author: SUMMERS, J.

text:
    2003 OK 109
    STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. STATE INSURANCE FUND, now known as Compsource Oklahoma, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ACCORD HUMAN RESOURCES, INC., Carl Edwards, Dale Hageman, and Ford C. Price, Jr., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 98,621.
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    Dec. 16, 2003.
    As Corrected Jan. 6 and Jan. 12, 2004.

      W. Rogers Abbott, II, Abbott & Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Joseph Walters, McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee.
   SUMMERS, J.

{1 This controversy presents two questions. The first, whether the State Insurance Fund (Fund) is entitled to an attorney's fee, must be answered in the negative due to our recent opinion in State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., 2003 OK 79, 78 P.3d 83. The second is whether the Fund is entitled to prejudgment interest. 'We conclude that it is so entitled, and also affirm the trial court's ruling on that issue.

{2 The controversy involves an action brought by the State Insurance Fund (Fund) against Defendants (Accord Human Resources, Inc.) to recover unpaid workers' compensation premiums. A continuing audit and/or negotiations resulted in the parties agreeing that Accord owed the Fund a net amount of $43,757.60, an amount considerably less than that originally demanded by the Fund. The parties reached their agreement on January 24, 2002, but payment was not tendered until May 13, 2002. The Fund refused to accept the payment because it did not include attorney's fees, interest, and court costs.

T3 The Fund sought summary judgment on the agreed amount of $48,757.60, plus additional amounts for attorney's fees, interest, and costs. The Fund argued that the action was on an open account and that attorney's fees were proper. The Fund also sought prejudgment interest at a rate of six percent commencing on October 19, 1994. The Fund claimed as the prevailing party it was entitled to costs.

T4 Accord sought summary judgment. Accord denied that the action was suit on an open account, and argued that the amount it agreed to pay was the result of negotiation and compromise, and that the Fund was not a prevailing party for the purpose of interest and costs.

T5 The District Court granted judgment against Accord in the amount agreed by the parties, $48,757.60. The Court rejected the Fund's argument that the action was an open account, and denied the motion for attorney's fees. The Court granted the Fund's motion for prejudgment interest, but limited it to commencing on January 24, 2002 and ending on May 13, 2002 for a total amount of $783.71. Costs against Accord was granted in the amount of $187.00.

T6 The Fund appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the District Court. The appellate court concluded that the action was on an account stated, but that an attorney's fee was not proper because the account stated did not involve goods or services. No party urged in the trial court, or on appeal, that the underlying obligation is an account stated. The Fund argues on certiorari that if the underlying obligation is an account stated as determined by the Court of Civil Appeals, or an open account as the Fund argued, then it is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 12 O.S. $ 986. The Fund also argues on certiorari that it was entitled to interest commencing on a date different from that used by the trial court and appellate court.

I. The Attorney's Fees Question

17 The Fund's action was brought to recover an amount for unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums. In State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., 2008 OK 79, 78 P.3d 83, we said that an action for unpaid insurance premiums was not an action on either an account stated or an open account. We said that: "We decline to adopt the concept that contractual obligations on an insurance policy are merged into, and superceded by, a subsequent statement of an amount due sent by one party to another based upon obligations becoming due under provisions of an insurance policy, and thus creating an 'account' to render or state." Id. at ¶ 15, 78 P.3d at 89. The action for unpaid insurance premiums is not an account stated.

T8 The appellate court concluded that the negotiations and subsequent agreement of the parties changed the nature of the obligation into an account stated. The phrase "account stated" refers to a type of contract where an agreement on a balance owed becomes a new and independent obligation that supercedes and merges the prior contractual obligation. (Great Plains, 2008 OK 79, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d at 88, quoting, Webster Drilling Co. v. Sterling Oil of Oklahoma, Inc. 1962 OK 242, 376 P.2d 236, 238.

T9 In Edwards v. Walden, 595 P.2d 445, 1979 OK 74, a party sought to enforce a settlement agreement, and requested attorney's fees pursuant to § 986 claiming that the settlement agreement was an account stated. Id. 595 P.2d at 447. We noted that the action had been brought to enforce a contract and not on an account stated, and we concluded that $ 986 attorney's fees were not proper.

T 10 The Fund argued on summary judgment that Defendants agreed to the amount due. However, this mid-litigation allegation of an agreement does not turn the Fund's action into one on an account stated. First, the Fund did not allege an account stated. Secondly, the Fund sought to enforce a contractual obligation that arose prior to the January 24th agreement. The action in the trial court was on an insurance contract, and attorney's fees pursuant to $ 986 were not proper. We thus affirm the trial court's attorney fee ruling. Great Plains, supra.

II. The Pre-judgment Interest Question

111 Recovery of interest on a judgment must be based upon a statute. Withrow v. Red Eagle Oil Co., 1988 OK 16, ¶ 10, 755 P.2d 622, 625. In the trial court the Fund claimed a right to interest on the indebtedness pursuant to 23 O.S. § 6. The Fund claimed that the amount of interest was based on 15 0.8. § 266:

The legal rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) in the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest, and by contract the parties may agree to any rate as may be authorized by law, now in effect or hereinafter enacted.

15 0.8.1991 § 266.

We agree that the Fund is entitled to interest, but disagree on the applicable statute. The applicable statute is 23 0.8. § 22 and not 23 0.8. § 6.

112 In Fidelity-Pheniz Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 1948 OK 223, 204 P.2d 982 the plaintiff brought an action against an insurance company for loss sustained by reason of damage to a building from a storm. Id. 204 P.2d at 984. The judgment on the verdict included prejudgment interest commencing on the date that payment was due under the provisions of the policy. Id. 204 P.2d at 985. The insurance company asserted that 23 O.S. § 6 was the applicable statute, and its application precluded an award of interest. We disagreed.

11 13 We first stated the issue thusly:

Involved in the consideration of the question is a determination of whether section 6 or section 22, of Tit. 28 0.8.1941, is applicable. The sections are as follows:
"See. 6. Any person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt."
"Sec. 22. The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon."

Id. 204 P.2d at 985-986.

We said that § 22 and not § 6 applied: "Hence, under our construction of the insurance contract the issue as to interest does not fall within the purview of section 6 but does fall within that of Section 22, even if certainty in the amount owing is required thereby." Id. 204 P.2d at 988.

