author: GOLDEN, Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 150
    In the Matter of the Retirement Benefits of Ann TOLLEFSON, Appellant (Petitioner), v. WYOMING STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, Appellee (Respondent).
    No. 02-62.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Nov. 20, 2003.

      Representing Appellant: Ann M. Rochelle of Shively, Taheri & Rochelle, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee: Hoke MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General,. Argument by Mr. Hubbard.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   GOLDEN, Justice.

[T1] In 1998, Natrona County School District Number One (the School District) decided to implement a performance based salary system for certain employees. These employees would receive a base salary and then potentially be eligible for additional incentive pay if they achieved certain performance goals. Ann Tollefson received several incentive payments under this program. The Wyoming Retirement System determined that these incentive payments were not salary, but rather constituted "bonus" payments and thus excluded them from the calculation of Tollefson's retirement benefits upon her retirement. Retirement benefits are calculated as a percentage of an employee's highest average salary for a certain number of years. The higher the average salary, the higher the retirement benefits. Thus, the decision of the Wyoming Retirement System to exclude the incentive payments lowered Tollefson's retirement benefit.

[12] Tollefson appealed to the Wyoming Retirement Board (the Board), which upheld the decision of the Wyoming Retirement System. Tollefson then appealed to district court, which certified the appeal to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09. We reverse the decision of the Board and remand with instructions to include the incentive payments in the calculation of Tollefson's retirement benefits.

ISSUES

[13] The parties agree the two issues before this Court are:

1. Did the Wyoming Retirement Board properly conclude that the Performance Salary Awards paid to Petitioner by Na-trong County School District No. One do not constitute "salary" under Wyo. Stat. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi)?
2. Did the Wyoming Retirement Board properly conclude that the Performance Salary Awards paid to Petitioner by Na-trona County School District No. One constitute "bonuses" as excluded by the Board's rules and regulations?

FACTS

[T4] This appeal is presented upon stipulated facts. The pertinent facts as stipulated are as follows:

1. The Petitioner, Ann Tollefson, is a member of the Wyoming Retirement System and has been a member of the Wyoming Retirement System since August 26, 1963.
2. Ann Tollefson retired on July 1, 2000, from Natrona County School District No. One with 394 total months of service. The total months of service is not in dispute in this matter. Ms. Tollefson has been a teacher and an administrator during her career with the Wyoming public schools.
3. During the last three years of her career, 1997 through 2000, Ms. Tollefson was the Executive Director of School-Community Relations and Resource Development with Natrona County School District No. One. This is a "cabinet level" position.
4. In 1998, the Natrona County School District No. One Board of Trustees started a new compensation system called "performance pay" for cabinet level employees. This new compensation system was the first such system for any employees in Natrona County School District No. One. Similar systems have been established by Natrona County School District No. One for administrators other than cabinet level positions starting school year 1998-1999; teachers starting the school year 1999-2000; and classified employees to begin with school year 1999-2000. . . .
5. On May 830, 2000, Ann Tollefson filed an Application for Retirement with the Wyoming Retirement System. The Application selected Option 1 retirement, with an effective retirement date of July 1, 2000.
*ooth ock
8... . B. In the calculation of Ann Tollef-son's retirement benefit the Wyoming Retirement System did not include amounts that were refunded due to "unacceptable bonus" or "performance pay." ...
10. By letter dated February 2, 2000, the Wyoming Retirement System notified the Natrona County Schools of the return of the contributions paid on bonus pay for Ann Tollefson ....
11. By letter dated July 25, 2000, the Wyoming Retirement System notified the Natrona County Schools of the return of the contributions paid on "performance pay" for Aun Tollefson, as well as other employees....
25. It is the position of the Wyoming Retirement System that the Performance Pay received by Ann Tollefson in this matter is a "bonus" and under the rule does not meet the definition of "cash remuneration."
26. It is Ann Tollefson's position that "performance pay" received by Ann Tollef-son is not a "bonus" under the applicable rule and meets the definition of "cash remuneration" in the statutes and the rules.
27. The performance salary compensation system initiated by the Natrona County School District No. One Board of Trustees is an ongoing, permanent system established to compensate all employees.
28. Not all employees who are eligible for "performance salary awards" receive them. ... The Performance Salary Awards granted by Natrona County School District No. One vary with the performance of the individual employee as evaluated by the assigned evaluators.
29. Performance Salary Awards are an incentive to encourage employee performance in Natrona County School District No. One.

[15] Attached to the Stipulation of Facts and incorporated therein are several documents. These documents help explain the compensation scheme implemented by the School District. The performance salary compensation system, as explained by the School District and reflected in employee contracts, entails the establishment of a Performance Salary Range (PSR) for each employee. The PSR essentially is a pay band. Employees are assigned a Basic Salary (BS) from within the PSR. The BS is the fixed annual salary and is the least annual compensation an employee can expect to receive during the year. In addition to the BS, the pay system provides for Performance Salary (PS). The PS is the difference between the BS and the top of the PSR. The BS and the PS together represent the maximum amount that an employee can earn in an annual period.

[16] As stated in Tollefson's employment contracts, the employee "may earn" a PS award not to exceed the difference between the employee's BS and the maximum of her PSR. Employees are evaluated four times a year to provide feedback on their performances and the Superintendent and the Board Compensation Sub-committee determine the PS award as a part of the second and fourth evaluation. As stated in the facts, the PS awards granted by the School District vary with the performance of the individual employee as evaluated by the assigned evaluators. Not all employees receive PS awards after evaluation. The School District, however, established a salary budget equal to the top of each employee's PSR.

