author: GREENWOOD, Judge:

text:
    2003 UT App 13
    In the matter of V.K.S., a person under eighteen years of age. D.K.C. and E.L.C., Appellants, v. C.S., Appellee.
    No. 20010455-CA.
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
    Michael J. Boyle and Daniel Drage, Boyle & Drage PC, Ogden, for Appellants.
    C.S., Roy, Appellee Pro Se.
    Before BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge, BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.
   OPINION

GREENWOOD, Judge:

¶ 1 This is an appeal from a final order terminating D.K.C. and E.L.C.’s (Grandparents) guardianship of V.K.S. and awarding custody of V.K.S. to her mother, C.S. (Mother). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 J.S. (Father) and Mother were married in December 1994 while both were in the Navy. Mother was discharged from the Navy prior to V.KS.’s birth in 1995 and moved into Grandparents’ home where she stayed for three and a half years. V.K.S. lived in Grandparents’ home from birth until the order terminating guardianship was entered in April 2001. Father never lived with Mother, except for 30 days immediately after V.K.S.’s birth. Father and Mother divorced in 1997. Mother was awarded custody of V.K.S. in the divorce proceedings.

¶ 3 During her stay with Grandparents, Mother worked and went to school. Mother, with Grandparents’ assistance, took care of V.K.S., although there is disagreement between the parties as to who bore the greater burden of this responsibility. In 1997, Mother and Father signed a consent to Grandparents’ guardianship of V.K.S. The Petition for Guardianship was based on Mother’s inability to provide adequate health care insurance and Father’s inability to care for V.K.S. while residing in another state. Grandparents petitioned for guardianship because V.K.S. needed medical insurance and they were concerned with Mother’s parenting skills.

¶4 Mother moved out of Grandparents’ home in 1998 without V.K.S. In 1999, Mother filed a petition in district court to remove Grandparents as V.KS.’s guardians. On April 11, 2001, an Order and Findings and Conclusions were entered awarding custody of V.K.S. to Mother and terminating Grandparents’ guardianship.

¶ 5 The trial court found that both Mother and Grandmother had developed a bond of love and affection with V.K.S. However, the trial court also found that there was extreme hostility between Mother and Grandmother, despite Mother’s substantial improvement in her life, resulting in detriment to V.K.S. Mother had married, had a second child, a stable home, a supportive husband, and employment. The trial court concluded that it was in V.KS.’s best interest to be in the custody of Mother.

¶ 6 This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 “When reviewing [trial court determinations regarding the custody of children], we must do our own weighing and make our own decision based on the facts in the record. Nevertheless, the [trial] court is allowed a considerable latitude of discretion in child custody matters, and its judgment will not be disturbed unless we determine the [trial] court has exceeded the scope of permitted discretion or has acted contrary to law.” Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225,¶ 6, 29 P.3d 676 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Furthermore, “ ‘[m]atters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court’s interpretation.’ ” State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,¶ 8, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ¶ 4, 18 P.3d 504), cert, denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Grandparents appeal the order of the district court terminating their guardianship of V.K.S. and awarding custody of V.K.S. to Mother. Grandparents argue, among other things, that (1) the district court erred by according Mother the parental presumption; (2) even if Mother was entitled to the parental presumption, the presumption was rebutted, and therefore, the court erred in not placing the parties on equal footing and determining custody under the “best interest of the child” standard; and (3) the probate court erred in determining that it was in the best interest of V.K.S. to terminate the guardianship.

¶ 9 We begin, however, by addressing the scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction under the Utah Probate Code, specifically those sections addressing the Guardianship of Minors. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-201 to - 212 (1993 & Supp.2002). We note that Utah has adopted the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.), Part 2, Guardians of Minors. Thus, Utah’s statutory language is identical to the U.P.C. In general, “[a] person becomes a guardian of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment, through appointment by a local school board under Section 53A-2-202, or upon appointment by the court.” Id. § 75-5-201(l)(a) (Supp.2002). Two requirements must be met prior to the district court appointing a guardian of a minor. First, a court may only appoint a guardian of a minor “if all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court order.” Id. § 75-5-204 (1993) (emphasis added). Second, a court may only appoint, as guardian, a person in the “best interest of the minor.’’ Id. § 75-5-206(l)(a) (Supp.2002) (emphasis added). If both requirements are met, the court may then grant guardianship or temporary guardianship. See id. § 75-5-207(2).

¶ 10 In this matter, Grandparents were appointed as guardians by the court. There is no record as to whether the probate court determined if Mother’s parental rights were “terminated or suspended by circumstance.” Mother, however, consented to the guardianship and apparently there was no objection at the time guardianship was awarded. The record before us does not include the

complete record of the guardianship proceeding. ... Thus, it is impossible for us to fully review the actions of the trial court in [the guardianship] proceeding. Therefore, we must assume that the trial court determined that [Mother’s] parental rights were suspended by circumstances. Moreover, by acquiescing in the appointment, [Mother] waived [her] right to object to the appointment ....

Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah Ct.App.1995), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); see also In re Mikrut, 175 Ariz. 544, 858 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz.Ct.App.1993) (stating that appointment of guardian when mother’s parental custody rights may not have been “terminated or suspended may have been error, but the court still had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian” where it could have been corrected by timely appeal).

¶ 11 Once appointed, “[a] guardian’s authority and responsibility terminates upon the death, resignation, or removal of the guardian_” Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-210 (1993) (emphasis added). “Any person interested in the welfare of a ward ... may petition for removal of a guardian on the ground that removal would be in the best interest of the ward.” Id. § 75-5-212(1) (1993) (emphasis added). “After notice and hearing on a petition for removal ... the court may terminate the guardianship and make any further order that may be appropriate.” Id. § 75-5-212(2).

¶ 12 There are no cases in Utah analyzing the proper procedures and requirements for terminating guardianship when sought by a parent. However, courts in other jurisdictions that have adopted the U.P.C. have addressed this issue under similar circumstances. These courts have held that where guardianship is based on the consent of a parent, the withdrawal of consent must terminate guardianship because any other result would be a de facto termination of a parent’s rights without due process. Courts base this reasoning on jurisdictional limitations, in that a probate court does not have jurisdiction to terminate parent-child relationships, which is usually the exclusive domain of the juvenile court. Therefore, these courts have held that permitting the probate court to deny a petition to remove guardianship based on consent, resulting in the termination of parental rights, would exceed the probate court’s authority.

¶ 13 For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered a similar case requiring interpretation of the Arizona Probate Code’s guardianship provisions. In In re Mikrut, 175 Ariz. 544, 858 P.2d 689 (Ariz.Ct.App.1993), a mother signed a notice waiver, which effectively granted guardianship to a non-parent. See id. at 690. There was no finding by the probate court that the mother’s rights had been terminated or suspended. See id. Later, the mother sought to discharge the non-parent’s guardianship but her request was denied. See id. The mother appealed. See id.

¶ 14 The appellate court reasoned that where the mother’s rights were not terminated, “the appointment of the guardian was based upon [mother’s] consent to give the guardian only temporary custody of her children ... as a substitute for suspension by circumstances pursuant to [section 14-5204].” Id. at 691 (emphasis added). The court then determined that if guardianship is based on parental consent, when “consent is withdrawn due to the parent’s changed circumstances, the probate court’s refusal to terminate the guardianship may operate as a de facto termination of the parent’s parental rights.” Id. at 692. The court noted that “[a]lthough guardianship proceedings in Arizona are heard in probate court, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions to terminate the parent-child relationship.” Id.; see also Morales v. Glenn, 114 Ariz. 327, 560 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1977) (“To completely sever the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction. The Probate Court does not have jurisdiction to award custody when custody by operation of the law or by court order ... has already been determined.”). The Mikrut court observed that

[w]hen a child lives and becomes established in a home, neighborhood, and school, barring any abuse in the home of the guardian, it would likely be best for the child to remain with the guardian in the familiar environment. While this may be acceptable when the parent-child relationship has been terminated or suspended after appropriate court proceedings, it certainly raises due process concerns for a parent who consented to the appointment of a guardian due to circumstances that have changed by the time the parent seeks termination of the guardianship.

858 P.2d at 693. The court then held “that where a guardianship is based on the parent’s consent, the proper procedure upon the parent’s withdrawal of consent is for the probate court to terminate the guardianship. If the guardian believes the parent to be an unfit parent, he or she can petition the [juvenile] court ... to terminate or suspend the parent-child relationship.” Id.

