author: GORDON McCLOUD, J. YU, J. (dissenting)

text:
    Teresa BANOWSKY, Petitioner, v. GUY BACKSTROM, DC, d/b/a Bear Creek Chiropractic Center, Respondent.
    NO. 96200-6
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    Argued March 14, 2019 Filed JULY 25, 2019
    James R. Banowsky, Han Santos, PLLC, 500 Union Street, Suite 800, Seattle, WA 98101-4051, Paul Fogarty, Fogarty Law Group PLLC, 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3200, Seattle, WA 98154-1003, for Petitioner.
    Jennifer D. Koh, Eron Zachary Cannon, Mark Brandon Melter, Fain Anderson Vanderhoef, Rosendahl O'Hal, 701 5th Avenue, Suite 4750, Seattle, WA 98104-7089, for Respondent.
   GORDON McCLOUD, J.

¶1 Washington's superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction-most claims, on most subjects, valued at most any amount, can be decided there. Washington's district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction-only a subset of claims, on a subset of subjects, with $100,000 or less in controversy for civil cases, can be decided there.

¶2 Teresa Banowsky filed her claim for medical malpractice in district court on the last day of the statute of limitations. She sought over $100,000. District courts can exercise jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims, but they cannot exercise jurisdiction over claims seeking over $100,000. CRLJ 14A(b), however, directs district courts to "remove[ ]," or transfer, a case to superior court when "any party" "asserts a claim in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court or seeks a remedy beyond the jurisdiction of the district court." This case is about the meaning and validity of that rule.

¶3 We hold that CRLJ 14A(b) validly and unambiguously required the district court to transfer Banowsky's case to superior court. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings in District Court

¶4 On the final day of the statute of limitations, Banowsky, acting pro se, filed a medical malpractice claim against her chiropractor, Guy Backstrom, in King County District Court. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 105-07. Banowsky sought "actual compensatory damages in an amount exceeding $100,000.00, together with attorney's fees, court costs, and whatever other damages deemed appropriate by the Court." Id. at 107.

¶5 A month and a half later, an attorney appeared on Banowsky's behalf and moved to transfer the case to superior court. Id. at 101, 95-96. Through counsel, Banowsky alleged that she had been unaware of the $100,000 "limitation of damages in District Court." Id. at 95. She argued that "[b]ecause the error was made in good faith, [the] case should be transferred to Superior Court pursuant to Rule CRLJ 14A(b)." Id. at 96.

¶6 CRLJ 14A(b) states, "When any party in good faith asserts a claim in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court or seeks a remedy beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court shall order the entire case removed to superior court."

¶7 Backstrom opposed transfer. Id. at 45-52. He did not dispute Banowsky's good faith. Instead, he argued that "the District Court has no authority to grant Plaintiff's motion and enter an Order of Transfer because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim." Id. at 47.

¶8 To explain CRLJ 14A(b) 's function, Backstrom pointed to the drafters' comment to the proposal that amended the rule into its current form. The comment states in part:

Plaintiffs can file in the district court knowing that if a basis for claiming damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the district court should arise after they have filed their complaint, then they will have the opportunity to transfer their case to the superior court.

Proposed amendment to CRLJ 14A(b), 150 Wn.2d Proposed-13 (Official Advance Sheet No. 7, Jan. 6, 2004). On the basis of that comment, Backstrom concluded that "if ... Plaintiff believed her damages were $50,000 at the time of filing, but later learned they were much more, CRLJ 14A would allow her to remove the claim to Superior Court to seek damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit." CP at 51. But because Banowsky's claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit from the start, Backstrom urged the court to dismiss. Id. at 52.

¶9 Banowsky countered that CRLJ 14A(b) 's history was immaterial to its interpretation given the lack of any ambiguity in its text, and the text required "remov[al]" or transfer. Id. at 31-32. She continued that CRLJ 14A(b) 's history really supported her position, not Backstrom's. She pointed out that the comment on which Backstrom relied actually referenced a prior version of the drafters' proposed amendment to the rule. Id .; see Bd. for Judicial Admin., Meeting Minutes (Jan. 24, 2003) at 3 [https://perma.cc/7VMW-FV3C]. The drafters did not update the comment when they formally submitted a different version of the proposed amendment-the one that ultimately became CRLJ 14A(b) as it exists today-to this court.

¶10 Following briefing on those matters, the district court heard argument, denied Banowsky's motion, and dismissed the case. CP at 25-26, 121-37.

B. Proceedings in Superior Court

¶11 Banowsky appealed, renewing the same arguments. Id. at 111-20. Likewise, Backstrom reiterated his previous arguments. Id. at 146-67. But Backstrom cited an additional source of authority in support of those arguments: CRLJ 12(h)(3). That rule states, "Whenever it appears ... that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."

¶12 The superior court heard argument and affirmed the district court's dismissal. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 1-19; CP at 170-71.

C. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

¶13 Banowsky moved the Court of Appeals for discretionary review. That court granted limited review "to address the issues raised by CRLJ 14A(b) and its relationship with other rules and statutes, including CRLJ 12(h)(3) and CRLJ 82." Notation Ruling, No. 76360-1-1, at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 31, 2017).

¶14 The Court of Appeals then affirmed. Banowsky v. Backstrom , 4 Wash. App. 2d 338, 421 P.3d 1030 (2018). That court emphasized that the Washington Constitution gives the legislature responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of district courts and that the legislature has confined that jurisdiction to claims seeking $100,000 or less. Id. at 344-46, 421 P.3d 1030. It explained, "Because the amount demanded exceeded the constitutionally based amount-in-controversy limitation for district court, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its only permissible action was dismissal." Id. at 346, 421 P.3d 1030. In that court's view, the opposite conclusion "would greatly undercut the [constitution's] intentional divide [between district courts and superior courts] to allow a plaintiff to ignore the district court amount-in-controversy limitation and force a transfer even though she demanded an amount over the district court limit." Id. at 347, 421 P.3d 1030.

¶15 But the Court of Appeals nonetheless reconciled CRLJ 14A(b) and CRLJ 12(h)(3) to sometimes give effect to CRLJ 14A(b) and sometimes permit transfer. "Where a plaintiff properly invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court by demanding relief that is within the amount-in-controversy limit of the court, CRLJ 14A(b) can afterward be applied to direct a transfer of the case to superior court. For example, a plaintiff may later seek to remove the case to superior court on the good faith belief that although her damages initially were below the limit, they now appear to exceed the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court." Id. at 349, 421 P.3d 1030. Thus, the Court of Appeals adopted Backstrom's interpretation of the rule.

¶16 We granted review. Banowsky v. Backstrom, 192 Wash.2d 1001, 430 P.3d 255 (2018).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶17 This case involves issues of subject matter jurisdiction, rule interpretation, and constitutional interpretation. We review each of these legal issues de novo.

B. We Assume That the District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Banowsky's Claim

¶18 " 'Subject matter jurisdiction' refers to a court's ability to entertain a type of case ...." In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wash.2d 438, 448, 316 P.3d 999 (2013) (citing ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n, 173 Wash.2d 608, 618, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) ). It "is the power of a court to hear and determine a case." State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 468, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989) (citing State v. Hampson, 9 Wash.2d 278, 281, 114 P.2d 992 (1941) ; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 88, at 449 (1965) ). "A tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction when it attempts to decide a type of controversy over which it has no authority to adjudicate." Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). "A lack of subject matter jurisdiction implies that [the tribunal] has no authority to decide the claim at all, let alone order a particular kind of relief." Id.

¶19 Backstrom argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Banowsky's claim. He relies on article IV, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, which provides that "[t]he legislature ... shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction [of the district courts]." Under this provision, the legislature has "sole authority to determine the jurisdiction and powers of the district court." State v. Hastings , 115 Wash.2d 42, 49, 793 P.2d 956 (1990) ; see also Young v. Konz , 91 Wash.2d 532, 542, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979) (stating that "the people, through our constitution, have ... authorized only the legislature ... to prescribe the powers, duties and jurisdiction of [district] courts"). To that end, the legislature enacted RCW 3.66.020. That statute states that "the district court shall have jurisdiction and cognizance" of certain types of civil actions-of which Banowsky's medical malpractice claim is one-but only "[i]f, for each claimant, the value of the claim or the amount at issue does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars." Banowsky's claim sought more than $100,000.

