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    PETER STAUFFER, Administrator of ROSE STAUFFER, Deceased, v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
    Division One,
    May 31, 1912.
    1. PLEADING: General Denial: Specifically and Generally. To deny specifically without specifying is a novelty in pleading. An answer denying “each and every allegation in said petition contained, both generally and specifically,” would challenge attention, if the question were vital.
    2. NEGLIGENCE:' Demurrer: At Close of Case. Where defendant does not stand on its demurrer at the close of plaintiff’s case, but goes on and puts in its own case, a final demurrer searches all the testimony, to see if plaintiff’s case was not aided by defendant’s proof.
    3. -: -: What Things are Taken as True. A demurrer to plaintiff’s case accepts plaintiff’s evidence as true, •so long as it is not impossible as opposed to the physics of the case or entirely beyond reason-. It also takes defendant’s testimony as untrue where contradicted by plaintiff’s; and it leaves to the jury the weight due the testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and to reconcile contradictions, if any, in the proof. It, therefore, allows to plaintiff’s case every reasonable inference of fact arising on all the proof.
    4. -: -: In View of the Applicable Law: Injury to Passenger. A carrier is under the duty of exercising a very high degree of care to its passengers; and when a demurrer to plaintiff’s case is interposed in a suit for damages where plaintiff while a passenger on defendant’s car was injured, it must be ruled in view of that rule of law.

      5. -: Carrier and Passenger: Degree of Care. A street railway carrier of passengers is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers, hut its contractual and legal duty is to carry safely. The standard of care rises with the hazard.
    6. -: Excesive Verdict: $10,275: Aneurism in Young Unmarried Woman. Plaintiff, a robust healthy girl, twenty-six years of age, while a passenger on defendant’s street car, was injured by its collision with a steam roller. She lost weight and the color of health, and became nervous and depressed; she could labor no more; womb troubles, from which she had previously been free, set in; she had careful medical attention from the first; and about three weeks after the accident, a faint aneurism, or arterial tumor, was discovered in her chest, • whose pulsations continued to increase until the time of the trial three years later, when they could be heard outside her dress by the unaided ear. Aneurism can be traced to a shock, an injury or a strain and is likely to arise in that way, and is incurable, progresses steadily, and forbids strong exertion or intense excitement under pain of instant death as a penalty, and also childbirth and hence marriage. Held, that a verdict for $10,275 was not excessive.
    7. EVIDENCE: Erroneous: Withdrawal by Instruction. Where it is not clear that the testimony of the witness was not admissible, and respondent withdrew it by an instruction, it will be held that the error, if any, was cured.
    8. -: Refused: Cross-Examination of Plaintiff: Name of Escort. Plaintiff, a young woman, was injured by a street car collision, and when her deposition was taken by defendant, on the advice of her attorney she declined to tell who her escort was. At the trial the deposition was introduced in evidence by defendant, and the court sustained an objection tó a question inquiring if she remembered she refused at the taking of her deposition to tell who her escort was. Held, that there was no reversible error in the ruling.
    9. TRIAL: Remarks of Attorney: No Reference Thereto in Motion for New Trial. An omission from the motion for a new trial of all reference to certain remarks made by plaintiff’s attorney in his argument to the jury, precludes any consideration of said remarks on appeal.
    10. -: —i-: No Exceptions. Where there was no objection to certain remarks of the plaintiff’s attorney, no ruling and no exception, those remarks, though of themselves objectionable and even inflammable, will not work a reversal, where the verdict is not excessive and the case is not a close one.
    11. -: -: Cured by Court. Where the court characterized remarks by respondent’s attorney as not proper and pointedly told the jury to disregard them, no reversal will be allowed on account of those remarks, in a case that is not close on the facts.
    12.. -: Passenger and Carrier: General Allegation: Burden. Where the petition counts on general negligence,, then, given the relation of carrier and passenger, a collision and an injury to the passenger, the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies, negligence is presumed prima facie,, and the burden is shifted to defendant ,to show that the injury was not the product of its negligence. And a charge in substance that the car was negligently run into a steam roller on the track and was negligently caused to collide with said roller with force and violence is a general charge of negligence; and plaintiff, by going on at the trial and proving specific acts of negligence, did not lose the right to have the maxim res ipsa applied to the case or to invoke the presumption of law arising from that maxim, namely, that negligence is presumed on proof of the relation of carrier and passenger, of the collision, and of a resulting injury to the passenger.
    13. -: Instruction: Passenger and Carrier: Humanitarian Doctrine not Applicable. That an instruction carries phraseology familiar in pronouncements of the humanitarian rule, does not of itself invoke that rule. In a case where plaintiff was a passenger and counts upon an injury caused by the running of the car into a steam roller on the track, that rule is not invoked by an instruction telling the jury that if defendant’s motorman saw, or by the exercise of proper care could have seen, said steam roller on the track in time to have stopped said car and avoided the injury, etc.; and, hence, that rule not being invoked, it will not be decided whether or not the rule applies to a case of passenger and carrier.
    14. -: -: -: Stopping and Running Car: Difference. There is no substantial difference between running a car so negligently as to cause it to collide with an obstruction on the track, and in running it so negligently that it was not stopped in time to prevent a collision when the collision could have been avoided by the exercise of due care'.
    15. -: -: -: Specific Negligence: General Allegation. Where the petition, in a suit by a'passenger against a carrier, counts on general negligence, an instruction' in the language of the petition -and properly defining the degree of care the law imposes on defendant, is proper. It need not set out any specific act of negligence. But instructions should be read as a whole, and if specific negligence was required- in this case the instructions given for defendant minutely specify them, and indeed reverse the rule of res ipsa.

