author: COATS, Chief Judge.

text:
    Stanley J. VASKA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
    No. A-8232.
    Court of Appeals of Alaska.
    July 25, 2003.

      Margi A. Mock, Assistant Public Defender and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.
    Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Ap-pellee.
    Before: COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
   OPINION

COATS, Chief Judge.

Stanley J. Vaska was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree for sexually penetrating his niece, T.E., who was about three years old at the time of the alleged offense. The only evidence the State had to establish that Vaska committed the sexual abuse were T.E.'s hearsay statements, which she made shortly after the alleged offense. When she testified at trial, several years after the alleged abuse, T.E. had no memory of the abuse or of her prior statements. Vaska contends that T.E.'s statements were inadmissible hearsay and that admitting them violated the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions. We conclude that T.E.'s statements were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and that admission of these statements did not violate Vaska's right of confrontation. We accordingly affirm Vas-ka's conviction.

The State alleged that in the spring of 1994, when T.E. was about three years old, her uncle, Vaska, sexually penetrated her. A jury convicted Vaska, but this court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The State retried Vas-ka.

At Vaska's second trial, TE. testified that she was ten years old and had just finished the fourth grade. After the State asked her a few general background questions-about her age, the name of her parents, and the need for her to tell the truth-she explained that she could not remember anything that happened before the third grade. At this point, the State indicated that it had no further questions for T.E. Vaska's attorney stated that he had no cross-examination for TE.

The State's evidence that Vaska committed sexual abuse against TE. was based primarily on T.E.'s hearsay statements from several years before identifying Vaska as having sexually abused her. The State presented the statements through the testimony of two witnesses, Olga Evan, who was T.E.'s mother, and Dr. Donald R. Burgess, who interviewed and examined T.E. for sexual abuse.

Evan testified that in the spring of 1994, T.E. began having mood swings. Evan questioned T.E., and T.E. told her that "her girl" hurt. According to Evan, TE. used the phrase "her girl" to refer to her vagina. When Evan asked who hurt her, TE. stated that a "ga-ga" hurt her. Evan testified that T.E.'s term "ga-ga" was a reference to monsters. After further questioning, TE. told Evan that M.V.'s dad hurt her. M.V.'s dad was Vaska. Evan testified that some time later, when T.E. saw Vaska, T.E. said,

"There's the ga-ga." Based upon this information, Evan suspected Vaska had abused her daughter and took her to a medical clinic for a physical examination.

Dr. Burgess, a medical doctor, was qualified at Vaska's trial as an expert in pediatrics and child sexual abuse examinations,. Dr. Burgess was working in the emergency department at the Yukon Kuskokwim Delta Regional Hospital in Bethel on May 6, 1994. Based on a claim that TE. made four days earlier to a health aid in Russian Mission that her bottom was hurting, the health aid's subsequent discovery of yellow-green discharge from T.E.'s vaginal area, and Evan's concerns, Dr. Burgess interviewed and examined TE. at the hospital.

During the course of the interview, T.E. informed Dr. Burgess that her bottom and "her girl" were hurting. In an attempt to verify the information and to more accurately determine where TE. was hurting, Dr. Burgess asked T.E. to place her fingers in the area that hurt on an anatomically correct female doll. In response to his question, Dr. Burgess testified that TE. placed her finger in the doll's vagina. When he then asked T.E. who hurt her, TE. told him that M.V.'s daddy's ga-ga (which was Vaska) hurt her. Dr. Burgess testified that in his opinion, T.E.'s hymen had been damaged by a large object.

Vaska testified at trial and denied sexually abusing TE. But the jury convicted Vaska of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. Vaska now appeals his conviction, arguing that Superior Court Judge Ray M. Funk erred in admitting T.E.'s hearsay statements through the testimony of Evan and Dr. Burgess.

While the record is not completely clear, it appears that, over Vaska's objection, Judge Funk found that T.E. was, under Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(@)(8), unavailable to testify because of her lack of memory. Judge Funk also found that T.E.'s prior hearsay statements to Evan identifying Vas-ka as her abuser were admissible under the hearsay "catchall exception" of Rule 804(b)(5). He admitted Dr. Burgess's testimony about T.E.'s statements identifying Vaska as the person who abused her because Vaska did not object.

Although Judge Funk admitted T.E.'s hearsay statement to Evan under Evidence Rule 804(b)(5), on appeal, the State argues that T.E.'s statement was admissible under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A). This rule provides: "A statement is not hearsay if ... the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and the statement is inconsistent with the declar-ant's testimony." The State relies on our recent decision in Wassilie v. State, pointing out that this court may affirm a correct ruling of law by a trial court, regardless of the reasons advanced by the trial court, "if there exists independent grounds which, as a matter of law, support the trial court's conclusion."

In Wassilie, the defendant was convicted of felony assault for assaulting his mother and father. His conviction rested in part on the hearsay statement that his father, who was over ninety years old, had given to the police shortly after the assault. The father testified at trial but had no memory of this prior statement or the cireum-stances surrounding it. The State presented the testimony of Chief Alexie who had interviewed Wassilie's father on the night of the alleged assault. According to Chief Alexie, the father said that Wassilie had beaten him and his wife. The father described the beatings. The trial judge admitted the father's statements to Chief Alex-ie as prior inconsistent statements, and we upheld that finding on appeal. We-stated:

If a witness claims not to remember the substance of a prior statement at trial, the witness's trial testimony is inconsistent with the prior statement for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). It is frrelevant for purposes of the rule whether the claimed memory loss is genuine or feigned because the claimed lacked memory at trial (whether genuine or feigned) is inconsistent with the witness's earlier claim to remember.[]

Our decision in Wassilie supports the conclusion that T.E.'s statements to her mother, Olga Evan, were admissible as prior inconsistent statements.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." A similar right is provided in Article 1, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution. Vaska argues that admitting T.E.'s hearsay statements identifying him as the person who molested her violated his rights under both the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.

Our analysis of the Confrontation Clause begins with the leading case of United States v. Owens. In Owens, a correctional counselor at a federal prison, John Foster, was attacked and brutally beaten with a metal pipe. His memory was severely impaired. At one point, while he was in the hospital, Foster was able to describe the attack to an F.B.I. agent. He named Owens as his attacker, and he identified Owens from a photographic lineup. At trial, Foster could describe his activities before the attack, and he remembered feeling the blows to his head. He also remembered identifying Owens as his assailant to the F.B.I. agent. But he could not remember seeing Owens during the assault, nor could he say whether hospital visitors might have suggested to him that Owens was his assailant. Owens argued that Foster's lack of memory about the assault meant that he was unable to meaningfully cross-examine Foster. He argued that this limitation on his cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that Foster's statement to the F.B.I. agent was inadmissible hearsay.

The United States Supreme Court rejected these arguments. The Court concluded that admission of Foster's hearsay identification of Owens as the person who assaulted him did not violate the Confrontation Clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802, which generally excludes hearsay. The Court held that "neither the Confrontation Clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated by admission of an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification."

Vaska points out that Owens is distinguishable from his case because Foster was able to testify about the assault and about his identification of Owens. In contrast, T.E. had no recollection of the assault, her identification of Vaska, or her prior statement. Vaska's case appears to push the Confrontation Clause to its limits. But our reading of Owens is that the United States Supreme Court adopted the view that the Confrontation Clause only requires the hearsay declar-ant to testify and be available for cross-examination. The fact that T.E. could not shed any light on whether the incident about which the statement was made occurred, whether she made the statement, or the circumstances under which she made the statement would not constitute a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

In the majority opinion in Owens, written by Justice Scalia, the Court adopts the analysis of Justice Harlan, which he set out in a concurring opinion in California v. Green. In Green, Justice Harlan stated:

[There is no 'confrontation' reason why the prosecution should not use a witness' prior inconsistent statement for the truth of the matters therein asserted. Here the prosecution has produced its witness ... and made him available for trial confrontation. That, in my judgment, ... satisfies the Sixth Amendment.
The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the cireumstances under which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequence. The prosecution has no less fulfilled its obligation simply because a witness has a lapse of memory. The witness is, in my view, available. To the extent that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts, for reasons stated [previously], I think confrontation is nonetheless satisfied.[]

It therefore appears to us, that under the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court would hold that Vas-ka's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of T.E.'s hearsay statements identifying him as the person who sexually molested her. Vaska has not argued that we should reach a different result under the Alaska Constitution.

We have reviewed federal and state cases that have arisen since Owens to see if the subsequent judicial history supports our reading of that case. In general, it appears that the courts that have interpreted Owens have, at least in dicta, reached an interpretation consistent with ours. Following Wass-ilie and Owens, we conclude that T.E.'s statements to Olga Evan identifying Vaska as having sexually abused her were admissible.

