author: Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court. Justice Jim Rice, concurring.

text:
    STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Todd Michael JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.
    DA 17-0194
    Supreme Court of Montana.
    Submitted on Briefs: September 26, 2018 Decided: March 19, 2019
    For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
    For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant Attorney General Helena, Montana Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Brett Linneweber, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana
   Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant Todd Michael Johnson appeals his judgment of conviction on jury verdict in the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, on the offense of partner or family member assault (PFMA), a felony. We address the following dispositive issue on appeal:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to excuse a prospective juror for cause?

¶2 We reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Based on an alleged assault on May 29, 2014, the State of Montana charged Johnson with PFMA, a felony in violation of § 45-5-206(1)(a), MCA. During jury voir dire on the morning of trial, defense counsel informed the venire that a central fact dispute in the case would be whether Johnson was a "partner" as alleged by the State as an essential element of proof of PFMA. Counsel thus inquired of three prospective jurors whether they could vote "not guilty" if the State proved that Johnson assaulted the alleged victim but was unable to prove that she was his "partner." All three generally responded that they could and would require the State to prove each essential element of the charged PFMA beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶4 However, the following colloquy later took place between defense counsel and prospective Juror S.:

Prospective Juror: So you're telling me that ... the State has to prove that she is a partner and that he beat her up. If they can't prove that she's a partner or a girlfriend, is that what we're talking about? If they don't prove beyond a reasonable doubt, say, maybe they're just acquaintances, she isn't a partner, they haven't had a relationship, then it's okay that he beat her up?
Defense counsel: No, I'm not saying that it's okay.
...
What I'm asking you is, what if that was the case?
Prospective Juror: If that was the case, I would have a hard time. Because if he truly beat her up, it makes no difference to me whether they were an acquaintance or they were-had a relationship.
Defense counsel: Okay. Even if he's not charged with that? Even if you're-
Prospective Juror: I personally would probably have a problem with that.
Defense counsel: So you would find him guilty because he's a bad man, not because he did what they say he did?
Prospective Juror: Yes.

Defense counsel later returned to prospective Juror S. and further inquired whether her work with assault victims at a local hospital would bias her against Johnson. After answering to the contrary and further opining that she thought her work experience would actually make her a better juror because she would not be shocked by photographs of gruesome injuries, prospective Juror S. spontaneously reiterated her previously stated problem with requiring the State to prove that the alleged victim was the Defendant's "partner," to wit:

Defense counsel: You think you'd be better as a juror with your background?
Prospective Juror: Probably. But I do have a problem with the partner aspect of it all.

Prospective Juror S. later unequivocally stated her problem yet a third time when generally asked by defense counsel if she could be fair and objective:

No, I don't know. I have a real problem with, if he beat the girl up, it makes no difference to me. I didn't realize ... there was such a thing as [PFMA]-that distinction. That would be a problem for me. If he beat her up, I think he should be punished, whether she was a partner or an acquaintance. ... And I would have a hard time with my decision. I would try to not let that affect me, but I just truthfully think it would.

¶5 Defense counsel then challenged prospective Juror S. for cause. After the State sought and obtained leave to further voir dire her prior to the court's ruling, the following colloquy ensued:

Prosecutor: Ms. [S.], you've given answers that it would be difficult for you. Would it be impossible for you to?
Defense counsel: I'd object. I don't think impossibility is the standard.
District Court: Yeah.
Prosecutor: ... I'll withdraw it-
District Court: Okay.
Prosecutor: -and go a different route. Difficulty notwithstanding, have you had to make decisions that were difficult for you?
Prospective Juror: Yes.
Prosecutor: Are you willing to set aside your-any difficulty that you have if the Judge orders you to follow the instruction that the State must prove all elements of the crime?
Prospective Juror: Say it again, please.
Prosecutor: If the Judge orders you to follow the jury instructions, will you follow the jury instructions?
Prospective Juror: Yes.
Prosecutor: And if the jury instructions include that the State must prove that the victim was a partner, will you follow that instruction even if that is difficult for you?
Prospective Juror: Yes.

The District Court thus summarily denied Johnson's challenge of prospective Juror S. for cause. Johnson then used his first peremptory challenge to strike Juror S. from the panel and subsequently exhausted all of his remaining peremptory challenges.

¶6 At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced Johnson as a persistent felony offender to a 20-year term of commitment to the Montana State Prison, consecutive to his sentence in a parallel-pending case independently appealed to this Court. Johnson timely appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 We review district court denials of challenges of prospective jurors for cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. Russell , 2018 MT 26, ¶ 10, 390 Mont. 253, 411 P.3d 1260 (citing State v. Richeson , 2004 MT 113, ¶ 14, 321 Mont. 126, 89 P.3d 958 ). If the defendant subsequently used a peremptory challenge to strike the prospective juror and ultimately exhausted all afforded peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial of a challenge of a prospective juror for cause is a structural error requiring automatic reversal. State v. Good , 2002 MT 59, ¶¶ 62-65, 309 Mont. 113, 43 P.3d 948.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to excuse a prospective juror for cause?

¶9 Criminal defendants have fundamental federal and state constitutional rights to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24 ; State v. Russell , 2018 MT 26, ¶ 12, 390 Mont. 253, 411 P.3d 1260 ; State v. Allen , 2010 MT 214, ¶ 25, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045 ; State v. Hausauer , 2006 MT 336, ¶ 20, 335 Mont. 137, 149 P.3d 895. A defendant may accordingly challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror manifests "a state of mind" regarding the case or either party "that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality" regarding the parties and material matters in the case. Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA.

¶10 Our cases manifest that it is not uncommon for prospective jurors to come to court with preconceived biases and fixed opinions about a defendant's guilt; information about the case obtained prior to trial; what the law is, requires, or should require; or the veracity of a victim, witness, or type of victim or witness. See , e.g. , State v. Johnson , 2014 MT 11, ¶¶ 14-20, 373 Mont. 330, 317 P.3d 164 (bias in favor of law enforcement); Allen , ¶¶ 26-30 (preconceived opinion of guilt based on law enforcement bias and pretrial publicity); State v. Braunreiter , 2008 MT 197, ¶¶ 12-17, 344 Mont. 59, 185 P.3d 1024 (inability to follow law-belief that defendant must prove innocence); State v. Falls Down , 2003 MT 300, ¶¶ 24-36, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797 (preconceived opinion of guilt based on pretrial publicity). It is similarly common for prospective jurors to have experiences common or similar to matters or persons at issue in a criminal case. See , e.g. , Russell , ¶¶ 13-19 (DUI-related death and injury of family members and resulting discomfort in sitting on that type of case); State v. Normandy , 2008 MT 437, ¶¶ 23-25, 347 Mont. 505, 198 P.3d 834 (initial concern about ability to be fair based on disdain for domestic violence and how it adversely affected juror's wife in her first marriage); State v. Rogers , 2007 MT 227, ¶¶ 25-26, 339 Mont. 132, 168 P.3d 669 (initial statement of disdain for child molesters and inability to be objective);

State v. Heath , 2004 MT 58, ¶¶ 25-36, 320 Mont. 211, 89 P.3d 947 (prior experience as stalking victim, work as rape survivor advocate, and resulting discomfort in sitting on sex case). Likewise, it is not uncommon for prospective jurors to have specialized or extraordinary knowledge or interest in similar crimes, investigative procedures, types of offenders, or associations with law enforcement entities. See , e.g. , Heath , ¶¶ 32, 37-42 (familiarity with rape kits, specialized education and interest in working with sex offenders, and prior juvenile detention center employment). For those reasons and more, it is common for prospective jurors to initially express doubt or concern about their ability to be fair and impartial. See , e.g. , Russell , ¶¶ 14-19 ; Normandy , ¶¶ 23-25.

