author: GLENN A. NORTON, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Paul G. LORENZINI and Laverne S.Lorenzini, Respondents, v. Keith SHORT, individually and d/b/a Short Solutions, Defendant, and Cathedral Properties, LLC, Appellant.
    No. ED 93813.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.

      Nelson L. Mitten, Jennifer L. Geschke, Saint Louis, MO, for Appellant.
    Joseph J. Trad, Carine M. Doyle, Saint Louis, MO, for Respondents.
   OPINION

GLENN A. NORTON, Presiding Judge.

Cathedral Properties, LLC (“Employer”) appeals the grant of Paul G. and Láveme S. Lorenzinis’ (“Plaintiffs”) motion for default judgment in a garnishment proceeding awarding them $475.81 in damages, $72.00 in costs, and $4,108.80 in attorney’s fees. We affirm as modified.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2008, Plaintiffs filed a petition for money had and received and for unjust enrichment against Employee alleging he failed to repay them $125,000.00. In July 2008, the trial court granted Plaintiffs a default judgment against Employee in the amount of $127,656.25 plus per diem interest (“the underlying judgment”). When Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in collecting the underlying judgment from Employee, they attempted to garnish his wages from Employer.

In October 2008, Plaintiffs filed a garnishment application directed to Employer. Employer was served with a writ of garnishment and interrogatories. It is undisputed that Employer timely answered the interrogatories and indicated it possessed $79.81 in wages owed to Employee for a 80-day garnishment period.

Plaintiffs filed a second garnishment application directed to Employer in December 2008. Employer was served with a writ of garnishment and interrogatories, but Employer failed to timely answer the interrogatories. Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment against Employer based upon its failure to timely answer interrogatories. The motion for default requested damages in the amount of the underlying judgment and costs. Plaintiffs then served Employer with notice that a hearing would be held on the motion for default. A few days before the hearing was initially scheduled, Employer filed an answer to the interrogatories indicating it possessed $396.50 in wages owed to Employee for a 180-day garnishment period.

The hearing was held, and after the hearing, the trial court took the case under submission. At some point thereafter, Plaintiffs’ counsel advised Employer’s counsel and the court that Plaintiffs were no longer seeking the full amount of the underlying judgment but were only seeking damages in the amount of money Employer owed to Employee, or $475.81. Plaintiffs’ counsel also advised Employer’s counsel and the court that Plaintiffs were requesting $72.00 in costs of collection and $4,108.80 in attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the trial court entered a default judgment against Employer awarding Plaintiffs $475.81 in damages, $72.00 in costs, and $4,108.80 in attorney’s fees. Employer appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Employer’s brief raises four points on appeal. Employer’s first point on appeal asserts the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiffs $475.81 in damages. Employer’s second point on appeal alleges the trial court did not have authority to award Plaintiffs $72.00 in costs and $4,108.80 in attorney’s fees. Finally, Employer’s third and fourth points on appeal contend the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees because Plaintiffs failed to properly request such relief in their motion for default judgment.

A. The Trial Court did not Err in Awarding Plaintiffs $475.81 in Damages

In their first point on appeal, Employer asserts the trial court erred in entering a default judgment awarding Plaintiffs $475.81 in damages because Plaintiffs did not follow the proper procedure when Employer failed to timely answer Plaintiffs’ second set of interrogatories. Specifically, Employer contends Rule 90.08 required Plaintiffs to file a motion to compel before filing a motion for default judgment. We disagree.

1. Background Law and Standard of Review

A garnishment proceeding is generally governed by Rule 90 and Chapter 525. Moore Automotive Group, Inc. v. Goffstein, 301 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Mo. banc 2009). Thus, in determining whether Rule 90.08 mandates a plaintiff to file a motion to compel before filing a motion for default judgment, we must interpret Missouri Supreme Court Rules and state statutes governing garnishment proceedings. Our interpretation of Missouri Supreme Court Rules and statutes involves questions of law which we review de novo. Lindquist v. Mid-America Orthopaedic Surgery, Inc., 269 S.W.3d 508, 510 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008) (stating that statutory interpretation is a question of law which is reviewed de novo); State ex rel. USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. David, 114 S.W.3d 447, 448 (Mo.App. E.D.2003) (stating that interpretation of Missouri Supreme Court Rules is guided by principles similar to those used in our interpretation of state statutes). Our primary role in interpreting Missouri Supreme Court Rules and statutes is to ascertain the intent of the Supreme Court and legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. USAA Casualty, 114 S.W.3d at 448; Whitelaw v. Director of Revenue, 73 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Mo.App. E.D.2002).

2. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of Rule 90.08 did not Require Plaintiffs to file a Motion to Compel before Filing a Motion for Default Judgment

Rule 90.08 states in relevant part:

If [the employer] fails to answer or improperly answers interrogatories, the court shall, upon motion, order [the employer] to answer or properly answer the interrogatories. , Failure of [the employer] to comply with such an order may, upon motion of [the plaintiff] or the court, subject [the employer] to a finding that [the employer] is in default, and [the plaintiff] may take judgment by default against [the employer].

We find that the plain and ordinary language of Rule 90.08 did not require Plaintiffs to file a motion to compel before filing a motion for default judgment because the only mandatory language in Rule 90.08 applies to the trial court, not to the plaintiff. The portion of the rule providing “the court shall, upon motion, order [the employer] to answer or properly answer the interrogatories” requires a court to issue an order to compel only if a motion to compel is filed by the plaintiff (emphasis added). See SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Schneider, 229 S.W.3d 279, 280-81 (Mo.App. E.D.2007) (interpreting portion of statute providing “the court shall, upon motion of any party, dismiss the action ... without prejudice” to require the court to dismiss the action without prejudice if a motion to dismiss is filed); State ex rel. USAA Casualty, 114 S.W.3d at 448 (interpreting the term “shall” in a Missouri Supreme Court Rule as mandatory).

Rule 90.08 not only mandates a court to issue an order compelling the employer to answer or properly answer the interrogatories when the plaintiff chooses to file a motion to compel, but also sets forth the procedural mechanism for the plaintiff and court to follow when a motion to compel is filed and the employer fails to comply with an order to compel. Specifically, the rule provides “[flailure of [the employer] to comply with such an order may, upon motion of [the plaintiff] or the court, subject [the employer] to a finding that [the employer] is in default, and [the plaintiff] may take judgment by default against [the employer].” Rule 90.08 (emphasis added). Because the term “may’ is permissive rather than mandatory, see, e.g. Schubert v. Tolivar, 905 S.W.2d 924, 929 (Mo.App. E.D.1995), we interpret this part of the rule simply: (1) to allow the plaintiff or court to make a motion for default judgment, and (2) to permit the plaintiff to take a default judgment against the employer.

