author: FELIPE REYNA, Justice.

text:
    In the Interest of M.H., S.H., and G.H., Children.
    No. 10-08-00308-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.
    May 5, 2010.

      Delia A. Gonzales, Dallas, Mark D. Griffith, Griffith & Associates, David K. Abbott, Waxahachie, for Relator.
    Michael W. Hartley, Waxahachie, for In-tervenors.
    Sara Ruth Spector, Ellis County Dist. Atty. Office, Waxahachie, Daniel G. Altman, Shrull Altman LLP, Fort Worth, Duke E. Hooten, Atty. Gen. (Tex. Dept, of Fam. & Pro. Serv.), Austin, Susan M. Mason, Susan M. Mason, PC, Midlothian, for Respondent.
    Gloria R. Ortiz, Waxahachie, for Ad li-tem.
    Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice REYNA, and Justice DAVIS.
   OPINION

FELIPE REYNA, Justice.

The mother and the maternal grandparents of the children the subject of this suit bring this appeal from a decree terminating the mother’s parental rights, designating the father of S.H. as her managing conservator, and designating the Department of Family and Protective Services as the managing conservator of the other two children. The grandparents contend that the court erred by: (1) failing to exclude the testimony of the Department’s expert witnesses for failure to properly designate the experts and disclose their mental impressions and opinions before trial in response to a request for disclosure; and (2) denying their motion for new trial because there is no evidence to support the jury’s refusal to find that the grandparents’ appointment as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the children and these adverse findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence (three issues). The mother contends that: (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the children; and (2) the court abused its discretion by denying her no-evidence motion for summary judgment. In a third issue, the mother adopts by reference the grandparents’ issues. See Tex.R.App. P. 9.7. We will affirm the judgment.

Background

The children were born in two other states. S.H.’s father is Appellee “Jack” who still resides in the state of S.H.’s birth. The other children’s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. The mother is Appellant “Sandra,” and her parents are Appellants “Bradley” and “Paula.” Bradley and Paula moved to Texas in 2003. Sandra moved with the children to Texas in 2004.

The Department became involved in 2006 amid concerns that the children were at risk because Sandra suffered from what was thought to be Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. In March 2007, the children were removed from the home. S.H. and G.H. were placed in foster care, and M.H. was placed with Bradley and Paula. After extensive discovery and the usual services afforded to families by the Department, the case proceeded to a jury trial in June 2008. Following several weeks of testimony, the jury returned its verdict.

Disclosure of Expert Opinions

Bradley and Paula contend in their first issue (and Sandra contends as part of her third issue) that the court erred by failing to exclude the testimony of eight of the Department’s expert witnesses for failure to properly designate the experts and disclose their mental impressions and opinions before trial in response to a request for disclosure. There are three components to this appellate complaint: (1) whether the experts are retained or non-retained; (2) whether the Department disclosed the mental impressions and opinions of the experts; and (3) if not, whether Appellants were unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the failure to disclose this information.

Bradley and Paula served the Department with a request for disclosure under Rule of Civil Procedure 194. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 194. Sandra filed a “written trial objection” to the admission of expert testimony on the ground that the Department failed to disclose the mental impressions or opinions of its experts. Id. 194.2(f)(3).

The court conducted a hearing on Sandra’s written objection before opening statements. Bradley and Paula joined in Sandra’s objection. After hearing argument of counsel, the court advised the parties that it would defer a ruling until the following day. The next day the court signed and entered an order overruling the objection and finding that permitting the experts to testify would not cause unfair surprise or prejudice “as the discovery responses themselves (documents, medical records, reports, etc.), and the available testimony of many of the individual non-retained experts” provided adequate notice “of the non-retained experts’ impressions.” In response to this ruling, the objection was re-urged, and the court granted a running objection with respect to each expert.

Preservation

Jack argues that Appellants failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because their “broad general objection” was not sufficiently specific. We disagree. The basis of the objection was that the discovery responses with respect to the experts failed to adequately disclose “the general substance of [each] expert’s mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them.” See Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)(3). The court’s written order essentially overruled this objection for two reasons: (1) the Department’s discovery responses provided the requisite information regarding the experts’ mental impressions and opinions even if the specific response to the request for disclosure did not; and (2) Appellants would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by permitting the experts to testify.

Appellants presented a specific objection. The trial court’s written order demonstrates that the court (1) understood the basis for the objection and (2) clearly overruled the objection. In addition, the trial court granted a running objection as to the testimony of each expert witness for the reasons specified in the written objection. Thus, we hold that Appellants adequately preserved this issue. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 907 (Tex.2004).

Waiver

Jack contends that Appellants waived their complaint because they did not request a continuance. He cites Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LP v. Crosby, 295 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied), to support this contention. However, we find that case distinguishable for several reasons.

The Dallas Court’s discussion regarding Wal-Mart’s failure to request a continuance was an alternate ground for disposing of Wal-Mart’s multi-faceted appellate complaint. See id. at 355. The court’s primary holding was that Wal-Mart could not complain on appeal regarding the admission of those portions of the complained-of evidence (medical records and testimony) to which it did not object. Id. Specifically concerning the issue of surprise, the appellate court observed that the trial court did not make any express rulings on this issue. Then the appellate court recited a litany of reasons the trial court could have concluded that Wal-Mart was not unfairly surprised by the plaintiffs late supplementation of discovery. Id, Finally, in response to Wal-Mart’s complaint that it “had no opportunity to evaluate [the expert’s] opinions and, if necessary, to obtain an expert to counter those opinions,” the appellate court observed that, after the trial court ruled on Wal-Mart’s objections and indicated that some of the expert’s testimony would be admitted, “Wal-Mart did not re-urge a continuance motion or otherwise raise with the trial court the need for a countering expert witness.”

We decline to apply Wal-Mart to the facts of this case. As explained, the continuance discussion was an alternate ground for overruling Wal-Mart’s multifaceted complaint. In addition, the parties in Wal-Mart did not have to concern themselves with the statutory dismissal deadline established by section 263.401 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.401 (Vernon 2008). Accordingly, we hold that Appellants did not waive their complaint by failing to request a continuance after the court overruled their objection.

Retained Expert

Rule 194.2(f)(3) requires, on proper request, a party to disclose for any testifying expert “the general substance of the expert’s mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them, or if the expert is not retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the responding party, documents reflecting such information.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)(3). The rule draws distinctions between the disclosure requirements for retained experts and those for non-retained experts. See In re Reaud, 286 S.W.3d 574, 579 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

Appellants challenge the admission of the testimony of eight experts but contend that only one, Dr. Matthew Cox, was a retained expert. The trial court implicitly found that Cox was a non-retained expert because the court referred to all of the Department’s experts in its -written ruling on Appellants’ objection as “non-retained experts.”

Our research has not disclosed a rule, statute or case explicitly defining who a “retained expert” is. But the Rules of Civil Procedure appear to view the term rather broadly because the rules treat similarly any expert “retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of [a party].” See Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(f), 195.3, 195.6.

Dr. Cox testified that he is an employee of the State of Texas, serving as an assistant professor and pediatrician at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School and Children’s Medical Center in Dallas. He explained that the State has provided funding to create “centers of consultation for Child Protective Services” at the four medical schools operated by the University of Texas to furnish experts to CPS for “evaluating kids when there’s concerns of abuse or neglect.” On cross-examination, he explained that part of his duties through this program are “to provide medical expertise and court appearances as needed for [the Department].” “I’m not getting any individual pay [for testifying]. This is part of my salary at Children’s reviewing these records and coming to court, part of my job that’s partially funded by the state.”

