author: PARRISH, Justice:

text:
    2004 UT 37
    BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANDY CITY CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20020020.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 4, 2004.

      Blake T. Ostler, Bountiful, for plaintiff.
    Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, Bryce D. McEuen, Sandy, for defendant.
    Stephen C. Earl, Orem, for amicus City of Orem.
    Brinton R. Burbidge, Thomas C. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah School Boards Assoc.
    Steven W. Allred, Salt Lake City, for amici Salt Lake City Corp. and Utah League of Cities & Towns.
   PARRISH, Justice:

¶ 1 In this appeal, we decide whether section 10-9-106 of the Utah Code precludes a municipality from charging school districts a monthly storm sewer drainage fee. The Jordan School District appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Sandy City on this issue. We affirm the district court’s decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1999, the Sandy City Council adopted Ordinance No. 99-16, establishing a storm sewer drainage utility. The ordinance was adopted pursuant to the city’s general welfare powers under Utah Code section 10-8-84 (1999). The purposes and objectives of the ordinance, as listed therein, are to (1) “[pjrovide and maintain an adequate storm sewer drainage system for handling storm water runoff’; (2) “[pjrovide fair, equitable and non-discriminatory rates for using the storm sewer drainage system which user fees will generate sufficient revenues for operating, improving, and maintaining the storm sewer drainage utility adequately”; (3) establish a policy that fees should be set after the consideration of specific factors; and (4) establish standards and guidelines for the discharge of storm water which comply with requirements of the federal Clean Water Act.

¶3 The ordinance specifies a method for calculating user rates based largely on the amount of impervious surface on a piece of real property. Monthly fees are collected and managed separately from other city funds. The ordinance provides for a reduction of the monthly fee for non-residential properties having on-site storm water collection facilities approved by the city. In addition, the ordinance establishes an appeals process for non-residential property owners who wish to contest the monthly billing amount assigned to their properties.

¶ 4 Jordan School District (“Jordan”) operates a high school and numerous middle and elementary schools within the boundaries of Sandy City. Shortly after the city’s adoption of the storm sewer drainage utility ordinance, Jordan filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the city’s authority to charge a school district the monthly fees.

¶ 5 Based on their apparent assessment that the case turned only on issues of statutory construction, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the narrow legal question of “whether the City has authority under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106(2) to charge and collect a storm sewer drainage fee for services provided to properties owned by the Jordan School District.” Restricting itself to the legal question framed by the parties, the district court held that section 10-9-106(2) did not prohibit Sandy City’s collection of such a fee. It accordingly granted Sandy City’s motion and denied Jordan’s motion. Thereafter, the parties jointly moved to dismiss their remaining claims without prejudice. The district court granted that motion, and this appeal followed.

¶ 6 On appeal, Jordan argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted section 10-9-106. Jordan contends that section 10-9-106 prohibits municipalities from imposing fees on school districts with the exception of those fees specified therein. Because storm sewer drainage fees are not specified, Jordan contends that Sandy City may not impose such fees on Jordan. In response, Sandy City argues that section 10-9-106 applies only to those fees arising from a municipality’s land use development regulation and therefore does not prevent a municipality from collecting service fees associated with the operation and maintenance of a municipality’s storm sewer drainage system. Sandy City also relies on section 17A-3-315 of the Utah Code, which specifically recognizes that a municipality may impose charges on governmental entities, including school districts, for services provided by the municipality. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 (1999). Jordan responds that section 17A-3-315 is irrelevant because the fees at issue should be classified as impact fees, rather than service fees contemplated under section 17A-3-315.

¶ 7 We first address whether section 10-9-106 of the Utah Code precludes the imposition of service fees on a school district. We then turn to the question of whether Sandy City’s storm sewer drainage fee may properly be categorized as a service fee.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the district court’s interpretation. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 65, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 473. Our aim in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 23, 1 P.3d 1074.

¶ 9 Pursuant to our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute’s plain language to determine its meaning. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, ¶ 21, 63 P.3d 705. ‘We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.” Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592; see also Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (“[Sjtatutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful.” (citation and quotation omitted)); Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994) (“[Tjerms of a statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion.” (citation and quotation omitted)); Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) (“It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts.”). In addition, “[i]t is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).

II. SECTION 10-9-106 DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE IMPOSITION OF SERVICE FEES

¶ 10 Jordan argues that the plain language of section 10-9-106 prohibits Sandy City from imposing a storm drain fee on a school district. Section 10-9-106 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)(a) Each county, municipality, school district, special district, and political subdivision of Utah shall conform to the land use and development ordinances of any municipality when installing, constructing, operating, or otherwise using any area, land, or building situated within that municipality only in a manner or for a purpose that conforms to that municipality’s ordinances.
(2) A school district is subject to a municipality’s land use regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may not:
(c) require a district to pay fees not authorized by this section!.]

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106 (2000).

¶ 11 Under Jordan’s reading of section 10-9-106, a municipality is not authorized to charge a school district any fee that is not specifically enumerated within the section. Because the section does not mention storm sewer drainage fees, Jordan argues that such fees are prohibited.

¶ 12 Sandy City argues that the interpretation of section 10-9-106 proposed by Jordan ignores both the plain statutory language and the context in which it is found. Sandy City further argues that Jordan’s proposed interpretation of section 10-9-106 would bring it into unnecessary conflict with other applicable statutory provisions and would produce an unreasonable and illogical result. We agree with Sandy City.

¶ 13 By its plain language, section 10 — 9— 106 operates to preclude imposition of only those fees arising under land use regulations of chapter 9 of title 10 of the Utah Code. Subsection (2) of section 10-9-106 specifically states that school districts are “subject to a municipality’s land use regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may not ... require a district to pay fees not authorized by this section.” Id. § 10-9-106(2), (2)(c) (emphasis added). The commonly accepted usage of the word “except” is to provide á limitation or qualification to the immediately preceding language. Such a limitation, by its very nature, precludes application of this narrow statutory exception in a land use context to a broader range of general statutory provisions unrelated to municipal land use regulation.

¶ 14 The context of the prohibition against unauthorized fees dictates the same result. We have long recognized that context is an important consideration in statutory interpretation. Because context is important, the “terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion.” Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994) (citations and quotation omitted).

¶ 15 When read in context, the proscription on fees has a fairly limited application. Subsection (c), like the other subsections of paragraph (2), operates as an exception to the general rule that school districts must abide by “a municipality’s land use regulations under [chapter 9 of the Utah Code].” Utility service fees of the type at issue here, however, are not properly categorized as fees arising under land use regulations of chapter 9.

¶ 16 Chapter 9, also known as The Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, is comprised of ten separate parts, each of which deals with land use regulations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003 (2003). These parts include the Planning Commission (sections 10-9-201 to -205), General Plans (sections 10-9-301 to -307), Zoning (sections 10-9-401 to -409), Residential Facilities for Elderly (sections 10-9-501 to - 504), the Board of Adjustment (sections 10-9-701 to -708), and Subdivisions (sections 10-9-801 to -811). Together these parts set up a framework for governing how land is used and developed within a municipality. See id. § 10-9-102. Charges for utility services provided by a municipality do not arise from regulations setting conditions of development approval or directing the types of authorized property use.

¶ 17 In addition, none of the subsections surrounding subsection (c) in paragraph 2 of section 10-9-106 expresses an intent to excuse a school district from paying for services or improvements that are directly connected to a need created by the school district. For example, under subsection (b), a municipality generally may not require a school district to participate in the cost of a roadway or sidewalk. It may require participation, however, if the improvement is reasonably necessary for the safety of school children and is located on or contiguous to school property, or if it is needed to connect an otherwise isolated school site to an existing roadway. Id. § 10-9-106(2)(b); see also id. § 10-9-106(2)(d) (requiring a school district to pay inspection fees when the district cannot provide its own qualified inspector and the city provides one instead); id. § 10-9-106(2)(e) (prohibiting the requirement of impact fees in general, but allowing a municipality to require impact fees if the fees are reasonably related to the impact of a school district project).

¶ 18 Not only does the interpretation urged by Jordan conflict with the plain statutory language and the context of section 10-9-106, Jordan’s proposed interpretation would create a conflict between section 10-9-106 and section 17A-3-315 of the Utah Code. Section 17A-3-315, which is found in the Utah Code chapter authorizing municipal improvement districts, generally prohibits municipalities from levying assessments against the property of public agencies. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 (1999). However, it specifically authorizes municipalities to charge public agencies for services. It provides:

Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from imposing or a public agency from paying reasonable charges for any services or materials actually rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public agency, including, by way of example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting, or sewer services.

