author: DURHAM, Chief Justice:

text:
    2004 UT 11
    DICK SIMON TRUCKING, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20010560.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    Jan. 30, 2004.

      Mark K. Buchi, Steven P. Young, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
    Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Clark L. Snelson, Michelle Bush, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
   DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Plaintiff Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. (Dick Simon) purchased satellite tracking units and attached them to new trucks that it uses in its trucking business. Following an audit, the Utah State Tax Commission (the Commission) concluded that the purchases were purchases of tangible personal property, and assessed sales tax accordingly. Dick Simon petitioned the Commission for reconsideration, arguing that the satellite units are parts of vehicles that Dick Simon partially self-manufactures, and that Utah Code section 59-12-104(36) (2000 & Supp.2001) (the Authorized Carrier Exemption) exempts the units from taxation. The Authorized Carrier Exemption provides that “sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized carrier” are exempt from sales and use taxes. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36). The Commission found the Authorized Carrier Exemption inapplicable, and upheld the tax assessment. Dick Simon petitioned the district court for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 59-1-601 (2000).

¶2 Dick Simon now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Commission. It argues that when Dick Simon installs a satellite unit onto a truck, the unit is integrated into the aggregation of parts that constitute a “vehicle” for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. The question before us is whether the satellite tracking units qualify for the Authorized Carrier Exemption by virtue of the fact that Dick Simon installs them and makes them part of its vehicles before use.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3 In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we give no deference to its conclusions of law. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 680. Instead, we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness. Id. “Likewise, a district court’s interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that we review for correctness.” Id. When we review a grant of summary judgment, “we review the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Houghton v. Dep’t of Health, 2002 UT 101, ¶ 2, 57 P.3d 1067 (internal quotation omitted).

II. APPLICABILITY OF THE AUTHORIZED CARRIER EXEMPTION

¶4 Utah imposes sales tax upon “retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state.” Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) (2000 & Supp.2003). It is undisputed that the satellite tracking units at issue here constitute “tangible personal property.” Sales of the units are therefore subject to sales tax, unless an exemption applies. Mark O. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 805 P.2d 176, 179 (Utah 1990).

¶ 5 Any doubt about the proper application of a sales tax exemption must be resolved against Dick Simon. ‘While courts generally construe taxing statutes favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the tax-mg authority, the reverse is true of exemptions.” SF Phosphates Ltd. v. Auditing Din, Utah State Tax Comm’n, 972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div. of the State Tax Comm’n, 842 P.2d 887, 890-91 (Utah 1992) (“Although we generally construe taxing statutes in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority, we construe statutes providing tax exemptions strictly against the taxpayer.”).

¶ 6 Both Dick Simon and the Commission base their arguments on the plain language of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. The Commission argues that the language indicates that the exemption applies only to “vehicles,” and that because the satellite units are neither “vehicles” nor, when the sale transaction occurs, parts of “vehicles,” they do not qualify for the exemption. Dick Simon argues that the language applies to all the parts of a vehicle that are installed before the vehicle is placed in service for the first time.

¶ 7 Dick Simon advances several additional arguments for treating the satellite units as exempt vehicle parts even though it purchases them separately from the trucks themselves. Specifically, it argues that (1) the Wyoming case of Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 820 P.2d 993 (Wyo.1991) supports its position; (2) the Utah legislature intended the exemption to apply in cases such as this; (3) language in section 59-12-104(41) of the Utah Code (the tax exemption for passenger tramways) supports Dick Simon’s position; (4) facts occurring after a transaction are relevant to determine the applicability of a sales and use tax exemption; (5) Dick Simon would have presented evidence at trial that the satellite units are simply one part of a tax exempt vehicle, and therefore the trial court should not have granted summary judgment; and (6) a ruling against Dick Simon will create bad tax policy.

A. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 8 The Authorized Carrier Exemption applies to “sales or leases of vehicles to, or use of vehicles by, an authorized carrier. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36). There is no dispute that the satellite units were sold to Dick Simon, as the exemption requires. Likewise, no dispute exists about whether Dick Simon is an - “authorized carrier.” The issue is whether the satellite units qualify as “vehicles” by virtue of their installation on Dick Simon’s trucks before the trucks’ first use.

¶ 9 The legislature has defined the term “vehicle” for purposes of the Sales and Use Tax Act generally, and for the Authorized Carrier Exemption specifically. “Vehicle” means, in pertinent part, “any vehicle, as defined in section 41-la-102 ... that is required to be titled, registered, or both.” Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(31) (2000). Section 41-la-102 of the Utah Code further defines “vehicle” as “a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, off-highway vehicle, manufactured home, and mobile home.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-102(66) (1998 & Supp.2003). The same section defines a “motor vehicle” specifically as “a self-propelled vehicle intended primarily for use and operation on highways.” Id. § 41-la-102(33)(a) (1998 & Supp.2003).

¶ 10 The Commission points out that the terms of the Authorized Carrier Exemption indicate that the exemption applies only to certain purchases of “vehicles,” and that, while the satellite tracking units may well be important vehicle parts, they do not qualify as “vehicles” in and of themselves. The legislature could have specified that the exemption would also apply to vehicle parts, as it did with the exemption for aircraft “parts and equipment.” See Id. § 59-12-104(5) (2000 & Supp.2003). The Authorized Carrier Exemption, however, does not mention vehicle parts. See Id. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36).

¶ 11 The Commission also points out that the “[sjales tax in Utah is a transaction-oriented tax.” Matrix Funding Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2002 UT 85, ¶ 15, 52 P.3d 1282. Thus, according to the Commission, we must look only at what constitutes the vehicle when the sale transaction occurs. It is improper, the Commission argues, to inquire into events taking place after the transaction to determine whether the exemption applies.

¶ 12 Dick Simon' concedes that the satellite units obviously are not themselves “vehicles,” and also agrees that the sales tax is transaction-oriented. Dick Simon argues, however, that it is sometimes necessary to consider events taking place after the actual purchase as part of the transaction. It argues that the exemption applies to “purchases of all parts of a vehicle installed prior to the vehicle being placed in service.” To support its argument, Dick Simon points out that the term “vehicle” includes “specially constructed vehicles.” Dick Simon reasons that because the definition of “vehicle” for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption encompasses “specially constructed vehicles,” “[t]he Legislature has thus declared that under Útah law, a vehicle is nothing more than a cumulation of parts.” Therefore, Dick Simon urges, the satellite units are exempt because they become part of Dick Simon’s exempt vehicles before Dick Simon places the vehicles in service.

¶ 13 According to the Utah Code, “specially constructed vehicles” are vehicles that (1) must be registered in Utah, (2) are “not originally constructed under a distinctive name, make, model, or type by a generally recognized manufacturer of vehicles,” and (3) are “not materially altered from [their] original construction.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-102(58) (1998 & Supp.2003). While it is true that the Authorized Carrier Exemption does apply to specially constructed vehicles, Dick Simon’s assertion that the legislature has therefore declared that a vehicle is “nothing more than a cumulation of parts” is a non sequitur. The fact that the Authorized Carrier Exemption encompasses specially constructed vehicles simply means that specially constructed vehicles are, like other vehicles, exempt from sales and use tax when they are sold or leased to authorized carriers. The satellite units are not “specially constructed vehicles” any more than they are ordinary “vehicles.”