{14 In Fidelity-Pheniz the insurance company relied upon American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lively, 1930 OK 155, 286 P. 797, which applied St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Robison, 1919 OK 133, 180 P. 702. Fidelity-Pheniz Fire Ins. Co., 204 P.2d at 986, 987. In Fidelity-Phenix we noted the "lack of clarity in the earlier decisions" discussing the issue. Id. 204 P.2d at 987. Our holding in Fidelity-Pheniz was thus stated in clear terms so that the earlier opinions would not control the issue:

We hold that section 22, supra, is applicable and controlling and that by reason thereof plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of right to interest on the judgment from the time loss was payable under the terms of the policy.
We further hold that section 6, supra, is not applicable to the question of recovery of interest in such actions as here involved, and that American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lively, supra, and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bernard [1923 OK 1117, 99 Okla. 44, 221 P. 1011], supra, in so far as they hold that the allowance of interest on the amount adjudged owing under insurance policy is controlled by Tit. 23 O.S.1941 § 6, are overruled.

Fidelity-Phenix, 204 P.2d at 988-989.

1 15 We followed Fidelity-Phenix, in Sebring v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 1963 OK 297, 401 P.2d 479, where we again discussed a difference between § 6 and § 22, and explained that the latter applies to a breach of an obligation to pay money and that allowance is mandatory pursuant to that section.

This argument of the commissioner is without merit. The relation between a bank and its depositor is contractual. Brown v. Eastman National Bank of Newkirk, Okl., 291 P.2d 828, 55 A.L.R.2d 971. Therefore this is a matter where the bank has breached its obligation to pay money only. The issue of interest in this proceeding is not controlled by 23 O.8.1961 § 6, but it is controlled by and provided for in 23 0.8.1961 § 22:
'The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon.'
Section 22 is a special statute applying to a specific subject matter (the detriment caused by breach of obligation to pay money only) whereas section 6 is a general statute applying to damages generally. A special statute will apply as to matters provided for therein and the general statute will not apply. Lewis v. Lewis, Okl., 380 P.2d 697; Smith v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Okl., 349 P.2d 646, 83 A.L.R.2d 454; State ex rel. White for Use and Benefit of Bd. of County Com'rs of Grady County v. Beeler, Okl., 327 P.2d 664; Koch v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 208 Okl. 556, 257 P.2d 790.
In the case of Fidelity-Phoniz Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Board of Education, 201 Okl. 250, 204 P.2d 982, we distinguished between the provisions of 28 0.8. 1961 § 6 and 23 O0.S.1961 $ 22. We held there that section 6 did not apply and that section 22 did apply. We concluded that the allowance of interest is mandatory where the detriment falls within the purview of section 22.

Sebring v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 401 P.2d at 483.

16 We followed Fidelity-Phenix, in Poteete v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 1974 OK 110, 527 P.2d 18, where we said:

MFA also argues that the trial court erred in failing to submit the issue of interest to the jury and by increasing the damage award returned by the jury by adding interest.
It is provided by 28 0.8.1971 § 22 that: 'The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation, with interest thereon.
This statute was interpreted by this court in Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 201 Okl. 250, 204 P.2d 982 (1949). This case involved an analogous situation to the case before us. In the Fidelity-Phenix case, the issue of recovery on a policy where damage was caused by windstorm was tried to the jury, and resulted in a plaintiffs verdict of $2700.00. The court awarded judgment to the plaintiffs for that amount with interest for a period of time antedating the verdict. The court at page 983 held that:
'Under Tit. 23 0.8.1941 § 22 interest on the principal amount due on an insurance policy is recoverable from the time the policy becomes due and payable under its terms.

The court further stated at page 988:

'If the obligation under the insurance contract is one to pay money and default in payment justifies the allowance of interest under such rule, it is manifest same not only falls within the purview of said section 22, supra, but that the allowance of interest becomes mandatory by force of the statute.

Poteete v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 527 P.2d at 22.

{17 Prejudgment interest commences on the date that payment was due under the provisions of the policy. Fidelity, Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 204 P.2d at 985. See Phoenix Ins. Co., Hartford, Conn. v. Diffie, 1954 OK 146, 270 P.2d 634, 640, (pursuant to 28 0.S.1941 § 22 and Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., supra, interest on the principal amount due on an insurance policy is recoverable from the time the policy becomes due and payable under its terms).

118 The rights and obligations created by an insurance agreement are contractual in nature. State of Oklahoma, ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Great Plains Center, Inc., 2008 OK 79, ¶¶ 8-10, 78 P.3d 83; Silver v. Stusher, 1988 OK 53, 770 P.2d 878, 883. Thus, § 22, and not § 6, of Title 23 applies to an obligation to pay money fixed by a contract of insurance. Fidelity-Pheniz Fire Ins. Co., supra, Nunn v. Stewart, 1988 OK 51, 756 P.2d 6. Application of these opinions requires us to determine the date the obligation to pay the premium was fixed, or more specifically, the date payment was due under the provisions of the policy.

"I 19 In our case today the obligation to pay an insurance premium was created by a contract of insurance. The date that obligation was to be performed was specified by the statutes then in effect, 85 0.98.1991 §§ 142, 148. Section 148 provided for premium payments semiannually or at such times as may be prescribed by general rule or regulation. Section 142 provided for adjusting premiums, as in the case before us today.

Premiums for any policy period shall be paid into the State Insurance Fund at the beginning of the period according to the estimated expenditure of wages for the period. At the end of the period an adjustment of the premium shall be made according to the actual expenditure of wages. If such adjusted premium is more than the premium paid at the beginning of the period, the employer shall pay the difference immediately upon notification of the amount of the true premium paid in advance, the employer shall at his option receive either refund of the difference or a credit of the amount thereof on his account with "The State Insurance Fund."

85 0.8.1991 § 142.

This statute provides for payment of an adjusted premium upon notification from the State Insurance Fund.

{20 The Fund's motion for summary judgment states that it audited Accord's records in 1995 and again in 1999. The Fund filed its action in 1999 seeking $138,789.60 from Accord. Accord disputed the amount owed, and the Fund's auditor continued to meet with Accord. The Fund states that the parties met on January 24, 2002, and agreed that Accord owed $43,757.60.

{21 Defendants responded to the motion for summary judgment and stated that the parties had agreed that $43,757.60 was owed by Defendants. Defendants pointed to a revised final audit summary sent to them by the Fund in July 2001. But in September 2001 the Fund and Defendants were still discussing certain items that the Fund agreed should not be included for calculation of the premium for a final audit summary.

{22 The Fund replied and noted that Defendants asserted that the audit was not complete until January 24, 2002. The Fund stated that the completion date of the audit did not matter for calculating interest, and argued that interest accrued commencing on the date it could first file suit to collect an unpaid premium on the contract of insurance, and that this date was, as a matter of law, the date the policy period expired.

