text:
    Brett WAYMENT, Appellee, v. SCHNEIDER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC and Nate Wade Subaru, Appellants.
    No. 20161090-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed January 31, 2019
    Mark O. Morris, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellants
    David M. Wahlquist, Adam D. Wahlquist, Lehi, and Justin W. Starr, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee
    Judge Jill M. Pohlman authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.
    Opinion
   POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Schneider Automotive Group LLC and Nate Wade Subaru (collectively, Nate Wade) helped sponsor a charity golf tournament. When Brett Wayment made a hole in one at the eighth hole in that tournament, he believed he had won the new car that Nate Wade parked near the hole's tee box. Nate Wade, however, refused to deliver the car, claiming Wayment was ineligible because he was a professional golfer. Wayment sued for breach of contract. After the parties conducted discovery, Wayment moved for summary judgment on his contract claim, which the district court granted. Nate Wade now appeals that decision, contending that there are material questions of fact that precluded summary judgment. We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND

The Tournament

¶2 In June 2015, Wayment, a professional golfer, played in a charity golf tournament sponsored, in part, by Nate Wade. Rule sheets, which described the tournament format and identified a hole-in-one contest at the eighth hole, were placed on the participants' golf carts. See infra Appendix. When golfers arrived at the eighth hole, they saw a new 2015 Subaru XV Crosstrek parked next to the tee box along with a sponsorship sign with Nate Wade's name and logo. See id. Neither the rule sheet nor the sign stated that the Subaru, or any other prize, would be awarded. See id.

¶3 As luck, or Wayment's skill, would have it, Wayment made a hole in one at the eighth hole. After holing the shot, Wayment believed he won the Subaru based on the tournament rule sheet indicating the contest on the eighth hole, Nate Wade's sponsorship of the hole, and the parked car. At the clubhouse, however, the club pro told Wayment, "Good luck getting that car, Brett," because he knew Wayment was a professional golfer. Several days after the tournament, when Nate Wade discovered that Wayment was a professional golfer, it refused to deliver the car. The tournament organizer did not expect professional golfers to compete for tournament prizes without disclosing their professional status, which Wayment never did. And although that condition was never communicated to the tournament participants, the insurance policy that Nate Wade procured for the tournament required that the hole in one be made by an amateur.

The Litigation

¶4 Wayment sued Nate Wade for breach of contract. He claimed that he had accepted Nate Wade's unilateral offer to give him the car when he made the hole in one, while Nate Wade maintained that professional golfers were excluded from the contest.

¶5 Because there was no written agreement detailing what was promised, each side obtained opinions from professional golfers about whether it was reasonable for Wayment to believe he was eligible to win the Subaru under the circumstances. Wayment and another professional golfer (Wayment's Expert) both opined that nothing in the custom or rules of the golf community bars professionals from winning prizes in charity golf events. However, the club pro from the tournament (Nate Wade's Expert) disagreed. He expressed his opinion that, as a matter of custom, professional golfers should disclose their professional status before playing in golf events with amateurs. He also opined that it is generally understood in the golf community that professional golfers are not eligible for competition prizes unless the competition rules explicitly say otherwise.

¶6 At his deposition, Nate Wade's Expert agreed there was no "uniformity amongst all pros in the golf community" regarding a professional's eligibility for competition prizes in charity golf tournaments. He explained that his opinion on the ineligibility of professional golfers in prize contests was a "personal feeling" and asserted that other professionals might reasonably think differently. And when asked specifically whether it was reasonable for Wayment to believe he was eligible to participate in the prize competition in question, Nate Wade's Expert responded, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable under some circumstances."

¶7 Another golf professional similarly opined that although he thought that professional golfers are generally excluded from competition prizes in charity golf events, this opinion was his "personal understanding-not an understanding, standard or custom necessarily adopted by the Utah professional golf community at large." He added that there are "no written rules" on the customs or standards of professionals' eligibility for tournament prizes and said, "I am aware that there are some golfers that believe as I do. There are also other golfers that believe differently. There is currently no uniformity of opinion on these issues."

The Judgment

¶8 Relying on the opinions expressed by both parties' experts, Wayment moved for summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, which the district court granted. The court determined it was undisputed that Nate Wade sponsored a hole-in-one contest at the golf tournament, and that by sponsoring that contest, Nate Wade agreed to reward a participant who hit the ball into the eighth hole with one stroke "based on whatever terms a reasonable contestant could understand." The court then identified the relevant questions as (1) whether Nate Wade manifested an intent to reward a hole in one with the Subaru and (2) whether it was reasonable for Wayment to believe that he, as a professional, was eligible to win the prize.

¶9 Based on the rule sheet, the sign on the eighth hole identifying Nate Wade as the hole's sponsor, and the new Subaru parked next to the eighth-hole tee box, the court concluded it was "reasonable for participants to think that they could win a car by making a hole-in-one ... if they were an amateur." The court then concluded that because Nate Wade did not manifest its subjective intent to limit the contest to amateur golfers, it was reasonable for Wayment, as a professional golfer, to believe he was eligible to win the Subaru. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that there was no dispute between the parties' experts. Specifically, the court concluded that the statement of Nate Wade's Expert that "it would be reasonable under some circumstances" for Wayment to believe he was eligible for the prize contest was a "definitive answer" because he knew the circumstances of the situation.

¶10 Discerning no material factual dispute, the district court concluded summary judgment was appropriate and granted Wayment's motion. Nate Wade appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Nate Wade contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Wayment on his claim for breach of contract. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). "We review the district court's summary judgment ruling for correctness and view all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp , 2010 UT 31, ¶ 28, 235 P.3d 749 (quotation simplified). And even where "the objective facts are undisputed," the "reasonable inferences made from those undisputed facts can ... create a genuine issue of material fact" precluding summary judgment. Id. ¶ 33. A contrary rule, our supreme court has noted, "would diminish the important role reasonable inferences play" in a summary judgment decision. Id.

ANALYSIS

¶12 Nate Wade argues that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that when Wayment made a hole in one on the eighth hole of the charity golf tournament, he accepted a binding offer from Nate Wade to award him a new Subaru. More specifically, Nate Wade argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because "not one golfer was told, orally or in writing, that they would win a car by hitting a hole-in-one." It argues that the burden is "on Wayment to demonstrate ... a sufficiently clear manifestation of intent to offer the [Subaru] to everyone, including professional golfers." Without any writing or statement about the hole-in-one contest's conditions, Nate Wade asserts that "there was no such offer or, at the very least, there is a fact question that precluded summary judgment."

¶13 Before addressing Nate Wade's arguments about the propriety of summary judgment, we find it helpful to label the type of contract in play here. Both parties agree that, to the extent a contract exists between Nate Wade and Wayment, it is a unilateral contract. A unilateral contract "is where one party makes a promissory offer and the other accepts by performing an act rather than by making a return promise." Z-Corp v. Ancestry.com Inc. , 2016 UT App 192, ¶ 5 n.3, 382 P.3d 652 (quotation simplified). This is the case in "prize-winning contests ... where an offer or promise is made in exchange for an act to be performed on the part of the contestant." Walters v. National Beverages, Inc. , 18 Utah 2d 301, 422 P.2d 524, 525 (1967). Accordingly, "the performance of th[e] act is an acceptance of the offer and results in a binding contract." Id. ; see also Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ. , 2014 UT 27, ¶ 23 n.11, 332 P.3d 922 (explaining that a "meeting of the minds" occurs and a "unilateral contract is established if and when the offeree begins substantial performance" (quotation simplified) ).

¶14 We also think it plain that the contract here would be implied in fact, not express. An express contract, as its name suggests, is "expressed in words." Gleason v. Salt Lake City , 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225, 1227 (1937). By contrast, an implied-in-fact contract is "established by conduct." Jones v. Mackey Price Thompson & Ostler , 2015 UT 60, ¶ 44, 355 P.3d 1000 ; Outsource Receivables Mgmt., Inc. v. Bishop , 2015 UT App 41, ¶ 6, 344 P.3d 1167 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1981) ("Conduct may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a proposed promise.").