3. Section 525.140 RSMo 2000 Permitted Plaintiffs to File a Motion for Default Judgment when Employer Failed to File a Timely Answer to Interrogatories

Section 525.140 RSMo 2000 is a counterpart to Rule 90.08; the statute and rule can be construed together and each can be given effect. Northwest Professional Condominium Association v. Kayembe, 190 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). Section 525.140 provides that when the employer does not timely file an answer, “the plaintiff may take judgment by default against [the employer], or the court may, upon motion, compel him to answer by attachment of his body .... ” (emphasis added). As we previously indicated, the word “may” is permissive rather than mandatory. See Schubert, supra. Thus, we interpret section 525.140 to allow the plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment or to file a motion to' compel when the employer fails to file a' timely answer to interrogatories. We also interpret the statute to allow the court to compel an answer by attachment when a motion to compel is filed by the plaintiff. These procedural matters are neither addressed by nor inconsistent with the plain and ordinary language of Rule 90.08. “Where the legislature has enacted a statute pertaining to a procedural matter which is not addressed by or inconsistent with any [S]upreme [C]ourt rule, the statute must be enforced.” State ex rel. Kinsky v. Pratte, 994 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Thus, pursuant to section 525.140, Plaintiffs could file a motion for default judgment when Employer failed to file a timely answer to interrogatories.

4. Conclusion

We conclude Rule 90.08 did not require Plaintiffs to file a motion to compel before filing a motion for default judgment, and section 525.140 permitted Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment when Employer failed to file a timely answer. Employer admits in its brief that it owed Employee $475.81. Generally, the liability of the employer is measured by its liability to its employee. Butler v. Physicians Planning Service Corp., 724 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo.App. E.D.1987); see also section 525.170. Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering a default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs which awarded them $475.81 in damages. Point one is denied.

B. The Trial Court did not Err in Awarding Plaintiffs $72.00 in Costs

In its second point on appeal, Employer first argues the trial court did not have statutory authority to award Plaintiffs costs. We disagree.

“In awarding costs, a trial court is limited to awarding only those costs granted by virtue of express statutory authority.” Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854, 880 (Mo. App. E.D.2009) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the issue in this portion of the second point on appeal involves statutory interpretation. See id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. Lindquist, 269 S.W.3d at 510. “Our primary role in interpreting statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Whitelaw, 73 S.W.3d at 733.

Section 525.250 RSMo Supp. 2009 provides: “In all cases between the plaintiff and [the employer], a court of competent jurisdiction may order the parties to pay or recover costs, as in ordinary cases between plaintiff and defendant ” (emphasis added). By using the word “may,” the legislature intended for a court to have discretionary authority to award costs to the plaintiff or the employer. See City of Centralia v. Norden, 879 S.W.2d 724, 730 (Mo.App. W.D.1994) (finding court had discretion to award costs pursuant to statute). Additionally, section 514.060 explains that in ordinary cases between a plaintiff and defendant, the prevailing party is entitled to costs: “In all civil actions, or proceedings of any kind, the party prevailing shall recover his costs against the other party, except in those cases in which a different provision is made by law.” Accordingly, we hold that the plain and ordinary meaning of sections 525.250 and 514.060 authorize the trial court to award costs to a prevailing plaintiff or employer. Here, Plaintiffs prevailed on their motion for default judgment. Therefore, in accordance with our interpretation of sections 525.250 and 514.060, the trial court had authority to award Plaintiffs costs. With respect to Employer’s argument that the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiffs costs, point two is denied.

C. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Plaintiffs $4,108.80 in Attorney’s Fees

Employer also argues in its second point on appeal that the trial court did not have authority to award Plaintiffs attorney’s fees. Whether a trial court has authority to award attorney’s fees is a question of law which we review de novo. 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp., 130 S.W.3d 573, 584 (Mo.App. E.D.2003).

Missouri courts follow the “American rule” with respect to awards of attorney’s fees. Id. at 594. The “American rule” generally provides that each party is required to bear the expense of its attorney’s fees. Id. However, there are four common exceptions to the rule which allow a court to award attorney’s fees if: (1) a statute authorizes an award of fees; (2) a contract authorizes an award of fees; (3) a party expends fees to defend collateral litigation; or (4) a court of equity deems fees are warranted in order to “balance benefits” where very unusual circumstances have been shown. See id.; Consolidated Public Water Supply District No. C-1 of Jefferson County v. Kreuter, 929 S.W.2d 314, 316-17 (Mo.App. E.D.1996). None of these exceptions apply in this case.

A court may also be allowed to award attorney’s fees as sanctions in two limited circumstances. First, Rule 55.03(d) provides a limited remedy of awarding attorney’s fees for frivolous or bad faith litigation. See Rule 55.03(d); Consolidated Public Water Supply, 929 S.W.2d at 317 n. 1 (discussing former version of Rule 55.03 providing for sanctions). And secondly, a trial court may award attorney’s fees as sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers. Mitalovich v. Toomey, 217 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Mo.App. E.D.2007).

Plaintiffs assert the trial court had authority to award attorney’s fees only pursuant to its inherent authority to award fees as sanctions. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the trial court had the inherent power to sanction Employer because it violated provisions of Rule 90 by failing to pay Plaintiffs after admitting it possessed money owed to Employee and by failing to timely answer Plaintiffs’ second set of interrogatories. Plaintiffs cite only one case where an appellate court has affirmed a trial court’s use of its inherent powers to award attorney’s fees as sanctions: Mitalovich v. Toomey, 217 S.W.3d 338. We find, however, that Mitalovich is inapplicable to the instant case. Our decision in Mitalovich to affirm the award of attorney’s fees was premised upon our Court’s conclusion that the award of attorneys’ fees in that case was actually imposed by the court as a sanction:

We conclude the award of attorney’s fees was imposed as a sanction for two compelling reasons: first, the award was made because of [father’s transgression in failing to appear for a hearing, which failing occasioned expenses of effort and money by [m]other; second, the court unequivocally denominated it a “sanction” in its order imposing the award.

217 S.W.3d at 340. Unlike in Mitalovich, the record on appeal in the instant case does not provide any clear indication as to why the trial court awarded attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the court did not denominate the award as a “sanction” in its judgment. Because we cannot conclude the award of attorney’s fees was imposed by the trial court as a sanction, we must find the court did not have authority to award attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs. With respect to Employer’s argument that the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiffs attorney’s fees, point two is granted.

