author: ATTREP, Judge.

text:
    STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angela CATT, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. A-1-CA-34839
    Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
    Filing Date: November 13, 2018 Certiorari Denied, February 25, 2019, No. S-1-SC-37421
    Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
    Law Offices of Jennifer J. Wernersbach, PC, Jennifer J. Wernersbach, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
   ATTREP, Judge.

{1} Defendant Angela Catt was convicted by a jury of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and conspiracy to commit drug trafficking. Defendant moved the district court to set aside the racketeering convictions and enter judgments of acquittal on the grounds that the jury had failed to find she committed the requisite two predicate acts and that there was instructional error. Defendant additionally argued that retrial would violate her right to be free from double jeopardy on the ground that sufficient predicate acts were lacking. The district court vacated Defendant's racketeering convictions but permitted retrial. Defendant now appeals this order. We hold that instructional error warranted vacating Defendant's racketeering convictions. Because the State may rely on conspiracy to commit drug trafficking as a predicate offense, however, sufficient predicates exist to permit retrial of the racketeering charges. Defendant additionally appeals her conviction for conspiracy to commit drug trafficking on sufficiency grounds. We hold that substantial evidence supported this conviction. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was alleged to be associated with a methamphetamine trafficking organization known as "the AZ Boys." She was charged by indictment with three counts of methamphetamine trafficking occurring on March 18, 2012, April 8, 2012, and May 1, 2012; three counts of conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine related to the same dates; and one count each of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. After a four-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of racketeering (Count 1), conspiracy to commit racketeering (Count 2), and conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine on April 8, 2012 (Count 8). The jury acquitted Defendant of the trafficking and conspiracy to traffic counts pertaining to the date of March 18, 2012 (Counts 5 and 6), as well as the trafficking count pertaining to the date of April 8, 2012 (Count 7). The jury deadlocked on the trafficking and conspiracy to traffic counts related to the alleged conduct of May 1, 2012 (Counts 3 and 4). The district court declared a mistrial as to those counts and permitted retrial. Defendant does not appeal this decision.

{3} Shortly after trial, Defendant moved the district court to set aside her racketeering convictions, and to enter judgments of "not guilty" or dismiss the racketeering counts with prejudice. Defendant argued that the failure of the jury to convict her of two trafficking counts demonstrated that insufficient evidence existed to convict her of racketeering and conspiracy to racketeer. Therefore, Defendant asserted, a retrial of those counts would violate her right not to be tried twice for the same conduct. At the hearing on Defendant's motion, Defendant additionally argued that the jury instruction defining "racketeering" was incorrect because it included all of the possible predicate offenses but failed to provide the elements of those crimes. The State agreed that the jury instructions for the racketeering counts were incorrect. Ultimately, the State did not oppose vacatur of the racketeering convictions but argued that retrial, not acquittal or dismissal, was the appropriate remedy. Both Defendant and the State maintained that the convictions for the racketeering charges and acquittals for the trafficking charges were inconsistent.

{4} The district court vacated the racketeering convictions but ordered a retrial. Although the exact basis for the district court's decision is not clear, the court noted the inconsistencies in the verdicts, that the motion was uncontested in terms of vacating the racketeering convictions, and that the State agreed that there was instructional error. The district court additionally entered a judgment and sentence on Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking methamphetamine on April 8, 2012 (Count 8), sentencing Defendant to a four-year term of incarceration. Defendant appeals the district court's denial of her request for judgments of acquittal or dismissal of the racketeering charges and appeals her conviction for conspiracy to commit drug trafficking for sufficiency of the evidence. Additional facts are discussed as needed in our analysis. Table 1 summarizes the present posture of the charges.

Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.

THE RACKETEERING CONVICTIONS

{5} We first address whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of Defendant's motion for acquittal or dismissal in the absence of a final order. Concluding we do, we then lay out general principles of double jeopardy and racketeering. We next hold that the district court correctly determined that both racketeering convictions should be set aside for instructional error. The issue then is whether Defendant can, consistent with her right to be free from double jeopardy, be subject to retrial on these charges. We hold that she can. Finally, although the parties request us to opine about the scope of retrial, we decline to do so.

I. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the District Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Acquittal or Dismissal

{6} The State argues that Defendant's appeal should be summarily dismissed "for want of a final order" or, if the appeal is construed as an interlocutory appeal, because it is untimely. The district court's order, however, implicates Defendant's constitutional right to avoid double jeopardy-indeed, Defendant's "right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place." State v. Apodaca , 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 372, 940 P.2d 478. This Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to immediately review the district court's denial of Defendant's motion for acquittal or dismissal of the racketeering charges. See id. ¶¶ 15-17 (holding that "a defendant has a constitutional right to appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss a charge on the ground that trial of the charge would subject the defendant to double jeopardy" and that this Court has jurisdiction to hear such an appeal); see also State v. McClaugherty , 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 27, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33 ("The denial of the motion [to bar reprosecution] below is all that is required by Apodaca to confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear an immediate direct appeal.").

II. Double Jeopardy

{7} The Constitutions of the United States and New Mexico guarantee that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V ; N.M. Const. art. II, § 15. "The Double Jeopardy Clause operates to protect an individual from repeated attempts by the state, 'with all its resources and power,' to secure a conviction, with the consequent anxiety, embarrassment, and undue expense to a defendant that results from retrial." Ben , 2015-NMCA-118, ¶ 7, 362 P.3d 180 (quoting Cty. of Los Alamos v. Tapia , 1990-NMSC-038, ¶ 16, 109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 ). "In common parlance, the state, upon failing to convict a defendant after a full and fair opportunity to do so is barred from a second bite of the apple." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Retrial is not barred, however, when a conviction has been set aside for reasons other than insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 14, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886 (holding that "when a defendant's conviction is vacated on appeal because of trial error, e.g., ... incorrect instructions, ... as opposed to insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant may be retried" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ).

We "review[ ] claims involving alleged violations of a defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy de novo." State v. Loza , 2018-NMSC-034, ¶ 4, 426 P.3d 34.

III. The Racketeering Act

{8} New Mexico's Racketeering Act (the Racketeering Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (1980, as amended through 2015), provides, in relevant part:

C. It is unlawful for a person employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. ...
D. It is unlawful for a person to conspire to violate the provisions of Subsection[ ] ... C of this section.

Section 30-42-4. The Racketeering Act is based on the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968 (2012), the federal statute criminalizing racketeering. Loza , 2018-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 426 P.3d 34. "[A]ccordingly we look to federal cases interpreting RICO for guidance in interpreting our [Racketeering] Act." Id. ; see also State v. Rael , 1999-NMCA-068, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d 280 (finding "federal decisions interpreting RICO ... instructive").

{9} In this case, Defendant was charged under Section 30-42-4(C), requiring, among other things, a "pattern of racketeering." The Racketeering Act defines a "pattern of racketeering" as "engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering with the intent of accomplishing any of the prohibited activities set forth in [the Racketeering Act,]" provided that the incidents occurred within a certain time frame not at issue here. Section 30-42-3(D). "Racketeering," in turn, is defined as "any act that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of New Mexico and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, involving any of" twenty-five offenses, including trafficking in controlled substances. Section 30-42-3(A). Thus, to establish a "pattern of racketeering," the state must prove "two incidents of racketeering," often referred to as "predicate offenses" or "predicate acts." Section 30-42-3(D); cf. State v. Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254 ("To be convicted under Section 30-42-4(A), [the d]efendants must have committed at least two punishable offenses that constitute racketeering." (citing § 30-42-3(D) ) ); State v. Crews , 1989-NMCA-088, ¶ 47, 110 N.M. 723, 799 P.2d 592 (discussing the elements of racketeering). At issue in this case is whether the jury was instructed correctly on all the elements of the racketeering charges, and whether sufficient predicates exist to permit retrial.

IV. The District Court Did Not Err in Vacating the Racketeering Convictions for Instructional Error

{10} "When the defendant has been found guilty, the court on motion of the defendant, or on its own motion, may grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice." Rule 5-614(A) NMRA.

When reviewing a [district] court's grant of a new trial, the appellate court must follow a two-step approach. First, this court must determine whether the grant of a new trial is based upon legal error. Second, this court must determine whether the error is substantial enough to warrant the exercise of the [district] court's discretion.

