text:
    STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frederick Percy STILLS, Defendant-Appellant.
    A166183
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted May 29, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Anna Belais, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the briefs for respondent.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Sercombe, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his refusal to perform the field sobriety tests (FSTs) and statements made to the officer, making three arguments in support of his assignment: (1) he was subjected to interrogation without first being given Miranda warnings; (2) the officer did not, as required under ORS 813.135 and ORS 813.136, inform him of the consequences of refusing to perform the FSTs; and (3) his refusal was an assertion of his right under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse consent to a warrantless search and must be suppressed. We reject defendant's first argument without discussion. The state concedes that, based on the unique facts of this case, defendant's refusal to submit to the FSTs was an invocation of his Article I, section 9, right to refuse a warrantless search, and, therefore, is not admissible as evidence of his guilt. On this record, we agree with and accept the state's concession, and, therefore, reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

      Our resolution of defendant's argument regarding the admissibility of his refusal to perform the FSTs based on his third argument obviates our need to address defendant's second argument.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the MATTER OF J. R.-M., a Child.
    Department of Human Services and J. R.-M. v. L. M.
    In the Matter of J. S.-M., a Child.
    In the Matter of A. R.-M., a Child.
    A168991
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. RAMIREZ, Carlos Estevan
    A166026
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    WEST v. DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY
    A166650
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    In the MATTER OF G. W., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    State of Oregon, Respondent, v. G. W., Appellant.
    A170034
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted July 5, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and James, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing her to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130. Appellant contends that the trial court erred because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that appellant is a "person with mental illness." ORS 426.005(1)(f). The state concedes that the evidence is legally insufficient to support appellant's commitment and that the judgment should be reversed. We agree, accept the state's concession, and reverse the judgment of commitment.

Reversed.


text:
    In the MATTER OF I. D., aka B. G. H., aka I. H., a Child.
    Department of Human Services v. P.D.
    A169577
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF C. K. L., a Child.
    J. I. M. et al. v. C. L. L.
    A169401
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    YOUNGER, Elizabeth McGee v. OFFICE OF ADULT ABUSE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIONS
    A168362
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    June 5, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Allen WILLIAMS, II, Defendant-Appellant.
    A167655
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted July 9, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Appealing a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010(4), and other misdemeanors, defendant assigns error to the trial court's imposition of a $490 "State Obligation." Although defendant did not object to that monetary obligation, he contends that he was excused from doing so because "[t]he amount simply appeared on the face of the judgment" and was not discussed at sentencing. He further contends that the court lacked statutory authority to impose a $490 State Obligation and that the obligation should be vacated. The state responds that the court did not err. According to the state, the $490 amount "is the statutory diversion filing fee that any defendant who enters into diversion is obligated to pay." The state points out that defendant "specifically agreed to pay that fee as part of his diversion agreement" and that the trial court previously "issued an order ordering that he pay that fee." In the state's view, the judgment merely incorporates that previously agreed-upon $490 amount, making the imposition of the $490 State Obligation proper. In reply, defendant does not dispute that he previously agreed to pay the $490 DUII diversion fee. He contends, however, that there is nothing on the face of the judgment showing that the $490 State Obligation is, in reality, the previously imposed DUII diversion fee. That lack of clarity, according to defendant, exposes him to the risk that the state will attempt to collect the $490 amount twice-once based on the order and again based on the judgment.

The record corroborates the state's representation that the $490 State Obligation represents the $490 DUII diversion fee that defendant previously agreed to pay and does not represent a new financial obligation imposed at the time of the judgment. We therefore accept the state's representation and conclude that the trial court did not err by memorializing the agreed-upon DUII diversion fee in the amended judgment.

Our decision in this matter, based on the state's representations, forecloses the state from attempting to collect the $490 at issue more than once. To the extent defendant remains concerned on that point, he may seek to have the circuit court correct the judgment.

Affirmed.


text:
    In the MATTER OF S. M. P., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    State of Oregon, Respondent, v. S. M. P., Appellant.
    A169211
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted July 29, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Powers, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing him to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130. Appellant contends the judgment should be reversed because the court failed to serve a citation on appellant "prior to the hearing," as required by ORS 426.090. Appellant acknowledges that he did not preserve his assignment of error, but requests that we review and correct the error as plain error. ORAP 5.45(1). We reject appellant's assignment of error because any error by the court was not "plain."

Here, the transcript of the proceedings shows that appellant was served with the citation at 10:03 a.m. prior to the commencement of the hearing. However, the court file provides that the hearing was set for 10:30 a.m., and the filed certificate of service provides that appellant was served with the citation on the date of the hearing at 10:37 a.m. Because it is not irrefutable, based on this record, that appellant was not served with the citation until after the hearing commenced, the error alleged by appellant does not qualify as plain error. See State v. Jury , 185 Or. App. 132, 135, 57 P.3d 970 (2002), rev. den. , 335 Or. 504, 72 P.3d 636 (2003) ("For error to be considered apparent on the face of the record for purposes of ORAP 5.45, it must satisfy three criteria: (1) it must be legal error; (2) it must be apparent, such that the legal point is obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) it must appear on the face of the record, such that we need not go outside the record or choose between competing inferences to find it, and the facts that comprise the error are irrefutable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

      ORS 426.090 provides:
      "The judge shall issue a citation to the person alleged to have a mental illness stating the nature of the information filed concerning the person and the specific reasons the person is believed to be a person with mental illness. The citation shall further contain a notice of the time and place of the commitment hearing, the right to legal counsel, the right to have legal counsel appointed if the person is unable to afford legal counsel, and, if requested, to have legal counsel immediately appointed, the right to subpoena witnesses in behalf of the person to the hearing and other information as the court may direct. The citation shall be served upon the person by delivering a duly certified copy of the original thereof to the person in person prior to the hearing. The person shall have an opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to being brought before the court."


text:
    STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jason Craig BUTLER, Defendant-Appellant.
    A166413
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted July 9, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Affirmed. State v. Payne , 298 Or. App. 438, 447 P.3d 71 (2019).


text:
    In the MATTER OF C. F. P., Jr., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    State of Oregon, Respondent, v. C. F. P., Jr., Appellant.
    A168861
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted July 29, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Powers, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing him to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130. We reject appellant's first assignment of error without discussion. In a second assignment of error, appellant contends that the judgment should be reversed because the court failed to timely serve the citation and warrant of detention and failed to provide in the warrant of detention that appellant was given the warning in ORS 426.123. Appellant acknowledges that he did not preserve his second assignment of error, but requests that we review for plain error. ORAP 5.45(1). For the reasons explained below, we conclude that any error does not qualify as plain error, and, thus, we affirm.

We first reject appellant's contentions regarding the warrant of detention. The lack of an indication in the warrant that appellant was given the warning in ORS 426.123 does not constitute plain error that requires reversal of the judgment of commitment under either the commitment statutes or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. R. C. , 298 Or. App. 280, 281-82, 443 P.3d 742 (2019). Additionally, the statutes do not plainly require that the court serve the warrant of detention upon the person alleged to have a mental illness prior to the hearing, and appellant has not shown that the Due Process Clause plainly requires it. See ORS 426.070 (5)(b)(A) (stating that "the court may issue a warrant of detention to the community mental health program director or designee or the sheriff of the county or designee").

