author: EASTAUGH, Justice.

text:
    J.A., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, DFYS, Appellee.
    No. S-10143.
    Supreme Court of Alaska.
    July 5, 2002.

      Avraham B. Zorea, Anchorage, for Appellant.
    Christi A. Pavia, Assistant Attorney General, Bethel, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.

      Before FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and CARPENETI, Justices.
   OPINION

EASTAUGH, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

J.A. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three Native children. We must determine whether expert testimony was sufficient under the Indian Child Welfare Act to support the trial court's conclusion that the children would likely suffer serious harm if they were returned to J.A.'s custody. We hold that the experts' testimony was sufficiently related to the facts and issues of the case even though the experts based their opinions on hypothetical seenarios and a limited review of the family's case file. And because J.A. explicitly concedes that the state provided active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family, we also reject J.A.'s claim that the state's rehabilitative services should have been better tailored to his Native values.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

J.A. appeals the February 27, 2001 termination of his parental rights to his three children, C.A., TA., and C. All three are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICW). A.A., J.A.'s estranged wife and mother of the three children, stipulated to the termination of her rights at trial.

The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS), obtained temporary legal custody of C.A., the eldest child, in January 1998, based on reports of sexual abuse and neglect. The parents stipulated in July 1999 that C.A. was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(7), (9), and (10), and acknowledged that their substance abuse placed C.A. at risk of substantial physical harm. Following a contested disposition hearing in September 1999, the superior court awarded legal and physical custody of C.A. to DFYS.

DFYS obtained temporary legal custody of the two younger children in May 1999 after a social worker made an unannounced visit to Kongiganak in March 1999 and found both parents inebriated and unconscious; the youngest child, C., in the care of W.J., one of C.A.'s alleged abusers; and TA., then five years old, playing outside unsupervised. Following C.A.'s removal from her parents' custody in September 1999, J.A. and A.A. stipulated that their two younger children, TA. and C., were also children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(7) and (9). They acknowledged that their substance abuse placed both children at risk of substantial physical harm and neglect. The court placed the children in DFYS's custody for two years in November 1999.

In February 2000 DFYS removed T.A. and C. from their parents' home due to continued substance abuse and domestic violence in the children's presence, as well as the parents' decision to continue to leave the children with A.A.'s mother and W.J. despite DFYS's warnings not to do so. The court made findings supporting the removal.

DFYS filed a petition to terminate both parents' rights to their three children in August 2000, and a termination trial was conducted in Bethel in January and February 2001. The Native Village of Kongiganak intervened and participated at trial. The village did not take a position at trial on the issue whether J.A.'s rights should be terminated. Rather, the village seemed principally interested in ensuring that the children be permanently placed in Kongiganak.

The superior court orally granted DFYS's petition with respect to A.A. following her decision not to contest termination at trial, and issued a written order granting DFYS's petition with respect to J.A. Following Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rule 18(c), the court concluded that DFYS proved that C.A., TA., and C. were children in need of aid under six subsections of AS 47.10.011. The court further found that J.A. had not remedied the conduct that caused his children to be in need of aid despite the department's active efforts to provide rehabilitative services. The court specifically noted J.A.'s recent relapses and failure to complete aftercare following his most recent substance abuse treatment program. Finally, the court concluded that there was "no doubt [J.A.'s] continued custody of these children is likely to result in serious emotional and physical damage to them."

J.A. appeals. The village does not join in J.A.'s appeal and has not filed a separate appeals.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

JA. limits his appeal to ICWA is-sues. Whether substantial evidence supports the court's conclusion that J.A.'s children would likely be seriously harmed if they were returned to him is a mixed question of fact and law. Whether expert testimony sufficiently supports this conclusion is a legal question. We review the court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Relying on the Experts' Testimony.

J.A. argues that the experts' testimony was improperly based on hearsay. J.A. further contends that the experts' testimony was insufficiently related to the facts and issues of the case to support the court's conclusion under ICWA that the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage if they were placed with him. Finally, J.A. argues that the court over-relied on the experts' testimony in reaching its ultimate conclusion.

1. J.A.'s objection to Dr. Maclan's reliance on hearsay reports of sexual abuse is meritless.

JA. argues that DFYS's expert psychologist, Dr. Paula Maclan, improperly relied on hearsay allegations of sexual abuse in forming her opinions. This objection fails because experts in termination cases may reasonably rely on DFYS records in forming their opinions, regardless of whether those records are hearsay.

Dr. Maclan based her opinion in part on DFYS records, including documents containing allegations of sexual abuse against C.A. and C. committed by Kongiganak community members and J.A., respectively. Dr. Maclan explained several criteria she used to determine whether the allegations were "substantiated," and testified that she only relied on the substantiated allegations to form her opinion. The trial judge ruled that although these "substantiated" allegations are hearsay, Dr. Maclan could rely on them because the court was satisfied with her testimony that experts in her field would reasonably do so.

This ruling was neither legal error nor an abuse of discretion. Alaska Evidence Rule 703 explicitly allows experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence so long as the material is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." We held in Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church that " 'Thlearsay can be a permissible basis for opinion testimony' provided the reasonable reliance test is satisfied," and further held that experts can reasonably rely on information from other case workers to form their opinions. J.A. asserts that the allegations of harm relied on by Dr. Maclan were unreliable, confusing, or unsubstantiated, but J.A. does not endeavor to explain these conclusory assertions, or explain why he thinks Dr. Maclan's methods for determining reliability are faulty or unreasonable. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Dr. Maclan could rely on the "substantiated" allegations of harm.

2. The experts' opinions were sufficiently related to the facts and issues of the case to support the trial court's conclusion that the children would likely suffer serious harm if returned to J.A.

J.A. argues that the state's experts, Dr. Maclan and Professor Michael Daku, were not sufficiently familiar with the facts of this case to offer precise, reliable testimony supporting the court's conclusion, required under ICWA, that the children would likely suffer serious harm if returned to their father's custody. We disagree.

J.A. relies on C.J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, in which we held that the expert's testimony was insufficiently based on "the facts and issues of the case" to support the trial court's conclusion that the child would suffer serious harm if returned to the father. We first noted that the expert's conclusions were "considerably weakened by the fact that she received all information about this case from reading the file given to her by DFYS and never met or spoke with either C.J. or the children prior to the hearing." We then observed that "her conclusions appear to be little more than generalizations about the harms resulting from a parent's absence and provide little discussion of the particular facts of the case." In the companion case, J.J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, we again rejected the expert's testimony, noting that she based her opinion on outdated information and was therefore unaware of the parent's recent successful efforts to maintain sobriety for a significant length of time.

J.A.'s attempts to analogize this case to C.J. and J.J. are unavailing. First, the fact that neither Dr. Maclan nor Professor Daku met with the parties is not determinative. We explicitly noted in C.J. that such pretrial interviews are not required in every case. Here, both experts were sufficiently apprised of the facts by their review of selected DFYS records and by DFYS counsel's summaries of relevant facts and of the testimony of other witnesses. These summaries also served to keep the experts' testimony sufficiently grounded in the facts and issues of the case.

Professor Daku was qualified as an expert in substance abuse evaluation and diagnosis and the cultural dynamics of Native Alaskan families. Dr. Maclan was qualified as an expert clinical psychologist with specific expertise in child sexual abuse and neglect.

DFYS's attorney posed several hypothetical questions to Professor Daku. These questions included information relating to general family history; the parents' long history of substance abuse right up to the time of trial (including failed treatment attempts); J.A's failure to complete his aftercare plan following his second stay at the Phillips Alcoholism Treatment Center (PATC) in Bethel; the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence in the presence of the children; and allegations of sexual abuse of C.A. and C., including the parents' choice to continue to leave the children in the care of alleged perpetrators as well as the parents' failure to obtain counseling for themselves or their children. The court denied J.A.'s attorney's motion for mistrial made in the midst of DFYS counsel's presentation of these hypothetical questions, ruling that they were sufficiently based on prior testimony and that they comported with the court's notes. Dr. Maclan received the same information in the form of DFYS counsel's summary of prior testimony. In addition, Professor Daku reviewed discharge summaries from the PATC program for both parents. Dr. Maclan reviewed various DFYS records, including a "family chart" containing allegations of sexual abuse and reports from the social worker's visits with the family.

Both experts gave specific testimony directly related to the most relevant issues before the court: the parents' chronic, unabated substance abuse and resulting neglect of their children, including their inability to protect their children against the risk of sexual abuse.

Professor Daku expressed concern that J.A. had relapsed following his second residential substance abuse treatment program in the summer of 2000 and had not completed his aftercare program. He was even more concerned that J.A. continued to smoke marijuana up to the time of trial. Professor Daku testified that J.A.'s likelihood of future relapse into alcohol use was potentially higher due to his continued marijuana use. In fact, Professor Daku did not consider J.A. in recovery or sober at the time of trial as a result of his ongoing substance abuse.