III. CONCLUSION

As authorized by Rule 84.14, we modify the judgment to exclude all references to the award of attorney’s fees and, as modified, affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiffs $475.81 in damages and $72.00 in costs.

MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J., concur.

      . Because Defendant Keith Short is employed by Cathedral Properties, LLC, we will refer to him as "Employee” for purposes of this opinion.

      . All references to Rules are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2010) unless otherwise indicated.

      . Most of Rule 90 and Chapter 525 refer to the employer as "garnishee,” refer to the judgment creditor as either "plaintiff”, or "garnishor,” and refer to the employee as "debtor” or "defendant.” In order to assist the reader, this Court will refer to the parties to a garnishment action simply as "employer,” "plaintiff,” and "employee” when discussing and citing provisions in Rule 90 and statutes in Chapter 525.

      . All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated.

      . All references to section 525.250 are to RSMo Supp.2009.

      . Employer asserts section 525.170 prohibited the trial court from awarding costs. Section 525.170 provides in relevant part that no final default judgment "shall be rendered against [the employer] ... for a greater amount than [the employer] shall appear to be liable for to [the employee]." When read in isolation, section 525.170 arguably appears to exclude costs from a final default judgment in garnishment cases. However, in ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute, we review the provisions of the entire legislative act and must harmonize all of the provisions if reasonably possible. Chester Bross Construction Co. v. Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards, 111 S.W.3d 425, 427 (Mo.App. E.D. 2003). Moreover, we presume every statutory provision has effect. Id. Guided by these principles, we find that to narrowly interpret section 525.170 as Employer contends would render sections 525.250 and 514.060 meaningless. As we explain above, the plain and ordinary meaning of sections 525.250 and 514.060 expressly grant the trial court discretionary authority to award costs to the prevailing party in all garnishment actions between a plaintiff and employer. Thus, we conclude Employer’s interpretation of section 525.170 lacks merit.

      . Rule 90.10(a) requires an employer whom admits in its answers to interrogatories that it is possesses money owed to the employee to pay such money "no later than ten days after the return date of the writ of garnishment or levy.” See also Rule 90.01(d). Rule 90.07(b) requires the employer to file and serve answers to interrogatories "during the ten days immediately after the return date of the writ.”

      . In Employer’s third and fourth points on appeal, it contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees because Plaintiffs failed to properly request such an award in their motion for default judgment. It is unnecessary for us to reach this issue because our determination that the attorney's fees award was not authorized is dispositive. Points three and four are denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lawrence A. MITCHELL, Appellant.
    No. ED 93663.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.
    June 8, 2010.
    Ethan B. Corlija, Clayton, MO, for Appellant.
    Christopher A. Koster, Attorney General, James B. Farnsworth, Asst. Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J., and ROBERT G. DOWD, JR. and PATRICIA L. COHEN, JJ.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Lawrence A. Mitchell (“Defendant”) appeals from the judgment upon his conviction, after a jury trial, of attempted forcible rape, Section 566.030, RSMo 2000. Defendant argues the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of attempted forcible rape; (2) denying his challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of two jurors; (3) denying him the opportunity to present evidence and elicit testimony dealing with an alternative theory of the crime concerning an alternative viable suspect; (4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s evidence and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury or, in the alternative, for a new trial because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove Defendant perpetrated the crime; and (5) failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial after the State made a comment during closing argument implying that it had personal knowledge of Defendant’s guilt.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. An opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating principles of law would have no precedential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).

      . All further statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.


text:
    Scott NIEDER, et al., Appellants, v. Michael SIFRIT, et al., Respondents.
    No. ED 93641.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Justin A. Hardin, Saint Louis, MO, for Appellants.
    Daniel J. Briegel, Union, MO, for Respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J. and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Scott Nieder and Tiffany Welker (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the trial court’s judgment denying their request for attorney’s fees. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees.

An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. The judgment is affirmed under Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    Mary REAGAN, Appellant, v. William J. HARTEL and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
    No. ED 93636.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Mary Bridget Reagan, Saint Peters, MO, for Appellant.
    Shelly A. Kintzel, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondents.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J. and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Mary Reagan appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirming and adopting the decision of the Division of Employment Security Appeals Tribunal disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits. We find that the Commission did not err in affirming the decision of the Appeals Tribunal.

An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. The decision of the Commission is affirmed under Rule 84.16(b).


author: LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Judge.

text:
    FRIENDS OF The SAN LUIS, INC., Appellant, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Respondents.
    No. ED 93582.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.

      Jonathan P. Beck, Ian C. Simmons, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Edward M. Goldenhersh, Bernard C. Huger, David P. Niemeier, for respondents.
   LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Judge.

Introduction

In this action to save the San Luis Apartment Building from demolition, The Friends of the San Luis, Inc. appeals the circuit court’s judgment dismissing its petition for lack of standing. However, because the building was demolished shortly after the circuit court’s judgment, we find that the ease is moot. We also conclude that the case does not fall within any exception to the mootness doctrine. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to vacate its judgment and dismiss the Friends’ petition. '

Factual and Procedural Background

The San Luis Apartment Building was a building located at 4483 Lindell Boulevard in the Central West End Historic District of St. Louis, Missouri. The building was first constructed as the DeVille Motor Hotel in 1962, opening in 1963. Charles R. Colbert, a prominent New Orleans architect of the mid-twentieth century, designed the building as a motel building using the International Style. The building became a Holiday Inn in 1966. The Archdiocese of St. Louis and the San Luis Apartments, Inc., (collectively, “the Archdiocese”) acquired the building in the 1970s. The Archdiocese renamed the building the San Luis and converted it into apartments for senior citizens. The San Luis Apartment Building was part of a campus of buildings on the block owned by the Archdiocese; these buildings include the Cathedral Basilica, the Archdiocesan Headquarters, the Cathedral School, and on the adjacent block to the east, Rosati-Kain High School.

The Central West End Historic District was certified by the National Park Service in 1974 as a district comprised of late 19th and early 20th Century Revival Style historic buildings. Within this district of Revival Style houses and buildings is a small enclave of structures, constructed on and around Lindell Boulevard and Taylor Avenue in the mid-20th Century, which retain aspects of the distinctive International Style influence of the period. The San Luis Apartment Building was one of these buildings. Although situated within a certified historic district, the San Luis was not listed on the National Register of Historic Places as a single site, or as part of a small International Style District, and would not be eligible for consideration as a National Register property until 2012, when it turned fifty years old.