We also reject appellant's contention with regard to timely service under ORS 426.090. Under that statute, the court is required to serve the citation upon the person alleged to have a mental illness "in person prior to the hearing." Here, according to the certificate of service filed with the court, appellant was not served with the citation until 12:45 p.m. on the date of the hearing. The prepared transcript provides that the hearing started at 9:30 a.m. However, the "witness/exhibit receipt" of the court, which includes notations of the time the hearing started and ended, as well as the time that each witness testified, indicates that the hearing did not commence until 1:08 p.m. In addition, the executed warrant of detention, which certifies when appellant was brought into custody for purposes of producing appellant at the hearing, was not executed until 12:45 p.m. Because it is not irrefutable, based on this record, that appellant was not served with the citation until after the hearing commenced, the error alleged by appellant does not qualify as plain error. See State v. Jury , 185 Or. App. 132, 135, 57 P.3d 970 (2002), rev. den. , 335 Or. 504, 72 P.3d 636 (2003) ("For error to be considered apparent on the face of the record for purposes of ORAP 5.45, it must satisfy three criteria: (1) it must be legal error; (2) it must be apparent, such that the legal point is obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) it must appear on the face of the record, such that we need not go outside the record or choose between competing inferences to find it, and the facts that comprise the error are irrefutable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.


text:
    In the MATTER OF K. L. H., a Child.
    Department of Human Services, Petitioner-Respondent, v. R. A. H., Jr. and A. M., Appellants.
    In the Matter of S. E. H., a Child.
    Department of Human Services, Petitioner-Respondent, v. R. A. H., Jr. and A. M., Appellants.
    A170200 (Control) A170202
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted August 1, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Shannon Flowers, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant R. A. H., Jr.
    Ginger Fitch filed the brief for appellant A. M.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Erin K. Galli, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Powers, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Mother and father each appeal permanency judgments with respect to two of their children, K and S. The judgments continue the children's permanency plans as reunification. Parents contend that the judgments do not satisfy the requirements of ORS 419B.476(5) in a number of ways, including by omitting "a brief description of the efforts the department has made with regard to the case plan in effect at the time of the permanency hearing," as ORS 419B.476(5)(a) mandates. The state concedes that the judgments lack the description of the department's efforts required by ORS 419B.476(5)(a), and, further, that the error requires us to reverse and remand under Dept. of Human Services v. T. H. , 254 Or. App. 394, 401, 294 P.3d 531 (2012), and State ex rel. DHS v. M. A. , 227 Or. App. 172, 183-84, 205 P.3d 36 (2009). In view of T. H. and M. A. , we accept the state's concession and reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

      The judgments refer to an "attached" Exhibit 1 as containing the description of the department's efforts, but no Exhibit 1 is attached to the judgments. The record contains three documents designated Exhibit 1 and it is unclear which of those, if any, the juvenile court intended to reference.


text:
    In the MATTER OF D. C. F., a Youth.
    State of Oregon, Respondent, v. D. C. F., Appellant.
    A168233
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    Submitted August 1, 2019. August 28, 2019
    Matthew J. Steven filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Powers, Judge.
   PER CURIAM

Youth, who was 14 when he was adjudicated, appeals a juvenile court judgment determining him to be within the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction under ORS 419C.005 for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160, and harassment, ORS 166.065. The assault adjudication stemmed from youth's act of biting his 12-year-old sister during a dispute in the car. On appeal, he contends that the juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction over him for fourth-degree assault. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that his act of biting his sister caused "physical injury" to her within the meaning of ORS 163.160 and ORS 161.015(7). The state concedes the error and, upon review of the record, we accept that concession. We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it asserts jurisdiction over youth for fourth-degree assault, but otherwise affirm.

Adjudication for fourth-degree assault reversed; otherwise affirmed.


author: MORTENSEN, Judge:

text:
    Janae A. KIRKHAM, Appellant, v. Jamie WIDDISON, HRB Tax Group, Grace Hansen, Bonny Widdison, and Alpine Gardens Inc., Appellees.
    No. 20170655-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed June 6, 2019
    Janae A. Kirkham, Appellant Pro Se
    Suzanne Marelius, Attorney for Appellees Jamie Widdison and Bonny Widdison
    Sean N. Egan, Anthony J. Durone, and Timothy West, Attorneys for Appellees HRB Tax Group and Grace Hansen
    Jonathan O. Hafen and Jeffery A. Balls, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee Alpine Gardens Inc.
    Judge David N. Mortensen authored this Opinion, in which Judge Diana Hagen concurred. Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster concurred, except that as to section VI, she concurred only in the result.
    Opinion
   MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Janae A. Kirkham appeals-for the fourth time -issues arising from claims that she alleges occurred during the litigation of a petition to modify in a separate divorce proceeding. Kirkham argues that the trial court erred by (1) granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss four of her claims, (2) granting a rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings dismissing one of her claims, (3) dismissing her remaining claims on summary judgment, (4) granting a motion to disqualify her attorney, (5) granting a protective order under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (6) awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-825. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2011, Jamie Widdison sought a modification of his and Kirkham's divorce decree, which would, among other things, allow him to retroactively claim a tax exemption for the parties' minor child-whom Kirkham had previously claimed. During those proceedings, Kirkham produced copies of her tax returns for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 (Tax Returns). According to Kirkham's second amended complaint (Complaint), Widdison and his wife Bonnie Widdison (collectively, Widdisons) received the Tax Returns from their attorney and used Alpine Gardens Inc.'s fax machine to send those copies to HRB Tax Group and its employee, Grace Hansen (collectively, HRB). HRB used the Tax Returns to prepare pro forma returns (Pro Forma Returns) demonstrating the potential impact to Kirkham's tax liability without the child exemption. The Pro Forma Returns were offered as exhibits in hearings before a commissioner and the trial court.

¶3 Based on the Pro Forma Returns, the commissioner determined that the parties' collective tax liability would be lowered by allowing Widdison to claim the child exemption. Widdison proposed that if Kirkham filed the Pro Forma Returns, he would pay Kirkham the difference in any tax that would be assessed to her as a result. The commissioner, however, certified the issue to the trial court when Kirkham would not agree. The commissioner noted that Kirkham "had no explanation for her position, particularly where it would cost her nothing."

¶4 The trial court agreed with the commissioner that Widdison would realize a greater tax benefit from the exemption than Kirkham. On October 10, 2012, the trial court entered a written order authorizing Widdison to claim the child exemption for tax years 2009 through 2012. The court also ordered Kirkham to sign and file the Pro Forma Returns as well as IRS Form 8332, which authorized Widdison to claim the child exemption for those years (Amended Returns). Finally, the court ordered Widdison to reimburse Kirkham any difference in taxes owed by Kirkham as a result of filing the Amended Returns. Kirkham timely appealed the trial court's order.

¶5 While the modification appeal was pending, Kirkham refused to sign and file the Amended Returns. On December 11, 2012, the commissioner held an order to show cause hearing and again ordered Kirkham to sign and file the Amended Returns. Kirkham, again, refused. On January 10, 2013, the commissioner ordered the clerk of the court to sign IRS Form 8332 on behalf of Kirkham -effectively authorizing the Widdisons to file their amended returns with the child exemption.

¶6 On January 18, 2013, Kirkham's Amended Returns were filed and received by the IRS. Kirkham alleged in her Complaint that the "amended tax returns for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 in [Kirkham's] name were filed by [the Widdisons] and HRB." However, Kirkham conceded two points. First, after HRB argued that it "did not and cannot file amended returns even if they are final" because "[a]mended returns cannot be filed electronically," Kirkham conceded that "[HRB] didn't file the amended returns." Second, when the court later asked Kirkham, "Who filed the returns?" Kirkham replied, "Widdison did." As discussed below, infra ¶ 13, Kirkham was ultimately unable to produce any evidence that Widdison, or any other defendant, filed the returns.

¶7 In October 2014, this court vacated the modification order and remanded with instructions to make additional findings on whether shifting the child exemption was justified. See Widdison v. Widdison , 2014 UT App 233, ¶ 21, 336 P.3d 1106. But prior to the remand trial, "the parties fully resolved all claims arising from their 2009, 2010 and 2011 tax returns," and therefore the court did not address that issue. On remand, the trial court reinstated the original modification order and found that the "allocation of tax dependent exemptions [was] consistent with Utah law ... [and] the ruling was an equitable, fair and reasonable way to distribute the tax benefit in this case." The trial court found Kirkham in contempt of the 2012 modification order for refusing to sign and file the Amended Returns and for obstructing Widdison's ability to comply with the order by "frustrating [his] efforts to compensate her." The court also found that due to Kirkham's contempt, Widdison "had to file his amended tax returns on his own with an 8332 form in the absence of [Kirkham's] amended return being filed. This led to [Kirkham's] tax return for 2012 being seized. ... [And] this [was] due to [Kirkham's] own lack of cooperation." Finally, the court awarded Widdison costs and attorney fees arising from Kirkham's contempt.

