author: ORME, Judge:

text:
    STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Danny Leroy LOGUE, Appellant.
    No. 20151092-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed August 16, 2018
    Herschel Bullen, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant
    Sean D. Reyes and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee
    Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges Ryan M. Harris and Diana Hagen concurred.
    Opinion
   ORME, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Danny Leroy Logue appeals his convictions for aggravated murder, a noncapital first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2017); possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-10-503(2)(a); and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-8-306(3)(a). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Shooting

¶2 Early in the morning on May 16, 2011, a man (Victim) was discovered in the driveway of his home suffering from a gunshot wound to his head. Victim had been lying in his driveway for more than four hours before his mother and sister found him. Victim was transported to a hospital and later died.

¶3 Two months prior to Victim's death, police officers executed a search warrant on a storage unit owned by Yuri Lara, a drug dealer who sold and transported drugs with Victim. Officers discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in the storage unit, and Lara was arrested. Lara immediately suspected that Victim had shared information with police officers because, during the search, officers went directly to drug paraphernalia that Lara assumed only Victim knew about.

¶4 Soon after the search, Lara approached one of his customers (Customer) and asked Customer if he knew of anyone willing to "beat somebody up." Customer introduced Lara to Darrell Wayne Morris, who agreed to assault Victim in exchange for one ounce of methamphetamine from Lara, which at that time was valued at $1200. Lara gave Morris half of the methamphetamine upfront and showed Morris where Victim lived. Morris then solicited Logue's help, as both were members of the same gang.

¶5 On the day before Victim's death, Logue gave his girlfriend (Girlfriend) money to buy .38 caliber ammunition from Walmart.

When Girlfriend returned from Walmart with the ammunition, she found Logue with Morris and a friend (Friend). All four of them spent the day together at Girlfriend's trailer home, and, around 2:00 a.m., Logue and Morris left, telling Girlfriend and Friend that they were going "to go beat somebody up." Friend noticed that Logue had a gun and suggested that he leave it. Logue replied that he needed it for protection.

¶6 Once Logue and Morris reached Victim's house, they found Victim sitting on the porch with his cell phone in hand. Upon seeing Morris and Logue, Victim stood up and tried to make a call. But Logue shot Victim before he could successfully dial. Lara, in the meantime, had been staying with Customer on the night of Victim's death. Several hours after the shooting, Lara learned of Victim's death and Customer recalled seeing Lara do a "little jig" while exclaiming, "[Victim's] dead." Customer and Lara parted ways, and Customer returned home that afternoon to find Morris and Friend looking to collect the remaining methamphetamine. Customer asked Morris if he had seen Victim and Morris replied, "[W]ell let's just say he's not going to testify." Morris left without the other half-ounce of methamphetamine, but Morris and Friend met Lara two days later and collected it. Morris and Friend then returned to Girlfriend's trailer. Morris and Logue went into one of the bedrooms for fifteen to twenty minutes, and when they emerged, Morris had less methamphetamine than he did before entering the bedroom.

The Investigation

¶7 Officers questioned Lara once they suspected his involvement, and his alibi led them to Customer. Customer then pointed them towards Morris and Logue. There was very little physical evidence, however, to connect Logue to Victim's death because officers were unable to recover the weapon used to kill Victim. Although phone records showed that Morris's phone was used near Victim's house at the time of the shooting, and that, from May 14, 2011, to May 22, 2011, 126 calls were made between Lara's and Morris's phones, most of the State's evidence came from witnesses with knowledge of Logue's involvement in the shooting. For example, Girlfriend testified that Logue admitted to her that he shot Victim, and Friend testified that Morris told her it was Logue who shot Victim.

¶8 Declining to seek the death penalty, the State charged Logue with one count of aggravated murder, a noncapital first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2017). Invoking five aggravating circumstances to support the elevated murder charge, the State asserted that Logue killed Victim: (1) "for pecuniary gain"; (2) "pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration"; (3) to prevent him from testifying; (4) to prevent him from "providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation"; and (5) to retaliate against him "for testifying, providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation." Id. § 76-5-202(1)(g)-(h), (k).

The Trial

¶9 During opening statements, Logue's trial counsel declared that there was no physical evidence tying Logue to Victim's murder. But on the fourth day of trial, the State sought to enter into evidence a duplicate receipt obtained from Walmart, dated the day before the murder. Officers learned of the possible existence of such a document from Girlfriend's admission that, the day before the murder, she had purchased ammunition at Walmart for Logue. But Girlfriend did not admit this to officers until three years after the murder, approximately five months before trial. Officers did not follow up on this information until trial, and upon visiting the Walmart from which Girlfriend claimed to have purchased the ammunition, officers obtained a copy of a receipt for the sale of .32 caliber ammunition at that Walmart on the day before the murder. Because the receipt memorialized a cash transaction, it contained no information bearing on who had purchased the ammunition.

