author: JIM GUNTER, Justice.

text:
    2009 Ark. 360
    Dorothy and Robert GREENWOOD, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Michael Anderson, a Minor Deceased, Appellants, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Jr., Appellee.
    No. 08-1200.
    Supreme Court of Arkansas.
    June 18, 2009.

      McDaniel and Wells, P.A., by: Phillip Wells, Jonesboro; and Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, Greenbriar, for appellants.
    Watts, Donovan & Tilley, P.A., by: Richard N. Watts and Staci Dumas Carson, Little Rock, for appellee.
   JIM GUNTER, Justice.

| Appellants, Dorothy and Robert Greenwood, appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Clifford Anderson, Jr. .on the basis of parental immunity. We accepted certification of this case from the court of appeals pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b)(4) and (5), as this case involves an issue of substantial public interest and a significant issue needing clarification or development of the law or overruling of precedent. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Michael Anderson, age five and a half months, and his mother, Erica Greenwood, age eighteen, were killed in an automobile accident on December 30, 2006. Erica and Michael were passengers in a car driven by Michael’s father, who is the appellee in this case. | ^Appellants, Michael’s maternal grandparents and co-personal representatives of Michael’s estate, filed a wrongful-death suit against appellee on November 1, 2007, asserting that the accident was the result of negligence on the part of appellee and that Michael was killed as a result of that negligence. Appellee filed a response on November 14, 2007, denying any negligence and claiming several affirmative defenses including parental immunity.

On December 21, 2007, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that, under the doctrine of parental immunity, the appellants could not maintain an action for wrongful death against him on behalf of Michael’s estate. In response, appellants contended that their case should not be barred because the lack of a significant relationship between appellee and his son should represent an exception to the parental immunity doctrine. In support of their argument, they attached an affidavit given by them explaining that appellee had essentially been an absent father and had not financially supported his child. They also stated in the affidavit that appellee’s liability-insurance policy had paid wrongful death damages to Erica, and the same liability policy would provide damages to Michael if not for the parental immunity doctrine. After a hearing held on June 24, 2008, the court entered an order granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment on July 17, 2008. Appellants then filed a timely notice of appeal on August 7, 2008.

This court’s standard of review for a summary judgment is well settled:

[Sjummary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof |sand demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material fact unanswered. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Our review is not limited to the pleadings, as we also focus on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. After reviewing undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied if, under the evidence, reasonable men might reach different conclusions from those undisputed facts.

Verdier v. Verdier, 364 Ark. 287, 289-90, 219 S.W.3d 143, 144 (2005) (quoting Hisaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 668, 676, 122 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2003)). Parental immunity was created judicially in Arkansas in Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938), and proscribes an unemancipated minor from maintaining an action for an involuntary tort against his parent. Under current Arkansas law, two recognized exceptions to the parental immunity exist: (1) when the parent has committed an intentional or willful tort, see Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982); (2) when the suit is a direct action against an insurer and the damages sought are uninsured-motorist benefits, see Fields v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 350 Ark. 75, 87 S.W.3d 224 (2002).

On appeal, appellants first assert that the so-called Fields exception, which allows an action where payment will come from an uninsured-motorist policy, should be expanded to include cases such as this where payment will come from a liability-insurance policy. Appellants contend there is no meaningful difference between the two situations, and such [4an expansion of the exception would bring Arkansas in line with other jurisdictions that recognize an exception for all automobile accidents.

However, after reviewing the pleadings below, we find that this argument was not sufficiently developed at the trial court level. While appellants did mention Fields in their response to the motion for summary judgment, appellants never asserted the specific argument that is now being made on appeal, and our case law has made clear that this court will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. City of Ft. Smith v. McCutchen, 372 Ark. 541, 279 S.W.3d 78 (2008). Appellant must raise an issue with specificity and make an argument to the circuit court for it to be preserved on appeal. Porter v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 374 Ark. 177, 286 S.W.3d 686 (2008). Therefore, we are precluded from addressing the merits of this argument.

For their second point on appeal, appellants urge this court to create a new exception to the parental immunity doctrine in cases where the policies supporting the doctrine will not be advanced because there has been no significant relationship developed between the child and the parent-defendant. This court has long recognized that the policy reasons supporting the parental immunity doctrine include the State’s interests in maintaining family peace and harmony, the adequacy of criminal sanctions to punish child abuse, and the upholding of parental authority. Fields, supra. In this case, appellants contend that appel-lee was a parent in “only the loosest sense” because he failed to provide significant financial support for the child and spent little of his available time with the child. 1 .^Appellants’ deposition, which was attached to their response to the motion for summary judgment, explained that the baby was born on July 17, 2006; appellee left for active duty in the United States Marine Corp on or about August 9, 2006; appellee spent the “majority” of his free time while on leave in November and December with his friends and not the baby; and appellee contributed a total of $100 to the support of the baby. In such a situation, appellants argue, there is no domestic harmony or family tranquility to protect because there was no real “family unit” in existence. Further, there is no “family” to protect because both the baby and his mother are deceased.

Under appellants’ proposed exception, however, every case would require an inquiry into the allegedly negligent parent’s relationship with the child to determine whether that relationship is “sufficient” to allow that parent immunity. We find such an approach to be highly subjective and ultimately undesirable. We also note that other jurisdictions have declined to adopt such an approach. See, e.g., Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 244 Conn. 692, 711 A.2d 708, 713 (1998) (declining to apply an exception to immunity for a non-custodial parent and noting that traditional models of the nuclear family have changed but “[t]he fact that the composition of families has become more varied, however, has no bearing on their essential nature as families”); Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1990) (declining to apply exception to immunity and finding that “maintenance of a common home is not the sine qua non of the elements of parenthood. The primary requisite of a father-child relationship is not that a person reside with the child but that the person is, in fact, the father of the child”).

| fiFinally, appellants urge this court to abrogate the traditional parental immunity doctrine and adopt the Restatement approach, found in § 895G in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: (1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship; (2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious. Under this approach,

“[T]he proper inquiry concerns the tor-tious or privileged nature of a parent’s act that causes injury to the child, not a special parental immunity from a child’s action for personal torts as distinct from other kinds of claims.” Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984). Parents are not immune from suit by virtue of the parent/child relationship. The Restatement recognizes that in the course of exercising parental discipline and parental discretion, parents may be privileged to act in a manner that would be deemed tortious if directed at a stranger.

