author: BOUDREAU, Justice: OPALA, V.C.J.,

text:
    2004 OK 9
    AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steve BOGDAHN and Bana Bogdahn, both individually and as parents and next friends of Blake Bogdahn, a minor, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 99,392.
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    Feb. 10, 2004.

      Duke Halley, Woodward, OK, for Defendants-Appellants.
    Mark E. Bialick and Katherine T. Loy, Oklahoma City, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
   BOUDREAU, Justice:

¶ 1 Pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2001, §§ 1601-1611, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on its own motion certified the following question of Oklahoma law:

Whether Blake Bogdahn was a person insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy, Inc. as the named insured?

We rephrase the certified question into the following two questions:

1. Is the definition of an insured in the UM endorsement of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy, Inc. ambiguous, such that the doctrine of reasonable expectations can be applied to define Blake Bog-dahn as an insured?
2. If so, does the statutorily mandated UM seleetion/rejection form create a reasonable expectation of coverage for Blake Bogdahn, such that the policy must be reformed to provide such coverage?

Our answer to the first question is that the definition of an insured is not ambiguous and therefore the doctrine of reasonable expectations cannot be applied to define Blake Bog-dahn as an insured. Because of our answer to the first question, it is unnecessary for us to answer the second question.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 To place the questions in perspective, we recite the facts and procedural history provided to us by the certifying court. Hill-crest Pharmacy, Inc. (Hillcrest Pharmacy) is a corporation with its principal place of business in Woodward, Oklahoma. Since at least the late 1960s, Hillcrest Pharmacy has purchased commercial liability insurance through Figley Salz & Co., Inc., a local insurance agency. In 1990, the insurance agency began procuring insurance for Hillcrest Pharmacy from American Economy Insurance Company (American Economy). Shortly thereafter, the sole owner of Hillcrest Pharmacy, Lanny Ducket, sold his interest in Hillcrest Pharmacy to the Bogdahns, who chose to continue insurance coverage through American Economy.

¶ 3 On August 19, 2000, the Bogdahns’ minor son, Blake, was seriously injured when he fell off the back of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) driven by a friend, who was also a minor. The ATV was owned by the friend’s parents and was apparently uninsured. The Bogdahns, through their attorney, requested coverage for Blake’s injuries under the uninsured . motorist (UM) endorsement of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy. American Economy denied coverage, concluding the ATV was not a covered vehicle under the .policy and that Blake was not an insured under the UM endorsement.

¶ 4 American Economy brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking a declaration that it was not required to provide coverage under the UM endorsement for Blake’s injuries. The Bogdahns filed a counterclaim seeking reformation of the policy in order “to comply with the intentions and reasonable expectations of the parties.” Alternatively, the Bogdahns asked that American Economy be required “to answer in negligence for all damages resulting from its failure to obtain coverage as requested and reasonably expected by” the Bogdahns and Hillcrest Pharmacy.

¶ 5 American Economy moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy did not provide UM coverage for Blake’s injuries and that no ground for reformation or evidence of constructive fraud or negligence existed which would require that UM coverage be provided. In granting summary judgment in favor of American Economy, the federal district court concluded that Blake was not an insured under the UM endorsement. Further, the court concluded there was no basis under Oklahoma law for reforming the policy as requested by the Bogdahns.

¶ 6 The Bogdahns appealed. The Tenth Circuit certified its question to us. In its certification order, the Tenth Circuit observed that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether “listing a family-owned corporation as a named insured, with the concurrent inclusion of family members in a commercial policy” creates an ambiguity in the policy.

The Policy

¶ 7 The policy listed Hillcrest Pharmacy as the sole “named insured” and listed the “form of business” as a “corporation.” The policy stated that “[t]hroughout this policy the words ‘y°u’ and ‘y°ur’ refer to the Named Insured.” In addition to providing coverage for Hillcrest Pharmacy’s vehicles, the policy contained an endorsement providing UM coverage. That endorsement contained the following relevant provisions:

A. COVERAGE
We will pay, in accordance with Title 36, Oklahoma Statutes, all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an “uninsured motor vehicle.” The damages must result from “bodily injury” sustained by the “insured” caused by an “accident.”
B. WHO IS AN INSURED
1. You.
2. If you are an individual, any “family member.”
3. Anyone else “occupying” a covered “auto”....
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of “bodily injury” sustained by another “insured.”

The policy defines “family member” as “a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household, including a ward or foster child.”

II. APPLICABLE LAW

¶ 8 Oklahoma law governing insurance coverage disputes is well-established. The foremost principle is that an insurance policy is a contract. Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2002 OK 26, ¶ 5, 49 P.3d 703, 706. Parties are at liberty to contract for insurance to cover such risks as they see fit and they are bound by the terms of the contract. Wiley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1974 OK 147, 534 P.2d 1293, 1295. It necessarily follows that courts are not at liberty to rewrite the terms of an insurance contract. Id.

¶ 9 In Max True Plastering Co. v. USF & G Co., 1996 OK 28, 912 P.2d 861, we adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations. This doctrine evolved as an interpretive tool to aid courts in discerning the intention of the parties, id. at 864, when the policy language is ambiguous or when an exclusion is “masked by technical or obscure language” or “hidden in a policy’s provisions.” Id. at 870. Under the reasonable expectations doctrine, when construing an ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy, the meaning of the language is not what the 'drafter intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it to mean. Id. Thus, in construing an ambiguity or uncertainty against the insurer and in favor of the insured, Oklahoma now looks to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured to fashion a remedy. Spears v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 2003 OK 66, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d 865.

¶ 10 The doctrine of reasonable expectations may be applied only when

(1) the challenged policy language is ambiguous, or
(2) an exclusion within the policy is
(a) masked by technical or obscure language, or
(b) hidden in a policy’s provisions.

Max True Plastering Co. v. USF & G, 1996 OK 28, ¶ 24, 912 P.2d 861, 870.

¶ 11 In the instant case, the challenged language is not an “exclusion within the policy.” Thus, unless we find as a matter of law that the language defining an insured in the UM endorsement is ambiguous, the doctrine of reasonable expectations cannot be applied to the policy. Whether the language is ambiguous is a question of law. Wynn v. Avemco Ins. Co., 1998 OK 75, ¶ 17, 963 P.2d 572, 575. The test for ambiguity is whether the language “is susceptible to two interpretations on its face ... from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent lay person, not from that of a lawyer.” Cranfill, 2002 OK 26, ¶¶ 7-8, 49 P.3d at 706.

III. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The UM endorsement covers compensatory damages for bodily injury. In previous cases we have said, for UM purposes, Class 1 insureds are “named insureds and resident relatives” and Class 2 insureds are “individuals insured in the policy only by reason of their occupancy or permissive use of a covered vehicle.” Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 1993 OK 32, ¶ 5, 849 P.2d 407, 409 n. 4. To recover in this case, the Bogdahns’ minor son must qualify as a Class 1 insured since the ATV was not a covered vehicle.

The Definition of an Insured in the UM Endorsement Is Not Ambiguous.

¶ 13 The UM endorsement defines a Class 1 insured as “You ” and, in addition, “If you are an individual, any family member.' ” The word “You” is not. susceptible to two or more interpretations — it plainly refers to the named insured which, in this case, is Hillcrest Pharmacy. Similarly, the phrase “If you are an individual, any ‘family member’ ” is not susceptible to two or more interpretations. The term “family member” is qualified or limited by the phrase “If .you are an individual.” Since the named insured, Hillcrest Pharmacy, is not an individual, no “family members” qualify as Class 1 insureds.

¶ 14 Thus, unless we accept one or more of the Bogdahns’ arguments, the Bogdahns’ minor son was not an insured person under the UM endorsement and, in fact, there are no Class 1 insureds under the UM endorsement.

¶ 15 The Bogdahns argue the UM endorsement is ambiguous for two reasons. First, they assert we must find the policy language ambiguous in order to be consistent with our earlier decision in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Craig, 1989 OK 43, 771 P.2d 212. They contend that when the named insured is a corporation we “deemed it appropriate” in Craig to substitute the corporation’s shareholders as Class 1 insureds and the corporation’s employees as Class 2 insureds. We disagree.

¶ 16 In Craig, we answered-the certified question of whether an injured employee/passenger in a covered auto may stack UM coverage on a fleet of commercial vehicles covered by a single insurance policy. To answer the question we relied on three previous decisions dealing with stacking: Babcock v. Adkins, 1984 OK 84, 695 P.2d 1340; Rogers v. Goad, 1987 OK 59, 739 P.2d 519; and Stanton v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 1987 OK 118, 747 P.2d 945. After reviewing these decisions, we held that “ONLY Class 1 insureds may stack the uninsured motorist protection in a commercial fleet insurance policy.” Craig, 771 P.2d at 214 (emphasis in original).