State v. Danek , 1993-NMCA-062, ¶ 20, 117 N.M. 471, 872 P.2d 889 (citations omitted), aff'd as modified , 1994-NMSC-071, 118 N.M. 8, 878 P.2d 326. "The [district] court's decision will only be reversed upon a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Id.

{11} For the reasons set forth below, the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the racketeering convictions because the jury instructions for those counts were erroneous. See, e.g. , State v. Parish , 1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 4, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 ("Reversible error arises if ... a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected."); see also State v. Montoya , 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 306 P.3d 426 ("In applying the fundamental error analysis to deficient jury instructions, we are required to reverse when the misinstruction leaves us with no way of knowing whether the conviction was or was not based on the lack of the essential element." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ).

{12} Racketeering. As to racketeering, the jury was instructed as follows:

For you to find [D]efendant guilty of racketeering (conduct or participate) as charged in Count 1, the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. There is an existence of an enterprise.
2. [D]efendant was associated with the enterprise.
3. [D]efendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity through the commission of two or more crimes.
4. [D]efendant engaged in at least two incidents of racketeering with the intent to commit a prohibited activity. ...
5. [D]efendant was not acting under duress.
6. This happened in New Mexico on or between the 1st day of November, 2007 and the 15th day of May, 2012.

A subsequent instruction set out the Racketeering Act's definition of "racketeering," i.e., "any act that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of New Mexico ... involving any of" the following offenses: (1) murder, (2) robbery, (3) kidnapping, (4) forgery, (5) larceny, (6) fraud, (7) embezzlement, (8) receiving stolen property, (9) bribery, (10) gambling, (11) illegal kickbacks, (12) extortion, (13) trafficking in controlled substances, (14) arson and aggravated arson, (15) promoting prostitution, (16) criminal solicitation, (17) fraudulent securities practices, (18) loan sharking, (19) distribution of controlled substances or controlled substance analogues, (20) a violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Money Laundering Act, (21) unlawful taking of a vehicle or motor vehicle, (22) embezzlement of a vehicle or motor vehicle, (23) fraudulently obtaining a vehicle or motor vehicle, (24) receiving or transferring stolen vehicles or motor vehicles, and (25) altering or changing the serial number, engine number, decal or other numbers or marks of a vehicle or motor vehicle. See § 30-42-3(A).

{13} The parties agree that this instruction was flawed because it failed to define the elements of each predicate offense that must be proved at trial, and that the error warranted vacating Defendant's conviction for racketeering (Count 1). We agree. New Mexico law is clear that "[t]he court must instruct the jury upon all questions of law essential for a conviction of any crime submitted to the jury." Rule 5-608 NMRA ; see Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 12, 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254 (holding that a failure to instruct on an essential element may rise to fundamental error). As already provided, to convict a defendant of racketeering under Section 30-42-4(C), the jury must find that the defendant committed at least two predicate acts. See Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 19, 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254. To do so, it is necessary that the jury is instructed on the essential elements of the alleged predicate acts upon which racketeering is based. See State v. Sloan , No. S-1-SC-34858, dec. ¶ 6, 2016 WL 3564360 (N.M. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2016) (nonprecedential) (holding "that the failure to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the predicate felony ... amounts to fundamental error requiring the reversal of [the d]efendant's felony murder conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge"); see also UJI 14-2810 NMRA (requiring the jury to be instructed on the essential elements of the felony alleged to be the purpose of a conspiracy); cf. United States v. Carrillo , 229 F.3d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[C]onfusion and unfairness can arise from failure to charge the elements of the state law crimes constituting racketeering acts.").

{14} Here, although the jury was given an instruction that listed twenty-five different predicate offenses, the jury was instructed on the essential elements of only two possible predicate offenses-trafficking in controlled substances and conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances. Because the instructions permitted the jury to convict Defendant for racketeering based on predicate offenses for which the jury had no elements, the instructions were erroneous. As such, Defendant's conviction for racketeering (Count 1) was properly vacated. See Montoya , 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 306 P.3d 426 ; Parish , 1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 4, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 ; see also United States v. Latorre-Cacho , 874 F.3d 299, 313 (1st Cir. 2017) (vacating a racketeering conviction where the jury was improperly instructed on the predicate offenses); State v. Adkins , 136 Ohio App.3d 765, 737 N.E.2d 1021, 1033-34 (2000) (holding that "this is a case where the predicate offenses as submitted to the jury were legally flawed and thus, inadequate to support the conviction in this case under [Ohio's racketeering statute] as a matter of law").

{15} Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering. On appeal, the State argues that Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering should be reinstated because the district court incorrectly determined that the jury instruction was erroneous. We decline to do so. First, the State agreed to vacatur of Defendant's conspiracy to racketeer conviction partially on the ground that the instruction-which the State specifically requested-was erroneous. Generally, this Court "will not allow the State to invite error and then to complain of it." State v. Dominguez , 2008-NMCA-029, ¶ 13, 143 N.M. 549, 178 P.3d 834. Second, in addition to the error identified with the substantive racketeering instruction, we conclude that the conspiracy to racketeer instruction is flawed on other grounds.

{16} As to the conspiracy to commit racketeering instruction, the jury was instructed as follows:

For you to find [D]efendant guilty of conspiracy to commit racketeering (conduct or participate) as charged in Count 2, the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. [D]efendant and another person by words or acts agreed together to commit racketeering;
2. [D]efendant and the other person intended to commit racketeering;
3. [D]efendant was not acting under duress[;]
4. This happened in New Mexico on or between the 1st day of November, 2007 and the 15th day of May, 2012.

This instruction tracks the uniform jury instruction for conspiracy, inserting "racketeering" as the named felony that was the subject of the conspiracy. See UJI 14-2810. Although the intention of the conspiracy to commit racketeering instruction may have been to incorporate all the elements from the racketeering instruction pertaining to Count 1, it did not accomplish this.

{17} Instead, the jury instruction refers to "racketeering" alone. Although "racketeering" is a separate criminal offense (as charged in Count 1), it also is a defined term meaning any act involving any of twenty-five predicate offenses. It is not clear from the instruction in Count 2 whether "racketeering" refers to the separate criminal offense or to the defined term. If it is the latter, the instruction for Count 2 (conspiracy to commit racketeering) requires only that Defendant and another agreed to and intended to commit any one of the twenty-five predicate acts. This leads to the possibility that, for example, if the jury determined that Defendant committed one count of conspiracy to commit drug trafficking, the jury also could have convicted Defendant for conspiracy to commit racketeering on this basis alone . This is impermissible. The instruction omitted, among other things, any elements pertaining to an enterprise or a pattern of racketeering. Cf. State v. Hughes , 1988-NMCA-108, ¶ 39, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382 (comparing requirements for trafficking conspiracy and racketeering conspiracy). And indeed the State acknowledges that the instruction for conspiracy to commit racketeering must contain such elements. Because the conspiracy to commit racketeering instruction permitted the jury to convict Defendant on the mere agreement to commit a single predicate act, Defendant's conviction for the same cannot stand. See Montoya , 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 306 P.3d 426 ; Parish , 1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 4, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988.

{18} Defendant argues on appeal that to maintain a conviction for conspiracy to racketeer, the State must prove she committed two predicate acts, making no distinction between racketeering and conspiracy to racketeer. The State disagrees and, quoting United States v. Nguyen , argues instead that it need only prove that Defendant "either agree[d] to commit two predicate [racketeering] acts or agree[d] to participate in the conduct of the enterprise with the knowledge and intent that other members of the conspiracy would commit at least two predicate acts in furtherance of the enterprise." 255 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001). Because of the likelihood that Defendant on retrial will raise the same argument about the conspiracy to racketeer instruction she raises on appeal and because this issue is well-developed, we address this purely legal argument here.

{19} To the extent Defendant relies on Hughes , 1988-NMCA-108, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382, for the proposition that the State must prove that she committed two predicate acts in order to convict her of conspiracy to racketeer, we conclude that Hughes does not so hold. The issue before the Court in Hughes was whether convictions for conspiracy to racketeer and conspiracy to traffic merged such that multiple sentences were barred. 1988-NMCA-108, ¶ 37, 108 N.M. 143, 767 P.2d 382. The statement on which Defendant relies-"[c]onspiracy to traffic by manufacturing can be proved by demonstrating one instance of manufacturing, while conspiracy to racketeer requires a showing of an enterprise and at least two predicate offenses"-was made in the context of comparing the elements of those two crimes. Id . ¶ 39. This Court, however, did not address whether a defendant must commit the predicate acts to be convicted of conspiracy to racketeer. See id. Hence, Defendant's reliance on Hughes is unavailing and does not establish the level of proof required for conspiracy to racketeer. See Sangre de Cristo Dev. Corp. v. City of Santa Fe , 1972-NMSC-076, ¶ 23, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323 ("The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.").

