author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    TEXAS HEALTH INSURANCE RISK POOL, Petitioner, v. Sharon B. SIGMUNDIK, Benjamin J. Sigmundik and Zachary P. Sigmundik, as the Sole and Legal Heirs and Beneficiaries of Thomas M. Sigmundik, Deceased, and/or of the Estate of Thomas M. Sigmundik, Deceased; Otto L. Monecke and Virginia L. Monecke, Respondents.
    No. 09-0772.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    May 28, 2010.

      Larry Parks, Mitchell Williams Long Burner, Austin, TX, for Petitioner.
    Jeff Rex Steinhauser, Attorney at Law, Flatonia, TX, Peggy S. Supak, Fayette County Courthouse, La Grange, TX, Max E. Roesch, Max E. Roesch, P.C., Giddings, TX, Gordon A. Holloway, Giorgio ‘George’ Caflisch, Holloway, Rowley & Caflisch, P.C., Houston, TX, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This health-insurance subrogation case tens on two rudimentary principles:

1. A trial court abuses its discretion when it invokes the equitable “made whole” doctrine to circumvent a party’s contractual right to subrogation.
2. A trial court may not cut a party out of a settlement where the settlement purports to resolve that party’s claim, and the party participated in the proceedings and requested an allocation.

As the court of appeals’ decision runs counter to both these principles, we reverse its judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Thomas Sigmundik was injured in an oilfield explosion and spent 52 days in the hospital before succumbing to his extensive injuries. His insurer, the Texas Health Insurance Risk Pool, paid $336,874.71 in medical expenses resulting from the accident.

After Sigmundik’s death, his wife filed a negligence action on behalf of herself, her two minor sons, and Sigmundik’s estate. The Risk Pool intervened, arguing it was “subrogated to the rights of Mr. Sigmun-dik and his estate” based on. this express subrogation provision in Sigmundik’s health-insurance policy:

We will be subrogated to all rights of recovery which any person may have against another party for all benefits paid by the Pool which were incurred by the Insured Person as a result of the negligence or misconduct of another party. Our right to repayment shall be a lien against any recovery by the Insured Person whether it be by judgment, settlement, or otherwise.

The negligence suit settled for $800,000. Mrs. Sigmundik signed on behalf of all settling plaintiffs (herself, her two children, and the estate), but the settlement agreement did not specify how the funds would be allocated. The trial court held a bench trial to allocate the settlement and awarded the entire $800,000 to the Sig-mundik family, finding it had not been “made whole” by the settlement. The trial court concluded that equitable principles apply to the Risk Pool’s subrogation claim and that where “a subrogation claim[] works an injustice, it shall not be allowed.” For support, it cited our decision in Ortiz v. Great Southern Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 597 S.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Tex.1980), which held an insurer may be denied equitable subrogation when the injured parties are not “made whole”—that is, fully compensated. Noting the Risk Pool’s solid financial position, the trial court found that allowing subrogation “would work a financial hardship” on Sig-mundik’s family, but disallowing subrogation “would not work a financial hardship” on the Risk Pool. The trial court thus allocated everything to Sigmundik’s widow and two children and nothing to the estate (and consequently nothing to the Risk Pool, which as subrogee contractually stood in Sigmundik’s shoes). The court of appeals affirmed. 315 S.W.3d 67.

Subrogation comes in three varieties: equitable, contractual, and statutory. Shortly before the court of appeals issued its decision in this case, we issued Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex.2007), which held that the “made whole” doctrine does not apply where, as here, “the parties’ agreed contract provides a clear and specific right of subrogation.” Id. at 651. As we indicated in Fortis Benefits, equitable doctrines conform to contractual and statutory mandates, not vice versa. Id. at 648. We further clarified that “contract-based sub-rogation rights should be governed by the parties’ express agreement and not invalidated by equitable considerations that might control by default in the absence of an agreement.” Id. at 650.

Fortis Benefits eliminated the basis for the trial court’s judgment in this case, as Ortiz dealt with equitable subrogation, not, as here, contractual subrogation. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, appearing to rely in part on the “made whole” doctrine but without expressly claiming to. 315 S.W.3d at 70 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion since there were not enough settlement funds to compensate Sigmundik’s wife and sons, and thus, in the words of Sigmundik’s wife, “there is nothing left for [the estate]” (alteration in original)).

Under Fortis Benefits, the “made whole” doctrine is inapplicable in this case. The Risk Pool has a contract-based lien on any recovery by Sigmundik’s estate, and the amount of repayment sought, $336,874.71, was not contested. The rub is this: the contractual “lien against any recovery” means nothing if there is no recovery by the insured—that is, if the estate receives no part of the settlement. Thus, if the settling parties are the three Sig-mundik family members and Thomas Sig-mundik’s estate, any amount allocated to Thomas Sigmundik would not go to his wife and children but to the Risk Pool as subrogee. Here, the trial court avoided the Risk Pool’s subrogation right by directing all the settlement funds to the family and none to the estate.

It was improper to cut the Risk Pool out of a settlement to which it, through the estate, has a valid claim, just as it would be an error to cut out any other estate creditor or recipient in this situation. As in all cases tried to the bench, the trial court was authorized to decide disputed issues of fact and law, see Tex.R. Civ. P. 262, however, a trial court abuses its discretion by failing to follow guiding rules and principles. Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex.2009). Here, the trial court could not cut the estate completely out of the settlement just because the estate’s main beneficiary is an insurance company or, more to the point, because the trial court believed the surviving family needed the money more than the insurer. This is especially true where beneficiaries and representatives are trying to remove others with an interest in the estate, notwithstanding fiduciary and other obligations owed by those asserting control of the estate. See, e.g., Tex. Prob.Code § 37 (providing that if someone dies intestate, his estate vests immediately in his heirs at law, but “shall still be liable and subject in their hands to the payment of the debts of the intestate.... ”). In this context, the “made whole” doctrine has no application; it was not a valid basis for the judgment.

The Sigmundiks’ other argument in support of the judgment is likewise erroneous. The court of appeals found that the Risk Pool failed to carry its burden of establishing that settlement funds should be allocated to the estate. 315 S.W.3d 67. However, the Risk Pool provided such evidence. The Risk Pool requested the full amount of the medical expenses, $336,874.71, beginning with its first petition in intervention. The Risk Pool provided extensive medical records and testimony to support both the expenses it requested and the damages suffered by Sigmundik; that evidence was uncontroverted. Even Sigmundik’s wife testified that his injuries—for which the Risk Pool could seek recovery—amounted to “[exceedingly more than” one million dollars. In short, there was evidence that the damages to Sigmundik exceeded the amount of the $800,000 settlement. There can be no doubt that all of the parties here—Sigmundik’s wife and children, but also Sigmundik himself (and thus his estate)-—suffered substantial injuries. Trial-court discretion is not boundless and cannot insulate a decision to allocate none of the $800,000 settlement to Sigmundik when the court knew the facts surrounding his severe burns and trauma, his suffering and numerous surgeries, and his death 52 days later.

The Sigmundiks also argue that the Risk Pool lacked standing to bring its claim via the estate. However, the Risk Pool asserts it is entitled to a distribution of the settlement funds since its contract gives it a lien on any judgment recovered by the estate; it does not claim to be bringing an action on behalf of the estate. Moreover, the Sigmundiks asserted their claims “as the sole and legal heirs and beneficiaries of Thomas M. Sigmundik, deceased and/or of the Estate of Thomas M. Sigmundik, deceased.” We have held that heirs in a survival action may sue on behalf of the decedent’s estate if they allege there is no administration pending and none is necessary, which was done here. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 850-51 (Tex.2005); Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Tex.1998). The Risk Pool seeks only to intervene in that action, and has standing to do so. Even if there had been a problem with the Risk Pool’s capacity, the Sigmundiks did not challenge the Risk Pool’s capacity to intervene in the survival action, so that argument has been waived. Tex.R. Civ. P. 93; Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 849 (holding that “a challenge to a party’s capacity must be raised by a verified pleading in the trial court”).