¶ 17 The dissent to Craig argued that the injured employee was not merely occupying a covered auto but was also “acting in the capacity of an agent for the sole benefit of the corporate named insured.” Id. at 218-19 (Wilson, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). Because of this, the dissent would have allowed the employee to stack UM coverage. According to the dissent, since a corporate named insured is “an incorporeal (without physical body) entity ... and can only act through its officers and agents ... the ‘named insured’ designation ... refers to those acting in the course and scope of the corporation’s authority — the agents,” for purposes of UM coverage. Id. (emphasis in original).

¶ 18 Craig criticized the dissent and impliedly rejected the dissent’s corporeal entity theory. Craig certainly never deemed it appropriate to substitute a corporation’s shareholders for the Class 1 named insured. However, while criticizing the dissent, Craig offered the following statement: “Even the most cursory reading of our cases makes it clear that employees of an insured are Class II insureds as a result of their status as employees, not as ‘permissive users’ as the dissent suggests.” Craig, 771 P.2d at 216. The Bogdahns rely on this portion of the opinion for their proposition that when the named insured is a corporation we deemed it appropriate to substitute the corporation’s shareholders as Class 1 insureds and the corporation’s employees as Class 2 insureds.

¶ 19 The portion of the Craig opinion relied upon by the Bogdahns was offered in the context of the majority’s response to the dissent’s position. It is not integral to the holding in Craig and is mere obiter dictum. Moreover, it is contrary to the eases relied upon by Craig which make clear that an employee is entitled to UM coverage as a Class 2 insured solely by virtue of being an occupant or permissive user of a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. The Craig case offers no support for the Bog-dahns’ argument.

¶20 Next, the Bogdahns argue that we must find the policy ambiguous because this issue has been litigated throughout the United States with some jurisdictions finding an ambiguity and some finding no ambiguity. We reject the notion that because there is a split of authority we must find an ambiguity. The vast majority of jurisdictions conclude as a matter of law that similar policy language is not ambiguous: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawafi, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. Only a small handful of jurisdictions find the language ambiguous and allow coverage: Connecticut, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont.

¶21 We agree with the vast majority of jurisdictions and reject the notion that the use of the term “family member” in a commercial automobile insurance policy renders the policy ambiguous.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 We answer the rephrased first certified question as follows: The definition of an insured in the UM endorsement of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy, Inc. is not ambiguous and therefore the doctrine of reasonable expectations cannot be applied to define Blake Bogdahn as an insured. Because of our answer to the rephrased first questions, it is unnecessary for us to answer the rephrased second question.

REPHRASED CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.

WATT, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur.

OP ALA, V.C.J., concurs in result.

HARGRAVE, J., dissents.

OPALA, V.C.J.,

concurring in result.

¶ 1 In conformity to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (certifying court) submitted the following question:

Whether Blake Bogdahn was a person insured under the uninsured motorist [UM] provisions of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy as the named insured?

The court today reformulates the question by dividing it into two parts:

Is the definition of an insured in the UM endorsement of the American Economy policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy, Inc. ambiguous, such that the doctrine of reasonable expectations can be applied to define Blake Bogdahn as an insured?
If so, does the statutorily mandated UM selection/rejection form create a reasonable expectation of coverage for Blake Bogdahn, such that the policy must be reformed to provide such coverage?

Because the first part of the reformulated question is answered in the negative, the court deems it unnecessary to answer the second part of the question it poses for an answer.

¶ 2 Although I accede to the court’s conclusion that Bogdahn’s son is not an insured under the UM endorsement, I recede from today’s unwarranted sua sponte repetition of the Western District’s original search for facial policy ambiguities. This court was not asked, either explicitly or implicitly, directly or obliquely, to reexamine that issue by reploughing the same field. Even though I do not dispute the soundness of the court’s legal counsel, I would not intrude on any aspect of the case left unopened for state-court invasion by the federal certification order. The Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence strongly militates against today’s gratuitous enlargement.

I

CRITICAL FEDERAL LITIGATION HISTORY

¶ 3 Hillcrest Pharmacy, Inc. (Hillcrest Pharmacy), a corporation, owned a commercial automobile policy issued by American Economy Insurance Company (American Economy or insurer). Blake Bogdahn, the minor son of the pharmacy’s owners, Steve and Bana Bogdahn (collectively called Bog-dahn or shareholder), was seriously injured when he fell off the back of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) while it was then driven by a friend, also a minor. The ATV was owned by the friend’s parents and was apparently uninsured. Hillcrest Pharmacy’s insurer, who had sought a declaration of its liability from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, denied coverage (for Blake’s injuries) under the uninsured motorist (UM) provisions of the policy issued to the pharmacy, taking the position that the ATV was not a covered vehicle under the policy and that Blake was not an “insured” within the meaning of the policy’s UM provisions. Insurer sought summary judgment, arguing that (a) Hillcrest’s policy provides no UM coverage for Blake’s injuries and (b) there is neither any basis for contract reformation nor any ground for constructive fraud or negligence which would require that UM coverage be provided. Giving summary judgment to the insurer, the district court concluded (a) the policy is clear and unambiguous, (b) the term in the UM endorsement which implicates “family members” was not triggered because the named insured is a corporation, (c) Blake Bogdahn is not an “insured” under the UM provisions of the policy and (d) there is no basis under Oklahoma-law for invoking the reasonable expectations doctrine to reform the policy. Bog-dahn appealed.

¶ 4 Finding no controlling Oklahoma precedent on the question tendered — whether Blake Bogdahn, a resident member of the shareholder’s family, is covered under the UM provisions of a policy issued to a corporation — the federal appellate court issued a certification order. In its text the appellate court invites our attention to some authorities in other states and requests that we search for an appropriate Oklahoma-law norm that governs the certified issue.

II

WHETHER THE FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING THE POLICY’S TERMS ARE UNAMBIGUOUS — AN ISSUE OF SUBSTANTIVE STATE LAW — WAS NOT INCLUDED FOR OUR RE-EXAMINATION IN THE CERTIFIED QUESTION

A.

Tenth-Circuit Jurisprudence Governs the Parameters Of This Court’s Statutory Reformulation Power

¶ 5 While this court has statutory state authority to reformulate a question of law certified to it by the federal court, the breadth of that authority is controlled by extant, effective and unwithdrawn Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence. Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers teaches that uninvited state-court intrusion into pending federal decision-making process will meet with rejection. Until there is an en banc pronouncement which accepts the broad reformulation freedom that has long been recognized by other circuit courts, by the uniform certification act, by treatises and by commentators, I would not ignore Shebester’s teachings on the restrictive sweep of reformulation. When there is doubt whether the certifying court intended to pose a much broader question than that which stands formulated, the better procedure appears to be either (a) to reformulate the question posed subject to the federal court’s approval or (b) to request that the federal court submit an amended question.

B.

Facial Ambiguity, Which Presents A Question of Substantive State Law, Is Not Encompassed Within the Certified Question

¶ 6 By concluding the policy is facially unambiguous and rejecting parol evidence as a permissible tool of construing the insurance contract in light of the parties’ intent, the Western District determined an issue of substantive state law. Oklahoma and federal jurisprudence both recognize that the common law’s parol evidence rule is a part of the pertinent state legal system’s substantive law rather than a mere rule of evidence. Because the policy’s ambiguity — an issue of substantive state law — was available for certification, its omission from the Tenth-Circuit order’s text must be regarded as significant and cannot be cavalierly ignored.

¶ 7 In the absence of a direct or oblique invitation to so do, I would neither repeat nor re-examine here the federal trial court’s earlier in-vain search for ambiguities. They were there found totally absent and we have not been invited — implicitly or explicitly — to re-decide that state-law issue by reploughing the same field. I would hence assume the policy is unambiguous and confine myself to determining, on a four-corners examination, whether the child’s parents may be considered to stand in the status of an insured under the policy issued to a corporate entity. The policy’s language is the only legitimate evidence of what the parties intended.

C.

The Policy’s UM Endorsement Does Not Include Coverage for Members of the Shareholder’s Family

¶8 I would, as the court does today, declare Oklahoma law to be that Blake Bog-dahn, a resident family member of the insured corporation’s sole shareholder, cannot stand in the status of an insured within any of the classifications of “who is an insured” entitled to coverage under the terms of the UM endorsement in the policy issued to a corporate entity as a named insured.

¶ 9 Hillcrest Pharmacy is the only named insured listed on the policy’s declaration page. Bogdahn’s position as the corporation’s sole shareholder does not confer on him a status equal to that of the insured company. Hillcrest Pharmacy is a distinct legal entity, separate and apart from Bog-dahn. Shareholders are not listed anywhere on Hillcrest Pharmacy’s policy. No reasonable interpretation of the policy’s terms would construe the shareholder’s status to be the same as that of the insured corporation entitled to UM indemnity.

¶ 10 Bogdahn claims that a construction adverse to his contention will render meaningless the UM coverage for a policy issued exclusively to a corporation. This is so because a corporation cannot occupy an automobile, sustain bodily injury or operate a motor vehicle. The decision that the UM endorsement will not, in this cause, produce coverage for Bogdahn’s son does not render the corporate policy ineffectual. The purpose of a UM provision is to protect the insured from the effects of personal injury sustained in an accident with another motorist who either carries no insurance or has inadequate coverage. In a policy issued to a corporation, the UM endorsement would provide coverage for occupants whose injuries were sustained while they were in an insured vehicle.