Though Cox may not be a “retained expert” in the traditional sense, we conclude from his testimony that he is a retained expert for purposes of the discovery rules because he is “employed by [and] otherwise subject to the control of’ the State on behalf of the Department. See id. 194.2(f). The trial court abused its discretion to the extent it held otherwise.

Disclosure of Mental Impressions and Opinions

Because Cox was a retained expert, Rule 194.2(f)(3) required the Department to disclose “the general substance of [Cox]’s mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them.” Id. 194.2(f)(3). For the non-retained experts, the Rule required the Department to disclose “the general substance of [their] mental impressions and opinions and [documents reflecting] a brief summary of the basis for them.” Id.; Barr v. AAA Tex., LLC, 167 S.W.3d 32, 36-37 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).

In an attempt to satisfy these requirements, the Department in its amended response to the request for disclosure stated that these experts:

may have knowledge of relevant facts concerning the subject matter of the above-referenced litigation, and/or any matter relating to the healthcare services provided to the Children, Respondent [Sandra], and/or Intervenors. Some are healthcare doctors, providers, therapists, developmental psychologists or clinical psychologists, who have provided healthcare services to the Children and/or to the Respondents and/or Inter-venors, or they have testified concerning matters relating to the Children, [Sandra], and/or the Intervenors.

This statement does not in any manner identify or disclose: (1) “the general substance of the expert’s mental impressions and opinions”; (2) “a brief summary of the basis for them” (with regard to Cox); or (3) documents reflecting such a summary with regard to the non-retained experts. See Llanes v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 635, 638-39 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). Thus, these experts should not have been permitted to testify unless, as the trial court found, permitting them to testify did not cause unfair surprise or prejudice.

Unfair Surprise or Prejudice

The Department had the “burden of establishing ... the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.6(b). The trial court had the discretion to determine whether the Department satisfied its burden, but the court’s finding must be supported by the record. Tex. Mun. League Intergov’tal Risk Pool v. Burns, 209 S.W.3d 806, 817 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (citing Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex.1992); Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.6(b)).

The Department characterizes this issue as a failure to supplement previous disclosures, but the issue presented by Appellants is whether the Department wholly failed to disclose the required information. Thus, we do not address the Department’s contention that supplementation was unnecessary because the experts’ trial testimony reflected only a refinement of an already disclosed subject. See Exxon Corp. v. W. Tex. Gathering Co., 868 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex.1993); Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Smoak, 134 S.W.3d 880, 902 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied). Nevertheless, the issue of whether Appellants were on notice regarding the mental impressions and opinions of the experts is relevant to whether they suffered unfair surprise or prejudice. See Hoefker v. Elgohary, 248 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Burns, 209 S.W.3d at 817-18.

Dr. Matthew Cox

Appellants contend they were unfairly surprised or prejudiced because Dr. Cox’s opinions changed between the 14-day adversary hearing conducted in April 2007 and the trial held in June 2008. At the 14-day hearing, the Department initially asked Cox to differentiate Falsification Syndrome and Factitious Disorder. Sandra objected that Cox was not qualified as an expert in mental health. The court noted that Cox was qualified without objection to testify as a pediatric forensic specialist. The court asked Cox whether, as a pediatric forensic specialist, he had the training and experience and whether it was part of his “regular protocol” to make such a differentiation. Cox answered:

As a child abuse expert, the spectrum of disorder of Munchausen Syndrome by proxy is the diagnosis in the child of pediatric condition falsification and a parental diagnosis of a mental illness, Factitious Disorder by proxy, so those two have interplays.
My role is the diagnosis of the falsification of the children’s symptom, but they work together.

The court overruled Sandra’s objection after Cox testified that it was part of his “regular course of conduct or protocol to distinguish the two.”

Cox testified in the 14-day hearing that he had reviewed S.H.’s and G.H.’s medical records and had found numerous examples where Sandra had misreported or falsified their medical history or their symptoms. He opined at this hearing that both children had suffered “abuse by pediatric condition falsification.”

At trial, Cox provided similar testimony regarding Sandra’s misreporting and/or falsification of S.H.’s and G.H.’s medical history or symptoms. Over objection, he defined Munchausen Syndrome by proxy, but he never opined that Sandra suffered from this condition. He concluded that S.H. and G.H. both were abused because of “pediatric condition falsification.” With respect to M.H., he testified that “there was a history” which led to (“in retrospect”) unnecessary diagnostic tests. He did not unequivocally testify that M.H. was abused by pediatric condition falsification.

At trial, Dr. Cox testified, consistently with his testimony at the 14-day hearing, that S.H. and G.H. suffered abuse by “pediatric condition falsification.” He expressed similar concerns at trial -with regard to M.H. but did not opine that she suffered abuse in this manner. He reviewed additional records (including all of M.H.’s available records) between the 14-day hearing and trial, but his expert opinion remained consistent. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by concluding that Appellants were not unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the Department’s failure to disclose his mental impressions or opinions. See Hoefker, 248 S.W.3d at 331; Burns, 209 S.W.3d at 817-18.

Dr. Muhammad Qamar

The Department did not list Dr. Qamar as a testifying expert in its response to the request for disclosure, but it did include him in an attached list of expert witnesses which included more than 250 other healthcare providers. Qamar did not testify at the 14-day hearing. Qa-mar was asked to evaluate Sandra in August 2007 by physicians at John Peter Smith Hospital for suspicion of factitious disorder. Based on his evaluation, Qamar concluded that she has factitious disorder. On cross-examination, he opined more forcefully that she “100 percent meets the criteria.” Qamar testified that Sandra’s prognosis with regard to this condition is good so long as she has family support, personal motivation, and appropriate counseling services.

Assuming without deciding Appellants were unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the admission of Qamar’s testimony, his opinion was admitted elsewhere without objection when his written consultation report was admitted in evidence. Therefore, any error in the admission of his testimony was rendered harmless by the admission of the same evidence in written form without objection. See Benavides v. Cushman, Inc., 189 S.W.3d 875, 885 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Combs v. Gent, 181 S.W.3d 378, 385 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).

Dr. Christian Sanchez

Dr. Sanchez testified concerning Sandra’s return to the Ennis Regional Medical Center in April 2008, several weeks after having surgery there to remove a staple from her knee. During her stay, nurses discovered that she had broken the lock on the PCA pump, which administered morphine for pain relief, and manipulated her dosage. Sanchez confronted Sandra about what he perceived to be a “definitely psychological, if not physical, addiction to pain medicine.”

In reviewing her history regarding the staple lodged in her knee, Sanchez testified that Sandra’s version of how the injury occurred was not entirely consistent with her injury. He explained this is a matter of concern when patients exaggerate symptoms or “inflict things upon themselves” to get medical attention or certain drugs. Based on his observations, he diagnosed her as suffering from Munchau-sen’s.

Assuming without deciding Appellants were unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the admission of Sanchez’s testimony, his opinion was admitted elsewhere without objection when his handwritten notes were admitted in evidence as part of Sandra’s medical records from Ennis Regional Medical Center. Therefore, any error in the admission of his testimony was rendered harmless by the admission of the same evidence in written form without objection. Id.

Other Physicians

Appellants also complain about the Department’s failure to disclose the mental impressions or opinions of Doctors Karen Schultz, Lorie Belitere-Blessing, Amy Haller, and Kimberly Sweet. However, Appellants present no argument or authority specific to the testimony of these doctors. We will not make their argument for them. See Robertson v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40, 67 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).

