended to established Indian uses of Santa Fe's historic Palace of Governors, reportedly the oldest public building in the United States; Indian use of the site dated back to the 1680s, and. the particular activities covered by the preference had been performed almost exclusively by Indians since the early 1900s. The court viewed these facts as establishing a compelling state interest in "acquiring, preserving and exhibiting historical, archeological and ethnological interests in fine arts." Livingston thus stands in sharp contrast to the borough's case. Nothing in the Tenth Cireuit's ruling in Livingston indicates that the court viewed the 708(i) exception alone as creating affirmative interests sufficient to sustain a municipal hiring preference in favor of Native Americans. And unlike the City of Santa Fe in Livingston, the borough here advances no independently viable state interest in economically preferring one group of workers over others; the economic interests it asserts are indistinguishable from those that we found illegitimate in Enserch.

We by no means suggest that boroughs are categorically barred from adopting hiring preferences. Nor do we suggest that all state or local legislation pertaining to Alaska Natives or tribal governments should be assumed to establish suspect classifications presumptively barred by equal protection. Our focus is considerably narrower: we simply hold, in keeping with Emserch, that the borough has no legitimate basis to claim a general governmental interest in enacting hiring preferences favoring one class of citizens over others; and we find that the borough has failed to identify any source of a legitimate, case-specific governmental interest in the preference it actually adopted-a hiring preference favoring Native: Americans. Because the borough is a political subdivision of Alaska, its legitimate sphere of municipal interest lies in governing for all of its people; preferring the economic interests of one class of its citizens at the expense of others is not a legitimate municipal interest, regardless of whether we view its ordinance as drawing distinctions founded on political status or race.

3. Step 3: means-to-end fit

The last step of equal protection analysis under the Alaska Constitution examines the nexus between the state's asserted interests and the means selected to implement those interests. As previously mentioned, even when the state acts for important and legitimate reasons, its action must bear a close connection to those interests to justify impairing an important individual right. Here, of course, because we have found no legitimate borough interest supporting the challenged preference, we need not dwell on the closeness of its means-to-end fit. But a brief comment on the issue is nevertheless important to establish an alternative basis for our equal protection ruling.

For even assuming that the borough had legitimate and. important interests in enacting a hiring preference favoring Native Americans, its preference is not closely related to attaining those interests. Addressing a similar situation in Enserch, we found a hiring preference in favor of residents of economically distressed areas unconstitutional under Alaska's equal protection guarantee in part because the fit between the preference and its objective was not sufficiently close. We noted that the preference failed to "prioritize relief for those areas most affected by nonresident employment" and that it set no meaningful limits on the state's power to declare any part of Alaska economically distressed at any time.

Here, the nexus between the borough's preference and its stated goals is insufficiently close for comparable reasons. The primary interest asserted by the borough lies in reducing Native American unemployment. But when viewed in light of this purpose, the borough's hiring preference is stunningly broad: it extends borough-wide and to all aspects of borough. employment; is potentially limitless in duration; covers not only hiring but also promotions, transfers, and rein-statements; and applies absolutely-even to the extent of requiring Native American applicants without minimum qualifications to be hired over qualified non-Native applicants. Because the borough advances no particular reasons to justify these sweeping provisions, it fails to establish a close fit between its goals and its actions.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the borough's hiring preference violates the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of equal protection because the borough lacks a legitimate governmental interest to enact a hiring preference favoring one class of citizens at the expense of others and because the preference it enacted is not closely tailored to meet its goals.

MATTHEWS, Justice, concurring.

MATTHEWS, Justice,

concurring.

I agree with the opinion of the court that the borough hiring preference violates the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution and with much of the court's reasoning. But I prefer to address directly the question whether the ordinance discriminates on the basis of race. I believe that it does, for the reasons that follow.

Inupiat Eskimos are a racial rather than a tribal group. The ordinance frankly acknowledges that its goal is to benefit them. In a prefatory clause the ordinance states "that its purpose in establishing an employment preference for Native Americans is to employ and train its Inupiat Eskimo residents in permanent, full-time positions...." Another clause sounds the same theme: "Whereas, to increase the employment of Inupiat Eskimos, the North Slope Borough would like to give an employment preference to Native Americans...." Similarly, the implementation plan for the ordinance expressly states that its purpose is to employ Inupiat Eskimo residents. Further, at oral argument counsel for the borough explained that one reason the term "Native American" was defined in terms of tribal membership was that it served to distinguish eligible Native Americans from others who are not eligible for benefits under the preference ordinance even though they may have some Native American ancestors. Tribal membership was thus used as a convenient mechanism to de-seribe bona fide Native Americans.

«Based on the above we can say with confidence that the purpose of the ordinance was to discriminate on the basis of race. Because by the express terms of the civil rights clause of the Alaska Constitution race is a suspect category, the ordinance must be subjected to strict serutiny in order to determine whether it is permissible under the equal rights and civil rights clauses. But even if there were no clear indicators of an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, I believe that strict serutiny would still be required because tribal membership is not only a political category but a racial one.

I reach the conclusion that state or municipal laws that grant individual benefits differentially based on tribal membership should be subject to strict serutiny for a number of reasons. 'As noted, this is how we treat all race-based classifications. Further, strict scrutiny is well designed to ensure that laws remain race-neutral, as contemplated by the framers of the Alaska Constitution. This case illustrates that tribal membership readily lends itself to use as a proxy for a racial classification and as a pretext for racial discrimination. An effective tool is necessary to prevent these abuses. In addition, strict serutiny is the approach taken by some federal courts in tribal classification cases when construing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. Since the federal constitution contains provisions authorizing legislation on behalf of Native Americans, while the Alaska Constitution presumptively prohibits such legislation, it follows that stronger reasons exist for using the strict serutiny method for state constitutional questions than for those arising under the federal constitution.

Although strict scrutiny review presents a high barrier, it is a barrier that may be overcome in deserving cases. It is impossible to categorize the kinds of cases that might pass strict scrutiny review. But a federal law calling on the state to give preferential treatment to tribal members would almost certainly present a compelling justification for state legislation. On balance, I believe that strict serutiny properly accommodates the state's strong interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of race and its relatively rare and limited need to act adjunctively with the federal government in programs that favor tribal members over other state citizens.

The present ordinance does not survive strict scrutiny review. As the opinion of the court establishes, the borough had no legitimate interest, much less a compelling one, in adopting the preference. I believe therefore that the ordinance is prohibited by article I, sections 1 and 3 of the Alaska Constitution.