¶11 In any event, the dispositive question is not whether a prospective juror has: (1) expressed a bias or fixed opinion of fact or law pertinent to a case; (2) a common or similar experience or connection that would or could give rise to such bias or fixed opinion; (3) specialized or extraordinary knowledge or interest in a matter pertinent to a case; or (4) expressed doubt or concern about the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. The dispositive question is whether the totality of the juror's statements and referenced circumstances raise a serious question or doubt about his or her willingness or ability to set aside any such matter to fairly and impartially render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented and instructions given. Russell , ¶¶ 14-19 ; Johnson , ¶¶ 14-20 ; Allen , ¶¶ 26-30 ; Normandy , ¶¶ 23-25 ; Braunreiter , ¶¶ 12-25 ; Rogers , ¶¶ 25-26 ; Heath , ¶¶ 25-42 ; Falls Down , ¶¶ 24-36. Thus, upon a challenge for cause, the court must determine whether a serious question exists about a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial based on the totality of the juror's statements and referenced circumstances. Russell , ¶ 14. The court must resolve any doubt or ambiguity about a juror's ability to be fair and impartial in favor of disqualification. Braunreiter , ¶ 10. In contrast to single-syllable answers prompted by leading questions, spontaneous and unprompted responses to open-ended questions are generally the most truthful, accurate, and reliable indicators of bias and the ability to be fair and impartial. Russell , ¶ 14 ; Allen , ¶¶ 26-28.

¶12 If a prospective juror makes a suspect statement, counsel or the court may properly ask open-ended questions to further investigate, clarify, or confirm whether a serious question exists about the juror's bias or ability to be fair and impartial. Allen , ¶ 26 ; Heath , ¶ 29. However, if a prospective juror's earlier unprompted responses to open-ended questions manifest a serious question about his or her ability to be fair and impartial, it is improper for counsel or the court to attempt to rehabilitate the juror through the use of leading or loaded questions, such as whether the juror will follow the law, jury instructions, or an order of the court. Russell , ¶ 15 ; Allen , ¶¶ 26-28. Recantations coaxed by such questions are inherently unreliable because they put ordinary citizens, who are already in "an unfamiliar and imposing courtroom" setting under scrutiny of the judge, peers, lawyers, and the community, in the untenable position of having to publicly disagree with the court or counsel on generally accepted legal principles in order to reiterate an earlier spontaneous statement of bias. State v. Brown , 1999 MT 339, ¶ 27, 297 Mont. 427, 993 P.2d 672 (Nelson, J., specially concurring). See also Allen , ¶¶ 26-28 ; Braunreiter , ¶¶ 9-11 ; Good , ¶ 54 ; Coaxed recantations thus "do not cure or erase a clearly stated" or indicated prejudicial bias. Heath , ¶ 26 (citing State v. Freshment , 2002 MT 61, ¶ 18, 309 Mont. 154, 43 P.3d 968 ). We again strongly caution that coaxed recantations are improper and are "merely fodder for appeal" at "major expense and inconvenience" to all. State v. DeVore , 1998 MT 340, ¶ 28, 292 Mont. 325, 972 P.2d 816, overruled on other grounds by Good , ¶ 63. Accord Braunreiter , ¶ 11.

¶13 This is not a case where a prospective juror merely had an experience in common with, or similar to, the experience of the accused or victim at issue. Nor is this a case where a prospective juror merely expressed concern about her ability to be fair and impartial but ultimately believed that she could and pledged to try.

¶14 This is a far more troubling case where a prospective juror twice spontaneously asserted emphatically that she would have a "hard time" and a personal "problem" with requiring the State to prove an essential element of the charged offense (i.e., that the alleged victim was a legally-defined "partner" of the Defendant). On a third occasion, she emphasized that she had "a real problem" with it. She twice stated emphatically that "it makes no difference to me"-if the defendant "beat her up," then "he should be punished" regardless of whether the victim was his partner or merely an acquaintance. In her final spontaneous statement, the prospective juror candidly stated that she "would try to not let" her desire for punishment of all assaults "affect" her, "but I just truthfully think it would."

¶15 For whatever reason, the State chose to charge Johnson with PFMA rather than assault. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim was a "partner" of the accused, as defined by § 45-5-206(2)(b), MCA, was an essential element of the State's burden of proof of the charged offense of PFMA. See §§ 26-1-403(2), 45-5-206(2)(b), MCA. The prospective juror's multiple spontaneous statements were consistent, clear, unequivocal, and emphatic-she would likely be unable or unwilling to set her personal view and bias aside and vote for acquittal if the State proved that Johnson assaulted the alleged victim but was unable to prove that she was his "partner." The record clearly and unequivocally manifests that the prospective juror would likely be unable or unwilling to follow the court's jury instructions due to her strongly-held personal bias that, if he assaulted the alleged victim, Johnson should be punished regardless of whether the victim was his "partner" or not.

¶16 When faced with the prospective juror's unequivocal bias, whether because it would have been futile or for another reason, the State made no attempt to use open-ended questions to allow the prospective juror to clarify or allay the obvious problem with her patently biased responses. Rather, precisely as we have repeatedly warned against, the State followed up with a series of leading and loaded questions which squarely put the prospective juror in the position of either having to acquiesce to those questions or state her intent to defy the court and the law. Not too surprisingly, the juror acquiesced. In coaxed, single-syllable answers, she answered "yes," she would follow the court's order and jury instructions. This is a clear, if not quintessential, case of a prospective juror clearly and unequivocally manifesting a serious question as to whether she could be fair and impartial, followed by a recantation improperly coaxed by leading and loaded questions that would otherwise have required the juror to defy the court and the law. We hold that that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to disqualify prospective Juror S. for cause. Pursuant to Good , ¶¶ 62-65, we hold further that the error was structural, requiring automatic reversal, because the Defendant later used a peremptory challenge to strike Juror S. from the panel and ultimately exhausted all of his peremptory challenges.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We hold that that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to disqualify prospective Juror S. for cause. Under the circumstances of this case, the error was structural, requiring automatic reversal.

¶18 Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

We concur:

JIM RICE, J.

INGRID GUSTAFSON, J.

BETH BAKER, J.

JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J.

Justice Jim Rice, concurring.

¶19 Jurors come to the trial process with their own set of experiences, preconceptions, and personal biases, and the expression of those feelings should be encouraged. Rather than an attempt to find jurors who do not hold any opinions, jury selection is about finding jurors who respect the process and understand that it requires them to apply the law as provided in the instructions impartially. Thus, educating jurors about the process and dispelling honest misconceptions they may hold is a proper function of voir dire, and should not be viewed as alarming or disqualifying. That purpose, along with the deference we are to give to a district court's determination regarding a challenge for cause, see State v. Robinson , 2008 MT 34, ¶ 13, 341 Mont. 300, 177 P.3d 488, overruled on other grounds by State v. Gunderson , 2010 MT 166, ¶ 50, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74 ("[T]he decision whether to grant a challenge for cause is within the discretion of the trial judge, who has the ability to look into the eyes of the juror in question, and to consider her responses in the context of the courtroom,") provides significant leeway for open dialog about juror viewpoints during juror selection.

¶20 I would vote to affirm based upon these principles, except that I believe the Court has correctly applied our precedent regarding "single-syllable answers prompted by leading questions" and "[r]ecantations coaxed by such questions." Opinion, ¶¶ 11, 12. Juror S. held quite firmly to her incorrect position about the elements of the particular charge at issue throughout the questioning, even voluntarily offering her position in response to general questions, until she issued short recantation answers in response to the prosecutor's leading questions. Once a juror has gone this far with a misconception, our precedent requires something more than short recantations in response to leading questions to determine if the juror's views remain "fixed" or otherwise biased. State v. Golie , 2006 MT 91, ¶ 25, 332 Mont. 69, 134 P.3d 95. For example, the state could have explained that prosecutors must determine the appropriate charges to bring, that they make that decision based upon many factors beyond a jury's consideration, and, here, prosecutors decided to bring this particular charge. Given that, the juror could have been asked whether she understood the trial was about a particular charge, and whether she could explain, in light of her expressed opinions, if she would be able to undertake the process of assessing whether the State had proved the elements of that particular charge. Granted, these questions may touch on areas the prosecution would rather not discuss, but the state could use other kinds of probing questions, or opt not to attempt rehabilitation at all.