Like Professor Daku, Dr. Maclan was concerned that J.A. had not demonstrated an ability to remain sober for an extended period of time. Both experts testified that J.A. would need to maintain a significant period of sobriety, complete his aftercare program, and associate only with sober individuals before reunification could be attempted. But both experts thought it very unlikely that J. A. would achieve such a transformation given his history of substance abuse, and both agreed that the children should not have to wait for J.A. to continue to try to achieve long-term sobriety.

Finally, both expel-{S were concerned that JA. might get back together with AA., thereby jeopardizing his long-term recovery chances. Professor Daku testified that the parents' history of drug use and domestic violence, as well as A.A.'s lack of commitment to achieving sobriety, creates risks of future relapses into drug abuse and violence. He further opined that when one member of a couple commits to recovery and the other does not, the committed member has a more difficult time maintaining sobriety because of the other's continued drug or alcohol use.

Dr. Maclan testified that she was concerned that the parents had not obtained counseling for C. after C. alleged that J.A. sexually abused her when she was three- and-a-half years old. Dr. Maclan explained that children who do not receive counseling are more likely to be abused in the future and more likely to engage in sexually acting-out behavior because they do not learn appropriate boundaries for physical contact with others. She testified that children with histories of sexual abuse need heightened supervision. She was also concerned that the parents continued to place their children in W.J.'s care despite allegations that he was one of the perpetrators of sexual abuse against C.A.

Professor Daku testified that the children had already been harmed by their parents' destructive behavior, and would more likely than not suffer additional serious harm if returned to J.A.'s custody. Dr. Maclan testified that the children would likely be neglected if returned to J.A., and that they would suffer harm as a result. She testified that JA. would be unavailable to the children during episodes of substance abuse, leaving the children at risk of exploitation by others.

Both experts recommended that J.A.'s rights to his three children be terminated. Professor Daku recommended adoption rather than reunification for the children because their parents continued to abuse substances and showed no signs of being able "to assume the responsibility of being parents anytime soon." Dr. Maclan recommended that J.A.'s rights to C. and T.A. be terminated because J.A.'s likely continued substance abuse placed the children at risk of further neglect. Dr. Maclan further recommended that J.A.'s rights to C.A. be terminated for the same reasons, including the parents' decision to continue to allow W.J. to associate with her.

In conclusion, Professor Daku and Dr. Ma-clan's testimony was "based on the particular facts and issues of the case to a [much] greater extent than occurred" in C.J. and J.J. Accordingly, their testimony was more than sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion under ICWA that J.A.'s children would likely be seriously harmed if returned to him.

3. The trial court did not over-rely on expert testimony in concluding that the children would likely suffer serious harm if returned to J.A.'s custody.

J.A. also argues that the court over-relied on expert testimony in reaching this conclusion. But the record is replete with evidence of J.A.'s chronic substance abuse and consistent neglect of his children's welfare independent of the experts' testimony.

The trial court explicitly noted that J.A. had an "abysmal track record, time after time neither following through with aftercare nor abstaining from mind/body altering substances." The court further found that J.A.'s "priorities are horribly skewed; substances obliterate any modicum of common sense and care for his children and expose them to neglect, domestic violence, and sexual abuse." Based on these findings, as well as the experts' testimony described above, the court concluded that "[J.A.'s] custody of the children would be disastrous." The trial court's findings regarding J.A.'s substance abuse and its adverse consequences on his children are fully supported by the record.

Both parents have long histories of substance abuse that continued relatively unabated right up to the time of trial. J.A. completed his second residential treatment program at the PATC in Bethel in September 2000, but failed to complete his prescribed aftercare program and relapsed within three weeks of his discharge. He claimed to have abstained from alcohol for six to eight weeks before the February 2001 termination trial, but admitted to continued near-weekly marijuana use.

Substantial evidence supports the court's concerns that J.A.'s substance abuse contributes to his violent tendencies. J.A. has been convicted of assaulting his wife four times, most recently in February 2000. A.A. testified that J.A. was drunk each time he assaulted her, and one of J.A.'s convictions includes an affidavit that J.A. exhibited many common symptoms of inebriation immediately after the incident. One or more of the children were present on at least two of these occasions.

The record also contains substantial evidence that the children are at risk of sexual abuse as long as they are in their parents' care. J.A. argues on appeal that past allegations of sexual abuse were not proved at trial. But AS 47.10.011(7) requires only that conduct by the child's parent place the child at substantial risk of sexual abuse. J.A. does not argue that his children are not at risk. J.A. also does not challenge the court's 1999 findings that C.A. "ha[d] been sexually abused by several members of her home community," and that she was at risk of further abuse as a result of her parents' substance abuse and resulting neglect. These uncontested findings are sufficient proof of risk, and there is no doubt that the parents were on notice of that risk. At the termination trial, both parents testified that they knew W.J. and other members of his village may have abused C.A., yet they both admitted that they continued to leave their children with W.J. despite DFYS's repeated warnings not to do so.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found in its February 2001 termination order that although J.A. was aware that C.A. had "probably been sexually abused ... and was at continued substantial risk of abuse," he "could not articulate anything he had done to protect any of the children amidst his drinking, smoking, and Bethel travel."

Thus, substantial evidence in addition to the experts' testimony supported the trial court's conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, J.A.'s substance abuse and resulting neglect would continue to place his children at risk of serious emotional and physical harm were they returned to his custody.

C. DFYS Did Not Fail To Offer Rehabilitative Services that Were Sufficiently Respectful of J.A.'s Native Values.

J.A. argues that DFYS should have offered rehabilitative services that were better tailored to his cultural background, and that this court should generally require a closer fit between DFYS case plans and traditional Native values. J.A.'s only specific complaints in this regard are that he should have been allowed to use his parents as his sober support group and to complete the aftercare component of his substance abuse treatment program in Kongiganak rather than Bethel.

J.A. concedes that the superior court correctly determined that DFYS made sufficient active efforts to provide rehabilitative services to prevent the permanent breakup of J.A's family as required by ICWA. Because there is no other legal basis under ICWA or elsewhere that would justify imposing heightened requirements on DFYS in this case, J.A.'s argument fails.

But even if we could reach the merits of this claim, J.A. would not prevail. J.A. presented no evidence that DFYS forbade him from using his parents as sober support contacts. J.A. also presented no evidence that DFYS required J.A. to stay in Bethel for aftercare following completion of his see-ond residential substance abuse program at the PATC. This is not to say the state would not have had good reason to impose such a requirement: all of J.A.'s assault convictions arose out of incidents in Kongiganak, and most of the documented instances of substance abuse and child neglect took place there as well. Therefore, the state could have required J.A. to relocate temporarily to Bethel as part of its case plan notwithstanding J.A's preference to live in his Native community.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court's termination of J.A.'s parental rights to his three children.

      . 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23, 1951 (1988).

      . Under AS 47.10.011,
      the court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to

      (7) ... sexual abuse, ...
      (9) ... neglect[, or] ...
      (10) the parent{'s] ability to parent had been substantially impaired by the addictive or habitual use of an intoxicant, and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child....

      . The permanent placement issue is not presently before us. For this reason, and because the village did not participate in this case on appeal, we do not consider the village's position regarding permanent placement in this opinion.

      . Accordingly, J.A. does not challenge the superi- or court's conclusions that the state has proven by clear and convincing evidence that his children continue to be in need of aid and that he has not remedied the conduct that would place the children at substantial risk of harm if returned to him.

      . See L.G. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 14 P.3d 946, 949-50 (Alaska 2000) (holding factual findings in termination proceedings are reviewed under clearly erroneous standard, but whether those findings comport with ICWA requirements is question of law).

      . See C.J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214, 1217-18 (Alaska 2001) (reviewing sufficiency of expert testimony de novo).

      . L.G., 14 P.3d at 949-50 (citation omitted).

      . Id. (citation omitted).

      . See Liimatta v. Vest, 45 P.3d 310, 313 (Alaska 2002) (citation omitted) (reviewing trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion).

      . 808 P.2d 1211, 1217 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Norris v. Gatts, 738 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1987)).

      . Id. (noting that had witness's testimony been offered as expert testimony, court could have admitted hearsay statements of other social workers and counselors that formed basis for expert opinion under Alaska Evidence Rule 705(c)) (citing In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Alaska 1986)).

      . 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) requires a court to determine "that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child" before terminating parental rights to the child. This determination must be "supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses." Id. (emphases added).

      . 18 P.3d 1214, 1218 (Alaska 2001); see also J.J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 38 P.3d 7, 10 (Alaska 2001) (reaching same conclusion regarding same expert's testimony concerning mother).

      . 18 P.3d at 1218.

      . Id.

      . 38 P.3d 7, 10 (Alaska 2001).

      . 18 P.3d at 1218.

      . J.A. does not explicitly challenge this ruling on appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that DFYS counsel's hypothetical questions were sufficiently based on the facts of the case to enable a qualified expert to give the testimony required by ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(F); see also Parts II and III.B.3 for record corroboration of the facts assumed by these hypothetical questions.

      . The family chart contained the five "substantiated" reports of sexual abuse involving C.A. described in Part IILB.1.

      . At the termination trial, J.A. admitted to "getting stoned" with friends on a near-weekly basis.

