author: WILKINS, Justice:

text:
    2000 UT 42
    STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Nealy W. ADAMS, Defendant and Petitioner.
    No. 980261.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 5, 2000.

      Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, Asst. Atty Gen., Salt Lake City, and Les Daroczi, Ogden, for plaintiff.
    Gregory G. Skordas, Lloyd R. Jones, Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
   WILKINS, Justice:

{1 Nealy W. Adams was convicted of one count of forcible sexual abuse pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404(1) (1999). The court of appeals affirmed, State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781 (Utah Ct.App.1998), and we issued a writ of certiorari to review that court's decision, cert. granted, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1998). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

T2 In 1998, Adams developed a relationship with Virla Hess and moved into her home, where she lived with her thirty-four-year-old daughter Carleen, who suffers from Down's Syndrome. Carleen is unable to read or write and has the cognitive abilities of a three-and-one-half-year-old.

T3 In late 1994, Adams, who was a regular drinker, began drinking excessively and occasionally became so intoxicated that he was unable to remember what he had done while inebriated. During this time, Virla noticed that Carleen became more reclusive, spending most of her free time in her room with the door closed.

T 4 Adams' relationship with Virla began to deteriorate in 1995. One night, Virla awoke to the sound of a bang followed by breaking glass. She got up to investigate and saw Adams, naked, with his pants in his hand, emerging from Carleen's bedroom. When Virla spoke with Adams about the incident the following morning he said he had been drinking and could not remember anything that had happened that night. Thereafter, the parties agreed that Adams should move out of Virla's house.

{5 When Virla told Carleen that Adams was leaving, Carleen responded by telling her mother, "Good, he's been messing with me." Virla waited until Adams had removed all of his belongings before contacting the police and reporting the alleged abuse. Detective DeHart conducted an interview with Carleen in her mother's presence. Adams was later charged with one count each of rape and forcible sexual abuse.

T6 At trial, Carleen testified that she had been molested by Adams. On cross-examination, Adams suggested that Virla invented the allegations and then coached Carleen to tell the story in retaliation for Adams breaking off the relationship. In response, the State elicited testimony from Detective De-Hart, who stated that he was unable to lead Carleen with his questions and that, in his opinion, she did not appear to be coached. He testified that Carleen's initial account of the molestation had remained consistent with her subsequent description of those events. The State also called Dr. Hawks, a psychologist who had evaluated Carleen's general cognitive abilities and who testified that it was unlikely Carleen could be coached to tell, or was sophisticated enough to make up, the story alleged here. Based on the evidence adduced, a jury acquitted Adams of rape, but found him guilty of forcible sexual abuse.

T7 Adams appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, alleging, among other things, that the testimony of Dr. Hawks and Detective DeHart improperly bolstered Carleen's credibility. Adams also argued that the State had failed to establish a proper foundation for Dr. Hawks' testimony that Car-leen was incapable of being coached. The court of appeals rejected Adams' argument that Dr. Hawks' testimony improperly bolstered Carleen's credibility; however, the court concluded that Detective DeHart's testimony violated Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which governs opinion testimony on character or truthfulness. See Adams, 955 P.2d at 786. Nevertheless, with respect to Detective DeHart's testimony the court of appeals affirmed. The court said that Adams' conviction was supported by other persuasive evidence, and therefore, the admission of Detective DeHart's testimony was harmless error. See id. The court of appeals also held that Dr. Hawks' testimony satisfied the foundational requirements for admitting scientific testimony established in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). See Adams, 955 P.2d at 784-85. Adams sought review of the court of appeals' decision by petitioning this court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

18 Before this court, Adams argues the court of appeals erred in (1) concluding Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence was not violated by the admission of Dr. Hawks' testimony that Carleen did not possess the intellectual capacity to either be coached or invent a false story, and (2) concluding that Dr. Hawks' testimony concerning Carleen's credibility was admissible under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Adams also maintains (8) that the court of appeals erred in determining that Detective DeHart's improper bolstering of Carleen's credibility was harmless error because it did not prejudice the outcome of the trial.

19 On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the trial court. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). This case involves the admissibility of expert testimony, and therefore, the court of appeals properly reviewed the decision of the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). In addition, because Adams failed to raise a timely and specific objection to Detective DeHart's testimony in the trial court, the court of appeals reviewed that issue for plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

I. ADMISSIBILITY OF DR. HAWKS TESTIMONY

A. Opimion on Mental Capacity

€10 We turn first to Adams' claim that Dr. Hawks' testimony violated Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Adams argues that Dr. Hawks improperly bolstered Carleen's credibility by testifying that she either did not or could not lie about the allegations against Adams. We disagree.

¶11 Rule 608(a)(1) "permits testimony concerning a witness's general character or reputation for truthfulness ... but prohibits any testimony as to a witness's truthfulness on a particular occasion." See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 391. In order to determine whether Dr. Hawks' testimony violated rule 608(a), we review his testimony concerning whether Carleen could have been coached. The relevant trial colloquy is as follows:

Q: Could your evaluation and expertise tell you whether [Carleen] was sophisticated enough to make up the story that was alleged here?
A: And, of course, as I mentioned, that's one of the things we deal with all the time, did somebody coach you-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at this point, Your Honor, I'm going to object to his answering that until there's further foundation. What he's talking about now I don't believe-he's gone into his examination of her testifying truthfully in this case. That, again, is the prerogative of the jury. I think it's improper.
THE COURT: Well, I think the form of the question is different and he has given some background. The objection is overruled.
A: In my opinion, that's a difficult question and surely I couldn't answer that 100 percent positively; however[,] it would seem that someone who-in the school system who has been taught in special ed and resource classes[,] and she's 34, I believel,] and if all those years of special ed and resource classes couldn't get her to even write her name correctly, couldn't get her to ... count past number 50 or say the alphabet, that I'd have trouble-it would be difficult for me to assume somebody could coach her, even if they tried, to consistently report anything, you know, even their birthday. I mean, she was inaccurate in giving her birthday. She struggled with that.
So I find it troubling if-if she has difficulty in doing, you know, second and third grade level, that I would-I'd have real trouble to see anybody[-Ja mother or me or the school system[-Ilif they can't do it with counting, how could-I ask myself, could someone do it with persuasion or threats to[,] to get her to consistently across two interviews spontaneously talk about some sexual activities that occurred. So in my opinion, that's probably not likely.