Zellmer v. Zellmer, 164 Wash.2d 147, 188 P.3d 497, 501 (2008). However, we again find that appellants failed to develop this argument at the trial court level, and as stated above, this court will not consider an argument made for the first time on appeal. City of Ft. Smith, supra. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice. ELANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    2009 Ark. 359
    ARKANSAS GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, Appellant, v. Ben EDDINGS; Harold Smith, Newton County Judge, Appellees.
    No. 08-1220.
    Supreme Court of Arkansas.
    June 18, 2009.

      James F. Goodhart, and John P. Marks, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, Little Rock, for appellant.
    Osmon & Ethredge, P.A., by: David L. Ethredge and Johnnie Abbott Copeland, Mountain Home, for appellee Ben Ed-dings.
   ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice.

liThe Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (“AGFC”) appeals from an order of the Newton County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice its appeal from the County Court of Newton County based upon the AGFC’s failure to timely perfect its appeal under Arkansas District Court Rule 9.

The relevant facts are that appellee Ben Eddings is the owner of a forty-acre tract of land located near the Buffalo River. Eddings lacks vehicular access to his land from either a public or private road due in part to the fact that his land is completely surrounded by public property. On two sides of the land lies the Gene Rush Wildlife Management Area (“WMA”), which is owned by the AGFC, while on the other two sides lies the Buffalo National River, which is owned by the United States through the National Park Service.

LOn April 20, 2005, Eddings petitioned the County Court of Newton County for the establishment of a road across the WMA pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-66-401. The AGFC answered and moved to dismiss Eddings’s petition, contending that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution and that Eddings had failed to join the National Park Service as a necessary party to the action. On November 9, 2005, the county judge entered an order finding that the AGFC’s answer and motion to dismiss had been filed five days late and thus the matters raised therein were waived. The county judge found, however, that despite its default, the AGFC was entitled to participate as to the issues of just compensation and the correct placement of the road. To this end, the county judge directed Eddings and the AGFC to each nominate a viewer within ten days to begin the process.

On December 8, 2005, the AGFC petitioned the Newton County Circuit Court for appellate review of the county judge’s November 9, 2005 order. Eddings moved to dismiss this petition and contended in that motion that a final order had yet to be entered in the matter. On January 9, 2006, the county judge entered a final order in which he declared a public easement over the WMA and assessed $1,500.00 and all other costs associated with the action against Eddings. The AGFC next filed a notice of appeal of the county judge’s | sfinal order with the clerk of the circuit court on February 8, 2006. At the request of the AGFC, a copy of the docket sheet was certified in the office of county-circuit court clerk Donnie Davis on February 6, 2009, but was not file stamped. The AGFC moved to consolidate its two appeals from the county court, which the circuit judge granted.

On September 5, 2007, the AGFC moved for summary judgment in the circuit court and again contended that sovereign immunity barred Eddings’s suit in county court and that Eddings’s failure to join the National Park Service as a necessary party was fatal to his suit. Following a hearing on the summary-judgment motion, the circuit judge entered an order on April 24, 2008, dismissing the AGFC’s consolidated appeal with prejudice. In his order, the circuit judge found that the AGFC’s appeal from the county court was not timely perfected under Arkansas District Court Rule 9, and said: “However, while the record from county court made it to the circuit court file there is no indication on said record or on the docket sheet indicating when it was filed in circuit court.”

On May 7, 2008, the AGFC moved to vacate the circuit judge’s order dismissing its appeal and contended that it had, in fact, perfected its appeal under Rule 9 by filing a certified copy of the record with the circuit clerk within thirty days of each of the county judge’s two orders. Attached to the AGFC’s motion to vacate were several exhibits which purported to show that the record had been filed in compliance with Rule 9. The primary ^exhibits were an affidavit of Donnie Davis, the County Clerk and Circuit Court Clerk of Newton County, correspondence from the AGFC, and docket sheets for the two appeals.

In his affidavit, Davis averred that for both appeals he agreed with the AGFC that he would file a certified copy of the county court record in the circuit court upon receiving the appeal documents from the AGFC; that on December 8, 2005, to the best of his knowledge and belief, he prepared and filed a certified copy of the county court record upon receiving the AGFC’s petition for appellate review of the county judge’s November 9, 2005 order; and that on February 8, 2006, to the best of his knowledge and belief and as was his customary and usual procedure, he prepared and filed a certified copy of the county court record upon receiving the AGFC’s notice of appeal of the county judge’s January 9, 2006 order. The circuit judge did not act on the AGFC’s motion to vacate, and it was deemed denied after thirty days.

Over four months after dismissing the AGFC’s appeal with prejudice on April 24, 2008, the circuit judge entered a Notice dated August 21, 2008, which read:

This is to advise that pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(b) the Court intends to direct the Circuit Court Clerk to correct the docket sheet in this case to reflect the date when the record from District Court was actually filed. The Court will then issue a ruling on the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment. If either party objects to this, said party shall make its objection known to the Court in writing by 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, September 1, 2008.

IsBy letter dated August 28, 2008, the AGFC wrote that it did not object to the circuit judge’s correcting the docket to reflect the date the records were filed in circuit court but noted that the circuit judge did not have jurisdiction to vacate the April 24, 2008 order and reconsider the AGFC’s motion for summary judgment under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 because this was not a correction of a clerical error and more than ninety days had passed since the order was entered. The AGFC was correct on this point. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (imposing ninety-day limitation for correcting nonclerical errors or mistakes); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 259, 57 S.W.3d 158 (2001) (an erroneously entered order is not a clerical error).

The AGFC now contends on appeal to this court that the circuit judge erred by dismissing its consolidated appeal and by failing to grant its motion to vacate because it had shown through the exhibits attached to its motion to vacate and, specifically, through Davis’s affidavit that a certified copy of the county-court record was filed within thirty days of each of the county judge’s orders. Eddings responds that the circuit judge correctly dismissed the AGFC’s appeal because the county clerk failed to properly certify the record and failed to place a file stamp on the record. Eddings further urges that the AGFC should not be allowed “to rehabilitate” its defective appeal through its exhibits and affidavits.

