author: GRAY, Justice.

text:
    Jacob A. SMITH, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Corinda D. KELLY, Appellee (Respondent).
    S-18-0220
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    June 4, 2019
    Representing Appellant: James A. Eddington, Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee: Raymond D. Macchia and Daniel G. Blythe, Legal Aid of Wyoming, Inc., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Two years after entry of an Order Approving Stipulation on Paternity, Custody and Visitation, Jacob A. Smith (Father) filed a complaint to modify custody claiming there was a material change in circumstances. After a two-day hearing on the matter, the district court determined there had been no material change and denied Father's complaint. He appeals from that decision. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] We consolidate the issues presented by Father into a single issue:

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined no material change of circumstances occurred?

FACTS

[¶3] In March 2013, Corinda D. Kelly (Mother) and Father had a brief sexual encounter. At the time, Mother was dating Mr. Kelly. When Mother discovered she was pregnant, she believed Mr. Kelly was the father of the child. The child, D, was born on December 3, 2013. Mother and Mr. Kelly married the same month. Shortly after D's birth, genetic testing established Mr. Kelly was not D's biological father. Mother immediately informed Father of the results. Mother, D, and Mr. Kelly moved to Florida in the spring of 2014. In August 2014, Mother and D returned to Wheatland, Wyoming, and moved in with D's maternal grandmother.

[¶4] Father lived in Torrington with his mother and stepfather. Shortly before Mother and D returned to Wyoming, Mother contacted Father to ask if Father wanted to be part of D's life. Father said yes and on October 24, 2014, filed a Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody and Support. Subsequently, Mother and Father filed a stipulated agreement establishing joint legal custody with Mother having primary residential custody. The stipulation contained a visitation schedule and child support calculations, along with other arrangements for D's care and financial well-being. On August 11, 2015, the district court entered an order approving the stipulation.

[¶5] Father filed a complaint to modify the order on custody and visitation on September 15, 2017. Father alleged there had been a change in circumstances due to Mother's instability, referencing her numerous jobs, numerous addresses, numerous romantic relationships, and her emotional volatility. He also claimed the home was unsafe due to the presence of various pets and Mother's failure to clean the house.

[¶6] The district court heard evidence on the modification of custody on May 21 and 22, 2018. Mother, Father, maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, Mother's doctor, and two of D's daycare providers testified. The evidence established Mother, Father, and their parents, worked together to raise D. There were no visitation issues. When the visitation schedule needed to be changed, Mother and Father cooperated with each other to make sure D could spend quality time with both parents. If necessary, the grandparents would assist with babysitting and facilitate exchanges for visitation. When D was upset about leaving Mother for visitation, Mother would talk to D about all the fun things D would do with Father until D was eager to begin the visit. Mother and Father communicated regularly about D's health, school, emotions, and other information parents share regarding their child. There is no question that D is surrounded by loving parents and family.

Mother's Jobs

[¶7] During the period from the 2015 stipulated order until the 2018 hearing on Father's motion to modify custody, Mother held five different jobs. Her first three jobs did not include any benefits. In March 2016, she accepted her fourth job because she believed it would be full-time employment with benefits. She worked at this job for several months, but when she did not get the promised hours and benefits, she accepted her current full-time position which provides health, dental, vision and life insurance, as well as a 401(k). During the relevant time, there was only one two-week gap in employment.

Mother's Residences

[¶8] Mother also lived in four different locations from 2015 to the present. She and D lived in a one-bedroom duplex for almost two years before moving to the other half of the duplex (the landlord had remodeled it and planned to do the same for the side Mother was renting). Next, Mother and D moved to a two-bedroom trailer house with a fenced backyard and a laundry building. She then moved to the two-bedroom house where she and D currently reside. During this time, Mother owned various pets. There were times when the residences were dirty or unkempt. When Father would pick D up, he also took pictures of the house with dirty dishes, soiled laundry, or other indications of uncleanliness.

Mother's Relationships

[¶9] Mother has had several romantic relationships since the district court's custody order. In the late spring of 2015, Mother began dating Mr. O. In May 2016, after the couple became engaged, Mother and Mr. O got into a fight. He threw Mother against a pantry door and then pressed his arm against her collar bone and neck. Mother returned the engagement ring and told Mr. O to "pack his stuff and leave." The physical assault left Mother with bruises on her arm and neck and a sore back. D was visiting Father and was not present during the altercation. When Mother went to get D from Father, she told Father about the incident and said her back hurt when she lifted D.

[¶10] After the incident with Mr. O, Mother had two other dating relationships before meeting Mr. W, her last boyfriend, who she began dating in March 2017. In April or May, Mr. W told Mother he had an upcoming court date because his prior girlfriend had accused him of abuse, even though it was merely "rough play." Mother testified she didn't know what to believe, but she wanted to give Mr. W the benefit of the doubt.

[¶11] Two incidents involving Mr. W are at the core of Father's argument on appeal. The first incident occurred on May 18, 2017. Mother testified she left the home for a short period to assist a co-worker. When she returned, D was wrapped in a bath towel and there were tear streaks on D's face. D's buttocks were bruised. When Mother asked Mr. W what happened, he told her he didn't know, but "assumed" D had fallen on some toy dinosaurs while getting out of the tub. Mother asked D what happened, and D replied, "I don't know." She asked D if he was spanked, but D said "no." Mother testified she was suspicious of Mr. W's story, but could get no further information despite repeatedly questioning D. She told Mr. W she did not trust his story and he wasn't to be alone with D or to administer punishment.

[¶12] Mother sent a text to Father the next day stating D had bruised buttocks from falling on a toy dinosaur. She did not tell Father she was not home at the time of the injury, nor did she relate any suspicions about Mr. W. Father took D for visitation and photographed the bruises. At the hearing, Father testified he did not know who caused the bruising, Mother or Mr. W, but he didn't believe D fell on a toy dinosaur "for a minute." Even so, Father never mentioned the incident or his concerns to Mother or Mr. W. There was no evidence similar incidents occurred while Mr. W was in the home.

[¶13] The second incident is the culmination of a series of events. In August 2017, Mother became pregnant with Mr. W's child. Due to her pregnancy, Mother stopped taking one of her anxiety medications. On approximately September 6, 2017, Mother and Mr. W were arguing in D's presence. Mr. W told Mother they needed to talk, and they went into the bedroom. Mr. W shut and locked the door. Mother said she wanted to leave and go to D. Mr. W blocked her way. Mother repeatedly told Mr. W to let her out. When she attempted to get by him, he shoved her onto the bed. Mother got back up to leave. When Mr. W would not let her leave, Mother punched him in the face. Mr. W stepped aside. Mother immediately left the room and she and D left the premises.

[¶14] Shortly after this incident, Mother began to feel abdominal pain and was put on bedrest. Later, on September 12, the same day Mr. W pled guilty to the misdemeanor sexual battery charges in his unrelated case, Mother suffered a miscarriage.

[¶15] Some time after this incident, Mr. W contacted Father and told him Mother had assaulted him and was out of control. After learning Mr. W had talked to Father, Mother telephoned Father to let him know she had been depressed and upset since the miscarriage but had reached out to her doctor and made an appointment. She said she knew she needed help and was seeking this help on her own. Mother asked Father if there was any secret agenda going on. Father said no and assured her "they were good." A few days later, Mother was served with a motion for modification of custody.

[¶16] After the May 2018 hearing, the district court found the changes in employment and Mother's financial situation were of little concern because there were only short periods of unemployment and she is current on her bills. The district court acknowledged that Mother's changes in residence "may have created some instability for D," but concluded Mother's current living situation is "appropriate and safe." As to her boyfriends, the court found no evidence to suggest D had been negatively affected by the number of relationships and there was no evidence D was "confused about who his dad is or about Mother's boyfriends." The court determined the cleanliness of the home and the number of pets did not significantly affect D's welfare. More importantly, D's medical records showed he is "well-nourished and well-groomed, and that mother's behavior is appropriate."