112 After reviewing this testimony, the court of appeals concluded Dr. Hawks' testimony did not violate rule 608(a) because it "did not go to whether Carleen was telling the truth.... [Rather] Dr. Hawks merely stated it was his opinion she did not have the cognitive ability to be coached." Adams, 955 P.2d at 783 n. 1. Adams, however, asserts that this testimony amounted to an expert opinion about Carleen's truthfulness on a particular occasion because no meaningful legal distinction can be drawn between whether Carleen has the mental capacity to invent or learn and consistently repeat a false story, and whether Carleen lied on this particular occasion. Adams contends that in either case, the evidence is "an opinion as to whether the jury can trust [Carleen's] testimony-precisely what rule 608(a) forbids."

113 Although Dr. Hawks testified that it was "probably not likely" that Carleen was either coached or "sophisticated enough to make up the story that was alleged here," he did not offer a direct opinion of Carleen's truthfulness about the alleged sexual abuse. Dr. Hawks merely stated that Carleen's mental capacity probably prevented her from either inventing or learning and consistently repeating a fabricated story. However, he did not offer a subjective credibility determination that Carleen was telling the truth about the alleged sexual abuse, nor did he completely rule out the possibility that Car-leen could have lied about this incident. Instead, Hawks stated that based on his evaluation of Carleen's general cognitive abilities, he found it unlikely that she could learn and consistently repeat a false story or fabricate her own. Although this is a subtle distinction, and one may infer from Dr. Hawks' testimony that he finds Carleen's story eredi-ble, there is a fundamental difference between testifying that Carleen does not possess the mental capacity to invent or learn a fabricated story and opining that Carleen was telling the truth about the alleged sexual abuse. Dr. Hawks' testimony regarding Carleen's limited mental capacity to fabricate or learn a story is not the equivalent of an affirmative statement that Carleen was in fact telling the truth about the alleged abuse. Rather, Dr. Hawks' testimony went to whether Carleen's mental facilities would prevent her from learning or fabricating a story, not whether she was being truthfal in this particular instance.

114 Rule 608(a) does not prohibit an expert such as Dr. Hawks from giving testimony from which a jury could infer the veracity of the witness. Rather, it only bars direct testimony regarding "the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 392. Because Dr. Hawks' testimony did not directly address Carleen's veracity about the alleged abuse in this case, it did not impermissibly invade the province of the jury or violate rule 608(a). See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the evidence presented is ... disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given particular evidence."). Because Dr. Hawks did not improperly comment on Carleen's veracity on a particular occasion, his testimony did not violate rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' ruling on this issue.

B. Adequacy of Foundation for Dr. Hawks' Testimony

¶15 Before the court of appeals, Adams argued that Dr. Hawks' testimony failed to satisfy the reliability requirements established in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). However, the court of appeals rejected this argument, and relying on Rimmasch, concluded that Dr. Hawks' testimony met the three-part standard for admitting scientific evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 702. See Adams, 955 P.2d at 784-85. More specifically, the court of appeals concluded that (1) Dr. Hawks based his opinion on inherently reliable information, (2) Dr. Hawks properly applied the scientific principles to the facts, and (3) the probative value of Dr. Hawks' testimony outweighed its potential for prejudice. See id. While the court of appeals reached the correct conclusion in holding that Dr. Hawks' testimony was properly admitted under rule 702, we conclude the court's reliance on Rimmasch was misplaced.

116 In Rimmasch, we held that expert testimony "based upon novel scienti-Aire principles or techniques ... [was subject tol additional tests of admissibility," including that the novel technique be "inherently reliable." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396 (emphasis added). However, the Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to all expert testimony. Rather, Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is "based on newty discovered principles" Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 19 (concluding Rimmasch is inapplicable where "there is no plausible claim that the type of expert testimony offered by the prosecution was based on novel scientific principles or techniques"); Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 16, 977 P.2d 1193 (refusing to apply Rimmasch test where expert's testimony not based on novel scientific principles or techniques). In this case, Dr. Hawks' testimony was not based on novel scientific evidence. In fact, the tests Dr. Hawks employed in examining Carleen have been administered since the 1950s, and Adams concedes that "Itlhese tests unquestionably meet the reliability standard of Rimmasch." Nevertheless, Adams asserts that Rimmasch applies because the actual testimony of Dr. Hawks is not inherently reliable. This argument is without merit. Rimmasch simply requires that the scientific principles underlying the expert's testimony be inherently reliable, not that the expert's actual testimony be inherently reliable. See, e.g., State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1989) (stating that in Rimmasch "[wle determined ... that the inherent reliability of the scientific principles and techniques upon which credibility appraisals and profile-based opinion testimony are predicated must be determined before a trial court can admit that evidence" (emphasis added)); State ex rel. G.D. v. L.D., 894 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ("Rimmasch requires the trial court to serutinize the scientific or statistical principles upon which the expert's testimony is based." (emphasis added)). Therefore, the Rimmasch standard for admitting novel scientific evidence does not apply to the present case.

1 17 However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry. Dr. Hawks' testimony must still be evaluated for admissibility under "the general rule for the admission of all expert testimony," which is articulated in rule 702. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Utah R. Evid. 702.

' 18 In this case, it is clear that Dr. Hawks had specialized knowledge which would assist the fact finder. At trial, Adams' defense was that Virla, Adams' "jilted" lover, invented the allegations and then coached Carleen to tell the story in retaliation for Adams breaking off their relationship. Dr. Hawks' testimony specifically addressed the issue of whether Carleen had the mental capacity to learn and consistently repeat a fabricated story of sexual abuse. Dr. Hawks is a designated mental retardation expert with extensive experience in evaluating victims of alleged sexual abuse. Clearly, the ability to assess and evaluate the intellectual capacities of a mentally handicapped individual is not within the knowledge or experience of the average individual, and therefore, this "evidence [was] helpful to the finder of fact." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n. 8. Accordingly, the trial court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion by admitting Dr. Hawks' testimony, and therefore we affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that Dr. Hawks' testimony was properly admitted.

II. DETECTIVE DEHARTS TESTIMONY

¶19 At trial, Detective DeHart testified without objection that he did not believe Carleen was coached and that her account of the alleged sexual abuse was consistent. On appeal, Adams argued, and the State conceded, that this testimony violated rule 608(a) because it essentially vouched for Carleen's " 'truthfuiness ... on a particular occasion.'" Adams, 955 P.2d at 786 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 392). Although the court of appeals agreed that the testimony was improper, it conelud-ed that the admission of Detective DeHart's testimony was harmless error because "other persuasive evidence support[ed] Adams's conviction." Adams, 955 P.2d at 786. Before this court, Adams asserts that Detective DeHart's testimony was prejudicial and constitutes plain and reversible error. Specifically, he contends that absent Detective DeHart's improper testimony, there is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been reached. We disagree.