The Archdiocese closed the San Luis Apartments and the residents relocated. At the commencement of the instant proceeding, the building had been completely empty for over one year. Citing deteriorating conditions, costly renovations, and its assessment based on architectural and engineering studies that the building had no viable economic use, the Archdiocese determined to demolish the San Luis Apartment Building and construct a surface parking lot in its place.

Accordingly, the Archdiocese applied for a demolition permit from the City of St. Louis. The Preservation Board of the Cultural Resources Office for the City of St. Louis conducted a preliminary review of the Archdiocese’s application at its public meeting on June 22, 2009. The Preservation Board heard a presentation covering the historical background of the building, the architect of the building, and the development of International. Style buildings in the City and in the Central West End. The Board also heard the Archdiocese’s assessment that the building could not be feasibly rehabilitated. Citizens were allowed to voice their support or opposition to the issuance of the demolition permit. In all, twenty-five people expressed their opinion; four spoke in favor of the demolition; twenty-one spoke in opposition to the demolition. The Preservation Board, by a 3-2 vote, granted preliminary approval to demolish the building. Sixteen days later, on July 8, 2009, the Cultural Resources Office approved the demolition. Twelve days later, on July 20, 2009, the Building Commissioner for the City of St. Louis granted a demolition permit to the San Luis Apartments, Inc., for the demolition of the San Luis Building.

A group of citizens opposed to the demolition of the San Luis formed The Friends of the San Luis, Inc., a Missouri non-profit corporation, organized for the express purpose of advocating for the preservation of the San Luis Apartment Building. Although the group was only incorporated on July 17th, 2009, the individuals comprising the organization had advocated on behalf of preserving the San Luis since January of 2008. The Board of Directors for the organization is composed of ten individuals — all of whom spoke in opposition to the demolition of the San Luis at the Preservation Board hearing. Of the ten directors, nine are residents of the City of St. Louis; the other is a resident of St. Louis County. One director lives within the Central West End Historic District. The address for the corporation’s registered agent and the group’s principal place of business are not within the Central West End Historic District. And the organization does not own property adjacent to the San Luis Apartment Building.

The Friends filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Archdiocese on July 17, 2009 — after the Cultural Resources Office approved the demolition, but before the Building Commissioner granted the actual demolition permit. The Friends’ stated purpose for filing its action was to stop further demolition of the San Luis Apartment Building while the Friends pursued administrative remedies. Specifically, the Friends wanted to maintain the building in its then-current condition while it appealed the action of the Building Commissioner pursuant to the appeal process set forth in St. Louis City Ordinance 64689, an ordinance relating to the identification and preservation of “Cultural Resources,” and which provides for review of actions of the Building Commissioner in certain circumstances. The Friends’ argument displayed an awareness that their challenge to the demolition process could be rendered moot by the actual demolition. Indeed, the Friends alleged that the Archdiocese had already begun “soft” demolition of the building, and that unless enjoined by the court, would proceed to complete the demolition.

The Friends’ prayer for relief was essentially two-fold. First, the group prayed for a declaration that the issuance of the demolition permit for the San Luis Apartment Building was unlawful under the ordinances of the City of St. Louis. Second, the Friends sought injunctive relief, in the form of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction, to prevent the Archdiocese from proceeding further with demolition. On July 20, 2009 — the same day the Building Commissioner issued the demolition permit — the circuit court denied the Friends’ request for a temporary restraining order, but scheduled a hearing on the Friends’ application for preliminary injunction.

The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the Friends’ petition for lack of standing. The Archdiocese argued the Friends lacked standing because the group did not have a specific and legally cognizable interest at stake, as the Friends’ professed interest to save the San Luis Apartment Building from demolition was not one protected by law or distinct from the interest of the general public.

The Friends countered with several arguments in support of its standing. To begin, the Friends argued that being composed of residents of the City of St. Louis, the group had standing to contest demolition of historic buildings and to enforce the historic-preservation mandates set forth in the city’s ordinances by virtue of the Preservation Review Ordinance, City Ordinance 64689. The Friends noted the stated intent and purpose of the Preservation Review Ordinance is to promote the interests of residents by preserving and protecting historic buildings located in the City. The group further noted section Forty-Four of the ordinance states that “any person aggrieved” by the granting of a permit to demolish a historic building has the right to appeal an action by the Building Commissioner in granting a demolition permit based on the recommendation of the Preservation Review Board. (Emphasis supplied). Thus, the group contended, because the Preservation Review Ordinance exists to protect the historical and cultural integrity of the City, and because the ordinance sets forth guidelines and restrictions prescribing when and whether the Preservation Review Board and the Building Commissioner may issue demolition permits for historical buildings, it follows that residents of St. Louis must be able to act when the Preservation Board or Building Commissioner ignore the Preservation Review Ordinance and issue a demolition permit for a historic building that the ordinance protects on behalf of the residents. The Friends argued that the Preservation Review Ordinance is unenforceable and without meaning if residents of the City do not have standing to object when the Preservation Board ignores the mandates, guidelines, and restrictions set forth in the ordinance. And similarly, the group contended the administrative-appeal right provided by the Preservation Review Ordinance is illusory and meaningless if a stay of demolition cannot be obtained pending that appeal.

The Friends additionally claimed standing because demolition of the San Luis Apartment Building adversely affected more distinctly and directly the group’s interest in the natural, architectural, and cultural heritage of the City of St. Louis than it affected the interest of the general public. And lastly, the Friends drew support for its argument from federal decisions, noting that actions seeking enforcement of the National Historic Building Act, federal courts have recognized that neighborhood residents have a legally-protected interest in maintaining the environmental and historic quality of their neighborhood. The Friends argued that like the residents in these federal cases, and for the reasons articulated by the federal courts, the St. Louis residents should have standing to enforce the historic-preservation mandates set forth in the Preservation Review Ordinance.