{20} We accordingly look to federal case law on point. See Loza , 2018-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 426 P.3d 34 ; Rael , 1999-NMCA-068, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d 280. Both our Racketeering Act and RICO, the federal racketeering act, have substantially identical statutory requirements for conspiracy to commit racketeering. Compare § 30-42-4(D) ("It is unlawful for a person to conspire to violate the provisions of Subsections A through C of this section."), with 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section."). The United States Supreme Court in Salinas v. United States , 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997), soundly rejected the idea that a defendant must have committed or agreed to commit two predicate acts to support a racketeering conspiracy conviction. Id. 64-66, 118 S.Ct. 469. Instead, Salinas held that a conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering was supported where, even though the defendant "did not [commit or agree to commit the acts of racketeering], there was ample evidence ... that [another member of the conspiracy] committed at least two acts of racketeering activity ... and that [the defendant] knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme." Id. at 66, 118 S.Ct. 469.

{21} In rejecting the defendant's argument that he could only be convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering if he committed the predicate acts, the Supreme Court relied on general principles of conspiracy that "[t]he partners in the criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and may divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts of each other." Id. at 63-64, 118 S.Ct. 469. We share these same principles in our conspiracy jurisprudence. See State v. Armijo , 1995-NMCA-115, ¶ 5, 120 N.M. 702, 905 P.2d 740 ("As a general rule, one who participates in a criminal venture is treated by the law as if he or she had committed all of the criminal acts of the other participants. ... A conspirator is ordinarily responsible for the criminal acts of coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy."); cf.

State v. Gallegos , 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 45, 149 N.M. 704, 254 P.3d 655 (noting that "a conspiracy is complete when the agreement is reached" and "New Mexico does not require proof of an overt act" (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) ). We presume, as did the Supreme Court in Salinas , that our Legislature "intended to use the term [conspire] in its conventional sense," and that, contrary to Defendant's assertion, our Legislature did not intend to require the State to prove that a defendant committed or agreed to commit the predicate acts herself to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering. 522 U.S. at 64, 118 S.Ct. 469 ; see also Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten , 1996-NMSC-003, ¶ 21, 121 N.M. 205, 910 P.2d 281 ("[W]e presume that the legislature was aware of existing statutory and common law and did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law.").

{22} We find Salinas persuasive and adopt its holding here. We, however, do not endeavor to set out the essential elements required for a jury instruction on conspiracy to commit racketeering. The potential nuances of such an instruction are simply not before us in this appeal.

V. The District Court Did Not Err in Ordering Retrial on the Racketeering Counts

{23} Having determined that the instructions for both racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering were erroneous, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating Defendant's racketeering convictions, we next examine whether retrial is appropriate. Generally, when a conviction is vacated for trial error, including incorrect instructions, the defendant may be retried. Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 14, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886 ; Clifford , 1994-NMSC-048, ¶ 12, 117 N.M. 508, 873 P.2d 254 (reversing a conviction where the jury instructions omitted an essential element and remanding for a new trial on that count). If a conviction is vacated on insufficiency of evidence grounds, however, double jeopardy principles will bar retrial. Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 13, 14, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886.

{24} Defendant maintains that only the trafficking counts, not the conspiracy to commit trafficking counts, can serve as predicate offenses. Because she was acquitted of two of the three trafficking charges, Defendant thereby maintains that only one possible predicate offense remains for retrial-and, thus, the State can never prove that she committed two predicate acts without her being retried for conduct on which she was acquitted. Viewed this way, Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her racketeering convictions and the district court erred by denying her motion for acquittal or dismissal.

{25} The fundamental premise underlying Defendant's argument is that the conspiracy to commit trafficking charges cannot serve as predicate acts. The State argues otherwise, although it admits that at trial it "operated from the false premise that a conspiracy to commit one of the [twenty-five] enumerated offenses ... cannot serve as a predicate racketeering act." Without citation to any authority, Defendant argues that the errors of the first trial do not permit the State to rely on conspiracy to commit trafficking as a predicate for racketeering. We need not consider this unsupported argument. See In re Adoption of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.3d 1329. Regardless, our Supreme Court has recognized that a retrial is a new trial, and, for example, the district court on retrial is under no obligation to give the same jury instructions that were given at the first trial. See State v. Torrez , 2013-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 33-34, 305 P.3d 944 (rejecting argument that same instruction must be given on retrial because state failed to object to it at first trial); cf. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque , 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 41, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 ("The application of the law-of-the-case doctrine, however, is discretionary and flexible; it will not be used to uphold a clearly incorrect decision."); State v. Jimenez , 2007-NMCA-005, ¶ 22, 141 N.M. 106, 151 P.3d 67 ("[T]he [s]tate has already gotten a conviction, and so allowing the [s]tate to retry the case would not mean giving the [s]tate an opportunity to correct its past mistakes that led to an acquittal, which is one outcome that double jeopardy is designed to prevent.").

{26} Defendant further submits that "the district court did not allow the State to base their racketeering allegations on other conspiracies." Defendant, however, provides no citation to the record showing that the district court made such a ruling or operated under such a premise, and we will not comb the record to find such support. See Muse v. Muse , 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 ("We will not search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized arguments."). Moreover, the district court's order denying Defendant's motion for acquittal or dismissal demonstrates that the district court appears to have determined that conspiracy to commit drug trafficking could be a predicate act. Even if the district court did not so determine, we may affirm the district court's decision on this basis. See Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 ("[W]e will affirm the [district] court's decision if it was right for any reason so long as it is not unfair to the appellant for us to do so.").

{27} Our appellate courts have not examined whether conspiracy to commit a racketeering act can serve a predicate offense under our Racketeering Act, so we again turn to federal case law. See Loza , 2018-NMSC-034, ¶ 12, 426 P.3d 34 ; Rael , 1999-NMCA-068, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d 280. Federal courts construing language in the RICO statute providing that "racketeering" is "any act ... involving" certain listed offenses consistently have held that "[t]his language is certainly broad enough on its face to include conspiracies involving [those listed crimes]." United States v. Weisman , 624 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that conspiracies to commit securities and bankruptcy fraud and drug related offenses can serve as predicates to a RICO charge), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized in Ianniello v. United States , 10 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1993) ; see also, e.g. , United States v. Darden , 70 F.3d 1507, 1524-25 (8th Cir. 1995) (narcotics conspiracy constitutes a RICO predicate); United States v. Licavoli , 725 F.2d 1040, 1045 (6th Cir. 1984) (conspiracy to commit murder constitutes a RICO predicate); United States v. Phillips , 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Conspiracy may properly be alleged as a predicate act of racketeering under RICO[.]").

{28} The Racketeering Act's definition of "racketeering" employs the same broad language as the RICO statute. Section 30-42-3(A) provides that " 'racketeering' means any act that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of New Mexico and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, involving any of the following cited offenses[,]" including "trafficking in controlled substances." (Emphasis added.) Just as the federal RICO statute, the plain language of our Racketeering Act is broad and expansive enough to include conspiracies as acts of racketeering. See Weisman , 624 F.2d at 1124 (holding that substantially identical language is "certainly broad enough on its face to include conspiracies"). Thus, consistent with the construction of RICO by federal courts, we conclude that conspiracy to commit trafficking in controlled substances may serve as a predicate offense for racketeering.

{29} In this case, the jury acquitted Defendant of three of the possible predicate offenses (two trafficking and one conspiracy to traffic), convicted her on one (conspiracy to traffic), and deadlocked on the remaining two (one trafficking and one conspiracy to traffic). The fact that the jury deadlocked on two of the possible predicates results in a mistrial, not an acquittal, of the racketeering charges. See United States v. Gotti , 451 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Assuming the other elements of the RICO charge were proved to the jury's satisfaction, lack of unanimity as to two predicate acts results in a hung jury and a mistrial, not a judgment of acquittal."); cf. United States v. Vastola , 899 F.2d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court's grant of acquittal to the defendant where the jury "found [the defendant] guilty of only one of the four predicate racketeering acts" and either deadlocked or acquitted on the remaining three predicate acts, but then convicted him for racketeering), vacated on other grounds by Vastola v. United States , 497 U.S. 1001, 110 S.Ct. 3233, 111 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990). The district court, therefore, correctly denied Defendant's motion for acquittal or dismissal and ordered retrial of the racketeering charges.

