author: Hill, Chief Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 7
    Frank W. DORSETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. Tim MOORE, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 02-98.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Jan. 17, 2003.

      Mary S. Garman, Sundance, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
    Patrick G. Davidson of Daly Law Associates, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   Hill, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Frank W. Dorsett (Dor-sett) challenges the portion of a district court judgment that required him to reimburse a neighboring landowner, appellee Tim Moore (Moore), for one-half of the cost of rebuilding a partition fence. Dorsett claims the district court erred in applying estoppel against him. We disagree and affirm.

ISSUES

[IT 2] Dorsett presents one issue for our review:

Did the trial court err when it sustained the objection by the plaintiff that defendant was estopped by his conduct from complaining that the fence plaintiff had built between the defendant’s and plaintiffs deeded land was not a partition fence pursuant to W.S. Section 11-28-106?

FACTS

[¶ 3] The parties own neighboring ranches in Crook County. Both ranches eon-sist of deeded property as well as lands used pursuant to grazing permits issued by the United States Bureau of Land Management. By early 1999, the fence between the parties’ lands had deteriorated and would no longer hold livestock in a number of places. On October 12, 1999, Moore mailed to Dorsett the first in a series of letters addressing fence-related problems. Dorsett received the letter but did not respond. Another letter, dated January 14, 2000, detailed, among other things, problems caused by cattle straying onto Moore’s lands. Moore indicated that he was contemplating fence repairs and that he was “looking to share the costs equally” with Dorsett. Dorsett did not respond to this letter.

[¶ 4] The next letter was dated January 24, 2000. In that letter, Moore detailed the repairs needed on the fence, indicated he intended to hire a fencing contractor, and stated that he expected Dorsett to pay one-half the cost. Moore’s letter also provided:

If you will not enter a formal agreement with me to pay for one-half of these repairs, I will give you the opportunity to arrange for your share of the labor on one-half of each project.... If you do not take the opportunity to do your share of these projects, which I have outlined, I will do them for you after July 1, 2000.

Although Dorsett received this letter, he did not respond. The next letter from Moore was dated March 3 and suggested the parties hire a reputable fencing contractor to do the work. Again, Dorsett received this letter but did not respond.

[¶ 5] In August of 2000, Moore contracted with a fencing company to rebuild the fence. The fencing company began work on September 10, 2000, and completed the project on October 6. The contractor rebuilt the fence where it had always been located. On October 26, 2000, Moore mailed a letter to Dorsett requesting payment for one-half of the cost of the fencing project. There was no response to this letter.

[¶ 6] In March of 2001, following a demand letter that went unanswered, Moore, relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106, filed this suit to recover, among other things, one-half of the cost of the fencing project. The case was tried to the bench. Dorsett offered testimony that, sometime after the complaint was filed, he hired a local engineer to perform a survey. The survey revealed that the fence was not on the property boundary line in places, although the record is somewhat confusing regarding where the fence deviates. When Moore objected to this testimony regarding deviation from the boundary line, the district court sustained the objection on the ground that Dorsett was estopped from presenting such evidence. The district court allowed Dorsett to make an offer of proof. The district court found generally in favor of Moore. It ordered Dor-sett to pay Moore $10,159.71 as one-half of the cost of rebuilding the fence. The district court also ordered Dorsett to pay Moore $954.00 for grazing fees, but Dorsett does not challenge that portion of the judgment.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Dorsett contends that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel against him. This Court has defined equitable estoppel in this fashion:

Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.

Snake River Brewing Company, Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, ¶ 28 (Wyo.2002) (quoting State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Company v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th Cir.1958)). Dorsett asserts that equitable estoppel is inapplicable because Moore never changed his position in reliance on Dorsett’s conduct. Dorsett claims that Moore was going to repair the fence regardless of Dorsett’s action or inaction. Moore responds that, if the district court did apply estoppel, it merely estopped Dorsett from his attempt, at trial, to establish that the fence was not a partition fence because it is not located on the true boundary line. Moore contends that Dorsett was properly estopped from arguing the fence should be located other than where it has always been located.

