source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CARL B. JONES, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2002 OK CIV APP 111
    John H. MAHORNEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Drucilla E. WAREN, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 96,341.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.
    Oct. 11, 2002.

      John H. Mahorney, Pro Se.
    Sean M. McKelvey, McAlester, OK, for Appellee.
   OPINION

CARL B. JONES, Judge.

¶ 1 John H. Mahorney, Appellant, is an inmate incarcerated at the Lawton Correctional Facility. Drueilla E. Waren, Appellee, is an attorney licensed to practice law in this state. In 1996, Waren represented Appellant in his defense against first degree murder charges before a LeFlore County jury. Appellant was convicted of the crime on November 8, 1996, and sentenced to life without the possibility of parol on December 5, 1996. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence on August 21, 1998, Mahorney v. State, F-96-1521 (Okla.Crim.1998) (unpublished), and affirmed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief on September 28, 2000, Mahorney v. State, PC-2000-469 (Okla.Crim.2000) (unpublished). The latter decision purportedly addressed and rejected Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

¶2 On October 16, 2000, Appellant filed the instant petition alleging that Waren negligently represented him in his criminal trial. Waren moved to dismiss on several grounds, including: (1) Appellant’s petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (2) Appellant’s claim was time barred. On May 3, 2001, the trial court granted Waren’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant’s petition failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 12 O.S.2001 § 2012(B)(6). This matter stands submitted without appellate briefs on the trial court record. See Rule 4(m), Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S.2001, Ch. 2, App. 1, and Rule 1.36, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S.2001, Ch. 15, App.

¶ 3 On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court’s reliance on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), was misplaced and generally asserts his conviction was the direct result of Waren’s malpractice. In reviewing a trial court’s disposition by dismissal, this court examines the issues de novo. Miller v. Miller, 1998 OK 24, ¶ 15, 956 P.2d 887, 894. After de novo review of the instant record, we affirm.

¶ 4 As a preliminary matter, we note Appellant specifically alleged this cause of action is based on three provisions of the now outmoded Code of Professional Responsibility (superseded by Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S., Ch. 1, App. 3-A, effective July 1, 1988). We point out that a violation of such rules does not provide a basis for a private action in tort. Rather, the Oklahoma Supreme Court possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute any alleged attorney rule violations. See Rule 1.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1 A. Notwithstanding, we find pursuant to 12 O.S.2001 § 2008(A)(l)(“notice pleading” provision), Appellant’s petition gave “fair notice of [his] claim [for negligence] and the grounds upon which it rests.” Delbrel v. Doenges Bros. Ford, Inc., 1996 OK 36, ¶ 3, 913 P.2d 1318,1320.

¶ 5 Addressing the merits of Appellant’s action, the trial court correctly noted:

A lawyer is not expected to be perfect in giving advice to her clients. One who alleges negligence by an attorney must plead and prove the attorney-client relation, a breach of duty arising from the relation, and injury proximately caused by the breach.

Myers v. Maxey, 1995 OK CIV APP 148, ¶ 11, 915 P.2d 940, 945. Here, Appellant alleges that the injury resulting from War-en’s alleged breach of duty was his wrongful conviction. As previously stated, however, Appellant’s conviction has not been set aside. Thus, his conviction is not a wrongful conviction, but a lawful one.

¶ 6 The trial court also relied on Heck as support for dismissal. In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order for a § 1983 plaintiff to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for some other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, he must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-7, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Analogizing the facts of this case to Heck, the trial court held Appellant has no cause of action for negligence against Waren until he can plead, in good faith, that his conviction has been invalidated as a proximate result of a breach of duty by Waren which arose out of the attorney-client relationship. We agree.

¶ 7 There also exists an additional, independent reason to affirm the trial court’s judgment: Appellant’s claim is time-barred. “An action for legal malpractice is an action for tort and is governed by the two-year statute of limitation found in 12 O.S. [2001], § 95.” Stephens v. General Motors Corp., 1995 OK 114, ¶ 7, 905 P.2d 797, 798. A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when a litigant can maintain an action to a successful conclusion. Marshall v. Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, P.C., 1995 OK 66, ¶ 8, 899 P.2d 621, 623. The statute of limitations on such actions begins to run after the alleged tortious act has occurred and the plaintiff has suffered damages. Id. at ¶ 9, 899 P.2d at 624. In the present case, the statute of limitations on any claim for damages Appellant suffered as a result of his trial counsel’s alleged malpractice — the damages being Appellant’s conviction and incarceration — began to run when Appellant was sentenced for his crime on December 5,1996. The instant claim, filed on October 16, 2000, came well after the two year limitation period had expired.

¶8 On de novo review, we hold the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

¶ 9 AFFIRMED.

JOPLIN, V.C.J., and BUETTNER, J., concur.

      . Although not specifically identified in the instant record, we take judicial notice of the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and their dates of issuance pursuant to 12 O.S.1991 §§ 2202 and 2203.


author: THORNE, Judge. ORME, Judge

text:
    2002 UT App 389
    Linda C. SPEIRS, Petitioner, v. SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Respondents.
    No. 20010374-CA.
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Nov. 21, 2002.
    Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Petitioner.
    James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
    Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., ORME, and THORNE, JJ.
   OPINION

THORNE, Judge.

¶ 1 Linda C. Speirs appeals from an order of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission), denying in part and granting in part her request for workers’ compensation. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 30, 1998, Speirs slipped and fell fracturing her nose and injuring her right ankle and left knee while waitressing on the Southern Utah University campus in Cedar City, Utah. Initially, Speirs received workers’ compensation benefits. However, after paying Speirs’s medical costs related to the accident, her employer, through its workers’ compensation insurer, denied Speirs’s request for permanent partial disability benefits or future medical benefits. Speirs appealed to the Commission. An administrative law judge (ALJ) convened a medical panel to render a medical opinion in Speirs’s case prior to making any finding or drawing any conclusions. The parties submitted stipulated facts to the medical panel and the ALJ asked the medical panel to opine on the following questions:

(1) What is [Speirs’s] total physical impairment, if any, for injuries sustained to her knee, ankle, nose and face, respectively? Please explain as necessary.
(2) What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the April 30, 1998, accident described above?
(3) Please address the following medical treatment for [Speirs’s] nose and face, ankle, and knee and specifically Dr. Mars-den’s request for a neurological consultation and whether the current prescription for Guaifenesin [is] necessary as a result of the industrial accident.

¶3 The medical panel examined Speirs, reviewed Speirs’s medical records, and then issued a one-hundred page detailed report that contained both the panel’s medical opinion and the material to support that opinion. In this report, the medical panel opined that: (1) based upon a reasonable medical probability, Speirs’s total permanent physical impairment attributable to her knee injury was zero percent; (2) the total permanent physical impairment attributable to her face and nose injury was zero percent; and (3) Speirs suffered a four percent permanent physical impairment attributable to her ankle injury. The medical panel further opined that Speirs’s injuries required no future medical treatment.

¶ 4 Speirs objected to the medical panel’s report and asked the ALJ to strike the report, or, in the alternative, provide Speirs with the opportunity to cross-examine the medical panel. The ALJ denied both of Speirs’s requests.

¶ 5 The ALJ then found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Speirs suffered no permanent partial impairment from her left knee, headaches, nasal problems, or other facial injuries. The ALJ further found a four percent whole body impairment attributable to Speirs’s ankle injury, and awarded Speirs a total of $915.16 in permanent partial disability compensation. The ALJ also denied Speirs any compensation for future medical treatment for her knee, headaches, nasal problems, or other facial injuries. The ALJ supported his conclusion by reference to both the medical panel’s report and other evidence in the record.

¶ 6 Speirs appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commission arguing that (1) the medical panel had usurped the ALJ’s authority, (2) the medical panel was biased against her, and (3) the medical panel’s conclusions lacked analysis and foundation. The Commission affirmed the ALJ and further found that the medical panel had properly performed the purposes assigned it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (2002)in that the underlying evidence sufficiently supported the medical panel’s report, and that the medical panel’s report was consistent with other medical opinions in the record. Speirs appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Speirs argues that the medical panel usurped the Commission’s authority by making findings of fact. “ ‘[T]he Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all eases coming before it.’ ” McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm’n, 2002 UT App 10,¶ 11, 41 P.3d 468 (quoting Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2000 UT App 35,¶ 7, 996 P.2d 1072)(alteration original). “ ‘As such, we must uphold the Commission’s determination ... unless the determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and ra-tionality_’”Id. (alterations original).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Speirs challenges the Commission’s denial of her claim for additional workers’ compensation benefits. Speirs asserts that the medical panel usurped the authority of the ALJ and made findings of fact relating to Speirs’s medical history.

¶ 9 “[T]o award compensation, the Commission must determine that an accident has occurred and that there is a causal connection between the accident and the injury claimed.” Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). This requires that the Commission make findings of fact and draw conclusions of law. See, e.g., id. In difficult cases, the opinions of a medical panel may be of assistance to the Commission in determining whether benefits should be awarded because the medical panel provides the Commission with the benefit of its medical expertise. See Intermountain Health Care, Inc., v. Industrial Comm’n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Keller, 657 P.2d at 1370; IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). The medical panel is empowered to study, take X-rays, and perform tests as it may determine necessary or desirable in rendering its opinion. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(a) (Supp.2002).