      . North Slope Borough Code (NSBC) § 2.20.150(A)(27) (1998). The original version of the hiring preference, NSB Ord. 80-26-12 (1997), did not include the extension of the preference to Native American applicants who failed to meet some of the minimum qualifications. NSB Ordinance 80-26-13 (March 3, (amending NSBC § 2.20.150(A)(27)). 1998)

      . Section 703(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1994).

      . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified as subchapter e of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994). Subchapter e broadly proscribes various forms of discriminatory employment practices.

      . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1994).

      . Alaska Appellate Rule 407 authorizes the supreme court to answer questions of state law certified to it by certain federal courts, including courts of appeals.

      . The Alaska Human Rights Act, AS 18.80.010-18.80.300, was originally enacted in 1963. Ch. 15, SLA 1963. The legislature extended the protections of the Act to bar unlawful employment discrimination by the state or its political subdivisions in 1966. Ch. 79, § 1, SLA 1966 (enacting AS 18.80.255). AS 18.80.255 provides in relevant part: "It is unlawful for the state or any of its political subdivisions ... to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person any local, state, or federal funds, services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because of race, religion, sex, color, or national origin{.]"

      . AS 18.80.220(a)(1).

      . AS 29.20.630 provides in relevant part:
      (a) A person may not be appointed to or removed from municipal office or in any way favored or discriminated against with respect to a municipal position or municipal employment because of the person's race, color, sex, creed, national origin or, unless otherwise contrary to law, because of the person's political opinions or affiliations.

      (c) This section applies to home rule and general law municipalities.

      . NSB Charter § 16.020.

      . 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 LEd.2d 290 (1974).

      . See id. at 538, 551, 554, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . See id. at 539, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . See id. at 545-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . See id. at 553 & n. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . See id. at 553 n. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. 2474.

      . See, eg., State, Dep'ts of Transp. & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 631 & n. 11 (Alaska 1989).

      . Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984).

      . 787 P.2d at 625.

      . See id. at 631-32 (applying test from Brown, 687 P.2d at 269-70).

      . Id. at 632 (citing Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1266 (Alaska 1980)).

      . Id. at 633 (citing Apokedak ).

      . See id. at 634.

      . Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).

      . Id.

      . Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974).

      . Id.

      . Alaska Const. art. XII, § 12.

      . See 4 Proceedings of Alaska Constitutional Convention 2525, 2527-91 (Jan. 18, 1956). As Delegate Davis said:
      [We consider the Eskimo and the Indian a citizen just the same as all the rest of us. We don't consider that he is any better than we are, and we don't consider that he is any worse. He is a man just like we are; and he is entitled to all the rights and privileges and all the duties of citizenship, just as we are; and he is covered by the bill of rights that we are adopting here, just as we are.
      Id. at 2536-37. See also Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 155 (Alaska 1977) (approvingly quoting Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 50-51, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962)).

      . See, eg., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (a state law relating to Native Americans does not create a "suspect" class for purposes of equal protection when enacted in direct response to congressional authorization specifically aimed at the state).

      . See, eg., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 92 Wash.2d 939, 603 P.2d 819, 824 (1979) (holding that the special status of Native Americans under federal law created a "permissible class" for purposes of state equal protection allowing Washington to protect treaty-guaranteed Native American access to fisheries in Washington after Supreme Court indicated in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695-96, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 LEd.2d 823 (1979), that Supremacy Clause would grant federal courts power to enforce those rights directly).

      . See Policy Statement on Indian Preference Under Title VII, N-915.027, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 405:6647 (May 16, 1988). This interpretation accords with Mancari's view of the exception as a provision enacted in recognition "of the unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-46, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 LEd.2d 290 (1974) (discussing 703() exception); see also Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1118, 1124 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that hiring preference for Navajos discriminates against Hopis and other Native Americans on basis of national origin}.

      . See NSBC § 2.20.150(A)(27) (1998) ("A Native American is a person belonging to an Indian tribe as defined in 25 U.S.C. Section 3703(10)."). We note that in 1988 the EEOC issued a formal interpretation and policy statement regarding the 703) exception. The statement "delineate[d] [the EEOC's] position with respect to the exception provided in Section 703(i) of the [1964 Civil Rights] Act." See Policy Statement on Indian Preference Under Title VII, N-915.027, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 405:6647 (May 16, 1988). The statement took the position that "the terms 'Indian reservation' and 'reservation' in Section 703(@) of Title VII include ... land held by incorporated Native groups, regional corporations, and village corporations in Alaska under the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act." Id. at 6650. In 1996, relying in part on the 1988 policy statement, an EEOC attorney sent the borough an opinion letter expressing the view that "Title VII permits a state or local government employer to invoke the Indian preference provision in section 703)"; yet the letter also noted that the borough would have to meet the exception's other criteria, "including the 'on or near a reservation' requirements." For purposes of deciding this case, we assume arguendo that the borough meets the "on or near an Indian reservation" requirements under the 703() exception, expressing no opinion on that issue.

      . Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 145 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000) (warning that "[alncestry can be a proxy for race"); Da-wavendewa, 154 F.3d at 1120 (hiring preference favoring specific tribe discriminates on basis of national origin).. We are aware that the EEOC has recognized that "as a practical matter," 703(i) preferences "may operate, in effect, to favor only members of [a] specific tribe without disadvantaging Indians of other tribes;" in the EEOC's view, these circumstances do not impair the preference's validity. See Policy Statement on Indian Preference Under Title VII, N-915.027, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Emp. Prac. Manual) 405:6654 (May 16, 1988). But while the EEOC's position tolerates these unavoidable incidental effects, it stops well short of condoning a preference enacted for the express purpose of favoring a narrow class of local residents defined by their racial or cultural heritage.

      . In briefing this case, neither party specifically discusses the significance of the disparity between the body of the ordinance and its statement of purposes or whether the ordinance's stated purposes jeopardize its compliance with the 703(i) exception. Moreover, the issue is complicated by the discussion of the exception set out in the EEOC's 1988 policy statement, which lends itself to varying interpretations and could generate misunderstanding. See note 33, above. Given these circumstances, we choose not to rest our decision on the ordinance's apparently race-conscious statement of purposes.

      . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).

      . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1994), quoted at note 4, above.

      . 1 Barsara Linpemann & Paur Grossman, Emptorment Discrmination Law 387 (Paul W. Cane, Jr., ed., 3d ed.1996).

      . Given our conclusion that the 703) exception creates no general state or borough interests in enacting hiring preferences, we find no merit to the borough's contention that the exception preempts any state law prohibiting a borough from enacting a preference. For a similar reason, we reject the borough's related contention that its interest in enacting a Native hiring preference flows from a general duty implied under federal law to "implement federal Indian policy." The borough cites Morton v. Mancari as confirming this interest. But by tying the federal government's "unique obligation toward the Indians" to the powers that arise under the United States Constitution's Indian Commerce and Treaty clauses, which are plenary and extend exclusively to Congress, 417 U.S. at 551-52, 94 S.Ct. 2474, Mancari cements the point that federal law implies no general role for states to play in carrying out federal Indian policy, leaving it to Congress to enlist state aid or direct state action by positive law. Our conclusion that no legitimate borough interest in a preference arises under the 703(i) exception-the only positive federal law that the borough contends is applicable-thus disposes of the point.