120 Because Adams failed to raise this issue below, the court of appeals correctly applied the plain error standard. To establish plain error, Adams must show that "@) [aln error exists; (i) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (ii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). A harmful error occurs where "the likelihood of a different outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). Like the parties and the court of appeals, we conclude that Detective DeHart's testimony violated rule 608(a) and that this error should have been obvious to the trial court. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether, absent Detective DeHart's improper statements, Adams would have enjoyed a sufficiently high likelihood of a different result such that our confidence in the outcome is undermined.

121 Applying that standard to the facts of this case, it is clear that Adams was not prejudiced by Detective DeHart's improper testimony. Our review of the record reveals ample evidence upon which the jury could have convicted Adams of forcible sexual abuse. Carleen testified that Adams had been molesting her. Carleen's testimony was bolstered by her mother's statement that late one night she saw Adams, naked, emerge from her daughter's bedroom with his pants in his hand. Also, Carleen corroborated this incident, stating that she awoke to the sound of a breaking clock, and that Adams "clame] in and glot] on me." Adams testified that he had been drinking that night and did not recall the alleged incident. However, Adams did not deny that he came out of Carleen's room naked, and he admitted that there were times when he became so intoxicated that he could not remember what he had done.

122 Also, with regard to Adams' theory that Carleen had been coached by her mother to repeat a false story, Dr. Hawks testified extensively about Carleen's severe intellectual disabilities. He stated that Carleen has the cognitive abilities of a three-and-one-half-year-old and "that 99 [out of 100] individuals can do better than she can on [intellectual tests]." Dr. Hawks also testified that Car-leen had been in special education classes for years and still could not count, recite the alphabet, or spell her own name. Dr. Hawks opined that, based on these limited cognitive capacities, Carleen probably did not have the ability to be coached and was probably not sophisticated enough to make up the story about the abuse. Therefore, although we find Detective DeHart's references to Car-leen's veracity erroneous and clearly improper, we cannot say that in their absence Adams would likely have received a more favorable result. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' ruling on this issue.

CONCLUSION

[ 23 We conclude that Dr. Hawks' testimony did not violate rule 608(a) because he did not offer a direct opinion of Carleen's truthfulness about the alleged sexual abuse. Rather, he testified only about Carleen's ability to be coached to tell a false story, and her lack of sophistication to invent and repeat such a story on her own. Also, we affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that Dr. Hawks' testimony was properly admitted under rule 702 but for different reasons. Dr. Hawks testimony was not based upon new or novel scientific principles or techniques. The three-part Rimmasch test does not apply, and Dr. Hawks' testimony was otherwise admissible under rule 702. Finally, we hold that the erroneous admission of Detective DeHart's testimony was harmless error because other persuasive evidence supports Adams' conviction, and there is not a sufficient likelihood of a more favorable outcome so as to undermine our confidence in the verdict. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

4 24 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice DURRANT concur in Justice WILKINS opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    2000 UT 50
    Randy P. BRADBURY and Dawn Bradbury, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Phil VALENCIA and Opal Valencia, Defendants and Appellants. Perry City, Intervenor.
    No. 981722.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    June 9, 2000.

      Jack H. Molgard, Brigham City, for plaintiffs.
    Kevin McGaha, Brigham City, for defendants.
    Jeff R. Thorne, Brigham City, for interve-nor.
   WILKINS, Justice:

¶1 Phil and Opal Valencia appeal the trial court's order granting Randy and Dawn Bradbury's motion for summary judgment. We conclude we lack jurisdiction because the Valencias have not appealed from a final order and no exception to the final judgment rule has been met. We therefore dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In September 1996, the Bradburys filed a complaint against the Valencias. The complaint alleged that the Bradburys had a legal right-of-way along a road that ran next to their house and land. The complaint further alleged that the Valencias, who owned the land along the west side of the road, were fencing off the road in an attempt to close the road, and were generally interfering with the Bradburys' legal use of the road. The complaint asked the trial court for an injuncetion preventing the Valencias from blocking or interfering with the Bradburys' use of the road. The complaint also requested actual and punitive damages and attorney fees and costs.

T3 The Valencias filed a counterclaim alleging that the Bradburys unlawfully pulled out a fence post on the Valencias' property. The Valencias sought $150 in actual damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, attorney fees, and court costs.

4 Perry City then filed a motion to intervene. It sought to have the property declared a public roadway.

15 Following a motion, the trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining the Valencias from blocking the road and right-of-way pending the court's decision, and it granted Perry City's motion to intervene. After discovery was conducted, the Bradbur-ys filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Valencias opposed.

T6 The trial court then heard oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court issued a memorandum decision and announced that it was granting the Bradburys' motion for summary judgment. The Valencias then filed a motion for reconsideration.

T7 After denying the Valencias' motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued three documents. First, the court entered an order granting the Bradburys' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded the Bradburys were entitled to an injunction enjoining the Valencias from blocking or interfering with their use of the disputed right-of-way, and granted the injunction. The court addressed neither the Valencias' counterclaim nor Perry City's intervening claim in its summary judgment order. Second, the court issued an order amending its summary judgment to allow the Valencias a full thirty days to appeal the summary judgment order. Third, the court entered a memorandum decision discussing its reasons for denying the Valencias' motion for reconsideration. The Valencias now appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

T8 Both the Bradburys and the Valencias present this appeal as an appeal of right taken from a final order under section 78-2-2(8)(j) of the Utah Code. However, "acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time." A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss. See id.

19 An appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is not final, see Utah R.App. P. 8(a), unless it fits within an exception to the final judgment rule. See A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325. For an order or judgment to be final, it "'must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case'" Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted). In other words, a judgment is final when it "ends the controversy between the parties litigant." Id.

{ 10 This court has consistently upheld the final judgment rule. See, e.g., A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325-26 (dismissing appeal because counterclaim remained pending before trial court); Kennedy, 600 P.2d at 535-37 (dismissing appeal because cross-claim remained pending before trial court). To be final, the trial court's order or judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to an action. Recently we held that a trial court must even determine attorney fee awards before a judgment is final. See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 15, 998 P.2d 254.

{11 In this case, the order granting the Bradburys' motion for summary judgment was not a final order because the Valencias' counterclaim and Perry City's intervening claim remain pending before the trial court. Therefore, under the final judgment rule, we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the Valencias are not appealing from a final order or judgment.

112 However, orders and judgments that are not final can be appealed if such appeals are statutorily permissible, see In re Southern Am. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Utah Ct.App.1996), if the appellate court grants permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325, or if the trial court expressly certifies them as final for purposes of appeal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. We therefore next examine whether the Valencias' appeal falls under an exception to the final judgment rule.

