text:
    LAKE FARM v. DISTRICT BOARD OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, KALAMAZOO TOWNSHIP.
    Schools and School Districts — Residents—Charitable Institutions — Tuition.
    Children who are not dona fide residents of a family in a school district, hut are inmates of an institution of a charitable nature, in such district, engaged in the support and education of homeless and needy minors, and which does not contribute, by paying taxes, to the maintenance of district schools, are not entitled to attend school in the district which has determined not to admit nonresident pupils. 1 Comp. Laws, § 4683 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9904).
    Certiorari to Kalamazoo; Stewart, J.
    Submitted January 27,1914.
    (Calendar No. 25,910.)
    Decided March 26, 1914.
    Mandamus by Lake Farm, a corporation, against the district board of school district No. 2, township of Kalamazoo, to require respondent to admit to the public schools two boys, inmates of the relator’s institution. Writ granted and defendant brings certiorari.
    Reversed, and petition dismissed.

      Lynn B. Mason, for appellant.

      Sidney S. Wattles (Harry C. Howard, of counsel), for appellee;
   Kuhn, J.

The relator is a private corporation; organized under the laws of this State. Its purposes, as expressed in article 2 of its articles of association, are the “support, care and education of homeless and needy boys and the promotion of their moral and material needs.” It is maintained solely by private subscriptions and donations, and its principal office and place of business is in the city of Kalamazoo. For the purposes as above stated it maintains a farm in the township of Kalamazoo, a part of which, including the building in which the boys are kept, is situated within the boundaries of school district No. 2 of the township of Kalamazoo, the respondent herein. Being a charitable and benevolent institution within the meaning of section 9, subd. 1, Act No. 309 of the Public Acts of 1909, and section 7, subd. 4, Act No. 174 of the Public Acts of 1911 (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §1777 and §1775), its property is exempt from taxation for any purpose and is not assessed nor taxed for any purpose whatsoever.

It further appears that some 14 boys were being kept and cared for on this farm. Among them were Claude Diamond and Frederick Millen, both of the age of 14 years. Claude Diamond, in April, 1909, being found to be a neglected child, was committed to Lake Farm by an order of the juvenile division of the probate court of Kalamazoo county, and prior to that time he had lived with his mother and stepfather in the 'city of Kalamazoo. Frederick Millen was likewise committed to Lake Farm in July, 1910, by said probate court, and both of his parents also resided in the city of Kalamazoo. None of the parents of these two boys were residents of school district No. 2, the respondent. Neither of the boys had ever attended the school in this district, and during a part of the school year of 1912 they attended the public schools in the city of Kalamazoo, and during the remainder of the school year had a private tutor provided for them at Lake Farm. At the beginning of the present school -year, the two boys were sent to the school maintained in district No. 2 to enroll and attend. The district board, having theretofore duly determined not to receive nonresident pupils into its school, refused admission to the boys. Relator applied to the circuit court of Kalamazoo county for a writ of mandamus, and the order granting this writ is brought here by certiorari for review.

Section 4683, 2 Comp. Laws (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9904), provides as follows:

“All persons residents of any school district, and five years of age, shall have an equal right to attend any school therein; and no separate school or department shall be kept for any persons on account of race or color: Provided, that this shall not be construed to prevent the grading of schools according to the intellectual progress of the pupil, to be taught in separate places as may be deemed expedient.”

The sole question here involved is whether or not the inmates of an institution chartered for the support, care, and education of homeless and needy children by their presence in such an institution for the purposes of education and maintenance shall become entitled to free admission to the schools of the district in which it is located, the same as resident children. The circuit judge held that, as the Lake Farm stood in loco parentis to the boys, they were entitled to admission, because to deny them that right would not be in accord with the liberal educational policy of the State and would be contrary to public policy. This conclusion must necessarily be based upon the proposition that, as the institution was in loco parentis to the children, mere physical presence is all that is necessary to constitute a residence within the meaning of the language pf the statute. We are of the opinion, however, that in construing this language some consideration must be had of the occasion and purposes of such presence. The parents of these children were not residents of the district, and the children were brought to the farm for the very purpose of giving them proper support and education, which the institution under its charter had agreed to do. Can it be said that, after having assumed this obligation, the institution can shift this responsibility and undertaking to the school district and oblige the school district to do what it has undertaken to do? If it can send two of its boys to the district school for free tuition, it can with equal right increase the number, being limited only by the extent of its facilities to accommodate them on the farm. The injustice and unfairness of thus forcing onto a school district the education of the inmates of such an institution can readily be seen. It might easily result in the denial to the children actually residing in the district and whose parents sustain the school of the facilities they would otherwise have therein. This State has from its beginning maintained a liberal educational policy, and it is one of the glories of its people that free education has always been provided for children. The purposes of this institution are indeed laudable and should be encouraged; but, if it finds that it cannot fulfill its undertaking, it should decline to receive more than it can properly support and teach in conformity with its charter, and not attempt to place additional burdens upon others who are under responsibility to provide school facilities for the children who are legally dependent upon them. While we have been unable to find that this question has been raised in this State, our attention has been called to two Pennsylvania cases in which the facts were very similar to the case under consideration. See Commonwealth, ex rel. Fry, v. School District, 164 Pa. 603 (30 Atl. 507, 26 L. R. A. 581); Commonwealth, ex rel. Parris, v. School District, 164 Pa. 607 (30 Atl. 509, 26 L. R. A. 584); also, State v. School District, 10 Ohio St. 448.

The principal case relied upon by appellee is State v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48 (41 N. W. 1014). In that case the question was the relationship between the child and the person in whose family it was living. The child .had a mother residing in another part of the State, and the school district attempted to apply the doctrine that its legal residence followed that of its mother. We do not decide in this case that, if these boys became bona fide members of a family who resided in the school district and who were in loco parentis to them, that would not give them a residence so as to entitle them to school privileges. What we do decide is that nonresidents of a district , do not acquire a residence therein for school purposes by becoming inmates of an institution whose purpose, as expressed in its charter, is the support and education of children, and which does not contribute to the support of the schools in that district.

