text:
    Ross D. BRAND, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.
    No. ED 93504.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.
    June 15, 2010.
    Alexa I. Pearson, Columbia, MO, for Movant/Appellant.
    Shaun J. Mackelprang, James B. Farns-worth, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent/Respondent.
    Before SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J., ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., J., and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J.
   SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J.

Introduction

Ross D. Brand (Movant) appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence in the trial court after pleading guilty of being a prior offender residing within 1,000 feet of a school or child care facility, in violation of Section 566.147. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 7, 1999, Movant pled guilty to one charge of statutory rape, for which he was sentenced to seven years, such sentence beginning on September 8, 1999. Movant was required to register as a sex offender due to this offense, which he did. In 2004, Section 566.147 was enacted, which prohibits sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school or child-care facility. On March 7, 2007, a child welfare worker visited Movant’s girlfriend’s home, where Movant had been living for two weeks, and which was within 1,000 feet of a “Head Start” facility. The child welfare worker, discovering this situation, reported Movant. Movant was charged with and pled guilty to violating Section 566.147.

The trial court advised Movant of his trial rights and made clear that those rights would be waived if Movant decided to plead guilty. Movant assured the court that he understood his rights, the charges against him and still wished to plead guilty, because he was guilty. The court also asked about Movant’s opportunity to discuss his case with counsel. Movant testified that he believed he had had sufficient time to speak with counsel, that counsel had done everything he asked, and that he had no complaints about counsel’s performance.

[THE COURT]: [Movant], the essential elements of the charge against you are as follows: That you did on or about March 7, 2007, in the County of Washington, State of Missouri, being a registered sex offender with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office, did reside at 602 Main Street, [Mineral Point], Missouri, which residence was within 1,000 feet of a school, a violation of Missouri law.
Do you understand and admit each essential element of that charge that I have read to you?
[MOVANT]: Yes, sir.
[COURT]: I need you to tell me in your own words what you did on or about March 7, 2007, which led to this charge filed against you.
[MOVANT]: I came home from work. DFS was there with the girl that I was staying with. And they noticed I lived a thousand feet of a school, but
[COURT]: You, sir, first of all, were you a registered sex offender with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office?
[MOVANT]: Yes.
[COURT]: And so you’re telling me that you did reside then within a thousand feet of a school; is that right?
[MOVANT]: Yes, sir.

In exchange for Movant’s guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend, and Mov-ant agreed to accept, that Movant’s sentence be suspended and he receive five years’ supervised probation. The trial court accepted the plea.

One year later, the court revoked Mov-ant’s probation and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment because he did not acquire the sex offender evaluation that the court ordered him to get as a term of his probation.

On October 28, 2008, Movant filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief, later amended by appointed counsel, alleging that Section 566.147 was an unconstitutionally retrospective law as applied to him, because his underlying conviction for a sex offense occurred in 1998, prior to the statute’s enactment in 2004. Movant also alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could not be found guilty of violating Section 566.147 unless he knew that he was residing within 1,000 feet of a school, and that he did not, in fact, know about the school’s location, and that if counsel had advised him appropriately he would have taken the matter to trial. The motion court denied Movant’s postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.

Points on Appeal

In his first point, Movant maintains that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because his conviction and sentence are in violation of constitutional prohibitions against retrospective laws, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 13 of the Missouri Constitution, in that Section 566.147 is unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to anyone who was convicted of or pled guilty to a qualifying sex offense prior to the statute’s effective date, and Movant pled guilty to the underlying sex offense in 1999, several years prior to the enactment of the statute, and the motion court’s conclusion declaring that this section does not impose a new obligation and thus is not unconstitutionally retrospective is clearly erroneous in light of the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent decision in F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s Department, 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. banc 2010), which expressly held to the contrary.

In his second point, Movant claims that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because this violated his right to due process of law and effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, in that Movant’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, because plea counsel unreasonably advised him to enter a guilty plea even though he did not possess the required culpable mental state to constitute a violation of Section 566.147, when Movant did not act “knowingly” or “purposely” in violation of the law as he was unaware that the address at which he was staying was within 1,000 feet of a school or day-care facility, and the court accepted his guilty plea even though he lacked understanding of the charge against him.