As we noted in Fortis Benefits, “contract rights generally arise from contract language; they do not derive their validity from principles of equity but directly from the parties’ agreement.” 234 S.W.3d at 647. Here, the trial court acknowledged the subrogation provision, quoted it in full, and then denied any distribution of funds based upon the provision. While the trial court was free to exercise some discretion in dividing the settlement funds, it abused its discretion by awarding the Risk Pool nothing. The “made whole” doctrine has no application in this case. Accordingly, in light of our Fortis Benefits decision and without hearing oral argument in this case, we grant the petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand to the trial court to determine what portion of the settlement funds should be allocated to the estate. See Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.

      . The Risk Pool is a quasi-governmental entity that exists to provide affordable insurance to Texans who have pre-existing conditions or other high-risk conditions that might prevent them from obtaining insurance otherwise. See Tex. Ins Code §§ 1506.101, .152.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Justice JOHNSON Justice GREEN,

license: Public Domain

text:
    The STATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. K.E.W., Respondent.
    No. 09-0236.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    Argued Feb. 18, 2010.
    Decided July 2, 2010.

      Donald S. Glywasky, Barry C. Willey, Galveston County Legal Dept., Galveston, TX, for Petitioner.

      Richard Hugh Branson, Attorney at Law, League City, TX, Thomas W. McQuage, Attorney at Law, Galveston, TX, for Respondent.
    Beth Mitchell, Advocacy, Inc., Austin, TX, for amicus curiae Advocacy, Inc.
   Justice JOHNSON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider whether the evidence supporting a court order requiring a mentally ill person to undergo mental health services is legally sufficient. The trial court found that K.E.W. was mentally ill and as a result of that mental illness was likely to cause serious harm to others, and the court ordered him to submit to temporary inpatient mental health services. The court of appeals reversed. It held there was no evidence of a recent overt act tending to confirm that K.E.W. was likely to cause serious harm to others. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s order and reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. We remand to the court of appeals for review of KE.W.’s factual sufficiency issues.

I. Background

On April 17, 2008, K.E.W., who had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was a regular patient of the Gulf Coast Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center (Center), went to the Center for an appointment. While he was there he told his treating physician at the Center, Dr. Pugh, that he had been assigned to impregnate multiple women. K.E.W. would not cooperate with the staff. He paced around the building smoking cigarettes, stated that he wanted to impregnate some of the Center’s female staff, and repeatedly asked for a particular female employee. The staff became concerned enough about his behavior that they isolated the female employee. Dr. Pugh called the police because he believed K.E.W. might be a danger to others. K.E.W. refused to cooperate with the police, and they took him to the emergency room at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston. There, K.E.W. told the treating physicians that he had been chosen to help populate a new and better race of humans. He said there was a group of women he planned to find and impregnate, including his adult stepdaughter. He had written plans detailing his mission and papers with the names of several women whom he believed he needed to impregnate. He expressed his belief that some of the women he was seeking had been at or near the hospital when he was brought there, but they had departed by plane and time travel. He became agitated and angry and accused the hospital staff of withholding information about the women’s whereabouts. He insisted that he needed to leave the hospital to accomplish his mission.

The State sought court orders to commit K.E.W. for temporary mental health services and to administer psychoactive medication. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034. Section 574.034 of the Texas Health and Safety Code is entitled “Order for Temporary Mental Health Services” and provides, in relevant part:

(a) The judge may order a proposed patient to receive court-ordered temporary inpatient mental health services only if the judge or jury finds, from clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1) the proposed patient is mentally ill; and
(2) as a result of that mental illness the proposed patient:
(A) is likely to cause serious harm to himself;
(B) is likely to cause serious harm to others; or
(C) is:
(i) suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress;
(ii) experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of the proposed patient’s ability to function independently, which is exhibited by the proposed patient’s inability, except for reasons of indigence, to provide for the proposed patient’s basic needs, including food, clothing, health, or safety; and
(iii) unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment.
(c) If the judge or jury finds that the proposed patient meets the commitment criteria prescribed by Subsection (a), the judge or jury must specify which criterion listed in Subsection (a)(2) forms the basis for the decision.
(d) To be clear and convincing under Subsection (a), the evidence must include expert testimony and, unless waived, evidence of a recent overt act or a continuing pattern of behavior that tends to confirm:
(1) the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others; or
(2) the proposed patient’s distress and the deterioration of the proposed patient’s ability to function.

Id. § 574.034 (emphasis added).

At the non-jury hearing on its commitment motion, the State presented KE.W.’s medical records, testimony from two Center employees, and testimony from two doctors who examined him at the hospital. K.E.W. presented no evidence.

The trial court committed K.E.W. to Austin State Hospital for inpatient care not to exceed ninety days. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that K.E.W. was mentally ill and as a result of that mental illness he (1) was likely to cause serious harm to others and (2) was suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress; was experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of his ability to function independently, which was exhibited by his inability, except for reasons of indigence, to provide for his basic needs, including food, clothing, health, or safety; and was unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether to submit to treatment. See 276 S.W.3d 686, 691-92.

Immediately following the commitment hearing, the trial court heard and granted the State’s application for an order to administer psychoactive medication. The trial court based its order on findings that KE.W.’s mental illness rendered him incapable of making medical treatment decisions and that such treatments would be in KE.W.’s best interest.

K.E.W. appealed. The court of appeals determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that K.E.W. was mentally ill but reversed the order for mental health services. Id. at 699-700. It held there was no evidence of an overt act or continuing pattern of behavior that tended to confirm either deterioration of K.E.W.’s ability to function independently, id. at 697, or that he was likely to cause serious harm to others. Id. at 699; see Tex. Health & Safety Code § 573.034(d). Because the order authorizing the administration of psychoactive medications depended on the existence of a valid order for mental health services, the court of appeals also reversed the order to administer psychoactive medication. 276 S.W.3d at 700.

We granted the State’s petition for review.

The State urges that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings and orders. Specifically, it argues that (1) the court of appeals erred by applying an elevated standard of evi-dentiary review; (2) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that K.E.W. committed an overt act that tended to confirm the likelihood he would cause serious harm to others; and (3) because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the commitment order, both the trial court’s commitment order and its order that K.E.W. be administered psychoactive medication should be affirmed.

K.E.W. does not challenge the finding that he is mentally ill. He urges us to affirm the court of appeals’ decision as to the standard of review and the legal insufficiency of the evidence. K.E.W. agrees that disposition of the commitment order controls disposition of the order to administer psychoactive medications.

II. Discussion

A.Jurisdiction

The ninety-day period for which K.E.W. was ordered to receive services has expired. Nevertheless, we have jurisdiction. The expiration of the time for which he was ordered to receive services does not require the appeal to be dismissed for mootness. State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980).

B.Standard of Review

The State argues that Section 574.034’s clear and convincing evidence requirement does not alter the appropriate standard of review. It urges that the evidence was legally sufficient so long as there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s challenged finding. We disagree.

Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979) (per curiam). Evidence that merely exceeds a scintilla is not legally sufficient when the burden of proof is clear and convincing. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-65 (Tex.2002); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex.2004). In evaluating evidence for legal sufficiency under a clear and convincing standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We resolve disputed fact questions in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not have done so. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex.2005); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

C.Order for Temporary

Civil Commitment

1. Proof required

In regard to the issue urged by the State, the trial court, to commit K.E.W., was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that as a result of his mental illness, K.E.W. was likely to cause serious harm to others. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034(a)(2)(B). The statute does not prescribe what evidence the State must present to carry its burden, except that it must include expert testimony and evidence of a recent overt act that “tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to ... others.” Id. § 574.034(d)(1). The court of appeals interpreted the latter as requiring evidence of “a substantial threat of harm, based on actual dangerous behavior, manifested by some overt act or threats in the past.” 276 S.W.3d at 695. The court further stated that evidence of “possible” or “potential” harm to others does not satisfy the State’s burden. Id. at 694. Arranging previous court of appeals’ cases into three categories — those involving “Per Se Overt Acts of Dangerousness,” those involving “Ambiguous Conduct,” and those involving “No Substantially Dangerous Conduct” — K.E.W. urges the court of appeals’ judgment be affirmed on the basis that courts of appeals have consistently required an “overt act” be proven by evidence of actual harmful conduct demonstrating a threat of imminent harm to others. The State, on the other hand, urges that the statute does not require evidence of an act that either is actually harmful itself or that demonstrates harm to others is imminent. We agree with the State.

In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s language. Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). We rely on the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition, is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008). Language in a statute is presumed to have been selected and used with care, and every word or phrase in a statute is presumed to have been intentionally used with a meaning and purpose. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex.2008); Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.1985).

First, we address the “overt act” requirement. The phrase is not defined in the Health and Safety Code. Accordingly, we read it in context and construe the term according to common usage. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a). When something is “overt,” it is generally considered to be open and observable, rather than concealed or secret. See Black’s Law DictionaRY 1137 (8th ed. 2004); WebsteR’s New UniveRSal Unabridged Dictionary 1386 (1996). And an “act” is something that is done or performed. See Black’s at 26; Webster’s at 19. Although this Court has not construed the term in the civil commitment context, courts from other jurisdictions have said it can include both physical acts and verbal statements. See, e.g., In re Mental Health of E.M., 265 Mont. 211, 875 P.2d 355, 356-57 (1994) (holding that a verbal statement of a threatening nature can constitute an overt act within the context of civil commitment cases). We do not see any indication the Legislature intended to limit the term “overt act” to physical conduct as opposed to any other action objectively perceptible, including verbal statements. Words can express intent just as physical actions can. For example, a person saying he is going to hit someone can reflect intent to do so, just as the physical act of making a fist and drawing back can reflect such intent. We conclude that a proposed patient’s words are overt acts within the meaning of Section 574.034(d). Further, when the words expressed by a person that has a mental illness foreshadow violence, the Legislature has permitted the law’s intervention to prevent serious injury to others. Stated another way, statements made by a proposed patient such as K.E.W. can be relevant both to determining whether he is mentally ill and also to predicting what actions he might or will take in the future as a result of his mental illness. The court of appeals stated that “potential” harm is not sufficient to deprive a person of his liberty and the threat of harm must be substantial. 276 S.W.3d at 694-95 (citing

J.M. v. State, 178 S.W.3d 185, 193 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); State ex rel. L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.); In re Interest and Protection of C.O., 65 S.W.3d 175, 181-82 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.); Broussard v. State, 827 S.W.2d 619, 622 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (stating that “[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a ‘potential danger’ to others is insufficient to support a commitment”)). Echoing that statement, K.E.W. argues that evidence of an overt act within the meaning of the statute must show a clear and present danger of imminent harm to others. He urges that to the extent his words can be considered evidence, the requirement that they show imminent harm to others accords with the United States Supreme Court’s holdings that speech is “protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). K.E.W.’s argument misses the mark.

The statute does not require that the overt act demonstrate serious harm to others is imminent if the proposed patient is not committed; its language is broad enough to permit commitment even if the person’s oral threat does not cause physical harm. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034. Rather, the statute requires evidence of an overt act that “tends to confirm” the “likelihood” of serious harm to others. Id. § 574.034(d). In determining the meaning of the statutory language, we presume its words were selected with care and used with purpose. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d at 599. “Likelihood” connotes more than mere possibility or conjecture and is synonymous with “probability.” Webster’s at 1114; see Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 681 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).

Some appellate courts, including the court of appeals in this case, have held that the proposed patient must have engaged in “actual dangerous behavior” manifested by an overt act or threats. See, e.g., 276 S.W.3d at 695 (citing J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; Taylor v. State, 671 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ)). This proposition seems to have originated with the court of appeals’ analysis in Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 948-51 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). In Moss, physicians testified that their diagnoses were based on statements the proposed patient made to them, but they did not reveal the contents of those statements or explain why they believed she was dangerous. Id. The Moss court stated that an order for involuntary commitment must be supported by the recommendation of a physician and proof of the factual information on which the recommendation was based. Id. at 950. We do not read Moss as requiring proof of a substantial threat of future harm founded on actual, dangerous behavior. In any event, after Moss was decided, the Legislature specified both the criteria by which a person can be ordered to submit to mental health services and certain elements of evidence required by the clear and convincing eviden-tiary standard in such proceedings. Act of April 20, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 47, § 50, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 241 (current version recodified at Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034); see also House Study Group, Bill Analysis, C.S. S.B. 435, 68th Leg., R.S., 4 (1983). The statute applicable to this case does not require evidence of a recent overt act that by itself proves the likelihood a proposed patient will cause serious harm to others. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034(d). It requires only that the overt act “tends to confirm” the likelihood of serious harm. Id. “Tends” means “to have leaning,” “to contribute to,” or “have a more or less direct bearing or effect.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1507 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “tend” as to be disposed toward something; to serve, contribute, or conduce in some degree or way; to have more or less a direct bearing or effect; and to be directed or have a tendency to an end, object, or purpose); Webster’s at 1955 (defining “tend” as “to be disposed or inclined in action, operation, or effect to do something”); see also Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (stating that in determining whether non-accomplice evidence tends to connect a defendant to the offense, “the evidence must simply link the accused in some way to the commission of the crime and show that rational jurors could conclude that this evidence sufficiently tended to connect [the accused] to the offense” (quoting Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.2008))); Nash v. State, 61 Tex.Crim. 259, 134 S.W. 709, 717-21 (Tex.Crim.App.1911) (defining the word “tend” as “[t]o stretch, extend, direct one’s course; to be directed as to any end, object or purpose; to aim; to have or give a leaning” and stating that “if the circumstances lead toward, or tend toward, the defendant as the party who committed the offense, and show the truth of the prosecutrix, this would be all the law required”). Accordingly, a recent overt act by a proposed patient “tends to confirm” that the patient poses a likelihood of serious harm to others within the meaning of Section 573.034(d) if the overt act is to some degree probative of a finding that serious harm is probable, even though the overt act itself may not be dangerous. Such a construction honors the statute’s language and the Legislature’s attempt to fairly balance the rights of a proposed patient, the difficulties in predicting future behavior of mentally ill persons, and the community’s interest in protection from persons who are mentally ill and who, by reason of their illness, may commit future harmful acts against others. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-30, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).

In sum, the statute requires evidence of a recent act by the proposed patient, either physical or verbal, that can be objectively perceived and that is to some degree probative of a finding that serious harm to others is probable if the person is not treated. The overt act itself need not be of such character that it alone would support a finding of probable serious harm to others. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 573.034(d)(1).

Keeping the foregoing in mind, we next review the evidence presented at the commitment hearing.

2. The Commitment Hearing

An employee of the Gulf Coast Center testified that he was present when K.E.W. came to the Center on April 17, 2008. According to the employee, K.E.W. appeared to be extremely paranoid, was difficult to redirect, and asked numerous times for a certain female staff member who worked there. The staff became concerned enough to place the female staff member “in the back behind a closed door” until K.E.W. could be escorted from the Center. The employee further testified that K.E.W. refused to cooperate with the staff, paced around the building, and refused to calm down or stand still. As a result of K.E.W.’s behavior the police were called, but when they arrived, he still refused to cooperate.