The writ of mandamus should not have issued. The order and judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the petition of relator for the writ of mandamus is dismissed.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Kuhn, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    CONGDON v. DETROIT, JACKSON & CHICAGO RAILWAY CO.
    1. Carriers — Negligence — Personal Injuries — Directed Verdict.
    Upon the trial of an action brought for injuries sustained in a collision between interurban cars of the defendant, evidence that the conductor of the car which caused the accident understood the train dispatcher over the telephone to order the cars to meet at one switch, and that the motor man repeated the order back as the conductor wrote it down, and the train dispatcher who testified that he gave the correct switch understood the motorman to repeat the order as he gave it, presented a question for the jury as to defendant’s negligence. The trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of defendant’s negligence.
    2. Same — Burden of Proof — Accident—Negligence.
    Where the defendant electric railway company claimed that the accident was unavoidable, that its telephone apparatus was in proper condition and that its employees exercised the high degree of care required of them in dispatching and operating trains, the evidence tended to rebut any inference of negligence, and although the circumstances were such as to justify an inference of negligence, the question was one of fact.
    Error to Washtenaw; Kinne, J.
    Submitted January 20, 1914.
    (Docket No. 18.)
    Decided March 26, 1914.
    Case by Susan Congdon against the Detroit, Jackson & Chicago Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff upon a verdict -directed by the court. Defendant brings error.
    Reversed.

      Cavanaugh & Burke (John W. Bennett, of counsel), for appellant.

      John P. Kirk, for appellee.
   Kuhn, J.

The plaintiff was injured in a head-on collision between two cars of the defendant company, in the county of Washtenaw, in this State. The dispatching of the cars was done by telephone. The dispatcher, who had control of the section of the road where the accident occurred, had his office in Ypsilanti. The trains which collided were No. 108, with conductor Balcom and motorman Clark, going west from Ypsilanti, and No. 109, conductor Clark and motorman Hudnut, going east from Jackson. The orders are given to the motorman and conductor of each train by the dispatcher, who writes the order at the time of giving it. The order is first received by the conductor while in the telephone booth. He writes this message, or train order, as he receives it over the telephone. The motorman then steps into the booth and, reading from the written order, repeats it back to the train dispatcher for the purpose of verification. The dispatcher then says, “Completed,” or “Correct,” if it is correctly repeated to him, and the motorman then signs the initials of the train dispatcher to the order. These orders are written by the conductor on a machine which makes triplicate orders, one of which is taken out by the conductor and one by the motorman, who retain them till the end of the day’s work, when they are forwarded to the office of the supervising dispatcher. The third copy remains in the machine until such time as it is refilled, when the copy is taken out and also sent to the supervising inspector.

On the day of the accident, the crew of train No. 108 were instructed to meet train No. 109 at Fink switch. This order was received and written by conductor Balcom exactly as written by the train dispatcher. Immediately thereafter the train dispatcher gave an order to the crew of train No. 109 at Jackson to meet train No. 108 at Fink switch. Conductor Clark, in taking this order, wrote the word “Bates” instead of “Fink,” which is a switch about eight miles eastward from Fink switch. The motorman testified that he read the order to the dispatcher as the conductor had written it; and the dispatcher testified that he heard the motorman read the order to meet train No. 108 at Fink, as he had originally written it. The collision occurred about two miles east of Fink switch and was caused by this confusion in the order.

The plaintiff, in order to establish defendant’s negligence, called as witnesses the supervising train dispatcher, the train dispatcher, and the motormen of defendant’s trains Nos. 108 and 109. The testimony of these witnesses was uncontradicted and showed that the motormen and the dispatchers were competent, experienced, and. careful men, who had been employed by the defendant for several years. Defendant called a witness whose testimony tended to show that a confusion and misunderstanding of names sometimes occurred in the transmission of messages over the telephone. The defendant requested the court to direct a verdict in its favor because no negligence had been shown, which was denied. The court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and submitted to the jury merely the question of the amount of damages.

An examination of this record satisfies us that the question of the defendant’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury. We think the case is governed by the principles of law announced by this court in the case of Sewell v. Railway, 158 Mich. 407, 409, 410 (123 N. W. 2), where it was said:

“It is the settled rule' of this State that negligence of the defendant must be proved, and that an inference of negligence is not to be drawn from the mere fact of an accident. But it has also been held in numerous cases that the circumstances attending an injury may be such as to justify an inference of negligence. As in the present case, if all that appeared had been that the plaintiff was riding in a car of the defendant under the control of its servants, and the car in which plaintiff was riding continued its course until it collided with another car ahead of it standing still, with sufficient force to push the still car ahead 75 feet, the inference that some one had blundered prima facie would be the most natural one to be drawn, and that inference is so clear that it would not require further proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. It is not very important as to whether this be termed a presumption arising from the peculiar facts of the case, or an inference of fact amounting, when not rebutted, to a positive inference of law. The result would be substantially the same. For cases bearing Upon this question, see Stoody v. Railway Co., 124 Mich. 420 (83 N. W. 26); Thurston v. Railway, 137 Mich. 231 (100 N. W. 395); Howell v. Railway Co., 136 Mich. 432 (99 N. W. 406).
“This inference, however, is open to rebuttal; and, if it appears that appliances of the railway company were in proper order and condition, and that the servants of the company did all that a high degree of care and prudence required in the conduct of the "business, the plaintiff’s case by inference is fully met. Dolph v. Railway Co., 149 Mich. 278 (112 N. W. 981); Rouston v. Railway, 151 Mich. 237 (115 N. W. 62).
“It is contended that the present case comes within this rule. We, however, agree with the circuit judge that this was a proper case for a jury, and depends in large part upon the credit given the statements of this witness.”

In the instant case, the accident was due to the mistake made by either the dispatcher in giving the order or the crew of train No. 109 in receiving it. As was said in the Sewell Case, the “inference that some one had blundered prima facie would be the most natural one to be drawn, and that inference is so clear that it would not require further proof of negligence on the part of the defendant.” However, it is the claim of the defendant that it was an unavoidable accident; that the telephone apparatus was in proper order and condition; and that its servants exercised the high degree of' prudence and care required of them in the dispatching and operating of its trains. This rebuts the inference of negligence, if the testimony of the witnesses satisfies the jury of these facts.' See, also, Niedzinski v. Electric Co., 160 Mich. 517 (125 N. W. 409); Felske v. Railway, 166 Mich. 367 (130 N. W. 676); Mirabile v. Murphy Co., 169 Mich. 522 (135 N. W. 299). The court properly denied the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict, but should have submitted the question of defendant’s negligence to the jury.