¶10 When the receipt was finally shared with the State, it sought to introduce the receipt into evidence. Defense counsel objected.

Agreeing that defense counsel should be given time to investigate the receipt, the trial court delayed Girlfriend's testimony until the seventh day of trial. After Girlfriend's testimony, defense counsel again challenged the admissibility of the receipt because of the State's failure to disclose the receipt until midtrial. Claiming that the admission of the receipt violated the State's duty to timely disclose all evidence and unfairly prejudiced Logue, defense counsel requested that either the receipt be excluded or there be a continuance or mistrial. The court denied defense counsel's motions and ruled that the State had properly disclosed the receipt once it had been discovered.

¶11 After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support an aggravated murder charge. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted Logue on all charges, and he now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶12 Logue first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factors underlying his murder conviction. Because a trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict presents a question of law, we review it for correctness, "giving no particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." State v. Hirschi , 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence, "we will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Montoya , 2004 UT 5, ¶ 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13 Logue next contends the Walmart receipt was unfairly prejudicial and, therefore, that the trial court erred in admitting the receipt and in denying his motion for a new trial. We review the admission of the receipt for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Calliham , 2002 UT 86, ¶¶ 23-24, 55 P.3d 573. When we review evidentiary rulings, we do so "with deference to the trial court based on the presumption that the trial judge, having personally observed the quality of the evidence, the tenor of the proceedings, and the demeanor of the parties, is in a better position to perceive the subtleties at issue than we can looking only at the cold record." Id. ¶ 23. A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pinder , 2005 UT 15, ¶ 20, 114 P.3d 551.

¶14 Finally, Logue challenges the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme in Utah Code sections 76-3-207.7 and 76-5-202. We review decisions concerning the constitutionality of statutes for correctness. State v. Reece , 2015 UT 45, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 712.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶15 Logue argues on appeal that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the factors underlying his aggravated murder conviction. At oral argument, he narrowed this argument by asserting that the evidence supports a conviction for aggravated assault but not aggravated murder. In effect, Logue challenges his aggravated murder conviction on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to support (1) that he had the requisite intent for murder and (2) that he committed the murder for one or more of the reasons supporting his aggravated murder conviction.

¶16 To be convicted of aggravated murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Logue "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of [Victim]." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (LexisNexis 2017). The State therefore had to show either that it was Logue's "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result," or that he was "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances." Id. § 76-2-103(1)-(2).

¶17 "It is well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence." State v. James , 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). Because intent is "a state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of direct proof, it can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience." State v. Robertson , 2005 UT App 419, ¶ 15, 122 P.3d 895 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When intent is proven by circumstantial evidence, we must determine (1) whether the State presented any evidence that [the defendant] possessed the requisite intent, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that [the defendant] possessed the requisite intent." State v. Holgate , 2000 UT 74, ¶ 21, 10 P.3d 346 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶18 The State presented evidence that Logue brought a gun with him to Victim's house, that Logue and Morris confessed to others that Logue shot Victim after he saw Victim trying to dial his phone, and that Victim's body showed a gunshot wound but no signs of an assault of less severity. Although there was some direct evidence that Logue's initial intent was to assault Victim, the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was ultimately Logue's conscious objective to shoot Victim, given that he took a gun to Victim's house and shot Victim upon seeing him attempt to place a call. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Logue had the requisite intent for murder.

¶19 Logue also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factors that he killed Victim in retaliation and to prevent him from participating or testifying in any legal proceeding or investigation. Section 76-5-202 elevates murder to aggravated murder when, inter alia, "the homicide was committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a witness from testifying; (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; [or] (iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(k)(i)-(iii).

¶20 When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we consider "whether a jury could, based on the evidence, make an inference to support a guilty verdict, or whether the guilty verdict rests upon mere speculation." Salt Lake City v. Howe , 2016 UT App 219, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 562. Inferences may be drawn from direct or circumstantial evidence, but they " 'must be more than speculation and conjecture to be reasonable.' " Id. ¶ 11 (quoting United States v. Jones , 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995) ). And "the difference between an inference and speculation depends on whether the underlying facts support the conclusion. A jury draws a reasonable inference if there is an evidentiary foundation to draw and support the conclusion." Salt Lake City v. Carrera , 2015 UT 73, ¶ 12, 358 P.3d 1067. We therefore review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Montoya , 2004 UT 5, ¶ 29, 84 P.3d 1183.