¶15 The existence of an express contract is "ordinarily a question of law." E.g. , Cea v. Hoffman , 2012 UT App 101, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 1178. "When the existence of a contract and the identity of its parties are not in issue and when the contract provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of the contract can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment." iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC , 2018 UT App 40, ¶ 36, 424 P.3d 970 (quotation simplified).

¶16 The existence of an implied-in-fact contract, however, "is a question of fact which turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent and is primarily a jury question." Tomlinson v. NCR Corp. , 2014 UT 55, ¶ 12, 345 P.3d 523 (quotation simplified). A court may properly determine the existence of an implied-in-fact contract as a matter of law if the evidence of the contract is not in dispute and admits of only one inference. See id. ; see also Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co. , 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992) ("If a reasonable jury cannot find that an implied contract exists, summary judgment is appropriate."). But a jury question is presented when the existence of an implied-in-fact contract is in dispute and reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of the parties' objective manifestations. See Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, PC , 2016 UT 7, ¶ 19, 367 P.3d 1006 ("In cases where reasonable minds could differ ... summary judgment is not an option. If the court ... concludes that reasonable minds could differ ..., then the issue is a jury question." (quotation simplified) ); see also, e.g. , Francisconi v. Union Pac. R.R. , 2001 UT App 350, ¶¶ 14-15, 36 P.3d 999 (holding that, because a reasonable jury could find an implied-in-fact contract, summary judgment was inappropriate); Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. , 2001 UT App 35, ¶ 18, 19 P.3d 392 (same).

¶17 Here, a reasonable jury could find an implied-in-fact contract between Nate Wade and Wayment, but would by no means be obligated to find such a contract. Thus, "the issue should not have been taken from the jury." See Sachs v. Lesser , 2007 UT App 169, ¶ 25, 163 P.3d 662 (quotation simplified), rev'd on other grounds , 2008 UT 87, 207 P.3d 1215. The undisputed facts of this case include Nate Wade's sponsorship sign on the eighth hole, the parked Subaru, and the tournament rule sheet indicating the hole-in-one contest. But none of those expressly promised the Subaru to Wayment; we are instead left with inferences to be drawn from the parties' conduct. And what the sign, car, and rule sheet mean-even though their factual character is undisputed-is for the jury to decide. See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp , 2010 UT 31, ¶ 33, 235 P.3d 749.

¶18 Letting a jury determine what was communicated by the parties' objective manifestations is especially important here because, as both parties agree, "[t]here is no uniformity of opinion among professional golfers as to whether they are eligible for prizes in tournaments that are intended for amateurs." Nate Wade's Expert testified that he personally would not feel eligible to win a prize in a charity golf tournament without checking with the tournament organizers first. He added, however, that "it would be reasonable under some circumstances" for Wayment to believe he was eligible for the Subaru. The district court determined that this was a "definitive answer," but that determination does not by itself make summary judgment appropriate in this context. With no uniform standard, it is for a jury to decide what was reasonable for Wayment to believe.

¶19 This does not mean that Wayment's subjective belief alone is sufficient to create an enforceable contract. Nate Wade suggests that the district court rested its summary judgment decision on nothing more than Wayment's subjective belief that he was entitled to a car. Although we conclude that the court's decision was in error, we reject Nate Wade's characterization of that decision. The court erred in treating as dispositive the agreement of the experts that it may have been reasonable for Wayment to compete as a professional. But the court did not, as Nate Wade contends, base its decision solely on what it determined was Wayment's subjective belief.

¶20 In urging us to affirm, Wayment contends that summary judgment was warranted because the facts are undisputed and lead to only one reasonable conclusion. Specifically, he argues that it is undisputed that Nate Wade intended to offer the Subaru to amateurs and that the limitation excluding professionals from the hole-in-one contest was never communicated to the players. He therefore seeks to bind Nate Wade to its intention of offering the Subaru but to ignore Nate Wade's intention to limit the offer to amateurs. This reasoning might be correct if there were an express contract. See Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group , 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983) ("It is well established in the law that unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a[n express] contract."). But the difficulty in this case is that there was no express promise. There is a sponsorship sign, a parked car, and a rule sheet. There is also testimony that, while not necessarily unreasonable to believe otherwise, some professional golfers do not consider themselves eligible for prizes unless explicitly told they are eligible. Thus, the fact that no one disputes the presence of the sign, car, or rule sheet during the tournament is not enough to take the question from the jury and deem a contract established as a matter of law. See USA Power , 2010 UT 31, ¶¶ 32-33, 235 P.3d 749.

¶21 In sum, the existence of an implied-in-fact contract depends on objective manifestations-conduct-and is typically a jury question. Where reasonable minds could differ on the meaning of the parties' objective manifestations, summary judgment is not an option. We hold that this is such a case. The lack of a uniform standard demonstrates that, as is usually the case for implied-in-fact contracts, this is a jury question. Nate Wade's Expert's testimony that it was, at least potentially, reasonable for Wayment to believe he was eligible for the contest prize did not remove all debate on the issue and establish a contract as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could conclude that, based on Nate Wade's objective manifestations, Nate Wade intended to exclude professional golfers from winning the Subaru. Or it could conclude otherwise. Because both options are possible, it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment in this instance.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to Wayment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

APPENDIX

The tournament rule sheet:

The sponsorship sign on the eighth hole:

      Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment, "we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the facts accordingly." Ockey v. Club Jam , 2014 UT App 126, ¶ 2 n.2, 328 P.3d 880 (quotation simplified).

      The insurance policy contained other conditions, such as requiring the hole in one be made from the correct yardage on the day of the tournament and be witnessed by another person. Nate Wade does not argue that these requirements were not met.

      Nate Wade's Expert originally responded, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable," without the qualification. He later clarified this response, under rule 30(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by adding, "Yes, I believe it would be reasonable under some circumstances ." (Emphasis added.) Wayment objected to this clarification, arguing that the district court should strike it because, although timely under rule 30(e), it was made after Wayment had filed his motion for summary judgment. The district court declined to resolve this objection because "the clarification did not alter [its] decision." Specifically, the court concluded that the addition of "under some circumstances" was still a "definitive answer" because Nate Wade's Expert "knew the circumstances of this situation."

      After first signing a declaration for Nate Wade, this individual signed a subsequent declaration for Wayment, expressing the opinion above but stating that he had "no desire to participate in th[e] case or to serve as an expert" and that he would "decline any such invitation" to serve as an expert in this case. Neither party moved to strike either one of his declarations.

      The golf professional relied on by both parties similarly stated that there is no uniformity of opinion in the golf community on this issue and that some golfers believe that professionals are ineligible and other golfers disagree. The fact that both parties leaned on his opinion highlights that reasonable minds can differ on whether Nate Wade extended an offer to Wayment.