¶ 10 However, even when a medical panel is convened, the ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate fact finder. See Whitear v. Labor Comm’n, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct.App.1998); accord IGA Food Fair, 584 P.2d at 830. Thus, while the ALJ/Commission may convene a medical panel to review applicants’ medical condition, the ALJ/Commission may not abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to the medical panel. See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986).

¶ 11 Here, after reviewing the proffered conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ convened the medical panel to examine Speirs’s medical condition. The ALJ provided the panel with a set of stipulated facts and three questions that the ALJ desired the panel to answer. The medical panel accepted the stipulated facts, however, after determining that the stipulated facts were insufficient to properly answer the proffered questions, the medical panel conducted a thorough examination of Speirs, and a thorough review of her medical history. The medical panel then used this information to answer each of the ALJ’s proffered questions. The ALJ, after receiving the medical panel’s opinion, then examined the record as a whole and issued findings and conclusions awarding Speirs a foui’ percent permanent partial impairment.

¶ 12 We have examined the record and conclude that the ALJ’s finding can be supported without reference to the medical panel’s opinion. We further conclude that the ALJ properly discharged his duty to make findings of fact and nothing in the record supports Speirs’s claim that the ALJ abdicated this responsibility. Thus, any error Speirs attributes to the medical panel’s conduct has no bearing on the benefits awarded her.

¶ 13 The ALJ reviewed the medical panel’s report and other medical opinions contained in the record and concluded that Speirs suffered a four percent permanent partial impairment. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s findings on appeal. It is not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute our conclusion for that of the Commission. See VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm’n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct.App.1995). “ ‘Instead, we defer to the Commission’s findings because, when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the Commission’s province to draw inferences and resolve these conflicts.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, the Commission did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness or rationality in affirming the ALJ’s decision. See McKesson, 2002 UT App 10 at ¶ 11, 41 P.3d 468.

CONCLUSION

¶ 14 We conclude that the medical panel properly performed its function and did not usurp the Commission’s authority. Furthermore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record, independent of the medical panel’s report, to support the Commission’s award. We therefore affirm.

¶ 15 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge.

ORME, Judge

(dissenting):

¶ 16 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues. The medical panel was provided with seventeen stipulated facts, and three specific questions were put to it. Four months after receiving its relatively simple charge, the medical panel submitted its 100 page report, which amounts to a life history of petitioner laden with irrelevant personal details.

¶ 17 The articulated basis for this peculiar foray is that the medical panel determined the stipulated facts were insufficient to properly answer the questions posed. Given the intention of the parties to have the matter resolved on stipulated facts, in conjunction only with “the deposition of Petitioner herein” and a medical record and report attached to the stipulation, once the medical panel ascertained it could not answer the three questions on the basis of the stipulated information, it should simply have so reported to the administrative law judge.

¶ 18 Once the judge informed the parties of this turn of events, they could then have considered supplementing the stipulation, undertaking additional discovery, proceeding to adjudication, etc. But for the medical panel to simply go its merry way-and for the administrative law judge to endorse this self-authorized adventure-was at odds with the expectation of the parties, as reflected in their stipulation.

¶ 19 I would remand the case to the Industrial Commission, with instructions to set aside the ineffectual stipulation and give petitioner an opportunity to pursue her claim in any alternative way properly available to her.

      . We refer to the most recent version of the statute because, excepted as specifically noted herein, any changes are not material.

      . Speirs presented the following arguments on appeal: (1) Did the medical panel usurp the authority of the Administrative Law Judge by disregarding the stipulation that was submitted to the panel?; (2) was the medical panel biased?; and (3) was there competent evidence to support the medical panel’s determination? We have summarized and restated Speirs's arguments to more concisely address them.

      . Speirs also argues that the medical panel ignored the stipulated findings of fact, but this claim is unpersuasive because the medical panel incorporated the stipulated facts into its report.

      . For example, Dr. Knoebel opined that he saw no objective evidence of any permanent impairment or problems secondary to the industrial accident. He opined that Speirs needed no further medical treatment. Dr. Marsden noted that Speirs had minimal nasal obstruction and normal sinuses. Dr. Kumar also provided a comprehensive medical history and opined that Speirs’s headaches were caused by "mixed vascular tension.” Other medical records contained information about her shoulder injury, a car accident, and her lower back pain, each of which either predated the industrial accident or exacerbated Speirs's existing medical ailments.

      . Speirs also argues that the ALJ/Commission should not have relied upon the medical panel’s findings of fact, for they were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her due process rights were violated because the medical panel was biased against her. Here, the ALJ/Commission, not the medical panel, made the findings of fact, thus, a sufficiency of the evidence argument does not apply to the medical panel. Furthermore, even if relevant, we are precluded from addressing Speirs’s due process claim because she failed to raise this issue before the Commission. Issues not raised in proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except under exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm’n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (refusing to address issues not raised before the Commission).


author: VOIGT, Justice.

text:
    2002 WY 180
    Douglas Malcolm WATSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. Darla Louise WATSON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 02-24.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Dec. 17, 2002.
    Dwight F. Hurich of Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
    Tad T. Daly and Patrick G. Davidson of Daly Law Associates, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

   VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] In response to his former spouse’s Petition for Modification of Child Visitation, the appellant, Douglas M. Watson (father), counterclaimed to modify his child support obligation due to a financial change. The district court held a hearing and subsequently denied the father’s counterclaim. On appeal, the father argues that the district court erred in recalculating his child support obligation by adding back to his income the business expense he deducted from his federal income tax pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 26 U.S.C.A. § 179 (2002) (Section 179). We reverse and remand to the district court for recalculation of the father’s child support obligation.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The issues on appeal are:

A. The district court erred by disallowing, for the purpose of child support computations, the Section 179 expense claimed by the father.
B. The district court erred in computing the net incomes of both parties when calculating the presumed child support so as to not find a twenty percent decrease in presumed support, and thus, modifying the father’s child support obligation downward.

FACTS

[¶ 3] The father and the appellee, Darla L. Watson (mother), married in 1987, subsequently had two children, and divorced in 1999. In the divorce decree, the district court awarded the mother primary custody of the children, awarded the father visitation rights, and ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $818.00 per month. On August '22, 2000, the mother filed a Petition for Modification of Child Visitation. The father filed his answer on September 8, 2000, and counterclaimed requesting that the district court modify the original divorce decree by recalculating his child support obligation based on the parties’ current incomes. The district court held a hearing on January 31, 2001, and denied the father’s counterclaim because the twenty percent threshold of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 (LexisNexis 2001) was not met.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4] A district court has broad discretion in determining the correct amount of a child support award. This Court will disturb a district court’s ruling only upon a showing that the district court abused its discretion. Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wyo.1999). We have stated that: “ ‘Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.’ ” Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)).

DISCUSSION

Section 179 Expense

[¶ 5] A party seeking to modify a child support order must show, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311, that a material change in circumstances occurred subsequent to entry of the original divorce decree. The father argues that, based on his current income and applying the presumptive support guidelines found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 (LexisNexis 2001), he should be paying twenty percent less than what he is presently ordered to pay. The father, a rancher, testified that his ranch operation had changed since the divorce, and he now receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 ($841.00 after deductions) as opposed to the $3,500.00 per month the district court determined at the time of the divorce. He further testified that he receives in-kind income amounting to $450.00 per month in the form of housing, transportation, gasoline, utilities, and groceries, and that he has been depleting his retirement savings since May 1999 in order to support his modest lifestyle.

[¶ 6] In calculating child support, the first step is to determine the parents’ current monthly net incomes and then to apply the total amount to the tables as set forth in the statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304. Income is defined, in part, in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001):

“Income” means any form of payment or return in money or in kind to an individual, regardless of source. Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, commission, compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability worker’s compensation payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and retirement benefits, and any other payments made by any pay- or, but shall not include any earnings derived from overtime work unless the court, after considering all overtime earnings derived in the preceding twenty-four (24) month period, determines the overtime earnings can reasonably be expected to continue on a consistent basis. In determining income, all reasonable unreim-bursed legitimate business expenses shall be deducted.

(Emphasis added.) The income used to calculate the child support obligation is “net income,” defined as:

“Net income” means income as defined in paragraph (ii) of this subsection less personal income taxes, social security deductions, cost of dependent health care coverage for all dependent children, actual payments being made under preexisting support orders for current support of other children, other court-ordered support obligations currently being paid and mandatory pension deductions. Payments towards child support arrearage shall not be deducted to arrive at net incomef.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20 — 2—303(a)(iii).

[¶ 7] At issue in the instant case is whether a Section 179 expense deduction claimed by the ranch corporation for the benefit of the father can be used to lower the father’s monthly net income. Citing Houston v. Smith, 882 P.2d 240 (Wyo.1994), the district court disallowed the Section 179 expense and included that amount in calculating the father’s net income. The district court reasoned that such deductions were “depreciation,” being more properly written off over several years, which should be added back to income, as in Houston, for the purpose of calculating a child support obligation.