The judgment is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.


text:
    PEOPLE v. FROST.
    1. Criminal Law — Cross-Examination—Knowledge.
    A respondent, charged with selling intoxicating liquors in his drug store to be used as a beverage, was properly required by the court, on cross-examination, to answer whether he had sold other intoxicating liquors on the same day, his register of sales being in evidence and no objection having been made to its admission.
    2. Same.
    Nor was it erroneous to permit the prosecuting officer to ask of the witness whether he knew that the purchaser of liquor went home intoxicated after the alleged sale.
    3. Same — Trial—Leading Questions.
    It was within the discretion of the trial court to refuse the attorney for respondent the right to ask a leading question of a witness who had stated he did not remember about a certain conversation, but who did not appear confused, agitated, or unfamiliar with English.
    Exceptions before sentence from the superior court of Grand Rapids; Stuart, J.
    Submitted January 29, 1914.
    (Docket No. 139.)
    Decided March 26, 1914.
    Charles Frost was convicted of violating the liquor law.
    Affirmed.

      Grant Fellows, Attorney General, Earl F. Phelps, Prosecuting Attorney, and Louis T. Herman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

      Dunham & Dunham, for respondent.
   Kuhn, J.

The respondent, a druggist in the city of Grand Rapids, was convicted in the superior court of said city, on February 9, 1913, of selling one-quarter pint of alcohol to William Boles, to be used by him as a beverage. The respondent admitted the selling to Boles of the alcohol on the day alleged, but claimed that Boles said he wanted it to make a lotion for rheumatism — that is, for medicinal purposes — and that he registered Boles’ name and the purpose of the purchase, as required by section 5381, 2 Comp. Laws (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5057). The questions raised on this appeal relate to the rulings of the court as to admission and rejection of testimony and the charge of the court.

The prosecuting attorney asked respondent on cross-examination the following question: “Did you sell any other intoxicating liquors that day?” And the court permitted an answer over objection. The register, the book in which the respondent kept a record of his sales of liquor, was offered in evidence without objection by the defense, and it cannot be said that the question was asked to show that there were other illegal sales that day, as the sales may have been entirely lawful if the requirements' of the statute were complied with. It was proper cross-examination.

Louis Dolan, a witness produced by the respondent, testified:

“Q. Did you hear Mr. Boles state, after Mr. Frost came down, what he got the alcohol for?
“A. I did. He said he got the alcohol for his rheumatism.
“Q. What can you say as to whether at that time Boles was intoxicated or not?
“A. He was not.”
Cross-examination:
“Q. You knew that he went home drunk that day?
“Mr. Dunham: I object to the question and I except.
“Mr. Herman: I will show it now — never mind.
“Mr. Dunham: I except to that statement of the prosecuting attorney.
“Q. I want to know if you don’t know that he went home drunk that day?
“Mr. Dunham: I object to the question, and I except to the question also.
“The Court: He may answer.
“Mr. Dunham: I except to the ruling of the court also.
“A. I don’t know it.”

The cross-examination and the remark of the prosecutor are complained of, but we are of the opinion that it was proper cross-examination and no error was committed.

Another assigment of error relates to the examination of Charles Murray, a witness for the respondent, who testified as follows:

“Q. Did you hear anything about what the conversation was, if anything, as to who must do the registering?
“A. I could not say as to that.
“Q. I will ask you if you remember anything else that was said there between Dunn and Frost, about that book or about that register?
“A. Just, Mr. Dunn was saying that you did not make Mr. Boles register, and Mr. Boles did not register; he said that a couple of times.
“Q. Do you remember anything else that was said there between them about it?
“A. Not any more than just Frost and he were talking.
“Q. I will ask you this, if Mr. Frost said that it was not necessary for Boles to write himself, or register himself?
“Mr. Herman: I object to the question as being leading.
“Mr. Dunham: There is no question about its being leading.
“The Court: Yes, that would be leading. He need not answer that question.
“Q. Did you hear — do you remember now anything more that was said than you have already given?
“A. I could not say just the words that were said. I did not pay much attention.
“Q. Do you remember of Mr. Frost’s saying, it is not necessary for Mr. Boles himself to write his name?
“Mr. Herman: I object to that as being leading.
“The Court: That has been ruled on.
“Mr. Dunham: I understand it, but I think the question is competent now.
“The Court: Of course, the ruling would be same.
“Mr. Dunham: I have exhausted the witness’ recollection, and I think the question is competent.
“The Court: No.
“Mr. Dunham: I will take an exception.”

It is the claim of respondent’s counsel that the court should have permitted him to ask the leading question as he had exhausted the witness’ recollection. This was respondent’s own witness. It does not appear that he was hostile, or that he was confused or agitated, or that he did not understand the English language. The question was clearly , leading, and whether or not it should be answered was a matter within the discretion of the court, which we are satisfied was not abused. People v. Jensen, 66 Mich. 711 (33 N. W. 811).

A number of assignments of error relate to the judge’s charge, and the principal' criticism that is made is that it was argumentative. A careful reading of the whole charge convinces us that it carefully guarded the respondent’s rights and properly submitted to the jury the question in issue.

We are satisfied that no error was committed on the trial of this case. The conviction of the respondent is affirmed, and the trial court is directed to proceed to judgment.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.


text:
    BERGER v. ROE.
    1. Quieting Title — Adequate Remedy at Law — Possession.
    A bill in equity to quiet title, which does not aver that the complainants are in possession or the defendants are not in possession, is demurrable, for if the defendants are in possession they are entitled to a jury trial. Act No. 256, Pub. Acts 1909 (4 How.’Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11965).
    2. Same — Equity—Fraud.
    While equity does not take jurisdiction of cases in which a full and adequate remedy at law exists, if it is made to appear that there is some feature of the case peculiarly within the province of a court of equity, the bill may be maintained.
    3. Equity — Jurisdiction—Cancellation oe Instruments.
    In a bill of complaint founded on fraud of one of the defendants in procuring the execution by complainant of a contract to purchase land, which complainant averred the other defendant claimed to own and that he had in- . stituted a suit, then pending, against the original claimant of the property, for possession thereof, the prayer of the complainant for cancellation of the contract on the ground of fraud gave the court jurisdiction, as to the defendant grantor: a demurrer of the other defendant was properly sustained because the remedy at law was adequate.

      Appeal from Muskegon; Sullivan, J.
    Submitted January 20, 1914.
    (Docket No. 133.)
    Decided March 26, 1914.
    Bill by Frederick P. Berger against Jennie Roe and John Torrent for cancellation of a land contract and to quiet title. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint, complainant appeals.
    Reversed as to defendant Roe.