[¶17] The district court recognized Mother suffers from depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. However, the court stated:

Certainly, her emotional state was unstable during the fall of 2017. She was dealing with a second pregnancy ending in miscarriage, an abusive boyfriend with legal problems, and not long after, a petition to modify custody of her son. The recorded phone conversation does demonstrate this state of distress, but in the same conversation she informed Father that she recognized her problem and was dealing with her manic episodes and anxiety. The Court believes mother did have significant emotional distress, but she is improving and taking appropriate steps to control her depression, bipolar disorder, and anxiety, and is therefore not 'emotionally unstable.'

[¶18] Finally, the district court addressed the issue of most concern-abuse. The court considered evidence of spousal or child abuse as being contrary to D's best interest under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c). However, it determined the two isolated incidents of violence directed at Mother by boyfriends were not enough to demonstrate a material change in circumstances. The court found no evidence that D observed or was harmed by either incident. While the court believed D overheard some of the fight between Mother and Mr. W, it concluded Mother swiftly resolved the situation.

[¶19] More concerning to the court was the bruising on D's buttocks. It found the bruising was caused by Mr. W hitting D-not from a fall on toys. The district court noted Mother did not relate her suspicions to Father nor did she tell Father she was not at home when the incident occurred. The court observed:

Continued or further poor choices such as these, including a failure to inform Father or leaving the child with someone like Mr. W[ ], is not in D[ ]'s best interests. Even so, the Court believes this was an isolated incident that occurred when Mother was unavailable. Dating Mr. W[ ] was obviously a poor choice on Mother's part, but D[ ] has not suffered any noticeable issues as a result of their relationship, which has since been terminated.

The court concluded, while this was a close case, there was no "material change in circumstances ... such that would warrant re-opening the parties' Order Approving Stipulation on Paternity, Custody and Visitation ...."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶20] We review child custody determinations as follows:

Decisions affecting child custody rest within the sound discretion of the district court. We will not disturb the district court's findings absent procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously. Our primary goal in reviewing for an abuse of discretion is determining whether the district court's decision is reasonable. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination, affording to the prevailing party every favorable inference and omitting from our consideration conflicting evidence.

Kappen v. Kappen , 2015 WY 3, ¶ 10, 341 P.3d 377, 381 (Wyo. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶21] A district court:

may modify an order concerning the care, custody and visitation of [a child] if there is a showing ... of a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the [child] pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2017). We require the court to conduct a two-step inquiry:

The first step requires a showing that there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question. Because of the res judicata effect afforded custody orders, such a finding is a threshold requirement. The district court does not properly acquire jurisdiction to reopen an existing custody order until there has been a showing of a substantial or material change of circumstances which outweigh society's interest in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a custody order. In short, unless the district court finds a material change in circumstances, it cannot proceed to the second step-determining whether a modification would be in the best interests of the child.

Jacobson v. Kidd , 2018 WY 108, ¶ 16, 426 P.3d 813, 820-21 (Wyo. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Father, as the party seeking modification, has the burden of proving a material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the Order Approving Stipulation on Paternity, Custody and Visitation. Id. ¶ 17, 426 P.3d at 821.

[¶22] Father argues the district court failed to correctly weigh the following undisputed facts: the incidents of abuse; Mother's instability as exhibited by her multiple boyfriends, jobs and addresses; and her financial struggles. He claims the district court's conclusion D "has not suffered any noticeable issues" is contrary to the undisputed evidence of abuse. Father emphasizes that he has been employed for two years, has bought and is remodeling a home, and Father has paid not only his share of the medical bills, but Mother's as well. Father claims this evidence shows his stability has dramatically increased since the initial custody order, while mother has barely maintained the same level of ability to care for D.

[¶23] "The district court [must] evaluate[ ] 'the current circumstances of the parties in relation to their circumstances at the time [of]' " entry of the governing order. Jacobson , ¶ 17, 426 P.3d at 821 (emphasis added). Here, the district court's conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances is well supported by the evidence. At the time of the hearing, Mother had found a full-time job with benefits. Mother's moves within Wheatland were either necessary (remodel of the first duplex) or an improvement over the last residence. There was no evidence of any disruption to D's schooling, medical care or family relationships while in Mother's care. The district court carefully considered the bruising incident and the obvious immediate harm to D, but acknowledged the bruising occurred almost a year before the hearing and was not likely to occur again since Mr. W was no longer in the picture. It is undisputed Mother and Father regularly communicated about all aspects of D's life. Yet, Father did not consider the incident serious enough to speak with either Mother or Mr. W about the bruising even though he testified he believed it was caused by one of them. Finally, there was no evidence of any further discipline by Mr. W while he was at the home. Mother has sought appropriate help when needed and has complied with all her doctor's directions. Her emotional condition is stable. There is no evidence Mother has issues with alcohol or drugs.

[¶24] This is not a case where the district court ignored "the obvious or natural effects of a situation" in reaching its decision. Jacobson , ¶ 19, 426 P.3d at 821. In Jacobson , we reversed the district court's conclusion there had been no change in circumstances because the district court required objective evidence of an adverse effect on the children to find a change in circumstances. Id. We noted "[a] circumstance may have relevance in a child's life before there are outward signs of harm." Id . The facts in Jacobson , however, were vastly different than the facts in this case. There, mother's violent relationship with her boyfriend was ongoing; mother had refused court-ordered counseling and failed to take the children to counseling; mother had continuous run-ins with law enforcement; mother had problems with alcohol and prescription drugs, id . ¶ 12, 426 P.3d at 818 ; and mother's hostility toward father was worsening. Id . ¶ 30, 426 P.3d at 823. Further, the children were diagnosed with adjustment disorders. Id . ¶ 32, 426 P.3d at 824. One child had trouble making or keeping friends. Id . In light of this evidence, we concluded: "[m]other's continued instability and poor decision-making, her unwillingness to address the issues through counseling and the parties' inability to make the current custody/visitation arrangement work affect [the children] and, therefore, amount to a material change of circumstances." Id . Here, there are no such ongoing issues.

[¶25] Importantly, Mother and Father are models of cooperative co-parenting. Both parties assured the district court they would continue this behavior no matter what the outcome of the hearing. In fact, the district court commended the parents "for working together to raise, from what the evidence shows, is a happy, healthy child who loves spending time with both parents." This Court will not retry the case on appeal. ELA v. AAB , 2016 WY 98, ¶ 18, 382 P.3d 45, 50 (Wyo. 2016). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision.

[¶26] Affirmed.

      The photograph of D's bruises was admitted as Father's Exhibit 6. There is some question whether the photograph is an accurate depiction of the injuries. Mother testified she recalled the bruises "were less dark." When shown Exhibit 6 paternal grandmother testified, "I don't recall them [the bruises] being that bad" and "I don't recall what I saw in person being as significant as what that photo showed." However, it is uncontested that D had bruising.

      Mr. W left the home shortly after his court date for work travel. He moved out of the home in November 2017 and no longer lives in Wheatland. Mother has not had contact with Mr. W since he moved and has had no other relationships since he left.

      At the time of hearing, Mother and Father disputed an amount she owed on D's medical bills.

      The various animals were not in the home at the same time, and Mother currently had only one fish.

      For the first time in his brief, Father asserts Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c) -which identifies spousal and child abuse as contrary to the best interest of the child-has, in essence, legislatively defined such abuse as a material change in circumstances. Father did not raise this issue to the district court, nor does he cite any authority to support this contention in his appellate brief. Therefore, we will not consider his argument raised for the first time on appeal. Yates v. Yates , 2003 WY 161, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 184, 188 (Wyo. 2003) (we do not consider issues "neither raised in, nor argued to, the [district] court except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature") (quotations and citations omitted).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DAVIS, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Trent KAUFMAN, an individual, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. RURAL HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Nebraska domestic corporation; and Shane Filipi, individually and as Regional Manager of Rural Health Development, Inc., Appellees (Defendants).
    S-18-0234
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    June 6, 2019
    Representing Appellant: C. M. Aron and Brock L. Faulkner of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming
    Representing Appellees: Robert C. Jarosh of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Trent Kaufman appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Rural Health Development (RHD) on his retaliatory discharge claim. He contends that genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment and that his claim should proceed to trial. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Kaufman presents two issues on appeal, which he states as:

Issue 1: Whether the public policy exception to at-will employment applies to termination of an employee for submitting a report on elder abuse of a resident that was required by statute.
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in making findings of a disputed material fact precluding summary judgment by accepting the employer's pretext for termination, and finding termination "non-retaliatory" and the Kaufman report "deficient."