      Wayment also places some reliance on three out-of-state cases involving hole-in-one contests that held that uncommunicated conditions did not limit the expressed offers made. Grove v. Charbonneau Buick-Pontiac, Inc. , 240 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 1976) ; Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc. , 385 Pa.Super. 587, 561 A.2d 1248 (1989) ; Harms v. Northland Ford Dealers , 1999 SD 143, 602 N.W.2d 58. In addition to being nonbinding, we also conclude that these cases are distinguishable. All three concerned express promises from the sponsor of the tournaments that whoever made a hole in one was entitled to a prize. Grove , 240 N.W.2d at 855 ; Cobaugh , 561 A.2d at 1249 ; Harms , 1999 SD 143, ¶ 4, 602 N.W.2d 58. Here, we have a potential implied-in-fact contract that must be determined by inferring intent from Nate Wade's objective manifestations. Moreover, Grove relied on a statute directing courts to construe ambiguous language against the party who created the ambiguity-that is, the drafters of that language-and Harms in turn relied on Grove . Grove , 240 N.W.2d at 858, 862 ; Harms , 1999 SD 143, ¶¶ 14-15, 602 N.W.2d 58. Wayment does not direct us to, and we are not aware of, any authority that would require us to construe manifestations of intent against an actor. Although the intent behind Nate Wade's objective manifestations may not be immediately apparent, it is not a contractual ambiguity in the usual sense. It simply presents a jury question.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HAGEN, Judge: ORME, Judge (dissenting):

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Michael J. MILLER, Appellant.
    No. 20170084-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed January 31, 2019
    Opinion
   HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Michael J. Miller appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of marijuana discovered during a traffic stop. Miller entered a plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He argues that the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged without reasonable suspicion when the officer conducting the traffic stop asked him to walk back to the patrol car, engaged him in unrelated questioning before and during the citation process, and waited to run a records check until later in the stop. Because none of these actions unconstitutionally extended the stop, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Traffic Stop

¶2 At 10:41 p.m., a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper (the officer) stopped Miller for driving seventy miles per hour on I-80, five miles per hour above the posted limit. After Miller gave the officer his driver license and the car rental agreement, the officer asked Miller to come back to his patrol vehicle. The officer testified that he asks drivers to come back to his patrol vehicle in 90% of traffic stops because he sometimes needs to gather additional information from drivers. In addition, by having Miller sitting in the passenger seat of the patrol vehicle and conversing with him, the officer "could try and gain suspicion while actively filling out a citation."

¶3 Miller followed the officer back to the patrol vehicle. Although Miller had a crutch with him and "was limping a little bit," the district court found that "it didn't take him an excessive amount of time to get back to the patrol [vehicle]." Once Miller was in the passenger seat, the officer stood at the passenger door and asked Miller, "What'd ya do to your ankle?" Miller told the officer how he came to be injured, and the officer asked no follow-up questions. Within one minute, the officer "was back on his side of the car and he began to fill out the citation."

¶4 Over the next seven minutes, the officer filled out the citation while conversing with Miller. The officer asked Miller "some questions about his license and the car and where he rented it." But "the majority of the conversation was the defendant making conversation with the [officer] about various topics[,] such as children and marriage and relationships." In reviewing the dashboard camera recording of the conversation, the district court found that Miller initiated much of the conversation and that the questions the officer asked "did not take up much of that time." The court also credited the officer's testimony that "during this time he was filling out the citation."

¶5 After finishing all but one section of the citation, the officer informed Miller that he needed to call Miller's information into dispatch. In his testimony, the officer explained that the final section of the citation requires him to identify the offenses or traffic code violations committed and whether he will issue a ticket or a warning. The officer "leave[s] the violations part, the offenses part blank until [he hears] back from dispatch in case there's any other offenses that [he] might be adding to the citation." The district court accepted the officer's testimony that "he needed to hear back from dispatch before he could complete the citation."

¶6 The officer testified that, approximately eleven minutes after he officer initiated the stop, he called into dispatch for a "license records and criminal-history check." On the dashboard camera recording, an automated voice announces, "License is valid." The officer's statements to dispatch are largely inaudible, but he testified that he asked the dispatch operator to run a criminal-history or "Triple I" check, which he typically requests only when the driver has roused his suspicions. The parties also agree that the officer's request included a check for outstanding warrants. While waiting for dispatch to respond with additional information, the officer deployed his police service dog around Miller's car.

¶7 Approximately sixty seconds after the call to dispatch, the dog alerted the officer to the presence of a controlled substance. Several minutes after the dog signaled the alert, dispatch responded with the results of the criminal-history check. A subsequent search of Miller's car uncovered seventy-one pounds of marijuana.

Miller's Motion to Suppress

¶8 The State charged Miller with one count of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and one count of speeding. After a preliminary hearing at which the officer testified, Miller was bound over for trial.

¶9 Miller moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, arguing that the "search and seizure went well beyond the time necessary to conduct and conclude a routine traffic stop involving a speeding ticket for going 5 over." In support of the motion, Miller relied on the officer's testimony at the preliminary hearing and did not request an opportunity to present further evidence.

¶10 The district court denied the motion to suppress. In an oral ruling, the district court addressed "whether the unrelated investigations[,] which were some of the questioning and the dog search, ... had the effect of extending [the] stop." First, the court concluded that the officer did not measurably extend the stop by conversing with Miller in the patrol vehicle. The court found that the officer "said much less than [Miller]" and the questions he did ask "were going on simultaneously with him filling out a portion of the citation."

¶11 Second, the court concluded that the dog sniff did not measurably extend the stop. Because the officer could not finish the citation until he heard back from dispatch on the records check, the court found that he could not have completed the mission of the traffic stop within the sixty seconds it took for the dog to alert the officer to the presence of drugs. The court also rejected Miller's argument that it was impermissible for the officer to fill out a portion of the citation before calling dispatch:

Is it possible that [the officer] could have shaved off some time if he had called dispatch first? It's possible, but that [would be] speculation on my part .... [And] that would basically be the Court holding that the [officer] has to call dispatch immediately upon getting back to his car. And that's micromanaging. That would be the Court telling the officer the order in which he has to perform the duties that are related to and permissible steps at a traffic stop.

The court concluded that the officer "was reasonably diligent in pursuing the mission of the traffic stop" and that "his unrelated questioning and the dog sniff did not measurably extend the stop, but took place during the time that he was conducting a permissible investigation that was related to the reason for the stop."

¶12 Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Miller pled guilty to possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 Miller contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the officer's search of his car. "We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Fuller , 2014 UT 29, ¶ 17, 332 P.3d 937. "While the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of law to the facts of the case." Id.

ANALYSIS

¶14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[T]he 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,' which 'is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.' " State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 10, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) ). In evaluating the reasonableness of a traffic stop, we assess whether the stop was "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Id. ¶ 12 (quotation simplified). Miller does not challenge the justification for the stop because it is undisputed that the officer had probable cause to stop Miller for speeding. Therefore, we must determine only whether the traffic stop, which was justified at its inception, was reasonable in duration and scope.

¶15 When a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation, "[t]he temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). "If, during the scope of the traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650. But "without additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id.

¶16 Miller contends that the officer impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Specifically, he argues that the officer extended the stop by asking him to walk back to the patrol car, engaging him in unrelated questioning before and during the citation process, and waiting to run a criminal-history check until later in the stop. The State does not contend that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the length of the stop to investigate other criminal activity. Therefore, we consider whether the officer's actions prolonged the time "reasonably required to complete" the mission of the traffic stop. See State v. Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 12, 424 P.3d 83 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ).

I. Request to Accompany the Officer to the Patrol Car

¶17 Miller first contends that the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop by asking him to exit his vehicle and accompany the officer to the patrol car. "An otherwise lawful traffic stop can become unreasonable if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." State v. Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 12, 424 P.3d 83 (quotation simplified). But the "mission" of a traffic stop is two-fold: " 'to [1] address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and [2] attend to related safety concerns.' " Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ). Because traffic stops "are especially fraught with danger to police officers," Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), an officer may "take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely," Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1616.

¶18 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court noted that officers face appreciable risks during traffic stops, such as being assaulted by a seated driver who can make unobserved movements or being injured by passing traffic. See id. at 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330. Acknowledging "it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties," the Court held that "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment[ ]." Id. at 110, 111 n.6, 98 S.Ct. 330 (quotation simplified). Some circuits have interpreted this to mean that officers may also ask drivers to join them in the patrol vehicle. E.g., United States v. Riley , 684 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that "a reasonable investigation during a traffic stop may include ... requesting the driver to sit in the patrol car" (quotation simplified) ). According to the Supreme Court, when weighed against the "legitimate and weighty" concern for officer safety, the additional intrusion occasioned by asking lawfully seized drivers to exit their vehicles is "at most a mere inconvenience." Mimms , 434 U.S. at 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330.

