text:
    Terry A. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. WD 70728.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
    July 6, 2010.
    S. Kate Webber, Esq., Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
    Shaun J. Mackelprang, Esq., and Karen L. Kramer, Esq., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
    Before: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, P.J., and JAMES M. SMART, JR. and ALOKAHUJA, JJ.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Terry A. Brown appeals the circuit court’s denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 24.035. On June 21, 2004, Brown pled guilty to one count of sale of a controlled substance in violation of § 195.211, RSMo. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, with suspended execution of the sentence. On February 21, 2008, the circuit court revoked Brown’s probation and ordered his sentence executed.

On appeal, Brown argues that the motion court clearly erred in rejecting three of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) that counsel failed to advise him of the meaning of the requirement that the State prove that he engaged in a “sale” of cocaine, and that the factual basis recited at his guilty plea hearing did not establish that a “sale” occurred; (2) that counsel failed to investigate the potential testimony of Sylvester Spencer, and subpoena Spencer to testify on Brown’s behalf; and (3) that Brown was coerced to plead guilty because counsel was unprepared to try the case. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order has been provided to the parties. Rule 84.16(b).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Charles W. EZELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
    No. WD 70532.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
    July 6, 2010.
    Laura G. Martin, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.
    Jayne T. Woods, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
    Before THOMAS H. NEWTON, C.J., JAMES EDWARD WELSH, and GARY D. WITT, JJ.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Mr. Charles W. Ezell appeals the judgment denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Ezell asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for causing the introduction of damaging credibility evidence.

For reasons stated in the memorandum provided to the parties, we affirm. Rule 84.16(b).


author: OPINION SHARON G. LEE, J.,

text:
    STATE of Tennessee v. James Rae LEWTER.
    Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
    Feb. 12, 2010 Session Heard at Murfreesboro.

    June 4, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied July 15, 2010.

      Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Cameron L. Hyder and Elizabeth Bingham Marney, Assistants Attorney General; Charles Crawford, District Attorney General; and Ann L. Filer and Hollyn Hewgley, Assistants District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
    S. Craig Moore, Fayetteville, Tennessee (on appeal) and A. Jackson Dearing, III and Dorothy Buck, Shelbyville, Tennessee (at trial) for the appellee, James Rae Lew-ter.

      . Oral argument was heard in this case on Feb. 12, 2010, in Murfreesboro, Rutherford County, Tennessee, as part of this Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.

   OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

A jury convicted the defendant of burglary and theft in connection with the break-in of a dental office. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the evidence, which included a white shirt bearing the defendant’s DNA found at the crime scene, was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Upon further review by this Court, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Background

On the morning of January 31, 2006, officers of the Fayetteville Police Department, responding to dispatches regarding a possible burglary and theft at Dr. William Hamilton’s dental office, arrived to find a window in the office waiting room had been broken. Shards of glass were found inside and outside of the building under the window. The office was in general disarray with papers scattered about, file and storage cabinet drawers open, and items missing. A large, heavy table had been moved from the center of the room to a wall. An extra-large white shirt was found draped over a stairway railing near the broken window. A blood-stained towel was discovered in a chair in the reception area, and blood stains were also found on a box of latex gloves in a restroom. Dr. Hamilton confirmed that various items were missing from the office, including furniture, pictures, computer equipment, office supplies, and rugs, one of which measured twelve feet by fifteen feet. The fair market value of all of the missing property was established to be more than $1,000.

The police dusted the crime scene for fingerprints, and the white shirt and bloodstained towel and latex glove box found at the scene were sent to the police department crime laboratory for testing. DNA extracted from the blood on the box and towel matched the profile of DNA extracted from a blood sample obtained from Dinah Lynne Justice. DNA extracted from skin cells on the shirt matched the profile of DNA extracted from a blood sample obtained from the defendant, James Rae Lewter. No identifiable fingerprints found in the office matched the fingerprints of either Ms. Justice or the defendant.

Ms. Justice claimed to have no memory of the break-in due to intoxication, but pleaded guilty to burglary in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 and theft in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103. The defendant was indicted and convicted of the same two offenses, and was sentenced to eight years incarceration for each offense, to be served concurrently.

The defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and vacated the defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictment. The court reasoned that the presence at the crime scene of a white shirt containing skin cell DNA matching the defendant’s DNA did not prove he was present at the time of the burglary and theft. The court concluded that “there was no other evidence, direct or circumstantial, to make the presence of the shirt at the dental office incriminating, [and that] the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Lewter’s convictions.” We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal.

Analysis

The issue we address in this case is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions. We begin by noting that a guilty verdict replaces the presumption that a defendant is innocent with a presumption of guilt and accordingly, on appeal, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty. State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992)). The firmly-established standard governing our review requires that “ ‘[w]hen considering a sufficiency of the evidence question on appeal, the State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ ” Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 274 (quoting State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn.2007)). All questions as to the credibility of trial witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and issues of fact raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court, and we may not re-weigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tenn.2003); see also State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn.2008) (“The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact.”). The standard requires that we consider “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 274-75, and this standard applies whether the conviction was based upon direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tenn.2005) (citing State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557 (Tenn.2000)).

At issue in this case is the identity of the perpetrator of the break-in of the dental office. The identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of all crimes and may be established solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn.2006). Where a defendant is convicted solely on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances “must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant ... and must be so closely interwoven and connected that the finger of guilt is pointed unerringly at the defendant and the defendant alone.” State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn. 478, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (1971). However, our review of circumstantial evidence is subject to the same strictures noted above pertinent to the standard of review with respect to evidence in general, and accordingly, the jury decides the weight to be assigned circumstantial evidence and “ ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn.2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (1958)). This Court may not substitute inferences it may draw from such evidence for those inferences that were drawn by the jury. See Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956).

Relying on the appropriate deferential standard of review, we have carefully considered all the evidence presented to the jury in this case. While there is no direct evidence linking the defendant to the crime, there is ample circumstantial evidence to support the convictions.

First, the white shirt found at the dental office on the morning after the break-in contains skin cell DNA matching the DNA of the defendant. Ms. Justice, who has pleaded guilty to the offenses of burglary and theft from the dental office, testified that she had never taken or worn any shirt belonging to the defendant and that he had never left any clothes at her apartment. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant left his shirt on the railing during the commission of the crimes.

Next, we consider the testimony before the jury indicating that more than one person was involved in the commission of the crimes. As we have noted, on the morning after the break-in, a large table, which before the break-in had been in the center of the room, was found pushed against a wall in the office waiting room. Dr. Hamilton testified that this table was “pretty heavy” and that it could not have been moved from its original position to its new position fifteen feet away without the effort of two people. One of the rugs stolen from the office measured twelve feet by fifteen feet, and Dr. Hamilton confirmed that one person could not have moved this rug. And finally, Dr. Hamilton provided a listing of the numerous items that were stolen, including three rugs, three wooden chairs, a computer and monitor, a microwave oven, a bookcase drawer, a large container plant, and various wall hangings. In addition to Dr. Hamilton’s testimony describing the items moved and stolen, Ms. Justice’s testimony that she is five feet five inches tall and weighs approximately 120 pounds, indicates that she is not an unusually large person and would be incapable of moving heavy objects without assistance. In addition, the number and size of the items stolen indicate that a truck or similar vehicle would have been required to transport them. Ms. Justice did not have a truck, but the defendant did. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony of Dr. Hamilton and Ms. Justice that more than one individual was involved in the break-in of Dr. Hamilton’s office and that the perpetrators used a pick up truck or some similar vehicle to remove the property that was stolen.

