author: LEHMAN, Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 25
    Rudy HERRERA, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Rudy Herrera, Appellant (Defendant), v. The State of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    Nos. 00-290, 01-220.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 27, 2003.

      Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant.
    Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Ap-pellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference.

   LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶ 1] This is an appeal from the judgment finding appellant Rudy Herrera (Herrera) guilty of kidnapping and its related sentence. Herrera also appeals from the order denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and remand,

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Herrera sets forth the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, both prior and subsequent to sentencing?
II. Did the State breach the plea agreement?
III. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct?
IV. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to attend the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea in person?

Appellee State of Wyoming (State) essentially agrees with these issues as stated.

FACTS

[¶3] Herrera was initially charged with one count of first degree sexual assault and one count of “aggravated” kidnapping. Herrera pled not guilty to both charges and was released on bond pending trial. Herrera was later taken into custody concerning an alleged assault and robbery incident and issues regarding violation of conditions of his bond. Thereafter, Herrera’s counsel and the prosecutor reached a negotiated plea agreement. The terms of this plea agreement required the State to dismiss the first degree sexual assault charge and reduce the “aggravated” kidnapping charge to “simple” kidnapping, thereby reducing the possible sentence length. The prosecutor also agreed to recommend both a minimum sentence term of five years and a referral to the youth offender program, commonly referred to as boot camp.

[¶ 4] On May 12, 2000, Herrera, his counsel, and the prosecutor appeared for a bond revocation hearing and re-arraignment proceeding. At this time, the district court was made aware of the plea agreement. The district court advised Herrera that it would “seriously consider the arrangements made between counsel” but would not be bound by them. However, the district court did not specifically advise Herrera that he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if the district court ultimately rejected the recommendation agreed upon with respect to boot camp as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2). Herrera then pled guilty to the sole remaining amended count of kidnapping.

[¶ 6] After a pre-sentence investigation was completed, a sentencing hearing was held on August 4, 2000. At first, the district court assumed that the pre-sentence investigation stated Herrera had committed new offenses since his change of plea. However, this was not the case. The prosecutor explained to the district court that the State was fully aware of and had considered Herrera’s alleged new offenses before the negotiated plea agreement had been reached and Herrera changed his plea. Critically, however, when asked by the district court to comment on Herrera’s sentence, the prosecutor stated as follows:

Just briefly, Your Honor.
As we’ve already outlined for the Court, there was a plea agreement in this matter, and I just wanted to point out that the factors that always go into an agreement like that include — but probably the only thing Mr. Herrera has going for him right now, and that is the fact he is a very young age, and that still then demands a recommendation for boot camp.
I do that with reluctance, however, only trying to abide by the plea agreement so that we don Y have to make this into a further legal technicality argument as to whether or not his actions since that agreement were made allow me to change that position.
I would urge the Court to at least give [Mr. Herrera] a very long sentence, especially the top number so that he can be monitored, and so that if he does not make it through boot camp and/or the probation following that, we can have some time to make sure he is held accountable.
It is very disturbing to the State as it was to the presentence report writer that Mr. Herrera entered this agreement, came in, pled guilty, essentially accepting responsibility for his actions, and then told the presentence report writer that it was all a big lie, that [the alleged victim] made it all up, and that her mother put her up to it.
The State finds that extremely offensive, and a very serious indication Mr. Herrera is not accepting any responsibility at all, and that he will not successfully complete any sentence that this Court gives him.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 6] Following this statement, Herrera’s counsel made an oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on the prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement. In particular, counsel for Herrera objected to the prosecutor only “reluctantly” recommending boot camp. Counsel argued such comments implied to the district court that, while the State technically recommended boot camp, it really did not want the district court to follow through with this recommendation. Defense counsel further asserted that by taking these actions the prosecutor had, in essence, breached the negotiated settlement agreement. Defense counsel also clarified that Herrera was before the district court to be sentenced solely on the kidnapping charge; therefore, it was improper for the prosecutor to infer that Herrera was to be sentenced on any related sexual assault. This oral motion was summarily denied by the district court, and the district court proceeded to sentence Herrera to a term of six to nine years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.

[¶ 7] Herrera appeals the judgment and sentence. Additionally, Herrera filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea. After a hearing, the district court issued a decision letter and order denying the post-sentence motion. Herrera also appeals that order. These appeals were thereafter consolidated by this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] When a plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the State, that promise must be fulfilled. Whether the prosecutor has violated the plea agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo. Clingman v. State, 2001 WY 46, ¶ 4, 23 P.3d 27, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2001) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)); Clouse v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 795 (Wyo.1991); and United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th Cir.1995). See also Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, ¶ 32 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 9] The standard for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to sentencing is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). “If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty ... is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.” Similarly, the standard for withdrawing a plea of guilty after sentencing is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). In such a situation, a guilty plea may be set aside “only to correct manifest injustice.”

[¶ 10] Decisions concerning whether a trial court properly denied a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, either pre-sentence or post-sentence, are determined under an abuse of discretion standard of review. In deciding whether or not a trial court abused its discretion, this court must “determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.” Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 46 P.3d 309, ¶ 44 (Wyo.2002) (citing Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 (Wyo.2000) and Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo.1998)).