¶ 14 Dick Simon’s argument suggests that the trucks it purchases are not yet “vehicles,” and do not become “vehicles” until Dick Simon does some additional work to ready them for service. To support this position, Dick Simon cites the affidavit of its Chief Financial Officer and General Manager Al-ban Lang, and asserts:

When Simon receives the partially-completed trucks from the manufacturer, the trucks are not legally or practically ready to be placed into service. In order to make them ready, Simon does a thorough maintenance check of the trucks, registers and licenses the trucks, cures any manufacturing defects in the trucks pursuant to an agency agreement with the manufacturer, installs the satellite units, and adds load-locks, trailers, company identification and detailing, government required markings, and government required safety equipment such as fire extinguishers, mud flaps, and reflective triangles. Simon also installs the tires because the manufacturers generally ship the trucks with the tires detached.

Even assuming that Dick Simon must perform these additional tasks before placing the, trucks in service, however, Dick Simon need not perform additional work for the trucks to qualify as “vehicles” for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. This is because the pertinent statutory provisions contain no requirement that a truck must be legally and practically ready to be placed in service before constituting a “vehicle.” See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36); Id. § 41-la-102(33), (66). Rather, at the time of the truck purchase transaction, the trucks already meet the definition of “motor vehicle.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-102(33)(a). The trucks are essentially completed “vehicles” at the time of their purchase.

¶ 15 Dick Simon claims that a ruling against it is tantamount to deciding that “the term ‘vehicle’ does not include the parts used to build the vehicle.” In actuality, we are ruling that a “vehicle” is comprised of all its parts at the time of the purchase transaction. Once the transaction is completed, however, additional parts cannot be exempted from taxation by adding them on to the already-built vehicle.

¶ 16 In sum, Dick Simon’s approach incorrectly conflates its purchase of trucks— trucks that are already “vehicles” at the time of the transaction — with its post-purchase addition of the satellite units to the trucks. We hold that the only way truck parts can constitute a “vehicle” for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption is for the parts to be integrated into the vehicle at the time of its purchase. Although Dick Simon emphasizes that it must perform some work on the trucks before it can place them in service, we are satisfied that the trucks are already “vehicles” when Dick Simon purchases them. The transaction on which Matrix Funding instructs us to focus does not include Dick Simon’s separate purchase of additional parts.

B. Related Arguments

¶ 17 As noted above, Dick Simon makes several additional arguments in support of its interpretation of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. It contends that we should construe the exemption based on reasoning in the concurring opinion of a Wyoming case, that we should analogize the Authorized Carrier Exemption to different sales and use tax exemptions, that the satellite units are critical parts of the trucks that must be attached before commercial operation, and that public policy and legislative intent support Dick Simon’s position. We have considered each of these arguments, but find them unpersuasive in light of the plain language of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. In addition, none of the different tax exemptions Dick Simon has cited are analogous to the Authorized Carrier Exemption. Finally, because we find the exemption inapplicable based on its plain language, we need not inquire into legislative history or weigh Dick Simon’s public policy arguments. “When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.” State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 667 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The plain language of the Authorized Carrier Exemption establishes that the exemption does not apply to Dick Simon’s purchases of satellite tracking units. The satellite tracking unit purchase transactions occur separate from and subsequent to the vehicle purchase transactions. Adding the units to the vehicles after the vehicle purchase transaction has been completed does not make the units part of the vehicle for purposes of the Authorized Carrier Exemption. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Utah State Tax Commission.

¶ 19 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM’S opinion.

      . The exemption is currently codified at Utah Code Ann. section 59-12-104(35) (Supp.2003). At all times pertinent to this litigation, however, it existed at section 59-12-104(36). Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(36) (2000 & Supp.2001). This opinion therefore cites the Authorized Carrier Exemption as it was codified at Utah Code Ann. section 59-12-104(36) (2000 & Supp.2001).

      . This provision is now codified at section 59-12-102(75) of the Utah Code (Supp.2003), with one substantively insignificant change in punctuation.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: DURHAM, Chief Justice, NEHRING, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    2004 UT 12
    Nellie THOMAS and Utah Labor Commission, Petitioner, v. COLOR COUNTRY MANAGEMENT dba Sizzler Restaurant, and/or Mid-Century Insurance Company, Respondents.
    No. 20020091.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    Jan. 30, 2004.

      David W. Parker, Salt Lake City, Virginius Dabney, Aaron J. Prisbey, St. George, for petitioner Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for petitioner Labor Commission.
    Carrie T. Taylor, Mark R. Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
   DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 In this case, we consider whether an order from an administrative law judge to an employer to initiate subsistence payments for an injured employee is enforceable before the administrative decision-making process has reached its end. Nellie Thomas, an employee of Color Country Management (“Color Country”), was injured in the course of her employment, and an administrative law judge for the Utah Labor Commission (“Commission”) made an initial finding that she qualified for permanent total disability compensation. When Color Country refused to comply with the administrative law judge’s accompanying order to initiate temporary subsistence payments, Thomas sought to enforce the order by obtaining an abstract of her award from the administrative law judge and filing it in the district court pursuant to section 34A-2-212 of the Utah Labor Code. The enforcement of the abstract was stayed by the district court while Color Country challenged the issuance of the abstract first before the administrative law judge, who held that he had properly issued the abstract, and later before the Commission’s Appeals Board (“Appeals Board”), which did not address the challenge because Color Country had already appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the order to initiate subsistence payments was .not a “final order” and that, consequently, the abstract of Thomas’s award was improperly issued by the administrative law judge.- Because the plain language of section 34A-2-413 provides that the initial finding of permanent total disability, upon which the subsistence payments in this case were predicated, is not final, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On October 15, 1994, in the course of her employment at Sizzler Restaurant, Nellie Thomas slipped in a puddle of greasy water and fell, breaking her left arm and injuring her shoulder. Over the next three years, Thomas underwent four separate surgeries but never fully recovered the use of her arm. On May 15,1997, Thomas filed an application for a hearing with the Commission, claiming entitlement to permanent total disability benefits under the Utah Workers’ Compensation Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 to - 803 (2001). An administrative law judge heard her case on January 6, 1998. On January 8,1998, the administrative law judge determined that Thomas was temporarily totally disabled and ordered that the issue of permanent total disability be held in reserve until her medical condition stabilized.

¶ 3 In the following months, Thomas underwent an examination by a doctor, who found that she had reached medical stability and would not recover any further use of her arm. Color Country then requested that the administrative law judge reconsider the issue of permanent total disability, and on August 11,1998, the judge determined that, based on her recent medical evaluations, Thomas qualified for increased disability compensation. The judge tentatively found that she was permanently totally disabled and ordered that Color Country initiate permanent total disability subsistence payments to provide for Thomas during the interim period pending a final finding of permanent total disability. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a final finding could not be made until Color Country had the opportunity to submit a reemployment plan for the judge’s evaluation.