Rule 9 of the Arkansas District Court Rules, which also applies to county courts, governs appeals and provides at all times pertinent to this appeal as follows:

|fi(a) Time for Taking Appeal. All appeals in civil cases from district courts to circuit court must be filed in the office of the clerk of the particular circuit court having jurisdiction of the appeal within 30 days from the date of the entry of judgment. The 30-day period is not extended by a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a new trial, a motion to amend the court’s findings of fact or to make additional findings, or any other motion to vacate, alter or amend the judgment.
(b) How Taken. An appeal from a district court to the circuit court shall be taken by filing a record of the proceedings had in the district court. Neither a notice of appeal nor an order granting an appeal shall be required. It shall be the duty of the clerk to prepare and certify such record when requested by the appellant and upon payment of any fees authorized by law therefor. The appellant shall have the responsibility of filing such record in the office of the circuit clerk.
(c) Unavailability of Record. When the clerk of the district court, or the court in the absence of a clerk, neglects or refuses to prepare and certify a record for filing in the circuit court, the person desiring an appeal may perfect his appeal on or before the 30th day from the date of the entry of the judgment in the district court by filing an affidavit in the office of the circuit court clerk showing that he has requested the clerk of the district court (or the district court) to prepare and certify the records thereof for purposes of appeal and that the clerk (or the court) has neglected to prepare and certify such record for purposes of appeal. A copy of such affidavit shall be promptly served upon the clerk of the district court (or the court) and the adverse party.

Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 (2006).

This court has made it clear that the requirements of Rule 9 are mandatory and jurisdictional. See Ottens v. State, 316 Ark. 1, 5, 871 S.W.2d 329, 331 (1994) (“[W]hen the 17time for filing an appeal is fixed by a rule or statute, the provision which limits the time is jurisdictional in nature.”). If an appellant fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 9, the circuit court has no authority to accept the appeal. Hawkins v. City of Prairie Grove, 316 Ark. 150, 871 S.W.2d 357 (1994). Furthermore, this court requires strict compliance with Rule 9, and an appellant’s failure to either file a certified copy of the record in the circuit court or file an affidavit stating that he or she has requested the district court clerk to prepare and certify the record and the clerk has neglected to do so within thirty days precludes the circuit court from acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal. See J & M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark. 126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001); Pike Ave. Dev. Co. v. Pulaski County, 343 Ark. 338, 37 S.W.3d 177 (2001).

In the instant case, in his order dismissing the AGFC’s appeal, the circuit judge stated that though the county court record made it to the circuit court file, there was no indication on the record or docket sheet when this was done. It is clear to this court that the circuit judge ruled as he did because of the absence of a file stamp on those documents. We, accordingly, begin our analysis with a determination of whether a file stamp was essential for a “filing” under these facts. We hold that it was not.

Over the years, our case law has discussed this very issue of whether the file stamp determines when a paper is filed. In 2004, we summarized our jurisprudence on this point in the case of Republican Party of Garland County v. Johnson:

| ¡¡It is true that there is caselaw to the effect that the file-stamp is merely “evidence of filing.” See, e.g., Stanislaus v. Austin, 202 Ark. 441, 150 S.W.2d 610 (1941) (“[t]he act of leaving or depositing the paper in the proper office constitutes a filing of it”); Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931) (“while it is proper for an officer whose duty it is to receive and file an instrument in writing to indorse thereon the date of filing when he receives the instrument, such indorsement is not the filing, but is merely an evidence of filing, and that the instrument is filed when it is delivered to the officer at his office to be received by him and kept on file”).

358 Ark. 443, 451, 193 S.W.3d 248, 254 (2004); see also Henard v. St. Francis Election Comm., 301 Ark. 459, 784 S.W.2d 598 (1990) (clerk’s testimony of receipt of a local-option petition in circuit clerk’s office, though not file marked, constituted filing); Tucker v. Batesville Motor Co., 203 Ark. 553, 157 S.W.2d 492 (1942) (delivery and receipt of record from justice-of-peace court without objection constituted filing); Cf. White v. State, 373 Ark. 415, 284 S.W.3d 64 (2008) (petitioner’s notice of appeal timely where circuit clerk erred in failing to file the notice of appeal on the day received). Other general sources confirm this black-letter principle. See Black’s Law Dictionary 660 (8th ed.2004) (“file, vb. 1. To deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record.”); Cf. 16A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.1 (Juris. 4th 2009) (“if the notice is timely received by the clerk, the clerk’s failure to formally “file” it within the time limit will not invalidate the appeal”).

There is no question but that the docket sheet for the final order was lodged in the circuit clerk’s office as of February 6, 2006, as evidenced by the county clerk’s certification, which contains that date. This court has held that the docket sheet of district court | proceedings constitutes the record for purposes of an appeal to circuit court, McNabb v. State, 367 Ark. 93, 238 S.W.3d 119 (2006), and that holding has now been incorporated into District Court Rule 9, effective January 1, 2009. Accordingly, the filing of that docket sheet as the record occurred in timely fashion.

We turn next to whether that docket sheet as the filed record was certified as required by Rule 9(b). We hold that it was. On the second page of the docket sheet which constitutes the record for the final order was this certificate:

STATE OF ARKANSAS) COUNTY OF NEWTON)
I, DONNIE DAVIS, COUNTY & CIRCUIT CLERK WITHIN AND FOR THE COUNTY & STATE AFORESAID, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED AND FOREGOING INSTRUMENT OF WRITING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL INSTRUMENT AS THE SAME APPEARS OF RECORD IN RECORD BOOK _ AT PAGE
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT THIS THE 6th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2006.
/s/ Donnie Davis
COUNTY & CIRCUIT CLERK

This court has made it abundantly clear that the record must be certified at the time of filing. See J & M Mobile Homes, 347 Ark. at 130-31, 60 S.W.3d at 484. Here, that was done by the filing of the certified docket sheet. Because a certified copy of the record was filed in the office of the circuit court in timely fashion, the requirements of Rule 9(b) were met.

hoThe concurring opinion correctly states that certification and filing are different procedures. But in this case, certification of the docket sheet occurred on February 6, 2006, which meant that the docket sheet had been received by the county-circuit clerk and, thus, filed. There is no certification stamp on the record dated February 8, 2006, since certification of the docket sheet had already taken place two days earlier. In short, February 6, 2006, was the date for both the certification of the docket sheet as the record and filing.

We recognize the unusual situation in this case where the county and circuit clerk are the same person and the office for filing is also the same. Accordingly, when the AGFC requested that the county court record be filed with the office of the circuit clerk, this was all handled administratively by Mr. Davis in his office. Again, the certification date on the docket sheet dated February 6, 2006, proves that this was done.