DISCUSSION

Refusal to Allow Withdrawal of Guilty Plea

[¶ 11] Herrera argues the district court erred when it denied his motions for withdrawal of guilty plea. Initially, Herrera asserts that a fair and just reason existed for allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea pri- or to sentencing because the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by only “reluctantly” recommending boot camp. According to Herrera, the prosecutor clearly advised the district court, with the intent to sabotage Herrera’s chances of obtaining a sentence at boot camp, that she did not think Herrera was an appropriate candidate for boot camp and that she did not think Herrera would complete boot camp. We agree.

[¶ 12] In determining whether a breach has occurred, we: (1) examine the nature of the promise, and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered. Principles of general contract law guide our analysis of the government’s obligation under the agreement. It follows that, as in contract, a party should not be released from its obligations under a plea agreement absent another party’s material or substantial breach of that agreement. A material or substantial breach is one that affects the whole consideration of the agreement. Several factors are relevant to determine whether a breach is material or substantial, including the extent to which the nonbreaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected and the extent to which the breaching party’s conduct comports with the standards of good faith and fair dealing. Browning, ¶ 32.

[¶ 13] In this instance, we conclude the agreement that the prosecutor would recommend boot camp to be material and substantial. It is obvious that given the young age of Herrera, as pointed out to the district court by the prosecutor, and the immediate reaction of his defense counsel to the prosecutor’s unelicited comments, that Herrera believed this element of the plea agreement to be an integral, if not a crucial and imperative, term of the agreement reached.

[¶ 14] Moreover, we hold the comments made by the prosecutor were delivered to the district court outside the realm of the standards of good faith and fair dealing. It is apparent by the prosecutor’s statements that — while she indicated that she desired to obviate any technical argument and thereby simply wanted to abide by the plea agreement despite any actions of Herrera since the plea agreement was reached — these statements were meant to purely highlight to the district court that she in reality did not recommend that the district court sentence Herrera to boot camp. Indeed, it is unquestionable that the prosecutor clearly intended to sway the district court to proceed in contravention of the very consequential term of the plea agreement concerning boot camp. Accordingly, Herrera was deprived of a determinative benefit he had every right to reasonably expect under the explicit terms of the plea agreement.

[¶ 15] Further, while the State both argues and infers that this matter should be properly determined through application of our holdings in Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, 32 P.3d 1061 (Wyo.2001), Clingman v. State, 2001 WY 46, 23 P.3d 27 (Wyo.2001), Stowe v. State, 10 P.3d 551 (Wyo.2000), and Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334 (Wyo.1996), we do not agree. We certainly do not wish to in any way abrogate the reasoning utilized in reaching our decisions in those cases. Rather, we find the facts in those cases to be distinguishable from the facts that exist in this case. In each of those eases we ultimately concluded that the asserted breach of the plea agreement did not occur or could not be characterized as substantial or material. In this case, we simply cannot reach that same result.

[¶ 16] Further, we note although defense counsel for Herrera made a timely and appropriate oral motion to withdraw guilty plea after the comments made by the prosecutor and prior to sentencing, the court summarily denied this motion by merely commenting, “I understand. That motion is denied.” From review of the transcript, it appears that the district court did not properly consider if Herrera had established a “fair and just reason” for his request requiring that his guilty plea be allowed to be withdrawn. Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor violated a material and substantial term of the plea agreement by making the elaborated comments to the district court at sentencing. The district court abused its discretion in denying Herrera’s pre-sentence motion for withdrawal of guilty plea because such a withdrawal was required by Herrera’s establishment of a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal.

[¶ 17] In Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Wyo.1993), this court set forth the standard for evaluating the validity of a guilty plea that results from a plea agreement:

A guilty plea is valid when it “ ‘ “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”’” Osborn [v. State], 806 P.2d at 271 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). See W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) (Former Rule 15(d)). The acknowledged standard, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, to test whether a plea is voluntary states:
“ ‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).’
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (5th Cir.1957), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958)).

Here, sufficient evidence exists to establish that a valid plea agreement was reached between the parties.

[¶ 18] Moreover, it is unmistakably established that a prosecutor must explicitly stand by those terms agreed upon and may not play “fast and loose” with the established terms reached between the parties in a plea agreement. Contrary to this obligation, the prosecutor involved in this case breached the plea agreement by making remarks to the district court that violated both the letter and the spirit of the agreement. These remarks were fundamental in nature and seriously affected Herrera.

[¶ 19] Finally, we find it appropriate at this time to remind prosecutors that they must comply with specifically enumerated ethical requirements in properly fulfilling their role as prosecutors. As stated in the comments of Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct For Attorneys At Law, Rule 3.8:

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 20] For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence is reversed, and this matter is remanded with direction to the district court to grant Herrera’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea.

      . The assault charge pending against Herrera was also to be reduced to a misdemeanor with Herrera receiving credit for time served. In addition, the robbery charge pending against Herrera was to be withdrawn.

      . The State subsequently filed a Motion for Dismissal concerning the first degree sexual assault charge which was granted by the court.

      . The alleged victim was allowed to speak at length at sentencing and address what had occurred to her during the incident, her involvement with Herrera, and how she had been adversely affected by these circumstances. The record reflects the district court's reaction and statements made regarding these comments. In fact, even after the pre-sentence oral motion to withdraw guilty plea made by Herrera, the district court continued to comment on the statements made by the alleged victim.