Id. § 17A-3-315(1).

¶ 19 Section 17A-3-315 thus underscores a municipality’s power to impose charges or “service fees” for utility-type services provided to a public agency such as a school district. See V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 942 P.2d 906, 911-12 (Utah 1996) (defining service fees), vacated on other grounds, 942 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1997). If we were to interpret section 10-9-106 in the manner Jordan advocates, no municipality would be able to charge or collect fees for utility services provided to a school district because section 10-9-106 does not enumerate, and therefore would not authorize, the charging of fees for utility services.

¶ 20 To the extent that Jordan’s proposed interpretation of section 10-9-106 conflicts with the legislative intent expressed in section 17A-3-315, Jordan urges this court to rule that the more recently enacted section 10-9-106 impliedly repealed section 17A-3-315. When two statutes relating to the same subject matter unavoidably conflict, the later statute may be viewed as having impliedly repealed inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute. See Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983); State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 335-36 (Utah 1980); Ellis v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct.App.1988). “[Ijmplied repeals are not favored,” however, and we need not find an implied repeal if the apparently inconsistent provisions can be reconciled. Sorensen, 617 P.2d at 336. Indeed, we have an obligation to harmonize alleged inconsistencies within and between statutes, avoiding conflicts when possible. I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110, ¶ 26, 61 P.3d 1038; Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). We therefore reject Jordan’s interpretation of section 10-9-106 in favor of an interpretation that allows us to reconcile sections 10-9-106 and 17A-3-315.

¶ 21 Finally, reconciling sections 10-9-106 and 17A-3-315 according to Sandy City’s interpretation of section 10-9-106 allows us to avoid an unreasonable result. See State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.” (citations omitted)). Under Jordan’s proposed interpretation of the statute, a school district could receive light, sewer, and other utility services and, if provided by a municipal-owned utility, the school district would not have to pay for them, even though it would have to pay for the same services if provided by a non-municipal entity. We do not believe it was the intent of the legislature to create such an unreasonable distinction.

¶22 In summary, section 10-9-106 proscribes fees associated with land use regulations of chapter 9. The ability of a municipality to collect service fees, as recognized in section 17A-3-315, stands independent of that proscription. Because we find no conflict between the two statutes, we do not find that section 10-9-106 impliedly repealed a portion of section 17A-3-315.

III. STORM DRAIN FEES MAY QUALIFY AS SERVICE FEES

¶ 23 Jordan argues in the alternative that the storm sewer drainage fees at issue are not service fees akin to the water, lighting, and sewer fees recognized in section 17A-3-315. Rather, Jordan maintains that the storm sewer drainage fees are properly classified as impact fees prohibited under section 10-9-106(e) and the Impact Fee Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-36-101 to -402 (2000). We reject Jordan’s argument in this regard and hold that a storm sewer drainage fee may properly be classified as a service fee.

¶ 24 Our prior cases distinguishing “service fees” from taxes or assessments are instructive. In V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, we described a service fee as “a specific charge in return for a specific benefit to the one paying the fee.” 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 1996), vacated on other grounds, 942 P.2d 915, 918 (Utah 1997). We contrasted a service fee with a regulatory fee, which is a specific charge that defrays the government’s cost of regulating and monitoring the class of entities paying the fee, and with a tax, which is a “general revenue-raising measure.” Id. In an earlier case, Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City School District, we determined that a monthly charge imposed for the use of a sewer system constituted a fee for services, not an assessment, and made the following distinction:

An assessment ... is imposed upon property within a limited area for an improvement to enhance all property within that area. On the other hand, the cost of a service is determined by the benefits conferred upon the occupants of the land rather than an increase in value to the land itself.

16 Utah 2d 115, 396 P.2d 628, 630 (1964) (citation omitted). Similarly, in Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District, we held that charges for use of a sewer system were service charges, not taxes or assessments, because they were “payments for services furnished” and were “ ⅛ the nature of tolls or rents paid for services furnished or available.’ ” 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting 11 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 31.30 (3d revised ed.1983)).

¶25 Jordan contends that a storm sewer drainage system provides no service or benefit to the school district and therefore any charge associated with the storm sewer system cannot be a service fee. Jordan asserts that service fees for electricity or water involve a school’s consumption of a commodity that has been delivered, whereas the handling of storm water runoff does not involve the school’s consumption of anything. Jordan also asserts that the school district should not be charged for its use of storm drains because the municipality’s storm drain system already exists and will be serviced whether or not it is utilized by the school district.

¶26 We find Jordan’s position untenable because Jordan does receive a service from Sandy City’s storm drain system. The service provided is the acceptance and handling of storm water runoff generated by school district property. This service prevents damage to property from excessive accumulations of water and from flooding. See City of Littleton v. State, 855 P.2d 448, 452-53 (Colo.1993) (noting benefits provided by storm sewer drainage systems and ruling that storm sewer charges constituted service fees rather than special assessments). Moreover, Jordan’s assertion that the storm drain system will be serviced regardless of whether the school district uses it ignores the fact that the impervious surfaces on school district properties contribute to the need to have and maintain such a system.

¶ 27 It is true that a school district does not “consume” storm water runoff in the same way it consumes water or electricity. Nevertheless, the district consumes storm drain “services.” In this respect, we find storm water runoff services comparable to sewer services — both involve the removal of unwanted substances from school district property. The removal of something one does not wish to retain can be as valuable as the delivery of something one wishes to receive. Our cases holding that charges for sewer services constitute service fees validate this principle. Ponderosa One, 738 P.2d 635; Murray City, 16 Utah 2d 115, 396 P.2d 628. Accordingly, we hold that a storm sewer drainage fee may properly be labeled a service fee and is akin to the water, lighting, and sewer charges mentioned in section 17A-3-315 of the Utah Code. See City of Littleton, 855 P.2d at 452-53; Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wash.2d 227, 704 P.2d 1171, 1180 (1985) (holding that charges related to control of storm and surface waters did not constitute taxes).

¶28 We also disagree with Jordan’s contention that the storm drain fee is really an impermissibly charged impact fee. In Jordan’s view, the appropriate way for Sandy City to fund its storm drain system is through impact fees charged prior to construction. Jordan asserts that because Sandy City did not require a storm water runoff impact fee at the time the schools were constructed, Sandy City cannot do so now.

¶ 29 By statutory definition, an impact fee is “a payment of money imposed upon development activity as a condition of development approval.” Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102 (2000). We provided a comprehensive discussion of the definition of impact fees in Salt Lake County v. Board of Education of Granite School District, where we noted that impact fees “are a species of real estate development exactions” and are generally defined as “charges levied by local governments against new development in order to generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development.” 808 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (citation and quotation omitted).

¶ 30 It may be that Sandy City could have attempted to fund its storm drain system through impact fees. Indeed, Salt Lake County opted for such an approach in the case just cited. Id. at 1056 (holding that a storm sewer impact fee was not an assessment). Sandy City argues, however, that its decision regarding the funding of its storm drain system is entitled to deference. It argues that a one-time fee paid only by property owners seeking development approval would not enable it to effectively address its storm water runoff challenges. It contends that creation of a storm sewer drainage utility and the imposition of periodic storm sewer fees are necessary to continuously support a system that must collect and dispose of the city’s storm water runoff in a manner that protects property and complies with the federal Clean Water Act.

¶ 31 We hold that Sandy City’s decisions regarding the structure, operation, and funding of its storm sewer system are entitled to deference. We generally give latitude to local governments in creating solutions to problems, especially in meeting the challenges and needs caused by accelerated urban growth. See Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ¶ 19, 995 P.2d 1237; State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the Sandy City Council in the resolution of this municipal problem.

¶ 32 Finally, Jordan and amicus curiae Utah School Boards Association argue that the charges in question do not qualify as “fees” because there are serious questions as to whether they are reasonable charges for the services and materials actually provided. The Utah School Boards Association also argues that the “fees” should be classified as impermissible taxes or assessments because they are made primarily for the purpose of constructing capital improvements to the storm drain system. Finally, the Association argues that Sandy City fails to apply the fees evenly to all governmental property, thereby rendering the fees illegitimate.