      Turner & Turner, for appellant.

      R. J. Macdonald (W. H. Simpson, of counsel), for appellee Torrent.

      Cross, Vanderwerp, Foote & Ross, for appellee Jennie Roe.
   Kuhn, J.

The complainant has appealed from an order sustaining defendants’ demurrer. The bill of complaint sets up a contract between the complainant and the defendant Jennie Roe by which the former purchased from the latter what is described as “all of the squatter’s right” to certain lands, “together with the house situated on said premises and the lumber belonging to the same,” for the sum of $250, of which sum $31 have been paid on the purchase price. The bill of complaint further alleges:

“Complainant further shows unto said court: That on said day at the time of the execution of said contract, this complainant had no knowledge of the title to said land except as represented to him by said. defendant, Jennie Roe, and that, not being familiar with such matters, he relied fully on such representations and placed implicit reliance on the same and believed the same to be true. That said defendant then and there represented to complainant that said land was government land, that it had never been surveyed by the government, and that no person had any right or interest in the same, that said land had been taken possession of by her brother, David Al-worth, that he had erected buildings thereon and cultivated the same, and that he had never been disturbed in such possession; that John Torrent, who is a resident of said city and county, had at one time, several years ago, commenced proceedings against said David Alworth to oust him from said possession, and that he had abandoned said proceedings, and that the court had decided that said Torrent had no rights in said land or any title thereto; that said .David Al-worth had communicated with the proper authorities both at Lansing and Washington, and that he had been assured that the said land was government land, supposed to be under water, had never been surveyed, and that the government had never given title thereto to any person whatever; that in case said lands were ever surveyed any one in possession could then apply for the same and purchase the same at the government price — all of which representations were untrue and no basis for the same. That said defendant had no knowledge whatever about the condition of the title to said land nor as to the status of any suit brought by said John Torrent against said David Alworth, for the possession of said land. Complainant has caused the records to be examined, and on information and belief charges that there is a suit now pending in the circuit court for said county for the possession of said land, commenced by said John Torrent against said David Alworth. That the same has never been tried, and that the court has in no case ever had an opportunity to adjudicate the question of title to said land. That said John Torrent claims to own said land. That he claims that he has purchased the government title to all the lands on section 17 in township 10 north, range 16 west, in said county and State, and that the land described in said contract is located on said section. That complainant has no actual knowledge as to who the owner is of said land; whether owned by said John Torrent, Jennie Roe or by the government. That if owned by the government, complainant is satisfied with his contract and is ready and willing to pay for the same in accordance with the conditions thereof. That the claim of said John Torrent is a cloud upon complainant’s title to said land and the personal property located on the same; said property consisting of a house of the value of more than $100, together with other property of some value.”

It is further alleged, on information and belief, that the contract was procured by means of untrue statements, and is a fraud against complainant’s rights, and that there is an entire want of consideration for the moneys already paid on the contract.

The relief prayed for is as follows:

“(a) That said contract be declared null and void and of no effect and that complainant be wholly released from all the requirements contained in the same.-
“(b) That if the said John Torrent be found to be the owner of said premises, then in that case the said defendant Jennie Roe be enjoined from interfering in any manner with the possession of complainant in and to said premises.
“(c) That the title to said premises and personal property be quieted in accordance with the just rights of all the parties interested or who claim to be interested in the same, who are parties to this suit.
“(d) That complainant have such other and such further relief in the premises as shall be consistent with equity and as to said court shall seem meet.”

In so far as the bill of complaint purports to be a bill to quiet title, it is clearly demurrable. Nowhere in the bill is it shown that any one is in possession of the premises described therein, and it does not allege that the defendants are not in possession. The statute with reference to the filing of a bill in chancery to quiet title is Act No. 256, Public Acts of 1909 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11965), which amends section 448, 1 Comp. Laws. It provides:

“Any person claiming' the legal or equitable title to lands, or claiming a title to lands through tax deed or deeds whether in possession or not, may institute a suit in chancery against any other person, not in possession,” etc.

If in possession, they are entitled to have their title determined by a law proceeding and a jury trial. Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Chandler v. Graham., 123 Mich. 327 (82 N. W. 814); Monroe v. Carter, 167 Mich. 325 (132 N. W. 1023). For this reason, so far as the interest of John Torrent is concerned, the bill was clearly demurrable.

It is urged, however, that equity has jurisdiction because of the allegation of fraud in the bill. It is well settled in this State that courts of law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fraud, but, as was said in the case of Detroit Trust Co. v. Old National Bank, 155 Mich. 61, 65 (118 N. W. 729):

“In this State equity has not taken jurisdiction of cases where a suitor has a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law, unless it is shown that there is some feature of the case peculiarly within the province of a court of equity.”

The bill prays that the contract be declared null and void and that complainant be wholly released from all the requirements in the same. This is specific relief, especially equitable, and, in our opinion, brings the case within equity jurisdiction.

A careful review of many of the decisions of this court on this question will be found in Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 143 Mich. 138 (106 N. W. 722, 5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1036). In Mack v. Village of Frankfort, 123 Mich. 421 (82 N. W. 209), cited by defendants, complainants merely sought a money judgment and there was no prayer for relief peculiar to courts of equity. See, also, Hamilton v. Hulled Bean Co., 143 Mich. 277 (106 N. W. 731); Roberts v. Sholes, 144 Mich. 215 (107 N. W. 904); Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Blain, 144 Mich. 218 (107 N. W. 877); Beaton v. Inland Township, 149 Mich. 558 (113 N. W. 361); Culver v. Avery, 161 Mich. 322 (126 N. W. 439).

The order of the trial judge sustaining 'the demurrer is affirmed as to defendant John Torrent and reversed as to defendant Jennie Roe, and the usual time to answer is given. Defendant Torrent will recover costs against complainant, and complainant will recover costs against defendant Jennie Roe.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.


author: Stone, J.

text:
    LINCOLN v. DETROIT & MACKINAC RAILWAY CO.
    1. Estates of Decedents — Death—Executors—Negligence.
    Under the death act (3 Comp. Laws, §§ 10427, 10428; 5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 13702, 13703), conferring a right of action on the personal representatives of a decedent for his death by negligence, and in favor and for the benefit of persons deprived of decedent’s care and support, a new right of action arises and the cause of action may not be said to survive as it does under the survival act. 3 Comp. Laws, § 10117 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12761).
    2. Executors and Administrators — Recovery for Loss of Earnings — Infants—Minors—Survival Act.
    Although the measure of damages recoverable by the representatives of a deceased infant differs from that which the minor could recover in an action as plaintiff for personal injuries, the cause of action is based on the same wrongful act, and the right which is conferred by the death act, so called, would authorize the personal representative to maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the act or default within the meaning of the statute; hence his administrator could recover for his negligent and wrongful death by drowning, although the infant would not be entitled to maintain an action for his lost earning power, which belonged to his parents until he reached his majority.