[¶ 8] In its oral ruling, the district court stated:

I don’t know whether estoppel is the proper word or not. But certainly Mr. Moore saw a problem, tried to fix it, wrote letters to his neighbor. Maybe they weren’t the best letters you could write, but they were certainly efforts to reach out. And what was the response? Well, clearly the response was no response.
So he still has a problem. And Mr. Dorsett says that there was a problem with cattle going back and forth. But Mr. Dorsett does nothing to solve the problem other than rebuild a fence.
And when it’s suggested that maybe it’s time for something more than just a band-aid on what’s been going on over the years ■because that’s not working, Mr. Dorsett doesn’t come in and say, “Wait a minute. I like this band-aid approach and I don’t want to do it this way. I don’t think you’ve got good bids. I don’t think you are going to put the fence in the right place.” A lot of things he could have said, but he didn’t say anything.
And you do have the right to remain silent. But in civil matters, your silence can be used against you. In criminal cases, your silence can’t be used against you.
So your silence is being used against you. You’ve had the right to remain silent, but it’s been used against you because you used the ostrich approach: I’ll just ignore the problem. I’ll ignore the forays of someone trying to solve that problem, and so you did nothing.
Well, Mr. Moore I think is entitled under the statute to do something about that and he did something. And maybe he went a little bit more than, quote, just the bare minimum legal fence, but he didn’t have any input from his neighbor even though he tried to get it. So he did what sounds fairly reasonable, at least it sounds reasonable for the Court from the testimony I’ve heard.

[¶ 9] Although the district court did not specify the equitable doctrine it applied, we do not agree with Dorsett that the district court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Instead, we conclude the district court’s ruling is properly characterized as an application of the doctrine of laches, which is simply a form of equitable estoppel. Thompson v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶ 6, 34 P.3d 278, ¶ 6, (Wyo.2001); Goshen Irrigation District v. Wyoming State Board of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 949 (Wyo.1996); Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo.1991). Laches is defined as such delay in enforcing one’s rights that it works to the disadvantage of another. Thompson, ¶ 17; Big Piney Oil & Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo.1986). A claim of laches is comprised of two elements—inexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendants or others. Thompson, ¶ 17.

[¶ 10] The district court ruled that Dorsett’s delay in enforcing his rights precluded him from asserting rights he would otherwise have been able to assert had he acted more promptly. Dorsett’s delay worked a disadvantage to Moore, who completed the fencing project with his own funds, then was required to resort to litigation to recoup one-half of the costs from Dorsett. In addition, had Dorsett come forward earlier with his concerns, any current problems could likely have been avoided. The district court properly applied the form of equitable estoppel known as laches.

[¶ 11] The district court’s ruling finds further support in the equitable maxim that “[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” Application of Beaver Dam Ditch Company, 93 P.2d 934, 939, 54 Wyo. 459, 482 (Wyo.1939);, Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum Company, 775 P.2d 1021, 1025 n. 5 (Wyo.1989). Here, despite Moore’s repeated attempts to resolve the fence problems in a neighborly fashion, Dorsett did not respond. Having slumbered on his rights, Dorsett was in no position to complain about Moore’s resolution of the problem or the placement of the fence where it had always been. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. Thompson, ¶ 7. (“Whether laches or, by analogy, equitable estoppel is available as a defense is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.”)

[¶ 12] We must also address Moore’s requests that this appeal be summarily affirmed and/or that this Court certify no reasonable cause for this appeal. Moore argues that (1) the appeal should be summarily affirmed because appellant’s brief violates various rules of appellate procedure; (2) the appeal should be summarily affirmed because the appellant has not presented a cogent argument; and (3) the Court should certify that there was no reasonable cause for appeal and award costs and attorney fees. We decline all of Moore’s invitations.

[¶ 13] Although Dorsett’s brief fails to comply with a number of requirements regarding format of appellant’s brief found in W.R.A.P. 7.01, we do not, in our discretion, find that these deficiencies require summary affirmance. W.R.A.P. 1.03. In addition, we find Dorsett’s argument is supported by authority and cogent enough, although misguided. Thus, we will not summarily affirm on that basis or certify no reasonable canse for appeal. Normally, we will certify no reasonable cause for appeal “only in those rare circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to adequately cite to the record.” Baker v. Reed, 965 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Wyo.1998) (citing Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo.1997)); Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo.2000). This appeal does not meet those requirements.