[17] -In its initial proposal, dated November 23, 1998, the School District explained the rationale for the performance pay system as follows:

In years past, salaries for the Superintendent and Cabinet-level employees were based on an annually determined percentage increase added to the existing salary of each employee. It is the desire of the Board Chair and the Compensation SubCommittee to dramatically change this previous compensation norm to one which emphasizes market standards, responsibility, and performance. It is believed that the Pilot Performance-Based Compensation Plan . provides a rationale and structure for compensation which addresses this premise. The two major goals of the proposed program are as follows:
1) to reward superior performance which produces improved opportunities and resources for students; and
2) to provide an incentive for executive administrators to achieve the goals and objectives of the District as established by the Board of Trustees.
By awarding compensation using a performance-based system, executive administrators will have a greater incentive to perform their jobs, both individually and collaboratively, at the highest level possible.... f
In the Natrona County School District, where the focus is on innovation, choice, opportunity, and improving achievement, this departure from traditional security-based pay systems which determine salaries based solely on longevity, is an appropriate method to address compensation. The proposed program requires a deep level of trust and relationship between the Board and the executive staff. It also promotes a continuous dialogue about the [sic] providing the best educational program possible for District students and rewarding those who commit to high expectations and high performance.

Attached to the Stipulation of Facts are annual "Work Plans" and semi-annual "Reports to Request Performance Salary." The Reports specifically reference the Work Plans and indicate the status of each task identified in the respective work plan.

[18] Tollefson received four PS installments prior to her retirement. Tollefson paid contributions into the Wyoming Retirement System for both her BS and her PS. The Wyoming Retirement System returned her contributions for her PS declaring that the PS was bonus pay and therefore unacceptable retirement salary. When Tollefson retired, the Wyoming Retirement System refused to calculate the PS into the final average salary from which it determined the amount of retirement due Tollefson, again claiming that the PS. constituted bonus pay which is excluded from salary calculations for the purpose of determining retirement benefits. Tollefson requested a hearing before the Board, which upheld the decision of the Wyoming Retirement System,. Tollefson appealed that decision to the district court, which certified the appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On review of petitions for judicial review certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09, we invoke the same standard of review applicable to the district courts. We review administrative decisions in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 16-3-114 (LexisNexis 2008):

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(i) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

Because this case was submitted upon stipulated facts, we are only concerned with the Retirement Board's conclusions of law. We review an agency's conclusions of law de novo. We affirm an agency's conclusions if the agency properly applied the correct rule of law to its findings of fact. Texaco, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 398, 399 (Wyo.1993). If, however, the ageney applied the incorrect rule of law to its findings or if it improperly applied the correct rule of law to its findings, we correct the agency's errors. Id.; see Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, Crook County, 2002 WY 167, ¶¶ 7-8, 57 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Wyo.2002); DC Production Service v. Wyo. Dep't of Employment, 2002 WY 142, ¶¶ 6-7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo.2002) (Appellant "contends that the legal conclusions based on the factual findings are not in accordance with law. An agency's conclusion of law is entitled to no deference from this Court. We will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law.") "When the determination before us is a mixed question of fact and law, we defer to an agency's findings of basic fact but correct misapplication of the law to those facts. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Wyo.1992) (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 860-61 (Wyo.1990))." Antelope Valley Imp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo.1999).

[T10] Likewise, to the extent this appeal involves mixed questions of law and fact:

When an agency's determinations contain elements of law and fact, we will not treat them as findings of fact. We extend deference only to agency findings of "basic fact." When reviewing a finding of "ultimate fact," we divide the factual and legal aspects of the finding to determine whether the correct rule of law has been properly applied to the facts. If the correct rule of law has not been properly applied, we do not defer to the agency's finding but correct the agency's error in either stating or applying the law.

Union Pacific R.R. Co., 802 P.2d at 861.

DISCUSSION

[111] Tollefson objects to the reduction in her retivement benefit caused by the exclusion of her PS awards from her salary by the Board. The legal question to be resolved is whether the PS awards received by Tollefson constitute "salary" for purposes of computing Tollefson's retirement benefit.

[T12] The Wyoming Retirement Act defines "salary" in pertinent part as "cash remuneration paid to a member in a calendar year." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi) (LexisNexis 2008). This Court defined "remuneration" in Mowry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729 (Wyo.1993):

Black's Law Dictionary defines remuneration as "{rleward; recompense; salary; compensation." Black's Law Dictionary at 1165 (5th ed.1979). Each of the terms used to define "remuneration" are also defined in Black's as referring to payments made in exchange for something equivalent, such as services rendered. Id., at 1188, 1144, 1200, 256. Websters' Third
New International Dictionary (1966) defines "remunerate" as: "1: to pay an equivalent for (as a service, loss or expense) 2: to pay an equivalent to (a person) for service, loss or expense," and defines "remuneration" as "remunerating." Thus, the plain and ordinary meaning of remuneration clearly contemplates payments made in return for something equivalent.

Id. at 781. In Mowry, this Court held that severance pay did not fall within the definition of salary because "definitions suggest that 'severance pay' is primarily gratuitous and, although it may be intended to partially alleviate the loss of employment, it is not an attempt to equally compensate the employee for services rendered, losses suffered, or expenses incurred." Id.

[113] The Board has promulgated a rule defining "cash remuneration":

"Cash remuneration," as used in W.S. 9-8-402(a)(xvi) for the purposes of contributions to the system and the determination of an employee's "highest average salary," means the compensation paid for services rendered to a participating employer, and includes: contributions required by W.S. 9-3-412; any salary reduction or salary deferral amounts under federal Internal Revenue Code Sections 125, 401(k), 408(b) or 457; any pay for administrative, sabbatical, annual, sick, vacation, or personal leave; any pay for compensatory time, provided that any such pay for compensatory time is made during the same calendar year in which the compensatory time is earned, and any retroactive compensation payments pursuant to court orders, arbitration awards, or litigation and grievance settlements. "Cash remuneration" does not include: fringe benefits such as payments for unused sick, personal or vacation leave; housing allowances; transportation expenses; early retirement incentive pay; severance pay; bonuses; medical insurance; workers' compensation benefits; disability insurance premiums or benefits; payments received by a member in lieu of previously employer-provided fringe benefits under an agreement between the member and participating employer entered into within sixty months before retirement; any other payment which may reasonably be construed to be a fringe benefit; or any payment made during any three-year period of employment which is deemed to increase highest average salary for the primary purpose of increasing a retirement benefit.