[¶ 8] The district court concluded that the father’s monthly income amounted to $2,950.00, resulting in a child support obligation of $692.35 per month. This did not satisfy the twenty percent rule required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311, so the district court denied the father’s counterclaim. The father does not dispute addition of forty percent of the LLC’s depreciation and amortization back to income, but does take issue with the Section 179 deduction being added back to income. We, too, disagree with the district court’s treatment of the Section 179 deduction.

[¶ 9] The pertinent subsections of Section 179 that apply in the instant case are 179(a), 179(d)(1), and 179(d)(10). Section 179(a) provides: “A taxpayer may elect to treat the cost of any section 179 property as an expense which is not chargeable to capital account. Any cost so treated shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year in which the section 179 property is placed in service.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 179 at 688. Section 179(d)(1) reads: “For purposes of this section, the term ‘section 179 property’ means any tangible property ... and which is acquired by purchase for use in the active conduct of a trade or business.” Id. at 690. Section 179(d)(10) provides: “The Secretary shall, by regulations, provide for recapturing the benefit under any deduction allowable under subsection (a) with respect to any property which is not used predominantly in a trade or business at any time.” Id. at 691-92.

[¶ 10] In general, Section 179 property is used in the active conduct of a taxpayer’s trade or business that would be subject to depreciation but for the election. See 4 Fed. Tax Guide Rep. (CCH) ¶ 12,126.01 (2002). Without an election under Section 179, the cost of such property would be treated as capital expenditure, and the cost would be recovered as depreciation over a period of years pursuant to IRC 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 167(a) and 168. However, when Section 179 property is sold, any gain is recognized as ordinary income to the extent of amounts ex-pensed and depreciation claimed. See 4 Fed. Tax Guide Rep. (CCH) ¶ 12,126.01.

[¶ 11] In 2000, the ranch corporation claimed $20,000.00 in Section 179 expenses for the purchase of eleven bulls and a horse. Since the father owned forty percent of the corporation, forty percent of the allowable $20,000.00 Section 179 expense or $8,000.00, passed through to the father, which he claimed on his personal federal income tax for the year 2000. The father asserts that the Section 179 deduction should not be added back to his income as “depreciation.” He argues that, whereas depreciation is added back to income because it does not reflect an actual cash expenditure, a Section 179 deduction reflects an actual cash expenditure, reducing available resources from which to pay child support.

[¶ 12] The states are split on the issue of whether certain business expenses such as Section 179 deductions should be added back to income in determining child support obligations. In Major v. Major, 124 N.M. 436, 952 P.2d 37 (1997), the court dealt with a situation somewhat similar to the instant case. In Major, the father raised cattle and sold his cull cattle in the spring, purchasing impregnated cattle to replace the cull cattle. Id. at 38. The Major court reviewed several cases that discussed determining the net income of self-employed parents, and stated:

The lesson we glean from these cases is that we are more concerned with a parent’s actual cash flow than we are with income as represented on tax returns.... We do not rely on technical treatments more appropriate for accounting and tax purposes unless there is evidence that those technical treatments bear some relation to actual cash flow.

Id. at 39. Regarding Section 179 expenses, the Major court stated:

The limitation imposed by the trial court comes from Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code. This section allows a taxpayer to elect to treat the cost of deprecia-ble property purchased for use in the active conduct of a trade or business as an expense in the year the property is placed in service, rather than as property that is capitalized and thereafter subject to depreciation over a number of years.... It is designed to “ ‘encourage additional investment in small business since it provides for a faster recovery of capital before the taxing of earnings.’” Smyers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 T.C. 189, 203, 1971 WL 2598 (1971) (quoting H.R. Rep. 85-2198 (1958)). Additionally, since the property is immediately expensed, there is no need to maintain a depreciation schedule on these assets.

Major, 952 P.2d at 39. The Major court continued:

Mother argues that this case comes down to an analysis of depreciation. She appears to be arguing that because Father depreciates the cattle over a period of years, he cannot expense them as inventory in one year. That is not what is happening here. Rather, Father is requesting that, when the trial court determines his income for child support purposes, it deduct as a necessary business expense the annual cost of replenishing his breeding herd. Again, how that cost is treated for income tax purposes is not necessarily relevant to determining income for child support.

Id. at 40.

[¶ 13] A Section 179 deduction reflects a cash expenditure made during the year in question, whereas depreciation taken in years subsequent to the initial year property is placed in service does not reflect cash expenditures made in those subsequent years. We note, however, the similarity between a Section 179 deduction and that of depreciation taken in the year in which property is placed in service, which typically reflects an actual cash expenditure made during that year. However, we conclude that when courts consider business expenses, they should make allowance for expenses that are actually necessary for the parent to sustain his or her business and that are unreim-bursed business expenses. In determining a parent’s income for a presumptive child support obligation, “ ‘all reasonable unreim-bursed legitimate business expenses shall be deducted.’” Roseman v. Sackett, 979 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo.1999); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2 — 303(a)(ii).

[¶ 14] We distinguish the instant case from Houston, where we considered depreciation of real property and adopted this rationale: “ ‘Since the purpose of depreciation is to assist a person in regaining their expenditures, it does not follow that depreciation is a business expense for the calculation of disposable income under the Guidelines.’ ” Houston, 882 P.2d at 244 (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 243 Mont. 180, 793 P.2d 813, 815 (1990)) (emphasis in original). We held that depreciation of rental properties failed to fit within the statute’s definition of “reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses” and concluded that it could not be deducted from income for child support purposes because it constituted a book reimbursement. Houston, 882 P.2d at 244. However, a Section 179 expense differs from depreciation in that it directly affects business cash flow and a parent’s disposable income. It is this distinction that makes a Section 179 expense more closely resemble the mortgage principal payments we allowed to be deducted from income in Fleenor v. Fleenor, 992 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo.1999) than the depreciation we disallowed as a deduction from income in Houston.

[¶ 15] We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in calculating the father’s monthly net income. The Section 179 deduction in this case may have been a reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expense that should not have been added back to income in determining child support obligations. In its decision letter, the district court did not, however, make that determination. Instead, it concluded only that the amount “would more properly be written off over several years without this special section .... ” But for child support computation purposes, the question is not whether an amount should be depreciated over time for tax purposes or whether it should be treated as an expense in the current tax year under Section 179. The question is whether it was a “reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expense” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii).

[¶ 16] We reiterate what we said in both Fleenor and Houston: the focus should be upon the reasonable and legitimate nature of the expense and its impact on the party’s actual cash flow in the year in question rather than the treatment of the expense by federal law in the context of income taxes. The rationale of Houston was that book depreciation does not reduce actual net income. Houston, 882 P.2d at 244. The rationale of Roseman was that the child support payor had failed to prove that the amounts he claimed were reasonable business expenses. Roseman, 979 P.2d at 943. The rationale of Fleenor was that, after the payor established that the expenses were reasonable expenses that directly affected business cash flow and his own disposable income, the payee failed to prove that the payments were unreasonable. Fleenor, 992 P.2d at 1070. That is the type of analysis required in eases of this nature. A central question in that analysis is whether the questioned expenses were unreasonably excessive or the assets were acquired to depress income to avoid support payments. Id. at 1069. The burden of proving that an expense was a reasonable un-reimbursed legitimate business expense lies with the party seeking the deduction. Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 15, 30 P.3d 542, 546 (Wyo.2001); Fountain v. Mitros, 968 P.2d 934, 938 (Wyo.1998).

[¶ 17] One court has commented that “were we not to treat Section 179 deductions as depreciation pursuant to the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines, a self-employed parent could distort his or her income in any given year by purchasing depreciable property and deducting the cost pursuant to Section 179, thereby reducing income available for child support.” Gammel v. Gammel, 259 Neb. 738, 612 N.W.2d 207, 212 (2000). That, of course, is true; a scheming non-custodial parent could seek to manipulate his or her income in such a manner. But the opposite is also true; if in computing child support, a court automatically rejects a business expense that has been afforded Section 179 treatment, that court has not fulfilled its obligation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii) to determine whether the amount should be deducted as a reasonable and legitimate business expense. Either course is wrong. The proper course is to make the statutory determination.

Net Income Computation

[¶ 18] The father next alleges that the district court erred in computing the net incomes of both parties when calculating the presumed child support so as not to find a twenty percent decrease in presumed support, and thus modifying the child support obligation downward. In its decision letter, the district court found that the net monthly income of the mother was $2,043.00. Unfortunately, the record does not disclose how the district court calculated the mother’s monthly income. There is no factual basis from which we can conclude whether this truly reflects her net income. On remand, the district court should set forth in its decision letter its computations of both parties’ incomes.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 19] The district court erred when it added the Section 179 expense deduction back to the father’s income in determining his child support obligation, without first having made a determination whether the expense was a reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expense under the statute. We reverse and remand to the district court for recalculation of the parties’ monthly incomes consistent with this opinion and a determination of the father’s appropriate child support obligation.

      . Visitation is not at issue in this appeal.

      . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311(a) states, in part: "Any party ... may petition for a review and adjustment of any child support order.... The petition shall allege that, in applying the presumptive child support established by this article, the support amount will change by twenty percent (20%) or more per month from the amount of the existing order.”

      .The father and his parents joined their sole proprietorship ranches into a corporation effective January 1, 2000, with their land being held by a limited liability company (LLC). The father owns forty percent of the corporation and forty percent of the LLC.

      . The applicable amounts allowed for Section 179 expenses are: Tax year 1997, $18,000.00; 1998, $18,500.00; 1999, $19,000.00; 2000, $20,000.00; 2001 or 2002, $24,000.00; 2003 or thereafter, $25,000.00. 26 U.S.C.A. § 179(b)(1) at 688-89.

      . See, e.g., In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1999); Preussner v. Timmer, 414 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Minn.App.1987); Gammel v. Gammel, 259 Neb. 738, 612 N.W.2d 207, 211-12 (2000); and Labar v. Labar, 557 Pa. 54, 731 A.2d 1252, 1255-56 (1999). See also Frank J. Wozniak, Treatment of Depreciation Expenses Claimed for Tax or Accounting Purposes in Determining Ability to Pay Child or Spousal Support, 28 A.L.R. 5th 46 (1995).

      .Those jurisdictions that consider Section 179 expenses as "depreciation” to be added back to income for computing child support obligations appear to ignore the recapture provision of Section 179(d)(10). In the instant case, the father's accountant testified that, when the Section 179 animals are sold in later tax years, the income will then be treated as ordinary income.

      . The record does disclose a Contract of Employment for the mother at the Northern Wyoming Community College for the school year 2000-2001, which indicates a nine-month salary of $27,375.00. On an annualized basis, this amounts to a gross monthly income of $2,281.25. How the district court arrived at a net monthly income of $2,043.00 is not discernable from the record.


author: KITE, Justice.

text:
    2002 WY 181
    WYODAK RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Appellant (Petitioner), v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee (Respondent).
    No. 01-249.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Dec. 17, 2002.

      Timothy L. Thomas of Morrill, Thomas, Nooney & Braun, LLP, Rapid City, South Dakota, Representing Appellant.
    Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Rowena L. Heckert, Deputy Attorney General; Martin L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Karl D. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of oral argument

   KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Wyodak Resources Development Corporation (Wyodak) challenged the valuation of coal produced from its mine in Campbell County for the years 1992 through 1995, 1998, and 1999. Most of Wyodak’s coal is sold under one long term contract with the joint owners of the nearby Wyodak power plant: Black Hills Corporation (Black Hills) — Wyodak’s parent company — and Pa-cifiCorp. Historically, Wyodak reported the value of the gross product sold to its parent company based upon the price it received under that contract. However, in 1997, Wyo-dak began claiming that, because the sale to Black Hills was not an arms length transaction, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39 — 14—103(b)(viii) (LexisNexis 2001) provided spot market prices must be used to determine the fair market value of that coal. This approach yielded a lower value resulting in a lower tax obligation. The Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) rejected Wyodak’s position for years 1992 through 1995 on res judicata and other procedural grounds, and, for years 1998 and 1999, DOR determined the statutes did not allow use of spot market prices to determine the value of coal sold under this long term contract. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) upheld DOR’s decision. We affirm in part on somewhat different grounds and reverse in part.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Wyodak presents these issues:

1. Whether the board erred in holding that petitioner’s claim for refund of severance taxes paid for the 1992 coal production year is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion.
2. Whether the board erred in holding that petitioner waived its right to request refunds of severance taxes paid for coal production years 1993, 1994 and 1995 by failing to appeal from the original notices of valuation within 30 days.
3. Whether the board erred in holding that petitioner is barred by the doctrine of laches from challenging the valuation method used by the department in issuing notices of valuation for coal production years 1992,1993,1994 and 1995.
4. Whether the board erred in upholding the department’s position that the non-arms-length sales of coal between petitioner and its parent company, Black Hills Corporation, cannot be valued under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-209(e) or its identical successor statute.
5. Whether the board erred in holding that the department properly valued the sales of coal from petitioner to the Wyodak power plant for the use of both Black Hills Corporation and PacifiCorp for coal production years 1995, 1998 and 1999 as mine mouth sales under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-209(b) and its identical successor statute.
6. Whether the board erred in holding that the department may use an alternate valuation method under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-202(d) for production years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998 and 1999 when coal is specifically required to be valued under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-209 and its identical successor statute.
7. Whether the board erred in affirming or upholding the department’s valuation of coal sold by petitioner in nonarms-length sales to Black Hills Corporation’s plants other than the Wyodak power plant when the valuation was based upon the transfer price between related entities.
8. Whether the board erred in holding that the sale transactions used by petitioner’s coal valuation expert were not comparable contracts under Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-209(e).
Responsively, DOR frames the issues in the following manner:
1. Could Wyodak, which had previously appealed and fully litigated its 1992 coal valuation, raise new valuation issues concerning its 1992 production, or do the doctrines of res judicata, claim preclusion and waiver bar such new claims?
2. Was Wyodak, after it knowingly and intentionally did not timely appeal the Department’s notices of valuation as required by statute, permitted to challenge the Department’s valuation methodology through refund requests?
3. Under the facts of this case, was Wyodak permitted to value its non-arms-length coal sales to parent company Black Hills, using a spot market average price pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-209(e), and its identical reeodification, which required that comparable long-term or spot market sales of like quality, quantity, terms and conditions be used?
4. Did the Department properly value Wyodak’s coal sales to Pacificorp and parent company Black Hills for production years 1995, 1998 and 1999, as mine mouth sales pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-209(b) and its reeodification, Wyo. Stat. § 39-14-103(b)(v)?
5. In the event that no methodology pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-209, or its reeodification, Wyo. Stat. § 39-14-103, applies or renders a fair market valuation for taxation purposes, may the Department alternatively use recognized appraisal techniques pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-202(d), recodified as Wyo. Stat. § 39-14-102(c)?
6. Assuming a recognized appraisal technique could be used pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-202(d) and its reeodification, could the Department value Wyodak’s coal sales to parent Black Hills using Wyodak’s arms-length sales to Pacificorp, under the same contract, as a comparable to determine the revenue number, and then perform a proportionate profits calculation to derive taxable value?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Wyodak sells most of the coal it produces to the owners of the power plant located immediately adjacent to the mine. PacifiCorp owns eighty percent of the plant, and Black Hills — Wyodak’s parent company — owns twenty percent. In 1987, Wyodak entered into a coal supply agreement with the two companies which provided for the sale to them of all coal required to fuel the plant for twenty-six years in proportion to their respective interest in the plant. Pursuant to the applicable statutes and regulations, Wyodak filed annual reports of the value of the gross product it produced for use by DOR in determining the appropriate assessment for ad valorem tax and severance tax purposes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-107 (LexisNexis 2001). Until 1997, Wyodak filed its gross product reports using the contract price it received for the coal from PacifiCorp and Black Hills. From 1992 through 1995, that price ranged from $9.57 per ton to $10.33 per ton. Each year, DOR issued its Notice of Valuation (NOV), and Wyodak paid its taxes based upon those reported values.

[¶ 4] DOR conducted an audit of certain Wyodak annual production reports including those filed for the 1992 tax year. Upon receipt of DOR’s final determination and assessment, Wyodak filed an appeal with SBOE challenging DOR’s treatment of the costs to relocate a state highway as direct mining costs. SBOE affirmed DOR’s final determination, Wyodak appealed that decision to this court, and we also affirmed DOR’s actions. Wyodak Resources Development Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 9 P.3d 987 (Wyo.2000). During the appeal process, Wyodak did not raise any other issue concerning the propriety of its previously reported gross product values.

[¶ 5] Beginning in 1997, Wyodak changed its position regarding gross value. First, it filed an amended gross product report and a request for refund for production year 1992. Ultimately, it filed amended reports and refund requests for 1993 through 1995, 1998, and 1999 production, claiming a lower gross product value for each year based on its interpretation of § 39-14~103(b)(viii) that spot market prices must be utilized to determine the value of nonarms length sales. In addition, it requested a refund of the taxes it contended were overpaid. DOR refused to process the amended production report and refund request for 1992 concluding they represented an effort to reopen that tax year which had been audited, appealed, and affirmed by SBOE and Wyodak had waived its right to appeal and change the valuation methodology with regard to that year. DOR contended the doctrine of res judicata precluded such an effort. DOR likewise rejected the amended production reports and requests for refund filed for the years 1993 through 1995. For these years, DOR concluded the statutory requirement that valuations be appealed within thirty days precluded later refund requests which raised issues that could have been raised in an appeal. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39 — 14—209(b)(iv) (Lexis-Nexis 2001).

[¶ 6] DOR also rejected the spot market values Wyodak reported for 1998 and 1999 and instead issued NOYs which utilized the contract price. DOR took the position that spot market prices were not comparable to Wyodak’s contract and, therefore, § 39-14-103(b)(viii) did not apply. Instead, DOR contended the sale was at the mouth of the mine and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-103(b)(v) (Lex-isNexis 2001) applied or, in the alternative, it was entitled to utilize accepted appraisal techniques pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-102(c) (LexisNexis 2001) which included use of comparable sales to value non-arms length sales and the PacifiCorp sale at the contract price was the most comparable. Wyodak appealed the 1998 and 1999 NOYs as well as DOR’s refusal to process 1992 through 1995 amended production reports and requests for refund. SBOE consolidated all the appeals and held a three-day contested case hearing in January of 2001.