      . While we believe that it is appropriate to consider those actions taken by the district court in this case, we want to be absolutely clear that even notwithstanding the actions taken by the district court, the prosecution's failure to abide by an essential term of the plea bargain reached is, in itself, reason mandating reversal and remand in this case.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KITE, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2003 WY 29
    In the Matter of the Worker’s Compensation Claim of Gay E. ROBBINS, an Employee of Safeway, Inc., Appellant (Petitioner), v. STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).
    No. 02-97.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 28, 2003.

      Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
    Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delieath, Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Gay E. Robbins appeals from the district court’s order which affirmed the hearing examiner’s denial of her request for worker’s compensation benefits for a back injury. We conclude substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner’s decision and, therefore, affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Ms. Robbins presents two issues for our review:

a.
Wdiere objective medical evidence shows an “injury” to a person’s back, and that the person has performed hard physical labor for twenty-seven (27) years, and medical opinion shows that such injury probably was caused by such labor, is a finding denying coverage under Wyoming’s Workers’ Compensation Act justified where the only evidence against coverage is evidence of concurrent degenerative bone disease?
b.
Was the claim timely filed or is there a showing of absence of prejudice?

Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division articulates the issues on appeal as follows:

I. Does the expert medical testimony and documentary evidence presented by the Division constitute substantial evidence supporting the Hearing Examiner’s determination that [Ms. Robbins] failed to meet her burden of proof?
II. Does substantial evidence support the Hearing Examiner’s finding that [Ms. Robbins] filed an untimely injury report and failed to prove a lack of prejudice arising from her untimely filing?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Ms. Robbins was employed by Safeway, Inc. for more than twenty-seven years. During her first nine years with Safeway, she worked as a meat cutter. For the next fourteen years, she was a delicatessen manager. She returned to cutting meat during the last four years of her employment with Safeway. Both positions — meat cutter and delicatessen manager — required repetitive physical activities, including lifting, bending, turning, and standing. The meat cutting position was, however, more strenuous than the delicatessen position.

[¶ 4] John H. Babson, M.D. treated Ms. Robbins for various medical problems over several years. On October 14, 1997, Ms. Robbins visited Dr. Babson, complaining of low back pain which radiated down her left leg. She did not relate that the pain resulted from her work activities. Ms. Robbins returned to Dr. Babson on February 17, 1998, with a complaint of mid-back pain. On June 2, 1998, she again sought treatment from Dr. Babson for her back pain. Dr. Babson’s notes state Ms. Robbins’ spinal X-rays showed degenerative changes without acute pathology, and he diagnosed her as suffering from muscle spasms. Dr. Babson treated Ms. Robbins for work-related right flank pain in January 1999. She visited him on two other occasions in 1999 without mentioning back symptoms.

[¶ 5] On January 17, 2000, Ms. Robbins visited Dr. Babson seeking treatment for work-related stress. The doctor excused her from work, and Ms. Robbins apparently filed an injury report with the Division of Workers’ Safety and Compensation (the division), seeking worker’s compensation benefits for her mental stress. The division denied her claim.

[¶ 6] Ms. Robbins returned to work on February 27, 2000. Just two days later, Dr. Babson again excused her from work for “medical disability based on job related stress.” On April 24, 2000, Dr. Babson examined Ms. Robbins and, although she complained of low back pain, he released her for work because “there [was] no contraindication to her returning to work.”

[¶ 7] Ms. Robbins worked for several days in May 2000. At a May 11, 2000, appointment with Dr. Babson, she complained only of work-related stress. Ms. Robbins visited Dr. Babson on May 26, 2000, with continuing muscle spasms and low back pain. He referred her to George J. Guidry, M.D., a neurological surgeon.

[¶ 8] Dr. Guidry examined Ms. Robbins in June 2000. He ordered X-rays and an MRI which revealed hypermobility at the L4-5 level and degeneration of the L5-S1 disk. Dr. Guidry also noted arthritic changes. He eventually recommended surgery to alleviate Ms. Robbins’ symptoms.

[¶ 9] On June 9, 2000, Ms. Robbins filed a report of injury with the division, asserting she had suffered a work-related back injury. Safeway filed an employer’s report, stating it did not believe Ms. Robbins’ injury was work related. The division issued a final determination, denying Ms. Robbins’ claim. Ms. Robbins requested a contested case hearing, and the division referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings.

[¶ 10] Prior to the hearing, Ms. Robbins’ attorney deposed Dr. Guidry. Dr. Guidry refused to offer an opinion as to the cause of Ms. Robbins’ back injury because he was not being paid his typical expert witness fee. Ms. Robbins then scheduled an appointment with Kenneth A. Pettine, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon.

[¶ 11] Ms. Robbins testified at the contested case hearing. Dr. Babson’s medical records, Dr. Guidry’s deposition testimony, and a letter authored by Dr. Pettine were also submitted as evidence at the hearing. The division called two Safeway employees to testify: Human Resource Representative Stephen Pingree and Store Manager Mark Fenwick. It also submitted the deposition testimony of Duane Kline, M.D. as evidence at the hearing.

[¶ 12] The hearing examiner issued an order denying benefits. She concluded Ms. Robbins had not met her burden of proving her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The hearing examiner also determined Ms. Robbins had not filed her claim within the time limits set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (LexisNexis 2001) and she did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that neither the division nor her employer was prejudiced by her late filing.