1 13 No statute grants an exception to the final judgment rule in this particular case, nor have the Valencias appealed an interlocutory order by following the steps outlined in rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, neither of these exceptions applies to this appeal.

' 14 However, it appears from the Valencias' brief that they may have intended the trial court to enter a rule 54(b) certification to allow them to appeal the summary judgment order. In their brief, the Valencias explain, "[The trial court, being advised of the remaining counterclaim at the status hearing September 24, 1998, certified the issue here on appeal by its 'Order' dated October 2, 1998, allowing defendants to re-institute their appeal." However, the October 2, 1998 order from the trial court did not certify the Valencias' appeal as required by rule 54(b). Instead, the October 2 order simply amended, nune pro tune, the date of its summary judgment order from September 14 to October 2 to allow the Valencias a full thirty days to file their appeal. As such, the October 2 order does not make "an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay," Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), nor does it make "an express direction for the entry of judgment," id., as required by rule 54(b). For these reasons, we conclude the Valencias' appeal is not proper under rule 54(b). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to review the Valencias' appeal and accordingly dismiss.

CONCLUSION

T 15 The summary judgment order was not a final order. For that reason, and because this appeal does not fall within an exception to the final judgment rule, we dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

16 The appeal is dismissed.

1 17 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice DURRANT concur in Justice WILKINS opinion.

      . The original complaint was filed against only Phil Valencia. Upon learning that Mr. Valencia owned the disputed property jointly with Opal Valencia, the Bradburys amended their complaint to join Ms. Valencia as a defendant to the action.

      . Before the Valencias filed their motion for reconsideration, the trial court drafted an order granting summary judgment, but that order was never entered.

      . Section 78-2-2(3)(j) provides:
      (3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: "
      (§) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
      Utah Code Ann. § (1996).

      . Various problems would arise if we decided cases before the trial court issued a final order or judgment. For example, rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants trial courts authority to revise an order or decision at any time before a final judgment is entered:
      [Alny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
      Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ¶¶ 54-56, 990 P.2d 945 (concluding trial court had power to revise its summary judgment order under rule 54(b) because previous order was not final order). Obviously, our judicial system would not work well if the trial court could revise an order or judgment after the parties had appealed it to our court. For that reason, among others, we generally require that appeals to this court be from final orders and judgments.

      . Rule 54(b) certifications must comply with the rule's requirements. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100-05 (Utah 1991); Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, ¶¶ 12-13. 988 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000); In re J.W., 950 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (per curiam).

      . We address neither whether the trial court's summary judgment order is eligible for rule 54(b) certification nor whether this appeal may properly be sought under rule 5.


author: DURRANT, Justice:

text:
    2000 UT 49
    UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, Respondent. Utah Association of Counties, Intervenor.
    No. 970528.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    June 9, 2000.

      Robert A. Peterson, John H. Bogart, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
    Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Brian L. Tarbet, Michelle Bush, John C. McCarrey, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
    Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for intervenor.
   DURRANT, Justice:

11 Utah Railway Company petitions for review of a decision of the State Tax Commission upholding an appraised valuation of Utah Railway's taxable property. Utah Railway initially challenged the valuation of its property by the Property Tax Division of the Commission, and the Commission granted a formal hearing. Before the Commission, the Division abandoned its initial valuation and argued for a higher valuation. The Commission rejected both Utah Railway's and the Division's requests for differing valuations and adopted the original appraised value.

BACKGROUND

2 Utah Railway was incorporated in 1912. It operates entirely within the state of Utah. Its business is hauling coal from mines in Carbon and Emery counties to terminal facilities in Provo, Utah. Utah Railway's assets primarily consist of leased locomotives, portions of wholly owned track, terminal facilities that are owned jointly with Union Pacific Railroad, and a right-of-way over track owned by Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad.

T3 In 1994, the Property Tax Division of the State Tax Commission valued Utah Railway's property at $32,895,900, and the tax due was calculated according to that valuation. Utah Railway filed a formal protest with the Commission, arguing its property was worth approximately $17 million. Utah Railway contested several aspects of the Division's valuation, but primarily asserted that the Division had employed methodologies that improperly included intangible assets, which are not subject to taxation under governing constitutional and statutory standards.

T4 A formal hearing was scheduled. Prior to the hearing, both parties were directed to submit their appraisals of the value of Utah Railway's property. The Division did not submit its original appraisal into evidence, but instead submitted and defended a new appraisal. The new appraisal valued Utah Railway's property at approximately $37 million. Utah Railway submitted an appraisal of $20.5 million. Utah Railway's appraiser did not attempt to segregate intangible from tangible values, but Utah Railway nevertheless argued that the Commission had a constitutional and statutory duty to do so.

T5 The Commission rendered its final decision based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. It determined that the fundamental factual dispute between the parties concerned economic forecasts for the continuing viability of Utah Railway's business. The Commission refused to adopt either of the appraisals presented to it. The Commission rejected Utah Railway's appraisal because it found that the information Utah Railway had supplied did not accurately reflect Utah Railway's own beliefs about future coal transportation prospects, and could not, therefore, support Utah Railway's arguments for a lower valuation. The Commission also rejected the Division's request for a higher valuation because it determined that the Division had not adequately sustained its burden of proof. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision, the Commission adopted the original valuation of $82,895,900. In so doing, the Commission did not address Utah Railway's constitutional and statutory arguments concerning separation and removal of intangibles for purposes of establishing taxable value, nor did it explain any basis for refusing to address the issue.

DISCUSSION

£6 On Utah Railway's petition for review, we "grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review, and ... [we] grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (1996); see also Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 90, ¶ 7, 987 P.2d 594, 596. Moreover, we conduct our review in light of the burdens the taxpayer carries before the Commission, where the protesting taxpayer is required "not only to show substantial error or impropriety in the assessment, but also to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation." Utah Power & Light Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979).

T7 Utah Railway presents three fundamental arguments: (1) the Commission's adoption of the original property valuation was not supported by substantial evidence because the Division did not submit the original appraisal supporting that valuation into evidence; (2) the appraisal was not based on reasonable, reliable indicators of value; and (8) the Division and the Commission violated the constitutional and statutory proscription against taxing intangibles by failing to employ valuation methodologies designed to exclude those intangibles.

I. THE DIVISIONS FAILURE TO SUBMIT ITS ORIGINAL APPRAISAL

18 Before this court, Utah Railway relies heavily on the first argument. It asserts the Commission may not adopt a property valuation unless available documentation supporting the valuation is placed in the record. We agree. In Utah Power & Light Co., we held that "the Commission must have a sound evidentiary basis for its decision." Id. In this case, the Division chose to effectively abandon its original appraisal and failed to even introduce that appraisal into evidence. As a consequence, the Commission had no evidence before it upon which to base its ultimate decision to adopt the original valuation.