      . He explained that marijuana and alcohol are "cross-addictive" and "cross-tolerant," meaning that someone recovering from an alcohol addiction would be more likely to resume abusing alcohol if he continued to smoke marijuana-the marijuana would lead the user back to his drug of choice, alcohol.

      . Indeed, DFYS makes no claim on appeal that the children were actually abused. Rather, it argues that the parents ignored the risk of possible abuse in the past and are very likely to continue to do so.

      . The court's order terminating J.A.'s parental rights explicitly incorporated the court's findings from prior hearings regarding J.A. and his family.

      . 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

      . JA. suggests that the state's expert condemned this arrangement. But Professor Daku simply opined that he thought family members should not be Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) sponsors because they could not be counted on to be sufficiently objective. Professor Daku made no negative remarks about J.A. using his parents as part of his sober support community, and clearly distinguished sober contacts from AA sponsors.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STEWART, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Henry L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
    No. A-8079.
    Court of Appeals of Alaska.
    July 26, 2002.
    See also 662 P.2d 981.

      John C. Pharr, Anchorage, for Appellant.
    Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Bo-telho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appel-lee.
    Before COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
   OPINION

STEWART, Judge.

In 1980, a jury convicted Henry L. Johnson of kidnapping and rape. Johnson served his time and is no longer on supervised probation and parole. In 2001, Johnson moved to have the court seal the records of his criminal convictions. The court denied his motion. Johnson now appeals. He claims the superior court erred when it denied his motion because he presented "good cause" for the court to seal his records.

Because the superior court could reasonably conclude that the public policy reasons for allowing criminal records to remain open to the public outweigh the reasons that Johnson proffered for sealing his records, we affirm the superior court's ruling.

Facts and proceedings

In 1980, a jury convicted Johnson of one count each of kidnapping and rape. We affirmed Johnson's convictions on direct appeal. Johnson served his time, and in 1992, his probation and parole supervision ended.

In 2001, Johnson moved to have the ree-ords of his criminal convictions sealed. Johnson's motion included a memorandum in support of the motion, an affidavit from Johnson explaining his reasons for wanting his records sealed, an award from an employer, and four letters praising Johnson from coworkers, friends, and a landlord. Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton denied the motion to seal the records. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion

Did Johnson present good cause for sealing his file?

Johnson states that he is "completely rehabilitated" and that public access to his files adversely affects his life. Johnson believes several recent events are related to individuals finding out about his conviction, including harassing phone calls, vandalism of his shed and truck (they were smeared with mud), a false accusation by a co-worker that Johnson threatened him, and "bad attitudes displayed toward him by [his superiors]." He believes co-workers have information on his convie-tions because the company does background checks of employees. Johnson recently married, and he would like to put the past behind him.

Johnson acknowledges that his case is the subject of a published opinion, but he still wants to limit access to his record. Johnson's proposed order states, "The records of defendant's conviction are sealed, and may be viewed only upon a showing of good cause to the court."

The policy of open access to public records has a long history. At common law, every interested person was entitled to inspect public records. And in Alaska, the open records policy dates back to 1900. Alaska Statute 40.25.120(a) provides that "every person has a right to inspect a public record in the state" and lists exceptions not applicable in Johnson's case. More specifically, AS 12.62.160 provides for the use and release of criminal justice information:

(b) Subject to the requirements of this section, and except as otherwise limited or prohibited by other provisions of law or court rule, criminal justice information
(8) may be provided to a person for any purpose, except that information may not be released if the information is noneonvietion information or correctional treatment information[.]

In addition, Alaska Administrative Rule 37.5(a) provides: "All public records within the Alaska Court System shall be open to inspection by any member of the public[.]" This administrative rule defines "public ree-ords" to include any "document or item filed with, or prepared, owned, or used, by the Alaska Court System which contains information relating to the conduct of the public's business[.]" The rule enumerates four exceptions to the requirement that records be open to the public, including "[mJatters which are required to be kept sealed or confidential pursuant to statute, court rule or order of a court for good cause[.]"

In cases where there is no express exception to the state's disclosure laws, we balance "the public interest in disclosure on the one hand, and the privacy and reputation interests of the affected individuals together with the government's interest in confidentiality, on the other." We also recognize the legislature's expressed bias in favor of public disclosure and that "[dJoubtful cases should be resolved by permitting public inspection." In a case involving criminal ree-ords, we balance the public's right to know about an individual's past crimes against the convicted individual's right to privacy.

Johnson's case is no different than any number of felons who are successfully rehabilitated yet who can point to negative events in their lives and blame the events on the disclosure of criminal records. "Courts, commentators, and legislatures have recognized that a person with a criminal record is often burdened by social stigma, subjected to additional investigation, prejudiced in future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by prospective employers."

We need not define the parameters of "good cause" in this case. Even if the court has the power to seal a court file such as Johnson's if presented with extraordinary cireumstances to override public access, the superior court could reasonably conclude that Johnson has not shown such extraordinary cireumstances. Furthermore, state law and the court rules express a clear preference for public records to remain accessible. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson's motion to seal his court records.

Conclusion

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

      . Former AS 11.15.2650 and former AS 11.15.120(a)(1), respectively.

      . See Johnson v. State, 662 P.2d 981 (Alaska App.1983).

      . Seeid.

      . Johnson is not required to register as a sex offender because he committed his sexual offense in 1980, prior to the legislature's 1994 enactment of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. See Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution when applied to defendants whose crimes were committed before enactment of the law), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1062, 151 L.Ed.2d 966 (2002).

      . See Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers, Inc., 642 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Alaska 1982).

      . See id.

      . Alaska R. Admin. P. 37.5(b).

      . Alaska R. Admin. P. 37.5(b)(4).

      . Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d 584, 590 (Alaska 1990) (citing Kenai, 642 P.2d at 1325).

      . Kenai, 642 P.2d at 1323.

      . Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1995).


author: KEITH RAPP, Judge.

text:
    2002 OK CIV APP 57
    PEOPLE'S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 95,719.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.
    Jan. 2, 2002.
    Patrick D. Shore, Derryberry, Quigley, Solomon & Naifeh, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    William R. Burkett, General Counsel, Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee Oklahoma Corporation Commission.

      CeCe Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appel-lee State of Oklahoma.
   KEITH RAPP, Judge.

111 People's Electric Cooperative (PEC), the respondent below, appeals the decision of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) finding that it had jurisdiction over PEC for purposes of regulating terms and conditions of service even though PEC's membership had elected not to be regulated by the OCC.

BACKGROUND

T2 The parties to this appeal have no material dispute as to the facts. The matter began when a PEC customer complained to the OCC's Consumer Services Division and requested assistance regarding a problem with an electric bill. PEC declined to cooperate with the OCC relative to the complaint on the ground that OCC no longer regulated PEC.

T3 OCC instituted a contempt action against PEC alleging that PEC was in violation of Article IX, section 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution and 17 0.8.1991, § 1, both of which define the general and specific authority of the OCC. OCC further alleged that PEC violated OCC Rules 165:85-1-4(A) and (B) and 165:85-21-40 by failing to maintain records and to cooperate with OCC in the investigation of a consumer complaint.

T4 The issue before the OCC, and here, involves the interpretation of 17 0.8.1991, § 158.27. PEC maintains that the OCC has no authority over it regarding consumer protection and terms and conditions of service because of the election. OCC asserts that the sole result of the election by PEC members was to remove the OCC's regulatory authority over the rates and charges imposed by PEC. The parties do not dispute that the PEC membership duly voted under the provisions of 17 0.8.1991, § 158.27, to opt out of OCC regulation. Thus, the threshold question was whether OCC had jurisdiction to consider the consumer complaint and take action under its Rules.

15 At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the parties agreed to submit the issue of OCC jurisdiction for consideration. The ALJ ruled in favor of PEC and the matter was appealed to the full Commission.

T6 The Commission, by a 2-1 vote, reversed the ALJ's holding that the OCC did not have jurisdiction. In doing so, the Commission noted that it had been informed that the underlying complaint had been resolved. The Commission then decided to treat the case as a declaratory judgment action. PEC appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{7 The parties do not agree upon the standard for review. OCC suggests that the "any substantial evidence" test applies notwithstanding the absence of any disputed fact and that the issue involves construction of a statute and jurisdiction. PEC, in turn, suggests a de novo standard because the issue for review presents a question of law.

T8 Although not discussed by either side, it is to be noted that the part of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act governing declaratory judgments, 75 O.S.1991, § 307, also applies to the OCC. The standard of review of declaratory decisions under Section 307 is governed by 75 O.S.1991, § 822, and administrative decisions of this nature will not be disturbed in the absence of constitutional violation or error of law.

19 Moreover, where the facts are not disputed an appeal presents only a question of law. Baptist Bldg. Corp. v. Barnes, 1994 OK CIV APP 71, 15, 874 P.2d 68, 69. Matters involving legislative intent present questions of law which are examined independently and without deference to the trial court's ruling. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); Keizor v. Sand Springs Ry. Co., 1993 OK CIV APP 98, ¶ 5, 861 P.2d 326, 328. The appellate court has the plenary, independent and nondeferential authority to reexamine legal rulings. Neil Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Investment Corp., 1996 OK 125, 982 P.2d 1100 n. 1.