The circuit court dismissed the Friends’ case, with prejudice, for lack of standing. In its sharply-worded judgment issued on July 27, 2009, the circuit court concluded that the Friends lacked standing because the group had not shown any pecuniary or personal interest, other than its generalized interest in preservation of historic structures in the City of St. Louis, that was directly in issue or jeopardy and that could be the subject of some consequential relief. The court found there was nothing in Ordinance 64689 that conferred standing on anyone who wanted to contest a demolition permit. Rather, the court noted, the ordinance employs the classic administrative-law phrase “person aggrieved” in describing those who may seek review of a demolition permit before the Preservation Board. Thus, the court noted, the ordinance recognizes that only a person “aggrieved” — that is, one who has standing — may prosecute an appeal. The court further concluded that even if the ordinance purported to confer standing on any citizen, it would not suffice to clothe the court with jurisdiction, as city ordinances cannot add to or subtract from the court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The court explained that the Missouri constitution confers upon circuit courts jurisdiction of “cases and matters.” This constitutional provision, the court reasoned, does not authorize courts to entertain lawsuits unless the plaintiff has the necessary personal stake in the outcome of the case to create a justiciable controversy, the existence of which is necessary to confer upon the court the authority to proceed. In other words, the court explained, to establish standing a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” must show a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and must show that it is likely that the injury may be redressed. Finding the Friends’ standing to contest the demolition “imperceptible,” the court concluded it was evident the action must be dismissed.

The Friends appealed, alleging the circuit court erred in dismissing the group’s petition for lack of standing. The group filed their notice of appeal on September 4, 2009. The Archdiocese, in the mean time, continued with its demolition of the San Luis Apartment Building. Demolition was completed on September 11, 2009. The Archdiocese provided this Court with pictures of the San Luis site, taken in April of 2010, which show that the building has been completely demolished, and that construction of the parking lot is well-underway.

Discussion

At the outset of any appellate review, we have an obligation to determine whether the case presents a “real, substantial, presently-existing controversy, or is instead moot.” Jackson County Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. City of Lee’s Summit, 277 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Mo.App. W.D.2008)(internal quotation omitted); City of Manchester v. Ryan, 180 S.W.3d 19, 21 (Mo.App. E.D.2005). It is well-established that Missouri courts do not determine moot cases or render advisory opinions. Kinsky v. Steiger, 109 S.W.3d 194, 195 (Mo.App. E.D.2003); State ex rel. Missouri Cable Television Ass’n v. Missouri Public Service Comm’n, 917 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). “Appellate courts do not sit as moot courts determining speculative issues for the benefit of some other case at some other time.” Lee’s Summit, 277 S.W.3d at 744 (internal quotation omitted). “The existence of an actual and vital controversy susceptible of some relief is essential to appellate jurisdiction.” Ryan, 180 S.W.3d at 21 (internal quotation omitted). We do not decide questions of law disconnected from the granting of actual relief. Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Mo. banc 1994). A case is moot when an event occurs that makes the court’s decision unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by the court impossible. Kinsky, 109 S.W.3d at 195. “Even a case vital at inception of the appeal may be mooted by an intervening event which so alters the position of the parties that any judgment rendered merely becomes a hypothetical opinion.” Ryan, 180 S.W.3d at 21 (internal quotation omitted).

This case is moot. The Friends sought to stop demolition of the San Luis Apartment Building. That building has been completely demolished. The Archdiocese is now building a parking lot. Even if we decided the circuit court erroneously determined that the Friends lacked standing, it is impossible for this Court to grant any effectual relief. The building is gone. As the last vestiges of the San Luis disappeared, so too did the Friends’ cause of action as well as the ability of this Court to grant relief. This Court cannot reconstruct the building from its rubble. “What’s done cannot be undone.” MacBeth, Act V, scenel; Kinsky, 109 S.W.3d at 196.

The Friends concede that this case is moot. Nevertheless, the group requests this Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and determine the issue of standing. The group ardently believes the circuit court erred in concluding the group lacked standing to bring its cause of action; the group ultimately seeks reversal of that ruling. They contend the court’s judgment effectively holds that no one has standing, and argue this creates a prece-dential brick wall for similar historic-preservation suits in the future. The group asserts that St. Louis has many privately-owned buildings subject to the Preservation Review Ordinance, with owners, like the Archdiocese, wishing to raze those buildings. The Friends argue that the next time city residents wish to enforce the Preservation Review Ordinance, they will confront the same problem as the Friends — finding their cause of action dismissed for lack of standing. Moreover, the group contends the issue will consistently evade review. They assert it takes but a short amount of time to irretrievably demolish a historic building, an assertion with which we agree. Therefore, the Friends argue, in future situations such as this, the building will be demolished before the party can even file a notice of appeal, let alone litigate the issue of standing to its conclusion. Thus, the group asks this Court to address the question of standing.

“As a general rule, moot cases must be dismissed.” Warlick v. Warlick, 294 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Mo.App. E.D.2009)(internal quotation omitted). Missouri, however, recognizes two exceptions to this general rule under which this Court may exercise its discretion to hear the appeal and reach the merits of a moot case. Id. First, we may consider the appeal if the case becomes moot after it has been argued and submitted. Id. Second, we may consider the appeal if the case presents “an unsettled legal issue of public interest and importance of a recurring nature that will escape review unless the court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Chastain v. City of Kansas City, 968 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Mo.App. W.D.1998); In re Dunn, 181 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Mo.App. E.D.2006)(exercising discretion to review moot case, finding that the “public-interest” exception applied). This “public-interest” exception is construed very narrowly. Ryan, 180 S.W.3d at 22. “[I]f an issue of public importance in a moot case is likely to be present in a future live controversy practically capable of appellate review, then the ‘public-interest’ exception does not apply.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

The present case does not fall within either of these exceptions. First, the case became moot prior to, not after, argument and submission to this Court. And second, we do not believe this is an appropriate case in which to exercise our discretion under the “public-interest” exception. Preservation of historic buildings is a worthy cause, and the issue of standing the Friends seek to raise is of public importance. However, we conclude the case does not fall within the “public-interest” exception.

Standing is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry. We cannot say that the facts present in this case will be repeated in future controversies. See Dunn, 181 S.W.3d at 604 (finding case fell within the “public-interest” exception where precise issue and scenario would recur). Cases in the future will likely involve different circumstances, different residents, and different interests. An individual or group may have standing in one situation, but not another. Even if cases in the future are brought by, and on behalf of, the residents of the City of St. Louis, the eases will involve different circumstances. Any decision we render would truly be hypothetical, with little or no application in future historic-preservation cases.

Furthermore, we perceive no reason why the issue need evade appellate review in a future live controversy. Supreme Court Rule 84.02 gives appellate courts the discretionary power to docket appeals, and courts have employed the power to expedite appellate proceedings when delay would threaten to moot an appeal. See Chastain, 968 S.W.2d at 239. Further, the Friends could have sought an original writ of prohibition from this Court. And the Friends could have sought a stay from this Court. Rule 92.04. We note the Friends did not file their appeal until September 4, 2009, some thirty-nine days after the circuit court’s judgment and just seven days before demolition of the San Luis was completed. And the Friends did not seek an expedited appeal, a writ, or a stay. The present case could have been prosecuted in such a way to avoid the present mootness problem. We do not believe future cases presenting the same issue will necessarily evade this Court’s scrutiny. .