T9 The Commission correctly notes that Utah Railway had the burden of demonstrating substantial error and providing an evidentiary basis for the Commission to adopt a lower valuation. See id. at 384-35. Based on this premise, the Commission argues that the original valuation is entitled to a "presumption of correctness." We agree that such a presumption is necessarily implied by our holding in Utah Power & Light Co. That presumption does not arise, however, unless and until available evidence supporting the original property valuation is submitted to the Commission.

110 In this case, because the Division is in the best position to present the evidence supporting its valuation, and because we think it unfair to impose upon the taxpayer an obligation to ensure that the record includes a property valuation the taxpayer contests, we hold that the Division is the entity obligated to do so. Cf. Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903-04 (Utah 1981) (in context of impact fees, agency with most accessibility to relevant information has burden of disclosure). Where a taxpayer challenges the valuation of property before the Commission, the entity defending against the challenge must present the available evidence supporting the original valuation. Onee that is done, the taxpayer, or any other entity seeking an adjustment of the original valuation, must meet its twofold burden of demonstrating "substantial error or impropriety in the [original] assessment," and providing "a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation." Utah Power & Light Co., 590 P.2d at 335.

II. THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIVISIONS VALUATION METHODOLOGIES

{11 Utah Railway's second argument is rendered moot by our decision on the first issue. Utah Railway attacks the accuracy and reliability of the methodologies ostensibly employed to arrive at valuation of its property. However, Utah Railway has already explicitly argued the Commission did not rely on any documentary evidence of the valuation it affirmed. Indeed, the appraisal supporting that valuation was never placed in the record and neither party attempted to comprehensively attack or defend it. Because the Commission did not rely on any valuation methodologies to support its holding, Utah Railway cannot attack non-existent bases for decision.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION ON TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES

112 Utah Railway argued in its initial protest and in its closing arguments before the Commission that the Commission had a constitutional and statutory duty to make practicable and reasonable attempts to segregate intangibles and deduct their value from the overall property valuation. See Utah Const. art. XIII, § 2(1) ("All tangible property ... shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. ..."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(19) (1996) (" 'Property' ... does not include ... intangibles."); id. § 59-2-1101(2) ("The following property is exempt from taxation: ... (¢) intangible property.") Utah Railway renews this argument on appeal. We are unable to address this issue because the Commission failed to make findings or rulings upon which to base our review.

113 The constitutional and statutory issue presented to the Commission encompasses both a legal dimension and a factual dimension grounded in ageney expertise. Whether a valuation methodology or group of methodologies meet the constitutional and statutory test of excluding intangibles from valuation of property is a legal question. Applying that legal query to the facts of any given case, however, is inextricably linked to a specific area of expertise vested in the Commission. See Utah Power & Light Co., 590 P.2d at 335. A legal conclusion about the constitutional and statutory propriety of a particular property valuation must be premised on the feasibility of separating tangible from intangible property within the particular context at issue, which in turn must be balanced against the accuracy with which any given valuation methodology captures the fair market value of the property. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 48, ¶¶ 5-9, 980 P.2d 690, 691-92 (describing Commission's discretion to apply appropriate valuation methodologies according to relevant factual cireumstances); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8) (defining fair market value for purposes of the Property Tax Act).

114 Our ability to address this argument on the merits requires specific findings and rulings, which the Commission did not provide in this case. Although Utah Railway's own appraiser did not attempt to segregate intangible and tangible values, Utah Railway did articulate a coherent argument for exclusion of intangibles. in the valuation process. Utah Railway's attorney examined its appraiser on the issue and elicited some testimony regarding methods that could be employed to ensure intangibles were not included in the calculation of value. The argument regarding exclusion of intangibles was thus presented to the Commission at the hearing and in Utah Railway's post-hearing brief The Commission either should have addressed it or should have provided a supportable basis for refusing to do so.

1 15 In conclusion, we remand this case to the Commission for entry of appropriate findings and rulings to support its decision. The Division should submit its original appraisal and the Commission may receive any further evidence or testimony it deems nee-essary to support its decision according to the dictates of this opinion. The Commission should also specifically address the question of whether the methodologies employed by the Division violated the constitutional and statutory proseriptions against taxation of intangibles, or it should explain the basis for its refusal to do so.

T 16 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice WILKINS concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.

      . Utah Railway's appraiser addressed three approaches to valuation-cost, income, and market-but relied most heavily on the income approach. Utah Railway's original protest, on the other hand, contended that the cost approach was the only method that adequately removed intangibles from the calculation of value. All parties agreed that a cost approach to valuation yielded a property valuation of roughly $17 million.

      . Utah Railway's appraiser testified that "the assignment [given him by Utah Railway] did not call for a segregation of the taxable amount versus nontaxable aspects."

      . Specifically, the Commission found as follows: Most of the negative comments were what could clearly be deemed to be differences in appraisal judgment, with no clear cut determination that such methodologies are either clearly correct or clearly erroneous. There were some negative comments made about each appraisal which could place in question the determination and precise correctness of each of those appraisals. However, since the information given to the appraiser of [Utah Railway] by the company was not sustained, the assumptions upon which that appraisal was prepared cannot be validated. The Commission therefore determines that the appraisal of [Utah Railway] does not correctly determine the fair market value of the subject property, primarily because the information provided by the company which the appraiser used, the Commission finds is not credible or verifiable, and is too speculative for an appraisal of value to be based upon that premise.
      [The Division] has suggested that the value of the property be increased approximately 10% beyond the original tax notice which was sent by [the Division]. The Commission does not specifically find that any maiter in the appraisal was erroneous, but [Utah Railway] did raise issue with some of the methodologies used by [the Division's] appraiser, and, in fact, stated that some items had been deducted when they should have been added. That testimony was unrebutted. Therefore, the Commission cannot determine that the slight increase proposed by [the Division's] appraiser is sufficiently proven to justify an increase to the value of the property of [Utah Railway] for ad valorem tax purposes. [The Division] did not sustain its burden of proof to establish that the value should be increased to a higher amount.


author: THOMAS, Justice.

text:
    THUNDERBASIN LAND, LIVESTOCK & INVESTMENT CO.; Lorenz Ranch, Inc., Ferguson Ranch, Inc.; Don Bosman, and Bonham Cattle Co., Appellants (Petitioners), v. The COUNTY OF LARAMIE COUNTY, Wyoming The Laramie County Commissioners, Jeff Ketcham, Chairman, in his official capacity, Nick Mirich, Commissioner, in his official capacity; and Fred Emerich, Vice Chairman, in his official capacity, Appellees (Respondents).
    No. 99-19.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    May 2, 2000.