      16. -: -: -: Damages: All Issues not Included. An instruction on the damages recoverable is not erroneous because it does not include all the issues plaintiff is required to establish — they being included in others given.
    17. -: -: -: -: Surplusage Words. Plaintiff’s instruction on the damages she might recover began with the words: “The jury are instructed that the plaintiff claims in her petition that on the 18th day of November, 1904, she was a passenger on the car of the defendant mentioned in evidence; and that while she was a passenger on such car, it came in collision with the steam roller mentioned in evidence.’’ Held, that all these words could have been omitted as surplusage, and the instruction without them would have been perfect; but they could have done no possible harm.
    18. -: -: -: Not Required to Prove Negligence: Does not Include Defense. Where on the facts and under the law, plaintiff is entitled to recover without proving negligence, and the burden is on defendant to show due care and no negligence, an instruction for plaintiff that does not include defendant’s defense, is not error; and that is true, although in other instructions plaintiff has handicapped herself, and by still' others defendant has handicapped her, by placing on her the burden of proving negligence, when negligence is presumed from proof of the relation of passenger and carrier, a collision and a resulting injury.
    19.-: -: -: Assumption of Relation Not Controverted. Facts not controverted, but shown to exist and constituting the very basis of the theory of both litigants at the trial, may be assumed in the instructions. An instruction for plaintiff may assume that she was a passenger and that there was a collision, where the whole issue is whether defendant was guilty of negligence in not avoiding the collision, the amount of damages, etc.
    20. -: -: -: Meritorious Case: Material Error. Where plaintiff has a meritorious case, the judgment will not be reversed unless defendant puts its finger on error materially affecting the merits or affecting its substantial rights.
    21. -: -: Cautioning Jury Against Sympathy for Plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff, mortally hurt and nervously depressed, while on the stand was overcome by weeping and hysteria, and left the stand at the suggestion of the trial judge, who then adjourned court until the next day, and on resuming gave to defendant an option to continue the case over the term, which it declined, is no reason for giving an instruction admonishing the jury against all unusual incidents arising during the progress of the trial and otherwise reading to them a moral homily on the duty of jurors. Such an instruction would have been an unwarranted comment, as much so as a comment on evidence. Besides, defendant’s declination to continue the case over the term closed the incident once for all.
    22. -: -: Carrier and Passenger: Obstruction on Track: Right to Assume a Clear Track. Whatever may he the right of a motorman to assume that a person will not enter the track in front of an approaching car or if on the track will not remain there, he has no right to assume, as betweeen the carrier and a passenger on the car, that a fifteen-ton steam roller approaching the track at a snail’s pace and about to cross, seen for two hundred feet away, will stop before going upon the track and wait for the car to pass, or will get across and out of danger of a collision before the car reaches the roller; and an instruction embodying such a doctrine as a defense should be refused. The motorman owes the duty to his passenger to exercise a high degree of care which precludes any presumption or assumption that the roller will get off or stay off. The law does not permit him to take a chance of a collision.
    Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. James E. Goodrich, Judge.
    Affirmed.