[¶ 13] Ms. Robbins filed a petition for review with the district court, and the district court affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision. Ms. Robbins appeals to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Causation of Injury

[¶ 14] The hearing examiner determined Ms. Robbins failed to prove by competent medical authority that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The hearing examiner also stated Ms. Robbins failed to meet her burden of proving her injury occurred over a substantial period of time under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (LexisNexis 2001). Ms. Robbins argues that the hearing examiner’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

[¶ 15] “When considering an appeal from a district court’s review of agency action, we accord no special deference to the district court’s conclusions. Instead, we review the case as if it had come directly to us from the administrative agency.” French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1998) (citation omitted); see also State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 9, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 16] In a worker’s compensation case, the claimant has the burden of proving she suffered a “compensable injury.” Logue v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 62, ¶ 11, 44 P.3d 90, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2002); see also State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division v. Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo.1996). To satisfy part of that burden, the claimant must prove the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment. Logue, 2002 WY 62, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo.1996).

[¶ 17] Section 27-14-603(a) sets forth the claimant’s burden of proving an injury which occurred over a substantial period of time:

(a) The burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i)There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is performed and the injury;
(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the employment;
(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;
(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of the employment; and
(v) The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.

[¶ 18] This court recently refined the standard of review for worker’s compensation cases in Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo.2002). We held “the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from WAPA contested case proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence.” 2002 WY 91, ¶ 22. “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency’s conclusions. It is more than a scintilla of evidence.” Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). In the case at bar, the hearing examiner made factual findings, and both parties submitted evidence; therefore, we will apply the substantial evidence test to Ms. Robbins’ appeal.

[¶ 19] Ms. Robbins claims the hearing examiner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because she gave more weight to Dr. Kline’s testimony than to Dr. Pettine’s testimony. Dr. Pettine examined Ms. Robbins on March 20, 2001. After the examination, he wrote a letter to Ms. Robbins’ attorney, which stated in relevant part:

In an attempt to answer your questions, the patient works as a butcher at Safeway and has for numerous years. As far as I know, there are no other contributing factors concerning her current back condition, which is basically two torn discs at L4-5 and L5-S1. I think the current back problem is likely directly related to the twisting, bending, stooping, and extensive use of her upper extremities placing continued stress on the lower lumbar area. I think the injury can fairly be traced to her employment as an approximate cause, and I think it is likely she would not be in the current condition she has been without the long history of employment as a butcher.

The hearing examiner gave little weight to Dr. Pettine’s opinion because it was based upon inaccurate and incomplete medical history provided by Ms. Robbins. In this respect, the heai’ing examiner found:

Robbins failed to mention that she had not worked any significant amount of time for the past one and one half years prior to Dr. Pettine’s evaluation, that she was not working as a butcher for the entire 27 years but managed the Deli for 14 of those years, that her back complaints dated back to 1997, some four years prior to Dr. Pet-tine’s examination, or that as recently as January 2000 Robbins related her back pain to activities outside her employment.

[¶ 20] The hearing examiner is the fact-finder in a worker’s compensation case and is, consequently, charged with determining the witnesses’ credibility. Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 132, ¶ 16, 36 P.3d 1145, ¶ 16 (Wyo.2001); Roberts v. R & S Well Service, 2001 WY 117, ¶ 10, 35 P.3d 1219, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001). When the claimant has not given a medical witness complete or accurate medical information, the hearing examiner may discount or disregard the medical witness’ testimony. See, e.g., Franks v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 77, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 876, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2002); Rice v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 21, ¶ 16, 19 P.3d 508, ¶ 16 (Wyo.2001). It was, therefore, appropriate for the hearing examiner to give little weight to Dr. Pettine’s opinion as to the cause of Ms. Robbins’ back injury because he did not have complete and accurate information when he formed that opinion.

[¶21] Ms. Robbins also argues that the hearing examiner was incorrect in relying upon the opinion given by Dr. Kline because Dr. Kline never examined her. Dr. Kline, a retired orthopedic surgeon, reviewed Ms. Robbins’ medical records at the division’s request. He testified that, based upon his review of Ms. Robbins’ medical records, he believed her back condition was the result of the aging process and was not caused by her work activities.

[¶ 22] In Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, 944 P.2d 1151 (Wyo.1997), we found substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner’s denial of benefits when the hearing examiner gave greater weight to the opinion of a physician who simply reviewed the claimant’s medical records than to the opinion of a physician who had actually examined the claimant but did not have a complete or accurate medical history. It is the hearing examiner’s prerogative to examine all the evidence, including the medical opinions offered, and determine whether the claimant has met her burden of establishing the injury occurred in the course or scope of her employment. See 944 P.2d at 1157. Under the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the hearing examiner was justified in giving more weight to Dr. Kline’s opinion than to Dr. Pettine’s opinion.

[¶ 23] Furthermore, the other evidence in this case supported the hearing examiner’s decision that Ms. Robbins’ injury did not occur in the course and scope of her employment. Dr. Babson treated Ms. Robbins for back pain for several years. In many of his medical notes, he did not mention the specific cause of her back problems. At her February 17, 1998, appointment, Ms. Robbins indicated her back pain was associated with her strenuous activity in caring for her grandchildren.

[¶ 24] The only time Dr. Babson’s notes indicated an association between Ms. Robbins’ work and her back pain was on January 11, 1999. Ms. Robbins related that she had pain in her right flank as a result of lifting heavy meat at work. Dr. Babson treated her, and, although she saw him two more times in 1999, she did not report any back pain. In January 2000, Ms. Robbins told Mr. Pingree her 1999 back injury had healed and the back pain she was presently enduring was the result of an incident at home.