We want to emphasize that the holding in this case is limited to the lodging of a record under these facts where the county clerk and circuit clerk are one and the same, where time of delivery is evidenced by the certification stamp which is signed and dated by the county-circuit clerk, where the affidavit of the county-circuit clerk evidences the filing, and where the act of delivery and receipt of the record involves a transfer of a certified docket sheet within the same office.

Because we hold as we do that the appeal from county court to circuit court was perfected, we reverse the order of dismissal by the circuit judge and remand for further proceedings.

In Reversed and remanded.

CORBIN and WILLS, JJ., concur.

ELANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Justice,

concurring.

I agree that the record was timely filed in this case, but differ with the majority opinion as to how or when this was accomplished. In my view, the evidence, in the form of an affidavit from the clerk, supports the conclusion that the Circuit/County Clerk filed the record in this case on February 8, 2006, rather than by certifying the docket sheet on February 6, as the majority concludes. The clerk stated that, as was his usual and customary procedure, he “filed the certified copy of the County Court record at about the same time” as he filed the notice of appeal and designation of the record. (Emphasis added.) The latter was accomplished at 1:29 p.m. on February 8, 2006.

As an initial matter, I disagree with the majority that the docket sheet was the “record” in this case. For this proposition, the majority cites McNabb v. State, 367 Ark. 93, 238 S.W.3d 119 (2006), which involved a district court appeal, rather than an appeal from county court. The docket sheet in the only document in the record, and the McNabb court took pains to point this out. 367 Ark. at 100, 238 S.W.3d at 124 (stating that the district court docket sheet “contained all of the information relating to the district court proceedings” that the “usual record” in district court “is the docket sheet ... [b]ut ... the record of proceedings must reflect all the proceedings, including all filed documents and motions, before the district court.”) Because no other documents in McNabb were marked |12as ever having been filed with the court, the docket sheet in that case was the only “record.” McNabb did not hold that the docket sheet was the record in all cases. See also Reporter’s Notes to former District Court Rule 9 (stating that “[t]he contents of the record need not be extensive for an appeal” but “[a]s as minimum ... should reflect the claim form, the written answer or response, if any, the judgment of the court and any other writing or documents filed in the inferior court or offered in evidence”).

My primary disagreement with the majority opinion, however, is with its conclusion that the appeal was perfected in this case when the docket sheet was “lodged in the circuit clerk’s office on February 6, 2006, as evidenced by the certification, which contains that date.” Certification is not the same as filing, and the previous version of Rule 9 specified that the record had to be filed with the circuit court within thirty days from the date of the entry of judgment. Here, counsel for the Game and Fish Commission faxed the clerk a letter on February 6, 2006, asking for the “preparation and certification” of the record. That preparation and “certification” of the record was accomplished on February 6, when the clerk stamped the second page of the docket sheet (the first document in the record), as having been “certified.” Counsel did not ask the clerk to “file” the record in the February 6 letter. Counsel for the Commission sent another letter dated February 7, 2006, by overnight delivery and asked in this letter for the clerk to “please file the original Notice of Appeal and | ^Designation of the Record along with the Certified Record of the County Court case in the Newton County Circuit Court.” (Emphasis added.) Extra copies of the notice of appeal were included for file-marking, but no request was made to return any proof of file-marking of the record. The “record” in this case was already in the hands of the county clerk, who also served as circuit clerk, and there was evidence that the record was “voluminous.” Although the county clerk had previously “certified” the record on February 6 by placing his “County & Circuit Clerk” stamp on the record, he neglected, as circuit clerk, to file-stamp the record on February 8.

As the majority notes, our case law supports the proposition that when a document has, in fact, been received by the clerk, file-marking is not inexorable proof of the exact time of filing, but is only evidence of the time of filing. Republican Party of Garland County v. Johnson, 358 Ark. 443, 193 S.W.3d 248 (2004); Henard v. St. Francis Election Comm., 301 Ark. 459, 784 S.W.2d 598 (1990); and Tucker v. Batesville Motor Co., 203 Ark. 553, 157 5.W.2d 492 (1942). Our rules have apparently not changed this common law pronouncement except with respect to orders and judgments, which are “entered” when stamped with the word “filed.” See Ark. Sup.Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(b)(2). We have also allowed the testimony of the clerk to supply the actual date of filing. See Henard, supra; Stanislaus v. Austin, 202 Ark. 441, 150 S.W.2d 610 (1941) (citing Buchanan v. Commercial Inv. Trust, 177 Ark. 579, 7 S.W.2d 318 (1928)). Here, despite the lack of file-marking, the clerk stated in his affidavit that he “filed the certified copy of the County Court record” at about the same time as he filed the notice of appeal on February 8, 2006, at 1:29 p.m. In my view, under our case law, this is sufficient evidence that the record was filed on February 8. This portion of the clerk’s affidavit is unequivocal. I therefore concur in the majority’s decision that the record, and thus the appeal, was timely filed.

I point out as a final matter, however, that we recently amended District Court Rule 9 to establish special procedures for taking an appeal from county court. See District Court Rule 9(e) (2009). The Reporter’s Notes indicate why: “Former Rule 9 was written solely in terms of appeals from district court, and its requirements did not fit appeals from county courts well.” The new rule permits a party to perfect a county court appeal by filing of a notice of appeal along with a certified copy of the county court order. In our age of fax machines, e-mail, and other electronic communications, it henceforth should be a simple matter for litigants to obtain a file-stamped copy of these documents in order to prove the timely perfecting of their appeals from county court to circuit court.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the opinion.

CORBIN, J., joins.

      . The AGFC also contended that an existing, but presently closed, road across the Buffalo National River provided Eddings with a shorter and more convenient route to his property.

      . Filing a notice of appeal is not required to perfect an appeal under Arkansas District Court Rule 9(b).

      . Davis’s certificate on the docket sheet for the final order in this case is dated February 6, 2009.

      . This court recently amended Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 effective January 1, 2009. See In re

        Arkansas District Court Rules, 374 Ark. App’x 653 (2008). Because the AGFC's attempted appeals occurred prior to the effective date of this revision, the prior version of Rule 9 applies in this case.

      . Counsel for the Commission noted in his affidavit attached to his motion to vacate that the docket sheet was the first page of the county court record.