      John H. Lucas and Ben T. Hardin for appellant.
    (1) The court erred in giving instruction 1 for plaintiff. It submits the case to the jury on an issue not raised by the pleadings, and on acts of negligence not pleaded in the petition, namely, the failure of the agents of defendant in charge of the car to observe the rule of the last chance doctrine. No such negligence is alleged in the petition; nor is ther'e any evidence in the record on which to base that instruction. Unless there is evidence as to the distance in which the car could have been stopped, after the motorman saw, or by proper care could have seen, the roller in or approaching the line of danger, the last chance is not in the case. Sehroeder v. Transit Co., Ill Mo. App. 67;' Heintz v. Transit Co., 115 Mo. App. 667; O’Farrell v. Railroad, 136 Mo. App. 353. Nor is the last chance in the case, unless it is pleaded. The negligence pleaded here is that “the agents, servants and employees of defendant in charge of said car, carelessly, negligently and unshillfully ran said car upon which plaintiff was a passenger as aforesaid, into a large steam roller which was on the track of defendant along which said car was running.” There is not a word in the petition that said servants knew the roller was on the track, that they “saw, or by the exercise of the care required of them as set out in instruction 2, could have seen said steam roller upon said' track in time to have stopped said car and have avoided the injury to plaintiff, but negligently and carelessly failed to stop said' car and prevent said injury,” as is submitted to the jury by instruction 1. The negligence pleaded is in running the car. The negligence submitted to the jury, in the instruction, is failing to stop the car after they saw, or by proper care “could have seen the roller on the track. ’ ’ The instruction went clear outside of the domain of the petition; it should have been limited to the negligence pleaded. Smith v. Railroad, 126 Mo. App. 120; McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97; Orcutt v. Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. App. 424; Roscoe v. Railroad, 202 Mo. 576; Kirkpatrick v. Railroad, 211 Mo. 68; Beave v. Transit Co., 212 Mo. 331; Miller v. Railroad, 155 Mo. App. 528; Gibler v. Railroad, 148 Mo. App. 475; Detrich v. Railroad, 143 Mo. App. 176; McManamee v. Railroad, 135 Mo. 448; Hesselbach v. St. Louis, 179 Mo. 505. (2) The court erred in giving instruction 2 for plaintiff. It broadens the issues made by the pleadings, and is broader than the petition. The allegations of negligence in the petition being specific, the instruction on the care required of defendant is too general; it covers the entire field of negligence, when it should have been limited to the negligence charged in the petition. It holds defendant to account for any negligent act, whether that act was charged in the petition or not. Beave v. Transit Co., 212 Mo. 351; Da - vidson v. Transit Co., 211 Mo. 355; Roscoe v. Railroad,' .202 Mo. 576; Orcntt v. Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 443; Van-horn v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 481; McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97; Allen v. Transit Co., 183 Mo. 411; Logan v. Railroad, 183 Mo. 582; Detrich v. Railroad, 143 Mo. App. 176. (3¡) The court erred in refusing instruction 7 asked by defendant. And it requires no citation of authorities to back it. The courts in all the cases, where a person is driving, toward a car track, without the zone of danger, hold this to be the law. And especially was it error to refuse it, in view of plaintiffs instruction 1. (.4) The court erred in refusing to permit defendant’s counsel to cross-examine plaintiff on her refusal to tell in her deposition who her escort was at the time of her injury. Defendant was entitled to know that fact when plaintiff’s deposition was taken. Devoy v. Transit Co., 192 Mo. 220; State ex rel. v. Theisen, 142 S. "W. 1088.

      McCune, Harding, Brotan £ Murphy for respondent.
    (1) The court did not err by giving instruction 1 for plaintiff. The petition charges general negligence in the running of the car into the roller. The instruction is not broader than the petition, but is in harmony with it. Meng v. Railroad, 108 Mo. App. 563; Schroeder v. Transit Co., Ill Mo. App. 67; Roscoe v. Railroad, 202 Mo. 588. (2) The court committed no error by giving instruction 2 for plaintiff. This instruction was the counterpart of instruction 1 and properly defined the degree of care referred to in instruction 1. The jury could not have been led by these instructions. Defendant saw to it that severe instructions were submitted, hedging about its case with every possible barrier. Their attention was particularly drawn to the point limiting the inquiry of negligence to that of running the car. Counsel is wrong in his assertion that the petition alleges specific acts of negligence. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is present. The petition was drawn on that theory. It alleged general negligence in running the car. Defendant evidently recognized the presence of that theory. It did not ask that the charge of negligence be made specific. Under a charge of general negligence, the defendant must be prepared to meet any kind of negligence in running the car. (3) The court did not err in giving instruction 3 for plaintiff. All parties agree that it was the car that plaintiff was in that hit the roller; otherwise plaintiff would not have been hurt; and that the roller the car hit was the one that was on the track. There being no dispute about the car or the roller that collided, it is not error for an instruction to assume the existence of a fact which is not controverted, and which the parties throughout the trial assume to exist. Davidson v. Railroad, 211 Mo. 321.
   LAMM, J.

Rose Stauffer had judgment against defendant in the Jackson Circuit Court for $10,275. Defendant appealed, and plaintiff died. By stipulation here the cause was revived in the name of Peter Stauffer, her administrator.

We are asked to reverse her judgment for error, to-wit:

In refusing a demurrer at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and again at the close of the whole case.

In allowing an excessive verdict to stand.

In permitting evidence from Hill, an expert.

In refusing to permit counsel to cross-examine plaintiff about her refusal to answer certain questions propounded to her at the time her deposition was taken.

In the disposition made of certain objections to remarks of one of plaintiff’s counsel in closing to the jury. .

In refusing .and giving, instructions.

Any record or facts essential t© an intelligent disposition of those propositions will appear under subheads in their discussion.

I. Of the demurrers (and herein of the pleadings).

Charging that defendant was operating an electric street railway in Rosedale, .Kansas, and that plaintiff was a passenger on one of its cars on the 18th of November, 1904, she states her cause of action to be that: “. . . the agents, servants and employees of defendant in charge of said car, carelessly, negligently and unskillfully ran said car upon which plaintiff was a passenger as aforesaid, into a large steam roller which was on the track of defendant along which said car was running, without any fault or negligence on the part of plaintiff; that said car upon which plaintiff was riding as a passenger as aforesaid, was negligently caused by the agents, servants and employees of defendant to collide with said steam roller with great force and violence, whereby,” etc.

The answer reads: “Comes now defendant and for its answer to the amended petition of the plaintiff denies each and every allegation in said petition contained, both generally and specifically. Wherefore defendant prays to be dismissed with its costs.”

