author: By the Court, SILVER, J.:

text:
    Michael A. TRICARICHI, Appellant, v. COOPERATIVE RABOBANK, U.A.; Utrecht-America Finance Co. ; and Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Respondents.
    No. 73175
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 02, 2019
    Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, Mark A. Hutchison, and Todd W. Prall, Las Vegas; Sperling & Slater and Thomas D. Brooks and Scott F. Hessell, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant.
    Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Dan R. Waite, Las Vegas; Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP and Chris Paparella, New York, New York, for Respondents Cooperative Rabobank, U.A., and Utrecht-America Finance Co.
    Morris Law Group and Steve L. Morris, Akke Levin, and Ryan M. Lower, Las Vegas, for Respondent Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
    BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.
   By the Court, SILVER, J.:

In this appeal, we address specific personal jurisdiction and whether to adopt the conspiracy-based theory of personal jurisdiction. In the underlying case, Michael Tricarichi sued respondents for luring him into an intermediary or "Midco" tax shelter scheme that left him liable as a transferee for a $ 21.2 million federal tax deficiency and penalty. The district court dismissed Tricarichi's fraud, conspiracy, and racketeering claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over respondents, and concluded that Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014), overruled Davis v. Eighth Judicial District Court , 97 Nev. 332, 629 P.2d 1209 (1981), to the extent Davis supported a conspiracy-based theory of personal jurisdiction.

First, as to specific personal jurisdiction, we conclude that neither sufficient minimum contacts nor conspiratorial acts targeted at Tricarichi support jurisdiction in Nevada. Tricarichi did not identify a link between the acts or conduct underlying his tort claims and Nevada, and because Tricarichi's injury does not connect respondents' actions to Nevada in a jurisdictionally significant way, the district court correctly determined that respondents lacked minimal contacts with Nevada to satisfy due process and support personal jurisdiction. Second, we clarify that Walden did not overrule Davis and that Nevada's long-arm statute encompasses a conspiracy-based theory of personal jurisdiction, which we adopt herein as a basis on which specific jurisdiction may lie. However, we conclude Tricarichi fails to establish personal jurisdiction under that theory because the complaint does not allege conspiratorial acts sufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts with Nevada. We therefore affirm the district court's orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Michael Tricarichi was the president and sole shareholder of Westside Cellular, Inc., an Ohio C corporation. Relevant here, when Westside dissolved, it realized roughly $ 40 million from a settlement agreement in a civil lawsuit. Under the C corporate tax structure, Westside's proceeds were taxable both to Westside at the corporate level and, after distribution, to Tricarichi at the shareholder level.

Fortrend International, LLC, a now defunct San Francisco-based "Midco" promoter, proposed Tricarichi engage in an intermediary transaction tax shelter known as a "Midco transaction" in order to avoid double taxation. Midco transactions are structured to provide the seller with the benefits of a stock sale and the buyer with the benefits of the asset purchase while avoiding the gain tax liability by claiming certain tax attributes-such as losses-that would allow the party to absorb the liability were the tax attributes legitimate. Salus Mundi Found., v . C.I.R., 776 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). In 2001, the IRS determined that Midco transactions were improper tax avoidance schemes, for which fictional losses would be disallowed and corporate tax liability assessed. See Tricarichi v. C.I.R., 110 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (T.C. 2015). Thus, if the IRS determines that the attributes of the Midco are artificial, the tax liability created by the built-in gain on the sold assets remains due. Salus Mundi Found., 776 F.3d at 1013.

Fortrend began negotiating with Tricarichi around March 2003 for the purchase of Tricarichi's Westside stock. At that time, Tricarichi resided in Ohio, but moved to Nevada in May 2003. In July 2003, Fortrend's affiliate intermediary, Nob Hill, Inc., sent Tricarichi a letter of intent to purchase his Westside stock. In August 2003, Fortrend contacted respondent Cooperatieve Rabobank, U.A., to request a short-term loan to Nob Hill to finance the Westside stock purchase. Westside would then repay the loan once the stock purchased closed. Rabobank, which is organized under Dutch law and has its principle place of business in the Netherlands, also has principal branches in Utrecht, Netherlands, and New York, New York. To facilitate the funds transfer, Westside opened an escrow account with Rabobank. The account documents list Tricarichi's Nevada address.

On September 9, 2003, Tricarichi sold all of his Westside stock to Nob Hill for $ 34.6 million. Rabobank's wholly owned subsidiary, respondent Utrecht-America Finance Co., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, New York, thereafter made a short-term loan to Nob Hill in New York for $ 2.9 million for the purchase of Westside. Nob Hill then transferred those proceeds, along with the remainder of the purchase price, from its Rabobank account to Tricarichi's Rabobank account. Tricarichi thereafter transferred the funds to another bank account he controlled in New York. Nob Hill repaid Utrecht the $ 2.9 million with Westside's funds, and Rabobank received a $ 150,000 fee from Nob Hill. Nob Hill thereby acquired Tricarichi's Westside stock.

Tricarichi resigned from Westside. Nob Hill represented to Tricarichi that Westside's tax liability for 2003 would be satisfied and further agreed to indemnify Tricarichi against Westside's tax liability. Nob Hill also warranted that it did not intend to cause Westside to engage in an IRS reportable transaction.

Consistent with the way Midco transactions operate, Nob Hill quickly merged into Westside. At that point, roughly $ 5.2 million remained in Westside's account. According to Tricarichi, Fortrend transferred the funds to its affiliates over the next few months rather than using those funds to facilitate Nob Hill's debt-collection business.

After Nob Hill purchased Westside's stock, Nob Hill's sole shareholder, Millennium Recovery Fund, LLC, contributed a portion of debt to Westside with a purported tax basis of about $ 43 million. Westside then wrote off the debt as uncollectable and used it to claim a bad debt tax deduction of roughly $ 42.5 million, thereby offsetting the settlement income and claiming it had no income tax liability for 2003. Similarly, Millennium previously planned to acquire a distressed Japanese debt for $ 137,000 and claim a $ 314 million basis for it. In that case, respondent Seyfarth Shaw LLP, a Chicago, Illinois, law firm, advised Nob Hill's president, John McNabola, that this high tax basis was appropriate. Seyfarth has offices in ten United States locations but none in Nevada and is not registered to do business in Nevada. None of Seyfarth's attorneys have practiced in Nevada in connection with any matter involving Tricarichi.