[¶ 14] In addition, sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05 are usually not available when the appeal challenges a discretionary ruling made by the district court. Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo.1997); Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo.1998). This Court has departed from this general rule in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo.2000) (only purpose served by appeal was “continued harassment of appellee and the waste of judicial resources”); Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo.1999) (appellant waived any claim of error); and Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo.1996) (appellant failed to provide a record to review). However, none of those circumstances are presented in this case. Therefore, because we find the argument to be cogent and supported by authority and because Dorsett challenged a discretionary ruling, we deny Moore’s request that we certify no reasonable cause for appeal.

[¶ 15] The district court’s Order and Judgment is affirmed.

      . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106 (LexisNexis 2001) provides:

        The owner of any lawful fence which is or becomes a partition fence separating the owner’s land from that belonging to some other person may require the person to pay for one-half (1/2) of what it would or does actually cost to construct the partition fence. In case of refusal, the owner may maintain a civil action against the person refusing and is entitled to recover one-half (1/2) of what it would or did actually cost to construct that portion of the partition fence used by the person and costs of suit. The joint users of a partition fence shall contribute to the cost of maintenance in proportion to their respective interests and if either refuses to pay his share of the cost of maintenance, the other may recover maintenance costs in the manner provided for recovering the cost of construction.

      . Our ruling is limited to location of the fence for recovery of costs of repair under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106. We offer no opinion on whether the fence is a “boundary fence” or a "fence of convenience.” See Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo.1995), and Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 306 (Wyo.1999).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LEHMAN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    2003 WY 8
    Dustin Allyn LEE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    No. 01-186.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Jan. 22, 2003.

      Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant.
    Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE and VOIGT, JJ.

       Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

   LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Dustin Allyn Lee, appellant, was found guilty by jury of felony possession of methamphetamine in excess of three grams. He seeks reversal of that conviction claiming the admission of physical characteristic evidence depicting appellant as an ongoing user of the drug was not relevant to the crime of possession of methamphetamine in excess of three grams. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Whether plain error was committed by the State when the investigating officer testified of his observation of round open sores on appellant’s face and body that are consistent with ongoing use of methamphetamine and are commonly referred to as “Crank Bugs.”

FACTS

[¶ 3] Officers and an ambulance were dispatched to a motel in Gillette after receiving a report that a man in one of the rooms was not responding to motel staff. A summary of the course of events upon the officers’ contact with appellant in the room indicates appellant’s appearance was ill, pasty, shaky, bloodshot and watering eyes with no odor of alcohol, difficulty in standing, and lack of coordination; admission to the officers of using methamphetamine; discovery of a plastic pen housing with a white powder residue found to contain methamphetamine; appellant’s production of a marijuana cigarette; a film canister containing .39 grams of methamphetamine rocks; and, finally, a plastic baggie containing 27.96 grams of rock methamphetamine.

[¶ 4] Appellant only denied knowledge of the plastic baggie containing 27.96 grams of methamphetamine. The appearance of appellant was discussed by each officer who testified and included some of the non-exhaustive attributions listed above. Appellant argues the testimony of the investigating officer’s observations of open sores on appellant’s face and body is not relevant to the possession of the 27.96 grams of rock methamphetamine.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[IT 5] No objection to the testimony was made at trial; therefore, the plain error standard is at work requiring the appellant to make a three-part showing:

First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him.

Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001) (quoting CB v. State, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo.1988)). See also Pearson v. State, 12 P.3d 686, 690 (Wyo. 2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] For context we quote the offending language:

Q. When you are sitting down there close to him looking at him, do you notice anything about his facial features, his arms, his body, his demeanor, other than that uncoordination that you’ve already described?
A. I noticed that his face was very badly pitted with small round open sores. A person would generally, I think, associate them with something like acne. But I later got a little better look at his entire upper torso and it was not consistent with acne.
Q. Did you ask him if he was under the influence of drugs or narcotics substances? A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did he respond in any manner?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said he had used methamphetamine. And I had asked him if he had used any other drugs, and he said no, just methamphetamine. I asked him when the last time it was that he used it, and he said the night before.
Q. Did that start kind of clicking looking at his sores?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. Why is that?