      Representing Appellants; Karen Budd-Falen, L. Eric Lundgren and Franklin J. Falen of Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellees: Peter Froclicher, Laramie County Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and John C. McKinley of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.
   THOMAS, Justice.

The dispositive question in this case is whether a district court must conduct a trial de novo in reviewing an award of damages by a board of county commissioners in a road establishment proceeding. Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Investment Co., Lorenz Ranch, Inc., Ferguson Ranch, Inc., Don Bosman, and Bonham Cattle Co. (collectively Thunderbasin) appeal a decision of the district court that affirmed the award of damages made by the Board of County Commissioners for Laramie County (the Board) for lands taken for the road. Thunderbasin contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-121 (Lexis 1999) requires those damages to be determined as in a civil action. The Board argues that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115 (Lexis 1999), is the controlling law in this instance, and the district court need only review the decision of the Board. We hold that the adoption of the WAPA did not repeal the procedure set forth in the road establishment statutes, and that the district court was required upon appeal to determine the damages to the several Thunderbasin interests as in a civil action. The Order on Petition for Review entered in the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's Opening Brief:

A. Whether Board of County Commissioners' decision to reduce a just compensation appraisal by ninety percent with no supporting evidence was arbitrary and capricious.
B. Whether the district court denied appellants' constitutional rights to due process of law and just compensation by denying them a de movo trial before an impartial tribunal.

This Statement of the Issues on Appeal is found in the Brief of Appellees:

1. Is the Laramie County Board of County Commissioners' decision awarding compensation for the road establishment supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and capricious?
2. Does the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act ("Wyoming APA") and W.R.AP. provide the exclusive methodology for appealing the Laramie County Board of County Commissioners' decision awarding damages?
3. Is the Laramie County Board of County Commissioners' decision establishing Road 101 as a county road supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and capricious?

Thunderbasin owned property located between Happy Jack Road (Happy Jack) and the North Crow Reservoir, west of Cheyenne in Laramie County. For nearly forty years, the public gained access to the reservoir by traveling over a road four miles long (now County Road 101) that traversed Thunderba-sin's property. Since 1978, Laramie County has maintained the road by grading it, draining it, and providing an all weather surface, but the Board did not designate the road as, or declare it to be, a public road. In 1993, Thunderbasin closed the road to public access, claiming that previously the public had trespassed on their property in traveling to and from the reservoir.

At the same time, Thunderbasin conveyed a perpetual utility easement to the Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities (the BOPU) to provide access to monitor, maintain, and repair the North Crow Reservoir Dam. The North Crow Reservoir Dam was one feature of the BOPU's multi-million dollar rehabilitation project of the North Crow Reservoir. The BOPU paid $640 per acre for the casement, and it was prohibited, by a restriction in the easement, from permitting public use of this easement.

As a result of the closure by Thunderbasin, the public users of the road were denied access to the reservoir, and, on March 28, 1994, some members of the public filed a petition for road establishment, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 24-8-101(b) (Michie Repl. 1993), which they presented to the Board on April 5, 1994. In response to this petition, Thunderbasin filed objections to establishing County Road 101; filed a claim for damages; and requested a hearing. The Board then followed the procedure set forth in the statutes for establishing public roads, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-108 through 24-8-118 (Lexis 1999). The Laramie County Engineer was designated to be the viewer pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-108. The County Engineer proceeded, in accordance with the applicable statutes (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-8-104 through 24-3-106), and submitted a report to the Board on May 10, 1994. In that report, the County Engineer offered his explanation of the method for arriving at damages stating that "actual estimated damages *" * * should be computed based only on the market value of the property used to contain the road."

The Board also appointed a committee, including representatives from Thunderbasin and the BOPU, the County Engineer, the United States Forest Service, a state representative from Albany County, two members of the petitioner's group, and others to address and resolve issues surrounding the road. Although the committee did not unanimously agree on the location of the road, the Board established County Road 101 as a public road. Both the BOPU and Thunder-basin filed damage claims, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-111. Thunderbasin sent a "Notice of Objection" dated August 15, 1994, to the Board objecting to the establishment of the road, making a claim for damages, and requesting a contested case hearing before the Board.

As provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-114, the Board appointed appraisers in November of 1994 to determine Thunderbasin's damages. The appraisers submitted their report to the County Clerk, in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-116, in which they found that, on November 10, 1994, the market value of the lands taken for the road was the same as the market value of the surrounding lands, $1,000.00 per acre. Ultimately, the total damage reported by the appraisers for the approximate twenty acres affected was $67,299.00. In accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-118, the report of the appraisers was considered by the Board at a contested case hearing, which began on February 7, 1995. In the course of the hearing, which continued on three separated days, the Board received evidence relating to the establishment of the road and the damages to the several owners. The damages the Board ultimately awarded, however, were significantly reduced from the amounts claimed, in part because the BOPU taking was of an easement rather than a fee simple interest.

In March of 1995, the Board decided to adopt a moratorium regarding the road establishment decision, and it appointed another committee to complete the management study. The following February, the Board conducted a second contested case hearing, and, at the end of that hearing, the decision to establish the road was postponed for another month. In March of 1996, the Board entered an order establishing County Road 101, and at that time the assessment of damages was reduced to a combined total of $5,863.63. Rather than using the appraisers' estimate, the Board followed the County Engineer's advice to assess the damages by computing the market value of the area occupied by the road as established.

Thunderbasin rejected the assessed damages, and a judicial review from the final Commissioners' Order Establishing Road 101 and Diminishing Damages was pursued in the district court. In a decision letter, dated January 27, 1997, the district court initially affirmed the establishment of County Road 101, finding that it was established in substantial compliance with the statutes and that Thunderbasin had been afforded its procedural rights. In accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121, the district court determined Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de movo to determine its damages using a "before and after valuation" standard. Moreover, the district court concluded that the WAPA did not repeal by implication either Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-119 or § 24-3-121 (Lexis 1999). In that decision letter, the district court invited the parties to brief the issue of the right of Thunderbasin to a trial de novo on the damages.

Laramie County did not take advantage of that invitation until August 14, 1998. Following a change of personnel in the office of county attorney, Laramie County moved to vacate the trial de movo set by the district court in its January 27, 1997, letter, On October 12, 1998, the district court issued a second decision letter reversing its earlier ruling that Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de novo on damages. Although the decision letter addressed several issues, the essential purpose was to determine that the WAPA and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.) superseded Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-119 through 24-8-121 (Lexis 1999). The district court concluded that W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 12.12 provided the exclusive means of seeking judicial review of final administrative action, and held that the statutory provisions were superseded. Consequently, the district court ruled that Thun-derbasin was not entitled to a new determination of damages, and the district court vacated the trial de novo it originally granted in its January 27, 1997 decision letter. The district court then proceeded to review Thun-derbasin's claim pursuant to the procedures specified in the W.RAP. under the standards provided in the WAPA. It ruled that the Board's decision to establish County Road 101 and the reduced damage award were supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the law. Thunderbasin appealed that decision to this Court.