The IRS audited Westside's 2003 tax return and disallowed roughly $ 42.5 million in bad debt deductions and over $ 1.65 million claimed deductions for legal and professional fees. Westside did not pay the resulting tax deficiency of $ 15,186,570 and penalties of $ 6,012,777, as it had no assets. Thus, the IRS determined that Tricarichi had transferee liability. Tricarichi petitioned for review in the U.S. Tax Court. That court determined that the Westside stock transfer was an improper Midco transaction, Tricarichi had constructive knowledge that Fortrend intended to employ an illegal tax shelter, and Tricarichi was liable for the tax deficiency and penalties plus interest. See Tricarichi v. C.I.R., 110 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (T.C. 2015).

Tricarichi filed the underlying complaint against respondents Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth, asserting claims for aiding and abetting fraud, civil conspiracy, and violation of Nevada's racketeering statute (NRS 207,400(1)). Tricarichi also asserted a claim for unjust enrichment against Rabobank and Utrecht. Seyfarth, Rabobank, and Utrecht filed motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Relying on Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014), the district court granted the motions, finding that Tricarichi had not shown conduct by respondents in Nevada or directed at Nevada that would enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. The district court also concluded that appellant's reliance on Davis v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 97 Nev. 332, 629 P.2d 1209 (1981), for a conspiracy-based theory of personal jurisdiction was misplaced because Walden overruled Davis. And, even though Tricarichi alleged Rabobank and Utrecht knew he was a Nevada resident when they contacted him about opening certain accounts and transferring funds, the court found Tricarichi's claims did not arise from those contacts. Tricarichi appeals.

DISCUSSION

When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that Nevada's long-arm statute grants jurisdiction over the defendants and that the exercise of that jurisdiction comports with the principles of due process. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 30, 36, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015) (citing NRS 14.065 ). When, as here, the litigation is in the pleading or motion stage, the plaintiff need only make a "prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction." Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 109 Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d 740, 744 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court may consider evidence presented through affidavits and must accept properly supported proffers as true and resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor. Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. 368, 374, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014). Due process requires that "a nonresident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so that subjecting the defendant to the state's jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Fulbright , 131 Nev. at 36, 342 P.3d at 1001 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Tricarichi challenges the district court's conclusions that (1) he failed to make a prima facie showing that Rabobank and Utrecht's contacts with Nevada are sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction; and (2) Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth's participation in a conspiracy aimed at him in Nevada does not provide an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction. Reviewing the district court's decisions de novo, see Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev. 932, 936, 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013), we consider each of these bases for personal jurisdiction in turn.

Specific personal jurisdiction

"[S]pecific jurisdiction is proper only where the cause of action arises from the defendant's contacts with the forum." Fulbright, 131 Nev. at 37, 342 P.3d at 1002 (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating specific personal jurisdiction, courts consider two factors: (1) whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or purposefully directed its conduct towards the forum state, and (2) whether the cause of action arose from the defendant's purposeful contact or activities in connection with the forum state, such that it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction. Dogra, 129 Nev. at 937, 314 P.3d at 955 ; Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 509, 513, 134 P.3d 710, 712-13 (2006).

In analyzing whether specific personal jurisdiction exists in a tort action, courts apply the "effects test" derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), which considers whether the defendant "(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state." Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the plaintiff's contacts with the defendant and the forum are not the proper focus of jurisdictional analysis; instead, the effects inquiry and the question of minimum contacts focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, and "the defendant's suit-related conduct," which "must create a substantial connection with the forum." Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 283-84, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014).

In Walden , the Supreme Court reviewed whether Nevada could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Georgia police officer who seized money belonging to two airline passengers at a Georgia airport and helped draft a probable cause affidavit for the forfeiture. Id. at 279-81, 134 S.Ct. 1115. The passengers, residents of California and Nevada, filed a tort action against the police officer in Nevada district court. Id. at 280-81, 134 S.Ct. 1115. The Supreme Court determined that the lower court improperly shifted the focus of the effects of the alleged tort and the minimum contacts analysis from the defendant's contacts with the forum state to defendant's contacts with plaintiffs. Id. at 288-89, 134 S.Ct. 1115. The Court emphasized that, "[f]irst, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself ' creates with the forum State," id. at 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ), and second, the "minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there," id. at 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying that analysis to the facts, the Court held that the defendant's "actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections." Id. at 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115. Plaintiffs' claim that Nevada had jurisdiction because defendant's tortious conduct injured plaintiffs while they resided in Nevada likewise failed, as the Court observed that the injury (lack of access to seized funds) "is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada in any meaningful way." Id. at 290, 134 S.Ct. 1115. While defendant's conduct of seizing funds in Georgia had an effect on the plaintiff in Nevada, that effect did not result from anything that independently occurred in Nevada and therefore was not a proper basis for jurisdiction. Id.

Respondents did not purposefully direct activities at Nevada

The first factor of specific personal jurisdiction requires that respondents purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Nevada or that their acts were expressly aimed at Nevada and caused harm that they knew was likely to be suffered in Nevada. Dogra , 129 Nev. at 937, 314 P.3d at 955 ; Arbella, 122 Nev. at 513, 134 P.3d at 712-13 ; Picot, 780 F.3d at 1213-14 (providing that specific personal jurisdiction in tort actions should focus on conduct the defendant purposefully directs at the forum state). Tricarichi contends that he made a prima facie showing that Rabobank and Utrecht directed their actions at him in Nevada. He points to Nob Hill's loan request to Rabobank and Rabobank's request that he open individual and escrow accounts at Rabobank because the documents associated with the opening of the accounts and closing of the loan reflect his Nevada address. We disagree.

First, Rabobank and Utrecht's services occurred in New York where the accounts were opened and the loan proceeds transferred. Tricarichi identifies communications he made to Rabobank and Utrecht, including his resignation, wire transfer instruction, and account opening documents, but does not dispute that those documents were actually sent from a San Francisco fax number. Rabobank's receipt of account documents and a loan request showing Tricarichi's Nevada address, by themselves, are incidental to activities that made up the Midco transaction, i.e., the loan, stock purchase, and transfer of money through an intermediary, all of which took place outside of Nevada. Thus, we are not persuaded that this evidence shows purposeful availment or express aiming such that would meet the first factor of personal jurisdiction. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 286, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (explaining that due process requires that jurisdiction be based on a defendant's "own affiliation with the State," and it is "insufficient to rely on a defendant's 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts' or on the 'unilateral activity' of a plaintiff" (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 )); Fulbright, 131 Nev. at 40-41, 342 P.3d at 1002-04 (holding that a Texas law firm's representation of a Nevada resident on a Texas-based matter, combined with communications with the client in Nevada incidental to that representation, was insufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction where the firm did not solicit the client's business and the representation dealt with a Texas matter).