Dr. Mitchell Dunn

Dr. Dunn’s opinion did change between the time of the 14-day hearing and trial. He testified as a psychiatric expert on Sandra’s behalf at the 14-day hearing and diagnosed her with a depressive personality disorder. In his opinion at that time, she was able to perform normal life functions and provide appropriate care for her children. Although it was discussed at the 14-day hearing, Dunn determined that Sandra did not have factitious disorder. The only medical record available to him at that time referred to an incident in which treating physicians felt she had “purposefully extended a laceration on her head.” He thought this incident “had more to do with a battle with the doctors, kind of an impulsive response” rather than an attempt to mislead them about her condition.

Dunn reviewed additional medical records provided by the Department about a week before trial. These records reflected subsequent incidents in which Sandra: (1) had some eyedrops which caused dilation of the pupils when she came to the hospital in August 2007 complaining of a dilated left pupil; and (2) had been giving herself heparin, a blood thinner, at the time of a different hospitalization in December 2007. Dunn opined at trial that, based on this additional information, “factitious disorder is more likely.”

Relying on Norfolk Southern Railway v. Bailey, 92 S.W.3d 577 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.), the Department contends that Appellants were not unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the Department’s failure to disclose Dunn’s diagnosis of factitious disorder because this represents only a refinement of his previous diagnosis, a perfection of his report, and an expansion of an already-disclosed subject. We disagree. In Norfolk Southern, the expert’s diagnosis changed from asbestosis with no impairment to asbestosis with mild impairment. Id. at 580. Here, Dunn’s opinion changed from an affirmative determination that Sandra did not have factitious disorder to the exact opposite determination, namely, that she likely does have factitious disorder. The Department’s suggestion that this change of opinion is only a refinement of Dunn’s prior opinion that Sandra suffers from several personality disorders is unpersuasive. Dunn explained that the disorders he had previously diagnosed are conditions which can be managed by medication and therapy. However, he is aware of no successful treatment regimen for factitious disorder.

The court abused its discretion by ruling that Appellants would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the admission of Dunn’s testimony. This error requires reversal if we conclude that it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Lopez v. La Madeleine of Tex., Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 863 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); see Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.1989).

Dunn was Sandra’s own expert, so she was undoubtedly surprised when he was called by the Department at trial and testified against her. However, his testimony was only cumulative of other expert witnesses whose testimony has not been challenged (or not adequately challenged) on appeal. See State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Tex.2008) (per curiam). Drs. Qamar and Sanchez both testified that Sandra has factitious disorder or Munchausen by proxy syndrome. Iowa psychiatrist Truce Ordona testified that he diagnosed her as having Munchau-sen by proxy syndrome after treating her in 2003. Moreover, the Department could have waited until after Sandra called Dunn to testify on her behalf, presented her medical records to him, and then cross-examined him during which he would presumably reach the same conclusion he reached during his direct examination as the Department’s witness. See Hunter v. Ford Motor Co., 305 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, no pet.) (“An expert’s testimony may be contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses or by cross-examination of the expert witness.”).

Accordingly, we hold that the erroneous admission of Dunn’s expert opinion testimony probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See Dawmar Partners, 267 S.W.3d at 881; Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 396-97. We overrule Bradley’s and Paula’s first issue and that portion of Sandra’s third issue which incorporates their first issue.

Best Interest of the Children-Termination

Sandra contends in her first issue that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the children.

In conducting a factual sufficiency review, “a court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the factfin-der could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); In re T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).

The primary factors to consider when evaluating whether termination is in the best interest of a child are the familiar Holley factors, which include:

(1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.1976); T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 632.

Desires of the Children: Sandra refers to the testimony of the children’s guardian ad litem that the children love Sandra “very much,” enjoyed their visits with her, and showed affection toward her during the visits. This evidence is at best marginally relevant. See In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 51-52 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet.) (“it is doubtful that such evidence is indicative of the [child]’s conscious, volitional desire to maintain a parent-child relationship or to permanently sever that relationship”). The record contains scant evidence that any of the children possess sufficient maturity to express an opinion regarding a parental preference. Id.

Children’s Emotional and Physical Needs: The children have the usual emotional and physical needs. According to a sibling assessment prepared by a social worker, they need individual therapy and non-sibling peer groups to help them each establish their unique identities. Sandra herself testified that she is not currently able to provide for the children’s needs.

Emotional and Physical Danger to Children: The primary evidence relevant to this factor are the children’s medical histories which are replete with instances in which they have suffered emotionally and physically because of Sandra’s false reports of non-existent medical conditions. The experts are divided on whether Sandra’s condition can be treated. Bradley and Paula both testified that Sandra’s visits with the children should be supervised. This evidence supports a finding that Sandra poses a present or future risk of danger to the children.

Parental Abilities: Sandra herself testified that she is not currently able to provide for their needs. The experts are divided on whether Sandra’s condition can be treated. This evidence supports a finding that Sandra currently lacks the requisite parental abilities.

Available Programs: A caseworker testified that Sandra has been attending counseling sessions three times per week, which exceeds what the Department requested. In her own testimony, Sandra did not highlight any particular programs she is participating in to improve her situation. Thus, there is conflicting evidence relevant to this factor.

Plans for the Children: Sandra’s only plan for the children at the time of trial was for them to remain with her parents. Her parents testified that they would not allow her to be around the children. She acknowledged her diagnoses and testified of her desire to become well enough for her children to return. She could not give a specific time to accomplish this other than to say “[w]hatever time frame it takes.” Thus, the evidence relevant to this factor supports the best-interest finding.

Stability of the Home: Sandra cannot provide the children a stable home at this time. The evidence relevant to this factor supports the best-interest finding.

Sandra’s Acts and Omissions (and Excuses): The children’s medical histories are replete with instances in which they have suffered emotionally and physically because of Sandra’s false reports of nonexistent medical conditions. The experts are divided on whether Sandra’s condition can be treated. The evidence relevant to this factor supports the best-interest finding.

Summary: Considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence is such that the jurors “could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction” that termination of Sandra’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 630. Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient on this element. We overrule Sandra’s first issue.

Best Interest of S.H.-Conservatorship

Bradley and Paula contend in their second issue that the court erred by denying their motion for new trial because there is no evidence to support the jury’s refusal to find that their appointment as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the children. They contend in their third and fourth issues that the challenged findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Sandra incorporates these issues as part of her third issue. We focus first on the evidence relevant to S.H.

Section 153.131 of the Family Code provides a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of a parent as a child’s managing conservator is in her best interest unless the appointment “would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (Vernon 2008); In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2007). To successfully overcome this presumption:

the non-parent must prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that appointing the parent as a managing conservator would result in serious physical or emotional harm to the child. Evidence must be presented to support the logical inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the parent will probably cause that harm. This link between the parent’s conduct and harm to the child may not be based on evidence that merely raises a surmise or speculation of possible harm. When a non-parent and a parent are both seeking managing conservatorship, “close calls” go to the parent.

Taylor v. Taylor, 254 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citations omitted).

We assume without deciding that Bradley and Paula presented evidence sufficient to rebut the parental presumption favoring Jack. Rather, we focus on whether the evidence conclusively establishes that it would be in S.H.’s best interest for them to be appointed as her managing conservators or whether the jury’s adverse finding on this issue is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.002 (Vernon 2008) (“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining [conser-vatorship] issues”); see also Hunter, 305 S.W.3d at 205-06. We again apply the Holley factors. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 632.