¶ 11 Dubious as I am that extant Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence will allow today’s broad reformulation of the question posed for our answer, I would assume the correctness of the trial judge’s conclusion' — 'that the policy is not facially ambiguous — and would view the certification not as a license to search once again for facial policy ambiguities but rather as calling for our response to whether the shareholder’s son may stand in the status of an insured.

Ill

SUMMARY

¶ 12 Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence commands that our answers be confined within the range of questions posed. It is not this court’s office to intrude (by its responses) upon the certifying court’s decision-making process. The question certified to us does not allow this court’s re-examination of the federal trial judge’s legal conclusion that, when measured by the norms of state law, the policy’s provisions are facially unambiguous. Today’s reploughing of the field that was earlier visited by the Western District in its own search for ambiguities — absent a direct or oblique invitation to do so — is but an unwarranted assumption of reviewing power neither encompassed in the certification order’s text nor tolerated by Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence.

¶ 13 In answer to the question certified I would hence assume that the policy is facially unambiguous (as the federal trial judge had concluded) and, upon a four-corners examination of the contract, declare that Oklahoma law will not allow the shareholder’s resident family member to stand in the status of an insured under the terms of the UM endorsement in a policy issued to a corporation.

      . In Babcock v. Adkins, 1984 OK 84, 695 P.2d 1340, we held that only persons who qualify as insured under a "series of policies" may stack UM coverage, and stated that "those qualifying as insured by reason of status as passengers or permissive users do not qualify as insureds beyond the [single] policy covering the vehicle in which they are located when injured by an uninsured motorist.” id. at 1343. In. Rogers v. Goad, 1987 OK 59, 739 P.2d 519, the policy was a single policy covering a fleet of vehicles. We held that an employee, being a Class 2 insured, is not permitted to stack UM coverage for each of the vehicles in the fleet. We declined to treat Class 1 and Class 2 insureds the same because to do so "would place upon the insurer a risk not contemplated by the contracting parties," id. at 522, and cited with approval Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972). In Cunningham, the Virginia Supreme Court said: “We remain committed to the practice that courts cannot substitute the name of each of the many employees of a given company in place of the employer as the named insured and thus stretch the coverage of the policy to include all employees and all members of their households. To do so would rewrite the contract of the parties and distort the public policy as set out in our cases.” Cunningham, 189 S.E.2d at 835. Again in Stanton v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 1987 OK 118, 747 P.2d 945, we repeated the well-settled rule that employees, as Class 2 insureds, are entitled only to the coverage provided by the specific vehicle the employee was occupying when injured.

      . Craig impliedly rejected the corporeal entity theory. In its criticism of the dissent, the opinion used the language: "Even if we could accept the dissent’s 'incorporeal entity' theory .... ” and "To accept the dissent’s view of incorporeal existence is to conclude, logically....” Craig, 111 P.2d at 216.

      . See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. C & G Contr., Inc., 186 Ariz. 421, 924 P.2d 111 (Ariz.App.1996); Gardner v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 2000 WL 121302 (10th Cir.2000) (applying Colorado law); Lampkin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 581 So.2d 175 (Fla.App.1990); American States Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 446 So.2d 1085 (Fla.App.1984); Nicks v. Hartford Ins. Group, 291 So.2d 673 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974); Bernard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 206 Ga.App. 519, 426 S.E.2d 29 (1992); Hogan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 171 Ga.App. 671, 320 S.E.2d 555 (1984); Foote v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 88 Hawai'i 122, 962 P.2d 1004 (Haw.App.1998); Rohe v. CNA Ins. Co., 312 Ill.App.3d 123, 244 IlI.Dec. 442, 726 N.E.2d 38 (2000); Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Jersey County Constr., Inc., 246 Ill.App.3d 387, 186 IlI.Dec. 233, 615 N.E.2d 1290, cert. denied, 152 Ill.2d 557, 190 Ill.Dec. 886, 622 N.E.2d 1203 (1993); Peterson v. Universal Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind.App.1991); Huebner v. MSI Ins. Co., 506 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 1993); Sears v. Wilson, 10 Kan.App.2d 494, 704 P.2d 389 (1985); Adams v. Thomason, 753 So.2d 416 (La.App.2000); Marcello v. Moreau, 672 So.2d 1104 (La.App.1996); Bryant v. Protective Casualty Insurance Company, 554 So.2d 177 (La.App.1989); Meche v. Thibodeaux, 550 So.2d 346 (La.App.1989), cert. denied, 558 So.2d 1124 (La.1990); Barnes v. Thames, 578 So.2d 1155 (La.App.1991); Langer v. USF & G, 552 A.2d 20 (Maine 1988); Smith v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co., 2000 WL 1357523 (D.Me.2000); Jacobs v. USF & G, 417 Mass. 75, 627 N.E.2d 463 (1994); Andrade v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 35 Mass.App.Ct. 175, 617 N.E.2d 1015 (1993), review denied, 416 Mass. 1105, 621 N.E.2d 685 (1993); Michigan Township Participating Plan v. Pavolich, 232 Mich.App. 378, 591 N.W.2d 325 (1999); Kaysen v. Federal Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 920 (Minn.1978); Lundgren v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 391 N.W.2d 542 (Minn.App.1986); Ott v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 936 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.App.1996); Cutter v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 133 N.H. 569, 579 A.2d 804 (1990); Benns v. Continental Cas. Co., 982 F.2d 461 (10th Cir.1993) (applying N.M. law); Royal Ins. v. Bennett, 226 A.D.2d 1074, 642 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996); Buckner v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 66 N.Y.2d 211, 495 N.Y.S.2d 952, 486 N.E.2d 810 (1985); Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 407 S.E.2d 497 (1991); Busby v. Simmons, 103 N.C.App. 592, 406 S.E.2d 628 (N.C.App.1991); Kitts v. Utica Nat'l Ins. Group, 106 Ohio App.3d 692, 667 N.E.2d 30 (1995); Meyer v. American Economy Ins. Co., 103 Or.App. 160, 796 P.2d 1223, review denied, 310 Or. 547, 800 P.2d 789 (1990); Hunyady v. Aetna Life & Cas., 396 Pa.Super. 476, 578 A.2d 1312 (1990), aff'd, 530 Pa. 25, 606 A.2d 897 (1992); Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 585 F.Supp. 408 (E.D.Pa.1984); Concrete Services, Inc. v. USF & G, 331 S.C. 506, 498 S.E.2d 865 (1998); Dixon v. Gunter, 636 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.App.1982); Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.1997); General Ins. Co. of America v. Icelandic

        Builders, Inc., 24 Wash.App. 656, 604 P.2d 966 (1979).

      . See, e.g., Agosto v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 239 Conn. 549, 687 A.2d 1267 (1996); Hansen v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262 (1996); Ceci v. National Indem. Co., 225 Conn. 165, 622 A.2d 545 (1993); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barre, 1996 WL 745842 (Conn.Super.1996); J &W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So.2d 550 (Miss.1998); Hager v. American West Ins. Co., 732 F.Supp. 1072 (D.Mont.1989); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 765 A.2d 195 (2001); Lunge v. National Cas. Co., 977 F.Supp. 672 (D.Vt.1997).
      Some jurisdictions and treatises include O’Hanlon v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 639 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir.1981) (applying Delaware law) among this group. However, O’Hanlon is not on point because the named insured was an individual’s trade name, not a corporation. Some include Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676 (Ky.1974). It is not on point because the named insured was a partnership and the case was decided based on partnership law, not policy language ambiguity. Some include American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sinz, 487 So.2d 340 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986). It is not on point because the injured person was a relative resident of an additional designated named insured. Finally, many include Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lambrecht & Sons, Inc., 852 P.2d 1317 (Colo.App.1993). However, this case was distinguished and limited to its unusual facts in Gardner v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 2000 WL 121302 (10th Cir.2000) (applying Colorado law).

      . 20 O.S.2001 § 1601 et seq.

      . Reformulation of a certified question is authorized by 20 O.S.2001 § 1602.1.

      . 20 O.S.2001 § 1602.1.

      . 974 F.2d 135, 139 n. 3 (10th Cir.1992).

      . In Shebester a panel of the Tenth-Circuit held that a statement added by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in an answer to a certified question was not binding on the appellate court since the precise “question was not certified ... and it is unclear whether the Oklahoma court had an adequate record to make this determination.” Although another Tenth-Circuit panel in an unpublished opinion has recently acknowledged this court's statutory reformulation freedom, I would not accept its pronouncement as repudiating Shebester’s restrictive approach. Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating, 66 Fed.Appx. 768, 2003 WL 2007934 (10th Cir.2003)(unpublished opinion). "Our statement of the questions is not meant to limit the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s inquiiy. We acknowledge the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reserved authority to reformulate legal questions presented through the certification procedure. See Olda. Stat. tit. 20, §§ 1602.1, 1604(A)(3).” Id.

      . Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of America, 530 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir.1976) ("Five questions were certified, but, following our usual practice, we left it to the Alabama Court to formulate the issues. As was their prerogative, the Alabama Court did just that and considered the basic issues rather than replying categorically to the certified questions.”); Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 871 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir.1989) ("Our phrasing of the questions should not restrict the court’s consideration of the problems and issues involved. 'The court may reformulate the relevant state law questions as it perceives them to be, in light of the contentions of the parties.’ "); Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir.1984) ("We do not intend this formulation to be exclusive. The Idaho Court is free to frame the basic issues in any appropriate manner.”); Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir.1993)(If, following certification of products liability issues the Illinois Supreme Court “will conclude that these are not the right questions ... the Justices should feel free to reformulate the questions, just as they would when dealing with the issues posed in a petition for leave to appeal.”); Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.1976) (the state court's answer to a question not certified proved dispositive); Engel v. CBS, Inc., 182 F.3d 124, 125, 126 (2nd Cir.1999).

      . The comment to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 74 (1995), describes the parameters of the state court’s reformulation authority:
      Requiring a question to be answered precisely as it is certified imposes a counterproductive rigidity that could decrease the utility of the answer received. Permitting the receiving court to amend the certified question freely may also adversely affect the utility of the answer and result in the issuance of an advisory opinion. The term "reformulate” is intended to connote a retention of the specific terms and concepts of the question while allowing some flexibility in restating the question in light of the justiciable controversy pending before the certifying court.
      (emphasis added).

      . In 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248 (2d ed.1988), the authors observe:
      [I]t is now the common practice of many courts, when certifying, to emphasize that the particular phrasing used in the certified question is not to restrict the state court and that the state court is free to reformulate the questions as it sees fit. State courts have availed themselves of this freedom whether or not it is expressly stated in the certificate.
      (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

      . In Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 411, 426 (1988), the authors, John B. Corr and Ira P. Robbins, state:
      Regardless of the clarity of the record, facts, and issues certified, the answering court must have the power to reformulate the questions posed. Although the court should not answer questions unrelated to the case at hand, the answering court should have the same freedom to analyze the factual circumstances that it would have if the entire case were before the court. Indeed, the ability of the answering court to reshape or add to the issues is necessary to further the goals of certification. The answering court may be best situated to frame the question for precedential value and to control the development of its laws. If state courts take offense at a poorly framed question, they may miss a genuine opportunity to settle state law on a particular point.

      . From the states’ vantage point, the uniform certification act is critical to the faithful practice of rudimentary federalism. It respects the state’s autonomy to declare the norms of state law— constitutional, statutory and unwritten — to be applied in pending federal-court litigation. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1459, 1550 (1997) ("Certification is perhaps uniquely suited to further the principles of judicial federalism underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie.”). The vehicle’s smooth operation enhances the continued recognition of state laws and should not be abused by offering uninvited and objectionable responses.

      . In Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 311 Or. 361, 811 P.2d 627, 633-34 (1991), the Oregon court observes that the discretion to reframe questions certified by the federal court "should be exercised with reserve, ordinarily after consultation with the certifying court, and for the primary purpose of facilitating a resolution of the actual question of law posed by the case in which certification is sought.” The court notes that it followed this course in the case before it. Id.

      . By force of the parol evidence rule pre-con-tract negotiations and oral discussions are merged into, and superseded by, the terms of an executed writing. 15 O.S.2001 § 137; Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 1993 OK 131, 863 P.2d 1176, 1180; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1979). Parol evidence cannotvary, modify or contradict the terms of an executed written agreement. Pitco Production Co. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc., 2003 OK 5, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 541, 546; Ollie v. Rainbolt, 1983 OK 79, 669 P.2d 275, 279; Snow v. Winn, 1980 OK 27, ¶ 12, 607 P.2d 678, 682; Jeffery W. Stempel, Law of Insurance Contract Disputes, ¶ 4.02 (2d ed.l999)(the parol evidence rule provides that where there exists a fully integrated written contract, the court will ordinarily not consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent or the meaning of a particular term).

      . The provisions of 15 O.S.2001 § 137 are declaratory of pre-existing common law. Henry v. Hope, 1957 OK 235, ¶ 5, 317 P.2d 239, 241; Warren v. Pulley, 1943 OK 248, ¶ 6, 141 P.2d 288, 290.

      . Pitco, supra note 12, at ¶ 14, at 546; First Nat. Bank in Durant v. Honey Creek Entertainment Corp., 2002 OK 11, ¶ 10, 54 P.3d 100, 103; Snow, supra note 12, at ¶ 12, at 682; McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 245 (1st Cir.1985) ("[I]t is well recognized that Congress did not intend the [Federal Rules of Evidence] to preempt so-called 'substantive’ state rules of evidence such as the parole [sic] evidence rule”); Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir.1998); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213, comment a (1979). Because the policy’s ambiguity was a certifiable state-law issue, its omission from the certification may not be rejected out-of-hand as without significance.

      . Parol evidence is not a rule of evidence for the resolution of which the federal courts may use federal evidence law. State-court intrusion into federal adjective-law process would not offer a binding resolution of an unsettled issue but mere gratuitous advice. On the other hand, a state court’s response to a state-law question becomes binding on the federal court for application in deciding the case for which the question was submitted. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2067, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226-27, 231-34, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1218-19, 1221-23, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).

      . The court’s opinion (at V 6) does not accurately render the gist of the certifying court’s range of concerns to be resolved. After narrowly stating the formulated issue, the Tenth Circuit, in the latter portion of its order, directs this court’s attention to authorities in other states. Its certification order states as follows:
      On the very question before us, there are competing views as to the inclusion of a corporation as a named insured. There is also a considerable body of case law addressing the ambiguity of listing a family-owned corporation as the named insured, with the concurrent inclusion of family members in a commercial policy. Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, has never squarely ruled on the issue presented.
      (citations omitted).
      The first part of the reformulated question is much broader than the certified question, and the second part is utterly erroneous. This is so because the court perceives that it has been called upon to determine whether the statutorily mandated UM selection/rejection form created a reasonable expectation of coverage which would justify the policy's reformation, although nowhere in the certification order is there any mention of evidentiary material tendered in summary process, let alone an invitation to consider it in support of the insured’s reformation quest should an ambiguity be found on the face of the policy. Solely in the parties’ briefs is there an argument that raises the issue. There is no basis in extant Tenth-Circuit jurisprudence for reformulating issues based on the parties’ arguments. Until the federal appellate court adopts an approach similar to that of the Ninth Circuit (see cases supra note 6), we should stand confined to the formulated question.

      . The votes of two Tenth-Circuit panel members lend support to my view that there was no broader certification than that contained in the federal court’s narrow formulation — a call for a four-corners examination of the policy with a view to determining whether, as a matter of state law, the policy entitles the shareholder’s family members to press their UM loss. The vote of the other two panel members appears as follows:
      "Hartz, J., concurs as to the certification of the question of state law.
      Briscoe, J., dissenting.
      I would not certify the question presented because the policy language at issue unambiguously outlines who is entitled to UIM coverage.”

      . In testing an unambiguous insurance policy this court must focus solely upon the agreement’s terms rather than on any extrinsic evidence. Pitco, supra note 12, at V 14, at 546; Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, 1994 OK 20, ¶ 27, 896 P.2d 503, 514, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S.Ct. 476, 133 L.Ed.2d 405 (1995); Hicks v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1938 OK 84, ¶ 0, syl., 182 Okl. 61, 76 P.2d 269, 269 (“The meaning of a contract is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible, the duty of the court being to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not what was intended to be written.”). Absent an ambiguity, insurance policies are generally subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts. Carraco Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 1971 OK 50, ¶ 8, 484 P.2d 519, 521; C.P.A. Co. v. Jones, 1953 OK 345, ¶¶ 26-27, 263 P.2d 731, 734.

      . The policy's UM endorsement states in pertinent part:
      B. WHO IS AN INSURED
      1. You.
      2. If you are an individual, any "family member."
      3. Anyone else "occupying” a covered “auto” or a temporary substitute for a covered "auto.” The covered "auto” must be out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, "loss” or destruction.
      4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of "bodily injury” sustained by another "insured.”
      (emphasis added).
      The UM endorsement provides four categories of insureds with UM coverage. The first two categories — "you” and "family members” — are deemed "class I insureds” entitled to UM coverage when injured by an uninsured motorist. "Class 2 insureds” are usually those individuals insured by the policy only by reason of their occupancy or permissive use of a covered vehicle. In order for a shareholder’s family member to stand in the status of an insured, that person must fall within one of named classes. Rogers v. Goad, 1987 OK 59, ¶ 5, 739 P.2d 519, 521.
      The policy's UM provisions extend coverage to family members only if the named insured is an individual. The policy defines a family member as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is resident of your household, including a ward or foster child." Because the insured named on the policy issued to Hillcrest Pharmacy is not an individual, the coverage term implicating family members is not triggered. Under the UM endorsement Bogdahn’s son clearly does not qualify as a "family member.” In the absence of a UM clause expressly extending coverage to the shareholder's family members, the latter would only be covered when occupying a vehicle insured by the policy.