FACTS

[¶3] In January 2017, the Platte County Hospital Board of Trustees retained Rural Health Development, Inc. (RHD) to provide nursing home management services at the Platte County Legacy Home. Shane Filipi worked for RHD and served as the nursing home's administrator until May 22, 2017, when RHD hired Trent Kaufman for that position. Mr. Filipi then became RHD's western regional manager and Mr. Kaufman's supervisor.

[¶4] On June 20, 2017, a resident of the nursing home reported to Mr. Kaufman that on June 9, 2017, a physical therapist working at the home threatened her with loss of Medicare benefits and removal from the home unless she agreed to undergo a physical therapy assessment and participate in physical therapy. Mr. Kaufman sent an email to Mr. Filipi describing the resident's concern and asking, "How do you suggest I address the situation?" Mr. Filipi responded:

I'm pretty positive that [the resident] made comments pretty similar in one of her previous stays. I hope I'm thinking of the same resident. After digging into that situation there were two other staff members present that gave different stories than hers that both lined up and contradicted what she said and that she added a lot of drama to her story. I would find out what time this happened and see if there were other staff members around or other residents that are better historians and see what they have to say. Let me know what you find out.

[¶5] The director of nursing spoke with the resident's attending nurse, who essentially confirmed the resident's version of the June 9 incident. The director of nursing instructed the nurse to document the incident using a grievance form, and that was done. Based on this corroborating information, Mr. Filipi, Mr. Kaufman, and the director of nursing all agreed that the incident should be reported to the State as a potential incident of elder abuse. Mr. Filipi also discussed the incident with the vice president of operations for the physical therapist's employer, and she likewise agreed the incident should be reported.

[¶6] Mr. Kaufman began work on the report, and while he was working on it, the director of nursing informed him that Mr. Filipi was on his way to the nursing home and wished to review the report before it was submitted. Mr. Kaufman submitted the report the afternoon of June 20, before Mr. Filipi had an opportunity to review it. The report included a copy of the attending nurse's grievance form as well as cut-and-paste copies of emails exchanged between Mr. Kaufman, Mr. Filipi, and the director of nursing. In the report's closing paragraphs, Mr. Kaufman stated, "It was the consensus of the regional manager, administrator, and director of nursing that this issue should be reported to the State of Wyoming as a potential abuse issue."

[¶7] When Mr. Filipi arrived at the nursing home on June 20, Mr. Kaufman informed him that he had submitted the report and provided him with a hard copy of it. Mr. Filipi was upset that Mr. Kaufman submitted the report without his review. He was also upset that Mr. Kaufman had included in the report the cut-and-paste emails exchanged between the two of them and the director of nursing, that he had not completed the investigation by interviewing the physical therapist before submitting the report, that he did not include a corrective action, and that the report was handwritten rather than typed. Mr. Filipi then told Mr. Kaufman that the two of them would work together to complete the investigation and submit a final report.

[¶8] On June 21 and 22, Mr. Kaufman was out of state for training. On the 22nd, Mr. Filipi was at the nursing home to take care of payroll and accounts payable in Mr. Kaufman's absence. While he was there, several of the home's department heads approached him with concerns about Mr. Kaufman's management of the home. When Mr. Kaufman returned on the 23rd, Mr. Filipi met with him to discuss the concerns that had been brought to his attention, as well as his concerns regarding the submission of the abuse report. During this meeting, Mr. Kaufman asked if he should resign since the department heads had no faith in him. Mr. Filipi told him no, but that Mr. Kaufman needed to think about it.

[¶9] After Mr. Filipi left his office, Mr. Kaufman sent an email to the department heads, stating, "It has been a pleasure working with you all and I will miss working with you all. I am sorry that I did not meet your expectations." A few minutes later, he sent an email to Mr. Filipi that stated, "With a lack of support from the managers and your concerns I am considering this as a 'termination.' " He then left the building.

[¶10] On June 26, 2017, Mr. Filipi and the director of nursing submitted a final report to the State concerning the June 9, 2017 incident. The report was signed by both Mr. Filipi and the director of nursing, and it indicated that the resident's physician and family had been notified and that the long term care ombudsman had been notified. The report summarized the incident, and stated the nursing home's assessment and proposed corrective action as follows (bold typeface in original):

Summary: On the afternoon of 6/9/17 [the resident] was admitted into the facility. [The physical therapist] came in to do an eval with [the resident]. [The resident] did not want to participate in therapy. [The attending nurse] was present in the resident's room for part of the exchange. It is unclear whether [the physical therapist] told [the resident] that she would be kicked out/thrown out/discharged from facility/Medicare if she did not participate in therapy. Both [the resident] and [the physical therapist] apologized to each other the next day. [The resident] agreed to do an eval on the 12th and has been participating in therapy since. [The resident] reported this incident to Administrator Kaufman on the 20th. [The attending nurse] was asked on the 20th about the exchange that took place on the 9th and agreed to fill out a grievance. [The resident] was admitted directly from the ER on the 9th and was already anxious from a fall that took place at her home. [The resident] was sent back later in the night to hospital due to hypoxia.
Administrative Decision based on evidence provided: [The physical therapist] should have taken a different approach and with [the resident's] anxiety and health issues that evening it would have been in everybody's best interests to come back the next day.
Corrective Action taken: [The physical therapist] has been assigned education that will be completed in the next 2 weeks that covers patients' rights/resident rights, resident abuse, and diffusing customer complaints. [The physical therapist's] supervisors will follow up to ensure proper resident interactions. [The attending nurse] will be educated on timely reporting of resident grievances.

[¶11] On September 20, 2017, the State issued a Notice of Conclusions. The notice indicated that the State had completed its investigation and had found the allegation of abuse to be unsubstantiated.

[¶12] On September 25, 2017, Mr. Kaufman filed a complaint against RHD and Mr. Filipi, individually and as regional manager of RFD. The complaint asserted a claim for retaliatory constructive discharge, and in support alleged:

45. Filipi instructed Kaufman that no report of the elder abuse incident should be made.
46. Kaufman understood that Filipi was asking him to either disregard the resident's complaint altogether, or to minimize it in any reports to the State agencies.
* * * *
67. Under federal and state legislation and regulation, elder abuse reporting is mandated, and serves and is an important and well established public policy to protect elderly and susceptible citizens.
68. Kaufman was given the choice to comply with the elder abuse reporting requirements under federal and state law, or to comply with Filipi's instruction not to file an elder abuse report.
69. Kaufman reported to the Wyoming Department of Health and Wyoming Department of Family Services that a vulnerable adult was being or had been abused, neglected, exploited, intimidated, or abandoned.
70. After Kaufman made his report, RHD provided Kaufman with two options as to his employment, to be fired or to resign.
71. Kaufman reasonably believed his discharge was imminent.
72. Kaufman was not given any alternative to resignation.
73. Kaufman understood the only choice he had was to resign, so as to avoid an involuntary termination report on his employment record.
74. Kaufman was not provided any time to make the resignation decision that Filipi required him to make.
75. Kaufman was not permitted to select the effective date of his resignation.
76. Kaufman's resignation was involuntary and required by RHD and Filipi.
77. RHD and Filipi's ultimatum to Kaufman created intolerable working conditions and required Kaufman's resignation on June 23.
78. Kaufman's involuntary and forced resignation on June 23 was a constructive discharge.
79. No legitimate reason existed for RHD's constructive discharge of Kaufman.
80. RHD's explanation to Kaufman for his discharge was pretextual.
81. Kaufman's elder abuse report was the substantial and motivating factor for RHD's constructive discharge of him.