In considering the no-evidence issue, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Jack, “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex.2005); Hunter, 305 S.W.3d at 205-06. Because the burden of proof at trial was a preponderance of the evidence on the con-servatorship issues, we do not apply the heightened standard of review required for findings in parental-rights termination cases in which the burden of proof at trial is elear-and-convincing evidence. See J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616.

For Bradley’s and Paula’s contention that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we weigh all the evidence and may set aside the adverse finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001); Hunter, 305 S.W.3d at 206.

Desires of the Child: The record contains no evidence that S.H. possesses sufficient maturity to express an opinion regarding a conservatorship preference.

Child’s Emotional and Physical Needs: S.H. has the usual emotional and physical needs. She needs individual therapy and a non-sibling peer group to help her establish her unique identity. Jack testified that such services are available in his home state and that he has a supportive family and lives in a good neighborhood where her needs can be met.

A social worker testified that, while S.H. was in Bradley’s and Paula’s care during the pendency of the case, her needs were being met appropriately.

Emotional and Physical Danger to Child: S.H. suffered emotionally and physically on numerous occasions because of Sandra’s false reports of non-existent medical conditions. The parties agree that S.H. must be protected from Sandra. Jack testified that, if Sandra were at some point permitted to visit S.H., he would make sure that “the proper safety rules [were] in place and followed.”

There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether Bradley and Paula are willing and able to protect S.H. from Sandra. The Department’s witnesses are generally not convinced of their willingness to do so. These witnesses are concerned because of past history and in particular because of the failure of Paula, a registered nurse, to acknowledge Sandra’s condition despite a 10-year history of similar incidents involving Sandra or her children. However, Bradley and Paula presented evidence that Dr. Ordona initially assured them that Sandra did not suffer from Mun-chausen’s although he stated in his deposition that he later did diagnose her with this condition. The social worker reported that Bradley and Paula want to follow the recommendations of the various professionals with regard to Sandra and the girls and “have chosen to accept to put their Grandchildren’s needs above the needs of their daughter.”

Parental Abilities: Jack testified about counseling services he has received to better understand S.H.’s needs and to gain the tools needed to develop a close relationship with her. He described what he learned in a 4-hour parent education program and how it would affect him if given custody of S.H.

The evidence indicates that Bradley and Paula are also capable of providing appropriate parenting for S.H.

Available Programs: Jack testified about various programs and services that are available in his home state to meet S.H.’s needs. Similar services are available to Bradley and Paula and have been employed during the pendency of the suit.

Plans for the Child: Jack told the jury about his plans for S.H.: how he would change his work schedule to maximize his time with her, how extended family would be available to help as needed, how he will allow her to maintain a relationship with her mother, grandparents and sisters as possible, and how he wants to provide her “a life of happiness” by showing her love and giving her the attention that she has been deprived in the past.

Paula testified that Bradley and she are “ready to raise the children for the rest of their lives but ready to allow [Sandra] to have some involvement in their lives” with appropriate “safety features.”

Stability of the Home: Jack currently lives with his parents in an appropriate home and has no plans to move in the near future. Bradley and Paula also have an appropriate and stable home environment, although their continuing relationship with Sandra at least poses a potential threat to the stability of the home.

Acts and Omissions (and Excuses): Jack failed to pay child support when S.H. first moved away, but Sandra would not allow the court in that state to provide him her address so he could make proper arrangements. After being served, Jack came to Texas for the 14-day hearing. Before being permitted access to S.H., he submitted to numerous tests, interviews, and screening procedures. He has made ten or eleven trips to Texas to see S.H. He testified that he has called to talk with S.H. almost every week. He sought appropriate counseling and parent education services in his home state.

Paula testified that the regularity of Jack’s phone calls was “erratic,” perhaps twice a month. Bradley and she have been the primary caregivers for S.H. during the pendency of the case. However, we have already reviewed the evidence regarding their unwillingness to accept Sandra’s diagnosis and the consequences flowing from that. The jury could have inferred from the evidence that they did not come to accept the diagnosis until the eve of trial and could have questioned the sincerity of their acceptance.

Sibling Relationships: Bradley and Paula cite Autry v. Autry, 350 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1961, writ dism’d), Dalton v. Doherty, 670 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ), and similar cases for the proposition that it is not in the best interest of siblings to be separated absent “clear and compelling reasons.” See also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 162.302(e) (Vernon 2008) (“It is the intent of the legislature that the department in providing adoption services, when it is in the children’s best interest, keep siblings together and whenever possible place siblings in the same adoptive home.”).

However, there is no statutorily prescribed “clear and compelling” standard to be met before siblings may be separated. See In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281, 303-04 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).

More importantly, the preference that siblings be kept together when possible applies only in cases involving children of the same marriage (or non-married parents) and not half-siblings. In re K.L.R., 162 S.W.3d 291, 306 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, no pet.); D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 303. Even the cases cited by Bradley and Paula recognize this limitation. See Autry, 350 S.W.2d at 236; Dalton, 670 S.W.2d at 424.

Nevertheless, it is undisputed that S.H.’s emotional well-being will be adversely affected by her separation from her half-sisters. Therefore, the impact of separating the girls is an appropriate consideration in evaluating what is in S.H.’s best interest. See K.L.R., 162 S.W.3d at 306. And the evidence relevant to this factor indicates that it would be in S.H.’s best interest for Bradley and Paula to be appointed as her managing conservators (so long as they were also appointed as managing conservators of her half-sisters).

Summary: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jack, we cannot say that the evidence conclusively establishes that it would be in S.H.’s best interest for Bradley and Paula to be appointed as her managing conservators. Thus, we reject Bradley’s and Paula’s no-evidence challenge with regard to this issue.

Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, there is evidence on many of the relevant factors which would have supported a verdict in favor of Jack or in favor of Bradley and Paula on this issue. “When a non-parent and a parent are both seeking managing conservatorship, ‘close calls’ go to the parent.” Taylor, 254 S.W.3d at 536. Thus, we reject Bradley’s and Paula’s contention that the jury’s finding on this issue is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Best Interest of M.H. and G.H.-Conservatorship

Bradley and Paula also contend in their second issue that the court erred by denying their motion for new trial because there is no evidence to support the jury’s refusal to find that their appointment as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of M.H. and G.H. They contend in their third and fourth issues that the challenged findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Sandra incorporates these issues as part of her third issue.

The evidence relevant to Bradley and Paula regarding the Holley factors and keeping the girls together in a single family does not vary appreciably from what has already been stated, so we will not repeat it.

For their no-evidence claim, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence conclusively establishes that it would be in M.H.’s and G.H.’s best interests for Bradley and Paula to be appointed as their managing conservators. See Hunter, 305 S.W.3d at 205.

The Department’s primary argument was (and is) that Bradley and Paula are not willing to protect the children from Sandra. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Department’s position. After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say that the evidence conclusively establishes that it would be in M.H.’s and G.H.’s best interests for Bradley and Paula to be appointed as their managing conservators.

Nor do we agree that the challenged findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 206. The jury heard conflicting evidence regarding what is in the best interest of the children and determined that the appointment of Bradley and Paula as managing conservators would not be in their best interest. We must defer to the jury on its resolution of these issues. See Harris v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 228 S.W.3d 819, 829-30 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.); Hunter, 305 S.W.3d at 206.

For these reasons, we overrule Bradley’s and Paula’s second, third and fourth issues and that part of Sandra’s third issue which incorporates these issues by reference.