Vaska also objects to Judge Funk's decision to admit T.E.'s hearsay statements to Dr. Burgess in which T.E. identified Vas-ka as the person who sexually assaulted her. In addition to the Confrontation Clause argument we have previously rejected, Vaska argues that the State was barred from eliciting testimony from Dr. Burgess that TE. identified Vaska as her abuser because the statement was not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(4). But our review of the record shows that Vaska did not make a timely specific hearsay objection when Dr. Burgess testified that T.E. identified Vaska as the person who abused her. From the record, Vaska appears to have objected to Dr. Burgess's characterization of how T.E. was playing with an anatomically correct female doll during his medical examination of her rather than objecting to T.E.'s statement as inadmissible hearsay. As Judge Funk later found, Vaska did not object on hearsay grounds. Hearsay evidence is admissible if it is not objected to. Therefore, Judge Funk did not err in admitting T.E.'s statements to Dr. Burgess.

Conclusion

Because we conclude that Judge Funk did not err in admitting T.E.'s hearsay statements identifying Vaska as the person who abused her, we affirm Vaska's conviction.

AFFIRMED.

      . AS 11.41.434(a)(1).

      . Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943 (Alaska App.1998); Vaska v. State, Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 4326, 2001 WL 21196 (Jan. 10, 2001).

      . 57 P.3d 719 (Alaska App.2002).

      . McGee v. State, 614 P.2d 800, 805-06 n. 10 (Alaska 1980).

      . - Wassilie, 57 P.3d at 720.

      . Id. at 722.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 721.

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 721-23.

      . Id. at 723.

      . 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 LEd.2d 951 (1988).

      . Id. at 556, 108 S.Ct. at 840.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 556, 108 S.Ct. at 841.

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . 1d.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 557-61, 108 S.Ct. at 841-43.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 559, 564, 108 S.Ct. at 842, 845.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 564, 108 S.Ct. at 845.

      . Id. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring)).

      . Green, 399 U.S. at 188-89, 90 S.Ct. at 1950-51.

      . See Alaska R.App. P. 212(c)(1); Aaron v. City of Ketchikan, 927 P.2d 335, 336 (Alaska App.1996) (quoting State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 n. 8 (Alaska App.1995) ("When a defendant asserts that the Alaska Constitution affords greater protection than the corresponding provision of the Federal Constitution, it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate something in the text, context, or history of the Alaska Constitution that justifies this divergent interpretation.")); Petersen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 406, 411 n. 8 (Alaska 1990) (explaining that party must meaningfully brief issue).

      . See, eg., Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 501-11 (6th Cir.2003) (concluding that trial court did not err in admitting four-year-old child victim's hearsay statements because she was subject to cross-examination regarding her inability to remember and her inarticulate responses); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 899-900 (10th Cir.1999) (finding no Confrontation Clause problem where child victim testified at trial but was unable to recall defendant's sexual abuse and defendant chose not to cross-examine witness); United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 47 (D.C.Cir.1993) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation and upholding admission of prior statements under Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) when witness testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination but could not remember events or prior statements); United States v. Martindale, 36 M.J. 870, 874-76 (N-M Crim.App.1993) (holding that twelve-year-old child who testified he could not remember sexual abuse or his prior statement to investigators, but was subject to cross-examination, created no Confrontation Clause problem); Tucker v. State, 564 A.2d 1110, 1113, 1123-24 (Del.1989) (concluding that because child abuse victim was available for cross-examination, the victim's lack of memory did not violate the Confrontation Clause); London v. State, 274 Ga. 91, 549 S.E.2d 394, 396-97 (2001) (holding that four-year-old child witness's evasive, forgetful, and unresponsive answers at trial made her prior inconsistent statements admissible and that there was no Confrontation Clause problem because defendant had opportunity for cross-examination); State v. Jenkins, 305 Mont. 95, 23 P.3d 201, 203, 204-06 (2001) (when witness, who suffered from Alzheimer's, testified at trial that she had no memory of event and was subject to cross-examination, the court held that the State properly introduced her prior inconsistent statements under Montana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and found no Confrontation Clause violation under Owens ); see also Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 535 N.E.2d 193, 202 (1989) (declining to address Owens but concluding that child victim's lack of memory presented no Confrontation Clause problem).
      But cf. United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1472-74 (8th Cir.1991) (explaining that "simply putting a child on the stand, regardless of her mental maturity, is not sufficient to eliminate all Confrontation Clause concerns[,]" but concluding that because the two child witnesses at issue were competent, testified in open court, and were cross-examined by defense counsel, the Confrontation Clause was not violated); State v. Canady, 80 Hawai'i 469, 911 P.2d 104, 113-16 (App.1996) (holding that because Hawaii Evidence Rule 802.1(1) "requires that the 'declarant [be] subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the declar-ant's statement[,]'"' Owens was distinguishable and that Rule 802.1(1) requires that "the witness be subject to cross-examination about the subject matter of the prior statement, that is, that the witness be capable of testifying substantively about the event, allowing the trier of fact to meaningfully compare the prior version of the event with the version recounted at trial ... before the statement would be admissible as substantive evidence of the matters stated therein"); State v. Rohrich, 132 Wash.2d 472, 939 P.2d 697, 698 (1997) (concluding that under Washington's child hearsay statute, the Confrontation Clause is violated when a child is called to testify at trial but "is not asked and does not answer any questions relating to ... the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay"); David Greenwald, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. Chi. L.Rev. 167, 186-87 (1993) (criticizing the Owens decision and arguing that for Rule 801(d) purposes, the witness should have some memory of making the prior statement); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. Ill. L.Rev. 691, 727-30 (1993) (critiquing the Owens decision, its treatment of the Confrontation Clause, and its implication to the hearsay rules).

      . See also Brandon v. State, 839 P.2d 400, 411-12 (Alaska App.1992) (affirming trial court's ruling allowing prior inconsistent statements of three-year old witness who testified at trial but who could not remember details of an assault and holding there was no Confrontation Clause violation because child was available for cross-examination).

      . See generally State v. Nollner, 749 P.2d 905, 908-09 (Alaska App.1988); Sluka v. State, 717 P.2d 394, 398-99 (Alaska App.1986).

      . Hayes v. State, 581 P.2d 221, 222 n. 2 (Alaska 1978); Cassell v. State, 645 P.2d 219, 220-21 (Alaska App.1982).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice KOURLIS

license: Public Domain

text:
    CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY, Petitioner, v. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; Zurich Specialities London Limited; and Gerling-Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG, Respondents.
    No. 02SC247.
    Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
    June 16, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 18, 2003.

      Fognani Guiboard Homsy & Roberts, LLP, John D. Fognani, R. Kirk Mueller, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
    White and Steele, P.C., Franz Hardy, Frederick W. Klann, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
    Roberts Levin & Patterson, P.C., Bradley A. Levin, Christine K. Wilkinson, Michael J. Rosenberg, Denver, Colorado, Amicus Curiae for the Trial Lawyers Association.
    Campbell, Latiolais & Ruebel, P.C., Brian E. Martin, Jeffrey Clay Ruebel, Denver, Colorado, Amicus Curiae for Colorado Defense Lawyer's Association.
   Justice KOURLIS

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

This is a case in which an insured is seek-The ing indemnification from its insurers. insured, Cyprus Amax Minerals Company ("Cyprus"), sold the Golden Cross Mine to Coeur d'Alene Mines Corporation ("Coeur"). Two years after the sale, the Mine experienced substantial damage, eventually leading to its close, stemming from a landslide deep below ground. After years of litigation, Cyprus and Coeur settled their claims and Cyprus sought indemnification from its insurers. The insurers refused, and Cyprus sued. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers and the court of appeals affirmed. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 55 P.8d 200 (Colo. App.2002). We granted certiorari on three issues, relating both generally and specifically to the insurers' indemnification obligation.

We now hold as follows. First, we explore the difference between an insurer's duty to defend its insured and an insurer's duty to indemnify its insured. We note that the rule directing a trial court to examine the underlying complaint in order to determine whether the insurer has a duty to defend its insured against the claims asserted is a rule designed to cast a broad net in favor of coverage. To interpret that rule in a way that narrows coverage when applied to a duty to indemnify would be inconsistent with our precedent. Accordingly, we hold that in determining the possibility of indemnity coverage, the trial court must examine the nature of the facts alleged and claims pled in the complaint or amended complaint liberally with a view toward affording the greatest possible protection to the insured. If, when read liberally, such document can colorably support a conclusion that coverage may attach, then the court may consider such additional evidence as will buttress or defeat coverage. Second, we hold that "property damage" was at issue in the lawsuit between Coeur and Cyprus, because "property damage" under the language of these policies can include the costs of repairing the Mine and the costs incurred by Coeur in loss of use of the Mine after the landslide. Third, we hold that the landslide was a "loss" or "accident" that could trigger the possibility of coverage under the terms of these policies and that no further causal connection was required by the policies.