[¶13] RHD answered the complaint, and Mr. Filipi filed a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claims against him, which the district court granted. On June 25, 2018, RHD moved for summary judgment, asserting that based on the undisputed evidence, Mr. Kaufman had no claim that RHD retaliated against him for his filing of the elder abuse report. On August 29, 2018, the district court granted RHD's motion, and Mr. Kaufman thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] W.R.C.P. 56 governs summary judgment and imposes obligations on the movant and nonmovant that we have described as follows:

The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c) ; Throckmartin v. Century 21 Top Realty , 2010 WY 23, ¶ 12, 226 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2010). Until the movant has made a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmovant has no obligation to respond to the motion with materials beyond the pleadings. Id .
Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present evidence showing that there are genuine issues of material fact. Boehm v. Cody Cntry. Chamber of Commerce , 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987) (citing England v. Simmons , 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Wyo. 1986) ). The party opposing the motion must present specific facts; relying on conclusory statements or mere opinion will not satisfy that burden, nor will relying solely upon allegations and pleadings. Boehm , 748 P.2d at 710. However, the facts presented are considered from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. [ Union Pacific R. Co. v. ] Caballo Coal Co. , ¶ 12, 246 P.3d [867], 871 [ (Wyo. 2011) ].

Bogdanski v. Budzik , 2018 WY 7, ¶ 18, 408 P.3d 1156, 1160-61 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Amos v. Lincoln Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 2 , 2015 WY 115, ¶ 15, 359 P.3d 954, 958-59 (Wyo. 2015) ).

[¶15] Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. We have said:

We review a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling. Thornock v. PacifiCorp , 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 (Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses the same legal standard as the district court. Id . The record is assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion ..., and we give a party opposing summary judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id . A material fact is one that would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id .

Wyo. Jet Center, LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd. , 2019 WY 6, ¶ 10, 432 P.3d 910, 914 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Reichert v. Daugherty , 2018 WY 103, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2018) ).

DISCUSSION

[¶16] An employer of an at-will employee may terminate that employment "at any time and for any reason without incurring liability." McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC , 2009 WY 84, ¶ 11, 211 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels , 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984) ). Our Court has recognized a limited exception to that rule and has held that an at-will employee may not be discharged for a reason that violates public policy. McLean v. Hyland Enter., Inc. , 2001 WY 111, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo. 2001). To avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in terminating at-will employees, we apply this exception narrowly, and only in rare cases. McGarvey , ¶ 12, 211 P.3d at 507 (quoting McLean , ¶ 23, 34 P.3d at 1268 ).

[¶17] A party asserting a discharge in violation of public policy must demonstrate that: "(1) The discharge violated a well-established public policy; and (2) there is no other remedy available to protect the interests of the discharged employee or society." McGarvey , ¶ 13, 211 P.3d at 507 (quoting Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc. , 987 P.2d 681, 688 (Wyo. 1999) ). This Court recently clarified the showing that an employee must make to sustain a claim for retaliatory discharge.

1. The employee must make a prima facie case showing employment, [a public policy-protected action by the employee], ... and consequent termination of employment.
2. After a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the inference that its motives were retaliatory by articulating a legitimate non-retaliatory reason.... The burden is one of production-the employer must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it retaliatorily discharged the employee.
3. The employee may then meet its ultimate burden of persuasion by proving directly that the discharge was motivated by [his public policy-protected action] ... or by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is not worthy of credence, i.e., that it is a pretext.

King v. Cowboy Dodge, Inc. , 2015 WY 129, ¶ 19, 357 P.3d 755, 760 (Wyo. 2015) (citing Cardwell v. American Linen Supply , 843 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Wyo. 1992) ).

[¶18] We explained that the term consequent , as articulated in Cardwell , was something of a misnomer, and we clarified that the showing an employee must make in his prima facie case is that his public policy-protected action was a substantial and motivating factor in his discharge. King , ¶ 25, 357 P.3d at 762. However, we also adhered to our holding in Cardwell that "mere proximity in time does not prove the required causal connection." Id . ¶ 30, 357 P.3d at 762 (citing Cardwell , 843 P.2d at 600 ).

Ordinarily the prima facie case must, in the nature of things, be shown by circumstantial evidence, since the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as his motive. Proximity in time between the claim and the firing is a typical beginning-point, coupled with evidence of satisfactory work performance and supervisory evaluations. Any evidence of an actual pattern of retaliatory conduct is, of course, very persuasive.

King , ¶ 19, 357 P.3d at 760 (quoting Cardwell , 843 P.2d at 600 ).

[¶19] Our starting point in a retaliatory discharge analysis would normally be to determine whether the employee has identified an established public policy and a lack of any other remedy for his alleged discharge in violation of the policy. We need not address those questions here, however, because we conclude that Mr. Kaufman failed to present admissible evidence in opposition to RHD's summary judgment motion that would make his required prima facie showing-that his submission of the abuse report was a substantial and motivating factor in his discharge-a triable issue. See Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc. , 987 P.2d at 688 (bypassing policy question where employee failed to show he was discharged in retaliation for reporting unsafe work condition).

[¶20] Mr. Kaufman alleged in his complaint that his supervisor instructed him that no report of the June 9, 2017 abuse incident should be made, and that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for submitting the report. In moving for summary judgment, RHD presented Mr. Filipi's affidavit, by which he attested that he discussed the June 9 incident with Mr. Kaufman and the director of nursing and expressed his agreement that a report should be made. RHD also presented the report that Mr. Kaufman submitted to the State, in which he stated, "It was the consensus of the regional manager, administrator, and director of nursing that this issue should be reported to the State of Wyoming as a potential abuse issue."

[¶21] Mr. Kaufman presented no evidence to refute RHD's evidence that Mr. Filipi did not instruct him to refrain from submitting an abuse report and that he wanted a report submitted. Instead, he revised his claim to allege that Mr. Filipi wanted to review the report before its submission so that he could "sanitize" the report and conceal his practice of having physical therapy forced on nursing home residents to increase the home's revenue. In support of his revised allegation, Mr. Kaufman offered what we view as three categories of evidence that he claims create an issue of material fact concerning his prima facie case: 1) evidence purporting to show Mr. Filipi's past failures to adequately respond to abuse reports and his practice of forcing physical therapy on nursing home residents; 2) evidence of Mr. Filipi's comments concerning the June 9, 2017 incident, his desire to review the abuse report, and his criticism of Mr. Kaufman's report; and 3) the final report submitted by Mr. Filipi and the director of nursing, which Mr. Kaufman characterizes as "false." We will address each category of evidence in turn.

1. Past Incidents Involving Mr. Filipi

[¶22] Mr. Kaufman alleges that Mr. Filipi wanted to review the incident report before its submission so that he could sanitize it and keep Mr. Kaufman from interfering with his practice of forcing physical therapy on residents in order to increase the nursing home's revenue. In support of this allegation, Mr. Kaufman submitted an affidavit, which stated, in relevant part (footnote added):