Second, merely suffering injury while residing in the forum is likewise insufficient. "The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way." Walden , 571 U.S. at 290, 134 S.Ct. 1115. To illustrate how the effects inquiry works, Walden pointed to the facts in Calder , wherein a California actress sued a reporter and editor for defamation based on an article written and published in a Florida newspaper. Id. at 286-87, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (citing Calder , 465 U.S. at 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482 ). Calder held that California had jurisdiction not because the actress suffered injury there, but because the tortious conduct occurred in California, where the reporter had gathered the information from sources in California about the actress's activities in California and the article was widely circulated in California. Id. at 287, 134 S.Ct. 1115.

Here, Tricarichi claims he suffered injury while residing in Nevada, but because Rabobank and Utrecht's acts were not connected to Nevada, that injury is insufficient to establish minimum contacts. Id. at 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (rejecting approach to minimum contacts analysis that grounds personal jurisdiction based on defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's connections to the forum combined with plaintiff suffering foreseeable harm there because it "impermissibly allows a plaintiff's contacts with the defendant and the forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis").

Tricarichi's claims do not arise from respondents' activities in connection with Nevada

The second factor of specific personal jurisdiction requires that the claims arise from respondents' activities in connection with Nevada. Fulbright, 131 Nev. at 38, 342 P.3d at 1002 ; see also Bristol-Myers SquibbCo. v. Superior Court , 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). In addressing the second factor, we have stated "the claims must have a specific and direct relationship or be intimately related to the forum contacts." Arbella, 122 Nev. at 515-16, 134 P.3d at 714 (internal quotations omitted). Here, the only alleged Nevada contact is that Rabobank and Utrecht knew that Tricarichi used a Nevada address because he provided it on bank account opening and loan closing documents. Rabobank and Utrecht's knowledge in that regard does not have a specific and direct relationship to the Midco transaction on which Tricarichi grounds his tort claims. The Midco transaction required the transfer of money through Rabobank accounts in New York and the purchase of Tricarichi's shares in an Ohio Corporation made possible through Utrecht's loan in New York. The fact that account opening and loan documents listed Tricarichi's Nevada address is inconsequential to that transaction. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 289-90, 134 S.Ct. 1115 ; Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the lower court's conclusion that personal jurisdiction existed because the nonresident defendant knew the plaintiff was an Indiana company and could foresee that its misleading emails and sales would harm the plaintiff in Indiana); Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 823 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that even if the defendant solicited an agreement knowing the plaintiff was an Iowa corporation, that knowledge could not create the required minimum contacts under Walden ).

Although Tricarichi relies on cases decided after Walden that found personal jurisdiction based on the effects test, those cases are distinguishable because they addressed defendants' activities with the forum that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Rilley v.MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 328-29 (Minn. 2016) (finding personal jurisdiction over a finance company that emailed over 1,000 Minnesota residents to solicit payday loans and distinguishing Walden on the facts because the contacts were not random or fortuitous). Such activity is missing here. Thus, because Tricarichi did not identify any jurisdictionally significant conduct by Rabobank and Utrecht showing necessary minimum contacts with Nevada, the district court properly granted respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of specific personal jurisdiction.

Conspiracy theory jurisdiction

As an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction over Rabobank and Utrecht, and as the sole basis for jurisdiction over Seyfarth, Tricarichi asserts that respondents' participation in a conspiracy that targeted, defrauded, and injured a Nevada resident subjects them to Nevada jurisdiction. Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth disagree, arguing that Nevada has not adopted a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction and Walden precludes jurisdiction based on participation in an out-of-state conspiracy.

A conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction provides that a nonresident defendant who lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the forum may be subject to personal jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator's contacts with the forum. See Gibbs v. PrimeLending, 381 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Ark. 2011), To support jurisdiction based on conspiracy theory and satisfy due process, a plaintiff must show (1) an agreement to conspire, (2) the acts of co-conspirators are sufficient to meet minimum contacts with the forum, and (3) the co-conspirators reasonably expected at the time of entering into the conspiracy that they would be subject to jurisdiction in the forum state. See id. at 832 ; Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 892 A.2d 479, 489 (2006). Courts that have applied the theory have observed that "[t]he underlying rationale for exercising personal jurisdiction on the basis of conspiracy is that, because co-conspirators are deemed to be each other's agents, the contacts that one co-conspirator made with a forum while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed for jurisdictional purposes to the other co-conspirators." In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 2015 WL 6243526, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015) ; Mackey, 892 A.2d at 483-84 (noting that courts have routinely drawn on the substantive law of agency as justification for exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and that conspiracy theory jurisdiction is an analogous concept).

We conclude that Nevada's long-arm statute encompasses a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. See NRS 14.065(1) (personal jurisdiction is proper "on any basis not inconsistent with" the Nevada or United States Constitutions). Although respondents correctly note that we have not expressly adopted the theory, our decision in Davis v. Eighth Judicial District Court recognizes that theory. 97 Nev. 332, 334, 338-39, 629 P.2d 1209, 1211, 1213 (1981), superseded by rule on other grounds, as recognized in Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 650, 653-56, 6 P.3d 982, 983-85 (2000). There, we concluded it was reasonable to require nonresident defendants who allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to seize control of a Nevada estate "to appear and defend their activities in Nevada where the alleged injuries occurred." Id.

The district court below agreed with respondents that Walden overruled Davis. But, while Walden readdressed Calder' s effects test and narrowed its application, Walden did not involve a conspiracy or discuss co-conspirator-based jurisdiction. We therefore conclude that Davis is distinguishable and Walden's holding does not overrule Davis. Accordingly, conspiracy allegations may provide a basis for specific personal jurisdiction when the acts of co-conspirators are sufficient to meet minimum contacts with Nevada and the co-conspirators reasonably expected at the time of entering into the conspiracy that their actions would have consequences in Nevada. Cf. Davis, 97 Nev. at 334, 338-39, 629 P.2d at 1211, 1213.

Davis did not articulate a specific test for conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction or discuss the acts of co-conspirators attributed to others. However, the Davis facts suggest a three-factor test. Notably, the defendants in Davis were a group of aides, physicians, attorneys, and business associates who "had attended [to] the late [Howard] Hughes during the last years of his life"; and allegedly "conspired to seize control of the Hughes' empire for their own financial gain by taking advantage of the trust and confidence Hughes had placed in them," causing "injury to [plaintiff's] property located in Nevada." 97 Nev. at 334, 338, 629 P.2d at 1211,1213. Thus, the alleged conspiracy was directed at Hughes in Nevada where his property and business interests were located, and the co-conspirators included physicians and others who actually attended to him there, and thus had the necessary minimum contacts and reasonable expectation that their actions would lead to consequences in Nevada such that they could be subject to Nevada jurisdiction. These key facts outlined in Davis therefore support jurisdiction over nonresident co-conspirators where: (1) there is a conspiracy, (2) the acts of co-conspirators meet minimum contacts with the forum, and (3) the co-conspirators could have reasonably expected at the time of entering into the conspiracy that their actions would have consequences in the forum state. See Gibbs, 381 S.W.3d at 832 (addressing these factors).

