author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In the Interest of B.S.H., a Child.
    No. 2-08-334-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
    Dec. 23, 2009.

      Bailey & Galyen, Attorneys at Law, Wade L. Griffin, Jr., Grand Prairie, TX, for Appellant.
    Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Andrew Weber, First Assistant Attorney General, Rande K. Herrell, Managing Attorney, Appellate Litigation Section, Child Support Division, John B. Worley, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, Kenneth L. McAlister, Fort Worth, TX, for Appellee.
    Panel: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and McCOY, JJ.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Cory H. appeals the trial court’s order modifying child support. We affirm.

I. Background

Cory and Tricia divorced in January 1993 when their only child, B.S.H., was two years old. In the divorce decree, Cory was ordered to pay $180 a month for child support through the Tarrant County Child Support Office beginning February 1, 1993.

In the early part of 1997, Cory started making payments directly to Tricia instead of through the county office. In 1999, he began to pay $200 each month regularly. In 2000, he increased the payments to $420 and then to $430 a month. From June 2001 through September 2002, he usually paid $510 a month. From October 2002 through July 2005, he consistently paid $450 each month.

In April 2007, Cory filed a petition to modify asking that (1) the direct payments to Tricia be credited to his child support amount, (2) the child support amount be increased to meet family code guidelines, and (3) the amounts paid over the $180 court-ordered monthly payment be credited to his future child support obligation. The Texas attorney general intervened in the case two weeks later. Tricia filed an answer and a counter-petition seeking increased support and an arrearage judgment for an alleged three months of missed payments.

The case went to a bench trial in February 2008. During trial, the parties stipulated that support should be set at $594 a month. They also stipulated that (1) Cory made all payments shown in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, (2) Petitioner’s Exhibit 5, a summary of those payments, was corrected to deduct payments for such items as braces and extra-curricular activities, and (3) Cory had paid $13,185 more in child support than had been ordered by the court.

Cory testified that he had made increased payments to “get ahead” on his child support. Tricia, however, testified that Cory never said to her, “I’m just getting ahead by sending this extra money.” Also, in a letter to B.S.H. admitted in evidence, Cory wrote, “Over the years I have increased the child support amount on my own to make sure you had everything you needed growing up.”

Tricia further testified that after Cory graduated from college she contacted a lawyer to see about increasing the amount of child support. The lawyer told her that it would cost about $1,100 to modify the child support order. Tricia testified that when she relayed this information to Cory, he suggested that, instead of incurring attorney’s fees, he would voluntarily increase the amount of support he was paying based upon his income. Cory and Tricia then agreed on the amount by which support would be increased. They continued to make similar agreements about increases in support over the years.

After taking the case under advisement, the trial court signed an order (1) modifying current support to $594 a month, (2) finding that Cory owed no arrears, and (3) finding that over-payments should not be credited towards future child support obligations.

Cory requested, and the trial court filed, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Cory had voluntarily increased his support payments in agreement with Tricia to avoid the cost of going to court to obtain a modification of the decree and that he had intended the increased support payments to be current support for their child. The trial court concluded that Cory was not entitled to a credit for the future support obligations because of the amounts that he paid in excess of court-ordered child support in the past.

II. Issues on Appeal

Cory contends in four issues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to credit his past excess child support payments toward his future support obligations. He argues that refusal to credit the overpayments violates common law and the purpose of section 154.014 of the family code, denies him a statutory right to reimbursement under section 154.012 of the family code, and amounts to a prohibited retroactive increase in his child support obligation under section 156.401(b) of the family code.

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision modifying child support for an abuse of discretion. To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles— in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the tidal court’s order, indulging every legal presumption in its favor. An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as there is some probative and substantive evidence to support the trial court’s decision.

IY. Application of Family Code Section 154.014

In part of his first issue and in his third issue, Cory argues that the trial court’s refusal to credit his increased support payments toward his future obligations is contrary to the purpose of family code sections 154.012 and 154.014 and would constitute an impermissible modification of a court decree without approval of the court. Section 154.014 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) If a child support agency or local child support registry receives from an obligor who is not in arrears a child support payment in an amount that exceeds the court-ordered amount, the agency or registry, to the extent possible, shall give effect to any expressed intent of the obligor for the application of the amount that exceeds the court-ordered amount.
(b) If the obligor does not express an intent for the application of the amount paid in excess of the court-ordered amount, the agency or registry shall:
(1) credit the excess amount to the obligor’s future child support obligation; and
(2) promptly disburse the excess amount to the obligee.

Cory concedes that section 154.014 does not control this case because it regulates the manner by which excess child support payments to child support agencies or registries, not to individual obligees, must be applied. He urges, however, that the trial court’s order refusing to credit his past over-payments to his future obligations is contrary to the “purpose” of section 154.014, which, he claims, provides guidance on how payments should be applied. The attorney general agrees that section 154.014 offers guidance on “the proper way to apply payments that exceed the court-ordered amount.”

We agree that section 154.014 of the family code offers guidance in determining how excess payments should be applied in a case where excess child support payments are made directly to individual obligees. Accordingly, we hold that in a case where an individual obligee receives from an obligor who is not in arrears a child support payment that exceeds the court-ordered amount, the trial court shall give effect to any expressed intent of the obligor to determine the proper application of the amount that exceeds the court-ordered amount.