Wyo. Retirement Bd., Rules, ch. 8 § 1(a) (1996). According to this definition, any amount received as a "bonus" is excluded from the calculation of retirement benefits. "Bonus" is not defined by either statute or rule. The rule does not specifically address incentive pay or merit pay.

[114] The task before this Court is to construe the record evidence relating to Tollefson's employment to determine if PS awards are "payments made in return for something equivalent." Our focus is on the intent of Tollefson and the School Board with regard to the compensation scheme. Our appellate obligation is to interpret and construe contracts as a matter of law in order to shed light on the intention and understanding of the parties. Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical, 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo.1980) ("Our basic purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and understanding of the parties.") Intention is determined from the words of the contract, if the language is clear and unambiguous, and we must consider the writing as a whole, taking into account the relationships between the various parts. Id. After reviewing the employment contract, the stipulated facts, and the other documents attached thereto, we conclude that PS is "salary" for retirement purposes. PS is a contractually integrated component of an employee's compensation for services rendered.

[T 15] It is stipulated that the School District implemented a performance based compensation system and that this system is an ongoing, permanent system established to compensate all employees. As noted above, the School District explained the compensation system in its initial proposal. The entire proposal speaks to changing the salary structure. The School District wanted to depart "from traditional security-based pay systems which determine salaries based solely on longevity." The School District wanted to create a compensation system that "emphasizes market standards, responsibility, and performance." The proposal says nothing about gratuitous bonuses; it speaks only to performance pay based upon the quality and timeliness of completion of standard work tasks. The proposal leaves no doubt that the School District intended its new compensation scheme to provide the method by which employees earn their complete salary based upon their performance.

[116] The Performance Based Compensation Plan as described by the School District in its original proposal is reflected in the language of Tollefson's employment contracts. The record contains two contracts of employment. The first contract was for the 1998-1999 school year, but it was not executed until April 1999 and was backdated to July 1, 1998. The second contract is for the 1999-2000 school year. It was executed in December 1999. The language pertaining to salary is virtually identical in both contracts:

The Administrator's Performance Salary Range will be $55,000.00 (minimum) to $75,000.00 (maximum). The Administrator's Basic Salary will be $65,500.00. The Administrator may earn a Performance Salary Award not to exeeed the difference between the Administrator's Basic Salary and the maximum of his/her Performance Range.

For any renewals of this contract as provided for in paragraph one herein, it is anticipated that the Administrator will be evaluated four times a year to provide feedback on his/her performance as scheduled below.

The Superintendent and Board Compensation Sub-Committee will determine the Administrative Performance Salary Award as a part of the second and fourth evaluations for any future contracts. The Performance Salary Award will be paid to the Administrator in accordance with the above schedule.

[T 17] The language of the employment contract implements the performance salary system as outlined in the School District's initial proposal. The employment contract provides for a base salary and a performance salary. As the contract notes, the employee's performance is evaluated four times a year. The performance salary is awarded as a part of the second and fourth evaluations. While perhaps it could have been written more distinctly, it is nevertheless clear from the language of the contract that the award of performance salary is directly tied to the individual performance of the employee.

[T18] Further, as the system is implemented, the performance of the employee is evaluated according to objectively defined criteria. The work plans in the record are very specifically individualized to Tollefson. As the Board found in its order, "[the work plan shows the tasks assigned, the task leader, the start date, the end date, success criteria/measures and state/national standard, as well as the [School] Board Goal Priority." Each work plan consists of over thirty tasks that are specifically assigned to Tollefson. Other tasks for which Tollefson has administrative oversight responsibility are also listed. These work plans are the foundation for the award of performance pay. Tollefson's requests for performance pay directly mirror the work plans. The requests are comprised of the tasks listed in the work plans, the status of each task, and any comments with regards to the task's completion. Thus, the awards of PS were expressly linked to Tollefson's services personally rendered and meet the definition of cash remuneration.

[119] On appeal, the Board adamantly argues that this Court should not consider the work plans or the requests for performance pay because there is no direct evidentiary link between these documents and the award of performance pay. Indeed, in its order, despite acknowledging the work plans and requests, the Board found that "Itlhere is nothing to show that the remuneration was carefully tied to actual services rendered." In reaching this conclusion, the Board viewed the evidence before it too narrowly. While no direct evidence was presented expressly linking the work plans and requests for performance salary to the award of performance salary, the documentation in this case is closely related. The relationship should not be ignored.

[€120] It is appropriate to draw reasonable inferences from evidence presented. The School Board presented its initial compensation proposal on November 28, 1998. The first work plan in the record is a work plan as revised on November 29, 1998, within a few days of the proposal. The first request for performance pay is dated March 11, 1999. The first award of performance pay occurred in late March 1999. The employment contract, retroactive to July 1998, was formally executed in early April 1999. The language of the employment contract leaves no doubt as to the relationship between the employment contract and the other documentation. The employment contracts contain "Recitals" that acknowledge that the parties successfully negotiated an agreement and are only now attempting to put it in writing because "the parties have conducted themselves pursuant to the mutually negotiated terms and conditions of this Contract of Employment to each party's satisfaction." Thus, put in context, it is reasonable to infer that the work plans and the requests for performance salary relate to the award of PS as provided for in the contract of employment. The Board erred in not examining these documents when determining the nature of the PS award. The evidence considered as a whole establishes that PS is awarded in direct relation to the individual services performed by the employee.

[T21] In the instant case, the Board held that PS is a bonus and not salary because:

The Performance Pay Awards are not guaranteed as part of the employee's employment contract. The Performance Pay Awards are not contractually due if the goals are met. The Performance Pay Award is determined by the Superintendent and the Board of Compensation SubCommittee. In addition, it is unlikely that the Performance Pay Award would be paid if goals are not met.