      . 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir.1979).

      . Id. at 1111, 1115. The Museum and Palace were not on a reservation and were state properties. See id. But see Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F.Supp. 1527, 1530-31 (D.N.M.1990) (declaring unconstitutional under a strict seruti-ny analysis a similar city ordinance in Albuquerque limiting vending within Old Town to Indians).

      . Livingston, 601 F.2d at 1114-15.

      . Id. at 1113.

      . Id. at 1114.

      . See id. at 1112.

      . Id. at 1113 (emphasis added).

      . Id. at 1112; Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F.Supp. 825, 827-28 (D.N.M.1978).

      . Livingston, 601 F.2d at 1115.

      . Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. Number 38, 496 N.W.2d 829 (Minn.App.1993), is inapposite for similar reasons. The case did not address a preference arising under the 703(i) exception and cannot fairly be read as supporting the proposition that this exception creates state interests justifying Indian employment preferences. Krueth considered a provision of Minnesota's American Indian Education Act allowing schools with ten or more American Indian students to retain American Indian teachers with less seniority over non-Indian teachers with more seniority. Id. at 833. The Minnesota legislature enacted the provision to meet "the unique educational and culturally-related academic needs of American Indian people." Id. (quoting Minn.Stat. § 126.46 (1990)). As in Livingston, the equal protection challenge in Krueth was advanced ouly under the federal constitution. Id. at 835. Characterizing the challenged preference as a political classification of the kind recognized in Mancari, the court in Krueth decided to apply rational basis review in determining its constitutionality. Id. at 836, 837. Under this standard, the court upheld the statute as applied to the school district action at issue; noting that "[this school district is located entirely on the Red Lake Reservation and consists of a student population almost 100% American Indian," the court observed that if the challenged statute "has meaning anywhere in the State of Minnesota, it has meaning in Independent School District No. 38, Red Lake, Minnesota." Id. at 837. Cf. Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F.Supp. 1527, 1530-31 (D.N.M.1990) (striking down ordinance after finding that city did not have powers similar to the federal government that would enable city to prefer members of federally recognized tribes).

      . Cf. Laborers Local 942 v. Lampkin, 956 P.2d 422, 431-32 (Alaska 1998) (upholding Fairbanks North Star Borough's requirement that successful construction contract bidder enter into project labor agreement with local labor unions given established use of such agreements in construction industry, Congress's endorsement of the agreements, and close nexus between agreement and borough's important economic interests); see also Krueth, 496 NW.2d at 836.

      . To the contrary, we think that the state has considerable latitude in dealing with recognized tribes as to matters of intersecting governmental concern when the state's actions rationally promote legitimate mutual governmental or proprietary interests. Ilustrations of political classifications that meet these criteria are not confined to any particular branch of state government. For example, AS 47.14.100(g) allows the Department of Health and Social Services to "enter into agreements with Alaska Native villages or Native organizations under 25 U.S.C. § 1919 (Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978) respecting the care and custody of Native children and jurisdiction of Native child custody proceedings." This legislative provision relates to inter-governmental interaction and is designed to further Native self-governance by involving Native governments in custody determinations of their own members. In the executive branch, Administrative Order 186 exemplifies a political classification, acknowledging "the legal and political existence of the federally recognized Tribes within the boundaries of Alaska" and declaring the state's commitment "to work on a government-to-government basis with Alaska's sovereign Tribes, which deserve the recognition and respect accorded to other governments[,]" and to "establish[ ] a comprehensive and mutually respectful State Tribal relations policy in an effort to promote and enhance Tribal self-government, economic development, a clean and healthy environment, and social, cultural, spiritual, and racial diversity." Administrative Order No. 186 (Sept. 29, 2000) (superceding and revoking Administrative Order No. 125 (Aug. 16, 1991)). And in the judicial arena, this court relied on a political classification in applying principles of comity to acknowledge that federally recognized tribes in Alaska retain concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between tribal members and that their judgments should be accorded comity in appropriate cases. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 749-50, 762-63 (Alaska 1999).

      . See State, Dep'ts of Transp. & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 634 (Alaska 1989); see also Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 708-10 (Alaska 1975).

      . We emphasize that the borough has not attempted to defend its ordinance as an affirmative action measure necessary to remedy a historical imbalance attributable to discriminatory hiring. Since the issue is not presented here, we need not determine the circumstances under which a borough might make a viable showing of affirmative action. Based on the current briefing and the limited record on certification, however, it seems unlikely that the borough could have prevailed on an affirmative action claim under prevailing federal constitutional standards. See, eg., Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 133, 136 (5th Cir.1997) (describing diversity-focused "affirmative action plans" and emphasizing that governmental racial preferences are constitutionally permissible only when necessary to counteract past provable discrimination by the governmental unit involved) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986)); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (government contractor preference using race to identify social and economic disadvantage was subject to strict scrutiny); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (government contractor preference using race to identify social and economic disadvantage was subject to strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 LEd.2d 854 (1989) (describing system of city contracting, held unconstitutional, that required general contractors to award 30% of contract's value to minority business subcontractors); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (circumstances may no longer support remedial justification for Bureau of Indian Affairs policy precluding non-Natives from owning reindeer in Alaska); cf. Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 372-73 (Alaska 1987) (describing affirmative action program that passed over plaintiff's application to police academy as "minority bump," but declining to review program, because claim was barred by statute of limitations).

      . See Enserch, 787 P.2d at 633.

      . See id. at 634-35.

      . Seeid.

      . See id. '

      . See NSBC § 2.20.150(A)(27) (1998) NSB Ord. 80-26-13 (March 3, 1998). > >

      . To put a human face on what might otherwise appear to be merely an abstract discussion of legal theory, I include the following from Judge Sedwick's opinion in this case:
      Malabed is an [Asian-American] of Filipino descent; he is not a Native American. Mal-abed worked for NSB as a temporary security guard from 1994 through 1998. He applied for a permanent security guard position in July 1997. North Slope Transit [an arm of the North Slope Borough] hired Malabed as a permanent security guard in August 1997, but immediately thereafter canceled the appointment. North Slope Transit re-noticed the position and solicited new job applications. The re-notice announced that NSB's employment preference for Native Americans previously described would apply for the position Malabed sought. Malabed was not hired. North Slope Transit terminated Malabed's temporary assignment on January 14, 1998, because NSB law prohibits temporary employees from holding a position longer than 120 days. Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F.Supp.2d 927, 929 (D.Alaska 1999).