8. Before my hiring, RHD did not inform me that RHD's management of the Nursing Home was deemed "deficient" in several areas by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") on a June 2016 State Survey, or that as part of such Survey, the Nursing Home entered into a Plan of Correction requiring the facility to "ensure that all allegations of abuse are reported to the appropriate state agencies."
* * * *
19. I learned that the CMS State Survey cited the Nursing Home for failure to comply with resident abuse reporting requirements, including but not limited to a May 15, 2016 forced feeding incident, verbal abuse of a resident by a nurse, RHD's non-responsiveness to complaints made by a resident's family members, and RHD's failure to cause the Nursing Home to take additional actions to ensure resident safety and to report abuse allegations to the appropriate state agency.
20. I learned that in July 2016, CMS required the Nursing Home to implement a "plan of correction" in order to continue to participate in, and receive reimbursement from, the Medicare Program, and that Filipi agreed to the plan of correction as a signatory and as part of RHD's management of the Nursing Home (Filipi was the Administrator of the Nursing Home at that time).
21. The required corrective actions included the requirement that "all allegations of abuse are reported to appropriate state agencies" and "any potential abuse found will be investigated promptly and thoroughly with a full report of findings sent to the appropriate state agency."
* * * *
58. In my follow-up to the investigation of the June 9 incident, and in preparation for this matter, I obtained information from another physical therapist that worked at the Nursing Home while Filipi was administrator. Said physical therapist indicated that Filipi improperly inflated RUG levels by "constantly pressuring the physical therapy staff to spend more time with each patient than they could tolerate for billing purposes, and were asked to perform procedures that were unnecessary, unethical or downright mean." The physical therapist further indicated that his company's physical therapy contract was terminated and RHD apparently hired two subsequent companies that they could pressure into that conduct.
59. Based on my report, Filipi realized that I would not be coerced into or be complicit with his practice of pressuring providers to increase RUG levels and reimbursement; instead, I was a resident/patient advocate, who respected clinical judgment based on the needs of the residents, and would not apply Filipi's administrative mandates to meet inappropriate productivity quotas.
60. By standing up against Mr. Filipi and filing the elder abuse report, Filipi became aware that prior practices of forcing therapy on residents would not be tolerated, and would likely result in further federal and state regulatory scrutiny and review of the Nursing Home, and might result in the Platte County Hospital District Board of Trustees terminating the Agreement for Nursing Home Management Services with RHD.
61. That was the real reason for Mr. Filipi's clear threat and intent to fire me, and as a newly-licensed Administrator in a state with few available Administrator jobs, I was certain that being fired after only one month on the job would damage my entire career as a nursing home administrator.

[¶23] "Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact." RB, Jr. by and through Brown v. Big Horn County Sch. Dist. No. 3 , 2017 WY 13, ¶ 30, 388 P.3d 542, 551 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Jones v. Schabron , 2005 WY 65, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2005) ). Additionally, Rule 56 requires that facts offered in support of or in opposition to summary judgment must be supported by admissible evidence.

(c) Procedures .
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

W.R.C.P. 56(c).

[¶24] The above-quoted paragraphs of Mr. Kaufman's affidavit are replete with conjecture, inadmissible hearsay, and matters outside Mr. Kaufman's personal knowledge. Additionally, the "state survey," referenced in paragraphs 8 and 19, was not attached to the affidavit or otherwise contained in the record. The same is true of the "plan of correction" referenced in paragraphs 8, 20, and 21. Because none of the above-quoted paragraphs complies with Rule 56(c), they cannot create a genuine issue of fact.

2. Mr. Filipi's Review and Criticism of Mr. Kaufman's Report

[¶25] The next category of evidence is Mr. Filipi's review and criticism of Mr. Kaufman's report, which Mr. Kaufman contends created a question of fact concerning his claim that Mr. Filipi wanted to sanitize the report. Mr. Kaufman stated as follows by affidavit:

14. By email, Filipi attempted to downplay the incident, about which he knew nothing, and blamed the resident for making similar previous comments and stated that she had "added a lot of drama to her story".
15. Filipi recommended that I attempt to corroborate the resident's story with other staff members, so I proceeded with the investigation by contacting the Nursing Home's Director of Nursing Services ["DON"].
* * * *
23. After conducting additional investigation, and after receipt of the attending nurse's Grievance Form, I emailed Mr. Filipi and the manager of the PT company (Beth Payne) on June 20, 2017, informing them the incident should be reported to the State of Wyoming. The email was soon followed up with a three-way conversation between Filipi, Payne, and myself, and during that conversation, I sent to both of them the attending nurse's Grievance Form that corroborated the resident's complaint by a disinterested third party with firsthand knowledge of the interaction.
24. It was my understanding based on that phone call that Filipi was supportive of reporting the incident to proper state agencies, and is why I stated in my elder abuse report that "[I]t was the consensus of the regional manager, administrator, and director of nursing that this issue should be reported to the State of Wyoming as a potential abuse issue".
25. Filipi called me directly after the three-way conference call ended, and stated that physical therapy was an important revenue source for the Nursing Home, he reminded me of the difficulty in obtaining physical therapy services for the Nursing Home (and the number of other physical therapy companies that had come and gone), and implied that physical therapy at the Nursing Home (and lucrative Medicare reimbursements for providing physical therapy to residents) could be at risk by submitting the elder abuse report.
26. During the same phone call, Mr. Filipi also reminded me that the resident was found to be unreliable, notwithstanding that we had the attending nurse's firsthand account in the Grievance Form.
27. At an earlier point in my employment by RHD as the Nursing Home Administrator, Filipi told me in person that an individual from the Wyoming DFS Adult Protective Services was difficult to deal with, had investigated several Nursing Home employees individually for their purported conduct, and stated that "you don't want her here at this facility."
* * * *
33. Sometime after arriving at the Nursing Home in the evening of June 20, Filipi entered my office and resumed the discussion of how delicate the situation was because of the importance of physical therapy to the Nursing Home, and stated that the Nursing Home had 5 days within which to submit an elder abuse report.
34. ... I informed Filipi that I had already submitted the report, and provided him a file that contained the hard copy of the report and accompanying documents.
35. Filipi read the report and became visibly angry and upset. He repeatedly asked me, "You submitted this? You submitted the actual emails? You submitted the Grievance Form?" He then began yelling at me that I had done the report wrong, had made him look bad by the information I had provided in the report, and reiterated that he instructed me not to file the report until he had reviewed it. He repeated in a raised voice, "I can't believe you submitted this".
* * * *
37. I responded to Filipi that he had reviewed the report because all of the information and materials in the report had already been sent to him earlier that day during various communications.
38. Filipi became even angrier, and kept repeating that I should not have submitted that report, that I had done it all wrong, that it was a minor issue, and that my report did not contain a solution.
39. After an intervening period, I asked Filipi what we should do, and he responded that both of us should work on a revised or final report to submit later in the week, and then he indicated that he needed to talk with the PT to smooth things over....
40. I spent the day of June 21 and 22 traveling to and from Nebraska to attend job training, and was not at the Nursing Home.
41. I returned to the Nursing Home on June 23, and attended our regular stand-up meeting in the morning and noticed that Filipi was also in attendance, which was unusual.
42. Filipi was visibly agitated by his demeanor and his interjections in the meeting; I tried on several occasions to talk with him and to figure out what was wrong and when we were going to work on finalizing the report.
* * * *
44. When I finally encountered Filipi in the hallway, I asked him to join me in my office, whereupon I asked why he was angry and he told me that because of my report, he had to do lots of damage control with the PT, and had to talk the PT out of quitting.
45. Filipi then told me that the PT reported that the PT and the resident had reached some type of settlement amongst them, and that therefore the report I made should never have been sent because the issue had been resolved internally.
46. I responded that I had not spoke with the PT because he was not an employee of the Nursing Home, but that I had instead contacted PT's manager (Beth Payne).
47. Filipi then reprimanded me for including the emails in my report and including the attending nurse's Grievance Form; he told me on several occasions throughout the conversation that I did not understand the implications of my report and that the State of Wyoming could come through the door at any time after receiving a report like that. He reiterated that the emails were not the way to submit the report and that the State could read into something in his email and make a big deal out of it.

[¶26] We have defined the evidence required to support an employee's prima facie case as

[e]vidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence .

King , ¶ 29, 357 P.3d at 762 (quoting Kruzich v. Martin-Harris Gallery, LLC , 2006 WY 7, ¶ 16, 126 P.3d 867, 874 (Wyo. 2006) ) (emphasis in King ). Judged against this standard, we must conclude that the above-quoted affidavit excerpts also fail to create a question of fact that would make Mr. Kaufman's prima facie claim a triable issue.

[¶27] Paragraphs 14 and 15 reference an email that is in the record. Setting aside Mr. Kaufman's characterizations and commentary, Mr. Filipi's actual statement referenced a prior incident with the same resident, which caused him to question her credibility. Mr. Filipi's email reads:

I'm pretty positive that [the resident] made comments pretty similar in one of her previous stays. I hope I'm thinking of the same resident. After digging into that situation there were two other staff members present that gave different stories than hers that both lined up and contradicted what she said and that she added a lot of drama to her story. I would find out what time this happened and see if there were other staff members around or other residents that are better historians and see what they have to say. Let me know what you find out.