[¶ 25] Dr. Babson saw Ms. Robbins several times in the winter and spring of 2000 for work-related stress. She complained of back pain on a couple of those occasions but did not relate it to her work activities. Indeed, Ms. Robbins worked very little during this time period. After Dr. Babson referred her to Dr. Guidry, Dr. Guidry diagnosed various medical problems with her back but refused to offer an opinion as to the cause of those problems. Neither Dr. Guidry nor Dr. Pettine — Ms. Robbins’ only medical witnesses — discussed the § 27-14-603(a) factors for proving a work-related injury which occurred over a substantial period of time. On the record before us, we must conclude substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner’s decision that Ms. Robbins did not satisfy her burden of proving her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment with Safeway.

B. Timeliness of Report

[¶ 26] Our holding that Ms. Robbins did not prove her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment is dispositive. We do not, therefore, reach the issue of whether Ms. Robbins’ injury report was filed in a timely fashion.

[¶ 27] Affirmed.

      . Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-610 (Lex-isNexis 2001), the hearing examiner ordered Dr. Guidry to forfeit remuneration for all services rendered to Ms. Robbins because he refused to cooperate at his deposition.


text:
    2003 WY 27
    Daniel HEILIG, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. WYOMING GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, and John Baughman, Director, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, Appellees (Defendants).
    No. 02-41.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 28, 2003.

      Daniel F. Heilig, Lander, Wyoming, pro se.
    Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General; and Lynda G. Cook, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellees.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Daniel Heilig, an attorney and avid hunter, filed a pro se declaratory judgment action in the Ninth Judicial District Court asserting Chapter 2, Section 12 of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department’s (Game and Fish) general hunting regulations was null and void, unenforceable, and invalid ab initio because Game and Fish had not complied with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 to -115 (LexisNexis 2001)) (WAPA) in incorporating its 2000 Walk-In Areas Hunting publication (Atlas) by reference into its rules and regulations. Prior to the declaratory judgment action being filed, a criminal action was filed against Mr. Heilig in the Big Horn County Circuit Court alleging he failed to obtain landowner consent to hunt in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-3-305(b) (LexisNex-is 2001). The criminal matter was pending on appeal to the Fifth Judicial District Court and presented the same legal issues as the declaratory judgment complaint. The Ninth Judicial District Court granted Game and Fish’s motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action finding the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and Mr. Heilig was not adversely affected in fact. We affirm the dismissal on different grounds because the declaratory judgment was not consistent with the circumstances in which we have allowed multiple similar actions to proceed.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] We rephrase the issue as follows: Did the Ninth Judicial District Court abuse its discretion by dismissing the declaratory judgment action?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Game and Fish began to develop a program in 1998 intended to make hunting on private lands available to the public through agreements with private landowners. The landowners stipulate the species for which they will permit access and the time frame within established hunting seasons in which the public will be allowed access on their private lands. We will refer to this as the Walk-In Area Program.

[¶ 4] On November 5, 2000, Mr. Heilig was hunting pheasants in Walk-In Area No. 28 located in Big Horn County. The area was not designated for pheasant hunting by the Atlas, and Mr. Heilig had not asked for nor received the landowner’s permission to hunt pheasants. He was cited by a Game and Fish warden and prosecuted in the circuit court of the Fifth Judicial District for allegedly violating § 23-3-305(b) by entering private property in Big Horn County to hunt without the landowner’s permission — a seventh degree misdemeanor. These facts are not in dispute.

[¶5] In February of 2001, Mr. Heilig filed a motion to dismiss the criminal action contending in part that Game and Fish’s rules and regulations for the Walk-In Area Program were void because they were improperly promulgated and were unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001, the circuit court denied the motion, and Mr. Heilig entered a conditional guilty plea under W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) and appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the Fifth Judicial District Court. On the same day, the parties filed a joint motion requesting the circuit court to certify specific questions to the Fifth Judicial District Court and identified these legal issues:

a. Does a person hunting on private lands that are enrolled in [Game and Fish’s] Walk-In Access Program who has received permission of the owner or person in charge of the property commit a trespass in violation of W.S. § 23-3-305(b) when that person hunts a species not contemplated in the contract which created the rights of the general public to hunt the private lands?
b. Did [Game and Fish] violate W.S. § 23-l-302(a)(i) when it established the Walk-In Access Program in a manner which allowed private landowners to determine which species may be hunted on their private lands, and at what dates, irrespective of the legally promulgated seasons which were established according to -the Wyoming Administrative Procedure! ] Act?
c. Has [Game and Fish] violated the requirements of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure[ ] Act when it allowed private landowners, in conjunction with the Walk-In Access Program, to set dates and species which could be taken on their private lands when said dates and species limitations conflicted with hunting areas not enrolled in said program?
d. Is the Walk-In Access Program in violation of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure[ ] Act in that the program was not subject to the procedural requirements of the Act, yet criminal sanctions may result from violations of the provisions of the program?
e. Can a [Game and Fish] publication (Walk-In Area Atlas), which has not been subject to public notice or public comment, provide a legal basis to sustain a criminal charge of trespassing, a violation of W.S. § 23 — 3—305(b)?
f. Is W.S. § 23-3-305(b), as applied to [Mr. Heilig] in this case, unconstitutionally vague, and therefore void, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I of the Wyoming Constitution?