(Note: While the statute, Revised Statutes 1909, section 1806, allows “a general or specific denial” and permits both to be united in the same answer, it will be observed that without being a statutory donee of power to that end defendant has tried to improve upon the lawmaker’s work. What the latter by grace allows to be united in the same writing, defendant mixes together after this fashion: It denies “generally and specifically” by the same stroke of the pen. Hitherto it has been supposed that “a general denial” was one thing and that “a specific denial” was another. The novelty of making both kinds by twin adverbs spliced by a conjunction, thereby denying “specifically” without specifying, would challenge attention if the question were vital.)

On the facts the case runs, on both sides, on the theory that defendant owns and operates a line of electric street cars in Kansas, known as the “Bosedale Line;” that on the 18th of November, 1904, at about ten o’clock p. m. plaintiff, who had been at a church bazaar, with her escort, took passage on one of those cars at the crossing, of Shawnee street and Southwest boulevard, north-bound to Kansas City, and paid her fare. There is some conflict on whether she sat on the west or east side, at the rear or towards the middle of the car, but none whatever that the seats ran lengthwise and that the car violently collided three blocks north of Shawnee, at the crossing of Lincoln street and Southwest boulevard, with a fifteen-ton steam street roller. This roller was in the act of crossing the track obliquely and was nearly across at the impact— the car striking the roller’s nearest hind wheel with such momentum as to slide the roller north a few inches, break some of its parts and smash the front end of the car. The few passengers aboard were thrown from their seats (“strung out” as one witness •put it) towards the front. Plaintiff testified she was thrown from the rear to the front of the car. That she was shocked and injured is not questioned, but the extent of her injuries is in dispute. Not all the eye witnesses saw lights on the roller, but there was satisfactory testimony it had four lighted lanterns displayed, one on each corner— that is, two to the south. There were no arc street lights at Lincoln, but there were two a- block off either way. There was also a lantern in the hands of one of the men attending to the roller. As near as we can make out this roller was about fifteen'feet from end to end. It had three wheels (rollers), one in front and two behind. While on a pinch, moving smartly yet at work the movement of the cumberous machine was very slow — something like (or less than) a man’s slow walk. It is shown that defendant’s servants in charge of the car knew the roller ran day and night and was on that evening, as it had been for a week before, used in reconstructing Southwest boulevard at the locus. So, there is no-dispute but what the motorman saw the roller working ahead on the trip that night.

On plaintiff’s 'behalf there was testimony tending to show that when the, roller, say, ten feet from the track, turned to approach it diagonally to cross and take water at a plug on the other side of the street, the car was three blocks away and when it got on or to the track the car was a block or over two hundred feet away. It is clear the roller was visible to the motorman at that distance and thenceforward while crossing. There are facts making it certain that, if credit is to be given to plaintiff’s testimony, the car could have been stopped after the steam roller came within striking distance of the track and was crossing over, and that a collision was avoidable if diligence and care had been used by the motorman. One of the men operating the roller testified it would take three or four minutes, after it got to the track, to cross over. Usually rocks had to be put in front of the wheel to keep the roller from sliding on the rail and we infer from some of the proof that crossing over the track was a slow affair in the then street conditions. ■„ As the roller was making the turn, as said, the car was in sight three blocks away taking on passengers. The car made no stop after taking on plaintiff at Shawnee street until it struck the roller. Defendant’s theory is that the motorman saw the roller running north in the-same direction his car was going, close to the track but in the clear; that the car was then going nine or ten miles an hour, and that, when about fifty or sixty feet away from the car, the roller turned towards the track and undertook to cross; that the instant the roller was seen heading across the track the motorman reversed his power and tried his best to stop, but that, by the sudden reversal of the power, the “automatic” or “overhead” blew out cutting off his power, whereat he had recourse to his brake; that he had reduced his speed to two or three miles per hour, but before he could stop he struck the roller. There was testimony sustaining that theory. There was some testimony that the overhead blew out at about the time of the collision, and testimony indicating that the car was going under full head when the crash came — a crash heard in nearby houses.

On such record neither demurrer was well taken.

(1) Where a defendant does not stand on his demurrer at the close of plaintiff’s testimony in chief but goes on and puts in its own case, a final demurrer searches all the testimony, to see if plaintiff’s case was not aided by defendant’s proof.

(2) It is trite and good doctrine that a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence accepts that evidence as true, whether contradicted or not by defendant’s proof, so long as it is not impossible as opposed to the physics of the case or entirely beyond reason. It takes defendant’s testimony as untrue where contradicted by plaintiff’s proof. It leaves to the jury to settle the weight due the testimony, the credit due the witnesses and to reconcile contradictions, if any, in proof. So, it allows to plaintiff’s case the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact arising on all the proof.