VI. The Court Will Not Address Arguments Pertaining To the Scope of Retrial

{30} The remaining arguments pertaining to the racketeering charges advanced by the parties relate to the scope of the retrial and not whether retrial should happen at all. These issues, however, are outside our review of the district court's order and should be addressed by the district court in the first instance. See Apodaca , 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 372, 940 P.2d 478 (limiting the constitutional right to appeal a non-final order when "interests [are] of the greatest importance," such as "a defendant's right not to be subjected to a second trial for the same offense[, a violation of which] could not be remedied once the second trial has taken place"); see also United States v. Wittig , 575 F.3d 1085, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (declining to address the defendant's collateral estoppel arguments and stating that the court's "jurisdiction [under the collateral order doctrine] extends only to vindicate the right not to be tried at all, not the right to be tried in a particular way").

{31} For instance, the parties dispute whether the State on retrial can rely on uncharged conduct as proof of predicate offenses for the racketeering charges. Defendant invokes the compulsory joinder rule, Rule 5-203(A) NMRA, and the law-of-the-case doctrine in support of her argument that the State cannot rely on any uncharged predicates. The State, in turn, requests carte blanche permission to rely on any and all uncharged predicates, without even naming the offenses it intends to rely on at retrial. But the parties did not present these arguments to the district court and the district court did not decide this issue below. See Graham v. Cocherell , 1987-NMCA-013, ¶ 16, 105 N.M. 401, 733 P.2d 370 ("As an appellate court, we are ... limited to a review of the questions that have been presented to and ruled on by the [district] court"). Moreover, the parties argue in the abstract before us. Without knowing, among other things, what predicate acts the State may attempt to rely on and whether Defendant had adequate notice of such predicates, our resolution of these matters require us to predict what might happen on retrial and to issue an advisory opinion based on that speculation. See State v. Zamora , 2005-NMCA-039, ¶ 28, 137 N.M. 301, 110 P.3d 517 (stating that "[t]he remaining issues raised by [the d]efendant may or may not arise on the retrial" and declining to consider them because "[a]ppellate courts do not give advisory opinions." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). This we will not do.

{32} For the foregoing reasons, we decline to address the parties' remaining arguments pertaining to the scope of retrial.

THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT DRUG TRAFFICKING CONVICTION

{33} Defendant additionally appeals from her judgment and sentence on conspiracy to commit trafficking methamphetamine (Count 8) for sufficiency of the evidence. We first address whether this Court has jurisdiction to review Defendant's conviction on Count 8. Concluding we do, we determine that Defendant's conviction is supported by substantial evidence.

I. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review Defendant's Conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Trafficking

{34} The State contends that Defendant's appeal from her judgment and sentence should be dismissed "for want of a final order." The State argues that even though the district court entered a judgment and sentence on Count 8, the judgment did not dispose of all issues of law and fact to the fullest extent possible and, thus, is non-final.

{35} In criminal cases, "an appeal may be taken by the defendant to the supreme court or court of appeals ... within thirty days from the entry of any final judgment[.]" NMSA 1978, § 39-3-3(A) (1972). "[T]he judgment is final for the purpose of appeal when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but enforcement. A sentence must be imposed to complete the steps of the prosecution." State v. Durant , 2000-NMCA-066, ¶ 5, 129 N.M. 345, 7 P.3d 495 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Generally, a "judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the [district] court to the fullest extent possible"-termed the "last act" requirement of the finality rule. Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have, however, recognized exceptions to the "last act" requirement. Under the "sufficiently aggrieved" exception, our Court recognized that an appeal may be taken "when the consequences of the order that is not the last contemplated order in the case are sufficiently severe that the aggrieved party should be granted a right to appeal to alleviate hardship that would otherwise accrue if the appeal were delayed." Id. ¶ 8.

{36} In this case, the district court sentenced Defendant in May 2015 to a four-year term of incarceration, followed by a mandatory two-year term of parole, and immediately remanded Defendant to the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Given that Defendant has been convicted of a felony and incarcerated, there are immediate and definite consequences-both direct and collateral. See id. ¶¶ 9, 10. Defendant is "sufficiently aggrieved" to permit her immediate appeal from the judgment and sentence on Count 8. Further, given Defendant already availed herself of the right to immediately appeal the district court's denial of her motion for acquittal on double jeopardy grounds, the usual countervailing arguments against piecemeal appeals simply are not at play in this case. See State v. Candy L. , 2003-NMCA-109, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 213, 215, 75 P.3d 429, 431 (noting policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals). Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment and sentence entered on Count 8 is sufficiently final to be appealable, and we proceed to address Defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant's Conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Drug Trafficking

{37} "In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence used to support a conviction, we resolve all disputed facts in favor of the State, indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary." State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. "Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [the d]efendant's version of the facts." Id. "The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{38} In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we review the evidence against the instructions submitted to the jury. State v. Caldwell , 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 29, 143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 175. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit trafficking methamphetamine, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-31-20 (2006) and 30-28-2 (1979). To support Defendant's conviction, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

1. [D]efendant and another person by words or acts agreed together to commit trafficking methamphetamine by possession with intent to distribute;
2. [D]efendant and the other person intended to commit trafficking methamphetamine by possession with intent to distribute;
3. [D]efendant was not acting under duress[;]
4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 8th day of April, 2012.

UJI 14-2810 (conspiracy). As required by the conspiracy instruction, the essential elements of trafficking methamphetamine by possession with intent to distribute ( UJI 14-3104 NMRA) also were given. UJI 14-2810 use note 1. As to duress, the jury was instructed that "[i]f [D]efendant feared immediate great bodily harm to herself or another person if she did not commit the crime(s), and if a reasonable person would have acted in the same way under the circumstances, you must find [D]efendant not guilty." See UJI 14-5130 NMRA.

{39} The AZ Boys, the methamphetamine trafficking organization Defendant was alleged to be associated with, was run by Defendant's boyfriend, Robert (Bob) Chavez, and his brother Joe Chavez. The State's primary witness was Sonya Sanders, who had been Defendant's friend and later became an informant. Sanders' testimony was as follows: In February 2012, Defendant asked Sanders if she wanted to travel to Arizona "to make some money." Defendant explained to Sanders that Bob Chavez, Joe Chavez, and Defendant needed a driver because the previous driver "had gotten busted" for possession of methamphetamine. Sanders agreed and indicated that she knew that "driving" for Defendant meant transporting drugs.

{40} Sanders made a total of three trips with Defendant and Bob Chavez to Phoenix, Arizona and back to Alamogordo, New Mexico, which were the bases for the drug trafficking charges in the indictment. On the first trip in March 2012, Sanders traveled with Defendant and Bob Chavez to a house in Phoenix. Sanders made the return trip to Alamogordo in a rental truck, while Bob Chavez and Defendant drove back in another vehicle. Sanders did not perform well on the first drive back from Arizona. While driving, Sanders observed Bob Chavez hitting Defendant; Sanders believed Bob Chavez was taking out his anger about her driving on Defendant. Both Defendant and Joe Chavez gave Defendant advice on how to drive better in the future. Joe Chavez and Defendant paid Sanders in cash and methamphetamine for the first trip.

{41} After the first trip, Defendant and Bob Chavez arranged to buy a truck for Sanders, "to go back and forth to Arizona with them." About ten days later, Sanders received a call from Defendant who instructed Sanders that "we're gonna leave in a couple hours, get ready." They stayed in Phoenix for several days. Despite Bob Chavez's displeasure, Defendant ensured that they left back to Alamogordo in time for Sanders to spend Easter (April 8, 2012) with her children. As they prepared for the return trip, Sanders observed Defendant and Bob Chavez make preparations with a tire on a tarp, and at one point, Defendant handed Sanders some methamphetamine to help her stay awake for the return trip. Sanders later observed the tire had been loaded onto her truck. After getting back to Alamogordo, Defendant "was really happy ... [because] for the first time in a long time," they had someone who was "able to drive." Defendant and Bob Chavez compensated Sanders with a combination of methamphetamine and cash.