¶8 Kirkham filed this lawsuit against the Widdisons, HRB, and Alpine (collectively, Appellees), alleging that Appellees' role in preparing the Pro Forma Returns and filing the Amended Returns gave rise to various claims. Specifically, Kirkham raised claims for tortious conversion against all Appellees (Claim 1); civil conspiracy against all Appellees (Claim 2); invasion of privacy against all Appellees (Claim 3); violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) against HRB (Claim 4); violations of the UCSPA-Unconscionability against HRB (Claim 5); intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against all Appellees (Claim 6); and breach of fiduciary duty against HRB and Widdison (Claim 7).

¶9 During discovery, HRB moved to have Kirkham's attorney disqualified. HRB argued that Kirkham's attorney had obtained employment with HRB without disclosing that he represented Kirkham, who intended to sue HRB. Further, HRB argued that Kirkham's attorney had taken at least one confidential document from HRB during his employment, which he intended to use in the suit against HRB. The trial court granted HRB's motion to disqualify, finding that (1) the "likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interest in allowing [Kirkham's attorney] to continue to represent [her]"; (2) because Kirkham "has filed this action as a Tier 3 action and seeks extensive punitive damages," "it is likely that [she] will be able to obtain substitute counsel"; and (3) "the ongoing harm to public confidence and to [HRB] in allowing [Kirkham's attorney] to continue to represent [Kirkham] outweighs the minimal harm to [her] in having to obtain substitute counsel."

¶10 HRB also moved the trial court to enter a protective order governing discovery. Kirkham objected, but rather than offering any alternative language to the proposed protective order, she requested that the court not enter the order at all. The trial court rejected Kirkham's objection, finding that "the order has procedure in it for designating documents as well as objecting to designations" and that "the order as prepared is an ordinary and customary protective order in commercial cases."

¶11 Next, the Widdisons moved pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Claims 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7-or in other words, Kirkham's entire Complaint as against them. Simultaneously, HRB moved pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Claims 1, 3, 6, and 7. The trial court granted both motions, excepting Claim 2 against the Widdisons. In a seven page memorandum decision, the trial court made the following conclusions with respect to each dismissed claim:

• Claim 1 (Tortious Conversion)-that "intangible property such as knowledge of Kirkham's tax status is not property that can be converted"-and "[e]ven if such an intangible interest were subject to conversion ... Kirkham was never deprived of its use."
• Claim 3 (Invasion of Privacy)-that "Kirkham's counsel made clear that this claim is brought based on misappropriation of name or likeness" and "[s]he alleges no 'intrinsic value' of her name" as required by Utah law. And Kirkham's argument that "every name has intrinsic value ... is simply legally incorrect." (Cleaned up.)
• Claim 6 (IIED)-that the Widdisons' conduct and HRB's conduct, as alleged, does not, as a matter of law, constitute such extreme conduct to state a claim for IIED. Further, Kirkham's allegations show that she views "the modification proceeding as one long pattern of [IIED]"-and under Utah law, "[a]n allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of legal process against an individual is not redressable by a cause of action for [IIED]." (Citing Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough , 2003 UT 9, ¶ 66, 70 P.3d 17.)
• Claim 7 (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)-that Widdison "is not a fiduciary for Kirkham ... by virtue of his status as a law enforcement officer." And similarly, HRB, "by contracting with [Widdison] and or his attorney, did not become fiduciaries to Kirkham."

¶12 HRB then moved the trial court, pursuant to rule 12(c), to dismiss Claims 2 (Civil Conspiracy), 4 (Violation of UCSPA), and 5 (Violation of UCSPA-Unconscionability). At the hearing for this motion, HRB argued that it "did not and cannot file amended returns even if they are final," because "[a]mended returns cannot be filed electronically." Kirkham then conceded, "[HRB] didn't file the amended returns." The court granted the motion, finding that HRB did not violate " 26 U.S.C. § 7216 or any other IRS regulation or tax law in preparing the [Pro Forma Returns]," nor did it violate " U.C.A. §§ 76-6-1102 or 76-6-1105 or ... the [UCSPA]." And thus, "[t]here was not an unlawful overt act committed by [HRB] upon which liability under a civil conspiracy theory could rest, nor has [Kirkham] pleaded any such act." Further, the court found that Kirkham failed to establish that HRB proximately caused her alleged damages, because she had been ordered to file the Amended Returns in the modification proceeding and refused to do so.

¶13 Finally, Alpine and the Widdisons moved under rule 12(c) to dismiss Kirkham's remaining claims: Claim 2 (Civil Conspiracy) against the Widdisons and all claims against Alpine. The trial court converted the rule 12(c) motion to one for summary judgment, "giving [Kirkham] the opportunity to support her claims with deposition testimony, affidavits or other evidence." Ultimately, the trial court granted the motion in favor of the Widdisons, finding (1) "the Declaration of [Kirkham] ... is merely a restatement of the allegations in the Complaint, and is not supported by personal knowledge on her part"; (2) "there is no evidence that [Alpine or the Widdisons] or any other defendant ever filed a tax return on behalf of [Kirkham] or conspired with others to do so"; and (3) "there is no evidence that a tax return was ever filed on behalf of [Kirkham] by anyone other than [Kirkham]."

¶14 After all Kirkham's claims were dismissed, HRB moved for attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-825. The court concluded that Kirkham's claims against HRB lacked merit and were brought in bad faith and therefore, awarded HRB $ 61,464 in attorney fees.

¶15 Kirkham appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶16 Kirkham raises six issues on appeal. First, whether the trial court erroneously granted HRB's and the Widdisons' rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on Claims 1, 3, 6, and 7. "We review a [trial] court's decision to grant a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for correctness, giving no deference to the [trial] court's ruling." Van Leeuwen v. Bank of Am. NA , 2016 UT App 212, ¶ 6, 387 P.3d 521 (cleaned up).

¶17 Second, whether the trial court erroneously granted HRB's rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings on Claims 2, 4, and 5. The same standard of review applies for a rule 12(c) motion as for one under rule 12(b)(6), and therefore we review the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. Tuttle v. Olds , 2007 UT App 10, ¶ 6, 155 P.3d 893.

¶18 Third, whether the trial court erroneously dismissed Claim 2 against the Widdisons, pursuant to rule 12(c). The record shows, however, that this rule 12(c) motion was converted into a rule 56 motion for summary judgment when matters and evidence outside the pleadings were presented to the trial court. Thus, "we review the [trial] court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and view all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp , 2010 UT 31, ¶ 28, 235 P.3d 749 (cleaned up).

¶19 Fourth, whether the trial court erroneously granted HRB's motion to disqualify Kirkham's attorney. "The proper standard of review for decisions relating to disqualification is abuse of discretion." Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg , 2013 UT 15, ¶ 18, 299 P.3d 1058 (cleaned up).

¶20 Fifth, whether the trial court erroneously granted a protective order governing discovery. A trial court's grant of a protective order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Spratley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 2003 UT 39, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 603.

¶21 And sixth, whether the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-825. "The Utah Code requires a court to award reasonable attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."