¶33 We decline to address these issues because the sole question preserved by the parties and presented in this appeal is the legal issue of “whether the City has authority under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106(2) to charge and collect a storm sewer drainage fee for services provided to properties owned by the Jordan School District.” We offer no opinion regarding whether the fee charged by Sandy City is reasonable, whether the manner in which Sandy City allocates funds derived from the fee renders the fee an impermissible tax or assessment, or whether Sandy City fails to apply the charges evenly to all governmental property and whether any such failure renders the fee illegitimate. We also decline the Utah School Boards Association’s request to remand this case to the district court for development of a factual record concerning these points. Because the parties voluntarily dismissed the claims giving rise to these issues, they are not before us. To the extent that the validity of Sandy City’s charges is dependent on any of these issues, the parties will have to resolve them in subsequent litigation.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34 In summary, we hold that section 10-9-106 of the Utah Code does not preclude a municipality from imposing service fees on a school district. We further hold that storm sewer drainage fees, akin to sewer fees, may properly be labeled service fees. We do not, however, address whether the fees assessed by Sandy City are otherwise permissible, leaving the resolution of such factually dependent issues to the parties and additional litigation if necessary.

¶ 35 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH’s opinion.

      . Paragraph (2) of section 10-9-106 provides in its entirety as follows:
      (2) A school district is subject to a municipality’s land use regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may not:
      (a) impose requirements for landscaping, fencing, aesthetic considerations, construction methods or materials, building codes, building use for educational purposes, or the placement or use of temporary classroom facilities on school property;
      (b) require a school district to participate in the cost of any roadway or sidewalk not reasonably necessary for the safety of school children and not located on or contiguous to school property, unless the roadway or sidewalk is required to connect an otherwise isolated school site to an existing roadway;
      ío) require a district to pay fees not authorized by this section;
      (d) provide for inspection of school construction or assess a fee or other charges for inspection, unless the school district is unable to provide for inspection by an inspector, other than the project architect or contractor, who is qualified under criteria established by the state superintendent;
      (e) require a school district to pay any impact fee for an improvement project that is not reasonably related to the impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is to address; or
      (f) impose regulations upon the location of a project except as necessary to avoid unreasonable risks to health or safety.
      Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106 (2000).

      . Section 10-9-102 provides that to accomplish the purposes of chapter 9, municipalities
      may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land within the municipality, including ordinances, resolutions, and rules governing uses, densily, open spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality, transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law.
      Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102 (2003).

      . (1) ... [A] municipality may not levy an assessment against properly owned by the federal government, the state of Utah, any county, school district, municipality or other political subdivision of the state of Utah or by any department or division of any such public agency even though such property is benefited by improvements made, but each such public agency is authorized to contract with the municipality for the making of such improvement and for the payment of the cost thereof to the municipality.
      Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315(l) (1999).

      . For further "key definitional elements” of impact fees, see Board of Education of Granite School District, 808 P.2d at 1058-59.

      . We accepted a similar argument in Murray City, 396 P.2d at 630. In that case, the Murray City School Board contested the imposition of a monthly sewer fee, arguing that the fee ought to be viewed as an assessment. We upheld the imposition of the fee, reasoning in part that "[h]igher standards of sanitation have ... resulted in the need for a continuing income for the operation of a sewer system and a single assessment against land served by the facility ... no longer suffices.” Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    2004 UT 38
    David L. BRADSHAW, Petitioner, v. WILKINSON WATER COMPANY, and the Public Service Commission of Utah, Respondents.
    No. 20020233.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 4, 2004.

      J. Craig Smith, D. Scott Crook, Salt Lake City, for Bradshaw.
    William N. White, David C. Wright, Salt Lake City, for Wilkinson Water Co.
    Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Kent L. Walgren, Asst. Att’y Gen., Sander J. Mooy, Salt Lake City, for Public Service Commission.
   PARRISH, Justice:

¶ 1 In this ease, we are asked to decide whether the Utah Public Service Commission (the “Commission”) erred when it required a real estate developer to bear a share of the costs of constructing facilities necessary for a local utility to supply water to the developer’s proposed subdivision. We also are asked to decide whether the Commission erred in determining that the additional demand for water attributable to the proposed subdivision may require the construction of additional facilities. We affirm the decision of the Commission on both issues.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Real estate developer David Bradshaw sought a commitment from Wilkinson Water Company (‘Wilkinson Water”) to supply water to a subdivision he plans to develop. Wilkinson Water is a local water utility that supplies water to approximately 194 lots using two wells and three storage tanks. Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision contains twenty-one individual residential lots.

¶ 3 In response to Bradshaw’s request for a service commitment, Wilkinson Water took the position that its existing tanks, wells, and pipes were insufficient to meet the anticipated demands of the proposed development. Accordingly, Wilkinson Water conditioned its service commitment on Bradshaw’s agreement to pay a proportionate share of the costs associated with construction of the additional infrastructure.

¶ 4 When Bradshaw and Wilkinson Water could not reach agreement with respect to Bradshaw’s responsibility for infrastructure costs, Bradshaw filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission and sought a hearing. Bradshaw disputed the need for construction of additional facilities and argued that even if new facilities were necessary, he should not be required to bear any of the associated costs. Specifically, Bradshaw argued that the tariff governing Wilkinson Water required it to provide water to each of Bradshaw’s lots for no more than the connection fee required of an individual residential customer.

¶ 5 Following a hearing, an administrative law judge ruled in favor of Wilkinson Water. He found that Wilkinson Water’s existing system was operating at or near capacity for both source and storage resources, thereby necessitating construction of additional facilities. He further found that Wilkinson Water did not violate the terms of its tariff when it required Bradshaw to pay a portion of the costs of constructing the additional facilities.

¶ 6 Bradshaw sought reconsideration of the decision by the Commission. The Commission granted Bradshaw’s request, and affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge. The Commission found that the terms of the Wilkinson Water tariff were not applicable in this situation. The Commission further found that Bradshaw had not advanced sufficient reason for departing from the Commission’s policy of requiring that real estate developers bear the cost of expanding utility capacity to meet the anticipated needs of speculative developments. The Commission therefore ordered that Bradshaw “be required to provide for a proportionate share of reasonable costs of reasonably necessary water plant installed or required to provide utility service to the proposed subdivision.”

¶7 Bradshaw sought a writ of review of the Commission’s order from this court. We have jurisdiction over review of final orders of the Public Service Commission pursuant to section 78 — 2—2(3)(e)(i) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2002).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Bradshaw advances two arguments in support of his challenge to the Commission’s order. First, Bradshaw argues that Wilkinson Water’s tariff requires it to shoulder the entire cost of any additional infrastructure required to provide service to his proposed development. In the alternative, he argues that he cannot be required to pay for any additional infrastructure because the evidence presented to the Commission establishes that Wilkinson Water’s existing facilities are adequate to serve his proposed development. We address each argument in turn.

I. APPLICATION OF THE WILKINSON WATER TARIFF

¶ 9 The Commission examined Wilkinson Water’s tariff and held that none of its provisions are applicable to this case. Because it found the tariff inapplicable, the Commission applied'its well-established policy requiring that developers pay the proportionate share of infrastructure costs associated with their proposed developments.

¶ 10 The tariff contains a “Facility Extension Policy” that explains the respective allocation of costs between Wilkinson Water and its customers when a customer obtains an “extension” of Wilkinson Water’s lines of service to the customer’s property. The Commission held that the Facility Extension Policy does not govern cost allocation for additional facilities necessary to supply a proposed subdivision. It reasoned:

[T]he Facility Extension Policy [is] applicable to a customer or prospective customer who requires an extension of [Wilkinson Water’s] facilities in order to begin his own consumption of water services offered by the Company.... This is not Mr. Bradshaw’s situation. Mr. Bradshaw would require Wilkinson Water to expand and upgrade facilities, not to meet Mr. Bradshaw’s own water service consumption, but to be prepared to serve possible, future customers in his proposed development.

¶ 11 We accord the Commission’s tariff interpretations “considerable deference and review them for mere reasonableness or rationality.” McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 1988). Although the Commission’s interpretation of a tariff is entitled to deference, its interpretation must be lawful. “One of the requirements for a finding of reasonableness [of a Commission tariff interpretation] is lawfulness; a minimally reasonable interpretation must avoid unnecessarily contravening general law.” Id.

¶ 12 Bradshaw asserts that the Commission made two errors in interpreting Wilkinson Water’s tariff. First, Bradshaw contends the Commission’s interpretation would render the tariff unlawful because it would allow unlawful discrimination against him. Second, Bradshaw argues the tariff should have been construed strictly against the utility pursuant to Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1978).

A. The Commission Appropriately Recognized a Distinction Between Real Estate Developers and Individual Utility Customers

¶ 13 The Commission’s holding that the tariff does not apply in this case is based on a distinction between prospective customers who seek water service for their own imminent consumption and real estate developers who seek commitments to serve lots they intend to sell to others. Bradshaw argues that the terms of the tariff recognize no such distinction and therefore he should be considered a customer in the same way as an individual who requests service on his own behalf.