{10 Therefore, because the facts are not disputed and the OCC chose to treat the matter in its final stages as a procedure for declaratory judgment, without objection, this review is then one of law, and this Court will employ the de novo standard of review.

ANALYSIS AND REVIEW

¶ 11 PEC maintains that it is completely exempt from OCC regulation pursuant to 17 O0.S. Supp.2000, § 158.27 (E), save for the stated exceptions listed therein pertaining to territory, acquisition of customers, and competition between utilities. The OCC's Consumer Division asserts that Section 158.27(E) applies only to rates and charges and that the OCC retains authority in all other areas under 17 0.8. Supp.2000, § 158.27 (A). The majority of the OCC Commissioners found the statute was plain and unambiguous and ruled that the OCC did possess the authority to regulate in areas other than rates and charges.

112 This Court holds that when the members of an electric cooperative, subject to the provisions of 17 0.8. Supp.2000, § 158.27, duly elect to exempt themselves from OCC regulation, then the seope of such exemption applies only to rates and charges and not to rules affecting the cooperative's services and operation. In reaching this conclusion, this Court has examined Section 158.27 as a whole with a view of ascertaining and carrying out the intent of the Legislature.

The determination of legislative intent controls judicial statutory construction. Legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute in light of its general purpose and object. We presume that the Legislature intends what it expresses in a statute. Except when a contrary intention plainly appears, the words used are given their ordinary and common definitions.

Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 OK 61, 1 8, 832 P.2d 834, 889-40.

1 13 The Corporation Commission finds its origin in Article 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution. As originally drafted, the Constitution empowered the OCC with the authority and duty of "supervising, regulating and controlling" transmission companies "in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor, and of correcting abuses and preventing unjust discrimination and extortion by such companies. ..." The OCC is further charged with the responsibility to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out its duty and authority. Okla. Const. art. 9, § 18. This constitutional charge has never changed.

{ 14 PEC finds its roots in the Rural Elec-trice Cooperative Act (RECA), although the record does not reflect when PEC was founded. In 1989, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted RECA and provided that cooperatives transacting business under the Act "shall be exempt in all respects from the jurisdiction and control of the Corporation Commission of this State." 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 42, § 27; 18 0.8. Supp.1989, § 487.26.

¶ 15 Section 487.26 was repealed in 1971 when the Legislature enacted the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RECTA).1971 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 118, § 12. Section 158.27 of Title 17 originated with RECTA. 1971 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 118, § 7. The statute gave OCC power in two general areas-rates or charges and terms and conditions of service. The statute provided, in part:

A. Effective January 1, 1978, the Commission shall have general supervision over all associations or cooperative corporations as defined herein with power to fix and establish rates and to prescribe rules, requirements and regulations, affecting their services, operation, and the management and conduct of their business. It shall have full visitorial and inquisitorial power to examine such associations or cooperative corporations and keep informed as to their general conditions, their capitalization, rates, plants, equipments, apparatus, and other property owned, leased, controlled or operated, the value of same, the management, conduct, operation, practices, and services; not only with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service, but also with respect to their compliance with the provisions of this act, and with the Constitution and laws of this state, and with the orders of the Commission....

17 § 158.27 (A) (emphasis added).

1 16 In 1988, the Legislature amended Seetion 158.27, by inserting a new subdivision B, but the subdivision A, set out above, was not amended in substance. 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 107, § 2. The new subdivision B provided that certain rate increases are not subject to OCC rate investigation. This same new subdivision also provided and delineated a means to have a rate investigation on petition of members either as to the exempt rate increases or for rates and charges in general.

117 Then, in 1998, the Legislature again amended Section 158.27, by adding the subsection ©.1993 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 281. Subsection A was not amended in substance, but the words "requirements and regulations" were deleted so that the first sentence now reads, in part:

The Commission shall have general supervision over all associations or cooperative corporations as defined herein with power to fix and establish rates and to prescribe rules affecting their services, operation, and the management and conduct of their business....

1993 Okla. Sess. Laws, c. 281, § 1 (emphasis added).

118 Thus, subsection A continued the scheme of the RECTA enacted in 1971 and still gave OCC power in two general areas rates or charges and rules governing terms and conditions of service. However, as demonstrated by PEC here, and before the OCC, the wording of the new subsection E in the 1993 version brought into question whether OCC had any authority over both areas-the rates and the terms of service-whenever the organization's members elected not to be regulated by OCC.

$19 The principal subject matter of subsection E concerns rates and charges and whether the organization or OCC will fix the rates and charges. Further, it is to be noted that subsection E does not expressly provide that the OCC will also lose authority over terms and conditions of service as a result of the membership election. It is obvious, based on the language of the 1989 RECTA, that the Legislature can, and does, make itself clear whenever its intent is to remove the OCC "in all respects" from involvement in the affairs of the cooperative. 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws 1989, c. 42, § 27; 18 0.8. Supp. 19839, § 487.26.

120 Moreover, subsection E defines its purpose thusly:

It is therefore the purpose of this subsection to determine the necessity of regulation of rates and charges by the Commission by allowing the members consumers of a rural electric cooperative to exempt themselves from regulation by the Commission except as provided herein.

(Emphasis added.)

121 PEC points to additional language in subsections E(2), E(4), E(5), and E(T), which refers to exemption from regulation "under this section." The thrust of PEC's argument is that such language enlarges the seope of deregulation by referring to "this section" asserting that "this section" includes all of 17 0.8. Supp.2000, § 158.27. Therefore, according to PEC's argument, the authority to regulate rates and terms of service as provided in subsection A are necessarily removed by subsection E's broad reference to "this seetion." This argument is clearly strained and outside the bounds of reasonable statutory construction.

¶ 22 While it may be argued that the Legislature's use of the word subsection instead of section might have avoided this controversy, it nonetheless does not change the legislative meaning of the statute. Moreover, to sustain PEC's argument, this Court must rely by inference upon the removal of the second prong of authority, regulation of terms of service; this removal must be inferred because the subsection E does not explicitly or clearly state that such authority is removed. This Court cannot make and will not make that inference because the general subject of subsection (E) pertains to rates and charges.

123 Since statehood, as evidenced in the Constitution, rates and charges are but one aspect of supervision and regulation of public service companies. The language of subsection A, adopted in 1971 when the cooperatives were brought under the umbrella of the OCC, after being totally removed in 1989, remarkably resembles the language of article 9, section 18 of the Constitution. This reinforces this Court's opinion that if the Legislature intended to exempt PEC and similar organizations "in all respects from the jurisdiction and control of the Corporation Commission of this State" then the Legislature would have caused the statute to plainly state that purpose.

"[ 24 Here, the stated purpose of subsection E, and its overall tenor, deals with rates and charges. Subsection A deals with terms of service as well as rates and charges. This Court finds that subsection E elections to become deregulated result only in removal of the OCC's rate making authority.

125 The Oklahoma Corporation Commission's finding is affirmed in all respects.

126 AFFIRMED.

27 STUBBLEFIELD, P.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.

      . The Rules provide:
      165:35-1-4. Location and retention of records
      (a) Record retention. Unless otherwise specified herein, all records required by this Chapter shall be preserved by the utility in the form and for a period of time not less than that specified by applicable rules of FERC or the RUS; or in absence thereof, for two (2) years.
      (b) Record location. All records required by this Chapter shall be made available for review in Oklahoma at the office or offices of the utility and shall be open for examination by the Commission or its representatives; provided that if the general office of the utility is located outside of Oklahoma, the records may be kept at the general office. Each utility shall maintain records in such detail that the cost of property located and business done in the State of Oklahoma, including cost of fuel for generation purposes, can be accurately and readily ascertained, and the utility shall make available any such records for examination by the Commission or its authorized representative. Each utility shall notify the Commission as to the location of the office or offices at which the various classes of records are kept and shall file with the Commission such reports as the Commission may from time to time require.
      165:35-21-40. Mediation
      (a) Whenever there is a dispute between the utility and the consumer as to the following, the matter may be brought by either party to the Commission's Consumer Services Division:
      (1) The existence of or seriousness of a life-threatening situation.
      (2) The existence of elderly or handicapped status.
      (3) The question of financial assistance or guarantee of payment by a federal, state, or local social service agency.
      (4) The provisions of a deferred payment agreement.
      (5) The terms and conditions of payment of any part of a bill as rendered.
      (6) The proper interpretation of this Section.
      (b) The Commission's Consumer Services Division shall review the matter and issue an informal review decision in writing, setting forth the terms and conditions for continued service, disconnection of service, or deferred payment agreement (DPA). If it is the desire of the consumer, they may be represented by a third party, if the consumer is available for verification. If the dispute can be resolved by telephone with the party seeking review, the review decision need not be in writing unless requested by either party. During any period of time when a disconnection dispute is before the Commission or in mediation, the utility shall suspend disconnection procedures.
      (c) If the Commission's Consumer Services Division is unable to resolve the dispute to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, either party may file a Complaint with the Commission for final determination.
      (d) Whenever the consumer informs the utility that the consumer disputes a charge for service, the utility shall investigate the dispute promptly and thoroughly, and make a diligent effort to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement. If the consumer is dissatisfied with the decision of the utility, the consumer may report the dispute to the Commission's Consumer Services Division. Upon written complaint by the consumer to the Commission, disconnection of service shall be held in abeyance provided the consumer pays the portion of the bill which is not in dispute.