Bresee v. Barton , 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 15, 387 P.3d 536 (cleaned up). "The without merit determination is a question of law, and therefore we review it for correctness. The bad-faith determination is a question of fact and is therefore reviewed by this court for clear error." Id. (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Dismiss

¶22 "The purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case, and accordingly, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim." Van Leeuwen v. Bank of Am. NA , 2016 UT App 212, ¶ 6, 387 P.3d 521 (cleaned up). Further, "we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true" and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc. , 2004 UT 101, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 1226, but we do not accept a complaint's legal conclusions as true, Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints , 2001 UT 25, ¶ 26, 21 P.3d 198 ("The sufficiency of ... pleadings must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated." (cleaned up)); see also America West Bank Members, LC v. State , 2014 UT 49, ¶ 7, 342 P.3d 224 ("When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), ... we accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged in the complaint to be true, but we need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need we accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts." (cleaned up)).

¶23 The trial court dismissed Kirkham's claims, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), for tortious conversion, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty against HRB and the Widdisons. We examine each claim in turn.

A. Claim 1-Tortious Conversion

¶24 "A conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Bonnie & Hyde, Inc. v. Lynch , 2013 UT App 153, ¶ 30, 305 P.3d 196 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The trial court concluded that Kirkham's conversion claim failed because "Kirkham's tax status is not property that can be converted" and "[e]ven if such an intangible interest were subject to a conversion," Appellees "plainly had lawful justification to use Kirkham's tax information ... and did not deprive her of its use in any event." The court elaborated, "[t]ax returns and pro forma returns are commonly exchanged and prepared in such actions. The whole point of the modification as it related to the underlying tax exemptions ... necessarily requires examining at least Kirkham's tax liabilities, with and without the exemption." Lastly, the court noted that "Kirkham could have sought protection on the use of such information in the context of discovery in that action, but did not do so."

¶25 Kirkham acknowledges that "Utah Appellate Courts have not explicitly recognized conversion as involving personal information as a chattel." Instead, her sole argument on appeal is that the personal information in her tax returns should be considered property subject to conversion. In other words, Kirkham urges us to expand the definition of a chattel to apply to intangible property. We decline to do so. But even if we did, Kirkham has failed to demonstrate that Appellees were not legally justified in using that information or that they deprived her of the use of that information.

¶26 Appellees were legally justified to use Kirkham's tax information for two reasons. First, Kirkham did not seek any discovery classification or designation-such as "confidential" or "attorney's eyes only"-which would have limited its use by Appellees. Second, Appellees used Kirkham's tax information merely to prepare the Pro Forma Returns in order to demonstrate the impact of claiming, or not claiming, the exemption at issue-a practice that is commonplace in this type of litigation.

¶27 Finally, Kirkham has not argued that Appellees deprived her of the use of her personal information. Even if Appellees' use of Kirkham's information was improper, she was not precluded from also using that information, and in fact she makes no argument otherwise. We agree with the trial court that "[i]n a sense, Kirkham appears to be arguing that she was entitled to defy the trial court's order and refuse to file the [A]mended [R]eturns as ordered, and thus is entitled to sue for damages resulting from their filing." Therefore, we conclude that Kirkham's claim for tortious conversion was properly dismissed.

B. Claim 3-Invasion of Privacy

¶28 Kirkham's invasion of privacy claim is based on misappropriation of her name or likeness. To prevail under this tort theory, a party must show "(1) appropriation, (2) of another's name or likeness that has some intrinsic value, (3) for the use or benefit of another." Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. , 944 P.2d 374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (cleaned up). The trial court concluded that Kirkham's allegations were not sufficient to satisfy these elements. The court noted that Kirkham "alleges no intrinsic value of her name" and that her argument "that every name has intrinsic value" is "legally incorrect." Further, the court concluded that "[a]t the time the returns were allegedly filed, Kirkham had been ordered to file amended returns without claiming that exemption. Thus, there was no intrinsic value in Kirkham's name that was appropriated by the supposed filing." We agree.

¶29 On appeal, Kirkham dedicates a single paragraph to support her position that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim. She argues that her tax information is private and confidential under federal law and that therefore Appellees had "absolutely no right to amend those tax returns." Again, Kirkham's argument misses the mark. First, Kirkham herself produced the Tax Returns without any designation limiting their use. Second, the Widdisons used the Tax Returns merely to prepare the Pro Forma Returns for the court's consideration. Third, even if the Widdisons filed the Amended Returns, Kirkham has not demonstrated that doing so was a misappropriation of her name that benefitted the Widdisons. And fourth, Kirkham fails to address the fatal defect in her complaint: that she has not alleged that her name has an intrinsic value. For these reasons, the trial court correctly dismissed Kirkham's invasion of privacy claim.

C. Claim 6-Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

¶30 To state a claim for IIED, a party must allege that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, "(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints , 2001 UT 25, ¶ 25, 21 P.3d 198 (cleaned up).

¶31 Kirkham's allegations of IIED show that "she views the modification proceeding as one long pattern of intentional infliction of emotional distress." That is, she alleges that a host of perceived offenses in the course of the modification proceeding amount to IIED. These perceived offenses included attempts to reduce child support, hold her in contempt, and modify the decree. Other alleged offenses included Appellees' representations and actions taken in the course of litigation, dragging the case out, rushing to get to hearings when Kirkham's attorney withdrew, rule violations, and discovery abuses.

¶32 Indeed, on appeal, Kirkham furthers this line of reasoning by arguing that "[s]he has been forced to deal with the IRS and continues in her litigation with her ex-husband relating to those amended tax returns" and "[f]ew if any people and certainly no reasonable person can disagree that one cannot be allowed to take and use another person's tax returns and personal information." We deem these arguments unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as we have already noted, Kirkham did not designate her tax returns as confidential under a protective order when she produced them in the modification proceeding. Therefore, use of those returns to prepare the Pro Forma Returns was not extreme and outrageous-especially given that the tax exemption was one of the key issues at play in the modification proceeding.

¶33 Second, Kirkham's argument on appeal is essentially a recitation of her argument to the trial court below-that "she views the modification proceeding as one long pattern of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Simply put, "allegation[s] of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of legal process against an individual is not redressable by a cause of action for [IIED]." Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough , 2003 UT 9, ¶ 66, 70 P.3d 17. Accordingly, the IIED claim was properly dismissed.

D. Claim 6-Breach of Fiduciary Duty

¶34 Kirkham contends that HRB owed her a fiduciary duty because "she was set up in HRB's system as a client." We reject this argument and affirm the trial court on this point because it is inadequately briefed in two aspects. First, Kirkham does not provide a citation to the record-nor have we been able to find one-in support of her position that she was set up in HRB's system as a client. See Angel Inv'rs, LLC v. Garrity , 2009 UT 40, ¶ 34, 216 P.3d 944 (declining to address a party's argument on appeal for lack of citations to the record). Second, even if she had cited the record, Kirkham does not provide any legal authority supporting her allegation that HRB became her fiduciary by entering her information into their system. See id. ¶ 35. Nor does she provide any reasoned argument to establish such a precedent under the facts of this case. In other words, we are not persuaded by the argument that HRB owed Kirkham a fiduciary duty when they were retained by the Widdisons to prepare Pro Forma Returns for the purpose of their litigation against Kirkham.

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

¶35 Next, Kirkham contends that the trial court erroneously granted HRB's rule 12(c) motion on Claim 2 for civil conspiracy. A claim for civil conspiracy requires "(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Lawrence v. Intermountain, Inc. , 2010 UT App 313, ¶ 12, 243 P.3d 508 (cleaned up).

¶36 The trial court-without deciding on the first three elements-concluded that Kirkham could not meet the final two elements of civil conspiracy. Specifically, the court concluded that HRB did not commit an unlawful or overt act, nor was HRB the proximate cause of damages (if any) that Kirkham sustained. We need not reach the issue of whether HRB committed an overt unlawful act because we agree with the trial court that any alleged wrongdoing on HRB's behalf was not the proximate cause of the alleged damages suffered by Kirkham, and this determination is fatal to her claim.