      . This same rule does not apply to allow a litigant to prove that a document has in fact been received by the clerk. See Wandrey v. Etchison, 363 Ark. 36, 210 S.W.3d 892 (2005) (where there was no evidence that a faxed notice of appeal had ever been received by the clerk’s office, proof by way of a fax confirmation sheet and attorney’s affidavit was not sufficient to prove filing).


author: JIM GUNTER, Justice. JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice,

text:
    2009 Ark. 361
    SEIZ COMPANY, d/b/a Seiz Sign Company, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Appellee.
    No. 09-46.
    Supreme Court of Arkansas.
    June 18, 2009.

      Quattlebaum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow, PLLC, by: John E. Tull III, Little Rock, and Brandon B. Cate, Springdale, for appellant.

      Robert L. Wilson, Chief Counsel, and Michelle L. Davenport, Staff Attorney, Arkansas Highway & Transp. Dep’t, Little Rock, for appellee.
   JIM GUNTER, Justice.

Appellant, Seiz Sign Company, appeals the decision of the circuit court affirming the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department’s (AHTD) denial of appellant’s application for a billboard sign permit. On appeal, appellant asserts that the AHTD has incorrectly interpreted Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-210 (Repl.1994) and that there was no substantial evidence supporting the denial of the application. As this case raises an issue of statutory interpretation, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. l-2(b)(6). We affirm the denial of appellant’s application.

On February 28, 2005, appellant filed an application for a permit to construct a billboard on Highway 70 in Saline County. On April 20, 2005, appellant’s application was denied by the AHTD for the following reasons: (1) the proposed billboard site was not located in a zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial area as required by Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-204(a)(2) (Repl. 1994) and the Regulations for Control of Outdoor Advertising on Arkansas Highways (the Regulations), and (2) the proposed billboard site was located in a predominately residential area, and such signs are prohibited in those areas pursuant to Paragraph I.H.2 of the Regulations. A hearing before an AHTD hearing officer was held on June 16, 2005. On May 3, 2006, the denial of appellant’s application was affirmed.

Appellant filed a petition for review in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, and a hearing was held on November 29, 2007. In an order filed October 14, 2008, the circuit court found that AHTD’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the denial of the application. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal.

Review of administrative agency decisions, by both the circuit court and appellate courts, is limited in scope. Nash v. Ark. Elevator Safety Bd., 370 Ark. 345, 259 S.W.3d 421 (2007). The standard of review to be used by both the circuit court and the appellate court is whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s findings. Id. The appellate court’s review is directed, not toward the circuit court, but toward the decision of the agency, because administrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures than courts, to determine and analyze legal issues affecting their agencies. Staton v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 372 Ark. 387, 277 S.W.3d 190 (2008). When reviewing such decisions, we uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Id. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, City of Ft. Smith v. Carter, 372 Ark. 93, 270 S.W.3d 822 (2008); however, the interpretation placed on a statute or regulation by an agency or department charged with its administration is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly wrong. Cave City Nursing Home, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 351 Ark. 13, 89 S.W.3d 884 (2002).

Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-204(a) provides that billboards may be erected (1) within those areas zoned industrial or commercial under state law, or (2) within unzoned commercial or industrial areas that are determined by agreement between the State Highway Commission (Commission) and the United States Secretary of Transportation. Section 27-74-211(b) (Repl.1994) provides that the definition of an unzoned commercial or industrial area shall be determined by agreement between the Commission and the Secretary of Transportation but shall be no more restrictive than that required by Title 23 of the U.S.Code. Title 23 defines unzoned commercial or industrial areas as unzoned areas actually used for commercial or industrial purposes as defined in the agreements between the Secretary of Transportation and each state. 23 C.F.R. § 750.703(0 (2008). Page Five, Paragraph I.H of the Regulations defines un-zoned commercial, business, or industrial areas as

[T]he land occupied by the regularly used building, parking lot, and storage or processing area of a commercial, business, or industrial activity, and that land within 600 feet thereof on both sides of the highway. The unzoned land shall not include:
1. Land on the opposite side of an interstate or primary freeway highway from an unzoned commercial, business, or industrial area, as defined above.
2. Land predominantly used for residential purposes.
3. Land zoned by state or local law, regulation, or ordinance.
4. Land on the opposite side of a non-freeway primary highway which is deemed scenic by the State Highway Department.

Page Five, Paragraph F defines commercial or industrial activities to include those activities generally recognized as commercial or industrial by public zoning authorities in Arkansas, and that are visible from the main road, but not those that are more than 660 feet from the nearest edge of the right-of-way. And finally, Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-210(b) defines “land predominately used for residential purposes” as

only those tracts of land within an un-zoned commercial, business, or industrial area on a primary or interstate highway which are occupied by a building regularly and principally used as a residence and those tracts of land adjacent to those residential tracts which are under the same ownership as the residential tracts and which are actively used and maintained for residential purposes.

In this present case, there is no dispute that the proposed billboard site is within an unzoned area with regular commercial activity present and that the commercial activity is visible from the road and within 660 feet of the road. The dispute in this case centers on how the second exclusion in Paragraph I.H, the “land predominately used for residential purposes,” should be interpreted.

Applying the above statutory and regulatory parameters in deciding whether a billboard may be erected at a certain site, the AHTD first determines whether the area is a zoned or unzoned commercial, business, or industrial area. If the area is an unzoned area with commercial activity on site, then the character of the entire surrounding area (600 feet on each side, 660 feet back), is determined. Within this area, there cannot be more residential properties than commercial, or the land will be deemed “predominately used for residential purposes” and a billboard will not be allowed on the site.

For his first point on appeal, appellant asserts that this interpretation is clearly wrong. Appellant contends that the AHTD has incorrectly applied the exclusion in paragraph H.2 and argues that the application of the exclusion should serve to reduce the overall size of the unzoned commercial area but not to eliminate the entire area as being a permissible site for the erection of a billboard. Addressing the exclusions found in paragraph H, appellant explains that H.l and H.4 both serve to eliminate the land on the opposite side of the road from being an eligible site for a billboard. At the administrative hearing, an AHTD representative agreed that the application of the H.l and H.4 exclusions “cut the size of the unzoned area in half as far as an acceptable building site for a billboard.” The exclusion in H.3 addresses the situation where zoning lines bisect the proposed unzoned area, and although the application of this particular exclusion is not at issue on appeal, the AHTD explained at the administrative hearing that a zoned area would decrease the available space within the unzoned area in which to erect a billboard. Finally, in addressing the exclusion under H.2, that the area shall not include “land predominately used for residential purposes,” appellant argues that this exclusion should function just as the other exclusions, namely by reducing the size of the unzoned area but not disqualifying the entire area from consideration.