¶ 15 In similar circumstances, distinguished only by the fact that the mother directly appealed the guardianship order, the Idaho Supreme Court also interpreted the language “suspended by circumstances.” See In re Copenhaver, 124 Idaho 888, 865 P.2d 979, 984 (1993). The Idaho court found that where the mother made it clear that she no longer wanted to leave her children with the appointed guardians and that she was willing and capable of earing for them, the circumstances suspending her custody no longer existed. See id. at 984-85. As a result, “findings regarding the children’s living situation, school enrollment, financial support and contact with their mother no longer had any bearing.” Id. at 985. The court reversed the probate court’s decision granting guardianship to a non-parent, finding error in its conclusion that the mother’s “parental rights were still suspended by circumstances and in proceeding with the second part of the analysis relating to the best interests of the children.” Id.

¶ 16 The Montana Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning in Copenhaver, held that a mother’s parental rights were not terminated or suspended when she “appeared in [the] action, withdrew her consent to the temporary guardianship, and filed a petition to terminate the temporary guardianship.” In re D.T.N., 275 Mont. 480, 914 P.2d 579, 583 (1996). The Montana court found those actions indicated that the mother did not “voluntarily relinquish[ ] her right to physical custody of her child.” Id. In coming to this conclusion, the court also relied on the commentary to the Uniform Probate Code § 5-204, which states:

Nothing in this Article is intended to deal with the status of a so-called natural guardian, with the authority of a parent over a child, or with authority over a child or children that may be conferred by other state laws.
The court [under the Probate Code] is not authorized to appoint a guardian for one for whom a parent has custodial rights or for one who has a parental guardian.

D.T.N., 914 P.2d at 583 (quotations and citations omitted); see Unif. Probate Code § 5-204 (Comment), 8 U.L.A. 336 (1998). The court further stated that “the guardianship provisions of the Probate Code were never intended as a substitute for the custody provisions of our [divorce laws] nor the prescribed and demanding procedures established for the termination of parental rights.” D.T.N., 914 P.2d at 583.

¶ 17 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island also examined the language “suspended or terminated” in response to a certified question from its appellate court. In Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291 (R.I.1999), a mother died leaving her child in the custody of an aunt. See id. at 292. The mother and father had been divorced, with custody awarded to the mother. See id. The aunt filed a petition for guardianship to which the father objected. See id. The certified question was whether the probate court has “jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of [a child] who is not orphaned and who has a surviving natural parent whose parental rights have never been terminated but whose fitness to serve as the minor’s guardian have been raised in the probate proceedings?” Id. at 293. As in the cases described earlier, the Rhode Island court held that granting a guardianship petition over the objection of a natural parent would implicitly terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child. See id. In analyzing the probate court’s jurisdiction to make such an implicit determination, the court held that although the probate court has the authority to appoint guardians, it lacks “the express authority to terminate parental rights or divest parents of the custody of their children.” Id. The court stated that only the family court has the power to terminate parental rights in “limited statutorily-dictated circumstances.” Id. at 293-94. The court observed that

the Family Court possesses the particularized expertise and resources that make it well suited for this task. It is able to marshal the “department of children, youth, and families, the department of health, the department of human services, the department of education, the office of substance abuse, and the department of mental health, retardation, and hospitals to render all assistance [ ] within [ ] its jurisdictional power” to aid the court.

Id. at 294-95 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). The court then held that the “[p]robate [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction to appoint a permanent guardian of [a child] who is not orphaned and who has a surviving natural parent whose parental rights have never been terminated and who opposes [the] petition.” Id. at295.

¶ 18 None of the cases decided under the U.P.C. directly address the effect of the statutory language in section 75-5-212(1), stating that “[a]ny person interested in the welfare of a ward ... may petition for removal of a guardian on the ground that removal would be in the best interest of the ward.” (Emphasis added.) Some of the courts’ decisions, however, impact that question. In Copen-haver, the court said that the parental presumption precludes consideration of a child’s best interest, unless it is shown “ ‘that the natural parent has abandoned the child, that the natural parent is unfit or that the child has been in the nonparent’s custody for an appreciable amount of time.’ ” 865 P.2d at 983 (citation omitted). Given the court’s ultimate conclusion that the probate court had erred in considering evidence related to best interest, it necessarily held that none of the circumstances rebutting the parental presumption existed. In D.T.N., the court noted that parents have “a fundamental constitutional right to the custody of [their] children.” 914 P.2d at 582. As a result, “the ‘best interest of the child’ test is only relevant after there has been a showing of dependency or abuse or neglect pursuant to our termination of parental rights statutes, or in custody disputes between two natural parents.” Id. These eases indicate that under the U.P.C. best interest should be determinative only where the petition to terminate guardianship is filed by a nonparent or, if filed by a parent, the parent has been adjudicated to have abandoned, neglected, or abused his or her child under the Juvenile Code.

¶ 19 Utah appellate case law addressing provisions in Utah’s juvenile code and divorce laws is of some assistance. In In re M.W., 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80, the Utah Supreme Court held that the parental presumption “can be lost in certain cases, including when a parent has had his or her parental rights terminated or has previously lost custody of his or her child.” Id. at ¶ 16. The “parental presumption” is judicially created in recognition of the constitutional “right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child.” Id. at ¶ 14 (citations and quotations omitted). In order for a loss of custody to result in deprivation of the parental presumption, “that loss of custody, whether temporary or permanent, must be the result of a final factual determination on the merits of an underlying petition.” Id. at ¶ 18. In M.W., a juvenile court decision on a neglect petition constituted the final factual determination. See id. at ¶¶ 20-22.

¶ 20 This court considered a father’s petition to modify a divorce petition after he had stipulated in the divorce proceedings that his child’s maternal grandparents should be awarded custody of the child. See Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225,¶¶ 4-5, 29 P.3d 676. In the petition, the father sought custody of the child, alleging a change of circumstances. See id. at ¶ 5. Applying M.W., this court held that the father was not entitled to the parental presumption because he had lost custody as the result of a final factual determination in the divorce proceedings. See id. at ¶ 10. The court stated that “[b]y signing a custody stipulation that reserved only visitation, Father implicitly agreed that his parental presumption had been rebutted and that [the child’s] best interests were served by giving custody to the [grandparents].” Id.

¶21 Although M.W. and Davis are not directly on point, they do indicate that court action on disputed facts or reflecting a valid stipulation is required to diminish a parent’s rights in and to his or her child. This requirement stems from the constitutional basis for parental rights and rights to due process.

¶ 22 As stated earlier, in Utah the district court has jurisdiction over “guardianship proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 75 — 5—101(1). Also, as in many — if not all — of the states with the U.P.C., “except as provided by law,” Utah’s juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction concerning “the termination of the legal parent-child relationship ... including termination of residual parental rights and duties.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(l)(f) (Supp. 2002).

¶ 23 Having reviewed the cases construing the U.P.C. and other related areas of the law, we adopt the reasoning of those cases decided under the U.P.C. We believe that they are consonant with the comments under the act and with jurisdictional limitations provided by Utah statutes. As observed in several cases, the U.P.C. was not intended to allow use of guardianship proceedings as a means to involuntarily terminate parental rights. See D.T.N., 914 P.2d at 583 (stating guardianship proceedings not proper means to involuntarily terminate parental rights); In re Sabrina Mae D., 114 N.M. 133, 835 P.2d 849, 853 (Ct.App.1992) (same), cert, denied 113 N.M. 744, 832 P.2d 1223 (1992). Therefore, we hold that when a parent merely consents to the appointment of a guardian for that parent’s minor child, there is only a suspension by circumstances of the parent’s custody. If the parent thereafter petitions for termination of the guardianship and custody of the child, the probate court must grant the petition unless there has been a final factual determination depriving the parent of custody or terminating the parent’s parental rights, by a court with proper jurisdiction.

¶ 24 Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we note that Mother consented to Grandparents’ guardianship. Mother has never been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to have lost or given up custody of her child, nor has she been found to have abandoned, abused, or neglected V.K.S. Therefore, the trial court was not required to conduct a “best interest” analysis. In petitioning for termination of the guardianship, Mother’s temporary suspension by circumstances of custody ended. There is, consequently, no basis for continuing the guardianship under the Utah Probate Code.

¶ 25 Lastly, Grandparents are not without a remedy. If Grandparents believe that Mother’s parenting skills are so deficient as to meet the substantial burden to terminate the parent-child relationship, Grandparents can file a petition in juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-404 (2002) (“Any interested party ... may file a petition for termination of the parent-child relationship with regard to a child.”); see also Mikrut, 858 P.2d at 693 (“If the guardian believes the parent to be an unfit parent, he or she can petition the court ... to terminate or suspend the parent-child relationship.”).