(emphasis in original). Essentially, the Board determined that PS is a gratuitous bonus because PS awards are discretionary, with no specific payment contractually guaranteed.

[122] We believe this views the issue too narrowly. Our definition of remuneration in Mowry only states that the payment must be directly related to the current employment efforts of the employee. A payment is not disqualified simply because it is discretionary. A payment also is not disqualified because it is offered as an incentive to an employee to achieve specific goals and objectives. Certainly any purely gratuitous payment would be excluded from "salary." Just as certainly, however, any payment that is a contractual "attempt to equally compensate the employee for services rendered" will fall within the definition of "salary."

[123] The fact that no specific payment is contractually guaranteed by itself is not decisive. The focus is on the reason behind the discretionary payment. The School District introduced the incentive factor to improve personal productivity. The discretionary factor is governed by objective goals for personal productivity. Thus, PS is strictly tied to personal productivity. It is quite consistent that some employees do not receive any PS. They simply did not perform the tasks necessary to earn the extra compensation. Instead of supporting the Board's determination that PS is a bonus, the fact that some individual employees earn different amounts of PS, including no PS, actually supports the finding that PS is salary that has to be earned through individual effort.

CONCLUSION

[124] From the stipulated facts, the doe-uments, and the practices they would necessarily dictate, it is clear that, as required by Mowry, there is a direct relationship linking the employee's own performance and the compensation to which that employee is entitled. PS is an integral part of an employee's remuneration for services rendered. The order of the Board is reversed and this case is remanded with specific instructions that the Wyoming Retirement System must include PS in its calculation of retirement benefits for Tollefson and all similarly situated employees.

      . There seems to be some confusion as to whether the case was certified, or if only the questions were certified to this court. A review of the order of the district court makes clear that the district court was certifying the entire case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

      . We note that Tollefson, on appeal, has included an affidavit explaining the correlation between the work plans, the requests for performance salary and the awarding of performance salary. The Board has objected to the introduction of what it considers to be new evidence at the appellate stage. There is record evidence that the affidavit was submitted to the Board. However, the affidavit is not included in the administrative record, and the findings of fact in the final order suggest that the Board did not consider the affidavit in reaching its determination. Therefore, this Court has not relied upon any information included in the affidavit in its review of this appeal.

      . We recognize that the dates on the second contract are not consistent. In some paragraphs the effective date is given as July 1, 1999, while in other paragraphs the term of the contract is given as from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999. We perceive this inaccuracy to be a scrivener's error and accept that the contract covers the time period from 1999 to 2000.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LEHMAN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2003 WY 152
    Allen Marty ADAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 02-190.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Nov. 21, 2003.

      Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Ko-ski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Do-monkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellant Counsel. Argument by Mr. Roden.
    Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   LEHMAN, Justice.

[11] After trial, a jury convicted appellant Allen Marty Adams (Adams) of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1042 and 85-7-1081(a)(i). (LexisNexis 2003) and delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Aun. § Adams claims multiple errors arising from accomplice/co-conspirator testimony given at trial, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm.

ISSUES

[12] Appellant sets forth the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury on the applicable law in Wyoming regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony, and by failing to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony?
2. Did plain error occur when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the law regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony, failed to either find as a matter of law that certain witnesses were accomplices/co-conspirators or submitting that question to the jury, and failed to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice/eo-conspirator testimony?
3. Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to request the trial court to give the jury instructions regarding testimony of accomplices and co-conspirators?
4. Was the evidence insufficient to convict Appellant of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance?
5. Was there insufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions for the crimes charged and stated in the jury instructions and verdict?
6. Did plain error occur when the state solicited testimony that Ben and Brooke Leibee and Jayme Hartmann were conviect-ed of offenses arising out of the civreum-stances leading to Appellant's trial, thus depriving Appellant of his right to a fair trial on its own merits?

FACTS

[13] On July 6, 2001, an amended information was filed alleging, in part, that between December of 1999 and June 27, 2001, Adams unlawfully conspired with Benjamin Tyson Leibee (Benjamin), Brooke Nichole Leibee (Brooke), Jayme Lynne Hartmann (Hartmann), and others to deliver methamphetamine and that Adams also unlawfully delivered methamphetamine to Benjamin in May of 2001. At trial, numerous witnesses testified, including both the Leibees, Hart-mann, Leann Redfearn, Patrick Neuman, Amy Sundstrom, Diane Cherry, and Adams. Ultimately, the jury found Adams guilty of conspiring to deliver methamphetamine and delivery of methamphetamine as charged. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[14] We stated in Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶¶ 4-7, 46 P.3d 298, ¶¶ 4-7 (Wyo.2002):

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is well established. We assess whether all the evidence presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We leave out of consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party which conflicts with the successful party's evidence, and afford every favorable inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence. Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1228 (Wyo.2000); Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1123 (Wyo.1997); Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 480 (Wyo.1997).
It is also well established that a trial court has a duty to instruct a jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case at issue. A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation. Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo.2000).
Jury instructions shall not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions confused or misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced the defendant. Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000). Prejudicial error must be demonstrated, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000). Further, a failure to instruct properly on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Id.
Finally, this court will find that plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error, 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and 3) the party claiming error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2000); Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo.1996).

See Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶¶ 36 and 42, 75 P.3d 628, ¶¶ 36 and 42 (Wyo.2003).

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[15] Adams asserts that the evidence against him was insufficient because it came almost entirely from persons who could be characterized as accomplices/co-conspirators. Specifically, Adams maintains that a conviction cannot be founded upon the testimony of accomplices/co-conspirators unless that testimony is corroborated by other testimony presented at trial from a non-accomplice/non-conspirator.

[16] We recently addressed a very similar argument in Vlahos. Therein Vlahos claimed that the State relied exclusively on accomplice/co-conspirator testimony and such testimony was not sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy under Wyoming law. Vlahos also alleged that, even if all the witnesses were not accomplices/co-conspirators, the only witness whose testimony connected him with acts in furtherance of the conspiracy was unquestionably an accomplice/co-conspirator. Thus, Vlahos argued that insufficient evidence existed to support the conviction without other witnesses to corroborate the accomplice/co-conspirator's testimony.