The status of the appeal to the Fifth Judicial District Court is unclear, but it appears from the designated record to be pending.

[¶ 6] On April 6, 2001, Mr. Heilig filed a pro se declaratory judgment action in the Ninth Judicial District Court setting out claims we paraphrase as follows:

Count I — “Violations of Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.” Game and Fish violated § 16-3-103(h) of the WAPA by incorporating “Department publications,” the Atlas, by reference into its rules at Chapter 2, Section 12 which are not codes, standards, rules, or regulations and were not in existence at the time the rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) were promulgated in April of 2000. Game and Fish violated the WAPA because it failed to identify what “Department publications” it was incorporating by reference, provide a statement of the terms and substance of the proposed rule, or indicate where the publications material could be accessed.
Count II — “Violations of Wyoming Game and Fish Statutes and Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.” Game and Fish exceeded its authority and acted contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1-302(a) and 23-1-303 (LexisNexis 2001) by establishing the Atlas hunting seasons and dates without conforming to the WAPA requirements.
Count III — “Violation of Due Process Requirements of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Game and Fish violated Mr. Heilig’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by prosecuting a criminal charge on the basis of Game and Fish’s rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) and the Atlas which were not properly promulgated under the WAPA and did not provide adequate notice of the prohibited behavior or the potential penal sanction.
Count IV — “Violation of Due Process Requirements of Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution of [t]he State of Wyoming.” Game and Fish violated Mr. Heilig’s right to due process under Article 1, Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution by prosecuting a charge on the basis of a rule and publication which failed to provide fair and adequate warning of the prohibited conduct or penalty and were not promulgated pursuant to the WAPA procedural requirements.

[¶ 7] Through this action, Mr. Heilig requested the Ninth Judicial District Court: (1) declare Game and Fish’s rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) and Atlas null and void, unenforceable, invalid ab initio, and unconstitutional; (2) issue an injunction precluding enforcement under the rules; and (3) award him attorney fees. Game and Fish'filed a motion to dismiss alleging Mr. Heilig did not have standing and was endeavoring to forum shop because these issues were’ before the circuit court of the Fifth Judicial District. The Ninth Judicial District Court granted Game and Fish’s motion holding that Mr. Heilig did not have standing to file the complaint because he was not affected in fact by the rule. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] The declaratory judgment action was dismissed because the district court found Mr. Heilig lacked standing. We agree dismissal was proper but on different grounds. This court must affirm the district court’s action on appeal if it is sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record even if the legal ground or theory articulated by the district court is incorrect. Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 8, 45 P.3d 237, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002); Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 1278 (Wyo.1990); Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation v. Naef, 842 P.2d 539, 541 (Wyo.1992).

In. a de novo review of the threshold question of jurisdiction, “we examine the policies underlying both the- Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the doctrine of justiciability to determine if this is a proper case for judicial action.” Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Wyo.1992). The district court’s decision to stay or dismiss an action due to a pending proceeding, however, is discretionary.

Southwestern Public Service Company v. Thunder Basin Coal Company, 978 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo.1999). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we must decide the ultimate issue of whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did in the situation before it. Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 13, 44 P.3d 47, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2002); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). However,

“ ‘[t]he trial court’s exercise of this discretion is subject to searching appellate review and is not given the same deference as is the trial court’s exercise of discretion in other contexts. Independent review is justified because the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in granting or denying declaratory relief is not dependent upon factors which are difficult for an appellate tribunal to review, such as, for example, factual determinations of credibility.’ ” Gaiser v. Village of Skokie, 271 Ill.App.3d 85, 207 Ill.Dec. 749, 648 N.E.2d 205, 210 (1995) (quoting Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Reserve Insurance Co., 99 Ill.App.3d 433, 54 IIl.Dec. 564, 425 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1981)).

Southwestern Public Service Company, 978 P.2d at 1142.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] “Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy.” Jolley v. State Loan and Investment Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2002). We hold Mr. Heilig was affected in fact by Game and Fish’s rules (Chapter 2, Section 12) because he held a hunting license, contributed to the Access Yes Program that helped fund the Walk-In Area Program, and was criminally cited on a designated Walk-In Area for hunting an unauthorized species under the program rules. Game and Fish argues the provisions of Chapter 2, Section 12 were procedural and not substantive and, therefore, Mr. Heilig could not be affected in fact by their application. We cannot abide this argument when the rules set out the allowed species, time, and location of hunting through the Walk-In Area Program. These directives are clearly substantive in nature, and Mr. Heilig had standing to file the declaratory judgment action. However, this determination does not resolve the question of whether the Ninth Judicial District Court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment action.

[¶ 10] “Wyoming has long held that a declaratory judgment action should only be maintained where it would serve a useful purpose.” Morris v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 771 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Wyo.1989); Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 408 (1935); Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 210 (1931); John C. Karjanis, Note, Basic Misconceptions of the Declaratory Judgment Law, 12 Wyo. L.J. 66, 71 (1957). In the context of insurance and coverage claims, we clarified the circumstances under which a declaratory judgment action should be dismissed when another similar proceeding is pending:

“1. The declaratory judgment action was ... intended to be used to force the [other party] to have a ‘dress rehearsal’ of an issue to be tried in the main case
“2. The holding in the declaratory judgment action might inappropriately collaterally estop the parties to the main action as to certain factual issues
“3. Such a proceeding would unduly burden the [opposing party] and improperly allow ... control of the litigation [to be wrested] from the [initiator of the original action]
“4. Such a declaratory judgment would violate the principle of judicial economy
“5. Such an action would constitute an unwarranted interference with another court’s proceedings[.]”