      3. Death — Negligence — Presumptions —■ Contributory Negligence.
    Where the decedent was drowned, as plaintiff claimed, because defendant’s agents intrusted him with a leaky and insufficient boat, which had not been properly repaired or inspected, and there were no eyewitnesses of the accident, it is to be presumed, on the trial, that the deceased, an infant, exercised ordinary caution.
    4. Same.
    The right of action also differs from that which the decedent might have maintained for injuries, if he had not been killed; the statute does not transfer a right of action to the estate of the deceased, but confers a new right, based on different principles, constituting an asset of the estate.
    5. Same — Railroads—Evidence.
    Evidence that decedent and his companions hired a boat of defendant's agent, at a resort; that said agent permitted the deceased, a minor, to overload the boat with passengers, although sufficient larger boats were present and might have been used; that the deceased asked for a larger boat, and was told that the one he had would do; that it was unseaworthy and leaked; that pieces of the woodwork of the boat were afterwards found floating showing a decomposed condition of the wood, and the air tank, supposed to be nonsinkable, was full of water and only floated because of the buoyancy of the wood to which it was attached, sufficiently presented a question of fact for the jury, and the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant upon counsel’s opening statement of the proofs proposed to be offered.
    Error to Arenac; Sharpe, J.
    Submitted January 8, 1914.
    (Docket No. 11.)
    Decided March 26, 1914.
    Case by Lansing E. Lincoln, as administrator of the estate of Ion Lincoln, deceased, against the Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company for the wrongful death of decedent. Judgment for defendant on a verdict directed by the court. Plaintiff brings error.
    Reversed.

      William C. Cook and Tom Bechraft, for appellant.

      Henry, Henry & Henry (James McNamara, of counsel), for appellee.
   Stone, J.

The defendant owns and operates a rail-

way system running from Pinconning, Bay county, to Linwood in said county, and elsewhere. It owns, in connection with its railway system, a pleasure resort located along its right of way at its station at Linwood, which resort is contiguous to the waters of Saginaw bay. In connection with this summer resort, it operates and controls certain amusement features, to wit, stands, bathing, boating, and other devices for the amusement of the public, for profit.

On June 17, 1912, plaintiff’s intestate, a boy 16 years of age, was a passenger for hire on excursion rates from his home in Pinconning to said summer resort, to attend a school children’s picnic thereat. Upon his arrival at said resort he secured a ticket from the defendant’s ticket agent for the use of one of defendant’s rowboats. He presented the ticket to another agent of defendant who had the boats in charge, and obtained a certain boat known as “D. & M. Ry. Co. No. 22” from the boat tender, which was a 14-foot steel rowboat. The boat was obtained by plaintiff’s decedent for the purpose of taking a row on the waters of the bay, in company with three companions of about the same age. Soon after leaving the landing the children were lost sight of, and it was afterwards discovered that they had been drowned. The action was brought under what is termed the “death act” to recover the pecuniary damages which it is claimed the father and mother have sustained by the death.

The declaration, after averring the duty of the defendant, alleges that it failed to provide plaintiff’s intestate and his three companions a reasonably safe and seaworthy boat; that it failed to provide for a careful and prudent inspection of said boat as to its repair before leasing the same as aforesaid; that it failed to maintain the ends, side, and bottom of said boat free from holes and leaks so that water could not enter to the inside of said boat when in use by plaintiff’s intestate and his companions for rowing purposes upon said water; that it failed to maintain the strip of wood around the inner side of said boat, to which were attached the prow and stern seats, to which seats were attached the air bulkheads or tanks, free from rot and other defects, etc., and alleging that it failed in some six other particulars, including that of permitting said boat to be overloaded, and that said boat was a two-passenger boat, etc.

The trial court having directed a verdict for the defendant upon the opening statement of plaintiff’s counsel, without receiving any evidence, it becomes necessary to refer to such statement. In such statement plaintiff’s counsel stated, in substance, that he would show upon the trial that the strip which went around the inner side of the boat, to which was attached the seats, was of wood; that at the time the defendant’s agent permitted decedent to get into the boat to go upon the water for a boat ride, he permitted decedent to load into what was really a two-passenger boat four people, although decedent asked for a larger boat, but was told that the boat was large enough; that this was the first day of the year that the rowboats were placed for the use of the public; that they had not been inspected to determine whether or not they were in a seaworthy condition, and safe repair; that decedent and his companions left the dock at said resort between 11 and 12 o’clock a. m., and that a watch found in the pocket of one of the decedents had stopped between 12 and 1 p. m.; that when last seen the boat and party were about three-quarters of a mile out from shore; that at the time the boat left the dock in charge of said party, it was in bad condition, and water was entering into the boat through seams in the rusting metal, it being an old boat, and had not been repainted or overhauled; that there were lying upon the beach and at hand larger boats of sufficient capacity to carry four and six passengers; that the hull of the boat furnished by defendant to decedent was constructed of steel; that the boat was not found, but that there were found floating on the surface, supported by the rear seat, the stern bulkhead and the boat mark, “Boat No. 22 D. & M.;” that the bulkhead under the seat was an oblong can, which should have been airtight; that around the edge of this seat, when it was found, there were several screw nails still sticking through the wood of the seat board; that on the ends of these screw nails were particles of decomposed rotten wood still adhering, the screw nails having pulled loose from the boat; that the air tank, which should have been nonsinkable, was full of water, and only floated by reason of the board’s buoyancy; that although the inspector was there he had received from defendant no orders to inspect said boat; that it had been the custom of defendant in prior years to furnish a beach patrol with a field glass, but that no patrol was provided by defendant at this time; that the bay or water adjacent to this resort was very dangerous, and subject to sudden wind squalls — all of which was known to defendant, but not to decedent, and that defendant paid no attention to the safety of the plaintiff’s decedent and his companions. Damages were claimed under sections 6308 and 6309, 2 Comp. Laws (3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§6663-4), relating to railroad companies, and sections 10427 and 10428, 3 Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§13702-3).