¶21 Logue asserts that the evidence supports his claim that he only intended to assault Victim. But the evidence and all reasonable inferences demonstrate that Victim was killed in retaliation for "snitching" to police and to prevent Victim from cooperating with police or testifying. And Logue concedes that the evidence in this case at least demonstrates that he and Morris "were going to beat [Victim] up for being a snitch." Additionally, when Customer asked about Victim after the shooting, Morris stated, "[W]ell let's just say he's not going to testify." It therefore would not have been mere speculation for the jury to infer that Logue shot Victim for the same reason that he was planning to assault Victim, namely, to prevent him from testifying. We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Logue committed the murder to prevent Victim from testifying, to prevent Victim from providing evidence or participating in any legal proceeding or official investigation, and to retaliate against Victim for providing evidence to officers that led to the search of Lara's storage unit. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the aggravating factors relied on by the State, it follows that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict.

II. Admitting the Receipt into Evidence

¶22 Logue contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a copy of the Walmart receipt and in denying him a new trial because the receipt's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. We note at the outset that the receipt's importance seems quite minimal in evidentiary terms. Logue never denied that Girlfriend bought him ammunition. And whatever the source of the ammunition, the most damning evidence was that Logue confessed to others that he shot Victim the moment he saw him stand up, cell phone in hand and poised to make a call. Logue concedes that the receipt had at least some probative value because it helped strengthen Girlfriend's testimony that she purchased ammunition for him prior to the shooting. However, he argues that admission of the receipt undermined defense counsel's credibility with the jury because, during his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that "there was no physical evidence linking Logue to the murder." And he claims that the appearance of the receipt portrayed defense counsel as "disingenuous," resulting in unfair prejudice towards Logue because of his counsel's inaccurate statement.

¶23 Under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a trial court "may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." In reviewing a trial court's admission of evidence, "we indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility." State v. Dunn , 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). Because all evidence is in a sense prejudicial and "damaging to the party against whom it is offered," "the rule only requires that the trial court measure the danger the evidence poses of causing unfair prejudice to a defendant." State v. Burke , 2011 UT App 168, ¶ 34, 256 P.3d 1102 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unfair prejudice therefore means that the evidence has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶24 Logue argues that by undermining defense counsel's credibility, the receipt "would inevitably tie the purchase" of the ammunition to Girlfriend and the jury would be misled "into making connections that were speculative at best." But Logue's claim of unfair prejudice is unavailing. First, the receipt did not really suggest defense counsel was untruthful. In his opening statement, after stating that "there is no forensic evidence" linking Logue to the murder, defense counsel explained:

There [are] no fingerprints. There's no DNA. There's no gunshot residue. There's no physical evidence whatsoever that ... Logue was there or had anything to do with this. It's all based on the testimony of ... witnesses.

Although the receipt is physical evidence, technically speaking, it does not contradict defense counsel's statement to the jury because the receipt does not establish that Logue was at the murder scene. And because the receipt documents a cash sale, it does not even prove that it was Girlfriend who made the purchase. Furthermore, Girlfriend testified that she purchased a box of .38 caliber ammunition, while the receipt showed a cash payment made by someone for one box of .32 caliber ammunition. Thus, in the context of this case, there could not have been any unfairly prejudicial effect from admission of the receipt.

¶25 Second, defense counsel mitigated any credibility concerns posed by the receipt in his closing argument. Because Girlfriend testified that she had purchased .38 caliber ammunition, defense counsel argued that Girlfriend's testimony did not align with the .32 caliber ammunition documented in the receipt. Defense counsel also pointed out that officers did not recover any .32 caliber ammunition during their search of Girlfriend's trailer home. He further argued that Girlfriend's testimony contradicted the time stamp of "4:23" on the receipt because she said she bought the ammunition "around 6:00 or 6:30." Defense counsel's closing argument effectively demonstrated that the connection between Girlfriend and the receipt was tenuous at best.

¶26 For these reasons, we conclude that the Walmart receipt did not have any unfairly prejudicial effect on defense counsel's credibility. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the receipt and in denying Logue's motion for a new trial on the ground that the receipt caused unfair prejudice.