      . Section 307 directs that agencies shall provide by rule for filing and disposition of "petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicablity of any rule or order of the agency." The record here does not disclose whether OCC has promulgated such a rule but neither side raises any issue about the Commission's decision to treat the proceedings before it as a request for declaratory relief.

      . The phrase "Effective January 1, 1973" was removed, otherwise the wording was unchanged.

      . PEC correctly does not assert that the proviso in the new subsection B reestablishing subsection A authority under certain conditions applies here. The terms of the proviso clearly pertain to instances involving elimination of OCC rate investigations when the rates are limited to 3% of the previous 12 months of revenue.

      . PEC offers letters from individual legislators concerning the legislative intent underlying Subsection E. However, such is neither binding on this Court nor relevant. This Court's inquiry is limited to examining the meaning of the Act by the permissible standards of our fundamental law. Kinney v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa, Ok., 1995 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 9, 894 P.2d 444, 447. The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed consideration of comments from individual legislators in a matter similar in this respect to the case now under review in Haynes v. Caporal, 1977 OK 166, ¶ 10, 571 P.2d 430, 434:
      At trial, legislative intent of § 536 was sought to be established through the testimony of an individual senator and house member at the time of its passage. This court is not bound, and need not consider such evidence. Testimony of individual legislators or others as to happenings in the Legislature is incompetent, since that body speaks solely through its concerted action as shown by its vote.


author: KENNETH L. BUETTNER, Judge.

text:
    2002 OK CIV APP 69
    In the Matter of the ESTATE OF A.E. RICHARDSON. James E. Richardson, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. First National Bank & Trust Company of Nowata, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 95,332.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.
    March 29, 2002.
    Certiorari Denied June 18, 2002.

      Jerry M. Maddux, Russell C. Vaclaw, Sel-by, Connor, Maddux & Janer, Bartlesville, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    D. Richard Funk, Melodie Freeman-Bur-ney, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant/Appellee.
   Opinion by

KENNETH L. BUETTNER, Judge.

{1 Plaintiff/Appellant James E. Richardson (Son) sought an omitted child's share from the estate of his father, A.E. Richardson (Decedent). Defendant/Appellee First National Bank & Trust Company of Nowata (Executor or Bank) moved for summary judgment on the basis that Decedent intentionally omitted Son in an amendment to a pour-over trust executed after Decedent's Will. The trial court found no dispute of material fact that Decedent intentionally omitted Son from his Will. The trial court also granted summary judgment to Executor on Son's claim for unpaid child support. We hold that the provisions of a pour-over trust, which have been amended after a will is executed, are not incorporated by reference in the will so that the amended provisions of the trust constitute competent evidence of the testator's intent to omit an heir as required by Oklahoma's pretermitted heir statute. We therefore reverse and remand this matter for determination of Son's share in the estate as a pretermitted heir.

12 Summary judgment proceedings are governed by Rule 18, Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S.Supp.1993, Ch. 2, App.1. Summary judgment is appropriate where the record establishes no substantial controversy of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. Alliance Real Estate Group, 1999 OK 7, 976 P.2d 1048, 1045. Summary judgment is not proper where reasonable minds could draw different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Id. Further, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Vance v. Fed. Natl. Mortg. Assn., 1999 OK 73, 988 P.2d 1275.

3 The undisputed evidence in the record on appeal establishes that Decedent executed his Last will and Testament June 22, 1998 (Will). The Will provided that after debts, funeral expenses, and taxes were paid, the residue of the estate would pour over into The AFE. Richardson Trust, dated September 25, 1992 (1992 Trust). The Will appointed the Bank as Executor of Decedent's estate. The Will did not refer to Son by name or by class.

¶ 4 Also on June 22, 1998, Decedent executed a First Amendment to the Declaration of Trust of A.E. Richardson (1998 Amendment). The 1998 Amendment amended the 1992 Trust in its entirety. Article 18(J) of the 1998 Amendment provided that if any beneficiary of the trust contests the 1992 Trust or the Will, or seeks any adjudication that the trust or Will is in any way void, then that person will be treated as if he predeceased Decedent. That provision also specifically stated "The Settlor's son, John R. Richardson, is not named in this trust document as a beneficiary, as he has been assisted and provided for during the Set-tlor's lifetime." Article 16(B) provided that distribution of 100% of the trust proceeds shall go to the A.E. and Juanita Richardson Charitable Foundation.

¶ 5 Decedent executed the Second Amendment to the Declaration of Trust of A.E. Richardson March 9, 1999 (1999 Amendment). The 1999 Amendment indicated that it changed the 1998 Amendment only by adding Article 8(B)(6):

6. Intentional Omissions: The omission in this Trust Declaration of any provision for the Settlor's sons, JOHN RICHARDSON and JAMES RICHARDSON, or any other relative or person is not due to oversight or neglect, but is based upon the Settlor's considered desire to omit such person and to benefit only the beneficiaries designated herein. Notwithstanding any and all of the other provisions -of this trust instrument, if any beneficiary or potential beneficiary shall object to this trust instrument, any provisions hereof or any part of the trust estate hereunder, then he or she shall be deemed to have predeceased the Settlor for the purposes of this Trust and any provisions herein contained.

{6 Decedent died April 17, 1999. The trial court admitted to probate Decedent's Last Will and Testament executed June 22, 1998, found that Decedent's survivors included a wife and his two adult sons, and appointed Bank as Executor.

¶ 17 Son filed his Application for Share as Omitted child September 13, 1999. Son asserted that Payne County Case No. 1240D established Decedent's paternity of Son. Son next asserted that he is not mentioned by name or class in the Will and that the Will contains no provision indicating that the omission was intentional. Son therefore requested that the court determine that he was an unintentionally omitted child and that the court include Son in the decree of distribution and award him his proper statutory share of the estate.

11 8 Executor filed its Motion for Summary Judgment December 27, 1999. Executor argued that the Will specifically incorporates the 1992 Trust and pours all the estate assets into the trust, and the 1992 Trust expressly omits Son from receiving any distribution. Executor argued that the incorporated Trust, as amended, satisfied the requirements for an intentional omission of a legal heir.

9 Article III of the Will provides, in part:

I give all the rest and residue of my property, not already in trust, of every kind and description, real personal, and mixed, ... including any lapsed or void bequest or devise, to the Trustee of the AFE. Richardson Trust, dated September 25, 1992, as may be amended, to be administered and distributed in accordance with the provisions of that Trust, which is incorporated by reference in this Will.
If for any reason the disposition referred to above is not operative or is invalid, ... then I give the residue of my estate, ... to the Trustee named in the present provisions of said Declaration of Trust to act upon my death, to be administered ... as provided in ... said Declaration of Trust, which for this purpose I incorporate by reference in this Will

The 1999 Amendment of the trust expressly provided for the intentional omission of Son and his brother, and further provided that if any party objected to the trust instrument, that party would be treated as if he predeceased Decedent.

110 As noted above, the trial court granted summary judgment to Executor. Son does not dispute the material facts. Rather, the parties dispute the legal effect of whether the Will and pour-over trust accomplished the result of intentionally omitting Son from inheriting from Decedent.

111 Testators are presumed to intend to provide for the natural objects of their bounty. Smith v. Crook, 160 Cal.App.3d 245, 249, 206 Cal.Rptr. 524, 526 (1984). In order to protect a testator and his issue from an unintentional omission from the testator's will, Oklahoma's pretermitted heir statute provides:

§ 182. Provision for Children Unintentionally Omitted
When any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child wnmless it appears that such omission was intentional, such child, or the issue of such child, must have the same share in the estate of the testator, as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceding section.

84 O.S.1991 § 132 (emphasis added). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the intent to omit a child from inheriting must appear on the face of the will in "strong and convincing language." Matter of Estate of Hoobler, 1996 OK 56, 925 P.2d 13, 17: Matter of Estate of Woodward, 1991 OK 25, 807 P.2d 262, 264; Monroe v. Lawrence, 1959 OK 261, 347 P.2d 1016, 1018 (intent to disinherit must appear from the four corners of the will and cireumstances under which the will was executed cannot be considered nor may extrinsic evidence be admitted to establish such intent). Additionally, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show an heir was unintentionally omitted, but extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show intent to omit a natural heir. Smith v. Crook, supra. In addition, simply leaving the entire estate to others is not alone sufficient to show intent to omit a child. Estate of Crump v. Freeman, 1980 OK 80, 614 P.2d 1096.