We therefore conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Accordingly, we overturn the entry of summary judgment and remand this case for resolution of the factual issue of whether some portion of the settlement amount is compensable property damage attributable to physical injury to or destruction of the Mine including the loss of use of the Mine arising out of the landslide.

II. Facts and Procedural History

In April of 1998, Cyprus sold the Golden Cross Mine in Auckland, New Zealand to Coeur through a stock purchase agreement for nearly $54 million. Coeur operated the Mine successfully for almost two years, until the Mine experienced significant damage as a result of deep-seated ground movement. Co-eur made efforts to repair the damage caused by the subsidence at the Mine, but eventually closed the Mine.

In 1996, litigation ensued between the parties, centering on the damaged Mine. Cyprus initiated suit by filing a declaratory judgment action against Coeur in Federal District Court in Colorado. Shortly thereafter, Co-eur filed an action in its home state of Idaho (the "underlying litigation"). In its Second Amended Complaint, Coeur alleged that Cyprus negligently, recklessly, or deliberately failed to disclose material facts regarding conditions at the Mine, which ultimately resulted in the subsidence. Coeur brought claims under the Idaho and Colorado Securities Acts, common law fraud, and common law rescission. Three years into litigation, the underlying litigation settled for approximately $31 million.

Cyprus maintained excess lability insurance policies through Lexington Insurance Company, Zurich Specialities London Limited, and Gerling-Konzern Aligemeine Versi-cherungs-AG ("Insurers"). Each policy provided in pertinent part that the Insurers would indemnify the Insured for a loss (defined as an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions) imposed upon the Insured by law or assumed by contract for damages on account of personal injury, property damage or advertising injury. "Property damage" is defined as physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of use thereof.

After Cyprus and Coeur settled the underlying suit, Cyprus then sought indemnification for the amount of the settlement. The Insurers denied the claim and refused to indemnify Cyprus, claiming that Cyprus' liability in the underlying suit was not covered by the policies.

Cyprus subsequently commenced a civil action against the Insurers in Denver District Court claiming breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair trade acts and practices. The Insurers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Cyprus' claim was not covered because the underlying litigation did not include "property damage," for which the Insurers would be liable. Rather, the Insurers contended that the claims were based entirely on fraud and other intentional acts by Cyprus and involved only economic damages, not property damage as would be covered by the policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurers, disagreeing with the Insurers' argument that the claims were based on intentional acts, but agreeing that Coeur did not allege property damage in the Second Amended Complaint. Additionally, the district court found that no material issue of fact was in dispute and that the "loss" suffered by Coeur focused solely on monetary damages not covered by the policies.

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Second Amended Complaint did not allege property damage, but rather only economic damages resulting from fraud and misrepresentation. The court determined that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and because Insurers' obligation to defend arises from the four corners of the complaint, there can be no duty to indemnify where the complaint does not allege facts that would impose liability. Finally, the court also noted that irrespective of Coeur's descriptions in the Second Amended Complaint of the property damage at the Mine, no causal connection existed between any alleged misrepresentations and the property damage.

II. - Standard of Review

- As a starting point for this analysis, it is important to remember that, "summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should only be granted if there is a clear showing that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Colo.1998); see also Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 613 (Colo.1999). Courts grant the nonmoving party all favorable inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts, and resolve any doubt as to whether a triable issue of material fact exists against the moving party. See Compass, 984 P.2d at 613. This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.

IV. Principles of Insurance Contract Interpretation

An insurance policy is merely a contract that courts should interpret in line with well-settled principles of contract interpretation. See Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 613 (Colo.1999); Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo.1990). In undertaking the interpretation of an insurance contract, courts should be wary of rewriting provisions, and should give the words contained in the contract their plain and ordinary meaning, unless contrary intent is evidenced in the policy. Chacon, 788 P.2d at 750. Courts should read the provisions of the policy as a whole, rather than reading them in isolation. Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 286, 239 (Colo.1992). Courts may neither add provisions to extend coverage beyond that contracted for, nor delete them to limit coverage. However, because of the unique nature of insurance contracts and the relationship between the insurer and insured, courts do construe ambiguous provisions against the insurer and in favor of providing coverage to the insured. Chacon, 788 P.2d at 750. A court's interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law, subject to de novo review. Compass, 984 P.2d at 613.

V. Duty to Indemnify

We must begin by deciding what a court may review in resolving whether an insured is entitled to indemnification of its loss. The trial court and the court of appeals began by looking to the underlying complaint itself and concluded that the Insurers had no obligation to indemnify Cyprus for liability stemming from the negotiated settlement with Coeur because the Second Amended Complaint contained no claim for covered losses. We agree that the Complaint serves as the starting point for the analysis of whether the loss is covered, but we disagree that it is the end point as well. To hold otherwise would belie the underlying purpose of the complaint rule as it has developed in the context of the duty to defend: namely, to require an insurer to provide its insured with a defense if the facts or claims alleged may arguably fall within the policy. When applying this rule in the context of a duty to indemnify, it must similarly be used to cast a broad net.

- Initially, we must revisit the distinction between an insurance company's duty to defend its insured, and its duty to indemnify. The duty to defend concerns an "insurance company's duty to affirmatively defend its insured against pending claims." Constitution Assoc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 563 (Colo.1996). We have long held that to determine whether a duty to defend exists, courts must look no further than the four corners of the underlying complaint (the "four corners" or "complaint" rule). See Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1089, 1089 (Colo.1991). An insurer is not excused from this duty "unless there is no factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held liable to indemnify the insured." Id. at 1090. Hence, if the alleged facts even potentially trigger coverage under the policy, the insurer is bound to provide a defense. Constitution Assoc., 930 P.2d at 563; Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1089.

The duty to defend is separate and distinct from an insurer's obligation to indemnify its insured. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086 n. 5; 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 8D § 200:8 (1999). The duty to indemnify relates to the insurer's duty to satisfy a judgment entered against the insured. Constitution Assoc., 930 P.2d at 563. Because the duty to defend encompasses any potential claims raised by the facts and the duty to indemnify relates to the actual liability imposed, this court has considered the duty to defend to be a broader concept than the duty to indemnify. Id.; Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1089.

Since we have held that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and have also held that the determination of whether an insurer has a duty to defend lies within the four corners of the complaint, the court of appeals here held that courts must also rely on the four corners of the underlying complaint to determine whether the insurer has an obligation to indemnify. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 200, 206 (Colo.App.2002). Relying on the principle that where no duty to defend exists, there can be no duty to indemnify, the court held that where the complaint contains no allegations that could create a duty to defend, then there is similarly no duty to indemnify. Id. Although we agree that the complaint must implicate coverage before any duty can be at issue, we do not agree with the court of appeals' narrow application of the principle in this case.

In Hecla, this court analyzed whether a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify existed in a general lability insurance policy covering Hecla. 811 P.2d at 1085-86. Prior to the resolution of the underlying claim, Hecla requested a defense from its insurers and the insurers sought a judicial determination as to whether it owed the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. Id. at 1086. Hecla set forth the common principles regarding the duty to defend, as discussed above, and concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that the insurers owed a duty to defend. Id. at 1086, 1089. Because the issue of whether the insurers faced an obligation to indemnify could only be decided after Hecla's liability had been determined, the court concluded that the issue of indemnification was not ripe for resolution. Id. at 1086. .

Several years later, this court again dealt with the duty to defend issue in an anticipatory declaratory relief action. The court, in Constitution Associates, confronted a situation in which an insurance company sought to determine its obligation to indemnify its insured before the underlying lawsuit, which framed the basis of the claims, was concluded. 980 P.2d at 558. The court did hold that an anticipatory declaratory judgment action can be appropriate in some instances, and in that context discussed the interplay between the duty to defend and duty to indemnify doctrines. Id. at 563-64. We confirmed the principles articulated in Hecla, noting that the duty to defend arises where the claims even potentially fall within the policy's coverage, but the duty to indemnify is only triggered where the policy actually covers the alleged harm. Id. at 568. We reiterated that where no duty to defend exists, it follows that there can be no duty to indemnify. Id.

Finally, in Compass Insurance Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 609 (Colo.1999), the city initiated a declaratory judgment action to determine whether its insurance poli-cles obligated its insurers to cover liability arising out of sewage sludge dumping. We again noted that the duty to defend sweeps more broadly than the duty to indemnify, reaffirming that where a duty to defend exists, a duty to indemnify may follow, but also recognizing that if the duty to defend does not first exist, the duty to indemnify cannot follow. Id. at 618, 621. The court noted that,

It is true that a resolution of the duty to indemnify is premature where there is a duty to defend but the liability of the insured has not yet been determined. However, onee an insurer has prevailed on the duty to defend, the issue of the duty to indemnity is ripe for resolution because "[wlhere there is no duty to defend, it follows that there can be no duty to indemnify."