¶37 Kirkham articulates an argument that damages arising under this claim include "[h]er 2012 tax refund [being] seized to pay for the tax liability created by the amended tax returns" and her "[spending] a considerable amount of time dealing with the IRS and still litigating with [Widdison]." These damages, however, were proximately caused by Kirkham's conduct, not HRB's. To be sure, the trial court, on remand from the modification appeal, found that due to Kirkham's refusal to sign and file the Amended Returns, Widdison "had to file his amended tax returns on his own ... in the absence of [Kirkham's] amended return being filed. This led to [Kirkham's] tax [refund] for 2012 being seized." But the court found that "this is due to [Kirkham's] own lack of cooperation." If Kirkham would have filed the Amended Returns, notified Widdison of the new amount that she owed, and allowed Widdison to pay that amount to the IRS-as she was ordered to do-her 2012 tax refund would not have been seized. But due to Kirkham's contemptuous behavior, this did not happen. In other words, Kirkham was not entitled to disregard the modification order or claim damages arising from doing so. Therefore, this claim was properly dismissed.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

¶38 Next, Kirkham contends that the trial court erred by dismissing Claim 2-for civil conspiracy-against the Widdisons. Although Kirkham argues on appeal that this claim was dismissed pursuant to rule 12(c), we note that the trial court converted the motion to one for summary judgment, "giving [Kirkham] the opportunity to support her claims with deposition testimony, affidavits or other evidence." Thus, we will "affirm [the trial court's] grant of summary judgment [if] the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the Widdisons are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Menzies v. State , 2014 UT 40, ¶ 30, 344 P.3d 581 (cleaned up).

¶39 As an initial matter, Kirkham does not argue on appeal that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists or that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law-rather, she argues that we must take her allegations as true under rule 12(c). We reject this argument because it ignores the conversion of the rule 12(c) motion to one for summary judgment, where a party cannot merely rest on its pleadings. Orvis v. Johnson , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 18, 177 P.3d 600 ("[O]n summary judgment ..., the nonmoving party ... may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings." (cleaned up)).

¶40 On summary judgment, Kirkham did produce a three-page declaration. However, as the trial court noted, that declaration "is merely a restatement of the allegations in the Complaint, and is not supported by personal knowledge on [Kirkham's] part"; "there is no evidence that [Alpine or the Widdisons] or any other defendant ever filed a tax return on behalf of [Kirkham] or conspired with others to do so"; and "there is no evidence that a tax return was ever filed on behalf of [Kirkham] by anyone other than [Kirkham]." Accordingly, because no genuine issue of material fact was created below, and because Kirkham has failed to argue that summary judgment was otherwise erroneously granted, we affirm the trial court on this issue.

IV. Motion to Disqualify

¶41 The trial court granted HRB's motion to disqualify Kirkham's attorney on the grounds of an appearance of impropriety. In State v. Johnson , 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court "articulated a two-pronged test for determining on appeal whether an attorney should have been disqualified from a case because of an appearance of impropriety." Id. at 490. "First, the court must find that there is at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety occurred because of the representation." Id. (cleaned up). "Second, the court must balance the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy against the social interest in allowing the defendant to continue being represented by the lawyer of his or her choice." Id. (cleaned up).

¶42 Kirkham now argues that "[HRB] is not telling the truth. [And] [a]t the very least [she] should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing before her attorney was disqualified." As an initial matter, these arguments do not address whether the trial court abused its discretion in its application of the facts of this case to the two-prong test set forth in Johnson . Further, we note that Kirkham has not cited any legal authority-nor do we believe that one exists-that entitles her to an evidentiary hearing before her attorney can be disqualified. Finally, even if we were to reach the conclusion that error was committed, Kirkham has not argued that she suffered any prejudice as a result. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61 ("The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."); Covey v. Covey , 2003 UT App 380, ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553. In any event, we determine that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Kirkham's attorney was properly disqualified under Johnson .

¶43 The record here demonstrates "a reasonable possibility" that Kirkham's attorney committed "some specifically identifiable impropriety." Johnson , 823 P.2d at 490 (cleaned up). Kirkham does not dispute that her attorney gained employment with HRB without disclosing that he simultaneously represented Kirkham, who intended to bring this suit. Nor does Kirkham dispute that her attorney obtained documents during his employment at HRB that he intended to use in the current litigation. This conduct potentially violates at least three rules of professional conduct-all of which could be grounds for disqualification. See Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 4.4(a) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use ... methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of [third parties]."); see also id. R. 8.4(c)-(d) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or to] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."). Further, in light of the fact that Kirkham does not dispute that this conduct occurred, we are hard-pressed to see how there is not at least a reasonable possibility of impropriety. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kirkham's attorney's conduct satisfied the first prong of Johnson .

¶44 The record also demonstrates that the trial court properly analyzed the second prong of Johnson -whether "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy" outweighed "the social interest in allowing the defendant to continue being represented by the lawyer of his or her choice." 823 P.2d at 490 (cleaned up). After considering the parties' submissions, the trial court concluded that the "likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interest in allowing [Kirkham's attorney] to continue to represent [her]." And because Kirkham "has filed this action as a Tier 3 action and seeks extensive punitive damages," "it is likely that [she] will be able to obtain substitute counsel." Therefore, "the ongoing harm to public confidence and to [HRB] in allowing [Kirkham's attorney] to continue to represent [Kirkham] outweighs the minimal harm to [Kirkham] in having to obtain substitute counsel."

¶45 Kirkham makes no attempt to show that these findings are clearly erroneous. Counsel's obtaining employment at a target defendant's business would generally be perceived as underhanded by the public. Moreover, Kirkham does not even claim that she unsuccessfully tried to retain alternative counsel. Accordingly, the trial court's analysis was sound, and it was not an abuse of discretion to disqualify Kirkham's attorney.

V. Protective Order

¶46 Kirkham next argues that the trial court erroneously granted a protective order governing discovery. Generally, a "trial court has numerous tools it must employ to prevent unwarranted disclosure of the confidential information, including the use of sealing and protective orders." Spratley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 2003 UT 39, ¶ 22, 78 P.3d 603 (cleaned up). "The liberal use of these tools, and others inherent in a trial court's authority to govern the conduct of proceedings, is a prudent and sufficient safeguard against overbroad disclosure." Id.

¶47 Here, HRB moved the trial court to enter a protective order governing discovery. Kirkham objected, but rather than offering any alternative language to the proposed protective order, she requested that the court not enter the order at all. The trial court rejected Kirkham's objection, finding that "the order has procedure in it for designating documents as well as objecting to designations." The court confirmed the existence of these provisions on the record by asking HRB whether the "order [had a] procedure in it for designating documents as well as objecting to designations." HRB replied, "Yes."

¶48 Kirkham now contends that the trial court erred because the protective order precluded her from obtaining discovery. She fails, however, to provide a single citation to the record that would support her argument. Indeed, her arguments on appeal show only that HRB objected to some of Kirkham's requests for production on the grounds of relevance and privilege. For example, she argues that "requests [that] HRB produce from its records the tax returns and amended tax returns of [the Widdisons]" was objected to on the grounds of relevancy and privilege. Whether this objection was well-taken has nothing to do with whether a protective order should have been entered. Kirkham does not explain how the protective order impeded her ability to conduct discovery. Nor has Kirkham provided any meaningful argument that the trial court abused its discretion by entering what we view as a standard, garden-variety protective order. We conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion. Moreover, Kirkham does not identify any prejudice associated with the entry of the protective order. Accordingly, Kirkham has provided no basis for reversal.

VI. Attorney Fees

¶49 Finally, Kirkham contends that the trial court erred in granting HRB's motion for attorney fees under Utah's bad faith attorney fees statute, which provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (LexisNexis 2018). "To award fees pursuant to this section, a trial court must determine both that the losing party's action or defense was without merit and that it was brought or asserted in bad faith." Fadel v. Deseret First Credit Union , 2017 UT App 165, ¶ 30, 405 P.3d 807 (cleaned up).