[¶ 7] At the hearing, in addition to contending § 39 — 14—103(b)(viii) was the exclusive method for valuing its coal production, Wyodak claimed the facts did not support a finding the sale occurred at the mouth of the mine. DOR contended a 1992 Coal Handling Facilities Agreement for the ownership and operation of certain coal handling and conveyance facilities which transported the coal from the north pit to the plant demonstrated the buyers took possession of, and responsibility for, the coal in the pit resulting in a sale at the mouth of the mine. Although the agreement located the transfer of title to the coal at the secondary crusher outside of the pit, it also provided Black Hills and Pacifi-Corp jointly assumed financial responsibility for all the costs associated with conveyance of the coal from the pit to the power plant. After execution of the Coal Handling Facilities Agreement, Wyodak and its parent company — Black Hills — entered into another agreement which purported to convey Black Hills’ interest in the coal conveyance facilities to Wyodak. Although the parties never signed this later agreement, an exchange of funds occurred between the two affiliated companies. On the basis of these facts, Wyo-dak argued the sale did not occur at the mouth of the mine and § 39-14-103(b)(v) could not apply.

[¶ 8] SBOE issued its decision on August 8, 2001, affirming DOR’s actions in all respects relevant to this appeal. Wyodak filed a petition for review of administrative action in the district court, and the district court certified the matter to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 9] This appeal raises fundamental issues regarding the appropriate construction of the ad valorem tax and severance tax statutes and is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in part:

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right[.]

When an administrative agency case is certified to this court under W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we review the decision under the appellate standards applicable to a reviewing court of the first instance. Amax Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825, 828 (Wyo.1991). The construction and interpretation of statutes are questions of law which we review de novo. Powder River Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2002); Osenbaugh v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 10 P.3d 544, 547 (Wyo.2000). We affirm an agency’s conclusions of law when they are in accordance with the law. Powder River Coal Company, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423. However, when the agency has failed to properly invoke and apply the correct rule of law, we correct the agency’s error. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. 1992 Production — Res Judicata

[¶ 10] DOR ai’gues Wyodak’s failure to raise the issue of the application of § 39-14-103(b)(viii) in its appeal of the final assessment of the 1992 production triggered the doctrine of res judicata and precluded Wyo-dak from again challenging the valuation for that production year in the form of an amended production report and refund request. In response, Wyodak contends no issue preclusion arose because this issue was not addressed in the audit. Wyodak hints in its brief that perhaps it might have even been unable to raise the issue of the use of spot market prices instead of contract price in the valuation of its 1992 coal production. It points to DOR’s final audit determination letter which stated, “Exceptions to this assessment may be instituted pursuant to Rules, Chapter 2, Section 5, Wyoming State Board of Equalization, by filing a written notice of appeal with the Board.” Apparently) Wyodak contends DOR’s use of the language “this assessment” somehow limited the scope of its right to appeal the final assessment to only those issues DOR addressed in the audit. However, no such limit appears in the language of the final assessment letter, the statute, or the applicable rules. Wyodak was not prevented from raising this issue on appeal from the final assessment simply because the issue of whether the contract price or spot market prices should have been utilized for valuing the coal production was not the focus of the audit. In fact, the issues on appeal were limited only by Wyodak’s choice.

[¶ 11] The doctrine of res judicata applies to final determinations from administrative proceedings. University of Wyoming v. Gressley, 978 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Wyo.1999); Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo.1993).

Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action. Four factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them.

Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001) (citation omitted). This doctrine furthers society’s interest in having disputes conclusively resolved in a single action and minimizing the expense and difficulties of piecemeal litigation. DLB v. DJB (Paternity of JRW), 814 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Wyo.1991).

[¶ 12] In addition to precluding issues previously raised and litigated from being the subject of later challenges, the doctrine precludes issues that could have been raised in the first action. Cermak v. Great West Casualty Company, 2 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Wyo.2000). We have explicitly stated that claim preclusion has “the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated because of a determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit.” Id. at 1053. A full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue is all that is required for the doctrine to apply. Bender v. Uinta County Assessor, 14 P.3d 906, 910 (Wyo.2000); Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo.1999).

[¶ 13] Wyodak had the right to challenge the 1992 valuation and assessment and exercised that right by appealing the final assessment through the administrative process and, ultimately, to this court. Wyo-dak Resources Development Corp., 9 P.3d 987. We affirmed Wyodak’s 1992 valuation as determined by DOR and confirmed by SBOE and found they had correctly considered the claims raised by Wyodak “in determining the taxable value of the coal production from this mine.” Id. at 992. After the 1992 valuation and assessment were final, audited, appealed, and affirmed by SBOE and this court, the taxpayer now asks us to consider yet another, albeit different, objection it has to that assessment. We conclude the doctrine of res judicata prevents that effort. To permit Wyodak to reopen the 1992 assessment and corresponding tax liability would undermine the finality critical to a sound tax system and subject the agency and the courts to endless litigation. This we cannot condone. The process provided this taxpayer with ample opportunity to challenge the agency’s determination of the value of its coal production, and DOR was not required to allow the taxpayer to mount yet another challenge to that value.

B. Refund Requests for Production Years 1993 through 1995

[¶ 14] The 1993 through 1995 NOVs notified Wyodak of the thirty-day time limit to object and appeal final valuations to SBOE. The appeal period to which DOR was referring is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-109(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides in pertinent part:

(i) Following determination of the fair market value of property the department shall notify the taxpayer by mail of the assessed value. The person assessed may file written objections to the assessment with the board within thirty (30) days of the date of postmark and appear before the board at a time specified by the board.

Wyodak chose not to appeal those valuations and assessments despite DOR’s acceptance of its reported gross product value which was the contract price of the coal sold to its parent company. Instead, in 1998, Wyodak filed amended gross product reports for both ad valorem taxes and severance taxes for production years 1993 through 1995 claiming § 39 — 14—103(b)(viii) required the gross product value be determined by spot market prices. It also requested a refund of taxes paid on the higher value originally reported pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-109(c) (LexisNexis 2001). Again, DOR refused to accept Wyodak’s amended production reports which claimed different values for ad valo-rem taxes and severance taxes contending they were “simply a device for appealing the original notices of valuation for the 1993-1995 production periods after the appeal periods had lapsed.”

[¶ 15] To resolve whether that appeal deadline precluded Wyodak’s requests for refund of either ad valorem taxes or severance taxes, we must examine the statutes governing those refunds and determine how they interrelate to the remedy provided by the appeal provision. The statutes provide different refund procedures for ad valorem taxes and severance taxes on coal production. Section 39 — 14—109(c)(i) states in pertinent part: “If any person pays any tax, or portion thereof, found to have been erroneous or illegal, the board of county commissioners shall direct the county treasurer to refund the erroneous or illegal payment to the taxpayer.” Although not stated directly, because this provision pertains to counties and counties are responsible for collecting ad va-lorem taxes, we can assume this provision applies to ad valorem, and not severance, taxes. No time limit is provided for refund requests for ad valorem taxes under this provision. However, the tax must have been found to be “erroneous or illegal” before a county is required to pay a refund.

[¶ 16] A second provision governs refund of severance taxes. Section 39 — 14—109(c)(ii) provides refund of taxes “imposed by this article” may be requested whenever a taxpayer has reason to believe those taxes were overpaid. “[T]his article” refers to Article 1, “Coal,” of Chapter 14, “Mine Product Taxes.” The only tax imposed by this article is severance tax on the value of the gross product for the privilege of severing or extracting coal in the state. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-103(a) (LexisNexis 2001). The statute specifies a severance tax refund request must be filed within five years after the end of the calendar year in which the claimed overpayment was made. Section 39 — 14—109(c)(ii). Wyo-dak’s amended production reports suggested different gross product values for both ad valorem taxes and severance taxes. The refund requests filed with DOR were specifically for severance taxes which were paid directly to the state. It is unclear whether those refund requests were also intended for ad valorem taxes collected by the county. However, if DOR had accepted the amended production reports, the new valuations would have been certified to the county, and § 39-14-109(e)(i) would have mandated the county refund the overpayment as an “erroneous” tax. Consequently, the refund provisions for both taxes are implicated in this appeal.

[¶ 17] DOR rejected Wyodak’s amended production reports and refund requests without determining whether the taxes were erroneous or illegal or whether overpayments were made. Instead, DOR concluded, when a taxpayer is aware of possible objections at the time it receives a final NOV, it must appeal that valuation within the thirty-day appeal period and cannot file amended production reports and refund requests at a later date. DOR contends Wyodak was fully aware of the statute concerning the valuation of coal in nonarms length sales and could have made its argument at the time of the final NOVs. DOR argues, if amended production reports and refund requests can be filed after the thirty-day appeal period even when the taxpayer is aware of the possibility of a “mistake,” the time limitation is rendered meaningless and valuations will have no finality. In response, Wyodak claims the procedures for appeals of valuations and requests for refund represent separate and distinct remedies.