[17] In Vlahos, after this court clarified the distinctions between an accomplice and a co-conspirator, it stated:

Wyoming law is that a conviction may be had upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice. Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 851, 360 (Wyo.1996). Thus, in Wyoming as well as in other states that follow the common law, no corroboration of accomplice testimony is required, and a conviction can be sustained on such testimony alone if it is convincing and credible. Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo.1983); Filbert v. State, 486 P.2d 959, 960 (Wyo.1968). Application of this principle to the present facts leads to the conclusion that no corroborating evidence was required if the witnesses Mr. Vlahos refers to can be properly characterized as accomplices.

T28. This court then continued to make an in-depth analysis of both in-state, as well as out-of-state, case authorities dealing with co-conspirator testimony and held

that independent evidence corroborating a conspiracy is not necessary when a cocon-spirator appears at trial and presents direct testimony of the conspiracy and the defendant's involvement therein. A cocon-spirator's in-court testimony is sufficient independent evidence to support a conspiracy conviction.

Vlahos, at ¶ 35. In reaching its conclusion this court cited as authority the case of United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484, 1487 (10th Cir.1986), which upheld a conspiracy convietion over the defendant's objection that it was based on co-conspirator testimony. In Szabo, at 1487 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895)), the court stated:

There is no constitutional requirement that such testimony be examined for trustworthiness before being placed before the jury. Rather, the Confrontation Clause, in its optimum application, envisions: "[A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."

Therefore, this court clarified that evidence corroborating the co-conspirator's statement is necessary when out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator are utilized. Conversely, when in-court statements of a co-conspirator are involved, independent evidence of the conspiracy is not required.

[18] Adams identifies both the Leibees and Hartmann as accomplices/co-conspirators. Given the applicable law set forth above and the fact that each gave direct testimony at trial, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether these individuals were accomplices or co-conspirators. Rather, we must simply address the specific question of whether Adams' convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.

[19] Sufficient evidence was presented to find that Adams committed each of the crimes alleged. Benjamin testified that he sold methamphetamine for Adams in Sheridan during the alleged time period. He explained that some drugs were sold through him as a go-between for Adams, and other drugs were sold when Adams met directly with the buyer. Benjamin stated that Adams usually arrived in Sheridan with the methamphetamine and stayed either with the Leibees at their residence or at either the Aspen Inn or Comfort Inn while the drugs were being sold. He also testified that Adams owned a scale and sometimes weighed and packaged the drugs at the Lei-bee residence. Benjamin stated that he received small quantities of methamphetamine for assisting in the selling and that Adams retained the monetary proceeds from the sales. Benjamin also identified the scale found when Adams and Hartmann were arrested as the scale owned by Adams. Benjamin further testified that Adams kept his methamphetamine and money in Adams' backpack and orange day timer.

[110] In addition, Benjamin claimed that he received methamphetamine from Adams in Gillette to sell and that he purchased methamphetamine from Adams for his personal use on several occasions. In particular, Benjamin recounted that he personally purchased methamphetamine from Adams on one occasion in May of 2001 when Adams was staying at the Aspen Inn with Neuman and two females. Benjamin specified that Adams sold the drugs to him in the bathroom and supplied him with a syringe.

[T11] Brooke testified that she used and sold methamphetamine in Sheridan for three to four years and that during this time frame she bought methamphetamine from Adams countless times. She further admitted to selling methamphetamine for Adams with Benjamin. Brooke stated that Adams came to Sheridan on a number of occasions in 2000 and 2001 for the purpose of selling methamphetamine and stayed with the Leibees at their residence or in a motel while doing so. Most of the time Adams would obtain a ride to Sheridan, and on a number of occasions she provided Adams with transportation for these trips from Gillette. Brooke also stated that although the methamphetamine was usually packaged when Adams arrived in Sheridan, she sometimes assisted Adams in weighing and packaging the methamphetamine at her home. Brooke also claimed that she gave the proceeds from the sales of methamphetamine to Adams and that Adams supplied her with methamphetamine as payment for her assistance. In addition, Brooke testified that Adams kept his methamphetamine, a digital scale, and money in a backpack and orange pouch/day timer. She similarly identified the scale found when Adams and Hartmann were arrested as being the scale owned by Adams.

[112] Furthermore, Brooke stated that she sold methamphetamine that she received from Adams to Cherry on several occasions. On one such occasion, Adams accompanied her to Cherry's residence and exchanged methamphetamine for Cherry's two stereo speakers. Brooke also recounted that she sold methamphetamine that she had received from Adams to Redfearn. She additionally stated that a sale of methamphetamine was accomplished at another time when she and Adams went to Redfearn's residence and Adams provided drugs to Ray Hahn, Red-fearn's boyfriend.

[113] Cherry, Redfearn, Neuman, Hart-mann, and Sundstrom each testified concerning their involvement with Adams. Cherry stated that she received methamphetamine from Brooke on several occasions in Sheridan during 2000 and 2001. She assumed that these drugs were supplied by Adams. She also recalled that on one occasion Adams waited for Brooke in the car when Brooke brought her methamphetamine. Cherry further admitted to buying eight ounces of methamphetamine from Adams between Christmas of 2000 and February of 2001 in Gillette and exchanging with Adams her two stereo speakers for methamphetamine.

[114] Redfearn testified that she received methamphetamine from Brooke and that Brooke usually telephoned her to advise that Adams was coming to town before Brooke would deliver the methamphetamine. She also recalled that Adams accompanied Brooke to her home and Adams had in his possession a brown bag with methamphetamine in it. Adams then went into a bedroom with her boyfriend, Hahn. Thereafter, Hahn exited the bedroom with methamphetamine in his possession. Redfearn also saw Adams in possession of a large amount of money on one occasion.