¶19 Here, Miller had been lawfully detained for speeding when the officer asked him whether they could walk back to the patrol vehicle together. Miller agreed to walk back to the patrol vehicle, assuring the officer that he was able to do so. Although Miller limped slightly, the district court found that "it didn't take him an excessive amount of time to get back to the patrol car." To the extent that the officer's request added any time to the stop, we conclude it was a negligibly burdensome precaution outweighed by the legitimate interests in officer safety. See Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1616.

¶20 Citing Rodriguez , Miller argues that officers may not ask drivers to step out of their vehicles unless safety is an actual concern because such a request detours from the officer's mission and unconstitutionally prolongs the stop. According to Miller, officers must develop reason to believe that they are in danger before they may take precautionary measures previously approved by the Supreme Court. To the contrary, Rodriguez emphasizes that, unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, "the government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself." Id. Additional reasonable suspicion is required only when the officer exceeds the scope of the traffic stop. See State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650. Because "reasonable officer safety measures are related to the mission-and therefore to the scope-of a traffic stop itself," Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 14, 424 P.3d 83, the officer's request did not require additional reasonable suspicion that Miller posed a danger.

II. Unrelated Questioning

¶21 Miller next contends that the officer detoured from the traffic stop's mission when he asked Miller questions unrelated to the traffic violation. The Supreme Court has held that officers may ask questions unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop "so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ; see also Muehler v. Mena , 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding that because the officers' unrelated questioning did not prolong the detention, there was no additional seizure requiring independent reasonable suspicion). Therefore, the "critical question ... is not whether the officer's [questions were] related to the purpose of the stop, but whether [those questions] prolonged-i.e., added time to-the stop." See State v. Taylor , 2017 UT App 89, ¶ 15, 402 P.3d 790. Here, Miller challenges the officer's unrelated questioning at two distinct points during the traffic stop-first, when the officer paused by the passenger door of the patrol car to ask about Miller's injury, and, second, when the officer asked about Miller's travel plans while completing the citation.

¶22 First, Miller argues that the officer measurably extended the stop by asking, "What'd ya do to your ankle?" But this single, casual inquiry did not unreasonably extend the stop. As our supreme court has recognized, a brief exchange of pleasantries, such as, " 'How 'bout them Georgia Bulldogs?' does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, provided that the unrelated questioning does not extend the encounter beyond the period reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lawful detention." State v. Simons , 2013 UT 3, ¶ 32, 296 P.3d 721 (quotation simplified). The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard affords flexibility and "reasonable breathing space," which "leaves room for traffic stop extensions that are de minimis in length but not independently justified by reasonable suspicion." Id. ¶ 40 (Lee, J., concurring). "Otherwise, the constitution would be implicated by such commonplace acts as a police officer's small talk or rumination about the weather." Id.

¶23 Miller argues that Rodriguez abolished such a de minimis extension doctrine. But, as the Utah Supreme Court recognized even before Rodriguez , there is a distinction between a de minimis extension during a lawful detention and a de minimis extension once the purpose of the stop is completed. Simons , 2013 UT 3, ¶ 35, 296 P.3d 721. While a de minimis extension might be reasonable "at any point before the conclusion of an otherwise lawful detention, ... 'once the lawful purpose of the stop has concluded, the occupants of the vehicle must be released from their temporary seizure.' " Id. (quoting State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650 ); see also State v. Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 23, 424 P.3d 83 (distinguishing Rodriguez , in part, because "the extension in Rodriguez took place after the mission of the stop had been concluded"); State v. Sosa , 2018 UT App 97, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 448 (distinguishing Rodriguez and Baker "because the request for a dog sniff and the resulting alert occurred during the traffic stop, not after its completion"). Because the authority for the seizure ends when the traffic stop is completed, even a de minimis extension constitutes an unlawful detention absent independent reasonable suspicion. Simons , 2013 UT 3, ¶ 35, 296 P.3d 721. But while a motorist is lawfully detained, the question is not whether the officer might have completed the stop in an incrementally more efficient manner, but whether the officer pursued his investigation in "a diligent and reasonable manner." United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). " 'The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.' " Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 83 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ). Reading Rodriguez as broadly as Miller suggests would eliminate the very flexibility the reasonableness standard affords.

¶24 Miller also contends that the officer extended the detention by asking questions unrelated to the stop while filling out the citation. Relying on State v. Duhaime , 2011 UT App 209, 258 P.3d 649, Miller argues that the officer's questions regarding his travel plans were unrelated to the traffic stop's mission and therefore unconstitutionally prolonged the detention. In Duhaime , this court suggested that questions about travel plans may "exceed the scope of a traffic stop because the objective of such questions is not to gain some insight into the traffic infraction providing the legal basis for the stop, but to uncover inconsistent, evasive or false assertions that can contribute to reasonable suspicion or probable cause regarding drugs." Id. ¶ 11 (quotation simplified). Because this court ultimately reversed on other grounds, those observations were dicta. And, under the facts presented here, there is no need to decide whether questions about the driver's travel plans go beyond the purpose of a typical traffic stop. Even assuming that the officer's questions were unrelated to the purpose of the stop, they did not measurably extend the detention.

¶25 The United States Supreme Court has "held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." Muehler , 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (quotation simplified). Therefore, where police questioning does not prolong an otherwise valid detention, no additional reasonable suspicion is required because "there [is] no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. In the traffic stop context, the Court has held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Johnson , 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781. In other words, if there is no measurable extension of the traffic stop, no additional reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is needed to justify unrelated questions because those inquiries do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

¶26 Here, the officer testified that he "always continue[d] to actively be working on the citation while ... speaking with [Miller]." The district court credited this testimony in finding that the officer's unrelated questioning "did not measurably extend the stop." Because the stop was not measurably extended, the officer's questions did "not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure." See id.

III. Records Check

¶27 Finally, Miller contends that the officer prolonged the stop by asking dispatch to conduct a records check, during which the officer conducted the dog sniff. "Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop." Rodriguez v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (quotation simplified). "Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Id. These checks are part of the stop's mission because they "serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly." Id. For example, a warrants check can "determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses," which serves "objectives sufficiently related to the initial reason for the stop, in much the same way as does the license/registration check." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2018).

¶28 Although police may not "extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff," Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1614, a dog sniff conducted during a lawful detention does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Because the records checks listed in Rodriguez are within the scope of a lawful traffic stop, a dog sniff that occurs while an officer is performing these checks does not require additional reasonable suspicion. State v. Sosa , 2018 UT App 97, ¶ 14, 427 P.3d 448 (holding that a dog sniff requested and performed before the officer completed a records check did not violate the Fourth Amendment).

¶29 Notwithstanding this authority, Miller contends that the traffic stop was extended beyond the time necessary to complete the stop's mission because, in addition to the routine record checks Rodriguez identified as mission-related, the officer requested a criminal-history check. But nothing in the record supports the assumption that but for the criminal-history check, the officer would have otherwise completed the "ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop" before the dog alert. Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (quotation simplified). One of these ordinary inquires is "determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver." Id. Both Miller and the State agree that the records check the officer requested included a check for warrants. And although the officer testified that it might take a dispatcher several minutes to go through a lengthy criminal-history to determine what information was pertinent to the stop, there was no testimony as to how long it typically takes to complete a warrants check alone. The district court found that the drug dog signaled an alert within sixty seconds after the officer contacted dispatch. Without evidence in the record that a warrants check would have been completed in less than sixty seconds, there is no basis to conclude that the officer's request for a more thorough criminal-history check prolonged the stop.