The record in this case shows that the trial court did indeed focus on Cory’s intent in making the payments. The court stated during trial, “[fit’s the Court’s understanding that the factual issue is what the expressed intent of the obligor was.” Thereafter, the trial court made these findings:

8. Cory [H.] voluntarily increased the amount of child support he was paying to Tricia [H.] to $200.00 per month in 1999 and then to the sum of $430.00 per month in August or September 2000. This occurred at the same [time] he became a school teacher. At approximately the same time, Respondent Tricia [H.] sought legal advice about modification to increase child support. After that consultation and discussions with Cory [H.], no motion to modify to increase child support was brought since Cory [H.] was paying increased child support without court action.
10. Cory [HJ voluntarily increased the amount of child support that he paid directly to Tricia [H.] in 1999 and, again in 2000 partially because Tricia [HJ had consulted with an attorney.
11. Cory [HJ voluntarily increased the amount of child support that he paid directly to Tricia [HJ in 1999 and again in 2000 partially because Tricia [H.] agreed to not pursue legal action if the child support payments were increased.
12. Cory [HJ increased the amount he paid to Tricia [HJ as child support in lieu of Tricia [HJ taking legal action to increase support.
13. Cory [HJ intended his increased support amounts beginning in 1999 and then in September 2000 to be current child support.
14. Cory [HJ did not intend for payments made in excess of court ordered support to be credited as future child support at the time he made the payments. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the trial court found that Cory’s intent in paying the excess amount of child support to Tricia was partially to avoid the cost of modifying the decree. There is no finding or evidence that either Cory or Tricia intended the excess payment to effect a modification of the existing child support order. Because Cory has not challenged the trial court’s findings that he agreed to pay additional support to avoid the cost of modifying the decree, all of which are supported by the evidence, we are bound to accept them. We overrule part of issue one and all of issue three.

V. Conflict with Family Code Section 154.012 Right of Reimbursement

In issue two and part of issue one, Cory contends that the trial court misinterpreted what section 154.014 means by “expressed intent” and improperly found that Cory’s intent was for the excess payments to be for current child support. According to Cory, the question that is to be determined in deciding the obligor’s expressed intent is whether the obligor intended that the payment be for “something other than child support.” Cory contends that to interpret it to mean whether a payment was intended as future or current support would be incongruous with section 154.012 of the family code, which entitles obligors who overpay to recover the excess without a finding of intent. We disagree.

“Generally, courts are to construe statutes so as to harmonize with other relevant laws, if possible.” If adopted by this court, Cory’s interpretation of sections 154.012 and 154.014 would put them in conflict. Under section 154.014, if the obli-gor intends the increased payment to be additional current support, it is treated that way. But, under Cory’s interpretation of section 154.012, any increased payment is to be treated as an advance payment towards future obligations, which must be reimbursed after termination of the obligation, regardless of what the obli-gor intended when he made the payment.

Under the Code Construction Act, in interpreting a statute, it is presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended and that the public interest is favored over any private interest. Cory’s interpretation of sections 154.012 and 154.014 would make it impossible for a court to recognize an obligor’s intent to provide additional current support for his or her child. This would not be in the best interest of the children of this state.

Statutes are also to be construed in light of the common law. Under common law, a parent may always provide more support for a child than is required by a court order. “[V]oluntary payments made [in fulfillment], or partial fulfillment, of the common law obligation [to support a child] are not necessarily to be offset against the statutory obligation enforced by a court order.” To construe section 154.012 to automatically make any increased support payment an advance payment against future obligations, would be contrary to the common law principle that an obligor may voluntarily provide additional support for his or her child.

The excess child support payments referred to in section 154.012, therefore, do not refer to additional or increased payments that an obligor intends to make to meet the current needs of his or her child. Rather, they are excess payments mistakenly made or intended to be advances against future obligations. This is the only interpretation of section 154.012 that harmonizes with section 154.014 and the common law, and that furthers the public interest in promoting the best interest of the children of this state. We overrule issue two and the remainder of issue one.

VI. Retroactive Modification

Cory complains in his fourth issue that the trial court’s actions amounted to an impermissible retroactive modification of his child support obligation. The trial court, however, did not find that Cory was obliged retroactively to provide additional support. It found only that he had intended his increased payments to be applied to current support for the child and that, as a result, they would not be considered advance payments for future support. We overrule issue four.

VII. Conclusion

We overrule Cory’s four issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

      . Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 108-09 (Tex.1990); In re P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).

      . Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986).

      . P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d at 405; see In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

      . Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex.2002) (op. on reh’g).

      . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.014 (Vernon 2008).

      . Inimitable Group, L.P. v. Westwood Group Dev. II, Ltd., 264 S.W.3d 892, 902 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).

      . Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.012 (Vernon 2008).

      . La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex.1984).

      . Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(3), (5) (Vernon 2005).

      . See id. § 311.023(4).

      . In re L.K.K., No. 11-07-00106-CV, 2008 WL 4173742, at *2 (Tex.App.-Eastland Sept. 11, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Lewis v. Lewis, 853 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).

      . In re McLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, orig. proceeding).

      . See L.K.K., 2008 WL 4173742, at *2.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John Carroll TAYLOR, Appellant, v. Patricia SPECK, Appellee.
    No. 04-09-00278-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
    Jan. 6, 2010.

      Lawrence L. Garcia, Lawrence L. Garcia & Associates, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.
    Karen L. Marvel, Law Offices of Sinkin & Barretto, P.L.L.C., San Antonio, TX, for Appellee.
    Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Chief Justice, KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice.
   OPINION

Opinion by:

MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order awarding a cumulative judgment for child support arrearages. Appellant John Carroll Taylor contends (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Court of Domestic Relations No. 2 in Dallas County had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, (2) recovery was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 157.005(b) of the Family Code and the dormancy provisions in sections 34.001 and 31.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and (3) the award of attorney’s fees was improper.

BACKGROUND

John Carroll Taylor and Patricia Speck divorced in 1967 pursuant to a final judgment signed by the judge of the Court of Domestic Relations No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas. In addition to granting Speck’s request for divorce, the trial court also ordered Taylor to pay child support for the benefit of the couple’s minor children — a boy born in 1962, and a girl born in 1963. Taylor was ordered to pay child support to Speck in the amount of $80.00 per week, beginning October 27,1967, and continuing until the youngest child turned eighteen.