III. Constitutionality of Logue's Sentence

¶27 Logue challenges the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme in Utah Code sections 76-5-202 and 76-3-207.7. The former section specifies that when a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed by the prosecutor, an aggravated murder charge is a capital felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017). If a defendant is found guilty of a capital felony, the jury sentences the defendant, unless the defendant chooses to waive that right. Id. § 76-3-207(1)(c)(i). But if the prosecutor chooses not to seek the death penalty, an aggravated murder charge becomes a noncapital first degree felony. Id. § 76-5-202(3)(b). And section 76-3-207.7 requires that a defendant convicted of noncapital-first-degree-felony aggravated murder be sentenced by the court, not the jury. Id. § 76-3-207.7(1).

¶28 Because a defendant charged with aggravated murder is subject to different sentencing procedures at the prosecutor's discretion, Logue argues that the sentencing scheme violates the federal equal protection and due process clauses, Utah's uniform operation of laws clause, and his right to a trial by jury under the state and federal constitutions. These same challenges were raised in Met v. State , 2016 UT 51, 388 P.3d 447, where the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code section 76-3-207.7 and the "dual-track sentencing structure for those convicted of aggravated murder do not violate the various federal and state constitutional provisions" raised by Logue. Id. ¶ 52. See also State v. Reyos , 2017 UT App 132, ¶ 48, 402 P.3d 113 (holding that sections 207 and 207.7, "taken together or independently," do not violate the state constitution's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause and the federal constitution's Equal Protection Clause). Because the Utah Supreme Court has already answered the constitutionality question, we need not consider it further.

CONCLUSION

¶29 We conclude that there exists sufficient evidence to support Logue's aggravated murder conviction, that the trial court's admission of the Walmart receipt did not cause unfair prejudice, and that the aggravated murder sentencing statutes are constitutional. We accordingly affirm his convictions.

      This appeal is the latest chapter in an ongoing saga concerning an act of retaliation against a suspected informant. See generally Logue v. Court of Appeals , 2016 UT 44, ¶ 7, 387 P.3d 976 (denying Logue's petition for extraordinary relief); State v. Morris , 2017 UT App 112, ¶ 19, 400 P.3d 1183 (affirming the contempt adjudication of Darrell Wayne Morris, Logue's co-defendant, for Morris's refusal to testify at Logue's trial).

      "In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. We recite the facts accordingly." State v. Boyd , 2001 UT 30, ¶ 2, 25 P.3d 985 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      In 2017, the Utah Legislature amended the aggravated murder statute; however, those amendments did not materially alter the sections referenced in this opinion, and we therefore cite to the most recent version of the Code for convenience.

      Logue also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the aggravating factor that he committed the homicide for pecuniary gain. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2017). At oral argument, both parties conceded that the jury needed to find only one aggravating factor for an aggravated murder conviction, and our opinion focuses on the three factors considered in the body of the opinion. Even so, we conclude that there is also sufficient evidence to determine that Logue killed Victim for pecuniary gain. While Logue contends that the agreement to beat up Victim was based on gang affiliation rather than the promise of methamphetamine, there is evidence that he was promised methamphetamine for helping Morris. Two days after Victim's murder, Morris and Friend went to collect the half-ounce of methamphetamine from Lara. After collecting the payment, they returned to Girlfriend's trailer. Morris and Logue took the methamphetamine and went into one of the bedrooms. After fifteen minutes or so, they reappeared and Morris had less methamphetamine than when he went into the bedroom. It would have been reasonable for a jury to infer that Logue and Morris agreed to share the payment of methamphetamine-valued at $1200 and thus constituting a pecuniary gain-for harming Victim.

      In his brief, Logue also argued that the admission of the receipt lacked relevance, but, at oral argument, he narrowed this issue solely to the prejudicial effect of the receipt. He further argued that the admission of the receipt violated his due process right to a fair trial. He offers no support for this assertion other than arguing that a constitutional error is not a harmless error. We therefore decline to address these issues.

      Logue also argues that the receipt created unfair prejudice because he "lacked sufficient time to defend against it." But when the State moved to admit the receipt, the trial court delayed its decision on its admissibility and Girlfriend's testimony to give defense counsel time to investigate the receipt-which counsel proceeded to do with the State's cooperation.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Everett P. WILSON Jr. and Darla Wilson, Appellants, v. EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
    No. 20150150-CA
    Court of Appeals of Utah.
    Filed August 16, 2018
    Jack C. Helgesen and Craig Helgesen, Layton, Attorneys for Appellants
    Randall R. Smart and Jeffrey A. Callister, Murray, Attorneys for Appellee
    Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Kate A. Toomey concurred.
    Opinion

      Due to a change in marital status, the authoring judge is now known as Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster.

   CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 This case is before us on remand from the Utah Supreme Court. See generally Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Ass'n (Wilson II ), 2017 UT 69, 416 P.3d 355, rev'g Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Ass'n (Wilson I ), 2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471. In Wilson II , our supreme court reversed this court's determination in Wilson I that Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA) lacked standing to pursue a subrogation action against the tortfeasor in its own name, concluding that EMIA had standing to sue for subrogation in its own name under the terms of the insurance policy in question. Id. ¶ 22. On remand, we are instructed to address the parties' remaining contentions. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

¶2 Appellants Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson contend that EMIA's claim was barred by Utah Code section 78B-3-107 and that the district court erred in its allocation of interpleaded funds. Regarding their first contention, the Wilsons have failed to provide any meaningful analysis and have therefore failed to meet their burden of persuasion on appeal. See Bank of Am. v. Adamson , 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 12-13, 391 P.3d 196. As to the Wilsons' second contention, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in equitably dividing the interpleaded funds between the Wilsons and EMIA. We therefore affirm the district court's order allocating the interpleaded funds.

BACKGROUND

¶3 This case began in September 2010 with the tragic death of Jessica Wilson, who was struck by a car while walking in a crosswalk. Jessica died at the hospital a few hours later. Jessica's insurance provider, EMIA, covered $78,692.34 of her medical expenses.

¶4 In 2011, Jessica's parents, the Wilsons, filed a wrongful death claim against the driver of the car that struck Jessica, seeking funeral expenses and compensation for the loss of Jessica's companionship, love, and affection. In 2013, the Wilsons reached a tentative settlement with the driver's insurer for the $100,000 limit of his liability insurance policy.

¶5 In January 2014, EMIA filed a "Complaint for Subrogation Claim" against the driver, seeking reimbursement for the $78,692.34 in medical expenses it had paid out on Jessica's behalf, with accrued interest. EMIA asserted its subrogation claim under the terms of its insurance policy with Jessica. The driver filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that EMIA lacked standing to bring suit in its own name. The district court denied the driver's motion, observing that (1) Utah Code sections 78B-2-105, 78B-3-106, and 78B-3-107 did not apply; (2) Utah Code section 31A-21-108 applied and allowed an insurer to bring "an action to subrogate in either its name or the name of its insured"; and (3) pursuant to EMIA's insurance policy with Jessica, EMIA "was entitled to recovery against a third-party tortfeasor." Consequently, the court determined that EMIA had standing to file its lawsuit.

¶6 Eventually, the parties agreed to consolidate the cases against the driver, and the driver filed an interpleader counterclaim against EMIA and the Wilsons, in which his insurer agreed to interplead with the court the $100,000 policy limit. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept the $100,000 in settlement of their claims against the driver and to dismiss him from the lawsuit with prejudice, but they disagreed on how to allocate the funds.

¶7 After a hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that it was "equitable to divide the $100,000.00 equally between the parties, specifically, $50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 to EMIA." However, in recognition of the fact that the Wilsons had "labored more than EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that was deposited with [the] Court by [the driver]," the court determined that it was "equitable to reimburse the Wilsons for one half of their attorneys' fees and costs from EMIA's portion"-$16,667 in attorney fees and $9,150.69 in costs. Accordingly, the court awarded $75,817.69 of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons and $24,182.31 to EMIA. The Wilsons appealed.

¶8 In Wilson I , this court determined that Utah Code section 31A-21-108 "contains no language granting an insurance company the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name." 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. We also observed that " 'it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce [a] right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right.' " Id. ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. , 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 104 (1944) ). Thus, we concluded that "EMIA lacked standing to bring a subrogation action [against the driver] in its own name rather than in the name of Jessica or Jessica's estate." Id. ¶ 7. Therefore, we further concluded that the district court erred in dividing the interpleaded funds between the Wilsons and EMIA, and we "reverse[d] the [district] court's order and remand[ed] with instructions for the [district] court to dismiss EMIA's claims and award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons." Id. ¶ 13. Given our determination that EMIA lacked standing, we declined to address the Wilsons' other arguments. Id. ¶ 7. EMIA petitioned our supreme court for certiorari, which was granted. See Wilson II , 2017 UT 69, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 355.