{42} Sometime after the second trip, Sanders was stopped pursuant to a warrant for selling methamphetamine. Sanders agreed to cooperate with law enforcement to help bring down the AZ Boys. In May 2012, Sanders participated in a third trip to Arizona while cooperating with law enforcement. During this trip, Sanders saw bruising on Defendant and observed Bob Chavez abusing Defendant; at one point, Sanders asked Defendant to leave with her but Defendant would not go. Law enforcement ultimately recovered four pounds of methamphetamine from the spare tire of the truck Sanders had driven back from Arizona on the third trip.

{43} At trial, Defendant testified on her own behalf and raised the defense of duress. Although Defendant claimed not to have knowledge about or involvement in the AZ Boys organization, some of Defendant's testimony corroborated Sanders' testimony. For instance, Defendant testified she had "invited [Sanders] to go to Phoenix" at Bob Chavez's direction, although Defendant claimed not to know why. Defendant spoke with Sanders about making a second trip to Phoenix. Defendant advised Sanders "to be ready," and to try not to make any mistakes. Defendant testified that she had given Sanders methamphetamine when they were in Phoenix on the second trip to help Sanders stay awake for the drive back. Defendant testified that she knew Bob Chavez "was selling drugs," but claimed not to know about the "interstate methamphetamine trafficking organization" until the second trip with Sanders. In reference to the tires that were used in the second and third trips, Defendant added that "any person in their right mind would know what was going on."

{44} Defendant testified to the abusive and controlling nature of her relationship with Bob Chavez and that she feared for her life if she left him. Defendant, however, acknowledged that she and Bob Chavez had previously broken up, and she had received family support during the breakup. She also acknowledged that she was able to go to her mother's home, which was close to the local police station, and that she had family members who were retired law enforcement.

{45} The foregoing evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy to commit trafficking. There was testimony that the second trip from Phoenix to Alamogordo happened on or about April 8, 2012, meeting the fourth element. There was significant circumstantial evidence that Defendant agreed with one or more individuals to commit trafficking methamphetamine and intended to commit this offense, meeting the first and second elements. See State v. Montoya , 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 53, 345 P.3d 1056 ("Just because the evidence supporting the conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ); State v. Pacheco , 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 46, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (observing that "conspiracy is rarely susceptible of direct proof and that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction"); State v. Donaldson , 1983-NMCA-064, ¶ 25, 100 N.M. 111, 666 P.2d 1258 (stating that "possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance, inconsistent with personal use, is sufficient proof of trafficking"). Defendant's contention on appeal that she merely submitted or acquiesced to the conduct of others simply is not borne out when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Further, the jury heard testimony that Defendant exerted some influence over Bob Chavez during the second trip and had options available to her other than committing the offense. As such, a rational jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not act under duress. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed each element of conspiracy to commit trafficking methamphetamine (Count 8).

CONCLUSION

{46} We affirm the district court's order vacating the racketeering convictions, denying Defendant's motion for acquittal or dismissal, and permitting retrial of the racketeering counts. Having determined that substantial evidence supports Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit drug trafficking, we also affirm Defendant's conviction for the same.

{47} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge

DANIEL J. GALLEGOS, Judge

      For ease of reference, the Court refers to racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering collectively as "the racketeering convictions," "the racketeering charges," or "the racketeering counts" when no distinction is necessary.

      Neither party argues that there is any difference in the application of the state and federal constitutional provisions to this case. We, therefore, do not distinguish between them in our analysis. See State v. Ben , 2015-NMCA-118, ¶ 7, 362 P.3d 180.

      In vacating the racketeering convictions, the district court seems to have relied on inconsistent or irreconcilable verdicts as one basis for its decision. On appeal, Defendant does not rely on this as a basis for setting aside the racketeering convictions, or for acquittal or dismissal of the racketeering counts. Neither do we. See State v. Leyba , 1969-NMCA-030, ¶ 37, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (holding that an acquittal that is "irreconcilable" with a conviction "does not require the conviction to be set aside as a matter of law"); see also United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57, 64, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) ("[W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, the most that can be said is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions[.]" (alteration, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) ); State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 ("[W]e will affirm the [district] court's decision if it was right for any reason so long as it is not unfair to the appellant for us to do so.").

      Defendant disputes whether conspiracy to commit drug trafficking may be a valid predicate offense. We address this argument in depth in Section V below.

      In addition to the new uniform jury instructions on conspiracy effective at the end of this year (UJIs 14-2810, 14-2810A, 14-2810B, and 14-6019B NMRA, http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmrules/NMRuleSets.aspx), the substantial federal authority pertaining to the essential elements of conspiracy to commit racketeering may provide guidance to the district court and parties when crafting a jury instruction to fit the evidence on retrial. For reference, we provide citation to pattern jury instructions adopted by several federal circuit courts. See, e.g. , 2B Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 56:11 (6th ed.) (setting out pattern jury instructions on conspiracy to commit racketeering through a pattern of racketeering, and including model criminal jury instruction from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit); Mod. Crim. Jury Instr. 3rd Cir. 6.18.1962D (2018) (Third Circuit pattern instruction); Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. 1962(d)[1] (2012 ed.) (Seventh Circuit pattern instruction); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. OI O75.2 (2016) (Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction). It should be noted that the federal circuits diverge, and in some cases conflict, on various elements required for conspiracy to commit racketeering. Our citation to these instructions in no way endorses the approach taken by any one of these circuits.

      As discussed above, the State need not prove that Defendant committed two predicate acts to be convicted of conspiracy to racketeer. Given this holding, we need only examine Defendant's arguments that insufficient predicate acts exist to permit retrial in the context of the racketeering charge, not the conspiracy to commit racketeering charge. Defendant has advanced no argument specific to the sufficiency of the evidence for the conspiracy to racketeer charge and we, therefore, do not address it. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock , 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 ("We will not ... guess at what a party's arguments might be." (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) ). There being instructional error on the conspiracy to commit racketeering charge and no corresponding insufficiency of evidence, retrial of Count 2 is not barred by double jeopardy. See Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 13, 14, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886.

      A number of jurisdictions regard a conviction and entry of a judgment and sentence on less than all counts of a multicount indictment as final and appealable notwithstanding that a retrial remains on other counts, treating the remaining counts as severed from the convicted counts. See, e.g. , United States v. King , 257 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Abrams , 137 F.3d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1998) ; State v. McCave , 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290, 304 (2011).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FRENCH, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Wilfredo ESPINOZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant-Appellee.
    NO. A-1-CA-35908
    Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
    Filing Date: December 5, 2018
    Mescall Law Firm, P.C., Thomas J. Mescall, II, Phillip Patrick Baca, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant
    Jessica M. Hernandez, City Attorney, Jeffrey B. Driggers, Assistant City Attorney, Andrew S. Coon, Assistant City Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
    C. Brad Lane-Cates, Attorney, Brad Cates, Fairacres, NM, Institute for Justice, Robert Frommer, Arlington, VA, for Amici Curiae Arlene Harjo
   FRENCH, Judge.

{1} This case requires us to resolve whether the New Mexico Forfeiture Act (NMFA), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-27-1 to -11 (2002, as amended through 2015), preempts the City of Albuquerque's (the City) civil forfeiture ordinance, Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances ch. 7, art.VI, §§ 7-6-1 to -7 (1992, as amended through 2014) (the Ordinance). Concluding that it does, we reverse the district court's judgment and order denying Wilfredo Espinoza's (Plaintiff) verified petition for writ of mandamus, and dismissing his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

{2} In 2016 the City seized Plaintiff's vehicle pursuant to the Ordinance, which provides that a motor vehicle "is hereby declared to be a nuisance and subject to immediate seizure and forfeiture" if the vehicle is "[o]perated by a person in the commission of a DWI offense" or "by a person whose license is suspended or revoked" as a result of a DWI conviction or arrest. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-2. Plaintiff sued the City seeking (1) a declaration that the Ordinance is in "violation of the [NMFA,]" (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the Ordinance, and (3) an order requiring the City to return Plaintiff's vehicle to him. The City answered and stated, among other things, that the NMFA does not apply to the Ordinance, after which Plaintiff filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition and motion for judgment on the pleadings. After briefing and a hearing on the matter, the district court entered a final judgment and order finding that the NMFA "does not preempt or limit in any way the City of Albuquerque's ordinance[.]" The court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint and denied the petition. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{3} The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the NMFA preempts the Ordinance. Whether a municipal ordinance enacted by a home-rule municipality is preempted by state law "requires us to construe together a constitutional amendment, the statutes, and an ordinance, which involves a question of law reviewed de novo." Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquerque , 2008-NMCA-149, ¶ 43, 145 N.M 156, 195 P.3d 1. "Interpretation of constitutional clauses begins with the language of the text[,]" as does our construction of statutes. New Mexicans for Free Enterprise (NMFE ) v. City of Santa Fe , 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149. We begin with the language of the statute, "resorting to other sources when necessary, and ultimately seeking to determine and give effect to the intent of the [L]egislature." Id.