Denial of Summary Judgment

Sandra contends in her second issue that the court erred by denying her no-evidence summary-judgment motion. “Where a motion for summary judgment is denied by the trial court and the case is tried on its merits, the order denying the summary judgment cannot be reviewed on appeal.” Moore v. Jet Stream Invs., Ltd., 261 S.W.3d 412, 427 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (citing Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.1966)).

We overrule Sandra’s second issue and affirm the judgment.

Chief Justice GRAY concurring with note.

      . The grandparents contend in their second issue that there is no evidence to support the challenged findings. They contend in their third issue that there is not factually sufficient evidence to support the findings. And they contend in their fourth issue that the challenged findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Because they had the burden of proof at trial on this issue, they must establish that the challenged findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to prevail on a factual insufficiency claim. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001); Hunter v. Ford Motor Co., 305 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, no pet.).

      . To protect the identity of the children, we shall refer to the parents and grandparents by pseudonyms. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.002(d) (Vernon 2008); Tex.R.App. P. 9.8(b)(1).

      . Generally, when a party presents multiple issues, an appellate court should first address the issue(s) that would afford the party the greatest relief (like a no-evidence issue which could lead to rendition of judgment by the appellate court). Bradleys’ Elec., Inc. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.1999) (per curiam); see Builders Transp., Inc. v. Grice-Smith, 167 S.W.3d 1, 6 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d 420, 428 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Here, however, because of the intertwined nature of the issues relating to termination of the parent-child relationship and post-termination conservatorship, we first address the issues relevant to termination and then those relevant to conservatorship.

      .Although this complaint actually refers to experts of the Department "and the Children,” we refer to these experts collectively as the Department’s experts because no information in the record indicates that a distinction should be noted for purposes of our analysis.

      . See Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff'd, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.1998) (in trials involving multiple defendants, each defendant must make his own objections to preserve error, but defendants may agree with court’s approval that the objection of one defendant may be considered as having been made on behalf of all defendants).

      . The Department's Amended Responses to Intervenor’s Request for Disclosure is 18 pages long and tracks the relevant language of Rule 194.2. The quoted portion appears on page 15 of the amended response directly after a reference to and quotation of subdivision (f)(3) of the rule.

      . It is noteworthy that the Department does not cite to any previous discovery response in the record which would have given Appellants the information they contend was never disclosed.

      . A transcription of Dr. Cox's testimony from the 14-day hearing was filed 2 weeks before trial and made available to the other parties for copying. Cox testified at trial that he did not have M.H.’s medical records at the time of the 14-day hearing.

      . At the time of trial, the children were 9, 7, and 5 years old.

      . For several of the best-interest factors, Sandra refers to evidence that Bradley and Paula are currently able to provide for the children's needs, but in deciding whether the evidence supports the verdict that termination of Sandra’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children, our focus must necessarily be on Sandra and not other potential caregivers. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.1976) (best-interest inquiry focuses on “the individuals seeking custody”).

      . We assume without deciding that Sandra has standing to do so even though her parental rights have been terminated.

      . Bradley and Paula do not challenge the jury’s refusal to find that Jack’s appointment "would significantly impair [S.H.'s] physical health or emotional development.” See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (Vernon 2008); In re 243 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2007).

      . The Holley factors are a non-exclusive list of considerations for the best-interest determination and other factors may also be considered. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex.2002); In re T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d 625, 632-33 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).

       Chief Justice Gray concurs in the judgment of the Court to the extent it affirms the trial court's judgment. He joins no part of the Opinion including its designation as such rather than as a memorandum opinion. A separate opinion will not issue, due in part to the already lengthy time this appeal has been pending.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: W. STACY TROTTER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bradford A. PHILLIPS, Clifton Phillips, Ryan T. Phillips and F. Terry Shumate, Appellants, v. UNITED HERITAGE CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, Appellee.
    No. 10-08-00161-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.
    May 26, 2010.

      Peter K. Rusek, Sheehy, Lovelace & Mayfield, Waco, Daren R. Van Slyke, Michael J. Rogers PC, Cleburne, for Appellants.
    Mitchell Madden, Madden Sewell LLP, Dallas, for Appellee.
    Elizabeth S. Miller, Atty. and Professor of Law, Waco, for Amicus Curiae.
    Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice REYNA, and Judge TROTTER.

       The Honorable W. Stacy Trotter, Judge of the 244th District Court of Ector County, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to section 74.003(h) of the Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(h) (Vernon 2005).

   OPINION

W. STACY TROTTER, Judge.

It is a fundamental principle that the corporate structure normally insulates shareholders, officers, and directors from individual liability for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the corporation. See Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271-72 (Tex.2006). Nevertheless, their abuse of this privilege can result in the “piercing of the corporate veil” and the imposition of individual liability. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex.1986). Theories exist that provide a basis for piercing the corporate veil. However, these theories and the attempts to utilize them are not substantive causes of action. See Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex.1991); Gallagher v. McClure Bintliff, 740 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex.App.Austin 1987, writ denied). Rather, they are a means of imposing on an individual a corporation’s liability for an underlying cause of action. See Dick’s Last Resort of the West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (citing Cox v. S. Garrett, L.L.C., 245 S.W.3d 574, 582 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).

In the matter before us, Bradford A. Phillips, Clifton Phillips, Ryan T. Phillips, and F. Terry Shumate appeal from the trial court’s judgment based on jury findings that pierced the corporate veil of Black Sea Investments, Ltd. and held them each individually liable for a judgment United Heritage Corporation had taken against Black Sea in a prior suit. In seven issues, Appellants contend that: (1) the trial court erred in denying their motions to transfer venue; (2) the trial court erred in rejecting the defense of res judi-cata asserted by Bradford A. Phillips; (3) the trial court erred in denying their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to the applicable laws of the Turks and Caicos Islands and article 8.02(A) of the Texas Business Corporation Act; (4) the trial court erred in denying their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to article 2.21(A) of the Texas Business Corporation Act; (5) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict of the jury and the trial court’s judgment; (6) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the verdict of the jury and the trial court’s judgment; and (7) the trial court submitted an erroneous jury charge. Because the trial court erred in determining that the Texas Business Corporation Act did not apply to this action and UHC failed to establish that Appellants committed actual fraud, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Appellants are not individually liable to UHC for the prior judgment entered against Black Sea.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Black Sea Investments, Ltd. was incorporated as an exempt company in the Turks and Caicos Islands on July 30, 1993. The laws under which it was formed required that Black Sea maintain its primary operations outside the territorial boundaries of those Islands. During its existence, Appellants at various and relevant periods of time served as either an officer or director of this corporation. However, Appellants were never shareholders in Black Sea. United Heritage Corporation (UHC) is a Utah Corporation and publicly traded entity in the NASDAQ capital market sector.

Because of its exempt and foreign corporation status, Black Sea was authorized to acquire and sell certain unregistered securities and avoid the prolonged investment registration requirements mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for similar domestic securities transactions. In 1997, Black Sea and UHC began negotiating the potential private offering of certain UHC securities. At the time, UHC’s principal place of business was located in Cleburne, Johnson County, Texas. On or about December 17, 1997, Black Sea and UHC executed a Subscription Agreement for the purchase of $300,000.00 of UHC stock. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, UHC sold 352,941 shares of its common stock to Black Sea. A majority of these shares were subsequently sold by Black Sea between July 16 and August 28, 1998. It was the alleged untimely manner in which these shares were disposed of by Black Sea that precipitated the filing of UHC’s first suit.