¶21 I concur.

      See also § 46-16-115(2)(a)-(i), MCA (enumerating various other grounds of disqualification for cause).

      When defense counsel followed with the leading question, "[s]o you would find him guilty because he's a bad man [rather than] because he did what they say he did[,]" the prospective juror answered with an unequivocal "yes."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: By the Court, HARDESTY, J.: GIBBONS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: PICKERING, J., dissenting:

license: Public Domain

text:
    RESOURCES GROUP, LLC, AS TRUSTEE OF the EAST SUNSET ROAD TRUST, Appellant, v. NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. ; and Hydr-O-Dynamic Corporation, a Revoked Nevada Corporation, Respondents.
    No. 71268
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 14, 2019
   By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

This case presents us with an opportunity to clarify whether a person conducting a sale under NRS Chapter 116, governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales by a unit-owners' association (UOA), has the discretion to refuse to issue a foreclosure deed to the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale after payment has been made, when it is later determined that the delinquency amount may have been paid by the property owner before the sale. We first hold that each party in a quiet title action has the burden of demonstrating superior title in himself or herself. We further hold that once a bid is accepted and payment is made, the foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser, and the person conducting the sale has no discretion to refuse to issue the foreclosure deed. Lastly, we reaffirm our prior holdings that the correct standard for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds is whether there has been some showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression affecting the sale.

Here, the purchaser demonstrated superior title by showing that it paid the sales price following a valid foreclosure sale. The burden of demonstrating that the delinquency was cured presale, rendering the sale void, was on the party challenging the foreclosure, who failed to meet its burden. Because we also conclude that the district court correctly found that there was no showing that fraud, unfairness, or oppression affected the sale, we hold that title vested in the purchaser's name and that the district court abused its discretion by setting aside the sale.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Hydr-O-Dynamic Corporation (HODC) was the legal owner and titleholder of real property located at 571 East Sunset Road in Henderson (the Property). The Property was located within a common-interest community comprised of commercial buildings overseen by Sunpac, a UOA formed under NRS Chapter 116. HODC became delinquent on the periodic assessments it was required to pay to the UOA, and respondent Nevada Association Services, Inc. (NAS), as the UOA's foreclosure agent, complied with all statutory presale requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Property pursuant to NRS 116.3116, including mailing default and sale notices certified with return receipt requested to HODC. The foreclosure sale was scheduled to take place on February 13, 2015, at 10 a.m.

On February 6, 2015, HODC's president mailed a check for the full amount of the delinquency ($6,554.09) to NAS via regular mail. At 10 a.m. on February 13, NAS, unaware that HODC had mailed a delinquency payment, began its property auctions, which included the subject Property. The auctions concluded at approximately 10:30 a.m. Appellant Resources Group, LLC, was the successful bidder on the Property, paying $350,000 in cashier's checks immediately following the conclusion of the auctions. That same day, at some point between 9:30 a.m. and 11 a.m., NAS received the check from HODC. NAS did not inform its general counsel that it had received the check until February 17, however, due to an intervening three-day weekend. NAS's general counsel then contacted Resources Group, explained the situation, and offered to return Resources Group's cashier's checks, along with interest for the five days that had elapsed since the sale, in exchange for canceling the sale of the Property. Resources Group declined the offer, stating that it wanted either $1 million or the Property. Resources Group's agent informed NAS that he saw the mailman arrive on February 13 as he was leaving NAS's offices following the foreclosure sale, which would have been about 10:30 a.m., and thus, by the time NAS could have processed the payment, the foreclosure sale would have been completed. Despite this claim, NAS declined to issue a foreclosure deed to Resources Group.

Resources Group then filed a complaint against NAS, the UOA, and HODC regarding title to the Property. After an unsuccessful summary judgment motion, the parties proceeded to trial. Ultimately, the district court entered judgment against Resources Group, finding that although HODC was delinquent in paying its assessments and the UOA's lien was perfected, Resources Group failed to demonstrate that the check curing the delinquency had not arrived before the foreclosure sale. The court discounted the testimony regarding the mailman as the agent had no specific memory distinguishing that day from any other. The court therefore concluded that Resources Group failed to meet its burden of showing that title should vest in its name.

The district court also concluded that the equities weighed in favor of setting aside the sale, reasoning that nothing in this court's recent line of NRS Chapter 116 foreclosure opinions "limit[ed] the exercise of equity to only those instances where there is gross inadequacy of price and fraud, unfairness or oppression that accounts for [an] inadequacy of price," even though that is a more common ground for setting aside a sale than it being deemed void due to sale irregularities. In balancing the equities, the court found that Resources Group tendered payment for the Property not knowing of the possible arrival of HODC's check, such that Resources Group arguably held bona fide purchaser status, but that setting aside the sale would not result in any prejudice to Resources Group as it would only suffer a loss of interest. The court also found that HODC did nothing more than deposit its delinquency-curing check in regular mail without any follow-up that NAS had received the check, but that the statutory scheme evidenced a legislative intent to allow post-sale redemption and that HODC would be severely prejudiced if the sale was not set aside. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the equities weighed in favor of HODC and set the sale aside such that HODC retained title to the Property.

DISCUSSION

I.

Resources Group argues that completion of a foreclosure sale and tender of the bid amount vests title to the property in the bidder, that the burden then lies on HODC to show that the sale was invalid because it cured the delinquency, and that HODC failed to meet that burden. Thus, Resources Group asserts that title to the Property vested in its name when it delivered the cashier's checks upon conclusion of the foreclosure sale and that there is no basis to set the sale aside.

Conversely, HODC argues that title passes to a successful bidder only at the conclusion of a valid foreclosure sale and payment of the bid amount. On this foundation, HODC argues that if its payment of the delinquency was received prior to the sale, the sale was invalid, and Resources Group had the burden to show that the sale was valid by demonstrating that HODC's check arrived after the sale or otherwise failed to cure the delinquency.

A.

While the "burden of proof [in a quiet title action] rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself," Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp ., 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 125 Nev. 564, 570, 217 P.3d 563, 567 (2009), "a plaintiff's right to relief [ultimately] ... depends on superiority of title," W. Sunset 2050 Tr. v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC , 134 Nev. ----, ----, 420 P.3d 1032, 1034 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). And because "[a] plea to quiet title does not require any particular elements, ... each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question." Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Natl Tr. Co., 129 Nev. 314, 318, 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we analyze the parties' respective claims to the Property.

B.

A foreclosure sale generally terminates a party's legal title to the property. See Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP, 129 Nev. 78, 86, 294 P.3d 1228, 1234 (2013) ; Charmicor, Inc. v. Bradshaw Fin. Co., 92 Nev. 310, 313, 550 P.2d 413, 415 (1976). This general rule is subject to certain limited exceptions, such as where the sale is void. See Energetix , 129 Nev. at 86, 294 P.3d at 1234 (noting that a lack of substantial compliance with the relevant statutes and a lack of proper notice are exceptions to the general rule); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. ----, ----, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018), as amended on denial of reh'g (2018) (holding that a foreclosure sale on a lien is void where that lien has been satisfied prior to the sale "as the lien is no longer in default"); Henke v. First S. Props., Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 619-20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (concluding that the payment of past-due installments cured a loan's default such that the subsequent foreclosure on the property was void); 1 Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman, Ann M. Burkhart & R. Wilson Freyermuth, Real Estate Finance Law § 7:21 (6th ed. 2014) (noting that a trustee's sale is void where there is no authorization to foreclose, and that there is no authorization to foreclose when the loan is not in default). To complete a valid foreclosure sale for unpaid assessments in Nevada, a UOA must comply with the provisions set forth in NRS Chapter 116. Relevant to the present case, the UOA must mail and record a notice of delinquent assessment, NRS 116.31162(1)(a), "a notice of default and election to sell," NRS 116.31162(1)(b), and a notice of foreclosure sale, NRS 116.311635(1)(a). Moreover, a foreclosure sale is complete and title vests in the purchaser once payment has been made by the highest bidder. See Dazet v. Landry, 21 Nev. 291, 295, 30 P. 1064, 1066 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 514-15, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963). After a sale is completed and payment is made, NRS 116.31164(3)(a) states that "the person conducting the sale shall ... [m]ake, execute and ... deliver to the purchaser" a deed conveying the property's title to the purchaser. (Emphasis added.)