      .Oklahoma law treats a corporation as a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. 18 O.S.2001 § 1016; 16 O.S.2001 § 1; Seitsinger v. Dockum Pontiac Inc., 1995 OK 29, ¶ 10, 894 P.2d 1077, 1080; Sautbine v. Keller, 1966 OK 209, ¶ 15, 423 P.2d 447, 451 (a family corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its shareholders).

      . For this proposition Bogdahn directs us to Lunge v. National Cas. Co., 977 F.Supp. 672, 677 (D.Vt.1997); Hansen v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262, 1267 (1996); J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So.2d 550 (Miss.1998); O’Hanlon v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 639 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1981); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 765 A.2d 195, 203-05 (2001); Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Of America, 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 1142 (1999).

      . Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 1983 OK 41, ¶ 6, 662 P.2d 681, 683-684.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: HARGRAVE, J. WATT, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    2004 OK 22
    Jimmy D. SMITH, Plaintiff/Appellee. v. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 99,157.
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    March 30, 2004.

      Fourth Scoufos, Thomas W. Condit, Law Offices of Harry Scoufos, P.C., Sallisaw, OK, for plaintiff/appellee.
    Kenneth T. Linn, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, OK, for defendant/appellant.
   HARGRAVE, J.

¶ 1 Plaintiffyappellee Jimmy D. Smith’s driver’s license was revoked for 180 days after he was arrested for D.U.I. and refused to submit to a breath or blood test. He filed a petition for appeal to district court seeking a modification pursuant to 47 O.S.2001 § 754.1 and § 755. Section 755 provides that the district court may modify the revocation or denial when it determines that the person whose license has been revoked has no other adequate means of transportation, and may enter a written order directing the DPS to allow driving, subject to certain limitations, including the ignition interlock requirement of section 754.1.

¶ 2 Section 754.1 requires that an approved ignition interlock device shall be placed, at the person’s own expense, upon every motor vehicle operated by that person. The ignition interlock device is not required to be installed upon any vehicle owned or leased by an employer of the person, unless the employer consents in writing to such installation. The employer-owned vehicle exception does not apply when the person is self-employed or is employed by relatives within the first degree of consanguinity or “who resides in the same household.”

¶ 3 The sole issue is whether nine trucks owned or leased by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, LLC must have an ignition interlock device installed at plaintiffs expense. Title 47 O.S.2001 § 754.1(B) provides:

B. As a prerequisite and condition of any modification, the person shall be required to have installed an ignition interlock device approved by the Department at the person’s own expense, upon every motor vehicle operated by such person, provided, the Department shall not require as a condition of modification the device to be installed upon any vehicle owned or leased by an employer of the person, except when the person is self-employed or employed by relatives within the first degree of consanguinity or who resides in the same household, without the employer’s written permission to install the ignition interlock device on any vehicle to be operated by the person during the course of employment. The permission to install the ignition interlock device shall be in writing on the official letterhead of the employer. The person shall comply with all provisions of law regarding ignition interlock devices.

¶ 4 Smith is employed by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, a limited liability company. The company is solely owned by Smith and his wife, and they have 16 other employees. The company owns or leases nine trucks, including trash compactors and dump trucks. Although Smith’s job is not to drive the trucks, if one of the drivers does not show up for work Smith is required to drive the truck assigned to that person. Smith was arrested for D.U.I. while driving his personal vehicle. Smith does not contest the requirement of ignition interlock devices for the two personal vehicles owned by his wife and himself.

¶ 5 The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, found that Smith had no other reasonable means of transportation for purposes of his employment and that he may need to drive any one of the of vehicles owned or leased by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, LLC. The trial judge found that Smith was an employee and co-owner of the business and that the company was exempt from the requirement of installing an interlock device on any vehicle owned or leased by the company.

¶ 6 The Department of Public Safety (DPS) appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that Smith was “self employed” because he is a co-owner of the company and is the “boss.” Smith filed a petition for certiorari with this Court and certiorari was granted.

¶7 DPS argues that because Smith owns 50% of, and is the “boss” of Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, LLC and makes the hiring and firing decisions, then he is not an employee of the corporation and is hence self-employed. To interpret the statute as DPS does would mean that a person who owns an interest in a business entity and makes management decisions would be deemed “self employed” for purposes of the statute. The statute, however, does not mention the role, or the degree of control wielded by an employee of a company. It says that if the vehicles are leased or owned by the person’s employer, they will not have the interlock device installed without the employer’s consent. Here, the vehicles are leased or owned by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, a limited liability corporation. It should be emphasized that the cost of installing the ignition interlock device on any required vehicle is the responsibility of the employee, not the employer. We think the intent of the self-employed or employed-by-a-close-relative exceptions to the modification statute contemplate that the person may use the same vehicle for both work and personal business or that both a personal and a work-related vehicle are owned by the individual and he would be the only person driving either of them. The phrase used in the statute is “any vehicle owned or leased by an employer of the person” which distinguishes those vehicles from vehicles that are owned by an individual.

¶ 8 There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature intended that the terms used therein should be given other than their ordinary meanings. Title 25 O.S. 2001 § 1 provides that words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense except when a contrary intention plainly appears. See, Hess v. Excise Board of McCurtain County, 1985 OK 28 ¶ 6, 698 P.2d 930 (statutory words are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary intention plainly appears).

¶ 9 There is no definition of “employer” or “self-employed” in § 1754.1. The section merely says that the ignition interlock device is not required to be installed on any vehicle owned or leased by an employer of the person. “Self-employed” in its plainest sense means working for oneself rather than for an employer. See, American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1985. Employee is likewise defined therein as a person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation. Smith testified that he receives a weekly paycheck from Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation LLC.

¶ 10 The statute focuses on ownership of the vehicles, rather than on ownership of the business. The vehicles in question are owned or leased by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation, LLC. They are not owned by Smith. We believe the vehicles in question are owned by Smith’s employer within the meaning of the statute. We must bear in mind that the modification is a “hardship” modification designed to accommodate a person whose license has been revoked and has no other adequate means of transportation. In the context of this case it is Smith’s need to drive the company trucks in the event that the regular drivers are unable to. While in every instance of his employment Smith may not be acting as an employee would, when he is driving the trucks owned by the company, he is acting as any other employee/driver of the company.

¶ 11 In sum, we cannot find that Smith is “self-employed” within the meaning and intent of the statute. We are satisfied that within the meaning and intent of the statute, Smith is employed by Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation LLC. If the legislature desires to change the statute to provide that an owner of a company is not entitled to the employer-owned-vehicles exception it may do so.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

¶ 12 CONCUR: OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ.

¶ 13 DISSENT: WATT (BY SEPARATE WRITING), C.J., KAUGER (JOINS, WATT, C.J.), J.

WATT, C.J.,

dissenting:

¶ 1 The PlaintiffiAppellee, Mr. Smith, is the owner of Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation. They are one in the same. The majority creates a “legal fiction” in holding otherwise. Clearly, the employer-owned vehicle exception does not apply here. Accordingly, I would, as the Court of Civil Appeals did, reverse the order of the trial court below. If Mr. Smith, as an “employee”, wants to drive any of the trucks owned or leased to “Sue’s Recycling and Sanitation”, they must have the ignition interlock device installed. To do otherwise undermines the statutory intent of 47 O.S.2001 § 754.1(B) and subjects the public to the potential for harm, serious injury, or death to which I cannot accede.

¶ 2 I respectfully dissent.

      . The trial court’s determination that plaintiff had no other reasonable means of transportation for purposes of his employment is not challenged here.

      . The Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act is codified at 18 O.S.2001 § 2000, etc. under the Corporations statutes. A limited liability company is a hybrid, having some of the characteristics of partnerships and some of corporations. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 357 (Wyo.2000).

      . See, for example, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1014(h) (2002) which provides that:
      (h) Any person whose license is restricted to operating only a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device installed may operate an employer’s vehicle without an ignition interlock device installed during normal business activities, provided that the person does not partly or entirely own or control the employer's vehicle or business.


author: WATT, Chief Justice. OPALA, V.C.J.,

text:
    2004 OK 21
    William A. STRONG, II, Carolyn E. Strong, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Donald D. LAUBACH, Defendant/Appellant, v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Garnishee/Appellant.
    No. 99,167.
    Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
    March 30, 2004.