In 2004, Speck filed a “Motion for Cumulative Judgment of Child Support Arrears and Petition for Suspension of Licenses for Failure to Pay Child Support” in the 302nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. In the motion Speck claimed Taylor failed to pay child support as ordered in the 1967 divorce decree, and she sought a judgment for arrearages and attorney’s fees. In 2008, Speck filed a motion to transfer, asking the 302nd Judicial District Court to transfer the case to Bexar County “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice,” but more specifically because Taylor, who resided in Bexar County, was unable “to travel to Dallas County because of his health.” She stated in the motion that all parties had agreed to the transfer. The trial court signed an agreed order transferring the entire matter to Bexar County and ordering the Bexar County district clerk to file and docket the case, and the Dallas County district clerk to transmit the entire file to Bexar County. The agreed order was signed by the attorneys for Speck and Taylor as “Agreed and Approved, as to Form and Substance.”

After the transfer, a bench trial was held in the 407th Judicial District Court of Bexar County. After hearing evidence, the trial court entered a cumulative money judgment in favor of Speck in the amount of $237,248.96 for child support arrearages and interest. The judgment also awarded (1) $7,024.00 in attorney’s fees, payable to Speck’s attorneys, (2) appellate attorney’s fees in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by Taylor, and (3) $6,000 in attorney’s fees, payable to Speck’s attorneys in the event Taylor filed a bankruptcy petition and the attorneys were required to collect child support through the bankruptcy process. Taylor filed a motion for new trial, which was denied, and then a notice of appeal.

Discussion

Jurisdiction

Taylor contends the 407th Judicial District Court lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment. Citing only section 157.001(d) of the Texas Family Code, he argues “[ojnly the Court of Domestic Relations No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas had jurisdiction to render a judgment for cumulative arrears,” and the agreed transfer order did not vest the 407th Judicial District Court with jurisdiction because it was signed by the 302nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, which did not have jurisdiction. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.001(d) (Vernon 2008) (stating that motion for enforcement shall be filed in court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction). In other words, Taylor argues that only the Court of Domestic Relations No. 2 of Dallas County had any authority to act in this matter. Taylor is incorrect.

Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the kinds of controversies a court has the authority to resolve as determined by the constitution, jurisdictional statutes, and the pleadings. See CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1995); Davis v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 865 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex.1993). It is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex.2000) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex.1993)). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.2004) (citing Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002)).

In 1977, the Texas Legislature passed the Family District Court Act. Act of May 28, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 859, § 4,1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2144, 2154, repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 26, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2048. The Act “substitutes district courts of general jurisdiction, to be called family district courts, for the existing domestic relations and special juvenile courts.” Id. § 1.02(a). In other words, the Act replaced domestic relations courts with family district courts, which had the same general jurisdiction as other district courts, but had primary responsibility for cases involving family law matters. Id. § 1.03(a), (b). The 302nd Judicial District Court, also known as the Family District Court for the 302nd Judicial District, was created by the Act to replace the Court of Domestic Relations No. 2. Id. § 2.03; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.601, 24.610 (Vernon 2004) (describing jurisdiction of family district courts; describing jurisdiction of 302nd Judicial District Court as Dallas County). When a family district court is created, “all cases pending in the replaced court are transferred to the family district court which replaces it.” Act of May 28, 1977, § 3.03(1). Accordingly, the parties’ divorce action in this case was automatically transferred to the 302nd Judicial District Court upon its creation, giving that court jurisdiction of the matter. See id. Because the 302nd Judicial District Court had jurisdiction over this matter, it had jurisdiction to transfer the case to Bexar County, and therefore Taylor’s contention is without merit. See id. § 2.03; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.601, 24.610.

If we interpret Taylor’s first issue to somehow include, beyond the jurisdictional issue, a challenge to the actual transfer to Bexar County we hold the transfer itself was a proper discretionary act by the 302nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County. Section 155.202(b) of the Texas Family Code, entitled “Discretionary Transfer,” states that “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the court, on the timely motion of a party, may transfer the proceeding to a proper court in another county in the state.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 155.202(b) (Vernon 2008). Speck’s motion to transfer tracks the language of the statute, and Taylor’s attorney agreed to the transfer. The transfer was, therefore, proper. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Taylor’s first issue.

Statute of Limitations/Dormancy

Section 157.005(b) of the Texas Family Code

In his second issue, Taylor first argues Speck’s effort to collect past-due child support and obtain a cumulative money judgment was barred by the limitations provision in section 157.005(b) of the Family Code. However, Taylor concedes that if Speck’s “amended” motion for cumulative judgment initiated a new action and there was a valid transfer of the case to Bexar County, then the limitations provision in the current version of section 157.005(b) of the Family Code umay have been unavailable.” The current version of section 157.005(b) of the Family Code states:

The court retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support arrear-ages and render a cumulative money judgment for past-due child support ... if a motion for enforcement requesting a cumulative money judgment is filed not later than the 10th anniversary after the date:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) on which the child support obligation terminates under the child support order or by operation of law.

Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.005(b) (Vernon 2008). Taylor recognizes the current version of section 157.005(b) applies only to enforcement proceedings commenced on or after the effective date of the current version of section 157.005(b), and no such limitations period existed under the version of the Family Code in existence at the time Speck filed her “amended” motion for cumulative judgment. See Act of May 20, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 556, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3058, 3062, amended by Act of May 29, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 916, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3148, 3156 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.005(b) (Vernon 2008)). Having determined the Dallas County court had jurisdiction to transfer the action to Bexar County, thereby vesting the 407th Judicial District Court with jurisdiction, we must determine whether Speck’s “amended” motion for cumulative judgment initiated a new action before June 18, 2005, the effective date of the current version of section 157.005(b).