A counselor from the Center testified that according to the medical records, K.E.W. said “he wanted to get some Gulf Coast Center women pregnant.” She testified that he was a regular patient of the Center — “[h]e is on our Ag team, the highest level of services you will see” — and that the Center employees recommended he be committed to Austin State Hospital.

Dr. Ortiz, one of KE.W.’s treating psychiatrists at the hospital, testified that she had seen K.E.W. daily during the week preceding the hearing and that during his stay at the hospital he would become agitated regarding his belief about the women. When he was in the emergency room he was inconsolable because he “experienced” the knowledge that some of the women that he was seeking were in the emergency room, that he had just missed them, and that staff members in the emergency room were withholding information from him about the women’s whereabouts as a conspiracy to hide them from him. During the times Dr. Ortiz interacted with K.E.W., he became agitated, was intrusive, and “invaded [her] space.” There were additional times when K.E.W. became very upset because he believed Dr. Ortiz knew where the women were located.

Dr. Ortiz expressed concern about two particular behaviors of K.E.W. as a potential danger to others. One of the potential dangers was non-consensual sexual interaction with the specific women he sought. While Dr. Ortiz acknowledged K.E.W. did not state that he intended to impregnate anyone against her will and to her knowledge K.E.W. did not directly proposition a particular staff member or patient at the hospital, she explained that K.E.W. was very intrusive and she did not know, given his state of mind, if he would understand that “no” means “no.”

Dr. Stone, another of KE.W.’s treating psychiatrists at the hospital, evaluated K.E.W. and stated that K.E.W. had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. K.E.W. told Dr. Stone on several occasions that he was on a mission to create a superior race, which involved tracking down and impregnating certain women. Dr. Stone stated that K.E.W. carried papers with him that detailed his intent to carry out his plans and that “there are several names that he has that he claims are the names of the women that he wishes to impregnate.” Dr. Stone testified that K.E.W. did not exhibit any threatening behavior at the hospital, but that because of KE.W.’s firm belief in his delusion that he needed to locate and impregnate certain women, he could harm others. He opined that K.E.W. was a danger to this group of women and expressed concern that K.E.W. would act on his delusions if he found a female who he believed was promised to him. Dr. Stone also testified that K.E.W. is a danger to women in general because K.E.W. might mistake any woman for one of the women he believed was promised to him. He testified, “In fact on the unit we’re very careful when female medical staff go to talk to him to keep the door open. Not because he is homicidal, but in his confused belief he could believe a woman is there and someone promised to him that does want to be impregnated.”

Dr. Stone recommended that K.E.W. receive antipsychotic medication and treatment at Austin State Hospital.

3. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

The record demonstrates that after K.E.W. arrived for his appointment at the Gulf Coast Center, he stated that he wanted to “get some Gulf Coast Center women pregnant” and that he had an assignment to impregnate multiple women; vehemently insisted on contacting a certain female Center staff member; and interfered with female staff despite being directed otherwise.

After he was taken to the hospital, K.E.W. said on several occasions that there were women he needed to track down and impregnate. He had written plans detailing his mission and had several names of women he was searching for. His treating physicians at the hospital testified that he would become very agitated, intrusive, and angry regarding his beliefs, accused the hospital staff of conspiring against him and withholding information about the women’s whereabouts, and insisted that he needed to leave the hospital to accomplish his mission.

In holding that the evidence failed to establish a recent overt act that tended to confirm K.E.W. was likely to cause serious harm to others, the court of appeals relied heavily on (1) the fact that the record did not contain the statement K.E.W. made to the female staff member at the Gulf Coast Center who was then isolated by the Center staff or the specific actions taken by K.E.W. that made it necessary to protect her and (2) Dr. Ortiz’s testimony that K.E.W. had not made any sexual advances toward women at the hospital nor had he said that he would impregnate women against their will. 276 S.W.3d at 698-99. However, evidence is not legally insufficient because a fact might have been established by other or more evidence. In evaluating evidence for legal sufficiency, regardless of whether the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing proof, all the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the finding. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Disputed facts are resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and all contrary evidence is disregarded unless a reasonable factfinder could not have done so. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

We agree with the court of appeals that evidence of a proposed patient’s mental illness, without more, does not fulfill the statutory requirement for ordering involuntary inpatient mental health services. But K.E.W.’s statements fall within the kinds of overt conduct the statute’s language makes clear the Legislature considered relevant to a commitment determination. Thus, K.E.W.’s statements regarding his belief that he had an assignment to impregnate specific women, his statements seeking access to the Center’s female worker, the fact that he had written plans detailing his mission and had the names of specific women who he firmly believed he needed to impregnate, and his verbal insistence on searching for the women were all overt acts within the meaning of Section 574.034(d). And the trial court was required to consider those acts in light of his particular mental illness because the statute required a finding that he was mentally ill and that as a result of that mental illness, he was likely to cause serious harm to others. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034(a)(2).

To the extent the concurrence says that statements made by proposed patients must be evaluated in light of the particular words of the statement and the facts of each case, we agree. But we disagree with the proposition that a verbal statement alone cannot suffice as an overt act under the statute. The concurrence agrees only that KE.W.’s conduct in writing down and carrying with him plans to complete his mission and the names of women he was assigned to impregnate constitutes an “overt act ... that tends to confirm ... the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034(d). We, however, believe that his verbal expression of the plan was sufficient under the circumstances to amount to an overt act within the meaning of the statute. Further, we conclude that when his statements and the other evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, as they must be, see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266, there is legally sufficient evidence to support the findings. That is, there is legally sufficient evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that as a result of his mental illness, K.E.W. would likely cause serious harm to others and that recent objectively observable acts by K.E.W. tended to confirm such a finding. See id. § 574.034(d). We sustain the State’s first issue.

D. Order to Administer Psychoactive Medication

After issuing the commitment order, the trial court held a hearing on and granted the State’s order to administer psychoactive medication. The court was authorized to order administration of psychoactive medication only if K.E.W. was under a valid order for temporary or involuntary mental health services. See id. § 574.106(a)(1). K.E.W. agrees that the disposition of the commitment order controls the order to administer psychoactive medications. Because we have determined that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order committing K.E.W. for temporary involuntary mental health services, we also conclude that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order that K.E.W. be administered psychoactive medication.

III. Conclusion

The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s order that K.E.W. be required to undergo temporary inpatient mental health services. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to that court for it to consider KE.W.’s factual sufficiency complaints and for further proceedings.

Justice GREEN filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice WILLETT joined.

Justice LEHRMANN did not participate in the decision.

Justice GREEN,

joined by Justice WILLETT, concurring.

I concur with the Court’s judgment in this case, and in nearly all of its analysis. I write separately to pause, however, on the notion that a verbal statement, by itself, may be an “overt act ... that tends to confirm ... the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others,” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.034(d). Certainly some verbal statements — -verbal threats — may constitute such overt acts, as the Montana Supreme Court held in a case the Court cites. See In re Mental Health of E.M., 265 Mont. 211, 875 P.2d 355, 356-57 (1994). Indeed, what the United States Supreme Court has called “true threats” are treated uniquely even in the First Amendment context, where other liberties are at stake:

“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscriba-ble sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted). By contrast, as the Court states here, “Dr. Ortiz acknowledged K.E.W. did not state that he intended to impregnate anyone against her will and to her knowledge K.E.W. did not directly proposition a particular staff member or patient at the hospital.” 315 S.W.3d at 24-25. Some of KE.W.’s verbal statements in this case may not, by themselves, rise to the level of a verbal threat in my view, at least in the sense described by Black. For instance, “KE.W.’s statement ] regarding his belief that he had an assignment to impregnate specific women” may not rise to the level of a threat if one considers it purely in the abstract. See id. at 26. Therefore, I would leave it as an open question in this case whether any of K.E.W.’s statements, by themselves, constitute an “overt act ... that tends to confirm ... the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others” for purposes of sanctioning “court-ordered temporary inpatient mental health services” under section 574.034.