Here, the district court found that it was uncontested that the sale complied with the statutory requirements, and that Resources Group made payment of the full bid amount in cashier's checks immediately after the auction. The record further suggests that NAS accepted the checks and provided Resources Group with a receipt of funds and instructions. If this constitutes a valid sale, NRS 116131164(3)(a) mandates that the person conducting the sale execute and deliver a deed of the Property to Resources Group.

II.

HODC argues, however, that it has superior title to the Property-despite the sale being properly conducted and Resources Group tendering payment of its bid-because it cured its default prior to the sale. In considering HODC's argument, we must address whether HODC has the burden of demonstrating that its delinquency-curing check arrived before the foreclosure sale, or whether this would be part of Resources Group's burden to prove that it has superior title to the Property. We conclude that the burden must lie with HODC. Payment of a debt is an affirmative defense, which the party asserting has the burden of proving. See NRCP 8(c) (listing payment as an affirmative defense);

Schwartz v. Schwartz, 95 Nev. 202, 206 n.2, 591 P.2d 1137, 1140 n.2 (1979) ("Since the averments of an affirmative defense are taken as denied or avoided, each element of the defense must be affirmatively proved. The burden of proof clearly rests with the defendant." (citations omitted)). At least one court to address the issue agrees. See Nguyen v. Calhoun , 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 446 (2003) ("The trustor-mortgagor or the person who alleges that a debt has been paid has the burden of proving payment." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Concluding that HODC bears the burden of proof on this issue, we now address whether it met that burden by proving that it paid the delinquency amount in full prior to the sale.

Although HODC does not argue on appeal that it met its burden of proof in this regard because it alleges that the burden was on Resources Group, it is clear from the record that HODC could not meet its burden. The evidence showed that, in its normal course of business, the mail would typically be delivered to NAS between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., and that NAS would open and date-stamp its mail on the same day that it was delivered. HODC's check was date-stamped on February 13, 2015, the date of the sale, but no witness could credibly remember when the mail arrived that day, The district court stated, and we agree, that this evidence could only support a finding "that HODC's check arrived between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. on February 13, 2015." Because the foreclosure sale ended at 10:30 a.m., this finding does not demonstrate that HODC paid the delinquency before the foreclosure sale. Thus, HODC failed to meet its burden and has therefore failed to demonstrate good title in itself.

III.

NRS 116.31164(3)(a) provides that, once payment has been made, the person that conducted "the sale shall ... [m]ake, execute and ... deliver to the purchaser ... a deed ... which conveys to the grantee all title" to the purchased property. The use of the word "shall" denotes a lack of discretion. Markowitz v. Saxon Special Servicing, 129 Nev. 660, 665, 310 P.3d 569, 572 (2013) ("The word 'shall' is generally regarded as mandatory."); cf. In re Montierth, 131 Nev. 543, 550, 354 P.3d 648, 652 (2015) ("A ministerial act is an act performed by an individual in a prescribed legal manner in accordance with the law, without regard to, or the exercise of, the judgment of the individual." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Rugroden, 481 B.R. 69, 78 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012) ("When a statute clearly gives an official no choice but to act, then the act is ministerial "). NAS therefore lacked the discretion to refuse to deliver the deed based on information received after the sale was properly completed and after Resources Group tendered its bid. Having concluded that Resources Group has demonstrated good title and HODC failed to demonstrate it cured its default before the sale, we now address whether the sale should be set aside on equitable grounds.

The district court erred by setting the sale aside on equitable grounds

Resources Group argues that, under Shadow Wood, 132 Nev. 49, 366 P.3d 1105, HODC must demonstrate that the sales price was grossly inadequate and that there was fraud, unfairness, or oppression that resulted in the low sales price in order for the foreclosure sale to be set aside on equitable grounds. Resources Group further argues that HODC is not entitled to equitable relief under Shadow Wood because the sale was conducted properly, lawfully, and fairly; because the sales price was not grossly inadequate; and because, even if the sales price was grossly inadequate, HODC failed to show that there was fraud, unfairness, or oppression that brought about that low price.

Conversely, HODC contends that Shadow Wood should be read broadly to recognize a court's equitable power to set aside a foreclosure sale based on the entirety of the circumstances. HODC argues that the use of the court's equitable powers are warranted under the circumstances presented by this case because the delinquency-curing payment was made on the same day as the foreclosure sale.

A district court's decision to set aside a foreclosure sale on equitable grounds is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Arsali v. Chase Home Fin. LLC , 121 So.3d 511, 519 (Fla. 2013) ("Trial courts' judgments pertaining to set asides of judicial foreclosure sales are now, as they always have been, subject to review by way of an abuse of discretion standard."). The party seeking to set aside the sale on equitable grounds bears the burden to "produce[ ] evidence showing that the sale was affected by fraud, unfairness, or oppression that would justify setting aside the sale." Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. ----, ----, 405 P.3d 641, 643 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Shadow Wood we held that "demonstrating that an association sold a property at its foreclosure sale for an inadequate price is not enough to set aside that sale [on equitable grounds]; there must also be a showing of fraud, unfairness, or oppression." 132 Nev. at 60, 366 P.3d at 1112. Shadow Wood also observed, however, that courts sitting in equity are required to analyze the totality of the circumstances when determining whether to set aside an HOA foreclosure sale on equitable grounds. See id. at 63, 366 P.3d at 1114 ("When sitting in equity, ... courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that bear upon the equities."). HODC interprets "totality of the circumstances" to mean that this court is to look broadly at all of the circumstances surrounding the sale and the parties in determining whether to set aside the sale and not just focus on whether there was a low sales price that was brought about by fraud, oppression, or unfairness.

As we subsequently clarified in Nationstar , this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is tied to the traditional rule for determining whether to set aside a sale on equitable grounds. 133 Nev., at ---- - ----, 405 P.3d at 648-49 ("[I]f the district court closely scrutinizes the circumstances of the sale and finds no evidence that the sale was affected by fraud, unfairness, or oppression, then the sale cannot be set aside, regardless of the inadequacy of price."). That is, if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the sale itself was affected by "fraud, unfairness, or oppression," then a court may set the sale aside. This has been the rule in Nevada since 1963. See Golden, 79 Nev. at 515, 387 P.2d at 995 ("[I]t is universally recognized that inadequacy of price is a circumstance of greater or less weight to be considered in connection with other circumstances impeaching the fairness of the transaction as a cause of vacating it...." (emphasis added) (quoting Odell v. Cox, 151 Cal. 70, 90 P. 194, 196 (1907) )).

Here, the alleged equities in favor of setting aside the sale include those expressly stated by the district court: (1) "it was not unreasonable to assume that a check deposited in the main Las Vegas post office would be delivered within seven days to another Las Vegas address"; (2) Resources Group was not unduly prejudiced, as the only prejudice was a loss of interest on the money spent on the bid, "which could have been mitigated"; (3) HODC would suffer "extreme prejudice" if the sale were not set aside; and (4) "the Legislature intended to allow for the payment of community liens post sale by right of redemption." In addition, the record suggests that there are possibly several other equities in favor of setting aside the sale. First, the district court found that, although unlikely, the check could have arrived earlier than February 13, 2015. Second, HODC's president testified that he was a small-business man and lacked the sophistication to know that he should follow up on his delinquency payment. Third, HODC did not have the keys to the mailbox for its property until late 2014, so it was unaware of any prior delinquency notices. Indeed, the first time that HODC allegedly received any notice of the delinquency or prior notices was when HODC's president was personally served with the notice of foreclosure in the parking lot of the Property on February 6, 2015.