Speck filed her original motion for cumulative judgment on March 23, 2004. The matter was dismissed for want of prosecution on May 6, 2004. The order stated the matter was being dismissed because the “cause was reached on the Docket, the case was called by the Court and there was no response.” On April 5, 2005, before the current version of section 157.005(b) became effective, Speck filed a document entitled “Amended Motion for Cumulative Judgment of Child Support Arrears and Petition for Suspension of Licenses for Failure to Pay Child Support.” The only difference between this motion and the original is the total amount of judgment sought, i.e., the “amended” motion includes arrearages through the end of March as opposed to the end of February. Though it was entitled an “amended” motion, at the time it was filed there was not a pending motion to amend. Given this and the substance of the motion, we interpret this “amended” motion as an original motion filed to reinstitute Speck’s claim for arrearages. See State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980) (holding courts look to substance of pleading to determine its nature, not merely at title); Tex.R. Civ. P. 71 (stating that when party has mistakenly designated any pleading, court shall treat it as if it had been properly designated); see also Johnson v. State Farm Lloyds, 204 S.W.3d 897, 899 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006), aff'd, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex.2009) (construing motion entitled “Motion to Compel Appraisal” as motion for summary judgment because in body of motion movant stated she was seeking summary judgment); In re A.M.K., No. 14-03-01208-CV, 2005 WL 3005636, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 10, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (construing motion entitled “Motion to Modify” as request for enforcement of ar-rearages). This interpretation is further supported by the fact that when she filed the “amended” motion, Speck obtained service of process on Taylor. Taylor appeared in the reinstituted matter by filing a plea in abatement on May 26, 2005, asserting the case should be transferred to Bexar County.

Moreover, if we construe the motion as an amendment to the original motion, somehow surviving the dismissal for want of prosecution, it would date back to the filing of the original, which was March 23, 2004. Thus, it too would have been filed before the effective date of the current version of section 157.005(b).

Based on the foregoing, we hold the limitations provision found in section 157.005(b) of the Family Code is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, Speck’s claim for arrearages was not barred under this provision.

Sections SI.006 arid 31.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

As an alternative to his limitations argument based on section 157.005(b) of the Family Code, Taylor contends Speck was barred by the dormancy provisions in sections 34.001 and 31.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Section 34.001 provides that if a writ of execution is not issued within ten years after the rendition of a judgment, the judgment is dormant and cannot be executed upon unless revived. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 34.001(a) (Vernon Supp.2009). A judgment can be revived if a writ of scire facias or an action of debt is brought no later than two years after the judgment becomes dormant. Id. § 31.006 (Vernon 2008). However, in 2009, the Texas Legislature amended section 34.001 to provide that it did not apply to child support judgments under the Family Code. Id. § 34.001(c). Moreover, the Legislature specifically provided that the amendment applied “to each judgment for child support under the Family Code, regardless of the date on which the judgment was rendered.” See Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3272, amended by Act of May 21, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 767, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.1935, 1945, 1947 (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 34.001 (Vernon Supp.2009)). Accordingly, the dormancy and revival restrictions in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code do not apply in this case.

Moreover, Taylor’s argument lacks merit for two additional reasons. First, he did not plead dormancy. Dormancy is an affirmative defense that must be raised in the pleadings. See Cadle v. Jenkins, 266 S.W.3d 4, 7 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); Tex.R. Civ. P. 94. Second, this court has held, prior to its amendment, that sections 34.001 and 31.006 did not apply in a situation nearly identical to that presented here. See In re J.M.R., No. 04-03-00284-CV, 2004 WL 1292284, at *1-*2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jun. 23, 2004, no pet.). Accordingly, we overrule Taylor’s second issue in its entirety.

Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Taylor contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees “in general and specifically a judgment for $6,000.00 in attorney fees” in the event he filed a bankruptcy petition.

As for the general award of attorney’s fees, which amounted to $7,025.00 in trial attorney’s fees, plus contingent appellate fees, Taylor argues there is no statutory authority for an award of attorney’s fees based on an effort to obtain a cumulative money judgment for child support ar-rearages. Taylor is incorrect. Attorney’s fees are not only permitted, but are mandated by section 157.167 of the Family Code when a respondent has failed to make child support payments:

If the court finds that the respondent has failed to make child support payments, the court shall order the respondent to pay the movant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and all court costs in addition to the arrearages. Fees and costs ... may be enforced by any means available for the enforcement of child support orders, including contempt.

Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.167 (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added). Here, Speck sought to enforce a prior child support order by way of a motion for cumulative judgment as provided in section 157.263, and the court’s order found Taylor failed to make child support payments. See id. §§ 157.167, 157.263. Therefore, the trial court was required to award Speck reasonable attorney’s fees.

Taylor argues attorney’s fees are permitted only under rule 308a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure only “when a claim is for violation of a court order for the payment of child support.” His contention is without merit. Rule 308a applies only when the trial court appoints an attorney to “determine whether there is reason to believe that the court order has been violated.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 308a. Here, no attorney was appointed to represent Taylor, Speck, or the adult children.

With regard to the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees relating to bankruptcy, the trial court ordered:

In the event of the filing of a petition for bankruptcy by John Carroll Taylor an additional judgment of $6,000.00 for attorney’s fees is granted in favor or [Speck’s attorney’s] for the collection of child support.

Taylor’s only argument with regard to these fees is that the award “is an attempt to preempt the power and jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court.” In support of this argument, Taylor cites Sw. Motor Transp. Co. v. Valley Weathermakers, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.1968). This case, however, is inapplicable. In Sw. Motor Transp., the supreme court was asked to decide whether a cause of action was governed by state law, which would allow a recovery of attorney’s fees, or by federal law, which would not. 427 S.W.2d at 599. The supreme court held federal law controlled, and therefore attorney’s fees were not recoverable. Id. at 603-04.

Here, there is no question that Speck’s suit to recover child support arrearages is governed by the Texas Family Code, which specifically allows recovery of attorney’s fees when a court finds that a respondent has failed to make child support payments. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.167. Moreover, the trial court’s decision to award conditional attorney’s fees for collection of the past due child support in the event of a bankruptcy does not preempt or otherwise intrude upon the jurisdiction of the trial court. Rather, such an award is akin to the conditional award of attorney’s fees in the event of success on appeal, or in the event of a successful defense on appeal. See Jones v. American Airlines, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 261, 271 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that it is well-settled that where attorney’s fees are recoverable, any award of attorney’s fees may include appellate attorney’s fees as long as they are properly conditioned); Villasenor v. Villasenor, 911 S.W.2d 411, 420 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (recognizing award of appellate attorney’s fee appropriate when conditioned upon successful appeal). Given that the trial court is mandated to award attorney’s fees by section 157.167, and a conditional award of post-judgment attorney’s fees is recognized in Texas, we see no error in the trial court’s award of additional attorney’s fees in the event of a bankruptcy filing by Taylor. Accordingly, we overrule Taylor’s third issue.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      . At the time of the divorce, Patricia Speck was known as Patricia Lee Blankenship Taylor.