¶ 4 Color Country prepared and submitted a reemployment plan but refused to make the ordered subsistence payments. On May 1, 2000, Thomas requested that the administrative law judge issue an abstract of her award that she could file with the district court in order to effect enforcement of the subsistence payments. A week later, Color Country filed an objection to the proposed request with the administrative law judge, arguing that, according to the statute, abstracts could only be issued for final orders, and that the order to initiate subsistence payments was not a final order.

¶ 5 On May 18, 2000, the administrative law judge held that the order based on the initial finding of permanent total disability “constituted a final order with respect to that particular issue.” Thereafter, the administrative law judge reviewed the reemployment activities that had followed the initial finding of permanent total disability and issued a comprehensive final order for the case on June 14, 2000. He held that Thomas was permanently totally disabled and ordered that Color Country pay her permanent total disability compensation covering the period from August 16, 1996, to August. 16, 2002, at which point the compensation would continue at a modified rate. He also ordered Color Country to pay all medical expenses related to Thomas’s accident.

¶ 6 The following month, Color Country filed two motions requesting that the Commission’s Appeals Board review the administrative law judge’s ruling regarding issuance of the abstract of Thomas’s award and his comprehensive decision of June 14, 2000. The Appeals Board issued its ruling on October 31, 2000, essentially affirming the comprehensive findings of the administrative law judge without addressing the propriety of the issuance of the abstract of award. Color Country then filed a petition for review with the Utah Court of Appeals challenging both the final finding and the issuance of the abstract of Thomas’s award. Additionally, it again requested that the Appeals Board issue a decision regarding the issuance of the abstract. On January 11, 2001, the Appeals Board notified Color Country that its appeal to the court of appeals “subsume[d] the issue” and refused to issue a decision on the matter. On December 6, 2001, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the Appeals Board regarding the legality and propriety of the comprehensive, and final, findings of the administrative law judge. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm’n, 2001 UT App. 370, ¶ 47, 38 P.3d 969. However, the court of appeals also briefly addressed whether the administrative law judge appropriately issued an abstract of Thomas’s award and concluded that “the order was not a final order, and hence, the abstract was improperly issued.” Id. at ¶¶ 44^17.

¶ 7 After the court of appeals issued its ruling, Thomas petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari,'which we granted. Thomas’s petition challenges only the final portion of the court of appeals’ decision, concerning the propriety of issuing an abstract of the initial award of permanent total disability compensation. We have jurisdiction to review the court of appeals’ decision pursuant to Utah Code section 78 — 2—2(3)(a). Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

ANALYSIS

¶8 In her petition, Thomas argues that the administrative law judge appropriately issued an abstract of her award for interim or tentative permanent total disability payments because the award was a final order as to the payments required to be made during the interim period between the initial and final finding. Color Country argues that we should uphold the court of appeals’ determination that this interim award was not final and that the administrative law judge improperly issued an abstract of Thomas’s award. Color Country further argues, however, that because the court of appeals’ ruling has rendered “[section] 34A-2-413 unworkable,” we should, for the benefit of future cases, hold that, as a general matter, tentative awards-of permanent total disability ordered pursuant to section 34A-2-413 are nevertheless final both for purposes of appeal and enforcement, i.e., issuance of an abstract, “once all appeals have been exhausted.” In order to address these concerns, we will examine the language of several statutes that govern these issues.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW .

II9 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving the court of appeals’ conclusions of law no deference. Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, ¶ 6, 44 P.3d 734. “When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.” State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 667 (quotation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters.” Id. (quotation omitted). Further, “ ‘when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision.’ ” Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1252 (quoting Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958).

II. SECTION 34A-2-212: ABSTRACT OF FINAL ORDERS

¶ 10 “Ordinarily, an award of benefits is paid by a workers’ compensation carrier without resort to judicial machinery.” Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1998). However, the legislature has provided' a mechanism to aid injured employees when employers refuse to comply with an administrative law judge’s award of disability compensation by allowing an order for such compensation to “be enforced in the same manner as any judicial judgment.” Id. Section 34A-2-212 of the Utah Labor Code states that “[a]n abstract of any final order providing an award may be filed ... in the office of the clerk of the district court,” and that such an abstract shall “constitute a lien” upon the employer’s real property. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(l)(a), (c) (2001). In other words, an injured employee may use the district court to enforce the payment of an award issued by the Commission by filing an abstract of “any final order providing an award” with the district court.

¶ 11 This case turns on the interpretation of this language. Clearly, the administrative law judge’s order provided Thomas with an award of permanent total disability compensation; at issue is whether that award was final. Since only abstracts of “final orders providing an award” may be filed in district court, the administrative law judge’s issuance of an abstract of Thomas’s award was proper only if the order based on the tentative finding constituted a “final order.”

¶ 12 In their arguments regarding the meaning of “final order” in section 34A-2-212, both parties rely on the three-prong test set forth in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, ¶ 16, 999 P.2d 17. The Union Pacific test asks three questions to determine whether agency action is final for purposes of judicial review:

(1) Has administrative decision-making reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?;
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences flow from the agency action?; and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action?

Id. These considerations aid us in determining whether “[ajgency actions that meet the foregoing test are appealable.” Id.

¶ 13 However, the parties’ reliance on Union Pacific is misplaced. We formulated the Union Pacific test to determine what constitutes a “final agency action” for purposes of judicial review as provided by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997); Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at ¶ 11, 999 P.2d 17. That act establishes that “the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997). Thus, the Union Pacific test is a jurisdictional inquiry.

¶ 14 Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over “final agency actions,” it “does not specifically define” this term. Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 970 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). Since this act does not provide a definition, we developed the Union Pacific test to determine when administrative orders constitute “final agency actions” in order to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Union Pacific, 2000 UT 40 at ¶ 16, 999 P.2d 17. Unlike the term “final agency action,” the term “final order” is defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Because this act clearly defines “final order,” we need not turn to Union Pacific for guidance on what constitutes a “final order” for which an abstract may issue. Thus, what constitutes a final order for purposes of appellate review is different than what constitutes a final order for purposes of the issuance of an abstract of an administrative award.

¶ 15 Although the Union Pacific test does not apply to determining what constitutes a “final order” for which an abstract may issue under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Union Pacific continues to be the standard by which “final administrative action” will be judged for the purpose of judicial review. To determine whether Thomas’s award was final within the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act for purposes of enforcing an abstract of award, however, we look to the plain language of the statute.

¶ 16 Our analysis today turns on the “final order” language of section 34A-2-212, but that language “should not be isolated from the rest of the [Utah Labor Code],” Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1990), especially because sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 define what constitutes a final order of the Commission while section 34A-2^413 places a limiting construction on the definition. Thus, in addressing the issue, we look to each of these sections and seek to harmonize them with each other.

III. SECTIONS 34A-1-303 AND 34A-2-801

¶ 17 Sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 set forth a broad definition of the term “final order.” Specifically, section 34A-1-303 of the Utah Labor Code states that “[a] decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title is the final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initb ated.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(1) (emphasis added).. It also states that “[a] decision of the commissioner is a final order of the commission,” and “[a] decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission,” unless the decisions are “set aside by the court of appeals.” Id. § 34A-1-303(2)(b)(ii), (2)(c)(ii) (emphasis added). In other words, the Utah Labor Code provides that any decision made by an entity that holds the authority of the Commission, which is not further appealed through administrative procedures, is a “final order” of the Commission.