Finally, we note the relationship between Ms. Justice and the defendant. Ms. Justice, an admitted alcoholic, met the defendant at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. In January of 2006, she had relapsed and was drinking regularly. On the evening the crime occurred, Ms. Justice was in a “black-out,” a condition from which she infrequently suffers as a result of her alcoholism, and she attested that until she was approached by the police about the break-in, she “knew absolutely nothing about it [and] ... had no recollection whatsoever of it.” She only remembered walking home alone on a roadway between the dental office and her apartment, which was located about one-third of a mile from the dental office.

At the time of the break-in, Ms. Justice was living in an apartment in a house owned by Dr. Stanley Pace. Dr. Pace had hired her and the defendant to work both at that house and at Dr. Pace’s own residence, and she and the defendant had been working at the residence during the week before January 30, 2006. She testified that during the month of January she and the defendant, using a truck in the defendant’s possession, moved rock and gravel. In addition to having an ongoing working relationship with the defendant, Ms. Justice further testified that when she drank, she either drank alone or with the defendant and that she and the defendant had been drinking together regularly at the time of the break-in, stating “I was drinking almost every evening with him. This went on about two weeks.” Ms. Justice further admitted that she and the defendant had been sexually intimate in January of 2006 and that the defendant had stayed at her apartment overnight on a couple of occasions during that time. The jury could reasonably conclude from Ms. Justice’s testimony that the defendant was involved in a close working and social relationship with Ms. Justice, a self-confessed perpetrator of the burglary and theft, at the time those crimes were committed.

Applying the analytical framework established by our prior cases, we determine that the combination of all the circumstantial evidence in this ease — the shirt that the defendant had worn that was found at the crime scene; the nature of objects moved during the commission of the crime, indicating that at least two persons committed the crime; and the contemporaneous ongoing and occasionally intimate social relationship that existed between the defendant and one self-confessed perpetrator of the crime — is sufficient, when taken in a light most favorable to the State, to support the inference that the defendant committed the crimes.

In setting forth these factual circumstances, we defer, consistent with the governing standard of review, to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State. In this regard, we acknowledge that there was conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. The defendant’s landlord, Joanne Riddle, and her friend, Anita Hill, attested that the defendant was at Ms. Riddle’s house on the evening of January 30, 2006, and, therefore, he could not have been present during the break-in of Dr. Hamilton’s office. Ms. Hill testified that the defendant was at Ms. Riddle’s house when Ms. Hill left at sometime around 11:00 p.m. Ms. Hill did not account for his whereabouts after that time. Similarly, Ms. Riddle attested that she observed the defendant asleep on her couch when she went to bed shortly after 11:00 p.m. Ms. Riddle did not state that she saw the defendant again that evening; however, she stated that he could not have left the house without her knowing because she set her burglar alarm and he did not know the code. It was within the jury’s authority to dismiss the testimony of both of these witnesses as not credible, and we must assume that the jury did not believe this testimony to the extent that it was irreconcilable with the result the jury reached. As we have stated, the credibility of trial witnesses and the weight and value of the evidence is determined by the trier of fact and not subject to re-evaluation by this Court. Further, it was not established by the evidence at what time the break-in occurred or, specifically, that the break-in occurred before 11:00 p.m. Therefore, if the jury rejected Ms. Riddle’s testimony that the defendant could not have left her house after she went to bed shortly after 11:00 p.m., the testimony of neither of these witnesses had sufficient weight to support the defendant’s alibi that the defendant was at Ms. Riddle’s house when the break-in took place and to overcome the other evidence supporting an inference of guilt.

The defendant also argues that it is likely that the shirt was not being worn at the time of the crime but rather was used to protect the hand of the person who broke the window in gaining access to the office. In support of this argument, the defendant notes that the shirt’s “dirty and nasty” condition indicates that it would not have been worn; that it would be odd for a perpetrator to take off his or her shirt during the course of a burglary, particularly on a winter night in January; that it would be irrational to wear a white shirt to commit a burglary at night; and that the broken glass found beneath the shirt indicates that the glass was shaken out of the shirt after it was used to break the window. The defendant also references the testimony of Tennessee Bureau of Investigation special agent forensic scientist Bradley Everett who stated that it was not possible to discern from the DNA retrieved from the defendant’s skin cells found on the shirt when the defendant last wore the shirt and that the skin cells could have been there for years, given the right conditions of temperature and humidity and thus, the shirt need not have been worn at the time of the crime. The defendant asserts that the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was at the crime scene and does not exclude every other reasonable theory except that of guilt. The defendant asserts that the evidence alternatively supports the reasonable theory that Ms. Justice “went to the dental office and committed the burglary using the shirt— which she obtained while [defendant was either at her residence (working, sleeping, or in sexual relations with her) or working elsewhere with her — to break the window and gain access.” The defendant further contends that even if the evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Justice had an accomplice in the crime, it does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was her accomplice.

We do not agree with the defendant’s assertion that the evidence supports this proposed alternative theory because, as we have noted, Ms. Justice specifically testified that she had never taken any shirt worn by the defendant. Again, questions regarding witness credibility are resolved by the jury. Accepting this testimony of Ms. Justice, the jury could have reasonably dismissed the theory that the white shirt was brought to the office by Ms. Justice, not the defendant. Having dismissed this theory, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the shirt was in Dr. Hamilton’s office because the defendant himself brought the shirt to the office when he participated in the break-in. Whether the defendant wore the shirt or carried it in his hand at that time is of no consequence.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we are bound to do, it is our determination that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant has failed to meet his burden in proving otherwise. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the two remaining issues presented to that court for review.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further action. It appearing that the defendant is indigent, the costs of appeal are taxed to the State.

      . Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 (2006) provides in part as follows:
      (a) A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner:
      (1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault;
      (2) Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building; [or]
      (3) Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault;

      (c) Burglary under subdivision (a)(1),(2) or (3) is a Class D felony.

      . Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103 (2006) provides that ‘‘[a] person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105(3) (2006) further provides that theft of property with a value of $1,000 or more is a Class D felony.

      . Fayetteville police department detective Joel Massey testified at trial that his investigation revealed that the defendant and Ms. Justice did landscaping work together prior to January 30.

      . These issues are 1) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence of eight years in violation of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tenn.2007) and 2) whether the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. State v. Lewter, M2007-02723-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1076716 at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. April 9, 2009).


author: CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., SHARON G. LEE, J., GARY R. WADE, J.,

text:
    Terrance Lavar DAVIS v. STATE of Tennessee.
    Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
    Feb. 11, 2010 Session.
    May 7, 2010.

      Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel, for the appellant, the State of Tennessee.
    Jay Norman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Terrance Lavar Davis.
   OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a concurring opinion. GARY R. WADE, J., filed an opinion concurring separately, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., joined.

We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to address the legality of a plea-bargained sentence requiring the defendant, being sentenced for two cocaine offenses committed in a school zone, to serve twenty-two years of a Range I sentence at “100%.” The defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal because it makes no provision for the possibility of early release on parole. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and he is therefore not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant Terrance Lavar Davis (“Defendant”) was charged with (1) felonious possession of over twenty-six grams of cocaine in a school zone; (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (3) delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone; and (4) delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. Defendant pleaded guilty to the first and third of these charges and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years; the remaining two counts were dismissed. In conjunction with entering his pleas, Defendant signed two petitions to enter a plea of guilty in which he acknowledged that he was subject to being sentenced as a Range II offender. Pursuant to his plea agreement, however, Defendant was actually sentenced as a Range I offender. Each of the petitions to enter a plea of guilty bears the notation “(EFFECTIVE SENTENCE 22 YRS @ 100%).” Further, each of the two judgments of conviction bears the notation “100%” entered by hand in the same line indicating that Defendant was sentenced to incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”).