Id. at 621 (internal citations omitted). The court found, as a matter of law, that the insurers could not be exeused from their duty to defend given the nature of the claims, therefore, the duty to indemnify issue was not yet ripe. Id.

All of these cases dealt with scenarios where both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify were at issue. 'To the contrary, the policy here contains no duty to defend, under any circumstance. The policy provides only indemnification.

None of the parties is arguing that because there is no contractual duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify. That would defeat the purpose of the policy altogether. In fact, the parties have explicitly contracted for the separate and distinct consideration of a duty to indemnify. What the Insurers do argue is that there is no basis for any duty to defend the lawsuit brought by Coeur against Cyprus, and thus no corresponding obligation to indemnify Cyprus for the loss. Hence, we must now determine how to evaluate the obligation to indemnify, cut loose from any obligation to defend.

The duty to indemnify arises only when the policy actually covers the harm and typically cannot be determined until the resolution of the underlying claims. See Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086 (concluding that the issue of indemnification was not ripe for resolution until the liability was actually determined); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. W. Guar. Fund Svcs., 924 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Colo.App.1996) ("While the duty to indemnify can only be determined after the development of a full factual record, the duty to defend must be determined based solely on a comparison of the allegations of the complaint made against the insured with the insuring provision of the policy."); see also 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segaila, Couch on Insurance 3D §§ 200:1, 200:3 ("whether an insurer has a duty to defend is based on the existence of coverage under the policy, but actual coverage is not ascertainable until after the underlying case is litigated").

Further, we have held that the determination of whether coverage is ultimately required is a question of fact. See Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1089. Our consistent recognition that the trigger for the duty to indemnify must normally await a determination of actual liability presupposes that indemnity flows from the nature of the ultimate verdict, judgment or settlement.

In the duty to defend context, the "complaint rule" operates to cast a broad net, such that when the underlying complaint alleges any facts or claims that might fall within the ambit of the policy, the insurer must tender a defense. See id.; Compass, 984 P.2d at 613-14. An insurer has a heavy burden to overcome in avoiding the duty to defend, such that "the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot." Compass, 984 P.2d at 614 (quoting Standun, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 882, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 120 (1998)).

Applying that principle in a straight duty to indemnify context in such a way as to limit or constrain coverage belies its purpose. Certainly, a trial court should look to the operative complaint as an important factor in resolving indemnity disputes, as such claims may have been amended to conform to the evidence. See C.R.C.P. 15(b) (allowing parties to amend complaints to conform to the evidence presented at trial); Idaho R. Civ. P. 15(b) (same). However, the nature of the claims pled, the relief sought and the facts alleged must be construed broadly; and the failure to identify a particular claim for relief, while simultaneously alleging facts that would support such a claim, cannot be dispos-itive.

When the facts pled, claims asserted and relief sought do arguably include a loss for which an insured would potentially be liable, that cannot be the end of the inquiry. Rather, at that point, the court must look to the facts as they developed at trial and the ultimate judgment. The jury's verdict form may break out specific claims and the verdict attributable to those claims. If there are various claims and the verdict does not separate them, the trial court making the indemnity determination may have to look at the facts presented at trial. In short, certainly no verdict can enter on a claim not pled and proven, but the complaint, as amended, is but the starting point in that analysis.

Where the claims do not proceed through the crucible of trial, and instead are settled by the parties, the analysis becomes more difficult. Again, the first step must be the final version of the complaint, for if no colorable claim is made that would invoke indemnification coverage, then the presumption is that no such coverage exists. However, notice pleading does not contemplate detail and specificity, and certainly, a trial court could review other matters in arriving at a conclusion as to whether some portion or all of the settlement would be properly subject to indemnification.

The determination of whether a duty to indemnify exists requires factual development, as it is largely a question of fact. Extrinsic evidence may assist the trial court in determining whether and to what extent actual liability, as represented by a verdiet or settlement, is covered by an existing policy.

VI. Analyzing Coverage Under These Policies

Thus, we now return to the facts of this case in order to answer the question of whether the Insurers have any responsibility to indemnify Cyprus for the Coeur lawsuit settlement. We first set out the language of the policies to establish the framework for applicable coverage, then we summarize portions of the Second Amended Complaint in order to identify Coeur's claims. Because we view the facts as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as raising a colorable claim of coverage, we also review the extrinsic evidence. Lastly, we determine, in light of applicable principles of law, what "property damage" means under the policies, and whether there is a causal connection required by the policies other than that the damages were occasioned by the landslide.

A. The Policy

The insurance policies require the Insurers to pay for Cyprus' liability for damages on account of property damage resulting from a loss. Specifically, the policies state in pertinent part:

In the event that a claim or claims are first made, in writing, against the Insured during the period of this Policy arising from a Loss which took place on or after 1st April, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Retroactive Date), Underwriters will indemnify the Insured, subject to the Limits of Liability set forth in the Declarations and the applicable provisions of this Policy, for that amount of the ULTIMATE NET SUM PAYABLE in excess of the UNDERLYING AMOUNTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE INSURED which the Insured shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability:
(a) imposed upon the Insured by law, or
(b) assumed by the Insured under contract or agreement,
for damages on account of:-
(i) Personal Injuries,
(ii) Property Damage,
(ii) Advertising Injury,
resulting from each Loss, but only such Personal Injuries, Property Damage and Advertising Injury, neither expected nor intended by the Insured, as respects the claim or claims that are first made, in writing, against the Insured during the period of this Policy.
The words "PROPERTY DAMAGE", wherever used in this Policy, mean:-
(a) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of use thereof resulting therefrom;
(b) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed.
The word "LOSS", wherever used in this Policy, means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions....

B. Coeur's Allegations

We look next to the allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint to see if there is a colorable articulation of facts that could lead to a finding of liability under the policies.

While not specifically citing a cause of action for "property damage," we do find instances in the Second Amended Complaint where Coeur alleged facts that could lead to a recovery for "property damage." Specifically, Coeur alleged in the Second Amended Complaint:

In late 1995, the plaintiffs learned that portions of the slope at the Mine site upon which the Union tailings impoundment is situated were sustaining movement approximately 60 meters under the surface. This movement potentially affected the tailings impoundment. ...
As a result of the ground movement, it has been, and will be, necessary to expend substantial sums of money to attempt to remedy the problem and to protect the integrity of the tailings impoundment and to close the Mine.

Second Am. Compl. 1% 33-34 (emphasis added). Further, in Coeur's prayer for relief, it sought the following damages:

If at law, for return to plaintiffs from defendant Cyprus of $54,023,460, the true amount of the purchase monies paid by plaintiffs to close the transaction, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest thereon, as may be provided by law, together with judgment for costs and expenses plaintiffs incur as a result of Cyprus' misrepresentations and omission, together with interest thereon, as provided by law.
If in equity, for the decree of this Court ordering rescission of the transaction de-seribed in Paragraph 17 of the foregoing complaint, together with such further orders, judgment, or decrees as may be found by the Court to be meet, proper, or necessary, given all of the circumstances, equitably to restore defendant Cyprus and plaintiffs to the positions they would have occupied had the transaction not occurred.

Second Am. Compl. 11 1-2 (emphasis added).

The Complaint also contains factual allegations that Coeur expended substantial sums of money in an effort to stabilize and repair the Mine and that Coeur incurred losses attributable to the loss of use of the Mine after Coeur was forced to close it. To "restore defendant Cyprus and plaintiffs to the positions they would have occupied had the transaction not occurred," Coeur would have to be reimbursed for those monies.

Thus, we conclude that the Second Amended Complaint does support a colorable claim for property damage, and we thus look to the additional evidence tendered by both parties. Without resolving the factual question, we do determine that the extrinsic evidence buttresses the conclusion that some portion of the settlement amount was attributable to property damage covered by the policies.

First, and most telling, is Coeur's settlement demand letter issued to Cyprus. In that letter, among other things, Coeur's counsel sought approximately $25 million dollars for stabilization and interest. This approximation was based on invoices submitted to Cyprus documenting the amounts expended to repair and stabilize the tailings im-poundment and related facilities. Irrespective of how narrowly or broadly we interpret the complaint to include "property damage," the demand letter clearly calls for reimbursement for those expenses associated with Co-eur's tangible property damage.