Morris, 771 P.2d at 1211 (quoting Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 8.04 at 326 (1982) (footnotes omitted)); see also National Chiropractic Mutual Insurance Company v. Doe, 23 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1122 (D.Alaska 1998). Although tandem proceedings are more often seen in the insurance arena, in Southwestern, Public Service Company, 978 P.2d at 1145, this court specifically declined to limit the application of the Morris test “to intrastate actions between an insured and its insurer.”

[¶ 11] When the certified questions from the criminal case and the counts of the declaratory judgment action are compared, it is obvious both actions raise the same issues. Applying the Morris factors, we can find no other purpose for the declaratory judgment action than as a “dress rehearsal” for the criminal case or to obtain a final judgment from a different forum which would bind the first court. A final judgment in the declaratory judgment action would at least arguably collaterally estop the parties in the main action from litigating the same issues. Further, the declaratory judgment action would take control of the proceedings from the prosecution in the Big Horn County criminal case because neither the prosecutor nor Big Horn County was a party to the Ninth Judicial District declaratory judgment action. Further, asking two district courts to address the same issues violates the principles of judicial economy and results in an unwarranted interference by the Ninth Judicial District Court in the proceedings before both the circuit court and the district court of the Fifth Judicial District.

[¶ 12] Mr. Heilig denies the issues presented before the Fifth and Ninth Judicial Districts are the same. While the language used to frame the issues is not identical, we conclude the same meaning is conveyed and the same relief is requested — a finding that Game and Fish’s rules and Atlas were improperly promulgated, unconstitutional, and, therefore, of no force and effect in Mr. Heil-ig’s circumstances. We reject Mr. Heilig’s argument as inconsistent with the application of the Morris factors and conclude the Ninth Judicial District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the declaratory judgment action. Southwestern Public Service Company, 978 P.2d at 1145.

[¶ 13] We anticipate these same issues may be presented to us in an appeal of the criminal action. Regardless, dismissal of this action is necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, discourage redundant actions, and minimize their attendant problems.

[¶ 14] Affirmed.

      . "(b) No person shall enter upon tire private property of any person to hunt, fish, or trap without the permission of the owner or person in charge of the property. Violation of this subsection constitutes a 7th degree misdemeanor.”

      . "(2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo conteiidem, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from, the judgment, to seek review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.”

      . "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

      . "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

      . The sixth consideration of the original Morris test is not set out because it is tailored solely to the circumstances of an insurance forum.


author: GOLDEN, Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 31
    STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, a Texas Corporation, Appellant (Defendant), v. Samuel J. TILDEN, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 02-37.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    March 5, 2003.

      Andrea L. Richard and John A. Coppede of Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
    Stephen L. Simonton of Simonton & Si-monton, Cody, Wyoming, Representing Ap-pellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN , KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

   GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] The primary issue in this appeal is whether the satisfaction of an arbitration award of costs precludes a district court from confirming the award as a judgment under Wyoming’s Arbitration Act. We conclude that when an arbitration award for costs has been satisfied and no controversy remains, the doctrine of mootness prohibits the district court from entering judgment. We reverse the order confirming the award and remand for dismissal.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Appellant Stewart Title Guaranty Company (Stewart) presents this statement of the issues:

I. A party must demonstrate injury in fact in order to have standing to bring an action in the court system. Roe v. Board of County Comm’rs, 997 P.2d 1021, 1021 (Wyo.2000). Stewart Title previously satisfied all obligations to Tilden which were entered in an underlying arbitration proceeding. Did the District Court properly enter judgment on a prior arbitration award, when no unsatisfied duties or obligations existed as between the parties?
II. The Wyoming Arbitration Act is designed to allow litigants to reduce an arbitration award to judgment so that they can obtain the relief ordered by the arbitrator. The Arbitration Act does not provide authority for the Judgment entered by the District Court because the Arbitration Award had been previously satisfied. Does the Wyoming Arbitration Act require that a district court enter a judgment on an arbitration award that has been previously satisfied?

Appellee Samuel J. Tilden (Tilden) states that the issues are:

1. Did the District Court correctly construe the language of W.S. § 1-36-102 and 1-36-113 of the Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act?
2. Having neglected to seek review of the arbitration findings within the time permitted by the Uniform Arbitration Act, was the Company bound by its own Title Policy’s express consent to entry of judgment on the arbitration award?
3. Was there reasonable basis for the arguments Stewart Title presented in the Brief of Appellant?
4. Should Tilden be awarded fees on appeal?

PACTS

[¶ 3] In May of 1998, Tilden informed Stewart of a title defect. Two years later, an arbitration award determined that insurance coverage existed, and Stewart cured the title defect. A few months later, on December 5, 2000, a final arbitration award determined that Stewart failed to cure the title defect in a reasonably diligent manner, but that Tilden had suffered no actual damages. Both parties had deposited an amount for arbitration fees and costs, and the final arbitration award ordered Stewart to pay Tilden’s share of those fees and costs in an amount of $5,299.20. One week later, on December 12, 2000, Stewart paid that amount to Tilden.

