author: Justice JOHNSON

text:
    TEXAS LOTTERY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. FIRST STATE BANK OF DEQUEEN, Stone Street Capital, Inc., and Cletius L. Irvan, Respondents.
    No. 08-0523.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    Argued Dec. 16, 2009.
    Decided Oct. 1, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 2010.

      Gregory W. Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Kent C. Sullivan, Austin, David S. Morales, Deputy First Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, James C. Ho, Solicitor General of Texas, Brantley David Starr, King & Spalding LLP, Ann Hartley, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Don Wayne Cruse Jr., Law Office of Don Cruse, Austin, Michael P. Murphy, Asst. Solicitor General, Clarence Andrew Weber, First Assistant Attorney General, Alicia Key, Deputy Atty. Gen. for Petitioner.
    Jeffrey S. Boyd, Schuyler Bailey Marshall V, Thompson & Knight LLP, Austin, for First State Bank of DeQueen.
    Max Ralph Tarbox, Andrew Raymond Seger, Todd Jeffrey Johnston, McWhorter Cobb & Johnson LLP, Lubbock, for Cleti-us L. Irvan.
   Justice JOHNSON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arises because provisions of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Texas Lottery Act conflict as to whether installment payments of a lottery prize are assignable. The primary issues are whether the Commission has sovereign immunity from suit and whether the Lottery Act’s prohibition against transferring the last two installments of a prize are negated by the UCC.

Cletius Irvan, a Texas Lottery prizewinner, assigned his final two annual installment prize payments as part of a financial arrangement by which he was to pay a bank debt. The Lottery Commission refused to recognize the assignment because the Lottery Act prohibits assignments of installment payments due within the final two years of the prize payment schedule. Irvan and other parties to the assignment sought a declaratory judgment that the UCC permits such assignments and specifically renders conflicting provisions of the Lottery Act ineffective. The trial court and court of appeals held that the UCC prevailed and the assignments were permitted. We agree and affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.

I. Background

A. The Statutory Conflict

When the Lottery Act was first enacted, lottery prizes generally could not be assigned, and to the extent they could be assigned, the assignment had to be pursuant to an “appropriate judicial order” that resolved a controversy involving the prize winner. See Act of Aug. 12, 1991, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, § 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 197, 218 (current version at Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.406). In 1999, the Act was amended and restrictions on assignment of prizes were relaxed. Act of May 30, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1394, §§ 2, 4, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4717, 4717-18. The amended provisions authorized prize winners to assign all but the last two installment prize payments if certain requirements were met. Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.410(a). Under the amended Act, however, “prize payments due within the final two years of the prize payment schedule may not be assigned.” Id.

The apparent statutory conflict in this case arises because thirteen days before amending the Lottery Act in 1999 the Legislature amended the UCC and included “winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a state” as part of the definition of “account.” Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639, 2640 (codified at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.102(a)(2)(viii)). Under the UCC, accounts are assignable. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 9.406(a). The UCC amendments, however, did not parallel the Lottery Act amendments that prohibited assignment of the last two installment payments of a lottery prize. To the contrary, the UCC reinforced the assignable character of accounts by specifying that rules of law, statutes and regulations purporting to prohibit or restrict assignment of accounts are ineffective:

[A] rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account or chattel paper. ...

Id. § 9.406(f). The amendments to the UCC were effective in 2001. In 2001, section 9.406(f) was amended in part and reenacted; the provisions making conflicting statutes ineffective were not changed by the amendment. See Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg, R.S. ch. 705, § 11, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1403, 1405 (codified at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.406(f)).

B. Facts

Cletius Irvan won a Texas Lottery prize in 1995. The prize was payable in twenty annual installments of just over $440,000 each, with the final two payments to be made in 2013 and 2014. After the Legislature amended the Act so prize payments could be assigned, Irvan assigned his rights to all but the last two of his prize payments in exchange for a lump sum. He later became indebted to First State Bank of DeQueen (FSB DeQueen). Arrangements were made in 2006 for Irvan to pay the debt through a common-law Composition of Creditors proceeding in Arkansas. The creditors’ arrangement provided for Irvan to assign the rights to his final two annual lottery payments to Stone Street Capital, which would in turn assign the rights to Great-West Life and Annuity. In consideration for assigning his rights, Irvan was to receive a lump sum of $308,032, out of which he would pay FSB DeQueen. The arrangement was approved by an Arkansas court. FSB De-Queen notified the Lottery Commission of the assignment and filed an application in Travis County to register the Arkansas judgment approving the arrangement. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 35.003. The Commission advised FSB DeQueen and Irvan that it did not recognize the validity of the Arkansas judgment and it intended to make the final prize payments to Irvan.

FSB DeQueen, Irvan, and Stone Street Capital (collectively, FSB) filed suit pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. §§ 37.001-011. Specifically, FSB sought declaratory judgment that (1) the final Arkansas order is effective as a Travis County judgment, (2) Section 9.406(c) of the UCC renders Lottery Act sections 466.406 and 466.410 ineffective, (3) the assignments of the final prize payments from Irvan to Stone Street and from Stone Street to Great-West are enforceable, and alternatively, (4) the Arkansas Final Order is an “appropriate judicial order pursuant to which the Commission shall make the final prize payments to Great-West.” See Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.406(f) (“A prize to which a winner is otherwise entitled may be paid to any person under an appropriate judicial order.”). FSB also requested the court to enjoin the Commission and to require it to make the final lottery payments to Great-West.

FSB moved for partial summary judgment on its claim that the UCC renders the anti-assignment provisions of the Lottery Act ineffective. The trial court granted the motion and declared that UCC sections 9.406 and 9.102 render Lottery Act sections 466.406 and 466.410 ineffective to the extent those sections purport to restrict or prohibit assignment of prize payments. At the parties’ request, the trial court severed the UCC claim and the Commission appealed the summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. 254 S.W.3d 677.

In this Court, the Commission seeks reversal of the court of appeals judgment on the bases that: (1) the Commission has sovereign immunity from suit, thus the appeal and suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (2) under the UCC, conflicts should be resolved in favor of the Lottery Act because the act is a consumer protection law; and (3) under established canons of statutory interpretation regarding conflicting statutes, the Lottery Act controls. We disagree with the Commission and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. Jurisdiction

The Commission first argues that it has sovereign immunity from suit so the appeal and suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It urges that this is an ultra vires suit which must be brought against a state official and it cannot be brought against the Commission because the Commission is a governmental entity. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-73 (Tex.2009). FSB counters that this appeal involves a challenge to the validity of a statute and the DJA waives the Commission’s immunity as to such claims. We agree with FSB. As we explain below, the claim in this appeal is not one involving a government officer’s action or inaction, but is a challenge to a statute. Thus this is not an ultra vires claim to which a government officer must be a party.

An ultra vires suit is one to require a state official to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions. Id. at 372. In Heinrich we distinguished between claims seeking declaratory relief in an ultra vires suit, which must be brought against governmental officials, and suits challenging the validity of an ordinance or statute. Id. at 373 n. 6 (“For claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes ... the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby waives immunity.” (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.006(b))). While FSB filed an initial claim challenging Commission actions and requesting the Commission be required to comply with statutory provisions, that is not the claim at issue here. FSB asserted in its pleadings that the Commission did not recognize the validity of the final order filed in Travis County and refused to acknowledge and comply with it, but that the Act authorized the Commission to accept and comply with the assignments. FSB requested a declaratory judgment that the final order was an appropriate judicial order pursuant to which the Commission should make payments to Great-West. It also sought a judgment enjoining the Commission to make payments to Great-West. Those claims were severed from the question ruled on by the trial court and at issue here: whether UCC sections 9.406 and 9.102 render Texas Government Code sections 466.406 and 466.410 ineffective to the extent those sections restrict or prohibit the assignment of Texas Lottery prize payments. FSB asserts that immunity does not apply because, unlike the plaintiff in Heinrich, it is not challenging an individual’s actions under a statute, but is challenging the validity of the statute itself. We agree.

The Declaratory Judgments Act

expressly provides that persons may challenge ordinances or statutes, and that governmental entities must be joined or notified. Governmental entities joined as parties may be bound by a court’s declaration on their ordinances or statutes. The Act thus contemplates that governmental entities may be — indeed must be — -joined in suits to construe their legislative pronouncements.

Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994).

The Commission also argues that the DJA does not waive immunity in this case because it only waives immunity of a municipality, not a state entity. The Commission points to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 37.006(b), which states that “[i]n any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance ... the municipality must be made a party.” But the Court in Leeper did not rely on section 37.006 when it concluded that “governmental entities” are to be joined in suits to construe legislative pronouncements. Rather, the Court concluded that because the DJA permits statutory challenges and governmental entities may be bound by those challenges, the DJA contemplates entities must be joined in those suits. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446. We have subsequently applied the holding of Leeper to different governmental entities. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 6; Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex.2003); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 859-60 (Tex.2002). Accordingly, we disagree that the DJA only waives the immunity of municipalities.

Next, the Commission asserts that the DJA does not waive immunity because it applies only to suits involving constitutional invalidation and not to those involving statutory interpretation. But the language in the DJA does not make that distinction. In Leeper, the issue was whether a mandatory school attendance private school exemption statute applied to children taught at home. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 433. While the plaintiffs also claimed that enforcement of the statute violated their constitutional rights, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue. Id. at 446. Rather, the DJA discussion was in the context of a statutory clarification. Id.

Because the claim at issue here is not one involving a government officer’s action or inaction, but is a challenge to a statute, this is not an ultra vires claim to which a government officer should have been made a party. The decision on this claim may ultimately impact actions taken by officers of the Commission, but that does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. at 445 (noting that the DJA allows courts to declare relief “whether or not further relief is or could be claimed”). The trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over this claim.

We next turn to the question of whether the UCC impacts the Lottery Act’s anti-assignment provisions, and if so, how.

III. Construing the Statutes

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003). In construing statutes our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pachucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008). We presume the Legislature selected language in a statute with care and that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex.2008); Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.1985).

A. Does the Lottery Act Provide a Different Rule for Consumers?

The UCC authorizes state lottery winners to freely assign their winnings. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 9.406(a) (permitting account assignments); see id. § 9.102(a)(2)(viii) (including “winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a state” in the definition of “Account”). Citing section 9.201 of the UCC, the Commission asserts that Chapter 9 of the UCC conflicts with the Lottery Act and the Lottery Act controls.

Section 9.201 of the UCC provides, in relevant part:

(b) A transaction subject to this chapter is subject to any applicable rule of law that establishes a different rule for consumers....
(c) In case of a conflict between this chapter and a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in Subsection (b), the rule of law, statute, or regulation controls.

Id. § 9.201. The Commission asserts sections 9.201(b) and (c) make it clear that any conflict between Article 9 and consumer protection laws must be resolved against Article 9 and that the Lottery Act and its anti-assignment provisions are unquestionably consumer protection provisions. FSB counters that (1) the Lottery Act provision does not “establish a different rule of law for consumers” because neither the Lottery Act nor the UCC refers to lottery prize winners or assignors as “consumers,” (2) the Lottery Act’s anti-assignment provisions protect lottery winners who are not consumers, but rather who are account creditors who sell their rights, and (3) a lottery winner such as Irvan who sells his right to receive payments is not purchasing or acquiring anything, thus he cannot be a consumer as to the transaction. We agree with FSB that the Lottery Act does not provide a different rule for consumers within the meaning of section 9.201 of the UCC.

Chapter 9 of the UCC does not provide a definition for “consumer,” but the term is defined in Chapter 1 as “an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 1.201(b)(ll). The Chapter 1 definitions apply to all chapters of the UCC except when the context in which they are used requires otherwise or a different definition is provided by a particular chapter. Id. § 1.201(a). Neither of the exceptions applies here, thus the definition in section 1.201(b)(ll) applies.

While the Lottery Act establishes a rule regarding lottery prize assignments different from the provisions in the UCC, the Lottery Act’s rule is not specifically directed at or limited to individuals who enter into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Any purchaser of a lottery ticket, whether an individual or some type of entity such as a partnership, trust, or corporation, purchases the ticket subject to the provisions of the Lottery Act. Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.252 (“By purchasing a ticket in a particular lottery game, a player agrees to abide by and be bound by the commission’s rules, including the rules applicable to the particular lottery game involved.”). The Lottery Act provides that “[a] person may assign, in whole or in part, the right to receive prize payments that are paid by the commission” and then sets out what is required of the assignor. Id. § 466.410. The Legislature has defined the term “person” to include “[a] corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity.” Id. § 311.005(2). Nothing in section 466.410 indicates the assignment provisions are applicable only when an individual purchases a ticket, much less only when an individual purchases a ticket for purposes of personal, family, or household use. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 1.201(b)(ll). Nor does the Lottery Act limit the applicability of the assignment provisions and restrictions to individuals such as Irvan, even if they are entering the assignment transaction to receive and use money for personal, family, or household purposes. To the contrary, the Lottery Act contemplates that a prizewinner, and therefore a person entitled to receive and assign — or restricted from assigning — prize payments, may be “persons” who are not individuals or consumers. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.406(b). Furthermore, the Lottery Act refers to “individuals” in several sections. See, e.g., id. § 466.3051 (providing that an individual younger than eighteen years of age may not purchase a lottery ticket); id. § 466.409 (providing that certain individuals are not eligible to receive lottery prizes). The fact that the Legislature made certain provisions of the Act applicable only to individuals indicates that its use of the word “person” rather than “individual” in section 466.410 was intentional. See Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 193 n. 20 (Tex.2007); see also Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex.2009) (noting that we examine the Legislature’s words in context of the statute as a whole and do not consider words or parts of the statute in isolation). So, while section 466.410 applies to individuals who assign or desire to assign their prize payments for personal, family, or household purposes, the use of “person” in context of section 466.410 does not require a different definition than that prescribed by the Code Construction Act. And, we do not see how use of the Legislature’s definítion yields an absurd result. Under the circumstances, we are bound to construe the term “person” to mean what the Legislature defined it to mean, and it is not limited to consumers as defined by the Lottery Act, the UCC, or any other applicable definition of consumer. Moreover, if section 9.201 (b)’s reference to a statute or rule that establishes a different rule for consumers encompasses statutes and rules applying equally to both consumers and non-consumers, as opposed to only consumers, then all conflicting laws or rules that apply to consumers would be subject to the exception, and the exception would swallow the UCC’s overarching rule that accounts are assignable.

The Commission stresses that a transaction by a consumer occurred in this case: Irvan assigned his future lottery winnings in return for an up-front lump sum payment — a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. But even assuming Irvan’s assignment was a consumer transaction, the UCC does not address individual transactions undertaken by consumers. It addresses rules of law, statutes, and regulations that apply broadly. Section 466.410 establishes a rule for all persons, not just individuals involved in Lottery Act transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Read in context, we do not believe section 466.410 is a statute or rule of law “that establishes a different rule for consumers” within the meaning of section 9.201(b).

B. Do Canons of Construction Apply?

The Commission asserts that the UCC does not render the Lottery Act assignment restrictions in sections 466.406 and 466.410 ineffective based on established canons of statutory interpretation. It points to the Code Construction Act, which provides guidance for courts when they seek to determine the Legislature’s intent. Specifically, the Commission points to the following as legislative guidance that should be used here: (1) an entire enacted statute is presumed to be effective, Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(2); (2) if statutes are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails, id. § 311.025(a); and (3) a specific statutory provision prevails as an exception over a conflicting general provision. Id. § 311.026.

FSB argues that even though the Legislature’s guidance for construing statutes would confirm the conclusions of the trial court and court of appeals if they were applied, applying the canons is inappropriate because in the UCC the Legislature specifically provided the means for resolving conflicts between the UCC and other statutes such as the Lottery Act. We agree with FSB that because the Legislature expressly and unambiguously set out the method for resolving conflicts between the UCC and other statutes, it would be improper to go outside the language of the statute and use canons of construction to resolve the question. City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 626 (“When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the language.”). Courts “do not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a useless act.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex.1998). But we must take statutes as we find them and first and primarily seek the Legislature’s intent in its language. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997). Courts are not responsible for omissions in legislation, but we are responsible for a true and fair interpretation of the law as it is written. Id. Additionally, “[i]t is at least theoretically possible that legislators — like judges or anyone else — may make a mistake.” Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex.2004). Even when it appears the Legislature may have made a mistake, courts are not empowered to “fix” the mistake by disregarding direct and clear statutory language that does not create an absurdity. See id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979)). And although some might believe precluding lottery prize winners from assigning all or some of their installment payments is the better policy choice, we do not see how it is an absurdity to construe this clear statutory language to mean what it says. Here the result is that lottery winners are allowed to assign what no one contests is their property, even at the risk of their making poor assignment choices.

The UCC specifies that state lottery winnings are accounts and are assignable, Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 9.406(a), but the Lottery Act prohibits assignments of the last two prize installments. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 466.406, 466.410. While these statutory provisions conflict, the Legislature also explicitly provided that “a rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits [or] restricts” an assignment of a prize won in a state lottery “is ineffective.” Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 9.406(f). Giving effect to the clear legislative language about how to resolve conflicts regarding assignments results in there being no conflict to resolve because the Lottery Act’s anti-assignment provisions are ineffective insofar as they conflict with the UCC.

Moreover, the Commission’s argument that we should not construe the UCC to render the Lottery Act anti-assignment provisions useless turns on itself. If we construe the Lottery Act’s anti-assignment restrictions as valid because otherwise their enactment would be a useless legislative action, we render UCC section 9.406(f) useless as it applies here. Under that construction section 9.406(f) would be useless legislative action, at least in part, because that section clearly was enacted to address situations in which the Legislature enacted a conflicting statute.

The Commission points to cases from other jurisdictions holding that statutory restrictions on lottery assignments are effective. In three of the cases the facts and statutes are distinguishable from those at issue here. See In re Guluzian, No. BK 04-10390-JMD, 2004 WL 2813523, at *3 (Bankr.D.N.H. Dec. 3, 2004) (noting that legislation amending the UCC assignment provisions to include lottery payments also amended the lottery statute to provide that the lottery prize assignment prohibition prevailed over UCC provisions); In re Duboff, 290 B.R. 652, 656 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2003) (holding that UCC provision was inapplicable because it was not enacted until nineteen months after the assignment was executed); Midland States Life Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 531, 797 N.E.2d 11, 17-18 (2003) (noting that at the same time the UCC was amended, the lottery statute was amended to provide that it prevailed over UCC provisions).

In two cases factually similar to the one before us, courts held that statutory restrictions on lottery prize assignments prevailed over UCC provisions declaring such restrictions ineffective. See Stone St. Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 340 (2008); Va. State Lottery Dept. v. Settlement Funding, LLC, No. CH-2003-183848, 2005 WL 3476682, at *3 (Va.Cir.Ct. Nov. 7, 2005). But in both those cases, the courts relied on statutory construction aids to reach their conclusions. Stone St. Capital, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d at 333 (noting that under California rules of statutory construction, a more specific statute controls over a general statute, regardless of which statute was passed earlier); Va. State Lottery Dep’t, 2005 WL 3476682, at *2-3 (applying the rule of statutory construction that a specific statute applies over a general one). While we have no argument with how those courts resolved their statutory conflicts, neither court discussed resolving the conflict by initially and primarily looking at the language in the statutes themselves. In contrast, we construe statutes by first looking to the statutory language for the Legislature’s intent, and only if we cannot discern legislative intent in the language of the statute itself do we resort to canons of construction or other aids such as which statute is more specific. City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 626. Under Texas rules of statutory construction, the language of UCC section 9.406 prevails because on its face it manifests clear legislative intent that conflicting statutes are ineffective.

The Commission argues that failing to give effect to the Lottery Act would essentially amount to an impermissible requirement that the Legislature use explicit language to carve out the Lottery Act from the reach of section 9.406; in other words, a requirement of a “magical password.” See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149, 126 S.Ct. 699, 163 L.Ed.2d 557 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other ‘magical password.’ ”). But Justice Scalia was referring to provisions that require Congress to use specific language in order to repeal, limit, or modify a statutory provision. See id. Here, UCC section 9.406(f) does not require some specific language to be included in subsequent legislation in order for it to be modified or repealed. Nor does the Commission contend that the Legislature was attempting to repeal or otherwise modify section 9.406(f) when it enacted the prohibition on lottery prize assignments.

Finally, the Commission asserts that we should give serious consideration to the Commission’s construction of the Lottery Act, by which it gives full effect to the assignment restrictions. See Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.1993) (“Construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.”). But here we are not construing the Lottery Act. We are construing the UCC and determining whether it renders sections 466.406 and 466.410 of the Lottery Act ineffective. The Commission does not argue that it is charged with enforcement of the UCC, and even if it were so charged, its interpretation of the UCC contradicts the plain language of that statute. See id.

In sum, the language of UCC section 9.406(f) is clear; we need not use a canon of construction to construe it other than the prime canon: we construe statutes by first looking to the statutory language for the Legislature’s intent, and only if we cannot discern legislative intent in the language of the statute itself do we resort to canons of construction or other aids such as which statute is more specific. City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 626. Here the statute’s unambiguous words disclose the legislative intent: if the Legislature should happen to have enacted, or enacts, a conflicting statute, the conflicting statute is “ineffective to the extent that the ... statute ... prohibits [or] restricts” the assignment of an account. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 9.406(f). Section 9.406(f) makes sections 466.406 and 466.410 of the Lottery Act ineffective to the extent they prohibit or restrict Irvan’s assignment.

IV. Child Support

Finally, the Commission asserts that holding the UCC prevails over sections 466.406 and 466.410 will inhibit the State’s efforts to collect child support because the Lottery Act provisions requiring the Commission to deduct the amount of a child support lien before paying a prize to a child support obligor will also be rendered ineffective. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.4075. The argument is substantively similar to the argument that we should use construction aids to resolve the conflict between the statutory provisions; it effectively urges us to disregard the rule that when a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous courts do not resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the language. See City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 626. We agree that persons who owe child support should pay it. But when the language of a statute is clear, it is not the judicial prerogative to go behind or around that language through the guise of construing it to reach what the parties or we might believe is a better result. See Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 847 (Tex.2009).

Y. Conclusion

Sections 466.406 and 466.410 of the Lottery Act are ineffective to the extent they restrict or prohibit Irvan’s assignment. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

      . The requirements are not relevant to disposition of this appeal, but they include: (1) approval of the assignments by a district court in Travis County, (2) service of the petition seeking approval on the executive director of the Lottery Commission, (3) the assignment being in writing, and (4) the assignor providing an affidavit stating that he is of sound mind, is over 18 years of age, has been advised regarding the assignment by independent legal counsel, has had the opportunity to receive independent financial advice, and has been provided a disclosure stating the payments being assigned, the purchase price being paid, the rate of discount to the present value of the prize, and the amount of closing fees. Tex. Gov’t Code § 466.410(b).

      . Irvan made two assignments to the same company. The record is not clear whether he received one or two lump sum payments.

      . The Commission also, in a footnote, urges that the UCC does not apply because it is inapplicable to assignments undertaken to satisfy a preexisting debt such as Irvan’s debt to FSB DeQueen. The Commission does not cite authority for nor present argument to support its position. We decline to make its case for it. See Tex.R.App. P. 55.2(i).

      . See also Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 6 (citing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 37.006(b) and noting that when the validity of ordinances or statutes is challenged, the DJA waives immunity to the extent it requires relevant governmental entities be made parties).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Richard SCHELLER, Relator.
    No. 09-1072.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Dee. 10, 2010.

      Cecilia M. Wood, Attorney & Counselor at Law, PC, Austin, for Richard Scheller.
    JoAl Cannon Sheridan, Kristen A. Al-gert, Ausley, Algert, Robertson & Flores, LLP, Austin, for William Pemberton.
   PER CURIAM.

In this grandparent-access suit, the trial court issued temporary orders that included granting a grandfather temporary access to and possession of his grandchildren. However, the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order because the grandfather did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of access to or possession of the grandchildren would significantly impair their physical health or emotional well-being. For the reasons expressed below, we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its temporary order for access and possession.

Amanda Scheller passed away in September 2007. She was survived by her two young daughters and husband, Richard Scheller (“Scheller”). Both before and after Amanda passed away, her daughters visited Amanda’s father and step-mother, William Pemberton (“Pemberton”) and Judy Pemberton (“Judy”), every four to six weeks in Crockett, Texas. During the year after Amanda’s death, Scheller relied on the Pembertons for assistance taking care of his two daughters. The girls currently live in Austin with Scheller and his new wife, Sylvia.

The Schellers’ relationship with the Pembertons began to deteriorate in December 2008. Scheller alleges the conflict began when he took the children to visit the Pembertons in Crockett on Christmas Day, rather than Christmas Eve. The Pembertons blame the conflict, in part, on a decreased frequency of visits, which they attribute to Scheller’s relationship with Sylvia. But Scheller claims the decreased visits were a result, in part, from the Pem-bertons admitted refusal to follow set conditions he laid out for his children’s visits, such as avoiding certain topics of conversation and adhering to a particular bedtime. Conflict over the time and manner of the Pembertons’ visits with the girls continued throughout 2009. Verbal confrontations about the girls arose on the telephone, in public, and at the Schellers’ home in Austin.

Pemberton filed suit for grandparent access in August 2009. See Tex. Fam.Code § 153.482 (providing for suits by grandparents for possession or access to grandchildren). He petitioned for temporary access to the girls and for the court to appoint an expert to evaluate whether denying Pem-berton access to the girls would significantly affect their physical health or emotional well-being. The trial court rendered temporary orders awarding Pemberton the following access rights: (1) weekly telephone or webcam access to the girls for up to ten minutes, (2) possession and access one weekend of every even-numbered month, (3) possession and access from December 28th through December 30th, and (4) possession and access for either the second week of July or the week during which a particular Vacation Bible School is held. The orders contain general conditions and restrictions that the Pembertons must follow while the children are with them. The court also appointed an expert to serve both as the children’s guardian ad litem and as a psychological expert to evaluate the relationship between the children and the parties in conflict and make recommendations regarding whether denying Pemberton access to his granddaughters would significantly impair their physical health or emotional well-being.

Scheller sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals. The court granted temporary relief and stayed the trial court’s temporary order, but subsequently lifted the stay and denied mandamus relief. Scheller now seeks mandamus relief from this Court. He argues that the temporary orders for access to and possession of the children and appointment of an expert violated his fundamental liberty interest as a parent to have control and autonomy in making child-rearing decisions. Scheller requests that we reverse the trial court’s order for temporary access and render judgment denying Pemberton’s petition for access and appointment of an expert. We address each contention.

Trial courts have considerable discretion in making temporary orders for a child’s safety and welfare in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See Tex.Fam.Code § 105.001. However, a trial court cannot “infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because [it] believes a better decision could be made.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality op.) (internal quotations omitted); see also In re Chambless, 257 S.W.3d 698, 700 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (“Parents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” (quotation omitted)). We have held that “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (ie., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family.” In re Derzapf 219 S.W.3d 327, 333 (Tex.2007) (per curiam) (quoting In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex.2006) (per curiam) (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054)).

Scheller first argues that the trial court improperly issued the temporary orders for access to and possession of the children. A trial court abuses its discretion if it grants temporary access to grandchildren when a grandparent does not “overcome the presumption that a parent acts in his or her child’s best interest by proving that ‘denial ... of access to the child would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional well-being.’ ” Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 333 (quoting Tex.Fam.Code § 153.433(2) (current version at Tex.Fam.Code § 153.433(a)(2))).

We have granted conditional mandamus relief in similar cases when a grandparent does not overcome his “high threshold” burden. Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 335; Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d at 778. In Derzapf, we held that the grandchildren’s “lingering sadness” from lack of contact with the grandparents did not sufficiently demonstrate significant harm to the children because the court-appointed psychologist testified that the sadness did not “manifest!; ] as depression or behavioral problems or acting out” so as to “rise to a level of significant emotional impairment.” 219 S.W.3d at 330, 332-33. And in Mays-Hooper, we held the trial court erred because it “did not indicate any reason why” it should interfere with the parent-child relationship, and the mother “articulated several reasons for not wanting to turn her son over to her mother-in-law[,]” including “differences about church attendance, what to say about [the father’s] death, and alleged inattention by her mother-in-law.” 189 S.W.3d at 778.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of grandparent access in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality op.). The Court held that a trial court’s order for grandparent access unconstitutionally infringed on the parent’s fundamental liberty interest where there was no evidence that the parent was unfit, that the children’s health and well-being would suffer, or that the parent intended to exclude grandparent access entirely. Id. at 68-71, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that ‘“[pjarents have a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons,’ and between parents and judges, ‘the parents should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas.’ ” Id. at 63, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (1998)).

Similar to Derzapf and Mays-Hooper, the trial court abused its discretion in this case because Pemberton did not satisfy his burden to be granted access rights. Pemberton argues that he met the statutory burden to prove that his granddaughters’ mental and physical health would suffer if he did not have access to them. He presented evidence about behavior exhibited by the girls and circumstances influencing their mental and physical health including: (1) the girls displaying anger; (2) one of the girls experiencing instances of isolated bed wetting and nightmares; (3) witnesses who have seen Pemberton with the children testifying that, from their experiences, denying Pemberton access to his granddaughters would impair the children’s physical or emotional development; and (4) the significant impact of loss of maternal family members on the girls, leaving Pemberton the only remaining maternal familial connection.

However, that evidence is not enough to satisfy Pemberton’s hefty statutory burden, and we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing a temporary order for access to and possession of the children. Like the children in Derzapf, there is nothing in the record here to indicate anything more substantial than the children’s understandable sadness resulting from losing a family member and, according to the Pembertons, missing their grandparents. 219 S.W.3d at 330. In fact, the record shows that Scheller has taken responsible, precautionary measures to ensure that his daughters are able to cope with their grief, such as sending his older daughter to counseling and grief groups. As in Troxel, Scheller appears to be willing to allow Pemberton to see the girls as long as he comes to Austin and does not bring Judy. Scheller concedes he has not spoken with Pemberton since this litigation began, but explains that his attorney advised him against it.

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary order for access to and possession of the Scheller girls because Pemberton did not meet the hefty statutory burden required to prove that he is entitled to grandparent access rights. If evidence is presented as the litigation develops that overcomes the hefty presumption, the trial court may reconsider the issue. However, there was insufficient evidence at this stage of the litigation for the trial court to issue the temporary order granting Pemberton access to and possession of his granddaughters.

Next, Scheller challenges the trial court’s order appointing an expert to serve both as guardian ad litem to the children and as an expert psychologist to examine the parties and children to make recommendations to the court. He argues that the trial court’s appointment violates his constitutional right to make child rearing decisions and is effectively more invasive than the temporary access orders because it requires Scheller to follow recommendations made by the expert.

Despite considerable discretion vested in courts to issue temporary orders “for the safety and welfare of the child,” a court cannot act to infringe on a party’s constitutional rights. Tex.Fam.Code § 105.001, see also Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1995) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court abused its discretion by entering a temporary gag order in a child custody modification proceeding that violated the parties’ constitutional rights to free speech and due process). Parental control and autonomy is a “fundamental liberty interest.” Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054). And as we previously explained, there is no reason to inject the State into the family realm when a parent adequately cares for his children. Id. at 333 (citations and quotations omitted). However, the trial court’s appointment of an evaluative expert does not infringe on Scheller’s rights because such an appointment is allowed by law; the order entered by the Court does not interfere with the parental relationship, but rather seeks to determine the best interests of the children; and no conflict exists between appointing the evaluating psychologist as guardian ad litem.

The Family Code specifically provides for this type of appointment. A suit for access to a child is a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) in which the principal consideration is the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam.Code § 101.032(a) (defining a SAPCR); id. § 153.002 (explaining that “[t]he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of ... possession of and access to the child”). In SAPCRs, a trial court may appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to conduct a mental examination of the parties and children subject to the suit. Tex.R. Civ. P. 204.4(a). A trial court additionally has discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem in a suit for access to a child if it “finds that the appointment is necessary to ensure the determination of the best interests of the child....” Tex. Fam.Code § 107.021(a)(3), (b)(2). Psychologists are one class of professionals qualified under the Family Code to serve as a guardians ad litem. See id. § 107.001(5)03), (5)(C). In using these finite resources at the trial court’s disposal to determine the best interests of the children, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Also, nothing on the face of the order indicates that the trial court erred in appointing the same person to serve as expert psychologist and guardian ad litem. The role of the psychologist in evaluating the children and parties is consistent with the role of a guardian ad litem because the psychologist gives the court recommendations about the children’s best interests. See Tex. Fam.Code § 107.002(a), (b), (e) (detailing a guardian ad litem’s duties, which include reviewing relevant records, interviewing the parties and children subject to the suit to determine the child’s best interest, reporting to the court, testifying during hearings, and performing any other relevant tasks the court orders).

Seheller argues that this specific order violates his constitutional rights. Generally, a trial court would commit error by requiring a party to adhere to expert recommendations in violation of a party’s constitutional rights. However, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law by appointing an expert to evaluate the parties and children, represent the children’s best interests, and make recommendations to the court as to whether depriving Pemberton access would significantly harm the girls’ emotional well-being or physical health. Seheller argues this order violates his constitutional rights because it orders his children to participate in counseling. Trial courts may order parties to participate in counseling with a mental health professional if they have a “history of conflict in resolving an issue of ... access to the child.” Tex. Fam.Code § 153.010(a)(1). But it is clear from the order that the trial court did not intend to require counseling, but instead intended to have an expert psychologist assist the court in making factual determinations regarding whether depriving Pemberton of access to and possession of his grandchildren would significantly impair their physical health or emotional well-being.

Scheller’s argument is unpersuasive given the content of the temporary order appointing the expert, whose dual role as guardian ad litem and evaluative psychologist facilitates the court’s factual inquiry into the children’s best interest and physical and emotional welfare. The trial court appointed the expert “to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the Petitioner, Respondent, and the children, and to make recommendations to the court regarding whether denial of possession and access to the children by Petitioner would significantly impair their physical health or emotional well-being.” The parties are only ordered to “follow the recommendations of [the expert] and otherwise cooperate in her evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the basis of th[e] suit, including but not limited to, making the children available for any interviews, joint sessions, individual sessions, or other contact deemed necessary by [the expert] in performance of her duties.... ” Further, the court will hold a hearing if party objects to the recommendations relating to whether an evaluation should be performed on a party or child. Accordingly, the expert’s role as demonstrated by the trial court’s order does not interfere with Scheller’s constitutional rights.

Scheller is entitled to mandamus relief because the trial court abused its discretion in issuing temporary orders for grandparent access. Pemberton did not meet the burden required to divest a parent of control and autonomy in making parenting decisions. This is irremediable error that warrants mandamus relief. See Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 334-35. However, the trial court did not err in appointing an expert to serve as guardian ad litem to the children and as a psychologist to evaluate the case and make recommendations to the court regarding the children’s best interests. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to lift the temporary order permitting grandparent access. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.8(c), 59.1. We are confident that the court will comply, and the writ will issue only if it does not.

      . Step-grandparents do not have standing to seek access to their step-grandchildren. See Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 331-33.


author: COCHRAN, J., MEYERS, J.,

text:
    Tawin SPENCE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
    No. PD-1458-09.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Sept. 15, 2010.

      Maxwell C. Peck III, Amarillo, for Appellant.
    Jeffrey S. Ford, Asst. Crim. D.A., Lubbock, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State’s Attorney, Austin, for State.
   OPINION

COCHRAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which KELLER, P.J., PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

We granted review to resolve a conflict between courts of appeals regarding whether a license plate must be displayed at the front (e.g., the front bumper) of a car or whether it is sufficient to be displayed somewhere else, such as inside the front windshield. In this case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the front license plate must be displayed at the foremost area of the car. The Austin Court of Appeals, in State v. Losoya, held that the Texas Transportation Code does not require the display of a license plate on the front bumper. We conclude that the plain language of Texas Transportation Code § 502.404(a) requires that a license plate be displayed at the foremost part or front of a vehicle, most commonly the front bumper. We also hold that the trial court did not err in declining to give an Article 38.23 jury instruction because there was no factual dispute for the jury to resolve; the requirement for the proper location of a license plate is a question of law, not fact. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

A. Background Facts.

Appellant was charged with possession of cocaine that Lubbock Police Officer Shane Bledsoe found during a pat-down search for weapons after he stopped appellant for traffic violations.

Around 1:00 a.m. on September 23, 2006, Officer Bledsoe saw a Chevrolet Impala with “blue sparkle paint with white racing stripes and large wheels” parked in the driveway of a known drug house. The officer circled the block, and, as he approached the house a second time, he saw the Impala backing out. As Officer Bled-soe drove past the Impala, he saw that there was no front license plate on it. The Impala “had a silver chrome looking decorative plate on the front, it didn’t have a license plate on the front.” The officer testified that he pulled appellant over for the license plate violation and for illegally parking in the driveway by blocking the sidewalk.

Officer Bledsoe said that, as he “approached the vehicle, [he] observed the [license] plate sitting in the windshield.” Before the officer could explain the reason for the traffic stop, appellant told Officer Bledsoe that “he already knew why, for the license plate, and advised me that he ... had just gotten a ticket ... for the same violation.” Because appellant could not produce a driver’s license, Officer Bledsoe asked him to step out of the car while he checked appellant’s license for warrants. While doing a routine pat-down search, the officer felt a bulge, which he believed to be drugs, in the space between appellant’s crotch and belt. He placed appellant in the back of his patrol car and recovered the baggie of cocaine after a backup officer arrived.

Appellant testified at trial and disputed the vehicle violations. Appellant denied parking on the sidewalk and explained that “my car was parked right behind [the homeowner’s car], so there would be no reason for me to be out here where I would have to obstruct the sidewalk in any kind of way.” Appellant stated that his front license plate was “all the way up in front of the front windshield” and, in his opinion, it was very visible from the street. He also confirmed his initial conversation with Officer Bledsoe. “As soon as he had came to the car, I told him — because I thought that’s what he had pulled me over for, for the license plates ... I let him know ... the license plate is right here ... up in the window.”

At the close of evidence, appellant’s counsel objected to the jury charge and provided two proposed instructions: First, he requested that the jury be instructed that “it is not a violation of [Section 502.404(a) ] of the Transportation Code to have a front license plate in the front windshield.” Second, he requested an article 38.23 jury instruction on Transportation Code § 545.302 because of the factual dispute of whether appellant was parked on the sidewalk. The trial judge denied both requests, reasoning that “if there’s more than one reason for a stop, and the Court concludes that there is no legal dispute as to that stop, then there should not be a 38.23 issue submitted.”

The jury found appellant guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance weighing between 200 and 400 grams. Appellant pled true to a previous drug conviction, and the trial judge sentenced him to 60 years in prison.

B. The Court of Appeals Decision.

On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying his article 38.23 jury instruction. Relying on State v. Losoya, he argued that, by testifying at trial that his license plate was clearly visible through the windshield, he raised a disputed fact issue entitling him to the 38.23 instruction. In Losoya, the Austin court held that wedging a license plate between the dashboard and the windshield “is not inconsistent with the language or purpose of’ Section 502.404(a). Appellant also argued that his trial testimony raised a disputed fact issue regarding whether he had parked on the sidewalk. In either case, if the jury credited his testimony, it should have been instructed to disregard the evidence of cocaine.

The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that Texas Transportation Code Section 502.404(a) requires that the front license plate be affixed “where the car begins, ie., the foremost area of the vehicle.” Because appellant’s front license plate was not so located, “the officer was not required to find some other reason to detain him after discovering the plate’s location. Nor was the trial court obligated to instruct the jury otherwise.” The Court of Appeals noted that, while there was a dispute about whether the license plate could readily be seen, both parties agreed that the plate was located in between the dashboard and the windshield. Thus, the only issue was whether that is a permissible location under Section 502.404(a). The court explained that the term “front” as used in the statute was not ambiguous and should be defined in accordance with its common usage. It explained that common expressions, such as “front page,” “front of the line,” or “storm front,” connote “the idea of something preceding something else, or of the beginning of an object.” In “appending the preposition ‘at’ before the phrase ‘front and rear,’ the legislature effectively described a location as opposed to a direction or ability to sense.” Finally, the court noted that, if the purpose of the statute is to facilitate vehicle identification, permitting the license plate to be displayed anywhere in the front half of the vehicle, so long as it can be seen, impedes this purpose.

II.

The question before this Court is one of statutory construction concerning Section 502.404(a) of the Texas Transportation Code. That section, titled “Operation of a Vehicle Without License Plate or Registration Insignia,” provides:

A person commits an offense if the person operates on a public highway during a registration period a passenger car or commercial motor vehicle that does not display two license plates, at the front and rear of the vehicle.

Specifically, does the text “at the front ... of the vehicle” permit a license plate to be displayed anywhere in the front half of the car or truck or only at its foremost part?

A. Statutory Construction.

Statutory construction is a question of law; therefore our review is de novo. As we recently stated in Mahaf-fey, in interpreting statutes, we focus on the literal text to determine the objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. We follow this principle because (1) “the text of the statute is the law”; (2) “the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators -... had in mind when the state was enacted into law”; and (8) “the legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.” Therefore, “if the meaning of the statutory text ... should have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning.” We depart from this plain-meaning rule only when “application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences” or “the language is not plain but rather ambiguous.”

B. Under the Plain Language of Section 502.404(a) of the Texas Transportation Code, a License Plate must Be Displayed at the Beginning or Foremost Part of a Vehicle, Most Commonly the Front Bumper.

The plain language of Section 502.404(a) requires a license plate to be displayed “at the front ... of the vehicle.” In this context, “front” means the foremost part or beginning of a vehicle, not in the front half, facing the front, or in the front portion. This meaning of “front” as a location is not ambiguous and does not lead to an absurd result. While the Transportation Code does not explicitly define “front,” common usage and definitions of the word provide ample support for this construction. As the Amarillo Court observed, common phrases such as “go to the front of the line,” “front page,” “front door,” and “front seat” each convey the idea of “something preceding something else, or of the beginning of an object.” This interpretation is consistent with the ordinary dictionary definition.

Furthermore, this plain-language construction does not lead to absurd results but rather accomplishes the purpose of the statute. We think that the purpose of Section 502.404(a) is to facilitate quick and accurate identification of vehicles through the content of their license plates. Several other Transportation Code sections also facilitate this goal. By requiring that license plates be displayed at the foremost part of a vehicle, police and citizens will know exactly where to look to quickly find and read the plate. Reducing the search time is especially important when trying to identify a moving vehicle. Additionally, consistent placement facilitates accurate aiming of red light and toll booth cameras. Thus, because the plain meaning of Section 502.404(a) is not ambiguous nor does it lead to an absurd result, it requires a license plate to be displayed at the foremost part or beginning of a vehicle.

Appellant argues, consistent with State v. Losoya, that the word “front” in Section 502.404(a) is ambiguous and does not necessarily refer to a specific location. Appellant explains that “‘front line’ and ‘battle front’ for example, can mean an area of real estate quite large” and “[w]hile certainly the phrase ‘front page’ ... connotes a singular meaning, in contrast ‘storm front’ does not.” While some of these common expressions may be susceptible to such an interpretation, the most straightforward reading of each connotes the edge of something. Furthermore, using each as part of a phrase such as “at the battle front,” “at the front line,” or “at the storm front” directs the reader to a specific location, most commonly found at the edge or beginning of what is being described. Similarly, Section 502.404(a) requires that a license plate be displayed “at the front ... of the vehicle.” The plain meaning of the word “front” in this statute is a specific location.

Appellant also argues, relying on the legislative analysis found in Losoya, that because the current statute omits the phrase “and attached thereto” found in the predecessor to Section 502.404(a), the Legislature intended to discard the requirement that a license plate be attached to the vehicle. This, he argues, is evidence that it need not be attached to the front bumper. While it is true that the current statute does not specifically state that a license plate be “attached” to the front of the vehicle, the amendment that eliminated this language was based on entirely different grounds. Both the Senate and the House committee reports express an intent to relocate the vehicle registration sticker from the license plate to the windshield, but those reports say nothing about changing the location of the license plate itself. Furthermore, there is no practical difference between requiring a license plate to be displayed “at the front ... of the vehicle” or having it attached and displayed “at the front.” The Losoya court implies that the previous statute required a license plate to be attached to the front bumper but under its own interpretation of “front,” one could just as reasonably conclude that the plate could be attached to the dashboard or windshield, because the phrase “at the front” did not change; only the phrase “displayed and attached” was shortened to “displayed.” The legislative history of Section 502.404(a) provides little evidence that the legislature intended to discard the requirement that a license plate be attached to or displayed at the front of the vehicle, usually the front bumper.

Finally, even if the word “front” were ambiguous, the Austin court’s interpretation in Losoya conflicts with the purpose of the statute. In Losoya the court stated, and we agree, that “[t]he apparent purpose of section 502.404(a) is to facilitate the identification of a motor vehicle by its license plate number whether it is moving toward or away from the viewer.” Allowing the plate to be located in a number of different places would make it difficult to quickly determine whether a given car has a license plate or what its numbers are. Furthermore, reflected sunlight or the lack of light at nighttime would further impede one’s ability to find the location and content of a license plate placed under the windshield. These difficulties would result in far more unnecessary traffic stops. The purpose of Section 502.404(a) is best accomplished when “front” is interpreted in accord with its plain meaning and requires a license plate to be located at the foremost part of the vehicle.

III.

A. Appellant’s Placement of His License Plate Did Not Comply with Section 502.404(a).

Appellant’s brief restates his trial testimony that the license plate was “propped up inside, up in the window on the glass, so it was all the way up in front of the front windshield.” Officer Bled-soe’s testimony that there was no license plate attached to the front bumper and that he saw the plate behind the windshield only when he walked up to the car also confirms the location of the plate. On appeal, the Amarillo Court observed that while “all agree on the plate’s location ... [a] question arises, however, as to whether that was a permissible location.” The Court of Appeals held that, because Section 502.404(a) requires the license plate to be located “where the car begins, ie. the foremost area of the vehicle” and because the license plate was not so located, appellant did not comply with the statute. We agree with the Court of Appeals; appellant’s placement of his license plate between his windshield and dashboard did not comply with Section 502.404(a).

B. Appellant Was Not Entitled to an Article 38.23 Jury Instruction.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in not giving an article 38.23 jury instruction regarding the placement of the license plate. Proper placement of a license plate is a question of law, not one of disputed historical fact. Since both parties agreed on the location of the license plate, an article 38.23 instruction was not warranted. Appellant also argues he should have been given a 38.23 instruction addressing the factual dispute about where he parked. This instruction was also correctly denied because there was sufficient probable cause for Officer Bledsoe to stop him based on the license plate violation. The traffic stop was legal regardless of whether appellant did or did not park on the sidewalk.

Under the plain language of the Texas Transportation Code, a license plate must be displayed at the foremost part or beginning of a vehicle, most commonly the front bumper. The word “front” in Section 502.404(a) is neither ambiguous nor does it lead to an absurd result. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Amarillo Court of Appeals.

MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, J., joined.

MEYERS, J.,

filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, J., joined.

Texas Transportation Code Section 502.404(a) says:

A person commits an offense if the person operates on a public highway during a registration period a passenger car or commercial motor vehicle that does not display two license plates, at the front and rear of the vehicle, that have been:
(1) assigned by the department for the period; or
(2) validated by a registration insignia issued by the department that establishes that the vehicle is registered for the period.

The only thing about this statute that is clear is that it is not well written.

The court of appeals in this case held that “one complies with § 502.404 of the Transportation Code when the license is affixed somewhere in the foremost or beginning area of the car.” Spence v. State, 296 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009). The majority agrees and concludes that “the plain language of Texas Transportation Code § 502.404(a) requires that a license plate be displayed at the foremost part or front of a vehicle, most commonly the front bumper.” The majority’s definition, however, is inconsistent with the placement of the rear license plate, which is usually on the trunk or tailgate. Therefore, if the majority is correct that front means “foremost part” or “front bumper,” then there is a discrepancy in the statute with how the front and back plates are displayed since rear license plates are not displayed on the back bumper. So front means “front bumper” but rear does not mean “rear bumper”? I prefer to believe that if the legislature meant front bumper then it would have said “bumper” in the statute. I would also like to point out that a vehicle must have a light to illuminate the rear license plate, while there is no requirement that the front license plate be illuminated. Compare Tex. Transp. Code § 547.322(f) (stating, “A taillamp or a separate lamp shall be constructed and mounted to emit a white light that: (1) illuminates the rear license plate; and (2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear.”) with Tex. Transp. Code § 547.321. To me, this indicates more leeway in the placement of the front license plate.

I agree with State v. Losoya that, “While a place to display the license plate is usually found on the front bumper, the statute does not expressly require the use of this location. The display of the plate in some other place or manner is not inconsistent with the language or purpose of the statute.” 128 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex.App.Austin 2004, pet. ref'd).

The court of appeals asserts that placing the license plate in the front windshield makes it “much harder” for police “to focus on several areas (as opposed to one) when a car drives past at traveling speeds.” Spence, 296 S.W.3d at 318. But officers must look at the front windshield anyway to see if the license plates that are displayed have a valid registration. I realize that the officer in this case testified that an alternative reason he pulled Appellant over was that when the car was parked in the driveway it was blocking the sidewalk. But this was just a parking violation, which goes to the car, not to the driver. If the officer so desired, he could have written a parking ticket and placed it under the windshield wiper of the illegally parked car, at which time he would have clearly seen the license plate displayed in the front windshield.

CONCLUSION

Using the majority’s logic, the rear of the vehicle would be the back bumper. But as we all know, 90% of all vehicles do not display the license plate on the back bumper, they are usually on the tailgate or trunk. I would construe front and rear to mean any surface facing that direction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

      .Appellant’s grounds for review read as follows:
      1. Does the Amarillo Court of Appeals’ decision in the petitioner’s case conflict with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Losoya concerning the same issue, to wit: the legally permissible location to display a vehicle’s license plate?
      2. Has the Amarillo Court of Appeals decided an important question of state law concerning the legislative intent of the term “front” and the permissible location of a vehicle’s license plate as provided by Section 502.404(a) of the Texas Transportation Code, which has not, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals?
      3.Has the Amarillo Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial review where it has not addressed or rendered an opinion on petitioner's original complaint on appeal, to wit: the trial court's error in failing to give 38.23 instructions in the charge?

      . Spence v. State, 296 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2009).

      . 128 S.W.3d 413 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd); see also United States v. Salinas, 665 F.Supp.2d 717, 726 (W.D.Tex.2009) (following Losoya).

      . The baggie contained 233.4 grams of cocaine. Appellant also had $1,400.00 in cash.

      . Section 545.302(a)(2) provides in relevant part that: "An operator may not stop, stand, or park a vehicle ... on a sidewalk.”

      . The trial judge perhaps meant "no factual dispute” rather than “no legal dispute." See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510-11 & n. 15 (Art. 38.23 requires a jury instruction only if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact that is essential to the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause).

      . 128 S.W.3d 413 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref’d).

      . Id. at 416.

      . Spence, 296 S.W.3d at 318.

      . Id.

      . Id. at 317.

      . Id. at 318.

      . Id.

      . Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Williams v. State, 253 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

      . Mahaffey v. State, 316 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

      . Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Spence, 296 S.W.3d at 317.

      . State's Brief at 14, n. 23 (“See, e.g. Black's Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed.2009) (defining front (noun) as ‘the foremost part of something’); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 503 (11th ed.2005) (defining front (adjective) as ‘of, relating to, or situated at the front' with front (noun) defined as ‘the forward part or surface’); Encarta World English Dictionary 716 (1999) (defining front, when used as part of adjective phrase 'at or near the front,’ as 'situated at, on, or near the front of something, or placed further forward than others’ with front (noun) defined as 'the area section, or position just ahead of, close to, or at the forward part of something’); The Cassell Concise English Dictionaiy, New Edition 537 (1992) (defining front (adjective) as 'relating to or situated in or at the front’ with front (noun) defined as 'the forward part or side of anything’); Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition 502-03 (1983) (defining front (adjective) as 'of, relating to, in, the front' with front (noun) defined as 'the forepart of anything’); Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary 736 (2d ed.1983) (defining front (adjective) as 'pertaining to the fore part or front; situated in, at, or on the front’ with front (noun) defined as ‘first part; beginning’); The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition 536 (2d ed.1982) (defining front (adjective) as ‘[o]f, pertaining to, aimed at, or located in the front' with front (noun) defined as '[t]he area, location, or position directly before or ahead.’)”).

      .Tex. Transp. Code § 502.409(a)(5) (displayed numbers and letters on a license plate must be free from "blurring or reflective matter” and "plainly visible at all times during daylight”); Tex. Transp. Code § 547.322(f) (vehicles must be equipped with a white lamp that “(1) illuminates the rear license plate; and (2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear.”); Tex. Transp. Code § 547.801(a)(3) (requiring motorcycles to be equipped with a white lamp to illuminate the rear license plate).

      . Losoya, 128 S.W.3d at 415 (“The code does not define the ‘front’ of a vehicle. Because we find the term to be ambiguous, we may resort to extratextual factors to determine the meaning of the statute.”).

      . Appellant’s Brief at 16.

      . Losoya, 128 S.W.3d at 415-16.

      . Act of June 19, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 621, § 3 (codified at Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 6675a-3e § 5) (providing that a motor vehicle that operates upon the public highways of Texas must have:
      displayed thereon, and attached thereto, two (2) license number plates, one (1) plate at the front and one (1) at the rear, which have been duly and lawfully assigned for said vehicle for the current registration period or have been validated by the attachment of a symbol, tab, or other device for the current registration period.).
      Thus, under former law, the registration sticker was attached to the license plates which were displayed and attached at both the front and the rear of the vehicle. Under current law, the registration sticker is attached to the driver’s side windshield, while the license plates are still displayed at the front and rear of the vehicle.

      . Senate Comm, on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 225, 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991); House Comm. on Transportation, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 225, 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991).

      . Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.404(a).

      . Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 6675a-3e, § 5 (repealed).

      . Losoya, 128 S.W.3d at 415-16 (stating that the omission of "attached thereto” in the current statute "supports Losoya’s argument that the present statute does not require the license plate to be physically attached to the vehicle” and that this "in turn, is some evidence that the license plate need not be attached to the front bumper.”).

      . Id. at 416.

      . Even if a license plate could be legally propped up against the windshield, Officer Bledsoe had probable cause to stop appellant because he reasonably believed appellant did not have a valid license plate at the time he was pulled over. Only when the officer walked up close to the car could he see the license plate. See Foster v. State, 814 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1991, pet. ref’d) (probable cause existed when officers could not see temporary plate legally displayed in rear tinted window), abrogated on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

      . Appellant’s Brief at 12.

      . Spence, 296 S.W.3d at 316.

      . See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

      . Id. at 510 & n. 15 (“And if other facts, not in dispute, are sufficient to support the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then the disputed fact issue is not submitted to the jury because it is not material to the ultimate admissibility of the evidence.”).

      . Registration stickers used to be displayed on the license plate but are now displayed inside the front windshield. Section 502.180(d) says, "Except as provided by Subsection (h), the registration insignia for validation of a license plate shall be attached to the inside of the vehicle’s windshield, if the vehicle has a windshield, within six inches of the place where the motor vehicle inspection sticker is required to be placed. If the vehicle does not have a windshield, the owner, when applying for registration or renewal of registration, shall notify the department, and the department shall issue a distinctive device for attachment to the rear license plate of the vehicle.”


author: WOMACK, J.,

text:
    Derrick Dwayne GRANT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
    No. PD-1059-09.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 17, 2010.

      Walter M. Reaves Jr., Waco, for appellant.
    John R. Messinger, Asst. Crim. D.A., Waco, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State’s Attorney, Austin, for State.
   WOMACK, J.,

delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

The appellant, Derrick Dwayne Grant, pled guilty to burglary of a habitation with a deadly weapon. After a jury trial on punishment, he was sentenced to 55 years in prison. The Tenth Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s Batson challenge to the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes. The Court found that the State’s explanation for striking venire member J. Franklin was a pretext for racial discrimination because “there was no meaningful examination of Franklin regarding the reason the State used to strike him.”

We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether a lack of meaningful questioning can be sufficient, on its own, to support a Batson challenge, and whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. We hold that a lack of meaningful questioning might be sufficient to support a Batson challenge under the appropriate circumstances, but the Court of Appeals erred in applying the standard of review in this case. We therefore reverse the Court’s decision and remand for consideration of the remaining claims.

I. Standard of Review

In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that, while a prosecutor ordinarily may exercise peremptory strikes for any reason related to his views concerning the outcome of the trial, “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” A Batson challenge to a peremptory strike consists of three steps. First, the opponent of the strike must establish a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Second, the proponent of the strike must articulate a race-neutral explanation. Third, the trial court must decide whether the opponent has proved purposeful racial discrimination.

The trial court’s ruling in the third step must be sustained on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Because the trial court’s ruling requires an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of prosecutors and venire members, and because this evaluation lies peculiarly within the trial court’s province, we defer to the trial court in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

II. The Challenged Strike

As Article 35.17(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits, voir dire examination in this non-death-penalty trial was conducted in the presence of the entire panel of venire members. During voir dire, Franklin was asked to respond to several general questions about evidence and criminal law, but he was not asked about his responses to the written juror questionnaire. At the Batson hearing, the State articulated this explanation for striking Franklin:

On Juror Number 20, Mr. Franklin, his actually comes from his juror card. He noted on his juror card that his wife works at the Wal-Mart return center, which is from the information we have where the Defendant’s — I don’t know if she’s a new girlfriend or somebody who’s just been a part of his life for some period of time ... our information is that she also works there. It’s a girl who is, I guess, seeing the Defendant off and on throughout the time that the victim is seeing him [and she] also works with that juror’s wife. And we had some concerns about that because, obviously, people who work together talk and people who go home to their spouses talk to them about why they’re in court.

The appellant argued that any relationship between Franklin’s wife and the appellant’s girlfriend “would be the subject of an inquiry in chambers to see if that actually existed.” The appellant further argued that the State could not “rely on surmise and speculation ... to disprove a prima facie case of systemic racial discrimination. ... [I]t has to be the subject of specific inquiry into those arenas and areas in order for it to get over the prima facie case.”

The State then elaborated on its explanation:

I would also tell you that as far as Number 20 goes, when we were looking through the eards[, a prosecutor] right away mentioned before we even started the process that the prospective juror’s spouse worked at the same place as a woman the Defendant had been involved with.
[N]o further inquiry or no further assertions by any of those people would have changed my opinion on why I felt like they couldn’t be fair in this case and why I felt like a preemptory [sic ] challenge was necessary.

The trial court ultimately found that “the State used their preemptory [sic ] strikes for race-neutral reasons,” but it did not make findings specific to any challenged strike.

III. On Appeal

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by listing factors from our opinion in Whitsey v. State, including the factor that “there was a lack of questioning to the challenged juror or a lack of meaningful questions.” The Court first suggested that the Whitsey factors were a “useful guide” but were not dispositive on the issue of discriminatory intent: a factor would only “weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation” and “tended to show ... that the State’s reasons for the strike were not actually supported by the record or were an impermissible pretext.” After reciting the parties’ arguments, however, the Court made oral questioning a requirement, stating that “[t]he State must engage in meaningful voir dire examination on a subject it alleges it is concerned about.” The Court cited Miller-El v. Dretke.

While the Court of Appeals seemed at another point to qualify its requirement by saying that the lack of “meaningful voir dire examination” is only “some evidence that the asserted reason for the strike was a pretext for discrimination,” the Court’s conclusion reestablished oral questioning as a requirement. The Court found that the State’s explanation was not supported by the record and was a pretext for discrimination because “absolutely no exchange between Franklin and the State took place regarding the reason for striking him.” Accordingly, the Court found the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s explanation to be clearly erroneous.

In dissent, Justice Reyna took issue with the majority’s statements that the State must engage in meaningful voir dire examination on a subject it alleges it is concerned about, and that a failure to do so is some evidence that the explanation was a pretext. Justice Reyna argued that in the vast majority of cases, a Batson challenge will not be successful if it rests solely on a lack of meaningful questioning. In Justice Reyna’s view, the majority’s reliance on Reed and Miller-El was misplaced because those cases used the lack-of-questioning factor only in conjunction with a comparative analysis of similarly situated jurors.

IV. Analysis

Shortly after Batson was decided, this Court suggested a number of factors that could be considered in the third step of a Batson challenge. In Keeton v. State, we looked approvingly to decisions in Alabama, Florida, and Missouri that set out illustrative lists of the types of evidence that could be used. Shortly thereafter in Whitsey, we applied a nonexclusive list of five factors used by the Florida courts (and cited in Keeton) to find that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes based on race.

Neither Keeton, nor Whitsey, nor any of our numerous Batson decisions have ever held that the presence of any particular factor should be dispositive on the issue of discriminatory intent.

The Court of Appeals cited Miller-El for the proposition that the State “must engage in meaningful voir dire on a subject it alleges it is concerned about.” We do not read Miller-El to stand for that proposition. To the contrary, Miller-El pointed to a lack of questioning only as additional evidence of discrimination, and quoted an Alabama holding that the failure to engage in meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting pretext. Miller-El also was a case in which prospective jurors were examined individually and apart from other prospective jurors; as we explain below, the evi-dentiary value of lack of questioning is likely to be significantly less when jurors are examined in a group.

In Vargas v. State, we stressed that the Keeton and Whitsey factors could be considered by the trial court, but they should not replace the applicable standard of review:

Appellant’s contention that the objective factors discussed in Keeton control the analysis is not correct. These factors certainly may be considered in evaluating the trial judge’s overruling of a Bat-son claim, but they are not determinative. The overriding standard is still whether the trial judge’s decision was supported by the record so that it is not clearly erroneous.

Nor have we held that some factor in addition to a lack of questioning must be present in order to find discriminatory intent. We said in Chambers v. State, “In cases reversed because of the State’s failure to establish the legitimacy of its explanations through voir dire questions, at least one of two other factors has existed[:] 1) the legitimacy of the State’s apprehension was not obvious and 2) there was other evidence of disparate treatment.” While we agree with Chambers and Justice Reyna that the lack-of-questioning factor may arise in conjunction with other factors, we do not find support in our cases for the State’s more extreme proposition that “basing reversal exclusively on a lack of questioning is wrong.” Categorically requiring more than the lack-of-questioning factor would be incompatible with Kee-ton’s and Whitsey’s characterization of the factors as nonexclusive illustrations of the types of evidence that can be considered— just as it would be inconsistent to allow the lack-of-questioning factor to be dispositive.

Our Batson cases also contain two further holdings specifically applicable to the facts of the present case. First, we have repeatedly held that a venire member’s written answers to a juror questionnaire may provide a valid reason for a peremptory strike. Second, we have held that the reason for a peremptory strike need not actually turn out to be correct.

In the present case, the State explained that it struck Franklin because a response on Franklin’s questionnaire led the State to believe that Franklin’s wife knew the appellant’s girlfriend. The trial court had before it Franklin’s written answer, the record of the entire voir dire, and the two prosecutors’ representations that they had certain information about the appellant’s girlfriend and suspected a relationship to Franklin’s wife. Thus there was a foundation in the record for the trial court’s ruling that the explanation was not a pretext for discrimination. The credibility of the prosecutors’ representations about their information and suspicion is a matter “peculiarly within the trial court’s province.” The correctness of the prosecutors’ suspicion was irrelevant.

The appellant’s argument that the lack of questioning is persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent fails for two reasons. First, the State did question Franklin. A written questionnaire was provided to Franklin, and Franklin gave a written response with certain information about his wife. The prosecutors represented that their strike was based on this response. A •written response to a written question can be just as valid an explanation for a strike as an oral response to an oral question.

Second, a lack of oral questioning to flesh out a written response has significantly less persuasive value when prospective jurors are being questioned together. When each venire member may be examined for extensive periods of time apart from the rest of the panel, the voir dire process may take weeks. In contrast, the record in this case reflects that each side was given “45 minutes to an hour” to complete its voir dire examination of the entire panel. Within these constraints a party is limited in its ability to ask an individual venire member on whom the party may exercise a strike — let alone all such venire members — about specific written responses to a written juror questionnaire. In fact, after reviewing the voir dire transcript in this case, we cannot find that either party asked any venire member about any written response.

We conclude that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard for reviewing the trial court’s ruling. Properly applying the standard of review, the Court should have given deference to the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecutors’ credibility and should not have given dispositive weight to the lack-of-questioning factor. Based on our review of the record, the trial court’s ruling denying the appellant’s Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining claims.

      . Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

      . Id., at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

      . See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex.Cr.App.2009).

      . See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008).

        . Id.) see also Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex.Cr.App.2008) ("[A] reviewing court should examine the trial court’s conclusion that a facially race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge is genuine, rather than a pretext, with great deference, reversing only when that conclusion is, in view of the record as a whole, clearly erroneous.”).

      . 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).

      . Grant v. State, 2009 WL 1412854, at *2 (Tex.App.-Waco May 20, 2009) (citing Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d, at 713-14).

      . Id. (emphasis added).

      . Id., at *3 (emphasis added).

      . 545 U.S. 231, 246, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005).

      . Grant, 2009 WL 1412854, at *3 (emphasis added) (citing Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir.2009)).

      . Id.

      . Id., at *4.

      . Id.

      . 749 S.W.2d 861, 865-69 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).

      . 796 S.W.2d, at 713-16. In Whitsey, the prosecutor testified that he struck a teacher and the wife of a nurse’s assistant because they were likely to be "liberal.” But the prosecutor failed to ask any questions of either juror. The failure to ask the jurors any questions, specifically whether they were in fact liberal, was significant in conjunction with the factor that the prosecutor's explanation was "based on a group bias not shown to apply to the challenged juror.” Id., at 716. Similarly, in Emerson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 269, 273-74 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), we found that the State’s explanation was not legitimate when the State believed that the venire member was an unemployed college student or professor, and therefore liberal. Because the State did not ask any questions to confirm the venire member was liberal, the State improperly "applied a group bias without inquiring whether it applied to [the venire member] specifically." Id., at 274.

      . Grant, 2009 WL 1412854, at *3 (emphasis added).

      . 545 U.S., at 246, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 (Ala.2000)).

      . 838 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).

      . Id., at 554.

      . 866 S.W.2d 9, 24-25 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).

      . See, e.g., Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).

      . For example, in Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 (Tex.Cr.App.2002), the record reflected that a person of the same name and date of birth as a venire member had been arrested. In response to the appellant's complaint that the State failed to ask the venire member whether she was the person arrested, we stated, "As the party making the Batson challenge, appellant had the burden to show that the explanation given was merely a pretext for discrimination. It is not enough merely to show that a proffered explanation turns out to be incorrect. ... Here, appellant has failed to prove that the prosecutor’s explanation was incorrect, much less that it was a pretext for discrimination.” Johnson, 68 S.W.3d, at 649. In Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1999), the State struck venire member Allen because she knew the appellant’s mother, but it was venire member Alaniz who actually knew the appellant’s mother. We found that ”[a]ll appellant has proven on appeal is that the reason given was incorrect; this is not equal to proving that the reason given was a pretext for a racially motivated strike.” Ford, 1 S.W.3d, at 694.

      . Snyder, 552 U.S., at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203.

      . See Johnson, 68 S.W.3d, at 649; Ford, 1 S.W.3d, at 694.

      . See Jasper, 61 S.W.3d, at 422; Camacho, 864 S.W.2d, at 529.

      . See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.17(2).