¶ 18 Section 34A-2-801 reaffirms this statutory definition of a “final order”, stating that “[ujnless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge ..., the decision of an administrative law judge ... is a final order of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.” Id. § 34A-2-801(2) (emphasis added). If a party in interest does not pursue further administrative review through the procedure outlined in this section, the decision of the administrative law judge becomes final. Id. § 34A-2-80K2), (3).

¶ 19 While the definition of what constitutes a final order in these two sections is very broad, there is also an express limitation on what constitutes a final order included in section 34A-2^tl3 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) specifically states that initial findings of permanent total disability are not final. Thomas’s award is based on this more specific section. Because “our rules of statutory construction provide that ‘when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision,’ ” Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1252 (quoting Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958), we must now determine how the more specific provision affects our analysis. Therefore, we examine section 34A-2-413, which provides for permanent total disability awards.

IV. SECTION 34A-2-413: PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY

A. Procedure Outlined in Section 34.A-2-j.13

¶ 20 Injured employees seeking permanent total disability compensation for work-related injuries must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they have become permanently totally disabled as a result of an industrial accident or [occupational disease. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) (200.1). An administrative law judge must review the evidence to determine, essentially, whether the employee is permanently disabled and unable to perform reasonably available work. Id. § 34A-2-413(l)(c).

¶21 Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the process an administrative law judge must follow when determining whether an injured employee is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. This section requires that a finding be issued in two parts — an initial finding and a final finding. The initial finding of permanent total disability triggers a review period in which the employer or its insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan. Id. § 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii), (d). This subsection specifically states that the initial “finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until” the employer has the opportunity to submit a reemployment plan, the administrative law judge reviews this reemployment plan and the reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to statute, and the administrative law judge holds a hearing. Id. § 34A-2-413(6)(a). The intent of the reemployment plan is to determine whether the injured employee can be rehabilitated in order to reenter the workforce, and a final finding of permanent total disability is held in reserve until the possibilities of reemployment are either exhausted or abandoned. Only after all of these requirements have been met does the finding of permanent total disability become final.

¶ 22 Even though the initial finding is expressly made not final by statute, section 34A-2-413(6)(b) requires that the administrative law judge order the employer to make subsistence payments during the review period between the initial and final findings of permanent total disability. Following the initial finding, and “[pjrior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order ... the initiation of permanent total disability payments to provide for the employee’s subsistence.” Id. § 34A-2-413(6)(b)(i) (emphasis added). Thus, through the section 34A-2-413(6)(b)(i) payments, section 34A-2-413 purports to provide injured employees with compensation until a final finding can be made regarding their disability status.

¶23 If the employer refuses to comply with a subsistence payment order from the administrative law judge, the employee’s only apparent means of enforcement is to request that the administrative law judge issue an abstract of this interim award that can then be filed with the district court. However, to obtain the abstract from the administrative law judge, the subsistence payment order must be a final order. Therefore, even though initial findings are not final orders, we must determine whether the section 34A-2 — 413(6)(b)(i) order to initiate subsistence payments, which is predicated on this non-final finding, qualifies, for the purpose of issuing an abstract under section 34A-2-212, as a “final order” under the definition set forth above.

B. A Section SJiA-2-fl3(6)(b)(i) Order Is Not a “Final Order”

¶ 24 A section 34A-2-413(6)(b)(i) order to initiate subsistence payments is predicated on the administrative law judge’s initial finding that, based on the evidence submitted, the employee is sufficiently injured to merit the receipt of permanent total disability compensation. Although this initial finding seems to fit the broad definition of a final order set forth' in sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 because it is a decision entered by an administrative law judge regarding an employee’s disability status, initial findings have been expressly excluded from the definition by the plain language of section 34A-2-413(6)(a). Thus, section 34A-2-413(6)(a) provides a specific exception to the broad definition of final order found in sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801. Moreover, because this section has specific application to the subsistence payment order at issue in this case, its provisions supersede the general provisions of sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 with respect to that order.

¶ 25 Because initial findings are not final orders, subsistence payment orders predicated upon initial findings also are not final orders. Before becoming final, the initial finding may be modified as a result of the employee’s rehabilitation or reemployment. The statute specifically prohibits the administrative law judge from entering a final order until these conditions are met. Because initial findings may be modified, subsistence payments predicated upon initial findings may also be modified. Hence, even though section 34A-2-413(6)(b)(i) directs administrative law judges to order the initiation of subsistence payments, such orders are expressly not “final orders.” Therefore, under the present statutory scheme, an administrative law judge may not issue an abstract of a subsistence payment order that is based on this initial, non-final finding.

¶ 26 Our conclusion does not alter the directive in section 34A-2-413(6)(b) that requires administrative law judges to order subsistence payments to be made to injured employees until the Commission reaches a final finding. However, the present structure of the statute does prevent enforcement by abstract because it classifies the initial finding of permanent total disability as not final. We recognize the difficulty this may create for injured employees and urge the legislature to rectify the problem, but we cannot ignore the plain language of section 34A-2-413(6)(a); “[t]o do otherwise trespasses upon the legislative domain.” Gottling v. P.R., Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 23, 61 P.3d 989.

CONCLUSION

¶ 27 Section 34A-2-212 of the Utah Labor Code provides that an abstract of any final order providing an award may be filed with a district court for the purpose of enforcement. While sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 of the Labor Code set forth a broad definition of what constitutes a final order, the language of section 34A-2-413 excepts the initial finding of permanent total disability from this broad definition of “final order” by expressly stating that the initial, tentative finding is not final. The present statutory structure of section 34A-2-413, which governs awards of permanent total disability compensation, divides the administrative law judge’s decision-making process into two parts — an initial finding and a final finding. Because the section 34A-2^U3(6)(b)(i) order to initiate permanent total disability subsistence payments is based on the initial finding — a finding that the statute expressly states is not yet final — it is not a “final order” from which an abstract may be issued. Thus, Thomas’s abstract of award was improperly issued, and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

¶ 28 Justice WILKINS and Justice PARRISH concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT’s opinion.

DURHAM, Chief Justice,

concurring:

¶ 29 I write separately to discuss an issue alluded to in footnote two of the majority opinion. In that footnote, we state that “any argument made by Thomas that her abstract of award should be evaluated using section 35-1-59, the section governing abstracts of awards that existed at the time of her injury, as opposed to the later amended section 34A-2-212, is ... moot.” ■ Thomas did, in fact, advance such an argument, and but for its mootness, I would find it determinative in this case. It raises the important question of how we analyze whether to apply statutory amendments — and specifically in this case, worker’s compensation statutory amendments — retroactively. For the benefit of future cases,1 wish to take this opportunity to clarify just how we should analyze the issue of whether to apply statutory changes retroactively.

¶ 30 We recognize an exception to the general prohibition on retroactive application of statutes. A statutory amendment that does not “ ‘enlarge, eliminate, or destroy”’ substantive rights is not substantive, and can therefore be applied retroactively. Moore v. Am. Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987) (quoting State Dep’t of Soc. Sens. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998,1000 (Utah 1982)). This should not be the end of our analysis, however. We must remember our strong presumption against retroactivity, and also consider several factors when deciding whether to allow retroactive application.