CONCLUSION

¶ 26 In sum, the probate court did not err nor abuse its discretion in granting Mother’s petition to end Grandparents’ guardianship of V.K.S. The district court acting under the Utah Probate Code does not have jurisdiction to terminate the parent-child relationship; that jurisdiction lies with the juvenile court in situations such as found in this case. Thus, we affirm.

¶ 27 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge.

      . Mother is the daughter of D.K.C. (Grandmother). E.L.C. (Grandfather) is Mother’s stepfather.

      . Father is not a party to this action and is living in Michigan.

      . Utah’s district courts have original jurisdiction of cases arising under the Probate Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002) (stating district courts have “original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.").

      . Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-201 to -212 (1993 & Supp.2002), with Unit Probate Code §§ 5-201 to -212, 8 U.L.A. 332-53.

      . Guardians are appointed by (1) acceptance of testamentary appointment, (2) other written instruments, or (3) appointment by the court. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-201 to -202.5. It is clear that V.K.S.’s guardianship was "court appointed” because (1) testamentary appointment and appointment by "other written instruments” requires the death of a parent and analysis of a will, and (2) the court entered an order appointing guardianship. Therefore, we analyze V.K.S.’s guardianship under sections relating to court appointed guardianship.

      .Grandparents have not cited any cases decided under the U.P.C. or Utah’s Probate Code to support their arguments but have relied primarily on Utah cases concerning divorce and custody. Because the underlying issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the probate statutes, we look to case law in Utah and elsewhere for guidance.

      . Arizona, like Utah, adopted the U.P.C., and has identical language relating to the appointment of guardians. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-201 to -212, with Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14-5201 to -5212 (West 1995 & Supp.2002).

      . It must be noted, however, that some courts, although not interpreting the U.P.C., have held that the probate court does have the power to refuse a parent’s petition to terminate guardianship if the court finds that it is in the best interest of a child. For example, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that where a guardianship was initially based on consent, the parents had the burden to show that termination of guardianship was in the best interest of the child. In re Markham, 32 Ark.App. 46, 795 S.W.2d 931, 933 (1990); see also In re Jessie E., 137 N.H. 336, 627 A.2d 591, 593 (1993) (holding New Hampshire law requires guardianship proceedings to be determined merely on a "best interest of the child standard” where court had jurisdiction to terminate parental rights and to grant guardianships); Styck v. Karnes, 462 N.E.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (stating custody determinations are inherent in guardianship proceedings where guardian has the "care and custody” of ward; such determinations should be made under "best interest standard”).

      . The juvenile court also has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of a minor under specified circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-118(2) (2002).

      . The only exception to the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction to terminate parental rights "provided by law," appears to be provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16 (2002) regarding contested adoptions.

      . Grandparents also contest the trial court's order restricting Grandfather's visitation with V.K.S. While we agree that the evidence justifying those restrictions is questionable, we are unaware of any basis under the Utah Probate Code for ordering visitation rights in these circumstances.

      . As part of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it ordered that V.K.S. be placed under the protective supervision of the Division of Child and Family Services to “develop a parenting and transition plan which will address the issues set forth in the foregoing findings of fact .... ” The propriety of this order was not raised on appeal and we do not address it in this opinion.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: VOIGT, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2003 WY 19
    Wade Travis KEATS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 01-231.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 13, 2003.

      Representing Appellant: Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee: Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Patrick J. LeBrun (Student Intern).
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] In July 2001, a Campbell County jury convicted appellant, Wade Travis Keats, of first-degree arson in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101 (LexisNexis 2001). The district court sentenced him to a three-to seven-year prison term. On appeal, appellant argues that the district court failed adequately to instruct the jury on the specific intent element of first-degree arson, improperly excluded evidence that appellant was taken into custody pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-101 through 25-10-127 (Lex-isNexis 2001), improperly precluded the jury from considering appellant’s ownership of the occupied structure at issue, and failed adequately to instruct the jury regarding the definition of “maliciously,” an element of first-degree arson. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Appellant raises the following issues:

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a specific intent jury instruction in the trial of first degree arson which is a specific intent crime.
Whether the trial court erred in limiting evidence of the appellant’s mental condition during the trial of the specific intent crime of first degree arson.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing appellant’s proposed jury instruction No. G which acknowledges ownership or title to an occupied structure is not a defense to first degree arson, however, ownership or title may be considered in determining appellant’s intent or state of mind.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing appellant’s proposed jury instruction No. H defining the term “maliciously” to in-elude that ill will, hatred or hostility be directed to another.

FACTS

[¶ 3] On the evening of December 30, 2000, appellant angrily left some friends, stating to one friend “if [you don’t] want to go to jail, get out of the car....” The friend complied. Appellant then returned to his mobile home in the early morning hours of December 31, 2000, and, appearing angry and intoxicated, asked his roommate to “get [her] stuff and leave, get out of his house.” After gathering some of her property, and her son, in order to leave the residence, the roommate observed appellant break a window and then saw a small fire in the hallway. She extinguished the fire, and as she left, appellant “was talking about burning the house down with himself in it and he was tired of everybody using him.” The roommate reported the incident to an emergency dispatcher.

[¶ 4] Campbell County sheriffs deputies responded to appellant’s residence just after 1:00 a.m. on December 31, 2000. As they stood outside the mobile home, they observed appellant periodically inside the residence, but he did not initially respond to their requests to exit the residence or talk to them. Eventually, the officers entered the residence and located appellant in the bathroom. A lengthy period of interaction and attempted negotiation between appellant, the officers, and, at appellant’s request, another individual ensued. During this period, appellant’s unstable demeanor vacillated rapidly between suicidal, threatening, anger, laughter, and depression. For example, appellant frequently exited and retreated to the bathroom, told the officers to get out of his house, threatened to kill himself if they did not do so, displayed three different knives, at times held a knife to his abdomen and throat, stabbed knives into the bathroom wall, door, and floor while yelling at the officers to “come and get some of this,” laughed at the officers, and stated that if the officers came through the bathroom door, a knife was positioned such that it would harm appellant.

[¶ 5] Appellant ultimately proceeded to light several fires at different times and at different locations within the residence. The officers, and firemen, were able to extinguish and control these fires until at least one fire began to spread, filling the mobile home with smoke. At one point, appellant broke a window, but upon seeing an officer outside the window pointing a flashlight and firearm at him, appellant took two deep breaths of fresh air and returned to the smoke-filled residence. Eventually, amidst the smoke, flames and steam, the officers subdued appellant, who was proceeding through the mobile home with a knife in his hand, and placed him into custody. The mobile home was “damaged probably beyond replacement fixing.”

[¶ 6] The State charged appellant with first-degree arson and possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, both felonies. A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree arson, but acquitted him of the possession of a deadly weapon charge. The district court sentenced appellant to a three- to seven-year prison term. He appeals from that judgment and sentence.

DISCUSSION

Specific Intent Jury Instructions

[¶ 7] Appellant first argues that the district court did not adequately instruct the jury regarding the specific intent element of first-degree arson. At trial, appellant entered a timely objection, stating that “it is reversible error not to instruct the jury as to the definition of specific intent” and that “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure.” See W.R.Cr.P. 30(a). Appellant contends that two jury instructions he offered at trial, which instructions the district court refused, would have adequately instructed the jury on this specific intent element.

[¶ 8] We have stated that the

“trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the issues.”

Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo.1999) (quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo.1987)). Jury instructions are “designed to inform the jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts.” Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991).

“Given this purpose, the test whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction ‘leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.’ Graham v. United States, 187 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C.Cir.1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S.Ct. 741, 95 L.Ed. 1353 (1951); United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir.1966). A failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant’s conviction!.] Vigil [v. State], 859 P.2d [659] at 662 [(Wyo.1993)], quoting Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added); Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo.1988); Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173,1174 (Wyo.1989).”

Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo.1995)) (emphasis in original).

[¶ 9] According to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a), a “person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.” The district court instructed the jury as follows regarding the elements of first-degree arson:

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
The necessary elements of the offense of First Degree Arson as contained in Count I are:
1. On or about December 31, 2000;
2. In Campbell County, Wyoming;
3. The Defendant, Wade Travis Keats;
4. Maliciously started a fire(s);
5.With intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.

[¶ 10] We recently stated:

In the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a “specific intent” or a “general intent.” For many years, Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not always readily discernible.

“Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to he a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury.”

Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1262 (quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.1978)). Following that logic, first-degree arson can be categorized as a “specific intent” crime in that the statute requires that one act “with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a).