Applying the theory here, however, we conclude that it does not support jurisdiction, as Tricarichi failed to make a prima facie showing of pertinent co-conspirator jurisdictional facts. Tricarichi alleges that Rabobank and Utrecht earned fees by financing other Midco transactions and financed the Westside transaction knowing it was illegal. Further, he claims that in 2001, two years before the Westside transaction, Seyfarth issued an opinion letter to Fortrend-affiliate Millennium supporting an improper debt scheme that Fortrend relied on in contributing and writing off Japanese debt. Tricarichi believes that this 2001 opinion letter was relied on when Westside claimed a deduction on its 2003 tax return. He further contends that in March 2003, respondents joined together to induce him to engage in the Westside Midco transaction to his detriment.

Assuming, arguendo, these allegations establish the first prong of the test, Tricarichi has not identified any co-conspirator acts that meet the minimum contacts requirement to satisfy the second prong of the test. Instead, he points to the original and amended letters of intent to purchase Westside stock sent in July and August 2003 by Fortrend-affiliate Nob Hill to his address in Nevada. These two contacts, however, did not involve the initial solicitation for his participation in the Midco transaction, as his complaint alleges that negotiations with Fortrend began in March or April 2003, well before his move to Nevada. Thus, the timing of the letters of intent does not support Tricarichi's contention that co-conspirator respondents directed their acts at Nevada, as the letters reflecting his Nevada address were incidental to initial solicitation negotiations occurring elsewhere and do not satisfy the constitutional minimum contacts requirement. Walden, 571 U.S. at 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (explaining that jurisdictional analysis that attributes plaintiff's forum connections to defendant "obscures the reality that none of [the] challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself').

Jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory also fails on the third prong of the test because Tricarichi's allegations do not support that co-conspirator respondents reasonably expected at the time of entering into the conspiracy that their actions would have consequences in Nevada. See Gibbs, 381 S.W.3d at 832. The Midco transaction on which the conspiracy is centered concerned an Ohio corporation transferring funds to New York. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the claims against respondents as to a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We clarify that under Nevada's long-arm statute and in line with Davis v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 97 Nev. 332, 629 P.2d 1209 (1981), a party may demonstrate personal jurisdiction under the conspiracy-based theory. We conclude here, however, that Tricarichi fails to demonstrate personal jurisdiction under either specific jurisdiction or under the conspiracy-based theory for personal jurisdiction. Tricarichi does not identify a jurisdictionally significant link between respondents and Nevada, and Tricarichi's injury, without more, is not a sufficient connection to Nevada. Tricarichi also fails to allege conspiratorial acts sufficient to meet minimum contacts with Nevada. Moreover, Tricarichi failed to demonstrate that respondents reasonably expected their actions to have consequences in Nevada at the time of entering into the alleged conspiracy. Therefore, the district court properly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth, and we affirm the orders.

We concur:

Hardesty, J.

Stiglich, J.

      Tricarichi alleges that Rabobank required that he open Rabobank accounts for escrow and closing.

      Another Fortrend affiliate loaned Nob Hill the remainder of the $ 34.6 million purchase price.

      Millennium is another Fortrend affiliate, formed in the Cayman Islands.

      The legal opinion letter was addressed and limited to McNabola at Millennium in Dublin, Ireland.

      Graham Taylor, who was a partner at Seyfarth, wrote the letter and later pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit tax fraud.

      The complaint also asserted claims against PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, and Graham Taylor, but those claims were not addressed in the dismissal orders, and neither of those defendants are parties to this appeal.

      The court certified the orders as final under NRCP

      Tricarichi agrees that general jurisdiction is not at issue.

      Thus, in tort actions, some courts focus solely on whether the defendant's tortious conduct was purposefully directed towards the forum state rather than whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the laws of the forum state. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1212 ("For claims sounding in tort, we ... look to evidence that the defendant has directed his actions at the forum state...."); Dogra, 129 Nev. at 937, 314 P.3d at 955 (providing that specific personal jurisdiction can be based either on purposeful availment or on purposefully directed conduct). But see Planning Grp. of Scottsdale, LLC v. Lake Mathews Mineral Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 246 P.3d 343, 348-49 (2011) (rejecting a rigid distinction between purposeful availment and purposefully directed conduct when analyzing specific personal jurisdiction issues). Because we conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction under either basis, we need not address this distinction further.

      Tricarichi also relies on Peccole v. Eighth Judicial District Court , which concluded that Nevada had jurisdiction over nonresident defendants because they purposefully directed their activities at Nevada through their agent, who contacted plaintiffs in Nevada to solicit the sale of defendants' Colorado property. 111 Nev. 968, 971, 899 P.2d 568, 570 (1995). Peccole is distinguishable because here, Rabobank and Utrecht did not reach out to Tricarichi in Nevada and solicit his participation in the Midco transaction.

      Tricarichi also contends that personal jurisdiction is reasonable. But, because minimum contacts are lacking, jurisdiction in Nevada is inconsistent with fair play and substantial justice. See Asahi Metal Indus . Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) ; cf. Peccole , 111 Nev. at 971, 899 P.2d at 570 (analyzing whether exercising jurisdiction over defendant who had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada was reasonable); Trump, 109 Nev. at 700, 857 P.2d at 749 (observing that if plaintiff establishes that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Nevada and the cause of action arose from defendant's Nevada activities, the burden shifts to defendant to set forth a compelling case that jurisdiction would still be unreasonable).

      While some courts have expressed doubt as to whether conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction applies post-Walden, we conclude that because co-conspirators are deemed each other's agents, contacts co-conspirators make in Nevada "while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed for jurisdictional purposes to the other co-conspirators." See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments , 2015 WL 6243526, at *29.

      We decline to consider Rabobank and Utrecht's argument that Tricarichi is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the U.S. Tax Court's determination that he knew or should have known that the Midco transaction was a tax fraud, as it was not raised in district court as a basis for dismissal on personal jurisdiction grounds. See City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, 129 Nev. 1, 7 n.2, 293 P.3d 860, 864 n.2 (2013).

      Neither Fortrend nor Nob Hill were named as defendants.