123 Title 85 §$ 142 requires an insured to pay the adjusted premium upon notification by the Fund that an amount is due. In other words, the contractual obligation to pay the adjusted premium did not arise until Defendants were given notification of the amount owed, and interest did not commence until that date. The Fund notified the Defendants that an amount was allegedly due, but the Fund continued to audit the Defendants' ree-ords to determine the correct amount due. Attached as an exhibit to the Fund's motion for summary judgment is a document titled "Final Audit Summary Date of Billing: 02/20/02," but the earlier date of January 24, 2002 shows that Defendants received notice, by at least that date, of the final audited amount sought by the Fund. Filing and service of the petition in 1999 provided notice to Defendants that the Fund sought an unpaid premium. But again, the summary judgment materials show that the Fund during this period of time was continuing to audit and/or negotiate with Defendants on the amount owed.

€ 24 The trial court determined that interest commenced on January 24, 2002 and stopped on May 13, 2002, when payment was tendered, and we agree. On certiorari the parties do not discuss the legal consequences of a debtor's tendering payment to a creditor, and we need not address the issue. The trial court did not state upon what statutes it was awarding interest. We conclude that it properly awarded interest pursuant to 23 0.S.1991 $ 22 and 15 0.S8.1991 $ 266. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

1 25 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.

      . The State Insurance Fund is now known as CompSource Oklahoma. Nicholas v. Morgan, 2002 OK 88, n. 1, 58 P.3d 775, 777. See 85 0.$.2001 § 131(e): "(e) The official name of the fund which is known as "The State Insurance Fund" shall be designated in all future references as 'CompSource Oklahoma'. Any references in the Oklahoma Statutes to The State Insurance Fund shall be deemed references to CompSource Oklahoma." The action was commenced in the District Court prior to the change in the name, and we refer to the Fund based upon the name used in this litigation.

      . We decline to address the hypothetical issue of recovery of interest involving accounts stated. But see, eg., Webster Drilling Co. v. Sterling Oil of Okl., Inc., 1962 OK 242, 376 P.2d 236, 238, (in an action on account stated the Court's analysis distinguished enforcing an agreement to pay that included interest and a recovery of interest as damages for breach of an obligation to pay money).

      . Both sections 6 and 22 of Title 23 have remained unchanged since our opinion in Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Education. See 23 0.$.2001 §§ 6, 22.

      . 85 0.$.1991 § 148:
      Every person, firm or corporation insuring in 'The State Insurance Fund" shall receive from the State Insurance Fund a contract or policy of insurance to be approved by the State Insurance Board.
      Except as otherwise provided in this act all premiums shall be paid by every person, firm, or corporation who elects to insure with "The State Insurance Fund" to the Commissioner semiannually, or at such times as may be prescribed by general rule or regulation applicable to all insurers alike by the Commissioner. Receipts shall be given for such payment and the money shall be paid over to the credit of the State Insurance Fund.

      . We note that the current statute has similar language. 85 0.$.8upp.2002 § 142;
      Premiums for any policy period shall be paid into CompSource Oklahoma and adjusted according to the contract of insurance. If such adjusted premium is more than the premium paid at the beginning of the period, the employer shall pay the difference immediately upon notification of the amount of premium due. If such adjusted premium is less than the premium paid at the beginning of the period, the employer shall at the employer's option receive either refund of the difference or a credit of the amount thereof on the employer's account with CompSource Oklahoma.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LAVENDER, J. WATT, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    2003 OK 115
    Vickie BLYTHE, Petitioner, v. The UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, Compsource Oklahoma, and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
    No. 98,371.
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    Dec. 23, 2003.

      Jack F. Tracy of Purcell, OK, for Petitioner/Claimant.
    M. Thad Groom and Tava S8. Jones of Groom & Hammond, P.C., of Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent/Employer.
   LAVENDER, J.

T1 The issue in the present cause is whether the collateral source rule applies in the context of a workers' compensation claim for prescription expense reimbursement. If applicable, the collateral source rule ensures that the injured employee's recovery is not diminished by benefits, saving or insurance of the injured employee. We hold that the collateral source rule, to the extent it is codified in the Workers' Compensation Act at 85 0.8.2001 § 45(A.), applies in this case and the COCA erred in sustaining the WCC's refusal to apply that rule and/or the terms of that statute in the instant case.

I

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 Claimant initiated her workers' compensation action in July, 1994 alleging she suffered a work-related injury during her employment with the University of Oklahoma. Claimant alleged primarily neck injury and consequential psychological overlay injury arising from lifting, bending and straining. In June, 1999, the WCC awarded PTD benefits and further ordered Employer to provide Claimant with reasonable and necessary continuing medical maintenance "limited to medications needed to maintain the [Cllaimant's physical and psychological state, to be provided under the care of Dr. Ed Ellis (including examinations to provide same)." This order was affirmed by a three-judge panel of the WCC. Employer appealed and the COCA affirmed the PTD award and order regarding continuing medical maintenance limited to medications necessary to maintain Claimant's physical injury, but reversed the trial court's determination regarding Claimant's alleged psychological injury. In accordance with its determination that competent medical evidence did not support a finding that Claimant suffered a psychological injury, the COCA modified the trial court's order by eliminating Claimant's award for continuing medical maintenance related to her psychological conditions.

13 In January, 2000, Claimant filed her Form 19 in the Workers' Compensation Court, seeking reimbursement for the cost of prescription medications. Employer challenged Claimant's recovery of the cost of prescriptions on three bases: (1) Claimant sought reimbursement for cost of prescriptions unrelated to her work-related injury; (2) the reasonableness and necessity for the numerous quantities of preseription medications being obtained by Claimant; and (3) Claimant sought reimbursement for cost of prescriptions not personally paid out of her own pocket, but actually paid on Claimant's behalf by her health insurance carrier. Pursuant to Employer's objections, the WCC entered an Order for an Independent Medical Opinion on reasonable and necessary prescriptions. The record reflects that ultimately, the parties stipulated to a detailed itemization of related, reasonable and necessary prescription medications, which included stipulated amounts of Claimant's out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $19,882.42 as well as the total amount of prescription medication expenses (Claimant's actual out-of-pocket cost plus the cost actually paid by Claimant's health insurance carrier) in the amount of $46,344.24.

T4 The record illuminates little detail regarding Claimant's health care coverage other than the fact that the third-party payor, Blue Cross and Blue Shield health insurance carrier, was a "group health policy" provided to Claimant by Employer as a part of a disability/ecompensation package as an employee at the University of Oklahoma. Claimant alleges (and Employer does not dispute) that she personally paid at least a portion of premiums for her own health insurance with Blue Cross. Unfortunately, we are prevented from verifying specifics concerning the subject insurance coverage because neither the policy, nor the terms thereof were included in the record.

T5 Claimant argued her entitlement to reimbursement for the total amount of $46,344.24 for prescription expenses pursuant to application of the collateral source rule and 85 0.8. § 45, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

A. No benefits, saving or insurance of the injured employee, independent of the provisions of this act shall be considered in determining the compensation or benefit to be paid under this act.