[¶ 11] Appellant offered this additional instruction on the specific intent element of first-degree arson, which instruction the district court refused:

DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. K
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent the State must prove that the Defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, [knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires,] specifically intending a result prohibited by law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
An act or a failure to act is “knowingly” done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

(Bracketed material in original.) The proposed jury instruction’s language mirrors that contained in former W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 (1978). Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9 n. 1, 55 P.3d at 1262 n. 1.

[¶ 12] We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing this proposed jury instruction. The district court’s jury instruction on the substantive elements of first-degree arson adequately instructed the jury regarding the specific intent element of first-degree arson, leaving “ ‘no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.’ ” Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 1265 (quoting Miller, 904 P.2d at 348). “Wyoming does not require particular words be used to properly instruct on the specific intent element of the crime of [first-degree arson].” Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo.1997). On appeal, Compton argued that the district court erred by not separately (beyond the substantive elements of the crime charged) instructing “the jury on the definition of specific intent” contained in the very jury instruction appellant proposed in the instant case. Id. at 940-41. We held that, instead, “it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they had to determine,” and the district court’s “elements” instruction in that case “specifically and precisely and in an understandable manner properly” instructed the jury on the specific intent element of the crime charged. Id. at 941.

[¶ 13] We further note that W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 is no longer contained within the pattern criminal jury instructions. Indeed, we have

acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury instructions defining and explaining intent due to their “vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries.” Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997). Instead, juries should be instructed as to the appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; “it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to determine.” Id. This is consonant with our recent holding that “the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.” Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001). The point is that attempting formally to distinguish between specific intent and general intent, beyond the substantive elements of the crime, may not be the surest way to define the nature of the intent that must be proven.

Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d at 1262-63 (footnote omitted).

[¶ 14] Appellant also offered this additional instruction, which instruction the district court refused:

DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L
You are instructed that First Degree Arson is a specific intent crime. To find the Defendant guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances presented by the evidence.

[¶ 15] The district court did not err in refusing this proposed jury instruction. We are unable to discern precisely how the proposed instruction would have assisted the jury in rendering its verdict. Regarding the proposed instruction’s first sentence, we find that the “facts and charges of this case did not require the court to identify [the requisite] intent as ‘specific’ or restate the name of the crime, but required the court to adequately instruct the jury that it should determine whether [appellant] was guilty of ...” first-degree arson. Compton, 931 P.2d at 940. We previously established that the district court’s “elements” instruction in the instant case met this requirement. Juxtaposition of the proposed instruction’s second sentence (“that the Defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure”) with the elements instruction actually given by the district court (the “Defendant, Wade Travis Keats ... [m]aliciously started a fire(s) ... [w]ith intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure”) reveals no meaningful distinction between the language contained in the proposed instruction and that contained in the elements instruction the district court actually gave the jury. Id. Finally, as to the proposed instruction’s third sentence, the district court did instruct the jury that:

The intent with which an act was done is [a] condition of the mind, that is seldom if ever, capable of direct or positive proof. Because we have no power to directly oversee the condition of a person’s mind, the best we can do is infer it from the evidence introduced.
The Jury may consider the circumstances surrounding the act, the doing of the act itself, the manner in which it was done, and the means used.

Jury Instruction Defining “Maliciously”

[¶ 16] As was mentioned above, one of the elements of first-degree arson that must be proved by the State is that the defendant “maliciously started a fire.” One of the trial battles in the instant case was over the correct definition of the word “maliciously.” The district court gave the following instruction to the jury:

INSTRUCTION NO. 15
“Maliciously” means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal justification or excuse. The term “maliciously” conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility and implies a wicked state of mind.

[¶ 17] The appellant objected to Instruction No. 15 and offered the following instruction in its place:

DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H
“Maliciously” means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal justification or excuse. The term “maliciously” conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.

(Emphasis added.) The wording of this proposed jury instruction is identical to the wording of a suggested definition contained in the Use Note to W.Cr.P.J.I. 31.01A (1996), which is the elements instruction for first-degree arson. That suggested definition borrowed and modified the definition of malice found in W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), which is one of the homicide instructions.

[¶ 18] There are two interrelated issues raised by these conflicting definitions. First, does the malice or the malicious act have to be directed toward another? And second, does the State have to prove either (1) that the act was done with no legal justification or excuse, or (2) that it was done with hatred, ill will or hostility, or does it have to prove both (1) and (2)?

[¶ 19] The words “malice,” “malicious,” and “maliciously” have appeared as elements in several crimes and causes of action, including murder, arson, malicious mischief, and malicious prosecution. Because the terms are not statutorily defined, this Court has at times been called upon to determine their meanings in their different contexts. A review of some of that case law may help to put our issues into perspective. For instance, in malicious prosecution, the term means that the prosecution was instituted from an “improper motive,” which is “ ‘any motive other than one to further the ends of justice or to punish an offender against the criminal law.’ ” Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1045 (1933) (quoting Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 P.2d 825, 831 (1932)).

[¶ 20] In Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 374 (1922), the defendant was convicted of violating a statute against “willfully and maliciously kill[ing] any ... neat cattle ... the same being the property of another.... In reversing the conviction, Justice Blume delivered the following analysis of the word “maliciously” as used in that statute:

The defendant asked an instruction to the effect that the jury must find that the killing of the animal was done through malice, hatred, or ill will toward George and Henry Frederick, or that the killing was so cruel that malice could be inferred therefrom.... The court gave, on this subject, over the objection of the defendant, the following instruction:
“You are instructed that malice includes not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. Malice is not confined to ill will toward an individual, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done with a wicked mind, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as evince plain indications of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief; hence malice may be implied or inferred from any deliberate and cruel act against another, or his property, which shows an abandoned and malignant heart.”
The case of State v. Johnson, 7 Wyo. 512, 54 Pac. 502 [1898], is a case involving malicious mischief, and the court, in speaking of the malice essential to be shown in such eases, although the act there involved was only a misdemeanor, said in part:
“The authorities are nevertheless substantially agreed that the malice necessary to constitute the offense is something more than the malice which is ordinarily inferred from the willful doing of an unlawful act without excuse. The statutes were not intended to make every willful and wrongful act punishable as a crime, but they are devised to reach that class of cases where the act is done with a deliberate intention to injure. * * * ⅛ seems ⅛ be generally held that in order to bring an offense under the head of malicious mischief it must appear that the mischief was itself the object of the act, and not that it was incidental to some other act lawful or unlawful.”
The principle laid down in that case that the malice in such cases is something more than what is ordinarily understood as legal malice, but is that malice as it is more ordinarily understood in common speech, has been the settled rule of law in this state since 1898, and we see no reason for departing therefrom....
“... Maliciously, in this sentence, is still more significant and controlling. It means, with ill will, malevolence, grudge, spite, wicked intention, enmity. And this ill will cannot exist without an object. It must be aimed at some one; and assimilating this offense to malicious mischief, which it very much resembles, we hold the malice the culprit entertains must be directed to the owner of the premises.”

Wiggin, 206 P. at 374 (quoting Johnson v. State, 61 Ala. 9 (Ala.1878)).

[¶21] Clearly, at least in 1922, and at least as applied to malicious mischief, the concept of malice included not only an element of ill will, but it required that such ill will be directed toward a particular person. Less than two years later, however, in penning the opinion that became the source for the pattern jury instruction definition of malice in murder cases, and indirectly, in arson cases, Justice Blume reached a noticeably different conclusion:

As to what constitutes malice is not easily defined.... In its popular sense, the term malice conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.... That is not its legal meaning, but the term nevertheless implies a wicked condition of mind while the homicide is committed; a mind, we may say, committing the very act willfully_ In Bennett v. State, 15 Ariz. 58,136 Pac. 276 [1913], it was said:
“The legal import of the term ‘malice’ extends beyond and is more comprehensive than ill will, hatred, or revenge. It includes all states of the mind under which the killing of a human being by another takes place without any cause which will, in law, justify or excuse it or mitigate the homicide to manslaughter.”
... [I]t is said that the term includes all those states and conditions of mind which accompany a homicide that is committed without legal excuse or extenuation.

State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 423 (1924).

[¶ 22] In the definition of malice in Wig-gin, emphasis was placed upon the concept of ill will toward another person. In the definition of malice in Sorrentino, emphasis was placed upon the concept of an act committed without legal justification or excuse. The “old” pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978), and the new pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), contain both concepts. The problem is that the concepts are not identical, leaving considerable doubt as to exactly what it is the State has to prove in a given ease. Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, the source note to the new pattern instruction directs attention to Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo.1987), where this Court, in a homicide case, said simply that “[mjalice has been defined as intentional killing without legal justification or excuse and under circumstances which are insufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter.” See also Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo.1963). In Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Wyo.1992), we noted the confusion that can arise because of differing legal and common definitions of malice, yet we also cited Sorrentino with approval and noted that the passage of six decades had “failed to endow our language with suitable synonyms.”