The point of convergence of the diverse views in this road establishment case is whether the trial de novo procedure for damages, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121, must yield to the judicial review provisions of the WAPA and the W.RAP. This focused issue is emphasized by the two conflicting decision letters issued by the district court. The road establishment statutes address the appeal to the district court in three sections, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-119, 24-8-120 and 24-8-121:

§ 24-3-119. Appeals from decisions of county commissioners; notice; bond required.
Any applicant for damages claimed, or caused by the establishment or alteration of any road, may appeal from the final decision of the board of the county commissioners to the district court of the county, in which the land lies, for the taking of which for a public road, damages are asked; but notice of such appeal must be made to the county clerk, within thirty (80) days after such decision has been made by the said board, or such claim shall be deemed to have been abandoned. No appeal shall be allowed, unless a good and sufficient bond be given by the party appealing, in a sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) to cover costs, said bond to be approved by the clerk of the district court.
§ 24-3-120. Appeals from decisions of county commissioners; duties of county clerk.
The county clerk shall, within ten (10) days after the notice of an appeal as provided for in W.S. 24-3-119 is filed in his office, make out and file in the office of the clerk of the district court, in his county, a transcript of the papers on file in his office, and the proceedings of the board in relation to such damages.
§ 24-3-121. Appeals from decisions of county commissioners; recovery of damages; court costs.
The amount of damages to which the claimant shall be entitled on such appeal shall be ascertained in the same manner as in a civil action, and the amount so ascertained, if any, shall be entered of record, but no judgment shall be entered therefor. The amount thus ascertained shall be certified by the clerk of the court to the county clerk who shall thereafter proceed as if such amount had been allowed by the board of the county commissioners to the claimant as damages. If the appellant shall fail to recover an amount exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00) above the amount allowed to him by the board of the county commissioners, he shall pay all costs of the appeal.

(Emphasis added.) These statutes use the mandatory verb form of "shall." Perhaps even more importantly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-119 provides for an appeal for damages rather than a review.

The judicial review statute included in the WAPA, Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 16-8-114, reads in pertinent part:

(a) Subject to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an ageney, is entitled to judicial review in the district court for the county in which the administrative action or inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by the administrative action or inaction is located, or if no real property is involved, in the district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of business. The procedure to be followed in the proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme court.
(b) The supreme court's authority to adopt rules governing review from agen-cles to the district courts shall include authority to determine the content of the record upon review, the pleadings to be filed, the time and manner for filing the pleadings, records and other documents and the extent to which supplemental testimony and evidence may be taken or considered by the district court. The rules adopted by the supreme court under this provision may supersede existing statutory provisions.

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, WRAP. 12.01 is phrased in a permissive rather than mandatory tone:

To the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in fact by a rule adopted by that agency, may obtain such review as provided in this rule. All appeals from administrative agencies shall be governed by these rules.

Both the WAPA provision and the court rule acknowledge that there may be a specific statutory provision limiting review.

This case could have been resolved rather readily by reversing the Board for failure to invoke the proper rule for arriving at damages in a road condemnation case. In determining damages, the Board clearly relied on the advice of the County Emgineer to assess the damages by computing the market value of the area occupied by the road as established. That approach eschewed the existing law in this regard. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 669-72 (Wyo.1990). Subsequently, in amending the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, the legislature adopted specific rules for determining damages for the taking of property. Wyo. Stat,. Ann. §§ 1-26-701 through 1-26-710 (Lexis 1999). Remanding the case for the purpose of requiring the Board to apply the proper law for determining damages, however, would have begged the question. The district court initially recognized the right of Thunderbasin to have its damages determined as in a civil action, but later ruled that the damages were subject only to judicial review under the WAPA. We are satisfied that the district court proceeded as it did in order to have the law settled on this point.

The clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-121 provides "[the amount of damages to which the claimant shall be entitled on such appeal shall be ascertained in the same manner as in a civil action * * *." Thunderbasin claims that under this language, they are entitled to a de novo trial before the district court to determine the proper damages they are entitled to receive. In contrast, the Board argues that since it is an agency, the WAPA controls and provides the exclusive means for review of an agency action. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (C), the relevant statutory provisions in this case, district courts review agency decisions and:

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

The Board claims the establishment of County Road 101 was supported by substantial evidence, and in all respects comported with the statutory factors material to review in the district court.

An issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Butts v. Wyoming State Bd. of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo.1996); Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993). In interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo.1983). If the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. Id. We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous. Parker Land, 845 P.2d at 1042.

Kirbens v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo.1999).

In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo.1983). All statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or haviing] the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Id. at 735. Holtz explained our statutory construction rules:
"If the language is sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent."
Holtz, 674 P.2d at 736.

Peterson v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 989 P.2d 113, 118 (Wyo.1999).

When the legislature adopts a statute it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference to the subject matter of the statute. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979); White v. Board of Land Commissioners, Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979) and Matter of Adoption of Voss [Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976) ], supra. In this latter case we said:
«* * * All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts. * * *" 550 P.2d at 486.

Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo.1984).

In honoring the foregoing principles of law, we are constrained to look at the broad area of eminent domain proceedings in Wyoming because we are satisfied that the road establishment statutes are simply a method of exercising the power of eminent domain. We held in L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d at 674-75, that the Board could proceed under either the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 (Lexis 1999), or under the road establishment statutes. Applying that decision, the district court was correct in ruling that the Board followed the proper procedure to establish County Road 101. We hold that the road was established according to law.