UHC originally filed suit against Black Sea and Bradford A. Phillips asserting claims for breach of contract, common law fraud, and statutory fraud. UHC also sought a declaratory judgment. After a bench trial, the trial court found that Black Sea’s actions constituted a breach of the Subscription Agreement. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment against Black Sea solely on the breach of contract claim and awarded UHC $2,000,000.00 in damages, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and interest. The trial court further concluded that Bradford A. Phillips was not personally liable to UHC under any theory alleged. An appeal ensued and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See United, Heritage Corp. v. Black Sea Invs., Ltd., No. 10-03-00139-CV, 2005 WL 375443 (Tex.App.-Waco February 16, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.).

UHC eventually proceeded to execute and collect the judgment it had secured against Black Sea in the first suit. These efforts were unsuccessful. As a result, UHC filed the present action to enforce this judgment against Black Sea. Additionally, UHC sought to pierce the corporate veil of Black Sea claiming that Appellants utilized Black Sea: (1) as their alter ego; (2) as a sham to perpetrate a fraud; (3) to evade an existing legal obligation; and (4) as a means to justify a wrong. See Castle-berry, supra. In response, Appellants contended, inter alia, that the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA) governed the disposition of these claims. Specifically, Appellants contended that the claims UHC had asserted against them were subject to and barred by the laws of the Turks and Caicos Islands pursuant to article 8.02(A) of the TBCA or, alternatively, by article 2.21(A) of the TBCA. The trial court rejected Appellants’ contentions and charged the jury pursuant to the Castle-berry principles. UHC prevailed on each charged theory. The jury’s verdict effectively pierced the corporate veil of Black Sea and held Appellants individually liable for the judgment UHC had taken against Black Sea in the first suit. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and this appeal followed. Black Sea defaulted and did not appeal the judgment entered against it.

II. Standard of Review

The denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed under a no-evidence standard. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex.2009) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex.2005)). We credit evidence favoring the jury verdict if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 830 (citing Central Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex.2007)). We will uphold a judgment based on the jury’s finding if more than a scintilla of competent evidence supports it. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex.2003) (per curiam)). Therefore, we must decide whether the evidence presented at trial could allow reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827).

III. Statutory Construction

We begin our analysis by reviewing the applicable principles of statutory construction. It is axiomatic that statutory construction is a question of law. See State ex rel. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Trans. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.2002). Therefore, when construing a statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.021, 311.023, 312.005 (Vernon 2005); see also State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.2006); McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003); Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Tex.2000). In discerning that intent, we look to the plain and common meaning of the statute’s words. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2004). Further, we read the statute as a whole, not just in isolated portions. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003).

Where statutory language is unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its terms, and give true meaning and effect to the language consistent with other provisions in the statute. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. We consider the objective the law seeks to obtain and the consequences of a particular construction. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023(1), (5); see also McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. We should not construe a statute in a manner that will either render any provision meaningless, see Columbia Med. Center of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex.2008), or lead to a foolish or absurd result when another reasonable and logical alternative is available. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 356 n. 20 (Tex.2004); see also Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex.2004) (noting that when a statutory text is unambiguous, courts must adopt the interpretation supported by the statute’s plain language unless that interpretation would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result). We also consider the legislative history in construing an unambiguous statute, see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023(3) (Vernon 2005), and presume the Legislature would not perform a useless act in adopting a statute. See Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.1990).

IV. Article 8.02(A) of the Texas Business Corporation Act

In their third issue, Appellants complain that the trial court erred by not applying the applicable laws of the Turks and Cai-cos Islands pursuant to article 8.02(A) of the TBCA to the determination of whether the corporate veil of Black Sea should be pierced. No Texas court has specifically addressed this issue in the context Appellants now urge.

Article 8.02(A) states:

A. A foreign corporation which shall have received a certificate of authority under this Act shall, until its certificate of authority shall have been revoked in accordance with the provisions of this Act or until a certificate of withdrawal shall have been issued by the Secretary of State as provided in this Act, enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a domestic corporation organized for the purposes set forth in the application pursuant to which such certificate of authority is issued; and, as to all matters affecting the transaction of intrastate business in this State, it and its officers and directors shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation of like character and its officers and directors; provided, however, that only the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation shall govern (1) the internal affairs of the foreign corporation, including but not limited to the rights, powers, and duties of its board of directors and shareholders and matters relating to its shares, and (2) the liability, if any, of shareholders of the foreign corporation for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the foreign corporation for which they are not otherwise liable by statute or agreement.

Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.02(A) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added). In 1989, the Legislature deemed it necessary to amend article 8.02(A) to address and clarify the limited circumstances under which veil piercing claims could be asserted against a shareholder of a foreign corporation. See Acts 1955, 54th Leg., ch. 64, effective September 6, 1955; amended by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 801, § 40, effective August 28, 1989; see also Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 271-72. The scope and intent of article 8.02(A) is now clearly defined: the laws of a foreign corporation’s state or place of incorporation, not Texas law, shall govern the adjudication and disposition of shareholder liability and other veil piercing claims against shareholders that involve the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the corporation. Although Texas courts have applied the laws of other states in determining veil piercing issues under article 8.02(A), we are confronted with the assertion of veil piercing claims involving an entity (Black Sea) that was incorporated in a foreign country. Nevertheless, the issues we must resolve go beyond Black Sea’s corporate formation.

Here, although Appellants served as either officers or directors of Black Sea, they were never shareholders. UHC contends that non-shareholder officers and directors of a foreign corporation are and should be excluded from the scope and protections afforded to shareholders under article 8.02(A) because although directors are referred to in article 8.02(A)(1) (addressing a foreign corporation’s internal affairs), neither officers nor directors are specifically mentioned in article 8.02(A)(2) (the shareholder liability section). We do not find this argument persuasive.

It is not surprising that the Legislature referred only to shareholders when it enacted and later amended article 8.02(A) because veil piercing claims are primarily asserted against shareholders, not non-shareholder officers and directors. Consequently, should officers and directors who are non-shareholders of a corporate entity be subject to the same veil piercing theories? Although some Texas state and federal courts have addressed whether traditional veil piercing claims may be pursued against non-shareholders, the extent to which these theories can be utilized to impose individual liability on a non-shareholder for corporate debts, liabilities, and obligations remains unclear. Having considered the unique circumstances presented in this action and the statutory scheme at issue, we believe the veil piercing theories and principles that are available and used to hold shareholders individually liable for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of a foreign corporation under article 8.02(A) should apply equally and in the same manner to non-shareholder officers and directors of that entity.

Certain provisions of the Business Organizations Code, the successor to the TBCA, are also instructive and mirror the language and intent of article 8.02(A). The Business Organizations Code explicitly states that the laws of a foreign corporation’s state or place of incorporation shall apply when determining the liability of a managerial official (i.e., an officer or director of a corporation) or a shareholder, for an obligation, debt, or liability of the corporation. Tex. Bus. ORGS.Code Ann. § 1.104 (Vernon Pamp.2009) (“The law of the jurisdiction that governs an entity ... applies to the liability of an owner, a member, or a managerial official of the entity ... for an obligation, including a debt or other liability, of the entity ... ”) (emphasis added). Importantly, article 8.02(A) (recodified in Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. §§ 1.101-1.106 (Vernon Pamp.2009)) was one of the source statutes the Legislature relied on for the adoption of section 1.104, and the revisor’s note further indicates that no substantive change to the source law was intended in the enactment of this section. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 1.104 Revisor’s Note (Vernon Pamp. 2009).