      Tricarichi alternatively argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for jurisdictional discovery. In light of the record here, the district court was within its discretion to conclude that jurisdictional discovery was unlikely to lead to evidence establishing jurisdiction. Tricarichi failed to make a prima facie case that Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada under either a specific or conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, and in denying his request for jurisdictional discovery, the district court noted that Tricarichi already had the benefit of discovery from Rabobank and Utrecht in the tax court proceeding before he filed his complaint here. We perceive no abuse of discretion in that determination. See Club Vista Fin . Servs ., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012) (reviewing the district court's discovery decisions for an abuse of discretion); Viega GmbH, 130 Nev. at 382, 328 P.3d at 1160 (explaining jurisdictional discovery is not warranted where plaintiffs fail to allege facts that would indicate that Nevada courts might have jurisdiction over defendants).


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    David August KILLE, Sr., Appellant, v. Julio CALDERIN; Dwight Neven; High Desert State Prison; Greg Cox; The State of Nevada Department of Corrections; and The State of Nevada, Respondents.
    No. 72358
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 10, 2019
    AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED IN PART. REMAND.


text:
    Melanie ANDRESS-TOBIASSON, Petitioner, v. NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, Respondent.
    No. 77551
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 10, 2019
    GRANTED IN PART. DENIED IN PART.


text:
    HAUNTED PARTNERS ENTERTAINMENT & LEISURE CORPORATION, a Nevada Domestic Corporation; and Mosaic Land, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Appellants, v. Donald Eugene NELSON, an Individual; and Shawn Lampman, an Individual, Respondents.
    No. 77325
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 09, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    MDC RESTAURANTS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; Laguna Restaurants, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and Inka, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, Petitioners, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Timothy C. Williams, District Judge, Respondents, and Paulette Diaz, an Individual; Lawanda Gail Wilbanks, an Individual; Shannon Olszynski, an Individual; and Charity Fitzlaff, an Individual, on behalf of themselves and all Similarly-Situated Individuals, Real Parties in Interest.
    No. 78562
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    DENIED.


text:
    In the MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF D. Bryce FINLEY, Bar No. 9310.
    No. 77996
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 14, 2019
    Reject. Remand.


text:
    TRP FUND IV, LLC, a Domestic Non-Profit Corporation, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Respondent.
    No. 77421
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 14, 2019
    DISMISSED.


text:
    In the MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF Michael H. HAMILTON, Bar No. 7730.
    No. 78101
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 14, 2019
    APPROVING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA.


text:
    In the MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF Sandra P. GELSI, Bar No. 11861.
    No. 78114
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 14, 2019
    APPROVING CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA.


text:
    Kevin FERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    Kevin Fernandez, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
    Kevin Fernandez, Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76741 No. 76742 No. 76743
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Narciso TORRES, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76459
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Brandyn William GAYLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76526
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Steven Edward CANO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 77163
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Daivion Devonte MOORE a/k/a Daivion Devanta Moore, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 75940
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    REVERSED. REMAND.


text:
    Erick Marquis BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76588
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    Lovell RANDOLPH, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
    No. 76677
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    REVERSED. REMAND.


text:
    Percy Lavae BACON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada; Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners ; and Nevada Department of Corrections, Respondents.
    No. 76663
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    AFFIRMED.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the Parental Rights as to E.K., M.G.
    Malina May Keates, Appellant, v. Washoe County Human Services Agency; and E.K., M.G., Minor Children, Respondents.
    No. 78162
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    Dismissed.


text:
    Leby ALAS-GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. Brian WILLIAMS, Warden, Respondent.
    No. 78670
    Supreme Court of Nevada.
    FILED MAY 15, 2019
    DENIED.