(3) And where, as here, the question is between a passenger and common carrier on the duty to carry safely, a demurrer to the evidence must be ruled in view of the rule of law that the carrier is under the duty of exercising a very high degree of care to its passenger. To put it in the language of some of the cases: “A high degree of care;” “The utmost degree of care of very prudent persons;” “The greatest possible care and diligence;” “Great care;” “Such care as a very prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances;” “The highest degree of care that can be reasonably expected of prudent, skilful and experienced persons; ” “ The highest degree of care practicable among prudent and skilful men in that business.” One or another of those propositions (all of them chips off of the same block) is announced in one or another of the following cases: Lemon v. Chanslor, 68 Mo. l. c. 358; Canaday v. Railroad, 134 Mo. App. l. c. 287; O’Gara v. Transit Co., 204 Mo. l. c. 732, and cases cited; O Orcutt v. Century Building Co., 201 Mo. l. c. 443-4-5; Mathew v. Railroad, 115 Mo. App. l. c. 473; Gilroy v. Transit Co., 117 Mo. App. l. c. 666-8; Redmon v. Railroad, 185 Mo. 1; Vancleve v. Railroad, 107 Mo. App. l .c. 100; Magrane v. Ry. Co., 183 Mo. l. c. 128.

The right doctrine is that the carrier of passengers-for hire is not an insurer of their safety; yet while not an insurer his contractual and legal duty is to carry safely. The law imposes that duty upon those who use powerful agencies like steam and electricity, with their attending dangers, in the transportation of those who intr.ust their persons to them for carriage. Therefore, when a passenger sues in tort for a breach of that duty, the standard to measure the carrier’s care is not a pinched.one. It is set high — the gauge of duty arises precisely with the hazard, agreeably to the precept ; The greater the hazard, the greater the care.

There is a question whether general or specific negligence is charged in the petition. "We need not pass on that at this point. If, however, the charge be held to be one of general (as distinguished from specific) negligence, then, given the relation of passenger and carrier, a collision and an injury, the maxim Res ipsa loquitur applies, negligence is presumed prima facie, and the burden is shifted over from plaintiff’s shoulders to defendant’s to show a want of negligence —i. e., to satisfactorily show the collision was without fault of the carrier. [Orcutt v. Building Co., 201 Mo. l. c. 441; Redmon v. Railroad, 185 Mo. 1.] There is no call to invoke that presumption to sustain the ruling on the demurrer. It stands solidly on the facts and the law applicable to them independent of the presumption.

The point of error in ruling the demurrers is disallowed to defendant.

II. Is the verdict excessive¶

As this question also searches the testimony, we may as well state pertinent facts while we are about it.

Before her injury plaintiff weighed, say, one hundred and forty pounds. She is pictured as a “healthy robust girl,” with “rosy cheeks” — “a great big, strong, fine looking girl” of “splendid color,” of steady nerves and good spirits, earning her own honorable livelihood and twenty-six years of age. The testimony put in by her tends to show that, beginning with her injury, those conditions changed. She lost weight to a marked degree, became nervous and depressed, her countenance became grave, she lost the color of health. From being able to labor, as she had been, she could labor no more. Womb trouble at once developed with attending distresses peculiar to them— all this with a dreadful affliction to be presently noted from which she had been hitherto free, doing back a little to the accident, it was shown without any contradiction worth while that she received bruises on her head and hip which, as to outside appearances, were temporary. Not so with her inward hurts. At once on the collision a physician was sent for before she was taken from the car, the conductor going for him. Some of the witnesses describe her as being in a faint, others as being unconscious for a spell, while others did not observe such phenomena. She testified she knew everything going on but could not speak. All ágree she was carried into a near-by house attended by women and a physician and there pnt to bed. In the small hours of that night she was taken to her uncle’s house, where she was staying. The family physician was out of the city, and another was called who attended her. After a week she was able to be up and around partly, but went to bed for a part of nearly every day from thenceforward to the time of the trial. About a fortnight thereafter the family physician returned and took charge of her. He then discovered, beside womb troubles, the faint pulsation of an aneurism in her chest. From thence on she was never entirely out of a physician’s care. An aneurism is a soft, hollow, pulsating tumor in an artery caused by the dilation or rupture of one or more of the three several coats making up the texture of that blood conduit. It may come, we take it, under the proof, from inherited tendencies, or from syphilis, rheumatism or certain other diseased conditions. But an aneurism, under the proof here, may be traced to a shock, a strain or an injury as its origin and is likely to arise in that way. Such a one is called a “traumatic aneurism” in the learned terminology of medicine — a terminology (if we may use words taking on color and size from the subject-matter) delighting in sesquipedalia, now and then having a vertiginous effect on the lay mind. I stand sponsor for neither “sesquipedalia” or “vertiginous.” They were taught me by two of my learned Brothers. But enough of that. The testimony on the point all tends to show that Bose Stauffer was suffering from a tumor of that sort. No facts heading to any other origin except the shock of the collision were shown. Now, an aneurism is incurable. It progresses steadily, and always to the bad. It forbids strong exertion or intense excitement, under pain of instant death as a penalty. This one was in the upper arch of the aorta, and forbade childbirth (hence marriage) and its victim was doom to face her known and melancholy fate uncheered by one ray of hope from human aid. This is strong language, but it is justified as within the testimony. The trial was well on towards three years after the injury and the growth of the trouble had been so pronounced that the pulsations of that arterial tumor could be heard outside her dress by the unaided ear. We may not know whether it did cause her death in point of fact, but if so it was a natural result. If it did not, then her suggested death, inevitable from it if left to run its course according to its will and laws, was but hurried up by some independent intervening cause. In the face of such a fearful calamity resulting to her by the collision, it seems to me it would be a court both uncommonly bold and uncommonly cold that would meddle with the size of her verdict on the ground of ex-cessiveness or prejudice* and passion. Certain it is no principle of law or precedent occurs to me springing courage or inciting duty to do so.