¶9 The supreme court reversed, concluding that EMIA had standing to sue for subrogation in its own name pursuant to the express terms of its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 19. First, the court discussed the law of equitable subrogation and observed that "[t]he law of equitable subrogation places limits or conditions on the insurer's right of subrogation." Id. ¶¶ 11-13. "One of those conditions is the 'made-whole' principle, which states that an insurer is at least sometimes required to fully compensate its insured for any losses before it asserts a claim for subrogation." Id. ¶ 13. The court then discussed subrogation by the express terms of a contract and explained that "[a]n insurer and an insured may agree to contract away the requirements of the common law of equitable subrogation. They may provide in an insurance policy that the insured need not be made whole before the insurer may sue for subrogation ...." Id. ¶¶ 18-19. With regard to the made-whole principle, the court explained that the principle "arise[s] as a matter of our common law of equitable subrogation" and that it "can be modified by contract." Id. ¶ 18 (quotation simplified). Observing that EMIA's insurance policy with Jessica "recognized EMIA's authority 'to pursue its own right of Subrogation against a third party' without regard to whether the insured 'is made whole by any recovery,' " the court stated that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of EMIA's authority to sue for subrogation in its own name and without regard to full 'make-whole' compensation for the Wilsons." Id. ¶ 19. Consequently, the supreme court upheld EMIA's standing to sue for subrogation in its own name. Id. ¶ 22. The court remanded the case to this court with instructions to identify and address any issues that remained for decision after Wilson II . Id. ¶ 23.

¶10 On remand from the supreme court, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing advising this court as to which, if any, of the issues raised in the original briefing in Wilson I remained outstanding and needed resolution. The Wilsons identified two remaining issues: (1) whether EMIA's claim was barred by Utah Code section 78B-3-107, and (2) whether the district court erred in its allocation of the interpleaded funds.

ANALYSIS

¶11 The Wilsons first contend that EMIA's claim was barred by Utah's survival action statute, Utah Code section 78B-3-107. More specifically, they assert that section 78B-3-107"expressly gives the cause of action for a pre-death injury (all special and general damages suffered) to 'the personal representatives or heirs of the person who died' " and that "[p]re-death medical expenses are part of an injury claim." Thus, although they do not explicitly state as much, the Wilsons appear to be arguing that EMIA could not seek reimbursement for the medical expenses it paid out on Jessica's behalf as part of its subrogation claim. We decline to address the merits of this contention because it is inadequately briefed.

¶12 An appellant's brief "must explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). "An appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal." Bank of Am. v. Adamson , 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 (quotation simplified). An appellant "must cite the legal authority on which its argument is based and then provide reasoned analysis of how that authority should apply in the particular case, including citations to the record where appropriate." Id. ¶ 13 ; see also Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co. , 2011 UT 22, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 161 (observing that "a party's brief must contain meaningful legal analysis"; that "a brief must go beyond providing conclusory statements and fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments"; and that "meaningful analysis requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority" (quotations simplified) ).

¶13 Here, the Wilsons' argument is devoid of any meaningful analysis. See Hess , 2011 UT 22, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 161. First, the Wilsons quote a paragraph from this court's decision in Wilson I , wherein we referred to EMIA's action as a personal injury action and stated that EMIA should have brought the action "in the name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons' action against [the driver]" instead of in its own name. See 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471. However, the Wilsons have failed to provide any analysis of that paragraph or, more importantly, to explain how it supports their argument in light of our supreme court's conclusion in Wilson II that EMIA could file a subrogation action in its own name based on the express terms of its insurance policy with Jessica. See 2017 UT 69, ¶ 22, 416 P.3d 355. Indeed, we are inclined to agree with EMIA that the Wilsons' argument is merely an "attempt to categorize EMIA's cause of action as one for personal injury" instead of as a subrogation action. Next, the Wilsons simply quote Utah Code section 78B-3-107, providing no analysis. And lastly, they assert, without providing any pinpoint citations, that Morrison v. Perry , 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943), stands for the proposition that "[p]re-death medical expenses are part of an injury claim."

¶14 That is the extent of the Wilsons' analysis, and it is inadequate. As we have stated many times, "an appellate court is not a depository in which a party may dump the burden of argument and research." See, e.g. , Wachocki v. Luna , 2014 UT App 139, ¶ 14, 330 P.3d 717 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Davie , 2011 UT App 380, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." (quotation simplified) ). The Wilsons have offered only bald citation to authority and conclusory statements without any meaningful analysis-they have failed to explain why, given the supreme court's opinion, EMIA could not seek reimbursement of the medical expenses it paid out on Jessica's behalf in its subrogation action. Consequently, they have failed to carry their burden of persuasion on appeal.