The district court and HODC, however, fail to demonstrate that any of these equities constitute "fraud, unfairness, or oppression" that affected the sales price. Indeed, the district court acknowledged that the bid price was not inadequate and that there was no "evidence that the price was infected with unfairness, fraud or oppression." Even if we broadly interpreted the "unfairness" factor to include these additional equities, we conclude that the equities would still weigh against HODC. HODC asserted that it did not have access to its mail to receive the initial delinquent assessment notices regarding the Property, but that was solely within HODC's control. Additionally, with regard to the check, HODC only mailed it in the regular course of mail, one week before the sale. At trial, HODC's president conceded that he failed to pursue other options, such as overnight delivery or certified mail. HODC's president also acknowledged that he could have delivered the check in person or called NAS to ensure that the check had arrived, but failed to do so. Based on these facts, we agree with the district court that "HODC did nothing [beyond putting the check in the mail] to ensure the check had arrived and there were certainly a number of alternatives."

The record reflects that HODC's lack of diligence-not "fraud, unfairness, or oppression"-is what led to the foreclosure sale. See Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 785 (1994) (holding that a party was not entitled to equity in a foreclosure sale where the party's "delays, negligence and inattention were the sole cause of the sale");

Chase Fin. Servs., LLC. v. Edelsberg, 129 So.3d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a party's lack of diligence is insufficient for setting aside a foreclosure sale on equitable grounds). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by setting aside the sale on equitable grounds.

CONCLUSION

We hold that Resources Group demonstrated superior title because it made payment of the bid amount upon conclusion of a foreclosure sale that complied with the statutory requirements, and HODC failed to demonstrate that the sale was void due to the deficiency being cured. Thus, NAS did not have the discretion to refuse to issue the foreclosure deed. We further hold that HODC is not entitled to equitable relief, as it has failed to demonstrate "that the sale was affected by fraud, unfairness, or oppression." Nationstar, 133 Nev. at ----, 405 P.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and conclude that Resources Group is entitled to the foreclosure deed upon remand.

We concur:

Parraguirre, J.

Stiglich, J.

Douglas, Sr. J.

GIBBONS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Although I concur with the majority that the burden of proof of payment of the debit is upon HODC, I would remand this case for a new trial. The district court incorrectly concluded that HODC had a right of redemption by payment of this lien post sale. Regardless, further findings of fact must be done so that the district court can determine if HODC can meet its burden of proof.

PICKERING, J., dissenting:

There are three reasons I must dissent. First, the appellant waived the burden of proof issue by not raising it until it filed its reply brief in this court. Second, the district court did not rescind the sale or prevent delivery of the trustee's deed, the person charged with conducting the sale did because that person believed that it had conducted the sale in error-a determination the facts and the law support. And third, even accepting for purposes of argument that the owner had to prove pre-sale payment to win, NRS 47.250(13) presumes "[t]hat a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail." The parties' stipulations and the evidence established that the owner mailed its cure check 7 days before the scheduled foreclosure sale and that a letter mailed from the main Las Vegas post office to a local address takes fewer than 7 days to arrive "in the regular course of the mail." Under NRS 47.200, this was evidence enough to establish timely payment or, at minimum, to make timely payment a question of fact for the trial court, not of law for this court, to decide.

I.

Appellant Resources Group, LLC was the plaintiff below. Its complaint asked the district court to do two things: (1) to compel the trustee who conducted the foreclosure sale, respondent Nevada Association Services (NAS), to deliver a deed to the commercial warehouse property in dispute (the property); and (2) to quiet title in its name and against respondent Hydr-O-Dynamic Corporation (HODC). HODC owned the property, which it acquired in 2009 for $2,250,000, free and clear. Since NAS rescinded the sale without delivering a trustee's deed to Resources Group, HODC was and remains the record titleholder of the property.

The first conclusion of law the district court stated was that, as the plaintiff seeking to quiet title in itself against the property's record titleholder, "Resources Group has the burden of proof to show title should be vested in its name." This is a correct statement of Nevada law:

In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself. Moreover, there is a presumption in favor of the record title holder.

Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp. , 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 125 Nev. 564, 570, 217 P.3d 563, 567 (2009) ; accord W. Sunset 2050 Tr. v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 134 Nev. ----, ---- - ----, 420 P.3d 1032, 1034-35 (2018) (quoting Breliant ); 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title § 73 (2011) ("In a quiet title action, there is a presumption in favor of the record titleholder, and the evidence to overcome that presumption must be clear and convincing.") (footnotes omitted) (citing Breliant ).

Against this mainstream law, the majority puts the burden of proof on HODC, the defendant and record titleholder. It does so based on arguments and authority, including NRCP 8, that Resources Group never raised until it filed its reply brief in this court. Compare NRAP 28(a)(6) (requiring an appellant to include in its opening brief "a statement of the issues presented for review"), with Phillips v. Mercer , 94 Nev, 279, 283, 579 P.2d 174, 176 (1978) (holding that issues "raised for the first time in appellant's reply brief[ ] will not be considered on appeal"). The rule against considering an issue not raised until an appellant's reply promotes sound decision-making because it ensures that, before weighing in on an issue, this court has input from the district court, the parties, and sometimes, even, amicus curiae. Since the majority's decision depends on assigning HODC the burden of proof, since the law does not clearly assign this burden to HODC, and since Resources Group did not make the burden of proof argument on which the majority relies to decide this appeal until it filed its reply, I would leave the issue for another day and deem it waived.

II.

A foreclosure sale on an NRS Chapter 116 homeowners' association (HOA) lien is void if, before the sale, the owner or deed-of-trust beneficiary cures the default. Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. ----, ----, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018) ("A foreclosure sale on [an HOA] lien after valid tender satisfies that lien is void, as the lien is no longer in default."). The equitable right to redeem by cure terminates when the foreclosure sale concludes and the person conducting the sale delivers a trustee's deed to a bona fide purchaser for value (BFP). Compare Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 6.4(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1997) (recognizing the equitable right to redeem property from a lien by performing the obligation secured by the lien terminates with foreclosure), with Nguyen v. Calhoun, 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 449 (2003) (holding that payment that arrived by Federal Express three days after the foreclosure sale occurred and the trustee's deed was delivered came too late to avoid loss of the property). The high bidder does not acquire title-much less the right to a statutory trustee's deed-absent a valid foreclosure sale. Cf. Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC v. Blaha, 134 Nev. ----, ---- n.7, 416 P.3d 233, 237 n.7 (2018) (emphasizing that only "a valid trustee's foreclosure sale terminates [a record title holder's] legal and equitable interests in the property") (internal quotation omitted).

NRS 116.31166(1) (1993) describes the presumptions of validity that attach to a delivered trustee's deed. But those presumptions do not attach until the trustee (or in Chapter 116 parlance, "the person conducting the sale," see NRS 116.31164 ) executes and delivers the trustee's deed. See Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 783-84 (1994). Because the statutory presumptions of validity do not attach "if there is a defect in the procedure which is discovered after the bid is accepted but prior to delivery of the trustee's deed, the trustee may abort a sale to a bona fide purchaser, return the purchase price and restart the foreclosure process." Id. ; accord Biancalana v. T.D. Serv. Co., 56 Cal.4th 807, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 300 P.3d 518, 522 (2013) (holding that a trustee who discovers a material defect in the foreclosure sale process before delivering the deed may rescind the sale and restart the process; "the statutory foreclosure process aims to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties" but this "purpose is not served by enforcing the finality of a sale that was conducted improperly"); Lee v. HSBC Bank, USA, 121 Hawai'i 287, 218 P.3d 775, 776 (2009) (holding that "where a mortgagor cures its default prior to a foreclosure proceeding ... but an auction inadvertently goes forward, ... [no] valid agreement [is] created entitling the high bidder at the auction to lost profits"); Taylor v. Just , 138 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 308, 310-11 (2002) (upholding the foreclosure trustee's authority to rescind the sale and refuse to deliver a deed without exposure to contract damages where the bank's email to the trustee advising it had promised the owner not to proceed with the sale went astray); Udall v. T.D. Escrow Servs., Inc., 159 Wash.2d 903, 154 P.3d 882, 887 (2007) (holding that a trustee may withhold a deed where there is a procedural irregularity that renders the sale void); 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Est. § 13:250 (4th ed. 2018) ("[T]he trustee has the authority to rescind the sale upon discovery of an irregularity before the delivery of the deed. Prior to the delivery of the trustee's deed, there are no conclusive presumptions that the sale is valid."); 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 819 (2009) ("Under statutory scheme, if there is a defect in the procedure which is discovered after the bid is accepted but prior to the delivery of the trustee's deed, the trustee may abort the sale to a bona fide purchaser, return the purchase price and restart the foreclosure process.").