Appellant asserts that, in determining that the proposed site was not located in a zoned or unzoned commercial area and was instead located in a predominantly residential area, the AHTD misapplied the exclusion in H.2 and mistakenly applied a “rule of thumb” analysis by comparing the number of residences to the number of commercial properties within the proposed site. Under this “rule of thumb,” if there are more houses than businesses in an area, the area will be considered predominately residential. Appellant contends that this analysis demonstrates an incorrect interpretation of the Regulations and is fundamentally at odds with the plain language of § 27-74-210.

First, appellant notes that the “rule of thumb” is not actually an official rule promulgated by the legislature or the AHTD. Second, appellant contends that using this “rule” requires the H.2 exclusion to operate in a different manner than the other exclusions in Paragraph H, because application of the other exclusions does not change the nature of the entire unzoned area but instead excludes certain land from the overall area. Appellant urges that, pursuant to the H.2 exclusion, the “land predominately used for residential purposes” should be taken out of the overall area and not be considered a proper site for a billboard, but the other land within the unzoned area could still be properly considered. In addition, appellant contends that to apply the exclusion as the AHTD has done would make the definition of an unzoned commercial or industrial area more restrictive than the federal standard, which would violate § 27-74-211.

Appellant also cites the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which holds that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. Black’s Law Dictionary 1087 (8th ed.2004). Applied to statutory construction, this doctrine dictates that we interpret related statutory provisions on the assumption that they each operate in the same manner, and courts may conclude that the Legislature would not intend one subsection of a subdivision of a statute to operate in a manner “ ‘markedly dissimilar’ ” from other provisions in the same list or subdivision. Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 944, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 5, 116 P.3d 479 (2005) (citing People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 294, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042 (1996)). See also Weiss v. Maples, 369 Ark. 282, 253 S.W.3d 907 (2007) (explaining that we reconcile statutory provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part).

In addition, appellant asserts that under the plain language of § 27-74-210, which defines “land predominately used for residential purposes,” it is clear that the AHTD should exclude only those specific residential “tracts of land” within the “un-zoned commercial, business, or industrial area,” and the remaining area is not rendered an impermissible site on which to erect a billboard. To instead apply the “rule of thumb” analysis clearly contradicts this statutory language. Appellant emphasizes the distinction between “area” and “land” in the statutes and regulations and argues that AHTD is incorrectly using the words interchangeably; according to appellant, pursuant to both § 27-74-210 and the H.2 exclusion, it is clear that the unzoned “area” will not include the “land” primarily used for residential purposes.

Based upon the language of Paragraph I.H.2, this court discerns two possible interpretations: one, if there is any land within the proposed area that is predominantly used for residential purposes, the area is ineligible for a billboard; and two, if the overall land within the area is predominately used for residential purposes, the area is ineligible for a billboard. Both of these interpretations are congruent with the Arkansas Highway Beautification Act’s stated purpose of preserving the natural beauty of the State and promoting the reasonable, orderly, and effective display of outdoor advertising. See Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-201(a). The former interpretation is obviously more restrictive; however, AHTD has chosen to use the latter interpretation, as evidenced by the “rule of thumb” analysis it applies to proposed sites. This court concludes that it cannot agree with appellant’s alternative interpretation of the statute and corresponding regulations. Appellant’s proposed interpretation ignores the meaning of Paragraph H as a whole and would operate contrary to the intent of the Highway Beautification Act, which is to preserve pastoral scenery and eliminate disharmonious advertising. See Yarbrough v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 260 Ark. 161, 166, 539 S.W.2d 419, 423 (1976). Pursuant to this finding, we cite with approval the decision of the court of appeals in Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 86 Ark.App. 279, 184 S.W.3d 461 (2004), in which the court held:

Under the terms of Regulation 1(H)(2), however, an area is precluded from being classified as unzoned commercial if it includes land predominantly used for residential purposes. Contrary to Lamar’s proposed construction, the statute and regulation do not require a different analysis if the billboard is placed directly on the commercial lot as opposed to a lot in the surrounding area; it is the character of the entire “boxed” area that is to be considered, regardless of where the billboard is placed in that area.

Id. at 286, 184 S.W.3d at 466. Appellant attempts to distinguish Lamar by noting that in that case, the court was precluded from applying § 27-74-210 to the analysis because Lamar had failed to argue for its application below. However, we find that consideration of the application of § 27-74-210 does not materially affect the analysis; the purpose behind providing a definition for “land predominately used for residential purposes” was to clearly define what properties should be considered “used for residential purposes” as opposed to those with unused or abandoned residences or, as in AHTD’s example, a commercial site that has an overnight guard sleeping on the property. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intent behind the Highway Beautification Acts:

Given the purposes of the state and federal Highway Beautification Acts, it is reasonable to conclude that the Acts intended to prohibit billboards in areas where, although a commercial use exists, there also exists a predominantly residential use. To interpret the statute and regulation as Lamar suggests would mean that a billboard could be placed on a single unzoned commercial lot even if that lot were closely surrounded by residential use, which would be at odds with the purpose of the Acts.

Lamar, 86 Ark.App. at 286, 184 S.W.3d at 466. In conclusion, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the AHTD’s interpretation of the exclusion is clearly wrong, and especially considering the great deference that is given to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutes and regulations, Cave City Nursing Home, supra, we see no basis for reversal on this point.

Regarding appellant’s invocation of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, we note that while the logic of this argument is appealing, it is ultimately unconvincing. Whether the AHTD has been inconsistent in its application of the exclusions is not dispositive of the issue, and further, canons of statutory construction such as nos-citur a sociis are only aids to judicial interpretation, and they will not be applied when there is no ambiguity, to defeat legislative intent and purpose, to make general words meaningless, or to reach a conclusion inconsistent with other rules of construction. United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443 (8th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).

There are also arguments from both parties concerning whether (1) appellant’s interpretation of § 27-74-210 would be preempted by federal law, and (2) AHTD’s interpretation renders the statute and regulations more restrictive than federal law, violating § 27 — 74—211(b). However, as we have no ruling on these issues from either the administrative agency or the circuit court, these arguments are not preserved for our review. Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. Ark Soil & Water Conservation Comm’n, 366 Ark. 50, 233 S.W.3d 615 (2006) (holding that to preserve arguments for appeal, including constitutional arguments, the appellant must obtain a ruling below).