A. Well, methamphetamine can produce — the technical term is formication. It’s called crank sores or crank bugs. And what it is is it’s a reaction to a false signal sent by the brain and the person begins to pick at a certain area of their body and picks open a very small area that would look like a pimple being dug open. Actually there was nothing there. There was no sore there to start with.

It’s formed from two things occurring sometimes simultaneously, sometimes on their own. One is that a person under the influence of methamphetamine may hallucinate and see actual crank bugs or actual small bugs on their skin. And they try to pick away that bug which continues to replace itself in the same spot. The other thing is that methamphetamine — what it’s doing in your brain is it’s releasing dope in a neuro transmitter and it’s sending out a false signal, an inverse signal, to the nerves and the nerve there at that particular point is sending out a signal that it’s being touched or being stimulated in some way. And the person will pick at that. What eventually occurs is the nerve ending is damaged. The signal goes away and the person leaves that particular spot alone. Later another false signal is sent or a hallucination or both and the person begins working at that spot and forms another small open ulcer on their person.

Q. We digressed a little bit, but we were — earlier you said you saw other parts of his body other than his face later on. Where did these other sores exist on the defendant that you know of?
A. On both arms and just a few on the chest and stomach area.

[¶ 7] For further enlightenment, the lack of objection to that testimony was followed by cross-examination of the officer which included the following exchange.

Q. Okay. Well, let me go over what you’ve said here. The defendant, when you got there, was basically using his hands like claws? He didn’t have any manipulation ability?
A. That’s correct.
Q. He had those round sores on him? .
A. Yes. That’s correct.
Q. I’ve seen pictures. Pretty sorry sight, wasn’t he?
A. Yes, he was.

The picture referenced by appellant’s counsel was a photograph of appellant’s face and upper torso, the introduction of which was stipulated by the parties.

[¶ 8] We begin our analysis by according appellant our acknowledgment that the record clearly presents the incident alleged to be error. The second prong, however, of the plain error standard, requiring a demonstration that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable way, falls, short of the mark. Appellant cites W.R.E. 401 as the unequivocal rule of law that was violated since the evidence regarding “crank bugs” was not relevant to prove appellant possessed over three grams of methamphetamine.

[¶ 9] A low threshold exists for determining that evidence is relevant.

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” W.R.E. 401. In criminal cases, “[e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime charged.” Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo.1980); see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶42, 43 P.3d 80, ¶42 (Wyo.2002); Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo.1993).

Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 9, 49 P.3d 975, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (emphasis added).

[¶ 10] Lee was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine. When considering possession of a controlled substance we have stated:

To convict for possession of illicit drags, the prosecution must establish that [the defendant]: (1) either individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control over the substance; (2) had knowledge of its presence; and (3) had knowledge that the substance was a controlled substance. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 620 (Wyo.1993); Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo.1982). It is not necessary to offer direct evidence of the defendant’s, actual possession of the contraband. “[C]ircumstantial evidence linking together a series of facts” allowing a reasonable inference that the defendant had the requisite control and knowledge of the substance is sufficient to show constructive possession. Wise, 654 P.2d at 119.

Houghton v. State, 6 P.3d 643, 647 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo.1999)). With the above statement in mind, we consider that the prosecution was required to establish that Lee had knowledge not only of the presence of the substance but also that the substance was a controlled substance. Certainly the physical characteristics of ongoing methamphetamine use by the defendant would be relevant to show that Lee had such knowledge. Courts in other jurisdictions have held in a similar manner. See State v. Thomas, 329 So.2d 704, 707 (La.1976) (holding conviction for drug possession required a showing that the defendant knew the substance he possessed was a narcotic, therefore evidence of track marks and narcotic paraphernalia were admissible to show he had knowledge of heroin and that what he possessed was heroin); State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 6 P.3d 840, 843 (App.2000) (holding the fact that Williams had previously used methamphetamine was relevant because prior methamphetamine use made it more likely that he possessed the drug with the intent to inject it rather than for some innocent purpose); State v. Thomas, 20 N.C.App. 255, 201 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1973) (holding the presence of track marks on defendant’s arm was relevant to show his knowledge and familiarity with the drug he was charged with possessing).