Id. (footnote omitted). Employer argued that 85 O.S. § 45 had no application in this case because there is no statutory authority for prescription reimbursement.

T6 The WCC entered a "Miscellaneous Order" on September 25, 2002, wherein the WCC specifically rejected Claimant's demand for application of the collateral source rule to this case and limited reimbursement to $19,882.42 for Claimant's actual out-of-pocket prescription expenses and denied recovery for the additional amount expended for prescriptions on her behalf by her health insurance carrier. Claimant appealed and the COCA sustained.

II

THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, AS CODIFIED IN 85 O.8.2001 § 45(A.), APPLIES IN THIS WORKERS COMPENSATION ACTION

A. The collateral source rule and 85 O.S. 2001 § 45(A.) compared

17 The collateral source rule traditionally applies in the context of common law tort actions to determine the amount of compensatory damages "which will compensate [the injured party] for all detriment proximately caused." See 23 0.8.2001 § 61; Denco Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hargis, 1951 OK 11, 229 P.2d 560, 564. The general rule applied to determine the proper amount which will compensate for the injured party's "whole loss" in a common law tort action is as follows: "total or partial compensation for an injury received by the injured party from a collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer will not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from the person causing the injury." Id. at 564 (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 198). Further,

[it is well settled that damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the party injured has been wholly or partly idemnified [sic] for his loss by insurance effected by him and to the procurement of which the wrongdoer did not contribute.... The same has been held true of compensation received by an employee from a benefit fund maintained by the employer.

Id. (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 201)(emphasis added). Pursuant to these authorities, in Hargis, this Court determined that "[u)nder the [damages] statute the receipt of compensation by the injured party from a collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer would not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from the person causing the injury." Id.

T8 85 0.8. § 45 has been the law since its enactment in 1915. The language of that statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. Case law generated since that time indicates that this statute has been construed consistently with its plain meaning, and this Court has accordingly refused to consider "benefits, saving or insurance of the injured employee, independent of [the Workers' Compensation Act] ... in determining the compensation or benefit to be paid under this act." 85 0.8. § 45(A.). While this seetion of The Workers' Compensation Act has never been expressly labeled "the collateral source rule," the meaning and application of the statutory provision clearly mirrors that common law damages rule in the context of workers' compensation awards and/or benefits. Whether $ 45(A.) is literally derived from the common law collateral source rule or not, the application of both the rule and the statute is the same albeit applied in different tribunals operating under distinct compensation schemes. Under both the collateral source rule and under the terms of the Workers' Compensation statutory provision, compensation is determined without any reduction for the amount of any benefits the injured party received from his or her health insurance carrier. Stated another way, under both the collateral source rule and statutory scheme, no credit or set-off is given to the liable party for the amounts previously paid by the injured party's health insurance carrier. Despite the lower courts' refusal to do so, we recognize that we are constrained to apply the terms of the statute. The collateral source rule, to the extent it is codified in 85 0.S. § 45(A.), is applicable to Claimant's claim for prescription reimbursement in this workers' compensation action.

B. Extant Oklahoma workers' compensation case law foreshadows today's pronouncement.

19 While the parties characterize this matter as a case of first impression, Oklahoma workers' compensation jurisprudence has foreshadowed the result in this case. In the workers' compensation case of Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 1942 OK 373, 180 P.2d 991, this Court held, pursuant to 85 0.8. § 45, employer there was not entitled to a credit for payments previously made to employee from an insurance policy procured by "joint efforts" of the employer and employee. In Tidewater, the Court noted the employee "paid a portion of the premiums." Id. at 993 (emphasis added). The precise nature and purpose of the insurance benefits at issue in Tidewater are unclear, but appear to have been either in the nature of health and/or disability benefits Clearly, the Tidewater Court construed the meaning of the statute's prohibition against "consideration" of the injured employee's insurance, as a prohibition against crediting the Employer with that insurance benefit amount when determining the worker's compensation award or benefits to be paid pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act.

T{10 More recently, this Court approved for publication the COCA opinion of Bill Hodges Truck Co. v. Humphrey, 1984 OK CIV APP 55, 704 P.2d 94. In Humphrey, the COCA determined the workers' compensation carrier was not entitled to a set-off against the workers' compensation award for the amount the employee recovered under the employee's uninsured motorist insurance coverage. In reaching this conclusion, the COCA analogized uninsured motorist coverage with medical insurance, which are "contractual vehicle(s)," whereby "the working person may protect himself against the vagaries of life. The rights under this coverage are bargained and paid for by the worker and belong to him. Uninsured motorist coverage is "insurance of the injured employee' to which the compensation carrier has no right." Id. at 96 (citation omitted). In Humphrey, the COCA cited with express agreement the Arkansas Supreme Court's "astute comments," which are provided in pertinent part as follows:

[The compensation carrier] has no right to expect an employee to supplement his common law remedies and the compensation carrier's statutory lien, by purchasing his own insurance. If the employee does choose to expend his own funds to provide additional protection for himself ... by paying for an accident and health policy . the compensation carrier does not thereby acquire additional rights. It does not become a third-party beneficiary of the employee's insurance contract.

Humphrey, 704 P.2d at 96 (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers U. Prop. & Cas. Co., 252 Ark. 624, 480 S.W.2d 585, 589 (1972). Just as the Humphrey court concluded the workers' compensation carrier has "no right" to a credit for the employee's uninsured motorist benefits, the workers' compensation carrier in this case should be similarly precluded from enjoying a credit for the Claimant's health insurance benefits.

T 11 It follows from the plain meaning of 85 O.S8. § 45(A.) and the cases construing that statute that just as recoverable damages in a common law tort action "are not diminished" by the amount of indemnification by the injured party's insurance, recoverable workers' compensation benefits and/or awards are likewise not diminished by amount enured to the injured employee via his or her health insurance. Contrary to the plain meaning of 85 0.8. § 45(A.), the COCA considered Claimant's health insurance amount in determining the amount of pre-seription expenses to be reimbursed. In essence, the COCA permitted the Employer to credit or set-off the amount paid on Claimant's behalf by her health insurance carrier, thus refusing to apply the statute and/or collateral source rule in the context of a workers' compensation case. In doing so, the COCA erroneously ignored and/or misconstrued the aforementioned Oklahoma workers' compensation statutory and case law and instead, based its determination primarily upon the authority of one Rhode Island Supreme Court case. However, Rhode Island law is not controlling here.