      . See Op. at. 424.

      . Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 1, 3. We have consistently indicated that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review. Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.2d 389, 396 n. 7 (Alaska 1994); State, Dep't of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 626 (Alaska 1993); Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Alaska 1980). Using strict scrutiny, "differential treatment will be upheld only when the purpose of the enactment furthers a 'compelling state interest' and the enactment itself is 'necessary' to the achievement of that interest." State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192 (Alaska 1983).

      . See, eg., Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Paul, 609 P.2d 32, 37 (Alaska 1980) (describing "Tribe" as "a racially discrete population group").

      . See Op. at n. 29 & accompanying text.

      . The reasons for applying strict scrutiny are especially strong when preferential benefits are granted on the basis of a racial classification that benefits a majority of the constituents of the enacting entity. As Judge Sedwick stated: "Courts should be particularly alert when a majority arrogates to itself special privileges and rights otherwise denied to similarly situated members of the minority." Malabed, 42 F.Supp.2d at 940

      . See Malabed, 42 F.Supp.2d at 937-40; Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F.Supp. 1527, 1530-31 (D.N.M.1990).

      . See Op. at 422-423.

      . The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1923, 1951, is an example. In response to this act the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules contain numerous provisions requiring differential treatment of Native Americans. See, eg., Alaska CINA Rules 17(c) and (d)(2), 18(c)(2)(B), and (3).

      . Op. at 423.


author: STEWART, Judge. MANNHEIMER, Judge,

text:
    Sam W. McGEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
    No. A-7697.
    Court of Appeals of Alaska.
    May 9, 2003.

      James M. Hackett, Law Office of James M. Hackett, Inc., Fairbanks, for Appellant.
    John A. Seukanee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
    Before: COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
   OPINION

STEWART, Judge.

We remanded this case to the superior court for additional findings on whether the police had reasonable suspicion to test a package with ion mobile spectrometry. Superior Court Judge Charles R. Pengilly found that the police did not have reasonable suspicion that McGee's package contained contraband when they removed it from the normal flow of commerce and tested it. The State does not challenge Judge Pengilly's factual findings but argues that his legal analysis was flawed. However, we agree with Judge Pengilly that under his findings the police did not have reasonable suspicion to remove the package from the normal flow of commerce to test it. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Pengilly's findings on remand and reverse McGee's convictions.

Background facts and proceedings

The police discovered the evidence against McGee after they intercepted a Federal Express package addressed to McGee and tested it with an Ion Track Instruments "Itemiser'-an ion mobility spectrometer. The Itemiser test revealed traces of a controlled substance. Based on this test result, the police obtained a search warrant to open the package. When the police opened the package, they found about seven ounces (200 grams) of cocaine. This discovery prompted further investigation and ultimately led to several charges against McGee.

McGee moved to suppress the evidence on several grounds but the superior court denied his motion. McGee entered a no contest plea to various counts of controlled substance misconduct while preserving his right to appeal the superior court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

When the case was first before us, McGee raised several claims on appeal, but we addressed only one: We ruled that the police must have reasonable suspicion to temporarily remove a package from the normal flow of commerce and test it with the Itemiser. Because the superior court did not address whether the police had reasonable suspicion, we remanded the case for additional findings. On remand, the superior court held an evi-dentiary hearing; the only witness was Anchorage Airport Police Officer Larry Tower who was assigned to the Statewide Drug Enforcement Unit.

On January 11, 1999, Officer Tower was at the Fairbanks Federal Express facility looking for packages containing drugs or contraband. Officer Tower removed McGee's package from the company's sorting process because he noticed that the airbill was addressed by hand. Tower looked closer at the package after removing it from the sorting area and noticed that the package was addressed to "Sam McGee." Tower conelud-ed that the addressee was fictitions because he recalled "a legend of Sam McGee or something" and the name struck him as "comical." Tower did not check to see if the name was fictitious. He also thought the package was suspicious because it was sent overnight delivery, the airbill did not include a phone number or a description of the contents, and the airbill had an indication that the $21.50 shipping charge was paid with cash. Tower testified that he felt a "container" inside the shipping envelope. He testified that Tacoma, Washington, the city where the package originated, is "one of the source cities ... that Alaska receives a lot of drugs from{[.]" Tower then had the package tested with the Itemiser.

Judge Pengilly reviewed the testimony by the officer and made the following findings: he thought the package might have been "double packaged" as Tower testified; he found the package was shipped from Tacoma, but he rejected the contention that Tacoma was suspicious as a city where "most shipments of drugs to Alaska originate"; he found that the airbill was addressed by hand; he found the shipping charge of about twenty dollars was paid in cash; and he found the officer thought McGee's name was fictitious, but did nothing to check his suspicion. Evaluating all these factors, Judge Pengilly concluded that Tower did not have reasonable suspicion to test the package.

Did the police have reasonable suspicion to remove McGee's package from the normal stream of commerce and test it for controlled. substances?

In Gibson v. State, we ruled that the police need reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before they can temporarily detain a package and subject it to sniffing by a drug detection dog. In our earlier decision in McGee's case, we held this same rule applies when the police temporarily detain a package to test for controlled substances with the Itemiser.

Whether the circumstances of a case establish reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of fact and law. As the Alaska Supreme Court announced when discussing the reasonable suspicion standard:

[TThe police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.... And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? []

Judge Pengilly's factual findings are unchallenged. Judge Pengilly found that McGee's package might have been "double packaged." He found that the package was shipped from Tacoma but did not find that Tacoma was an important source city for drug shipments. He found the shipping charge of about twenty dollars was paid in cash and the airbill was hand written. He also found that the officer thought that McGee's name was fictitious. The question then is whether these facts would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that McGee's package should be tested for controlled substances.

The fact that a FedEx overnight priority delivery package is "double packaged" means little because Federal Express requires that shippers use FedEx containers for their items or have the contents of their package cushioned on all sides with a minimum of two inches of protection. A shipping charge of about twenty dollars for priority delivery from Tacoma to Fairbanks reflects the carrier's normal price range for priority delivery. The State did not present evidence at the hearing before Judge Pengilly that these facts, in conjunction with the remaining facts about the package-the hand-addressed air-bill, the cash payment for shipping from Tacoma, and the officer's subjective thought that McGee's name was comical and therefore fictitious-distinguished McGee's package from any small express package sent from one individual to another. The record provides no information to support a rational inference that the package contained contraband. Therefore, we agree with Judge Pen-gilly that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to test McGee's package with the Itemiser.