Standard of Review

An evidentiary hearing is not required for a postconviction motion for relief if the motion, the files and case record conclusively show that a movant is not entitled to relief. Thomas v. State, 249 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Mo.App. E.D.2008), Rule 24.035(h). To warrant an evidentiary hearing: 1) the motion must plead facts, not conclusions, which if true, would merit relief; 2) the facts alleged must raise matters not refuted by the record; and 3) the matters must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Thomas, 249 S.W.3d at 238. Our review of decisions under Rule 24.035 is limited to determining whether the findings, conclusions, and judgment of the motion court are clearly erroneous. Id.

Discussion

The holding of F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff’s Department, 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo.banc 2010), is dispositive of Mov-ant’s first point on appeal. In F.R., the Missouri Supreme Court found that Section 566.147 as applied to a defendant convicted of a sex crime in 1999 was unconstitutional:

The new obligations and duties imposed on [the defendant] are solely the result of [his] past criminal acts, and the failure to perform these new duties and obligations carries a criminal penalty. The obligations and duties, imposed after the fact of [his] criminal conviction [ ] and based solely on [that] prior conviction [], violate [the defendant’s] rights under article I, section 13.

Id. at 66.

Movant pled guilty to the sex offense upon which his sex offender status is based in 1999, before the enactment of Section 566.147. At the time he pled guilty and was convicted, there was no law forbidding him from living within 1,000 feet of a school or day-care center. See, F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 61. That law, Section 566.147, was enacted in 2004. Its command that a person who has been convicted of a sex offense cannot reside within 1,000 feet of a school or day-care center imposes a new obligation, duty or disability upon Movant. Id. The 2004 law restricting Movant’s choice of residency changes the legal effect of his past conviction. Id. at 63, 64; see also Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc. v. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Comm’n, 702 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo.banc 1985). The statute makes Movant take some action, not previously required of him, based on his previous conviction — or face a new criminal charge. F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 63. As such, Section 566.147 violates the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against the retrospective application of laws and is unconstitutional as applied to Movant in this case. Id.

The State argues that this cause should be remanded for a hearing by the motion court because there may be another sexual offense committed after Section 566.147 came into effect upon which this conviction is based. The record indicates that the conviction was based upon Movant’s 1998 statutory rape charge to which he pled guilty in 1999. He was incarcerated for seven years, released in 2006, and then charged with the instant violation in 2007. However, in the interests of diligence, we find that the State should submit to the trial court an official criminal records check of Movant in order to conclusively prove that Movant’s conviction of violating Section 566.147 was exclusively based on his 1999 conviction that occurred before the statute’s effective date.

Accordingly, Point I is granted.

Our resolution of Point I renders the claims raised in Point II moot. As such, Point II is denied as moot.

Conclusion

The judgment of the motion court denying Movant’s Rule 24.035 motion is reversed and this cause is remanded. The State is ordered forthwith to submit to the court an official criminal records check of Movant to establish that Movant’s conviction of violating Section 566.147 was based only on the 1999 conviction that occurred before Section 566.147’s effective date of 2004. Upon such establishment, the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence against Movant for violating Section 566.147 is ordered vacated.

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., J. and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J„ concur.

      . All rule references are to Mo. R.Crim. P.2007, unless otherwise indicated.

      . All statutory references are to RSMo 2006, unless otherwise indicated.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    William GRACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93439.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.
    June 15, 2010.
    Jessica M. Hathaway, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, John W. Grantham, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
   GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., Judge.

Introduction

William Grace (Movant) appeals from the motion court’s judgment denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his amended motion under Rule 24.035 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment and Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. We affirm.

Background

Movant was charged as a prior and persistent offender with first-degree statutory rape of a person less than 14 years of age, pursuant to Section 566.032 (Count I); first-degree statutory sodomy of a person less than 14 years of age, pursuant to Section 566.062 (Count II); first-degree child molestation, pursuant to 566.067 (Count III); and exposing another person to HIV infection without knowledge or consent, pursuant to Section 191.677 (Count IV). The State entered a nolle pro-sequi on Count III. On October 9, 2007, Movant’s trial began; however, on October 10, he pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

During the guilty-plea hearing, the State testified that it would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Movant, at the age of 34, had sexual intercourse with Victim, who was then eight years old. Specifically, Victim told her mother that while she was in the laundry room -with Movant, he pulled down her pants, touched her genitals, and then put his penis between her legs touching her genitals and ejaculated. Victim stated that there was partial penetration. DNA seized from Victim’s underpants was an identity match to Movant. At the time of the assault, Movant was HIV positive. During sentencing, the State further stated that Movant’s seminal fluid was found covering the entire crotch of Victim’s underpants, and that a physical examination of Victim within 24 hours of the incident revealed redness in her vaginal area, which the doctor would have testified was consistent with a penis rubbing against it. The court found that a factual basis for the charges was established.