[¶ 18] In the conduct of statutory interpretation, we begin by inquiring into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in which those words are arranged. If more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we resort to general principles of statutory construction. When the legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, however, we are bound to the results so expressed. State by and through Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶7, 18 P.3d 1182, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 19] We have also observed:

It is the court’s obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the legislative product; in construing statutes, intention of the law-making body must be ascertained from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. A statute must not be given a meaning which would nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.

Hasser v. Flint Engineering, 647 P.2d 66, 69-70 (Wyo.1982). Likewise, we will not construe a statute in a way that renders a portion of it meaningless. Foster v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo.2000); US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 989 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Wyo.1999). With these precepts firmly in mind, we consider the proper meaning of the statutes in question in the context of the entire tax system as established by the constitution and the tax code as a whole.

[¶ 20] On several occasions, this court has agreed with the proposition as stated by Wyodak that appeals and refund requests are different remedies and both are available to taxpayers. Amax Coal West, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1329 (Wyo.1995); Amoco Production Company v. Board of Commissioners of Carbon County, 876 P.2d 989 (Wyo.1994); Atlantic Richfield Company v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Sweetwater, 569 P.2d 1267 (Wyo.1977). In Amax Coal West, the court found, pursuant to earlier versions of the statute, that, since Amax had neither appealed the valuation for ad valorem taxes nor “applied for a refund of any excess taxes it had paid pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-304(g) (1985) (repealed 1988),” it waived its right to later contest the tax. 896 P.2d at 1332-33. A strong inference can be drawn from the court’s language that the right to apply for a refund of ad valorem taxes exists separately from the right to appeal the valuation within thirty days. Likewise, in Atlantic Richfield Company, we concluded the refund process for erroneous or illegal ad valorem taxes does not require the taxpayer to file an appeal within thirty days of the valuation determination. In that case, the valuation was decreased as a result of a federal court ruling, issued after the taxpayer had filed its production report, which increased the required federal royalty. The facts in Amoco Production Company are more closely analogous to this case, and, therein, we held an appeal within thirty days of the valuation determination was not required before a taxpayer could file amended production reports and an ad valorem tax refund request. In 1985, Amoco discovered mistakes in its production reports as a result of an internal audit and filed amended reports for production years 1980 through 1984. 876 P.2d at 991. This court held the refund statute for ad valorem taxes was available for “erroneous” as well as “illegal” taxes when the taxpayer discovered mistakes in the gross product reports after the thirty-day appeal period had expired. Further, we made it clear, if the state accepted the amended production reports and adjusted the valuations, the taxes, paid on the original valuations were “erroneous.” Id. at 995. We recognized “[m]any valid reasons exist for a taxpayer to amend its report subsequent to the thirty day period. Examples of those grounds called to our attention included adjustment of interest owners’ values and volumes.” Id. at 994. Our opinion did not disclose the reasons for Amo-eo’s mistake or whether it could have, with due diligence, discovered the mistake earlier. Although certain dicta in the opinion speculated the legislature may have provided for refunds to afford relief to taxpayers who do not know of mistakes at the time of the filing, the holding provided no appeal within thirty days was required before amended production reports could be filed and a refund of ad valorem taxes could be requested. Id.

[¶ 21] No case has directly addressed whether amended production reports and refund requests can be filed after the thirty-day appeal period in cases where the taxpayer was, or arguably should have been, aware of the basis for the refund request at the time of the final valuation. DOR contends the primary reason the Amoco Production Company court concluded ad valorem tax refund requests should be allowed after the thirty-day appeal period was to provide relief for the taxpayer who might not have been aware of the erroneous nature of a tax until sometime after the tax was paid. Armed with this rationalization, DOR argues Wyo-dak was capable of urging its interpretation of § 39 — 14—103(b) (viii) since the adoption of its substance in 1990. No one disputes Wyo-dak was charged with knowledge of the statute at the time of its passage. Further, DOR witnesses testified Wyodak representatives contacted them on numerous occasions to discuss the possible applicability of the statute and were informed DOR did not agree the statute applied in Wyodak’s situation. The record discloses Wyodak chose not to argue the point for its own business and strategic reasons until 1997 when it began to file amended production reports and requests for refund.

[¶ 22] Even accepting these facts as true, we fail to see how these circumstances prevented Wyodak from taking advantage of remedies the legislature provided to “any person” who filed within five years of the alleged overpayment or paid a tax determined to be erroneous. This conclusion is consistent with this court’s statement in Amoco Production Company regarding the ad valorem tax refunds that “ ‘the legislature has determined ... the taxpayer is entitled to a remedy — a remedy which will recover for the taxpayer those taxes which were not justly or equitably due from him and — at the same time — will avoid an unjust enrichment of the particular taxing entity.’ ” 876 P.2d at 994 (quoting Atlantic Richfield Company, 569 P.2d at 1273).

[¶23] We are not inclined to judicially impose a due diligence standard upon taxpayers which would mandate they appeal every valuation in order to preserve a future argument concerning the legality of an assessment. To reach that conclusion, we would have to read language into the statute that is not there. Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo.1976). Had the legislature intended such a limitation on the right to request a tax refund, it would have said so. Instead, the legislature chose to mandate a refund of ad valorem taxes whenever a tax is deemed erroneous or illegal and to impose a five-year statute of limitation on refund requests for overpayment of severance taxes.

[¶ 24] Our hesitancy to judicially impose a condition precedent to the right of a refund of either erroneous ad valorem taxes or the overpayment of severance taxes is enhanced when we review the legislative history of the applicable provisions and see how often the legislature has considered this issue and, ultimately, declined to impose a statute of limitation on requests for refund of ad valorem taxes, imposed a clear statute of limitation on application for refund of severance taxes, and made no mention whatsoever of the need to file an appeal of the valuation before such refund can be requested. With regard to ad valorem tax refunds, the two applicable statutory provisions have existed since before statehood: § 39-14-109(c)(i), which directs the county to refund any erroneous tax without a statute of limitation; and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-109(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides an action may be filed in district court within one year after the assessment to enjoin an erroneous tax. The substance of § 39-14-109(c)(i), enacted in 1876, was originally found in a chapter entitled “Territorial and County Revenue,” and the substance of § 39-13-109(c)(i), enacted in 1886, was originally located in the “Code of Civil Procedure.” No severance tax existed when these original versions were enacted, and both sections have since found their way into tax code statutes pertaining to ad valo-rem taxes. The Atlantic Richfield Company court found these two sections were neither mutually exclusive nor conflicting and the first offered an administrative remedy with no statute of limitation and the second afforded a distinct judicial remedy with a one-year limitation.

[¶ 25] Severance taxes were first adopted in 1969. 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193. In that same year, the legislature enacted the substance of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-304(g) (Michie 1985) (repealed 1988) and mandated any excess tax found to be erroneous, the result of an overpayment, or the result of an appeal be refunded so long as application for such refund was made within two years from payment. Although this provision appears in the severance tax section, on its face, it applies to any tax. In a case involving a severance tax refund request, we held this two-year statute of limitation was an absolute bar to later requests for refund irrespective of whether the taxpayer knew about the erroneous tax at the time of the assessment. Amoco Production Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 797 P.2d 552, 555 (Wyo.1990). We noted that the alleged difficulty taxpayers might have complying with such a time limit was a matter for the legislature. Id. Two other cases that followed, Enron Oil & Gas Company v. Freudenthal, 861 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Wyo.1993), and CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue, 880 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo.1994), were decided consistently with Amoco Production Company, 797 P.2d 552, and concluded § 39-6-304(g) was a statute of repose intended to place the burden of timely filing on the taxpayer. We find it significant the legislature repealed § 39-6-304(g) in 1988 and, at the same time, adopted the substance of § 39 — 14—109(c)(ii) which extended the time for filing refund requests from two years to five years but applied that requirement to only severance taxes. The legislature did not impose a specific time limit on refund requests for ad valorem taxes.

[¶ 26] Despite the numerous revisions and recodifications of the tax code since the first refund provision was adopted in 1876 and this court’s decisions indicating the separate and distinct nature of the appeal and refund remedies, the legislature has not chosen to impose an obligation of due diligence on the taxpayer as a condition precedent to the filing of a refund request. Nor has the legislature imposed a statute of limitation on requests for refund of erroneous or illegal ad valorem taxes. To impose such limitations on the remedies provided by the legislature to taxpayers in light of this legislative history would constitute an improper exercise of judicial power. “[T]he enactment of tax measures is exclusively within the providence of the legislature.” Wyoming State Tax Commission v. BHP Petroleum Company Inc., 856 P.2d 428, 439 (Wyo.1993); see also Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 35. In the same vein, the following description is as apt today as it was in 1929:

“The courts can not venture upon the dangerous path of judicial legislation to supply omissions, or remedy defects in matters committed to a co-ordinate branch of the government. It is far better to wait for necessary corrections by those authorized to make them, or, in fact, for them to remain unmade, however desirable they may be, than for judicial tribunals to transcend the just limits of their constitutional powers.”