author: /S/ CHIEF JUSTICE

text:
    STATE of Oklahoma EX REL. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. Charlotte Linn CLABORN, Respondent.
    Case Number: SCBD-6746
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    Decided: March 25, 2019
    ¶0 ORDER APPROVING RESIGNATION PENDING DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
    ¶1 Complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), has applied pursuant to Rule 8.2 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A) for an order approving the resignation of the respondent, Charlotte Linn Claborn, pending disciplinary proceedings.
    ¶2 On March 8, 2019, Claborn filed with this Court her affidavit of resignation from membership in the Bar Association pending disciplinary proceedings. The affidavit was executed March 6, 2019.
    ¶3 Claborn's affidavit of resignation reflects that: (a) it was freely and voluntarily rendered; (b) she was not subject to coercion or duress; and (c) she was fully aware of the consequences of submitting the resignation.
    ¶4 The affidavit of resignation states Claborn's awareness of a grievance received by the Bar Association concerning her conduct and alleging she engaged in conflicting representation of clients. The Bar's Complaint based on this grievance alleges: (1) Claborn represented Daniel Geiser in a divorce case against April Geiser; (2) Claborn visited April Geiser in 2013 while April was incarcerated in order to obtain a waiver of her appearance in the divorce; (3) The documents April Geiser signed "gave up custody of her older child", stated Daniel Geiser was not the father of April Geiser's unborn child, April (hereafter Geiser) was not awarded visitation, and she was required to pay child support; (4) Claborn contacted Geiser in April 2014 to discuss Geiser's intentions concerning her unborn child and Claborn's representation of Geiser in a Judicial Review of her criminal case; (5) Claborn started discussions with Geiser about placing her child with Claborn's daughter until Geiser was no longer incarcerated; (6) Claborn delivered a letter to Geiser from Claborn's daughter stating Claborn's daughter would take care of Geiser's child; Geiser gave birth to a boy and she agreed to a temporary guardianship with Claborn's daughter and son-in-law; (7) The infant was released from the hospital to Claborn's daughter and son-in-law who started calling the child by a name other than the one selected by Geiser; (8) Claborn filed a petition for guardianship on behalf of her daughter and son-in-law; (9) The guardianship was granted and included language allowing for the adoption of the child; (10) Claborn informed Geiser by letter that Claborn's daughter and son-in-law were planning to adopt the child, and had decided to give the child a different first name because "they do not believe the child should be named after the biological father;" (11) Claborn then filed an Application for Judicial Review concerning Geiser's criminal case and the application was denied; (12) Claborn's daughter and son-in-law, as guardians, filed a petition for adoption without consent; (13) Claborn was not the lawyer for the guardians on their petition for adoption; (14) Geiser filed a petition to modify the guardianship stating she was deceived by Claborn, and Claborn had "only sent part of the guardianship papers to her to get her to sign;" (15) Geiser stated she was unaware the guardianship was not a temporary guardianship or that it included a possible adoption; (16) Geiser was released from incarceration; (17) The assigned trial judge denied the petition for adoption and characterized Claborn's actions as "the most dishonest, deceitful and unethical behavior" the judge had seen in several years; and (18) Geiser was reunited with her child.
    ¶5 The Complaint against Claborn states she represented Geiser in a criminal case while representing Claborn's daughter in the guardianship case involving Geiser's son, and Claborn created a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, (ORPC). The Complaint states Claborn had conversations with Geiser when she lacked an attorney, and these conversations were false and misleading regarding Claborn's interests. The Bar asserts Claborn's conduct violated Rules 4.1 and 4.3 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A. The Complaint alleges Claborn's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and in violation of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and Rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A.
    ¶6 Respondent's resignation states she is aware the allegations against her, if proven, would constitute violations of Rules 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, and Rules 1.7, 4.1, 4.3, and 8.4 (a), (c), and (d) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, as well as her oath as an attorney.
    ¶7 Respondent states she is aware the burden of proof regarding the allegations against her rests upon the Oklahoma Bar Association, and she waives any and all rights to contest the allegations. The record before us shows a motion by the Bar Association before the trial panel to have the allegations in the Complaint be deemed admitted, and an order of a presiding master of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal which grants the motion deeming the Complaint's allegations admitted. We need not examine the allegations deemed admitted for the purpose of imposing the proper professional discipline in this proceeding . A proper resignation pending disciplinary proceedings will necessarily result in the Court imposing a rule-mandated degree of discipline tantamount to disbarment. Further, the particularized list of all allegations of misconduct against her stated in her affidavit satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.
    ¶8 Respondent states her awareness of the requirements of Rule 9.1, of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, and she states she shall comply with that Rule "within twenty (20) days following the date of her resignation."
    ¶9 Her resignation states she surrendered her Oklahoma Bar membership card to the Bar Association "with this resignation." The affidavit from the Bar Association states Claborn surrendered her Bar Association membership card to the Bar on March 6, 2019. Respondent's resignation was executed March 6, 2019. Her statement of compliance with Rule 9.1 shows she is using the "date of the resignation" for performing professional obligations. The Bar Association filed its application for approval of the resignation in this Court on March 8, 2019.
    ¶10 If the Court approves a resignation pending discipline, then the Court may determine an effective date for the resignation to be the date it was submitted to the Bar Association when the resignation is contemporaneously filed with this Court and the attorney is treating the date of submission as an effective date for all of the attorney's professional obligations. The two days between March 6th and March 8th is sufficiently contemporaneous for dating the resignation from the date of its submission to the Bar Association in the circumstance of respondent treating the resignation as effective on March 6, 2019. We determine the effective date of resignation to be March 6, 2019.
    ¶11 Respondent states her awareness of Rule 8.2, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, and that approval or disapproval of her resignation is within the discretion of the Supreme Court.
    ¶12 Respondent states she is aware she may make no application for reinstatement prior to the expiration of five years from the effective date of the order approving her resignation. We construe this language to mean she is aware she may make no application for reinstatement prior to the expiration of five years from the effective date of the order approving her resignation or the effective date of her resignation as determined by the Court. Respondent states she is aware that reinstatement requires compliance with Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.
    ¶13 Respondent states she is aware the Client's Security Fund may receive claims from her former clients, and she shall pay to the Oklahoma Bar Association, prior to reinstatement, those funds, including principal and interest, expended by the Client's Security Fund for claims against her.
    ¶14 Respondent acknowledges she must cooperate with the Office of the General Counsel by providing current contact information and identifying active cases wherein client documents and files should be returned to the client or forwarded to new counsel, and cases where fees or refunds are owed by Claborn.
    ¶15 The application for approval of Claborn's resignation filed by the Bar Association states costs were incurred in the investigation, and the Bar Association seeks reimbursement of costs. Respondent's resignation states she has been informed by the Bar Association that costs in the investigation were incurred and the Bar Association is seeking reimbursement. If professional discipline occurs in the form of the Court approving a resignation pending discipline, then costs may be awarded and a respondent shall pay those costs within ninety (90) days unless the Court has determined otherwise upon good cause shown.
    ¶16 The Application lists individual items of cost for which the Bar Association seeks reimbursement, and the Application states a sum of these costs. The expressly specified total amount of costs pled in the Application is $1,148.19. However, this total appears to be approximately 79% of the total amount of the individual items of costs listed in the Application. When the individual items of cost are added together the sum is $1,448.19. The individual items of costs listed in the Application are supported by exhibits attached to the Application. The individual items of costs include three transcript expenses totaling $978.10, and an additional $470.09 for postage, travel mileage for the Bar's investigator and Trial Panel members, and a witness fee with travel mileage.
    ¶17 The Court's exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction in a Bar disciplinary proceeding includes a full-scale exploration of all relevant facts. Due process requires the Bar to allege facts sufficient to put an attorney on notice of the claims asserted against the attorney. Respondent had notice the Bar's Application sought costs in the amount of $1,448.19. We award costs in the amount of $1,448.19, and they shall be paid within 90 days of the effective date of this Order.
    ¶18 The official roster name and address of the respondent is Charlotte Linn Claborn, O.B.A. No. 21139, P. O. Box 13, Stonewall, OK 74871-0013.
    ¶19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application by the Bar Association for an order approving Charlotte Linn Claborn's resignation be approved, and the resignation is deemed effective on the date it was executed and submitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association, March 6, 2019.
    ¶20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys and that she make no application for reinstatement to membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association prior to five years from the effective date of her resignation, March 6, 2019.
    ¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall pay costs in the amount of $1,448.19 to the Oklahoma Bar Association within ninety (90) days from the effective date of this order.
    ¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if any funds of the Clients' Security Fund of the Oklahoma Bar Association are expended on behalf of respondent, she must show the amount paid and that the same has been repaid, with interest, to the Oklahoma Bar Association to reimburse such Fund prior to reinstatement.
    ¶23 DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THIS 25th DAY OF MARCH, 2019.

      5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, ORPC, Rule 1.7 :
      (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
      (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
      (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
      (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
      (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
      (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
      (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
      (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

      5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, ORPC, Rule 4.1 :
      In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
      5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, ORPC, Rule 4.3 :
      In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

      5 O.S.2011, Ch.1, App. 3-A, ORPC, Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) :
      It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
      (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; ...
      (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
      (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; ....

      5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 1.3:
      The commission by any lawyer of any act contrary to prescribed standards of conduct, whether in the course of his professional capacity, or otherwise, which act would reasonably be found to bring discredit upon the legal profession, shall be grounds for disciplinary action, whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, or a crime at all.