¶30 Miller also argues that, by not contacting dispatch at the outset of the stop, the officer manipulated the stop's order of operations to give himself "bonus time" to conduct the dog sniff. As an initial matter, the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant so long as the actions taken by the officer are objectively reasonable. See Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence forecloses "any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Therefore, we consider whether the scope of the stop was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, without regard to the officer's subjective intent.

¶31 As Miller correctly points out, the authority for a seizure "ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Id . at 1614. But the question is whether the officer pursued his investigation in "a diligent and reasonable manner," not whether the investigation may have been accomplished by less intrusive means. United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). "A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished." Id. at 686-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568. "A court should not micromanage the details of a traffic stop to ensure that no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so long as the duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650.

¶32 The district court properly declined Miller's invitation to micromanage the details of the stop by "telling the officer the order in which he has to perform the duties that are related to and permissible steps at a traffic stop." Other courts that have addressed this issue have similarly refused to require officers to initiate computer checks at the outset of traffic stops. See, e.g. , United States v. Brigham , 382 F.3d 500, 511 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "neither our prior cases nor any other caselaw of which we are aware institutes a per se rule requiring an officer immediately to obtain the driver's license and registration information and initiate the relevant background checks before asking questions"); People v. Chavez-Barragan , 2016 CO 66, ¶¶ 27-28, 379 P.3d 330 (holding that officers "failure to multitask" by calling in the driver license and registration at the outset of the traffic stop was not a constitutional violation).

¶33 The Georgia Supreme Court's analysis of a similar fact pattern is instructive. In State v. Allen , 298 Ga. 1, 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015), the officer waited until "[a]bout eight minutes into the stop" before he radioed for a computer records check on both the driver and passenger. Id. at 251. While awaiting the response from dispatch on the passenger, the officer deployed a drug detection dog around the car. Id. Approximately three-and-a-half minutes later, the dog signaled an alert, giving the officer probable cause to continue the detention and search the car for narcotics. Id. at 260. The question on appeal was "whether the free-air dog sniff that resulted in probable cause to detain [the car's occupants] and search inside their car was done while some other task related to the mission of the traffic stop was still being conducted, so that the sniff did not add any time to the stop." Id. at 253-54.

¶34 In Allen , it was undisputed that the officer "walked his dog around the car while waiting for the results of the computer check" and that he "had finished all other mission-related actions by the time he retrieved his dog." Id. But the court noted that Rodriguez had "rejected the proposition that the constitutional analysis depends on the order in which the officers complete their actions." Id. at 259. The court explained:

The sequence of the officer's actions during a traffic stop is not determinative; instead, the primary question is whether the activity at issue was related to the mission of the stop. If it is not, like a dog sniff, it can be done only concurrently with a mission-related activity, or it will unlawfully add time to the stop. If, on the other hand, the task is a component of the traffic-stop mission, it may be done at any point during the stop. It does not matter if a mission-related activity takes place as soon as the stop begins or, as is the case here, after other mission-related activities have been completed.

Id. at 258-59. Because the court determined that a background check on a passenger is a mission-related activity, it held that such a mission-related activity could not unlawfully prolong the stop regardless of the order in which the officer accomplished those tasks.

¶35 Here, the officer requested the records check about eleven minutes into the stop, after completing all but one part of the citation. The district court credited the officer's testimony "that he needed to hear back from dispatch before he could complete the citation." Although the officer received an immediate automated response that the license was valid, he did not yet have any information on whether Miller had outstanding warrants. Because checking outstanding warrants is a mission-related component of a traffic stop, this task did not extend the detention beyond its permissible scope. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2018) (noting that, under Rodriguez , "determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver [is] a valid aspect of carrying out a traffic stop, ... which means such action is permissible even if it does 'prolong' the traffic stop" (quotation simplified) ). Although it may have been more efficient to call dispatch at the outset of the stop, we decline to prescribe the order in which an officer must complete mission-related tasks during a traffic stop so long as the officer is pursuing the investigation in a reasonably diligent manner.

CONCLUSION

¶36 We conclude that the officer did not unconstitutionally extend the duration of the traffic stop by asking Miller to sit in the patrol car, by engaging in unrelated conversation, or by requesting a records check. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Miller's motion to suppress drug evidence found pursuant to a lawful dog sniff.

ORME, Judge (dissenting):

¶37 I respectfully dissent from the majority's assessment of the "reasonableness" of the stop, primarily because of the circumstances surrounding the criminal-history check the officer conducted on Miller. While I agree with the majority that in most instances "[a] court should not micromanage the details of a traffic stop," State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650, there are cases where the actions of an officer raise such concern that further scrutiny of the stop is required, see Rodriguez v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (providing that the incidental checks conducted by an officer may not be performed "in a way that prolongs the stop") (emphasis added). See also Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650 ("A court should not micromanage the details of a traffic stop ... so long as the duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. ") (emphasis added).

¶38 In this case, there are two causes for concern. First, Miller was stopped for going five miles above the posted speed limit, which is simply not something for which Utah drivers are pulled over when traveling on an interstate highway, in their own lane, during decent weather. And in his testimony, the officer acknowledged that he typically does not pull drivers over for such an insignificant infraction and that he actually pulled Miller over because Miller had "out-of-state plates" and such plates "are huge with drug transportation." He also testified that his actions throughout the stop were driven by an intent to "gain suspicion" on Miller, raising questions about how diligent the officer was in wrapping up the issuance of a citation for the traffic offense. And second, the officer admitted that he "spend[s] more time" on certain stops, including running a criminal-history check on people he finds suspicious. Such admissions by an officer should, as a practical matter, trigger closer scrutiny of whether the officer deliberately acted in a manner to prolong the duration of the stop.

¶39 Here, the officer's request for a "Triple I check" was based on a "suspicion" that he had regarding Miller, not anything related to Miller's traffic offense or anything regarding a safety concern that arose during the stop. I agree with Miller that the officer prolonged the stop by requesting a "Triple I check" as a means to buy himself additional time to conduct the dog sniff.

¶40 Officers "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop," but they "may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615. There are, to be sure, certain investigative activities unrelated to a traffic infraction that "are so common as to now be a part of [a] 'routine' " for officers during a stop, including "a records check via radio or computer regarding the criminal history of those stopped." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(c), at 508 (5th ed. 2012). This type of inquiry "serves to identify drivers who deserve (at least in the officer's mind) more intense scrutiny," id. at 519, and aims at "detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" rather than "ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly," Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (quotation simplified). For a relatively minor traffic infraction, a criminal history "counts for very little [in assessing guilt for the infraction], but may lead to interrogation that is intense, very invasive and extremely protracted," LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(c), at 517-18 (quotation simplified), "even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history and even though there had not yet developed any reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity," id. at 518-19.

¶41 But, in certain circumstances, officer safety may justify running a criminal-history check because, "[b]y determining whether a detained motorist has a criminal record or outstanding warrants, an officer will be better apprized of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent activity during the stop." United States v. Holt , 264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Stewart , 473 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2007). Such circumstances, however, must be based on a "subjective assessment of [a] safety risk." See State v. Brake , 2004 UT 95, ¶ 24, 103 P.3d 699.

¶42 In this case, officer safety was not a concern. It was a full eleven minutes into this uneventful stop before the officer requested Miller's criminal history, during which time Miller had done or said nothing to suggest he posed a threat to the officer's safety. At that point, the officer had essentially completed his citation, and it would have been more efficient, as well as safer, ultimately, for the officer to finish the last section of the citation and send Miller on his way. There was also nothing in Miller's behavior throughout those eleven minutes that suggested the officer's safety was at risk. And in his own words, the officer admitted that his only reason for requesting Miller's criminal history was to "gain suspicion," not to confirm or dispel a reasonable suspicion he had already formed or because, at the tail end of the stop, he suddenly became reasonably concerned about his safety. Because there was no officer safety or reasonable suspicion justification, the criminal-history check was "aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and "detour[ed]" from the stop's mission. Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16 (quotation simplified).