¶20 The parties therefore acknowledge that the district court lacked jurisdiction over her case. Because our analysis does not turn on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, we assume without deciding that they are correct.

C. CRLJ 14A(b) Required the District Court To Transfer the Case to Superior Court Even If the District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶21 Even assuming that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the district court still had the power-and the obligation-under CRLJ 14A(b) to transfer the case to superior court. That is because CRLJ 14A(b), not CRLJ 12(h)(3), applies, and CRLJ 14A(b) is a constitutionally valid procedural rule that abrogates' the common-law rule of dismissal in this situation.

1. The Common Law Requires Dismissal of a Claim over Which a Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction, but This Court Has Recognized an Exception to the Common-Law Rule

¶22 Washington courts generally follow the common-law rule "that a court lacking jurisdiction of any matter may do nothing other than enter an order of dismissal." Deschenes v. King County, 83 Wash.2d 714, 716, 521 P.2d 1181 (1974) (citing 21 C.J.S. Courts § 118 (1940) ), overruled in part by Clark County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Wilkinson, 139 Wash.2d 840, 848 n.8, 991 P.2d 1161 (2000). This court has repeated this "well known and universally respected" rule several times. Id .; see Ralph v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 182 Wash.2d 242, 255 n.4, 343 P.3d 342 (2014) ; Young v. Clark, 149 Wash.2d 130, 133, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003) ; Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wash.2d 29, 35, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003) ; Crosby v. County of Spokane, 137 Wash.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999) ; In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 655, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). And as Backstrom points out, if the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this rule would support the district court's dismissal below.

¶23 But we recognized an exception to this common-law rule in In re Personal Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997). Johnson concerned the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, which, like the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, is set by statute. Id. at 565-66, 933 P.2d 1019 ; WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 10, 30 ; RCW 2.06.030. The question in Johnson was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to resolve the merits of certain personal restraint petitions. 131 Wash.2d at 565-66, 933 P.2d 1019. We held that one statute divested the Court of Appeals of subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions at issue. Id. at 566, 933 P.2d 1019 (interpreting RCW 10.73.140). But we recognized that another statute gave the Court of Appeals the power to transfer the petitions over which it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to our court. Id. That second statute stated, " 'No case, appeal, or petition for a writ filed in the supreme court or the [Court of Appeals] shall be dismissed for the reason that it was not filed in the proper court, but it shall be transferred to the proper court.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 2.06.030 ). Thus, by legislative design, a court lacking the power to hear and determine a case nonetheless had the power to transfer that case to the appropriate court.

¶24 We reaffirmed that holding in In re Personal Restraint of Perkins, 143 Wash.2d 261, 19 P.3d 1027 (2001). As in Johnson, the nondismissal statute, RCW 2.06.030, operated to prevent dismissal, even though the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 266, 19 P.3d 1027. We observed:

Clearly [petitioner] could have filed his [personal restraint petition] directly in the Supreme Court at his election. Had he done so we could not have transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant to RAP 16.5 because we have jurisdiction in this matter whereas the Court of Appeals does not. Thus, [petitioner's] problem arises because he initially filed his [petition] in the Court of Appeals rather than in the Supreme Court. Is this fatal?
We think not because RCW 2.06.030 explicitly requires the case ... shall be transferred to the proper court.

Id. This court continues to adhere to that holding. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Bell, 187 Wash.2d 558, 562, 387 P.3d 719 (2017) (per curiam); In re Pers. Restraint of Adolph, 170 Wash.2d 556, 564, 243 P.3d 540 (2010) ; In re Pers. Restraint of Fawcett, 147 Wash.2d 298, 301, 53 P.3d 972 (2002).

¶25 Johnson and Perkins guide the outcome of this case. Although the district court may have lacked the power to hear and determine Banowsky's claim under RCW 3.66.020, it did not necessarily lack the power to transfer the case. Following Johnson and Perkins, the district court should have first considered whether another enactment gave it power to transfer and, if so, whether that enactment required the court to exercise that power. See Bell, 187 Wash.2d at 562, 387 P.3d 719 ("We have previously determined that [the jurisdictional statute] cannot be applied in isolation." (citing Perkins, 143 Wash.2d at 266, 19 P.3d 1027 )).

2. The Exception to the Common-Law Rule Applies and Requires Transfer

¶26 Such an enactment exists. As explained below, CRLJ 14A(b) provided the district court with the power to transfer a case and, according to its plain terms, required the district court to transfer this case.

a. CRLJ 14A(b) Applies and Requires Transfer

¶27 "Court rules are interpreted in the same manner as statutes and are construed in accord with their purpose." Bus. Servs. of Am. II, Inc. v. WaferTech, LLC, 174 Wash.2d 304, 307, 274 P.3d 1025 (2012) (citing State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d 467, 484, 880 P.2d 517 (1994) ). "The starting point is thus the rule's plain language and ordinary meaning." Id. (citing State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) ). We conclude that neither CRLJ 14A(b) nor CRLJ 12(h)(3) is ambiguous, but that CRLJ 14A(b) applies in cases such as this one when a party filed a claim on a subject within the district court's jurisdiction but sought damages in excess of that jurisdiction.

i. CRLJ 14A(b) Appears To Apply-and Would Require Transfer

¶28 CRLJ 14A(b) states, "When any party in good faith asserts a claim in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court or seeks a remedy beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court shall order the entire case removed to superior court."

¶29 The rule plainly applies to this case. Banowsky, the plaintiff, is "any party." By seeking "damages in an amount exceeding $100,000.00," she asserted a claim in excess of the district court's jurisdiction. CP at 107; RCW 3.66.020. Backstrom has not contested Banowsky's good faith.

¶30 Banowsky has therefore satisfied all of the rule's conditions, thereby triggering its result: "the district court shall order the entire case removed to superior court." CRLJ 14A(b) (emphasis added). That language is mandatory. Snohomish County v. Thorp Meats, 110 Wash.2d 163, 168-69, 750 P.2d 1251 (1988) ; Wallace v. Evans, 131 Wash.2d 572, 576, 934 P.2d 662 (1997).

ii. CRLJ 12(h)(3) Appears To Apply-and Would Require Dismissal

¶31 But CRLJ 12(h)(3) also bears on Banowsky's claim. It states, "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."

¶32 Assuming that the district court completely lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this rule also applies. As a result, "the court shall dismiss the action." CRLJ 12(h)(3) (emphasis added). As with CRLJ 14A(b), that language is mandatory. CRLJ 12(h)(3) therefore seems to require dismissal while CRLJ 14A(b) seems to require transfer.

¶33 But the district court cannot both dismiss and transfer the same case. We must resolve the apparent conflict.

iii. Only CRLJ 14A(b) Applies in This Case

¶34 We conclude that CRLJ 14A(b), not CRLJ 12(h)(3), applies in this case for two reasons.

¶35 First, CRLJ 14A(b) is the more recently amended rule, and its substantive amendment bears directly on the issue presently before the court. See Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 73 Wash. App. 442, 446 n.3, 869 P.2d 1110 (1994) (describing that interpretive rule). CRLJ 14A(b) was amended in 2004 to expand its reach to "any party" like Banowsky. Order No. 25700-A-792 (Wash. July 8, 2004). CRLJ 12(h)(3), however, was last amended in 1984. CRLJ 12 at 101 Wn.2d 1172-77 (1984). As a result, application of CRLJ 14A(b) better reflects this court's intent.