Conclusion

We uphold Judge Pengilly's ruling that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to test McGee's package. Accordingly, we REVERSE McGee's convictions.

MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.

MANNHEIMER, Judge,

concurring.

I am writing separately to highlight what I perceive to be the rationale of our decision.

The question presented is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Federal Express package contained contraband when they removed the package from the normal stream of commerce and subjected it to an ion seanner. As we noted in State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734 (Alaska App.1983), the concept of "reasonable suspicion" is "[njecessarily ... somewhat vague". Nevertheless, in Moran we approved Professor Wayne R. LaFave's suggestion that "reasonable suspicion" means "a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. We also quoted the formulation employed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cortes:

Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance [for resolving] the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written [about "reasonable suspicion") is that the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture,] the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

Id. (citing 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 LEd.2d 621, 628-29 (1981)).

The essential dispute in the present case involves the proper interpretation of this last-quoted sentence from Cortes: specifical ly, the meaning of the phrase "particularized and objective basis for suspecting ... criminal activity".

The State argues that the testimony presented to the superior court established particularized and objective reasons for suspecting that the package contained contraband: the person who shipped the package paid extra for overnight delivery; the shipping fee was paid in cash (rather than by check or credit card); the shipping envelope appeared to hold another container inside it; the shipping label was written by hand; and the shipment originated in a city from which many shipments of illicit drugs are sent to Alaska. According to the State, all of these articulated factors show that the police did not randomly pull the package out of the stream of commerce, but rather they acted on identifiable indicators that the package contained contraband.

But as Judge Pengilly suggested in his written decision, and as Judge Stewart suggests in this Court's lead opinion, the problem with the State's articulable factors is that they describe too many innocent shipments. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Prouse, the circumstances offered to validate an investigative stop must serve to differentiate the person stopped from the general public. Likewise, the circumstances offered to justify the temporary detention of mail or mail-like articles shipped through commercial carriers like Federal Express and United Parcel Service must serve to distinguish the detained package from the general body of shipments.

I assume, for purposes of argument, that there is some reason to believe that packages shipped overnight are more likely to contain contraband than packages shipped on a slower delivery schedule. Likewise, I assume that there is some reason to believe that a package is more likely to contain contraband if the shipper pays the fee in cash, or addresses the package with a handwritten label. Finally, I assume that there are identifiable cities which are the origination points for a large number of drug shipments to Alaska. But if the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the search and seizure provision of Alaska's Constitution (Article I, Section 14) are to act as curbs to government intrusion, it is not enough for the State to point to identifiable reasons to suspect that a package contains contraband. The State's reasons must also serve to differentiate the suspected package from the body of innocent packages.

Doubtless, some ascertainable and predictable percentage of all mailings and commercial shipments contain drugs or other contraband. Thus, the State could properly assert that there is an identifiable, non-negligible possibility that any package, selected at random, will contain drugs. But if people are to have any privacy in the letters and packages they send, this fact can not serve as a justification for subjecting all mailings to government serutiny.

In the present case, the factors that the State relies on to justify its seizure and search of the package deseribe too many innocent mailings. As Judge Stewart points out in his opinion, Federal Express normally requires all persons to use the company's shipping envelopes (even when the item being shipped is already enclosed in a coritainer). Thus, the fact that McGee's package may have been "double packaged" does not differentiate it from a great number of other Federal Express shipments. The same is true regarding the fact that the shipping label was handwritten and the fee was paid in cash. One could reasonably expect to find handwritten labels affixed to most of the packages shipped by individuals and businesses who do not routinely ship items through express commercial carriers. Moreover, since the standard fee for express delivery is slightly over $20, one could expect that many of these people would pay in cash. Finally, as Judge Pengilly pointed out, the fact that a large number of drug shipments come to Alaska from Tacoma, Washington is unremarkable if, overall, a similarly large percentage of all shipments to Alaska come from Tacoma.

In other words, if we allowed the State to temporarily seize packages and subject them to ion seanning based on the factors offered in the present case, we would potentially be . authorizing wholesale government seizure and inspection of the majority of envelopes and packages shipped by individuals and small businesses. Such a result would be at odds with the constitutional guarantees of privacy embodied in the search and seizure clauses of our federal and state constitutions.

One might argue that there is no need for alarm, since the physical intrusion is minimal (no physical opening of the package, and only a slight delay in its shipment), and since the ion scanning device is designed to detect only drugs and explosives. But we live in an age when someone who wishes to know another person's words and activities need not engage in physical intrusion to discover them. Technological advances have given us devices that "see" through opaque containers and through the walls of residences, devices that can pick up and record conversations in another building, devices that can scan the contents of e-mails as they move across the Internet-even devices that can detect and record each of my keystrokes as I compose this concurring opinion.

If the government were free to use such devices to investigate its citizens based on the sorts of factors presented in this case, the result would be a significant chilling of personal and political discourse. As our supreme court noted in State v. Glass,

In a pluralistic society dedicated to liberal democratic traditions, confidential communication serves as a lubricant for the smooth functioning of social and political institutions. Without "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public and private expression on the great issues of our day, as well as private discussion about the mundane, the trivial, and the banal, a once free society will soon become a nation of "hagrid-den and furtive" people.

583 P.2d 872, 877 (Alaska 1978)

In Glass, our supreme court perceived- and took action to protect Alaska society against-"It]he corrosive impact of warrant-less participant monitoring on our sense of security and freedom of expression" The present case does not involve electronic monitoring of speech, but rather electronic scanning of the contents of the letters and packages we mail to each other. And yet the adverse consequences of unrestrained government intrusion would be similar. For these reasons, I join in this Court's decision.

      . See McGee v. State, 51 P.3d 970, 971 (Alaska App.2002).

      . See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974).

      . See The Cremation of Sam McGee, a poem by Robert Service originally published in 1916.

      . 708 P.2d 708 (Alaska App.1985).

      . Id. at 709-11.

      . McGee, 51 P.3d at 971.

      . Hayes v. State, 785 P.2d 33, 36 (Alaska App.1990).

      . Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 45 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 LEd.2d 889, 906 (1968)).

      . See Terms and Conditions for Shipping within the United States at www.fedex.com/us/ser-vices/pdf/SG._Vol3_TermsCond.pdf?link=4 (last visited April 4, 2003).

      . See www.fedex.com/ratefinder/shiplIufo (last visited April 4, 2003).

      . 667 P.2d at 735.

      . Id.

      . 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59; L.Ed.2d 660, 672 (1979).

      . Quoting Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 65-66 (9th Cir.1973).