The New Mexico Forfeiture Act

{4} The New Mexico Legislature enacted the NMFA in 2002 and substantially revised it in 2015. Of particular importance are the amendments made to Section 31-27-2, enumerating the purposes of the NMFA. Prior to 2015, the stated purposes of the NMFA were to "(1) make uniform the standards and procedures for the seizure and forfeiture of property subject to forfeiture[,] and (2) protect the constitutional rights of persons accused of a crime and of innocent persons holding interests in property subject to forfeiture." Section 31-27-2(A) (2002). The Legislature expounded upon the NMFA's purposes in the 2015 amendments. In addition to the existing two purposes, the NMFA is intended to "(3) deter criminal activity by reducing its economic incentives; (4) increase the pecuniary loss from criminal activity; (5) protect against the wrongful forfeiture of property; and (6) ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in [New Mexico]." Section 31-27-1(A)(3-6).

{5} To that end, the NMFA is a criminal forfeiture proceeding that allows property to be forfeited by a law enforcement officer when a person is arrested for and convicted of a criminal offense, and the state establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture because it was acquired through the commission of the criminal offense, or it was an instrumentality that the person used in the commission of the criminal offense. See § 31-27-4(A), (B).

{6} The state may seize property prior to a person's conviction for a criminal offense only under certain circumstances. Section 31-27-4(D), (E). The court can issue a preliminary order to seize property after determining that there is a "substantial probability" that (1) the state will be able to prove the property is subject to forfeiture; (2) the property will be destroyed, removed from the state, or otherwise made unavailable if the court does not enter the order permitting seizure; and (3) the need to preserve the property through the order outweighs the hardship to the owner and those known to claim an interest in the property. Section 31-27-4(D). Property may be seized without the preliminary order only if (1) the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest for a crime, or a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant and the arresting officer has probable cause to believe both that property is subject to forfeiture and that the arrested or search person is an owner of the property; (2) the seized property is the subject of a judgment in favor of the state; or (3) the officer has probable cause to believe both that the property is subject to forfeiture and that the delay caused by obtaining a preliminary order would result in the removal or destruction of the property. Section 31-27-4(E).

{7} The NMFA requires that "[w]ithin thirty days of making a seizure of property or simultaneously upon filing a related criminal indictment, the state shall file a complaint of ancillary forfeiture proceedings or return the property to the person from whom it was seized." Section 31-27-5(A). Those that claim an interest in the property must then answer the complaint, Section 31-27-6(A), and following the trial for the criminal offense, a forfeiture proceeding may begin. Section 31-27-6(C). During the proceeding, the state has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the person whose property is alleged to be subject to forfeiture is an owner of the property; (2) the criminal prosecution of the owner of the property resulted in a conviction; and (3) the value of the property to be forfeited does not reasonably exceed the monetary gain derived from the crime, the monetary loss caused by the crime, or the value of the convicted owner's interest in the property. Section 31-27-6(F),(G).

{8} If the state meets its burden, the court enters a judgment of forfeiture. Section 31-27-6(G). After the closing of the forfeiture proceeding, "the person whose property was forfeited may petition the court to determine whether the forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive," and "grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the criminal offense for which the person was convicted[,]" requiring the court to consider a host of factors, including the seriousness of the crime and its impact on the community, and the sentence imposed for the commission of the crime. Section 31-26-6 (K), (L), (M).

{9} Finally, the NMFA describes the processes whereby the state acquires title to the forfeited property, as well as the sale of the forfeited property, and the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the forfeited property, which is to be distributed into the state's general fund. Section 31-27-7.

The City's Forfeiture Ordinance

{10} The Ordinance permits the City to subject motor vehicles to "immediate seizure and forfeiture" if they are:

(A) Operated by a person in the commission of a DWI offense ... and has, on at least one prior occasion, been arrested, summonsed or convicted for (i) an offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drugs in any jurisdiction, or (ii) homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle ... while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of any drug and/or[;]
(B) Operated by a person whose license is suspended or revoked as a result of conviction for driving while intoxicated or suspended or revoked as a result of a driving while intoxicated arrest.

Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-2. The Ordinance allows for seizure by court order, or without such order if the seizure is incident to an arrest of the driver for driving while intoxicated or driving while his or her license is suspended or revoked as a result of an arrest for driving while intoxicated. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(A), (B).

{11} Once seized, the arresting officer serves a "Notice of Forfeiture" to the person from whom the vehicle was seized. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(D). The owner may then request a hearing in front of a city hearing officer-that is "informal and not bound by the technical rules of evidence"-to determine whether the officer had probable cause to seize the vehicle. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(D)(8). If so, "proceedings for an order for forfeiture shall be instituted promptly. Id. Once the property is forfeited, the police department sells the vehicle and uses the proceeds to "carry out the purpose and intent" of the Ordinance. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(E).

{12} Finally, the Ordinance provides an "innocent owner defense," which allows any owner or co-owner of the property an opportunity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she "could not have reasonably anticipated that the vehicle could be used in a manner constituting" a nuisance. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-7(A) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the owner makes this prima facie showing, "the burden is upon the city to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner could have reasonably anticipated that the vehicle could be used in the manner constituting the nuisance." Id.

Preemption

{13} Plaintiff argues that several provisions of the Ordinance are inconsistent with the NMFA, and the NMFA thereby preempts the Ordinance. The City relies upon Section 31-27-2(B)(1) of the NMFA and argues that the Ordinance does not conflict with the NMFA because "the Legislature allowed municipalities the decision to opt-in to the [NMFA.]" Section 31-27-2(B)(1) states: "The [NMFA] applies to seizures, forfeitures and dispositions of property subject to forfeiture pursuant to laws that specifically apply the [NMFA.]" Based upon this statutory language, and the lack of language in the Ordinance expressly providing that the NMFA applies to the Ordinance, the City maintains that the NMFA cannot preempt the Ordinance. Indeed, the City maintains that the "other provisions of the [NMFA], are irrelevant since the [NMFA] does not apply to the Ordinance."

{14} We agree with Plaintiff, and therefore we begin with the law of preemption in New Mexico. We then explain why the City's argument is incorrect. "A municipality ... may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter." N.M. Const. art. X, § 6 (D). The City "no longer has to look to the [L]egislature for a grant of power to act, but only looks to legislative enactments to see if any express limitations have been placed on their power to act." NMFE, 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 15, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Titus v. City of Albuquerque , 2011-NMCA-038, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 556, 252 P.3d 780 (defining "Albuquerque is a home[-]rule charter municipality"). An enactment by the Legislature preempts a municipality's ordinance if it "expressly denies municipalities the authority to legislate similar matters[.]" Casuse v. City of Gallup , 1987-NMSC-112, ¶ 3, 106 N.M. 571, 746 P.2d 1103. Determination of express denials of a home-rule municipality's power or authority involves a two-step process. "In the first step, a court asks whether a state law is a general law," and "[i]n the second step, we ask whether state law expressly denies the City's power to enact the [o]rdinance in question." Prot. & Advocacy Sys. , 2008-NMCA-149, ¶¶ 46-47, 145 N.M. 156, 195 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The NMFA Is a General Law

{15} A general law is "one that [a]ffects the community at large, as opposed to a local law that deals with a particular locality." Casuse , 1987-NMSC-112, ¶ 3, 106 N.M. 571, 746 P.2d 1103. A general law "applies generally throughout the state, relates to a matter of statewide concern, and impacts inhabitants across the entire state." Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2006-NMCA-048, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 410, 133 P.3d 866 ; see Apodaca v. Wilson , 1974-NMSC-071, ¶ 16, 86 N.M. 516, 525 P.2d 876 (emphasizing that in order "to control or limit municipal enactments, the general law must be of general concern to the people of the state").