Midwest Hotel Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 39 Wyo. 461, 273 P. 696, 699 (1929) (quoting State ex rel. Crow v. West Side Street Railway Company, 146 Mo. 155, 47 S.W. 959, 961 (1898)).

[¶ 27] In addition to suggesting an interpretation of the statutes which would prohibit amended production reports and refund requests after the time limit for appeals, DOR argues we should reach the same result on the basis of the doctrine of laches. SBOE agreed and affirmed DOR’s refusal to consider the amended production reports and refund requests relying, in part, on laches. That doctrine requires findings of (1) inexcusable delay and (2) injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the party claiming laches. Thompson v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 278, ¶ 17 (Wyo.2001). Neither DOR nor SBOE made such findings and, we believe, could not do so under these facts. Certainly, the “delay” cannot be considered inexcusable when the taxpayer complies with the statute of limitation provided by the legislature. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“When a limitation on the period for bringing suit has been set by statute, laches will generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period”); Morad v. Brown, 549 P.2d 312, 317 (Wyo.1976); Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1953). Likewise, no prejudice can be inferred when the legislative process is followed.

[¶ 28] As we interpret statutes, we must read them in context and harmonize them in a sensible fashion. Wyoming Community College Commission v. Casper Community College District, State of Wyoming, 2001 WY 86, ¶ 22, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶ 22 (Wyo.2001). When we do so in this situation, we can reach only one conclusion: The right to request a refund of severance taxes existed for five years after the calendar year in which the overpayment of tax was made, and no limitation existed for a refund request for ad valorem taxes; however, a refund could be granted only when there was a determination such tax was erroneous or illegal.

[¶ 29] We are not concluding Wyodak was entitled to the refund requested herein. No such entitlement would arise unless and until DOR concluded the previous valuations were erroneous or an overpayment occurred. Our holding is limited to whether Wyodak has a right to have its amended production reports considered at all. DOR conceded Wyodak’s severance tax refund requests for the years 1993 through 1995 were timely and properly filed. The decision to refuse to accept and process the amended production reports was improper and beyond DOR’s statutory authority.

“An administrative agency is limited in authority to powers legislatively delegated. ‘Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and their power is dependent upon statutes, so that they must find within the statute warrant for the exercise of any authority which they claim.’ ” Amoco Production Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 12 P.3d 668, 673 (Wyo.2000) (citations omitted). “An agency is wholly without power to modify, dilute or change in any way the statutory provisions from which it derives its authority.” Platte Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo.1998).

Billings v. Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Guides, 2001 WY 81, ¶ 24, 30 P.3d 557, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001); see also Lineberger v. Wyoming State Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 2002 WY 55, ¶ 20, 44 P.3d 56, ¶ 20 (Wyo.2002).

C. Valuation of Coal Sold by Wyodak to Its Parent Company

[¶ 30] Now we turn to the fundamental issue in this case: What valuation method do the statutes provide for the coal Wyodak sold to its parent company? Historically, Wyodak reported its gross product value using the price per ton for which it sold its coal to its parent company and an arms length customer — PacifiCorp—pursuant to a single, long term contract. ■ In 1990, the legislature enacted the substance of § 39-14-103(b)(viii), which provides:

(viii) For coal used without sale, or coal not sold pursuant to a bona fide arms-length agreement, the sales value for the purposes of paragraph (vii) of this subsection shall be the fair market value of coal which is comparable in the quality, quantity, terms and conditions under which the coal is being used or sold, both in the spot market and through long-term agreements negotiated within the previous twelve (12) months, multiplied by the respective number of tons used or sold for each reporting period[.]

[¶ 31] Wyodak argues the sale to its parent company — Black Hills — of twenty percent of the coal produced was not arms length and, therefore, this statute applied to that sale exclusive of other valuation methods provided in the statutes. However, Wyodak ignores the fact that the remaining eighty percent of the coal was sold under the same contract and at the same price in an arms length transaction. In adopting this statute, the legislature likely did not consider this unique situation in which both arms length and nonarms length sales occurred under the same contract, making application of the statute difficult at best.

[¶ 32] Wyodak’s inability to identify another similar long term contract negotiated in the twelve months previous to the filing of the respective production reports presents an additional problem with applying this provision. Unable to identify a similar long term contract, Wyodak argues spot market prices for coal sold in the Powder River Basin must be used to determine the fair market value of its coal sold to Black Hills. DOR determined spot sales were not “comparable in the ... terms and conditions under which the coal is being used or sold.” Instead, DOR contended other statutory provisions applied which required the higher contract price be used as the basis for the value of Wyodak’s coal sales to its parent company.

[¶ 33] To properly interpret the various statutes applicable to coal valuation, we must first review their fundamental objective. The Wyoming Constitution requires the gross product of mines be taxed in proportion to the value thereof and uniformly valued for tax purposes at full value as defined by the legislature. Wyo. Const, art. 15, §§ 3, 11. The legislature defined “value of the gross product” as the fair market value less deductions and exemptions, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-101(a)(xv) (LexisNexis 2001), and “fair market value” as “the amount ... a well informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well informed seller is justified in accepting, assuming neither party to the transaction is acting under undue compulsion.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39 — 11—101(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2001). With regard to the valuation of coal, the value of the gross product is the fair market value of the product at the mouth of the mine where produced, after the mining or production process is completed, and mining or production is deemed completed when the mineral product reaches the mouth of the mine. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-103(b) (LexisNexis 2001). The “mouth of the mine” for a surface mine, such as Wyo-dak’s, is further defined as “the top of the ramp where the road or conveying system leaves the pit.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-101(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2001). All these provisions read together provide the context within which the specific valuation methods contained in § 39 — 14—103(b) must be interpreted. While the valuation statutes may not result in seamless coverage of all possible mining situations, we conclude the legislature intended for those statutes to be interpreted so that mineral production would be valued at its full fair market value. Wyodak’s contention that § 39-14-103(b)(viii) allowed coal sold to its parent company pursuant to a long term agreement to be valued on the basis of spot market prices is inconsistent with this conclusion.

[¶ 34] When coal sales are not arms length transactions, such as the sales by Wyodak to Black Hills, the potential exists that the sales price may not reflect the fair market value. Typically, one would presume the nonarms length sale price would tend to be lower and thereby more favorable to the preferred customer, such as a parent company, than the actual fair market value. If such an artificially low price were utilized for purposes of taxation, the result would be a lower tax for operators selling to affiliated companies than that paid by other operators. That lack of uniformity would be unacceptable because “[t]he Wyoming Constitution mandates that all coal mines shall be taxed uniformly on the value of their gross product.” Amax Coal West, Inc., 896 P.2d at 1332. It is not surprising then that the legislature deemed it important to provide a method for assuring coal sold in nonarms length sales is valued at its full fair market value as if the sale were arms length. We perceive this to be the purpose of § 39-14-103(b)(viii). Using the fair market value of other arms length transactions to establish the value of the nonarms length sale in question assures the full market value is subject to tax. However, the statute requires those other sales to be of coal “which is comparable in the quality, quantity, terms and conditions under which the coal is being used or sold” and allows both the spot market and long term agreements negotiated within the previous twelve months to be utilized. Section 39-14-103(b)(viii). For this valuation method to be employed, comparable coal sales must first be identified, and those sales must be similar in terms and conditions to the nonarms length sale before they can be utilized to establish the value.

[¶ 35] As fundamental “terms,” the lengths of the contracts must be comparable before § 39 — 14—103(b)(viii) can apply. It is well accepted that the price of coal sold under long term agreements is based upon different market considerations than the price of coal sold in the spot market. In fact, Wyodak’s expert witness testified to the difference between spot sales and long term agreements and concluded that, if long term agreements reflected current market conditions, it would be accidental. Long term contracts provide security of supply at a stable price. That price is dependent on the market conditions in existence at the time the contract is negotiated and the length of the contract term. Both the buyer and the seller assume certain market risks that are not present in the spot market which can respond immediately to changes in market conditions. Comparing spot market prices to long term prices is indisputably comparing apples to oranges, and we do not believe that is what the legislature intended. Instead, we believe it intended comparable spot sales be used to establish the value of nonarms length spot sales and comparable, long term agreements negotiated within the previous twelve months, if any can be identified, be used to establish the value of nonarms length, long term sales.

[¶ 36] In this ease, Wyodak was unable to identify any similar long term contracts negotiated during the prior twelve months and, therefore, claimed spot market prices must be utilized. Under its interpretation, we would have to ignore the statute’s requirement that the terms be “comparable,” which we cannot do. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County v. Dunnegan, 884 P.2d 35, 40 (Wyo.1994); Enron Oil & Gas Company, 861 P.2d at 1093.

[¶37] The record discloses other differences in “conditions under which the coal is being used or sold” between Wyodak’s sales and spot sales. Coal sold by Wyodak was consumed by the adjacent plant and did not require the rail transportation needed for other spot sales from the Powder River Basin. That fact could affect the price a willing buyer would agree to pay a willing seller for the coal. In addition, the coal supply agreement between Wyodak and its parent company required that specific coal reserves be committed to the buyers for twenty-six years. This fact could also affect the price upon which a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree.