      If allegations against an attorney are deemed admitted in the context of a trial panel proceeding, then this Court exercises exclusive and original jurisdiction using de novo review to impose and determine discipline based upon clear and convincing evidence of professional misconduct. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Knight , 2015 OK 59, 359 P.3d 1122, 1128-1129 ; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Seratt , 2003 OK 22, ¶ 8, 66 P.3d 390, 392.

      State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Caporal , 2014 OK 104, ¶ 6, 350 P.3d 106, 107 (a resignation pending discipline is tantamount to disbarment); 5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 11.1 (e) (attorney may not make an application for reinstatement prior to the expiration of five years from the effective date of disbarment). See infra note 12, stating RGDP, Rule 8.1 (c) (attorney may not make an application for reinstatement prior to the expiration of five years from the effective date of resignation).

      5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 8.1, states in part:
      A lawyer who is the subject of an investigation into, or a pending proceeding involving, allegations of misconduct may resign membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association, and thereby relinquish the right to practice law, only by delivering to the Commission an affidavit stating that the lawyer desires to resign and that:...
      (b) The lawyer is aware that there is presently pending an investigation into, or proceedings involving, allegations that there exist grounds for discipline, specifying particularly the misconduct alleged;....

      5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 9.1:
      When the action of the Supreme Court becomes final, a lawyer who is disbarred or suspended, or who has resigned membership pending disciplinary proceedings, must notify all of the lawyer's clients having legal business then pending within twenty (20) days, by certified mail, of the lawyer's inability to represent them and the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel. If such lawyer is a member of, or associated with, a law firm or professional corporation, such notice shall be given to all clients of the firm or professional corporation, which have legal business then pending with respect to which the disbarred, suspended or resigned lawyer had substantial responsibility. The lawyer shall also file a formal withdrawal as counsel in all cases pending in any tribunal. The lawyer must file, within twenty (20) days, an affidavit with the Commission and with the Clerk of the Supreme Court stating that the lawyer has complied with the provisions of this Rule, together with a list of the clients so notified and a list of all other State and Federal courts and administrative agencies before which the lawyer is admitted to practice. Proof of substantial compliance by the lawyer with this Rule 9.1 shall be a condition precedent to any petition for reinstatement.

      State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Demopolos , 2015 OK 50, ¶ 36 & n. 56, 352 P.3d 1210, 1221 (a proper resignation may be made effective on the date of submission to the Oklahoma Bar Association); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Bourland , 2001 OK 12, ¶¶ 14-17, 19 P.3d 289, 291-292 ("the usual effective date for a resignation is the date it is submitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association ... [when] the resignation was executed, tendered to the Bar Association, and contemporaneously filed with the Court with a statement therein that the respondent was treating the resignation as effective upon the date of filing"). See also State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Perkins , 1988 OK 65, 757 P.2d 825, 827 ("effective date of a resignation is upon filing the resignation with the Executive Director").

      5 O.S.2011, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 8.2:
      Upon receipt of the required affidavit, the Commission shall file it with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may enter an order approving the resignation pending disciplinary proceedings. A lawyer who so resigns shall only be permitted to apply for reinstatement after the lapse of five (5) years and under the provisions of Rule 11.

      See , e.g. , In re Morgan , 2014 OK 110, ¶¶ 4-5, 340 P.3d 1, 2-3 (application for reinstatement was timely when based upon Court's determination of the effective date of resignation pending discipline).

      5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 8.1(c) (no application for reinstatement may be filed prior to the lapse of five years from the effective date of the resignation); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Bourland , 2001 OK 12, ¶ 12, 19 P.3d 289 ; In re Reinstatement of Hird , 2001 OK 28, 21 P.3d 1043. See supra note 10, stating 5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 8.2.

      5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, RGDP, Rule 11.1(b); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Heinen , 2003 OK 36, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 708, 709.

      State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Williams , 2009 OK 88, ¶ 2, 228 P.3d 1195 (citing 5 O.S.2001 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, Rule 6.16, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Anton , 2007 OK 84, ¶ 13, 175 P.3d 364, 368 (same); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. O'Neal , 2007 OK 13, ¶ 13, 154 P.3d 1270, 1273--1274 (same).

      State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Carpenter , 1993 OK 86, 863 P.2d 1123, 1128.

      State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Giger , 2003 OK 61, n.17, 72 P.3d 27, 34.

   /S/ CHIEF JUSTICE

¶24 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.


text:
    EDDY v. ANDERSON
    A162867(S066301)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Allowed.


text:
    STATE v. HUNTER, Torrance Alexander
    A160561(A160562)(S066441)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Allowed.


text:
    STAVELAND and FISHER
    A163944(S066424)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Allowed.


text:
    BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC v. REED
    A159598(S064727)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    CENTRAL OREGON LANDWATCH v. CROOK COUNTY
    A167178(S066525)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    CONAHAN, Jeriel Paul v. STATE of Oregon
    A164428(S066434)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DARAMOLA, Abayomi Emmanuel v. STATE of Oregon
    A164145(S066494)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.
    Walters, C. J., and Flynn, J., would allow.


text:
    DAVIS, Devin Blake v. TAYLOR
    A164834(S066575)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. A. D. F.
    A168113(S066541)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. C. M. H.
    A167896(A167897)(A168033)(A168034)(S066520)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. FRARY, Michael Eugene
    A164167(S066394)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. HILLMAN, Eddie Lee
    A166258(S066473)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    ALLEN v. VIERRA
    A166251(S066507)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    COLLICOTT, Phillip v. CAIN
    A163443(S066395)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    COOPER, Michael v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION
    A163575(S066522)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    CUDDIE, Peter Joseph v. TAYLOR
    A164415(S066408)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. R. A. H., Jr.
    A167879(A167880)(A167881)(S066501)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. R. L. D.
    A168078(A168079)(S066497)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DROWN, Robyn Kay v. PERSSON
    A161107(S066375)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    EPPS, BY AND THROUGH his guardian ad litem, Molly S. EPPS v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
    A166532(S066450)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    KYEI v. SWIFT
    A165878(S066532)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    PENA v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    A164924(S066374)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    SMITH, Shawn Cleveland v. CAIN
    A163653(S066506)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. COCHRAN, Kyle Nickolaus
    A164243(A164244)(S066539)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. ESTABROOK, Robert Erle
    A164332(S066421)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. MARLATT, Jeani Elyse
    A165451(S066572)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. SALAZAR, Jordan Michael
    A164001(S066418)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. STICKLEY, Casey Earl
    A163719(S066485)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    DISCOUNT TOWING AND RECOVERY v. OREGON STATE POLICE
    A164996(S066462)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. DORN-PRIVETT, Erin Elizabeth
    A164493(S066415)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    MURPHY, Robert Doyle v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION
    A166771(S066495)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. CONN, Dustan Allen
    A165994(S066481)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. LOUIS, Damajio Rahan
    A162966(A162967)(S066389)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    SWIGERT v. HAMANN
    A163969(5066508)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. DEANDA-MORENO, Armando
    A163126(A163127)(S066500)
    Supreme Court of Oregon.
    April 18, 2019
    Review Denied.