Nevada law has long given courts "the power to grant equitable relief from a defective foreclosure sale when appropriate." Shadow Wood Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., Inc., 132 Nev. 49, 57-59, 366 P.3d 1105, 1110-11 (2016) (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 514, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963), and Oller v. Sonoma Cty. Land Title Co., 137 Cal.App.2d 633, 290 P.2d 880, 882 (1955) ). Low price, alone, will not justify invalidating a properly conducted sale; there must also be a showing of irregularities affecting the sale. Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. ----, ---- - ----, 405 P.3d 641, 647-48 (2017). But the greater the disparity between price and value, the less in the way of unfairness or irregularity need be shown. Golden, 79 Nev. at 515-16, 387 P.2d at 995 ("[I]t is universally recognized that inadequacy of price is a circumstance of greater or less weight to be considered in connection with other circumstances impeaching the fairness of the transaction as a cause of vacating it, and that, where the inadequacy is palpable and great, very slight additional evidence of unfairness or irregularity is sufficient to authorize the granting of the relief sought.") (quoting Odell v. Cox, 151 Cal. 70, 90 P. 194, 196 (1907) ), quoted with approval in Nationstar Mortg. , 133 Nev. at ----, 405 P.3d at 648.

While our cases authorize a court to set aside a foreclosure sale for invalidity-even after the trustee has delivered its deed-we have not had occasion to consider whether a trustee can rescind a sale and refuse to deliver a deed because the trustee discovers facts indicating the sale's invalidity. California law, on which Golden, Shadow Wood, and Nationstar all rely, draws on the courts' equitable authority to set aside a foreclosure sale in recognizing a trustee's authority to rescind a sale for procedural irregularity or unfairness, so long as the trustee does so before delivering the deed. Biancalana, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 300 P.3d at 522-23 (reciting that "gross inadequacy of price coupled with even slight unfairness or irregularity is a sufficient basis for setting the sale aside" and applying it to a trustee's decision to rescind a sale prior to delivering the deed); see Residential Capital LLC v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 108 Cal.App.4th 807, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 162, 173 (2003) ("Only a properly conducted foreclosure sale, free of substantial defects in procedure, creates rights in the high bidder at the sale."). Allowing a trustee to rescind a defective or improperly conducted sale so long as the trustee acts before it issues the deed incentivizes the trustee "to exercise diligence in promptly reviewing the sale and identifying any irregularity." Biancalana, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 300 P.3d at 527. While this "may create some uncertainty for bidders" and detract from the interest in finality, "if a procedural defect in the sale is detected before the trustee's deed is issued, the successful foreclosure sale bidder has not been seriously prejudiced." Id. , 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, 300 P.3d at 526 (internal quotation omitted).

Applying this law to the record facts, we should affirm, not reverse, the district court. NAS sent the notice of default in 2012 and the notice of sale in 2015. Although the notices were properly mailed, HODC did not learn about the foreclosure proceedings until February 6, 2015-7 days before the scheduled foreclosure sale-when an NAS agent delivered a copy of the notice of sale to HODC's principal, Juan Guzman. That same day, Guzman went inside the main U.S. Post Office on Sunset Road in Las Vegas and mailed NAS the $6554.09 check needed to cure its default. In Guzman's experience, mail sent from this Post Office to another local address normally takes a day or two to arrive. We know NAS received the check on or before the date of the sale because it stamped the check "received" on February 13, 2015, the date of the sale. (Although the majority suggests otherwise, the district court found it "possible" the check arrived before February 13, 2015.)

NAS scheduled and conducted the foreclosure sale at 10 a.m., despite that its mail normally arrived between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., and despite not having in place protocols to establish the precise date and time a mailed check arrived. It is at this point that the procedural irregularities that led NAS to rescind the sale emerge: After discovering HODC's check and examining its records, NAS could not verify it had conducted a valid foreclosure sale. Given this uncertainty and the ambiguous February 13, 2015 "received" stamp on HODC's cure check, NAS declined to issue a trustee's deed and offered to return Resources Group's bid price payment, with interest. These are not disputed or inferred facts; the parties stipulated to them in district court. See July 6, 2016 Joint Pretrial Memorandum (stipulating that NAS believed "(22) the check for payment in full had crossed paths with the foreclosure sale and that NAS did not have enough time to process the check on February 13, 2015, link it with the foreclosure sale set that morning, and stop the sale"; that NAS believed "(25) the sale was made in error because of the crossing of the owner's payment in full and the sale"; and "(27) that [b]ecause NAS believed the sale was conducted in error, it has never released nor recorded a Foreclosure Deed for the subject property.").

The rule allowing a trustee to rescind a sale when material irregularities emerge before delivery of a deed is consistent with Golden, Shadow Wood, and Nationstar -and with the judgment the district court entered, which denied Resources Group's requests that it direct NAS to deliver the trustee's deed and quiet title in Resources Group and against HODC. But this case does not require the court to adopt Biancalana, Residential Capital, and Just. It can also be resolved under Golden, Shadow Wood , and Nationstar.

The record establishes a substantial disparity between value and bid price. HODC acquired the property in 2009 for $2,250,000 and owned it free and clear, except for the HOA's $6554.09 lien. The property's value had declined substantially by 2015. Even so, the $350,000 bid Resources Group made for the property represented less than a third of what the district court found it was worth. This price/value disparity, combined with NAS's inability to verify a valid sale (not to mention its determination that it had conducted the sale in error, see Joint Pretrial Memorandum ¶27, supra ) support the district court's judgment against Resources Group and in favor of NAS and HODC under existing Nevada law. As noted in my concurring and dissenting colleague's opinion, we would need to reverse and remand to resolve this case purely under Golden, Shadow Wood, and Nationstar, because the district court may have relied in exercising its equitable authority, on a statutory right of redemption that did not enter NRS Chapter 116 until after the sale in this case was held.

III.

The majority holds, seemingly as a matter of law, that HODC failed to produce evidence from which the finder of fact could find its check arrived at NAS on or before the 10 a.m. February 13, 2015 sale date. This holding does not square with the record facts or with NRS 47.250(13) and NRS 47.200. As noted above, HODC mailed the check from the main U.S. Post Office in Las Vegas on February 6, 2015, to NAS's Las Vegas office. NAS received the check at least by February 13, 2015, when it stamped it received. Guzman testified that letters mailed locally from that post office usually take a day or two to arrive.

NRS 47.250(13) presumes that "a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail." This presumption, combined with the date stamp and NAS's testimony that the check could have come even earlier than February 13, 2015, constitutes evidence of delivery to NAS on or after February 8, 2015 and before the 10 a.m. February 13, 2015 sale date and time. See Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, 37, 11 S.Ct. 691, 35 L.Ed. 332 (1891) (noting that the presumption that mail is received within a normal delivery time is "not a presumption of law but one of fact"). The "basic facts" thus established, NRS 47.200 applies. NRS 47.200 does not demand 100% certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It deals in terms of "reasonable minds" and "probability." Under NRS 47.200, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the check did not arrive on or before February 13, 2015 at 10 a.m. On the contrary, NRS 47.200 and NRS 47.250(13) mandate the opposite finding or, at minimum, a determination that the time of delivery is a question of fact for the district court to determine in the first instance.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

      The 2015 Legislature substantially revised NRS Chapter 116. See Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. NY. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev. 49, 56 n.2, 366 P.3d 1105, 1109 n.2 (2016). The references in this opinion to NRS Chapter 116 statutes are to the version of the statutes in effect when the events in this case occurred, which was before the effective date of the 2015 amendments.