¶31 First, the Utah Code provides that “[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000). Consequently, Utah courts follow the general rule that “a statute generally cannot be given retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute.” Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986)); see also Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953 (Utah 1987); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Utah 1982). Section 34A-2-212 of the Utah Code does not expressly provide for its retroactive application; if the issue were not moot, therefore, our default position would have to be that section 34A-2-212 was retroactively inapplicable unless it was clear that some exception could be invoked.

¶32 Superimposed on this foundational rule against retroactive application is a second general rule for workers’ compensation cases in particular: The parties’ rights in such cases are controlled by the law as it stood on the day of the accident. Moore, 737 P.2d at 990. This second general rule further strengthens the default position.

¶ 33 One exception to the general rule against retroactive application of laws in workers’ compensation cases is the “procedural” exception. According to this exception, amendments that merely alter the procedure by which substantive rights are adjudicated are retroactively applicable. The rule is simple enough to articulate, but it is much more difficult to determine whether a statutory change is procedural rather than substantive. We have differentiated “procedural” from “substantive” statutes in varying ways. As we said in Moore, an amendment is not substantive if it does not “ ‘enlarge, eliminate, or destroy’ ” substantive rights. 737 P.2d at 990 (quoting Higgs, 656 P.2d at 1000). “[A] statute is procedural when it provides a remedy for already existing rights or merely adds to or provides a substitute for already existing remedies.” Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., 731 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1986) (citing Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 119 (1909)).

¶ 34 Significantly, “convenience and reasonableness are properly considered in determining whether legislation is remedial or procedural.” Moore, 737 P.2d at 990 (citing Boucofski, 104 P. at 119-20).) “Considerations of ‘convenience, reasonableness and justice’ should be taken into account in making determinations of legislative intent.” Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 478 (quoting Boucofski, 104 P. at 119)).

¶35 While we have not, in the past, expressly aligned Utah law with federal court pronouncements on retroactive application of statutory amendments, the federal rule is entirely sound. “Retroactivity is not favored in the law.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988). When analyzing whether applying a statute as amended “would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective,” we should use “a common sense, functional judgment about ‘whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.’ This judgment should be informed and guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’ ” Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357-58, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). This approach is both complementary and analogous to our own mandate to consider “convenience, reasonableness, and justice.” Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 478 (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 36 As we use all these factors to analyze whether a given amendment enlarges, eliminates, or destroys substantive rights, however, we must keep in mind that the procedural exception to the general rule against retroac-tivity is “narrow.” J.P., 648 P.2d at 1369 n. 4 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, “[wjhen the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it intended to make a substantive, rather than a procedural or remedial change.” Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ¶ 13, 35 P.3d 341 (citing Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). Finally, this court should adhere to the deeply-rooted principle that “a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties.” United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801). We should fall back on our general rule against retroactive application when the presumption of substantiveness is not clearly rebutted. In other words, when in doubt, we should find that the statute is substantive.

¶ 37 The statutory provision at issue in Martin v. Hadix involved the amount of attorney fees that courts can award to attorneys who successfully litigate prisoner lawsuits. 527 U.S. at 347, 119 S.Ct. 1998. The statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), capped certain kinds of attorney fees, and the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether the cap was applicable only to attorney work performed after the PLRA’s effective date, or whether it could also be applied retroactively, to work that attorneys had performed before the effective date. Id.

¶ 38 The petitioners in Martin argued that the PLRA’s attorney fee provision should be retroactively applicable, “because fees questions are incidental to, and independent from, the underlying substantive cause of action. They do not, in other words, change the substantive obligations of the parties because they are collateral to the main cause of action.” Id. at 359, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (internal quotations omitted). The Martin Court did not disagree with the argument that the law did not change the parties’ substantive rights or obligations. See id. Consequently, if all it took to permit a new law’s retroactive application was the ability to characterize it as merely procedural, then the Martin petitioners should have had an airtight argument. They did not. Instead, the Martin Court emphasized that a more searching, nuanced analysis is necessary.

Attaching the label “collateral” to attorney’s fee questions does not advance the retroactivity inquiry, however. While it may be possible to generalize about types of rules that ordinarily will not raise retro-activity concerns, these generalizations do not end the inquiry. For example, in Landgrafwe acknowledged that procedural rules may often be applied to pending suits with no retroactivity problems, but we also cautioned that the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case. We took pains to dispel the suggestion that concerns about retroactivity have no application to procedural rules. When determining whether a new statute operates retroactively, it is not enough to attach a label (e.g., “procedural,” “collateral”) to the statute; we must ask whether the statute operates retroactively.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Martin Court looked beyond the PLRA’s superficial procedural character. Applying “a common sense, functional judgment” that was “guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations,” id. at 357-58, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (internal quotation omitted), it found that the PLRA’s attorney fees cap could not be applied retroactively. Id. at 358-60,119 S.Ct. 1998.

¶39 If the retroactivity issue were not moot, this case would, like Martin, demand that we use our “common sense, functional judgment” to decide whether to impose the final- order requirement of Utah Code section 34A-2-212 on claims that arose before the requirement was enacted. Prior to the amendment, injured workers had a reasonable expectation of receiving subsistence payments, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(b)(i)(2000), and undisputed disability and medical benefits, see id. § 34A-2-413(6)(b)(ii), once they could make an initial showing that they were permanently totally disabled. They could reasonably rely on ALJs to order these payments because the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) operate under a definitive statutory mandate to order them. An ALJ must order the payments, in every case, once he or she has made an initial finding of permanent total disability. See id. § 34A-2-413(6)(b) (providing that the ALJ “shall order” such payments “[p]rior to the finding becoming final”). Similarly, employers had the expectation that they would have to make those payments to injured workers. Employers and employees alike knew where they stood in the event that an employee made an initial showing of permanent total disability.

¶40 The new final order requirement, however, directly conflicts with this legislative mandate. “The statutes of this state require the courts to give legislative enactments a liberal construction, with a view to effectuate the purpose sought by the Legislature.” Utah Copper Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24, 29 (1920). If the final order requirement of section 34A-2-212(l)(a) is retroactive, it means that a permanently, totally disabled worker cannot enforce the ALJ’s order, because the worker cannot get an abstract of the ALJ’s order to issue. It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to create a statutory conflict that would deprive permanently totally disabled workers of important rights. The amendment’s retroactive applicability means that the employer serendipitously benefits from what is apparently an unintended loophole, while the injured worker suffers serious hardship. Such a conclusion should offend our “common sense, functional judgment.” See Martin, 527 U.S. at 357-58, 119 S.Ct. 1998. If the retroactivity issue were not moot, therefore, I would hold that the final order requirement could not be applied retroactively.