[¶23] In Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Wyo.1983), we considered the meaning of the word “maliciously” specifically within the context of the first-degree arson statute. The value of Dean as precedent, however, is diminished by the fact that the crime in that case was charged under a statute, now repealed, that did not much resemble the present statute. For ease of comparison, we will set out both statutes in full. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-121 (1957) states:

Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, shop, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto or any standing timber on public or privately owned land, whether the property of himself or of another, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree_

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) states:

A person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure.

[¶ 24] In Dean, in a discussion focused mainly on the fact that the old statute defined a general intent crime, while the new statute defined a specific intent crime, we quoted with approval the following definition of the word “maliciously” as used in the old statute:

“ ‘... “[M]alieious” when used in defining the crime of arson is quite different from its literal meaning. ⅜ * * “The malice ⅜ * * need not be express, but may be implied; it need not take the form of malevolence or ill will, but it is sufficient if one deliberately and without justification or excuse sets out to burn the dwelling house of another.” ’ ...
... To be a willful and malicious burning in the law of arson, the burning must simply be done voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right.... ‘[MJaliciously’ means that state of mind which actuates conduct injurious to others without lawful reason, cause or excuse.”

Dean, 668 P.2d at 642-43 (quoting State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)). See also 5 Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 7 (1995).

[¶ 25] The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, of which the new arson statute is a part, abolished common law crimes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102 (LexisNexis 2001). Consequently, the important question is not what “maliciously” may have meant as part of common law arson, or even as part of the earlier statute, but what it means in the current statute. See 5 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at §§ 1, 2. In making that determination, however, we may resort to prior ease law as an interpretive aid. Id. The ordinary rules of statutory construction, however, are our primary guide.

[¶ 26] We have often stated our principles of statutory construction, and we will not repeat them here at length. Suffice it to say that, if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we simply abide by its plain meaning. If the statute is ambiguous, which means that its meaning is uncertain and it is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we may construe it. Our primary goal is to determine legislative intent. Statutes are to be given a reasonable interpretation with reference to their purpose. Ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. Union Pacific R.R. v. Trona Valley Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1203, 1205-06 (Wyo.2002); DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo.2002); State v. Nelson, 2002 WY 99, 116, 49 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo.2002); Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 10, 41 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Wyo.2002).

[¶ 27] In applying the Somntino definition of malice, it becomes obvious that different evidence is required to prove the hatred or ill will that characterizes malice in its common meaning than the evidence that is required to prove the absence of a legal justification or excuse. In applying its murder statutes, the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared that

the element of malice may be established by at least three different types of proof: (1) “express hatred, ill-will or spite”; (2) commission of inherently dangerous acts in such a reckless and wanton manner as to “manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief’; or (3) a “condition of mind which prompts a person to [act] intentionally without just cause, excuse or justification.” [State v.] Reynolds, 307 N.C. at 191, 297 S.E.2d [532], 536 [ (1982) ].

State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2000). This approach relieves the dichotomy between the concept of “ill will” and the concept of “no legal excuse or justification” left by Sorrentino, in that it suggests that the varying definitions are alternatives. We must then ask whether the legislature intended for either or both of those alternatives to apply under the first-degree arson statute.

[¶ 28] In his analysis of the revised criminal code that included the new arson statute, Professor Theodore E. Lauer concluded that the word “maliciously” may well be surplusage in the statute:

The word “maliciously” in first-degree arson is probably unnecessary. While traditionally arson has required that a fire be “willfully and maliciously” started, the term “maliciously” has meant something less than intentionally. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 856-61 (3d ed.1982), where a malicious state of mind is said to be one wherein there is an absence of justification, excuse or mitigation, and either an intent to cause a particular harm or the “wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result.” Id. at 860. But where, as in first degree arson, the act of starting the fire must be done “with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure,” it is clear that only an intent to cause the harm will suffice, and a knowing or reckless state of mind is not enough.

Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. 509, 511 n. 12 (1984). We are not, however, free to ignore any word that the legislature has chosen to place in a statute, and every word is presumed to have a meaning. Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo.1999). Furthermore, “maliciously’ is a word that gives the statute a mens rea element, without which it would reach innocent conduct. State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 347 (Wyo.1974); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 at 164R65 (15th ed.1993). See also Dean, 668 P.2d at 642 and State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223,1229 (Wyo.1982).

[¶ 29] Wyoming is far from alone in having attempted to modernize its arson laws. The commentaries to the Model Penal Code describe a “vast legislative development of the offense” of arson in the United States. Model Penal Code, § 220.1 at 4 (1980). Three patterns existed in this legislation: (1) offenses classified in relation to the types of property involved, but with criteria discriminating according to the likelihood of endangering life; (2) offenses classified specifically with reference to danger to persons; and (3) offenses classified solely on the basis of the type of property burned. Id. at 5-9. In most legislation, the concept of danger to others was incorporated through use of the term “maliciously” or by denoting that the property burned had to be the property “of another.” Id. at 18-25.

[¶ 30] Arizona’s experience with the mens rea element of its first-degree arson statute is enlightening as we study our own statute. Prior to 1978, first-degree arson in Arizona required that a person “willfully and maliciously” set fire to a structure. That phrase was judicially construed to mean “voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right.” Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-37390-1, 116 Ariz. 519, 570 P.2d 206, 209 (1977). After a full revision of Arizona’s criminal code, and a couple of subsequent amendments, the mens rea element of the first-degree arson statute now is “knowingly and unlawfully damaging an occupied struc-ture_” Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-1704 (West 2001). In construing the word “unlawfully” and its statutory definition — “contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by law” — the Arizona Court of Appeals emphasized the dangers of fire:

“A fire poses unique hazards. As a means of destruction, it is difficult to control and may quickly spread to nearby buildings or fields. Firemen and policemen are endangered. Neighbors and passers-by, fearing that a structure is occupied, may attempt hazardous rescue efforts.”

State v. Newfield, 161 Ariz. 470, 778 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1989) (quoting State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1983)).

[¶ 31] The point of this detour into Arizona law has been to show that there is little difference between the concept of “unlawfully” (contrary to law or not permitted by law) and “maliciously” (without legal justification or excuse). Beyond that, the use of these terms in conjunction with the burning of an occupied structure, rather than the burning of the property of another, suggests that the goal of the first-degree arson statutes in both cases is to protect all members of the public who might be harmed, not just the owner of the property or some other identified individual In turn, this suggests that in a prosecution for first-degree arson, the State does not have to prove that the malice or the malicious act was directed toward another.

[¶32] Earlier in this opinion, we noted that we do not construe statutes that we have not first found to be ambiguous. If a statute is not ambiguous, we simply “abide by its plain meaning.” Union Pacific R.R., 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d at 1205-06; DeLoge, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1237; Nelson, 2002 WY 99, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d at 188; Jones, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 10, 41 P.3d at 1252. In that regard, we must ask whether the word “maliciously” is ambiguous as it appears in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a). Despite the lengthy analysis through which we have just gone, we conclude that the answer is “no.” In enacting statutes, the legislature is presumed to have acted with full knowledge of the existing law. In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo.2000); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 306 (Wyo.1999). In the present context, that means that in 1982 when the legislature adopted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) as part of the new criminal code, it was aware of the definition of malice that this Court has been applying since at least 1924. That definition has always contained the alternative theories of actual hostility or ill will and the doing of an act without legal justification or excuse, the latter alternative not requiring the direction of ill will toward any particular person. The legislature’s use of the word “maliciously” in a statute designed to protect any person who may be endangered as a result of an arson comports with that definition. The fact that the pattern jury instructions, in not distinguishing between the alternate theories, may have created questions for juries, does not make the statute ambiguous.

[¶ 33] We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing the appellant’s proposed jury instruction defining the term “maliciously.” In fact, the jury instruction as given may have been prejudicial to the State in that it appears to require the State to prove both that the appellant acted with ill will and hostility and that he acted without legal justification or excuse. The jury instruction does not distinguish between actual malice and implied malice. The facts of the instant case bear out the need for such distinction. The appellant may not have felt actual hostility or ill will toward his roommate or toward the police officers who responded to the 911 call. His actions, nevertheless, placed them all in great danger. That is exactly the type of conduct that can be characterized as being “without legal justification or excuse.”