We are left, then, with the appropriate disposition of the circuit court’s judgment. The Friends are concerned that the circuit court’s judgment, which the Friends believe is grievously in error, will stand as a roadblock to future historic-preservation efforts. Whether the circuit court’s judgment is erroneous or not, we agree with the Western District’s well-reasoned Chastain decision, wherein the Court concluded that the underlying trial-court judgment in a moot case should normally be vacated upon request if the requesting party had no control over the mooting event. Chastain, 968 S.W.2d at 240-43. The Archdiocese, at oral argument before this Court, stated it is not opposed to having the circuit court’s judgment vacated. We remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the Friends’ petition without prejudice due to the mootness of the controversy.

It has been observed that Courts must be responsive to efforts to preserve historic districts and, within the framework of the law, support such efforts. Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856, 864 (Mo.App.1977). But the question of a party’s standing under the City of St. Louis’s historic-preservation ordinances will have to be determined in a future live controversy.

GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., and MARY K. HOFF, J., concur.

      . We shall hereafter refer to this entity as "the Friends,” and use plural constructions for ease of reading.

      . It appears that the San Luis Apartments, Inc. is the record owner of the property.

      . The Friends note the ordinances of the City of St. Louis have no provision addressing a stay of demolition pending administrative appeal.

      . “Cultural Resources,” as that term is defined and used in Ordinance 64689 means:
      a site or Improvement that:
      a) Has significant character or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the City, state or nation; or
      b) Is the site of a significant historic event; or
      c) Is the work of a master whose individual work has significantly influenced the development of the City, state or nation; or
      d) Contains elements of design, detail, materials or craftsmanship which represent a significant innovation; or
      e) Owing to its unique location or singular physical characteristic represents an established and familiar visual' feature of a neighborhood, community or the City; or
      f) Has yielded, or is likely to yield, according to the best available scholarship, archaeological artifacts important in prehistory or history
      g)Is a work of art located in a public space.
      The term "Improvement” is further defined, and includes, among other things, any building or structure.

      .City Ordinance 64689 Section Forty-Four, entitled "Appeal on actions or determinations: Demolition, Construction, Alteration— Historic District or Landmark/Landmark Site” provides:
      Any person aggrieved by, or any officer, department, board, bureau or commission of the city affected by, the action of the building commissioner with respect to a requested permit based on the Cultural Resources Office’s application of the Landmark or Historic District standards to a requested permit or based on the recommendations or determinations by the Preservation Board or Cultural Resources Office pursuant to Sections Thirty-Nine through Forty-Three, may appeal the action of the building commissioner to the Preservation Board for review and hearing. Such appeal shall be known as a preservation appeal and shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the action of the building commissioner by filing a notice of appeal with the Cultural Resources Office specifying the grounds of such appeal.
      City Ordinance 64689 Section Forty-Five, entitled "Hearing on filed appeal: Demolition, Construction, Alteration — Historic District or Landmark/Landmark Site” provides:
      Within forty five (45) days after the filing of appeal to the Preservation Board, the Preservation Board shall hold a hearing thereon. The Preservation Board shall hear the recommendations and evidence submitted by the Cultural Resources Office and by any officer, department, board, bureau or commission desiring to be heard thereon and shall permit the appellant and other parties to the appeal an opportunity to appear and be heard by the Preservation Board and to submit evidence. The Preservation Board may permit any other interested person an opportunity to appear and be heard by the Preservation Board. The Preservation Board may continue or adjourn the hearing or schedule additional hearings to permit a full hearing of the appeal. The Preservation Board shall cause all proceedings in a preservation appeal to be suitably recorded and preserved.
      City Ordinance 64689 Sections Thirty-Nine through Forty-Three, in part, address the requirement of a permit to demolish a building in a Historic District, and the requirement prohibiting the building commissioner from issuing such a permit "unless the Cultural Resources Director shall have determined that the proposed work complies with the applicable Historic District or Landmark or Landmark site standards, or the Preservation . Board or Cultural Resources Director has recommended that the application for permit be approved.” Section Forty-One.

      . The Friends alleged that demolition of the San Luis and the issuance of a permit for that demolition were improper and unlawful in a number of respects. For instance, the Friends alleged that the demolition did not comply with the intent of St. Louis City Ordinance 64689; that the proposed demolition did not comply with the plans and standards of the Central West End Historic District, codified by St. Louis City Ordinance 56768; that the Preservation Board considered incorrect and inappropriate standards in granting preliminary approval of the demolition; that the Board did not consider the effect of the demolition on the significant features or characteristics of the Central West End Historic District, which were the basis for designation of the district; and that the Board improperly considered an excessively-high per-square-foot figure for the cost of rehabilitation. The Friends asserted that rehabilitation of the San Luis Building would not exceed its assessed value. The Friends also argued that the building was eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The group contended that further demolition of the building would undercut these arguments, e.g., demolition would increase the per-squa-refoot figure for the cost of rehabilitation, and also would make the building ineligible for placement on the National Register of Historic Places.

      . Thomas Richter, the Archdiocese’s Director of Building and Real Estate, explained that "soft” demolition included removing items related to walls, ceilings, and floors, as well as wiring, piping, diywall, and other nonstructural items.

      . The Archdiocese asserted two additional grounds for dismissal. For one, the Archdiocese argued that the Friends’ petition should be dismissed because a declaratory judgment could not be used to challenge an administrative decision. For its other ground, the Archdiocese contended the Friends petition should be dismissed for failure to state a claim against the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese argued that the Friends failed to plead any facts demonstrating the Archdiocese’s alleged wrongdoing, but instead had directed all allegations of unlawful conduct towards the Preservation Board.

      . City Ordinance 64689 states, in part:
      WHEREAS, preservation of the City’s natural, architectural and cultural heritage is beneficial to the City and its residents. .. .BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS AS FOLLOWS:.... SECTION TWO. Purpose. The intent of this ordinance is to promote the prosperity and general welfare of the public, including particularly the educational and cultural welfare, through: The protection, ... perpetuation ... of buildings ... as have or may reasonably be expected to have historical or cultural value and significance to the nation, the state or the City ... The increase of commerce and prosperity by the protection of the value, convenience, and amenity of property and to promote the tourist trade and civic pride and wider public knowledge and appreciation of the heritage and history of St. Louis.