In this case, I would not address this more difficult question as the Court does by indicating that some of K.E.W.’s verbal statements were “evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that ... recent objectively observable acts by K.E.W. tended to confirm” a finding that “as a result of his mental illness, K.E.W. would likely cause serious harm to others.” In my view, the facts that K.E.W. “had written plans detailing his mission and papers with the names of several women whom he believed he needed to impregnate” and “carried [these] papers with him” meet the overt act requirement. See id. at 18, 25. It is an overt act to write a list of women’s names as well as detailed plans to impregnate them (among other things), or to carry these documents on one’s person and hold them out to those providing one’s medical treatment, as K.E.W. did. Because these were overt acts that tend to confirm the likelihood of danger to others, I agree with the result in this case. My concern is only that in another case, where a verbal statement that does not rise to the level of a verbal threat is the only evidence, a person may be civilly committed for mental health treatment beyond the Legislature’s certain intent.

      . State ex rel. E.E., 224 S.W.3d 791 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); State ex rel. D.C., No. 12-05-00138-CV, 2005 WL 3725079 (Tex.App.-Tyler Jan. 31, 2006, no pet.); D.M. v. State, 181 S.W.3d 903 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); In re K.S., No. 2-03-295-CV, 2004 WL 254267 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2004, no pet.); In re S.E.W., Nos. 14-02-00602-CV, 14-02-00603-CV, 2002 WL 31599910 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 21, 2002, no pet.); Goldwait v. State, 961 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); L.S. v. State, 867 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ); K.L.M. v. State, 735 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); W.L. v. State, 698 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).

      . In re Protection of J.J.K. v. State, Nos. 14-03-003 79-CV, 14-03-003 80-CV, 2003 WL 22996950 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2003, no pet.); G.H. v. State, 96 S.W.3d 629 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); In re State for Interest of P.W., 801 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).

        .State ex rel. L.H., 183 S.W.3d 905 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.); M.S. v. State, 137 S.W.3d 131 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); In re State ex rel. K.D.C., 78 S.W.3d 543 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.); K.T. v. State, 68 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); In re Interest and Protection of C.O., 65 S.W.3d 175 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.); T.G. v. State, 7 S.W.3d 248 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); Broussard v. State, 827 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); In re J.S.C., 812 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).

      . The requirements as to danger to others posed by the proposed patient varies widely in other jurisdictions, with some jurisdictions requiring the danger to others to be imminent while others require the risk to be a substantial risk, a clear and present threat, likely, or a reasonable expectation. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 36-501 (can reasonably be expected to result in serious physical harm); Haw.Rev. Stat. § 334-60.2 (imminently dangerous); Iowa Code § 229.1(17) (is likely to physically injure the person’s self or others); La.Rev. Stat. § 28:2(3) (reasonable expectation of substantial risk of physical harm); Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1401(a) (can reasonably be expected within near future to cause serious injury); Minn.Stat § 253B.02 Subd. 17(2) (presents a clear danger); Mont.Code § 53-21-102(7) (injury or imminent threat thereof); N.M. Stat § 43-l-3(N) (“more likely than not that in the near future” person will cause harm).

      . Moreover, the same standard applies to "court-ordered extended inpatient mental health services.” See Tex Health & Safety Code § 574.035(e) (emphasis added).


text:
    QUIXTAR INC., Petitioner, v. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT TEAM, LLC, d/b/a Team, Respondent.
    No. 09-0345.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    July 2, 2010.

      Richard E. Griffin, Jackson Walker, L.L.P., Houston, David T. Moran, David C. Myers, Mark R. Steiner, Jackson Walker L.L.P., Dallas, Brian S. Loughmiller, Loughmiller Higgins, P.C., McKinney, for Petitioner.
    Clyde M. Siebman, Bryan Hillary Burg, Susan Marie Fisher, Siebman Reynolds Burg Phillips & Smith LLP, Sherman, Homer B. Reynolds, Siebman Reynolds Burg Phillips & Smith LLP, Plano, William M. Boyd, Boyd Veigel, P.C., McKinney, Wm. Charles Bundren, Wm. Charles Bundren & Associates, P.C., Frisco, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

In this case, the trial court dismissed a lawsuit filed in Collin County, Texas between two Michigan businesses based on common law forum non conveniens. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. It agreed that the proposed forum, Michigan, was available and adequate for the lawsuit, but held that the defendant did not meet its burden to show that the private and public interest factors of the forum non conveniens analysis strongly weighed in favor of dismissal. The defendant appealed to this Court. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.

This dispute arose between Quixtar Inc. and Signature Management Team, LLC, d/b/a Team (“Team”). Quixtar is a Virginia corporation with a principal place of business in Michigan. Team is a limited liability company organized in Nevada with a principal place of business in Michigan. Quixtar, a successor to Amway Corporation, is a multi-level marketing corporation that sells products through a network of individual business owners (IBOs). IBOs increase revenue by recruiting new IBOs for Quixtar, and Quixtar promulgates rules regulating IBO recruitment to ensure compliance with Federal Trade Commission regulations pertaining to multi-level marketing businesses.

Team is a “tools company” that sells marketing tools, self-help books, seminars, and motivational speaker appearances to IBOs to assist them in developing their businesses. Quixtar also owns a training system and sells similar tools to IBOs, making it a direct competitor with Team. Leading up to this dispute, Quixtar alleged that Team taught IBOs improper and potentially illegal business-building techniques that put Quixtar’s entire business at risk. The entities met at Quixtar’s headquarters in Michigan on August 9, 2007, to discuss Team’s alleged noncompliance with Quixtar’s rules and potential remedial measures. Quixtar alleges that Team threatened to file a “storm” of litigation initiated by Team-affiliated IBOs if Quix-tar did not capitulate to certain demands, such as waiving non-compete provisions in its contract so that Team founders Orrin Woodward and Chris Brady could recruit IBOs for a separate business endeavor. When they did not resolve their disagreements, Quixtar terminated Woodward and Brady’s IBO contracts and revoked Team’s authorization to sell training materials. The same day, Team-affiliated IBOs filed a class-action lawsuit against Quixtar in California. Over the next several days, Quix-tar sent e-mails to its IBOs. In the e-mails, Quixtar explained the terminations and warned certain Team-affiliated IBOs that their businesses would also be terminated if they continued using Team products. Team-affiliated IBOs filed seventeen lawsuits, including seven in Michigan. Michigan courts repeatedly denied the injunc-tive relief requested by the IBOs, but eventually a court in Collin County, Texas issued a temporary restraining order against Quixtar to prevent Quixtar from initiating any adverse action against Team-affiliated IBOs.

Team initiated suit in Collin County, Texas on September 4, 2007, alleging that Quixtar abused its power by interpreting rules governing IBOs to restrain Team’s trade and business with certain IBOs located in Collin County. It alleges that Quixtar’s e-mail communications were part of its basis for commencing suit. Quixtar filed a motion to dismiss based on the common law forum non conveniens doctrine, arguing that the suit arose from a business dispute centered in Michigan that had no substantial connection to Texas. At the evidentiary hearing on Quixtar’s motion to dismiss, the trial court heard testimony from three Team-affiliated IBOs and the General Counsel of Quixtar’s parent company, Alticor. It granted the motion to dismiss.