{16} An example of a general law is a statute governing utility rate-making, which is a matter of statewide rather than local concern "because a proposed service rate for one municipality can affect rates to other municipalities in the state." City of Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (Public Service Commission ), 1993-NMSC-021, ¶ 25, 115 N.M. 521, 854 P.2d 348. The Minimum Wage Act is also a general law because "an hourly minimum wage is of obvious concern to workers across the state and it applies to all workers in the state." NMFE , 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 18, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149. In contrast, state provisions setting the allowable number of municipal commissioners is not a matter of general concern because the number of commissioners a municipality has "is predominately, if not entirely, of interest to the citizens of the" municipality for which the commissioners serve. State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem , 1992-NMSC-062, ¶ 21, 114 N.M. 627, 845 P.2d 150. Similarly, a statute regulating government employees' First Amendment activities is not a matter of general concern because it touches upon the regulation of only municipal employees' activities in order to further the efficiency of governmental operations.

Kane v. City of Albuquerque , 2015-NMSC-027, ¶ 52, 358 P.3d 249 (emphasis added).

{17} Like the statutes at issue in Public Service Commission and NMFE , the NMFA applies to and thereby affects all New Mexicans. See § 31-27-2(A)(6) (explaining that the NMFA is intended to ensure that "only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state," i.e. statewide ). The Legislature intended that the extinguishment of civil forfeiture and the existence of specific procedures for only criminal forfeiture proceedings apply across the state. See § 31-27-2(A)(1) (explaining that one purpose of the NMFA is to "make uniform the standards and procedures for the seizure and forfeiture of property" (emphasis added) ). Both its protective and punitive aspects are intended to apply to all persons in New Mexico. See Section 31-27-2(B)(1) (making the NMFA applicable to all "seizures, forfeitures, and dispositions of property subject to forfeiture"); § 31-27-2(A)(2) (recognizing that the NMFA is intended to protect the rights of persons whose property is subject to forfeiture and of innocent owners holding interests in property subject to forfeiture, not only to target and thereby deter the conduct of those engaged in criminal activity). We, therefore, conclude that the NMFA is a general law because it applies generally throughout the state, relates to a matter of statewide concern, and impacts everyone across the entire state.

The NMFA Expressly Denies Home-Rule Municipalities Authority to Enforce Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceedings

{18} Having concluded that the NMFA is a general law, we next consider whether it "expressly denies" the City the authority to maintain and enforce the Ordinance. Kane , 2015-NMSC-027, ¶ 49, 358 P.3d 249. While earlier cases construing the phrase "not expressly denied," N.M. Const. art. X, § 6 (D), required the statute to contain "some express statement of the authority or power denied[,]" Apodaca , 1974-NMSC-071, ¶ 16, 86 N.M. 516, 525 P.2d 876 (emphasis added), our Supreme Court more recently has rejected the argument that Article X, Section 6(D)"allows a municipality to disregard an express law of the Legislature unless the law specifically states 'and no municipality may do otherwise.' " Casuse , 1987-NMSC-112, ¶ 6, 106 N.M. 571, 746 P.2d 1103. Rather, any general law "that clearly intends to preempt a governmental area should be sufficient without necessarily stating that affected municipalities must comply and cannot operate to the contrary." Id. "[A] negation of the power in haec verba is not necessary; words or expressions which are tantamount or equivalent to such a negation are equally effective." Haynes , 1992-NMSC-062, ¶ 22, 114 N.M. 627, 845 P.2d 150. Specifically, we are to look to the "explicitly articulated purposes" of the general law, if enumerated, and in light of the purposes of the general law, determine whether the local law would circumvent and thereby frustrate Legislative intent in enacting the statute. ACLU v. City of Albuquerque , 1999-NMSC-044, ¶ 13, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866 ; see City of Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n , 2003-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 134 N.M. 472, 79 P.3d 297 ("Local governments also cannot use ... their home[-]rule power to frustrate or violate established public policy."). The question, then, is one of legislative intent. See NMFE , 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 19, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149 (describing the analysis as an inquiry into (1) whether the general law evinces an intent to negate municipal power, (2) whether there is a clear intent to preempt the governmental area from municipal policymaking, and (3) whether municipal authority to act would be "so inconsistent" with the general law that the general law "is the equivalent of an express denial"); see also Prot. & Advocacy Sys. , 2008-NMCA-149, ¶ 61, 145 N.M. 156, 195 P.3d 1 ("When considering preemption, we must, above all, follow our Legislature's intent[.]").

{19} We begin by examining the clearest expression of the Legislature's intent when enacting a statute: the expressly stated purposes of the NMFA. See Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (explaining that the plain meaning rule requires a court to give effect to the statute's language and refrain from further interpretation when the language is clear and unambiguous); see also ACLU , 1999-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866 (holding that the Children's Code preempted the City's curfew ordinance, citing first to and relying heavily upon the Legislature's stated purpose within the Children's Code). The Legislature specifically enumerated the purposes of the NMFA. See § 31-27-2(A). Importantly, the Legislature intended to "ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state." Section 31-27-2(A)(6) (emphasis added). Additionally, the NMFA is meant to "make uniform the standards and procedures for the seizure and forfeiture of property subject to forfeiture." Section 31-27-2(A)(1) (emphasis added). While the language of the NMFA does not prohibit municipalities from enacting and enforcing criminal forfeiture proceedings, it restricts forfeiture to criminal proceedings, and imposes specific requirements on any criminal forfeiture proceedings that must comport with the provisions of the NMFA. See id. The Ordinance, however, allows the City to accomplish precisely what the Legislature intended the NMFA to eliminate: civil forfeiture. City of Albuquerque ex rel. Albuquerque Police Dep't v. One (1) 1984 White Chevy , 2002-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 1, 4, 132 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94 (describing the ordinance as a civil forfeiture proceeding).

{20} In several specific ways, the procedures of the Ordinance for seizing and forfeiting a person's property are at odds with the procedures set forth in the NMFA. First, the NMFA requires the person to be convicted of the criminal offense to which the property is tied before that property becomes potentially subject to forfeiture. See § 31-27-4(A) (providing that a person's property is subject to forfeiture if the person "was arrested for an offense to which forfeiture applies[,]" and "the person is convicted by a criminal court of the offense"); § 31-27-5(A) (requiring that the state, within thirty days of seizing the property or filing a related criminal indictment, file a complaint of ancillary forfeiture proceedings or return the property to the person from whom it was seized). The Ordinance, on the other hand, allows for forfeiture of property upon a person's arrest-before conviction-for a criminal offense. See Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance §§ 7-6-2, -5(B) (providing that a vehicle is subject to "immediate seizure and forfeiture" if "seizure is incident to an arrest of the driver"). Nothing in the Ordinance requires that the person be convicted of DWI or driving on a revoked or suspended license as a result of a DWI before the officer seizes and subjects the vehicle to forfeiture, or that criminal proceedings occur contemporaneous with the City's effort to forfeit the vehicle.

{21} Second, the NMFA carefully sets out the procedure for replevin hearings-initiatory proceedings at which an individual who claims an interest in the property seized can seek its return prior to the resolution of the related criminal matter-see § 31-27-4.1, whereas the Ordinance specifically states that seized vehicles "shall not be subject to replevin," but are "deemed to be in the custody of the [p]olice [d]epartment." Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(C).

{22} Third, the NMFA places the burden on the state to prove that the property owner "had actual knowledge that the property was subject to forfeiture" because of its use in the course of criminal activity. Section 31-27-7.1(F)(1). This is in stark contrast to the Ordinance, which places the burden of proof on the owner of the property to prove that he or she "could not have reasonably anticipated that the vehicle could be used in a manner constituting" a public nuisance. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-7(A). Beyond that, the NMFA calls for a different burden of proof than the Ordinance. See § 31-27-7.1(F)(1) (proving by clear and convincing evidence); Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-7(A) (demonstrating preponderance of evidence).