      .In particular, the Friends note the inability to enforce Section Sixty-One of the Preservation Review Ordinance, which states that proposed demolitions of "Sound High Merit Structures shall not be approved,” and that demolition of Merit or Qualifying Structures "shall not be approved except in unusual circumstances which shall be expressly noted.” (Emphases added).

      . The Friends cite to the following federal decisions: Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459 (4th Cir.2001); Society Hill Towers Owners’ Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168 (3d Cir.2000); and Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.2000).

      . Because the circuit court found that the Friends lacked standing, the court’s dismissal of the cause of action properly should have been one without, not with, prejudice. See Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Missouri Clean Water Com’n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 29 (Mo. banc 2003).

      . The circuit court cited the test for standing set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

      . The group also advocates for a different analysis of standing when it comes to historic preservation. The Friends argue that the question of standing has its own unique considerations when analyzing a historical-preservation ordinance because the benefits of historic preservation will inherently inure to the benefit of the entire community. Citing to two previous decisions by this Court, Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., N.A., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo.App.1975) and Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo.App.1977), the Friends advocate relaxing the need for plaintiffs to show how their interest is distinct from the general public, because an interest in historic preservation is common to the entire community.


text:
    Ben L. BURSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93473.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.

      Mark A.. Grothoff, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., Dora A. Fichter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Ben L. Burse appeals the motion court’s denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. An opinion would have no precedential value. We have furnished the parties with a memorandum, for their information only, explaining the reasons for our decision. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b)(2).


text:
    Lamonica R. LEWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93434.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Maleaner Harvey, Saint Louis, MO, for Appellant.
    Chris Koster, Attorney General, Jamie Pamela Rasmussen, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J. and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

LaMonica R. Lewis appeals the judgment denying her Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentia-ry hearing. We find that the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly erroneous. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. We affirm the judgment under Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    Hattie L. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93363.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.
    June 8, 2010.
    Maleaner R. Harvey, Assistant Public Defender, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

      Shaun J. Mackelprang, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J., ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., J., and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Hattie Smith (Movant) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis denying her Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Movant claims the motion court erred in denying her claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform her of her right to testify in her own defense. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find the motion court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided a memorandum opinion only for the use of the parties setting forth the reasons for our decision.

We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    R.L.G. by his Next Friend David Ray GOULD, and David Ray Gould, Individually, Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. Rachael DICKENS, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. ED 93199.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.
    June 8, 2010.
    Joseph R. Aubuchon, Union, MO, for Respondents.
    Brian H. May, Clayton, MO, for Appellant.
    Before SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J., ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., J., and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Rachael Dickens appeals from the trial court’s Judgment of Paternity (Judgment) awarding her and David Gould joint physical and legal custody of their minor child (Child). We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and conclude the trial court’s judgment is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and does not erroneously declare or apply the law. Loumiet v. Loumiet, 103 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision to the parties for their use only. We affirm the judgment pursuant to Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 84.16(b).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Revon SWINNEY, Appellant.
    No. ED 93120.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 8, 2010.
    Jo Ann Rotermund, MO Public Defender Office, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Shaun Mackelprang, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P. J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Revon Swinney (“Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of a controlled substance by possessing cocaine base in violation of Section 195.202 one count of possession of a controlled substance by possessing methylene-dioxymethamphetamine in violation of Section 195.202 and one count of resisting arrest in violation of Section 575.150. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a persistent drug offender to a total of twenty years’ and six months’ imprisonment. The court suspended execution of its sentence and sentenced Defendant to the long-term substance abuse program pursuant to Section 217.362.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal. The findings and conclusions of the motion court are based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous. No error of law appears. An opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, which sets forth the facts and reasons for this order.

We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).

      . All statutory references are to RSMo.2000, unless otherwise indicated.


text:
    Alfred L. BOSS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93076.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.

      Mark A. Grothoff, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., Dora A. Fichter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Alfred L. Boss, Jr., appeals the motion court’s denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. An opinion would have no precedential value. We have furnished the parties with a memorandum, for their information only, explaining the reasons for our decision. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b)(2).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Raymond BAKER, Appellant.
    No. ED 93038.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Margaret M. Johnston, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
    Chris Koster, Attorney General, John M. Reeves, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Raymond Baker (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of one count of attempted first-degree robbery, in violation of Sections 569.020 and 564.011, one count of second-degree murder, in violation of Section 565.021, and two counts of armed criminal action, in violation of Section 571.015. Consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years for the attempted robbery, six years for the related armed criminal action, nineteen years for the second-degree murder, and ten years- for the related armed criminal action. The terms for the attempted robbery and related armed criminal action counts ran concurrent with each other and consecutive to the terms for the second-degree murder and related armed criminal action counts, which also ran concurrent with each other.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the legal file, and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. No error of law appears. An extended opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law applicable to this case would serve no jurisprudential purpose. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for our decision. We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).

      . All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antwon GUEST, Appellant.
    No. ED 93036.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Scott Thompson, District Defender, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
    Chris Koster, Attorney General, Richard A. Starnes, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Antwon Guest (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment and sentence imposed All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated, after a jury found him guilty of trafficking drugs in the second degree in violation of Section 195.223. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a prior and persistent offender and a prior and persistent drug offender to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the legal file, and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. No error of law appears. An extended opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law applicable to this case would serve no jurisprudential purpose. We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).

      . All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.


text:
    Brandon ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 92968.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Timothy Forneris, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., John M. Reeves, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Brandon Anderson appeals the motion court’s denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. An opinion would have no precedential value. We have furnished the parties with ■ a memorandum, for their information only, explaining the reasons for our decision. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b)(2).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mallory RUSH, Appellant.
    No. ED 92931.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.
    June 8, 2010.
    Timothy Forneris, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Missouri Public Defender, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
    Chris Koster, Attorney General, Mary H. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before GLENN A. NORTON, P.J., MARY K. HOFF, J., and LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Mallory Rush (Defendant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment and sentence imposed after a jury found her guilty of three counts of assault in the first degree, in violation of Section 565.050, and three counts of armed criminal action, in violation of Section 571.015. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of ten years on each first-degree assault count and five years for two of the armed criminal action counts. The trial court also sentenced Defendant to five years for the third armed criminal action count to be served consecutively with the terms for the other counts.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the legal file, and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. No error of law appears. An extended opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law applicable to this case would serve no jurisprudential purpose. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for our decision. We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).

      . All statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.


author: KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Mary HANKINS, Appellant, v. RELIANCE AUTOMOTIVE, INC., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
    No. ED 94259.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.
    June 8, 2010.