C. Extension of Handy v. City of Lawton fringe benefit analysis in the context of workers' compensation.

112 Claimant asserts she personally paid a portion of premiums for her health insurance coverage, which was provided as a part of Claimant's benefits package with Employer University of Oklahoma. In our view, Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for the amount paid on her behalf by her insurance carrier regardless of Claimant's payment of premiums for such coverage because such coverage was a fringe benefit of her employment for which Employer has no right to set-off. Generally, this Court has held in a tort action that an employer is not entitled to a set-off for an amount attributable to a fringe benefit received by the employee. Handy v. City of Lawton, 1992 OK 111, 835 P.2d 870; Folkestad v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 813 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.1987). Although these cases are not workers' compensation cases, they are common law tort actions brought by employees against their employers and they address the issue of whether the employer is entitled to offset liability for health insurance benefits recovered by the employee. Handy provides "that the courts were unanimous that the determining factor was the purpose and nature of the fund, and not merely the source." Handy, 835 P.2d at 874. These cases further provide "[ilf the fund is for general hospital and medical coverage upon which the insured may make a claim without regard to liability on the part of the employer, the policy is a fringe benefit, and is part of the employee's income. The collateral source rule prohibits a set-off of benefits received thereunder by the employee." Handy, 835 P.2d at 874-75 (citing Folkestad, 813 F.2d at 1381).

T13 The rule enunciated in Handy and Folkestad falls squarely in line with the older workers' compensation case of Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 1942 OK 373, 130 P.2d 991, which likewise prohibited the employer's set-off of the employee's insurance benefit in the context of determination of a workers' compensation award. Further, pursuant to the test set forth in Handy and Folkestad, the nature and purpose of the fund at issue in this case, Claimant's health insurance benefit, was in the nature and purpose of health insurance coverage, which employees such as Claimant are entitled to make claims thereto without regard to Employer's liability. Clearly, Claimant's health insurance constitutes a fringe benefit of Claimant's employment to which Employer is not entitled to a set-off. Claimant is therefore entitled to recovery of $26,461.82, which represents the amount Claimant's health insurance carrier paid on Claimant's behalf for prescriptions, in addition to $19,882.42, which is the amount the WCC previously ordered to be reimbursed for Claimant's personal prescription expenses.

HII

SUMMARY

{14 In sum, we hold that the collateral source rule, as codified in the Workers' Compensation Act at 85 0.8. § 45(A.), applies in this case and the COCA erred in sustaining the WCC's refusal to apply the rule and/or terms of § 45(A.) in this case. Claimant is entitled to recover her related, reasonable and necessary personal out-of-pocket expenses for prescriptions in the amount of $19,882.42, as was awarded by the WCC below. Further, Claimant is also entitled to recover related, reasonable and necessary prescription expenses in the amount of $26,461.82, which was the amount expended on Claimant's behalf by her health insurance carrier. Both the WCC and the COCA erred in allowing Employer a credit or set-off in this workers' compensation action for the amount expended by Claimant's health insurance carrier for the cost of related, reasonable and necessary prescription medications. Pursuant to 85 0.8.2001 $ 45(A.), Claimant is entitled to total reimbursement for prescription expenses in the amount of $46,344.24.

' 15 Upon certiorari previously granted,

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION IS VACATED; THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COURT ORDER IS VACATED IN PART; AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT.

116 OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER and BOUDREAU, JJ., concur.

1 17 SUMMMERS, J., concurs in part; dissents in part.

18 WATT, C.J., HARGRAVE and WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent.

WATT, C.J.,

dissenting:

DISSENTING OPINION

T 1 The majority's holding that 85 0.8.2001 § 45 codifies the collateral source rule is misguided. The collateral source rule is a rule of tort law that prohibits a tortfeasor from reducing its liability based on benefits the injured party has received from insurance to which the tortfeasor was a stranger, despite the fact that doing so allows the injured party to enjoy a double recovery. Workers' compensation, though, calls for the employer to pay compensation "without regard to fault." 85 0.8.2001 § 11.

T2 It is understandable that the law prohibits those whose wrongdoing make them liable to those they have negligently injured from reducing their Hability in the amount of insurance paid to the injured party, although doing so results in a double recovery for the injured party. But there is no reasonable basis for imposing the same burden on those who are made liable under the Workers Compensation Act, "without regard to fault."

T8 In none of the opinions the majority relies on to support its conclusion that § 45 means that workers' compensation employers may be burdened with a double recovery, was a double recovery involved. Thus, the question whether § 45 codifies the collateral source rule was not presented.

11 4 In Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Ale, 1942 OK 373, 180 P.2d 991, the injured worker suffered a "paralytic condition" as the result of a cerebral hemorrhage, which was aggravated by the worker's on the job injury, and which resulted in permanent injury. The Court noted that there were other payments made to the worker because of his disability, but there is no indication in the opinion that these other payments resulted in a double recovery. Thus, the Court's holding that § 45 allowed the worker to recover benefits from both sources does not stand for the proposition that § 45 "codifies" the collateral source rule.

15 Similarly, in Bill Hodges Truck Co., Inc. v. Humphrey, 1984 OK CIV APP 55, 704 P.2d 94, (approved for publication by the Supreme Court) the injured worker received both workers' compensation benefits for permanent disability and a $12,000 payment from his uninsured motorist carrier. Section 45 was held to allow the injured worker to retain both benefits. As in Tidewater, there is no indication in Humphrey that the court's action in allowing the worker to retain the $12,000 resulted in a double recovery so the collateral source issue was not presented there, either.

"I 6 The other opinions cited by the majority were tort cases, which are inapposite here for the reasons stated above. Here, in contrast to the cases relied on by the majority, an employer who is liable without regard to fault is being required to provide the claimant a windfall by paying to her tens of thousands of dollars for medicines that her insurer has admittedly already paid for. Title 85 0.8.2001 § 14 requires that the employer "shall promptly provide for an injured employee such ... medicine ... as may be necessary after the injury." It does not provide that the injured employee shall receive payment for such medicine twice.

T7 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island was presented with this precise question in Moniz v. Providence Chain Company, 618 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1993). There, the court, after observing the differences between tort liability and that created under workers' compensation law, rejected the notion that the employer should have to pay the worker for medicines that the worker's insurance had already paid for. The court so held in order "to prevent an employee from reaping a financial bonanza from workers' compensation." Here, though, the majority has sance-tioned just such a "financial bonanza."

T8 There is nothing in Oklahoma law to support the majority's notion that § 45 codifies the collateral source rule. In fact, a fair analysis requires the opposite conclusion.

1 9 I respectfully dissent.