This point is also disallowed to defendant.

III. Of the evidence of Hill, an expert.

When Valentine, the motorman running the car, was on the stand for defendant, he testified on cross-examination without objection that his car could have been stopped in from 100 to 150 feet. Plaintiff’s witness, Hill, qualified as an expert, and was permitted to testify that the car could have been stopped in from thirty to forty feet, and that a “blow out” came from feeding the current too fast. Hill’s testimony was admitted over an objection that it was “incompetent, irrevelant and immaterial,” It is not quite clear whether plaintiff’s object in Hill’s evidence was to contradict Valentine’s, or to prove the ultimate fact that the car could have been stopped in thirty or forty feet. An ingenious attack is made in defendant’s brief on Hill’s testimony to the effect that it was directed to an issue, the “last clear chance,” when such issue was not in the ease, and an ingenious parry of that attack is made in plaintiff’s brief. Bnt we will not develop or determine the matter from that standpoint. The fact is that plaintiff withdrew Hill’s testimony by an instruction to the jury. On that situation we observe: Oases may be found where, under stress of extreme provocation and when the waters of justice have been incurably muddied by improper testimony, courts have held it error to admit the testimony, although it was after-wards withdrawn. To illustrate that theory: a metaphor has been used whereby such testimony has been likened to the administration of poison to a victim of such sort that an antidote could not provide a remedy, and another whereby it has been likened to scarring a victim with a red-hot branding iron that would leave the burning brand behind in the flesh when the branding iron was taken away. But this case does not fall within any such inflamed similes. It is not clear to us why the testimony was not admissible, and certainly its withdrawal by an instruction of the court is the only known way of healing the error (if any) of its admission. That rule is a good working one to attain 'a right result, and is always held to attain such result except under exceptional circumstances, not present here, calling for a reversal as the only cure.

The point is also disallowed to defendant.

IY. Of refusing to permit a cross- examination of plaintiff on a certain matter.

At a certain time defendant had plaintiff summoned before a notary and took her deposition. Reciting the incidents of the accident, she was asked by Mr. Hardin for defendant the name of her escort on that evening. At this point Mr. Murphy, her counsel, instructed her not to answer, and she refused to give the name under such advice. No attempt was made to follow up the incident to coerce an answer by citation and commitment. But it ended at that point. At the trial the whole of her deposition was introduced by defendant as part of her cross-examination. Before her deposition was so introduced, the following occnred:

“Q. Do you remember what you said over there that day? A. Tes, sir.

“Q. Well, you remember you refused to tell who, it was that was with you, didn’t you?”

“By Mr. Hardin: I object to that as incompetent.

“By the Court: The objection is sustained.

“And to the ruling and action of the court, defendant then and there duly excepted.”

Beversible error is now assigned on the foregoing ruling. It is argued that defendant was entitled to the name of her escort when her deposition was being taken, and that the refusal of the court to permit her cross-examination on the matter of her refusal to give his name is reversible error. But we shall not follow the lead of that suggestion. It will be observed in the first place that Miss Stauffer was asked if she remembered refusing to tell who was with her. That was the question' ruled out. She was not asked to tell why she refused to answer and there was. no use in inquiring if she remembered her refusal, because her deposition shows (and defendant had the benefit of that part) that she did refuse and she had just testified she remembered what she said at the taking of that deposition. In the second place, if the object was to go on and ask why she refused, then the deposition explains itself on that score; it was done by advice of counsel. In the third place, no possible injury happened to defendant by the ruling. Her escort’s name was Murphy, the record shows he was in attendance at the trial up to the time he was wanted by plaintiff when he disappeared. There is nothing to show that his name was not known to defendant. The presumption is the other way, for there is testimony that the names of at least some of the witnesses were taken by the conductor or ■motorman a.t the time of the accident. There is also testimony showing that some of defendant’s witnesses knew the name of her escort.

For the foregoing reasons there is no substance in the point and it is disallowed to defendant.

V. Of alleged improper remarles by plaintiff’s counsel in closing to the jury.

(a) In his argument Mr. Hardin for plaintiff said:

“They were getting the names of witnesses instead of looking after the dying woman in the car; these employees of the defendant, were taking names at that time for the purpose of putting into operation the machinery of this railroad company to defend this law suit.”

On that head the record shows as follows (By Mr. Hardin, counsel for defendant):

“I object to that; I deny that that is the evidence, and I object to the remark as unwarranted, and prejudicial to the interests of this defendant.”

The Court said: “Keep within the record, Mr. Harding; go ahead.”

The motion for new trial pretermits all reference to that incident. That omission closes the door to an appellate court. [Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. l. c. 739.]

(b) During the same argument Mr. Harding also said:

“Mr. Hardin asked why Mr. Murphy, who was with Miss Stauffer the night she was injured, wasn’t brought in to testify. He also criticised Miss Stauffer because on the advice of her lawyer she refused to give his name to the defendant when her deposition was taken. Perhaps she was wise in refusing to give his name; he has been here in attendance on this court at every term until this and now he cannot be found. That is the reason we don’t give the defendant the names of onr witnesses, because if we did they might not be here.”