¶36 Second, application of CRLJ 14A(b) is more consistent with the principles underlying the rules. CRLJ 1 tells us to interpret the rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." See also RCW 2.04.190 (expressing the legislature's desire for rules that "promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits"); cf. Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor, 83 Wash.2d 764, 767, 522 P.2d 822 (1974) (observing that "the basic purpose of the new rules of civil procedure [for superior court] is to eliminate or at least minimize technical miscarriages of justice inherent in archaic procedural concepts"). Transferring the case to superior court under CRLJ 14A(b) would move the dispute to the proper forum for a determination on the merits; applying CRLJ 12(h)(3) would completely preclude a determination on the merits.

b. Backstrom's Argument that the Court Rules Do Not Apply When the Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Fails

¶37 Backstrom contends that CRLJ 14A(b) cannot provide power to transfer because court rules do not apply when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 11-12. He relies on Diehl v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board for the proposition that "[s]uperior court civil rules are procedural rules, applicable only after the commencement of an action, and thus do not purport to extend subject matter jurisdiction of the court." 153 Wash.2d 207, 216, 103 P.3d 193 (2004) (citing Vasquez v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 44 Wash. App. 379, 383, 722 P.2d 854 (1986) ). Backstrom thus reasons that application of a procedural rule such as CRLJ 14A(b) is inappropriate when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 11-12.

¶38 Backstrom is correct that CRLJ 14A(b) does not extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 10 ; CRLJ 82 ; accord City of Seattle v. Hesler, 98 Wash.2d 73, 79, 653 P.2d 631 (1982). But it does not follow that the district court operates totally without rules when a party has filed a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

¶39 This is clear from the well-accepted rule that a court generally has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Johnson, 131 Wash.2d at 566 n.3, 933 P.2d 1019 (citing Stikes Woods Neigh. Ass'n v. City of Lacey, 124 Wash.2d 459, 465, 880 P.2d 25 (1994) ). Sometimes that determination requires resolution of a difficult issue. But the court's rules unquestionably apply to that process. Moreover, if court rules did not apply unless a court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, a district court could not even apply CRLJ 12(h)(3) in cases such as this one, despite Backstrom's asserting that that is exactly what a district court should do.

¶40 Backstrom's position is also at odds with Stikes Woods, 124 Wash.2d 459, 880 P.2d 25. In that case, this court resolved a conflict between a statute and a court rule about how to compute a limitations period. Id. at 462, 880 P.2d 25. We held that the court rule trumped the statute. Id. at 463, 880 P.2d 25. In response to a concern that application of the court rule would inappropriately extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, we noted that "[t]his court ... has jurisdiction to determine the procedures which govern its own jurisdiction." Id. at 465, 880 P.2d 25. That is, we rejected the view that court rules apply only after the court has definitively acquired subject matter jurisdiction.

¶41 Diehl does not stand for a contrary rule. 153 Wash.2d 207, 103 P.3d 193. In that case, this court resolved a conflict between lenient Administrative Procedure Act (APA) service-of-process requirements and more stringent civil rule service-of-process requirements. Id. at 213, 103 P.3d 193. The petitioner in that case filed an appeal of an agency decision in superior court. Id. at 209-10, 103 P.3d 193. Both RCW 34.05.542 and CR 4 appeared to establish service requirements that had to be satisfied to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court. Id. at 217, 103 P.3d 193. Given that the Civil Rules generally govern matters within a superior court's original jurisdiction and that RCW 34.05.542 set forth specific requirements for appeals, which are part of the superior court's appellate jurisdiction, this court concluded that the statute prevailed over the court rule. Id. at 216-17, 103 P.3d 193.

¶42 But Diehl 's conclusion was based on the fact that the APA had specific requirements for appeals of agency decisions, that such appeals fall outside the original jurisdiction of superior courts, and hence those APA-specific rules must control over more stringent civil rules to the contrary. 153 Wash.2d at 213-16, 103 P.3d 193 ; see Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, 165 Wash.2d 275, 294-95, 197 P.3d 1153 (2008) (describing the superior court's appellate jurisdiction). That holding furthered the legislature's directive to "eliminate[ ] many of the formalities associated with the initiation of an action in superior court and instead ... allow pro se litigants to seek judicial review without the need to hire an attorney or process server." Diehl, 153 Wash.2d at 215, 103 P.3d 193. In other words, Diehl's holding had nothing to do with whether one district court rule, particularly one that has more stringent procedural requirements and more dire consequences for the unwary, controls over another.

¶43 We therefore hold that court rules apply to cases even when it is not yet certain that the court has subject matter jurisdiction due to the amount in controversy.

3. Applying CRLJ 14A(b) Is Constitutional

¶44 Backstrom next asserts that applying CRLJ 14A(b) to this case would violate the state constitution. First, Backstrom argues that applying CRLJ 14A(b) would violate article IV, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. As noted, that provision of the constitution gives the legislature, not this court, the sole authority to prescribe the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of district courts. Hastings , 115 Wash.2d at 49, 793 P.2d 956 ; Young , 91 Wash.2d at 542, 588 P.2d 1360. Second, Backstrom argues that applying CRLJ 14A(b) would undermine article IV's division of authority between the superior courts and the district courts.

¶45 Both arguments fail.

a. Applying CRLJ 14A(b) Does Not Usurp the Legislature's Authority To Prescribe the Powers, Duties, and Jurisdiction of the District Courts

¶46 Backstrom, like the Court of Appeals, asserts that applying CRLJ 14A(b)

to this case would constitute an impermissible judicial encroachment on the legislature's authority. Resp't's Suppl. Br. at 6-11; Banowsky, 4 Wash. App. 2d at 346-47, 421 P.3d 1030. We disagree.

¶47 "The inherent power of article IV includes the power to govern court procedures." City of Fircrest v. Jensen , 158 Wash.2d 384, 394, 143 P.3d 776 (2006) (plurality opinion); id. at 400, 143 P.3d 776 (Owens, J., concurring). This court exercises that power in part by promulgating rules, like the CRLJs. See generally GR 9.

¶48 Our rules have the force of law. "If a statute appears to conflict with a court rule, this court will first attempt to harmonize them and give effect to both, but if they cannot be harmonized, the court rule will prevail in procedural matters and the statute will prevail in substantive matters." Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 166 Wash.2d 974, 980, 216 P.3d 374 (2009) (citing Jensen, 158 Wash.2d at 394, 143 P.3d 776 ).

¶49 CRLJ 14A(b) is unquestionably a procedural rule. By providing for transfer of a case from one court to another, the rule "pertain[s] to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974) (citing State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929) ; In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam)); see also CRLJ 1 (stating that rules govern procedure); CRLJ 81(b) (providing that rules supersede procedural statutes). Accordingly, this court had authority to adopt CRLJ 14A(b), and that rule has the force of law.

¶50 Although Backstrom agrees that CRLJ 14A(b) is procedural, he contends that applying it in this case would violate the state constitution. Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 11-12. He reasons that article IV, section 10 allocates jurisdiction-setting responsibility to the legislature so only the legislature can authorize transfer when the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, in his view, a statute could authorize transfer, but a court rule cannot. On that basis, he distinguishes Johnson and Perkins.

¶51 We disagree. Our power to establish procedural rules governing the judicial branch of government is well established in our precedent and well grounded in our constitutional authority. Moreover, by removing a case from district court when that court lacks jurisdiction, CRLJ 14A(b) respects the jurisdictional lines that the legislature has drawn in RCW 3.66.020 and in no way " 'invades the prerogatives' " of the legislature. Jensen, 158 Wash.2d at 394, 143 P.3d 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Moreno, 147 Wash.2d 500, 505-06, 58 P.3d 265 (2002) ).

¶52 But even if we were to agree with Backstrom's premise that the legislature must authorize transfer, we would not agree with his conclusion. The legislature has endorsed this court's promulgation of rules regulating the practice and procedure of state courts, including district courts. RCW 2.04.190, .200.

¶53 RCW 2.04.190 states that this court "shall have the power ... generally to regulate and prescribe by rule ... the kind and character of the entire pleading, practice and procedure to be used in all suits, actions, appeals and proceedings of whatever nature by the supreme court, superior courts, and district courts of the state." Additionally, the legislature expressed the view that we exercise power to give "regard to the simplification of the system of pleading, practice and procedure in said courts to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits." Id.