Although the transcript of the plea hearing is not in the record, we have gleaned some additional background from the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion denying the petition for post-conviction relief Defendant filed after entering his pleas. See Davis v. State, No. M2005-01902-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 3290822 (Tenn. Crim.App. Nov. 13, 2006). During the post-conviction hearing, Defendant “admitted that when he entered his pleas the trial judge told him his sentence was twenty-two years at 100%.” Id. at ⅜2. Defendant’s counsel also testified at the hearing and stated that “he told [Defendant] he would have to serve 100% of his sentence.” Id. Following the hearing, “the post-conviction court found that [Defendant] was informed by counsel and the [trial] court that he was receiving a sentence of twenty-two years that must be served at 100%.” Id. at *5. The post-conviction court also “noted that [Defendant] had above average intellect, was familiar with criminal proceedings, was represented by a competent attorney, was aware of the charges against him and the potential penalties, and avoided federal prosecution!,] and received concurrent sentences as a result of his pleas.” Id. The trial court denied post-conviction relief and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at *6.

Following his unsuccessful effort to obtain post-conviction relief, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 9, 2007. Defendant admits in his petition that, pursuant to his plea agreement, “his sentences are to be served with a release eligibility set at one hundred percent,” but contends that a 100% release eligibility renders his judgments and sentences void and illegal. The trial court denied relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Defendant’s sentences are illegal and remanded. Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. May 6, 2008). This Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn.2008). Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-SC-R11-HC (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2009). Following remand and reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again reversed the trial court and remanded. Davis v. State, No. M2009-00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn.Crim.App. April 8, 2009). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether to grant relief upon review of a petition for habeas corpus is a question of law. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn.2000). Accordingly, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the conclusions of the court below. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn.2005).

ANALYSIS

This case requires us once again to examine a particular sentence and determine whether it is beyond a trial court’s jurisdiction to impose and therefore requires us to grant habeas corpus relief. A brief review of our statutory sentencing scheme and the principles of habeas corpus jurisprudence as applied to sentences is helpful to our analysis.

I. Statutory Sentencing Scheme

A. Range Classification

Under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2006 & Supp.2009), a trial court’s first obligation in imposing sentence is to “determine the appropriate range of sentence.” Id. § 40-35-210(a). Two alternatives exist for determining a defendant’s appropriate range of sentence. One alternative requires the trial court to make findings of fact about how many prior felony convictions the defendant has and to determine the felony classes to which those prior convictions belong. See id. §§ 40-35-105 to -109. On that basis, the trial court determines that the defendant is either a standard Range I offender, id. § 40-35-105; a multiple Range II offender, id. § 40-35-106; a persistent Range III offender, id. § 40-35-107; a career Range III maximum offender, id. § 40-35-108; or an especially mitigated Range I reduced offender, id. § 40-35-109. The other alternative allows the defendant and the State to negotiate a plea bargain that includes a range classification. Thus, as in the present case, a defendant who would otherwise be classified as a multiple Range II offender may negotiate a plea bargain which includes a standard Range I offender classification instead.

The classification of a defendant for sentencing range purposes is significant because the higher ranges carry longer sentence terms. For instance, the Range I sentence for a Class A felony is fifteen to twenty-five years. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35 — 112(a)(1). The Range II sentence for a Class A felony is twenty-five to forty years. Id. at (b)(1). The Range III sentence for a Class A felony is forty to sixty years. Id. at (c)(1). It therefore benefits defendants to seek the lowest possible range classification, either through contesting the State’s proof about prior convictions or through plea negotiations.

Once the appropriate range is determined, and after considering any mitigating and enhancement factors that apply, the trial court imposes a specific term of years within that range. Id. § 40-35-210(c). Alternatively, a plea bargain may include both a range classification and an agreed-upon term of years. The trial court (or plea bargaining parties) must also determine (1) the manner in which the defendant will serve his or her sentence, for example, incarcerated in the TDOC or on probation, id. at (b), and (2) if the defendant is being sentenced for more than one conviction (or is currently serving another sentence), whether the terms imposed for each conviction are to be served concurrently or consecutively, id. § 40-35-115.

B. Early Release

1. Parole

The sentencing range is important for another reason. For most felonies, a defendant ordered to serve his or her sentence incarcerated in the TDOC becomes eligible for early release on parole upon reaching his or her “release eligibility date” (“RED”). Id. § 40-35-501(a)(1). A defendant’s RED is expressed as a percentage of his or her sentence and is generally determined by reference to the defendant’s sentencing range classification. Thus, “[r]elease eligibility for each defendant sentenced as a Range I standard offender shall occur after service of thirty percent (30%) of the actual sentence imposed less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant.” Id. at (c) (emphasis added). And, “[rjelease eligibility for each defendant sentenced as a Range II multiple offender shall occur after service of thirty-five percent (35%) of the actual sentence imposed less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant.” Id. at (d) (emphasis added). The RED is based on service of a progressively greater percentage of the defendant’s sentence as his or her sentencing range increases. A defendant’s RED is indicated on his or her uniform judgment document by checking a box labeled, e.g., “Mitigated 20%,” “Standard 30%,” or “Multiple 35%.” As is clear from the term “shall occur” in section -501, felony inmates are generally entitled to be considered for parole after a date certain.

As with most general rules, however, there are exceptions. For instance, our legislature has specified that, for a few enumerated violent offenses, “[tjhere shall be no release eligibility.” Id. at (i)(l). That is, defendants convicted of these particular violent offenses are not eligible for early release on parole. These violent offenses include first and second degree murder; especially aggravated and aggravated kidnapping; especially aggravated robbery; aggravated rape and rape; aggravated sexual battery; rape of a child and aggravated rape of a child; aggravated arson; aggravated child abuse; and certain offenses involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Id. at (i)(2). On the uniform judgment document completed for each conviction offense, release eligibility for most of these offenses is indicated by a box labeled “Violent 100%.”

Significantly to this case, a defendant’s RED may also be determined by plea bargain. As we observed in McConnell v. State, “the legislature’s failure to limit the use of offender classification and release eligibility as plea bargaining tools evinced the legislature’s intent to permit the practice.” 12 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tenn.2000) (citing Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn.1997)). And, this Court has made clear that a defendant may plea bargain for a RED that is inconsistent with the sentencing range agreed to. Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 706. Thus, a defendant may agree to a “hybrid” sentence which combines, for instance, a Range I offender classification with a Range II RED. Id.

2. Sentence Reduction Credits

In addition to the possibility of early release on parole, most felony offenders sentenced to serve their sentences incarcerated in the TDOC have the opportunity to obtain sentence reductions based on sentence credits earned for, e.g., “good institutional behavior.” See generally Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-21-236 (2006 & Supp.2009). Sentence reduction credits operate distinctly from eligibility for parole. Sentence reduction credits actually reduce a defendant’s sentence such that his or her term of imprisonment expires earlier than it would without the credits. Sentence reduction credits may also hasten a defendant’s RED. See id. at (b) (“The allowances which can be awarded pursuant to this section shall be referred to as inmate sentence reduction credits and shall affect release eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the same manner as time credits affected parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates prior to September 1, 1980.”). Parole, on the other hand, allows a defendant to continue serving his sentence outside the walls of the prison; parole does not actually reduce the parolee’s sentence.