The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the forum non conveniens dismissal. It reasoned that “the plaintiffs choice of forum must be respected unless evidence shows the private-interest and public-interest factors strongly favor dismissal in favor of another forum.” 281 S.W.3d 666, 674 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. granted). Though the court agreed that Michigan was an available and adequate forum, it held that Quixtar’s “evidentiary showing under the private-interest factors was weak” and that it “did not show that the public-interest factors, on the whole, strongly favor Michigan as a more appropriate forum for Team’s lawsuit than Texas.” Id.

Quixtar argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the court of appeals erred in reversing the forum non conveniens dismissal. It asserts that the court of appeals’ analysis was flawed, imposing an excessive burden of proof on Quixtar because (1) a nonresident plaintiffs forum choice deserves substantially less deference than a resident plaintiffs, and (2) it improperly required Quixtar to prove that all of the public and private interest factors “strongly” favored dismissal. We address each contention.

The “forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). “It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all the relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its discretion deserves substantial deference.” Id. A trial court commits an abuse of discretion when it acts “without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). And the “mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred.” Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242.

A defendant seeking forum non conveniens dismissal “ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiffs chosen forum.” Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007). However, in In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., this Court explained that the “forum-non-con-veniens doctrine generally affords substantially less deference to a nonresident’s forum choice.” 247 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Tex. 2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252 (upholding dismissal of nonresident plaintiffs forum choice as reasonable — despite existence of an important American interest to prevent faulty manufacturing — where evidence of private interest factors pointed in both directions and public interest factors weighed against the plaintiffs forum choice); Owens Coming v. Caider, 997 S.W.2d 560, 570 (Tex.1999)); see also Sino-chem, 549 U.S. at 430, 127 S.Ct. 1184 (explaining that “the presumption in the plaintiffs favor applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate in such cases is less reasonable” (quotations omitted)). Obviously, this does not mean that a plaintiffs choice of forum deserves no deference. Sino-chem, 549 U.S. at 430,127 S.Ct. 1184. But that a plaintiff is not a Texas resident speaks directly to a defendant’s burden. See id.; In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 n. 10 (5th Cir.2008).

Team argues that we should not defer to Pirelli’s “less deference” language because Pirelli is a plurality opinion and only addressed Texas’s forum non conveniens statute. But Pirelli’s significance should not be dismissed so easily. First, while it addressed Texas’s forum non conveniens statute and not the common law doctrine, the statute has “deep roots in the common law.” Pirelli, 247 S.W.3d at 675. The Pirelli plurality cites to Reyno, a common law forum non conveniens case, for the proposition that a nonresident plaintiffs forum choice deserves “substantially less deference.” Id. (citing Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252). Also, the fact that Pirelli is a plurality opinion does not mean it is of no significance. A majority of the Court agreed that the public and private interest factors from the common law forum non conveniens analysis — known as the Gulf Oil factors — would merit dismissal on common law forum non conveniens grounds and that a nonresident plaintiffs forum choice does not require “the same balancing of interests” as a resident plaintiffs. See id. at 680 (Willett, J., concurring) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947)) (applying the former statute which only enumerated a balancing test for resident plaintiffs’ forum choices). Therefore, Pirelli directly addresses issues in this case.

In addition to Pirelli, precedent from the United States Supreme Court supports the proposition that a defendant’s “heavy burden” applies with “less force” when seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal to a nonresident plaintiffs forum choice. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430, 127 S.Ct. 1184; Reyno, 454 U,S. at 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252; see also Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 697, 70 S.Ct. 861, 94 L.Ed. 1206 (1950) (distinguishing between the forum non conveniens analysis for a plaintiff who is a United States citizen and one who is foreign). Because Texas’s forum non con-veniens statute governs in most situations, we rarely address the common law doctrine. However, we regularly consider United States Supreme Court precedent in both our common law and statutory forum non conveniens cases. See Pirelli, 247 S.W.3d at 675, 677-79; In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.1998); Exxon Corp. v. Choo, 881 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex.1994); Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex.1962).

Here, the court of appeals acknowledged Pirelli, but dismissed it as a plurality opinion and followed language from its opinion in Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). In that case, the court, relying on language from Gulf Oil, declared that courts should rarely disturb a plaintiffs forum choice “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839). The quote from Gulf Oil is accurate, but the plurality opinion in Pirelli and numerous subsequent United States Supreme Court cases apply the “less deference” standard to nonresident plaintiffs’ forum choices. See, e.g., Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255-56, 102 S.Ct. 252; Pirelli 247 S.W.3d at 675.

Team is not a Texas resident. It is organized in Nevada with a principal place of business — like Quixtar- — in Michigan. It claims a connection to Texas because Team-affiliated IBOs reside here, but only one of these IBOs testified to material facts of firsthand knowledge at the evidentiary hearing in the trial court. There are Team-affiliated IBOs all over the world- — including in Michigan — that could supply substantially the same testimony. As a result, the presumption that Team filed in Texas as a matter of convenience applies with less force and deserves “substantially less deference” than it would if Team were a Texas resident. See Pirelli, 247 S.W.3d at 675; see also Carter, 997 S.W.2d at 582 (recognizing the Legislature’s legitimate interest in preventing forum-shopping through retroactive application of an amendment to the forum non conveniens statute). There is a connection to Texas when one of the parties is a Texas resident and at least some justification for the burden to Texans of providing judicial resources for the dispute. There is also normally less concern about forum-shopping when a Texas plaintiff files suit in a Texas court. See Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. Schichau-Unterweser, A.G., 955 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir.1992). Therefore, Quixtar’s burden of proof is less stringent than if Team were a Texas resident. And the court of appeals’ reliance on Sarieddine erroneously influenced its entire forum non conveniens analysis by placing an excessive burden of proof on Quixtar.

Next, Quixtar alleges that the court of appeals further placed an excessive burden of persuasion on it, contrary to our opinion in In re General Electric Co., by requiring it to prove that each of the Gulf Oil factors strongly favored dismissal. See generally In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 681 (Tex.2008). Team argues that the court of appeals did not place an extraordinary burden of proof on Quixtar, but that Quixtar was simply unable to meet its burden of proof to justify a forum non conveniens dismissal in the trial court. It also argues that General Electric does not apply because it is a statutory forum non conveniens case. We agree that General Electric does not offer much guidance because there is minimal discussion relevant to common law forum non conveniens. See id. We conclude that the court of appeals did improperly require Quixtar to prove that each Gulf Oil factor strongly favored dismissal, an extremely weighty burden given the circumstances of this case.

The “central focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience.” Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249, 102 S.Ct. 252. The well-known Gulf Oil factors direct courts to consider both public and private interest considerations in forum non conveniens dismissals. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839. Private considerations include: (1) the “relative ease of access to sources of proof’; (2) the “availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses”; (3) the “possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action”; (4) the “enforceability of a judgment” once obtained; and (5) “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. Public considerations include: (1) “[a]d-ministrative difficulties ... for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin”; (2) the burden of “jury duty ... that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation”; (3) “local interest in having localized controversies decided at home”; and (4) avoiding conflicts of law issues. Id. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839.

In Reyno, the United States Supreme Court purposefully refused to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion” in these cases because “ ‘[e]ach case turns on its facts.”’ 454 U.S. at 249, 102 S.Ct. 252 (quoting Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 557, 66 S.Ct. 284, 90 L.Ed. 311 (1946)). If “central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the flexibility that makes it so valuable.” Id. at 249-50, 102 S.Ct. 252. In the same manner, requiring an “extensive investigation” to produce evidence for the dismissal hearing “would defeat the purpose” of the request for this type of dismissal altogether. Id. at 258, 102 S.Ct. 252 (explaining that it is not necessary for defendants to “submit affidavits identifying witnesses they would call and the testimony these witnesses would provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum”). Obviously, there needs to be enough information “to enable the District Court to balance the parties’ interests.” Id. at 258-59, 102 S.Ct. 252 (holding that an affidavit identifying witnesses the defendant planned to call if the trial was held in Scotland was sufficient proof to satisfy the defendants’ forum non conveniens burden; the affidavits presented did not identify the substance of each proposed witnesses’ testimony). And we do not require detailed quantification of costs. See id.; see also Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317 (dismissing the need to quantify travel expenses because of the “obvious conclusion” that travel distance from home means time away from work, food and lodging expenses, and similar costs) (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 204-05 (5th Cir.2004)).