      . Taylor not only agreed to the transfer, he filed a plea in abatement in which he asked that the case be dismissed because of the agreement of the parties to have the action heard in Bexar County.

      . In his brief, Taylor refers to Rule 208a. We assume this reference was a typographical error because Rule 208a was repealed effective April 1, 1984.


author: REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.

text:
    Sara Elsa ARIZPE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 04-09-00131-CR.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
    Jan. 6, 2010.

      John Kuntz, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.
    J. Barrett Shipp, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Appellee.
    Sitting: PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
   OPINION

Opinion by:

REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.

Appellant Sara Elsa Arizpe was convicted by a jury of Driving While Intoxicated-lst Offense. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.04 (Vernon 2003). Arizpe’s motion to suppress, based on a lack of reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, was denied by the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual BackgROund

On May 3, 2007, Officer James Phelan with the San Antonio Police Department was writing a report on an unrelated accident while sitting in his marked vehicle in a grocery store parking lot at Highway 281 and Loop 1604. A car came “screeching into the parking lot,” and a “lady jumped out and started pointing at [Arizpe’s] car” saying it was “swerving all over the highway, driving erratically.” The unidentified woman stated the car “almost caused a couple of accidents” and that she thought the driver was drunk. The woman then pointed to the car waiting “right at the traffic light.” Officer Phelan said he had a “clean view” of the car, about 100 yards away, and that it was “straddling the lane” in the center of lane “number 1 and 2.” The traffic light turned green and Officer Phelan went to pursue the suspected drunk driver, later identified as Arizpe. He received no further information from the unidentified woman, and she was never seen again.

Officer Phelan initiated the traffic stop of Arizpe’s car immediately “to make sure we weren’t driving in traffic.” He testified that Arizpe was “failing to maintain a single lane essentially.” Upon smelling intoxicants, Officer Phelan asked if she was ok to drive, and Arizpe said she had “two ehardonnays.” Her speech was “slurred, confused, [and] thick.” After a roadside field sobriety test, Officer Phelan placed Arizpe under arrest. Later breath samples showed a .164 and .161 blood alcohol concentration. The jury convicted Arizpe, and she timely filed this appeal.

Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, affording almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when based on an evaluation of the witness’s credibility and demeanor.” Dossett v. State, 216 S.W.3d 7, 23 (Tex.App-San Antonio 2006, pet. ref'd) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). We review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Dossett, 216 S.W.3d at 23; Perez v. State, 103 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). In determining whether a trial court’s decision is supported by the record, we generally consider “only evidence adduced at the suppression hearing because the ruling was based on it rather than evidence introduced later.” Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). This general rule, however, is inapplicable where, as in this case, “the suppression issue has been eonsensually re-litigated by the parties during trial on the merits.” Id.

Motion to Suppress

Arizpe’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Arizpe’s motion to suppress. Arizpe argues the officer received information from an unidentified, unknown individual, and the officer used this anonymous tip as the sole basis to effectuate a traffic stop. The State asserts that the individual was identifiable and the officer had additional information with which to effectuate the traffic stop. Therefore, the State argues the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Arizpe’s vehicle. We review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo, as questions of law. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-88.

A. Applicable Law — Reasonable Suspicion

It is well-settled that before a police officer is justified in detaining a motorist, the officer must have reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist was operating or was about to operate her vehicle in violation of the law. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). However, although these facts must amount to more than a mere suspicion or hunch, they need not be based upon an officer’s personal observations. Id. at 258-59; Bilyeu v. State, 136 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (“The observations need not reveal criminal conduct; even innocent acts can give rise to reasonable suspicion under certain circumstances.”). A reasonable suspicion determination is made by objectively considering the totality of the circumstances. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492-93 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). “Totality of the circumstances” considers both quantity and quality of information. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

Generally, “[an] anonymous tip usually will justify the initiation of a police investigation.” State v. Simmang, 945 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (citing Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). However, a tip by an unnamed informant of undisclosed reliability “rarely will establish the requisite level of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative detention.” State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269-70, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)). There must be some further indicia of reliability, some additional facts from which a police officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375. A suitably corroborated anonymous tip can, however, exhibit “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” Id. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412).

B. Reliability of the Anonymous Tip

The following factors are important in evaluating the reliability of information received from an informant: (1) whether the informant provides a detailed description of the wrongdoing; (2) whether the informant observed the wrongdoing firsthand; (3) whether the informant is somehow connected with the police (e.g. a paid informant); and (4) whether the informant places himself in a position to be held accountable for the report. Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir.1978) (other citations omitted)).

1. Analysis o/Pipkm Factors

The record supports the presence of the first three Pipkin factors. The informant provided a detailed description of the drunk driving and, specifically, pointed out Arizpe’s car to the officer. Second, the informant witnessed the driving firsthand and relayed this information to the officer. Third, the unidentified woman appears to have no connection with the police and was simply a concerned citizen. Arizpe argues the fourth Pipkin factor is absent because the informant was not accountable for her report to Officer Phelan. She provided no identifying contact information to the officer. Arizpe argues the officer’s lack of information regarding the type, color, or age of the vehicle as well as the informant’s age, gender, or driver’s license number render the tip anonymous and unreliable. Although not memorialized at the time by the officer, the record reflects the officer spoke directly to the informant and saw the suspected vehicle in question firsthand.