There was no objection to that part of his argument, no' ruling and no exception. In the presence of this silence, nisi, the statute has play forbidding exceptions here not decided below. [R. S. 1909, sec. 2081.] If there had been objection, a ruling and exception saved or if counsel had not been rebuked by the court when called on to do so, there would be matter challenging sharp attention, especially so in the wasp’s sting in the tail of the statement. The ugly insinuation coiled up there is grievous and poisonous.. It might be as well said now as at any other time that in a close case where the trial court refused to act with vigor on timely objection to veiled and damaging insinuations of that ilk, we would not allow a verdict to stand if earned by such means where there are no facts justifying the means. If the verdict were excessive, such inflammatory matter might, even as it is, allow a correction. [Bragg v. Railroad, 192 Mo. l. c. 365-6.]

(c) Mr. Harding, on defendant’s objection, was twice checked by the court in an argument relating to medical witnesses; but as the court then characterized his remarks in the presence of the jury as not proper and pointedly told the jury to disregard them, we shall not reproduce them. There was no error at that point.

The premises considered, all the assignments of error under this sub-head are disallowed.

This brings us to the main proposition relied on for reversal, viz:

VI. Alleged error in refusing and giving instructions.

(a) Before considering the instructions there is a question applicable to the body of them to be disposed of in limme. It may be stated this way: Plaintiff contends that under the pleadings the maxim, The thing speaks for itself, applies. Contra, defendant stoutly asserts that is not so. We are of opinion the maxim res ipsa does apply. The controversy hinges on whether the charge of negligence is general or specific as those terms are understood in the law. If the charge is general the maxim applies and when it applies it is trite learning that the burden shifts to defendant carrier to show that a collision resulting in injury to a passenger was not the product of the carrier’s negligence. If it does not apply, because the charge is specific, then plaintiff must prove the specific charge of negligence, because having made the specified charge he is presumed to know what specific acts caused the accident, whereas under a general charge no such presumption arises, and knowledge is presumably with the carrier, not with the passenger. As heretofore pointed out the charge in the petition in substance is that the car was negligently run into a steam roller and was negligently caused to collide with said roller with force and violence. By metaphysics we may split things up, but trouble comes thereby. Some one had defined :a metaphysician as a man who splits a log and when he has split it behold he has two logs instead of one to reckon with. Too free use of metaphysics is bad in legal exposition. Eschewing it, we think the charge here is a general charge of negligence. To be sure there.is precision and specification as to what resulted from the negligence, to-wit, a collision with a steam roller, but there is no specification of the negligence itself. It stands nakedly as general. This holding accords with the trend of the cases. Price v. Railroad, was in Banc. There was a question there whether the charge was of general or specific negligence. It was in substance precisely as the charge in this case (220 Mo. l. c. 443), and was held to be general (p. 454). It was held further (and the proposition now to be announced is applicable in this case) that plaintiff, by going on at the trial and proving specific acts of negligence, did not lose the right to have applied the maxim Res ipsa loquitur and the presumption of law-arising from that maxim, to-wit, that negligence was presumed on proof of the relation of carrier and passenger, of the collision and of an injury (p. 456). In the MacDonald case (219 Mo. l. c. 474-5) will be found a charge of negligence. It was held general, although it is more definite than the charge in the petition at bar (p. 487).

As we held in those cases so we hold in this, viz: The contention is ruled against defendant.

We reach now plaintiff’s given instructions:

(b) Plaintiff got three over objections, reading:

“1. The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that plaintiff was a passenger upon the car mentioned in the evidence, at the time she claims to have been injured,, and that defendant by its agents, servants and employees in charge of said car upon which plaintiff was a passenger (if you find she was a passenger) so negligently, carelessly and unskillfully managed, operated and ran said car at a point on the Southwest boulevard near the intersection of Lincoln street and said Southwest boulevard in Rose-dale, Kansas, as to cause said car to be brought into violent contact with the steam roller mentioned in the evidence which was at said time upon said track at said point (if you find such to be the fact), and that plaintiff was injured thereby, and that the agents, servants and employees of defendant in charge of said car upon which plaintiff was riding, saw, or by the exercise of the care required of them as set out in instruction No. 2, could have seen said steam roller upon said track in time to have stopped said car and have avoided the injury to plaintiff; but negligently and carelessly failed to stop said car and prevent said injury (if you find plaintiff was injured), then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

“2. The jury are instructed that if you believe and find from the evidence that defendant at the time of the occurrence in question, received and accepted plaintiff as a passenger upon a car which it was then operating, then the degree of care which defendant and its employees were “bound to exercise towards plaintiff while she was being so carried upon said car was this: Defendant was bound to run and operate its ear with the highest practicable degree of care of a very prudent person engaged in like businesses; in view of all the facts and circumstances as shown in the evidence at the time of the alleged injury of plaintiff, and defendant is liable in this case if its agents, servants and employees in charge of said car were guilty of even slight negligence in the management and operation thereof, if the jury further find and believe from the evidence that the injury to plaintiff was the result of such negligence.