For purposes of determining individual liability in a veil piercing context under article 8.02(A), we conclude that applying the laws of a foreign corporation’s state or place of incorporation to the shareholders of that entity, including shareholders who are also corporate officers and directors, while under the same circumstances requiring the laws of Texas to govern the fate of non-shareholder officers and directors of the same foreign entity, produces an unreasonable, illogical, and absurd result and is contrary to the spirit and intent of article 8.02(A). Therefore, we hold that the scope and protections of article 8.02(A) extend and apply to non-shareholder officers and directors of a foreign corporation in the determination of their potential individual liability for that corporation’s debts, liabilities, and other obligations.

A. Notice of Foreign Laws

UHC contends that if the laws of the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) are applicable to this action, Appellants failed to properly comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Evidence 208 regarding the laws of a foreign country. See Tex.R. Evid. 203. Rule 203 is a “hybrid rule” by which the presentation of foreign law to the court resembles the presentment of evidence, although the determination of its application is ultimately a question of law. See Long Distance Int’l, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., 49 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex.2001). Nevertheless, a party who intends to rely on the laws of a foreign country under Rule 203 must provide to all parties (1) some form of notice and (2) copies of any writings or other sources that the proponent will utilize as proof of such foreign laws. It is UHC’s belief that Appellants neither proffered nor requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the laws of TCI, therefore, it should be presumed that the laws of TCI and Texas are the same. We disagree.

Approximately five months prior to the commencement of trial, Appellants filed their motion for summary judgment based in part on the laws of TCI, which the trial court denied. Appellants’ summary judgment evidence included deposition excerpts from UHC’s retained expert, Timothy Prudhoe, a British barrister and practicing TCI attorney. Prudhoe also prepared a comprehensive report. His deposition testimony and report explained the application and fundamental principles of the laws of TCI, and his conclusions as to Appellants’ potential liability to UHC. At the trial of this action, Prudhoe’s deposition testimony and report were offered by UHC and admitted into evidence without objection for all purposes. Here, UHC is a victim of its own trial strategy. As such, UHC cannot by its actions now complain that the trial court erroneously admitted this evidence. See Halim v. Ramchandani, 203 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Voskamp v. Amoldy, 749 S.W.2d 113, 123-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied); Schwarte v. Bunting, 210 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Moreover, in addition to their motion for summary judgment, at trial Appellants presented to the trial court for its consideration a voluminous trial brief on TCI law. Their brief was based substantially upon Prudhoe’s deposition testimony and report. UHC did not object to this proffer. Here, we find that Appellants substantially complied with the procedures and requirements of Rule 203. Reasonable notice of Appellants’ intention to rely on the laws of TCI, including the necessary proof of these laws, was provided to UHC. See Nexen, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g Co., 224 S.W.3d 412, 417-19 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Lawrenson v. Global Marine, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 519, 525-26 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied). In fact, counsel for UHC acknowledged this at oral argument. Nevertheless, even if we are incorrect in our analysis, because UHC did not attempt to limit the trial court’s consideration of the laws of TCI under this rule or the scope of the evidence that was introduced to explain and support these laws, it has forfeited the right to complain of Appellants’ use of this evidence. See Dankowski v. Dankowski, 922 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).

B. Laws of the Turks and Caicos Islands

The Turks and Caicos Islands, located approximately ninety (90) miles to the north of the Dominican Republic, are a common law jurisdiction which primarily follows English law. TCI has adopted ordinances that address the potential personal liability for officers and directors of corporations formed under TCI law. TCI ordinances are comparable to our statutes. Under TCI law, it is a fundamental principle that a validly constituted and operated corporate entity has its own legal existence and limited liability. See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] AC 22 HL (E).

In most jurisdictions, including Texas, the circumstances under which an officer or director may be held personally liable for the debts, liabilities, or obligations of the corporation are limited. Similarly, the circumstances for imposing personal liability under TCI law are also restricted. According to Prudhoe, UHC’s retained expert on TCI law, the circumstances required to pierce the corporate veil under TCI law are limited to when:

• The officer or director acted ultra vires;
• The articles of association provide for unlimited officer or director liability;
• Upon the winding up of the corporation, monies are to be recovered from the officer or director that belong to the corporation;
• Debts are incurred by the officer or director if the corporation is insolvent;
• The officer or director has personally committed a tortious activity that would be tantamount to actual fraud;
• The officer or director voluntarily assumes personal liability for the corporation’s torts;
• The officer or director procures or induces the corporation to commit a tort; and
• The officer or director has given a personal guarantee.

Prudhoe’s testimony, conclusions, and the substance of his report were undisputed. Consequently, in order to establish a valid claim against Appellants under TCI law, it was incumbent upon UHC to prove that any of the listed circumstances were applicable. We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us and it is clear that UHC failed to present any evidence that would support a right to recovery.

There is no evidence that Appellants acted ultra vires, or contrary to the stated objectives of Black Sea. There is no evidence that Appellants had unlimited liability pursuant to Black Sea’s articles of association, or that they provided any personal guarantee. There is no evidence that Appellants owed any monies or were financially indebted to Black Sea upon its winding up, or that Black Sea was insolvent when UHC’s underlying causes of action accrued. Additionally, there is no evidence that Appellants voluntarily assumed any personal liability for the judgment rendered against Black Sea in the first suit or for any tortious acts allegedly committed by Black Sea. Yet, other circumstances further preclude UHC’s ability to recover against Appellants.

This is an action to enforce and collect a judgment taken against Black Sea in the first suit for its breach of the Subscription Agreement, not for its alleged tortious activities. Indeed, UHC believes that Appellants engaged in fraudulent conduct and because of their alleged conduct they should each be individually liable to it for this judgment. Nevertheless, in its responses to Appellants’ request for admissions, UHC admitted that Appellants had not committed an actual fraud against it. In fact, UHC conceded it had no right of recovery against Appellants for fraud or any other relevant cause of action because it had previously litigated these claims, unsuccessfully, in the first suit. Consequently, UHC’s admissions are conclusive and further dispositive as to these issues. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.3.

UHC presented no evidence that would allow it to recover against Appellants under any applicable TCI theory or law. In fact, the uncontroverted testimony, conclusions, and report of UHC’s retained expert even supports Appellants’ contentions. Therefore, if the laws of TCI apply to this action pursuant to article 8.02(A), Appellants would not be individually liable to UHC for the judgment taken against Black Sea. Appellants’ third issue is sustained.

V. Article 2.21(A) of the Texas Business Corporation Act

In their fourth issue, Appellants further complain that the trial court erred by refusing to apply the standards set forth in article 2.21(A) of the TBCA. This statute requires an affirmative finding of actual fraud in order to pierce the corporate veil when, like in this action, a contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter that relates to or arises from such obligation is involved. See Willis, 199 S.W.3d at 271-72 (recognizing that article 2.21 limits Castleberry’s application); Priddy v. Rawson, 282 S.W.3d 588, 600 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Dick’s Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 909-10. Article 2.21(A) states in part:

A. A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation, shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees with respect to:
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the obligee demonstrates that the holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefít of the holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate; or

Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21(A) (Vernon 2003) (recodified in Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. §§ 21.223-21.226 (Vernon Pamp.2009)) (emphasis added). We must initially determine if the Legislature intended to include non-shareholder officers and directors of a corporation within the scope of this statute. Consistent with our interpretation of article 8.02(A), we hold that it did.