[¶28] Mr. Filipi did not instruct Mr. Kaufman to ignore the complaint. He instructed him to investigate and if possible corroborate it. Even viewing the email in the light most favorable to Mr. Kaufman, we are unable to find that it in any way contributes to a question of fact regarding Mr. Kaufman's prima facie claim.

[¶29] The upshot of paragraphs 23 through 26, again setting aside Mr. Kaufman's assumptions and characterizations, is that Mr. Filipi wanted the incident reported but he was concerned with the report's effect on physical therapy services and with the resident's account of the incident. Again, even giving Mr. Kaufman all favorable inferences from this evidence, we are unable to find that it creates an issue of material fact. We have said that "[g]uesswork is not a substitute for evidence or inference, and inference cannot be based on mere possibility." Cook v. Shoshone First Bank , 2006 WY 13, ¶ 44, 126 P.3d 886, 896 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Jones , ¶ 23, 113 P.3d at 39-40 ). To draw some sort of subterfuge from Mr. Filipi's airing of his concerns regarding the incident and the report is a departure from inference and amounts to no more than the same conjecture we rejected above.

[¶30] Paragraph 27 references a conversation unrelated to the June 9, 2017 incident and for which no context is provided. We can find no inference that may be reasonably drawn in Mr. Kaufman's favor to create a genuine issue of fact.

[¶31] The remaining paragraphs detail the fallout from Mr. Kaufman's submission of his abuse report without Mr. Filipi's review. In considering this evidence, we must give Mr. Kaufman all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it, but we are also mindful of the narrow scope of the public policy exception to at-will terminations. See McLean , ¶ 23, 34 P.3d at 1268 ("[The] public policy exception is narrow in scope to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in terminating at-will employees."). Our reluctance to interfere with an employer's at-will termination decisions extends with equal, if not greater, force to an employer's discretion to establish and enforce internal procedures and protocols. In the absence of a showing that those protocols and procedures violate or undermine the reporting statute, we must take care to avoid an unjustified and unreasonable intrusion.

[¶32] The reporting statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-20-103, does not bar an employer from requiring supervisory review of abuse reports, and it does not require disclosure of management's deliberative emails, or even its internal processing and reporting forms. We therefore draw no inferences from Mr. Filipi's enforcement of his protocols and process. Turning then to the statements attributed to Mr. Filipi, even giving Mr. Kaufman any reasonable favorable inferences, the most we are able to glean from the evidence is that Mr. Filipi wanted the report submitted in a different manner and he was concerned with the physical therapist's response to the report. It is again pure conjecture to suggest that from this evidence one can draw an intention to cover up abuse so that an illegal practice of forcing physical therapy would not be revealed. This evidence again, therefore, fails to create a genuine issue of fact as to Mr. Kaufman's prima facie claim.

3. Final Abuse Report

[¶33] The remaining evidence Mr. Kaufman points to as creating a genuine issue of material fact is the final report Mr. Filipi and the director of nursing submitted to the State. Mr. Kaufman argues the report is false because it categorizes the nature of the event as "Mistreatment," rather than "Verbal Abuse," and because it states that it is unclear what the physical therapist said to the resident. We have reviewed the report, and we disagree that it is false or otherwise creates an issue of material fact.

[¶34] First, with regard to the report's identification of the incident as one of mistreatment, rather than verbal abuse, this is a distinction without much of a difference for purposes of the report. The nursing home's "Policies and Procedures" defines "mistreatment" as "To treat wrongly or badly contrary to the Nursing Home's policies and compromising the resident's physical or emotional integrity." It defines "verbal abuse" as "Any use of oral, written or gestured language that willfully includes disparaging and derogatory terms to residents or their families or within their hearing distance, regardless of their age, ability to comprehend or disability. Examples of verbal abuse include, but are not limited to: Threats of harm; saying things to frighten a resident, name calling, threats of punishment in any form, such as telling a resident that he/she will never be able to see his/her family again." Mistreatment is a broader, more general category, that arguably includes verbal abuse. Use of one term over the other cannot reasonably be construed as a whitewash, particularly in light of the remainder of the report.

[¶35] The report confirms that the incident occurred, and it confirms that the resident's attending nurse was a witness. It states, "It is unclear whether [the physical therapist] told Resident that she would be kicked out/thrown out/discharged from facility/Medicare if she did not participate in therapy." The report then goes on to state that "[the physical therapist] should have taken a different approach and with resident['s] anxiety and health issues that evening it would have been in everybody's best interests to come back the next day." The report cannot be characterized as false, and no reasonable inference may be drawn from the report that it was an attempt to cover up an illegal practice of forcing physical therapy on nursing home residents.

[¶36] The evidence Mr. Kaufman submitted in response to RHD's motion for summary judgment failed to create a disputed issue of material fact that would make his prima facie claim a triable issue. We therefore have no need to address the remaining showings required under the burden shifting analysis, and we uphold the district court's grant of summary judgment to RHD.

[¶37] Affirmed.

      Physical therapy services were provided to residents of the nursing home by an independent contractor physical therapy firm.

      While it is not entirely clear from the record, we understand the ombudsman referenced in the report to be the long term care ombudsman who is statutorily charged with investigating, advocating, and mediating on behalf of adults applying for or receiving long term care services. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1304 (LexisNexis 2017).

      Mr. Kaufman does not dispute that his employment with RHD was at-will.

      Mr. Kaufman's attorney in fact conceded during his summary judgment argument to the district court that he did not dispute that Mr. Filipi wanted the report submitted.
      THE COURT: But in terms of the public policy exception, this isn't so much what was originally alleged that they didn't allow him to file it; right? I mean, I guess the evidence that I've read is that everybody agreed that it was going to be filed.
      [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: That is correct. We can't deny that there was this general consensus. There was a three-way phone call, and it was agreed that they had to be filed....

      The affidavit does not define what the acronym "RUG" stands for.

      W.R.C.P. 56 was amended in 2017 to align with its federal counterpart, which was amended in 2010. The affidavit requirements previously found at Rule 56(e) were renumbered and are now found at Rule 56(c)(4). Although the express statement that any materials referenced in an affidavit must be attached to the affidavit was omitted, it is still required because of Rule 56(c)(1)(A) 's requirement that any material cited be in the record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment ("Subdivision (c)(4) carries forward some of the provisions of former subdivision (e)(1). Other provisions are relocated or omitted. The requirement that a sworn or certified copy of a paper referred to in an affidavit or declaration be attached to the affidavit or declaration is omitted as unnecessary given the requirement in subdivision (c)(1)(A) that a statement or dispute of fact be supported by materials in the record.").

      While we give Mr. Kaufman all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence, that does not mean that we are required to ignore undisputed facts in the record. See McGarvey , ¶ 7, 211 P.3d at 505 (citation omitted) ("Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment against Ms. McGarvey, we consider the facts in a light most favorable to her position. At the same time, we cannot ignore undisputed facts just because they are less favorable to her position."). It is apparent from the undisputed evidence that the damage control that Mr. Filipi stated he was doing with the accused physical therapist related to Mr. Kaufman's filing of the abuse report without first interviewing him.
      Q. Well, now we know from this email that it was sometime on June 20th that Mr. Filipi talked to [the physical therapist], right?
      A. Yes.
      Q. We know you didn't, right?
      A. That is correct.
      Q. Mr. Filipi told you that [the physical therapist] feels betrayed that nobody from the facility came to talk to him and doesn't understand why he wasn't allowed to tell his side. Do you see that?
      A. I do.
      Q. Could you understand why [the physical therapist] would feel betrayed and not understand why he wasn't allowed to tell his side of the story before someone submitted an allegation that he had abused an elderly patient to the State of Wyoming?
      A. His employer communicated with him.
      [COUNSEL]: That's not my question. Will you please read back my question. (Last question read by the reporter.)
      A. Yes.
      Q. You would be upset, wouldn't you, if someone did that to you?
      A. Probably.
      Q. You would want an opportunity to tell your side of the story before someone reported it to the state?
      A. Most likely.
      Q. Can you think of a circumstance under which you would not want to have an opportunity to tell your side of the story before someone accused you of abusing an elderly patient to the state?
      A. I wasn't accusing; I was reporting.
      Q. Can you think of a situation in which you would not want an opportunity to tell your side of the story?
      A. I would want to be able to tell my side of the story.