¶54 Another statute, RCW 2.04.200, reinforces the legislature's intent to defer to this court's control of practice and procedure in state courts. RCW 2.04.200 provides that "all laws in conflict [with the rules that this court promulgates] shall be and become of no further force or effect."

¶55 In enacting those statutes, "[t]he legislature recognized that rules of court to promote justice[ ] should be in the hands of that department of government which, in addition to being always in session and unhindered by the delays and influences besetting legislative enactments, is likewise qualified, through actual experience, to formulate salutary rules ...." State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 8, 267 P. 770 (1928). Thus, the legislature has spoken, and CRLJ 14A(b) exists against the backdrop of the legislature's endorsement. It is a procedural rule that does not extend the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, and its application does not offend article IV, section 10. See Hesler, 98 Wash.2d at 78, 653 P.2d 631 (holding that this court's creation of rules for appeals from district courts does not "invade[ ] the Legislature's authority to define the 'jurisdiction, duties and powers' of inferior courts").

b. Applying CRLJ 14A(b) Does Not Undermine Article IV's Division of Authority between Superior Courts and District Courts

¶56 Backstrom adopts the Court of Appeals' view that applying CRLJ 14A(b) would upset article IV's allocation of judicial authority. The Court of Appeals stated:

The clear policy of our state constitution is that the superior court is the court of almost "universal" subject matter jurisdiction. The other Washington trial courts necessarily have limited jurisdiction. It would greatly undercut that intentional divide to allow a plaintiff to ignore the district court amount-in-controversy limitation and force a transfer even though she demanded an amount over the district court limit.

4 Wash. App. 2d at 347, 421 P.3d 1030 (footnote omitted).

¶57 To be sure, the constitution creates different roles for district courts and superior courts. And article IV, section 10 provides that the jurisdiction of the district courts "shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of superior ... courts."

¶58 But CRLJ 14A(b) supports, not undermines, that constitutional scheme. When the district court applies CRLJ 14A(b), it in no way "hear[s] and determine[s]" the case. Lane, 112 Wash.2d at 468, 771 P.2d 1150. The district court makes no rulings; it merely transfers the case to the superior court. Transferring, rather than dismissing, recognizes the superior jurisdiction of the superior court and places the dispute before the correct tribunal. This is important when a plaintiff such as Banowsky makes the mistake of filing her complaint on the floor of the courthouse where the district court clerk is located instead of the floor where the superior court clerk is located.

¶59 We took this commonsense approach before, at the time of statehood. Washington's new constitution mandated that the dying territorial courts transfer all their cases to the newborn state courts:

All actions at law and suits in equity which may be pending in any of the courts of the Territory of Washington, at the time of the change from a territorial to a state government, shall be continued, and transferred to the court of the state having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof.

WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5.

¶60 In one case, however, the territorial justice of the peace made a decision on November 18, 1889, the day on which the court died and its cases were all "continued" to the new justice of the peace courts. Moore v. Perrot, 2 Wash. 1, 2-3, 25 P. 906 (1891). The problem was that the old territorial justice of the peace had jurisdiction over matters up to $300; the new state justice of the peace had jurisdiction over matters up to $100. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (orig. text); Moore, 2 Wash. at 4-5, 25 P. 906. The judgment in the case was $240, "the full amount demanded." Moore, 2 Wash. at 3, 25 P. 906. We held that the new state justice of the peace's transfer of the case to the court with subject matter jurisdiction, the superior court, solved the problem. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

¶61 Backstrom acknowledges that Banowsky filed her claim within the statute of limitations and that service was proper. CP at 154; VRP at 11. The only question is whether the district court had power to transfer that claim-regarding a subject within the district court's jurisdiction but seeking an amount outside its jurisdiction-to the superior court. Under CRLJ 14A(b), the district court did have such power and was obligated to exercise it.

¶62 We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WE CONCUR:

Johnson, J.

Owens, J.

Stephens, J.

Wiggins, J.

González, J. (concurring in result)

¶63 I concur with the majority opinion that our court rules required the district court to transfer Teresa Banowsky's medical malpractice claim to superior court. "When any party in good faith asserts a claim in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court or seeks a remedy beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court shall order the entire case removed to superior court." CRLJ 14A(b). I write separately because I am unwilling to join the majority's "assum[ption]" that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Majority at 548. Depending on the type of jurisdiction at issue, the district court may have been powerless to do anything but dismiss. See dissent at 556 & n. 1.

¶64 Banowsky filed her medical malpractice claim in district court, seeking over $100,000 in damages. When "the value of the claim ... does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys' fees, the district court shall have jurisdiction [over] ... [a]ctions for damages for injuries to the person." RCW 3.66.020(2). I would hold the $100,000 amount-in-controversy ceiling does not limit the district court's subject matter jurisdiction because it merely concerns the amount of damages available. See State v. Posey, 174 Wash.2d 131, 139, 272 P.3d 840 (2012) ("[A] court's jurisdiction cannot hinge on the result it reaches."); see also ZDI Gaming Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n, 173 Wash.2d 608, 617, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) ("Where jurisdiction describes the forum or location of the hearing, it is generally understood to mean venue."). Here, the district court plainly had subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury actions. RCW 3.66.020(2).

¶65 " 'Jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine.' " State v. Werner, 129 Wash.2d 485, 493, 918 P.2d 916 (1996) (quoting State ex rel. McGlothern v. Superior Court, 112 Wash. 501, 505, 192 P. 937 (1920) ), overruled in part by Posey, 174 Wash.2d 131, 272 P.3d 840. While the district court had the authority to hear Banowsky's medical malpractice claim, it was required to "order the entire case removed to superior court" because Banowsky sought damages beyond what the district court could award. CRLJ 14A(b). Accordingly, the district court lacked statutory jurisdiction, but the penalty for filing in a district court that lacks statutory jurisdiction is transfer, not dismissal. CRLJ 14A(b). I concur in result.

Madsen, J.

YU, J. (dissenting)

¶66 The Civil Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction do not purport "to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of limited jurisdiction." CRLJ 82. In this case, the majority's interpretation of CRLJ 14A(b) does just that by extending a district court's judicial authority to cases over which it never acquired subject matter jurisdiction. I would affirm the Court of Appeals' well-reasoned decision, which gives meaning to CRLJ 14A(b) while respecting the legislature's exclusive constitutional authority to establish the powers, duties and jurisdiction of district courts. I respectfully dissent. ANALYSIS

A. Where a court never acquires jurisdiction over a case, that case is subject to mandatory dismissal

¶67 The majority's "assum[ption]" that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case is entirely correct. Majority at 548. Rather than merely assume, I would hold that the district court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over this case and therefore properly dismissed it in accordance with settled law.

¶68 In this state, district courts have limited, not general, jurisdiction, and " '[t]he legislature has sole authority to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers.' " State v. Granath, 190 Wash.2d 548, 551, 415 P.3d 1179 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Whatcom County Dist. Court, 147 Wash.2d 98, 104, 52 P.3d 485 (2002) ). Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the legislature has provided that district courts have authority to hear certain civil cases in which "the value of the claim or the amount at issue does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars." RCW 3.66.020.

¶69 According to the statute's plain language, the amount-in-controversy limit is not a venue provision, a procedural rule, or a claim-processing statute but, instead, a substantive limit on the district court's "jurisdiction." Id. Therefore, the legislature has made it clear that district courts have no authority "to hear and determine the class of actions" in which the amount in controversy exceeds $100,000. In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 655, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).

¶70 "[T]he original amount in controversy is to be determined by the averments of the pleadings." Baker v. Oliver, 37 Wash.2d 862, 864, 226 P.2d 567 (1951). In this case, the complaint unambiguously sought "actual compensatory damages in an amount exceeding $100,000.00." Clerk's Papers at 62. Thus, from the outset, the amount in controversy unequivocally exceeded the district court's jurisdiction. The district court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over this case and therefore had no authority to "exercise" any "judicial power." Buehl, 87 Wash.2d at 655, 555 P.2d 1334. "A court lacking such jurisdiction may do nothing other than enter an order of dismissal." Id.