      . Claimant Vickie Blythe also filed a common law tort action in the District Court of Pushmai-aha County against the State Insurance Fund (now known as Compsource Oklahoma) in August, 2000 alleging the Insurance Fund's bad faith failure io reimburse her for prescription costs. That case was dismissed pursuant to Fehring v. State Ins. Fund, 2001 OK 11, 19 P.3d 276 (holding the State Insurance Fund is a state entity entitled to immunity from suit for bad faith failure to timely pay a workers' compensation award pursuant to the Governmental Tort Claims Act). For reasons unclear from the record before us, Claimant apparently refrained from appealing the dismissal of her district court case. Instead, for the first time on appeal in this workers' compensation action, Claimant seeks collateral redress concerning the dismissal of her tort claim in district court and demands reversal of Fehring in this case. The COCA correctly determined that the district court case is not appealed here and the issue of bad faith was never addressed by the WCC below. We note that even if Claimant had pressed her common law tort claim before the Workers' Compensation Court in this maiter, we would still decline consideration of Claimant's tort claim against Employer. The Workers' Compensation Court is a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction" as ascertained by reference to the Workers' Compensation Act and "limited to the purposes of the Act." Hefley v. Neely Ins. Agency, Inc., 1998 OK 12, 17, 954 P.2d 135, 137; Pine v. Davis, 1944 OK 10, 145 P.2d 378, 380. Further, the Workers' Compensation Court "lacks the power possessed by the courts of general jurisdiction to decide tort and general contract matters" and "the [COCA] sitting in review of that tribunal's decision similarly lacks the authority to decide those issues." Hef ley, 1998 OK 12 at 111, 954 P.2d at 138. We are similarly bound by the limitations of jurisdiction in this workers' compensation matter, and we therefore decline to determine Claimant's common law tort claims.

      . The COCA modified paragraph 10 of the trial court's order by striking the words "and psychological" such that the order as modified reads as follows:
      That the Claimant's demand for reasonable and necessary continuing medical is GRANTED by the Court limited to medications needed to maintain the claimant's physical state, to be provided under the care of Dr. Ed Ellis (including examinations to provide same) until further order of the Court.

      . Employee attempis to distinguish the Employer's contribution from that of its insurance carrier CompSource Oklahoma [formerly known as and persistently referred to by Employee as the State Insurance Fund] regarding the procurement of the subject health insurance coverage. Initially, Employee alleges on page 1 of her brief-in-chief that "the parties agree that Mrs. Blythe has her own [health] insurance coverage" and it "is not disputed" that she paid "all the premiums" and "respondent made no contributions to this insurance"), but later acknowledges on page 4 that "[als part of her compensation package, she is insured by Blue Cross Blue Shield. The insurance premiums for the medical insurance are paid solely by Vickie Blythe and/or the [employer] University of Oklahoma. The State Insurance Fund has not paid any part of the premiums and is not a party to the insurance contract between Vickie Blythe and Blue Cross." In its response brief, the Employer makes no attempt to clarify or dispute these facts concerning the health insurance coverage and/or payment of premiums therefor. Instead, Employer merely refers to the health insurance carrier as a "Third Party who did pay" and/or "her health insurance carrier." These characterizations may constitute a direct admission by Employer that it did not solely provide the health insurance benefit and possibly may also constituile Employer's indirect admission concerning Employee's payment of premiums. However, aside from Employee's unchallenged assertions in the brief and/or at the hearing before the Workers' Compensation Court, there is no objective evidence in the record supportive of Employee's assertion that it is undisputed that she paid a portion of the premium for her health insurance.

      . 85 O.S. § 45 was amended in 1994 to add a substantive provision, which was ultimately labeled part (B.), and the longstanding provision at issue in this case was thereupon labeled part (A.). Part (B.) is inapplicable in this case. The parties and the lower courts have referred generally to § 45, but we refer more precisely to § 45(A.), which is the express provision applicable on the facts of this case.

      . Although Employer argues there is no statutory authority for an employee's reimbursement for prescription expenses, 85 O.S. § 14(A.)(1.) expressly provides "[the employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment ... medicine ... as may be necessary after the injury." Id. Case law further provides that medical treatment pursuant to § 14 is a benefit and "a requirement other and in addition to the schedule of compensation." Depue v. Barsh Truck Lines, 1972 OK 5, 493 P.2d 80, 83. Where an employer is under an express statutory duty to * provide the injured employee with medical treatment including but not limited to medicine, Oklahoma case law has construed this statutory authority to impliedly permit employees' reimbursement for their related, reasonable and necessary medical expenses. See generally Depue, 493 P.2d at 82-82; Jobe v. American Legion, 2001 OK 75, 32 P.3d 860; Armstrong v. Unit Drilling, 2002 OK 17, 43 P.3d 383; Campbell v. Hunt JB Transport Services, 2002 OK CIV APP 33, 17, 43 P.3d 421, 423 (providing "[al goal of the Workers' Compensation Act is to insure that medical expenses of an employee who has suffered an on-the-job injury will be paid.")

      . 23 0.$.2001 § 61. Obligation not arising from contract
      For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this chapter, is the amount which will compensate for all detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not. Id. (footnote omiited).

      . An injured party's health insurance is a collateral source, the benefits of which may not be reduced from a damages award in a tort action. See Handy v. City of Lawion, 1992 OK 111, 835 P.2d 870, 874; Robinson v. Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp., 2001 OK 59, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 1041, 1045.

      . Although the statute has been re-numbered and has undergone recent amendment with the addition of subsection (B.) thereto, the substantive language of the original act (now 85 0.S.2001 § 45(A.)) has remained virtually unchanged since its 1915 enaciment. Rev. Laws Okla. Ann. Supp., Ch. 42-A, Art. III, § 3782w. (1915) provided as follows: "Benefits or savings not considered. No benefits, savings or insurance of the injured employee, independent of the provisions of this Act shall be considered in determining the compensation or benefit to be paid under this Act." Id.

      . Where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, no room exists for construction of its language. Oldham v. Drummond Bd. of Ed., 1975 OK 147, 542 P.2d 1309, 1311.

      . "[The plain meaning of a statute's language is conclusive except in the rare case when literal construction produces a result demonstrably at odds with legislative intent." Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307; City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1998 OK 92, 114, 967 P.2d 1214, 1220. Courts have "the duty ... to give effect to legislative acts, not to amend, repeal or circumvent them." Public Employees Relations Bd., 1998 OK 92, ¶ 18, 967 P.2d at 1221 (citation omitted). Further, this Court has no authority to re-write legislation merely because the legislation does not somehow comport with our conception of prudent public policy. See id.

      . The COCA interpreted § 45 "to mean simply that an employee may recover under both the workers' compensation act and his or her own. insurance policy." The COCA has no explanation for why, contrary to the express statutory prohibition against consideration of the employee's insurance, the COCA did just that in determining Claimant was not entitled to reimbursement of those prescription expenses incurred by her health insurance carrier.

      . Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270 (R.1.1993)(holding the workers' compensation claimant may not rely on the collateral source rule to obtain personal reimbursement for medical expenses incurred by claimant's private medical insurer). The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Moniz reached its determination primarily by distinguishing between damages recoverable in a common law tort action and workers' compensation benefit/award payments. Further, the Mon-iz court reasoned that application of the collateral source rule in a workers' compensation case would result in a windfall to the employee, "would weaken the policies underlying the Workers' Compensation Act and arrive at an inequitable result."" Id. at 1272. We disagree with the reasoning in Moniz, insomuch as it is premised upon a distinction without a difference. While it is irue that injured employees are not entitled to recover "damages" in a workers' compensation action, the compensatory purpose behind both schemes is identical. Notably absent from the Moniz analysis is any reference to a statutory provision similar to 85 O.S. § 45(A.), the application of which demands a different result in this Oklahoma workers' compensation case.

      . While the COCA cited only one Rhode Island case in support of its determination that the collateral source rule is inapplicable in Oklahoma workers' compensation actions, more recent and more analogous case law outside our jurisdiction supportive of the contrary position exists. See Farmer-Cummings v. Personnel Pool, 110 S.W.3d 818 (Mo.2003)(holding workers' compensation claimant is entitled to compensation for past medical expenses actually paid by third-party insurers). One critical distinguishing feature of the Missouri Supreme Court case of Farmer-Cummings is the application of the Missouri statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 287.270, which provides in pertinent part as follows: "No savings or insurance of the injured employee, nor any benefits derived from any other source than the employer or the employer's insurer for liability under this chapter, shall be considered in determining the compensation due hereunder ..." Id. The Farmer-Cummings court reasoned
      [this [statutory] section clearly was intended to allow the employee to benefit from any collateral source the employee might have available io him or her, independent of the employer, whether purchased or not. If the employer has not provided such a source, the employer has no right under the statuie to claim benefit from it. 'Payments from ... any source other than the employer or the employer's insurer for liability for Workmen's Compensation are not to be credited on Workmen's Compensation benefits.'
      Id. At 822 (quoting Shaffer v. St. John's Reg'l Health Ctr., 943 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo.App.1997)) (emphasis added). Farmer-Cummings is more instructive and far more analogous to this case than Moniz considering the striking similarity of the Missouri statute in Farmer-Cummings to ours at 85 O.S. § 45(A.). Just as the Farmer-Cummings case construed the plain language of the Missouri workers' compensation statute as a codification of the collateral source rule, so too should we construe our statuie and render an analogous determination in this case.

      . Claimant's brief-in-chief contains an acknowledgment that "[tJhe insurance premiums for the medical insurance are paid solely by Vickie Blythe and/or the [employer] University of Oklahoma. The State Insurance Fund has not paid any part of the premiums and is not a party to the insurance contract between Vickie Blythe and Blue Cross." To the extent that Claimant concedes the Employer, University of Oklahoma paid at least a portion of the premiums for Claimant's health insurance coverage, such an "admission[ ] in an appellate brief [is] acceptable as material supplementing the record." Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 1990 OK 37, 791 P.2d 84, 86, n. 3 (citation omitted).

      . The WCC's order is vacated in part because of its erroneous refusal to apply the collateral source rule and/or 85 O.S. § 45(A.). However, we do not disturb the WCC's order directing Employer to reimburse Claimant $19,882.42 for her personal prescription expenses. Upon remand, the WCC shall enter an order directing Employer to reimburse Claimant $26,461.82 in addition to the $19,882.42 the WCC previously awarded Claimant for refmbursement of her per-somal prescription expenses. The total reimbursement amount due Claimant is the sum of her personal prescription expenses in the amount of $19,882.42 plus her health carrier prescription cost of $26,461.82, for the total reimbursement amount of $46,344.24.


author: MITCHELL, Presiding Judge:

text:
    2004 OK CIV APP 1
    PARK EAST LTD. CO., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Jack GORDON, Tulsa County Assessor, and the County Board of Equalization of Tulsa County, Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 97,468.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.
    Dec. 5, 2003.

      John W. Hunt, Howard, Widdows & Bufo-gle, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Dick A. Blakeley, Assistant District Attorney, Tulsa County District Attorney's Office, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants/Appellees.
   MITCHELL, Presiding Judge:

T1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Tulsa County regarding the 2001 ad valorem assessment the Tulsa County Board of Equalization made on certain real estate and improvements owned by Plaintiff/Appellant Park East Ltd. Co. The property at issue is a mobile home park located in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Park East purchased the property in March, 2000. In December 2000, the Tulsa County Assessor determined the fair cash value of the property to be $1,355,000, the amount Park East paid for the property. Park East filed a protest with the Tulsa County Board of Equalization, asserting the value to be $667,500. In response to the evidence Park East presented in protest, the Board reduced the valuation to $1,195,000. Contending the Board's assessment was still too high, Park East appealed to the trial court, which approved the Board's decision. Because the trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that the Board's assessment was entitled to a presumption of correctness, we reverse.

T2 Park East's mobile home park comprises two parcels of land, Nos. 27725-94-07-06570 and 27725-94-07-06800. The larger of the two tracts measures 524,000 square feet and consists of ninety-eight mobile home lots, an office building, and a swimming pool. The smaller of the two tracts measures 107, 220 square feet and consists of twenty-four mobile home lots and a storage building. Many of the mobile home lots on both parcels have concrete pads, drives, and/or patios. Paved roads run throughout the park. Park East provides streetlights and pays for water and sewer usage.

T3 In connection with the financing of its purchase, Park East's lender required an appraisal of the mobile home park. That appraisal set the fair market value at the sale price of $1,355,000. No other appraisal was done on the property until the present litigation was well under way. On its tax return for 2000, Park East valued its total assets in the mobile home park at $1,311.901.

T 4 John Szalay, one of Park East's principals, testified Park East's purchase of the property was a free and voluntary arm's-length transaction to which Park East committed without compulsion. He further admitted the value of the commercial improvements and the goodwill associated with the mobile home park were included in the sales price. In undertaking to buy the property, Park East relied on its knowledge of, and prior experience in, the mobile home park business.

1 5 On December 11, 2000, the Tulsa County Assessor's office determined the fair cash value of the real property of larger parcel to be $524,700 and that of its commercial improvements to be $590,600, for a total of $1,115,300. It assessed the fair cash value of the real property of the smaller parcel at $107,200 and that of its commercial improvements at $132,500, for a total of $239,700. According to the Assessor's valuation, the fair cash value of the two parcels together totaled $1,355,000-the purchase price paid by Park East.