¶ 14 Utah law prohibits public utilities from engaging in disparate treatment of similarly situated customers, Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 (2003), and requires that a utility’s charges be “just and reasonable,” id. § 54-3-1. Utah law recognizes, however, that not all customers are similarly situated. “The scope [of the] definition of ‘just and reasonable’ may include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah....” Id.

¶ 15 Bradshaw argues that he is similarly situated to an individual lot owner and that the Commission erred in treating him differently. He points out that the tariff makes no distinction between a prospective customer who seeks water service for his own imminent consumption and a real estate developer who seeks a commitment to serve lots he intends to sell to others at some future time. He reasons that Wilkinson Water would collect the same amount in connection fees whether it were to collect them from Bradshaw for twenty-one lots collectively or from twenty-one individual lot owners.

¶ 16 We disagree. The primary basis for distinguishing between a real estate developer and an individual customer is found in the substantial risk to the utility and its customers presented by a developer’s request for a commitment to serve a proposed subdivision when the utility’s infrastructure is insufficient to meet the anticipated demand. In such a situation, the utility is asked to construct additional facilities without any assurances that the increased demand will soon materialize in the form of rate-paying customers.

¶ 17 Real estate development is a speculative enterprise. Indeed, Bradshaw previously delayed his development for a period of approximately five years after first approaching Wilkinson Water about a service commitment. Bradshaw’s lots may or may not be developed and may or may not be sold. Even if they are sold, a great deal of time may elapse before the lots actually require water service. Wilkinson Water and its existing customers should not be forced to bear the costs of constructing additional facilities that may turn out to be unnecessary. As the Commission pointed out, this would be tantamount to forcing a utility’s customers to speculate in real estate development.

¶ 18 Moreover, as the Commission noted in its decision, it is unlikely that simultaneous individual requests for new service would amount to such an increase in demand as to require the utility to construct additional facilities. There is a marked increase in the risk associated with the construction of a multi-unit housing development over the risk associated with construction of a single home. In contrast to a hypothetical simultaneous request for service from twenty-one lot owners, a developer’s request for a service commitment does not necessarily represent twenty-one customers ready to move in and immediately begin paying for water service. Therefore, it may be years before Wilkinson Water can begin to recover the costs of its additional construction in the form of payments for service.

¶ 19 The Commission has adopted a policy recognizing that real estate developers are better positioned than local utilities to bear the costs associated with construction of additional infrastructure necessary to supply water to proposed subdivisions. We find nothing in the Commission’s policy to be unreasonably discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.

B. The Tariff Need Not Be Strictly Construed Against Wilkinson Water

¶ 20 Bradshaw also argues that the Commission erred by not construing the tariff strictly against Wilkinson Water. In Josephson, we observed that because tariffs mainly serve the interests of the utility, a utility’s tariff “should be construed strictly against [it].” 576 P.2d at 852.

¶ 21 While the observation enunciated in Josephson is applicable in most instances, it does not apply in this case. Construing a tariff against a utility generally protects the customers of the utility against unreasonable or unjustified charges. In this case, however, construing the tariff strictly against Wilkinson Water may actually harm its existing customers by requiring them, rather than Bradshaw, to bear the costs associated with service to Bradshaw’s proposed development.

¶22 The Commission’s requirement that Bradshaw be responsible for the costs of the infrastructure necessary to serve his proposed subdivision was motivated in part by a desire to protect consumers within the Wilkinson Water service area from the risk that the construction costs for new infrastructure may not otherwise be recovered. The Commission is not required to mechanically construe a tariff against a utility when the particular circumstances of an individual case dictate a contrary result.

¶ 23 We find that the Commission’s interpretation of the tariff was reasonable in this ease. We therefore affirm the Commission’s holding that the tariff in question does not require Wilkinson Water to bear all of the costs associated with preparing to serve Bradshaw’s proposed development. Rather, Bradshaw should bear a proportionate share of those costs.

II. THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

¶24 Bradshaw alternatively attacks the Commission’s holding that he be required to bear a proportionate share of the costs associated with additional infrastructure by arguing that Wilkinson Water’s existing plant is adequate to meet the anticipated needs of his proposed subdivision. Bradshaw reasons that he can be required to contribute to the costs of additional infrastructure only if the proposed subdivision will actually force Wilkinson Water to exceed its existing capacity.

¶25 Bradshaw argues that the Commission erred when it found that Wilkinson Water’s source and storage capacity might be inadequate to meet the anticipated demands of the proposed subdivision. Specifically, Bradshaw argues that the Commission improperly departed from the source and storage requirements promulgated by the Utah Drinking Water Board (the “Drinking Water Board Standards”) in estimating the necessary capacity for the system. Bradshaw maintains that the Commission was bound to rely on the Drinking Water Board Standards by their terms and also because he and Wilkinson Water had so stipulated. Bradshaw also argues that the Commission’s factual findings with respect to the likely need for increased capacity were not supported by substantial evidence.

A The Commission Was Not Bound by the Drinking Water Board Standards in Assessing the Anticipated Demands on Wilkinson Water’s System

¶ 26 Whether the Commission was required to rely on the Drinking Water Board Standards in determining whether Wilkinson Water’s existing facilities are adequate to supply Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision presents a question of law that we review for correctness. Savage Bros. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (“Where the issue involves the interpretation of a general question of law, we apply a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the expertise of the Commission.” (internal quotation omitted)). We are unpersuaded by Bradshaw’s argument that the Commission was legally bound to use the Drinking Water Board Standards to resolve the factual issues presented in this case. Neither Title 54 of the Utah Code nor the Drinking Water Board Standards themselves require that the Commission rely on the Drinking Water Board Standards in estimating the need for utility plant expansion. Thus, while the Drinking Water Board Standards may have been informative, they were not binding.

¶ 27 Title 54 vests authority in the Commission to ensure that a public utility’s charges are just and reasonable. By contrast, the Drinking Water Board Standards were promulgated for the purpose of the “sizing of public drinking water facilities such as sources (along with their associated treatment facilities), storage tanks, and pipelines.” Utah Admin. Code R309-510-1 (2003). The Drinking Water Board Standards exist to guarantee an adequate supply of drinking-water to a utility’s customers. They were not intended to constrain the Commission in determining whether a utility’s charges are just and reasonable under Title 54 of the Utah Code. While the Commission found them useful in estimating future demand on the Wilkinson Water system, the Commission did not err in refusing to treat them as determinative.

¶ 28 In the alternative, Bradshaw argues that the Commission was bound by the Drinking Water Board Standards because the parties so stipulated. This argument fails because the Commission cannot permit itself to be bound by stipulated standards when doing so would contravene its statutory mandate to consider the public interest.

¶29 Upon agreeing to reconsider Bradshaw’s appeal, the Commission requested that the parties provide a list of agreed upon and disputed facts and issues. In response, Bradshaw and Wilkinson Water submitted a statement of “Stipulated Facts,” which contained the agreement of the parties to use the Drinking Water Board Standards in estimating the water use and capacity that would be required to serve Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision.

¶ 30 At the hearing, the Commission did not limit Wilkinson Water’s evidence of anticipated future requirements to the Drinking Water Board Standards and Bradshaw objected. The Commission ruled that it might “have to make resolutions beyond what [the parties] have stipulated to, as far as the issues to be resolved by the Commission.”

¶ 31 In its order on reconsideration, the Commission indicated that it had not limited itself to the Drinking Water Board Standards in evaluating whether Wilkinson Water could meet the anticipated demand associated with Bradshaw’s development. Although the Commission considered the Drinking Water Board Standards to be useful guidelines, it held that it was not strictly bound by the Standards in evaluating whether it was just and reasonable for Bradshaw to bear’ a proportionate share of the costs of constructing new facilities.

¶ 32 Whether the Commission was bound by the stipulation of the parties in this case is a question of law that we review for correctness. Utah Code section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) authorizes the courts to grant relief to a petitioner if an agency decision is “contrary to a rule of the agency.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1997). Bradshaw alleges that rule 746-100-10(F)(4) of the Utah Administrative Code required the Commission to treat the parties’ stipulations as binding. He therefore concludes that the Commission’s failure to strictly apply the Drinking Water Board Standards as stipulated by the parties renders the Commission’s decision invalid.