112 The issue then, is what constitutes the "face of the will." We first note that 84 O.S.1991 $ 154 provides: "Several testo-mentary instruments, executed by the same testator, are to be taken and construed together as one instrument." (Emphasis added). Also relevant in determining what constitutes the "face of the will" is the doctrine of incorporation by reference. There are two factors required to successfully incorporate another document into a will by reference: first, the other document must be in existence when the will is executed; second, the other document must be referred to in the will so as to reasonably identify the other document. Miller v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 1981 OK 133, 637 P.2d 75, 77. Miller specifically dealt with incorporation of a trust into a will by reference. The court explained that the reference to the trust in the will "must show the testator's intention to incorporate the instrument into his will, 'or at least his intention that the instrument should operate with his will in disposing of property left by him at his death'" Id., quoting Bottrell v. Spengler, 348 Ill. 476, 175 N.E. 781 (1981). The court indicated that once another document is incorporated by reference into a will, that document is operative as a part of the will. Id. We therefore hold that a document which is successfully incorporated by reference may constitute part of the "face of the will" for purposes of finding intent to omit a natural heir on the face of the will. Indeed, this court has implicitly indicated that intent to omit may be found in an incorporated trust document. See Corr v. Corr, 2001 OK CIV APP 31, 21 P.3d 642, 645-646 (court reviewed trust, incorporated by reference in will, to determine whether adopted children had been intentionally omitted).

¶ 13 In Miller, the court noted:

Decedent's will clearly identifies the trust. The trust was in existence when the will was executed. The reference exhibits decedent's intention that the trust operate with his will to dispose of his property. He signed the will and the trust contemporaneously, indicating one instrument and a scheme of testamentary disposition.... The will without the trust has no meaning or value to the decedent's estate plan.

Id. The court concluded that the trust was incorporated by reference into the decedent's will so that the trust operated as part of the will and that the provisions for the former wife were statutorily invalidated along with those in the will as a result of the divorce.

¶ 14 The undisputed evidence in the instant case shows that the 1992 Trust and 1998 Amendment were in existence at the time the Will was executed and that the Will expressly provides for Decedent's intent that the trust be incorporated into the Will,. Indeed, Article III of the Will states that the 1992 Trust (as amended) is incorporated by reference. However, the intent to omit Son was first mentioned in the 1999 Amendment to the trust, which was made well after the Will was executed. Nothing in the record indicates that the 1999 Amendment to the trust was executed with testamentary formalities. Thus, the issue is whether a later amendment may be considered as part of "the face of the will."

{15 There is no question that the Will effectively incorporated by reference the trust provisions. The Restatement of the Law, Third, of Trusts, § 19 " 'Pour-over' Dispositions by Will" provides:

Where a will contains a testamentary disposition for the purpose of adding property to an irrevocable or revocable inter vivos trust, or for the purpose of funding a trust pursuant to the terms of an instrument of trust executed but not funded during the testator's lifetime, the intended disposition is effective if and as
(a) Provided by statute; or
(b) Validated by the doctrine of incorporation by reference or by the doctrine of facts of independent significance; or
(c) The trust instrument, together with the will either
(1) satisfies an applicable rule of substantial compliance, harmless error, or judicial dispensation, or
(#) otherwise satisfies the policies underlying the formal safeguards of the applicable Wills Act.

T16 Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (UTA-TA). See 84 O.S.1991 §§ 801 et seq. Executor argues that UTATA validates trust amendments executed after the will. Section 301 of UTATA provides:

A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determined by the law of this state, may be made by a will to the trustee or trustees of a trust established or to be established by the testator or by the testator and some other person or persons or by some other person or persons (including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the trustor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts) if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before or concurrently with the execution of the testator's will or in the valid last will of a person who has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or both, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or after the death of the testator. Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed (a) shall not be deemed to be held under a testamentary trust of the testator but shall become a part of the trust to which it is given and (b) shall be administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the instrument or will setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before the death of the testator, regardless of whether made before or after the execution of the testator's will, and, if the testator's will so provides, including any amendments to the trust made after the death of the testator. A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse. (Emphasis added.)

Although this provision of UTATA indicates that a testamentary devise to a trust will not fail even if the trust is amended after the will is executed, it does not expressly alter the requirements for incorporation by reference in all cases, or address the requirement of Oklahoma caselaw that intent to omit an heir appear on the face of the will. Nothing in the provisions of UTATA indicate that intent to omit an heir can be established in a trust document incorporated by reference in a will if the intent to omit is expressed in an amendment to the trust document made after the will was executed.

{17 One treatise has explained that if the testator has created a trust and has reserved the power to amend the trust, the trust instrument may be incorporated by reference, but the operative effect of the will cannot be changed by subsequent amendments to the trust unless those amendments are executed in accordance with the applicable wills act. 1 Page on Wills, § 260, p. 518. Effect will only be given to the will and the trust provisions as they existed when the will was executed. No effect can be given to the subsequent modification of the trust instrument if it is not executed in accordance with the act which regulates the execution of a will. Id.

118 The formal requirements for executing and attesting wills are codified at 84 O.S.Supp.1999 § 55. Much less is required to establish a trust. The elements of a creation of a valid trust are simply the present intent by a competent settlor that a competent trustee hold and manage an ascertainable trust res for the benefit of sufficiently certain beneficiaries, which is accompanied by an act which constitutes a present, complete disposition of the trust property. Matter of Estate of Stokes, 1987 OK 119, 747 P.2d 300, 302. In other words, a trust does not require the formalities of witnesses, attestation, and notarization which safeguard the testator's wishes for the disposition of his estate. We are therefore persuaded that the intent to omit a natural heir must be within the "face of the will," which includes a document incorporated by reference, so long as the document is in existence at the time the will was executed. We do not believe that existing law will countenance disinheriting children by the simple expedient of signing a trust amendment after the will is executed, without the formalities required by § 55.

19 Likewise, while some cases have held that a gift to a trust, established by a will, is valid even when the trust is amended after the testator's will is executed, it is also the rule in Oklahoma that a testator cannot avoid her spouse receiving an elective share by placing her entire estate in trust for the benefit of her children. See Thomas v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A., 1984 OK 41, 684 P.2d 553 (Reld: property placed in trust by wife for her children must be included in estate for purposes of husband's election to take against the estate because the revocable trust res remained under the wife's control until her death and was therefore part of her estate.) We analogize that case to the instant facts and find that Decedent could not cause his entire estate to pass to the trust and therefore avoid Son receiving his intestate share as a pretermitted heir-without showing the intent to omit on the face of the will.

1[ 20 In the instant case, the face of the will contains no "strong and convincing language" indicating intent to omit Decedent's children. Additionally, the document which does indicate intent to omit Son, the 1999 Amendment, was not in existence at the time the Will was executed and therefore may not be included in the terms of the Will as incorporated by reference. The Will admitted to probate in the instant case, including the incorporated trust as it existed at the time the Will was executed, fails to mention Son by name or class. Therefore, Son is a pre-termitted heir-a forgotten child. As such, Son shall take the share of Decedent's estate to which he would be entitled had decedent died intestate, according to the Oklahoma pretermitted heir statute. 84 O.S.1991 § 132.

21 REVERSED AND REMANDED.

JOPLIN, V.C.J, and JONES, J., concur.

      . The trial court's order is an interlocutory order in a probate case which is appealable by right. See S.Ct. Rule 1.60(b), 12 0.S.8upp.1997, Ch. 15, App. Although the appeal is from summary judgment, the Supreme Court Rules refer to briefs in appeals from interlocutory orders appealable by right and the Supreme Court ordered briefs in the instant case in an order filed June 1, 2001. See S.Ct.Rule 1.65, 12 O.$.Supp.1997, Ch. 15, App.

      . Son has not appealed the denial of his claim for unpaid child support. Son also moved for summary judgment which was denied.

      . John R. Richardson is Son's brother. The 1998 Amendment did not refer to Son in any manner.

      . The will does not include a no-contest clause, but the 1999 Amendment indicates that any person who objects to the trust provisions shall be treated as having predeceased Decedent. Son's application for share as omitied heir does not amount to a will contest. A will contest seeks to deny admission of a will to probate. Matter of Estate of Massey, 1998 OK CIV APP 116, 964 P.2d 238, 241. In Massey, this court explained that when a will is offered for probate, the only question is the factum of the will-whether it was executed and attested properly, whether the testator was competent and not under undue influence, fraud or duress. Id. Finally, Massey explained that a will is not void for omitting an heir. The question whether an omission was intentional is not decided in a will contest, but it is decided at the time the estate is distributed. Id. Accordingly, Son's application for share as omitted heir would not implicate the no-contest provision in the trust instrument.

      . Also on September 13, 1999, Son filed his Petition for Payment of Rejected Claim in which he asserted that Decedent's estate had rejected Son's claim for child support that Decedent owed pursuant to the 1941 judgment which had established Decedent's paternity and had ordered Decedent to pay Son's mother $25 per month during Son's minority. Son alleged that Decedent made only one child support payment and further alleged that the Estate owed son $28,555 in child support and interest. Son requested judgment against the estate for that amount plus attorney fees.

      . Black's Law Dictionary teaches "To 'pretermit' is to pass by, to omit or to disregard, e.g. failure of testator to mention his children in his will." Revised Fourth Edition (1968).