For its second point on appeal, appellant asserts that, even assuming the AHTD correctly interpreted the statutes and regulations, there was no substantial evidence to support the finding that the proposed site was predominately residential. Substantial evidence is evidence that is valid, legal, and persuasive and that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion and force the mind to pass beyond speculation and conjecture. Williams v. Ark. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 353 Ark. 778, 120 S.W.3d 581 (2003). To establish an absence of substantial evidence to support the decision, the challenging party must demonstrate that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded persons could not reach its conclusion. Id.

Appellant’s entire argument on this point consists of the following: “The Marketplace contains a 7,000 square foot showroom while the four residences are of a modest size. Further, the photographs of the area do not show the residential areas predominating the Marketplace.” In response, AHTD asserts that the AHTD hearing officer’s findings of fact were based on testimony received at the hearing, the testimony established that the proposed site contained four residences and is otherwise forested with the exception of one business, and the hearing officer correctly found that this clearly constituted a predominantly residential use.

We find appellant’s argument on this point underdeveloped and unconvincing. Where no citation to authority or convincing argument is offered, this court will decline to address the issue on appeal. Norman v. Norman, 347 Ark. 682, 66 S.W.3d 635 (2002). Further, it appears that appellant raised this argument to the circuit court but failed to raise this argument at the agency level. This court will not set aside an administrative determination upon a ground not presented to the agency because to do so would deprive the agency of the opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action. McQuay v. Ark. State Bd. of Architects, 337 Ark. 339, 989 S.W.2d 499 (1999). See also Teston v. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 361 Ark. 300, 206 S.W.3d 796 (2005) (holding that in order to preserve a constitutional argument in an appeal from an agency decision, the issue must be raised and developed at the administrative level). We therefore affirm the decision to deny the billboard permit.

Affirmed.

HANNAH, C.J., dissenting.

IMBER, J., not participating.

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The Commission is wrong in its interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-210 (Repl. 1994). The location where Seiz Sign Company sought a permit to erect a billboard was in an unzoned commercial or industrial area as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-204(a)(2) (Repl. 1994) and as defined under paragraph 1.H.2 of AHTD’s Regulations. Further, the site was not in a predominately residential area as defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-210 (Repl.1994).

In 1967, the legislature passed the Arkansas Highway Beautification Act, which provided that nothing shall prevent billboards in unzoned commercial or industrial areas. See Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-204(a)(2). The Act allowed the Commission to define unzoned commercial or industrial area. See id. In 1972, the Commission defined the term in pertinent part as “land occupied by the regularly used building, parking lot, and storage or processing area of a commercial, business, or industrial activity, and that land within 600 feet thereof on both sides of the highway. See Regulations for Control of Outdoor Advertising, 001-00-005-8 Ark.Code R. App’x 3(1)(H) (Weil 2008). The unzoned land shall not include ... (2) “Land predominantly used for residential purposes.'” Id. (emphasis added). In 1979, the legislature amended the Act to include section 27-74-210, which defined the term “land predominantly used for residential purposes” for the Commission.

Section 27-74-210 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) It is the legislative intent and purpose of this section to specifically define a certain term used in the [Regulations for Control of Outdoor Advertising ] “predominantly used for residential purposes” as that term is used in enumerating exclusions in the definition of “unzoned commercial, business, or industrial areas,” in order to ... enable the [Commission to more effectively and efficiently and uniformly administer the provisions of this chapter....
(b) “[L]and predominantly used for residential purposes” means only those tracts of land within an unzoned commercial, business, or industrial area ... which are occupied by a building regularly and principally used as a residence ....

Under the plain language of section 27-74-210, the Commission may define as predominantly residential only those specific tracts of land within unzoned commercial, business, or industrial areas that contain residential structures. Because only the tracts containing residences may be predominantly residential, the remaining tracts within the unzoned commercial area are open for billboard erection under the statute.

Generally, “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong.” Nash v. Ark Elevator Safety Board, 370 Ark. 345, 351, 259 S.W.3d 421, 425 (2007). While we defer to the Commission’s factual determinations, we review issues of statutory construction de novo because it is this court’s duty to decide what a statute means. Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., 365 Ark. 133, 135, 226 S.W.3d 753, 755 (2006). While it is true that an agency’s interpretation is highly persuasive, where a statute is not ambiguous, we will not interpret it to mean anything other than what it says. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 494, 996 S.W.2d 20, 25 (1999). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Richard’s Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 52, 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001).

The Commission’s decision is wrong because, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the AHTD denied Seiz a billboard permit where the proposed site was found to be “predominantly residential,” even though the tract had no residential structures. The decision to deny the permit was based upon the residential nature of nearby tracts of land. The plain meaning of section 27-74-210 is that only the tracts of land occupied by a residence are to be considered “land predominantly used for residential purposes.” Because there are no residences located on the tract of land at issue, the AHTD and the Commission misapplied the law in finding the tract to be “land predominantly used for residential purposes.” Therefore, the Commission erred when it failed to reverse AHTD’s decision denying Seiz’s application for a billboard permit.

      . The desirability of billboards in an area near residences is not at issue. The court's duty is to apply the statute as it is written.


author: DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

text:
    2009 Ark. 357
    Larry Franklin WICKHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
    No. CR 08-1309.
    Supreme Court of Arkansas.
    June 18, 2009.

      Montgomery, Adams & Wyatt, PLC, by: James W. Wyatt, Little Rock, for appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
   DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

|, Appellant Larry Franklin Wickham appeals an order of the Marion County Circuit Court ordering him to pay $6,706.22 to Marion County pursuant to its “pay for stay” ordinance, enacted as Marion County Ordinance No.2005-15, as the ordinance conflicts with Ark.Code Ann. § 12-41-505 (Supp.2007), the statutory provision that allows counties to recoup certain expenses. This case was certified to us by the Arkansas Court of Appeals as involving a question of statutory interpretation; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1 — 2(b)(6). We affirm the instant appeal.

Appellant was charged by felony information with one count of rape in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Repl.2006), eighteen counts of engaging children in sexually explicit conduct for use in visual or print medium in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-27-303 (Repl.2006), and eighteen counts of possessing visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-27-602 |2(Repl.20Q6). Immediately prior to trial, Appellant decided to enter into a plea agreement with the State.