It was the claim of the defendant that by a proper construction of the statutes, above cited, there could be no recovery in the case, because if death had not ensued, the “party injured,” Ion Lincoln; could not have sued the defendant for the recovery of his earning power, for that belonged to his parents, and also for the further reason that the cause of death was wholly conjectural.

The trial court, after a lengthy argument by counsel, but without stating any reasons therefor, directed a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff has brought the case here by writ of error, and by proper assignments of error he claims:

(1) That under the statutes above cited, the plaintiff may maintain an action for the drowning of his intestate, who was a minor 16 years of age, occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect, and default of defendant, in having furnished plaintiff’s intestate with an unsafe and unseaworthy boat; (2) that death by drowning is an instantaneous death; (3) that the measure of damages would be the amount found by the jury that they should deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to the persons who may be entitled to such damages when recovered, to wit, the earning power of decedent from the time of his death until he became 21 years of age, less what it would cost for his maintenance, under the rule as stated in Black v. Railroad Co., 146 Mich. 568 (109 N. W. 1052); (4) that damages recoverable under the statutes cited are held to be assets of decedent’s estate, and should be so considered, even before recovery had thereunder; (5) that the case as stated' by counsel did not leave the cause of death conjectural.

We quote the following from the brief of defendant and appellee:

“In the statements made by plaintiff’s counsel in the circuit court and in his brief filed in this court, the following admissions are made, which to some extent limit the scope of discussion on the questions of law. (1) That plaintiff’s decedent, Ion Lincoln, was a minor, 16 years of age at the time of his death; (2) that plaintiff’s decedent came to his death on the 17th day of June, 1912, by drowning; that no one was a witness to the occasion of his death; (3) that the death of plaintiff’s decedent was instantaneous; (4) that the measure of damages recoverable in this case was plaintiff’s decedent’s ‘earning powers up to the time he became of age, less what it would cost for his maintenance.’ ”

Also quoting plaintiff’s third proposition as above set forth:

“(5) That no damages can be recovered under the common law for the death of an individual; (6) that no recovery can be had in this case, other than by virtue of the statute laws of this State, viz.,” referring to the statutes cited by plaintiff. * * *
“We shall assume that each and every one of the above allegations is agreed upon and conceded to be true, and from such premises we shall briefly consider the law which must control.”

1. We summarize the following from the American authorities: The death loss act of the English statute of 1846 (St. 9 & 10 Viet. 93), commonly called “Lord Campbell’s Act,” and the various laws of a similar kind that have been modeled after it, gave a new cause of action unknown to the common law, for the benefit of certain designated classes of surviving relatives. Such relatives do not take the cause of action for damages to the deceased by transfer to them by operation of law, or otherwise, but are enabled by the statute to recover the pecuniary loss to themselves caused by the wrongful taking off of the decedent, the continuation of whose life would have been beneficial to them. The action accrues to the surviving beneficiary mentioned in the statute by reason of the death of the injured person caused by the wrongful act of another. It is strictly not proper to say that it is a cause of action which survives; it is rather a new action given by sections 10427 and 10428, 3 Comp'. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 13702-3), which can be brought, not for the benefit of the estate but solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute. The above sections, when compared with section 10117, 8 Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §12761), are made plain. They refer to entirely distinct losses recoverable in different rights. Section 10117'refers to the right of the deceased for the loss and injury occasioned to him. Sections 10427 and 10428 refer to the right of the surviving relatives as beneficiaries for the loss to them. Both are dependent on the injury. The language of one provision is that “actions for personal injuries shall survive,” and of the other “in case of the death of a person by the wrongful act of another.” Section 10117 creates no new liability, but prevents the lapsing by death of an old one, while sections 10427 and 10428 create a new liability, one not known to the common law.

The case of Read v. Railway Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 555, is often referred to. The decision there is only to the effect that if an injured person have satisfaction of his claim before death, the subsequent death from the injuries does not confer a right of action upon surviving relatives; that such right exists only where there is an existing claim for damages therefor at the time of his death. Justice Blackburn, who delivered the opinion, said, in substance, that the proper construction of the statute is that it gives a right of action to certain surviving relatives of a person when death was caused by the wrongful act of another, where he had not received satisfaction in his lifetime, and that to go further would be straining the language of the law. The language of our statute (section 10427) is that liability of the wrongdoer exists where the deceased could have recovered, if death had not ensued. That clearly excludes the idea that where the decedent receives satisfaction for his injuries, the conditions requisite to the right of surviving relatives may exist notwithstanding. There is nothing in Read v. Railway Co. in conflict with Blake v. Railway Co., 10 Eng. Law & Eq. 443, where, in a very instructive opinion by Coleridge, J., it is said that Lord Campbell’s act does not transfer to the surviving relatives mentioned the claim for damages previously possessed by the deceased, but gives to them an independent cause of action for damages peculiarly incident to their relations to the deceased. As was well said by Marshall, J., in Brown v. Railway Co., 102 Wis. 146 (77 N. W. 751, 44 L. R. A. 579), in speaking of the last two cited cases:

. “The two cases are often cited to opposite views, but are in fact, when correctly understood, in perfect harmony. The one holds that the right of the relatives named in the statutes is separate and distinct from that possessed by the deceased; the other, that the right of the relatives is contingent on the death of the injured person without having satisfied his claim for damages.”

See Id., 102 Wis. 137 (77 N. W. 748, 78 N. W. 771, 44 L. R. A. 579).

In Cooley on Torts (1st Ed.), at page 263, that eminent author, in speaking of Lord Campbell’s act, says:

“It is seen, on a perusal of this statute, that it gives an action only when the deceased himself, if the injury had not resulted in his death, might have maintained one. In other words, it continues for the benefit of the wife, husband, etc., a right of action which, at the common law, would have terminated at the death,_ and enlarges its scope to embrace the injury resulting from the death. If, therefore, the party injured had compromised for the injury, and accepted satisfaction previous to the death, there could have been no further right of action, and consequently no suit under the statute. It is a logical conclusion, also, that if the negligence of the person killed contributed proximately to the fatal injury, no action can be maintained on the statute, because he himself could have brought none had the injury not proved fatal. So if the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, no action will lie under the statute against the master, unless the statute, by construction, appears to give it in such case. A question has also been made in some States whether suit could be maintained where the death was instantaneous; and in Massachusetts, under a somewhat nice and technical construction of the statute, it was decided that the action would not lie in such case. But probably under no existing statute would it be so held now.”