{23} Finally, as another example, the NMFA provides the person whose property is subject to forfeiture an opportunity to contest the conclusion of the proceeding. At the close of a forfeiture proceeding conducted in accordance with the procedures of the NMFA, the person whose property was forfeited may petition the court to determine whether the forfeiture was "unconstitutionally excessive" and "grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the criminal offense for which the person was convicted" in light of several factors, including the impact of the crime on the community and the sentence imposed for the commission of the crime. Section 31-27-6(K), (L), (M). Under the Ordinance, there exists no means for the person to contest the conclusions drawn at the close of the probable cause hearing, nor does the Ordinance provide the presiding official any discretion to consider whether forfeiture is a proportionate response to the factual nuances of the circumstances presented, critically, the seriousness of the crime. Rather, at the close of the "informal" hearing where it is determined that the seizure was supported by probable cause, "proceedings for an order for forfeiture shall be instituted promptly." Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-5(D).

{24} The Ordinance and the NMFA are functionally at odds with one another. The NMFA constrains the circumstances under which a person's property may be subject to permanent forfeiture, for example, by requiring conviction (not merely arrest) prior to the initiation of forfeiture proceedings, by allowing persons to seek replevin, by shifting the burden of proof to the state, by heightening the burden of proof before the court can conclude that the property is subject to forfeiture, and by allowing the person to petition the court to determine whether a finding of forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive. The Ordinance, however, simply-and far more strictly-deems the property associated with the named conduct forfeitable without further consideration. See Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinance § 7-6-2 (providing that a motor vehicle operated under the described circumstances "is hereby declared to be a nuisance and subject to immediate seizure and forfeiture"). Such a per se approach to seizing and forfeiting property owned by individuals is wholly contrary to the language and spirit of the NMFA. Thus, because the Legislature intended to eliminate civil forfeiture and the Ordinance allows for it, and because the procedures set forth in the Ordinance are different from and contrary to the procedures outlined in the NMFA, we conclude that the Ordinance is so inconsistent with the terms of the NMFA that the NMFA is the equivalent of an express denial of the City's authority to enforce the Ordinance.

{25} We find further support for our analysis of the NMFA's purposes and provisions in our case law. In ACLU , 1999-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 13,15, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866, for example, the Delinquency Act was found to have "comprehensively" and "exhaustively" addressed the conduct and behavior of children that could be described as criminal, thus a local ordinance providing criminal penalties for curfew violations conflicted with and was preempted by the state law. By contrast, NMFE , 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 20, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149, held that the Minimum Wage Act did not preempt a city ordinance setting the minimum wage higher than that in the statute because "unlike the situation in ACLU , [the] state law does not establish any type of comprehensive wage-setting program or scheme and the Minimum Wage Act does not exhaustively address the subject of minimum wages."

{26} Like the general law at issue in ACLU , the NMFA comprehensively addresses asset forfeiture by expressly limiting the circumstances under which such proceedings may occur-namely, only in the criminal context-and by detailing each step of the seizure and forfeiture process. It sets forth specific procedures for each step of the process, including (1) when an order to seize potentially forfeitable property may be issued, Section 31-27-4; (2) what documentation of receipt of property the property owner must receive following seizure, Section 31-27-4.1(A); (3) under what circumstances a party may move the court to issue a writ of replevin and what responsive pleadings are permitted, Section 31-27-4.1(B),(C); (4) the timing and form of the complaint for the state to initiate a permanent forfeiture of property, as well as the requirements for service of process, Section 31-27-5; (5) the mechanisms available for persons who claim an interest in seized and forfeited property and the rules of procedure and burdens of proof to be applied in the forfeiture proceeding along with the option to appeal the district court's decision following the proceeding, Section 31-27-6; and (6) the disposition of forfeited property and depositing of proceeds from the sale of forfeited property into the state's general fund, Section 31-27-7. As in ACLU , we conclude that the Legislature, through these extensive, detailed, and comprehensive provisions has "exhaustively addresse[d]" the existence and manner of enacting and enforcing asset forfeiture proceedings. ACLU , 1999-NMSC-044, ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 315, 992 P.2d 866.

The NMFA Does Not Operate as an "Opt-In" Statute as the City Argues

{27} Finally, we address the City's argument. The City relies upon Section 31-27-2(B)(1) of the NMFA and argues that the Ordinance does not conflict with and therefore cannot be preempted by the NMFA because "the Legislature allowed municipalities the decision to opt-in to the [NMFA]." Section 31-27-2(B)(1) states: The NMFA "applies to seizures, forfeitures and dispositions of property subject to forfeiture pursuant to laws that specifically apply the [NMFA.]" Because the Ordinance does not contain language expressly providing that the NMFA applies, the City maintains that the NMFA cannot preempt the Ordinance.

{28} We disagree, based first upon the fact that the City's interpretation of Section 31-27-2(B)(1) subverts the NMFA's clearly stated purpose, that is, to ensure that only criminal forfeiture exists in New Mexico. Under the City's interpretation, a municipality wishing to enact a civil forfeiture law could entirely avoid the NMFA and the stated rationale that underpins it, along with all of its requirements concerning forfeiture proceedings by simply not mentioning the NMFA in a given ordinance and in so doing, allow non-criminal asset forfeiture-such as that embodied by the City's Ordinance-to continue from municipality to municipality.

{29} Second, whether the NMFA only applies to statutes "that specifically apply the [NMFA]", as the City interprets Section 31-27-2(B)(1), is an issue separate and distinct from preemption. We view the related language to mean that the Legislature may, in another statute, provide that the NMFA applies to the statute in order to incorporate its procedures and penalties into the substance of the statute. See, e.g. , NMSA 1978, § 60-7A-5(C) (2002) (penalizing the unlawful manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages or any money "that is the fruit or instrumentality" of such by subjecting it to forfeiture and providing that "the provisions of the [NMFA] apply to the seizure, forfeiture[,] and disposal of such property"); NMSA 1978, § 17-2-20.1(A), (C) (2002) (providing that "[t]he provisions of the [NMFA] apply to the seizure, forfeiture and disposal of property" when "used as instrumentalities in the commission of" possessing, taking, or attempting to take big game during closed season). The latter concept-preemption-is an issue that arises any time two governing bodies attempt to regulate the same subject matter. The inferior of the two governing bodies, the local government, cannot exempt itself from the application of the sovereign's laws. See Casuse 1987-NMSC-112, ¶ 6, 106 N.M. 571, 746 P.2d 1103 ("It is commonly recognized that a sovereign and its subdivision may tax the same activity without causing an inconsistency in the law. However, when two statutes that are governmental or regulatory in nature conflict, the law of the sovereign controls."). Where a municipality's ordinance interferes with a general law, the general law, i.e. the law of the sovereign, preempts that of its subdivision, regardless of whether the language of the municipality's ordinance acknowledges the existence of the laws of the sovereign.

{30} Finally, if the City is correct that the statute only applies to cities that include in their ordinances such similar words as "and the NMFA applies," courts would be precluded from engaging in a preemption analysis at all for any statute with a provision similar to Section 31-27-2(B)(1). As previously described, the analysis for determining whether a law is a general law requires us to examine the effect of a legislative enactment-whether it affects all of the inhabitants of the state and is therefore of statewide concern, or whether it affects only the inhabitants of the municipality and is therefore of only local concern. Haynes , 1992-NMSC-062, ¶ 19, 114 N.M. 627, 845 P.2d 150. Under the City's view, it is the local government that determines which of the sovereign's laws are general. If true, a municipality could simply assert that the law is not of statewide concern because it does not apply to all municipalities by the very terms of the municipality's own ordinances. Where local governments are able to decide which statutes of the sovereign apply to them based upon the wishes of local officials and the language of a local ordinance, local governments can evade a determination that an otherwise restrictive statute is a general law. We find it quite unlikely that the Legislature would empower an inferior governmental body with the capacity to decide which statutes are general laws and which are not. The City's argument turns the interaction between sovereigns and the subdivisions that exist within them completely on its head.

{31} We conclude that the NMFA denies the City's authority to seize and forfeit property under the Ordinance because the enforcement of the Ordinance frustrates, and, in fact, completely contradicts the Legislature's intent in amending the NMFA. Thus, the NMFA preempts the Ordinance in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

{32} We conclude that the NMFA preempts the Ordinance and reverse the judgment and order of the district court.

{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge

HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge

      The provision of the Ordinance requiring owners of seized property to prove their innocence was recently found to be an unconstitutional procedural due process violation. See Harjo v. City of Albuquerque , 307 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1210 (D.N.M. 2018), modified on reconsideration by 326 F.Supp.3d 1145 (D.N.M. 2018).