¶41 Examining this case in light of the “convenience, reasonableness and justice” factors that we articulated in Moore, Docutel Olivetti, and Boucofski reinforces my conclusion. The majority acknowledges that its interpretation of the amendment creates a “problem” with section 34A-2-413(6)(b) that the legislature should “rectify.” Asking the legislature to fix the problem may be convenient for us, but it certainly does not satisfy the “convenience” factor for Ms. Thomas. Because of this statutory conflict, ALJs “shall order” employers to pay subsistence payments to injured workers, but the employers can flout those orders with impunity, because the ALJ’s initial finding of permanent total disability is not a “final order.” That can hardly be called “reasonable.” Ms. Thomas had an enforceable right to subsistence payments prior to the amendment, but applying the amendment retroactively emasculates that right without any indication that the legislature truly intended such a result. That is not “just.” At the very least, a careful analysis using all of these factors would raise enough doubt that use of the narrow procedural exception to escape the strong presumption against retroactivity would be misguided.

¶ 42 We have previously held that it would be improper to apply statutory amendments retroactively, even when those amendments seemingly implicated mere procedure. We have found, for example, that an amendment that alters the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act is substantive. The plaintiff in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988), sued a county employee for personal injuries that the county employee allegedly caused the plaintiff in a traffic accident. The defendant employee had been acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, but was engaged in a nongovernmental function. Id. at 166. At the time the plaintiff filed suit, Utah Code section 63-30-13 (1986) required the plaintiff to file a notice of claim with the county only if her claim arose from the performance of a true governmental function. Id. After the plaintiff had filed suit, the legislature amended section 63-30-13 to require the filing of a notice of claim whether the function from which the claim arose was governmental or nongovernmental. We held that the amendment did not apply to the ease, and that therefore the plaintiff only needed to follow the notice requirement that was in place when her claim arose. Id.

¶43 The amendment at issue in Schultz was similar to the one at issue in this case because it did not, on its face, appear to “enlarge, eliminate, or destroy” the plaintiffs substantive right to sue a government employee. It did not, for example, create or abolish any causes of action that a plaintiff might have against government employees acting within the scope of their employment. It did not raise or lower any of the evidentia-ry burdens that a plaintiff must bear to state a claim against a government employee. It simply imposed a requirement that a plaintiff file a notice of claim “with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year- after the claim arises.”' Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1997). While we did not explain the factors that moved us to find that the procedural exception did not apply, Schultz does demonstrate that in the past we have had no difficulty barring retroactive operation of changes in procedural law.

¶ 44 Utah courts have also been quite willing to reject interpretations of the Workers’ Compensation Act that would allow employers to avoid their payment obligations “in direct contravention to the larger purpose and spirit of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm’n, 2001 UT App 370, ¶ 21, 38 P.3d 969 (citing Wilstead v. Indus. Comm’n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d 692, 693 (1965) (listing purposes of the Act as insuring income to injured employees; eliminating the expense, delay, and uncertainty of employees having to prove negligence; and making industry bear the burdens of worker injuries)). For example, in Industrial Commission v. Daly Mining Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301 (1918), we rejected an employer’s proposed interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act because it would have made the Act “useless and of no material benefit.” Id. at 306. In this case, there can be no doubt that interpreting the final order requirement to be within the narrow procedural exception would indeed render section 34A-2-413(6)(b) “useless and of no material benefit.”

¶ 45 In other contexts as well, Utah appellate courts have refused to impose upon innocent litigants a statutory interpretation granting them a right, but at the same time render that right “meaningless or illusory.” For example, the Utah legislature has given parents the statutory right to representation by counsel at every stage of a custody termination proceeding, including the court-appointment of counsel for indigent parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78~3a-913(l)(a) (1999). The statute, however, does not expressly mandate that the counsel be “effective.” See id. The court of appeals reasoned that the statutory right must be construed in such a way as to ensure that the right granted is meaningful:

Although this section does not expressly state that counsel must be effective, the statute would be meaningless or illusory if it guaranteed only ineffective assistance of counsel. The legislature’s omission of “effective” should not be read to suggest an intent to provide only ineffective assistance of counsel.

State ex rel. E.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1994). We recently agreed with this reasoning. State ex rel. M.M., 2003 UT 54, ¶ 7. Just as the court of appeals in State ex rel. E.H. was unwilling to follow a statutory interpretation that would strip a right of substance and enforceability, so too I would decline to interpret section 34A-2-212 in a way that renders the right to subsistence payments “meaningless or illusory.”

¶ 46 Our rejection of statutory interpretations that render statutory rights “worthless and of no material benefit” or “meaningless or illusory” is consistent with the rule that we consider factors such as convenience, reasonableness, and justice in determining the procedural or substantive character of statutes. It is also consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s dictate that courts should use a “common sense, functional” approach to determine whether a law should be applied retroactively.

¶ 47 The law contains strong general presumptions against retroactive application. While it is not always simple to determine whether a statutory amendment is procedural or substantive in nature, careful analysis of the amendment adding the “final order” requirement does show that it qualifies as a substantive change. If we were deciding whether the narrow procedural exception applies to Ms. Thomas, we would have to consider a host of factors, such as convenience, reasonableness, and justice. In future cases, furthermore, we should remember the United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that even if a rule of law seems aimed at procedure only, its effects can be so significant that retroactive application is improper. See Martin, 527 U.S. at 357-60, 119 S.Ct. 1998.

¶48 I would concede that if, following a statutory amendment, the party holding a right can still enforce that right in some meaningful, albeit different way, then retro-activity is acceptable. That is not what we confront with the change from section 35 — 1— 59 to section 34A-2-212. The statutory change in this case converts an enforceable right into an unenforceable one. Such an amendment is almost as substantive as an outright abolition of the right itself. If the issue of retroactive application were not moot, therefore, I would find that the final order requirement could not be applied to Ms. Thomas.

NEHRING, Justice,

concurring:

¶ 49 I concur in the opinion of the Associate Chief Justice and write separately out of apprehension that the failure of the Chief Justice’s concurrence to assemble a majority may betray her cause to clarify our jurisprudence concerning the retroactive application of statutes by carrying the inference that we take issue with her analysis. I do not. To the contrary, I endorse her proposed methodology for taking on issues of retroactive statutory application. Moreover, I agree that the identification of the elements of that methodology is an “important question.” It is not, however, a question that demands an answer in this case. Therefore, while I would be inclined to join the Chief Justice under other circumstances, because the status of Ms. Thomas’s abstract of award is moot, I decline to do so here.

      . Beginning August 16, 2002, Color Country’s compensation payments would continue at either the permanent total disability weekly compensation rate or "36% of tire state average weekly wage, whichever [was] greater, reduced by 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits” that Thomas was receiving.

      . It appears that the question of whether the abstract of Thomas's award was properly issued is moot. Because the administrative law judge made a second, and final determination, on June 14, 2000, that Thomas was permanently totally disabled and ordered Color Country to pay permanent total disability compensation commencing from the time of her injury, an abstract of that final order could properly issue. Accordingly, any argument made by Thomas that her abstract award should be evaluated using section 35-1-59, the section governing abstracts of awards that existed at the time of her injury, as opposed to the later amended section 34A-2-212, is also moot. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35 — 1— 59 (1979) ("[a]n abstract of any award may be filed in the office of the cleric of the district court” (emphasis added)), with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(l)(a) (2001) ("[a]n abstract of any final order providing an award may be filed ... in the office of the clerk of the district court” (emphasis added)).
      Notwithstanding the apparent mootness of the issue, however, we have discretion' to address whether the first abstract in this case was properly issued under Utah Code section 34A-2-212(l)(a) because it presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and is capable of evading review during the brief time any one litigant is affected. Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 26, 16 P.3d 1233. “[T]he ultimate determination of whether to address an issue that is technically moot rests in the discre-lion of this court.” Id. Considering the serious nature of the ambiguity in the statute and the potential for recurring problems between injured employees and employers, we assume for purposes of analysis that section 34A-2-212(l)(a) applies retroactively and address the issue accordingly.