      Jon W. Laaseh, Jacobson & Laasch, Edmond, OK, for Appellant.
    Kelley L. Cornelius, Kelley L. Cornelius, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellees.
    Richard E. Hornbeek, Hornbeek, Krahl, Vitali & Braun, P.L.L.C. Oklahoma City, OK, for Garnishee/Appellant.
   WATT, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 Two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) have been consolidated for our consideration. In one case, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SBTC), as Garnishee, appealed the judgment against it in favor of the Appellees, William A. Strong, II, and Carolyn E. Strong (the Strongs), for the entire sum paid to its employee, Appellant Donald D. Laubach, for a workers’ compensation claim. The Strongs are Laubach’s judgment creditors. The other case is an appeal by Laubach from the judgment in favor of the Strongs, in which the court found he was not entitled to an unlimited exemption for workers’ compensation benefits under 85 O.S.2001 § 48 (§ 48), of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), but to an exemption limited to $50,000.00, under 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21) (§ 1(A)(21)), found in Title 31, Homestead and Exemptions of the Oklahoma Statutes. The following reformulated question has been certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit pursuant to the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.2001 §§ 1601-11:

Are workers’ compensation proceeds paid to an injured worker entirely exempt from garnishment, as provided in Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 48, or is the exemption limited to fifty thousand dollars ($50,-000.00), as provided in Okla. Stat. tit. 31, § 1(A)(21)?
We answer the federal question as follows:
Claims for compensation or benefits due are completely exempt under 85 O.S.2001 § 48, the exclusive statutory authority for exemptions under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 85 O.S.2001 §§ 1 et seq. The purported exemptions for a “person’s interest in a ... workers’ compensation claim”, under 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21), shall not apply to “claims for compensation or benefits due” under the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act.

FACTS

¶ 2 Laubach sustained two injuries during his employment with SBTC. He filed claims in the workers’ compensation court and received awards for compensation benefits. He settled his claim with SBTC and its insurer, and an annuity was purchased for the remaining $40,000.00 of his award. The Strongs had previously received a judgment against Laubach in federal court in Missouri in an unrelated matter. They filed their judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. They have attempted to collect their judgment from Laubach’s workers’ compensation proceeds through two separate garnishment actions. The first one, in March, 1998, was a continuing garnishment against SBTC to intercept the workers’ compensation proceeds then being paid to Laubach. The other garnishment action was brought in November, 1998, against Laubach’s bank account, in which the annuity payments were deposited. This case involves the annuity payments in the November, 1998 garnishment.

¶ 3 Laubach and SBTC objected, claiming workers’ compensation proceeds are totally exempt under 85 O.S. § 48. In the November, 1998, bank account garnishment, Lau-bach claimed he was entitled to an exemption for workers’ compensation and social security benefits. The federal magistrate entered a report and recommendation granting his claim for an exemption for the social security benefits. An exemption of $50,000.00 was granted for the workers’ compensation benefits. However, the magistrate held that because Laubach had already received $50,000.00 in workers’ compensation benefits in the March, 1998, garnishment action, he had received the maximum exemption allowed pursuant to 31 O.S. § 1(A)(21).

¶4 Laubach objected to the Magistrate’s report and recommendation. He relied on an opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Young v. Rimer, 1998 OK CIV APP 49, 964 P.2d 911 (cert.denied), as authority for his position that he was entitled to a complete exemption for workers’ compensation proceeds. The district court rejected his objection, recognizing that Young v. Rimer is not accorded precedential value because it is not an opinion from this Court, or a case which this Court released for publication. See Rule 1.200(c)(2), Rules of the Supreme Court, 12 O.S.2001, Ch.15, App. The district court relied instead on this Court’s opinion in In re Anderson, 1996 OK 135, 932 P.2d 1110. In its certification order, the Tenth Circuit recited the finding of the district court with regard to Anderson, has follows: “The district court concluded that the exemption is limited to $50,000.00 even when asserted by the worker.” Laubach and SBTC then appealed to the Tenth Circuit which has certified the question now before us.

DISCUSSION

A. Contentions of the Parties

¶ 5 Laubach contends there should be no limit to the exemption under § 48 and that the federal court erroneously applied § 1(A)(21). He contends the issue in this case is whether the two statutes can be reconciled and that reconciliation is possible, considering how each statute is to be applied. He contends that the Legislature is not presumed, in enacting a new statute, to have intended to repeal an earlier statute by implication. Conflicting legislative acts should be construed in such a way as to reconcile the provisions and render them consistent and harmonious, giving force and effect to each. This is known as the rule of in pari materia. See Beavin v. State ex rel. Dept, of Public Safety, 1983 OK 34, 662 P.2d 299, 302. He contends the exemption in § 48 is unlimited for “claims for compensation” paid to employees, similar to the benefits awarded and paid to him in this case. On the other hand, he contends § 1(A)(21) does not apply to an employee’s “claims for compensation”, but instead, applies only to a person’s “interest in” a claim for ... workers’ compensation”. [Emphasis added.] Thus, Laubach’s contention that the two statutes can be reconciled is based on the premise that § 48 applies to compensation paid to the injured employee, while § 1(A)(21) applies to the “interest” in compensation of someone other than the injured employee. This contention is consistent with COCA’s holding in Young v. Rimer, supra Laubach contends that construing both statutes to apply to the injured employee prohibits a reconciliation of the statutes and notes that COCA recognized only one exception to the unlimited aspect of § 48:

[T]he only express exception to that exemption contained in the opening paragraph is for ‘the enforcement of any valid lien for child support or valid income assignment for child support.’ If the legislature had intended there to be other exceptions to the exemption protection of compensation and benefits paid to employees, we believe that the legislature would have expressly provided them as it did with liens and income assignments for child support. [Emphasis in original].

964 P.2d 911, 913. This exception for child support obligations was added to § 48 in 1994. Also in 1994, the Legislature enacted § 48.1, authorizing a lien to enforce child support judgments.

¶ 6 SBTC takes Laubaeh’s position that Young v. Rimer, supra, should be followed. It contends the full exemption granted in § 48 has never been repealed, and has only been modified to allow a lien or income assignment for child support obligations. Moreover, it contends Young v. Rimer is the only Oklahoma authority which addresses the issue in this case: reconciliation of the conflict between 31 O.S. § 1(A)(21) and 85 O.S. § 48.

¶ 7 The Strongs contend the district court correctly held Laubach’s workers’ compensation payments (the annuity) are subject to an exemption of only $50,000.00 under § 1(A)(21), and that he had already received it in conjunction with the March, 1998 garnishment. Although they cite Beavin for the rule of in pari materia as being applicable here, they also cite Edmond Independent School District No. 12 v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 1943 OK 62, ¶ 13, 135 P.2d 57, 192 Okla. 241, for the rule that clear legislative intent to restrict the application of a former statute should be respected by the courts. They contend that in 1980, when sub-section A(21) was added to § 1 of title 31, it showed Legislative intent to limit the workers’ compensation exemption under § 48 of the Act to $50,000.00. They claim that to ignore the clear language of § 1(A)(21) by carving out legal exceptions would judicially repeal the statute and defeat Legislative intent.

¶8 The Strongs contend Laubach’s interpretation would, in effect, repeal § 1(A)(21). They argue that no one other than the workers’ compensation employee or a creditor of the employee could have been contemplated by the Legislature’s use of the terms “such person’s interest in a claim for ... workers’ compensation ...” under the statute. [Emphasis added.]

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

¶ 9 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to, the Legislature’s intention and purpose as expressed in a statute. Hill v. Board of Education, 1997 OK 111, 944 P.2d 930. Under the rule of in pari materia, the Legislature is not presumed, in enacting a new statute, to have intended to repeal an earlier statute by implication. Conflicting legislative acts should be construed in such a way as to reconcile the provisions and render them consistent and harmonious, giving force and effect to each. See Beavin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1983 OK 34, 662 P.2d 299, 302. However, when an irreconcilable conflict is found to exist between two statutes, the Court will hold one of them to be repealed by implication. Upton v. Dept. of Corrections, 2000 OK 46, 9 P.3d 84.

¶ 10 The purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers for loss of earning power and disability to work. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Switch, 1994 OK 59, 878 P.2d 357. Workers’ Compensation Laws must be liberally construed in favor of injured employees. Special Indemnity Fund v. Treadwell, 1984 OK 91, 693 P.2d 608. Workers’ compensation is purely a creature of statute; it did not exist at common law. See Lang v. Landeros, 1996 OK CIV APP 4, 918 P.2d 404 (cert.denied). Thus, any allowance of benefits or the restriction upon an award must be given, if at all, by statute. The Legislature provided for workers’ compensation benefits to be exempt when workers’ compensation statutes were first created. See 85 O.S.1915 § 48. That statute, although modified, has never been repealed. The case law interpreting the workers’ compensation act supports liberal construction of the exemptions granted in § 48.

¶ 11 The other types of claims in § 1(A)(21) for which exemptions are allowed, i.e., personal bodily injury and death claims, however, were claims which arose at common law. When § 1(A)(21) was added in 1980, part of the legislative title given to the amendment to § 1 of title 31 was “Increasing Exemptions”. Granting an exemption for an interest in this type of claim would have increased an exemption for such claim, as none previously existed. We generally assume the Legislature will not perform a vain and useless act in enacting new laws. See Hill v. Board of Education, 1997 OK 111, 944 P.2d 930. However, including workers’ compensation claims in § 1(A)(21) with personal bodily injury and death claims was an unnecessary act. The Legislature had previously provided for a total exemption in the Workers’ Compensation Act for “claims for compensation and benefits due”, under § 48. Clearly, granting an exemption of $50,000.00 for an “interest in” a claim for workers’ compensation could not increase an exemption which was already totally exempt under § 48, except for the noted exception for child support obligations, not applicable here.