2. Face-to-Face Informants

Courts traditionally distinguish between anonymous informants that call 9-1-1 versus those that tell an officer the tip in a faee-to-face manner. State v. Fudge, 42 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.). A person, not connected with the police, “who gives a police officer unsolicited information in a face-to-face manner is inherently reliable.” Id. at 232 (citing Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763) (emphasis added). Several courts have recognized the heightened reliability of a tip provided by an unidentified informant who places himself in a position to be easily identified and held responsible for the information he provides. See e.g. Mitchell v. State, 187 S.W.3d 113, 117-18 (Tex.App.Waco 2006, pet. ref'd) (stating the face-to-face manner of the citizen informant tip provided a heightened indicia of reliability); Bilyeu, 136 S.W.3d at 696 (“The citizen’s providing this information directly to the officers, in person, makes the information significantly more reliable than a simple anonymous telephone call.”); Hawes v. State, 125 S.W.3d 535, 538-89 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Fudge, 42 S.W.3d at 232); State v. Garcia, 25 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (stating that an individual presenting himself to the officer in person, and doing so while driving a vehicle from which his identity might easily be traced, puts himself in a position to be held accountable for his intervention); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188-89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd) (giving great weight to the unsolicited information provided to the officers in a face-to-face manner).

In the present case, there is nothing in the record that should have caused Officer Phelan to doubt the reliability or good faith of the woman who gave him the information. See Sailo, 910 S.W.2d at 189. The woman, although unknown to Officer Phelan, was sufficiently reliable because she came forward to give the officer unsolicited information in a face-to-face manner. The Sailo court held that a person presenting oneself to a police officer, and doing so while driving a car from which an identity might easily be traced, is in a position to be held accountable for the intervention unlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call. Id.

Arizpe argues the officer should have taken down the informant’s name, phone number, address, and other identifying information. However, Officer Phelan testified that the informant pointed directly to Arizpe’s car as the car driven by the suspected drunk driver and that the light had just turned green. Due to the need to prevent any harm to the drivers around Arizpe, the officer immediately initiated a traffic stop. We conclude, therefore, the information provided by the informant exhibits a heightened indicia of reliability.

C. Reasonable Suspicion for Stop

Having determined the informant’s tip was reliable, we now turn to the officer’s reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The level of corroboration required under the totality of the circumstances to establish reasonable suspicion is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” See White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412. “[C]orroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is justified.” Pipkin, 114 S.W.3d at 654 (citing Sailo, 910 S.W.2d at 188. Observation of easily obtained facts and conditions (such as identifying information) will not generally provide the requisite corroboration. See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412; Bilyeu, 136 S.W.3d at 696. However, the officer need not personally witness criminal activity, for “even innocent acts can give rise to reasonable suspicion under certain circumstances.” Bilyeu, 136 S.W.3d at 696; accord Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258-59.

Officer Phelan clearly saw the car identified as that of the alleged drunk driver by the citizen informant, and he noticed the car was positioned in between two lanes at a traffic light. He also testified regarding his nineteen years of police experience as well as his special training recognizing intoxicated drivers. As mentioned, the citizen informant provided details of the alleged drunk driving she witnessed, and she was simply a private concerned citizen, unconnected with the police. Giving deference to the trial court’s judgment of the credibility of witnesses and determination of historical facts, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances — including: (1)the reliable tip from a face-to-face citizen informant directly pointing to Arizpe’s ear; and (2) Officer Phelan’s observation of Arizpe’s car straddled over a lane divider at the traffic light — created sufficient reasonable suspicion for Officer Phelan’s traffic stop.

Conclusion

Because the citizen informant’s face-to-face encounter and immediate identification of the vehicle was inherently reliable, and because the tip was sufficiently corroborated by the officer, the traffic stop was reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Arizpe’s motion to suppress. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.


author: BILL MEIER, Justice.

text:
    Robert T. CLIFTON, Raquel Gutierrez Bryson, Richard D. Jordan, and Michael Sutton, Appellants, v. Jennifer WALTERS in her Official Capacity as City Secretary for the City of Denton, Texas, Appellee.
    No. 2-08-389-CV.
    Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
    Jan. 14, 2010.
    Reconsideration En Banc Overruled April 1, 2010.

      Robert T. Clifton, Denton, TX, pro se.
    Raquel Gutierrez Bryson, Denton, TX, pro se.
    Richard D. Jordan, Denton, TX, pro se.
    Michael Sutton, Denton, TX, pro se.
    Michael J. Whitten, Jerry E. Drake, Jr., The Whitten Law Firm, P.C., Denton, TX, for Appellee.
    Panel: LIVINGSTON, McCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
   OPINION

BILL MEIER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

In six issues, Appellants Robert T. Clifton, Raquel Gutierrez Bryson, Richard D. Jordan, and Michael Sutton, pro se, appeal the trial court’s judgment dismissing their claims against Appellee Jennifer Walters in her official capacity as City Secretary for the City of Denton, Texas, and declaring Clifton a vexatious litigant. We will affirm.

II. Factual and PROCEDURAL Background

On March SI, 2008, Clifton delivered a letter to Walters, Denton’s City Secretary, expressing that Mark Burroughs, Perry McNeill, and Mary Jo “Pete” Kamp were ineligible for election to the Denton City Council in any municipal general election. The following day, Clifton filed his original petition, seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying article 2.01(c) of the Denton City Charter and “finding” that Burroughs, McNeill, and Kamp were ineligible for election to the city council. Clifton also sought to enjoin Walters from placing the names of Burroughs, McNeill, and Kamp on the ballot for the May 10, 2008 election and to enjoin them from “forever filing for any elective office” on the city council because each had “been previously elected to three consecutive two-year terms on the Denton City Council.”

On April 11, 2008, Clifton filed a first amended petition, which named Gutierrez Bryson, Jordan, Sutton, and Justin Bell as additional plaintiffs but did not amend any of the allegations for declaratory and in-junctive relief pleaded in the original petition. The amended petition alleged that all of the plaintiffs have standing because they are citizens of Texas, residents of Denton County and Denton, voters, and taxpayers. It further alleged that Sutton and Bell have standing for the additional reason that they were candidates in the May 10, 2008 election.