¶15 The Wilsons next contend that the district court erred in its allocation of the interpleaded funds. "An action in interpleader is a proceeding in equity in which a person who has possession of money or property which may be owned or claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of liability, or possible multiple liability, by disclaiming his interest and submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the court." Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur , 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980). "When a district court fashions an equitable remedy, we review it to determine whether the district court abused its discretion." Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc. , 2006 UT 72, ¶ 13, 149 P.3d 348. "This standard recognizes the district court's unique ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies and our corresponding hesitance to act as a Monday morning quarterback in such matters." Id. (quotation simplified).

¶16 Here, the district court found that the Wilsons suffered damages for the loss of the love and affection of their daughter, as well as funeral expenses, which amount exceeded the $100,000.00 deposited with the court. The court also found that EMIA disbursed a substantial amount for Jessica's medical expenses. The court then noted that the $100,000 interpleaded by the driver was "insufficient to satisfy the damages claimed by the Wilsons and EMIA." The court further found that the Wilsons had been in litigation with the driver for a longer period of time than EMIA and that the Wilsons had "labored more than EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that was deposited with [the] Court by [the driver]." Lastly, the court found that both parties had incurred attorney fees and costs, and the Wilsons specifically had paid $33,334 in attorney fees and $18,301.38 in litigation costs.

¶17 The district court then observed that "[i]nterpleader actions filed pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are equitable in nature" and that, because the parties' claims to the $100,000 exceeded that amount, the court had to "balance the equities and determine how that amount should be allocated." Relying on its factual findings, the court stated that "[t]he equities that should be balanced in this matter are the Wilsons' loss of their daughter and EMIA's claim for reimbursement for the medical expenses it paid out [on] behalf of Jessica Wilson." The court determined that it was equitable to divide the $100,000 equally between the parties, that is, $50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 to EMIA. However, recognizing that the Wilsons' efforts to obtain the $100,000 were disproportionate to those of EMIA, the court further determined that it was equitable to reimburse the Wilsons for one-half of their attorney fees and costs from EMIA's portion of the funds. Accordingly, the court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and $24,182.31 to EMIA.

¶18 The Wilsons do not challenge the district court's factual findings. Instead, they assert that the district court's allocation of the interpleaded funds was incorrect for two reasons: (1) "wrongful death claimants have 'superior equity' " over an insurer attempting to enforce its subrogation rights, and (2) there is a "priority of payment" in situations, like this one, where there are multiple parties competing for the same settlement proceeds. We address these arguments in turn.

¶19 First, relying on Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), the Wilsons assert that "parents in a Utah wrongful death action have 'superior equity' over a subrogated insurer and are entitled to be made whole." We are not persuaded.

¶20 In Hill , our supreme court explained that "[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles." Id. at 866. "This doctrine," the court continued, "can be modified by contract, but in the absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Id. In other words, in the absence of a clear contract to the contrary, an insurer cannot assert its equitable subrogation rights against a tortfeasor unless its insured has been made whole. See id.

¶21 The equitable-subrogation and made-whole principles described in Hill are inapplicable to this case. Indeed, in Wilson II , our supreme court ruled that EMIA's authority to sue for subrogation was based in contract-EMIA's insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. 2017 UT 69, ¶¶ 9-10, 19, 416 P.3d 355. The court explained that "[t]he made-whole principle ... arise[s] as a matter of our common law of equitable subrogation" and that the made-whole principle " 'can be modified by contract.' " Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Hill , 765 P.2d at 866 ). Observing that EMIA's policy with Jessica specifically "recognized EMIA's authority 'to pursue its own right of Subrogation against a third party' without regard to whether the insured 'is made whole by any recovery,' " the supreme court stated that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of EMIA's authority to sue for subrogation in its own name and without regard to full 'make-whole' compensation for the Wilsons." Id. ¶ 19. Because Jessica's policy with EMIA was sufficiently clear to contract away the common law principles of equitable subrogation, the made-whole principle-the general rule that the insured be made whole before the insurer can recover from the tortfeasor-does not apply in this case.

¶22 Second, the Wilsons assert that Utah law establishes "[a] priority of payment in competing claims." More specifically, they assert that "[w]hen victims (like the Wilsons) and a subrogated insurer (like EMIA) compete for the same settlement proceeds, Utah law establishes a priority of payment, and gives first priority to the claimant with 'superior equity.' " (Emphasis omitted.) The Wilsons cite Section 5 of Article 16 of the Utah Constitution, and Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc. , 598 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979), to support their "first priority" argument.