[¶ 4] Many months later, Tilden filed an application for confirmation of the arbitration award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113. Stewart objected on grounds that its earlier satisfaction of the award rendered the controversy moot and the district court was without jurisdiction to enter the award confirmation. The district court found that Stewart’s objections included a claim that the arbitration proceedings were defective, decided this claim was tantamount to a request for the court to review, and concluded that the claim proved that mootness was not at issue. It held that the statutory time frame for such a review had expired and summarily confirmed the arbitration award. Stewart appealed.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 5] Wyoming’s Uniform Arbitration Act (Act), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-101 through 1-36-119, provides for confirmation of an arbitration award by a district court having jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-113 (Lexis 1999) which states, in pertinent part:

Upon application of a party the court shall confirm the award unless within the time limits allowed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying the award[.]

Stewart contends that Tilden did not have standing to request confirmation of a satisfied award and the district court did not have jurisdiction to confirm a satisfied award. These contentions present a question of law, requiring statutory interpretation of the Act.

[¶ 6] A question of law is reviewed de novo by this Court as an exercise of its plenary authority, and no deference is given to the district court’s determination that it could confirm a satisfied arbitration award. Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo.1997). Absent ambiguity, we do not construe the statute but will rely on its plain language alone to ascertain its meaning. LePage v. State Dep’t of Health, 2001 WY 26, ¶ 10, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001). The statute directs the court to confirm an award unless it is petitioned to vacate or modify the award. We have previously decided that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited and an award can only be vacated, modified or corrected as provided by statute. Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Pecha v. Dorr, Bentley & Pecha, 841 P.2d 811, 817-18 (Wyo.1992). The statutory grounds for vacating or modifying an award are not relevant here because Stewart’s only contention on appeal is that the district court was without power to confirm the award.

[¶ 7] The authorities generally agree that the purpose of confirming an award is to provide a judgment that can be enforced through court proceedings. Kutch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93, 98-99 (Colo.1998). Usually, the arbitration agreement under which the parties operate provides for resolution by an award, and a breach permits judicial involvement to confirm the award and permit enforcement. Id. Wyoming statute provides the mechanism for a confirmation, and the statute uses the language, “shall,” which is usually accepted by this Court as mandatory. LePage, ¶ 11. The statute mandates that a district court confirm the award upon petition and does not state that the district court may reject a confirmation motion and dismiss it. See Kenneth W. Brooks Trust v. Pacific Media LLC, 111 Wash.App. 393, 44 P.3d 938, 941 (2002). Accordingly, it cannot be found that Tilden did not have standing or that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a confirmation. The purpose of the statute, however, is to provide a means for enforcement of an unsatisfied award by means of court-ordered judgment. If the trial court confirms the award, it must then enter a consistent judgment for enforcement. Id. The purpose of the Uniform Arbitration Act itself is to limit the role of the judiciary, and its procedure is “designed to achieve enforcement without undue delay or undue expense.” Kutch, 960 P.2d at 99. We have said that:

[Ajrbitration provides for voluntary settlement of disputes in an inexpensive and expeditious manner without resort to a tribunal and conducted without the rigid formality of strict rules of law. Riverton Valley Electric Association v. Pacific Power and Light Company, Wyo., 391 P.2d 489 (1964). Arbitration is embedded in the public policy of Wyoming and is favored by this court. Matter of Town of Greybull, Wyo., 560 P.2d 1172 (1977).

Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 201 (Wyo.2000).

[¶ 8] Given these purposes and our policy, the satisfaction of the award requires that we examine whether the doctrine of mootness applies. We recently summarized that:

Our general law on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues which have become moot. We do not decide eases when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters that might arise in the future. A case is moot when the determination of an issue is sought which, if provided, will have no practical effect on the existing controversy. Therefore, if events occur during the pen-dency of an appeal that cause a case to become moot or make determination of the issues unnecessary, we will dismiss it.... [We have] further elaborated that a case is moot when the matter upon which a determination is sought presents no actual controversy or when a decision can have no practical effect. We have also recognized the general rule that the issue of mootness constitutes a question of law and may be properly addressed by a court sua sponte.

Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2002 WY 24, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1106, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (citations omitted).

[¶ 9] Stewart’s satisfaction of the award effectively rendered the issue moot, and the district court should have dismissed the confirmation motion unless it determined that live issues remained to be litigated. See Goodman v. Seaver, 12 Mass.L.Rept. 145, 2000 WL 1257462 *7. In Goodman, the Superior Court held that a satisfied arbitration award was not moot because under Massachusetts law a judgment was necessary to receive an award of multiple damages. Because the good faith settlement was a live issue, the award would have practical legal significance if it was confirmed and made a judgment.

[¶ 10] Here, Tilden asserts that Stewart opposed confirmation of the award because it carried res judicata and collateral estoppel implications for a bad faith claim. Specifically, Tilden claims that the award implicates Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c) which permits attorney fees and interest against an insurance company found to have acted unreasonably and under tort law establishing the element of a bad faith claim. Tilden, however, also states that the arbitrator determined his scope of authority under the arbitration provision of the policy was not broad enough for him to hear and decide the statutory and tort claims. These facts significantly depart from the rationale of Goodman, and we cannot see that a judgment on the award is necessary to receive a further additional judgment permitted by law.

[¶ 11] This award had been satisfied, and, under the doctrine of mootness, the order of confirmation is reversed and remanded for dismissal.

      . Tilden has not offered any authority that the judicial concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel would apply to an arbitration award, and we make these observations without deciding that they apply to an arbitration award.