Also during the guilty-plea hearing, the trial court initially rejected Movant’s Alford plea after Movant stated that he “[did not] know” whether there was a “substantial likelihood that [a jury] would find [him] guilty of [the] charges,” that the reason he was pleading guilty was because he did not want to get life in prison, and that he “[did not] know” why it would be better to plead guilty than go to trial. The court noted an off-the-record conversation occurred in which Movant stated that he was being forced to plead guilty.

His plea counsel requested to speak with Movant off the record. Subsequently, Movant stated he had been confused during the earlier questioning; rather, he believed that he stood a “better chance of getting a better result” from the judge than from a jury, that there was enough evidence for a jury to find him guilty of the charges even though he denied their truth, and that it was in his best interests to plead guilty. Plea counsel stated that he informed Movant it was “more likely than not” that Movant would be found guilty; and that while Victim’s mother had initially been willing to offer favorable testimony on Movant’s behalf, she had changed her mind before trial.

Movant then confirmed that no promises had been made to him regarding the judge’s decision or the sentence, and that he understood the range of punishment for each of the charges: a minimum of five years to life on Counts I and II, and a minimum of five to thirty years on Count IV. Movant acknowledged that he could receive a sentence of life in prison from the court even after pleading guilty. Mov-ant confirmed that he knew he could still go to trial if he wanted to, that he had sufficiently discussed his legal rights with plea counsel, that plea counsel had answered all his questions and had done everything that was asked, that plea counsel was capable of continuing to trial, and that Movant had no criticisms of plea counsel and was satisfied with his legal services.

The court narrated the trial rights Mov-ant was waiving, and Movant confirmed he understood and had no questions. Finally, Movant confirmed that no one had “threatened, intimidated or mistreated [him] or any member of [his] family or in any way forced [him] to plead guilty against [his] own free will[.]” The court accepted Mov-ant’s pleas as given “voluntarily and intelligently with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of the guilty pleas.” The court also found that there was a factual basis for the pleas.

On November 30, 2007, the court sentenced Movant, as a persistent offender, to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five years on both Counts I and II and fifteen years on Count IV. In January 2008, Mov-ant filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Through appointed counsel, he filed an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment and Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Amended Motion), in which he argued that he was erroneously sentenced as a persistent offender when the State presented no proof and the court made no such finding; and that his guilty plea was involuntary because his plea counsel denied him effective assistance of counsel. For the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, he asserted that plea counsel unreasonably pressured him to plead guilty by telling him he would receive a 100-year sentence if he went to trial, and that, but for plea counsel’s coercion, he would not have pleaded guilty.

The motion court granted the Amended Motion in part, determining that Movant was erroneously sentenced as a persistent offender, and overruled it in part. The court overruled Movant’s claim regarding the voluntariness of his plea, determining that Movant’s assertion that his plea was involuntary and due to unreasonable pressure was refuted by the record. Rather, the court noted Movant was fully informed of his rights, and Movant had testified that his pleas were not the result of threats or coercion and that he understood he could receive a life sentence from the court even after pleading guilty. The court also denied Movant’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his plea, determining that, upon review of the case files and transcript, Movant failed to allege grounds that would entitle him to relief if true and that were not refuted by the record.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a Rule 24.035 motion is “limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); Weeks v. State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Mo. banc 2004). This court will find error only if, after review of the entire record, we have a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made. Weeks, 140 S.W.3d at 44. On review, the motion court’s findings and conclusions are presumptively correct. Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 1991).