The critical issue we must address is whether Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de novo on the issue of damages under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-121. The statute specifies that "damages * * * shall be ascertained in the same manner as in a civil action Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-121. The reference to a civil action invokes the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply in condemnation cases generally. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-501 (Lexis 1999). The rules provide, consistently with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-8-121, that "issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only * * * shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial be waived, or a reference be ordered." W.R.C.P. 38(a). The rules pertaining to condemnation are set forth in W.R.C.P. 71.1. This rule articulates the procedure for a special civil action relating to condemnation of property, and W.R.C.P. 71.1(j) provides for a jury trial. Although the parties in the case goo oen before us did not request a jury trial, W.R.C.P. 39(b) affords to the court discretion to order a jury trial. There is no ambiguity in the road establishment statute nor the rule, and the language is clear and unequivocal. Thunderbasin was entitled to a trial de novo on the issue of damages upon review in the district court, and a jury trial if requested. >

The district court apparently accepted the Board's argument that the enactment of the WAPA repealed by implication Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-121 of the road establishment statutes. Under the circumstances, a refutation of the Board's contentions is appropriate. Recently, in Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming v. Transportation Com'n of Wyoming, 970 P.2d 858, 863 (Wyo.1998), we revisited the doctrine of statutory repeal by implication. In a limited number of cases, we have held that the legislature repealed a statute by implication, but "our longstanding rule that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged if there is any other reasonable construction" continues to be the law. Emulisified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 970 P.2d at 863. "The party asserting implied repeal bears the burden of demonstrating beyond question that the legisla ture intended that its later legislative action evinced an unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal." Id. (citing Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 73 (Wyo.1978)). "It must be shown that the later statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot logically stand together, or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the subject."Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 910 P2d at 863. See also Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 283-84, 333 P.2d 700, 709 (1958).

The Board bases its argument on Section 17 of the original WAPA legislation, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 108 (1965), which states that "[alll acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed * * *." The Board then cites City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., 647 P.2d 1378, 1384 (Wyo.1982), in which we said "[wlith the adoption of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) in 1965, the trial de novo provisions were replaced and all judicial review of an administrative agency's action was required to be conducted in accord with what is now [Wyo. Stat. Ann § 16-3-l114(c)]." This is an accurate reading of the general rule, because prior to the adoption of the WAPA, judicial review was accomplished by a trial de novo. The statute upon which the Board relies also stated, "[pJrovid-ed, however, to the extent not inconsistent herewith existing procedures provided by statute shall be deemed preserved and the procedures provided for by this Act shall be in addition and supplementary thereto." Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 108 (1965).

The Board has not demonstrated in this instance that the WAPA "is so repugnant to the [road establishment statute] that the two cannot logically stand together, or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the subject." Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyoming, 970 P.2d at 863. The contentions of the Board fall far short of carrying its "burden of demonstrating beyond question that the legislature intended that its later legislative action evinced an unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal." Id. Instead, as we have explained, there is a rather comprehensive scheme for exercising the power of eminent domain, of which the establishment of a county road is only one part, and that scheme almost universally incorporates a right to a jury trial to determine the damages to the landowner. The limited reach of the WAPA into this comprehensive scheme is quite contrary to the burden assigned to the Board.

Indeed, other rules of statutory construction provide useful criteria to aid us in our fundamental effort to determine legislative intent. We have held a specific statute controls over a general statute on the same subject. Rock Springs Ford Nissan v. State Bd. of Equalization, Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, 890 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Wyo.1995) (citing L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d at 674). A specific provision in a statute controls over an inconsistent general provision pertaining to the same subject. The WAPA limits the court's review of an agency decision to whether an agency decision is "[alrbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]" Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 16-8-114(c)@ii)(A). It addresses in a general way the review of damages for land taken for a county road, but Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-38-121 provides a specific procedure to ascertain damages. The latter statute is limited exelu-sively to a determination of damages in con nection with condemnation for a road, while the WAPA provision addresses all types of agency decisions. Although the Board is correct in its assertion that the WAPA was enacted subsequent to the county road statute and repeals all acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with it, that does not control the application of other rules of statutory construction. The WAPA imposes basic procedural due process standards upon administrative activities and provides a mechanism for agencies to adopt procedural rules, which guide agency decision making in a predictable manner. First Nat. Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, 559 P.2d 42, 47 (Wyo.1977). The specific statute controls over the general when they address the same subject. As indicated by its title, the WAPA is procedural and not substantive in nature, it does not serve to repeal by implication the more specific statute. Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Commission of Wyoming, 601 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Wyo.1979). These principles are particularly applicable in an area of the law that implicates constitutional protection of property rights, and the constitutional right to a jury trial.

The district court failed to provide Thun-derbasin with its statutorily guaranteed de movo trial to determine damages for the twenty acres at issue. Although the WAPA provides that courts must review an agency decision to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law, a statute that specifies the procedure in an appeal of an agency's damages determination controls. The road establishment statute requires that Thunderba-sin's damages be determined in the same manner as in a civil action, which includes the right to a jury trial. The district court failed to follow the proper procedure prescribed by statute.

We reverse the district court's decision, and remand this case for further proceedings to properly afford Thunderbasin an opportunity to have its damages determined as in a civil action.

      . Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 24-3-101(b) provides:
      (b)(@)Any person desiring the establishment, vacation or alteration of a county highway shall file in the office of the county clerk of the proper county, a petition signed by five (5) or more electors of the county residing within twenty-five (25) miles of the road proposed o be established, altered, or vacated, in substance as follows: To the Board of County Commissioners, of .... County. The undersigned ask that a county highway, commencing at .... and running thence .... and terminating at .... be established (altered or vacated as the case may be).
      (ii) With said petition shall be filed a list containing the names and also the known post office address of each person owning or having an interest in any land over which the proposed establishment, vacation or alteration of a county highway is to be made.

      . Those rules state, in pertinent part:
      Rule 1. Scope and purpose of rules.
      These rules govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature and in all special statutory proceedings except as provided in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
      Rule 2. One form of action.
      There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action".

      . W.R.C.P. 71.1 provides, in pertinent part:
      Rule 71.1 Condemnation of property.
      thore or
      (§) Formal trial; jury trial.-If a judgment has been entered on the basis of informal proceedings, any party may file, within 30 days after such entry of judgment, a written demand for a formal trial to the court or for a jury trial, whereupon the action shall proceed as though no informal proceedings had occurred. If an assessment has been made by appraisers, any party not satisfied with the award may file, within 30 days after the certificate of assessment has been filed, a written demand for a trial by jury on the issue of just compensation, whereupon the action shall proceed to a jury trial on that issue.
      (1) Demand.-The demand, whether for a formal trial to the court or for a jury trial, shall be filed with the clerk and served upon the other parties in accordance with Rule 5(b).
      (2) Procedure.-The formal trial or trial by jury shall be conducted in the same manner as other civil actions.
      (3) Decision; verdict.-If the action is tried without jury, the court shall determine the compensation to be made to the defendant or defendants, and shall render its decision in writing, and enter its judgment accordingly. If the action is tried with jury, the jury shall determine these matters, and shall render its verdict in writing, signed by the foreman, and the verdict shall be entered in the record.

      . See Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832, 834 (Wyo. 1968), where we held that when the two statutes were read together they were so repugnant to each other that we held it was the manifest legislative intent that the general statute have universal application and repeal by implication the earlier specific statute.