A. Without Merit

¶50 Kirkham argues that the trial court erred in concluding that her claims against HRB were without merit. "To determine whether a claim is without merit, we look to whether it was frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Id. ¶ 32 (cleaned up). In other words, "the bare existence of a basis in law for a potential claim is not sufficient to make a claim meritorious. Rather, there must also be a factual basis for a party's claims apart from a ... theoretical basis in law." Id. (cleaned up).

¶51 Kirkham has not shown that the trial court erred in concluding that her claims were without merit. Kirkham's only meaningful allegation against HRB was that "[t]he amended tax returns for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 in [Kirkham's] name were filed by ... HRB." This allegation, if true, certainly could have given rise to a meritorious claim. Kirkham, however, conceded that "[HRB] didn't file the amended returns," and she instead argued that "Widdison did." This concession is telling. If Kirkham knew that HRB had not filed her Amended Returns, we are left with only the allegation that HRB prepared Pro Forma Returns to assist in the underlying modification proceeding-an act that does not rise to the level of tortious or criminal conduct. Further, even after Kirkham conceded this point, she refused to drop her remaining claims against HRB. Thus, we conclude that there was no factual basis for Kirkham's claims against HRB and therefore, those claims were frivolous as a matter of law.

B. Bad Faith

¶52 Kirkham contends that the trial court erred in finding that she did not bring her claims in good faith. She argues that "there was no evidentiary hearing and indeed no discovery" and "[t]he amounts of fees and costs awarded clearly indicate the court has not proceeded judiciously and has sought to limit [Kirkham's] access to the courts." This assertion does not address the findings that were the legal basis of the trial court's ruling.

¶53 To satisfy the bad faith element under the statute, a court "must find that the plaintiff (1) lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) had intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay or defraud others." Fadel , 2017 UT App 165, ¶ 35, 405 P.3d 807 (cleaned up). "On appeal, a trial court's finding of bad faith may be upheld despite a party's claim that he or she held a subjectively reasonable or honest belief in the propriety of the claims ... raised during the course of a case." Id. (cleaned up). Thus, we will affirm a finding of bad faith "when there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that at least one of the three factors applies." Id. (cleaned up).

¶54 Here, we conclude that the trial court's bad faith finding was not clearly erroneous for three reasons. First, as discussed above, Kirkham conceded that HRB did not file the Amended Returns. When Kirkham alleged that HRB did file the Amended returns, she clearly "lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question." See id. (cleaned up). Second, Kirkham's general allegation that she suffered damages as a result of the Amended Returns being filed is in direct contradiction to the ruling made in the modification proceeding ordering Kirkham to sign and file the Amended Returns. See Warner v. Warner , 2014 UT App 16, ¶¶ 35-37, 319 P.3d 711 (affirming a finding of bad faith when a party prepared an order that was "180 degrees different than what the court ruled" (cleaned up)). Third, Kirkham, on appeal, has declined to provide a single meaningful citation to the record or otherwise provide analysis or legal authority in support of her position. Instead, Kirkham provides the conclusory statement that "[t]he amounts of fees and costs awarded clearly indicate the court has not proceeded judiciously and has sought to limit [her] access to the courts." Again, this assertion does not directly confront the basis of the trial court's ruling and fee award. Further, HRB supported their motion below with assertions of bad faith actions that Kirkham does not mention, let alone rebut. In failing to directly address the basis of the trial court's ruling and additionally failing to confront the record evidence of bad faith, we conclude that Kirkham has not established a basis for overcoming the trial court's bad faith finding-and therefore, she has failed to meet her burden of persuasion on appeal. See State v. Nielsen , 2014 UT 10, ¶ 41, 326 P.3d 645.

¶55 Next, we reject Kirkham's argument that "[t]he amounts of fees and costs awarded clearly indicate the court has not proceeded judiciously and has sought to limit [Kirkham's] access to the courts." As we have discussed above, supra ¶¶ 50-54, the trial court's award was justified under the bad faith attorney fee statute. Furthermore, this conclusory statement does not provide a basis for us to reverse by showing that the "amounts of fees and costs awarded" were unreasonable or excessive. Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc. , 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) ("The amount to be awarded as attorney[ ] fees is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court" and will be "upheld ... where the amount does not appear to be unreasonable." (cleaned up)). Therefore, besides affirming the award in general, we decline to disturb the trial court's finding of the amount of fees awarded below.

¶56 Finally, HRB seeks an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. "Generally, when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Fadel , 2017 UT App 165, ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 807 (cleaned up). "This rule applies when the basis for attorney fees in the trial court is the bad faith statute." Id. (cleaned up). HRB has successfully defended the trial court's dismissal of Kirkham's claims, and the trial court awarded attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-825. Therefore, we grant HRB's request for an award of attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶57 We conclude that all of Kirkham's claims were properly dismissed, the trial court did not erroneously disqualify Kirkham's attorney, the trial court properly entered a protective order, and HRB was properly awarded attorney fees. We further award HRB's costs and attorney fees on appeal. We remand to the trial court only to determine HRB's fees on appeal.

      See generally Widdison v. Kirkham , 2018 UT App 205, 437 P.3d 555 (appealing the remand trial regarding the 2012 modification order); Kirkham v. McConkie , 2018 UT App 100, 427 P.3d 444 (appealing the dismissal of her legal malpractice claim); Widdison v. Widdison , 2014 UT App 233, 336 P.3d 1106 (appealing the trial court's 2012 modification order).

      Pro forma is defined as "made or carried out in a perfunctory manner or as a formality" or "based on financial assumptions or projections: such as ... reflecting a transaction (such as a merger) or other development as if it had been or will be in effect for a past or future period." Pro forma , Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pro% 20forma [htt ps://perma.cc/68K9-FQ3U].

      Kirkham also brought numerous claims against the attorney who represented her from 2007 to 2012 for conduct related to the modification proceeding. See McConkie , 2018 UT App 100, ¶ 2, 427 P.3d 444. Kirkham's claims were dismissed on summary judgment, and this court affirmed. Id. ¶ 1.

      The record does not indicate that Kirkham moved to stay the modification while the appeal was pending.

      The court clerk was authorized to sign IRS Form 8332 on behalf of Kirkham under rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

      Kirkham again appealed, and this court affirmed. See Widdison , 2018 UT App 205, ¶ 18, 437 P.3d 555 (affirming the trial court, but remanding to recalculate attorney fees owed by Kirkham for the prior appeal and remand trial proceedings).

      Kirkham's attorney was her father, Larry A. Kirkham.

      Kirkham makes no mention of the trial court's treatment of Claim 7-as against Widdison-in her opening brief, and therefore we decline to address whether it was properly dismissed. See Allen v. Friel , 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 ("Issues ... that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court." (cleaned up)).

      Kirkham makes no mention of the trial court's treatment of Claims 4 and 5 in her opening brief, and therefore we decline to address whether they were properly dismissed. See id.

      Because of Alpine's insignificant role in this case-the Widdisons used Alpine's fax machine to send copies of the Tax Returns to HRB-the trial court disposed of all claims against it pursuant to this rule 12(c) motion by simply stating that "all Causes of Action against the Defendant Alpine Gardens, Inc., are hereby dismissed with prejudice." And while the trial court dedicated no analysis to the disposal of claims against Alpine, Kirkham has dedicated an equal paucity of analysis in her opening brief. Therefore, we limit our review to claims against HRB and the Widdisons as the appeal of the dismissal of claims against Alpine are inadequately briefed. See Angel Inv'rs, LLC v. Garrity , 2009 UT 40, ¶ 35, 216 P.3d 944 ("We have long held that we have discretion to not address an inadequately briefed argument.").

      The court also noted, and we agree, that the precise issue is not whether the Pro Forma Returns were subject to conversion but whether the underlying information used in the returns was.

      Kirkham conceded below that this claim was rooted in misappropriation of name or likeness.

      The Widdisons' only practical benefit arose from the signing and filing of IRS Form 8332, which transferred the child exemption to them from Kirkham. IRS Form 8332, however, was properly signed by the court clerk under rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Kirkham cannot-nor has she attempted to-demonstrate that filing the Amended Returns benefitted HRB or the Widdisons.