¶71 The district court's order of dismissal in this case was therefore entirely proper in light of the statutory limits on its jurisdiction and this court's precedent. This result is also consistent with legislative intent.

B. The legislature intends mandatory dismissal to apply in this case

¶72 The legislature is undoubtedly aware that where a court never acquires jurisdiction over a case, that case is generally subject to mandatory dismissal. We know this is so because the legislature has chosen to explicitly allow transfer (or removal) of certain cases where a court otherwise lacks statutory jurisdiction. The areas in which the legislature has, and has not, made such allowances are indicative of the legislature's intent as applied to this case.

¶73 For example, the legislature has provided that " '[n]o case, appeal or petition for a writ filed in the supreme court or the [Court of Appeals] shall be dismissed for the reason that it was not filed in the proper court, but it shall be transferred to the proper court.' " In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 566, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997) (second alteration in original) (quoting RCW 2.06.030 ); see majority at 548-49. The legislature has also provided that district courts otherwise lacking statutory jurisdiction have the power to transfer a case rather than dismiss it in certain circumstances, such as where transfer is necessary "in order to acquire jurisdiction over a third party defendant." RCW 4.14.010. We have always respected these legislative judgments because the legislature's constitutional authority to prescribe statutory limits on the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of certain courts necessarily includes the authority to modify those limits through legislation.

¶74 There is no statute authorizing a district court to transfer a case to superior court where the amount in controversy as pleaded in the complaint unambiguously exceeds the district court's statutory jurisdiction. Thus, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, a district court does not have "the specified or implied power to transfer jurisdiction over a case to the superior court when an amended complaint is filed alleging damages exceeding the district court's jurisdictional limit." Howlett v. Weslo, Inc., 90 Wash. App. 365, 367, 951 P.2d 831 (1998).

¶75 Since that opinion was published, the legislature has had over 20 years to enact a statute allowing or mandating transfer in such cases. It has not done so. We must therefore assume that the legislature intends for mandatory dismissal to apply where the complaint, on its face, seeks damages in excess of the district court's statutory jurisdiction. The majority's interpretation of CRLJ 14A(b) is thus directly contrary to the legislature's intent.

C. The majority's reading of CRLJ 14A(b) intrudes on the legislature's exclusive constitutional authority

¶76 The majority here concludes that the district court was required to act contrary to the legislature's intent by assuming that because a statute may expand a court's statutory jurisdiction, "another enactment" such as a court rule may do so as well. Majority at 549. I cannot agree.

¶77 Unlike the legislature, the judiciary does not possess the inherent authority to prescribe or modify the district courts' statutory jurisdiction. Instead, "the people, through our constitution, have ... authorized only the legislature (aside from the constitutional amendment process) to prescribe the powers, duties and jurisdiction of such courts." Young v. Konz, 91 Wash.2d 532, 542, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979). The majority's interpretation of CRLJ 14A(b), however, gives district courts both the power and the duty to exercise judicial authority in cases where they never acquire jurisdiction, contrary to the legislature's intent.

¶78 Referring to CRLJ 14A(b) as a mere "procedural rule" cannot save the majority's interpretation. Majority at 548. We have already held that procedural rules are "applicable only after the commencement of an action." Diehl v . W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 153 Wash.2d 207, 216, 103 P.3d 193 (2004). I agree that this does not mean "the district court operates totally without rules when a party has filed a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Majority at 550. There is indeed a rule: dismiss the case.

¶79 Mandatory dismissal where a court never acquires subject matter jurisdiction is not an ordinary procedural rule that may be enacted, rescinded, or modified at this court's discretion. While such dismissal is memorialized in a court rule of civil procedure, CRLJ 12(h)(3), it is required by our basic constitutional structure. All government entities, including courts, may exercise power only within the scope of their authority because "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." CONST. art. I, § 1. The people have not given their consent, either by constitution or by statute, for a district court to exercise judicial power in a case that unambiguously seeks damages in excess of the district court's jurisdiction.

¶80 Dismissal without prejudice properly treats such a case as though it was never commenced, because it was not. The complaint was merely presented to an entity with no authority to act on it, and a district court does not acquire "jurisdiction of the subject matter by reason of the filing of such complaint."

State ex rel. Egbert v. Superior Court , 9 Wash. 369, 371, 37 P. 489 (1894). Meanwhile, transferring such a case is an exercise of judicial power that gives legal effect to the complaint's filing as though it properly commenced an action. As discussed above, the legislature has authorized such transfers in certain circumstances pursuant to its constitutional authority. But it has not done so here, and we have no inherent authority to negate that legislative judgment by court rule.

¶81 The long-standing practice of mandatory dismissal in cases where a court never acquires subject matter jurisdiction is a recognition of the constitutional limitations on a court's authority. By contrast, transferring such a case in accordance with the majority's interpretation of CRLJ 14A(b) is a substantive expansion of the district court's power to act where it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, contrary to both the legislature's intent and the constitution.

D. The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted CRLJ 14A(b)

¶82 CRLJ 14A(b) provides, "When any party in good faith asserts a claim in an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court or seeks a remedy beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, the district court shall order the entire case removed to superior court." The majority asserts that its interpretation of this rule is compelled by its plain language. Majority at 549-50. However, the majority's interpretation renders CRLJ 14A(b) an unconstitutional intrusion on the legislature's exclusive authority, as discussed above. Meanwhile, as explained by the Court of Appeals, it is possible to interpret CRLJ 14A(b) in a manner that is both reasonable and constitutional:

Where a plaintiff properly invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court by demanding relief that is within the amount-in-controversy limit of the court, CRLJ 14A(b) can afterward be applied to direct a transfer of the case to superior court. For example, a plaintiff may later seek to remove the case to superior court on the good faith belief that although her damages initially were below the limit, they now appear to exceed the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Or the rule may be applied where a plaintiff, through third-party practice, recognizes the need to assert a claim against a new party that exceeds the subject matter jurisdiction dollar limit. Additionally, cross claims and counterclaims that exceed the amount-in-controversy limit would also be subject to CRLJ 14A(b).

Banowsky v. Backstrom, 4 Wash. App. 2d 338, 349, 421 P.3d 1030 (2018) (footnote omitted). Such applications of CRLJ 14A(b) do not occur until after the district court has acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the case, at which point court rules of civil procedure do apply. Diehl, 153 Wash.2d at 216, 103 P.3d 193. I would therefore adopt the Court of Appeals' interpretation of CRLJ 14A(b), which does not authorize transfer to superior court in this case.

CONCLUSION

¶83 The majority's interpretation and application of CRLJ 14A(b) in this case is contrary to legislative intent and intrudes on the legislature's exclusive constitutional authority to prescribe the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of district courts. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Fairhurst, C.J.

      The district court dismissed without prejudice. CP at 26. But because the statute of limitations had since run, Banowsky could not refile her claim in superior court. Hence, she appealed the district court's order of dismissal.

      In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wash.2d 438, 443, 316 P.3d 999 (2013) (citing ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n, 173 Wash.2d 608, 624, 268 P.3d 929 (2012) ); Bus. Servs. of Am. II, Inc. v. WaferTech, LLC, 174 Wash.2d 304, 307, 274 P.3d 1025 (2012) (citing State v. Schwab , 163 Wash.2d 664, 671, 185 P.3d 1151 (2008) ); State v. Gresham, 173 Wash.2d 405, 419, 269 P.3d 207 (2012) (citing Optimer Int'l, Inc. v. RP Bellevue, LLC, 170 Wash.2d 768, 771, 246 P.3d 785 (2011) ).

      The Washington Constitution refers to justices of the peace, not district courts. But district courts are justice of the peace courts, simply renamed. RCW 3.30.015.

      A similar principle exists in federal law. A federal court hearing a case that has been removed from state court must transfer the case back to state court if the federal court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C § 1447(c).