Quixtar presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that the private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal. Both entities’ principal places of business are in Michigan; a key meeting leading up to this dispute occurred in Michigan; and the vast majority of evidence that would be produced and key witnesses that would testify at trial are located in Michigan. In contrast, Team argues that the case should proceed to trial in Collin County because Team-affiliated IBOs reside there whose testimony is material for trial. At the evidentiary hearing, Team presented evidence of three IBOs who testified that it would be inconvenient for them to travel to Michigan for trial, only one of which appeared to have material, firsthand knowledge of events leading up to Team filing this lawsuit.

Despite recognizing that Quixtar identified sixteen important witnesses residing in Michigan and that an “overwhelming majority” of records that it intended to use in the lawsuit were maintained in Michigan, the court of appeals determined the evidentiary showing was “weak.” 281 S.W.3d at 673-74. It held that Quixtar did not identify witnesses unwilling to appear in Texas that could not be compelled by process to do so, that Quixtar did not quantify the additional expense for procuring attendance of its witnesses, and that the location of Quixtar’s records was not “probative evidence” because it did not demonstrate the volume or how difficult it would be to transport them to Texas. Id.

However, parties do not need to quantify the extra costs of litigating in an undesirable forum in detail for a forum non conveniens dismissal. They only must provide enough information for the trial court to weigh the interests at hand. The court of appeals inappropriately disregarded Quixtar’s evidence about the location of its witnesses and records. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 258-59, 102 S.Ct. 252. It is an “obvious conclusion” that costs will increase when witnesses travel great distances. Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317 (quoting Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d at 205). Likewise, Quixtar could have but did not need to quantify the expense or difficulty of transporting its records. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court for it to determine that the private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.

The court of appeals also held that the public interest factors did not “on the whole, strongly favor Michigan as a more appropriate forum for Team’s lawsuit than Texas.” 281 S.W.3d at 674. It conceded: “Michigan has a greater interest in seeing that Team is compensated for any injuries”; “[ajrguably, it would be more fair to require Michigan courts and jurors to bear the time and expense of litigating a business dispute between two businesses that are essentially Michigan enterprises”; and “[t]o the extent the controversy has a center of gravity, that center appears to be in Michigan, where a key meeting between Team and Quixtar personnel took place and where Quixtar took the actions that have allegedly resulted in injury to Team.” Id. But the court dismissed the relevance of these facts because both “Texas and Michigan have an interest in protecting their citizens from wrongful conduct by Quixtar.” Id. It also apparently reasoned that Quixtar’s failure to demonstrate any choice of law issues or docket congestion problems weighed against Michigan as a more favorable forum.

Ultimately, the court of appeals recognized the trial court’s legitimate dismissal, but did not give the trial court’s decision appropriate deference. There was sufficient evidence to uphold the dismissal, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court of appeals mechanically re-weighed the Gulf Oil factors under the scope of an excessive burden of proof. But, forum non conveniens dismissals are within the sound discretion of the trial court and involve weighing various factors that may be difficult to quantify. We decline to establish a formulaic application for a trial court’s forum non conveniens determination.

The trial court’s dismissal in this case was not an abuse of discretion in light of the evidence before it and Quixtar’s burden of proof. For these reasons, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s dismissal. See Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.

Justice HECHT and Justice LEHRMANN did not participate in the decision.

      . Team argues it should be considered a Texas resident because it is registered to do business and has numerous contacts here. However, Team was not registered to do business in Texas until after it filed suit against Quixtar in Collin County. Even so, Team's authority to do business in Texas does not govern residency. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.1998) (“Corporations’ power to sue and be sued says little about their right to do so, and absolutely nothing about the restrictions of the forum non conve-niens doctrine.”).

      . While we disagree with the court of appeals’ reliance on the “strongly favors” standard from Sarieddine as applied to nonresident plaintiffs' forum choices, we express no opinion on the validity of the holding in that case.


author: JOHNSON, J.,

text:
    Abelino MONGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
    No. PD-0154-09.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 30, 2010.

      George McCall Secrest, Jr., Houston, for Appellant.
    Dan McCrory, Asst. D.A., Houston, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State’s Attorney, Austin, for State.
   OPINION

JOHNSON, J.,

delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

After appellant’s motion to suppress his confession was denied, appellant plead guilty to capital murder. The trial court convicted him of that offense and assessed punishment at life in prison.

On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession, which he alleged had been tainted by his unlawful arrest. Monge v. State, 276 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009). The court of appeals weighed the four Brown factors to determine whether the taint of the unlawful arrest had been attenuated. Id. at 184-85. It held that the Brown factors weighed in favor of the state and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 190.

We granted review of the sole ground for review raised in appellant’s petition for discretionary review.

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the prosecution discharged its affirmative burden of establishing that the appellant’s confession was not the product of his illegal arrest and detention and, therefore, was admissible against him, by concluding that the act of police interrogators in confronting the appellant with the inculpatory admissions of an alleged co-defendant prior to eliciting appellant’s confession, constituted an adequate “intervening event” which supposedly broke the causal chain between his illegal arrest and detention rendering his confession “a product of a free will,” notwithstanding the fact, that the record irrefutably demonstrates that the appellant was arrested illegally, without the benefit of a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, in violation of Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was thereafter interrogated while illegally detained, was, at all times during his 22 hours at the homicide division, in the presence and under the control of the police, was never taken to a magistrate, never spoke with a lawyer and was mislead by the interrogators about what he was actually being charged with?

We affirm appellant’s conviction for capital murder.

Facts

The record reflects that on July 14th a detective discovered a cell phone near the scene of a murder which had occurred two days earlier. The phone belonged to appellant and had been used to call and receive calls from the victim. It also had been used to call a third person, Margil Ochoa.

Detectives wearing plain clothes located appellant at his workplace on July 21st at 10:30 a.m. They invited appellant to accompany them to their office at the police station to answer some questions about the phone. Appellant advised the detectives that his phone had been stolen and agreed to accompany them. The detectives offered to give appellant a ride because appellant’s car was in the shop. Appellant accepted the offer, was not handcuffed, and he rode in the front passenger seat of an unmarked police vehicle.

Appellant arrived at the station at 11:15 a.m. and was escorted to an interview room, where he was questioned. At 1:00 p.m., the detectives asked appellant for a DNA sample, and he agreed to provide one. The detectives advised appellant that he had not been charged with a crime and was free to leave.

Over the course of the afternoon appellant was provided with a chicken lunch and a smoke break. The detective also requested permission to search appellant’s car and home and that appellant take a polygraph test. Appellant agreed to all the requests and failed the polygraph test. Appellant maintained his innocence, and questioning ended for the day at 6:10 p.m. Although free to leave, appellant instead went to sleep in the interview room.

Meanwhile, detectives had found Ochoa, the other man whose name was associated with the cell phone, and were questioning him in another room. Sometime between midnight and 4:13 a.m., Ochoa admitted that both he and appellant had been involved in the victim’s murder and named appellant as the shooter.

At 7:00 a.m., a detective informed appellant that he was under arrest, placed him in handcuffs, and began working on the paperwork concerning appellant’s arrest. A detective read appellant the Miranda rights at 8:44 a.m. and confronted him with Ochoa’s confession. Appellant then confessed his involvement in the crime.