Discussion

In his only point on appeal, Movant claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his Amended Motion without an evidentiary hearing, because he pleaded facts that would warrant relief and were not conclusively refuted by the record. Specifically, Movant argues his counsel was ineffective for unreasonably pressuring Movant to plead guilty on the day trial was scheduled and telling him that he would receive a 100-year sentence after a trial; further, the record reflects that Movant pleaded guilty because he feared a 100-year sentence after a trial. Accordingly, Movant contends the allegations were not “conclusively refuted” by the record but were, in fact, consistent with the existing record, and thus a hearing on his Amended Motion was required under Rule 24.035(h). We disagree.

First, the motion court did not err in denying the Amended Motion without an evidentiary hearing. To warrant an evidentiary hearing, movant’s motion must meet three requirements: (1) it must contain facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would warrant relief; (2) the alleged facts must not be refuted by the record; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Mo.App. E.D.2003). Where the guilty-plea proceedings directly refute that movant’s plea was involuntary, then Movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Guynes v. State, 191 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Mo.App. E.D.2006); see also Rule 24.035(h) (where motion, files, and case records conclusively show that movant is not entitled to relief, evidentiary hearing is not required).

Here, the guilty-plea proceedings show that Movant testified that no one had threatened or intimidated him, and that he understood what his trial rights were and the range of punishment. Movant stated that he believed that an Alford plea was in his best interests and that he would get a better result from the judge than from a jury; Movant stated he was pleading guilty because he hoped to avoid a life sentence after a trial, but he acknowledged that he might get life imprisonment after pleading guilty as well. While the court noted an off-the-record comment where Movant stated he was being forced to plead guilty, Movant testified on the record that his plea was voluntary, knowing, and not coerced. Because the facts alleged were refuted by the record, Movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Guynes, 191 S.W.3d at 83.

Second, the motion court did not err in denying post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a guilty plea, our review is limited to a determination as to whether the underlying plea was knowing and voluntary, Loudermilk v. State, 973 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo.App. E.D.1998); and counsel’s ineffectiveness is only relevant to the extent it affects the voluntariness of the movant’s plea, Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo. banc 1991); Chaney v. State, 223 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) (Alford plea is treated same as guilty plea where defendant admits to committing crimes charged) (citations omitted).

Here, even assuming that Movant’s plea counsel did in fact tell Movant that he would get a 100-year sentence after a trial, this statement does not constitute the type of inducement by fear or persuasion that would render a plea involuntary. Chaney, 223 S.W.3d at 206 (“[a] plea of guilty is not made voluntarily if the defendant is misled, or is induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false”) (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, we are not blind to the inflammatory nature of the facts that would have been presented to a jury: namely, the tender age of Victim, the DNA evidence, and Movant’s HIV status. The range of punishment for both Counts I and II was five years to life in prison, and plea counsel acknowledged that it was more likely than not that Movant would be found guilty.

“It is the duty of counsel to advise a client of the possible consequences of trial so that the client may make an informed decision as to whether to accept or to reject a plea agreement.” Id. at 207. Thus, his plea counsel’s advice regarding the possible ramifications of completing trial was the type of “mere prediction or advice of counsel” that does not render a guilty plea involuntary. Loudermillc, 973 S.W.2d at 554. Moreover, Movant’s claim of coercion is refuted by his statements at the plea hearing that he was not threatened, and that he was pleading guilty knowingly and of his own free will. We note, especially, that the motion court initially rejected Movant’s Alford plea, and accepted it only after confirming that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.

The motion did not clearly err in denying Movant’s request for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Weeks, 140 S.W.3d at 44.

Point denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.

KURT S. ODENWALD, P.J., and GEORGE W. DRAPER III, J., concur.

      . All rule references are to Mo. R.Crim. P.2010, unless otherwise indicated.

      . All statutory references are to RSMo 2004, unless otherwise indicated.

        .North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Eric R. MARSHALL, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.
    No. ED 94048.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.
    Lisa M. Stroup, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    John W. Grantham, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Movant, Eric R. Marshall, appeals from the judgment denying on the merits his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The findings and conclusions of the motion court are not clearly erroneous, and an extended opinion would have no prece-dential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Charles L. FARR, Appellant.
    No. ED 93067.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.
    June 15, 2010.
    Edward S. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Shaun J. Mackelprang, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, P.J., ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., J., and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Charles Farr (Defendant) of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy. Defendant appeals on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to submit a substitute information in lieu of indictment on the morning of trial. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. We have, however, prepared a memorandum opinion for the use of the parties only setting forth the reasons for our decision.