Defendants serving sentences for most of the statutorily-enumerated violent offenses listed above are eligible to earn sentence reduction credits, although they are limited to thereby reducing their sentence by no more than 15%. Id. § 40-35-501(i)(l). However, our General Assembly has designated a few offenses for which neither parole nor sentence reduction credits are available. Persons meeting the definition of “child sexual predator,” “multiple rapist,” or “child rapist” are not eligible for early release on the basis of either parole or sentence reduction credits. Id. § 39-13-523(b), (c) (Supp. 2009); see also id. § 40 — 35—501(i) (3). These defendants must serve their entire sentences. The uniform judgment document designates these sentences by boxes labeled “Child Rapist 100%” and “Multiple Rapist 100%,” respectively. Our legislature has also provided that a defendant determined to be a “repeat violent offender” shall, upon conviction of any of certain enumerated offenses, be sentenced “to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.” Id. § 40-35-120(g). The uniform judgment document designates these sentences by a box labeled “Repeat Violent 100%.” Repeat violent offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are, obviously, not entitled to a RED or early sentence expiration on the basis of sentence reduction credits.

II. Sentencing and Habeas Corpus

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees that “the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires it.” While arising from the constitution, the writ has nevertheless been regulated by statute for more than 150 years. Ussery v. Avery, 222 Tenn. 50, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1968). The statute applicable at the time Defendant filed his habeas corpus petition provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases [in which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction], may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000).

In spite of the statute’s broad language, “the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be granted are narrow.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn.2004) (citing Dixon v. Holland, 70 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tenn.2002)). Specifically, this Court has held that the writ may be granted “only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that the sentence has expired.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.1993)) (emphasis and footnote added); see also State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37 (1868). It is well-settled “that a petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used to review or correct errors of law or fact committed by a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d 887, 888 (1963). Furthermore, “the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to serve the purpose of an appeal or writ of error.” Id.

With respect to sentencing, we have recognized that “[sentencing is jurisdictional and must be executed in compliance with the [applicable Sentencing] Act.” McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 798. Thus, a trial court lacks the jurisdiction or authority to impose on a defendant a sentence that (1) is not authorized by the applicable statutes, see, e.g., May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 348-49 (Tenn.2008) (granting habeas corpus relief to convicted felon declared infamous for a crime not listed as infamous under the statute); Stephenson, 28 S.W.3d at 912 (holding habeas corpus attack proper where defendant’s sentence of life without parole was not statutorily authorized and was therefore illegal), or (2) directly contravenes an applicable statute, see, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 127-28 (Tenn.2006) (holding sentence illegal because it provided for a RED where the applicable statute expressly prohibited early release eligibility); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.1978) (holding sentence imposed in direct contravention of express statutory provisions “a nullity”). This Court considers unauthorized sentences, including those that are in direct contravention of an applicable statute, to be illegal as opposed to merely erroneous. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn.2007) (recognizing that a judgment rendered without statutory authority is void and that “[a] sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is void and illegal”). Habeas corpus relief may be granted on illegal sentences but not on those that are merely erroneous. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 161.

Examples of illegal sentences include (1) a sentence imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, see McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 796, 799-800; (2) a sentence designating a RED where a RED is specifically prohibited by statute, see Lewis, 202 S.W.3d at 127-28; (3) a sentence ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively, see Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d at 873; and (4) a sentence not authorized for the offense by any statute, see Stephenson, 28 S.W.3d at 912. In each of these cases, relief was appropriate because the trial court did not have the statutory authority (or jurisdiction) to impose the challenged sentence.

With regard to allegedly improper sentences arising from plea bargains, we have stated repeatedly that offender range classification and release eligibility are “non-jurisdictional.” See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn.2007). Thus, “a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any irregularity as to offender classification or release eligibility.” Id.; Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 709; see also State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn.1987). Accordingly, the parties may agree to a “hybrid” sentence that “mixes and matches” range assignment, term of years, and release eligibility without regard to what our sentencing scheme might call for absent a plea bargain so long as (1) the term of years is within the overall range of years specified for the offense, see Hoover, 215 S.W.3d at 779, and (2) the RED is not less than the minimum allowable for the offense, see Lewis, 202 S.W.3d at 128. See also McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 799 (“The 1989 [Sentencing] Act establishes the outer limits within which the State and a defendant are free to negotiate, and the courts are bound to respect those limits.”).

Examples of sentences which might contain “errors” but would not entitle the defendant to habeas corpus relief include (1) a plea-bargained sentence including a range classification that is greater than would be assigned on the basis of the defendant’s prior convictions, see Mahler, 735 S.W.2d at 227-28; (2) a plea-bargained sentence including a term of years that was incompatible with the range designation, see Hoover, 215 S.W.3d at 780-81; and (3) a plea-bargained sentence includmg a RED that was incompatible with the range designation, see Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 706. In each of these cases, this Court held that the challenged sentence was not illegal. Relief from legal sentences that contain alleged errors must be sought through an appeal as of right or through a petition for post-conviction relief.

III. Defendant’s Sentence

In this case, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of delivering .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of felonious possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine. Each of these offenses is ordinarily a Class B felony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17 — 417(c)(1), (i)(5) (2003). When the offenses occur within 1000 feet of a school zone, however, they are Class A felonies. Id. § 39-17-432(b) (2003). Thus, Defendant pleaded guilty in this case to two Class A felonies. The authorized term of imprisonment for a Class A felony is “not less than fifteen (15) nor more than sixty (60) years.” Id. § 40-35-lll(b)(l) (2003).

Because he possessed and delivered cocaine in a school zone, Defendant’s plea-bargained sentence was imposed pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act, Term. Code Ann. § 39-17-432 (2003) (“the Act”). Similar to child rapists and multiple rapists, for whom no early release on parole or from sentence reduction credits is available, the legislature has also created a specific sentencing provision precluding early release on any basis for defendants convicted of dealing drugs within a school zone. The Act provides as follows:

(a) It is the intent of this section to create Drug-Free School Zones for the purpose of providing all students in this state an environment in which they can learn without the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of drug activity in or around school facilities. The enhanced and mandatory minimum sentences required by this section for drug offenses occurring in a Drug-Free School Zone are necessary to serve as a deterrent to such unacceptable conduct.
(b) A violation of § 39-17-417 [prohibiting the manufacture, delivery, sale, or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a controlled substance], or a conspiracy to violate such section, that occurs on the grounds or facilities of any school or within one thousand feet (1,000’) of the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle school or secondary school shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is provided in § 39 — 17—417(b)—(i) for such violation.
(c) Notivithstanding any other provision of law or the sentence imposed by the court to the contrary, a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b) shall be required to serve at least the minimum sentence for such defendant’s appropriate range of sentence. Any sentence reduction credits such defendant may be eligible for or earn shall not operate to permit or allow the release of such defendant prior to full service of such minimum sentence.
(d) Notwithstanding the sentence imposed by the court, the provisions of title 40, chapter 35, part 5, relative to release eligibility status and parole, shall not apply to or authorize the release of a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b) prior to service of the entire minimum sentence for such defendant’s appropriate range of sentence.
(e) Nothing in the provisions of title 41, chapter 1, part 5 [regarding early release for prison overcrowding] shall give either the governor or the board of probation and parole the authority to release or cause the release of a defendant sentenced for a violation of subsection (b) prior to service of the entire minimum sentence for such defendant’s appropriate range of sentence.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the judge from sentencing a defendant who violated subsection (b) to any authorized term of incarceration in excess of the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence....

Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-432 (emphases and footnote added). The precise question before us is whether Defendant’s sentence is illegal because, pursuant to the Act, the trial court imposed a plea-bargained sentence requiring Defendant to serve more than the minimum number of years in his agreed-upon range at “100%.”

Of course, our primary aim in construing any statute “is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature.” Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.Sd 301, 309 (Tenn.2008). Whenever possible, we discern legislative intent “‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language.’ ” Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn.2000) (quoting Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn.1997)). Accordingly, when we are faced with clear, unambiguous language, “we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute’s application.” Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004). When construing a more recent statute in conjunction with pre-existing legislation, “we presume that the legislature has knowledge of its prior enactments and is fully aware of any judicial constructions of those enactments.” Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 707.

We begin with subsection (c) of the Act, which, by its plain and unambiguous language, requires a defendant being sentenced for committing a drug offense in a school zone “to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence.” As explained above, a defendant’s “appropriate range of sentence” is determined in one of two ways: by the trial court upon proof of the defendant’s prior convictions, or by plea bargain. The final sentence of subsection (c) makes clear that a defendant sentenced under the Act is not eligible for early release on the basis of sentence reduction credits before “full service” of the minimum sentence in his or her range.

Subsection (d) provides plainly and unambiguously that the minimum sentence must also be served with no eligibility for early release on parole. Accordingly, a defendant sentenced under the Act to the minimum term in his or her range will have a RED of 100%. Subsection (e) provides plainly and unambiguously that the minimum sentence must also be served before a defendant can be released in order to relieve prison overcrowding. In sum, a defendant being sentenced for committing a cocaine offense in a school zone will serve at least the minimum sentence in his or her range in its entirety, with no prospect of eligibility for early release on parole and no prospect of early release resulting from sentence reduction credits or prison overcrowding.

Significantly, the Act does not place a maximum upon the number of years that a trial court may order a defendant “to serve” for committing a drug offense within a school zone. Indeed, two specific provisions within the Act clearly contemplate that a trial court may order a defendant to serve more than the minimum sentence in his or her range. Subsection (c) refers to “at least ” the minimum sentence, and subsection (f) plainly and unambiguously provides trial courts with the discretion to sentence defendants committing drug offenses in school zones “to any authorized term of incarceration in excess of the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range of sentence.” Accordingly, it is entirely permissible— and legal — for a trial court, after considering mitigating and enhancement factors, to sentence a defendant who committed a drug offense in a school zone to serve up to the maximum term of years in the defendant’s range.

We acknowledge, however, that the final sentence of subsection (c), and the full text of subsections (d) and (e), appear to contemplate that early release may become available with respect to those years in excess of the minimum that the trial court orders the defendant to serve in prison. A comparison to another statute limiting early release is helpful in this analysis. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523(c) (2003) provides that “[t]he provisions of title 40, chapter 35, part 5, relative to release eligibility status and parole shall not apply to or authorize the release of a multiple rapist or child rapist ... prior to service of the entire sentence imposed by the court.” (Emphasis added). This language is substantially identical to that used in subsection (d) of the Act relative to parole, with the significant exception that it refers to the entire sentence imposed by the court. The comparable subsection (d) of the Act refers instead to the minimum sentence in the defendant’s appropriate range. The same difference exists with respect to sentence reduction credits, compare § 39-13-523(b) with § 39-17-432(c), and prison overcrowding, compare § 39-13-523(d) with § 39-17-432(e). The clear implication of this difference in terminology is that the possibility of early release may be accorded to defendants who are sentenced for committing a drug offense in a school zone and who are sentenced to serve a term of years greater than the minimum in their range, but only with respect to the years in excess of the minimum term. Nothing in the Act requires the possibility of early release, however, regardless of the term of years imposed.

Defendant argues in his brief to this Court that “[rjelease eligibility of 60% is the maximum release eligibility permitted by statute” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501 and that, if he is “deemed to have agreed to a release eligibility of 100%, then he has agreed to a release eligibility in excess of what is allowed or authorized by law in regard to release eligibility.” He also asserts that the “punishment provided by the legislature for [his] convicted offense does not include a provision for service of the sentence without the possibility of parole and therefore [his] sentence is void.”

In light of the express statutory provisions of the Act set forth above, Defendant’s argument must fail. Contrary to his assertions, the General Assembly has declared specifically and unambiguously that defendants being sentenced for committing drug offenses in a school zone shall serve the entire minimum term of years in the defendant’s sentencing range, without regard to parole eligibility or sentence reduction credits. While we recognize that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501 states generally that “release eligibility ... shall occur” (emphasis added), that directive is overridden by the subsequent language of subsection (d) of the Act which declares that the release eligibility provisions of section 40-35-501 “shall not apply to or authorize the release” of defendants “prior to service of the entire minimum sentence for such defendant’s appropriate range of sentence.” Accordingly, defendants sentenced as Range I offenders to fifteen years for committing a Class A drug offense in a school zone will serve their entire sentence with no possibility of early release by virtue of either parole or sentence reduction credits. Like child rapists and multiple rapists, defendants dealing drugs in school zones who are sentenced to the minimum term in their sentencing range will serve literally 100% of their sentences.

We turn now to the actual sentence imposed on Defendant. In this case, Defendant acknowledged that he was a multiple offender and therefore subject to a Range II sentence. Id. § 40-35-106(c) (2003). The Range II sentence for a Class A felony is “not less than twenty-five (25) nor more than forty (40) years.” Id. § 40-35-112(b)(1) (2003). Defendant was therefore facing a potential sentence of forty years, with a minimum sentence of twenty-five years to be served in its entirety on each count.

The two uniform judgment documents filled out for Defendant’s convictions each indicate that Defendant is sentenced as a “Standard” (Range I) offender, that his release eligibility is determined by reference to the Act (because the box labeled “School Zone” is checked), that he is sentenced to the TDOC, that his sentence length is twenty-two years, and that he is to serve “100%.” We construe the handwritten instruction of “100%” to mean that Defendant is sentenced to serve his entire term of twenty-two years with no eligibility for early release on parole. We reject the State’s characterization of the “100%” notation as “random” and “ambiguous” and conclude, instead, that the uniform judgment documents designate clearly and correctly the sentence to which the parties had, in fact, agreed. Had the parties intended that Defendant be eligible for parole with respect to the last seven years of his twenty-two-year term, the judgment documents would not bear the handwritten “100%” designation. In that event, the remaining information on the judgment forms would have alerted the TDOC that Defendant was eligible for early release on parole some time after he had served the first fifteen years.

Defendant obtained significant concessions in exchange for his guilty plea. First, the remaining two counts against him were dismissed. Second, the State agreed that Defendant’s sentences be served concurrently, whereas he otherwise faced the possibility of consecutive service. Third, Defendant avoided federal prosecution for these offenses. Finally, although he qualified as a multiple Range II offender, the State and the trial court agreed that Defendant be sentenced as a Range I offender and therefore subject to a sentencing range of only fifteen to twenty-five years. The actual term of years imposed was twenty-two years for each offense instead of the minimum twenty-five years that is applicable to Range II offenders convicted of a Class A felony. In exchange for the lower range and reduced term of years, Defendant agreed to a RED of 100%: that is, he agreed to forego any possibility of early release on parole.