¶ 33 We disagree and hold that the Commission did not err when it refused to abide by the stipulation. Ordinarily, stipulations are binding in the context of administrative proceedings. Yeargin v. State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 19, 20 P.3d 287. However, an administrative body may not apply its rules in a way that is inconsistent with statute. See McKnight v. State Land Bd., 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726, 730 (1963) (“[T]he rules and regulations of an administrative agency must conform to rather than be contrary and inconsistent with statutory law.”); cf. First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979) (holding that stipulations are not binding “when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved”). The binding effect of parties’ stipulations in hearings before the Commission must be relaxed where the Commission would act unlawfully in limiting itself to the stipulations. The principle that stipulations are binding must therefore yield to the Commission’s statutory mandate to consider the interests of parties outside of the proceeding, such as a utility’s customers and the public interest generally. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1, 54-4-1 (2000).

¶ 34 The “Stipulated Facts” in question were agreements on the amount of water that would be required by Bradshaw’s subdivision and on the method by which future outdoor water requirements would be estimated. The stipulations therefore constituted a limitation on the Commission’s ability to meet its statutory mandate of considering the public interest. Had the Commission limited itself to these stipulated standards, it would have ruled out any other type of evidence tending to show that Wilkinson Water likely would need to construct additional facilities to meet future demand, or evidence to the contrary. To rule out such evidence would have been to turn a blind eye to the interests of parties outside the proceeding, such as current and future customers of Wilkinson Water.

¶35 The stipulated standards also would have intruded on the mandate in section 54-4-18 of the Utah Code that the Commission “fix adequate and serviceable standards for the measurement of quantity, quality, pressure, initial voltage or other conditions pertaining to the supply of the product, commodity or service furnished or rendered by any such public utility.” Id. § 54-1-18 (2000). Had the Commission permitted the parties to dictate the standards for estimating future water demand, it would have im-permissibly delegated to the parties the task of determining standards of measurement for the supply of water to the public in Morgan County.

¶ 36 Unlike traditional court proceedings, hearings before the Commission are not designed to consider only the interests of the litigating parties. The Commission must consider the interests of the utility’s customers and the interests of the public. See id. §§ 54-3-1, 54-4-1; Stewart v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 776 (Utah 1994) (holding that the role of the Commission is to accommodate the interests of a utility’s ratepayers and shareholders to the overall public interest); cf. Comm, of Consumer Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2003 UT 29, ¶ 15, 75 P.3d 481 (holding that the Public Service Commission must review a utility’s affiliate transaction for prudence, as part of the Commission’s responsibility to determine that a rate increase is just and reasonable, before it may accept a stipulation leading to a rate increase). Accordingly, the Commission cannot be bound by stipulated standards in contravention of its statutory mandate to serve the public interest.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Determination That Bradshaw Must Bear a Proportionate Share of the Cost of New Facilities Required to Serve His Proposed Development

¶37 Bradshaw challenges the Commission’s conclusion that Wilkinson Water’s existing facilities may be insufficient to supply Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision. We will affirm the Commission’s factual findings unless they are “not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1999). We have interpreted this “substantial evidence” standard to mean “that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.” Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, ¶ 15, 70 P.3d 47 (quotation and citation omitted).

¶ 38 Before addressing Bradshaw’s specific arguments, we note that his general approach to this issue is inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Commission’s ruling. Indeed, the Commission explicitly stated that its ruling in this matter did not turn on its resolution of the competing calculations of plant capacity requirements offered by the parties.

¶39 The administrative law judge found that Wilkinson Water’s system was operating “at or near capacity for both source and storage resources,” measured “according to Utah Division of Drinking Water [Standards.” Based in part on this finding, he found no violation of the Wilkinson Water tariff, or of any applicable law or rule, in Wilkinson Water’s requirement that Bradshaw bear some of the cost of constructing additional facilities.

¶40 On reconsideration, the Commission declined to render any specific factual findings regarding the adequacy of Wilkinson Water’s existing infrastructure and the amount of additional infrastructure that would be required to serve Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision. Rather, the Commission held that evidence regarding the adequacy of Wilkinson Water’s existing plant was not dis-positive. It stated:

Mr. Bradshaw will be required to pay for the proportionate share of water plant costs that are reasonably attributable to provide water service to his proposed subdivision.... We recognize that utility plant development is not necessarily sized, engineered or built to provide service solely to one development. Deployment of utility plant takes into consideration the current and future uses of existing customers, potential customers that might locate in the proposed subdivision and potential customers that may locate elsewhere in the utility’s service territory. As long as the overall deployment of additional water plant is reasonable in relation to the Company’s reasonable operations, Mr. Bradshaw should provide for the recovery of a proportionate amount of the costs.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 41 While the Commission recognized that it would have been helpful to the parties to provide specific guidance with respect to the level of reasonable plant deployment in this particular case, it determined that the record did not provide support for any detailed instructions. Accordingly, it ruled that “to the extent the parties are unable to reach mutually acceptable resolution of future issues, further proceedings may be conducted by the Commission.”

¶ 42 In contrast, Bradshaw’s approach to the determination of plant capacity seems to proceed from the assumption that he will not be required to pay anything beyond connection fees if he can show that anticipated demand from his subdivision will not exhaust every remaining drop of Wilkinson Water’s source and storage capacity. This assumption is wrong. The Commission did not hold that Bradshaw’s obligation to bear a proportionate share of construction costs was contingent upon proof that Wilkinson Water’s existing source and storage capacity could not possibly absorb the demands of Bradshaw’s subdivision. Rather, the Commission upheld the administrative law judge’s finding that Wilkinson Water’s system was operating “at or near capacity” and that some expansion of Wilkinson Water’s facilities was “reasonably necessary” to meet the anticipated demand of Bradshaw’s subdivision. We therefore will affirm the Commission’s holding so long as we are able to find substantial evidence suggesting that the anticipated demands of Bradshaw’s proposed subdivision may exceed existing plant capacity. We first discuss the dispute over storage capacity, and then the issue of source capacity-

¶43 The most significant dispute, measured in terms of water volume, related to the question of storage capacity is whether the Commission should have considered the storage capacity owned by the Wilkinson family as part of Wilkinson Water’s storage capacity. The Wilkinson Water storage tanks have a capacity to store 400,000 gallons of water, but 146,000 gallons of that storage capacity are owned by the Wilkinson family (the “family capacity”). That leaves 254,000 gallons of capacity owned by Wilkinson Water.

¶44 In the past, the family capacity has readily been made available to the utility to meet peak demand. In such cases, the family capacity apparently has been transferred to the utility without consideration. There is, however, no agreement obligating the Wilkinson family to make its storage capacity available to the company in the future. Because Wilkinson Water owns only 254,000 gallons of capacity, and has no contractual right to use the family capacity, the Commission’s use of this figure is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the Commission’s finding with respect to the current storage capacity available to Wilkinson Water.

¶ 45 Bradshaw also challenges the fire flow storage requirement applied by the Commission, arguing that it should have found the requirement to be 60,000 gallons rather than 120,000 gallons. Mr. Wilkinson testified at the first hearing that Wilkinson Water was required to have 60,000 gallons of storage at all times for fire flow. At the hearing on reconsideration, however, the Commission heard evidence that the State Fire Marshal had increased the fire flow requirement, and that the Water Quality Board had set a standard of 120,000 gallons of storage in cases where no local fire suppression authority exists. It also heard evidence that the local fire suppression authority, the Fire Marshal for Morgan, requires a fire flow capacity of 180,000 gallons. We find that this constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Commission’s determination that the required fire flow storage was at least 120,-000 gallons.

¶ 46 The resulting calculations show that the anticipated additional storage capacity required by Bradshaw’s development would substantially exceed the 254,000 gallon storage capacity owned by Wilkinson Water. We therefore affirm the Commission’s finding that the anticipated additional storage demands associated with Bradshaw’s proposed development may require the construction of additional facilities.

¶ 47 Finally, we turn to Bradshaw’s argument that Wilkinson Water has sufficient source capacity to meet the anticipated needs of Bradshaw’s development. As presented to the Commission, the dispute on source capacity consisted of disagreement over the percentage of land in each lot that should be considered irrigable, as well as disagreement over the sizes of the lots currently served by Wilkinson Water.

¶48 The Commission made no specific findings as to these factual disputes. After noting the parties’ disagreement over these issues, the Commission held:

Although the Commission believes that consideration of well production capacity has relevance in this matter, it does not believe that the absolute numbers resulting from the competing calculations should be directly applied in the fashion advocated by the parties. Whether the Company’s wells appear to have production capacity that falls short of or exceeds the gallons per minute recommendations of the Division of Drinking Water, is not singularly dispositive of determining the conditions by which Wilkinson Water would prepare to serve possible, future customers in Mr. Bradshaw’s proposed development.