Insurers point to a brief submitted to the trial court, in which Coeur stated that it did not seek personal injury or property damage in the Second Amended Complaint. The statements read as follows:

Cyprus has not set forth any basis for liability the engineering firm it hired has to Coeur for misrepresentations or omissions of Cyprus. Coeur could not sue the engineering firm for tort since no personal injury or property damage is alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. ... Co-eur alleges injury to the value of the stock (and various elements of associated damage), and not injury to its "property".

Coeur's Opp'n to Cyprus' Mot. to Vacate Trial at 19. In an attempt to minimize the effect of Coeur's statements, Cyprus notes that Coeur limited its statements by adding: "and various elements of associated damage." With this phrase, Cyprus contends that Co-eur included the $21 million sought in stabilization costs, and regardless of Coeur's characterization of those monies, they meet the definition of "property damage" provided for by the policies.

We view the evidence as supporting the conclusion that there is a material question of fact as to whether Coeur was seeking property damage for which Cyprus was entitled to indemnification under the policies.

C. - Analysis

We must now read the factual and legal allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and the extrinsic evidence in the context of the language of the policy.

The Insurers make two primary arguments against coverage. First, they argue that Coeur is really asserting claims only for economic loss, and not for property damage. Second, they argue that that the policies require a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations by Cyprus and the ultimate subsidence, and there is no such connection.

i. Property Damage

The Insurers claim that the term "property damage" is a limited concept, which on its face, excludes economic loss damages. In considering this argument, we note preliminarily that the policies make no attempt affirmatively to exclude economic losses or economic damages, and to the contrary, do include damages associated with loss of use of property, which might normally be classified as economic damages.

We also note that the term "property damage" is not, in and of itself, a term that carries legal connotation. For example, in Black's Law Dictionary, various kinds of damages are defined, including actual, compensatory, consequential, direct, general, land, proximate and special. Black's Law Dictionary 898-97 (7th ed.1999). "Property" damage is not included.

This court has struggled with differentiating between damages that flow from a breach of contract action and a tort action, focusing in that context on the economie loss rule. See Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo.2000) (finding that the crucial difference between tort and contract damages lies in the source of the duties of the parties and that a party suffering from only economic loss stemming from a breach of contract may not assert a claim in tort unless that party is owed an independent duty under tort law); Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 870-71 (Colo.2002) (reaffirming principles of Town of Alma, holding that "where the duty breached stems from a contract, redress must be under the contract," but "where a duty arises independently of any contractual obligations between the parties, a tort action will lie"); Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 240 (Col0.2003) (allowing non-economic damages in a insurance contract claim when the insurer willfully and wantonly breaches the contract, as long as the damages are foreseeable at the time of contracting and the damages are a natural and probable result of that breach).

However, there is no argument here that the policy covers only torts and not contract actions or that the damages are confined by that distinction. Rather, the argument is that property damage is a stand-alone term, implicitly understood to exclude the kinds of damages normally flowing from contract causes of action, such as depreciation in the value of stock or other financial loss.

The court of appeals compared this case to Safeco Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 915 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.1990). In Safeco, a purchaser of real property brought claims against the insured/seller of negligent failure to inspect property and inform buyer of defects, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and rescission of contract. Id. at 501. The complaint focused on the seller's alleged failure to discover and properly inform the buyer of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property. Id. Safeco claimed that that it owed no duty to defend its insured, as the lawsuit both failed to allege any "property damage" within the meaning established by the policy and to allege an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy. Id. The policy in that case provided coverage "lilf a claim is made or suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies" and excluded coverage "under any ... contract or agreement except those directly relating to the maintenance or use of the insured location." Id. at 502.

The Ninth Cireuit noted first that the coverage clearly did not extend to claims for breach of contract or rescission. Id. Next, the court concluded that the purchaser's claims did not expose the insured to liability for damages to tangible property, but rather for economic loss resulting from the failure to discover and disclose facts relevant to the property's value and desirability, because while the defective condition of the property served as an element of the claims alleged, it was not the gravamen of the cause of action against the seller. Id. Rather, the court concluded that the damages were caused by the misrepresentations, which the court could not construe as an "occurrence" or a "peril insured against" under the terms of the policy. Id.; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brewer, 914 F.Supp. 140, 148 (S.D.Miss. 1996) (holding that claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentation and fraud are pecuniary in their nature, thus finding that preexisting termite damage was not property damage).

The policies at issue in this case made no attempt to carve out an exclusion for breach of contract or rescission actions, unlike the policy in Safeco. Further, in both M.L. Foss and in Safeco, the parties sought damages related solely to the difference in the actual value versus the represented value, rather than including any additional damages for remediation costs. Other jurisdictions have considered remediation costs to constitute property damage as well as economic damage. See, eg., Gaylord Chem. Corp. v. Pro-Pump, Inc., 753 So.2d 349, 353-54 (La.Ct.App.2000) (finding property damage under the terms of insurance policy in case where pump failed to operate as represented at time of sale); Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679 A.2d 540, 545 (1996) (determining that property damage existed for loss of use where septic system failed after purchase of property); see also Wood v. Safeco Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 43 (Mo.Ct.App.1998).

Insurers point to Gregory T. Lawrence, Sheets v. Brethren Mutual: Maryland's High Court Misconstrues CGL to Cover Excluded Economic Loss Caused be Negligent Misrepresentation, 27 U. Balt. L.Rev. 189, 221-24 (1997), to argue that harm flowing from misrepresentations is not "property damage," but rather pure "economic loss." Lawrence contends that a majority of states have followed the Safeco decision, rather than Sheets v. Brethren Mutual, such that where a purchaser seeks damages for economic loss-the difference between the actual value of the property and the value of the property as represented-no liability exists for property damage. Id. at 224. We are not persuaded.

We are guided in our analysis by various factors applicable to this case: i. the policy provides not only for property damage coverage, but also for coverage associated with the loss of use of property; ii. the policy does not exclude contract causes of action or economic losses, as do the policies in a number of the cases denying coverage; iii. an ambiguity must be interpreted to the benefit of the insured; iv. Coeur did allege damage to the Mine, costs associated with remediating that damage and loss of use of the Mine occasioned by the damage; and lastly, v. this case is before us on a motion for summary judgment.

Considering all of those factors, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Cyprus incurred liability for property damage under the policies. We find no authority showing that liability cannot include a mix of property damages and other kinds of damages.

ii. - Causal Nexus

Assuming that Coeur sought and received damages for the injury to the Mine itself, we must still determine whether the alleged - misrepresentations - of - Cyprus "caused" a "loss" in such a way as to trigger indemnification coverage under the policy. The court of appeals held that in order to receive indemnification under the policy, Co-eur would have had to show that Cyprus' alleged misrepresentations in some way caused the damage to the property. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 200, 203 (Colo.App.2002).

Cyprus urges a different interpretation of the policy. Cyprus contends that coverage exists where the property damage results from a "loss," or "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful condition." Cyprus alleges that the property damage resulted from the "accident" or "harmful condition" of the landslide for which Coeur sought to hold Cyprus liable because Cyprus did not disclose that there was a risk of that harm. Conversely, Insurers contend that the misrepresentations must cause the "accident" which in turn causes the property damage.

As quoted above, the policy provides that:

In the event that a claim ... against the Insured ... arising from a Loss ... Underwriters will indemnify the Insured ... for that amount ... the Insured shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability . imposed upon the Insured by law ... for damages on account of ... Property damage ... resulting from each Loss ....

(emphasis added). The court of appeals construed the term "resulting from" to create the causal nexus between any damage to the Mine and any misrepresentations by Cyprus. The term "resulting from" is not defined by the policy, and "[when faced with terms in an insurance policy that are not defined, [Colorado law] dictates that such terms be given their plain, ordinary meaning and interpreted according to the understanding of the average purchaser of insurance." Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 617 (Colo.1999).

Looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of this passage, the causal connector, "resulting from", attaches to the term "loss," not "damages." "Loss" then refers to an "accident." The policy language also expands insurers' indemnification obligations beyond that property damage directly caused by Cyprus' action by including the language: "damages on account of ... Property damage." Based on a plain reading of the provision, indemnification is triggered where liability is imposed on Cyprus for damages on account of property damage caused by an accident.

Construing the policy in favor of providing coverage, we again determine that Cyprus is entitled to indemnification when it faces legal liability for damages to property that are caused by an accident, e.g. the landslide. If Insurers intended a different result, it was incumbent upon them to so delineate. Insurers seeking to avoid liability "must do. so in clear and unequivocal language and must call such limiting conditions to the attention of the insured." Tynan's Nissan, Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 321, 824 (Colo.App.1995). We find no such limitations present in the policies.