We turn, finally, to the crux of this ease: whether a Range II defendant being sentenced for drug offenses committed in a school zone who plea-bargains to be sentenced as a Range I offender may be ordered to serve more than the minimum Range I sentence, but less than the minimum Range II sentence, without the possibility of early release on parole. Certainly, nothing in the language of the Act prevents or prohibits this result. And, in the context of this habeas corpus proceeding, we reiterate that, with respect to plea-bargained sentences, release eligibility is non-jurisdictional. A defendant may legally bargain for a higher RED in exchange for a lower sentencing range. A defendant’s bargaining power extends to the point that he or she may choose to forego entirely any entitlement to a RED. That is precisely what happened here: to avoid a minimum sentence of twenty-five years to be served in its entirety, with the possibility of a longer sentence, Defendant bargained for, and received, a sentence of only twenty-two years to be served with no RED. Nothing in the Act, or elsewhere in our sentencing statutes, prohibits this result.

Nevertheless, the final sentence of subsection (c) of the Act appears to contemplate that a defendant ordered to serve more than the minimum term in his or her appropriate range is eligible for early release on the basis of sentence reduction credits applicable to that portion of the sentence in excess of the minimum. That the judgment documents designate the sentence to be served at “100%” does not preclude this result. As set forth above, several of the “100%” designations on a uniform judgment document do not preclude the accrual of sentence reduction credits. Accordingly, Defendant may inquire of the TDOC whether and how it intends to calculate any sentence reduction credits to which he may become entitled with respect to years sixteen through twenty-two of his sentence. If Defendant is not satisfied with the TDOC’s response, he may file a proceeding pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. See Hughley v. State, 208 S.W.3d 388, 395 (Tenn.2006) (quoting Carroll v. Raney, 868 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993)).

Our interpretation of the Act allowing for the parties to agree on sentences that do not allow for early release on parole is consistent with our position that sentencing range classification and REDs are non-jurisdictional elements of sentencing. This interpretation allows the parties the maximum flexibility to craft a particular sentence for a particular defendant that still satisfies the overall legislative intent expressed in our sentencing scheme. For instance, in this case Defendant received a sentence that was more favorable than any sentence he would have received had he not agreed to the plea bargain and then been convicted at trial of the charged offenses. The State’s ability to craft this distinct sentence enabled it to avoid the cost and uncertainty of a trial and yet ensure that Defendant spends a considerable amount of time incarcerated. Defendant’s sentence does not contravene the Act or any other applicable provisions of our sentencing statutes. Further, the Act authorizes this result. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s plea-bargained sentence requiring him to serve twenty-two years pursuant to the Act with no possibility of early release on parole was within the trial court’s jurisdiction to impose and is therefore a legal sentence. Because Defendant has failed to show that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the challenged sentence, or that he is presently held on an expired sentence, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The costs of this cause are taxed to Terrance Lavar Davis and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a concurring opinion.

GARY R. WADE, J., filed an opinion concurring separately, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., joined.

SHARON G. LEE, J.,

concurring.

I write separately to state my position in this case. I concur with the views of my colleagues as expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that the defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. My decision in this case would have been different had the trial court imposed this sentence on the defendant after a trial. However, because this was a voluntary guilty plea agreement, and not a sentence imposed by the trial court following a trial, the defendant waived any habeas corpus relief he may have been entitled to receive because the sentence he bargained for was within the statutory minimum and statutory maximum for the offense.

I do not join in Justice Wade’s concurring opinion because I do not think this is the appropriate case to decide the viability of Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn.2008). The majority opinion does not rely on Edwards nor cite it for any legal proposition. Neither party briefed or argued the merits of Edwards. Edwards is factually distinguishable as it involved a sentence imposed by the trial court after a trial, whereas this case concerns a guilty plea. Therefore, the affir-mance or reversal of Edwards should await a day when the issue is squarely before the Court. Today is not that day.

GARY R. WADE, J.,

concurring.

As the majority opinion observes, the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice held that petitioner Davis’s sentences were illegal. After our intermediate appellate court’s first opinion in this case, Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. May 6, 2008), we granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn.2008). Upon reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again remanded to the trial court for the entry of habeas corpus relief. Davis v. State, No. M2009-00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn.Crim.App. April 8, 2009). Upon application by the State, we granted permission to appeal.

I concur in the result, but I write separately in an effort to identify a workable rule in an area of law which has, on occasion, produced confusing results. While the more recent cases from this Court have rejected claims for habeas corpus relief based upon deviant range classification or release eligibility percentages inconsistent with statutory guidelines, see, e.g., Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn.1997), and Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780-81 (Tenn.2007), I maintain that the majority opinion in Edwards cannot be reconciled with established precedent. Nevertheless, I would conclude, based on other of our opinions which do offer some consistency in analysis, that a guilty plea as a part of a negotiated sentence waives release eligibility and offender status so long as the sentence falls within the minimum and maximum terms for the offense. Thus, the petitioner Davis would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief.

Some historical perspective may be in order. Initially, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in subsection (b) and in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may prosecute a writ of ha-beas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a) (2000 & Supp. 2009). Our ease law has interpreted the statutory terminology, and we recently defined “imprisonment” and “restraint”:

To obtain habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must be ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty.’ ‘Imprisoned’ refers to actual physical confinement or detention. ‘Restrained of liberty’ is a broader term and encompasses situations beyond actual physical custody. However, a petitioner is not restrained of liberty unless the challenged judgment itself imposes a restraint on the petitioner’s freedom of action or movement.

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.Bd 251, 257 (Tenn.2007) (citations omitted); see also May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tenn.2008).

Despite the broad statutory language, I would observe that the grounds upon which habeas corpus relief may be granted are, in practice, limited. See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn.2004). Unlike a post-conviction petition, for example, which may afford relief from a voidable judgment, the purpose of a state habeas corpus petition is to contest only void judgments. Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn.2007); State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (1968). A facially invalid or void judgment is one that a court has no authority to enter. Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn.1998). A voidable judgment, on the other hand, appears valid on its face and typically requires proof of a constitutional violation to establish its invalidity. Id.

This Court has often ruled that the writ of habeas corpus may be sustained “only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings ... that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that the sentence has expired.” Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn.2000); accord Ussery v. Avery, 222 Tenn. 50, 432 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1968); State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37 (1868). Nevertheless, this Court has consistently added that an illegal sentence qualifies as void and may be set aside through habeas corpus at any time. May, 245 S.W.3d at 344; see also Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256. For years, our Court has quite simply defined an illegal sentence as one that directly contravenes a statute. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256; see also State v. Burkhart, 566 S;W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.1978). Indeed, we have provided specific instructions that the petition for habeas corpus is the proper procedure for challenging a sentence which is not authorized by statute. Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tenn.2005). Prior opinions have identified two grounds upon which a petitioner may qualify for relief from a judgment: (1) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction or authority to impose a sentence upon a defendant; or (2) when the trial court imposed a sentence in direct contravention of a statute. The majority opinion in Edwards, however, blurred these two concepts by suggesting that a judgment is void, and that habeas corpus relief is warranted, only upon showing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. In my view, the analysis by the Edwards majority further clouded our treatment of habeas corpus in that it did not address whether the record established that the trial court had imposed an “illegal” and, therefore, a void sentence in “direct contravention of a statute.”