T6 Park East appealed this assessment to the Tulsa County Board of Equalization. The Board modified the valuation of the larger tract to $955,800 based on Park East's evidence its operating costs, particularly its water bills, were much higher than they had predicted in determining their purchase price. The Board did not alter the Assessor's valuation of the smaller parcel, however. Accordingly, the Board reduced the total fair cash value for the entire property from $1,855,000 to $1,195,000. Park East then appealed the Board's assessment to the trial court, which, in presuming the assessed value to be correct, came to the same conclusion as the Board. This appeal ensued.

T7 Appeal to the district court of an order of a county equalization board fixing the assessed valuation of property for ad valorem tax purposes is de novo. 68 O.S. 2001 § 2880.1(A); Jackson v. Bd. of Equalization of Pushmataha County, 1995 OK CIV APP 35, ¶ 11, 892 P.2d 673, 676. In conducting a de novo review we claim plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine a trial court's legal rulings and factual determinations. Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 OK 66, 12, 73 P.3d 865, 867; see also Jackson, 1995 ¶ 12, 892 P.2d at 676. The burden is on the taxpayer appellant to produce competent evidence to justify a change in value. 68 0.$.2001 § 2868. "[A]l-though Oklahoma law ordinarily requires the district court, in an appeal from an administrative order, to defer to the factual determinations of an administrative tribunal, Oklahoma law requires the district court, in an appeal from an order of the board of equalization, to conduct a trial de novo of both legal and factual issues without regard to the prior decision of the equalization board." Jackson, ¶ 13, 892 P.2d at 676.

T8 The Oklahoma Constitution provides all property which may be taxed ad valorem shall be assessed at its fair cash value. Okla. Const. Art. 10, § 8. The legislature requires all taxable real property in Oklahoma to be assessed at its fair cash value as of January Ist of each year. 68 0.9$.2001 § 2817(B). The fair cash value of property is the

price at which a willing buyer would purchase property and a willing seller would sell property if both parties are knowledgeable about the property and its uses and if neither party is under any undue pressure to buy or sell and for real property shall mean the value for the highest and best use for which such property was actually used, or was previously classified for use, during the calendar year next preceding the applicable January 1 assessment date.

68 0.8.2001 $ 2802(18). "The county assessor estimates this fair cash value by making a market appraisal and calculates the assessed value by multiplying the estimated fair cash value by the assessment ratio." In re Oneok Field Servs. Gathering, LLC, 2001 OK 116, ¶ 9, 38 P.3d 900, 903.

T9 In furtherance of the mandate in Okla. Const., Art. 10, § 8, the Legislature expressly has defined three different methodologies for assessing fair cash value. The "cost approach" uses an estimate of the current construction cost of improvements, subtracting accrued depreciation and adding the value of the land. 68 0.8.2001 § 2802(14). The "income and expense approach" considers the present value of the projected income stream. 68 0.8.2001 § 2802(20). Finally, the "sales comparison approach" arrives at fair market value through collection, verification, and screening of sales data. 68 O.S. 2001 $ 2802(25).

[$10 The Tulsa County Assessor's office based its fair cash value assessment on the arm's-length sales price Park East paid for the property. It is the policy of the Assessor's office to use the sales price for assessment purposes if other information is not readily available. For its part, the Tulsa County Board of Equalization considered, along with the sales price, Park East's operating expenses, particularly its water bills, in deciding to reduce the Assessor's valuation. In addition to the valuation factors and witness testimony before the Assessor and the Board, the trial court had available to it Park East's rent records and the report of Park East's expert witness.

'I 11 In rendering its decision affirming the Board's assessment, the trial court correctly determined that Oklahoma Tax Commission Ad Valorem Tax Rule 710:10-1-8(g) does not apply to the present case because Park East is appealing the assessment of the Board, not the Assessor. Unlike the Assessor, the Board did not arrive at its fair cash value amount "simply [by] placing the property on at its sale price." Rather, its decision reflected Park East's operating costs as well.

12 The trial court cited In re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 1984 OK 281, ¶ 64, 38 P.2d 772 in concluding as a matter of law that "[a] presumption exists in reviewing the assessment of the Tulsa County Board Of Equalization in favor of the correctness of the determination of the value fixed by the board." It further cited In re Assessment of Nat'l Bank of Tulsa, 1941 OK 402, ¶ 7, 108 P.2d 130, in concluding as a matter of law that "[alssessed values are presumed to be fair and just and will be approved by the court unless it is clearly made to appear that the final assessed value is excessive or unjust or was arbitrarily fixed, or was determined upon some controlling formula which was erroneous, or determined by failing or refusing to consider certain pertinent facts or elements of value."

T13 The cited cases refer to the trial court's standard of review for assessment decisions as it stood prior to the Legislature's 1989 addition of 68 O.S. § 2880.1 to Oklahoma's code of revenue and taxation. 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 821, § 17. As cited above, 68 0.8.2001 § 2880.1(A) provides that the taxpayer's or county assessor's right of appeal from orders of the county board of equalization to the district court of that county shall be de movo. In a de novo review, the trial court shall determine questions of law and fact "without regard to the prior decision of the equalization board." Jackson, 113, 892 P.2d at 676. Here, "the trial court clearly believed itself bound by the decision of the Board, so reciting in the journal entry of judgment" and thus misapplied the standard of review. Id. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a de novo determination of Park East's protest of the ad valorem valuation of its property.

T 14 REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HANSEN, J., and JONES, J., concur.

      . Park East's expert performed a commercial appraisal of the subject property utilizing a market/sales approach, a cost/replacement approach, and an income appraisal approach. We agree with the trial court that Park East's expert did not take into account the actual sales price of the property, and based at least some of his calculations on estimated rather than actual information relating to the property. For example, Park East's expert built into certain of his calculations a fictional 10% vacancy factor, an assumed collection loss, and an assumed amount of "home office" expenses.

      . Oklahoma Tax Commission Ad Valorem Tax Rule 710:10-1-3(g) provides in pertinent part:

        Effect of conveyance of property. If title to the property is transferred or conveyed, the parcel or real property shall be assessed at fair cash value as set forth by Section 8 of Article X of the Oklahoma Constitution. This valuation is to be based upon current market value standards rather than simply placing the property on at its sale price, and it is the responsibility of the county assessor to value the property at fair cash value consistent with applicable statutes and ad valorem rules.
      {emphasis added).

      . While 68 0.S.2001 § 2880.1(E) does provide "Jn all appeals taken by the county assessor the presumption shall exist in favor of the correctness of the county assessor's valuation and the procedure followed by the county assessor," (emphasis added), it is Park East, not the Tulsa County Assessor, who is appealing the Board's valuation herein. Hence, the presumption of correctness does not apply.