[¶ 11] In this case the officer’s observation of “crank bugs” tended to show that the defendant displayed the characteristics of ongoing methamphetamine use. Ongoing methamphetamine use is relevant to whether the defendant knew the substance he possessed was methamphetamine and whether he did in fact have knowledge of this possession. The fact that the amount in possession weighs more or less than three grams plays no role in that assessment. We are not suggesting that evidence of drug use must be admitted in cases where the defendant is charged with felony drug possession. As always, relevant evidence may be excluded, if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” W.R.E. 403.

[¶ 12] In fact, appellant asserts W.R.E. 403 was violated because the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed the probative value. As a final analysis, therefore, we note the following to both the third prong of the plain error standard, as well as the claimed prejudice pursuant to W.R.E. 403. First, there is overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction eliminating any possibility that, absent the challenged testimony, an acquittal would have occurred and, further, appellant failed to demonstrate the evidence had little or no probative value and was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury. Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 340 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting DeWitt v. State, 917 P.2d 1144,1148 (Wyo.1996)).

CONCLUSION

[¶ 13] Appellant failed to establish that plain error was committed in violation of W.R.E. 401 or 403 when evidence of his physical characteristics, consistent with the ongoing use of methamphetamine, was admitted during his trial for possession of methamphetamine.

[¶ 14] Affirmed.


author: KITE, Justice.

text:
    2003 WY 10
    James D. MATHEWSON, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).
    No. 02-187.
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    Jan. 23, 2003.

      James D. Mathewson, Cheyenne, Wyoming, pro se, Representing Appellant.
    Michael D. Basom, City Attorney; Mary B. Guthrie, Assistant City Attorney; and Bill Hibbler, Special Assistant City Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
    Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
   KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] James D. Mathewson, a citizen of the City of Cheyenne, objected to the City’s authorization of the sale of bonds to finance construction of a parking facility by resolution instead of by ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment to the City finding the statutes allowed the use of a resolution. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] The issue we must decide in this case is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City.

FACTS

[¶ 3] On May 13, 2002, the Cheyenne City Council passed Resolution No. 4307 authorizing the sale and issuance of Refunding and Improvement Revenue Bonds in the amount of $9,575,000, the proceeds from which were to be used to construct an off-street parking facility in downtown Cheyenne. As authority for the bond issue, the resolution cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15 — 1—801(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides that the procedure for issuing revenue or refunding revenue bonds is the same as prescribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436 (LexisNexis 2001). Those statutes provide the procedures for issuance of revenue bonds by hospital districts and allow such bonds to be authorized by resolution. The bonds were to be paid with the proceeds from the use of the parking facility. As additional security for the payment of the bonds, the City pledged its share of certain federal mineral royalties which it was entitled to receive. However, those royalties were also pledged to the repayment of revenue bonds issued by the City eight years earlier to finance the construction of the George S. Cox parking facility. In 1994, when the City issued those revenue bonds, it did so by ordinance instead of by resolution. Some of the 1994 revenue bonds remained outstanding, and, therefore, a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the 2002 revenue bonds was to go toward payment or refunding of those bonds, thereby enabling the City to provide the 2002 bond purchasers with a first lien on its federal mineral royalties. The closing for the City’s bonds was scheduled for May 28, 2002. However, the filing of this action on May 24, 2002, prevented the sale from occurring.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4] We review summary judgments according to the following standards:

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the parties have asserted. We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. We do not accord any deference to the district court’s decision on issues of law.

Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 5] Mr. Mathewson objects to the City’s use of a resolution instead of an ordinance to authorize the parking facility revenue bonds because citizens who opposed such a resolution did not have the right to petition for an initiative pursuant to which they could have elected to reverse the City’s action — a right they would have had if the action had been pursuant to an ordinance. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-1005 (LexisNexis 2001). He bases his objection to the City’s use of a resolution rather than an ordinance on an interpretation of the statutes governing the issuance of those bonds. He concedes these revenue bonds were not subject to the mandatory election requirement established by Article 16, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution because they were payable solely from a special fund and not from taxes. Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1977); Snyder v. City of Cheyenne, 79 Wyo. 405, 334 P.2d 750 (1959).