¶ 12 Since 1915, section 48 has provided that workers compensation benefits shall not be assigned, released or commuted “except as provided by this act” and has also provided for an exemption “from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt”. We, therefore, recognize § 48 under the Workers’ Compensation Act as the only exemption intended by the Legislature for workers’ compensation. Our holding today is not intended to affect the exemptions granted pursuant to 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21) for an “interest in a claim for personal bodily injury ... [or] death _” [Emphasis added.]

¶ 13 In defining the purpose of the homestead exemption laws, the statutes in which 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21) is found, this Court stated in 1935 in Security Building & Loan Ass’n v. Ward, 1935 OK 996, 50 P.2d 651, 657, 174 Okla. 238:

The purposes of the exemption statute are to prevent improvident debtors from becoming subjects of charity by preserving to them sufficient definitely classified property that they may maintain a home for themselves, and to prevent inconsiderate creditors from depriving them of the necessities of life. It is the duty of the court to so apply these exemption statutes as to accomplish these purposes.

Nothing we have decided today impairs that purpose in any way.

NEITHER YOUNG v. RIMER NOR IN RE ANDERSON RESOLVES THE PRESENT CASE

¶ 14 COCA reached the correct result in Young v. Rimer as to the parties involved, in holding that Young had no interest in, and could not execute upon, Rimer’s workers’ compensation proceeds because they are completely exempt under § 48. However, because it implies the situation could arise in which someone other than a workers’ compensation employee, or the employee’s dependents, could have an “interest in” the employee’s “claim for compensation or benefits due”, under § 1(A)(21) to entitle them to an exemption of $50,000.00, we cannot adopt it as a resolution to this case. We find such an inference to be contrary to the language of § 48 and apparent legislative intent. Thus, we hold § 48 is the exclusive statutory authority for workers’ compensation exemptions.

¶ 15 In the present case, the federal district court relied on Anderson, supra, in holding the $50,000.00 exemption was applicable, although already exhausted. We acknowledge we held therein that a workers’ compensation employee should receive the limited exemption under § 1(A)(21), when he sought protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code. We had before us in Anderson a certified federal question from the bankruptcy court. The narrow question asked was whether the debtor could receive an exemption for each “separate and distinct” claim allowed under 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21). This Court held he could receive two exemptions because he sustained two separate injuries, i.e., his employment-related injury (workers’ compensation), and the injury which arose later during surgery, in his medical malpractice action (bodily injury claim) for treatment of the first injury.

¶ 16 Anderson considered the § 1(A)(21) limitation of $50,000.00 without reference to § 48. We answered the specific question posed by the bankruptcy court. Moreover, it remains applicable to exemptions for “personal bodily injury” and “death” claims under § 1(A)(21). While we also find Anderson instructive as to the extent to which a bankruptcy proceeding affects a claimant’s property and exemptions, because of our holding herein, we find Anderson inapplicable to this case.

EXEMPTIONS UNDER § 48 APPLY TO THE CLAIMANT AND THE CLAIMANT’S DEPENDENTS

¶ 17 The Legislature has shown its intent to protect workers’ compensation benefits awarded to the employee, as well as the benefits awarded to an employee’s dependents upon the employee’s death. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, benefits are protected from the claims of creditors and from the claimant’s attempts to assign his own benefits. Moreover, the Legislature has determined that the dependents of employees shall also be protected from losing the accrued benefits awarded to their deceased family member, subject to some reductions set out in § 48. This agrees with our statement of the purpose of workers’ compensation benefits in Commons v. Bragg, 1938 OK 355, 80 P.2d 287, 290, 183 Okla. 122, in which this Court quoted approvingly from Corbin v. Wilkinson, 1935 OK 977, 52 P.2d 45, 48, 175 Okla. 247:

This court has heretofore pointed out that in enacting the Workmen’s Compensation Law “the Legislature intended the benefits of the act shall flow to the injured workmen and their dependents, in order to afford them a living and prevent them from becoming public charges.” [Emphasis added.]

¶ 18 This Court’s discussion in Commons v. Bragg, supra, of § 48 expounds on the intention of the Legislature, as shown by amendments to § 48, to the effect that the proceeds of an award under the Act:

were to protect the dependents of the injured employee as well as the employee himself. These provisions provided that in case of the death of the claimant, the award was payable to dependents and did not go to his estate where his creditors might claim it. It would indeed be anomalous to hold that by reason of the exemption from claims of creditors as provided in the foregoing section the injured employee could avoid his obligation to support and maintain his wife and children when in fact the exemption was to assure them, as well as the husband, the necessities of life during his disability. [Emphasis added.]

80 P.2d 287, 290.

¶ 19 Protection of the “necessities of life” of the employee and the employee’s family has been a constant theme of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In Commons v. Bragg, and in cases following it, this Court held there was no exemption for the employee under the Act against a claim by the employee’s former wife for alimony and child support. See also Crocker v. Crocker, 1991 OK 130, 824 P.2d 1117; Meadows v. Meadows, 1980 OK 158, 619 P.2d 598. Consistent with the objective of protecting the worker and the worker’s family’s ability to make a living, the Legislature amended § 48 in 1994 to protect the claimant’s dependent children by adding the following:

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any party from the enforcement of any valid lien for child support or valid income assignment for child support.

¶ 20 Section 48 of the Act gives a complete exemption to claimants for compensation or benefits due and provides that compensation and benefits shall be paid only to employees. Then, § 48 enumerates circumstances in which the employee’s benefits cease and are paid to others, seemingly contradictory.

¶ 21 The protection of compensation proceeds from creditors is extended not only to the injured worker, but also to the worker’s dependents. In National Gypsum Company v. Brewster, 1969 OK 185, 461 P.2d 593, we held § 48 also applied to protect a wife’s death claim “from being assigned, released or commuted”. The Workers’ Compensation Act is intended to provide the necessities of life for them, just as the employee’s claim was paid to him to provide such necessities of life for himself and his family during his lifetime.

THE EXTENT OF THE EXEMPTION FOR “CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION OR BENEFITS DUE”

¶22 The § 48 exemption is granted for “claims for compensation or benefits due under the Workers’ Compensation Act”. The timing and extent to which workers’ compensation benefits are exempt under § 48 is an issue which has been litigated in a number of jurisdictions, including ours. In other words, when does the exemption take effect? Is an exemption granted at the time the claim is filed, or when the claim is approved, or when the claim is paid? Prior cases held an exemption allowed for “benefits due” protected the benefits until the moment they were “due”. Once paid, however, the claimant received no further exemption and the funds received were subjected to creditors’ claims.

¶23 In his bankruptcy proceeding, the Anderson claimant listed his workers’ compensation and his medical malpractice claims on his bankruptcy schedules and claimed exemptions. Neither claim had been fully litigated at that point in time. Whatever the debtor owns, including legal and equitable interests at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, becomes property of the bankruptcy estate and must be listed on the bankruptcy schedules. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521, 541; In re Alexander, 1999 OK 31, 980 P.2d 659. At that time, Anderson was not receiving compensation under the Act. Moreover, it was possible his claims might never be approved.

¶ 24 In Alexander, supra, a case involving an exemption for a bodily injury claim in a bankruptcy context, we acknowledged the workers’ compensation and bodily injury claims held by the claimant in Anderson had been unresolved, but, that Anderson was, nevertheless, entitled to claim a $50,000.00 exemption under § 1(A)(21). We stated at 980 P.2d at 664:

[EJven potential recoveries for a workers’ compensation claim and for a personal injury action were items of the bankruptcy estate for which the debtor could claim exemptions.” [Emphasis added].

We recognized that a personal injury claim asserted before bankruptcy, was a “potential recovery” and must be considered part of the bankruptcy estate. In so doing, we acknowledged the debtor could claim an exemption for contingent and unliquidated claims.

¶ 25 We reiterate that section 48 was not at issue in either Alexander or Anderson. Our consideration in Anderson was limited to the terms of the certified federal question submitted. Alexander did not involve workers’ compensation. Despite the factual differences between this case and our previous decisions in Anderson and Alexander, we find a significant common thread throughout: the liberal construction of exemption statutes in Oklahoma. In Alexander, we affirmed a bankruptcy’s debtor’s right to exempt his annuity payments for his personal injury claim after bankruptcy was filed, pursuant to § 1(A)(21), noting that any amount received in excess of $50,000.00 would become bankruptcy estate property. This was so, even though the debtor’s interest in the annuity payments was contingent at the time bankruptcy was filed. In Anderson, we recognized unliquidated or contingent workers’ compensation benefits were exempt, subject only to the public policy exception recognized for the debtor/claimant’s obligations for child support and alimony. Oklahoma’s policy of liberally construing exemption statutes, as shown in our treatment of the exemptions allowed in both cases under § 1(A)(21), even for contingent or unliquidated claims, persuades us there should be no restriction imposed on the exemption under § 48 for “claims for compensation or benefits due”.

¶26 Workers’ compensation proceeds retain their exempt character, even when deposited in a bank, unmingled with other funds. This Court addressed this issue in In re Allen’s Guardianship, 1938 OK 271, 78 P.2d 700, 182 Okla. 512. It was argued exempt funds became subject to seizure the instant they were paid. This Court quoted approvingly from Gaddy v. First National Bank, 115 Tex. 393, 283 S.W. 472, 473, in which the Texas Supreme Court held:

If the exemption shall obtain only until the employee receives the compensation, it would never benefit him. He cannot use it, because nonassignable, until he actually collects it. Then, if, at that very minute, it is subject to debts and legal writs, there would not be a minute when he could call it his own. He would really have no exemption.

CONCLUSION

¶ 27 The workers’ compensation benefits paid to Laubach are in the nature of a “money allowance” which compensated him for the loss of earning power and disability to work, and which affords him a living. These benefits were intended by the Legislature to remain completely exempt under 85 O.S.2001 § 48 alone, without restriction as to amount. The application of 85 O.S.2001 § 48 to workers’ compensation benefits is inconsistent with 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21), providing for an exemption of only an “interest in” such workers’ compensation proceeds. Workers’ compensation benefits are not subject to claims of creditors, except as explained, for valid child support obligations, not applicable here. The exemption under 85 O.S.2001 § 48 extends to contingent or unliquidated workers’ compensation claims before they are paid, as well as to unmingled funds deposited in bank accounts after they are paid. They protect the injured worker and the worker’s dependents. “Claims for compensation or benefits due” are completely exempt under 85 O.S. 2001 § 48, which is the exclusive statutory authority for exemptions under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 85 O.S.2001 §§ 1 et seq.

FEDERAL CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.

HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, JJ., concur.

OPALA, V.C.J., concurs in result.

OPALA, V.C.J.,

concurring in the court’s answer but not in its pronouncement.

¶ 11 concur in today’s answer to the federal court’s question. By the provisions of 85 O.S.2001 § 48 all workers’ compensation awards, regardless of their amount, are totally exempt from all creditors’ claims (except those asserted for the enforcement of a valid child support lien or income assignment). Because my analysis for the court’s conclusion varies somewhat from that expressed in the opinion, I submit my own views by offering this statement of concurrence in the result reached today.

¶ 2 Although for resolution of a legal question before the court the total corpus of pertinent law should be taken into consideration, not all of its sources need be contribu-tive to the answer ultimately pronounced. This principle must guide the court’s answer in this case. The two statutes drawn here to our attention — 85 O.S.2001 § 48 and 31 O.S. 2001 § 1(A)(21) — are not in pari materia and hence need not be construed together as a harmonious whole. They deal with different subjects. The former section is found in a comprehensive act that addresses itself specifically and solely to the Workers’ Compensation Law, while the latter section deals generally with exemptions from creditors’ levy. Section 48, as well as the entire act of which it forms a part, is public law of employers’ liability. In contrast, § 1(A)(21), which relates to the rights of debtors in proceedings to enforce adjudged obligations, constitutes private law. We need not resolve the apparent conflict between the texts of the two sections. The former must be declared to control over the latter.

¶3 Where a matter before the court is addressed by two statutes — one specific and the other general — the specific enactment which clearly focuses on the point in controversy and prescribes the legal norm for resolving the contest, will control over the general statute.

¶ 4 Section 48 specifically addresses itself to the exemption provided for proceeds of workers’ compensation awards, while § 1(A)(21) generally deals broadly with numerous classes of exemptions from the creditors’ levy. The former section must be allowed to govern here to the exclusion of the latter.

¶ 5 Extant Oklahoma jurisprudence on the matter dealt with here does not form a harmonious body of precedent. I would hence expressly disapprove of all unguarded language found in the past pronouncements which may be regarded as not entirely consistent with today’s conclusion. In the interest of attaining optimal clarity for the contested point of law we settle here, the Bench and Bar deserve to have the court wipe the slate clean of yesteryear’s decisional cacophony. Today’s opinion falls short of achieving that goal.

      . Claims for compensation or benefits due under the Workers’ Compensation Act shall not be assigned, released or commuted except as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, and shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution or attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived. Compensation and benefits shall be paid only to employees; ... Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any party from the enforcement of any valid lien for child support or valid income assignment for child support.... [Emphasis added],

      . Section 1(A)(21) of title 31, Oklahoma Statutes, provides:
      A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsection B of this section, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts, except as herein provided:

      21. Such person’s interest in a claim for personal bodily injury, death or workers’ compensation claim, for a net amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,-000.00), but not including any claim for exemplary or punitive damages;.... [Emphasis added].

      .The Tenth Circuit explains in its Certification order that Laubach’s claims were settled in three stages. He received the sum of $368.90 every two weeks from March 4, 1998 through August 5, 1998. He then entered into a settlement which paid a lump sum payment to him of $221,374.00. Then, an annuity was issued on Laubach’s behalf in the amount of $40,774.00, payable to him over ten years at a rate of $425.00 per month.

      . Although SBTC responded by letter to the Strongs’ counsel, objecting on the basis of service in Missouri and exemption of workers' compensation benefits, SBTC did not otherwise answer the garnishment summons.

      . Young v. Rimer was released for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals.

      . 48.1. Lien Against Workers’ Compensation Benefits to Enforce Child Support Judgments
      A. 1. A lien against workers’ compensation benefits is authorized for the purpose of enforcing a judgment for child support. Child support liens filed in accordance with Section 135 of Title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes are specifically authorized and shall be paid in accordance with such statute without any order of the Worker’s Compensation Court.
      2. Additionally, all income assignments or wage assignments for child support issued pursuant to Section 1170 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes or Section 240 of Title 56 of the Oklahoma Statutes are specifically authorized and shall be paid in accordance with such statutes without any order of the Workers’ Compensation Court.
      B. Venue for purposes of subsection B of Section 1171.3 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes and subsection E of Section 240.2 of Title 56 of the Oklahoma Statutes shall be either the location of the employer's insurance carrier or the employer's place of business within Oklahoma.

      . First, if the employee dies as a result of his injury or occupational disease, any unaccrued portions of the award or order for benefits shall abate. Next, the enforcement of a valid lien for child support obligations of the claimant will not be prohibited. Then, section 48 explains how the benefits are paid to the claimant’s dependents in the event of his death due to causes other than the injury for which he received the award.

      . Protection under § 48 is also provided the employee’s dependents when the employee, who has been receiving workers’ compensation benefits, dies due to causes other than his employment-related injury or occupational disease. Section 48 sets out specified percentages and dollar amounts for accrued benefits to particular dependents for permanent partial and permanent total disability awards.

      .In In re Alexander, we held: "The line of separation between the debtor's property and the bankruptcy estate is settled in the bankrupt’s affairs on the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. References to exemptions refer to this point in time — when the general estate passes out of the bankrupt's control and when the creditors’ and trustees' rights are fixed. It is here that the right of exemption arises. Exemptions allow the withdrawal of property from the bankruptcy estate which would otherwise be subject to levy and sale under judicial process. It is the trustee's duty to set aside the bankrupt’s legally claimed exemptions.” 980 P.2d at 663. [Footnotes omitted.]

      . Because we were only considering the exemption pursuant to 31 O.S. § 1(A)(21) under the CFQ submitted, any amount received over $50,000.00 would become bankruptcy estate property.

      . If there is a doubt as to whether an exemption is allowed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the exemption. See In re Anderson, In re Allens Guardianship, supra.

      . The terms of 85 2001 § 48 are:
      Claims for compensation or benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act shall not be assigned, released or commuted except as provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, and shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution or attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived. Compensation and benefits shall be paid only to employees; ... Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any party from the enforcement of any valid lien for child support or valid income assignment for child support.

      . The terms of 31 O.S.2001 § 1(A)(21) are:
      A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsection B of this section, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts, except as herein provided:
      * * *
      21. Such person’s interest in a claim for personal bodily injury, death or workers’ compensation claim, for a net amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,-000.00), but not including any claim for exemplary or punitive damages;

      . Where the same subject is treated in several acts having different objects the statutes are not in pari materia. Holleyman v. Holleyman, 2003 OK 48, 78 P.3d 921, 942 (supplemental opinion on rehearing’s denial); Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 51.03, pgs 210, 211.

      . Workers' Compensation Law falls under the rubric of public-law legislation. Special Indemnity Fund v. Reynolds, 1948 OK 14, 188 P.2d 841, 842, 199 Okla. 570; Reynolds v. Special Indemnity Fund, 1986 OK 64, 725 P.2d 1265, 1270; PFL Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 1998 OK 32, 958 P.2d 156, 164 n. 21; Jobe v. American Legion # 7, 2001 OK 75, 32 P.3d 860, 867 n. 22; Amos v. Spiro Public Schools, 2004 OK 4, 85 P.3d 813 n. 18.

      . Hall v. Globe Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 1999 OK 89, 998 P.2d 603, 605; State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 818 P.2d 889, 899; Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 40:3 et seq, pgs. 230 et seq.