[115] Neuman stated that he stayed with Adams at the Aspen Inn in Sheridan for one night in May 2001 and that he and Adams used methamphetamine together. Later on that date, Benjamin and a friend came to see Adams. Neuman then recounted that Benjamin and Adams went into the bathroom and that Benjamin left soon thereafter. Neuman further stated that he had seen Adams with methamphetamine at the Leibee residence and that Adams shared that methamphetamine with him. He also remembered that Adams kept methamphetamine in his orange day timer.

[116] Hartmann admitted to using and selling methamphetamine and that on June 27, 2001, she and Adams attempted, without success, to locate some methamphetamine to sell. She stated that Adams had been staying with her at her home and that he had tried to sell her the scale found under the passenger seat of her vehicle where Adams had been sitting when they were arrested. Hartmann stated that she got methamphetamine primarily from the Leibees but that Adams was the source of that methamphetamine. She also testified that Adams kept his money in an orange bag.

[117] Sundstrom indicated that she had seen Adams sell methamphetamine at the Leibee residence in June of 2001. She further stated that Adams possessed various quantities of pre-packaged methamphetamine during that time period. Sundstrom also testified that she observed Adams and Brooke weighing and packaging methamphetamine in Brooke's bedroom and selling it to whoever entered the room. Sundstrom also stated that Adams kept his methamphetamine, a scale, and money in his orange day timer, and that she recalled seeing a big "wad" of money in the day timer.

[118] Adequate evidence existed in this case for the jury to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when such evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. As stated previously, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Black v. State, at ¶ 4. "We assume the jury duly considered all the testimony and gave it the weight to which it was entitled." Vlahos, at ¶ 41 (citing Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 991 (Wyo.1998)). We have further recognized that:

The State satisfies its burden of proof in a conspiracy case involving controlled substances by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there existed at least a tacit understanding between the defendant and a co-conspirator to commit an act vio-lative of Wyoming's Controlled Substances Act; and (2) the defendant intended to commit the elements of the offense which was the object of the understanding. Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to establish a conspiracy due to the covert nature of the crime.

Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo.1996) (citing Gilliam v. State, 890 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wyo.1995) and Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 110 (Wyo.1992)). The evidence outlined above satisfied both these elements in support of Adams' convictions.

[119] Adams further alleges that his convictions cannot be sustained under the principles espoused in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo.1995). See also May v. State, 2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo.2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo.2002); King v. State, 2002 WY 27, 40 P.3d 700 (Wyo.2002); and Cloman v. State, 574 P.2d 410 (Wyo.1978). According to Adams, because the State failed to specify with whom each of the identified co-conspirators Adams conspired, i.e., the Leibees or Hartmann, and because the jury was not required to do so by way of a special verdiet form, the State is required to provide sufficient evidence that Adams conspired with all of them. Adams also contends that his delivery conviction cannot stand because it is questionable whether the jury found that he delivered methamphetamine to Benjamin or Neuman in May of 2001.

[120] The same problem that existed in the above-cited cases, however, does not exist in this case. Here, the instructions given to the jury concerning the charges alleged do not contain alternative theories upon which a conviction could be based. Rather, the jury instruction given concerning the conspiracy charge stated:

The elements of the erime of Conspiracy to Deliver a Controlled Substance, as charged in Count I are:
1. On or between December 1999 and June 27, 2001,
2. -In Sheridan County, Wyoming{,]
3. The Defendant, Allen Marty Adams,
4. Agreed with one or more persons [,]
5. That they or one or more of them would commit the crime of delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the jury instruction pertaining to the alleged crime of delivery provided:

The elements of the crime of Delivery of a Controlled Substance, as charged in Count II are:
1. On or about the month of May, 2001(,]
2. In Sheridan County, Wyomingl,]
3. The Defendant, Allen Marty Adams,
4. Delivered a controlled substance, methamphetamine, to another person.

(Emphasis added.)

[121] Bush and its progeny do not require that the jury verdict be premised on a finding that Adams conspired with each of the Leibees and Hartmann just because they were all identified in the charging document. Rather, those cases require only that when two separate actions or theories of a crime are specified in the alternative that both of the actions or theories be supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. Here, the jury instruction given required that the jury find that Adams conspired with "another person." In any event, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that Adams conspired with each of the Leibees and Hartmann.

[122] Likewise, Busk and subsequent cases do not mandate that Adams' delivery conviction be reversed based on his speculation regarding the basis for the verdict rendered. Adams' delivery conviction is sustainable so long as sufficient evidence was presented that he delivered methamphetamine "to another" in May of 2001. In this instance, the record evidences that the delivery charge surrounded Adams' delivery of methamphetamine to Benjamin. Therefore, it is unlikely that the jury's verdict was based on the jury's finding that Adams delivered methamphetamine to Neuman as Adams argues.

Jury Instructions

[123] Adams argues that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on Wyoming law regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony. He asserts that error occurred when no instructions were given to the jury to inform it that a conspiracy cannot be proved solely by the testimony of a co-conspirator. Adams also contends that the jury must be instructed that accomplice/co-conspirator testimony must be viewed with caution and supported by corroborating evidence and that the witnesses constituting accomplices/co-conspirators of Adams must be identified for the jury. Because defense counsel did not offer any such instructions or object to the proposed instructions, we review Adams' claims under the plain error standard.

[124] As stated previously, a conviction may be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if it is convincing and eredible. In-court testimony of a co-conspirator is sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Given the status of the law concerning both accomplice testimony and the "in-court" testimony of co-conspirators, identification of the trial witnesses that were characterized as either accomplices or co-conspirators would serve no purpose. Therefore, the district court did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law by not instructing the jury in such a manner nor is Adams able to show that he was prejudiced. Adams, accordingly, has not established plain error in that regard. See Vlahos v. State, at ¶¶ 42-45.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[125] Adams further contends that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the district court instruct the jury concerning accomplice/co-conspirator testimony. As noted above, the law does not require corroborating evidence of accomplice testimony or in-court co-conspirator testimony. Hence, Adams' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unpersuasive. See Vlahos, at ¶ 48.