      Mary Hankins, St. Louis, MO, pro se.
    Reliance Automotive, St. Louis, MO, pro se.
    Shelly A. Kintzel, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Employment Security, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent Division of Employment Security.
   KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge.

Introduction

Mary Hankins (Claimant) appeals pro se from a final order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission). The Commission’s order affirmed the Division of Employment Security Appeals Tribunal’s finding that Claimant is not eligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged by Reliance Automotive (Employer) for misconduct connected with work. Because Claimant’s brief fails to substantially comply with the appellate briefing requirements as provided in Rule 84.04, we dismiss Claimant’s appeal.

Background

The record reveals that Claimant worked for Employer in accounts payable for about four or five months until August 10, 2009, when her employment was terminated. On that date, Claimant became engaged in a verbal altercation with Employer’s Office Manager, John Zeman (Ze-man), and Employer’s president, Craig Epstein (Epstein). During the “discussion,” Epstein instructed Claimant to lower her voice and act in a professional manner. When Claimant continued talking “and ranting and raving,” Epstein again directed Claimant to stop and warned her that if she did not stop, she would be asked to leave. Claimant continued and Epstein terminated Claimant’s employment.

Claimant filed a claim with the Division of Employment Security for unemployment benefits, which Employer protested on the grounds that Claimant was terminated when she refused to act professionally and continued to argue loudly.

The Division of Employment Security issued its Deputy’s Determination Concerning Claim for Benefits (Deputy’s Determination) on September 18, 2009, and found Claimant was disqualified from unemployment benefits because she was discharged by Employer for “misconduct connected with work.”

Claimant appealed the Deputy’s Determination to the Appeals Tribunal and a telephone hearing was held on October 22, 2009. Claimant testified on her own behalf while Zeman and Epstein testified on behalf of Employer. The Appeals Tribunal issued its decision on October 28, 2009, affirming the Deputy’s Determination.

Claimant filed an Application for Review with the Commission on October 30, 2009. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the Appeals Tribunal on January 14, 2010, with one of the three commissioners filing a dissenting opinion.

Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal with this Court on January 20, 2010. This appeal follows.

Discussion

Claimant appeals as a pro se appellant. While we note Claimant’s apparent effort to conform to the rules for appeals to this Court, her brief is substantially lacking not only in form, but in content as well. Given the significant deficiencies in Claimant’s brief, we dismiss her appeal.

Pro se appellants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. Blakey v. AAA Prof'l Pest Control, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo.App. E.D.2007). The briefs of pro se appellants, as with all appellants, must comply with the rules of appellate procedure, including Rule 84.04, which governs the content of appellate briefs. Carlisle v. Rainbow Connection, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 583, 584 (Mo.App. E.D. 2009). A pro se litigant is not granted preferential treatment if he or she fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04, and failure to comply with this Rule constitutes grounds for dismissal. Id.; Thornton v. City of Kirkwood, 161 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Mo.App. E.D.2005). Our adherence to these principles stems not from a lack of sympathy for the pro se appellant, but is necessary to assure judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties. Thornton, 161 S.W.3d at 919.

Rule 84.04 exists because “it is not proper.for the appellate court to speculate as to the point being raised by the appellant and the supporting legal justification and circumstances.” Blakey, 219 S.W.3d at 794. “Appellate courts are not permitted to speculate on an appellant’s arguments because, to do so would cast the court in the role of an advocate for the appellant.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In fact, Missouri precedent has established that “appellate courts are not required to review an appeal on the merits where there are flagrant violations of Rule 84.04 concerning the requirements of an appellate brief in a civil case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Claimant’s brief fails to conform to the mandates of Rule 84.04 in several respects and to such an extent that her appeal cannot be reviewed. First, Claimant’s Table of Contents fails to comply with Rule 84.04(a)(1), as it does not contain the elements mandated by the Rule. Claimant’s Table of Contents only lists the various sections of her brief with reference to the corresponding page numbers. Her brief fails to contain, as the Rule requires, a table of case law and other authority with reference to the corresponding page numbers.

Second, Claimant’s Jurisdictional Statement lacks the content required by Rule 84.04(b). Rule 84.04(b) requires that “[t]he jurisdictional statement shall set forth sufficient factual data to demonstrate the applicability of the particular provision or provisions of Article V, section 3, of the Constitution whereon jurisdiction is sought to be predicated.” Claimant’s Jurisdictional Statement contains no information or reference to the applicable constitutional provisions conferring jurisdiction on this Court. Instead, Claimant’s Jurisdictional Statement contains legal argument.

Next, Claimant’s Statement of Facts is grossly deficient. Rule 84.04(c) requires that the Statement of Facts be a “fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.” Claimant’s Statement of Facts is not only fairly incomprehensible, but does not accurately represent the record on appeal, fails to inform this Court of the procedural facts or history of this case, contains recitation of law, and is composed almost exclusively of argument. “A violation of Rule 84.04(c) standing alone, constitutes grounds for dismissal of an appeal.” Carlisle, 300 S.W.3d at 585.

Similarly, Claimant’s Points Relied On fails to comply with the mandates of Rule 84.04(d). Claimant fails to “identify the administrative ruling or action [ she ] challenges,” fails to “state concisely the legal reasons for [her] claim of reversible error;” and fails to “explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Rule 84.04(d). Instead, Claimant’s Points Relied On section contains additional legal argumént of her apparent complaints with her case.

Finally, Claimant’s Argument section is equally deficient and fails to comply with Rule 84.04. Claimant entirely fails to include the requisite “concise statement of the applicable standard of review.” Rule 84.04(e). Because Claimant also fails to “support [her] contentions with relevant authority or argument beyond conclusory statements, the point is deemed abandoned.” Carlisle, 800 S.W.3d at 585. Her argument contains very little citation to relevant authority, lacks any legal analysis, and is comprised mainly of legal conclusions. “Mere conclusions and the failure to develop an argument with support from legal authority preserve nothing for review.” Id. Furthermore, as with the rest of her brief, Claimant’s Argument section fails to site to any references in the record as required by Rule 84.04(i).

Clearly Claimant’s brief fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04. Given these deficiencies, Claimant has preserved nothing for appeal. Accordingly, Claimant’s appeal is dismissed.

Conclusion

We dismiss Claimant’s appeal for failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04.

GEORGE W. DRAPER III, and GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., JJ., Concur.

      . All further Rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P.2009, unless otherwise indicated.

      . "A recitation of the law even when correct is improper in the statement of facts portion of the brief, and is a violation of Rule 84.04(c).” Carlisle, 300 S.W.3d at 585.