      Because CRLJ 14A(b) 's text is unambiguous, we do not examine the comments or history behind the rule. Dep't of Ecology v . Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Although the Court of Appeals adhered to that interpretive principle, Banowsky, 4 Wash. App. 2d at 346 n.20, 421 P.3d 1030, it nonetheless reached a different conclusion about CRLJ 14A(b) 's meaning. Id. at 349, 421 P.3d 1030. Backstrom now urges this court to adopt that interpretation. But the Court of Appeals proceeded out of order. It considered the constitutional question first and then interpreted CRLJ 14A(b) to confonn to the rule it believed the constitution required. Our first task, however, is to determine the plain meaning of the rule. Ralph, 182 Wash.2d at 248, 343 P.3d 342. And CRLJ 14A(b) 's broad text does not support the meaning that the Court of Appeals found.

      Although courts have historically considered compliance with statutes of limitations to be "jurisdictional," Buecking gives reason to question that label. 179 Wash.2d at 446-54, 316 P.3d 999. But see In re Estate of Jepsen, 184 Wn.2d 376, 358 P.3d 403 (2015).

      Ch. 34.05 RCW.

      The legislature appears to agree that case transfer is a procedural matter. See RCW 34.05.510 (referring to transfer as an "[a]ncillary procedural matter[ ]" when parties invoke a superior court's statutory appellate subject matter jurisdiction of agency decisions under the APA). The Ninth Circuit has also characterized CRLJ 14A as a procedural rule. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).

      We recognize that our court ruled that "the [state] justice transferred the cause to the [state] superior court, and we hold that the transfer thus made was sufficient, although accomplished under the form of an appeal." Moore, 2 Wash. at 5, 25 P. 906. The form of the transfer does not undermine the analogy to the instant case.

      It is irrelevant that civil rules may govern a court's determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See majority at 550-51. Courts do have "inherent jurisdiction to construe jurisdictional statutes," as well as "jurisdiction to determine the procedures which govern its own jurisdiction." Stikes Woods Neigh. Ass'n v. City of Lacey, 124 Wash.2d 459, 465, 880 P.2d 25 (1994) (citing RCW 2.04.190 ). Meanwhile, courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to exercise judicial power in cases where they clearly lack subject matter jurisdiction from the outset. Buehl, 87 Wash.2d at 655, 555 P.2d 1334.

      The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of our opinions in Posey and ZDI when it decided Howlett v. Weslo, Inc., 90 Wash. App. 365, 951 P.2d 831 (1998). To the extent Howlett is inconsistent with our opinion today, I would overrule it.

      I question the assumption that a good faith error of law regarding the district court's statutory jurisdiction must be treated the same as a good faith error of fact regarding the amount that is actually in controversy in a given case. See majority at 549-50. The law is clear, stable, and publicly available, and self-represented litigants are expected to know and comply with applicable laws just as attorneys are. In re Pers. Restraint of Rhem, 188 Wash.2d 321, 328, 394 P.3d 367 (2017). Meanwhile, the amount in controversy in a particular case may actually change over time as injuries develop or may become more apparent over the course of discovery.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: /s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Justin STONE, Petitioner.
    No. 97125-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins; González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Julien Bailey BROUSSARD, Petitioner.
    No. 97122-6
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Erzsebet DORNAY, Respondent, v. Mouad ELBOU, Petitioner.
    No. 97120-0
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    IN RE the DETENTION OF: C.B. Petitioner,
    No. 97119-6
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John M. SANCHEZ, Petitioner.
    No. 97118-8
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Pamela Jean WOODALL, Respondent.
    No. 97116-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Harjinder Singh KABARWAL, Petitioner.
    No. 97115-3
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steven M. MARSHALL, Petitioner.
    No. 97114-5
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Ethel Fay LONG, et al., Petitioners, v. RITE AID CORPORATION, et al., Respondents.
    No. 97112-9
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Johnny Narvin TALBERT Jr., Petitioner.
    No. 97106-4
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Howard B. GOODWIN IV, Petitioner.
    No. 97149-8
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Scott Alexis CASIMIRO, Petitioner.
    No. 97147-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Ebrima DARBOE, Petitioner.
    No. 97145-5
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mary E. SANDOVAL, Petitioner.
    No. 97143-9
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Charles Frank FISHER, Petitioner.
    No. 97142-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Hach PHETH, Petitioner.
    No. 97141-2
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joshua Dean MCINTYRE, Petitioner.
    No. 97139-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jose AGUILAR, Petitioner.
    No. 97133-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Peggy Colleen KNOTT, Petitioner.
    No. 97130-7
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    IN RE the DETENTION OF: Kyle HAMMOND, Petitioner.
    No. 97102-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tyler Scott FIFE, Petitioner.
    No. 97095-5
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Susan PURNELL-CARLSON, Petitioner, v. The BOEING COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
    No. 97088-2
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Terence BUTLER, Petitioner, v. Randall THOMSEN, et al., Respondents.
    No. 97101-3
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent, v. GAMESTOP, INC. and Socom, LLC, Petitioners.
    No. 97098-0
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    ADMIRAL WAY, LLC, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY LINES INS., et al. Respondents.
    No. 97096-3
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶3 That the petition for review is denied.

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    ZURICH AMERICAN INS., et al., Respondents, v. LEDCOR INDUSTRIES INC., et al., Petitioners.
    No. 97083-1
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Robert PARRISH Jr., Respondent, v. Alaxandria VON HELL, Petitioner.
    No. 97079-3
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    Kevin CALCOTE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent.
    No. 97070-0
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petition for review is denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


text:
    STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Galeana RAMIREZ, Alejandro Ramirez and Steven Russell, Petitioners.
    No. 97008-4
    Supreme Court of Washington.
    DATED at Olympia, Washington, August 7, 2019.
    ORDER
   ¶ 1 A Special Department of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Fairhurst and Justices Owens, Wiggins, González, and Yu considered at its August 6, 2019, Motion Calendar, whether review should be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b), and unanimously agreed that the following order be entered.

¶ 2 IT IS ORDERED:

¶ 3 That the petitions for review are all denied.

For the Court

/s/ Fairhurst, C.J. CHIEF JUSTICE


author: Dwyer, J.

text:
    Ronald BRETT, Appellant, v. Caroline MARTIN, and State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services, Respondents.
    No. 79076-5-I
    Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
    FILED: May 20, 2019 Publication Ordered July 17, 2019
    E. Allen Walker, Attorney at Law, 2607 Bridgeport Way W, Ste. 2c, University Place, WA, 98466-4725, for Appellant.
    Lianne Schain Malloy, Attorney at Law, Po Box 40124, Olympia, WA, 98504-0124, Megan Danielle Card, Rodgers Kee Card & Strophy P.S., 324 W Bay Dr. NW, Ste. 201, Olympia, WA, 98502-4926, for Respondents.
   Dwyer, J.

¶1 In 1983, the Supreme Court of Ontario imposed upon Ronald Brett spousal and child support obligations arising from his dissolved marriage to Caroline Martin. In 2011, the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services, sought to enforce the Ontario court's order against Brett, who is currently a Washington resident. Brett objected, averring that manifest incompatibility of Ontario and Washington's public policy forbade registration and enforcement of the order. Following a hearing, the Department issued a decision rejecting his arguments. The superior court affirmed this decision. Brett now appeals to us. Because his challenges to registration and enforcement of the order are without merit, we affirm.

I

¶2 Ronald Brett and Caroline Martin were married on May 18, 1963, and had two children together. On July 19, 1983, the marriage was terminated by a decree of dissolution entered by the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, Indiana. However, as that court did not have personal jurisdiction over Martin (who had moved to Ontario), the decree did not address spousal or child support obligations. Subsequently, these matters were tried in the Supreme Court of Ontario, which resulted in the issuance of the following order:

THIS COURT DOTH ORDER AND ADJUDGE that the Respondent [Brett] shall pay to the Applicant [Martin] who has custody of the child, DEBBIE CAROL BRETT, born December 12, 1967, on the first day of each and every month commencing September 1, 1983 the sum of $1,300.00 (Canadian Dollars) support until January, 1986, at which time the payment will be reduced to $800.00 per month for support and maintenance of the wife in accordance with Section 71 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Such payments will continue until the death of the wife or until the Court otherwise orders.