¶43 The State suggests that, because the criminal-history check occurred simultaneously with the warrants check, it is merely a matter of speculation as to how much time this informational detour added to the stop. The majority accepts this view, holding that there is no evidence "that a warrants check would have been completed in less than sixty seconds."Supra ¶29. But criminal-history checks are a "somewhat time-consuming task[ ]" that "can easily add to the total length of the stop," and often "take longer to process than the usual license and warrant requests." LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(c), at 517 (quotation simplified). While the length of license and warrant checks may also vary, these types of checks are typically brief, especially given that most officers have computers installed in their patrol cars that give them access to this type of data "almost instantaneous[ly]." Id. at 512-13. See also id. at 508 n.155, 517. Cf. United States v. Sanders , 248 F.Supp.3d 339, 342 (D. R.I. 2017) (officer testifying that the results for a license and warrants check "came back almost instantaneously") (quotation simplified); State v. Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 21, 424 P.3d 83 (officer testifying that it usually takes less than five seconds to run a license and warrants check).

¶44 Even in this case, the officer testified that a criminal record check can vary from one to eight minutes, but the length depends on the time it takes a dispatcher to locate a driver's criminal history and parse through that information to find any "pertinent" information that might be helpful to the officer. For example, the officer testified that there was an instance where 47 pages of criminal history took dispatch "seven, eight minutes" to go through. Here, it took dispatch over seven minutes to report back to the officer with Miller's criminal history. Suffice it to say, a criminal-history check adds measurable time to a more routine records check, and it is therefore unreasonable for an officer, without any safety justification or reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, to burden a stop for an exceedingly minor traffic infraction with a time-consuming investigation of a driver's criminal history.

¶45 Seemingly, the officer had a hunch that Miller was engaged in criminal wrongdoing and, as he testified, he was therefore going "to spend more time on it." "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration ... we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly , during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (emphasis added). But nothing in the officer's actions suggests that he acted diligently to conclude the traffic stop. Rather, he acknowledged that it is his practice to deliberately prolong stops to "gain suspicion" on certain drivers, which includes requesting criminal histories as a means to "gain suspicion." He did so in this case to buy additional time to conduct the dog sniff because he had essentially finished the citation and had already conducted the license check and, in fairness, Miller should then have been sent on his way. Regardless of whether the warrants check was simultaneous to the criminal-history check, there was no purpose for requesting Miller's criminal-history check, given its timing so late in the stop, other than to extend the length of the stop. See Rodriguez , 135 S.Ct. at 1615 ("An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But ... he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual."). Here, the officer was not reasonably diligent in concluding the purpose for the traffic stop, and he detained Miller beyond what was necessary for the completion of a singularly minor traffic offense.

¶46 I would reverse.

      "We recite the facts in detail because the legal analysis in a search and seizure case is highly fact dependent." State v. Warren , 2003 UT 36, ¶ 2, 78 P.3d 590.

      Miller also cites Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, but he does not argue that the state constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. To the extent he attempts to raise a separate argument based on the state constitution, he has inadequately briefed this argument. See State v. Fuller , 2014 UT 29, ¶ 50, 332 P.3d 937 (declining to review a state constitutional claim where the appellant's brief "contains bald citations to authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority" (quotation simplified) ).

      The dissent takes issue with the justification for the stop, citing the officer's testimony that he does not stop every driver going five miles per hour over the speed limit and that he primarily looks for "out-of-state plates" that "are huge with drug transportation." See infra ¶38. The officer's subjective motivation for stopping Miller would have been relevant under the pretext doctrine, which examined "the detaining officer's state of mind [to] divine his or her true motives for making the stop." State v. Lopez , 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994). However, in Lopez , the Utah Supreme Court rejected that doctrine, holding that "a traffic stop based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations is lawful under the Fourth Amendment," regardless of whether a reasonable officer "would have stopped the defendant for the traffic violation absent a desire to search for evidence of more serious crime." Id. at 1140 (quotation simplified). Because "the Fourth Amendment simply does not require an officer's state of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions," id. at 1137, the officer's reasons for making the stop are irrelevant where, as here, it is undisputed that the officer observed a traffic violation that objectively justified the stop.

      According to the officer, he routinely asks drivers to accompany him to the patrol vehicle so he can complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop and "gather further information from them." By eliminating the need to walk back and forth between vehicles, the officer may have been able to complete his tasks more expeditiously. The officer also acknowledged that increasing his interaction with the driver may allow him to gain additional reasonable suspicion over the course of the stop. To the extent the officer may have had ulterior motives in asking Miller to join him in the patrol car, "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978).

      Miller argues that "even the best multi-taskers will be distracted from their main task while engaging in a conversation." But the potential loss of efficiency while multitasking cannot be enough, standing alone, to impermissibly extend the stop; otherwise, the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), would have no application.

      In State v. Lopez , 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that "running a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and to issue a citation." Id. at 1133. This holding was based on the concern that "[r]unning a warrants check without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense itself arguably exceeds the reasonable scope of a traffic stop." Id. at 1132. Rodriguez has since clarified that checking for outstanding warrants is directly related to the mission of ensuring highway safety and is part of the stop itself. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2018) (citing Lopez and other pre-Rodriguez cases but noting "that the Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States expressly approved determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver as a valid aspect of carrying out a traffic stop, given the fact that traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, which means such action is permissible even if it does prolong the traffic stop" (quotation simplified) ).

      It is unclear whether our supreme court would reach the same conclusion under the facts in Allen . Recently, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a background check of a passenger unconstitutionally prolonged a traffic stop. The court began "by underscoring that reasonable officer safety measures are related to the mission-and therefore to the scope-of a traffic stop itself." State v. Martinez , 2017 UT 43, ¶ 14, 424 P.3d 83. This statement suggests that the court would agree with the Georgia Supreme Court that a background check on a vehicle's occupant does not prolong an otherwise lawful stop because it is mission-related and therefore within the scope of the stop itself. However, the court went on to analyze whether the officer's questioning and background check of the passenger "unreasonably extended the stop in question," id. ¶ 19, an analytical step that would be unnecessary if such actions were part of the stop's mission. Here, we need not reach the issue of whether the broader criminal background check was within the scope of the stop because it is undisputed that the officer was also waiting for information on whether Miller had any outstanding warrants when the drug dog signaled an alert.

      Such plates are also "huge" with legitimate visitors from out of state, who are far from a rarity in Utah, a state that actively positions itself as a tourist mecca. See, e.g. , Utah Office of Tourism, Calendar Year 2017-Utah TravelTrakAmerica Visitor Profile Report & Insights 16 (May 2018), https://travel.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/CY17-Utah-Report-05182018.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS39-REZK] ("Utah hosts over 19 million visitors annually.").

      A Triple I check refers to the "Interstate Identification Index," a "federal-state system for the exchange of criminal history records." 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(m) (2018).

      Although the officer used the word "suspicion," he did not use the term in its Fourth Amendment sense-a "reasonable articulable suspicion" of criminality. See State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650. He used the term as meaning a feeling, guess, or hunch.