Statements of the Prosecution

[126] Finally, Adams asserts the prosecution committed plain error when it elicited testimony and thereafter inferred in closing argument that the Leibees and Hart-mann had been convicted of offenses arising out of the same cireumstances for which Adaros had been charged. Thus Adams claims that the State improperly suggested that the jury could infer that Adams was guilty of the crimes alleged against him because an accomplice/co-conspirator of his was guilty. In support of this contention, Adams cites the case of Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo.1979) and subsequent cases addressing the same subject.

[127] In Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d at 969, we recognized:

Appellant relies upon Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1872 (Wyo.1979), in making his argument that admitting his co-conspirators' testimony was a prejudicial error which mandates a reversal. In that case, this Court ruled that, "when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same cireumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other." 596 P.2d at 18375. "[Elvidence of a witness' guilt for an offense which arose out of a cireumstance leading to the defendant's trial implies that the defendant is also guilty. Such an implication violates a defendant's right to have a trial on its own merits." Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 595 (Wyo.1992), denial of habeas corpus aff'd sub. nom. Wells v. Shillinger, 37 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir.1994). See also Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236 (Wyo.1994); Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001 (Wyo.1979). The defendant in Kwallek presented appropriate and timely objections to the testimony which was given about his co-conspirator's guilty plea. 596 P.2d at 1876. The Court determined that the trial court's admission of the guilty plea evidence amounted to a prejudicial error. Id.

[T28] In this case, as was the case in Urrutia, Adams did not object to the statements by the prosecutor that he now claims were made in error. Applying a plain error analysis, review of the record reveals that Benjamin testified that he had been convicted of delivering marijuana after authorities conducted a controlled buy at his residence. Similarly, both Brooke and Hart-mann testified that they had been convicted of delivering controlled substances. Brooke stated that she was convicted of delivering both marijuana and methamphetamine, while Hartmann testified she was convicted of delivering methamphetamine. The prosecutor then made comments concerning these circumstances during closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:

What makes sense? I'm going to ask you to use your common sense. I mean if what he's [Adam's] telling you is true, that everybody else is lying, then why would everybody else lie? The ones that are in jail, the ones that have been convicted said, I did something. I did it. Who did you do it with? Marty. Why would they do that?
And I talked a little bit in jury selection about my witnesses being drug dealers, drug users.... I hope you don't hold it against the State that some of my star witnesses are people that came in here in handcuffs. People that deal drugs, buy drugs are criminals. They are criminals. They are in jail. They are criminals. They are convicted felons. And Marty Adams was involved in it, and he is right along with them.

Therefore, it is clear that the first prong of the plain error test was satisfied. In addition, a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated as Kwallek and its progeny dictate.

[¥29] However, Adams has not shown that he suffered material prejudice as a result of the statements made by the prosecutor. In applying the factors set forth in Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 539 (Wyo.2000), we do not recognize that the prosecutor's remarks had any significant tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused. Further, the prosecutor's remarks were not extensive. As we have already explained, substantial evidence existed for Adams' convictions. Additionally, we find that absent the remarks made by the prosecutor, the strength of the evidence used to establish Adams' guilt was substantial.

[130] We also recognize, as this court did in Urrutia, 924 P.2d at 970, that, because the jury's attention was not inordinately directed to the improper statements, this case is distinguishable from Kwallek. In Kwallek, the defendant was prejudiced, in part, because the trial court twice overruled the defendant's objections and the jury may have been improperly left with the intent of the judge by these rulings. Such did not occur in this case as no objections were made by Adams. See also Black v. State, at ¶¶ 44-45.

[131] Further, in this case the defense upon cross-examination questioned the Lei-bees about the cireumstances surrounding their respective convictions in an effort to discredit their testimony. Indeed, Adams' trial strategy was to assert that it was the Leibees who sold methamphetamine and that Adams merely bought drugs from them for his own personal use. Adams further stated that he made trips to Sheridan primarily to see his girlfriend, Andrea Weber, a cousin of the Leibees, and to buy methamphetamine from the Leibees for his own personal use. In addition, Adams testified that he merely gave Benjamin a syringe in the bathroom in May of 2001 so that Benjamin could inject the methamphetamine that Benjamin had brought with him. Adams also claimed that he purchased the stereo speakers from Cherry for cash. Accordingly, it appears that the statements made by the prosecutor may have served, in actuality, to benefit Adams' defense and the theory proffered by him at trial. Therefore, additional support exists for our finding that plain error did not occur in this instance.

[132] Benjamin's conviction stemmed from the drug marijuana, while Brooke was convicted of delivering both marijuana and methamphetamine. Hartmann was convicted of delivering methamphetamine. However, no connection was ever established that these convictions even remotely stemmed from the same circumstances which acted as the foundation of the crimes alleged against Adams. Moreover, this court has recognized the principle that the State may properly introduce evidence of a witness' prior felony conviction on direct examination to lessen the sting of such an attack on cross-examination by the defense. Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo.1991).

[¥83] Thus, we hold that no plain error occurred with respect to the actions of the prosccutor when she elicited testimony and thereafter inferred in closing argument that the Leibees and Hartmann had been convicted of offenses arising out of the same cireum-stances for which Adams had been charged.

CONCLUSION

[134] For the foregoing reasons, the convictions of Adams for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, are affirmed.

      . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) provides, in applicable part:
      (a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to ... deliver ... a controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
      (i) Methamphetamine ... is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or both[.]
      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 states:
      Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

      . Because Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him, additional facts will be set forth in the body of this opinion as necessary.

      . The district court did instruct the jury with respect to its evaluation of the general credibility of witnesses and the degree of weight the jury could give such testimony based upon the jury's own independent evaluation of such testimony including truthfulness, bias, prejudice, and motive, along with each juror's knowledge, observations, and experiences in the affairs of life.