      . Glass, 583 P.2d at 877.


author: Justice HOBBS

text:
    The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado: In re the Interest of: J.R.T., Minor Child, Petitioner, v. Jason MARTINEZ, Respondent. The People of the State of Colorado: In re the Interest of: J.A., Minor Child, Petitioner, v. Jason Martinez, Respondent.
    Nos. 02SC316, 02SC317.
    Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
    June 2, 2003.
    Pueblo County Attorney's Office, Pat J. Rosales-Chavez, Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
    Margaret L. Herdeck, Pueblo, Colorado, Attorney for Respondent.
   Justice HOBBS

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This opinion consolidates two cases in which the trial courts modified the amount of child support that Jason Martinez was required to pay for two of his children, J.A. and J.R.T. In both cases, the trial courts held that Martinez was voluntarily underemployed after he had been terminated from two jobs in Denver for knowingly violating company policy and had subsequently taken a lower paying position in Pueblo. The trial courts imputed income to Martinez based on the first-and highest paying-job from which he was fired.

Holding that Martinez was not "voluntarily underemployed" simply because he had been fired, the court of appeals reversed both trial courts. The court of appeals concluded that the trial courts should have examined "the reasonableness of father's attempts, if any, to obtain comparable employment and pay following his firings." In re J.R.T., 55 P.3d 217, 220 (Colo.App.2002). The unpublished second case, In re J.A., 2002 WL 1822995, relied heavily on the published case.

We agree with the court of appeals. The income imputation inquiry must start with whether the parent is shirking a child support obligation. Is the parent unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain? If not, the child support obligation calculation commences with actual gross income. If the parent is shirking a child support obligation, the trial court must determine what the parent can reasonably earn and contribute to the child's support. In determining whether to impute income to a parent when considering a child support modification order, the trial court must examine all relevant factors.

I.

In April 1995, the trial courts first set child support in the amount of $308 per child per month for J.A. and J.R.T. At that time, Martinez was employed in Denver by Denver Mattress Company, earning $1866 per month. In 1998, Martinez was promoted to store manager, and his salary increased to $4510 per month and the child support order for J.A. was ultimately modified accordingly. Shortly afterwards, Martinez was fired for violating company sexual harassment policy by trying to resolve a dispute between two subordinates without reporting the alleged harassment to the legal department and by engaging in inappropriate conversations.

Next, Martinez accepted a position as an assistant store manager with A World of Tile in Denver, where he earned $2648 per month. Martinez was asked to resign when he failed to make timely bank deposits of company funds, after having been warned against such behavior. In both cases, Martinez signed letters following his termination or resignation in which he admitted wrongdoing and acknowledged awareness of the company policy he had violated.

In October 1999, after being fired a second time, Martinez looked for a job in Denver for a week or two, but he needed money immediately to pay rent for himself, his current wife, and one child. Martinez decided to move 'to Pueblo, where J.A. and J.R.T. reside, to live with his wife's family. Martinez obtained a retail job in Pueblo, earning approximately $2167 per month.

In November 1998, the trial court entered a default order increasing child support due for J.A. based on a monthly income of $4510. Then, Martinez moved to modify child support to decrease the amount owed. The trial court found that Martinez was voluntarily underemployed under section 14~10-115(7)(b)(I), 5 C.R.S. (2002), so it set child support based on an imputed monthly income of $4500, based on his income before being fired from Denver Mattress Company.

In August 2001, another trial court modified support owed for J.R.T. on motion of the Pueblo County Department of Social Services. That court also found that Martinez was voluntarily underemployed and had the potential to earn $4510 per month.

Martinez separately appealed both child support modification orders. The court of appeals reversed both orders in decisions entered the same day, In re J.R.T., 55 P.3d 217, and In re J.A., unpublished. On the same day, a different division of the court of appeals decided In re Marriage of Atencio, 47 P.3d 718, 721 (Colo.App.2002), holding that a father who was fired for drug use was not voluntarily underemployed solely because he was fired. No party filed a certiorari petition in Atencio.

In J.R.T. the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's legal standard de novo and held that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Martinez was voluntarily underemployed based solely on the fact that he was fired for misconduct. J.R.T., 55 P.3d at 219-20. Examining dictionary definitions and criminal law cases dealing with voluntary waiver of rights, the court of appeals determined that "voluntarily" has a commonly understood meaning as an intentional, free choice. Id. at 219. Since voluntarily modifies "unemployed or underemployed" the court concluded that "{the plain, definite, and sensible meaning of the provision, then, is that a parent is 'voluntarily unemployed or underemployed' when the parent intentionally chooses of his or her own free will to become unemployed or underemployed." Id. When considering whether or not to impute income under section 14-10-115(7)(b)(I), 5 C.R.S. (2002), the court of appeals required the trial courts to inquire into the parent's behavior after being terminated from prior employment. 55 P.3d at 220. If the parent does not seek in good faith a job paying a comparable salary, or rejects employment offers, the parent could be voluntarily underemployed or unemployed for the purpose of imputing income. Id.

We granted the People's petition for cer-tiorari, consolidated the two cases, and now affirm the judgments of the court of appeals.

IL

We hold that the trial courts must examine all relevant factors bearing on whether the parent is shirking his or her child support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain, and, if the parent is, the trial courts must determine what he or she can reasonably earn and contribute to the child's support. If the trial courts do not find that the parent is shirking his or her child support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment, they should calculate the amount of child support starting from actual gross income only.

A.

Standard of Review

We defer to the trial courts' findings of fact and review their legal conclusions de novo. Jagow v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 49 P.3d 1151, 1158 (Colo.2002). Deciding whether a parent is "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed" under section 14-10-115(7)(b)(I), 5 C.R.S. (2002), requires the trial court to make factual findings and apply a legal standard to those findings. See Atencio, 47 P.3d at 720.

The meaning of a statutory term is a question of law for de novo review. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 42 P.3d 23, 27 (Colo.2002). When construing a statute, we seek to effectuate the legislative intent of the General Assembly. Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo.2003). We examine the statutory language, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted and understood meaning. Colo. Dep't of Revenue v. Garner, 66 P.3d 106, 109 (Colo.2003). We read the statute as a whole and give harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts, when possible. Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo.2001). In the event the statute is ambiguous, we consider the language the legislature chose to utilize, the evident legislative purposes, the consequences of alternative constructions, and the legislative history, if available. Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326.

-B.

"Voluntarily Unemployed or Underemployed"

The phrase we construe in this opinion appears in Colorado's Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act. Under that Act, both parents have a duty to support their children. In any action to establish or modify child support, the child support guidelines create a rebuttable presumption as to the appropriate amount of the child support order based upon each parent's actual gross income, see-tions 14-10-115(8)(a) and (T)(@a), 5 CRS. (2002). The court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for the child's support, after considering all relevant factors. § 14-10-115(1), 5 C.R.S. (2002).