¶23 Section 5 of Article 16 of the Utah Constitution provides, "The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law." Utah Const. art. XVI, § 5. Our supreme court has observed that Article 16, Section 5"enshrines two separate protections on the right to recover for wrongful death": (1) "that the right to recover damages 'shall never be abrogated' " and (2) "that the amount of the damages 'shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.' " Smith v. United States , 2015 UT 68, ¶ 18, 356 P.3d 1249. The Wilsons provide no explanation or analysis as to how either protection has been implicated or violated in this case. Moreover, as EMIA correctly observes, the Wilsons "provide no argument or analysis as to how Article Sixteen of the Utah Constitution supposedly supports their proposition that [they] have a superior right of recovery over EMIA." Because the Wilsons' argument is "devoid of any meaningful analysis," we conclude that it is inadequately briefed and decline to address it further. See State v. Garner , 2002 UT App 234, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 467 (quotation simplified).

¶24 Citing Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc. , 598 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979), the Wilsons also assert that "heirs have a superior right to be made whole ahead of the insurer which paid medical expenses, even in light of an arguably conflicting statutory scheme." But Oliveras does not stand for the proposition advanced by the Wilsons. In that case, after the decedent was killed in a workplace accident, the State Insurance Fund (the Fund) paid out compensation benefits to the decedent's dependent heirs who qualified for such benefits under the workers' compensation statute then in effect. Id. at 1321-22. The decedent also had two nondependent heirs who did not receive any worker's compensation benefits, but they were later awarded damages in a separate wrongful death action. Id. at 1322. The dependent heirs also received damages in the wrongful death action. Id. The workers' compensation statute then in effect authorized the Fund to seek reimbursement from any amount received in the wrongful death action "for the payments made by the Fund to dependents." Id. The Fund sought to be reimbursed from both the dependent and nondependent heirs for the compensation benefits it had paid out. Id. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately determined that, while the Fund was entitled to reimbursement from the dependent heirs' share of the recovery in the wrongful death action, the Fund was not entitled to reimbursement from the share of the nondependent heirs' recovery, as the nondependent heirs had received no workers' compensation benefits from the Fund. See id. at 1324-25.

¶25 Essentially, the Oliveras case dealt with the Fund's statutory right to reimbursement from certain heirs and the limitations of those rights as against other heirs. As EMIA correctly observes, Oliveras had nothing to do "with the general priority of an heir's claim versus an insurer's claim against a third-party tortfeasor." Accordingly, we conclude that Oliveras is inapplicable to the present case. The Wilsons have not cited any other authority to support their "first priority" argument, and they have therefore failed to demonstrate that they have a superior right to the interpleaded funds.

¶26 Turning to the district court's equitable allocation of the interpleaded funds, as previously discussed, "[w]hen a district court fashions an equitable remedy, we review it to determine whether the district court abused its discretion." Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc. , 2006 UT 72, ¶ 13, 149 P.3d 348. Here, the district court recognized that the interpleaded funds were insufficient to satisfy either of the Wilsons' or EMIA's claims, and it divided the funds equally between the parties. The court then equitably reimbursed the Wilsons, out of EMIA's portion of the funds, for one-half of their attorney fees and costs. Although equity might have countenanced the court awarding more of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons, equity did not demand that the court do so. The Wilsons received approximately three-fourths of the interpleaded funds, and we are unable to conclude that the court abused its discretion in allocating the funds as it did. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We conclude that the Wilsons' argument that EMIA's claim was barred by Utah Code section 78B-3-107 is inadequately briefed. We further conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in allocating the interpleaded funds. We therefore affirm the district court's allocation of those funds.

      "The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, having paid a loss resulting from a peril insured against, to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its losses from a tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss." Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 2005 UT App 395, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 696 (quotation simplified).

      An interpleader is an action in which a person deposits money or property claimed by others with the court so that the court can determine the respective ownership rights of the claimants. See Interpleader , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur , 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980) (explaining that interpleader is an action "in which a person who has possession of money or property which may be owned or claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of liability, or possible multiple liability, by disclaiming his interest and submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the court").

      "Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (LexisNexis 2017).

      Aside from brief references to this court's decision in Wilson I , the Wilsons' supplemental briefing on the two identified issues is almost identical to its original briefing on the same issues in Wilson I .

      Utah Code section 78B-3-107 provides,
      A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages ....
      Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).

      The district court's order states, "The amount of damages claimed by EMIA for the medical expenses paid [on] behalf of Jessica Wilson also exceed[s] $100,000.00." The amount EMIA sought to recoup for medical expenses in its subrogation action, however, was $78,692.34. See supra ¶ 5. We also note that, in briefing the issue of allocation in the district court, the parties did not dispute that $78,692.34 represented the full amount EMIA paid in medical expenses for Jessica.