      Resource Group later voluntarily dismissed the UOA without prejudice pursuant to NRCP 41(a)(1)(i).

      The covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC & Rs) governing the Property imposed the same requirements as those required by statute.

      Resources Group argues that HODC waived the issue of payment because it did not plead it in its responsive pleadings below. A party waives an affirmative defense where the "party fails to raise the affirmative defense in any pleadings or any other papers filed with the court, including its answer, pretrial statement, or post-trial brief." City of Boulder City v. Boulder Excavating, Inc., 124 Nev. 749, 755 n.12, 191 P.3d 1175, 1179 n.12 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we have held "that an affirmative defense can be considered (if not pleaded) if fairness so dictates and prejudice will not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., v. Quinn River Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. 471, 473, 705 P.2d 673, 675 (1985). Here, fairness dictates that we consider HODC's arguments regarding payment, as those arguments are crucial for determining whether the sale was void. In addition, no prejudice would follow because "[o]ne who bids upon property at a foreclosure sale does so at his peril," Henke, 586 S.W.2d at 620, and thus, if a sale is void, a purchaser should not be entitled to reap a windfall.

      An agent of Resources Group testified he remembered seeing the mail being delivered after the foreclosure sale was completed, but the district court found that testimony not to be credible and we will not reassess witness credibility on appeal. See Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 244 (2007).

      Resources Group also argues that HODC had no right to redemption under the CC & Rs or statutory law because the sale was conducted properly, and the UOA CC & Rs provide that a properly conducted sale vests title in the purchaser without the unit owner's equity or redemption. In Shadow Wood , however, this court held that "[h]istory and basic rules of statutory interpretation confirm our view that courts retain the power to grant equitable relief from a defective foreclosure sale when appropriate despite NRS 116.31166 ." 132 Nev. at 57, 366 P.3d at 1110-11 (emphasis added). Courts can also provide equitable relief despite the language in the CC & Rs. See McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 129 Nev. 610, 615, 310 P.3d 555, 558 (2013) (recognizing the contractual nature of CC & Rs); Wainwright v. Dunseath, 46 Nev. 361, 366, 211 P. 1104, 1106 (1923) (holding that "courts of equity have the power to order the reformation of deeds [or] contracts").

      HODC also argues that it should be granted equitable relief because Resources Group failed to demonstrate it had good title. Having already concluded that Resources Group demonstrated good title in itself, we do not address this argument further.

      As noted earlier, the 2015 Legislature made substantial changes to NRS Chapter 116. As the revised version of NRS 116.3116 did not apply to the present case, and the 2014 version of the statute unambiguously did not allow for a right of redemption, the district court erred by gleaning an intent by the Legislature to provide for a post-sale right of redemption.

      HODC does not dispute the sufficiency of the notices.

      As HODC received, at least, the notice of foreclosure sale, it was aware that it needed to cure the deficiency before the date of the foreclosure sale as the notice provided as follows:
      WARNING! A SALE OF YOUR PROPERTY IS IMMINENT! UNLESS YOU PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE BEFORE THE SALE DATE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT IS IN DISPUTE.
      (Emphasis added.) See NRS 116.311635(3)(b). The notice also provided the date of the sale; thus, HODC was on notice that the Property could be lost if the amount specified was not paid by February 12, 2015, not the date of the foreclosure sale.

      The Honorable Elissa F. Cadish and the Honorable Abbi Silver did not participate in the decision of this matter. The Honorable Michael L. Douglas, Senior Justice, was appointed by the court to participate in the decision of this matter.

      The foreclosure proceedings in this case predated the effective date of the 2015 amendments to NRS Chapter 116, which created a statutory right of redemption and imposed time limits on pre-sale lien-default cures. See NRS 116.31166(1), (3) (2017). The parties stipulated that if HODC's check arrived at the Las Vegas offices of respondent Nevada Association Services (NAS) before NAS proceeded with the foreclosure auction on February 13, 2015, this would void the sale. This stipulation comports with section 6.12 of the governing CC & Rs, which state: "In the event the delinquent assessments ... are fully paid or otherwise satisfied prior to the completion of any sale held to foreclose the lien provided for in this Declaration, the Association shall record a further notice ... stating the satisfaction and releasing of such lien." Of note, as a commercial property, the warehouse would not be subject to NRS Chapter 116 except the CC & Rs incorporate NRS 116.3116.


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    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Renato L. TREJO, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable David M. Jones, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 78274
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 15, 2019
    DENIED.


text:
    Roberto J. RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 75615
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 14, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven DENSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 74929
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 14, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Fred NASSIRI, Individually; and as Trustee of the Nassiri Living Trust, a Trust Formed Under Nevada Law, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, v. The State of Nevada, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 76660
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 18, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Mario John CAMACHO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 73380
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 18, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Keishawn Lashawntae CRANFORD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 75494
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Melissa ARIAS, a/k/a Elizabeth Kay Carley, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    Elizabeth Kay Carley a/k/a Melissa Arias, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 75404 No. 75982
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 14, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daimon MONROE, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Eric Johnson, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 78312
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DENIED.


text:
    TYRONE & IN-CHING, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Respondent.
    No. 77322
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 19, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Alejandro BANDY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 75612
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 18, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    NEVADA SANDCASTLES, LLC, Appellant, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, n/k/a Ditech Financial, LLC, Respondent.
    No. 77857
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 18, 2019
    Dismiss.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the FUND FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF SELF RELIANCE, an Irrevocable Trust.
    Doan L. Phung, Appellant, v. Thu-Le Doan, Respondent.
    No. 74964
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    REVERSED. REMAND.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP FUND, an Irrevocable Trust.
    Doan L. Phung, Appellant, v. Thu-Le Doan, Respondent.
    No. 74963
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    REVERSED. REMAND.


text:
    Trevor POPE, Appellant, v. James FELLHAUER; and Sharon Fellhauer, Respondents.
    No. 74428
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    John Anthony DALY, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK, Respondent, and The State of Nevada; NDOC; OMD; and TLVCC, Real Parties in Interest.
    No. 78311
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2018
    DENIED.


text:
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a National Banking Association, Appellant, v. CFA, INC., a Domestic Corporation, Respondent.
    No. 73463
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Tabudah Eugene HUMES, a/k/a Tabuta Eugene Johnson, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 78159
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Leslie S. MCAFEE, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 75853
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    Deny.


text:
    In the MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF Sean L. BROHAWN, Bar No. 7618.
    No. 77967
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    Approve.