      In reviewing the video recording, it appears that the officer did run a license check, prior to requesting the Triple I check, which "almost instantaneously" announced that Miller's license was valid.


author: HAGEN, Judge:

text:
    KILGORE COMPANIES, Appellee, v. UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Appellant.
    No. 20170585-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed February 7, 2019
    M. Cort Griffin, Provo, and Jeffrey R. Buhman, Pleasant Grove, Attorneys for Appellant
    Graden P. Jackson, Sandy, and William B. Ingram, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee
    Judge Diana Hagen authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Michele M. Christiansen Forster concurred.
    Opinion
   HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Utah County appeals the district court's decision to set aside the Utah County Board of Adjustment's denial of Kilgore Companies' request for a conditional use permit. The Board denied Kilgore's request to build silos that were taller than otherwise permitted, finding that the increased height would "degrade the public health, safety, or welfare" or "adversely affect local property values." We agree with the district court that there was insufficient evidence to support these findings. Because Kilgore carried its burden of proving that the proposed conditional use requirements were met, the district court correctly set aside the Board's decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Kilgore operates a properly licensed and bonded asphalt batch plant (the Plant) located in a mining and grazing zone of Utah County. Operation of the Plant is a permitted use under subsection 5-7(B)(2) of the Utah County Land Use Ordinance (UCLUO). Under UCLUO subsection 5-7(G)(1), the "maximum permissible height of any structure shall be forty (40) feet" unless, among other exceptions, the Board approves a conditional use for a taller, unoccupied structure. There is no limit to the number of 40-foot or shorter unoccupied structures that may be built.

¶3 Kilgore applied for, and the Board unanimously approved, a conditional use permit for three silos with a height not to exceed 100 feet. The Board found that the requested silos met the conditional use requirements outlined in UCLUO subsection 7-20(C)(1)-(7). Kilgore received and installed the three 100-foot silos, as well as two additional 65-foot silos.

¶4 Several months later, Kilgore submitted a new application (the Application), requesting a conditional use for the two additional 65-foot silos, and the Board met to consider the Application. The Board repeatedly acknowledged throughout the meeting that because silos up to 40 feet in height are a permitted use, it was considering only whether to approve the additional 25 feet.

¶5 The Board also received public comment. Among other things, citizens expressed concern regarding local property values, traffic, road safety, light pollution, and the impact that dust and other emissions have on public health. Based on these concerns, the Board continued the meeting and requested that Kilgore provide further information at the subsequent meeting addressing how the additional 25 feet would affect local property values and the public health, safety, or welfare.

¶6 Before the next meeting, the Utah County Zoning Administrator (the Administrator) issued a written report, recommending approval of the Application. Although Kilgore had yet to submit the requested supplemental information, the Administrator found that the Application satisfied the conditional use requirements under UCLUO subsection 7-20(C). Notably, the Administrator found that the proposed conditional use would "not degrade the public health, safety, or welfare," because only the height of the silos could be considered and not the operations of the Plant, which is subject to "bonding requirements and the approved travel route and traffic plan analysis." The Administrator also found that there was "no evidence ... [that the additional height] would adversely affect local property values due to the existing uses on the property, and its general compatibility with uses on adjacent properties."

¶7 As to property values, the Administrator noted that "[o]nly the excessive height should be considered as a factor" because UCLUO subsection 7-20(C) permits the Plant's operations and 40-foot silos at the current location. The Administrator conceded that his finding was not based on any appraisals or other professional statements regarding property values, because none had been included with the Application. But the Administrator explained that any visual impact of the conditional use would be mitigated because the closest dwelling is more than half a mile away from the proposed location and the additional silos could be painted in earth tones to match the approved 100-foot silos. This finding was further supported by a professional report later submitted by Kilgore in which an appraiser determined that the additional silos "would have [an] inconsequential visual impact on nearby properties ... based on the presence of the three 100-foot silos, which have a dominant position relative to any silos of a lesser height [that] could be placed on the site."

¶8 Utah County, on the other hand, provided testimony from residents that live near the Plant. They complained that their property values had diminished. One homeowner claimed that he purchased a house near the Plant three years earlier for $145,000, but a realtor told him that the value was "probably going to be cut in half." Other homeowners said that they would not have purchased their homes if they had known that the Plant would operate as it does. One homeowner felt that the "homes are not of value anymore."

¶9 As to the public health, safety, and welfare, Utah County explained, presumably referring to the sources of origin, that there are "six different forms of emissions that are related directly to [the Plant]: Batch mix and drum mix driers, hot oil heaters, truck load-out, silo filling, asphalt storage tanks, and yard emissions." Utah County also explained that "dust is often a product of asphalt production." Among other things, Utah County asserted that these emissions can affect "reproduction, cause birth defects, [and cause] harmful effects on the skin, bodily fluids and the immune system." Utah County "believe[d] the additional height [of the silos] could compound these effects and make them worse."

¶10 Members of the public also testified before the Board and complained that taller silos would lead to Kilgore "grinding more dirt," which could have an effect on the children with asthma. One resident living a mile away from the Plant could smell the smoke the Plant produces. Another resident claimed she had to "sleep in [her] closet for [a] year" because the light from the Plant would shine through her window. Residents also complained that some of the trucks transporting the asphalt do not stop at stop signs, the number of trucks leads to unsafe walking and biking conditions, and the trucks are damaging local roads due to the weight of the loads. But Utah County conceded, "We don't have any authority to shut down their operation, to stop trucks from moving, to stop smoke from flying. That's beyond our authority."

¶11 In response, Kilgore explained that the additional height of the silos "doesn't change how fast [the Plant] can run," "how much material it can produce," or the "hours of operation." Even if Kilgore added "eight more 40-foot silos ... [Kilgore] still cannot increase [the number of] trucks under [its] current permit," which is 150 round-trips per day. Kilgore attributed the "dust issues" to the traffic on "the dirt roads inside the pit," not the material stored in the silos. And the Division of Air Quality inspected the Plant and informed Kilgore that it was "doing really well." Kilgore explained that, without approval of the Board, it is permitted to install as many 40-foot silos as it wanted to achieve the same result. Kilgore requested the additional height to reduce the number of silos on the property to achieve the same permitted use.

¶12 The Board denied the Application and determined that:

1. The additional height degrades the property values of adjacent properties, and
2. The increased height for additional silos would continue this degradation, and
3. That [Kilgore] has not shown that the application will not degrade the public health, safety, or welfare.

¶13 Kilgore challenged the Board's denial by filing a petition for judicial review in district court. After reviewing the Application, the Administrator's report, "transcripts of the meetings, and all materials submitted to and considered by the Board" in making its decision, the court determined that the Board's decision was "not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, is arbitrary and capricious."

¶14 First, the court concluded that "insufficient evidence was presented to the Board to distinguish between public health, safety, and welfare affected by the overall operation of [the Plant] and the conditional use requested by the Application." Second, the court concluded that there was "insufficient evidence ... presented to the Board to distinguish between property values affected by the overall operation of [the Plant] and the conditional use requested by the Application." The court therefore set aside the Board's denial of the Application and "remand[ed] the matter to the Board with instruction to approve Kilgore's Application."

¶15 Utah County appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶16 Utah County contends the district court erred in setting aside the Board's denial of the Application because Kilgore failed to carry "its burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 65-foot silos do not degrade the public health, safety or welfare and do not adversely affect local property values." Relatedly, Utah County contends the district court erred in determining that the Board's decision to deny the conditional use permit was not supported by substantial record evidence. "[I]n an appeal of an administrative order, we review the district court's decision for whether it correctly determined whether the administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious or illegal." LJ Mascaro Inc. v. Herriman City , 2018 UT App 127, ¶ 16, 428 P.3d 4 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (providing that district courts "shall ... presume that a final decision of a land use authority ... is valid" and uphold that decision unless it is "arbitrary and capricious" or "illegal").

ANALYSIS

I. Burden of Proof

¶17 Utah County contends the district court erred in determining that Kilgore satisfied its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the additional height of the silos would not have a negative effect on (1) the public health, safety, and welfare, or (2) property values. UCLUO subsection 7-20(D) provides that the "applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all the conditions for granting a conditional use have been met and must meet that burden based on the facts presented [in] the record; expressions of support or protest alone shall not constitute the basis of approval or denial." The preponderance of the evidence standard "requires the proponent of a contested fact to demonstrate that its existence [or nonexistence] is more likely than not." Harken Sw. Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) ; see also T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 2011 UT 28, ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 752.