In speaking of the measure of damages in such action, at page 272, the same author says:

“If a parent sues for the killing of a minor child, who is yet too young to render services, it is manifest that for the time being there could be no pecuniary loss whatever, and whether the child, if living, would ever become serviceable, must be matter for speculation only. Yet, as the statutes plainly give the right of action for the benefit of the parent, without restriction to circumstances, but manifestly assume that there is some injury in every case, the right to recover in these cases must be deemed unquestionable” — citing cases.

The act known as “Lord Campbell’s Act,” and frequently referred to as the “death act,” was adopted by the legislature of this State in 1848. With a slight amendment in section 2, indicated below, the act is now embraced in sections 10427 and 10428, 3 Comp. Laws.

As originally enacted it was as follows [Act No. 38]:

“Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and. recover damages, in respect thereof, then and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.”
“Sec. 2. Every such action shall be' brought by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action, shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin in the proportions provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property, left by persons dying intestate; and in every such action, the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person.”

In section 2 amendment was by striking out words in italics and inserting “distributed to the persons and.”

Counsel for defendant contend that the clause of the statute which must control is the following:

_ “And the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof”—

and the claim is asserted that, .had not death ensued, Ion Lincoln could not have maintained an action for the recovery of his earning power, for that would belong to his parents. We do not agree with counsel’s construction of this language. We have already shown, by quotation from Cooley on Torts, what that author understood by the words in parenthesis in the above quotation. He says:

“It is seen, on a perusal of this statute, that it gives an action only when the deceased himself, if the injury had not resulted in his death, might have maintained one.”

The author then illustrates by showing that if the injured party had compromised for the injury, and accepted satisfaction previous to his death, there could be no further right of action, or if he had been guilty of contributory negligence, no action could be maintained on the statute, because he himself could have brought none had the injury not proved fatal. He then proceeds to show that if the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant the result would be the same. Let us suppose that instead of having been drowned the decedent had, by the wrongful act of the defendant, lost a leg or an arm. Would it be contended that he, although a minor, could not, in such case, maintain an action for the injury, including his pain and suffering? True his measure of damages in such a case would be different from that of the plaintiff in this case. But that fact does not meet or answer the question. The statute does not say that he must be able to maintain the same action and recover the same damages, but “an action and recover damages in respect thereof.” In respect of what? Manifestly, for the same wrongful act, neglect, or default. So we say that, although the measure of damages may differ, the cause of action is the same; that is, the wrongful act, neglect, or default. We are of opinion that counsel place a wrong interpretation upon the language of the statute.

It is also claimed by defendant that the case of Verlinde v. Railroad Co., 165 Mich. 371 (130 N. W. 317), disposes of the question in favor of the contention of the defendant. That action was brought under the “survival act,” so called; the boy having lived two hours after his injury. The declaration contained one count, and averred the right of the father and mother, to recover damages for pecuniary loss and injury, and the deprivation “of the value of the services, assistance, aid, comfort, society, and prospective earnings of intestate until he would have arrived at the age of 21 years,” to the amount of $5,000, and also that intestate would, after becoming 21 years old, have earned $40 a month, and, in consequence of his injuries, he suffered great pain, and his estate had suffered a loss thereby through pain and suffering, and what he would have earned after he became 21 years old during his expectancy of life, etc. At the beginning of the testimony,- defendant’s counsel objected to the reception of any testimony, for the reason that there was a misjoinder of causes of action in one count. The objection was overruled and exception taken. Later in the course of the trial, the following paper, executed by the parents, was received in evidence, against the objection and exception of counsel for defendant:

“We, the parents of Peter Verlinde, formerly of Waters, Michigan, now deceased, hereby severally surrender to the estate of said Peter Verlinde, all right of action for damages for the injuries sustained by him and his consequent death on June 20, 1908, through the claimed negligence of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, and all loss of earnings and earning capacity during his minority, which otherwise would have existed in us, or either of us, hereby granting such rights and claims to the said estate and severally releasing such company from all such rights and claims upon our several parts.”

The language of Justice Blair, who wrote the opinion, upon the points here involved, was as follows:

“We are of the opinion that the defendant’s objections to the declaration and charge based thereon are well founded. The plaintiff could not combine in one count a claim for loss of his son’s services with his claim as administrator under the survival act, and recover for both in the same action. Walker v. Traction Co., 144 Mich. 685 (108 N. W. 90); Id., 156 Mich. 514 (121 N. W. 271); Fournier v. Railway, 157 Mich. 589 (122 N. W. 299). Neither could the administrator combine in one count a claim under the death act, so called, and a claim under the survival act, and recover both classes of damages. Dolson v. Railway Co., 128 Mich. 444 (87 N. W. 629); Carbary v. Railway, 157 Mich. 683 (122 N. W. 367). Independent of statute, the father could only recover for the loss of services accruing between the injury and the death. Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Merlke v. Township of Bennington, 58 Mich. 156 (24 N. W. 776, 55 Am. Rep. 666). No cause of action survived for loss of services, which belonged to the father. Walker v. Traction Co., supra. And the father could not confer upon the administrator a cause of action for loss of services subsequent to death which he himself did not possess.”

We cannot agree with the contention of defendant relating to the Verlinde and Walker Cases, for they should be viewed together. In the Walker Case, suit was brought under the “survival act,” and the damages which the administrator could recover were those which Mrs. Walker could have recovered in her lifetime had she lived to prosecute the suit. Inasmuch as her services belonged to her husband, she not having been emancipated, her personal representative, under that act, could not recover for the loss of the services. The court properly said, therefore: “No action survived for the loss of services, which belonged to the husband.”

In the Verlinde Case, the father claimed the right to recover for the loss of his minor son’s services in an action brought under the “survival act,” and the court very properly, we think, said: “No cause of action survived for loss of services, which belonged to the father.” In other words, this court said that, inasmuch as the case was brought under the “survival act,” the only damages which the administrator could recover were such as the boy could have recovered, and as his services belonged to the father, he could not recover for those. We think that when the distinction between the two causes of action is kept in mind, the difficulty disappears.

We are here dealing with the “death act,” as all agree, and we think that the instant ease is readily distinguished from the cases above referred to.