      As noted, Claims 4 and 5 were also dismissed on this motion, but Kirkham has failed to brief those claims, instead focusing only on Claim 2. See supra ¶ 12 n.9.

      We note, however, that in light of Kirkham's concession that HRB did not actually file her Amended Returns, we agree with the trial court that no unlawful act was committed by HRB.

      Even if we were inclined to take Kirkham's argument at face value-that we must take her allegations as true-this claim still fails for the reasons we articulate in section II.

      Kirkham instead argues that obtaining HRB's internal documents was not prejudicial to HRB because that information was discoverable.

      Because the statutory provision in effect at the relevant time does not differ in any material way from the provision now in effect, we cite the current version of the Utah Code.

      Kirkham cites the record only to indicate that a full motion cycle and ruling on attorney fees was made below.


author: HARRIS, Judge:

text:
    Jesseca Rae ROSS, Appellee, v. Timothy Ronald ROSS, Appellant.
    No. 20170916-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed June 13, 2019
    Bastiaan K. Coebergh, Park City, Attorney for Appellant
    Kyle Adams, Attorney for Appellee
    Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Diana Hagen concurred.
    Opinion
   HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 When they divorced, Jesseca Rae Ross (Mother) and Timothy Ronald Ross (Father) agreed to an arrangement under which they equally shared physical custody of their two minor children (the Children). After a time, Mother expressed a desire to relocate from Salt Lake County to Uintah County, and she wanted to take the Children with her. To effectuate this change, she filed a notice of relocation with the district court pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-37, but did not file a separate petition to modify the joint custody provisions of the divorce decree. Father protested that no change in custody could be ordered in Mother's favor in the absence of a petition to modify, but the district court disagreed. After holding a hearing, the court allowed Mother to relocate with the Children, and changed custody to make Mother the primary physical custodian. Father now appeals from that decision, asserting that the district court improperly ordered a change in custody without requiring Mother to file a petition to modify. We agree with Father's argument, and therefore reverse the court's order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After seven years of marriage, Mother and Father divorced, and stipulated to a decree that provided for joint legal custody and equally-shared physical custody of the Children. Less than a year after the decree was entered, Mother filed a notice of relocation, setting forth her intent, "due to her impending marriage," to relocate to Lapoint, a small farming community in Uintah County, Utah. The notice also stated Mother's intent to take the Children with her, and her belief that such a move was in the best interest of the Children, since she "provided the majority [of] care" for them. Mother did not separately file a petition to modify asking the court to change the custody provisions of the decree.

¶3 Father objected to Mother's notice to relocate, arguing that the relocation would require the Children to leave their current school district, where they were "well adjusted and happy," that he and Mother had equal custody of the Children according to the stipulated decree, and that the move would interfere with his access to, and parent-time with, the Children.

¶4 A hearing was held before a domestic relations commissioner, who heard argument from both sides and apparently considered the matter a close call. He lamented the fact that no petition to modify had been filed, stating that although he did not want to "put the parties through a ... more expensive elaborate process than necessary," he viewed this case as one "that just begs for having someone file a petition to modify to address this relocation," and stated that he was not "comfortable that [he knew] the right answer" in the absence of the more formal process a petition to modify would provide. He also noted that the filing of a petition might have caused the parties and the court to "consider whether some kind of custody evaluation or mediation-based custody evaluation ... might be useful in ... coming up with the best solution." At the conclusion of the hearing, and in the absence of a petition to modify or a custody evaluation, the commissioner recommended that Mother not be permitted to relocate the Children out of Salt Lake County on a permanent basis, but that the Children could go to Lapoint with Mother for the summer, during which time Father would have parent-time for one weekend each month.

¶5 Mother objected to the commissioner's recommendation, and asked the district court to issue an order allowing the Children to relocate with her permanently. Father opposed that request, and the court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the matter. At the close of Mother's evidence, Father moved for a directed verdict, specifically raising the issue flagged by the commissioner, namely, that Mother had not filed a petition to modify and therefore was not entitled to a change in custody. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict, and at the conclusion of the hearing took the matter under advisement.

¶6 A few weeks later, the district court issued a written decision on Mother's objection. Therein, the court noted that, "[o]rdinarily, a petition to modify is required to change the custody arrangements" at issue, and acknowledged that granting Mother's relocation would alter the current physical custody arrangement. However, the court explained that the arrangement would change "regardless" because the commissioner's recommendation effectively awarded custody to Father, and determined "that no petition to modify is required with a notice of relocation." The court then proceeded to apply a "best interest" analysis with regard to the relocation, and concluded that relocation would be in the best interest of the Children. Accordingly, the court overruled the commissioner's recommendation, allowed Mother to relocate to Lapoint with the Children, and ordered a change of custody making Mother the primary physical custodian and awarded Father parent-time pursuant to the relocation statute.

¶7 Thereafter, Father filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to amend findings based on allegedly newly discovered evidence, insufficiency of the evidence, and the verdict being contrary to law. The court denied Father's motions, finding that the allegedly new evidence was available before the evidentiary hearing, that the evidence presented at trial had been sufficient, and that its ruling complied with the requirements of the relevant statutes.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Father now appeals both the district court's original order allowing the relocation and changing custody, as well as the court's subsequent order denying his motions for a new trial and to amend findings. Father asks us to consider three issues, but because of our resolution of the first, we need not consider the other two. Father's first argument raises the issue of the propriety of ordering a change in custody in favor of a relocating parent in the absence of a petition to modify. That question involves the interpretation of various statutes and one procedural rule. "The applicability of a particular rule or statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness." Gullickson v. Gullickson , 2013 UT App 83, ¶ 16, 301 P.3d 1011. "A [district] court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness."

Donnelly v. Donnelly , 2013 UT App 84, ¶ 11, 301 P.3d 6 (quotation simplified). And a "district court's interpretations of rules of procedure are questions of law reviewed for correctness." Simler v. Chilel , 2016 UT 23, ¶ 9, 379 P.3d 1195 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶9 In this case, we must consider whether, under applicable statutes and rules, a district court may order a change in custody in favor of a relocating parent in the absence of a petition to modify. Father asserts that a district court is not authorized to take such action and, after examination of the relevant provisions, we agree.

¶10 Our procedures for interpreting statutes and rules are the same: "[W]e do so according to our general rules of statutory construction." Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC , 2010 UT 40, ¶ 18, 238 P.3d 1035. We interpret the relevant provisions according to their plain language, "seek[ing] to give effect to the intent of the body" that enacted the statute or promulgated the rule, Burns v. Boyden , 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19, 133 P.3d 370, and we read the language "in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context," Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City , 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465.

¶11 Here, we start our analysis with two provisions that generally require the filing of a petition to modify before allowing changes to divorce decrees. First, rule 106(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states generally that, "[e]xcept as provided in Utah Code Section 30-3-37, proceedings to modify a divorce decree or other final domestic relations order shall be commenced by filing a petition to modify." Second, Utah Code section 30-3-10.4(1) states specifically that, "[o]n the petition of one or both of the parents, ... the court may, after a hearing, modify or terminate an order that established joint legal or physical custody" if certain conditions are met. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Thus, rule 106 establishes a general rule-subject to an important exception, discussed below-that any changes to divorce decrees must be brought about by the filing of a petition to modify, and section 10.4 makes clear that this rule applies specifically in the context of modifying decrees that provide for joint custody.

¶12 Mother points out, however, that the exception set forth in rule 106 expressly references the relocation statute, and allows a district court to alter custody orders in the relocation context even in the absence of a petition to modify. See Utah R. Civ. P. 106(a) (stating that, "[e]xcept as provided in" the relocation statute, modifications require a petition). We acknowledge Mother's point that rule 106 refers to the relocation statute and allows exceptions to the petition requirement in relocation cases, at least to the extent that the relocation statute permits modification. But we do not read rule 106 as providing a blanket exception for all modifications that might be sought in the relocation context.