In our 1978 Burkhart opinion, the lead case on the subject of illegal sentences, the defendant escaped from prison while serving a term for burglary. 566 S.W.2d at 872. He pled guilty to escape and received a sentence concurrent with the one he was serving even though the statute required a consecutive term. Id. When the Department of Correction notified Burkhart that his sentence was to be served consecutively regardless of the judgment by the trial court, he filed a petition asking for relief. Id. This Court held that the concurrent sentence was imposed “in direct contravention of the express [statutory] provisions ... and consequently was a nullity.” Id. at 873. Citing precedent in a number of other jurisdictions, this Court ruled that “a trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become final.” Id. The case was remanded to the trial court for further consideration as to whether the judgment should be set aside. Id.

More recently, in Moody, this Court pointed out that habeas corpus is the proper collateral remedy for the correction of an illegal sentence. 160 S.W.3d at 516. Moody received consecutive six- and four-year sentences for spousal sexual battery and aggravated assault. Id. at 514. He was sentenced to an enhanced supervised probation program, and the judgment required him to register as a convicted sex offender. Id. He did not seek appeal of the revocation order, nor did he file a petition for post-conviction or habeas corpus relief. Id. When the trial court later revoked his probation, he filed a “Motion to Correct Errors in Judgment,” challenging the legality of the sentences on the basis that he was convicted under statutes that did not require his registration as a sex offender. Id. The motion was denied, and Moody filed a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. Because the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure did not authorize a direct appeal from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, we held that “the proper procedure for challenging an illegal sentence at the trial level is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 516.

Later, this Court refined the process by which a habeas corpus petitioner might be permitted to establish the illegality of a sentence where a jurisdictional defect is not apparent from the judgment. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261. We held that when there is “an illegal sentence claim based on facts not apparent from the face of the judgment, an adequate record for summary review must include pertinent documents to support those factual assertions.” Id. Further, “[w]hen such documents from the record of the underlying proceedings are not attached to the habeas corpus petition, a trial court may properly choose to dismiss the petition without the appointment of counsel and without a hearing.” Id. Applying these principles in Summers, we arrived at the following conclusions:

Although the judgment on Summers’ escape conviction states that the sentence is to be served concurrently with his sentences for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated arson, and sale of cocaine, the judgment is silent as to whether Summers committed the escape while being held for the other charges. We conclude, therefore, that no illegality of the sentence is evident on the face of the judgment ordering a concurrent sentence for the escape conviction. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Summers committed the escape while being held for the other charges_ Because the escape judgment is facially valid and Summers failed to support his factual assertions with pertinent documents from the record of the underlying proceedings, we conclude that summary dismissal was proper.

Id. at 262 (emphasis added).

In my assessment, the Summers opinion taught that the inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding requires an analysis of any “pertinent documents” from the record of the underlying proceedings that are attached to the petition in support of the assertions. See id. at 261. Thus, the procedure developed in that case, directing a habeas corpus petitioner to file those “pertinent documents,” necessarily recognizes a challenge to a possible jurisdictional defect in a sentence that is “not apparent fi-om the face of the judgment.” See id. That is, habeas corpus relief may be available, but the illegality of a sentence may be established by documentation other than the judgment of conviction and sentence.

The dissent in Edwards, joined in by Chief Justice Holder, criticized the holding because the majority treated the case, in which the trial court imposed the Petitioner’s sentence in direct contravention of a sentencing statute after a jury verdict, as identical to those cases (such as the one before us today) in which the judgment has been entered through a guilty plea and negotiated sentence. In Edwards, the petitioner neither bargained for nor agreed to a sentence higher than the permissible range, as was the case in both Mahler, 735 S.W.2d at 226, and Hoover, 215 S.W.Bd at 776. The trial court, based upon a miscalculation of the prior offenses, unilaterally imposed upon Edwards a sentence under the Range III, persistent offender category rather than the Range II, multiple offender classification. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-106 & -107 (2006 & Supp.2009). The consequence was a sentence beyond legislative authority.

That this Court in Hoover used the term “non-jurisdictional” to describe our statutory sentencing scheme when trying to reconcile errors in the context of a plea-negotiated sentence, 215 S.W.3d at 780, appears to be the origin of some of the confusion. In Mahler, former Chief Justice Harbison, speaking for a unanimous Court, recognized the concept of waiver as to range classification and release eligibility:

It is generally true ... that a judgment imposed by a trial court in direct contravention of express statutory provisions regarding sentencing is illegal and is subject to being set aside at any time, even if it has become final. In [Burk-hart], the trial judge had ordered a sentence for escape to be served concurrently with a previous sentence in direct contravention of a statute requiring the sentence to be consecutive.
There have been other cases where sentences were imposed which were higher or lower than that authorized by the statute designating the punishment for the crime. In those cases the sentences have been held subject to being later vacated or corrected.
As previously stated, that is not the situation here. The sentence imposed was clearly within statutory limits fixed for the offense of murder in the second degree. In our opinion any question as to the classification of appellant as a Range II offender or as to his release eligibility was waived by the guilty plea.

Mahler, 735 S.W.2d at 228 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Reference to the Mahler ruling may help reconcile what I perceive to be inconsistencies in our application of the habeas corpus remedy. Indeed, the state has argued, and the majority in Edwards so held, that offender classification and release eligibility are non-jurisdictional regardless of whether the sentence is the result of a guilty plea or imposed by the trial court and, therefore, habeas corpus relief is not warranted. In its opinion in Edwards, the Court of Criminal Appeals, consistent with our prior ruling in Hoover, took exception to that contention, observing that “the use of offender classification and release eligibility as subjects of plea bargaining are non-jurisdictional,” and further observing that “release eligibility offender classification can be the subject of plea negotiations and agreed to by a defendant provided that the sentence imposed is within the statutory authority of the sentencing act.” Edwards v. State, No. M2006-01043-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 92359, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 11, 2007). The critical difference, of course, is that the challenged judgment in Edwards resulted from a mistaken range classification imposed by the trial court after a jury conviction, whereas the judgment in Hoover was the result of a negotiated guilty plea.

After our ruling in Edwards, this Court remanded the case at issue today to the Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider its decision to grant petitioner Davis habe-as corpus relief. That our intermediate court did not change its ruling is not surprising. In my view, this Court’s ruling in Edwards, because of internal contradictions, provided little guidance. To illustrate, on the one hand, this Court had ruled in Edwards that

habeas corpus relief is limited to remedying jurisdictional defects that are apparent on the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings on which the judgment is rendered. For purposes of habeas corpus challenges to sentencing, jurisdictional defect means either a sentence that directly contravenes a governing statute or a sentence that was not available under governing statutes.

269 S.W.3d at 924 (emphasis added). On the other hand, this Court also ruled that

offender classification is a non-jurisdictional element of sentencing. Thus, errors and/or irregularities in offender classification are waived by a guilty plea, and are not grounds for habeas corpus relief if the sentence is imposed by a trial court after a jury conviction. Simply stated, habeas corpus relief is not available to correct errors or irregularities in offender classification.

Id. (emphasis added). Offender classification is, of course, based in statute. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-105 to -109 (2006 & Supp.2009). It is difficult, therefore, to fathom how any sentence imposed by the trial court could contain “errors and/or irregularities in offender classification” resulting in a term of imprisonment beyond legislative authority and not “directly contravene[ ] a governing statute.” Edwards, 269 S.W.3d at 924.