[¶ 38] A final reason why applying this provision to Wyodak’s circumstances was not likely what the legislature intended is the cost of mining the coal exceeded the spot market price upon which Wyodak relied. It is difficult to conceive the legislature intended for a ton of coal sold under a nonarms length agreement to be taxed at a value less than the cost incurred to mine the same ton of coal. Hillard v. Big Horn Coal Company, 549 P.2d 293, 302 (Wyo.1976).

[¶39] Wyodak contends § 39-14-103(b)(viii) applied to its situation because no other statutory method did. DOR responds that there were two other applicable statutory provisions— § 39-14-103(b)(v), which applied to coal sold at the mouth of the mine; and § 39-14-102(c), which allowed use of “recognized appraisal techniques” to value coal not sold at the mouth of the mine in an arms length sale and for which no other provision was applicable.

[¶ 40] The mine mouth statute provides: “In the event the product as defined in paragraph (iii) of this subsection is sold at the mouth of the mine without further movement or processing, the fair market value shall be the price established by bona fide arms-length sale less exempt royalties.” Section 39-14-103(b)(v). DOR contends Wyodak’s coal was sold to its parent company at the mouth of the mine and the bona fide arms length sale to PacifiCorp should have been utilized to determine the fair market value of Wyodak’s production. However, Wyodak contends this section did not apply because the coal was not sold at the mouth of the mine. The parties disagree over how the location of the point of sale should have been determined. DOR contends the point at which possession of, and responsibility for, the coal was transferred constituted the point of sale. In response, Wyodak argues the point of sale was where title transferred. The April 1, 1992, Coal Handling Facilities Agreement between Wyodak and its buyers — PacifiCorp and Black Hills — provided title transferred at the secondary crusher 1,670 feet from the mouth of the mine. Wyo-dak argues this fact caused the “sale” to occur at that point and not at the mouth of the mine. However, DOR points to the fact that the same agreement provided Paeifi-Corp (80%) and Black Hills (20%) owned and operated the coal handling facilities which transported the coal from the pit to the plant. Since the buyers assumed possession of, and responsibility for, the coal in the pit, DOR concluded the coal was in fact “sold” at the mouth of the mine. Wyodak references the later December 31, 1993, Agreement for the Sale of Certain Coal Handling Facilities, which provided Wyodak would purchase Black Hill’s interest in the conveyance facilities and be responsible for transporting the coal away from the mouth of the mine. This nonarms length agreement was never signed, and the actual financial impact on the parties is unclear. Irrespective of these concerns, Wyodak contends it became responsible for delivering Black Hill’s portion of the coal outside of the pit which prevented the sale of that coal from occurring at the mouth of the mine. Without question, PacifiCorp continued to take possession of the coal in the pit and assumed all responsibility for the coal from that point. The statute provides, “In the event the product ... is sold at the mouth of the mine,” bona fide sales can be utilized to determine value. Section 39-14-103(b)(v) (emphasis added). DOR argued, and SBOE agreed, that, because eighty percent of the “product” was sold at the mouth of the mine, coal sales to both PacifiCorp and Black Hills should be considered mine mouth sales.

[¶ 41] We question whether Black Hill’s nonarms length attempt to transfer financial responsibility for the coal conveyance facilities to its subsidiary should be considered determinative of the value of the coal. State v. Davis Oil Company, 728 P.2d 1107 (Wyo.1986). However, for two reasons, we do not perceive the significance of that issue to be as great as the parties apparently do. First, the primary thrust of the statutory distinction between mine mouth sales and sales away from the mouth of the mine appears to be to insure transportation costs are not considered part of the value of the gross product and not to be to determine how to value nonarms length sales that may occur away from the mouth of the mine. Section 39-14-103(b). Neither Wyodak nor DOR argues that Wyodak’s contract price included transportation charges. Second, the legislature, in its wisdom, provided § 39-14-102(c) as a catch-all valuation method for situations which do not fit within the other specific valuation provisions. That section provides:

(c) Except as otherwise provided, in the event the product as defined in W.S. 39-14 — 103(b)(iii) is not sold at the mouth of the mine by bona fide arms-length sale, or if the product of the mine is used without sale, the department shall determine the fair market value by application of recog•nized appraisal techniques.

Section 39-14-102(c). Wyodak claims this section is limited by the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” and § 39-14-103(b)(viii) otherwise provides. As noted above, we disagree that § 39-14-103(b)(viii) applies where no contracts are identified with comparable terms. The application of “recognized appraisal techniques” includes the use of comparable sales or other bona fide arms length sales. Amoco Production Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 899 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo.1995); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13 — 103(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001); Department of Revenue Rules ch. 6, §§ 4(n), 10. Consequently, whether § 39-14-103(b)(v) or § 39-14-102(c) applied, the statutes allowed the contract price paid by PacifiCorp, a comparable sale, to be utilized to determine value in this circumstance.

[¶ 42] This conclusion is unavoidable given the constitutional and statutory construct governing mineral taxation which mandates uniform taxation of the gross product at the full fair market value. Underlying all the issues in this dispute was the sale of the same coal to PacifiCorp under the same contract and circumstances, which no one disputes should be valued at the price paid pursuant to the long term coal supply agreement. In this case, we are not faced with the possibility the nonarms length sale has resulted in a price below fair market value. Instead, Wyodak’s argument suggests the contract price was above the fair market value, and yet it was the same price Pacifi-Corp agreed to pay for the same coal in an unquestionably arms length agreement.

[¶ 43] We agree with DOR that the proper valuation of Wyodak’s gross product was the price it actually received. We affirm SBOE’s order upholding DOR’s decision to “use the arms-length PacifiCorp coal price as a comparable ... to arrive at a fair market taxable value for Wyodak’s non-arm’s-length sales to Black Hills” and hold Wyodak’s amended production reports and requests for refund for production years 1993 through 1995 should have been rejected on their merits.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 44] We affirm DOR and SBOE’s conclusion that the doctrine of res judicata barred Wyodak’s amended report and refund request for production year 1992. However, for production years 1993 through 1995, we reverse DOR’s refusal to accept the amended reports and refund requests and SBOE’s approval of that decision simply because Wyo-dak did not file appeals within thirty days after receipt of the notices of the final valuations for those years. We find no such condition precedent to refund requests in the statutes. Finally, we affirm DOR and SBOE’s conclusions that § 39 — 14—103(b)(viii) did not apply in Wyodak’s circumstance and § 39-14-102(c) allowed use of the sale to Pacifi-Corp as a comparable sale to establish the fair market value of coal sold to Wyodak’s parent company.

[¶ 45] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      . The legislature recodified Title 39 effective March 6, 1998, without making substantive changes. 1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 5. We will cite to the current, recodified statutes.

      . "Spot Market” or “spot sales” refers to coal sold under contracts of less than one year in duration. See Instructions to Complete Form 8101 MTD (Rev. Jan. 1999), Annual Gross Products Report for Coal, line lb.

      . SBOE reversed DOR's decision to add on fees of $.31 per ton to Wyodak’s value for 1993 through 1995 production and remanded the matter for recalculation. Wyodak did not appeal this aspect of SBOE's decision.

      . Although the record is somewhat confusing, it appears both ad valorem taxes and severance taxes were placed at issue by Wyodak’s amended reports and refund requests. In SBOE 99-158, Wyodak appealed DOR's refusal to process its amended reports for 1992 through 1995. Each amended report for those years provided "new” computations using the spot market price for both severance lax and "gross products tax.” Gross products tax is the same as ad valorem tax as we noted in Wexpro Company v. Brimhall, 7 P.3d 42, 43 (Wyo.2000). In SBOE 99-90, Wyo-dak appealed DOR's final audit letter "for severance and ad valorem taxes for production years 1993-1995." In SBOE 99-70 (1998 production) and SBOE 2000-99 (1999 production), Wyodak appealed the NOVs for the 1998 and 1999 gross product reports which were utilized for both severance tax and ad valorem tax purposes.

      . The statute does discuss the situation where an increase in value that is subject to approval by an agency of the federal or state government is ultimately disapproved and taxes are paid on the increased amount. Under this statute, any person who paid taxes on that increased amount may apply for a refund within one year of the final determination of value, and the board of county commissioners must refund the amount of the excess tax paid. Section 39 — 14—109(c)(i). That situation is not applicable in this case.

      . Similarly, Wyodak sought to file amendments in 1997 for its 1992 through 1995 production.

      . Previously Wyo. Stat. § 39-116 (1957) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(b) (Michie 1997) (repealed 1998).

      . Previously Wyo. Stat. § 39-157 (1957) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-203 (Michie 1997) (repealed 1998).

      ."Overpayment” was added by amendment in 1980. 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 17, § 1.

      . In 1991, the legislature imposed a time limit on audits by the state to five years back in time and provided an offsetting credit for any overpaid gross product or severance tax within the scope of the audit. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-14-108(b)(vii), —109(d)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001).

      . While Wyodak's expert testified the spot market prices he relied upon were adjusted to deduct the cost of transportation to the more distant buyers, he did not address questions raised concerning the possibility that a seller might be able to obtain a higher price if its buyer has little or no transportation cost.