author: THUMMA, Chief Judge:

text:
    NATASHA S., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Navajo Nation, Whiteflutte Y., R.Y., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 18-0389
    Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.
    FILED May 7, 2019
    Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Autumn Spritzer Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    Natasha S., Tempe Appellant
    Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
   THUMMA, Chief Judge:

¶1 Natasha S. appeals the superior court's order denying her motion for foster care payments. Because Natasha S. failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 For a time, Natasha S. was a licensed foster care provider for R.Y. in this dependency proceeding. While R.Y. was in her care, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) Office of Licensing and Regulation denied Natasha S.'s application to renew her foster care license. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-506 (2019). Natasha S. challenged that denial administratively and continued to serve as foster placement for R.Y. When DCS affirmed the denial of her foster care license, Natasha S. did not challenge that final agency action in superior court. See A.R.S. § 41-1092.08 ; 12-901 to -914.

¶3 In December 2017, R.Y.'s guardian ad litem moved for an order requiring DCS to pay Natasha S. for foster care provided to R.Y. through November 2017. The superior court granted that motion and DCS paid the amount ordered; that order and payment are not part of this appeal. Later, Natasha S. moved for an order requiring DCS to pay her for foster care provided to R.Y. in December 2017. The superior court denied the motion, and Natasha S. timely filed this appeal challenging that denial.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Natasha S. asserts appellate jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1). DCS counters that Natasha S. is not an "aggrieved party" as required by A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and, alternatively, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion. Assuming (without deciding) that Natasha S. was an aggrieved party, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion.

¶5 "[A]ppellate jurisdiction is derivative," meaning that "when jurisdiction is lacking in the trial court, it is lacking on appeal." Webb v. Charles , 125 Ariz. 558, 565, 611 P.2d 562 (App. 1980). This court "cannot consider an appeal from the superior court on the merits unless the superior court has jurisdiction." Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 223 Ariz. 540, 541 ¶ 4, 225 P.3d 597, 598 (App. 2010).

¶6 The superior court has jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings brought under Title 8. See A.R.S. § 8-202. Title 8, however, does not grant that court jurisdiction to address foster care licensing or payment. Instead, those matters are first addressed administratively. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 8-503(A)(4)(g) (granting DCS authority to "[e]stablish rules, regulations and standards for ... [u]niform amounts of payment for all foster homes according to certification"); Ariz. Admin. Code (A.A.C.) R21-1-301 to - 314 (setting forth such rules). An individual wishing to challenge an adverse decision by DCS on such matters may seek review by an Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). See A.A.C. R21-1-301 to - 314 ; Ariz. Dep't of Child Safety, Policy and Procedure Manual ch. 4, § 9 (eff. Oct. 15, 2018), https://extranet.azdcs.gov/DCSPolicy/Content/04_Out_of_Home_Care/foster_care_rate.htm. When such review is requested, the ALJ issues a recommended decision after an evidentiary hearing. A.A.C. R21-1-313. After review of the ALJ's recommended decision, DCS issues a final administrative decision. Id. An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of a final administrative decision pursuant to Arizona's Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to - 914; 41-1092.08(H); A.A.C. R21-1-314.

¶7 "[A] party must exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing to the courts." Minor v. Cochise Cty. , 125 Ariz. 170, 172, 608 P.2d 309, 311 (1980). A failure to do so means "judicial interpretation is withheld until the administrative process has run its course." Id. Natasha S. did not exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking a court order requiring foster care payments. Even if she had, any court challenge by Natasha S. to a final DCS administrative decision would be made under the APA pursuant to Title 41, not in this Title 8 case. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1092.08(H) ; 12-901 to -914. Accordingly, the superior court in this dependency proceeding lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion for foster care payments.

CONCLUSION

¶8 Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for foster care payments, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of that denial. See Riendeau , 223 Ariz. at 541 ¶ 4, 225 P.3d at 598 ; Webb , 125 Ariz. at 561, 611 P.2d at 565. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

      Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

      The court in this dependency ultimately appointed Natasha S. guardian for R.Y., A.R.S. §§ 8-871 to -874, a ruling recently vacated given a failure to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, see Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Child Safety , --- Ariz. ----, 441 P.3d 982, 2019 WL 1723574 (Ariz. App. Apr. 18, 2019) (mem. dec.).

      Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion, this decision is without prejudice as to any administrative remedies Natasha S. may have available to recover payment for foster care.


author: JOHNSEN, Judge:

text:
    STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Margaret MAHONEY, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,
    Calvin Ragsdale and Virginia Ragsdale, Real Parties in Interest.
    No. 1 CA-SA 19-0067
    Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.
    FILED May 16, 2019
    Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By Brock J. Heathcotte, Christopher B. Davis, Counsel for Petitioner
    Palumbo, Wolfe & Palumbo, PC, Phoenix, By Elliot G. Wolfe, Co-Counsel for Real Parties in Interest
    Severiano A. Rodarte, Esq., Phoenix, By Severiano A. Rodarte, Co-Counsel for Real Parties in Interest
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
   JOHNSEN, Judge:

¶1 A motorist died before dawn one day when his car slammed into some horses that had wandered onto State Route 77 near Dudleyville. Tracks showed the horses had passed through an open gate in a barbed-wire fence maintained by the State of Arizona adjacent to the highway. Investigators also spotted tire tracks of one or more all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") leading through the gate. The motorist's parents sued several defendants, including the State, which filed a notice of nonparty at fault asserting that "unknown ATV riders were responsible for leaving" the gate open. The superior court struck the notice, noting the State had not tried to identify or locate the ATV riders and there was no evidence that any nonparty "was actually known" to be at fault. We hold the notice was valid. The claim against the State is that the highway gate was open because the State did not secure it. On these facts, the State may name as a nonparty at fault the individual who negligently left the gate open even though the State cannot identify that person by name.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Joseph Ragsdale was driving to work in Miami when his car collided with the horses. Ragsdale was killed, and four of the horses also perished. His parents (the "Plaintiffs") sued a couple that owned property near the highway (the "Owners"), the couple who kept the horses in a fenced pasture on that property (the "Ranchers"), and the State. The Plaintiffs alleged the Owners and the Ranchers negligently failed to secure the gate to the pasture in which the Ranchers kept the horses. The Plaintiffs alleged the State negligently failed to secure a gate in another fence that ran along the highway about a half-mile beyond the pasture.

¶3 Discovery had revealed that hunters and hikers sometimes came and went through the pasture gate, and the State, joined by the Owners, filed a notice naming as nonparties at fault "unknown persons" who opened the pasture gate without closing it. The State separately filed another notice naming "Unknown ATV Riders" who, the State alleged, had left the highway gate open in disregard of a sign on the gate saying, "KEEP GATE CLOSED."

¶4 In support of its allegation about the ATV riders, the State cited a DPS report that stated as follows:

[T]he horses came from the pasture and traveled towards State Route 77, where they located the opened right-[of-way] fence gate, traveled through it and up onto the highway where the collision occurred. It could not be determined who had left ... either the pasture gate or the right-[of-way] fence gate open, but ... a subject(s) operating [ATVs], based upon tire prints, had left the right-[of-way] fence gate open.

The Plaintiffs objected to the notices of nonparty at fault, and, after briefing and oral argument, the superior court struck them both.

JURISDICTION

¶5 The State petitioned for special action relief from the superior court's order striking its notice of the ATV riders as nonparties at fault. By prior order, we accepted jurisdiction of the State's petition because it raised a purely legal question and, in the circumstances presented, the State lacked an adequate remedy. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; Bowen Prods. v. French , 231 Ariz. 424, 426-27, ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 87, 89-90 (App. 2013) ; Ocotillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court , 173 Ariz. 486, 488, 844 P.2d 653, 655 (App. 1993).