The Commission’s refusal to resolve the competing calculations of source capacity was further based on its observation that “[t]he record also reflects that calculations of water needs based upon Division of Drinking Water recommendations and assumed water consumption does not mirror actual use for individual consumers.” In short, the Commission made no finding resolving the dispute over source capacity and therefore did not rely on any such finding in deciding that Bradshaw must pay for a proportionate share of expansion costs that are “reasonably necessary” to meet the needs of Bradshaw’s proposed development.

¶ 49 Because the Commission did not rule on the question of Wilkinson Water’s source capacity, it would be inappropriate for us to resolve it on appeal. The proportion of the costs of additional source capacity, if any, for which Bradshaw will be obligated is therefore left to resolution by the parties or, failing that, to resolution by the Commission in subsequent proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶ 50 We affirm the Public Service Commission’s order requiring Bradshaw to bear “a proportionate share of the reasonable costs of reasonably necessary water plant installed or required to provide utility service to Bradshaw’s proposed development.” To the extent that the parties are unable to agree on what constitutes a proportionate share of reasonably necessary costs, that issue must be resolved, in the first instance, by the Commission.

¶ 51 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH’s opinion.

      .The "Facility Extension Policy” in Wilkinson Water's tariff provides:
      1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the nearest available existing line of the Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing line to meet the customer's requirement.
      2. Costs. The total cost of extensions, including engineering, labor and material shall be paid by the applicants. Where more than one applicant is involved in an extension, the costs shall be prorated on the basis of the street frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves and fire hydrants shall be included with every installation.
      3. Construction Standards. Minimum standards of the Company shall be met, which standards shall also comply with the standards of the Utah State Bureau of the Environmental Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the Company, but the size shall never be smaller than 4".

      4. Ownership. Completed facilities shall be owned, operated, and maintained by the Company including and through the meters, as detailed in the Tariff Rules and Regulations.
      5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing needed water supply and storage shall be paid by the Company. This cost shall include the installation and operation of pumps as required for proper pressure regulation of the system.
      6. Temporary Service. The customer will pay the total cost for the installation and removal of any extensions for service to a venture of a temporary or speculative permanency. The Company will receive the estimated cost from the customer before beginning work on the extension.

      . Section 54-3-8 of the Utah Code provides:
      No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.
      Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8(1) (2003).

      . Bradshaw argues that the Commission's policy applies only in cases, unlike this one, where the developer owns the water system. The administrative law judge found this argument unpersuasive because the policy's purpose of shielding customers from exposure to the risks of real estate development is served in both situations. We agree with the administrative law judge and hold that application of the policy should not depend on whether Bradshaw owns the utility.

      . See Utah Admin. Code R309-510 (2003).

      . Rule 746-100-10(F)(4) of the Utah Administrative Code provides that stipulations of the parties as to "relevant matters of fact” are binding on the participants:
      Stipulations — Participants in a proceeding may stipulate to relevant matters of fact or the authenticity of relevant documents. Stipulations may be received in evidence, and if received, are binding on the participants with respect to any matter stipulated. Stipulations may be written or made orally at the hearing.
      Utah Admin. Code R746-100-10(F)(4) (2003). We note that this rule is limited to stipulations of "relevant matters of fact or the authenticity of relevant documents” that are "received in evidence.” It does not extend to stipulations that involve legal issues, such as whether the Commission must use certain measuring standards in regulating the charges of public utilities.

      . By affirming this finding, we do not mean to suggest that the Commission may permit parties within its jurisdiction to manipulate its decisions through the use of affiliate transactions that shift the ownership of assets. In this case, there was no evidence that the sale of capacity from Wilkinson Water to the Wilkinson family was undertaken for the purpose of shifting or sharing future expansion costs with a real estate developer or some other third party. Rather, the evidence suggested the transaction was motivated by the legitimate objective of reducing the company's debt.

      . Our affirmance of the Commission's use of 254,000 gallons as the amount of water storage capacity owned by Wilkinson Water is limited to the purposes for which the Commission used it, that is, in determining whether there was a reasonable likelihood that Wilkinson Water would need to expand its facilities to meet Bradshaw's demand. We express no opinion on what figures or methods should be used in determining what proportion of the plant expansion costs are properly attributable to Bradshaw.


author: DURHAM, Chief Justice:

text:
    2004 UT 39
    STATE of Utah, in the interest of B. B., a person under 18 years of age. Susan and Garth Hardinger, Petitioners, v. Kimberly and Kenneth Scott, Respondents.
    No. 20020404.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 7, 2004.

      Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, John L. Valentine, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for petitioners.
    Brook J. Sessions, Provo, for respondents.
   DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 This petition concerns whether the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order after entering an adoption decree.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 B.B., a minor who had been neglected, became subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Utah Code section 78-3a-104(1)(e). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(c) (Supp.2003). Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-3a — 407 (2002), the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both of B.B.’s biological parents. Kimberly and Kenneth Scott (the Scotts) and Susan and Garth Hardinger (the Hardingers) filed competing petitions for custody and guardianship under the abuse and neglect statute. See id. § 78-3a-104. The Scotts and Hardingers stipulated that the Hardingers would withdraw their petition for custody and guardianship of B.B. in exchange for receiving visitation rights. The juvenile court granted the Scotts’ petition for custody and guardianship of B.B. and allowed the Hardingers visitation rights. Two weeks later, the juvenile court issued an adoption decree to the Scotts. The decree of adoption did not mention the pre-adoption visitation order or grant any visitation rights to the Hardingers.

¶ 3 After the adoption, the Scotts terminated B.B.’s visitation with the Hardingers. In response, the Hardingers filed an order to show cause requiring the Scotts to appear in juvenile court to demonstrate why they should not be held in contempt of court for not abiding by the pre-adoption visitation order. The Scotts filed a motion to quash the order to show cause, claiming the juvenile court’s jurisdiction ended when the Scotts’ decree of adoption was granted. The juvenile court denied the motion to quash and entered two separate orders on the same day: (1) Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (the Visitation Order); and (2) Order of Attorney Fees and Judgment (the Attorney Fee Order). In the Visitation Order, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction and ordered the Hardingers’ visitation to be restored pursuant to the stipulated pre-adoption visitation order. The Attorney Fee Order required the Scotts to pay the attorney fees incurred by the Hardingers for the order to show cause. The Scotts, through new counsel appealed.

¶ 4 The court of appeals reversed the juvenile court’s order restoring visitation rights to the Hardingers on the grounds that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the pre-adoption visitation order. State ex rel. B.B. (K.S. v. S.H.), 2002 UT App 82, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d 527. We grant the Hardingers’ petition for certiorari and affirm.

ANALYSIS

I. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 This petition presents three issues for review: (1) whether the juvenile court’s Visitation Order was appealable as a final order; (2) whether the Attorney Fee Order was adequately raised in the notice of appeal; and (3) whether the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order after entering an adoption decree. On certiorari, we review the Court of Appeals’ conclusions of law for correctness and grant them no deference. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 10, 984 P.2d 987; see also Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997).

II. THE VISITATION ORDER WAS A FINAL ORDER

¶ 6 The Hardingers contend that the Visitation Order appealed from was not final because the juvenile court retained jurisdiction to modify the Visitation Order pursuant to subsequent counseling evaluations. We disagree. The Visitation Order was a final, appealable order because it left no question for further judicial action concerning the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to enforce the pre-adoption visitation order.

¶ 7 “An appeal may be taken from a ... juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments.... ” Utah R.App. P. 3(a). “The finality of an order in juvenile proceedings is determined the same way as the finality of an order in other courts.” State ex rel. M.W., 2000 UT 79, ¶ 25, 12 P.3d 80. “ ‘A final, appealable order is one that ends the current juvenile proceedings, leaving no question open for further judicial action.’ ” Id. at ¶ 26 (quoting State ex rel. T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201, 202 (Utah Ct.App.1988)).

¶ 8 State ex rel. M.W. held that although an order may contemplate further action in the case, it is a final, appealable order if it leaves no question on the underlying petition open for further judicial action. Id. In State ex rel. M.W., the mother of two minor children was denied custody pursuant to a neglect petition. Id. at ¶ 4. We held that “[following a neglect adjudication, the juvenile court continues to have jurisdiction over and periodically reviews the case, but that does not mean the neglect adjudication is not final.” Id. at ¶ 26. A final order “ends the current juvenile proceedings begun by the petition and is a final factual determination of the underlying petition.” Id. at ¶ 26 (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Visitation Order expressly stated that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over B.B. and ordered the Hardingers’ visitation restored pursuant to the pre-adoption visitation order. The Visitation Order left no question open concerning the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to enforce the pre-adoption visitation order. Therefore, we hold that the Visitation Order was a final, appealable decision.

III. ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION

¶ 9 The Hardingers contend that because the Attorney Fee Order was not specifically mentioned in the notice of appeal the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the order. We disagree.

II10 Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that “[t]he notice of appeal shall ... designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from.” Utah R.App. P. 3(d). In Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, we stated that “ ‘the object of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular case. Respondent is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed.’ ” 1999 UT 10, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 474 (quoting Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964)). In Jensen, we held that the appellant failed to preserve issues on appeal relating to a partial summary judgment when none of the dates recited in the notice in any way related to the partial summary judgment and the appellee was unduly prejudiced by the oversight. 1999 UT 10 at ¶¶ 6, 8, 977 P.2d 474. In Jensen, the appellee was prejudiced by the appellant’s failure to properly describe the appeal because the appellee elected not to proceed with cross appeals against third party defendants when the appellant failed to raise issues relating to partial summary judgment. Id. However, this court has long adhered to the policy that where the notice of appeal sufficiently identifies the final judgment at issue and the opposing party is not prejudiced, the notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. See id. at ¶ 8; Price v. W. Loan & Sav. Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677, 679 (1909).

¶ 11 The notice of appeal states that the Seotts “appeal the ruling of the Court on the Motion to Quash and Objection to Setting Hearings without re-opening the file.” The notice of appeal identifies “the ruling of the Court on the Motion to Quash” as the final judgment from which the appeal is taken. In response to the motion to quash, the juvenile court entered two separate orders on the same day: the Visitation Order and the Attorney Fee Order. Since the Visitation Order and the Attorney Fee Order were issued on the same day and neither was identified individually as the order from which the Seotts appeal, together they comprise “the ruling of the Court on the Motion to Quash.” Moreover, the Hardingers do not claim that they were misled or in any way prejudiced by the failure to list the orders separately in the notice of appeal. While the notice of appeal was not a model of clarity, it adequately notified the Hardingers of the issues to be reviewed. Therefore, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the Attorney Fee Order.

IV. AN ADOPTION DECREE TERMINATES THE JUVENILE COURT’S JURISDICTION

¶ 12 The Scotts argue that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Visitation Order after the decree of adoption was entered. We agree.

¶ 13 The juvenile courts are created by statute and have limited jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-102(1), (5) (2002); State ex rel. Hales, 538 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Utah 1975); State ex rel. Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P.2d 172, 175 (1946). Their powers are limited to those specifically conferred by the statute. State ex rel. Hales, 538 P.2d at 1035.

¶ 14 This case came under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in accordance with Utah Code section 78-3a-104(1)(c) because B.B. was a minor child who had been neglected. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(c) (Supp. 2003). Pursuant to Utah Code section 78-3a-407, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both of B.B.’s biological parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (2003). At that point, the juvenile court continued to have exclusive original jurisdiction over B.B. See id. § 78-3a-121(1) (Supp.2003). The statute provides that unless it is terminated earlier, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the child turns twenty-one years old. Id. “The continuing jurisdiction of the court terminates ... upon order of the court.” Id. § 78-3a-121(2)(a)(i). Therefore, the determinative issue is whether an adoption decree is an “order of the court” that terminates the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

¶ 15 Once the juvenile court is satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by adoption, the court must “enter a final decree of adoption declaring that the child is adopted by the adoptive parent or parents and shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the adoptive parent or parents.” Id. § 78-30-9(1) (emphases added). Thus, “[ajfter the decree of adoption is entered, the adoptive parent or parents and the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relationship.” Id. § 78-30-10. The legislature has expressly provided that “the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children ... [and] in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements,” id. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a); that “adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements,” id. § 78 — 30—4.12(2)(c); and that “adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in retaining custody of an adopted child,” id. § 78-30-4.12(2)(d). A conditional adoption decree is not consistent with the expressed intent of the legislature.

¶ 16 The legislature has repeatedly expressed the importance of preventing the disruption of adoptive placements: “the adoptive parent or parents and the child shall sustain the legal relationship of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relationship.” Id. § 78-30-10. The adoption decree not only changed B.B.’s name to B. Scott, but also created a parental bond between her and the Scotts which may not be intruded upon without meeting anew the threshold requirements for court intervention. After the adoption decree, there were no new findings that brought B.B. within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the pre-adoption visitation order because the decree of adoption superseded the order as a matter of law.

¶ 17 The underlying goal of the adoption statutes is to provide adoptive children with stable, permanent homes and to form new families that are regarded and treated equally in all respects to other parent-child relationships. A conditional decree of adoption, allowing the juvenile court to impose its judgment on the adoptive parents as to what visitation is in the best interests of the child, unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. . See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.

[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.

Therefore, once the legal relationship of parent and child is established, the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the adopted child until new requirements for jurisdiction are satisfied.

V. ATTORNEY FEES

¶ 18 The Scotts argue that the court of appeals’ decision reversing the juvenile court’s award of attorney fees should be upheld. We agree.

¶ 19 Because the juvenile courts are creatures of statute, they are courts of limited jurisdiction. State ex rel. Hales, 538 P.2d at 1035. Given that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the order to show cause, the court also lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees incurred by the Hardingers. See Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (“Because we reverse the trial court on every ground on which it relied ... we also reverse the court’s grant of attorney fees.”). We order each party to pay its own attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20 We affirm the court of appeals on all issues: the Visitation Order was a final, ap-pealable order because it left no area for further judicial action concerning the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to enforce the pre-adoption visitation order; the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the Attorney Fee Order because it was adequately identified in the notice of appeal; and the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order after entering a decree of adoption. Because the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the order to show cause, the court also lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees to the Hardingers. We expressly hold that the Utah Code does not permit conditional adoptions.

¶21 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM’S opinion.

      . Kimberly Scott is the sister of B.B.'s biological father.

      . The Hardingers are B.B.’s biological maternal grandparents.

      . The requirements that must be met in order to invoke the juvenile court's jurisdiction are found in Utah Code section 78-3a-104 (2002). These requirements include a finding that the minor has violated a federal, state, or local law; that the minor is an abused or neglected child; or that the parental rights of the minor's biological parents are being terminated. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 (2002).


author: NEHRING, Justice:

text:
    2004 UT 40
    PANGEA TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. INTERNET PROMOTIONS, INC., Defendant. Zions First National Bank, Garnishee and Appellant.
    No. 20020445.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 18, 2004.

      Craig A. Hoggan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
    David M. McGrath, Robert A. Goodman, Salt Lake City, for garnishee.
   NEHRING, Justice:

¶ 1 This appeal presents us with the question of whether a garnishee is entitled to a hearing after the plaintiff in the principal case replies to the garnishee’s answers to interrogatories and seeks to have the garnishee held liable to the plaintiff for the property sought to be garnished. We reverse the district court’s denial of a hearing to garnishee Zions First National Bank and vacate the judgment against Zions in favor of the plaintiff and judgment creditor in the principal action, Pangea Technologies, Inc.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Pangea obtained a judgment against Internet Promotions, Inc., for $65,641. Believing that Zions held money belonging to Internet Promotions, Pangea served Zions with a writ of garnishment. As authorized by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the writ ordered Zions to hold all money in Internet Promotions’ accounts up to the amount of the judgment and instructed Zions to answer interrogatories about funds held by the bank which belonged to Internet Promotions. Zions answered the interrogatories the next day, telling Pangea that $10,089 remained in Internet Promotions’ account.

¶ 3 However, before Zions froze the funds, they were transferred to the personal account of Internet Promotions’ president. After discovering this, Zions amended its interrogatory answers to disclose the transfer. Pangea responded by filing a reply to Zions’ amended answers as permitted by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64D(i). Pangea asked the district court to charge Zions with liability for the amount of the transferred funds. Pangea also requested a hearing on the issue of Zions’ liability.

¶4 The district court granted the judgment against Zions without conducting a hearing, finding that the money had been “improperly releas[ed].” Zions asked the district court to reconsider, citing language in rule 64D(i) which, it contended, mandated a hearing. The court denied Zions’ motion and entered judgment against Zions for $10,089, the amount of the transferred money, and an additional $2,370.30 in attorney fees and costs. The district court did not disclose its reasons for awarding attorney fees. Zions appealed.

¶ 5 Zions’ appeal is confined to the question of whether the district court erred when it declined to hear the merits of Pan-gea’s claim that Zions was liable for the transferred money. We do not address whether Zions was, in fact, liable. So presented, Zions’ appeal concerns an interpretation of a rule of procedure. This is a legal issue which we review anew without deference to the district court’s interpretation. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 8, 29 P.3d 1225.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 The seizure of property by garnishment is governed by rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i). A garnishee is a stranger to the principal case and an involuntary participant in the garnishment proceeding. This structural circumstance imposes unique due process demands on garnishment procedures. The need for heightened sensitivity to due process is particularly evident where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to obtain a judgment from a garnishee. We conclude that rule 64D(i) requires that a garnishee be afforded a hearing before it can be found liable to a plaintiff and have a judgment entered against it.