      . In Mazurek, at 539, this court, citing United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 241-42 (4th Cir.1993), set forth several factors that must be considered in evaluating whether there was prejudicial plain error at the trial level. These factors are:
      1) The degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused;
      2) Whether the remarks were isolated or extensive;
      3) The strength of the competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks;
      4) Whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters;
      5) The presence or absence of a limiting instruction;
      6) Whether there was a proper purpose for introducing the conviction;
      7) Whether the conviction was improperly emphasized;
      8) Whether the conviction was used as substantive evidence of guilt;
      9) Whether the error was invited by defense counsel;
      10) Whether the failure to object could have been the result of tactical decisions; and
      11) Whether, in light of all the evidence, the error was harmless.


text:
    2003 WY 151
    Lené JORDAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Chris Allen BRACKIN, Appellee (Defendant).
    No. 02-260.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Nov. 21, 2003.
    Representing Appellant: Lené Jordan, Pro se.
    Representing Appellee: Mark W. Harris, Evanston, Wyoming.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, D.J.
   GOLDEN, Justice.

[T1] Appellant Lené Jordan (Jordan) appeals the district court's determination that Appellee Chris Allen Brackin (Brackin) could properly cease child support payments on each son's eighteenth birthday. Jordan contends that because the age of majority was nineteen when the divorcee decree was entered, the district court erred by not ruling that the child support obligation should continue until the nineteenth birthday.

[12] We hold that the district court properly determined that the current statutory age of majority was applicable, and Brackin was entitled to cease payments when the parties' sons turned eighteen. We affirm.

ISSUES

[13] Jordan presents the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err when it determined that Father's obligation to pay child support for the benefit of his sons ... terminates at the new age of majority?

Brackin restates the issue as:

Did the trial court err when it determined that the age of majority for an on-going child support obligation was 18 years of age?

FACTS

[14] Jordan and Brackin first married in 1981 and had two sons, one born on May 24, 1984, and one born on March 7, 1986. The parties divorced in 1988 but remarried in February of 1992. The couple divorced again in October of 1992. As part of that divorce decree, a separation agreement was incorporated stating that the parents would share equally in the physical custody, support and maintenance of the children so long as parents lived within 100 miles of each other. No child support was awarded or ordered for either party.

[15] Two years later, when Brackin planned to move over 100 miles away to Evanston, the parents negotiated an amendment to the settlement agreement that Brac-kin would begin paying child support to Jordan. That amendment was never filed with the court. Later, the parties did petition to modify child support, and an order was entered in 1996 that was later modified in 2000. Under that later order, Brackin began paying $548 per month in child support.

[16] Our review of the separation agreement and the court's child support orders indicates that none addressed the duration of the payment of child support nor the continuation of the court's jurisdiction after the children reached age eighteen. The district court held a hearing on Brackin's motion to reduce his child support when his eldest son turned eighteen and granted the motion based upon statutory requirements that terminate the child support obligation at age eighteen unless certain cireumstances exist. Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the district court should apply the statutory age of majority that existed when the separation agreement was executed and the divorce decree was final. The district court denied reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[17] In 1998, the Wyoming legislature changed the age of majority from nineteen to eighteen. Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 855 (Wyo.1996). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-313 (LexisNexis 2008) provides for the cessation of a child-support obligation when the child reaches the age of majority. The child support obligation may continue under some circumstances such as when the child is disabled or still attending high school; however, none of those cireumstances apply in this case. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204 (LexisNexis 2008).

[18] At the hearing, Jordan clarified that she was seeking the additional year of support because her son planned to attend college and she asserted that it was in his best interests that Brackin continue to pay child support to assist with college expenses. The district court determined that the statutory language deprived it of jurisdiction to order continued child support payments beyond the eighteenth year. On appeal, Jordan does not challenge this determination, but instead points to our decision in Thomas as permitting the prospective application of the 1998 statutory change in the age of majority. She contends that because the separation agreement and the divorce decree were final in 1992, the district court had jurisdiction to apply the 1992 statute and allow the child support obligation to continue until her sons' nineteenth birthdays.

[T9] The precise issue considered in Thomas was:

Where before the effective date of a statute changing the age of majority from nineteen (19) to eighteen (18) years a child support order specified 19 years as the age at which the divorced father's duty to make support payments would end, was the district court in error in terminating the duty of support at the new age of majority?

913 P.2d at 854.

[T10] The issue in Thomas questioned an existing child support order that did not specify when the child support obligation was to cease. Id. at 856. Thomas held that the legislature intended that this change would apply prospectively and, thus, the district court should not apply the statutory change to an existing child support order. Id. Thus, in Thomas, the father was required to support his children until the age of nineteen. Id.

[111] In this case, the existing child support order entered in 1992 did not specify any child support obligation for either party and did not discuss duration for any matter except to specify that Brackin would provide medical insurance "until each child became emancipated." When it became necessary to determine a child support amount, the parties went to court and the first court-ordered child support obligation for Father was entered in 1996. We find that the holding in Thomas applies only to those court orders that specify a child support obligation for at least one of the parents and which was entered before 1998 when the statutory change in age became effective. In 1992, neither Brackin nor Jordan was ordered by the court to pay monthly support for the children, and we find this distinction from Thomas sufficient to uphold the district court's order.

[112] Brackin, however, contends that further statutory amendments have overruled Thomas and all child support obligations must cease at the age of eighteen regardless of when the child support was ordered. Having already determined that Jordan's argument fails, we need not consider this contention in this case and its resolution must wait another day. Affirmed.

      . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101(a) (LexisNexis 2003) reads:
      § 14-1-101. Age of majority; rights on emancipation.
      (a) Upon becoming eighteen (18) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities granted or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by law.

      . (a) An on-going child support obligation terminates when the:
      (i) Parents marry or remarry each other;
      (ii) Child dies;
      (iii) Child is legally emancipated; or
      (iv) Child attains the age of majority.