(Emphasis added.)

¶3 After making one payment of $1,300 in September 1983, Brett made no further spousal or child support payments. However, in November 1987, Brett and Martin agreed that Brett's attorney would transfer to Martin $6,000 of the proceeds Brett was to receive from unrelated litigation. Brett also agreed to drop his application to the Ontario court for relief from paying back child and spousal support. For her part, Martin agreed to withdraw the garnishment notice that she had served on Brett's employer. That same month, Martin remarried. She remained married until September 2001. She has not remarried since.

¶4 On October 13, 2011, the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services' Division of Child Support (DCS) received a request from the Canadian Family Maintenance Enforcement Program to enforce Brett's ongoing spousal support obligation as well as his back child and spousal support obligations. The Canadian agency's record reflected no support payments having been made since the initial $1,300 Brett paid in September 1983. Indeed, Brett does not assert that he made any further payments except for the $6,000 payment made through his attorney.

¶5 On December 29, 2011, DCS served a notice and demand for payment on Brett.

This notice and demand included only the amount due for spousal, and not child, support. When Brett challenged the amount due under the Canadian order, DCS made an internal review of the arrearage calculation. This review produced a figure of $287,900 owed through April 2012, which included the arrearages for both spousal and child support. This figure credited to Brett his original $1,300 payment, but did not credit the $6,000 payment made through his attorney in 1987.

¶6 On January 25, 2016, Brett requested an opportunity to administratively challenge DCS's efforts to enforce the order. On March 7, 2016, DCS served Brett with a notice of support debt and registration to which Brett objected. After an evidentiary hearing on June 30, 2016, an administrative law judge confirmed registration of the order and entered conclusions of law, including the following:

5.7 Mr. Brett was given proper notice of the request to administratively register the Order. Mr. Brett has an ongoing obligation to provide spousal support as required under the Order, as well as to pay the accrued support arrears. The clear language in the Order requires Mr. Brett to pay spousal support until the death of Ms. Martin or until the Order is modified. The Order for child and spousal support entered on September 30, 1983, in the Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada is the controlling order. Mr. Brett did not present any valid defense to nonpayment of arrears pursuant to WAC 388-14A-7125 or RCW 26.21A.530(1). Therefore, the registration of the Order should be confirmed. The Department should collect current spousal support under the terms of the Order as well as past due spousal and child support.
5.8 Mr. Brett wants to remove the support arrears that have accumulated under the Order, and his ongoing obligation for spousal support. I do not have the authority under the Department's laws and rules to modify the support obligation in the parties['] Order. Because Mr. Brett did not establish a defense under subsection (1) of ROW 26.21A-530, this tribunal must issue an order confirming DCS' Notice of Support Debt and Registration.

Brett's request for reconsideration of the administrative order was denied.

¶7 Brett appealed to the Lewis County Superior Court, which affirmed the administrative order, concluding that Brett failed to meet his burden of establishing a permissible defense under RCW 26.21A.530 or the Washington or United States Constitutions.

Here, Mr. Brett admitted during the administrative hearing that he does not have any of the statutory defenses required to prove invalidity of the order. Mr. Brett further admitted the Canadian court maintains personal jurisdiction over him. ...
Additionally, Mr. Brett has provided no evidence the order was obtained by fraud, as Mr. Brett was present for the hearing when the order was issued, was represented by counsel, and agreed to the order. The Canadian order is the controlling order with an ongoing maintenance obligation, and the order has never been vacated[,] suspended or modified.
Furthermore, any argument by Mr. Brett regarding the amount or duration of maintenance would need to be addressed by the Canadian Court, as this court lacks jurisdiction to authorize those modifications.
Brett now appeals from this ruling.

II

¶8 Brett's principal argument is that, because Washington courts presume a spousal support obligation will terminate on remarriage of the support recipient, enforcement of an order from a jurisdiction that does not employ such a presumption is barred by public policy considerations. However, the difference between Washington and Ontario law regarding the duration of a spousal support obligation does not amount to a manifest incompatibility of Ontario's rule with Washington's public policy.

¶9 Brett's appeal is governed by Washington's Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 ROW, which establishes the exclusive means for obtaining judicial review of an agency action. ROW 34.05.010. The party challenging a final agency order bears the burden of demonstrating that it should be overturned. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a). We review the order based on the agency record, sitting in the same position as the superior court, and do not defer to the superior court ruling. Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash.2d 621, 633, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994).

¶10 Only when the petitioner demonstrates that one of the standards enumerated in RCW 34.05.570(3) is met may an agency's order be overturned. Brett does not articulate the grounds under RCW 34.05.570(3) on which he challenges the order. The State understands, and we interpret, Brett's challenge to be that the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). When an agency order is challenged on the basis of an error of law, we review the order de novo, although substantial weight will be given to an agency's interpretation of the law within its area of expertise. Verizon Nw., Inc. v. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 164 Wash.2d 909, 915-16, 194 P.3d 255 (2008).

¶11 The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), chapter 26.21A RCW, as adopted by the Washington legislature, grants the Department of Social and Health Services' Division of Child Support (DCS) the authority to administratively enforce a foreign support order. RCW 26.21A.500. DCS is authorized to enforce a support order to the extent not prohibited by other law. RCW 26.21A.220(2)(a). Upon registration of a foreign support order, it is enforceable in the same manner, and subject to the same procedures, as an order issued by a Washington tribunal, with the exception that it may not be modified by Washington courts. RCW 26.21A.510.

¶12 The law of the issuing jurisdiction governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order, as well as the computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages, and the existence and satisfaction of other obligations. RCW 26.21A.515(1)(a)-(c). The UIFSA is designed to ensure that only one controlling support order exists at a given time, permitting the issuing jurisdiction to retain continuing and exclusive jurisdiction, and preventing an enforcing state from altering the order. RCW 26.21A.150(2). The 2008 amendments to the UIFSA extended its reach to foreign provinces and countries with which the United States has a reciprocal enforcement agreement. Ontario is one such province.

¶13 If the nonregistering party does not contest registration and enforcement by establishing a defense under RCW 26.21A.530(1), the order is confirmed by operation of law. RCW 26.21A.530(3). Thus, to bar enforcement of an order, there must be a legal basis preventing the State from registering it for enforcement. During the adoption of the 2008 UIFSA amendments, the legislative history of our Senate's consideration of the bill noted that:

A Washington court may refuse to register a foreign court order for the following reasons:
• recognition and enforcement of the order is manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing foreign tribunal to observe minimum standards of due process, which include notice and an opportunity to be heard;
• the issuing foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction;
• the foreign order is not enforceable in the issuing country;
• the foreign order was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
• a record transmitted from the foreign CSE agency lacks authenticity or integrity;
• a proceeding between the same parties and with the same purpose is pending before a Washington court and that proceeding was the first to be filed;
• the foreign order is incompatible with a more recent support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose if the more recent support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under Washington law;
• the paying parent has already paid, i.e. the alleged arrears have been paid in whole or in part;
• the respondent neither appeared nor was represented in the proceeding in the issuing foreign country, if the law of that country (1) provides for prior notice of proceedings, and the respondent did not have proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or (2) does not provide for prior notice of the proceedings.
Washington presumes any foreign order is manifestly incompatible with public policy when enforcement of the order would result in a violation of any right guaranteed by the state or federal constitutions.

FINAL B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5498, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).

¶14 The statute as enacted, RCW 26.21A.530, codifies several of these defenses to registration and enforcement of an order, including when a party has made full or partial payment of an arrearage. In turn, a tribunal confronted with evidence establishing a full or partial defense "may stay enforcement of a registered support order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders." RCW 26.21A.530(2).

¶15 RCW 4.24.820(1) bars the enforcement by Washington courts or administrative agencies of "any order issued under foreign law, or by a foreign legal system, that is manifestly incompatible with public policy." As stated above, an order is presumed to be manifestly incompatible with public policy when it does not grant parties the same rights as the parties are granted under the Washington or United States Constitutions. RCW 4.24.820(2). This statute was enacted in conjunction with the most recent amendments to the UIFSA. LAWS OF 2015, ch. 214 § 61.