Article 2.21(A) was amended by the Legislature in 1997 to include the phrase “any affiliate thereof or of the corporation.” This amendment expanded the classification of persons previously covered by that article. See Acts 1955, 54th Leg., ch. 64, effective September 6, 1955; amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 375, § 7, effective September 1, 1997. Central to our analysis is the interpretation of the term “affiliate.” UHC contends that an “affiliate” under article 2.21(A) should not include non-shareholder officers and directors of the corporation unless they are affiliates of shareholders, owners of any beneficial interests in the shares, or subscribers of shares whose subscription has been accepted. We disagree. The plain and intended meaning of “affiliate” as article 2.21(A) and its amendments reflect, also encompasses any individual who is affiliated with (1) a shareholder of the corporation, (2) a beneficial owner or subscriber of shares of the corporation, or (3) simply the corporation itself in some capacity, which we hold includes officers and directors.

The Business Organizations Code defines “affiliate” as “a person who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another person.” See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 1.002(1) (Vernon Pamp. 2009) (emphasis added). This definition is derived from the Federal Securities Act of 1933, and was not intended to be substantively different from the TBCA’s definition of “affiliate.” See Tex. Bus. ORGS.Code Ann. § 1.002(1) Revisor’s Note (Vernon Pamp.2009); see also Tex. Bus. CoRp. Act Ann. art. 13.02(A)(1) (Vernon 2003) (defining “affiliate” as “a person who ... controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a specified person.”) (emphasis added). Further, relevant and controlling statutes define a “person” to include an individual. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. § 1.002(69-b) (Vernon Pamp.2009); see also Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 13.02(A)(7) (Vernon 2003). Therefore, it logically follows that an “affiliate” must also include individuals. Moreover, it is significant that the concept of an “affiliate” has been generally understood to encompass officers and directors. C.f. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (defining an “affiliate” of an issuer as “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer”). We agree with this concept and hold that the term “affiliate” encompasses and includes officers and directors of the corporation.

We further conclude that in order to give proper meaning and effect to the Legislature’s amendment to article 2.21(A), the term “affiliate” must also be extended to include affiliates of the corporation or the phrase “thereof or of the corporation” is rendered meaningless. See In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284, 291 n. 6 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2007) (“In 1997, the legislature added ‘affiliates’ of the corporation, of the shareholders, of the owners of beneficial interests in shares, and subscribers of shares to the list of parties to whom § 2.21(A) applies (which, as of 1993, already included shareholders, beneficial interest holders, and subscribers of shares).”). The word “thereof’ links “affiliate” to the antecedent category of parties, i.e., shareholders, owners of beneficial interests in shares, or subscribers of shares. The phrase “or of the corporation” relates “affiliate” solely to the corporation itself. Clearly, the phrase “or of the corporation” would be of no consequence if the affiliate relationship was limited only to shareholders, beneficial owners, and subscribers. In this instance, we do not believe that the Legislature intended to enact a statute with such a limited application, effect, and purpose and we decline to construe it so narrowly. Therefore, we hold that non-shareholder officers and directors are also affiliates of the corporation under article 2.21(A). Consequently, Appellants are affiliates of Black Sea for purposes of article 2.21 (A)’s application.

Because of their status as affiliates, in order to pierce the corporate veil of Black Sea, UHC was required to establish that Appellants not only caused Black Sea to be used for the purpose of perpetrating an actual fraud, they did in fact perpetrate an actual fraud on UHC primarily for their own direct personal benefit. See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003); see also Priddy, 282 S.W.3d at 600-01; Dick’s Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 909; Solutioneers Consulting, Ltd. v. Gulf Greyhound Partners, Ltd., 237 S.W.3d 379, 389 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). UHC was clothed with this burden of proof. As such, UHC was obligated to request the submission of the necessary questions in the trial court’s charge and to obtain affirmative jury findings of actual fraud against Appellants. See Dick’s Last Resort, 273 S.W.3d at 911-13; Huff v. Harrell, 941 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 273, 274. UHC did neither. Although the jury found that Appellants had committed constructive fraud, such a finding cannot support the recovery UHC seeks against them. Constructive fraud and actual fraud are independent causes of action and a finding of constructive fraud will neither establish nor support a finding of actual fraud. See Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex.1964); Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); Flanary v. Mills, 150 S.W.3d 785, 795 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied).

Here, the failure to request and obtain affirmative jury findings of actual fraud against Appellants is fatal to UHC’s recovery pursuant to article 2.21(A). Nevertheless, even if the jury had been properly charged, the record is silent as to any evidence of an actual fraud committed by Appellants or that any such fraud would have been for Appellants’ direct personal benefit. Further, UHC conclusively admitted that Appellants had not committed an actual fraud against it. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.3. Therefore, if article 2.21(A) applies to this action, UHC’s claims to pierce the corporate veil of Black Sea would also fail. Appellants’ fourth issue is sustained.

VI. Choice of Law and Conclusion

It is not necessary for us to determine whether TCI or Texas law should apply to the piercing claims asserted by UHC because, under either statute, these claims fail and the disposition of this appeal would be the same. See generally Duncan v. Cessna, 665 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.1984) (noting that before undertaking a choice of law analysis, the court must determine whether different results would be produced under the laws of the competing jurisdictions). We conclude the trial court erred in denying Appellants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Appellants’ third and fourth issues are sustained. In light of our holding, we need not address Appellants’ remaining issues. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is rendered that UHC take nothing on its claims against Appellants. See Tex.R.App. P. 43.3.

      . See Pride Intern., Inc. v. Bragg, 259 S.W.3d 839, 849 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (applying Delaware law); ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 64-65 (S.D.Tex.2007) (applying New Jersey law); In re Kilroy, 357 B.R. 411, 425 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006) (applying Delaware law).

      . The evidence UHC presented at trial focused extensively on the internal affairs of Black Sea. Here, the status of Black Sea’s internal affairs is of no consequence to the issues this Court must address.

      . See Bollore S.A. v. Import Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317, 325-26 (5th Cir.2006) (”[t]he great weight of Texas precedent indicates that, for the alter ego doctrine to apply against an individual ..., the individual must own stock in the corporation.”); see also Stewart & Stevenson Servs. v. Serv-Tech, 879 S.W.2d 89, 108 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Lane v. Dickinson State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Patterson v. Wizowaty, 505 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); George v. Houston Boxing Club, Inc., 423 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

      .In the past, the "single business enterprise” theory was applied by some Texas courts to hold non-shareholder corporate affiliates liable for the corporation’s debts, liabilities, and obligations. We note that the Texas Supreme Court recently rejected this theory and its application. See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455-56 (Tex.2008).

      . The Legislature enacted the Business Organizations Code in 2003, effectively reorganizing and recodifying the Texas statutes governing business entities into a single Code. Although enacted in 2003, the Business Organizations Code did not become effective until January 1, 2006. This delay was structured to provide a transition period during which domestic entities formed on or after January 1, 2006, and foreign entities not registered in Texas on January 1, 2006, would be governed by the Business Organizations Code. Any entity formed prior to January 1, 2006, would continue to be governed until January 1, 2010 by the pre-Code statutes under which they were formed, e.g., the TBCA, unless such entity filed with the Texas Secretary of State a "Statement of Early Adoption” and an election to be governed by the Business Organizations Code. All pre-Code statutes, including articles 8.02(A) and 2.21(A) of the TBCA, expired on January 1, 2010. Therefore, the Business Organizations Code now applies to all business entities, regardless of when such entities were formed. See In re HRM Holdings, LLC, 421 B.R. 244, 246 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2009).