Under section 14-10-115(7)(a), 5 C.R.S. (2002), income is defined as "actual gross income of a parent, if employed to full capacity, or potential income, if unemployed or underemployed." Section 14-10-115 proceeds to provide that the trial court shall impute potential income if the parent is "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed":

If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income; except that a determination of potential income shall not be made for a parent who is physically or mentally incapacitated or is caring for a child under the age of thirty months for whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility.

§ 14-10-115(7)(b)(I), 5 C.R.S. (2002). The guidelines identify three circumstances in which a parent "shall not be deemed 'underemployed ": temporary employment reasonably intended to result in higher income; a good faith career choice; and enrollment in an educational program:

(A) The employment is temporary and is reasonably intended to result in higher income within the foreseeable future; or
'(B) The employment is a good faith career choice which is not intended to deprive a child of support and does not unreasonably reduce the support available to a child; or
(C) The parent is enrolled in an educational program which is reasonably intended to result in a degree or certification within a reasonable period of time and which will result in a higher income, so long as the educational program is a good faith career choice which is not intended to deprive the child of support and which does not unreasonably reduce the support available to a child.

§ 14-10-115(7)(b)(IID(A)-(C), 5 CRS. (2002). All three of these cireumstances require a good faith, or reasonable, intent not to deprive the child of support. The second and third cireumstances add that the parent's choice shall not unreasonably reduce the support available to the child. If any of these three cireunmstances exist, a trial court may not impute potential income to the parent.

The legislature's listing of these three income imputation exemption cireumstances nevertheless leaves open the question of when the trial court can or must impute income to a parent. Because the statute directs the trial court to calculate child support based upon potential-rather than actual-income only if the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, we begin by examining the meaning of the term "voluntarily." The dictionary meaning of "voluntarily" is: "Intentionally; without coercion," Black's Law Dictionary 1569 (7th ed,1999), and as "of one's own free will," Webster's New International Dictionary 2564 (1998).

Accordingly, we conclude that the term "voluntarily" has the meaning "intentionally, of free will," Nevertheless, the statutory phrase "voluntarily unemployed or underemployed" is susceptible to alternative constructions: (1) the one adopted by the court of appeals that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if, after being fired, he or she does not attempt in good faith to obtain new employment at a comparable salary or refuses to accept suitable employment offers; or (2) the other urged by the People that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if the parent has been fired for misconduct from a higher paying job. The trial courts focused on the parent's fault in getting fired. The court of appeals focused on the parent's subsequent course of action and decision making. "The trial court[s] should have considered the reasonableness of father's attempts, if any, to obtain comparable employment and pay following his firings." J.R.T., 55 P.3d at 220.

Courts in other jurisdictions differ from one another over the construction of statutory terms similar to ours. See, e.g., Savage v. Savage, 821 So.2d 603, 606-07 (La.App.2002) (being voluntarily unemployed results from an intentional act of misconduct which leads to unemployment); Lee v. Lee, 459 NW.2d 365, 370 (Minn.App.1990) (stating that parent is voluntarily unemployed only if the parent intends to get fired in order to avoid paying child support); Wilson v. Wilson, 43 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tenn.App.2000) (holding that voluntary unemployment or underemployment results from "an intent on the part of the parent to reduce or terminate his or her income"). Because Colorado's statutory language is susceptible to alternative constructions, we look to the statute as a whole and to the legislative history in determining the General Assembly's intent.

C.

Statutory Goals

In keeping with our primary responsibility to give effect to the General Assembly's intent, People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 343 (Colo.2003), we begin our analysis by examining the statutory goals of the child support guidelines. Their stated purposes are: to establish adequate child support based on parental ability to pay; to make awards more equitable; and to promote settlements:

(I) To establish as state policy an adequate standard of support for children, subject to the ability of parents to pay;
(II) To make awards more equitable by ensuring more consistent treatment of persons in similar cireumstances;
(III) To improve the efficiency of the court process by promoting settlements and giving courts and the parties guidance in establishing levels of awards.

§ 14-10-115(8)(c)(I-IID), 5 C.R.S. (2002) (emphasis added). A child support order should serve these three statutory purposes and the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Colo.1997); Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 656 (Colo.1989).

Section 14-10-115(1), 5 CRS. (2002), requires the court to consider all relevant factors in determining the amount of child support that is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering all relevant factors implements the Act's underlying legislative policy to mitigate the potential hardship to children caused by the dissolution of marriage and assure their ongoing support. Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1875.

Ability to pay is generally calibrated on the basis of actual gross income, unless the facts of the case indicate that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Certainly, at the very least, the statute requires that a parent have the ability to earn a higher income but refuse to do so before income can be imputed to him or her. Indeed, the ALI recommends imputing income that can be potentially earned only when the parent is believed to be concealing income or to be shirking in his or her efforts to earn income:

Imputation is used when the obligor is believed to be concealing income or to be shirking in his efforts to earn income. Imputation is troubling when the obligor is charged with obligations that he may not be able to pay, even with the best of efforts. Failure to pay child support may have serious legal consequences for the obligor; thus, the court should exercise caution when considering imputation of earnings to a support obligor suspected of shirking gainful employment.

American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 8.14(5) emt. ei) (2002) (emphasis added).

When a parent declines to pursue higher paying employment in order to shirk child support obligations, imputing income to the parent serves the goal of requiring parents to support their children to the extent of their reasonable ability to pay. On the other hand, the automatic imputation of income at the level of pay the parent earned before being fired would prevent the court from examining the present cireumstances of the parent's incoming earning ability, would not result in like treatment for similarly situated parents, and would not necessarily take into account the best interests of the child. Likewise, a per se rule of income imputation based on termination for misconduct might promote quick settlements, but could clearly result in judicial orders that set child support at unattainable or unrealistic levels for a parent who intends to pay but can never achieve the ordered amount.

We conclude that the General Assembly intended income imputation to be an important exception to the normal rule of computation based on actual gross income of the parent. This exception applies when the parent shirks his or her child support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain. The legislature meant this exception to prevent detriment to children by deterring parents from making employment choices that do not account for their children's welfare. Nevertheless, the General Assembly intended courts to approach income imputation with caution. Legislative history aids in this construction of the statute.

D.

Legislative History

The General Assembly included the income imputation provision when it adopted the child support guidelines in 1986. Ch. 120, see. 1, § 14-10-115, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 718, 718-24. Senator Jeffrey Wells amended the bill to define "underemployment" to state that "a parent shall not be deemed 'underemployed as long as he is gainfully employed on a full-time basis." Id. at 720. Senator Wells explained that the statute would still apply to parents who quit their jobs to "lie on the beach." Hearing on H.B. 1275 before the Conference Comm., 55th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (April 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Wells).