Counsel for defendant have called our attention to Osborn v. Gillett, decided in the Court of Exchequer of England in 1878 and reported in L. R., 8 Exch. 88. In that case the declaration was for injuries caused to E., plaintiff’s “daughter and servant,” by the negligent driving of defendant’s servant, by reason whereof she afterwards died; claiming as special damages the loss of E.’s services and her burial expenses. There was a special plea that E. was killed “on the spot.” This plea was demurred to, and by a divided court the defendant was given judgment on the plea, and it was held that a master cannot maintain an action for injuries which cause the immediate death of his servant. Conceding, what does not appear in the case, that the daughter was a minor, this should be said of the decision: That it was not by a court of last resort, but by a court inferior to the King’s Bench and. the Common Pleas. It was rendered 25 years after Michigan had adopted Lord Campbell’s act, and after this court had construed that act, in Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180. Where a foreign statute has been construed by the courts of the State or country where first enacted, and subsequently such statute is adopted here, the general rule is that such construction will be followed by the courts of the adopting State, upon the principle of comity; but to this rule there are exceptions.

Our attention has also been called to Griffiths v. The Earl of Dudley, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 357, decided in 1882, where Field, J., said:

“Read v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. is a clear decision that Lord Campbell’s act did not give any new cause of action, but only substituted the right of the representative to sue in the place of the right which the deceased himself would have had if he had survived.”

We need only say that this language is opposed to the great weight of authority in this country, as evidenced by the decisions and by textwriters. Cooley on Torts (1st Ed.), p. 264.

In Mich. Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, at page 69 (33 Sup. Ct. 192), Justice Lurton, in speaking of Lord Campbell’s act, said:

“This act has been, in its distinguishing features, re-enacted in many of the States, and both in the courts of the States and of England has been construed not as operating as a continuance of any right of action which the injured person would have had but for his death, but as a new or independent cause of action for the purpose of compensating certain dependent members of the family for the deprivation, pecuniarily, resulting to them from his wrongful death. * * *

“In one of the earliest cases which arose under the act, Coleridge, J., said:

“ ‘It will be evident that this act does not transfer this right of action to his representative, but gives to the representative a totally new right of action, on different principles.’ Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. Div. 93.

“In Seward v. The Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cases, 59, Lord Blackburn said:

“ ‘A totally new action is given against the person who would have been responsible to the deceased if the deceased had lived; an action which * * * is new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principle, in every way new, and which can only be brought if there is any person answering the description of the widow, parent, or child, who under such circumstances suffers pecuniary loss.’
“But as the foundation of the right of action is the original wrongful injury to the decedent, it has been generally held that the new action is a right dependent upon the existence of a right in the decedent immediately before his death to have maintained an action for his wrongful injury. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, § 124. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U. S. 230 [14 Sup. Ct. 579]; Read v. Railway, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 555; Hecht v. Railway, 132 Ind. 507 [32 N. E. 302]; Fowlkes v. Railroad Co., 9 Heisk. [Tenn.] 829; Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24 [42 Am. Rep. 271]; Southern Bell Telegraph Co. v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575 [36 S. E. 881, 50 L. R. A. 694].”

See, also, Hurst v. Railway, 84 Mich. 539 (48 N. W. 44). By the great weight of American authority, the right to recover in such a case is maintained. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Henson, 58 Fed. 531, 7 C. C. A. 349; City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (68 Am. Dec. 553); Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Baddeley, 150 Ill. 328 (36 N. E. 965); Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend, 71 Kan. 524 (81 Pac. 205, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 191).

In Watson v. Railway Co., 70 Minn. 514 (73 N. W. 400), the right is recognized, but as the statute of that State specially names the recipients, and does not include the husband, it was held that he could not recover; and the court calls attention to the feature that distinguishes their statute from ours. This distinguishing feature controls the decisions of a number of the States. Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191; Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470 (15 N. E. 350, 4 Am. St. Rep. 548); Bream v. Brown, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 168); Trafford v. Express Co., 8 Lea (Tenn.), 96; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563 (18 S. W. 243). There are States, notably Virginia, holding a different doctrine.

We think that the profession in this State would be surprised were we to hold, at this late day, that the father and mother of a minor child, who had been instantaneously killed by the wrongful act of a defendant, could not, through an administrator, maintain a suit for damages, or a husband for the wrongful death of a wife. Such right has been recognized in many cases in this State. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Cooper v. Railway Co., 66 Mich. 261 (33 N. W. 306, 11 Am. St. Rep. 482); Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 74 Mich. 20 (41 N. W. 847); Nelson v. Railway Co., 104 Mich. 582 (62 N. W. 993); Miller v. Meade Township, 128 Mich. 98 (87 N. W. 131); Black v. Railroad Co., 146 Mich. 568 (109 N. W. 1052); Gorton v. Harmon, 152 Mich. 473 (116 N. W. 443, 15 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 461). Many other cases might be added to this list. It is true that the precise question here discussed was not raised in those cases, but the right to maintain the action under the death act was determined. The latest case to which our attention has been called is that of Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Gilpin (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit), 208 Fed. 126, 125 C. C. A. 278. It was there held, that under our statute, an action may be maintained by a husband against a railroad company for the wrongful killing of his wife, by which he lost her services, though death was instantaneous.

That the right of action under the death act constitutes assets of the estate of deceased was held in Findlay v. Railway Co., 106 Mich. 700 (64 N. W. 732).

2. This brings us to the second question discussed: Was the cause of death conjectural? It should be borne in mind that there, is no living witness to the drowning, and that decedent is not here to give his testimony. In the absence of such testimony the presümption is that he and his companions were in the exercise of due care, which presumption is sufficient to permit recovery if negligence is shown on the part of the defendant. Gilbert v. Railroad Co., 161 Mich. 73, 79 (125 N. W. 745); Gates v. Beebe, 170 Mich. 107 (135 N. W. 934); Richardson v. Railway Co., 176 Mich. 413 (142 N. W. 832). We cannot say, as matter of law, that the defendant was not guilty of any of the alleged negligence.

In La Fernier v. Wrecking Co., 129 Mich. 596, at page 604 (89 N. W. 353), this court said:

“While it is true that, simply because an accident has occurred, negligence is not to be presumed, still, in determining the question of negligence, the fact that an accident has occurred may be and should be taken into consideration,' in connection with all other facts and circumstances of the case, for the purpose of determining whether in fact there was negligence.”

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a new trial granted.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Kuhn, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.