text:
    NCP BAYOU 2, LLC, Appellant, v. Giorgio MEDICI; Elvira Malenky Medici; Edeltraud Revord; and Ruediger Schrage, Respondents.
    NCP Bayou 2, LLC, Appellant, v. Giorgio Medici; Elvira Malenky Medici; Edeltraud Revord; and Ruediger Schrage, Respondents.
    No. 73122 No. 73820
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED IN PART. REMAND.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Petition of the State of Nevada DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
    Frank Milford Peck, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 77407
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    RH KIDS, LLC, Appellant, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f/k/a the Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OC5, Respondent.
    No. 76389
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Daimon MONROE, a/k/a Daimon Devi Hoyt, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 78299
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    HYOUNGSOO YOON, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION; Renee Olson, in Her Capacity as Administrator of the Employment Security Division; Katie Johnson ; Now J. Thomas Susich, in His Capacity as Chairperson of the Employement Security Division Board of Review; and OpenSoft, Inc., as Employer, Respondents.
    No. 76889
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Matthew JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 78213
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Michael Jerome SMITH, Appellant. v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76787
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    JMB CAPITAL PARTNERS MASTER FUND, L.P. ; Caldwell FB I LLC; Fulcrum Credit Partners LLC ; Steelman Partners LLP; Joint China Commerce Limited; and Concave Investors, LLC, Petitioners, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge, Respondents, and Soneet R. Kapila, Not Individually but as Chapter 7 Trustee of Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLC, Fontainebleau Las Vegas, LLC, Fontainebleau Las Vegas Capital Corp., Fontainebleau Las Vegas Retail Parent, LLC, Fontainebleau Las Vegas Retail Mezzanine, LLC, Fontainebleau Las Vegas Retail, LLC; W&W-AFCO Steel LLC ; Commercial Roofers, Inc.; Dielco Crane Service, Inc.; Desert Mechanical, Inc., f/k/a Desert Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.; American Building Supply, Inc., f/k/a Door & Hardware Management, Inc.; Eberhard Southwest Roofing, Inc. ; Fisk Electric Company; L.A. Nevada, Inc., d/b/a G&G Systems; Geo Cell Solutions, Inc. : J.F. Duncan Industries, Inc.; JS&S, Inc.; Lally Steel, Inc. ; Northstar Contracting Group, Inc., f/k/a LVI Environmental of Nevada, Inc.; Marnell Masonry, Inc.; Midwest Pro Painting, Inc.; Modernfold of Nevada, LLC ; Aggregate Industries-SWR, Inc. ; Water FX, LLC ; F. Rodgers Corporation; Coreslab Structures (L.A.) Inc. ; Keenan, Hopkins, Suder & Stowell Contractors, Inc.; Dayco Funding Corporation ; Air Design Technologies, LLC; Airtek Products LLC; Johnson Controls International, PLC ; Allegheny Millwork & Lumber Co.; L&P Interiors, LLC ; Honeywell International, Inc.; The Penta Building Group, Inc.; Ram Construction Services of Michigan, Inc.; Graybar Electric Company, Inc.; Giroux Glass Inc.; Farmstead Capital Management, LLC ; JBA Consulting Engineers, Inc.; Bergman, Walls & Associates; YWS Architects, Ltd.; TMCX Nevada, LLC; John A. Martin & Associates of Nevada, Inc. ; Scoggin Worldwide Fund, Ltd. ; Scoggin International Fund, Ltd.; Scoggin Capital Management II, LLC ; Lockwood, LLC; American Crane and Hoist Erectors, LLC ; Republic Towers and Hoist, LLC ; Republic Crane Service, LLC; Tracy & Ryder Landscape ; Cashman Equipment Company; GCP Applied Technologies, Inc., f/k/a W.R. Grace & Co.; Superior Tile & Marble, Inc.; Midwest Drywall Co., Inc.; West Edna & Associates, d/b/a Mojave Electric, Inc.; Tractel, Ltd.; Tractee, Inc.; Technicoat Management, Inc. ; Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC; Gerdau Reinforcing Steel, f/k/a Pacific Coast Steel and Century Steel, Inc.; Schwimmer Drapery, Inc. ; Las Vegas Sands Corp.; Derr and Gruenewald Construction Co.; and Roncelli, Inc., Real Parties in Interest.
    No. 78008
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DENIED.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Honorable David HUMKE, District Court Judge, Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, State of Nevada.
    No. 77871
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    Administratively close.


text:
    Alvin J. GRIFFIN, III, Appellant, v. Agata MACINKIEWICH, Respondent.
    No. 78133
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 21, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Jessica ARNOLD, Petitioner, v. Jacob DREY, Respondent.
    No. 77796
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    William MILKS, in His Capacity as Member and Manager of Affirmed Technologies, LLC, Appellant, v. Dwight J. BAUM, AS TRUSTEE FOR the DWIGHT C. AND HILDAGARDE E. BAUM TRUST, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Affirmed Technologies, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Robert Benjamin; Diane Benjamin; Joe Mloganoski; Nancy Skallerup; Dan Skinner; Denise Skinner; Gerald Skinner; Jeff Yonce ; and Joyce Yonce, Individually, Respondents.
    No. 77968
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Ronald Walter LAW, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
    No. 78146
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Wilbert Roy HOLMES, Appellant, v. Marsha KIMBLE-SIMMS, Respondent.
    No. 77770
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Stephen CHOATE, Petitioner, v. Brian WILLIAMS, Warden, Respondent.
    No. 77755
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    RLP-BARROW DOWNS, LLC, a Nevada 9 Series Limited Liability Company of the Container Red Lizard Productions 10 LLC Under NRS 86.296, Appellant, v. CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC., f/k/a Vericrest Financial, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., a National Association ; and Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee for Vericrest Opportunity Trust 2011-NPL1, Respondents.
    No. 78165
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Christina GALVAN, Appellant, v. Matthew Travis JOHNSON, Respondent.
    No. 77482
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Francis James JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 77798
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Michael J. BEIERSCHMITT, an Individual, Appellant, v. Kirk Shawn SMITH, D.O., an Individual, Respondent.
    No. 77082
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Kevin Antoine BANKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 78192
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    John Elvin TURNER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada; and C.C.D.C., Respondents.
    John Elvin Turner, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada; and C.C.D.C., Respondents.
    No. 76944 No. 77799
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    GGP, INC., f/k/a General Growth Properties, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Fashion Show Mall, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and Grand Canal Shops II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Petitioners, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Mark R. Denton, District Judge, Respondents, and Zi Beauty, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, Real Party in Interest.
    No. 76100
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DENIED.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Trust of JOE FRANK EILAND AND JANIS EVERLY EILAND REVOCABLE TRUST.
    Adele Jeter-Wheaton, f/k/a Adele Eason Eiland, Appellant, v. Janis Everly Eiland, Respondent.
    No. 77579
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Scott Allen KEVARI, a/k/a Mac McClain McDugald, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    Scott Allen Kevari, a/k/a Mac McClain McDugald, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 78254 No. 78255
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Eddie James THOMAS, Jr., Appellant, v. Brian WILLIAMS, Warden, Respondent.
    Eddie James Thomas, Jr., Appellant, v. Brian Williams, Warden, Respondent.
    Eddie James Thomas, Jr., Appellant, v. Brian Williams, Warden, Respondent.
    No. 78166 No. 78167 No. 78168
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    Rene SHERIDAN, an Individual; and Gorock, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liablity Company, Appellants, v. Gina GOFF, an Individual; Goff Productions, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; Senior Moment Movie, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and Rudolf Sedlak, an Individual, Respondents.
    Rene Sheridan, an Individual; and Gorock, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Appellants, v. Gina G. Goff, an Individual; Goff Productions, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and Senior Moment Movie, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, Respondents.
    Rene Sheridan, an Individual; and Gorock, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Appellants, v. Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright ; Gina G. Goff, an Individual; Goff Productions, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and Senior Moment Movie, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, Respondents.
    No. 77992 No. 78068 No. 78202
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 22, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    TRUMBULL INSURANCE COMPANY ; and Central Florida Investments, Appellants, v. Lourdes Lemos NADER, Respondent.
    No. 75506
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    KEYNOTE PROPERTIES, LLC, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC, Respondent.
    No. 76732
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    NEVADA SANDCASTLES, LLC, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, Respondent.
    No. 76876
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    RJRN HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC, Respondent.
    No. 76101
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 25, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    NEVADA SANDCASTLES, LLC, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC, Respondent.
    No. 76332
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    SATICOY BAY LLC SER. 529 QUAIL BIRD, Appellant, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC; and Ditech Financial LLC, f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC, Respondents.
    No. 74716
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 780 VORTEX, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, f/k/a Green Tree Servicing LLC, Respondent.
    No. 77480
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 26, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    PREMIER ONE HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada Corporation, Appellant, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, n/k/a Ditech Financial LLC, Respondent.
    No. 77481
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 25, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, Appellant, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, Respondent.
    No. 77469
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MARCH 25, 2019
    Dismissed.