      . We note that Color Country also argues that the tentative order the administrative law judge issued to initiate permanent total disability payments lacked the mandatory language that provides notice of the parties' rights to administrative or judicial review as required by section 63-46b-10(l) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(l)(f) (Supp.2003); see also id. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(vii) (Supp.2003). In light of our analysis in today's decision, we feel it unnecessary to reach this argument.

      . According to section 78-2a-3(2)(a), the court of appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings of the Commission in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).

      . We note that the legislature amended sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 effective May 2003. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-1-303, 34A-2-801 (Supp.2003). The changes to these sections were stylistic rather than substantive, however, and our analysis would be the same under either version. We cite therefore the sections currently in effect.

      . "When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee’s rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(8) (emphasis added).

      . Although the statutory amendment adding the "final order” requirement became effective on July 1, 1997 and the statute of limitations for workers' compensation cases is generally six years, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(2) (2001), the Commission has continuing jurisdiction to reexamine claims that were initially brought within the six year statute of limitations. Id. § 34A-2-420; Ortega v. Meadow Valley Constr., 2000 UT 24, ¶ 9-11, 996 P.2d 1039.

      . I note that the law at issue in Schooner Peggy was different from the "final order” statutory amendment in this case, because the Schooner Peggy law — a treaty — expressly stated that it was to be applied retroactively. See 5 U.S. (lCranch) at 108 (basing holding on fact that new treaty expressly applied to property that was not "defln-itively condemned” at the time the treaty was signed). This distinction does not diminish the importance of the principle that we should "struggle hard" against construing statutory amendments as retroactively applicable when those amendments affect litigants' substantive rights.

      . Prior lo the amendment, section 63-30-13 read:
      A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsection 63-30-11(4).
      The only significant change that the amendment made was to add this phrase onto the end of the section: "regardless of whether or not the func-lion giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.” 1987 Utah Laws ch. 75, § 6.


author: HILL, Chief Justice.

text:
    2004 WY 13
    JG, Appellant (Respondent), v. STATE of Wyoming, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; State of Wyoming, ex rel., JLVW, minor child, Appellees (Petitioners).
    No. C-03-4.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 25, 2004.
    Representing Appellant: Carol K. Watson of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellees: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Dan Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sue Chatfield, Assistant Attorney General.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] In a pleading filed in the district court on December 16, 2002, Appellant, JG, and the State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services (DFS), as well as the mother of the affected child (JLV), stipulated in a settlement agreement that JG was not the biological father of JLV. JLV was born January 23, 1991. The basis for this stipulation was that genetic testing had ruled out the possibility that JG could be the biological father of JLV. The district court found that JG had not timely requested genetic testing and had conceded he was the father of JLV in the paternity proceedings that occurred during 1992-97. The district court also determined there was no legal basis for altering the earlier paternity judgment, concluded that the applicable statute of limitations had run, rejected the stipulation, and denied the motion to vacate the judgment that was in place. We will vacate the order from which this appeal is taken and remand to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion and the stipulation of the parties.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] JG advances these issues:

1. Whether [JG’s] procedural and substantive due process rights were violated by the district court for failing to follow statutory procedures in the determination of paternity, rendering the district court orders finding paternity in [JG] as null and void.
2. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to promulgate an order which denied [JG’s] and the State of Wyoming’s stipulated agreement to vacate the finding of paternity in [JG].
3. Whether the applicable statute of limitation, Wyo. Stat. § 14 — 2—104(a)(ii)(B) was tolled until [JG] obtained a paternity test in June of 2001.

DFS initially posited this statement of the issue:

Whether the district court erred in refusing to accept the parties’ stipulated agreement seeking to vacate the 1993 paternity order?

[¶ 3] In its initial briefing, DFS conceded that the district court did err in that respect. Thus, at that point, this case was in the somewhat unusual posture of having neither Appellant nor Appellee arguing that the district court’s order could or should be affirmed. However, on August 14, 2003, before this Court held a conference on the case as a part of the expedited docket, DFS submitted a letter to the Court suggesting that the district court’s conclusion that JG had by-passed several opportunities to present grounds for relief from the judgment under W.R.C.P. 60(b) provided a potential basis for affirmance of the district court’s order.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

[¶ 4] On April 6, 1992, DFS filed a petition to establish paternity in the district court alleging that JG was the biological father of JLV. There was considerable difficulty locating both JLV’s mother and JG, so service of process was not completed until September 28, 1992. JG, who resided at the Wyoming State Penitentiary at that time, filed a request for the appointment of counsel and an affidavit of indigency on October 20, 1992. By letter dated October 27, 1992, the district court advised JG as follows:

At this point in the process, it is unnecessary for you to have an appointed attorney. The Statute requires a hearing and if you deny paternity, a blood test will be ordered. If the blood test indicates that you are the probable father and you still deny paternity, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent you. On the other hand, if the test indicates that you are not the father, then you have no further obligation and all the costs of this action will be paid by the State.
Under the circumstances, I will ask the attorney in this case to arrange for a telephone conference call and will ask the Warden to make you available at a telephone.

[¶ 5] Because the governing statutes that were in place when these proceedings were in process are so important to the resolution of the issues raised, we summarize them here. JG was not presumed to be the natural father of JLV. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (Michie 1986 and Supp.1992). Thus, in order to establish parentage, it was required that paternity be established by blood tests or other credible evidence. Blood tests are critically important evidence in the context of parentage eases. No blood tests were ordered.

[¶ 6] The record in the instant case contains no transcripts or other evidence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-108 (Supp.1992) required that a hearing on the paternity action be held as soon as practicable and that a record of the proceeding be kept. Apparently, a hearing was held, and JG appeared by phone, but no record of that hearing was made. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14 — 2—109(b) and (c) (Supp.1992) required the district court to order genetic tests if requested by a party, and to order further independent tests, if requested. Under that same statute, the district court also had authority to order genetic testing on its own motion. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-112(d) (Supp.1992), trial by jury was available if a party requested it. According to the record on appeal, no such request was made, but the record reflects that JG was incarcerated, indigent, and did not have the benefit of counsel. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-116(a) and (b) (Supp.1992) provided that “[t]he court shall appoint counsel for a party who is financially unable to obtain counsel” and that “[i]f a party is unable to pay the cost of a transcript, the court shall furnish on request a transcript for purposes of appeal.” Here, no transcript could have been made available to JG, because the proceedings, to the extent there were meaningful proceedings, were not reported or otherwise memorialized.

[¶ 7] The hearing in this case was held before a district court commissioner, and his findings and conclusions were referred to the district court for approval and signature. The Judgment and Order of Paternity and Support, entered on February 8, 1993, included a statement that JG appeared pro se by phone from the State Honor Farm and that the court commissioner heard testimony and received evidence.