We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Donald COX, Appellant.
    No. ED 93180.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.
    Danelle Carter-Duffy, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, John M. Reeves, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Donald Cox appeals from the judgment of the trial court entered after a jury convicted him of stealing a motor vehicle in violation of section 570.030 RSMo 2000. The trial court sentenced Cox as a prior and persistent offender to a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error of law. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 30.25(b).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Anthony COLE, Appellant.
    No. ED 93244.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.
    William J. Swift, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, Robert J. Bartholomew, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KÁTHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Cole (Defendant) appeals the trial court’s judgment and sentence after a jury convicted him of first-degree robbery but acquitted him of armed criminal action. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by accepting inconsistent verdicts.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error of law. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 30.25(b).


text:
    Derrick PRUITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. ED 93440.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.
    Gwenda R. Robinson, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
    Chris Koster, John M. Reeves, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Derrick Pruitt (“Movant”) appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying his amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035 after an evi-dentiary hearing.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error of law. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. John L. KOEHLER, III, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. ED 93356.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.
    Ellen H. Flottman, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
    John W. Grantham, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, John L. Koehler, III, appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of statutory sodomy in the first degree, in violation of section 566.062 RSMo (2000). The trial court sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment.

No error of law appears and no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

We affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).

      . All further statutory references are to RSMo (2000).


text:
    Eric ROBINSON, Claimant/Appellant, v. LACLEDE GAS COMPANY, Employer/Respondent, and Division of Employment Security, Respondent/Respondent.
    No. ED 93934.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.
    June 15, 2010.

      John J. Ammann, St. Louis, for appellant.
    Judith Lynne Garner, St. Louis, for respondent Laclede Gas Co.
    Jeannie Desir Mitchell, Jefferson City, for respondent Missouri Dept, of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Employment Security.
    Before KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, P.J., CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J., and NANNETTE A. BAKER, J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Claimant, Eric Robinson, appeals from an order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, with one member dissenting, affirming the decision of the Appeals Tribunal of the Division of Employment Security finding claimant disqualified from unemployment benefits.

The order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. A written opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no precedential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion, for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

We affirm the order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).


text:
    Marva HILL, Appellant, v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
    No. ED 93997.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.
    June 15, 2010.
    John J. Ammann, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
    Larry R. Ruhmann, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before KURT S. ODENWALD, P.J., GEORGE W. DRAPER III, J., and GARY M. GAERTNER, JR., J.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Marva Hill (hereinafter, “Claimant”) appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (hereinafter, “the Commission”), denying her unemployment compensation benefits. Claimant raises two issues on appeal. First, Claimant alleges she involuntarily left her job with the Special School District of St. Louis County (hereinafter, “Employer”) because she was forced to leave employment as a result of her supervisor repeatedly stating she would recommend Claimant’s employment contract not be renewed. Second, Claimant asserts that even if she did leave her job voluntarily, she had good cause to leave work which was attributable to her employer.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the legal file, and transcript on appeal. The Commission’s decision is supported by competent substantial evidence and authorized by law. Korkutovic v. Gamel, Co., 284 S.W.3d 658, 656 (Mo.App. E.D.2009). An extended opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no precedential value. We have, however, provided a memorandum opinion, for the use of the parties only, setting forth the reasons for our decision. The Commission’s decision is affirmed pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).


author: . PER CURIAM:

text:
    STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Liheame Kenneth JOHNSON, Appellant.
    No. WD 70040.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
    June 22, 2010.
    Susan L. Hogan, Appellate Defender, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.
    Chris Koster, Attorney General, Terrence M. Messonnier, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before Division II: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and VICTOR C. HOWARD and ALOK AHUJA, Judges.
   Order

. PER CURIAM:

Liheame Johnson appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Johnson County in which he was found guilty of murder in the second degree, attempted possession of a controlled substance in excess of thirty-five grams of marijuana, and resisting arrest. In his sole point on appeal, Johnson maintains that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of self-defense because he claims the evidence adduced at trial injected the defense of self-defense. We affirm in this per curiam order and have provided the parties a memorandum explaining our ruling today. Rule 30.25(b).