Walters filed a motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims for want of jurisdiction, arguing in part that Clifton, Gutierrez Bryson, and Jordan do not have standing as citizens to seek declaratory relief. Walters also sought rule of civil procedure 13 sanctions against Clifton, and she moved pursuant to civil practice and remedies code section 11.051 to declare Clifton a vexatious litigant. On April 21, 2008, the trial court denied Appellants’ request for in-junctive relief. Thereafter, Walters filed her first supplemental motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims for want of jurisdiction, arguing that Sutton and Bell lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment because neither prevailed in his respective race and neither contested the election results. Appellants filed an “Objection Without Waiver and Motion to Strike Defendant’s First Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction and Original Answer; and, for Sanctions” in response to Walters’s supplemental motion to dismiss.

On September 5, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing on Walters’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. With the exception of Sutton’s and Bell’s claims seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying article 2.01(e) of the Denton City Charter, the trial court granted Walters’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The trial court subsequently granted Bell’s no tice of nonsuit and, after reconsidering its earlier ruling on Walters’s motions to dismiss, dismissed Sutton’s claims as moot. After a hearing, the trial court denied Walters’s request for sanctions but declared Clifton a vexatious litigant. This appeal followed.

III. Standing

In their first issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting Walters’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on the ground that they each lack standing to sue Walters. Appellants argue that they have standing because they are citizens of Texas, residents of Denton, registered voters, and taxpayers and because “two of the plaintiffs were candidates for office for the May 10, 2008, general election for city council.” Appellants cite Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex.2001), in support of their taxpayer-standing argument and argue that they have standing as taxpayers to sue “to stop and prevent illegal spending by the City of Denton.”

Walters’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction are pleas to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, as in this case, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555; Cox v. Perry, 138 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id.; Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555.

Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445. If a party lacks standing to bring an action, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 444-45; Town of Fairview v. Lawler, 252 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.App.Dallas 2008, no pet.). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case, then it lacks authority to decide that case. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex.2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443 (reasoning that subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide case).

Generally, unless standing is conferred by statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he possesses an interest in a conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.1984); SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153-54 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, pet. denied). Regarding a voter suing over an alleged ineligible candidate, our case law has consistently held that a voter having no special interest cannot bring a lawsuit seeking the removal of an ineligible candidate from the ballot. See, e.g., Brimer v. Maxwell, 265 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re Jones, 978 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see also Allen v. Fisher, 118 Tex. 88, 41, 9 S.W.2d 731, 732 (1928). “No Texas court has ever recognized that a plaintiffs status as a voter, without more, confers standing to challenge the lawfulness of governmental acts.” Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.2001); Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 218, 281 S.W. 837, 841 (1926) (reasoning that in the absence of a statute authorizing the suit, “there can be no doubt that in Texas an action relating to elections or other matters of law enforcement, not involving questions of taxation or unlawful expenditure of public funds, cannot be maintained by a relator or plaintiff whose interest is only that of the public generally”).

In this case, as voters, citizens of Texas, and residents of Denton, Appellants lacked standing to challenge Burroughs’s, McNeill’s, and Kamp’s eligibility for election to the city council. See Brimer, 265 S.W.3d at 928; Jones, 978 S.W.2d 648, 651; see also Allen, 9 S.W.2d at 732. As for their argument that they each have standing because two of the plaintiffs (Sutton and Bell) were candidates in the May 2008 election, Appellants set forth no argument, analysis, or citation to relevant authorities to support this contention. The single-sentence argument is therefore inadequately briefed and, accordingly, waived. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex.1994) (discussing “long-standing rule” that issue may be waived due to inadequate briefing). To the extent Appellants mean to argue by this single sentence that Sutton — as opposed to the other Appellants — has standing to sue because he — unlike the other Appellants — was a candidate in the May 10, 2008 election, this argument is also waived because Appellants provide no supporting analysis or argument. See Tex. R.App. P. 38.1(i).

Regarding Appellants’ taxpayer-standing argument, through a judicially-created exception to the particularized injury requirement, a taxpayer has standing “to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without showing a distinct injury.” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556. Taxpayers in Texas thus generally have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and need not demonstrate a particularized injury. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179. Implicit in this rule are two requirements: (1) that the plaintiff is a taxpayer and (2) that public funds are expended on the allegedly illegal activity. Id. Underpinning these limitations is the realization that governments cannot operate if every citizen who concludes that a public official has abused his discretion is granted the right to come into court and bring such official’s public acts under judicial review. Id. at 180 (citing Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555).

Here, Walters introduced and the trial court admitted a copy of Ordinance No. 2008-103, the ordinance canvassing the returns and declaring the results of the May 10, 2008 election. It states in relevant part as follows:

The City Council finds and declares that the May 10, 2008 regular municipal election was duly ordered for the purpose of electing two council members to Places 5 and 6, and a Mayor to Place 7; that proper notice of said election was duly given and election officials appointed; that the election was duly held and the returns of the election officials have been delivered to the Council, all in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas and the Charter and ordinances of the City of Denton. [Emphasis added.]