In fact, in an attempt to interpret the policy as a whole, we also note that Cyprus' policies each contained a "completed operations" clause. A finding that misrepresentations cannot lead to property damage would be in direct conflict with the language of the completed operations clause and so holding would eliminate its effect. The clause reads:

The words "COMPLETED OPERATIONS LIABILITY HAZARD", wherever used in this Policy, mean Personal Injuries and/or Property Damage which arise out of operations or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at the time with respect thereto, but only if the Personal Injuries or Property Damage occurs after such operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the Insured.

The provision specifically contemplates that "property damage" can arise from "reliance on a representation." To hold that a misrepresentation cannot, under any cireumstances, cause or lead to property damage vitiates this provision. This is not acceptable, as courts are charged with seeking "to give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless." Pub. Serv. Co. v. Wallis & Co., 986 P.2d 924, 983 (Colo.1999) (quoting Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo.1984)).

The court of appeals points to several jurisdictions holding that there cannot be a causal nexus between misrepresentations and property damage. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 915 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.1990) (finding that the misrepresentations caused the economic damages, but finding that a misrepresentation was not an "occurrence" for which liability would be triggered under the policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brewer, 914 F.Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.Miss.1996) (finding no proximate cause between alleged misrepresentation and property damage, as damage occurred prior to the misrepresentation); Martin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 146 Or.App. 270, 932 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1997) (holding that no causal connection was alleged between negligent misrepresentations and property damage); State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex.App.1996) (finding only economic damages, but stating that even if property damages were alleged, misrepresentations are not "conditions" that the property could be "exposed" to as required by the policy). Each case necessarily turns on the language of the policy at issue in that case and the nature of the claim made. We do not view the cited cases as persuasive, given the language of these policies and the nature of Coeur's claims.

The facts before us do, unequivocally, involve an accident: the subsidence of the Mine. They do not involve a cireumstance in which the value of the stock was not as represented because of undisclosed financial liabilities or the depth of the mineral deposit. There was an accident here.

We need not reach as far as the court in Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679 A.2d 540 (1996), which uses a more relaxed standard for evaluating the necessary occurrence or accident. The court in Sheets analyzed whether insurers owed a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify in a lawsuit alleging that the sellers of a farmhouse intentionally and negligently misrepresented that the septic system was in good working order. Id. at 541. Finding that the loss of use of the property constituted "property damage" under the policy, the Court went on to determine if negligent misrepresentations met the definition of "occurrence," or "accident" under the policy. Id. at 545-51. The Court analyzed the apparent split in authority over the issue, and concluded that an interpretation of a policy denying coverage for damages that are the natural and probable consequences of negligent acts is too limiting. Id. Instead, the Court read the definition of "accident" to include negligent misrepresentation if the insured did not expect or foresee the resulting damage. Id. at 551. See also Gaylord Chem. Corp. v. Pro-Pump, Inc., 753 So.2d 349, 358 (La.Ct.App.2000) (allowing property damages where pump failed to operate as represented at time of sale).

Accordingly, under a plain reading of the policy, we conclude that the indemnification provisions apply when Cyprus faces legal liability because of property damage that results from an accident, in this case the landslide. The policy does not require that Cyprus must have caused the landslide, but rather only that Cyprus must be found, or agree to be held, liable for the same.

VIL - Conclusions

Because we view the case as presenting material issues of disputed fact, we now reverse the court of appeals' decision upholding the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . Specifically, we granted certiorari on the following three issues:
      1) Whether the court of appeals erred in determining the Respondent insurance companies' ("Insurers") duty to indemnify Cyprus by applying a duty to defend analysis, le. restricting its review of the underlying case to the four corners of the complaint and ignoring other evidence of what was at issue in the underlying litigation and settlement.
      2) Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that damages sought by Coeur d'Alene Mining Company ("Coeur"), based on allegations that negligent misrepresentations by Cyprus led it to purchase mining property that was subsequently damaged by a landslide causing Coeur to incur remediation costs, were purely "economic" losses and not "property damage" as defined in the subject insurance policies.
      3) Whether the court of appeals erred in effectively holding that, even if there was a sufficient "casual connection" for Cyprus to have been held Hable for the costs of repairing property damaged by a landslide due to its alleged negligent misrepresentation, there was not a sufficient "causal connection" to bring such liability within the coverage provided by the subject insurance policies.

      . Ultimately, only the Idaho suit proceeded and the Second Amended Complaint in that case forms the basis of argument in the case at hand.

      . We decline to comment as to the effect of such an amendment on an anticipatory declaratory action where a court finds no duty to defend and consequently no duty to indemnify.

      . We quote from the Lexington policy; however, each of the policies contains substantially similar language.

      . The demand letter contained the following outline of damages:
      Purchase Price Paid to Cyprus $ 54,023,460.00
      Interest on Purchase Price @ 12% 38,896,891.20
      (Idaho Legal Interest) - Six Years
      Coeur's Payments For Stabilization 21,623,765.34
      (Through 1998 Only)
      Interest on Coeur's Payments For 3,910,277.176
      Stabilization @ 12% -Three Years
      Attorneys' Fees and Taxable Costs 3,000,000.00
      For This Case
      Total: $ 121,554,394.30

      . Furthermore, counsel appear to be drawing a distinction that relates to privity, and the difference between a tort action and a contract action. Those distinctions are not applicable to the parsing of Coeur's claims against Cyprus.

      . See also M.L. Foss, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 885 P.2d 284, 285 (Colo.App.1994), in which a land purchaser sued ML. Foss for breach of contract and fraud in connection with environmental contamination of property the party purchased from ML. Foss. M.L. Foss then sought a defense and indemnification from its insurers. Id. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that no coverage was available, because the underlying claims alleged only intentional or knowing misrepresentations and did not include an "occurrence, ie. an 'accident' resulting in 'property damage neither expected nor intended," " as required by the policy. Id. at 285-86. Further, even if the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an "occurrence," the court of appeals also determined that the complaint sought only monetary damages-those damages represented by the difference in the value of the property between what was represented by the seller and the actual value considering the undisclosed contamination. Id. The case did not include any damages associated with mitigating the actual damage to the property or loss of use associated with the damage; and the case did not involve an "accident" as does this case. The case is therefore factually distinguishable. To the extent, however, that reasoning in the opinion in M.L. Foss in inconsistent with our holding in this case, we disapprove it.

      . The court of appeals characterized this line of cases as the minority view.

      . This provision is not directly at issue in the case.

      . The insured there only sought coverage under the "property damage" clause for the loss of use of the system, not for the repairs.


text:
    FRANKLIN BANK, N. A., a national bank association, and NBD Equipment Finance Inc., Petitioners, v. Bruce T. BOWLING and Elizabeth H. Bowling, Respondents.
    No. 02SC524.
    Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
    June 23, 2003.
    As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Aug. 4, 2003.

      Otto, Porterfield & Post, LLC, Wendell B. Porterfield, Jr., Vail, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners.
    Bailey & Peterson, P.C., James S. Bailey, Jr., Randall M. Livingston, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.
   Justice KOURLIS

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this case, Bruce T. and Elizabeth H. Bowling purchased a condominium unit and parking space in Eagle County from Patrice Merritt. The Bowlings obtained a title insurance commitment, which did not refer to any judgment liens encumbering the property. Several months after that transaction, Franklin Bank, NA. and NBD Equipment Finance, Inc. (Creditors), sought to execute against the property, based upon judgment liens filed prior to the sale against "Grady Merritt," husband of Patrice Merritt, and a signatory on the deed of trust encumbering the property. The Bowlings brought this action to enjoin the execution sale and for a declaratory judgment that the judgment liens were not valid against their property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bowlings, finding that the Bowlings' property was not subject to the judgment creditors' lien, because the name on the property was "T. Grady Merritt" and the name on the liens was "Grady Merritt." Creditors appealed to the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court's order. Bowling v. Franklin Bank, N.A., No. 01CA1346, 2002 WL 31058824 (Colo.App. May 30, 2002) (not selected for official publication).

We accepted certiorari on two issues relating to the effect of the judgment Hens. The operative question is whether recorded transcripts of judgment identifying the judgment debtor as "Grady Merritt" created liens against real property titled in the name of "T. Grady Merritt." We now hold that when an individual uses a first initial and a full middle name, there is a presumption that he may transact business under the middle name rather than the first name. Accordingly, the title examiner, was on constructive notice of judgment liens filed against "Grady Merritt" even though the examiner was searching for recordings against "T. Grady Merritt." We therefore reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment and injunction, and remand with directions to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts

In March of 1996, T. Grady Merritt and Patrice Merritt purchased a condominium unit and associated parking space in Eagle County from David M. Zinn and Marilyn Zinn, evidenced by a general warranty deed. The Merritts executed a deed of trust encumbering the property to a third party

Creditors each obtained a judgment against "Grady Merritt" in Michigan, filed their judgment in Colorado pursuant to the proper procedures, and recorded it with the clerk and recorder of Eagle County on March 12, 1999. It is uncontested that "T. Grady Merritt" and "Grady Merritt" are the same person. As a part of the process, Creditors notified Merritt of the filing of the judgment in Colorado.