¶16 It is apparent that the chief constitutional concern embodied by the public policy exception is the right to due process. While a dearth of case authority exists as to what nonconstitutional issue could amount to a manifest incompatibility of public policy, the phrase also appears in article 22(a) of the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Maintenance-a treaty that the United States, but not Canada, has ratified. Commentators have sought to provide a coherent definition. An applicable example, provided by the State Department to the Senate in facilitation of the Hague Convention's ratification, was as follows:

''[A] U.S. competent authority could decline to recognize and enforce a decision against a left-behind U.S. parent in an abduction case where the child had been wrongfully taken or retained, on the grounds that recognition and enforcement of such decision would be manifestly incompatible with the U.S. public policy of discouraging international parental child abduction."

Robert Keith, Ten Things Practitioners Should Know About The Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 51 FAM. L.Q. 255, 262 (2017) (quoting S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-21, at 16 (2008)).

¶17 It follows that a constitutional concern that a party raises as part of its public policy defense should be of equal importance to the provision of due process in ensuring the integrity of the proceeding that produced the order. Similarly, if a party believes a public policy exists that conflicts with another sovereign's law, it should be shown to be on the order of magnitude of the policy against parental abduction of children (a public policy that we unhesitatingly recognize as extant in Washington).

¶18 The law of Ontario, the jurisdiction issuing the contested support order herein, provides that, when a support order is silent as to the effect of a support recipient's remarriage, it will remain in effect either until the recipient dies or until the order is changed by the issuing court. This contrasts with Washington law, which presumes that an order will terminate upon the support recipient's remarriage unless it contains language to the contrary. RCW 26.09.170(2).

¶19 In a spousal support order, the effect of remarriage is simply a durational requirement. In Washington, courts are not bound to terminate the requirement of spousal support upon the recipient's remarriage; it is simply the presumption when no language to the contrary provides otherwise. Similarly, in Ontario, courts have the discretion to provide for the termination of spousal support payments upon the recipient's remarriage.

¶20 Brett does not identify any right under the Washington or United States Constitutions that is violated by the Ontario order's continuing applicability. Neither does he identify any Washington public policy that is contravened by Ontario's law. These are his burdens in order to avail himself of the defense of manifest incompatibility with public policy.

¶21 Nevertheless, Brett insists, notwithstanding UIFSA's choice of law provision and the paucity of his constitutional argument, that enforcement of the order must be barred by public policy. In support of his contention, he relies entirely on the decision in In re Marriage of Williams, 115 Wash.2d 202, 206, 796 P.2d 421 (1990), which applied RCW 26.09.170(2) to hold that, absent specific language to the contrary in a support order, spousal maintenance terminates upon remarriage in Washington. But this, the lone case citation in Brett's entire brief, is insufficient. The Ontario court's support order explicitly states that spousal support payments will continue until Martin's death or modification of the order in Ontario. Ontario law governs. Brett has not provided a valid reason why it should not. No Washington public policy is offended by the requirement that he petition the Ontario court for modification of its order.

III

¶22 Brett makes a second public policy argument, unsupported by any citation to any pertinent statutory or case authority, that enforcement of the 1983 support order is time-barred by the expiration of Ontario's formerly applicable statutory limitation period regulating support actions. For several reasons, this argument is without merit.

¶23 Washington law anticipates differences between jurisdictions as to statutes of limitations concerning support orders. It thus provides that, "[i]n a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies." RCW 26.21A.515(2) ; see In re Marriage of Waters, 116 Wash. App. 211, 215 n.4, 63 P.3d 137 (2002).

¶24 Ontario's statutory limitation period applicable to support actions, previously 20 years, was eliminated entirely as of January 1, 2004. Limitations Act, S.O. 2002, c 24, sched. B, §§ 16, 24 (Can.). Thus, all of Brett's arrearages accruing after January 1984 are fully enforceable. This is because they never were barred prior to the repeal of the statute of limitation. Each installment of a family maintenance obligation becomes a separate judgment upon its due date. In re Marriage of Sanborn, 55 Wash. App. 124, 129, 777 P.2d 4 (1989). The only portion of Brett's arrearage that would not be enforceable is the sum of those accrued prior to January 1984.

¶25 Brett owed a total of $3,900 in missed spousal and child support payments accruing from October to December 1983.

Through his attorney, he paid Martin $6,000 at the end of 1987. At the time of that payment, his monthly obligation had been reduced to $800. Thus, a $5,200 excess over his current support obligation existed at the time the payment was made. This excess over current support at the time the payment was made would apply to his oldest accrued arrears. ,

¶26 No limitation period applies to the remainder of Brett's arrearage. Nor is the difference between Ontario's and Washington's law regarding the statutory limitation period applicable to support enforcement actions a manifest incompatibility of public policy such as must be shown to bar registration and enforcement of the order. The UIFSA

assumes that different sovereigns will have differing laws regarding limitation periods. It resolves this dispute by requiring deference to the law of the issuing forum. To establish a difference in limitation periods as a manifest incompatibility of public policy, Brett must do more than simply identify the variance. He does not. At its core, this dispute is simply about a durational provision. Brett does not establish that such a difference in a durational provision amounts to a manifest incompatibility with public policy or a denial of his constitutional rights.

IV

¶27 Martin contends that she is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to RAP 18.9(a), which permits this court to award such fees and costs as a sanction for filing a frivolous appeal. "An appeal that is affirmed simply because an appellant's arguments are rejected is not frivolous." In re Estate of Pesterkoff, 37 Wash. App. 418, 424, 680 P.2d 1062 (1984). That Brett does not prevail in his appeal is not due to the strength of Martin's arguments. Indeed, at oral argument, neither Martin nor the State were able to articulate a standard for determining manifest incompatibility with public policy. Rather, it is due to the weakness of Brett's own argument which, nevertheless, does not fall within the realm of frivolousness. We decline to award fees under RAP 18.9.

¶28 Affirmed.

We concur:

Chun, J.

Mann, A.C.J.

      Off. of Child Support Enforcement, Canada - Foreign Reciprocating Country: Official Reference Documents, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/canada-frc (published Feb. 4, 2013; last reviewed May 9, 2019).

      Office of Child Support Enf't, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Hague Child Support Convention: Judicial Guide 32 (May 2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/proarams/css/ocse_judicial_quide_pdf [https://perma.cc/3958-GJW8].

      Status Table: Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, Hague Conf. on Priv. Int'l L ., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=131 [https://perma.cc/C4XZ-FK6M].

      See Bhupal v. Bhupal, (2009) 97 O.R. (3d) 230 (Can. Ont. C.A.).

      Thus, each state provides for judicial alteration of the otherwise-presumed duration. In this regard, the two provisions are entirely compatible.

      The State cites to Schmitke v. Schmitke, 87 B.C.L.R. 2d 377 (B.C. Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that the statute of limitation does not begin to run on child support arrears until the child reaches the age of majority. While this may be the law in British Columbia, it is not the law in Ontario. See Cooney v. Neave, (2016) O.N.S.C. 525 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.).

      It is unclear whether this $6,000 payment has been credited toward Brett's arrearages. For some reason, Brett did not request that this amount be credited, either in the administrative hearing or before the superior court. As stated above, full or partial payment of an arrearage is a valid defense to enforcement of a registered support order pursuant to RCW 26.21A.530(1). The same statute also recognizes the bar of a statute of limitation precluding enforcement of some or all of an arrearage as a valid defense. RCW 26.21A.530(g). However, the proper forum in which to assert these defenses is at an administrative proceeding or trial, not in this court. As a general rule, we do not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal except when such issue is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a) ; State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 332-33, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Brett had the opportunity to assert such defenses at the administrative hearing and did not do so.

      The State concedes that all arrearages arising from missed payments predating January 1984 have been satisfied and are "uncollectable." Br. of Resp't (State) at 22.