Subsequently, the General Assembly wrestled with whether full time employment should be a blanket exemption from income imputation. In 1987, it deleted the full-time employment exemption from income imputation. Ch. 113, see. 38, § 14-10-115(7)(b)(I1), 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 600. In 1990, it reinstated this exemption. Ch. 118, see. 9, § 14-10-115(7)(b)(III), 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 890.

A year later, the General Assembly again deleted the full-time employment exemption, choosing to provide instead that potential income should not be calculated if the parent (1) holds temporary employment reasonably intended to result in higher income in the foreseeable future, or (2) makes a good faith career choice not intended to deprive a child of support and not unreasonably reducing available support. Ch. 88, see. 1, § 14-10-115(7)(b)(III), 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws 286. The bill's sponsor, Representative Betty Swenson, explained this amendment as closing a loophole in the law that had previously allowed parents to quit a job and take a lower paying job for the purpose of avoiding child support payment. Hearing on H.B. 91-1049 before the House Judiciary Comm., 58th Gen. Assemb., lst Reg. Sess. (Jan. 15, 1991) (statement of Rep. Swenson).

In 1994, the General Assembly added a third cireumstance under which potential income is not calculated, that is, when the parent acts in good faith to pursue education that is reasonably intended to lead to higher income. Ch. 266, see. 5, § 14-10-115(7)(b)(III)(C), 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 1588.

The General Assembly's concern about income imputation is realistic. The legislature's persistent focus is upon realistic, adequate child support awards. Its policy is to allow good faith choices that may result in lower paying employment, while preventing parents from shirking a child support obligation. The intent of the income imputation provision, when read as a whole and viewed in the light of legislative history is to impute income when the parent shirks his or her child support obligation by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain. Prior case law is consistent with this construction.

E.

Case Law

On several occasions, the court of appeals has examined the income imputation provision. The court of appeals determined that a parent was underemployed when choosing to forego employment under cireumstances not involving one of the three statutory exemptions to income imputation. See, eg., In re Marriage of Mackey, 940 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Colo.App.1997)(determining that income should be imputed to mother who significantly reduced her earnings to stay home with the children). The court of appeals determined that income should be imputed to a parent when, upon losing a job, the parent entered another field at a lower paying wage or failed to diligently search for another job. In re Marriage of Bregar, 952 P.2d 783, 785-86 (Colo.App.1997) (affirming trial court's finding that father, who was trained as attorney, unreasonably discontinued law practice to start a cattle ranch); see also In re Marriage of Zisch, 967 P.2d 199, 203 (Colo.App.1998) (upholding trial court finding that mother could, with little additional education, be re-certified as a teacher).

In other cases, the court of appeals determined that committing an act which leads to unemployment does not automatically render an individual voluntarily underemployed. In re Marriage of Hamilton, 857 P.2d 542 (Colo.App.1993) (ruling that incarceration is just one factor to be considered in determining whether father is voluntarily underemployed); Atencio, 47 P.3d at 718 (holding that a parent is not voluntarily underemployed just because of firing due to drug use).

Whether potential income should be imputed to a parent is typically a question of fact; and the factual findings of the trial court are entitled to deference on review, if supported by the record. See Zisch, 967 P.2d at 203. A trial court may interpret a parent's lack of initiative in finding or keeping work as a voluntary refusal to fulfill a support obligation. It may consider whether alternative employment is available, but the other parent does not have the burden of proving that a particular job actually exists. See Bregar, 952 P.2d at 785.

F.

Application to this Case

The income imputation inquiry must start with whether the parent is shirking a child support obligation. Is the parent unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he or she could obtain? If not, the child support obligation commences with actual gross income. If the parent is shirking a child support obligation, the trial court must determine what the parent can reasonably earn and contribute to the child's support. The trial court must examine all relevant factors. These may include: firing and post-firing conduct; the amount of time the parent spent looking for a job of equal caliber before accepting a lower paying job; whether the parent refused an offer of employment at a higher salary; whether the parent sought a job in the field in which he or she has experience and training; the availability of jobs for a person with the parent's level of education, training, and skills; the prevailing wage rates in the region; the parent's prior employment experience and history; and the parent's history of child support payment.

In this case, Martinez does not contest that he was fired for misconduct, and he could have foreseen that being fired was a possible consequence of his actions. But, when he was fired or asked to resign from both jobs, he had no choice whether to retain those jobs.

We agree with the court of appeals that the trial courts erred when imputing income to Martinez solely because he was fired for misconduct. Martinez briefly sought a job in Denver but was unable to find one in time to pay rent, so he decided to move to Pueblo, in order to have more support from his family and perhaps to be closer to his children. The trial courts held Martinez to the highest paying Denver job from which he was fired and refused to take into account his search for another job and the reasons for his move to Pueblo. In starting and ending with the firing for misconduct, the trial courts failed to examine all relevant factors.

IIL

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the court of appeals and return these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial courts must examine all relevant factors bearing on whether Martinez is shirking his child support obligations by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment that he could obtain, and, if he is, the trial courts must determine what Martinez can reasonably earn and contribute to the children's support. If the trial courts do not find that Martinez is shirking his child support obligations by unreasonably foregoing higher paying employment, they should calculate the amount of child support starting from actual gross income only.

      . We granted certiorari on two issues:
      1. Does "voluntarily underemployed" within the meaning of Section C.R.S., hinge on whether a parent intentionally chooses to get fired from a job in an effort to reduce his or her income for child support obligation, or does it hinge on the reduction of available income for child support as a foreseeable consequence of a parent's misconduct?
      2. Is a parent underemployed voluntarily if af ter he is fired for cause from more than one job, he relocates immediately to another city where he is paid much less than at the positions from which he was fired?

      . The trial court's order recites:
      6. The father in this case will be deemed to be underemployed and has the potential of making income in the amount of $4500.00 per month. The sole reason for his termination from Big Sur [Denver Mattress Company] was his own failure to abide by the procedures set out by his employer. There is no evidence that this termination was done by the employer in bad faith ... The Respondent relocated to Pueblo because he could not find any equivalent paying jobs. The inference the Court will make is that the circumstances resulting in his termination from the last two employers has affected his ability to secure employment and thus he is underemployed since that is a result of his own actions.

      . The trial court's order recites:
      5. The Father was previously employed at Big Sur Waterbeds [Denver Mattress Company] with a gross income of $4510.00 per month; 6. The Father was also employed at A World of Tile with a gross monthly income of $2648.09; 7. The Father was terminated from both prior jobs because of his own misconduct; 8. The Father is voluntarily underemployed as defined by [section] 14-10-115(7)(b)(I). He has potential income of $4510.00 per month.