DISCUSSION

¶6 As our supreme court explained in Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 169 Ariz. 505, 821 P.2d 166 (1991), "[w]ith certain exceptions ... the liability of tortfeasors in Arizona is several only." Id. at 506, 821 P.2d at 167 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 12-2506(A) (2019) ("Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault ....")). "In assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury, death or damage to property, regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." A.R.S. § 12-2506(B).

¶7 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) sets out the procedure by which a defendant may exercise its rights under the statute:

Notice of Nonparty at Fault . No later than 150 days after filing its answer, a party must serve on all other parties--and should file with the court--a notice disclosing any person: (A) not currently or formerly named as a party in the action; and (B) whom the party alleges was wholly or partly at fault under A.R.S. § 12-2506(B). The notice must disclose the identity and location of the nonparty allegedly at fault, and the facts supporting the allegation of fault.... The trier of fact may not allocate any percentage of fault to a nonparty who is not disclosed in accordance with this rule except on stipulation of all the parties or on motion showing good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties.

We review a superior court's rulings on discovery and disclosure issues for abuse of discretion. Bowen , 231 Ariz. at 427, ¶ 9, 296 P.3d at 90.

¶8 The Plaintiffs argue the superior court correctly struck the State's notice because it did not identify the ATV riders by name, in violation of Rule 26(b)(5). In Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds, Inc ., 188 Ariz. 431, 937 P.2d 353 (App. 1996), however, we held a defendant's failure to identify a nonparty by name was not fatal to its notice. The plaintiff in Rosner was injured in a nightclub brawl, but his assailants left the club before police arrived. Id. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354. The plaintiff sued the nightclub, alleging its negligence caused the fight. Id. After the nightclub tried without success to locate the assailants, it filed a notice of nonparty at fault designating them as nonparties. Id. at 432-33, 937 P.2d at 354-55. On appeal from a defense verdict, the plaintiff argued the superior court should have struck the notice of nonparty at fault. Id. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354. As here, the plaintiff argued the notice did not comply with Rule 26(b)(5) because it did not identify the nonparties nor give their location. Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354.

¶9 We held that, like any procedural rule, Rule 26(b)(5)"can only affect procedural matters and cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights created by statute." Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355. Under § 12-2506(A), we explained, the issue is whether the defendant's notice discloses "facts sufficient to establish the existence of another tortfeasor, despite the inability to further identify the tortfeasor." Rosner, 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added); cf. McKillip v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc. , 190 Ariz. 61, 945 P.2d 372 (App. 1997) (upholding allocation of fault to a nonparty in mode-of-operation case against grocer without deciding whether evidence was sufficient to support fault of unknown person who dropped piece of paper on which plaintiff slipped); Smith v. Johnson , 183 Ariz. 38, 899 P.2d 199 (App. 1995) (jury allowed to consider fault of unidentified driver of a "red Mercedes" who negligently waved the defendant driver through an intersection, where the defendant collided with an oncoming car).

¶10 The nightclub in Rosner filed its notice only after going to "great lengths" to identify the patrons who had beaten up the plaintiff. 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355. Here, the Plaintiffs assert that, by contrast, the State has done nothing to try to identify the ATV riders who left the tracks through the highway gate. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (court may grant relief from rule upon showing of "good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties"). But while the existence of the ATV riders may be material to the jury's allocation of fault, the Plaintiffs do not argue the names of the riders are material to that determination. The State will have the burden at trial to prove that the horses made their way onto the highway because ATV riders left the gate open. The State's failure to try to learn the names of the ATV riders, and its resulting inability to offer specifics about how they left the gate open and when, are things the Plaintiffs may ask the jury to weigh at trial, but under these circumstances, they are not grounds for striking the notice of nonparty at fault.

¶11 Citing dictum in Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Cendejas , 220 Ariz. 281, 205 P.3d 1128 (App. 2009), the Plaintiffs nevertheless argue we cannot disregard the requirement in Rule 26(b)(5) that a defendant provide the "identity and location" of the alleged nonparties at fault. See Cendejas , 220 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 24, 205 P.3d at 1133 (noting the defendant's unsuccessful efforts in Rosner to locate the assailants and warning that Rosner "did not hold that a party could ignore the Rule's requirements"). But we did not rule in Cendejas that a notice of nonparty at fault that lacks the name and location of the nonparty necessarily fails under Rule 26(b)(5) unless the defendant can show it tried without success to find the nonparty. The notice in that case identified the nonparty by name but did not explain what the nonparty did that deserved fault. Id. Here, there is no doubt that the State alleges the ATV riders should bear fault because they opened the gate and did not close it behind them.

¶12 In any event, we question any suggestion in Cendejas that Rule 26(b)(5) must be applied in a way that ensures a plaintiff has sufficient information "to bring [the nonparty] into the action before the statute of limitations expires." 220 Ariz. at 286, 205 P.3d at 1133. At its heart, Rule 26(b)(5) is in service of a defendant's substantive right to have the jury assess fault to a nonparty - regardless of whether the plaintiff may hail that nonparty into court. See Dietz , 169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 (upholding defendant's right to name as a nonparty at fault an employer that is immune from suit by the plaintiff); Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 ("[T]he comparative fault statute apportions fault, even at the expense of the plaintiff."); Ocotillo West , 173 Ariz. at 488, 844 P.2d at 655 ("Essentially, a defendant can name a nonparty at fault even if the plaintiff is prohibited from directly naming or recovering from such a party.").

¶13 It follows that Rule 26(b)(5) may not be read to undermine a defendant's statutory right to be assessed no more than its proportionate share of fault. See Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 358, 678 P.2d 934, 939 (1984) (when legislature creates substantive right, court may not diminish that right by procedural rule); Marsin v. Udall , 78 Ariz. 309, 312, 279 P.2d 721, 723 (1955) ("Any rule of court that operates to lessen or eliminate the right is of no legal force."). Although a defendant will be better served at trial if it can offer detailed information about a nonparty it alleges should bear some share of fault, a notice of nonparty at fault is not necessarily defective if it lacks information that would enable the plaintiff to sue the nonparty directly. See Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 ( § 12-2506 was enacted "to allow the trier of fact ... to apportion fault among all tortfeasors based on the facts presented at trial") (citing Dietz , 169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 ( § 12-2506"establish[ed] a system of several liability making each tortfeasor responsible for paying for his or her percentage of fault and no more ")).

¶14 The Plaintiffs argue that, as the superior court reasoned, in Rosner and the other nonparty cases cited above, it was undisputed that a nonparty had in fact committed a fault-worthy act. The Plaintiffs contend that here, by contrast, as the superior court found, "there is no person who actually saw anyone leave open the gate." On the facts presented, however, the State need not support its notice with testimony by someone who saw ATV riders open the highway gate and leave without closing the gate behind them. It is undisputed that the highway gate was open; indeed, the Plaintiffs allege the State negligently failed to secure the gate so that horses could not come from the nearby ranch onto the highway. Although the Plaintiffs do not concede that a human being must have opened the gate, at oral argument, they admitted they have no evidence to support the notion that the gate could have been opened any other way. And one of the Owners testified that gates like the one in the highway fence are not easy to open and "generally ... don't get opened very often by people that can't close them."

¶15 As the superior court noted, the premise of the State's notice is that the horses came onto the highway because someone left the gate open. Tire tracks mixed with the tracks of the horses show it may have been ATV riders who did so. On this record, given the nature of the gate and the other evidence in the record, the superior court erred by concluding the State's notice was too speculative. The Plaintiffs' claim against the State presumes the highway gate was open, and the State is entitled to argue to the jury that it should apportion fault to the ATV riders if it finds they opened the gate without closing it.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For these reasons, we accept jurisdiction of the State's petition for special action and grant relief by vacating the order of the superior court striking the State's notice of nonparty at fault concerning "unknown ATV riders."

      Our order vacated the ruling striking the State's notice and stated that we would issue an opinion in due course. This is that opinion.

      Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current version of a statute or rule.