On May 18, 1999, T. Grady Merritt conveyed his share of the property to his wife Patrice for nominal consideration, by executing a quitclaim deed. Thereafter, Patrice Merritt sold the property to the Bowlings by general warranty deed dated December 3, 1999, which deed was duly recorded. As a part of the contract for sale, Patrice caused a commitment for title insurance for the property to be furnished to the Bowlings.

Land Title Guarantee Company issued a commitment for insurance of title prior to closing, on November 1, 1999. Land Title required the release of the deed of trust in the names of both “T. Grady Merritt” and “Patrice Merritt,” but did not make any reference to the transcripts of judgment as liens against the property. Land Title later insured the title without excepting the judgment liens.

After closing, Creditors attempted to execute on and sell their interest in the property. The Bowlings filed a complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin the sale, claiming that the judgment did not attach to their property because they had no notice of the judgment lien recorded against “Grady Merritt.” The Bowlings subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, noting that neither party disputed the operative facts. Creditors opposed Bowlings motion, but filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Essentially, both parties agreed that the dispositive question of law was “whether recording a transcript of judgment with the judgment debtor named ‘Grady Merritt’ provides constructive notice of the judgment to purchasers of property that was once owned in the name of ‘T. Grady Merritt.’ ”

The trial court observed that both parties had made mistakes—Creditors by failing to ascertain all correct legal names of the debt- or/grantor, and the Bowlings, through Land Title, by failing to search the index for the name “Grady Merritt.” The court determined that the title company had no duty to search the index for the grantor’s middle name.

Creditors appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Bowlings had no notice of Creditors’ judgments because “T. Grady Merritt” is a materially different name than “Grady Merritt” and any judgments recorded against “Grady Merritt” were consequently outside the chain of title. Further, the court found that no irregularity occurred in the chain of title that would persuade it to charge the Bowlings with inquiry notice, rejecting Creditors’ argument that the presence of a quitclaim deed and the absence of consideration raised a duty to inquire. Creditors sought, and we accepted, certiorari.

To summarize, then, the current parties to this action are the Bowlings, who had no actual knowledge of the judgment liens, and who obtained title insurance on the property that represented the title to be free and clear of any such hens. On the other side are the Creditors, who have a valid judgment against Grady Merritt, which would presumably have been paid at closing out of the proceeds of the sale if the title insurance company had located it. So, simply stated, does the law impose upon the purchasers, through Land Title, the burden of locating Creditors’ judgment liens despite the difference between the name “T. Grady Merritt,” which appeared in the chain of title to the real property, and “Grady Merritt?”

To answer that question, we must determine whether Creditors’ filings in the Eagle County records gave notice to the Bowlings’ title examiner of the existence of the liens.

II. Standard of Review

Both parties in this case moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Bowlings motion, and entered an injunction against the enforcement of the liens against the Bowlings property. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 954 P.2d 608, 611 (Colo.1998); see also Joe Dickerson Assocs. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo.2001) (holding that an appellate court reviews a trial court’s granting of a summary judgment motion de novo because it is a question of law). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and supporting documents demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Martini v. Smith, 42 P.3d 629, 632 (Colo.2002).

III. Judgment Liens

The conveyancing and recording statutes, sections 38-85-101 to 126, 10 C.R.S. (2002), provide that documents encumbering or affecting title to real property may be recorded in the office of the clerk and recorder of the county where the property is located. Once filed, such recorded documents operate as record notice of the interest or encumbrance described. The purpose of the statute, quite clearly, is to provide notice to prospective purchasers of encumbrances on title, and to protect certainty and marketability of title to real property, such that only recorded instruments will be honored. "[The prime purpose of the recording acts is to give subsequent purchasers information regarding the title of the property that they propose to acquire." 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 82.08[2][blii] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2003).

When a creditor obtains a money judgment against a debtor in a court of law, the clerk of the court enters it on the register of actions. C.R.C.P. 58. The judgment ereditor may then serve written interrogatories upon the debtor seeking information about all property owned by the debtor, and if the debtor does not answer, may even subpoena the debtor to court to answer the questions before the court. C.R.C.P. 69.

The creditor may take a transcript of the docket entry of any judgment and record it in the clerk and recorder's office of a county where real property owned by the debtor is located. § 38-85-109(1). The tran-seript will not contain a legal description of real property owned by the debtor, but will rather contain only the names of the creditor, debtor and the amount of the judgment. Creditors who obtain judgments against debtors have a time-honored right to enforce those judgments against the real and personal property of the debtor. When a judgment is filed and recorded, a lien attaches immediately to the real estate of the judgment debt- or. Gottlieb v. Thatcher, 151 U.S. 271, 14 S.Ct. 319, 38 L.Ed. 157 (1894); Sky Harbor, Inc. v. Jenner, 164 Colo. 470, 435 P.2d 894 (Colo.1968). In Colorado, the General Assembly has provided that when a creditor records a judgment against a judgment debt- or, the judgment becomes a lien "upon all the real estate, not exempt from execution in the county where such transcript of judgment is recorded, owned by such judgment debtor or which such judgment debtor may afterwards acquire in such county, until such len expires." § 18-52-102.

Judgment liens are recorded under the grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor indices. Section 30-10-408(2)(b), 9 C.R.S. (2002) requires that "tlhe clerk and recorder shall make correct entries in the grantee index of every document filed or recorded, as required by law, concerning or affecting real estate under the appropriate heading, entering the names of the grantees in alphabetical order." Thus, the judgment lien here would have appeared in the indices both under the Creditors' names and under "Merritt, Grady.”

The scope of a search of real property records should include a search of the direct and inverted indices of recorded documents maintained by the clerk and recorder. Those indices should be searched "as to each person who has held or holds title to an interest in any portion of the subject property" during prescribed periods. Attorneys Title Guar. Fund, Inc., Colorado Real Estate Title Standards 1.1.3 (1997). The search period for liens is as set out in section 13-52-102 and clearly would include March of 1999 when these liens were recorded.

The parties do not dispute that the judgment was valid in the state against which it entered, and was properly authenticated. They also do not dispute that the title examiner had the responsibility to search for liens under the names of "T. Grady Merritt" or "Patrice Merritt." Accordingly, they do not dispute that if the judgment lien had contained the name "T. Grady Merritt" as well as or in addition to "Grady Merritt," it would have attached to the condominium and parking space upon recording; would have given rise to the right of Creditors to execute upon the condominium and parking space; and would have shown up as an exception to title on the title insurance policy.

IV. Notice: Actual, Constructive, or Inquiry

We recognize three forms of notice, by which a party shall be charged with knowledge of the rights of another: actual notice, constructive notice, and inquiry notice. Actual notice occurs simply when one has actual knowledge of another's claim. However, constructive and inquiry notice operate to impute knowledge to a party under certain specific conditions.

Constructive notice is, for all practical purposes, record notice. When a party properly records his interest in property with the appropriate clerk and recorder, he constructively notifies "all the world" as to his claim. The recording acts operate to alert all future grantees as to the rights of the recorder, as the law assumes such grantee will search the index and discover the claim.

Inquiry notice arises when a party becomes aware or should have become aware of certain facts which, if investigated, would reveal the claim of another. By operation of law, the party will be charged with all knowledge that a reasonable investigation would have revealed.

In this case, it is undisputed that the Bowlings had no actual knowledge of the judgment liens. Creditors make two arguments that would, nonetheless, charge the Bowlings with notice of the liens. First, they argue that the difference between "T. Grady Merritt" and "Grady Merritt" was not so significant as to defeat the constructive notice of the liens provided by recording. Alternatively, they argue that the transaction between T. Grady Merritt and Patrice Merritt by quitclaim deed should have raised a suspicion about some intervening cireum-stance, such as a judgment, and thereby triggered a duty of inquiry that would have led to a discovery of the liens.

'When a judgment lien is properly recorded, it "become{s] a lien upon all the real estate, not exempt from execution in the county where such transeript of judgment is recorded, owned by such judgment debtor or which such judgment debtor may afterwards acquire in such county, until such lien expires." § 18-52-102(1); Mortgage Invs. Corp. v. Battle Mountain Corp., No. 028C102, slip op. at 21, 70 P.3d 1176, 1185, 2003 WL 21057571 (Colo. May 12, 2008). Accordingly, a subsequent purchaser of property owned by that judgment debtor has record notice of the lien.

Furthermore, so long as "a prior instrument is properly recorded, subsequent purchasers have an obligation to find it on the record and are considered to have constructive notice of it, even if they do not locate it." 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 82.03[2][bliil (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2008). A transeript of judgment is a prior instrument; thus, a properly recorded judgment lien burdens the property, and serves as notice to all subsequent purchasers.