      . The preceding section, 84 O.S.1991 § 131, provides that children born after the execution of a will, for whom no provision is made in the will, succeed to that portion of the estate that they would have received had the testator died intestate.

      . In Miller, the issue was whether 84 O.S.1991 § 114, which revokes bequests for a spouse in a will in the event the testator and the spouse have divorced after the execution of the will, also operated to revoke provisions for the spouse made in a trust which was incorporated by reference into the will.

      . The doctrine of "facts of independent significance" has not been applied in any Oklahoma case. It is referred to as an escape mechanism to effect the testator's intent in cases where the doctrine of incorporation by reference does not apply because the document to be incorporated was not in existence at the time the will was executed. See In re Tipler, 10 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn.App.1998) (Wife's will directed that all of her estate go to her husband, and that if her husband predeceased her, her estate be distributed according to the provisions of her husband's will. Husband's will was not in existence at the time Wife's will was executed, but Husband did predecease Wife. Husband's will was therefore not incorporated by reference, but its provisions were used to effect Wife's intent by the doctrine of facts of independent significance.) The doctrine will not be used to alter the requirements of § 132.

      . Indeed, if the complete § 301 was applicable, as Executor suggests, then a child could be omitted by an amendment to the trust even after the death of the testator, if the testator's will so provides.

      . See Matter of Will of Daniels, 247 Kan. 349, 356, 799 P.2d 479, 484 (1990).


author: HILL, Chief Justice.

text:
    2002 WY 109
    Robert E. JUDGE, Appellant (Petitioner), v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION, Appellee (Respondent).
    No. 01-121.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    July 15, 2002.

      Representing Appellant: Donald L. Painter of Casper, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee: Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and Joe Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN , KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

   HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant, Robert E. Judge (Judge), challenges a determination made by the Department of Employment, Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission), that disqualified him from receipt of benefits for a 52-week period because he knowingly filed a claim that contained a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact.

[¶ 2] We will affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 3] Judge broaches this issue:

Whether, contrary to Wyo. Stat. § 27-3-311(e), [Judge] knowingly filed a claim for benefits which contained a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact as determined by the [Commission].

The Commission expresses the issue somewhat differently:

Whether the Unemployment Insurance Commission's findings that Robert E. Judge worked and received pay during weeks for which he knowingly filed claims representing that he had not, are supported by substantial evidence.

FACTS

[¶ 4] On June 20, 2000, Judge filed a claim with the Unemployment Insurance Division (Division) for unemployment compensation benefits that covered the weeks of June 4-10, 2000, and June 11-17, 2000. In that application, he answered the questions asked of him as follows:

1. Did you work during this week? If yes, NO complete section 1.
2. Were you able and available for work ... ? YES
3. Did you actively seek work? .... YES
4. Did you refuse any job offers or job referrals NO during this week? If YES, complete section 3.
5. Have you returned to work full-time? That NO is, did you work more than 35 hours? If YES, complete section 4.
6. Did you receive holiday, vacation, severance, NO self-employment, social security, retirement or any other type of pay this week? If YES, complete section 2.

Each claim form concludes with the following admonition above the signature line: "I certify that all statements on this claim are true to the best of my knowledge. I am not receiving benefits from any other state. I know that the law provides penalties for false statements."

[15] During the time period for which these claims were submitted, Judge was "working" for High Mountain Welding and Manufacturing (HMWM). The explanation Judge used to justify his answers was that he was not "working for wages" during the time period at issue in this case; rather, he had merely "donated" his time to a corporation he owned, and that he had "rented" welding equipment to HMWM, which he then operated for "free." Judge also asserted that he was always available for "work," because HMWM understood that if Judge found other "work," he would quit providing services to HMWM. Payments for the "work" Judge performed for HMWM were made to Sheridan Corporation, a corporation owned and operated by Judge and his wife but which had no employees. Judge was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for a 52-week period beginning June 4, 2000, on the basis that his claim contained a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact.

[¶ 6] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-8-311(e) (Lexis Nexis 2001) provides:

(e) Any person who knowingly files a claim for benefits which contains a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact, as determined by the department, shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for a fifty-two (52) week period beginning the week in which the false statement or misrepresentation was made or the date that notice of the overpayment determination or decision is mailed to the person who filed the claim.

[¶ 7] Judge indicated to the Division that he wanted to appeal his disqualification from receiving benefits. A hearing on the appeal was held on December 26, 2000. It was agreed that all parties had notice of the hearing. The only issue that was to be considered at the hearing was "whether or not Mr. Robert Judge knowingly filed a claim for benefits which contained a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact." The proceedings before the Division's Appeals Examiner in this matter were informal, and the procedures used were well explained to all participants. It is clear that the burden of proof was on the Division.

[¶ 8] -It was evident from the outset of the hearing that the Division had received information from HMWM that Judge had worked for it during the period of time for which he claimed unemployment benefits. Steve Bad-gett (Badgett), the owner of HMWM, testified at the hearing that Judge worked for him during that time period. Badgett also testified that he did not rent equipment from Judge and that, although Judge asked that the remuneration paid to him be designated as "equipment rental," he refused to do that after Badgett's bookkeeper told him he had to designate it as "contract labor." Further, Badgett's testimony indicated that Judge was paid by the hour for his work, and Badgett viewed the payments he made to Judge as wages. However, Badgett had to concede that the time cards showing the numbers of hours Judge worked had the name Sheridan Corporation on them and the notation, "equipment rental." Judge did not fill out a W-4 for his employment, nor was he covered by worker's compensation or unemployment compensation.

[¶ 9] Judge testified that he did not work for Badgett for wages, but that he donated his working time to his corporation and only charged Badgett for the rental value of the equipment used in performing the work (he emphasized that, although his corporation rented the equipment to Badgett, no one was permitted to operate it except Judge himself). Judge contended that Badgett was confused because "he doesn't realize we are two different entities." Judge testified that he filed for unemployment for the time he worked for Badgett because he was "donating" his time and, thus, he "wasn't employed." Judge was asked if he understood the reporting requirements pertinent to unemployment insurance claims. He answered thus:

JUDGE: Well, I know that if I received any money I would have to claim it, but any money received by Sheridan Corporation wouldn't be money that I made, unless Sheridan Corporation paid me money, and Sheridan Corporation couldn't afford to pay me, and so I didn't get anything.
VINCENT [Appeals Examiner]: Did you receive any money from Sheridan Corporation during this time?
JUDGE: Sheridan Corporation purchased welding equipment from me, along with purchasing other welding equipment, including new equipment, including a new portable welder. And those would all be in the accounting sheets under fixed assets.
JUDGE: Well, I just wanted to say that Sheridan Corporation does not have any employees, and a corporation does not have to pay its officers. And, uh, so if I'm doing things for Sheridan Corporation and the company can't pay me, I don't get paid. But, I have an interest in Sheridan Corporation, and then also that on the uh, time sheets, where it says uh, number one, and it says did you work during this week. I took that to mean did you work for wages this week. And since I didn't work for wages, I didn't think that was a uh, misrepresentation to put down that I did not earn any wages.
JUDGE: OK then, then the other thing I would like to tell is that I add to my case here, is that Mr. Badgett, I asked him almost weekly to produce a W4 and hire me, and the reason for that is, in that line of work um, if you guys know anything about the welding field, a person should make sure they're covered by Workers' Compensation insurance at the least, and of course it good to have the uh, um, unemployment insurance, and so a person does not have to accept employment without that i#f, if, if, they, and I can't see why the State would, would require someone to accept employment without, from a corporation without a W4. So I was insisting on that, and when, every time that the subject come up, I told him I would like to do a WA4, and be hired, and he would not hire me, so I never was employed, even though I kept asking to be employed.

[¶ 10] On January 8, 2001, the Appeals Examiner issued his findings that Judge had worked during the relevant time period and was aware of his obligation to provide "true information" when submitting his claim for benefits. The Examiner also found that Judge had worked and earned wages and, thus, had submitted a claim containing a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact.

[¶ 11] Judge was entitled to appeal the above-described determination to the Unemployment Insurance Commission and he did so. 3 Weil's Code of Wyoming Rules, Department of Employment, Unemployment Insurance Division, Chapter 30, Section 7, 025 050 Q01-12 (2001). On March 21, 2001, the Commission affirmed Judge's disqualification from benefits. Judge then filed a petition for review in the district court pursuant to WRAP. 12. By order entered on June 1, 2001, the matter was certified to this Court under W.R.A.P. 12.09(b)(1),(8), and (6).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 12] In synthesizing the standard of review for a case such as this, we must look beyond the usual formula found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001), though that statute is a part of the mix. First, we note the standard of review we articulated in Wyoming Department of Employment v. Porter, 986 P.2d 148, 150 (Wyo.1999):

Review of the Commission's decision proceeds as if the matter had come directly to us, and we afford no special deference to the district court's determinations. Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance v. Banks, 854 P.2d 709, 711 (Wyo.1998). The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act defines and limits our authority in review of administrative decision-making:
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
i) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
Wyo. Stat. § 16-8-114(c) (1990).
Gibson v. Wyoming Division of Unemployment Insurance, 907 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wyo.1995). "We will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law." Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 962 P.2d 876, 878 (Wyo.1998).