In an effort to provide a workable rule for the trial courts, I am persuaded to concur in this opinion based primarily upon an interpretation that I believe reconciles the rulings in Mahler, McConnell, and Hoover. As stated, in Hoover, this Court held that the use of offender classification and release eligibility, as subjects of plea bargaining, are non-jurisdictional. 215 S.W.3d at 780. By the application of the rationale in Mahler, 735 S.W.2d at 228, therefore, release eligibility and offender classification by range can be the subject of plea negotiations and agreed to by a defendant provided that the agreed sentence is within the statutory limits for the particular crime regardless of range. See generally Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-112 to -115 (2006 & Supp.2009). I can concur in the majority’s conclusion only because Davis, in contrast to the petitioner in Edwards, entered into a plea agreement as to guilt and sentence. Because a guilty plea may serve as a waiver of the constraints of range classification or release eligibility, Davis is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Obviously, I would favor overruling Edwards, at our next opportunity, to the extent that the majority of the Court held that the trial court’s imposition of a sentence beyond the legislative authority does not qualify as grounds for relief. I support a rule that a guilty plea which includes release eligibility provisions or range classifications in contravention of the statutory language serves as a waiver of grounds for a writ of habeas corpus; otherwise, a sentence imposed by a trial court after conviction or an open plea of guilt (absent any negotiated term) that qualifies as illegal under our statutory scheme would be subject to a meritorious attack. Stated differently, a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, made with a full understanding of release eligibility and offender classification, would serve to waive any subsequent claims for habeas corpus relief so long as the sentence is within the statutory minimum and the statutory maximum for the offense.

As stated, the majority in Edwards avoided a statutory interpretation analysis by simply characterizing the error regarding offender classification as “non-jurisdictional.” 269 S.W.3d at 924. Here, the Court has properly included such an analysis. The petitioner Davis pled guilty to two Class B felonies, which, by virtue of their being committed within 1,000 feet of a school zone, were elevated to Class A felonies, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(b) (2003). The range of service for a Class A felony is no less than fifteen and no more than sixty years. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40 — 35—111(b)(1). Because the petitioner was convicted under the Drug-Free School Zone Act, he was required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the appropriate range, and the release-eligibility provisions could not apply prior to service of the entire minimum sentence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-432(c), (d). The negotiated sentence of twenty-two years with a 100% release eligibility is not in direct contravention of either section 40-35-111(b) or the Drug Free School Zone Act because it requires a prison term of at least fifteen years, which is the statutory minimum for a Class A felony. The sentence can, therefore, be classified as compliant with the underlying statute and does not present a ground for habeas corpus relief, even though the Act does not explicitly provide for 100% of service.

Thus, I concur in the result.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice HOLDER joins in this concurring opinion.

      . The indictments are not included in the record. We base our recitation of the charges brought against Defendant on the copies of two petitions to enter a plea of guilty included in the record.

      . The twenty-two-year sentences are concurrent to each other and to a previous sentence Defendant was serving.

      . As the appealing party before this Court, the State had the duty to prepare the record so as to convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what occurred below with respect to the issues forming the basis of its appeal. State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tenn.1999); Tenn. R.App. P. 24(b). Although this is a habeas corpus proceeding, we may consider "the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment was rendered.” Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tenn.2006).

      . We have previously observed that "the 1989 [Sentencing] Act contemplates that its provisions will govern plea bargain agreements” and "permits a court to impose a plea bargain sentence without a specific sentencing hearing or presentence report.” McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 n. 7 (Tenn.2000) (citing Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-203(b), - 205(d) (1997)). Of course, all plea bargains are subject to the trial court's review and acceptance or rejection. See Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11(c)(3).

      . A defendant’s eligibility for early release on parole is no guarantee that he or she will be granted parole. See Hopkins v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles & Prob., 60 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). Parole is a privilege, not a right. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tenn.2009). A release eligibility date simply, and merely, provides a date after which a defendant is entitled to be considered for early release on parole. The Board of Probation and Parole makes the decision whether to grant parole. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-118(a) (2006).

      . A defendant’s RED "is conditioned on the inmate's good behavior while in prison" and may be deferred by the TDOC for infractions of institutional rules. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-501(m).

      . This provision applies to defendants who have committed these offenses on or after July 1, 1995. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40 — 35—501(i)(l).

      . Additionally, release eligibility is limited for certain offenses committed while the defendant is in possession of a firearm, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-501(j), and for certain defendants convicted of aggravated robbery, id. at (k)(l).

      . For reasons set forth below, there are separate boxes for multiple rapists and child rapists.

      . The designation "100%” for violent offenders, child rapists, multiple rapists, and repeat violent offenders refers to the defendant's RED. A "100%” RED indicates that the defendant is not eligible for early release on parole.

      . Defendants with no previous criminal history who are convicted of first degree murder may also be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39~13-204(a) (2006 & Supp.2009), for which there is no release eligibility, id. § 40-35 — 501 (h)(2).

      . In habeas corpus proceedings, we construe the term “jurisdiction” as synonymous with the term "authority.” See Lynch v. State ex rel. Killebrew, 179 Tenn. 339, 166 S.W.2d 397, 398-99 (1942).

      . Since Defendant filed his habeas corpus petition in this case, the General Assembly has acted to limit habeas corpus relief on plea-bargained sentences further by adding the following language to the habeas corpus statute:
      (b) Persons restrained of their liberty pursuant to a guilty plea and negotiated sentence are not entitled to the benefits of this writ on any claim that:
      (1) The petitioner received concurrent sentencing where there was a statutory requirement for consecutive sentencing;
      (2) The petitioner's sentence included a release eligibility percentage where the petitioner was not entitled to any early release; or
      (3)The petitioner's sentence included a lower release eligibility percentage than the petitioner was entitled to under statutory requirements.
      Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (Supp.2009). This language applies to all habeas corpus petitions filed on or after June 11, 2009. Act of June 2, 2009, ch. 420, § 3, 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts_We do not address the efficacy of this amendment to the habeas corpus statute in this case.

      . We cite to the 2003 version of the statute because Defendant pleaded guilty in December 2003. The statute has since been amended to expand the drug-free zone to include preschools, child care agencies, public libraries, recreational centers, and parks. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(l) (2006).

      . We recognize the legislature’s desire to emphasize its intent that defendants sentenced for dealing drugs in school zones will not be released on parole prior to a certain time. Nevertheless, the TDOC is not at liberty, even pursuant to a legislative directive, to ignore a trial court’s judgments. See Burk-hart, 566 S.W.2d at 873 ("The [Tennessee] Department of Correction may not alter the judgment of a court, even if that judgment is illegal.”).

      . Section -523 has since been amended to include child sexual predators. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523(c) (Supp.2009). We refer to the 2003 version because it is the version most comparable to the 2003 version of the Act.

      . See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40 — 35—501(j) (requiring 100% service of the minimum mandatory sentence for certain offenses committed with a firearm, less sentence reduction credits of no more than 15%); id. at (k)(l) (requiring 100% service of sentence imposed by court for certain aggravated robberies, less sentence reduction credits of no more than 15%).

      .Thus, the Act allows a trial court to impose, for instance, a twenty-two-year sentence on a Range I offender for a Class A felony, of which fifteen years must be served in their entirety. With respect to the remaining term of seven years, absent a contrary plea bargain, the appropriate RED and sentence reduction credits would apply.

      . The Act was originally enacted in 1995, see Act of May 26, 1995, ch. 515, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 918, whereas Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501 was originally enacted in 1989, see Act of May 24, 1989, ch. 591, § 6, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1169, 1348.

      . Nevertheless, "the State may not confer through plea negotiations release eligibility for criminal offenses that are statutorily ineligible for early release.” Hoover, 215 S.W.3d at 780 (citing Smith, 202 S.W.3d at 128).