Appellants alleged in their amended petition that they seek declaratory relief to stop “unconstitutional and illegal activities by” Walters. The alleged illegal activity referred to is Walters’s “allowance and inclusion of ineligible candidates on a general election ballot.” Aside from this allegation, which is based on Appellants’ position that the City Charter prohibited Burroughs, McNeill, and Kamp from seeking election to the city council in the May 10, 2008 election, Appellants made no showing in response to Walters’s plea that they were suing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds. Appellants did not appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for injunctive relief, and their remaining claims seeking declaratory relief involve a dispute over the interpretation of part of the Denton City Charter. Appellants’ opinion that Burroughs, McNeill, and Kamp were ineligible for election does not mean that the election itself or Walters’s ministerial duty of reviewing candidate applications for inclusion on the ballot were activities on which public funds were illegally expended; these activities, which were “all [conducted] in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas,” according to Ordinance No. 2008-103, would have taken place regardless of the dispute over the provision in the City Charter — the lawsuit was not filed until April 1, 2008, approximately forty days before the May 10, 2008 election, and the case was not set for trial until September 2008, months after the May 10, 2008 election. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 145.004 (Vernon 2003) (stating that a candidate’s. entitlement to a place on the ballot or to a certificate of election is not affected by a judicial determination that the candidate is ineligible until a judgment declaring the candidate to be ineligible becomes final), § 145.094(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (stating that the name of a candidate shall be omitted from the ballot if the candidate is declared ineligible before 5 p.m. of the second day before the beginning of early voting by personal appearance, before 5 p.m. of the 53rd day before election day, or before 5 p.m. of the 67th day before election day, depending on the applicability of sections 145.092(a), 145.092(b), or 145.092(f)). Accordingly, Appellants do not have standing as taxpayers. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179-80.

We hold that the trial court did not err by granting Walters’s motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. We overrule Appellants’ first issue. Having overruled Appellants’ first issue, we need not address their second, third, fourth, and fifth issues, which are issues subsumed by the first issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.

IV. Vexatious Litigant

In their sixth issue, Appellants challenge the trial court’s order declaring Clifton a vexatious litigant. Clifton does not argue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s order. Instead, he asserts numerous arguments complaining of alleged constitutional violations resulting from the trial court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant. Specifically, he contends that the vexatious litigant statute is unconstitutional because it denies him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, denies him equal protection, denies him access to court, does not “further any compelling state interest,” violates the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, is a bill of attainder, is “unconstitutionally over-broad,” and is an “invitation to ‘invidious discrimination.’ ”

Chapter 11 of the civil practice and remedies code contains the legislature’s plan for dealing with vexatious litigants — persons who abuse the legal system by filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 11.001-.104 (Vernon 2002). The statute provides in part that on or before the ninetieth day after the date the defendant files an original answer or makes a special appearance, the defendant may move for an order declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and requiring the plaintiff to furnish security. Id. § 11.051. Section 11.054 provides as follows:

A court may find a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows that there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant and that:
(1)the plaintiff, in the seven-year period immediately preceding the date the defendant makes the motion under Section 11.051, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been:
(A)finally determined adversely to the plaintiff;
(B) permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing; or
(C) determined by a trial or appellate court to be frivolous or groundless under state or federal laws or rules of procedure;
(2) after a litigation has been finally determined against the plaintiff, the plaintiff repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either:
(A) the validity of the determination against the same defendant as to whom the litigation was finally determined; or
(B) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant as to whom the litigation was finally determined; or
(3) the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.

Id. § 11.054.

Clifton’s arguments that chapter 11 denies him equal protection and access to court are unpersuasive. See Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 457-58 (Tex.App.Austin 2005, pet. denied) (reasoning that chapter 11 did not implicate appellant’s right to equal protection and did not violate the Texas constitution’s open courts provision). We overrule this part of Clifton’s sixth issue.

A bill of attainder is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). Chapter 11 does not involve punishment. Thus, it is not a bill of attainder. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 178 S.W.Sd 230, 240 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). We overrule this part of Clifton’s sixth issue.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids, among other things, extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Chapter 11 does not involve punishment. We overrule this part of Clifton’s sixth issue.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[no] State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. This “require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S.Ct. 780, 787, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (concluding that “restriction on litigants’ use of established adjudicatory procedures denies due process when such restriction is “the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s]”). A cause of action is a species of property protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Logan, 455 U.S. at 428, 102 S.Ct. at 1154. Here, Clifton complains of chapter ll’s requirement that a vexatious litigant obtain permission by a local administrative judge to file litigation if a prefiling order has previously been entered, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 11.102, but the record does not show that he has been denied permission from a local administrative judge to file a claim. Also, courts have described the legislature’s intent in enacting chapter 11 as a balancing of individual Texans’ rights to access their court system against the public’s interest in protecting defendants from individuals who abuse that system. Drake v. Andrews, 294 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. filed). In light of this, Clifton has not met his burden of demonstrating that obtaining permission to file litigation is “the equivalent of denying [him] an opportunity to be heard,” thus violating due process. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380, 91 S.Ct. at 787. We overrule this part of Clifton’s sixth issue.

We overrule the remainder of Clifton’s arguments about the First Amendment, “compelling state interest,” “unconstitutionally overbroad,” and “invidious discrimination” because they are inadequately briefed. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(i). We overrule the remainder of Clifton’s sixth issue.

V. Conclusion

Having overruled Appellants’ first and sixth issues and having determined that we need not reach Appellants’ second, third, fourth, and fifth issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      . According to the original petition, article 2.01(c) states that “[ajll members of the council and the mayor shall be elected for two-year terms and shall not be eligible for election to more than three (3) consecutive two year terms....”

      . Sutton was a candidate for Place 5 on the city council, and Bell was a candidate for Mayor of Denton.

      . Appellants did not file a response to Walters’s motion to dismiss.

      . Appellants sought sanctions on the ground that Walters’s supplemental motion to dismiss was frivolous.

      . The trial court allowed Appellants to introduce evidence at the hearing in response to Walters's motions.

      . Appellants argue in these issues that "[t]his case is a suit for office; not an election contest”; that ”[t]he City Charter for the City of Denton limits the number of consecutive elections an individual may be elected to the city council”; that “[t]he City Secretary's actions pertaining to the applications of three individuals for a place on the May 10, 2008, general election ballot for city council was an abuse of discretion”; and that "[t]he District Court’s action, or inaction, in this case was a result of the court’s confusion as to whether or not this case was a civil suit or an election contest.”

      . The order declares only Clifton a vexatious litigant, not all of the Appellants. We therefore construe this issue as a challenge by Clifton, not all of the Appellants, to the order declaring him a vexatious litigant.