To be valid, a judgment must be filed "under the 'proper' name of a party or under a name so similar or so frequently used as a substitute that due notice is given." 5 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 38.04[8] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2002). "Slight deviations are generally held to be immaterial," id., as "substantial identity in given names is all that is necessary." R.G. Patton, Priorities, Recording, Registration, in IV American Law of Property § 17.18 n. 7 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).

When a title examiner conducts his search of the record, and discovers a judgment recorded against a grantor in the chain of title, he automatically receives constructive notice of the creditor's claim. Constructive notice carries the same consequences as actual notice. Notice may not be avoided "by variations in names provided they are so spelled as to be in that part of the index which a purchaser is under obligation to examine and in such form as to place him upon inquiry as to identity." Carroll G. Patton & R.G. Patton, Examination of Title, in, IV American Law of Property § 18.31.

Creditors did not file the transcript of judgment in this action against "T. Grady Merritt," the name that appeared on the deed of trust in the chain of title to the property. We conclude that the deviation was insufficient to defeat constructive notice.

V. Variations in Name

Historically, individuals were known by one name only. German Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l State Bank, 3 Colo.App. 17, 19, 31 P. 122, 122 (1892) ("surnames were almost unknown in Europe and in England until the Norman conquest"). This court has held that a person's middle name was not a legally material part of the name. Nelson v. Dist. Ct., 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (Colo.1957) (trial court refused to invalidate service of process merely because middle initial may have been erroneous). Earlier, in an ejectment case, absent proof presented by the defendant, we refused to presume that an individual identified solely by his surname and beginning initials (F.M.MecCracken) was "one and the same person" as an individual identified by his given and surname (Frank McCracken), in the absence of any evidentiary support. McCracken v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 80 Colo. 164, 249 P. 652 (Colo.1926).

The myriad possible formulations of a person's name have always bedeviled the courts' efforts to apply the recording acts. Nicknames, abbreviations, title or legacy designations, and chance omissions of the first or middle initial provide numerous accurate identifications. Names may be misspelled, and many names have numerous possible spellings. Further, many names are idem sonams, which are spelled differently but sound alike, such that the doctrine of idem sonans evolved to regard the two as the same.

In our modern society, numerous other factors confuse the process of accurately identifying individuals by name. People may adopt a popular name but alter the traditional spelling. Many wedded couples choose to retain their individual surnames or hyphenate their names, rather than assimilate under a family name. Some Americans embrace their cultural roots by retaining ancestral names beyond the first generation and outside the paternal chain, such that they have four or more names, each fundamental to their identity. Important in this case, sometimes individuals choose to identify themselves by a middle name rather than their first name, perhaps to avoid confusion when their given name is a legacy or perhaps just because of a preference for the middle name.

We have a curative statute in Colorado which provides that when two instruments affecting title to the same real property have been of record for three years, one of which uses the full first name and the other only the initial letter of the first name, or one uses a full middle name and the other only the initial letter of the middle name, there is nonetheless a presumption that it is the same person. § 38-35-116, 10 C.R.S. (2002). The Bowlings cite the statute as support for their argument that the difference between a full first name and initial is presumed to be material; to the contrary, we view the statute as supporting a conclusion that when an individual uses a first initial, his middle name is deemed to be material in identifying him. Next, when an initial, such as "T." appears in place of a full first name, the examiner should assume that the individual may not use his first name, and the middle name comes to carry more import. In this case, the fact that Merritt did not use his first name, but rather used an initial only, should have led the examiner to examine the record for encumbrances in the name of "Grady Merritt."

One treatise proposes that a title search for liens should include idem sonans, abbreviations, derivatives and initials:

Where the name in the claim of lien differs from that of the record owner, it nevertheless may be effective to create inquiry-notice even though the discrepancy is sufficient to destroy its evidentiary value as creating a presumption of identity. Although there is no constructive notice of a claim against a party designated by a name materially different from that in which he holds title of record, the courts have been liberal in construing that considerable departures in the name of the lienee from that of the record owner are effective in placing a purchaser on inquiry.... [Judgment searches or other searches of indices should include not merely the name under which a title is held, but also surnames which commence with the same letter and are idem sonans, as well as abbreviations, derivatives, and initials of the given name.

Carroll G. Patton & R.G. Patton, Examination of Title, in, IV American Law of Property § 18.76 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (footnotes omitted).

We need not go that far in this case. Rather, we hold merely that when an individual uses an initial rather than a first name, his middle name carries more import.

We believe such a construction is consistent with the intent of the Conveyancing and Recording Act and with the specific provisions regarding enforceability of liens. Indeed, interestingly, our statutes presuppose that title examiners will come across judgment liens that contain variations in names, and the statutes impose detailed obligations upon the examiners when they do. Specifically, a title insurance company that believes there is a judgment lien affecting title to real property has a

duty to make a bona fide good faith effort to determine whether the person against whom the judgment was obtained is the same person as the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the (lien). If a bona fide good faith effort is made and such effort fails to disclose satisfactory information ... then, in that event, the person or title insurance company ... may require the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the representation to provide satisfactory evidence or information that he is not the same person as the judgment debtor.

§ 13-52-102(4)(a), 5 C.R.S. (2002). A "bona fide good faith effort" is defined as including but not limited to "an examination of the judgment debtor's social security number, his driver's Heense, his address, his birth record, and the court record in the action which resulted in the judgment lien, if available." § 13-52-102(4)(c).

In this case, we now determine that, based upon the undisputed facts of this case, the judgment liens filed against "Grady Merritt" served, by statute, to give constructive notice to anyone searching the real property ree-ords under the name of "T. Grady Merritt." The title insurance policy insuring title free and clear of those liens was, therefore, in error.

VI - Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and injunction entered by the trial court, and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to grant Creditors' cross-motion for summary judgment and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      . As counsel agreed during oral argument, the Bowlings have recourse to Land Title to protect them against any rights of Creditors that we may here conclude should attach.

      . What we do not have before us in this case is the issue of the culpability of Merritt himself, who executed a quitclaim deed to his wife after he learned of the judgment liens and who bears ultimate responsibility for the judgment lien.

      . Judge Casebolt dissented, holding that the Creditors did have valid liens.

      . 1) Did transcripts of judgment recorded pursuant to C.R.S. Section 13-52-102(1) identifying the judgment debtor as "Grady Merritt" create liens against real property titled in the name "T. Grady Merritt?"
      2) Did the recording of transcripts of judgment identifying the judgment debtor as "Grady Merritt" put a subsequent purchaser of real property from a successor to ""T. Grady Merritt" on constructive or inquiry notice of liens claimed by virtue of C.R.S. Section 13-52-102(1)?

      . All transactions were recorded in Eagle County, Colorado.

      . Creditors Franklin Bank N.A. and NBD Equipment Finance, Inc. recorded judgments for $45,810.06 and $38,361.83, respectively, for a combined total of $84,171.89. Both creditors also seek statutory interest.

      . Unless the purchaser has actual knowledge of an unrecorded instrument. § 38-35-109(1).

      . Creditors had a judgment obtained in another state, and domesticated it pursuant to section 13-53-103, 5 C.R.S. (2002), such that it had the force of a judgment obtained in a court in Colorado.

      . Colorado has statutes and a rule creating procedures and penalties related to purportedly false or invalid liens specifically because a judgment lien creates a cloud on title to real and personal property that impacts the owner of that property. §§ 38-35-109(3), 201; C.R.C.P. 105.1.

      . A judgment creditor may levy upon real property owned by the debtor by way of a writ of execution. See §§ 13-52-101 to 111; CRCP. 102.

      . We recognize that traditionally, inquiry notice has been considered merely a form of constructive notice. We find this construction cumbersome and misleading, as inquiry notice is sufficiently distinct from constructive notice to merit separate consideration. Unlike constructive notice, inquiry notice depends on extrinsic factual inquiry. For these purposes, we limit constructive notice to notice imputed solely through operation of the recording acts.

      . We disagree. The fact that T. Grady Merritt, a joint tenant, conveyed his interest to his wife, the other joint tenant, by way of a quitclaim deed does not constitute a transaction that, in and of itself, gives rise to a duty of further inquiry. There was a time when the use of a quitclaim deed may have triggered a duty of inquiry; however, that presumption is no longer favored. See 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property Bradford v. Carpenter, 13 Colo. 30, 21 P. 908 (Colo.1889)(finding that use of a quitclaim deed coupled with other circumstances put purchaser on inquiry notice).

      . The legislature has recently revised this statute; however, it remains, for our purposes, substantively the same.

      . In this case, there were cross motions for summary judgment, and stipulated facts.