¶18 Here, "the correct focus for review is whether Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof relative to the request for additional height [of the silos], and not the number of silos or overall operation of [the Plant]" because it is undisputed that there is no limit to the number of 40-foot silos Kilgore could install.

¶19 With respect to the public health, safety, and welfare, Kilgore presented testimony from its representatives, including the Plant manager, that the height of the two silos would not change the overall operation or production capacity of the Plant or the attendant secondary effects on air quality, traffic, or noise and light pollution. Kilgore's representatives testified that if the Board did not approve the Application, it would install three or more 40-foot silos to achieve the same result. In addition, the representatives testified that the greater capacity of two taller silos, rather than three or more smaller ones, would have a positive effect on the public health, safety, and welfare because it would require less movement of material between the silos and would avoid outside storage and mixing of materials that can negatively affect air quality. Although Utah County dismisses this testimony as mere representations and not proof, this was "competent, credible, and uncontradicted testimony" given by qualified witnesses with personal knowledge of the Plant's operations. See Harken Sw. Corp. , 920 P.2d at 1178, 1182 (determining that the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining "ignor[ed] ... competent, credible, and uncontradicted testimony" of an expert witness regarding the status of oil and gas wells when the board made its decision). This testimony also supports the "more likely than not" conclusion that the height of the silos will not have a negative effect on the public health, safety, or welfare. See id.

¶20 As to property values, Utah County argues on appeal that "increased activity and output facilitated by the 65-foot silos have adversely affected local property values." But, as Kilgore repeatedly explained to the Board, the height of the silos has no effect on "how fast [the Plant] can run" or "how much material it can produce." A separate permit "restricts the amount of ground to be disturbed ... [and] the number of trucks that come and go [from the Plant] each day" and that "any expansion [of Kilgore's operations] would have to go through a whole new approval process" with the State, the county, and regulatory agencies. The addition of silos, whether 40 feet or taller, does not increase the activity of the Plant.

¶21 Kilgore also provided the Board a professional report from an appraiser who visited the Plant and determined that the additional silos "would have [an] inconsequential visual impact on nearby properties ... based on the presence of the three 100-foot silos, which have a dominant position relative to any silos of a lesser height which could be placed on the site." The Administrator's report also explained that, because the increased height of the silos would have no impact on the secondary effects of the Plant's operations, the only impact would be visual.

And this visual impact would be mitigated because the closest dwelling is located more than half a mile away from the proposed location and the silos could be painted in earth tones, just like the 100-foot silos. These reports support the "more likely than not" conclusion that the height of the silos will not have a negative effect on surrounding property values.

¶22 On this record, Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the two 65-foot silos would not have a negative effect on the public health, safety, and welfare, or property values. "[W]e cannot determine how the Board could have reached its conclusion without ignoring this competent [and] credible" evidence submitted by Kilgore in support of the Application. See Harken Sw. Corp. 920 P.2d at 1182. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Kilgore carried its burden of proof before the Board.

II. Substantial Evidence

¶23 Utah County also contends "[t]he Board's finding that the 65-foot silos adversely affect local property values" and "degrade the public health, safety [and] welfare" is "supported by substantial evidence in the record." We disagree.

¶24 Courts shall "presume that a final decision of [the Board] is valid" unless the decision is arbitrary and capricious or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(3)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). "A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. § 17-27a-801(3)(c)(i). Substantial evidence "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 2001 UT 112, ¶ 21, 38 P.3d 291 (quotation simplified). It must be "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence[,] though something less than the weight of the evidence." Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment , 893 P.2d 602, 604 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quotation simplified).

¶25 Here, the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree with the district court that "insufficient evidence was presented to the Board to distinguish between the public health, safety, and welfare[, or the property values] affected by the overall operation of [the Plant] and the conditional use requested by the Application."

¶26 Utah County provided no support for the conclusion that the conditional use would degrade the public health, safety, and welfare. The only evidence provided by Utah County was in the form of testimony by members of the public, which included complaints about the Plant's operations generally and the fear that increasing silo capacity would result in greater production and more truck traffic. While the expressed concerns are sincere and likely valid, they are primarily addressed to the general operation of the Plant in an area that has become increasingly residential. They do not focus on the incremental problem posed by the additional height of a few additional silos.

¶27 Critically, Kilgore is not limited in the number of silos that it can install and operate, only in the height of the silos, and no evidence was presented to suggest that taller silos would have a greater impact than additional shorter silos. In addition, Kilgore repeatedly explained that if the Board denied the Application, then Kilgore would instead install three or more 40-foot silos on the property to achieve the same result. And Utah County provided no testimony showing any causal link between the height of the silos and the increased effects as opposed to the increased capacity to store materials, which could have been accomplished through permitted uses, such as installing more 40-foot silos. Mere "expressions of support or protest alone shall not constitute the basis of approval or denial." See Utah County, Utah, Land Use Ordinance 7-20(D).

¶28 Similarly, Utah County provided no evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the increased height of the silos would degrade surrounding property values. Instead, the testimony given by residents from surrounding areas tied the decrease in property values to the Plant's operation and the attendant secondary effects. No evidence was presented that taller silos would increase operations beyond the permitted uses and there was no testimony about the visual effect of taller silos that would rebut the appraiser's report.

¶29 We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that the Board's denial of the Application was not based on substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶30 We conclude the district court did not err in granting Kilgore's petition and setting aside the Board's denial of the Application because Kilgore satisfied its burden of proof that the additional height of the silos would not have a negative effect on the public health, safety, and welfare or surrounding property values. We further conclude the district court correctly determined that the Board's denial was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

      UCLUO subsection 7-20(C) provides that "the Board shall grant approval" if the conditional use: (1) does not "degrade the public health, safety or welfare"; (2) is "consistent with the general purposes and intent of the land use ordinance"; (3) is "consistent with the 'characteristics and purposes' stated for the zoning district involved and the adopted general plan"; (4) is "compatible with the public interest and with the characteristics of the surrounding area"; (5) does "not adversely affect local property values"; (6) "compl[ies] with all of the terms and requirements of the land use ordinance"; and (7) does "not result in a situation which is cost ineffective, administratively infeasible, or unduly difficult for the provision of essential services."

      "Light pollution" is defined as "unwanted or excessive artificial light." Light Pollution , Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/science/light-pollution [https://perma.cc/22BS-5SZZ].

      In the alternative, Utah County argues that we should vacate the district court's order and remand to give the Board the opportunity to enter additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Utah County relies on McElhaney v. City of Moab , 2017 UT 65, 423 P.3d 1284, in which the Utah Supreme Court directed the district court to instruct the land use authority to revisit an issue and make additional findings. Id. ¶ 42. In that case, our supreme court determined that the absence of any written findings of fact made the land use authority's decision "an amorphous target" and left the reviewing courts and the parties to guess at "what specifically a party seeking to overturn the [authority's] ultimate determination would have to show was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. ¶ 31. Here, in contrast to McElhaney , the Board provided written findings that the conditional use was denied because (1) "the applicant has not shown that the application will not degrade the public health, safety, or welfare," (2) "the additional height degrades the property values of adjacent properties," and (3) approval would "continue this degradation." While the Board made no subsidiary findings to support these ultimate conclusions, the findings were sufficient to apprise the parties of "the basis of its decision," provided "notice of what [the parties] would need to challenge on appeal," and allowed us to perform our duty of assessing whether "there was substantial record evidence to support the Board's decision." See J.P. Furlong Co. v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining , 2018 UT 22, ¶ 30 & n.8, 424 P.3d 858. And our review of the record shows that "the evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion." Palmer v. St. George City Council , 2018 UT App 94, ¶ 13, 427 P.3d 423 (quotation simplified).