[¶ 6] To determine what the statutes require with regard to the issuance of revenue bonds, we must follow our well established rules of statutory construction.

We attempt to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. We begin by making an “ ‘inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.’ ” Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040,1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe statutes as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statutes on the same subject. We give effect to the plain language of unambiguous statutes. We resort to extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history or intent, only when statutes are ambiguous.

Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012,1018 (Wyo.1999) (some citations omitted); see also Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶ 18, 53 P.3d 1080, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2002). Fundamental to this effort is our duty to give effect to the plain meaning of the language of the statute.

[¶ 7] Without question, § 15-1-801 authorizes the City to issue revenue bonds for parking facilities by following the procedures set forth in §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436, which plainly state bonds shall be authorized “by resolution.” The district court properly found this statute is not ambiguous. No credible argument can be made that the term “resolution” is vague or ambiguous. Black’s Law Dictionary defines resolution as “[a] formal expression of an opinion, intention, or decision by an official body or assembly (esp. a legislature).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1313 (7th ed.1999). The Collegiate Dictionary defines it as “a formal expression of opinion, will, or intent voted by an official body or assembled group.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 997 (10th ed.1999). This court has considered the meaning of the term “resolution” as

“simply an expression of opinion or mind or policy concerning some particular item of business coming within the legislative body’s official cognizance, ordinarily ministerial in character and relating to the administrative business of the municipality.” 5 Eugene McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Nature and Operation of Ordinances § 15.02 p. 59 (3rd Ed.1996).

Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1207 (Wyo.2000).

[¶ 8] Mr. Mathewson does not even suggest the term “resolution” itself is ambiguous. Instead, he argues that, when § 15 — 1— 801 is read together with § 35-2-425, an ambiguity is created. He contends the ambiguity stems from the language “[ejxcept as otherwise provided” which precedes the requirement for a resolution to authorize bonds and from the fact that the latter statute is directed to hospital trustees. We must presume that, when the legislature imposed the provisions contained in the hospital district statutes on municipalities seeking to construct off-street parking, it did so with full knowledge of the content of those provisions, and we can glean no ambiguity from the statutes themselves. Mr. Mathewson fails to direct us to any provision of § 15-1-801 or §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436 which “otherwise provides” in connection with procedures for the issuance of revenue bonds for off-street parking facilities. Consequently, we are left with the clear language of the statute as the final statement of legislative intent regarding the procedures to be followed in issuing revenue bonds for that purpose.

[¶ 9] Mr. Mathewson urges, without authority, the legislature must have intended a municipality should use its “highest form of authorization,” — e.g., an ordinance — because a resolution is the “highest form of authorization” for a hospital district. We simply cannot engage in such creative reasoning in an effort to insert language into the statutes that the legislature omitted. Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 888 (Wyo.2000) (we will not expand the plain language of a statute to encompass requirements beyond those clearly set out by the legislature); Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo.1997) (a basic tenet of statutory construction is that omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature; this court should not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them).

[¶ 10] In a final effort to create ambiguity where none existed, Mr. Mathewson points to an entirely different statute— the Downtown Development Authority (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-9-201 through 15-9-223 (LexisNexis 2001))—adopted after the statutes upon which the City relied for its actions, which allows municipalities through a separate development authority or on their own to issue bonds for public parking facilities and requires such be done by ordinance. The City complains Mr. Mathewson did not raise this issue below. A review of the record indicates that, although he did not provide the district court with a discussion of that statute, he did mention it as an example of other revenue bond statutes which required ordinances. In the interest of affording this citizen a full and complete hearing of his complaints, we will address this argument.

[¶ 11] Simply because the legislature chose to make two different options available to municipalities to construct parking facilities does not mean either provision automatically becomes ambiguous. Nor does it mean the legislature intended to repeal the original provision. Had the legislature so intended, it could readily have done so. It did not directly repeal the original provision, and, absent such direct repeal, Mr. Mathewson has the burden of showing the legislature intended an implied repeal. Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 130, ¶ 15, 37 P.3d 361, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001).