A plea hearing was held on July 14, 2008. Appellant announced that he was pleading no contest and stated on the record that he had thoroughly discussed the plea with his attorney and understood the punishment he would receive. Thereafter, the circuit court stated that the plea had been made freely and voluntarily and came after consultation with counsel. The court agreed to sentence Appellant in accordance with the plea agreement and, thus, sentenced him to a term of thirty years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction on one count of sexual assault in the first degree, twenty years’ imprisonment on the count of engaging children in sexually explicit conduct, and ten years’ imprisonment on the charge of possessing visual or print medium depicting a child. The court further ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Additionally, the court imposed a $1,000 fine, court costs of $150, as well as several other fees, including a “pay for stay” fee authorized by Marion County Ordinance No.2005-15. The following discussion occurred at the hearing regarding the “pay for stay” fee:

The Court: ... On the final issue of monetary matter, is the — under this county ordinance for Pay for Stay, it’s the Court’s understanding that given the time that the Defendant has remained in the custody of the Marion County Sheriffs Office, something well over four hundred days, that the — that the standard fee in that would be over twenty-two thousand dollars at this point. The Court is going to set that uh, oh, I’m going to set that at a substantially smaller amount. I guess I’ll set it in at ten thousand dollars, that along with these other obligations will be due and payable subsequent to the Defendant’s release from the Department of Corrections.
|sMr. Wyatt: Your Honor, on that issue, it’s my understanding that in speaking with my client that he basically served on trustee status since last September and I think it was his understanding that his Pay for Stay would be waived from that point on because he works there at the jail, but I don’t know, I mean, I just—
Mr. Wickham: That’s right.
Mr. Mike Moffett (Marion County Jail Administrator): Your Honor, Mr. Wickham has been our Trustee for a little over twelve months. The day that we made him trustee where he began working twelve hours a day, I stopped the jail [inaudible] at that point, he has over six thousand seven hundred and a six dollar jail bill at this time.
Mr. Wyatt: That’s fine, your Honor.
The Court: Alright, let’s go with that, that’s even more reasonable, six thousand what was it?
Mr. Carter: Seven hundred and six dollars and twenty-two cents, that’s medication, transport and jail [inaudible].
The Court: The Court’s making under the Pay for Stay program, making the assessment, six thousand seven hundred and six dollars and twenty-two cents, again, all those financial obligations will be due and payable, beginning at a minimum amount of one hundred dollars per month beginning sixty days after his release from the Department of Corrections on parole.

A judgment and commitment order was entered of record that same day. On July 17, 2008, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of his sentence regarding the “pay for stay” fee. Therein, Appellant argued that section 12-41-505(a) applies only to persons committed to the county jail, not the Arkansas Department of Correction. | ¿Appellant also argued that Ark.Code Ann. § 16-10-305 (Supp. 2007) addressed the issue of court costs and did not authorize the collection of a “pay for stay” fee.

The circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order entered on July 29, 2008. The circuit court found the ordinance to be validly adopted and not contrary to any statutory provision. On August 1, 2008, Appellant filed a motion for clarification that the “pay for stay” fee was not part of his plea agreement. He contended that the “pay for stay” section on the plea form was blank when he executed it and that the matter was subsequently taken up by the court at the plea hearing because there was no agreement as to this issue. The circuit court never ruled on this motion. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 27, 2008, appealing the court’s order requiring him to pay the “pay for stay” fee, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

Appellant’s sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in ordering Appellant to pay $6,706.22 to Marion County, pursuant to its ordinance, as part of the sentence he received in connection with his negotiated plea. Specifically, Appellant argues that the county’s ordinance is in conflict with section 12-41-505(a), as that section applies only to those persons committed to the county jail, not the Arkansas Department of Correction. The State counters that there is no conflict and that the circuit court correctly ordered Appellant to pay such a fee.

| ¿Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure — Criminal 1(a) states that “[ejxcept as provided by ARCrP 24.8(b) there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Thus, other than those appeals from a conditional plea of guilty, this court has only recognized two other exceptions to this restriction on appeals from a guilty plea. See, e.g., Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003); Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999). Those exceptions are (1) an appeal relating to an issue involving testimony or evidence which occurred during a sentencing trial before a jury following a guilty plea; and (2) an appeal from a postjudgment motion to amend an incorrect or illegal sentence following a guilty plea. The instant case falls within this second exception as this is an appeal from the order of the circuit court denying Appellant’s posttrial motion to correct a sentence he claims is illegal.

We review issues involving statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute. See State v. Britt, 368 Ark. 273, 244 S.W.3d 665 (2006). When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we are mindful that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. (quoting Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005)). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Britt, 368 Ark. 273, 244 S.W.3d 665. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds Rmight disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Id. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. Id. With these rules of statutory interpretation in mind, we now turn to the statute at hand.

Section 12-41-505 states in relevant part:

(a)(1) Every person who may be committed to the common jail of the county by lawful authority for any criminal offense or misdemeanor, if he or she shall be convicted, shall pay the expenses in carrying him or her to jail and also for his or her support from the day of his or her initial incarceration for the whole time he or she remains there.
(2) The expenses which accrue shall be paid as directed in the act regulating criminal proceedings.

A plain reading of this subsection does not support Appellant’s argument on appeal. In order to accept Appellant’s argument that it does not apply to persons held in county jails pending a resolution of their criminal cases, we would have to interpret the statute such that the phrase “committed to” is tantamount to incarceration resulting from a final judgment and commitment order. We decline to do so. First, Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (8th ed.2004) defines the word “commit” as “to send (a person) to prison ... esp. by court order.” It further defines “commitment” as “[t]he act of confining a person in prison, mental hospital, or other institution.” Id. The crux of both of those definitions is that a commitment is a confinement and is not necessarily limited to a confinement resulting from a final determination of guilt.

17Such a conclusion is also supported by those statutes governing situations where a person is awaiting trial. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-84-113 (Repl.2005) (allowing a defendant who is “committed to jail” to seek bail); Ark.Code Ann. § 16-84-116 (Repl.2005) (setting forth circumstances where the court may order a defendant to be arrested and “committed to jail” after posting bond). Also, the phrase “if he or she shall be convicted” is indicative of the General Assembly’s intent that section 12-41-505 apply to pretrial detainees. To hold otherwise would render this phrase superfluous, and we will not interpret a word or phrase so that it is left void or superfluous.

Accordingly, we find no merit in Appellant’s argument that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay $6,706.22 to Marion County as part of his sentence.

Affirmed.

      . Appellant has not pursued any argument on appeal regarding the effect of section 16 — 10— 305 on a county’s authority to collect a "pay for stay” fee.