OtheR Issues

[¶ 34] Appellant asserts that because first-degree arson contains an element of specific intent and appellant argued at trial that he ultimately intended to commit suicide, the district court improperly excluded evidence that law enforcement took appellant into custody pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-101 through 25-10-127, the statutory procedures utilized to place a mentally ill person in emergency detention. Appellant’s contention is that his specific intent being the intent to kill himself, he did not have the specific intent to commit first-degree arson. Aside from citing summarily to the referenced statutes, appellant does not otherwise cite to any legal authority in advancing this argument. Appellant further contends that the district court’s jury instruction that “ownership or title to an occupied structure is not a defense to First Degree Arson” improperly precluded the jury from considering appellant’s ownership of the occupied structure for other proper purposes. This argument consists of two paragraphs, neither of which cite to any supporting legal authority.

[¶ 35] “We have repeatedly stated that arguments that are not ... supported by pertinent citations to authority will not be considered.” Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo.2000).

CONCLUSION

[¶ 36] The district court did not err in refusing to give the appellant’s proposed jury instructions regarding specific intent and malice. The appellant’s other arguments have not been supported by cogent reasoning or pertinent authority. The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed.

      . During deliberations, the jury in the instant case sent a note to the judge asking, "Does maliciously when it says hatred, ill will, or hostility have to be towards someone else or can it be towards yourself or an object?” The district court judge did not answer that question, other than to tell the jury that the law was contained in the instructions they had been given.

      . W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978) states:
      “With malice” means the commission of a wrongful act done intentionally without legal justification or excuse. The term "malice” conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another and implies a wicked condition of mind.
      W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996) states:
      "Malice” means the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal justification or excuse. The term “malice” conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another.

      . In the case of a contract killing, for instance, should the State have to prove that the hired killer had actual, personal ill will or hatred for the victim? That does not seem likely.

      . Because first-degree arson is now a specific intent crime, the third alternative identified in Cobh — the commission of inherently dangerous acts in a reckless and wanton manner — would not suffice to prove the crime.

      . The intentional burning of an “occupied structure” could certainly be done without any criminal intent, especially since "occupied structure” is defined by statute to include situations where no one is actually present in the structure. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-l-104(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2001). For instance, fire departments often perform training exercises by burning old structures with the owner’s permission. The fire is set with the specific intent to destroy or damage the structure, but there is no unlawful intent.

      . In addition to the cases cited herein, see State v. Vickers, 138 Ariz. 450, 675 P.2d 710, 711 (1983), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1033, 110 S.Ct. 3298, 111 L.Ed.2d 806 (1990); Rudolph J. Gerber, Arizona Criminal Code Revision: Twenty Years Later, 40 Ariz. L.Rev. 143, 145 (1998); and Rudy J. Gerber and John F. Foreman, Commentary, Arizona’s Criminal Law: The Critical Need for Comprehensive Revision, 18 Ariz. L.Rev. 63, 65, 95 (1976).

      . Of course, that does not foreclose the State, in an appropriate case, from pursuing and proving the alternate definition of malice based on actual hostility or ill will toward someone.


text:
    2003 WY 21
    Maile A. REHNBERG, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Alan S. HIRSHBERG, Appellee (Defendant).
    No. 02-106.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 20, 2003.

      Jessica Rutzick of the Law Offices of Lawrence B. Hartnett, Jackson, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
    Joseph F. Moore, Jr. and R. Scott Garland of Moore, Myers & Garland, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C. J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] Maile A. Rehnberg (Rehnberg) appeals from the district court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Rehn-berg’s complaint alleged breach of a real estate sales contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference with contract, and also sought contractual attorney’s fees. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Rehnberg raises the following issues:

1. Is paragraph 12 of Attachment “A” to the contract ambiguous?

2. Does the complaint allege facts that, if taken as true, establish a cause of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and contractual attorney’s fees?

3. Does the complaint allege facts that, if taken as true, establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract?

[¶ 3] The appellee, Alan S. Hirshberg (Hirshberg), does not present a separate list of issues, but raises the following additional arguments in his appellate brief:

1. Did the contract merge into the warranty deed?

2. Did a condition precedent fail to occur?

3. Are Rehnberg’s claims barred by the statute of frauds?

4. Was there a lack of consideration?

FACTS

[¶ 4] Hirshberg owned Lot 2 of McNeely Mountain subdivision in Teton County. In 1998, Hirshberg and others sued Countryside 1, LLC for its alleged breach of contractual duties to honor licenses to fish along certain creeks and to honor use agreements for the dining lodge and other facilities located within Crescent H Guest Ranch. Hirshberg’s interest in the fishing licenses and use agreements derived from his ownership of Lot 2. The civil action against Countryside seeks, among other things, specific performance with respect to the fishing licenses and use agreements.

[¶ 5] In 1999, Hirshberg listed Lot 2 for sale, with an asking price of $895,000.00 with the Crescent H fishing rights, and $595,000.00 without those fishing rights. The property was again listed for sale, with the same asking prices, in January 2000. Later in 2000, Hirshberg again listed Lot 2 for sale, this time with an asking price of $649,000.00 and no mention of fishing rights. In September 2000, after Rehnberg’s initial offer to purchase Lot 2 expired, Hirshberg listed it again, this time with an asking price of $895,000.00. Later in September 2000, Rehnberg offered to purchase Lot 2 for $735,000.00. The offer was contained in a standard form Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate. During the negotiations that followed, Hirshberg and his real estate agent told Rehnberg that she would have the right to substitute herself for Hirshberg in the Countryside case. On October 25, 2000, Hirshberg accepted Rehnberg’s counteroffer of $795,000.00. Paragraph 12 of Attachment “A” to the Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate reads as follows:

This offer is based upon said property being sold without any fishing rights. However, should litigation, which is currently underway, result in fishing rights, Seller agrees to transfer all fishing rights to Buyer.

[¶ 6] At closing, Rehnberg was not provided with any written assignments of the fishing rights or use agreements. During the next few months, her attempts to contact Hirshberg or his attorney to obtain such assignments were unsuccessful. In May 2001, Michael Olin (Olin) offered to purchase Lot 2 from Rehnberg, but he wanted an assignment of the fishing rights and use agreements. In response to a communication from Rehnberg to Hirshberg’s realtor, Hirshberg informed Rehnberg and Olin that he would provide Rehnberg with an assignment of the fishing rights for $125,000.00, would provide Olin with an assignment of the fishing rights and use agreements for an additional $75,000.00 plus another $50,000.00 in the event the Countryside lawsuit was successfully resolved.

[¶ 7] As a result of Hirshberg’s demands for additional payments, Olin withdrew his offer to purchase Lot 2. Hirshberg continues to pursue his own interests in the Countryside lawsuit, including damages for “deprivation of use, preclusion from the fishing lands, inability to use the club facilities, and diminution in value of his real property holdings ...,” but is not pursuing Rehnberg’s interest in obtaining a fishing license and use agreement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] Hirshberg filed a Motion to Dismiss based on W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which provides for a motion alleging “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” We recently restated our standard of review applicable to the dismissal of claims under this rule:

“When claims are dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Such a dismissal will be sustained only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that would entitle him to relief. Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d 1066, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001). Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle that plaintiff to relief. Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo.2000).”

Manion v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2002 WY 49, ¶ 6, 43 P.3d 576, 577 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Van Riper v. Oedekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶ 24, 26 P.3d 325, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2001)).

[¶ 9] Our rules of contract construction are well known. First, we do not need to construe contracts that are not ambiguous. Evans v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2001 WY 110, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 284, 286 (Wyo.2001).

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. O’Quinn Enterprises [v. Central Wyoming Regional Water System Joint Powers Board], 975 P.2d [1062], 1064 [ (Wyo.1999) ]. When deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, we endeavor to determine the intention of the parties. Wolter [v. Equitable Resources Energy Company, Western Region], 979 P.2d [948], 951 [ (Wyo.1999) ]. An ambiguity exists when a contract’s language conveys an obscure or double meaning. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo.1997). When contract provisions are not ambiguous or uncertain, the document speaks for itself. 937 P.2d at 209. With an unambiguous agreement, we secure the parties’ intent from the words of the agreement as they are expressed within the four corners of the document. Wolter, 979 P.2d at 951. All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are merged into the written agreement. O’Quinn Enterprises, 975 P.2d at 1064. We turn to extrinsic evidence and rules of contract construction only when the contract language is ambiguous and its meaning is doubtful or uncertain. Wolter, 979 P.2d at 951.

Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo.2000). And finally, a “district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record.” Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo.1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] In his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Hirshberg presented six theories: first, the contract specifically excepted fishing rights; second, the contract made no mention of any use agreements; third, the contract did not obligate him to represent Rehnberg in the Countryside lawsuit; fourth, the integration clause of the contract forbids modification of its terms by any alleged oral agreements or representations; fifth, the statute of frauds forbids modification of the contract by any alleged oral agreements or representations; and sixth, the provisions of the contract merged into the deed, leaving Rehnberg to look to the deed, and not to the contract. In her Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Rehnberg asserted first that the language of paragraph 12 of Attachment “A” creates a “current and continuing obligation” on Hirshberg’s part to attempt to obtain the fishing rights or to allow Rehn-berg to represent her own interests in the Countryside lawsuit. Next, relying on the “collateral obligations rule,” Rehnberg argued that the contract provisions did not merge into the deed because the assignment of fishing rights would have had to occur after closing. Finally, Rehnberg contended that the integration clause is immaterial because the source of her rights is the ambiguous provisions of paragraph 12 of Attachment “A,” rather than any oral representations or agreements.

[¶ 11] In its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the district court found that “[a]ll of the claims [in the Complaint] are based on paragraph 12 of Attachment A to the Contract....” The district court then concluded that paragraph 12 was unambiguous, and that it “does not place any obligations on [Hirshberg] other than to transfer fishing rights if they are awarded in [the Countryside case].” Finally, the district court also emphasized paragraph XV of the Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate, the integration clause, which provided as follows:

All prior representations made in the negotiations of this sale have been incorporated herein, and there are no oral agreements or representations between Buyer, Seller or Brokers to modify the terms and conditions of this Contract.

[¶ 12] The nature of the district court’s ruling raises the issue we find dispositive in this appeal. Rehnberg drafted a complaint relying solely on the contract for sale. When Hirshberg raised the merger defense, Rehn-berg countered with legal and factual arguments as to why the merger doctrine should not be applied. Without directly ruling on the merger question, the district court based its dismissal on the contract for sale, which indicates that the district court agreed with Rehnberg that the contract for sale did not merge into the warranty deed. Rehnberg continues to assert on appeal that application of merger is inappropriate. Hirshberg likewise continues to argue to the contrary.

[¶ 13] A contract for the sale of realty is executory until closing, at which time the contract has been executed, it merges with the deed, and it is no longer separately enforceable. Richardson v. Hardin, 5 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo.2000); 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo.1998); Bakken v. Price, 613 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo.1980). Thereafter, the rights and obligations of the parties are controlled by the deed. Bakken, 613 P.2d at 1227. An exception to merger, called the “collateral obligations rule,” provides that contractual obligations that are collateral to the transaction survive closing and may be enforced under the contract. Richardson, 5 P.3d at 799; American Nat. Self Storage, Inc. v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So.2d 303, 305 (Fla.App.1988); and Lawrence Berger, Merger by Deed—What Provisions of a Contract for the Sale of Land Survive the Closing?, 21 Real Estate L.J. 22, 24 (1992). A collateral obligation is one that is not “deed-related.” Lawrence Berger, supra, 21 Real Estate L.J. at 32. Deed-related provisions are those concerning “ ‘title, possession [and] quantities or emblements of the land_’ ” Bakken, 613 P.2d at 1232 (McClintock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Chavez v. Gomez, 77 N.M. 341, 423 P.2d 31, 33 (1967)).

[¶ 14] To apply these concepts, we must review the pertinent facts set forth in the complaint. Once again, these facts are presented in the light most favorable to Rehn-berg and are assumed to be true. Hirshberg advertised Lot 2 for sale. Rehnberg made an offer to purchase Lot 2. Negotiations ensued, during which Rehnberg was told that she would be able to substitute herself for Hirshberg in the Countryside lawsuit. Eventually, the parties signed the sale contract.

[¶ 15] Rehnberg contends that, in addition to the duty to convey Lot 2, the sale contract created three other duties on Hirsh-berg’s part: the duty to assign the fishing rights, the duty to assign the Crescent H use agreement, and the duty actively to pursue Rehnberg’s interests in the Countryside lawsuit or to allow her to be substituted for Hirshberg in that lawsuit. Before we can determine whether any of these obligations merged with the deed, we must first determine whether they actually were created by the sale contract.

[¶ 16] The district court made the dual findings that the sale contract was unambiguous and that it was a fully integrated contract. We agree. The integration clause clearly established the parties’ intent that the written terms contain their entire agreement, which is not to be modified by prior negotiations. Further, the pertinent portions of the sale contract are not ambiguous because the intent of the parties is clearly revealed in the words used. We see no double meanings or obscure language. In such case, the search for the parties’ intent is limited to the four corners of the document, and such intent may not be modified or determined through parol evidence. Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Ass’n, 2002 WY 94, ¶¶ 26, 31, 48 P.3d 1072, 1081, 1084 (Wyo.2002); Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 892 P.2d 124, 127 (Wyo.1995).

[¶ 17] The question then is whether the unambiguous language of the sale contract created any of the duties alleged by Rehnberg. Clearly, it did not. There was no mention whatsoever in the contract of the Crescent H use agreements. Fishing rights are specifically excluded from the sale. And any duty to assign fishing rights obtained in litigation was intended to arise only upon successful completion of that litigation. Had the parties intended to create an obligation on Hirshberg’s part actively to pursue fishing rights on Rehnberg’s behalf, or to help Rehn-berg substitute herself for Hirshberg in the lawsuit, such easily could have been stated. It was not.

[¶ 18] Our conclusion that the purported duties were not created by the contract obviates any necessity to determine whether those duties merged into the deed. Perhaps that was the district court’s rationale for not ruling specifically on the merger issue. At any rate, we conclude that the decision of the district court must be affirmed.

[¶ 19] One other issue requires mention. In her complaint, Rehnberg alleged that Hirshberg’s interests in the fishing rights and use agreement derived from his ownership of Lot 2, and that those interests were appurtenant to Lot 2. That allegation is not pursued, however, and Rehnberg provides no cogent argument or citation to authority as to the effect, if any, of such appurtenant status. Consequently, we will not pursue a detailed analysis of the issue. Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo.2000).

CONCLUSION

[¶ 20] The unambiguous and fully integrated contract for sale did not require Hirshberg to assign fishing rights or Crescent H use agreements to Rehnberg, nor did it require Hirshberg actively to pursue fishing rights on Rehnberg’s behalf or to assist Rehnberg in • substituting herself for Hirsh-berg in the Countryside lawsuit.

[¶ 21] We affirm.

      . Hirshberg's appellate brief lists eleven "legal arguments,” but most are defenses to Rehnberg's claims rather than separate issues.

      . Because we are reviewing the dismissal of a complaint under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we accept as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, and examine those facts in the light most favorable to Rehnberg. Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206, 207 (Wyo.1995).

      . For a detailed analysis of this controversy, see Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶¶ 3-5, 45 P.3d 237, 239-40 (Wyo.2002).

      . Although it is a minor distraction in the parties' briefing, we feel compelled to mention that extrinsic evidence is limited by the "parol evidence rule,” not the "parole evidence rule.”


author: KITE, Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 28
    Barbara RAWLINSON, and Aaron Rawlinson, Adrienne Rawlinson and Kristen Rawlinson, Minors, by and through their next best friend and mother, Barbara Rawlinson, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Helen GREER and No. 1 Properties, Inc., Appellees (Defendants).
    No. 02-54.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Feb. 28, 2003.

      Bernard Q. Phelan and Carol K. Watson of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellants.
    Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appel-lees.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Barbara Rawlinson purchased a home in Cheyenne in 1994. A few months after she and her family moved into the home, they discovered water seepage in the crawl space. Ms. Rawlinson and Appellants Aaron Rawlinson, Adrienne Rawlinson, and Kristen Rawlinson brought suit against Appellees No. 1 Properties, Inc. and Helen Greer, who acted as the real estate agency and associate broker for the transaction. The district court held the two-year statute of limitation applicable to professional negligence applied to realtors and, consequently, dismissed the Rawlinsons’ negligence claims because they did not file their complaint within the limitation period.

[¶ 2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] The Rawlinsons present the following issue for our review: “Does Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-107, providing a two-year statute of limitation for licensed or certified professionals, apply to acts or omissions of a licensed realtor alleged to have been committed in 1994?” The appellees phrase the issue as: “Did the District Court err in granting Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, on the basis that the statute of limitations barred those claims?”

FACTS

[¶ 4] This is the second time this ease has been before the Wyoming Supreme Court for appellate review. In the first appeal, we affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities. Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities, 2001 WY 6, 17 P.3d 13 (Wyo.2001). We recite herein only the facts which are relevant to this appeal.