Before trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession, contending that he was unlawfully arrested, that his subsequent confession was tainted under the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and that the state did not prove attenuation of the taint.

The trial court found that appellant’s arrest was unlawful because the police officers failed to obtain an arrest warrant. Id. at 183. However, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress because it also found that the taint of appellant’s warrantless arrest had been attenuated. Id. Appellant subsequently plead guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to life in prison.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant contends that the Brown factors do not weigh in favor of finding that the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated. In particular, appellant argues that the confession of a co-defendant does not satisfy the “intervening event” factor and that the remaining factors are not sufficient to justify a holding that the taint was attenuated.

The state concedes that the arrest was illegal, but contends that the Brown factors weigh in favor of finding that the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated and that the confession of a co-defendant is an “intervening event.”

Analysis

The Four Factor Test

The court of appeals provides a concise and accurate introduction to the law pertinent to this case.

The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine generally precludes the use of evidence, both direct and indirect, obtained following an illegal arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). Here, the State does not challenge the illegality of appellant’s warrantless arrest, which did not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Instead, the State contends the nexus between the unlawful arrest and appellant’s confession was so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the prior illegality. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 [83 S.Ct. 407]. [holding omitted]
Evidence that is sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest is not considered to have been obtained therefrom. See Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The prosecution carries the burden of proving attenuation. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 242 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), aff'd, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). In deciding whether appellant’s confession, which was given following an illegal arrest, was sufficiently attenuated as to permit the use of the confession at trial, we are to consider the following factors:
(1) whether Miranda warnings were given;
(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04 [95 S.Ct. 2254]; Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Weems [v. State], 167 S.W.3d [350] at 359 [(Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) ]. These four factors do not necessarily carry equal weight. See Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788-90 (generally describing the relative importance of each factor); Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

Monge v. State, 276 S.W.3d 180, 184-85 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).

No single factor is decisive. We examine each factor in turn and then consider the effect of the factors as a whole.

Miranda Warnings

Miranda warnings are an important and necessary factor in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254. However, the fact that a Miranda warning has been given is not sufficient to break the causal connection between an illegal arrest and the confession. Id.

In this case, a Miranda warning was given to appellant before his confession, thus the first Brown factor weighs in favor of the state.

The Temporal Proximity of the Arrest

Temporal proximity is generally not a strong determining factor. Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788. Nevertheless, if there is a short period of time (under three hours) between the illegal arrest and the confession, this factor will weigh in favor of appellant. Id.

In this case, appellant was illegally arrested at the time he was implicated by Ochoa, was informed of his arrest at 7:00 a.m., and gave his confession approximately two hours later at 8:44 a.m. The short period of time between his illegal arrest and confession weighs in favor of appellant.

The Presence of Intervening Circumstances

The presence of an intervening circumstance is an important factor. Generally, “[a] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” Townsley v. State, 652 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). However, the lack of intervening circumstances is not disposi-tive if other Brown factors weigh strongly in favor of the state. Self, 709 S.W.2d at 668.

Confrontation with significant evidence untainted by an illegal arrest may be an intervening circumstance if it breaks the causal connection between the arrest and the confession. See Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). However, in a particularly coercive atmosphere, such confrontation will not be sufficient to break the causal connection between an arrest and the confession. See Gregg v. State, 667 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).

In Dowthitt, the police were investigating a capital-murder case. Dowthitt voluntarily went to the police station to give a statement. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 252. Over the course of 16 hours, Dowthitt took a polygraph test and was interrogated. Id. at 252-54. While being interrogated, he made statements that suggested that he had been at the scene of the crime. Id. at 253. He was then arrested without a warrant. Id. at 262. The interrogation continued, and Dowthitt made a confession, which he sought to suppress at trial. Id.

We held that the taint of the illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated, noting that Dowthitt’s “custodial statements appeared to flow as much from [his] precus-todial admission to being present at the murders as from his custody status.” Id.

By contrast, in Gregg, this court was unconvinced that Gregg’s reading of a co-defendant’s admission constituted a sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate the taint of the arrest. Gregg, 667 S.W.2d at 129. In that case, the arrest was tainted by significant police misconduct; Gregg was unaware of what he was being investigated for before he read his co-defendant’s confession, and the interrogation was coercive and intimidating. Id.

The present case is a close one, but it is more similar to Dowthitt. Appellant voluntarily went to the police station and submitted to a lengthy interrogation even though he was told that he was free to leave. After Ochoa gave a statement that implicated appellant in the murder, police officers had probable cause to believe that appellant was involved in the murder, but they did not obtain a warrant before they arrested appellant. A distinction is that, instead of confessing after being confronted with his own earlier statements, appellant confessed immediately after being confronted with a confession by Ochoa that was untainted by appellant’s illegal arrest. Appellant’s subsequent confession flowed at least as much from being confronted with his co-defendant’s untainted confession as from his arrest. In such circumstances, we hold that confrontation with Ochoa’s confession was an intervening circumstance that weighs in favor of the state in this case.

Purpose and Flagrancy of Official Misconduct

Purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct “is one of the most important factors to be considered.” Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 789. When official misconduct is the most flagrantly abusive, the standard for the state to prove attenuation is elevated to require the “clearest indications of attenuation.” Id. at 789. Examples of such abusive conduct may include “reliance on factors in making an arrest which were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; an arrest effectuated as a pretext for collateral objectives; or an arrest which is unnecessarily intrusive on personal privacy.” Id. Similarly, the taint may not be attenuated if the accused was arrested for no apparent justification and with the sole intent to extract a confession by exploitation. See id. at 789-90. This contrasts with situations in which probable cause exists and failure to get an arrest warrant is a comparatively less serious misconduct. Id. at 790.

As in all attenuation cases, there was official misconduct, specifically, failing to obtain a warrant before the arrest. However, none of the Bell examples of abusive conduct occurred in this case. Based on Ochoa’s confession, the discovery of appellant’s phone at the crime scene, and appellant’s failing of a polygraph test, the detectives had probable cause to arrest appellant. Furthermore, the detective in charge testified that he chose not to procure a warrant because he misunderstood Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a)(6) to mean that a warrant was unnecessary in the situation.

Appellant contends that police misconduct is further demonstrated by the fact that he was in the control of law enforcement for over 22 hours and received only one meal during that period. Additionally, appellant claims that the detectives mislead him by telling him he was being charged with “murder” instead of “capital murder.”

Neither of those contentions have merit. The record reflects that appellant went to the station voluntarily and cooperated with police up until he was arrested approximately two hours before his confession on July 22; he was not held against his will for an extraordinary or coercive length of time. Furthermore, there is evidence that the detectives were civil and non-coercive while appellant was at the station and not in custody. The detectives gave appellant a ride to the station when told his car was in the shop, he rode in the front of the patrol car, they provided a lunch, they took smoke breaks with him, they provided a blanket when appellant got cold, and they maintained a sympathetic and non-coercive atmosphere even after the arrest.

Appellant appears to argue that the police telling appellant that he was being charged only with murder, instead of capital murder, was an improper inducement under Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.21. However, “[f]or a promise to render a confession invalid under Article 38.21, it must be (1) positive, (2) made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and (3) of such an influential nature that it would cause a defendant to speak untruthfully.” Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In this case, there is no evidence in the record that any promise was made or that the specific nature of the alleged promise had any impact on appellant’s decision to confess. To the contrary, the detective’s statement seems to be an attempt to convey the gravity of the charge in ordinary, if legally imprecise, terms.

We therefore conclude that the fourth Brown factor weighs in favor of the state.

Conclusion

Three of the four Brown factors weigh in favor of the state. Weighing the factors together, we are satisfied that the confession in this case was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the illegal arrest. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.