[¶ 8] On March 17, 1997, DFS filed in the district court a petition for order to show cause why JG should not be found in contempt for failure to pay child support. Such an order was issued on March 20,1997, and a new Judgment and Order was entered on May 30, 1997. This judgment also recited the taking of evidence and testimony but it too was not summarized in the judgment, nor is it otherwise found in the record. The only matter that is entirely clear is that JG never received the original judgment of paternity. DFS conceded that JG did not receive a copy of that judgment; however, the district court did not assign fault for that failure (State should have located JG; JG should have inquired about the result of the 1992-93 proceedings) and confirmed the 1993 judgment.

[¶ 9] In a letter dated June 24, 1997, JG conveyed to the district court his concerns about the renewed paternity determination. The letter stated that JG did not know if he was the father of the child, had never admitted that he was the father of the child, and that he had timely requested both counsel and genetic testing. JG requested that genetic testing be ordered and offered to pay for it. The district court treated JG’s letter as a motion for genetic testing and to vacate the 1997 judgment. In an order entered on June 30, 1997, the district court denied any relief.

[¶ 10] On December 17, 1999, DFS filed another motion for order to show cause why JG should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. Appended to that motion was the 1993 judgment, but not the 1997 judgment. Such an order was issued on December 17,1999, and re-issued on May 30, 2000. JG did not appear and another judgment was entered on September 26, 2000. The order indicated that evidence and testimony were taken by the district court. Again, if such evidence and testimony was taken, it was not summarized in the order, nor does it otherwise appear in the record.

[¶ 11] On September 20, 2001, JG filed a motion to set aside the judgment of paternity, as well as the child support ordered over the years. In that pleading, JG reiterated that he asked for counsel at the time these proceedings were initiated, that he requested and was denied genetic testing, and that he did not know of the 1993 judgment until 1997. Continuing, JG asserted that during the period 1997 through 2001, he did not have funds to hue an attorney. In July of 2001, JG finally obtained counsel at a fee of $200.00 a month. JG also obtained genetic testing. That testing revealed that JG was not the biological father of JLV. By order entered on February 1, 2002, the district court determined that the five-year statute of limitations had run, and dismissed JG’s motion. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104(a)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis 2001). JG appealed that order to this Court on February 21, 2002.On May 29, 2002, an attorney for DFS filed in the district court a notice of buccal swab for genetic testing, and a second such notice was filed on June 18, 2002. On June 26, 2002, JG’s appeal of the district court’s February 1, 2002 order was dismissed for want of prosecution. On July 19, 2002, DFS filed the results of the genetic testing in the district court. The tests established that JG was not the biological father of JLV.

[¶ 12] On December 16, 2002, a pleading styled as a “Stipulated Settlement Agreement” was filed in the district court. In that stipulation DFS, JG, and JLV’s mother agreed that JG was not the biological father of JLV and that he owed no past or future child support to JLV’s mother or to the State. No hearing was held on that motion. On January 14, 2003, the district court entered its order disallowing the stipulated settlement. JG’s appeal from that order is the subject of the instant appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 13] We are confronted by an unusual set of circumstances that we hope make this case sui generis — i.e., a case unlike any other. We have reviewed parentage cases in many and varied circumstances, but few, if any, of our precedents provide meaningful guidance in sorting out this matter. Indeed, it may do a disservice to our jurisprudence with respect to the resolution of parentage cases to attempt to explicate or justify what transpired in this case.

[¶ 14] In a case that bears some similarity to this one, we held:

Father injects the “best interests of the child” at several junctures. There are some circumstances where the best interests of the child are at issue in a paternity proceeding. TL ex. rel. TL v. CS, 975 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo.1999). However, much like the TL case, such an analysis was rendered unnecessary because the statute permitted this action and mandated genetic testing if requested by even one party. Id. Here, we do not have a circumstance where a biologic father seeks to disrupt an established father-child relationship. Instead, we have a presumptive father who seeks to dissolve what he contends is not an established and functional father-child relationship in favor of a man who has been determined to be the biologic father. Courts simply are not always capable of resolving the sorts of profound human dilemmas that are brought to their doorsteps, at least not in a way that will avoid all potential hardship to even innocent parties. Here, though Child has two presumptive fathers, he has none who wishes to fully embrace that role and the responsibility that goes with it. We cannot disagree with the position of Mother, JDB, and the GAL (as well as the reluctantly-reached decision of the district court) that “the truth” was the best result that could be salvaged in this case.

In re State, Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 2001 WY 118, ¶ 14, 35 P.3d 1224, ¶ 14 (Wyo.2001).

[¶ 15] In addition, we have held that the district court must ensure that a complete record of parentage proceedings is created, including the reporting of any hearings (thus ensuring the preservation of all evidence and the testimony of any witnesses). JAG v. State, Department of Family Services, 2002 WY 158, ¶ 18, 56 P.3d 1016, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2002).

[¶ 16] We have long held that parentage actions must be conducted in conformance with the strict procedural requirements set out in the parentage statutes. CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 532 (Wyo.1992); Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811, 813 (Wyo.1989) (holding that failure to strictly follow statutory procedures results in a void judgment); AEI v. JDM, 758 P.2d 22 (Wyo.1988).

[¶ 17] Finally, we conclude that W.R.C.P. 60(b) cannot serve as a basis to affirm the district court because the 1993 and 1997 judgments are void for the reasons set out above.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 18] We hold that the 1993 and 1997 judgments of the district court are void for failure to strictly follow required statutory procedures and because no record was made of the proceedings that produced those judgments. Further, like the NDB case cited above, “the truth” is the best result that can be salvaged in this ease. The order from which the appeal was taken is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the district court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion, as well as the stipulation of the parties.

      . The settlement agreement was structured to resolve a ten-year-long paternity and child support dispute that went awry in 1992 and never really got back on the right track.

      . The record demonstrates that JLV did not have counsel or a guardian ad litem during the most recent proceedings, though JLV did have a guardian ad litem in the early proceedings. The most recent version of the parentage statutes does not require that a minor child be represented. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-812 (LexisNexis 2003) (counsel may be appointed for a minor child if the child’s interests are not otherwise adequately represented). At the time these proceedings were initiated, the governing statute required that a guardian ad litem be appointed for a minor child. Wyo. Slat. Ann. § 14-2-107 (Michie 1986).

      . W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides:
      (b) Other Reasons. — On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute, or to grant relief to a party against whom a judgment or order has been rendered without other service than by publication as provided by statute. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, 'and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

      . In the intervening years, the statutes articulating the process for determining paternity (parentage) have been amended many times. Currently, they are found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-801 through 14-2-823 (LexisNexis 2003). Under the usual circumstances, and to the extent necessary, we would apply the statutes that were in effect at the time the paternity action was initiated, or the most recent statute if that statute were more favorable to the affected party. Suffice it to say here that the most recent version of the parentage statutes is not more favorable to any of the parties to this action.

      . This case graphically illustrates the rather serious consequences of relying on an admission of intercourse, or even an admission by the alleged father that the child is his, when blood tests can usually resolve this factual issue definitively.

      . In its brief, DFS characterizes the circumstances of this case as "unique.”