[O] ur longstanding rule is that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged if there is any other reasonable construction. One asserting implied repeal bears the burden of demonstrating beyond question that the legislature intended that its later legislative action evinced an unequivocal purpose of affecting a repeal. Furthermore, it must be shown that the later statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot logically stand together, or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the later one having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules applicable to the subject.

Id. Mr. Mathewson has met no part of this burden here. Looking to the plain meaning of the language utilized by the legislature in each case, we find no conflict. Both provisions can be given their plain meaning without hindering the application of the other. The result is the City had the option of taking either approach. Board of County Commissioners of County of Albany v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 335 P.2d 433 (1959). Whether this is a wise policy, whether it deprives citizens of rights granted by the legislature in other statutes, or whether, in the opinion of a citizen, it grants too much leeway to the governing body of a municipality is not a question for this court. Instead, Mr. Mathewson and other citizens similarly disposed must make their case to the legislature.

[¶ 12] The district court also properly concluded our opinion in Cooper, 1 P.3d 1197, “supports the City’s use of a resolution.” In that case, the Town authorized a promissory note for the construction of a water system by resolution and not by ordinance. We held the note did not constitute a bond which the statutes required to' be authorized by an ordinance. In addition, we concluded the resolution which authorized the promissory note did not constitute a legislative act which Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-l-114(a) (LexisNexis 2001) requires to be authorized by an ordinance. In discussing the distinction between a resolution and a legislative act requiring an ordinance, we relied upon 5 Eugene McQuil-lan, Municipal Corporations § 15.02 at 59 (3d ed.1996) for the proposition that “ ‘a resolution deals with matters of a special or temporary character; an ordinance prescribes some permanent rule of conduct or government, to continue in force until the ordinance is repealed.’ ” Cooper, 1 P.3d at 1207. When we apply that reasoning here, we conclude the resolution authorizing the revenue bonds in question was not a permanent rule of conduct contemplated by the term “legislation.” Our holding as stated in Cooper applies with equal force in this case. “Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that absent a specific requirement that it act by ordinance, the Town could act by resolution.” Id.; see also Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974 (1951).

[¶ 13] Finally, Mr. Mathewson argues the City’s use of an ordinance to authorize the 1994 bond issue for the George S. Cox parking facility somehow required that it utilize an ordinance for the issuance of the 2002 bond issue. Although it is not completely clear from his brief, Mr. Mathewson is apparently arguing that, because the proceeds from the 2002 bonds were to be used in part to “advance, refund and defease,” or repay, the 1994 bonds which were still outstanding, the ordinance authorizing those earlier bonds was somehow “repealed” by the City’s 2002 resolution and an ordinance cannot be repealed by a resolution. The district court found “[t]he fact that the City had previously issued off-street parking facility revenue bonds by ordinance is irrelevant.” We agree. The City had the option of using either an ordinance or a resolution when the statute did not direct the use of an ordinance. Mr. Mathewson’s suggestion that the later resolution constructively repealed the 1994 ordinance is not persuasive. He cites 6 Eugene McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 21.09 at 260 (3d ed.1998) for the definition of “constructive repeal” which on its face does not apply to the 2002 resolution. A constructive repeal occurs when the later ordinance “contains provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable with those of the earlier ordinance that only one of the two can stand in force; ... The repeal of an ordinance is accomplished when it is destroyed, abolished, abrogated, cancelled, annulled, recalled, or rescinded by a later one.” 6 Eugene McQuil-lan, Municipal Corporations § 21.09 at 260 (3d ed.1998). The 2002 resolution merely authorized the use of the proceeds from the later bond issue to repay the outstanding 1994 bonds before they became due. It in no way annulled or rescinded the earlier ordinance which originally authorized the issuance of the 1994 bonds.

[¶ 14] Mr. Mathewson cites no authority which prohibits the City from utilizing the procedures explicitly authorized by § 15-1-801. The district court found he presented no evidence the City failed to follow the procedures outlined in § 15-1-801 and §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436. On appeal, he does not contest that finding. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment and hold the City’s use of a resolution to authorize the 2002 revenue bonds for a parking facility was in compliance with the statutes adopted by the legislature.