¶13 The language "[e]xcept as provided" signals a limited exception to the petition requirement. See id. To be sure, the drafters of the rules could have stated that petitions to modify are required "except in cases in which relocation is sought." Such language would have made clear that, in relocation cases, a court could modify divorce decrees in any manner, even without a petition to modify. But the drafters did not use such language; instead, they included a simple reference to the relocation statute, signaling an intent to incorporate into rule 106 whatever exceptions that statute allows. Indeed, at oral argument, Mother's counsel acknowledged that, even in the relocation context, a party seeking to modify alimony or child support would need to file a petition to modify, since the relocation statute makes no mention of alimony or child support. Thus, a court may not simply ignore rule 106 's petition requirement any time section 30-3-37 is invoked; rather, a court may modify a decree without a petition only in instances in which section 30-3-37 allows such modification.

¶14 And section 30-3-37 contemplates modification of divorce decrees in only three particular instances: (a) it allows modification of parent-time arrangements in cases where a custodial parent is allowed to relocate with a child, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37(5) - (11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); (b) it allows assessment of transportation costs, see id. § 30-3-37(12) ; and (c) it allows modification of custody-but only in favor of the non-relocating party-in cases in which the court decides not to allow the children to relocate with the relocating party, see id. § 30-3-37(4). Only subsection (4) addresses a change of custody (as opposed to parent-time), providing:

In a hearing to review the notice of relocation, the court shall, in determining if the relocation of a custodial parent is in the best interest of the child, consider any other factors that the court considers relevant to the determination. If the court determines that relocation is not in the best interest of the child, and the custodial parent relocates, the court may order a change of custody.

Id. (emphasis added).

¶15 The relocation statute thus authorizes a change of custody only if two events occur: (1) the court "determines that relocation is not in the best interest of the child," thus denying the relocating parent's request for the children to relocate; and (2) the custodial parent decides to relocate-alone-in spite of the court's ruling. Id. ; see also Pingree v. Pingree , 2015 UT App 302, ¶¶ 12-13, 365 P.3d 713 (noting that, "if a court determines that relocation is not in a child's best interest, it then has authority to order a change in custody if a custodial parent chooses to relocate," and that "a conditional change of custody ordered under section 30-3-37(4) is triggered only if ... a custodial parent elects to relocate despite a court's finding that relocation would not be in the child's best interest"). Only then is the court authorized to order a change of custody under section 30-3-37. The relocation statute does not contemplate changes in custody (as opposed to parent-time) outside that context, and therefore if a change in custody is sought in a different context, rule 106 (as well as, in some cases, section 30-3-10.4 ) requires the filing of a petition to modify.

¶16 Thus, we read rule 106 and the relocation statute together to require that a petition to modify be filed in all cases in which a grant of the relocation request will necessitate a change in custody in favor of the relocating party. In a situation in which a parent enjoys "sole" (as opposed to "joint") physical custody, and wishes to relocate with a child, no change in custody will be required in the event the relocation request is granted. That parent will have sole physical custody prior to the request, and (if granted) that parent will have sole physical custody after the relocation. In that situation, the court need only consider appropriate modifications to the parties' parent-time schedule.

¶17 The situation is different, however, where the parent who seeks to relocate does not already have sole physical custody, but wishes to attain sole physical custody upon relocation. Because "relocation" is defined as "moving 150 miles or more from the residence of the other parent," see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37(1), joint physical custody is very difficult to practicably maintain in the wake of one parent's relocation. These practical realities mean that a parent who relocates with a child will usually need to be awarded sole (as opposed to joint) physical custody. And if that parent does not already enjoy sole physical custody, that parent will need to seek a modification of the existing custody arrangement in order to facilitate well-ordered relocation, because rule 106 requires the filing of a petition for any modification, and the relocation statute does not provide an exception in that particular situation.

¶18 In this case, Mother did not have sole physical custody prior to seeking relocation. As noted above, the parties shared physical custody equally. Moreover, Mother did not claim that her situation presented one of the presumably rare situations in which a joint custody arrangement could be continued even after she moved more than 150 miles away from Father; that is, the success of Mother's relocation request-at least insofar as she would be able to take the Children with her-depended upon Mother being awarded sole physical custody. In this situation, the relocation statute does not contemplate a change in custody without a petition to modify, and therefore rule 106 's petition requirement applies with full force.

CONCLUSION

¶19 Mother needed to file a petition to modify in order to effectuate the change of custody in her favor that was, as a practical matter, essential to her relocation request. The relocation statute does not contemplate such a change of custody, and therefore the exception to rule 106 's petition requirement does not cover this situation. Because Mother did not file a petition to modify, the district court erred in ordering a change of custody in favor of Mother without one. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's custody order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶20 On remand, one of the parents (or both) will need to file a petition to modify to address the custody situation. It will be up to the district court, on remand, to determine whether the Children will remain in Lapoint pending adjudication of the petition(s) to modify. In making that determination, and in ruling upon the merits of the petition(s) to modify, the court should consider the present circumstances of the parties and the Children and not simply re-litigate the issues as they were at the time of the now-vacated custody order, bearing in mind its duties to "ensure that a child's best interests will be met before transferring custody" and "to provide stability to children by protecting them from 'ping-pong' custody awards." Chaparro v. Torero , 2018 UT App 181, ¶¶ 39-40, 436 P.3d 339 (quotation simplified).

      Father's other two arguments are: (1) that the district court's relocation decision, on its merits, was against the clear weight of the evidence presented and/or supported by insufficient evidence; and (2) that the court ignored newly discovered relevant evidence when it denied his motion for a new trial. In light of our determination that a change in custody in Mother's favor was not permitted in the absence of a petition to modify, and our resolution vacating the district court's custody order and remanding for further proceedings, we need not reach the merits of Father's additional arguments.

      Section 10.4 contains no such exception, and it could be argued that section 10.4 eclipses rule 106 's relocation exception in instances where a relocating party seeks to alter a joint custody order. We do not address this argument further, however, because Father does not expressly make it, and because-as we explain herein-even if section 10.4 is somehow construed (like rule 106 ) to contain such exceptions as are permitted by the relocation statute, those exceptions do not benefit Mother here.

      Custody and parent-time are conceptually distinct. See Jones v. Jones , 2016 UT App 94, ¶ 10, 374 P.3d 45 (stating that, "while altering custody orders generally requires a showing of substantial change in circumstances material to the modification of custody, a lesser showing may be required when the change sought is not a change of custody," and holding that "there was no error in the district court's failure to require a substantial or material change of circumstances" when modifying parent-time (quotation simplified)); see also Erickson v. Erickson , 2018 UT App 184, ¶ 16, 437 P.3d 370 ("A material change of circumstances with respect to parent-time is thus a different inquiry from whether there was a material change with respect to custody." (quotation simplified)).

      Although the relocation statute does not expressly cover a situation in which a noncustodial parent seeks leave to relocate, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37(4) (speaking only in terms of "determining if the relocation of a custodial parent is in the best interest of the child" (emphasis added)), for obvious reasons no change in custody would be required if a noncustodial parent relocates and does not seek a change in custody status associated with that relocation. Whether a petition to modify would be required in this context-given that the relocation statute does not specifically speak to this situation, and that rule 106 's exception is limited to situations covered by the relocation statute-to address requested changes to the parent-time arrangement is a question we leave for another day.

      According to statutory definition, "joint physical custody" occurs when a "child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(3)(a). Thus, any parent who enjoys less than 70% of overnights has something short of sole physical custody, and would almost certainly need to seek a change in the custody arrangement in order to relocate with a child.

      By contrast, the relocation statute (and rule 106 's exceptional reference to it) would have allowed the district court to order a change of custody in favor of Father, even without a petition to modify, in the event that it had denied Mother's relocation request and Mother had decided to relocate anyway. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37(4) ; Utah R. Civ. P. 106(a).