text:
    STATE v. EATON, William Michael
    A166952
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. BECERRA, Jessie Gregory, aka Becerra, Jessie G.
    A165723
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    NEIGHBORS FOR SMART GROWTH et al v. WASHINGTON COUNTY et al
    A169969
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. ABU-NEEL, Omar Suliman
    A167524
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. BRAZEAU, Justin Michael
    A165764
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MOODY, Neoma M.
    A166634
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    ACKERET, Merle Everett, Jr. v. STATE of Oregon
    A167495
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. FREY, David Allen, aka Frey, David A.
    A166209
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. LACKEY, Jason Abraham
    A164981
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MYERS, Stacey Marie
    A165437 A165438
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. PALMA-CASTRO, Sergio Mario, aka Castro, Sergio Mario, aka Castro, Sergio Mario Palma, aka Palma, Sergio Mario
    A164389
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. VERDUGO, Andrew Douglas
    A166262
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    BELL, Larry D. v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION
    A165864
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    CULBERTSON, Karl Clinton v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION
    A168062
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    RUSH, Kanoris v. CAUSEY
    A168654
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. BLASKA, Jamie Wayne, aka Blaska, James Wayne
    A166586
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. BUCKLEY, James Allen
    A166812
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. CASSIDY, Christopher Robert
    A165927 A165928
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. CATER, Doreen Elizabeth, aka Cater, Doreen
    A165787 A165788
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. GALAN-SANCHEZ, Santiago
    A166696
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. GERMANY, Michael Glenn
    A167506
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. GLENN, Melree Larea, aka Glenn, Melree Larae
    A166554
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. HITE, Melissa Nicole
    A166465
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. JAKLEWICZ, Donald Lee
    A167627
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. KNAPP, Jeffrey Scott
    A166823
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MAY, Christopher Alexander
    A164697
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MCLNTOSH, Elizabeth Rae, aka Mclntosh, Elizabeth, aka Mclntosh, Elizabeth R.
    A166368
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MORGAN, Tammy
    A165467
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. NEWMANN, Rico Carlos, aka Newman, Rico Carlos
    A165835
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. PARKER, Jeffrey Scott
    A165808
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. PETERSEN, Leslie Ward
    A168071
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. POLKEY, Audry Yolanda
    A165743
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. SALAZAR, Oscar Enrique Mejia
    A167029 A167030
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. SIMPSON, Brian Gerald
    A166744
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    NICITA AND SPADY et al v. CITY OF OREGON CITY et al
    A169961
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. SKALOS, Jodi Lynn, aka Conklin, Jodi Lynn
    A164967
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MORRIS, Alyson Nicol
    A165734
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. SOUTER, Michael Germaine
    A165818
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 10, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    RIVERVIEW ABBEY MAUSOLEUM COMPANY v. CITY OF PORTLAND et al
    A169938
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    BAILEY, Dominic Antonio v. AMSBERRY
    A165191
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, The , fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Holders of the Certificates, First Horizon Mortgage Pass-through Certificates Series Fhams 2005-FA7, by First Horizon Home Loans v. BROWN et al and Reeves, occupants of the property and Styler, as trustee of the Angels Farm Trust dated September 28, 2010 et al
    Brown et al and Reeves v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. et al
    A167244
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    BERKLEY REGIONAL SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. IRONSHORE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY et al
    A164069
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF A. K. M., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    State v. A. K. M.
    A167170
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF C. W. F, aka C. F, a Child.
    Department of Human Services v. L. F, aka L. G. F./J. R. B.
    In the Matter of K. T. F, aka K. F., a Child.
    Department of Human Services v. L. F., aka L. G. F./J. R. B.
    A169272 A169742 A169273 A169290
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF M. C., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
    State v. M. C.
    A167766
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the COMPENSATION OF ARVIDSON, Danny E., Claimant.
    Arvidson v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation et al
    A166091
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Allie Mae KILPATRICK-BROWN, Deceased.
    Brown/Tyler v. InTRUSTment Northwest, Inc., Personal Representative of the Estate of
    Allie Mae Kilpatrick-Brown, Deceased
    A166211 A167174
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF: EUBANK and Taylor
    A168215
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC v. COWAN et al. and Reeves
    A166747
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. BEADZ, Christopher Stephen
    A165364
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. FOWLER, Dammien Charles
    A165501
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. HARVEY, Mickey L.
    A166117
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. HUGHES, Clifford Alan
    A166711
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. LAMB, Mack Douglas
    A165408
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. MCDONOUGH, Jason Edward
    A164872
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. SHAMPANG, Trapper Daniel
    A165545
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. STULL, Howard Richard
    A165384
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    GALSTAUN, George v. KELLY
    A165449
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF E. G., a Child.
    Department of Human Services v. J. A. G.-B., aka J. A. B., aka J. A. G. et al
    In the Matter of S. L. G., a Child.
    Department of Human Services v. J. A. G.-B., aka J. A. B., aka J. A. G. et al
    A169131 A169132 A169133 A169134
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF WACKER and Wacker
    A164648
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    LEE, Veda Marie v. PERSSON
    A166817
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. GAGE, Joseph Chevy, aka Gage, Joseph
    A165306
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    STATE v. WOOD, Heather Chen
    A165629
    Court of Appeals of Oregon.
    April 17, 2019
    Affirmed without opinion.


text:
    PINNEY v. CARRERA
    20190117
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 30, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    SALT LAKE CITY CORP v. Mark HAIK and Pearl Raty
    20190091
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 24, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    TRAPNELL v. LEGACY RESORTS
    20190048
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 24, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    STATE v. MARQUINA
    20180994
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 18, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    DAVIDSON v. BAIRD
    20190105
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 24, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. BELL
    20190043
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 27, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    BENSON v. LABOR COMMISSION
    20190137
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 26, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    IN RE B. T. B.
    20180805
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 18, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted.


text:
    STATE v. ALIRES
    20190077
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 11, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. BOWDREY
    20190085
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 26, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. BILEK
    20180964
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 6, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. DOYLE
    20190078
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 6, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    IN RE A. H. & K. H.
    20190082
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    April 23, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. ROBINSON
    20190112
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 26, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. ROBERTS
    20190113
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 26, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.


text:
    STATE v. MARTINEZ
    20190086
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    March 6, 2019
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied.