author: DAVIS, Chief Justice.

text:
    Monty Dwayne SULLIVAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    S-18-0215
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    July 16, 2019
    Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Valerie Schoneberger, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Schoneberger.
    Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Deputy Attorney General; Russell Farr, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Farr.
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Monty Sullivan filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act claiming new evidence showed he was innocent of the first-degree sexual abuse of a minor for which he was convicted in 2009. The district court dismissed the petition for failing to identify newly discovered evidence and for making conclusory claims, and Mr. Sullivan appeals. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Sullivan presents two issues on appeal, which he states as follows:

I. Did the district court err in finding Mr. Sullivan did not present newly discovered evidence in his post-conviction petition for determination of factual innocence?
II. Was this denial premature in light of the district court's refusal to grant Mr. Sullivan an evidentiary hearing?

FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Sullivan was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor in 2009. We described the underlying facts in our decision affirming the conviction:

In February of 2009, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) took K.T., a minor child who was then nine years old, to the Child Advocacy Project (CAP) in Casper, Wyoming, to be interviewed. During the interview, K.T. revealed that on two separate occasions in her grandmother's bedroom, Sullivan attempted to have sex with her but because it was too painful, K.T. stated that Sullivan anally raped her when she was seven and eight years old. K.T. also revealed that Sullivan made her taste his semen, and that there were occasions when Sullivan made her sit on his lap while he watched pornography on the computer. During one specific instance, K.T. recalled that Sullivan was rubbing K.T.'s private area through her clothes.
The Thermopolis Police Department interviewed Sullivan after learning of the CAP interview with K.T. They informed Sullivan of K.T.'s allegations, which he initially denied. Eventually, Sullivan admitted to law enforcement that he had done to K.T. what she alleged him to have done.

Sullivan v. State , 2011 WY 46, ¶¶ 3-4, 247 P.3d 879, 880-81 (Wyo. 2011) (footnote omitted).

[¶4] In 2011, following this Court's mandate affirming the judgment against him, Mr. Sullivan filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to assert ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Mr. Sullivan argued several grounds for his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, including: 1) failure to challenge his confession to law enforcement; 2) failure to depose the victim's physician; 3) failure to present expert testimony regarding alleged defects in the victim interview; and 4) failure to present evidence of sexual abuse of the victim by her uncle. The district court denied Mr. Sullivan's petition, and this Court denied his petition for a writ of review.

[¶5] On April 23, 2018, Mr. Sullivan filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act (hereinafter "Act" or "Factual Innocence Act"). As grounds for his petition, he asserted newly discovered evidence consisting of: 1) a defense counsel interview of the victim's physician during which the physician stated that he found limited signs of sexual abuse, that he referred the victim to a gynecologist, and that the record contained no indication that a rectal examination of the victim had been performed; 2) the victim's prior allegations against her biological father and uncle; 3) a February 22, 2018 newspaper article reporting that the victim's uncle, Glenn Tanner, had pled guilty to the 2007 second-degree sexual abuse of an unnamed minor; and 4) an assertion that law enforcement witnesses lied when they testified that Mr. Sullivan confessed to first-degree sexual abuse of the victim.

[¶6] On August 13, 2018, the district court entered an order summarily denying Mr. Sullivan's actual innocence petition because it failed to cite newly discovered evidence and made irrelevant and conclusory allegations. Mr. Sullivan filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] We review a district court's summary dismissal of a factual innocence petition de novo. Parkhurst v. State , 2019 WY 63, ¶ 9, 443 P.3d 834, 836 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Miller v. State , 340 P.3d 795, 796 (Utah App. 2014) (per curiam)). This appeal also presents a question of statutory interpretation concerning a district court's grounds for dismissing a factual innocence petition, which is a question of law that we likewise review de novo. Parkhurst , ¶ 9, 443 P.3d at 836.

DISCUSSION

[¶8] Mr. Sullivan contends the district court erred in finding that he had not presented newly discovered evidence to support his factual innocence petition and that its dismissal of his petition was thus premature.

A. Initial Review Requirement under the Act

[¶9] The legislature enacted the Factual Innocence Act in 2018. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-401 to 407 (LexisNexis 2019). The Act allows a person convicted of a felony offense to petition for a hearing to establish that he or she is factually innocent, sets forth specific requirements for the petition, and it mandates a two-stage process before the district court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-403, 404; see also Brown v. State , 308 P.3d 486, 493-94 (Utah 2013) (interpreting Utah's similarly structured act). The district court is required to first review the petition to see that it meets certain of the Act's requirements. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-403(c), 404(b). If it does not, the district court is required to dismiss the petition.

[¶10] The district court dismissed Mr. Sullivan's petition after initial review. To begin our discussion, then, we must determine how a district court is to view a petition's allegations or averments in conducting the initial review required by sections 403(c) and 404(b) of the Act. In doing so, we are guided by our rules of statutory interpretation.

"When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we 'attempt to determine the legislature's intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.' " Fugle v. Sublette County School Dist. No. 9 , 2015 WY 98, ¶ 8, 353 P.3d 732, 734 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist. , 2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 2009) ). "Where legislative intent is discernible a court should give effect to the 'most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.' " Adekale v. State , 2015 WY 30, ¶ 12, 344 P.3d 761, 765 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez v. Casey , 2002 WY 111, ¶ 20, 50 P.3d 323, 329 (Wyo. 2002) ).
We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari materia , giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction.
PacifiCorp, Inc. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue , 2017 WY 106, ¶ 10, 401 P.3d 905, 908-09 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Nicodemus v. Lampert , 2014 WY 135, ¶ 13, 336 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2014) ).

Wyo. Jet Center, LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd. , 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019).

[¶11] Sections 403 and 404 of the Act set forth the requirements for the petition and mandate initial review by the district court. Section 403 provides in relevant part:

(b) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner and shall aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that:
(i) Newly discovered evidence exists that, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence;
(ii) The specific evidence identified by the petitioner establishes innocence and is material to the case and the determination of factual innocence;
(iii) The material evidence identified by the petitioner is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, is not reliant solely upon recantation of testimony by a witness against the petitioner and is not merely impeachment evidence;
(iv) When viewed with all other evidence in the case, whether admitted during trial or not, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually innocent; and
(v) Newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition is distinguishable from any claims made in prior petitions.
(c) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in W.S. 7-12-404, and make a finding whether the petition has satisfied the requirements of subsection (b) of this section. If the court finds the petition does not meet all the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, it shall dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney, and the attorney general .

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403 (emphasis added).

[¶12] Section 404(b) of the Act directs that "[t]he assigned district judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition. If it is apparent to the court that the petitioner is merely relitigating facts, issues or evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting issues that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the court shall dismiss the petition[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-404(b).

[¶13] The question then is whether W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) requires the district court to accept allegations in a factual innocence petition as true when conducting its initial review of the petition. We hold that it does not, and that factual innocence petitions should be reviewed for dismissal in the same manner as petitions under our general post-conviction relief act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 to 108 (LexisNexis 2019).

[¶14] The Factual Innocence Act and the general post-conviction relief act specify that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure apply to their respective petitions and proceedings to the extent not inconsistent with the governing statutes.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403(h), § 7-14-101(c). With respect to petitions under the general post-conviction relief act, we have held that the district court is not required to accept the petition's factual allegations as true as it must when considering a motion to dismiss a complaint under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Schreibvogel v. State , 2012 WY 15, ¶ 8, 269 P.3d 1098, 1101 (Wyo. 2012) (citing Harlow v. State , 2005 WY 12, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 1049, 1059 (Wyo. 2005) ). We have explained:

Before a person is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for post-conviction relief, there must be set forth in the text of the petition and the required supporting attachments a substantial claim plus some specificity in support of the claim. Boggs v. State, Wyo ., 484 P.2d 711 (1971). In order to justify a hearing, there must be more than a naked statement of a conclusion unsupported by an evidentiary basis. Cook v. State , 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 985 (1976) ; State v. Gillihan , 85 N.M. 514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973). There must not only be verified factual allegations in the petition, § 7-14-101, but the statutory requirement is that they must be supported, likewise with some specificity, § 7-14-102.

State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County , 696 P.2d 54, 61 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶15] We presume that the legislature is aware of our interpretation of the general post-conviction relief act, and the manner in which we have applied the rules of civil procedure to petitions under that law. See Wyo. Jet Center , ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 915 (Court presumes that legislature acts with knowledge of existing law). Given that the legislature used similar language in both acts concerning the applicability of the rules, we presume that it anticipated the same approach in this situation. This is particularly likely because the Factual Innocence Act, like the general post-conviction relief act, requires certain specific averments, and requires that those averments to be supported by "affidavits or other credible documents." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403(b). We thus conclude that while the rules of civil procedure generally apply to a district court's consideration of a factual innocence petition, the court is not required to accept the petition's allegations as true in evaluating their adequacy.

[¶16] We turn then to the district court's initial review and dismissal of Mr. Sullivan's petition.

B. District Court's Dismissal

[¶17] The Act requires dismissal of a factual innocence petition if it fails to aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that "[n]ewly discovered evidence exists that, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403(b)(i), (c). "Bona fide issue of factual innocence" means that "the newly discovered evidence presented by the petitioner, if credible, would clearly establish the petitioner's factual innocence." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-402(a)(i). As it pertains to Mr. Sullivan's claim, "factual innocence" means that he "[d]id not engage in the conduct for which he was convicted." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-402(a)(ii)(A). The Act also requires dismissal of a petition if it presents issues "that appear frivolous or speculative on their face." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-404(b).

[¶18] Mr. Sullivan concedes that the district court properly ruled on most of the evidence cited in his factual innocence petition as new evidence. The only ruling he challenges is the court's rejection of the 2018 newspaper article, which reported that KT's uncle, Glenn Tanner, had pled guilty to sexual abuse of a minor for acts occurring in 2007. He contends that because the sexual abuse for which he was convicted was also alleged to have occurred in 2007, Mr. Tanner's plea is evidence that KT misattributed the acts to him. He argues that because the plea evidence was not available for his 2009 trial, it qualifies as newly discovered evidence and was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his factual innocence claim. We disagree.

[¶19] Glenn Tanner's reported guilty plea did not clearly establish Mr. Sullivan's factual innocence. First, the cited newspaper article did not identify the victim as KT, and Mr. Sullivan cited no other credible source identifying the victim as KT. Moreover, even if the petition had contained a verified averment that KT was the victim, the evidence would not have clearly established Mr. Sullivan's innocence. KT testified at trial that three men sexually abused her: Mr. Sullivan, Glenn Tanner, and her biological father. Glenn Tanner's plea does not mean that Mr. Sullivan and KT's biological father did not also abuse her, and it therefore fails to clearly establish Mr. Sullivan's innocence. The petition was therefore properly dismissed for failing to comply with the section 403(b)(i) requirement that the proffered evidence establish a bona issue of factual innocence.

[¶20] Dismissal was also warranted by section 404(b)'s requirement that a petition be dismissed if it presents issues that appear speculative. The plain meaning of "appear" is "to have an outward aspect: seem." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 60 (11th ed. 2007). The plain meaning of "speculative" is "theoretical rather than demonstrable." Id . at 1199. Mr. Sullivan's claim of misattribution is a theory and no more. It does not demonstrably establish his factual innocence.

CONCLUSION

[¶21] Although the rules of civil procedure generally apply to petitions under the Factual Innocence Act, a district court is not required on its initial review of a petition to accept its allegations as true. The district court properly dismissed Mr. Sullivan's petition on its initial review for failing to cite newly discovered evidence that would clearly establish his factual innocence. Affirmed.

      We recognize this approach differs from that taken by Utah courts in interpreting that state's similar factual innocence act. The distinction we find is that by statute, factual innocence proceedings in Utah are civil proceedings governed by the rules of civil procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) ("Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure."); see also Perea v. State , 438 P.3d 77, 80 n.5 (Utah App. 2018). In contrast, proceedings under Wyoming's post-conviction statutes are criminal proceedings to which the rules of civil procedure apply to the extent not otherwise inconsistent with the statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-403(h) ("Except as provided in this act, and unless otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this act, the petition and all subsequent proceedings shall be governed by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and the Wyoming Rules of Evidence and shall include the underlying criminal case number."); see also Harlow , ¶ 7, 105 P.3d at 1059 ("Furthermore, we have previously made it clear that post-conviction relief proceedings, while utilizing some rules of civil procedure, are continuations of criminal proceedings, and that, therefore, the petition is not comparable to a civil complaint such that notice pleading is sufficient, or that the contents of the petition must be taken as true.").

      The theory itself is not new. Although it was not developed at trial in the manner Mr. Sullivan believes it should have been, defense counsel did argue misattribution at trial based on KT's allegations against her biological father and Glenn Tanner.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bruce Henry KNELL, Jr., Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Tanya Louise KNELL, Appellee (Defendant).
    S-18-0269
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    July 17, 2019
    Representing Appellant: James R. Salisbury, The Salisbury Firm, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming
    Representing Appellee: No appearance.
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Bruce Knell, Jr. and Tanya Knell were divorced in 2015, and in 2018 Ms. Knell applied for a writ of garnishment against Mr. Knell's earnings for amounts owing under the property division ordered by the district court. Over Mr. Knell's objection, the district court ruled the garnishment enforceable, and Mr. Knell appealed. We reverse.

ISSUE

[¶2] This appeal presents a single issue: Did the garnishment ordered by the district court exceed the statutory limits on creditor garnishments?

FACTS

[¶3] The Knells divorced in 2015. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Knell was ordered to pay child support for the couple's three children in the amount of $1,393.00 per month. The decree ordered:

[P]resumptive child support for the three minor children shall be set at $1,393.00. The first payment shall be due on June 1, 2015. Subsequent payments shall be made on or before the 1st day of each month thereafter until said children reach the age of majority and graduate from high school, or become otherwise emancipated. All child support payments shall be made payable to the Clerk of District Court and sent to the Clerk of District Court, Ninth Judicial District, Fremont County Courthouse, P.O. Box 370, Lander, WY 82520, and shall include the Civil Number of this case. The parties shall comply with W.S. §§ 20-6-201 through 20-6-222 as necessary to provide for the child support as herein set forth.

[¶4] Mr. Knell was also ordered to pay Ms. Knell the sum of $541,873.10 for her 49% ownership interest in the couple's business. With regard to that payment, the decree provided:

The plaintiff [Mr. Knell] shall pay the defendant the sum of $541,873.10 for her 49% ownership (equity) interest, in Knell Transport, LLC, as valued on December 31, 2013 and computed as set forth above. The defendant is granted a judgment against the plaintiff for said amount. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant the amount of $541,873.10 within 90 (ninety) days of the date of this judgment and decree in cash or certified funds. No interest shall be due provided the full amount is paid within the 90 (ninety) days. Any part of said sum not paid in full within 90 (ninety) days should bear interest at the statutory rate of 10%. A judicial lien is hereby imposed on all of the assets set over to the plaintiff, including all real and personal property, as well as any and all after acquired property both real and personal, as well as the ownership interest in Knell Transportation, LLC, and the same are encumbered by such judicial lien until such time as the $541,873.10 is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as set forth above.

[¶5] On March 23, 2018, Ms. Knell filed an application for issuance of a writ of continuing garnishment of Mr. Knell's wages. The application identified the amount still owing as $499,826.88, plus interest. On that same date, the clerk of district court issued the requested writ and served it on Mr. Knell's employer, Knell Enterprises. Mr. Knell objected to the writ, arguing that because his child support obligation already resulted in a withholding of more than 25% of his disposable earnings, a creditor garnishment was impermissible. In support of his objection, he submitted an affidavit stating:

5. Before deduction for child support, I receive a gross monthly income of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) from my employment with Knell Enterprises, LLC, paid in bi-weekly payroll checks in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) each (a total of two checks).
6. After deductions for FICA, Social Security and Medicare but before deduction for child support, my net bi-weekly payroll check totals one thousand six hundred seventy-five dollars ($1,675.00).
7. My net monthly earnings total three thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($3,350.00) before deduction of child support.
8. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered herein on May 19, 2015, I am obligated to pay the sum of one thousand three hundred ninety-three dollars ($1,393.00) per month in child support with said obligation commencing on June 1, 2015, and monthly thereafter.
9. On a monthly basis, approximately forty-two percent (42.00%) of my net monthly income is committed to payment of my monthly child support obligation ($1,393.00/$3,350.00). This same percentage applies to a bi-weekly calculation ($696.50/$1,675.00).
10. My bi-weekly child support obligation is deducted from my payroll check and remitted in the form of a check from my employer, Knell Enterprises, LLC, to the Wyoming Department of Family Services, State of Wyoming Disbursement Unit ....
11. The amount of the payment of bi-weekly child support is deducted from my payroll check for each payroll period.
12. After deduction of child support, I receive a net payroll check in the amount of nine hundred seventy-eight dollars and fifty cents ($978.50) ($1,675.00 - ($1,393.00/2)) on a bi-weekly basis.

[¶6] On July 16, 2018, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Knell's objections. The court thereafter entered an Order After Garnishment Hearing, overruling Mr. Knell's objection and enforcing the writ. It found:

1. The Writ of Garnishment of March 23, 2018, in the amount of $418.75 per paycheck for employee Bruce Knell, is enforceable despite Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor's child support obligation. Therefore, Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor's objection to garnishment should be DENIED.
2. The Writ of Garnishment is enforceable from March 23, 2018 forward with payments due and owing twice monthly.
3. Accordingly, Garnishee Knell Enterprises, LLC shall immediately pay $418.75 to the Clerk of District Court for the Ninth Judicial District for payment to Defendant/Judgment Creditor Tanya Knell for each paycheck issued from March 23, 2018 forward on an ongoing basis.

[¶7] Mr. Knell timely appealed the district court's ruling to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] Ms. Knell chose not to participate in proceedings before this Court, and our review of the record suggests that there were no factual disputes concerning the ordered garnishment. This appeal therefore presents only the question of whether the garnishment exceeded the statutory limits on creditor garnishments. This is a question of law that we review de novo. Wyo. Jet Center, LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd. , 2019 WY 6, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019) ; see also Union Pacific R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union , 2002 WY 165, ¶ 6, 57 P.3d 1203, 1205 (Wyo. 2002) (reviewing interpretation of garnishment statutes de novo).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] The federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) limits the amount of an individual's earnings that may be garnished. It provides in relevant part:

a) Maximum allowable garnishment
Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).
b) Exceptions
(1) The restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in the case of
(A) any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is established by State law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review.
* * * *
(2) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed-
(A) where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual's disposable earnings for that week; and
(B) where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such individual's disposable earnings for that week ....

15 U.S.C.A. § 1673.

[¶10] Wyoming law parallels the CCPA and imposes the same limits on garnishment of disposable earnings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15-511(a) ; 20-6-210(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2019). The upshot is that both laws limit creditor garnishments to 25% of an individual's disposable earnings and support garnishments to 50% or 60% of disposable earnings, depending on the circumstances. Union Pacific , ¶ 11, 57 P.3d at 1207-08.

[¶11] The CCPA does not address the priority of garnishments, but instead leaves that to state law. 29 C.F.R. § 870.11(b)(2) ; see also Koethe v. Johnson , 328 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 1982) (priority between garnishments to be determined by state law). Under Wyoming law, an order withholding income for child support has priority over any other garnishment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-219 ; Union Pacific , ¶ 12, 57 P.3d at 1208. We have thus said:

Garnishments are generally limited to 25% of an individual's disposable income with an exception up to 6[0]% for support order garnishments. Support garnishments have priority under Wyoming law, and creditor judgment garnishments may be imposed only to the extent support garnishments do not exceed the general 25% limit.

Union Pacific , ¶ 16, 57 P.3d at 1209.

[¶12] In this case, the district court did not enter an income withholding order. Mr. Knell instead voluntarily remits his child support to the Department of Family Services, State Disbursement Unit, through income withholding by his employer. The question then is whether this voluntary remittance constitutes a support garnishment.

[¶13] The CCPA defines a garnishment to mean "any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1672(c) ; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-501(a)(vi). Other courts have interpreted this to include a voluntary wage assignment. For example, in Voss Products, Inc. v. Carlton , 147 F.Supp.2d 892, 893 (E.D. Tenn. 2001), the defendant and his wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement under which the defendant agreed to a voluntary wage assignment for his child support obligations. A creditor of the defendant thereafter applied for a writ of garnishment and argued that the defendant's support obligation should not be treated as a priority garnishment because it was a voluntary wage assignment. Voss Products , 147 F.Supp.2d at 894. The federal court rejected the argument based on the CCPA's definition of garnishment.

The following language in Marshall v. District Court for Forty-First-b Judicial District of Michigan , 444 F.Supp. 1110, 1116 (E.D. Mich. 1978) is persuasive:
Any order for the support of any person within the scope of § 303(b)(1) of the Act ... is an order falling within the definition of "garnishment" order contained in § 302(c) of the Act, if, pursuant to it, the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld to meet the requirements of the order.
Accordingly, I conclude that the wage assignment made by plaintiff to satisfy his support obligations was a "garnishment" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c). For the purposes of this Act, it is immaterial whether the court order orders or merely coerces a principal defendant to assign a portion of his wages for support. Marshall , 444 F.Supp. at 1116.

Voss Products , 147 F.Supp.2d at 896 (emphasis in original); see also Koethe , 328 N.W.2d at 297 ) (reaching same conclusion).

[¶14] We agree with these authorities. Although the district court did not enter an income withholding order in this case, we see no meaningful distinction between Mr. Knell's voluntary payroll deduction and a garnishment. The divorce decree's support order requires Mr. Knell to pay a percentage of his monthly earnings for child support, and if he fails to do so, an income withholding order will be entered without a hearing. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-204(b) ("An income withholding order under this subsection shall be entered without a hearing if an arrearage occurs."). In other words, the support order itself, with or without an income withholding order, requires the same dedication of earnings that would result from a garnishment. As another court observed:

[I]t would seem clear that when a support order provides for payment to the Support Collection Unit and all such orders must provide for a wage deduction order upon a failure to make a designated number of payments, that in such a case the federally mandated percentages do apply. This is so for the reason that the wage deduction order is served on the employer upon the happening of the contingency of non-payment and that no such order could be carried out by an employer which exceeds the mandated percentages without additional notice to respondent. See , Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969).

Liedka v. Liedka , 101 Misc.2d 305, 423 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979).

[¶15] We hold that for purposes of calculating the limits on individual garnishments, a child support order equates to a garnishment. To conclude otherwise would result in an unfair and absurd application of the CCPA's protections, because one who is subject to an income withholding order because of an arrearage would be afforded the Act's protections, whereas an individual who remains current through voluntary payroll deductions would not. Our holding also comports with the policy objective we recognized in Union Pacific .

We are sympathetic to the concerns expressed by Trona Valley FCU that the statute, as construed, can limit or even prevent a judgment creditor from recovering their money by allowing debtors to evade payment when their support orders exceed the general statutory maximum of 25%. The purpose behind these statutes was to deter predatory credit practices while preserving debtors' employment and insuring a continuing means of support for themselves and their dependents. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (1998) ; Kahn v. Trustees of Columbia University , 109 A.D.2d 395, 492 N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1985). The Wyoming legislature has made a policy choice to give priority to support orders. That is the legislature's prerogative, and it is hard to argue against a policy whose purpose is to ensure the financial well being of an employee's family. In any event, these statutes merely prohibit the garnishment of a debtor's wages and do not inhibit a judgment creditor from pursuing other means to collect on a judgment. See, e.g. , Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-201 through -212 (LexisNexis 2001) (attachment).

Union Pacific , ¶ 15, 57 P.3d at 1209.

[¶16] Because we conclude that a support order must be treated as a garnishment, "creditor judgment garnishments may be imposed only to the extent support garnishments do not exceed the general 25% limit." Union Pacific , ¶ 16, 57 P.3d at 1209. Mr. Knell's monthly disposable earnings total $3,350, and his monthly child support obligation is $1,393. His support garnishment is therefore approximately 42% of his disposable earnings, which precludes any additional creditor garnishments. The district court thus erred in enforcing the additional garnishment for the property settlement debt to Ms. Knell. Reversed.

      It is not clear from the record whether the hearing was an evidentiary hearing or limited to argument on the writ and objection.

      " 'Disposable earnings' means that part of an individual's earnings remaining after the deduction of all amounts required by law to be withheld." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-501(a)(iii).

      Additional percentages may be garnished for support payments under certain circumstances where an arrearage exists, but those provisions are not relevant here. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(2)(B).

      The record does not tell us when Mr. Knell changed from making payments to the clerk of court, as required by the decree, to having his employer remit the payments to the disbursement unit, or if that had been his payment method from the outset.

      The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached a different result and held that because the child support order in question did not order income withholding, it was not a garnishment. Carpenter v. Mumaw , 230 Wis.2d 384, 602 N.W.2d 536, 542 (Wis. App. 1999). We find that decision less persuasive as a matter of policy, and because it relied in great part on Wisconsin statutes and the procedure for obtaining an income withholding order upon an arrearage. Id . Unlike the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-204(b) requirement that an income withholding order issue without a hearing upon the event of an arrearage, the Wisconsin statute requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id .


author: FOX, Justice.

text:
    The MATTHEIS COMPANY, Appellant (Defendant), v. The TOWN OF JACKSON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
    S-18-0268
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    July 23, 2019
    Representing Appellant: Mark D. Sullivan, Mark D. Sullivan, PC, Wilson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Sullivan.
    Representing Appellee: Audrey P. Cohen-Davis and Lea M. Colasuonno, Town of Jackson, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Colasuonno.
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   FOX, Justice.

[¶1] The Mattheis Company (Company) operated a bar in Jackson, Wyoming. After learning that the Company had submitted a liquor license renewal application containing false information, the Town of Jackson (Town) initiated proceedings to revoke the Company's liquor license. Following a bench trial, the district court revoked the Company's liquor license. The Company timely appealed, and we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] The parties raise several issues that we rephrase and reorganize:

1. Does liquor-license revocation require a "gross violation" of Title 12, or a violation of the "intent and purpose" of Title 12?
2. Did the district court err in concluding that the Company's submission of a false liquor license renewal application was a gross violation of Title 12?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking the Company's liquor license, rather than suspending it?

FACTS

[¶3] In 2007, brothers Steve and Mike Mattheis formed The Mattheis Company, purchased a liquor license, and began operating the Town Square Tavern (Tavern) in Jackson, Wyoming. The Tavern's 10-year lease was set to expire on March 31, 2017, unless the Company provided notice of its intent to exercise its five-year right-of-renewal 120 days before that date. Between 2007 and 2016, the Company renewed its liquor license annually-nine times in total.

[¶4] The Company first became aware that its liquor license was in jeopardy when Ms. Sandy Birdyshaw, Town Clerk, informed it that its December 9, 2016 liquor license renewal application was "inaccurate." The renewal application indicated that the Company's lease expired on March 31, 2022, referencing the lease the Town had "on file" and its five-year right-of-renewal provision. Ms. Birdyshaw called Steve Mattheis and told him she could not certify the application complete because its lease expiration date did not match the March 31, 2017 expiration date contained in the Town's "on file" lease. She requested that the Company "provide the lease renewal that went to 2022 or something that would substantiate that's when the lease expired." In a follow-up email to Steve, she stated that "liquor renewal requires a lease be in place for the full renewal liquor year which runs to 3-31-2018."

[¶5] The record does not explain precisely what occurred between the Company and its landlord. In any event, the Company had not secured the anticipated five-year lease extension when it submitted its December 2016 application and failed to ever do so. Worried about the future of its business, the Company hired attorney Richard Mulligan to assist with the dispute. The Company told Mr. Mulligan that it needed to have a lease through March 31, 2018, to renew its liquor license and that it was important that the Tavern remain open during Jackson's summer "prime season," which would require having a lease until at least October 31, 2017. Mr. Mulligan and the landlord's attorney attempted to reach an agreement over the next several weeks.

[¶6] Meanwhile, uncertain of whether the Company would secure a new lease before the license expired on March 31, 2017, Steve asked Ms. Birdyshaw what he could do to preserve it. Ms. Birdyshaw informed Steve that the Company could transfer the license to another location on a non-operational status for up to two years and transfer it back to the Tavern location when the Company secured a new lease. Steve also confirmed with the Wyoming Liquor Division (Division) that it was possible to "park" a liquor license on non-operational status for up to two years. On February 1, 2017, the Company submitted a transfer application to the Town, explaining that it was parking the license at another location on non-operational status due to a lease dispute with its landlord. The Town Council approved the transfer.

[¶7] Eventually, the Company and its landlord reached an agreement. On March 3, 2017, the parties executed a lease with a term from April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018. The same day, the parties executed a "Modification of Lease Term" that reduced the term to a seven-month period ending on October 31, 2017. Three days later, Steve and Mike executed an application to transfer the liquor license back to the Tavern location. The Company stated that the Tavern lease expired on March 31, 2018, directly above the application provision: "NOTE: Please submit a copy of the lease with the application. W.S. 12-4-103(a)(iii) requires the lease be valid THROUGH the TERM OF THE LICENSE ...." (Emphasis in original.) Steve and Mike signed, and Mr. Mulligan notarized, the application directly beneath its "Oath or Verification" section, which stated: "Under penalty of perjury, and the possible revocation or cancellation of the license, I swear the above stated facts, are true and accurate ." (Emphasis in original.) Steve and Mike each signed affidavits authorizing the Town to conduct investigations into the truth of the information in the application, both of which stated: "The applicant hereby agrees to comply fully with the rules and regulations of the Town of Jackson governing the license/permit requested." Mr. Mulligan also notarized these documents. The same day, the Company submitted the application to the Town, attaching the one-year lease and the affidavits, among other required documents. It did not submit the modification that shortened the lease term to October 31, 2017.

[¶8] The Town Council approved the transfer application, and the Tavern conducted business throughout the summer of 2017. During that period, the Tavern's landlord entered into a new lease agreement with a local restaurateur, set to begin after the Tavern's modified lease expired on October 31, 2017. In August 2017, the future tenant applied to the Town for a liquor license. Ms. Birdyshaw noticed that the application cited the Tavern address as its place of business and became "concerned that there might be a lease issue" because she "thought there was a one year lease in place with The Mattheis Company." She emailed Steve, saying that the application "kind of took us [ ] by surprise," and requested that he share any plans the Company had for its liquor license. She reminded him that the Company must have a written lease for the duration of the liquor-license period and asked him to confirm the Company's last occupancy date.

[¶9] In the meantime, the future tenant's attorney gave Ms. Birdyshaw a copy of the "Modification of Lease Term" that changed the term expiration to October 31, 2017. The Town sent the Company a letter notifying it that, unless the Company provided evidence disproving the inconsistency between its March 2017 application and the lease modification, it would initiate revocation proceedings. The Company admitted the inconsistency, but asked the Town Council for leniency, asserting they "had no idea that we were signing something that would jeopardize our business or our liquor license. We wouldn't knowingly sign documents with false information, nor would our attorney allow us to do so (and he in fact notarized all documents)."

[¶10] The Town filed an action to revoke the Company's liquor license, arguing that its omission of the lease modification from its March 2017 application amounted to a "gross violation" of Title 12 and that it violated the "intent and purpose" of Title 12. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1-101 to 12-10-102 (LexisNexis 2017). The Company admitted that its March 2017 application contained false information but argued that it had neither committed a "gross violation" of Title 12 nor violated the Title's "intent and purpose" because its mistake was not purposeful or flagrant and because it had acted under the advice of counsel. It also requested that the district court suspend the license in lieu of revoking it, in part because other businesses that had committed liquor-license violations had not had their licenses revoked.

[¶11] The district court held that the "Company's conduct amount[ed] to a gross violation, which violated the intent and purpose of the liquor licensing statute[s]," finding:

Mattheis Company had applied for the renewed annual license every year for almost a decade. It was not a novice or newcomer to the process. The renewal license application is a form provided by the Wyoming Liquor Division. ... Each includes an express provision that reads as follows: "NOTE: Please submit a copy of the lease with the application. W.S. 12-4-103(a)(iii) requires the lease to be valid THROUGH the TERM OF THE LICENSE and MUST contain a provision for the SALE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES." (emphasis in original). Mattheis Company provided testimony that Steve Mattheis was aware of the one-year lease requirement. He discussed that requirement with the Town of Jackson when it had the lease dispute with its landlord. According to his testimony, that one-year lease requirement was of paramount concern from mid-December 2016 to the time the license was renewed in March 2017.

The court found the submission of the application representing that the Company had a one-year lease "was a flagrant violation of the Wyoming liquor licensing statutes" and "not a careless act or a negligent oversight." It also found the violation "contrary to the purpose and intent of the licensing statutes."

[¶12] Turning to the Company's advice-of-counsel defense, the district court noted that this Court has never considered whether the defense is available in a liquor-license revocation proceeding. It concluded that even if the defense applied, it would fail in these circumstances. The district court was "unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence" that Mr. Mulligan had advised the Company "that it was legal to provide false information on the license application." Moreover, it found that even if the Company had received that advice, it could not rely on it in good faith:

Even if Mr. Mulligan was engaged to resolve the license problem, and even if Mr. Mulligan's actions could be construed to allow an inference to Steve Mattheis that he could submit false information on his license application, the Court cannot find that reliance on such advice was in good faith. Mr. Mattheis was acutely aware of the need for a one-year lease. The requirement is stated in a mix of bold and underlined letters on the license application. Mr. Mattheis had filed applications containing this requirement for ten years. Mr. Mattheis discussed the need for a one-year (or longer) lease with Ms. Birdyshaw in December 2016. He took steps to preserve the license in the event he could not get a new one-year lease by transferring the license elsewhere. There are numerous pieces of correspondence admitted into evidence of Mr. Mattheis working with the Town of Jackson to find a way to preserve its license because it had no one-year lease in place. To assert that any reliance on counsel's alleged advice was in good faith is not possible in a case where Mr. Mattheis had such affirmative knowledge corroborated by his actions to preserve the license. ... Mr. Mattheis also unequivocally admitted in his testimony that he knew of the one-year license requirement.

Finally, the district court declined to order license suspension over revocation. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Before a court can revoke a liquor license, it must conclude that the license holder committed a gross violation of Title 12

[¶13] The Town argues the Company committed a "gross violation" of Title 12 and that it violated the "intent and purpose" of Title 12, each standard independently warranting revocation of its liquor license. The Company responds that only a "gross violation" of Title 12 warrants license revocation and that this standard was not met. The parties generally agree that a gross violation of Title 12 requires proof of "willful" and "flagrant" conduct but disagree whether such conduct occurred in this case. The district court concluded that The Mattheis Company's conduct violated both standards, without deciding if either or both applied.

[¶14] This issue presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. In re Estate of Frank , 2019 WY 4, ¶ 6, 432 P.3d 885, 887 (Wyo. 2019) (citing In re Estate of Meyer , 2016 WY 6, ¶ 17, 367 P.3d 629, 634 (Wyo. 2016) ). When interpreting statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statutes. Rhoads v. State , 2018 WY 143, ¶ 9, 431 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Wyo. 2018). We are guided by the full text of the statute, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and construing all components of a statute in pari materia . Bear Cloud v. State , 2013 WY 18, ¶ 30, 294 P.3d 36, 44 (Wyo. 2013) (citing LM v. Laramie Cty. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re MN) , 2007 WY 189, ¶¶ 4-5, 171 P.3d 1077, 1079-80 (Wyo. 2007) ). A statute is unambiguous if reasonable people can agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. MF v. State , 2013 WY 104, ¶ 8, 308 P.3d 854, 857 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Rock v. Lankford , 2013 WY 61, ¶ 19, 301 P.3d 1075, 1081 (Wyo. 2013) ). "However, the fact that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court." Romsa v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. , 2012 WY 146, ¶ 22, 288 P.3d 695, 702 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting McClean v. State , 2003 WY 17, ¶ 6, 62 P.3d 595, 598 (Wyo. 2003) ).

[¶15] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-101 states: "Any violation of this title by any manufacturer, rectifier, wholesaler, licensee, employee or agent thereof is sufficient cause for the suspension and in the case of gross violation the revocation of the license of the licensee." "Gross," as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-101, is an adjective that describes the type of violation sufficient for revocation. In the context of negligence, we have described "gross" as a difference in degree and indicated that it serves to measure the level or extent of the conduct in question. See McClure v. Latta , 348 P.2d 1057, 1062 (Wyo. 1960) ("Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention .... The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is, in gross negligence, magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence."). This understanding aligns with dictionary definitions of the term, which often guide our determination of the plain language used in statutes. In re Birkholz , 2019 WY 19, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1102, 1106 (Wyo. 2019) (citing BJ Hough, LLC v. City of Cheyenne , 2012 WY 140, ¶ 25, 287 P.3d 761, 770 (Wyo. 2012) ). Black's Law Dictionary defines "gross" as:

1. Conspicuous by reason of size or other attention-getting qualities; esp., obvious by reason of magnitude < a gross Corinthian column>.
2. Undiminished by deduction; entire < gross profits>.
3. Not specified or detailed; general < a gross estimate>.
4. Coarse in meaning or sense < gross slang>.
5. Repulsive in behavior or appearance; sickening < a gross fellow with gross habits>.
6. Beyond all reasonable measure; flagrant < a gross injustice>.

Gross , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). See also Gross , Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gross (last visited July 17, 2019) ("glaringly noticeable usually because of inexcusable badness or objectionableness < a gross error >"). Thus, we conclude that "gross" as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-101 speaks to the degree of violation that must occur before a license can be revoked and requires a transgression of Title 12 so unreasonable as to be flagrant.

[¶16] Conflict arguably arises when section 101 is read alongside Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-201(b), which permits revocation "upon proof that the intent and purpose of [Title 12] has been violated." However, the sections are not irreconcilable under our established methods of statutory interpretation. "Each word of a statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superfluous." In re JB , 2017 WY 26, ¶ 16, 390 P.3d 357, 361 (Wyo. 2017). The clear "intent and purpose" of Title 12 is to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1-101 through 12-10-102. Thus, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-201(b) any violation that transgressed Title 12's methods of alcoholic beverage regulation would be sufficient to revoke a liquor license. If that were the case, it would never be necessary to show a "gross violation," which certainly requires a higher standard of proof than any violation. We refuse to read the "gross violation" standard out of Title 12. Conversely, requiring a gross violation does not read section 12-7-201(b) 's "intent and purpose" standard out of Title 12. "Gross" merely describes with greater specificity the type of violation license revocation contemplates. We find no ambiguity in the statutes. A gross violation of Title 12 will necessarily violate the intent and purpose of Title 12. Thus, it remains true that "[t]he court may revoke the license or permit upon proof that the intent and purpose of [Title 12] has been violated," subject to the qualification that the violation be gross. We therefore hold a court must conclude that a licensee committed a gross violation of Title 12 before it can revoke a liquor license.

II. The district court did not err in concluding The Mattheis Company committed a gross violation of Title 12, despite its asserted reliance on the advice of counsel

[¶17] The question is whether there was sufficient factual evidence for the district court to conclude that a gross violation occurred. The Company argues that a "single, isolated violation such as the one before this Court, one committed upon the advice of experienced counsel, unknowingly, and which has no victim and no adverse consequence to anyone other than The Mattheis Company, does not rise to the level of a 'gross violation.' " It asserts that the Wyoming Liquor Division's and the Town's history of enforcing Title 12 demonstrates that a "gross violation" must be "very serious, repeated, and flagrant" because other licensees have not had their licenses revoked in circumstances the Company considers comparable. It asserts that "good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is a complete defense to certain actions, and may be considered a palliative" in a liquor-license revocation proceeding. The Town counters that one gross violation is sufficient cause to revoke a liquor license, that the Division's and the Town's "enforcement history" do not control the result in this case, and that the record supports the district court's conclusion that the Company committed a gross violation of Title 12. It argues reliance on advice of counsel should not be a defense in a liquor-license revocation action and, alternatively, that the defense does not apply in this case.

[¶18] Following a bench trial, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Acorn v. Moncecchi , 2016 WY 124, ¶ 23, 386 P.3d 739, 748 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Wallop Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Goodwyn , 2015 WY 81, ¶ 21, 351 P.3d 943, 949-50 (Wyo. 2015) ).

The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail reweighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In considering a trial court's factual findings, we assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo .

Meiners v. Meiners , 2019 WY 39, ¶ 8, 438 P.3d 1260, 1265-66 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Galiher v. Johnson , 2018 WY 145, ¶ 6, 432 P.3d 502, 507 (Wyo. 2018) ).

[¶19] As with gross negligence, whether a licensee has committed a gross violation of Title 12 "must be determined by the facts and circumstances in the particular case." McClure , 348 P.2d at 1062 ("whether or not a motorist involved in an accident has been guilty of gross negligence must be determined by the facts and circumstances in the particular case"); 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 239 ("The degree of negligence in any particular case is ordinarily a question of fact."). Consequently, a gross violation may indeed be purposeful or repeated, but need not be in every situation. Thus, we agree with the district court that "whether conduct is repeated may be a factor to consider but does not control whether certain conduct is a gross violation." The district court found that Steve Mattheis was "acutely aware of the need for a one-year lease." The record supports this finding: Ms. Birdyshaw told him he needed a lease in place through March 31, 2018; the falsified application contained the requirement in capitalized and underlined words (as did the nine renewal applications he had completed over the last decade); he had "parked" the license roughly one month before because he knew it was the only way to comply with the one-year lease requirement; and he testified that he knew about the requirement. He was also acutely aware that he did not have a one-year lease for the Tavern location. He testified that it was "very clear" to him that the lease modification reduced the term of the lease to less than a one-year period. He also testified that he knew when he submitted the application indicating that the Company had a lease through March 31, 2018, that the lease in fact expired on October 31, 2017. We find no clear error in the district court's conclusion that the Company knowingly submitted a false application under penalty of perjury. We agree that the Company's actions constitute a gross violation of Title 12.

[¶20] Turning to the Company's asserted reliance on advice of counsel, we do not decide whether reliance on advice of counsel may ever be a complete defense in a liquor-license revocation proceeding. The Company points out that reliance on advice of counsel "is a complete defense to certain actions," such as malicious prosecution claims, but does not advocate for its adoption as a complete defense to a license revocation action. Instead, it explicitly "asks this Court ... to weigh its reliance on the advice of its counsel in mitigation of the penalty to be applied." Thus, we limit our analysis to consideration of whether reliance on advice of counsel can serve as a mitigator in this liquor-license revocation proceeding.

[¶21] The Company's asserted reliance on advice of counsel does not mitigate its violation of Title 12. As noted, Steve Mattheis was keenly aware of the one-year lease requirement and the fact that the Company did not have one. Although he claimed that the manner in which Mr. Mulligan presented him with the lease documents led him to believe he did not need to submit the modification, the district court was "unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence" that Mr. Mulligan advised him "that making a false representation on [the] license application was legal." The record supports this conclusion. Steve Mattheis knew of the lease term requirement and swore to the truth of his license application. He cannot claim that advice of counsel excuses his violation of the law, particularly when the record does not establish that he received advice negating that knowledge.

[¶22] We hold the district court did not err in concluding that the Company committed a gross violation of Title 12 and correctly rejected the Company's advice-of-counsel defense.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Company's liquor license

[¶23] The Company asks this Court to "exercise its discretion to suspend, rather than revoke" its license. As a court of appellate review, we have no discretion to suspend the Company's license. That power belongs to the district court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-102 ("In a proceeding for revocation of a liquor license and when a licensee is found guilty of violating W.S. 12-1-101 through 12-8-301, the district court ... may, if it appears inadvisable to revoke the license, suspend the license[.]"). The question before this Court is whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking the Company's license in the first instance. "Our primary goal in reviewing for an abuse of discretion is determining whether the district court's decision is reasonable. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination, affording to the prevailing party every favorable inference and omitting from our consideration conflicting evidence." Smith v. Kelly , 2019 WY 60, ¶ 20, 442 P.3d 297, 301 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Kappen v. Kappen , 2015 WY 3, ¶ 10, 341 P.3d 377, 381 (Wyo. 2015) ).

[¶24] The court acknowledged that it had the discretion to order suspension of the license but decided against it, reasoning:

Wyo. Stat. § 12-7-102 indicates that suspension for the term of the license may be appropriate when revocation is inadvisable. Thus, the Court can either revoke the license or suspend the license. The Court cannot find that a suspension in this instance would be appropriate due to the gravity of the violation. Moreover, a suspension would be of little to no consequence. In instances where a licensee is operating a business, a suspension for the term of the license would likely result in decreased or no revenue for a period of time, which could be considered a serious consequence. In this case, however, the licensee has no lease and no place of business and those facts gave rise to this revocation action. A suspension of the license then would merely preserve the status quo while Mattheis Company finds a new location for the license or a buyer for the license. If the Town of Jackson considered that type of negligible consequence to be appropriate, it could have suspended the license directly as the licensing authority. It did not do so. While the Court has discretion to second-guess that decision and suspend the license, the Court cannot find that to be an appropriate consequence after having found that Mattheis Company was affirmatively aware of the licensing requirements and knowingly failed to comply by submitting a liquor license, application under oath, containing false information.

[¶25] The Company criticizes the district court for stating that the Town could have suspended the license directly because "[s]uspension is an option reserved only to the Court." Nevertheless, the record shows that the district court understood that it had discretion to either suspend or revoke the license, considered the evidence before it and the nature of the violation, and decided that suspension would not be a meaningful consequence in the circumstances. We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering revocation of the Company's liquor license.

CONCLUSION

[¶26] Before a district court can revoke a liquor license, it must conclude that the licensee committed a gross violation of Title 12. The district court correctly determined that The Mattheis Company committed a gross violation of Title 12, notwithstanding its asserted reliance on the advice of counsel. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking The Mattheis Company's liquor license instead of suspending it. Affirmed.

      When referring to the Mattheis brothers individually we use their first names to avoid confusion.

      Throughout this litigation, the parties hotly contested the scope of Mr. Mulligan's representation. The Town claimed the Company hired Mr. Mulligan exclusively to resolve the lease dispute and that he had no duty to ensure its liquor license application was properly completed. The Company claimed the lease dispute was inextricably linked to issues with its liquor license, and therefore Mr. Mulligan had a duty to properly advise it concerning the license. There is no engagement letter between the Company and Mr. Mulligan, and witness testimony concerning the scope of Mr. Mulligan's representation conflicts. The district court could not "discern with affirmative evidence the scope of legal services requested of Mr. Mulligan."

      Each application the Company submitted between 2007 and 2017, including the February 2017 transfer application, recited the one-year lease requirement and required the applicant to swear to the truth of the application under penalty of perjury.

      The liquor license was set to expire in March 2018, raising the concern that a justiciable controversy might no longer exist by the time of trial months later. However, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-7-201(b) provides:
      upon a showing to the satisfaction of the court that there are probable grounds for believing the license holder's license should be revoked, the court may issue an order suspending a license during the pendency of an action for its revocation and no bond shall be required as a condition to the issuance of the suspension order. Appeal from the final district court decision may be taken according to the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, but the order of revocation shall remain in effect pending a decision by the appellate court.
      The district court ordered a stay according to this procedure. We conclude the stay had the effect of preserving a justiciable controversy for trial. Because we affirm, we need not consider the effect of a reversal on appeal.

      Below, and on appeal, the Town asserted that the Company had committed repeated violations of Title 12 because it had previously been cited for serving a minor and warned about its patrons' late-night, rowdy behavior in and around the Tavern. Although we doubt the relevance of these incidents to the violation that prompted this proceeding, we need not address them because the district court did not rely on this evidence in concluding that the Company had committed a gross violation of Title 12.

      The Company claims the district court mischaracterized testimony from the Wyoming Liquor Division's Chief of Enforcement, Tom Montoya. Mr. Montoya testified that license revocation could be appropriate if an applicant submitted false information on a license application. The Company takes issue with the district court's statement that: "Mr. Montoya's opinion that submitting false information on an application is a violation warranting revocation corroborates the Court's finding." It asserts this statement shows that the court considered the testimony an opinion on the "ultimate issue" in the case, when it should have been given "no weight whatsoever." We do not find that the district court gave undue weight to Mr. Montoya's opinion. Directly preceding the offending statement, the court acknowledged that Mr. Montoya's opinion was "useful although not binding" and "[e]ven without considering Mr. Montoya's testimony ," it found the Company committed a gross violation by knowingly failing to disclose that it did not have a one-year lease. (Emphasis added.) The district court's factual findings support its conclusion that the Company committed a gross violation of Title 12, independent from any reliance on Mr. Montoya's testimony.

      The Company's reliance on the Division's and the Town's enforcement history do not convince us otherwise. Both parties discuss a 1999 decision letter suspending a liquor license after an administrative contested case hearing and evidence that another restaurant in Jackson had committed violations of Title 12 without having a revocation proceeding brought against it. However, neither party explains why we should afford any weight to these unrelated, non-binding matters. Like the district court, we do not consider these matters in concluding that the Company committed a gross violation of Title 12.

      The Company claims several of Steve Mattheis's "outward manifestations" show that he relied on advice of counsel in good faith. The district court apparently did not credit these "outward manifestations" as indicators of good faith, nor do we under our standard of review. Acorn , 2016 WY 124, ¶ 23, 386 P.3d at 748 ("Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail reweighing disputed evidence."). The Company also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence that it is normal for attorneys to craft "private agreements" relating to a statutory liquor licensing requirement and, thus, that it was reasonable for Steve Mattheis to rely on the "side agreement" his attorney crafted in this case. The Company asserts the excluded evidence was "highly relevant" but cites no authority supporting that assertion. It also fails to cite any authority supporting a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. Schell v. Scallon , 2019 WY 11, ¶ 28, 433 P.3d 879, 888 (Wyo. 2019) ("We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion."). We therefore decline to consider whether the district court erred in excluding the evidence. Mitchell v. Preston , 2019 WY 41, ¶ 33, 439 P.3d 718, 725 (Wyo. 2019).


author: GRAY, Justice.

text:
    Gordon James GUNSCH, Appellant (Petitioner), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Respondent).
    S-18-0264
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
    July 24, 2019
    Representing Appellant: Katherine A. Strike, Stanbury & Strike, P.C., Lander, Wyoming.
    Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Deputy Attorney General; Jessica Frint, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
    Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
   GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Appellant Gordon James Gunsch obtained an order granting him relief from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The State subsequently moved to vacate the order pursuant to W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1). The district court granted the W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) motion and revived Mr. Gunsch's registration requirement. Mr. Gunsch appeals. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] We consolidate the parties' arguments into a single issue:

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's motion for relief under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) ?

FACTS

[¶3] In 1990, Mr. Gunsch was convicted of incest as an adult and was required to register as a sex offender. Later, in 2008, he received three years of unsupervised probation after being convicted on two counts of failing to meet this obligation. Since 2008, he has registered as required and has had no other conviction for any misdemeanor or felony offense.

[¶4] In June of 2018, Mr. Gunsch petitioned the district court to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i). Mr. Gunsch claimed that he met the statutory requirements-he continuously registered for at least ten years, maintained a "clean record" for ten years, and, for his specific crime, he was an offender "adjudicated as a delinquent ." (Emphasis added.) The petition alleged the reporting requirement was a substantial burden because of Mr. Gunsch's age (64), numerous health problems (including legal blindness, ambulatory challenges, and kidney failure ), and the inconvenience to his spouse (also his caregiver). The State urged the district court to deny relief based on the egregious nature of Mr. Gunsch's incest conviction and his subsequent convictions for failure to register. However, it conceded Mr. Gunsch "appears to meet the statutory requirements for termination of his duty to register as a sex offender pursuant to W.S. § 7-19-304(a)(i)."

[¶5] The district court entered its "Order Terminating Duty to Register" on July 13, 2018, finding Mr. Gunsch "meets all statutory requirements set forth in Wyoming Statute § 7-19-304(a)(i) and (d), and, therefore, is eligible for relief under the same." Ten days later, the State filed a W.R.C.P. Rule 60 motion alleging Mr. Gunsch was not eligible for relief from the duty to register because he was convicted of incest as an adult and not "adjudicated as a delinquent." Based on this mistake, the State asked the district court to vacate its "Order Terminating Duty to Register" and deny the Petition for Termination of Duty to Register.

[¶6] The district court granted the motion and entered the Order that is the subject of this appeal ("Order Granting State's W.R.C.P. 60 Motion for Relief from Order Terminating Duty to Register"). It found that Mr. Gunsch was not statutorily eligible for termination because he was "not adjudicated as [a] delinquent for a violation of that statute; rather, he was convicted [of incest] as an adult." The court concluded it "had no subject matter jurisdiction, and it was error on the [c]ourt's part to enter the Order Terminating Duty to Register ." Mr. Gunsch filed a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment in six circumstances, two of which are relevant to our analysis in this case: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;" and "(4) the judgment is void." Our review of the grant or denial of a W.R.C.P. Rule 60 motion is for an abuse of discretion unless the judgment is attacked under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4). State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP , 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989). "When [a] judgment is attacked pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), ... there is no question of discretion" in granting or denying relief-"either the judgment is void or it is valid" and "the trial court must act accordingly." Id. ; Essex Holding, LLC v. Basic Properties, Inc. , 2018 WY 111, ¶ 69, 427 P.3d 708, 728 (Wyo. 2018). We will address W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) before turning to W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1).

DISCUSSION

W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) Void Judgment

[¶8] Here, the district court's finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is incorrect. "[D]istrict court[s] ... have original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases ... and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for." Wyo. Const. art. V, § 10 ; see also Matter of Adoption of L-MHB , 2018 WY 140, ¶ 9, 431 P.3d 560, 564 (Wyo. 2018). The district court has jurisdiction over claims under the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act (WSORA), which includes those raised in Mr. Gunsch's petition. See Kammerer v. State , 2014 WY 50, ¶ 31, 322 P.3d 827, 839 (Wyo. 2014) ("Wyoming's Act expressly provides a mechanism by which certain categories of registered sex offenders can petition the district court for relief from the duty to register."). Consequently, the original "Order Terminating Duty to Register" was not void and the district court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Linch v. Linch , 2015 WY 141, ¶ 10, 361 P.3d 308, 311 (Wyo. 2015). This conclusion does not end our inquiry.

[¶9] We have long held we may affirm the district court on any ground apparent in the record, even if that basis was not relied upon by the district court in its decision. Guy v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr. , 2019 WY 69, ¶ 18, 444 P.3d 652 (Wyo. 2019) ; Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Dep't of Envtl. Quality , 2010 WY 25, ¶ 37, 226 P.3d 809, 820 (Wyo. 2010) ("Based on common sense and notions of judicial economy, it is appropriate for us to decline to remand a case [for] further proceedings [when it] would serve no useful purpose.") (internal citation omitted); State v. Alexander , 78 Wyo. 324, 333, 324 P.2d 831, 833 (1958) ("[T]he correct ruling is not adversely affected by the wrong reasons given therefor."); Peterson v. Johnson , 46 Wyo. 473, 483-84, 28 P.2d 487, 490 (1934) ("[I]n so far as [the preliminary] injunction is concerned ... we could not reverse the case, if error was committed in issuing it, if the ultimate decision rendered herein is correct, for the error would then be without prejudice."); see also Mendez v. Republic Bank , 725 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The district court's citation of a wrong subsection [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ], however, does not merit reversal if relief is appropriate under another subsection.").

[¶10] Although we have declined to affirm on alternate grounds "when the underlying issues involve complex factual and legal arguments that were never addressed by the district court," that is not the situation here. Campbell Cty. Mem'l Hosp. v. Pfeifle , 2014 WY 3, ¶ 31, 317 P.3d 573, 581 (Wyo. 2014). In this case, the dispositive facts were undisputed. Both parties represented Mr. Gunsch was adjudicated as a juvenile when he was not. The State moved for relief under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1) and both parties have had an opportunity to brief the issues. Therefore, we will address the applicability of W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1).

W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1) Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect

[¶11] W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1) provides "[o]n motion and just terms, the court may" grant relief from a final judgment due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Mr. Gunsch contends that the State's and the district court's failure to correctly interpret the statute does not fall within the concept of mistake or inadvertence. Rather, the State was required to correct any error by bringing an appeal. Mr. Gunsch also claims the term "adjudicated as a delinquent" is unclear and is not specifically defined in the WSORA.

[¶12] First, we address Mr. Gunsch's argument on the meaning of "adjudicated as a delinquent" in the WSORA. In Vaughn v. State , 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 1086 (Wyo. 2017), we fully explained the meaning of this phrase. This phrase was introduced in the 2011 amendments to the WSORA. The amendments expanded the reporting requirements to not only include adults convicted of a sexual offense, but to also include juveniles adjudicated as a delinquent of a sexual offense. Id. ¶ 13, 391 P.3d at 1092. The language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) is not ambiguous. It clearly limits persons who can petition for relief for offenses specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(j) to persons who were adjudicated as delinquents of the offense. Mr. Gunsch offers no other reading of this term. He is undeniably ineligible for relief from the reporting requirements under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i).

[¶13] We next turn to whether the State must bring an appeal to correct the error. We recognize motions to set aside a judgment under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) are not intended as a substitute for an appeal of a judicial error or a means to extend the time limits in which to file an appeal. See Essex Holding , ¶ 72, 427 P.3d at 728-29 ; Estate of Dahlke ex rel. Jubie v. Dahlke , 2014 WY 29, ¶ 48, 319 P.3d 116, 128 (Wyo. 2014) ; Barnes v. Barnes , 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 2000). Here, on recognizing the mistake, the State immediately brought the error to the court's attention well within the time to file an appeal.

[¶14] We have found it appropriate for a district court to correct its mistake under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). In Bradley , the principal ground for the wife's motion to modify a divorce decree was based on a mistake under W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). Bradley v. Bradley , 2005 WY 107, ¶ 16, 118 P.3d 984, 990 (Wyo. 2005). The husband had offered an affidavit which "should have alerted the district court that the relief requested ... should not have been granted without notice to the [w]ife and without further proceedings." Id. ¶ 15, 118 P.3d at 990. We held the district court abused its discretion when it denied the wife's motion "because the mistake that the district court was required to correct was readily evident from the record." Id. ¶ 17, 118 P.3d at 991.

[¶15] We are also persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Mendez , 725 F.3d 651. There, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the "significant majority of circuits" that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) "allows a district court to correct its own errors that could be corrected on appeal" where the "motion is not a device to avoid expired appellate time limits." Id. at 659. The court reasoned, "in the rare case where a district judge recognizes a clear legal or factual error before a pending appeal has been briefed, no purpose is served by prohibiting the district judge from remedying the error." Id. at 660. "[C]onsistent with the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive' resolution of disputes, [the parties] may be spared the effort and expense of preparing an appeal and educating a new court on the particulars of their case." Id. (citation omitted). "Whether such an error may be remedied more efficiently through Rule 60(b) rather than the normal appellate process is a question appropriately left to the district court's discretion." Id. The court made clear, however, its "conclusion [did] not undermine [the] effort to prevent Rule 60(b) from being used to evade the deadline to file a timely appeal." Id.

[¶16] The Seventh Circuit's discussion harmonizes with our own "notions of judicial economy." Powder River Basin Res. Council , ¶ 37, 226 P.3d at 820 ("Based on common sense and notions of judicial economy, it is appropriate for us to decline to remand a case [for] further proceedings [when it] would serve no useful purpose.") (internal citation omitted). We have held W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) is remedial and "intended to promote decisions on the merits when possible." In re ARW , 2015 WY 25, ¶ 17, 343 P.3d 407, 412 (Wyo. 2015) (internal citations omitted). A court has wide discretion to grant or deny a W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) motion, and "[w]e will not disturb the exercise of that discretion unless [the] appellant demonstrates that the trial court abused [its discretion] and was clearly wrong." Rosty v. Skaj , 2012 WY 28, ¶ 27, 272 P.3d 947, 957 (Wyo. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

[¶17] "Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Nowotny v. L & B Contract Indus., Inc. , 933 P.2d 452, 460 (Wyo. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Here, the district court's decision to grant the State's motion to vacate the judgment relieving Mr. Gunsch from the sex offender reporting requirement was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.

CONCLUSION

[¶18] Although the district court erroneously concluded it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, its decision to set aside its original judgment and deny Mr. Gunsch's petition was not an abuse of discretion or clearly wrong. Affirmed.

      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-402.

      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017) reads:
      (a) The duty to register under W.S. 7-19-302 shall begin on the date of sentencing and continue for the duration of the offender's life, subject to the following:
      (i) An offender specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g) or adjudicated as a delinquent for offenses specified in W.S. 7-19-302(j) , who has been registered for at least ten (10) years, exclusive of periods of confinement and periods in which the offender was not registered as required by law, may petition the district court for the district in which the offender is registered to be relieved of the duty to continue to register if the offender has maintained a clean record as provided in subsection (d) of this section. Upon a showing that the offender has maintained a clean record as provided in subsection (d) of this section for ten (10) years, the district court may order the offender relieved of the duty to continue registration[.]
      (Emphasis added.)

      W.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) states:
      (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. - On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
      (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
      (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
      (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
      (4) the judgment is void;
      (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
      (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

      "Because the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal court interpretations of their rules are highly persuasive in our interpretation of the corresponding Wyoming rules." Oldroyd v. Kanjo , 2019 WY 1, ¶ 9, 432 P.3d 879, 882 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Windham v. Windham , 2015 WY 61, ¶ 20, 348 P.3d 836, 842 (Wyo. 2015) ); see also, e.g. , Meiners v. Meiners , 2019 WY 39, ¶ 17, 438 P.3d 1260, 1268 (Wyo. 2019).