¶ 7 Rule 64D(i) reads as follows:

The plaintiff or defendant may, within 10 days after the service of any answers to interrogatories, file and serve upon the garnishee and the other party to the principal action a reply to the whole or any part thereof and may also allege any matters ivhich would charge the garnishee with liability except that all claims for exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of property garnisheed shall be resolved under the procedures as otherwise provided for in Subdivision (h) herein. Such new matter in reply shall be taken as denied and the matter thus at issue shall be tried in the same manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or finding.

Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i) (emphasis added).

¶ 8 Pangea defends the district court’s determination that Zions was not entitled to a hearing on the grounds that its reply to Zions’ amended interrogatories contained no “new matter” and thus did not trigger the need for a trial. We disagree. The “new matter” raised in Pangea’s reply was its assertion that Zions was liable for the money transferred out of Internet Promotions’ account. Pangea would have us narrowly read “new matter” to include only new facts. This interpretation would inevitably cause garnishees to be deprived of due process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. We long ago succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due process, observing that it “requires that notice be given to the person whose rights are to be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.” Riggins v. Dist. Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645, 660 (1935) (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 9 Until Pangea claimed in its reply that Zions was liable, Zions was not placed on notice that Pangea was seeking a judgment against Zions. If Pangea’s reply is to square with due process, its request to find Zions liable must be construed as a “new matter,” thereby entitling Zions to a trial “in the same manner as other issues of like nature.” Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(i).

¶ 10 We have previously held that a judgment may not be taken against a garnishee who has not been served with a reply to the garnishee interrogatories. Remington Rand, Inc. v. O’Neil, 4 Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416, 417 (1956) (Remington I). When the Remington I litigants returned to this court a year later, we reiterated our commitment to the right of a garnishee to be heard before being at risk of having a judgment entered against it, stating, “the object of promoting justice requires that both sides to [the] controversy have a fair opportunity to present their claims on their merits. Otherwise, the main purposes of our courts of justice and our judicial system will be defeated.” Remington Rand, Inc. v. O’Neil, 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 368, 370 (1957) (Remington II).

¶ 11 The reasoning of Remington II remains sound today. Accordingly, the district court’s issuance of a judgment against garnishee Zions, absent a hearing, violated Zions’ due process rights. We therefore reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 12 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING’s opinion.

      . Zions also challenges the district court's award of attorney fees to Pangea. Because we reverse the district court on the legal question presented, within which the issue of attorney fees is subsumed, we do not reach this question.


author: DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

text:
    2004 UT 41
    Rae ADAMSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ranae ADAMSON, Defendant and Appellee.
    No. 20030108.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 21, 2004.
    Mary C. Corporon, Jarrod H. Jennings, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
    Nathan Pace, Stacie G. Schmidt, David S. Pace, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
   DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 This ease arises from an order denying a petition to modify an alimony award. Rae and Ranae Adamson divorced in J989. In the divorce decree, the original trial court awarded Mrs. Adamson $200 per month in alimony, which was to continue until the death of either party or until Mrs. Adamson remarried or cohabited, whichever occurred first.

¶ 2' Ten years later, when he was approaching retirement age, Mr. Adamson filed a petition to modify his divorce decree pursuant to Utah Code section 30 — 3—5(7)(g)(i). See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). He asserted that his impending retirement was a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce and petitioned the court to terminate his alimony obligations. The district court denied his petition.

¶ 3 On appeal, in an unpublished memorandum decision, the court of appeals declined to consider Mr. Adamson’s petition. Adamson v. Adamson, 2002 UT App 419. Citing its decision in Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah Ct.App.1991), the court reasoned that Mr. Adamson’s petition was not ripe for determination because he had not, in fact, retired. We granted Mr. Adamson’s petition for a writ of certiorari to address the following issue only: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the issue presented in the petition for modification of alimony was not ripe for adjudication.

¶ 4 At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Adamson informed this court that, since his petition for certiorari was granted, Mr. Adamson has retired. Due to his retirement, the issue raised by Mr. Adamson in his petition for certiorari review is moot. See State v. Vicente, 2004 UT 6, ¶ 3, 84 P.3d 1191. Because “judicial policy dictates against our rendering an advisory opinion” when an issue is moot, State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation and quotation omitted), we decline to address the issue raised by Mr. Adamson and dismiss the petition.

¶ 5 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT’s opinion.


text:
    2004 UT 43
    CENTRO DE LA FAMILIA DE UTAH, a Utah nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bonita CARTER, in her individual capacity and her capacity as Trustee of the Carter Family Trust; and Dream Chasers, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, Defendants and Appellees.
    No. 20030441.
    Supreme Court of Utah.
    May 28, 2004.

      David J. Burns, Scott W. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
    Kevin N. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
   PARRISH, Justice:

¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal, Centro de la Familia de Utah (“CDLF”) asks us to review the district court’s denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. We find that the issue presented by CDLF is moot and consequently dismiss the interlocutory appeal.

¶ 2 CDLF requested injunctive relief from the district court to stay potential eviction proceedings against it. CDLF feared eviction from former school property that it had renovated for use as a federal Migrant Head Start center. According to CDLF, Bonita Carter (“Carter”) orally promised to convey the property to CDLF as a charitable donation. In reliance thereon, CDLF expended more than $680,000 to improve the property. After the renovations were complete, Carter refused to convey title. Accordingly, CDLF filed suit alleging, among other things, breach of oral contract. After commencement of the suit, Carter sent two separate letters demanding that CDLF vacate the premises. CDLF then sought a preliminary injunction to protect itself from eviction. The district court denied CDLF’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that CDLF could not satisfy the requirements set forth in rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶ 3 CDLF filed its motion for preliminary injunction in March 2003, and the district court denied the motion on April 2, 2003. Although no injunction has been in place during the pendency of these proceedings, Carter has made no actual attempt to evict CDLF from the property. Moreover, when questioned during oral argument on this matter, Carter’s counsel represented that his clients have “no immediate plans for eviction.” Given the lack of any eviction proceedings and Carter’s stated lack of intent to evict CDLF from the property, it does not appear that a decision on the interlocutory appeal would have any practical effect on the parties. Under these circumstances, the appeal is moot, and we therefore decline to consider the issues presented. See State v. Vicente, 2004 UT 6, ¶¶ 2-3, 84 P.3d 1191.

¶4 Despite the lack of any immediate plans to evict CDLF, the parties suggested at oral argument that resolution of this appeal is nevertheless necessary because the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the district court in denying the preliminary injunction will have a binding, preclusive effect in any forthcoming trial on the merits. Indeed, counsel for both parties represented that proceedings in the district court have been delayed pending this interlocutory appeal based on an assumption that our disposition of the preliminary injunction issue will bear on the final outcome of CDLF’s claims against Carter. The parties base this assumption on an erroneous interpretation of rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶ 5 Rule 65A provides that “any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at the trial.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(a)(2). In cases where a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction has been consolidated with the trial of an action on the merits, rule 65A promotes judicial economy by preventing duplicative presentations of evidence submitted in an injunction proceeding that would also be admissible at trial. The rule speaks to presentation of evidence only, however, and does not direct that findings and conclusions relating to an injunction are binding in a subsequent trial on the merits. In addition, rule 65A(a)(2) must be “construed and applied [so] as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury.” Id.

¶ 6 In this case, the district court’s ruling on CDLF’s motion for preliminary injunction was based entirely on documentary evidence and testimony presented through affidavit. Because much of this evidence, such as the affidavit testimony, was not in a form “which would be admissible at the trial on the merits,” it could not become a part of the trial record. Moreover, the district court’s findings and conclusions based on such evidence cannot provide a basis for disposing of the case on the merits. This is particularly true where CDLF’s claims, or at least a portion of them, may be appropriate for trial by jury. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 (2003) (recognizing right to jury trial on issues of fact presented by certain types of actions); Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318, 1319-20 (1974) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to jury trial on disputed factual issues presented in context of claim seeking specific performance of contract for sale of land); Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b) (allowing for a separate trial of claims or issues “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice”).

¶ 7 In the interest of avoiding any further delay in the resolution of the underlying case, we dismiss CDLF’s interlocutory appeal as moot. The parties are free to return to the district court for a bench trial or, on those claims or portions of claims where appropriate, for a trial by jury.

¶ 8 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH’s opinion.