[¶ 6] In 1994, the sellers listed their Cheyenne home for sale through No. 1 Properties. Ms. Greer was employed by No. 1 Properties and acted as the listing agent for the sellers. She was licensed by the Wyoming Real Estate Commission as an associate broker.

[¶ 6] Ms. Rawlinson’s attorney-in-fact contacted No. 1 Properties and Ms. Greer for assistance in locating a home in Cheyenne for Ms. Rawlinson. No. 1 Properties and' Ms. Greer showed the attorney-in-fact the sellers’ home. On December 13, 1994, Ms. Rawlin-son and the sellers entered into a contract for sale. Because No. 1 Properties and Ms. Greer assisted both parties, they acted in the capacity of dual agent.

[¶ 7] Prior to the closing, Ms. Rawlinson had the home inspected for structural integrity. The report noted the soil in the crawl space was wet and stated that, consequently, a positive “no-leak” condition could not be established. The property sale closed, and the Rawlinsons moved into the home on January 9, 1995. In June 1995, the Rawlinsons discovered water in the home’s crawl space.

[¶ 8] After various attempts to rectify the water problem, the Rawlinsons filed an action in the district court on December 11, 1998. The complaint and amendment thereto stated causes of action against the sellers, the inspector, the home builder, Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities, the City of Cheyenne, and the appellees. The Rawlinsons asserted a number of causes of action against the appellees, including claims sounding in negligence, breach of contract, and fraud. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the appellees’ motion on the Rawlinsons’ claims for fraud and breach of contract, and the Rawlinsons did not appeal that determination.

[¶ 9] As to the Rawlinsons’ negligence cause of action, the appellees argued the two-year statute of limitation for professional negligence set forth at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § l-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2001) applied to that claim. The appellees maintained the Rawlinsons’ claims were barred because the limitation period expired prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. The district court initially denied the appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the professional negligence claim, ruling § l-3-107(a) did not apply because realtors were not “licensed or certified professionals]” within the meaning of the statute.

[¶ 10] After this court issued its decision in Hulse v. First American Title Company of Crook County, 2001 WY 95, ¶¶ 57-61, 33 P.3d 122, ¶¶ 57-61 (Wyo.2001), the appellees renewed their motion for summary judgment. The district court reconsidered its earlier decision and granted the appellees’ motion. The Rawlinsons appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 11] Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. City of Powell v. Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 63, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2002); Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001); W.R.C.P. 56(c). This court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by applying the same standards and utilizing the same materials as the lower court. Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 7; Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001). This case involves a pure question of law, and we do not defer to the district court’s decisions on issues of law. Id.

B. Two-Year Professional Negligence Statute of Limitation

[¶ 12] The district court ruled § 1-3-107(a), the two-year statute of limitation applicable to negligence claims against licensed and certified professionals, applied to the realtors in this case. Because the Rawlin-sons did not file their lawsuit within two years after they discovered the water problem, the district court dismissed their claims. The Rawlinsons argue that the district court misinterpreted Wyoming law.

[¶ 13] Section l-3-107(a) states in relevant part:

(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the following times:
(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:
(A) Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or
(B) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

[¶ 14] The question in this case is whether a realtor is a “licensed or certified professional” within the meaning of § 1-3-107(a). In answering this question, we must apply our well established test for interpreting statutes:

We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. A “statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.” Allied-Signal, Inc. [v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization ], 813 P.2d [214,] 220 [(Wyo.1991)]. A “statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.” 813 P.2d at 219-20.
If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute.
We begin by making an “ ‘inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.’ ” Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.
State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo.1994). If we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature’s intent.

State v. Bannon Energy Corporation, 999 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Wyo.2000) (some citations omitted); see also Powder River Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2002).

[¶ 15] This court has applied § 1-3-107(a) to claims against various types of licensed or certified professionals, including physicians, attorneys, surveyors, and chiropractors. See, e.g., Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo.1998) (physician); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880 (Wyo.1998) (attorneys); Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo.1992) (land surveyors); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo.1989) (accountant); Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730 (Wyo.1987) (chiropractor).

[¶ 16] The State of Wyoming regulates the realty profession. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-28-101 to -124; §§ 33-28-201 to -206; §§ 33-28-301 to -309 (LexisNexis 2001). In particular:

[I]t is unlawful for any person to engage in or conduct, directly or indirectly, or to advertise or hold himself out as engaging in or conducting the business, or acting in the capacity of a real estate broker, associate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a license as a broker, associate broker or salesman, as provided in this act.

Section 33-28-101. Consequently, because licensure is required before a person may work in the real estate profession, realtors would seem to fall under the plain language of § 1-3-107(a).

[¶ 17] Wyoming precedent also supports categorizing realtors as licensed or certified professionals within the meaning of § l-3-107(a). As early as 1981, we stated that “ ‘a real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public.’” Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127, 137 (Wyo.1981) (quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980)). The Hagar decision also stated:

Realtors, just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold themselves out as professionals; it is then-job to know their profession. People rely on and trust them. Failure to comply with either the accepted standards in the field or the standards society is willing to recognize as acceptable, is actionable.

638 P.2d at 138; see also Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo.1999). “[T]he failure to maintain those standards of skill, competency and integrity exposes realtors to, in effect, malpractice actions.” Hagar, 638 P.2d at 137. Consequently, the law expects a high standard of care from realtors, and courts may define the standard of care applicable to realtors by looking to legislative enactments. Id. In Hulse, 2001 WY 95, ¶ 60, we stated it was obvious the Hagar decision considered a claim against a realtor as being grounded in professional negligence. This court expressly reaffirmed this aspect of the Hagar holding in Hulse.

[¶ 18] In 1997, the legislature essentially codified the Hagar decision and clarified the duty of care owed by real estate professionals when acting in the capacity of seller’s agent, buyer’s agent, or intermediary agent. Hulse, 2001 WY 95, ¶ 60; § 33-28-303 (agent engaged by seller); § 33-28-304 (agent engaged by buyer); § 33-28-305 (intermediary agent). Moreover, in 2000, the legislature adopted § 33-28-124 which provides in pertinent part: “A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of services provided by a licensee under this act shall be brought within the time limits provided under W.S. 1-3-107.” In Hulse, we expressly stated that § 1-3-107(a) was applicable to claims arising after July 1, 2000 — the effective date of § 33-28-124.

[¶ 19] The Rawlinsons seize upon this language in Hulse and argue that only claims arising after the effective date of § 33-28-124 — July 1, 2000 — fall within the scope of § l-3-107(a). We acknowledge the Hulse decision specifically stated the two-year professional negligence statute of limitation applies to claims arising after July 1, 2000. We did not, however, decide in Hulse which statute of limitation would apply for claims against realtors arising prior to July 1,2000.

[¶20] In resolving this issue, the preamble to § 33-28-124 is instructive. The preamble states in pertinent part: “AN ACT relating to causes of actions involving real estate services; specifying that existing statute of limitations for causes of action in the rendering of licensed or certified professional services is applicable to causes of action in the rendering of real estate services by real estate licensees.” 2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 16. While a preamble to a statute is not binding, it is worthy of consideration by the court in discerning the legislature’s intention in adopting a statute. The preamble to § 33-28-124 confirms the legislature intended to clarify and codify the existing law.

[¶ 21] This court presumes “ ‘that the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts. Such legislation should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing law.’ ” Hoff v. City of Casper—Natrona County Health Department, 2001 WY 97, ¶ 30, 33 P.3d 99, ¶ 30 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo.1984)). When the legislature adopted § 33-28-124, the existing law included the Hagar decision which, according to Hulse, established that a claim against a realtor was a claim for professional negligence. Therefore, when we construe the clear language of § l-3-107(a) together with § 33-28-124 and the Wyoming statutes which license and regulate realtors and in the context of the holdings of Hagar and Hulse, we conclude § l-3-107(a) applies to all claims against realtors, even those which arose prior to July 1,2000.

[¶22] We hold that a claim against a realtor has always been a claim for professional negligence. Realtors are licensed or certified professionals within the scope of § l-3-107(a), and the two-year limitation period applies to claims against realtors. The undisputed record in this case establishes that the Rawlinsons moved into the home on January 9, 1995, and became aware of the water problem in June 1995. They filed their lawsuit on December 11, 1998, well after the two-year limitation period expired. The district court, therefore, properly ruled that § l-3-107(a) barred their claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees.

[¶ 23] Affirmed.

      . All the other defendants have been dismissed from the action.