[¶ 13] We include with that, this guideline quoted from Hat Six Homes v. Department of Employment, 6 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Wyo.2000):

In reviewing unemployment benefit cases, we have said:
The standard of review of an agency determination is well-established. Unemployment benefit cases involving contended misconduct normally present mixed questions of law and fact. Henson v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State, 113 Wash.2d 374, 779 P.2d 715 (1989). See generally Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1089 (Wyo.1988). A reviewing court is "confined to the matters explicitly referenced in W.S. 16-3-114(c) and W.R.A.P. 12.09." Cook v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181, 184 (Wyo.1989).
"On appeal from a district court's consideration of an ageney action, this court is not bound by the conclusions of the reviewing court. Rather, using the same evidentiary materials and the same review standards as the district court, we conduct an independent inquiry into the matter, just as if it had proceeded directly to us from the agency."
Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Emp. Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 920 (Wyo.1989). (Accord Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Wyo.1985) and Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo.1980).) Our deference for findings of fact is reserved for the fact-finder which, in this case, is ESC. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming v. Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc., 767 P.2d 608 (Wyo.1989). See Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759, 764 (Wyo.1986).

Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d at 870 (footnote omitted).

We review an agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence standard. DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 960 P.2d 502, 508 (Wyo.1998). This Court examines the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's findings. Id. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept in support of an agency's conclusions. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency when substantial evidence supports its decision. Id. We do not, however, grant the same deference to an agency's conclusions of law. Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo.1997). We affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo.1996). Unemployment benefit cases which involve the contention that an employee was discharged for misconduct connected with his work normally present mixed questions of law and fact. Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance v. Rissler & McMurry Company, 837 P.2d 686, 688 (Wyo.1992); Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo.1990).

SF Phosphates, Ltd., 976 P.2d at 201.

[114] Finally, we must also include this principle in our review:

Provisions of an unemployment compensation statute imposing disqualifications for the benefits available thereunder should be strictly construed in favor of the claimant. This rule is a corollary to the rule requiring generally liberal interpretation of such statutes as a whole so that they may achieve their benign purpose. A disqualifying provision should not be enlarged by implication or by adding to one such provision words found only in another.

76 Am.Jur.2d, Unemployment Compensation § 14 (1992), Johnides v. St. Lawrence Hospital, 184 Mich.App. 172, 457 N.W.2d 123, 125 (1990), Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hospital, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn.1989), Armstrong v. Neel, 725 SW.2d 953, 955 (Tenn.App.1986), and see Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181, 189 (1943).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 15] The Wyoming Employment Security Law is designed to provide a form of unemployment insurance so that workers who become unemployed may receive benefits under the provisions of that act. The preprinted form used for submitting an application for benefits is worded in terms that are simple, direct, and easily understood. When asked the question, did you work? Judge answered, "No," although no stretch of the meaning of the word "work" could permit him to give such an answer, without risk of being accused of making a false statement or a misrepresentation of the fact that was the most significant bit of information in his application. His own testimony is that he did work. The preprinted form provided Judge with ample opportunity to explain his theory of his claim, without the need to resort to falsity. We conclude that substantial evidence, as set out more fully above, supports the Commission's decision to disqualify Judge from benefits. See Gipson v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 315 N.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Iowa App.1981), Whitney v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, 585 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1978), and see generally, John C. Williams, Annotation, Criminal Liability for Wrongfully Obtaining Unemployment Benefits, 80 A.L.R.3d 1280, esp. § 7 (1977).

[¶ 16] Moreover, Judge clearly misapprehended the interaction of the law, which governs the operation of corporations, the law pertinent to federal corporate and individual taxation, and the law applicable to unemployment benefits. That misapprehension may have been grounded in part in ignorance, but as is almost universally true, ignorance of the law is no defense. See Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159, 166 (Wyo.1982).

[¶ 17] For these reasons, the decision of the Commission is affirmed.

      . In addition, Judge submitted claims for the time period between June 18, 2000, and August 26, 2000, wherein he supplied the same answers.

      . The word "work" is not defined by the statutes or applicable rules and regulations, and we will accord it its usual meaning given the context: "[The labor, task or duty that affords one his customary means of livelihood." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2634 (1986). We note that, in context, "work" means much the same thing as "employment," and employment is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-104 (LexisNexis 2001), though it takes a bit more reading than just consulting a dictionary to get to the bottom of it:
      § 27-3-104. "Employment" defined; generally; exceptions.
      (a) As used in this act, "employment" means service:
      (i) Performed by an employee defined under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) including service in interstate commerce, except 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) does not apply;
      (ii) Subject to any federal tax against which credit may be taken for contribution payments into any state unemployment fund;
      (iif) Required to be employment under this act as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 3301 through 3311; and
      (iv) Otherwise specified under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108.
      (b) An individual who performs service for wages is an employee for purposes of this act unless it is shown that the individual:
      (i) Is free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services by contract and by fact;
      (ii) Repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 153, § 1.
      (iii) and (iv) Repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 121, § 3.
      (v) Represents his services to the public as a self-employed individual or an independent contractor; and
      (vi) May substitute another individual to perform his services.

      . "Wage" is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-102(a)(xviii) (LexisNexis 2001):
      § 23-3-102. Definitions generally.

      (xviii) "Wage" means remuneration payable for services from any source including commissions, bonuses and cash. The reasonable cash value of remuneration other than cash or check shall be prescribed by rule of the commission. To the extent the following are not considered wages under 26 U.S.C. [§§ 13301 through 3311, "wage" does not include:
      (A) For purposes of W.S. 27-3-503 through 27-3-509, remuneration greater than fifty-five percent (55%) of the statewide average annual wage calculated pursuant to W.S. 27-3-303(a) and rounded to the lowest one hundred dollars ($100.00), which is paid during any calendar year to an individual by each employer or a predecessor within any calendar year including employment under any other state unemployment compensation law unless the amount is subject to a federal tax against which credit may be taken for contributions paid into any state unemployment fund;
      (B) Any premium paid by an employing unit under a plan, system or into a fund for insurance or annuities to provide an employee or class of employees retirement, sickness or accident disability, medical and hospitalization expenses for sickness or accident disability or death benefits if the employee cannot receive any part of this payment instead of the death benefit or any part of the premium if the benefit is insured and cannot assign or receive cash instead of the benefit upon withdrawal from or termination of the plan, system, policy or services with the employing unit;
      (C) A payment by an employing unit not deducted from an employee's remuneration for the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 3101;
      .(D) Dismissal payments which the employing unit is not obligated to make;
      (E) That portion of tips or gratuities not reportable under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(s);
      (F) The value of any meals or lodging furnished by and for the convenience of the employer to the employee if the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer or in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment;
      (G) Remuneration received by an employee as sick pay following a six (6) month continuous period of illness;
      (H) Any benefit under a cafeteria plan specified by 26 U.S.C. § 125, excluding cash;
      (J) Wages of a deceased worker paid to a beneficiary or estate following the calendar year of the worker's death;

        (K) Services received under any dependent care assistance program to the extent excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 129;
      (M) Wages paid to a disabled worker during the year in which he became entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act;
      (N) Services or benefits received under any educational assistance program;
      (0) Any benefit or other value received under an employee achievement award;
      (P) The value of any qualified group legal services plan to the extent payments are excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 120;
      (Q) Costs of group term life insurance;
      (R) Any loan repayment which is repaid at interest rates below established market rates;
      (8) Any moving expenses;
      (T) Employer contributions to any qualified retirement and pension plan or individual retirement account and distributions from qualified retirement and pension plans and annuities under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b);
      (U) Benefit payments under any supplemental unemployment compensation plan; and
      (W) Any benefits paid under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act or any other worker's compensation law of another state.

      . The document memorializing this action does not appear in the record.

      . This statute has a parallel criminal component:
      § 27-3-1702. Obtaining benefits by fraud; disqualification of benefits; penalties.
      (a) No person shall, for himself or any other person, knowingly make a false statement or misrepresentation or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase benefits or other payments under this act or other state or federal law. Any person violating this section is guilty of:
      (i) A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), imprisonment for not more than ninety (90) days, or both, if the amount of benefits obtained in violation of this section is less than five hundred dollars ($500.00); or
      (ii) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both, if the amount of benefits obtained under fraud is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or greater.
      (b) Upon conviction the court shall require the defendant to make restitution to the department in the amount of benefits or other payments improperly paid due to the defendant's fraud. Each false statement, misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact is a separate offense. This section shall not preclude prosecution under any other applicable law.
      (c) In addition to the penalties provided by this section, a person convicted under this section or any other applicable law shall be disqualified from receiving benefits in any week beginning within a two (2) year period immediately following conviction.
      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-702 (LexisNexis 2001).

      . The document memorializing this action does not appear in the record.

      . The document used to provide notice does not appear in the record.

      . Judge's brief was not filed in this Court until November 6, 2001, because of extensions of time sought by him, and granted by this Court.

      . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-101 (LexisNexis 2001).