“3. The jury are instructed that the plaintiff claims in her petition that on the 18th day of November, 1904, she was a passenger on the car of the defendant mentioned in evidence; and that while she was a passenger on such car, it came in collision with the steam roller mentioned in the evidence. Now, if you find for the plaintiff, and if you believe from the evidence that she sustained injuries as the direct result of said collision, then you may allow her such damages for such injuries, if any, as you may believe from the evidence she has sustained, as a direct result of said collision. In estimating such damages you may take into consideration the physical pain and suffering, which you may believe from the evidence she has endured, if any, or is reasonably certain to endure in the future, if any, as a direct result of said injuries, if any.

“You may also take into consideration the effect, if any, of said injuries, if any, upon plaintiff’s health.

“You may also take into consideration any reasonable sums of money, if any, which you may believe from the evidence, plaintiff has become liable for for necessary medical treatment received by her on account of said injuries, if any, not to exceed the sum of $275', but the whole amount of your verdict should not exceed $20,000.”

(1) Instruction number one is assailed as outside of or as enlarging the issues. It is argued the “last chance” doctrine is envoked thereby, when such doctrine is not applicable to a case of this character. Moreover, that the petition counts on negligence in running not in stopping the car as the instruction does.

The proposition that the last chance or humanity rule is invoked by the instruction and is not counted on in the petition is elusive and nice. It seems to pro-cede on the notion that the doctrine does not apply in suits by a passenger against the carrier, therefore a false light was held out to the jury misleading them to the injury of defendant. But that argument seems to us fallacious. Have we a call to decide the abstract question whether the humanity rule is broad enough to include the relation of passenger and carrier? We think not. The best plan in procedure in court, as in traveling generally, is not to cross a river until one gets to it. That the instruction carries phraseology familiar in pronouncements of the humanity doctrine, does not of itself hurt the instruction. If taken by and large and read by its four corners, it announces a legal proposition applicable to the actual facts of the case, it is well enough.

Recurring to' the petition, it charges that defendant’s servants carelessly, negligently and unskilfully ran the car into a large steam roller. It does not stop at that point, but goes on the charge that the car was negligently caused by defendant’s servants to collide with said steam roller with great force and violence. The ultimate and obvious meaning of those two charges is that there was negligence in causing the car to collide with the roller. What does-caused to collide mean in that connection? In common sense if A is accused of causing a collision negligently, does that not mean he caused it by running or not stopping, either or both? Does not stopping refer to the running and vice versa¶ We think so. At bottom the collision was the thing complained of and the running without stopping produced that thing. When I say a car was running without stopping, is not “without stopping” a modifier of “running” and does it not tell the hind of running? The testimony on both sides on the paper issues shows how the car was run and why the collision took place and the instruction, dealing with the facts, tells the jury if it was run so negligently as to cause it to strike the roller when the stroke could have been prevented by proper care in stopping the car then the finding should be for plaintiff if she was hurt thereby. Because the selfsame words were not used in- petition and instruction, that does not vitiate tbe latter so long as the sense is the same. Looked at from any view point it is hard to see the difference between running a car so negligently as to cause it to collide with a roller, on the one hand, and in running it so negligently that it was not stopped in time to prevent a collision when the collision could have been avoided by the' exercise of due care, on the other; and it is still harder to see how the merits are affected materially.

The cases relied on by defendant are not this case. If the charge was running too fast, and the proof was directed to a mere negligent stop, we would have another case to deal with.

The point is disallowed to defendant.

(2) Plaintiff’s instruction, number two is criticized as too general; it is said that it should have been specific like the petition, and not cover, as it did, the whole field of negligence. But we have held the charge in the petition general, and that holding covers the point made. In a preceding paragraph, in ruling on the demurrers, the high degree of care due by a carrier to a passenger is discussed. The instruction is in line with the conclusion there reached. But if we were to concede any force to defendant’s criticism we confront the fact that over against plaintiff’s general definition of a carrier’s care defendant got specific definitions applying to the facts of the case on trial. Some of those instructions cast on plaintiff the burden of proving negligence of a precise hind, thereby ignoring the proposition that under the Bes ipsa loquitur doctrine the boot was on the other foot and negligence was presumed. We reproduce some' of them:

“2. The court instructs the jury that the bur-’ den of proof is on the plaintiff to prove to your satisfaction by the preponderance or greater weight of the credible testimony that defendant company was guilty of negligence as submitted to you in these instructions, and this burden of proof continues and abides with plaintiff throughout the entire trial; and unless you believe and find from the evidence in the case that the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the credible testimony to your reasonable satisfaction that the defendant was guilty of negligence as defined in these instructions, and that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries complained of, then your verdict must be for the defendant.

“4. You are further instructed that the only negligence that is submitted to you for your consideration in this case is that the agents, servants and employees of defendant in charge of the car carelessly and negligently and unsldlfully ran said ear into a large steam roller, which was on the track of defendant along which said car was running, with great force and violence, thereby throwing plaintiff from her seat upon the floor of said car and injuring her. Now the court instructs you that in this case you are limited in your consideration to the negligence as above specified in this instruction; and no- other acts or conduct of the defendant, its agents, servants or employees, either of commission or omission, must he considered hy yon. If the plaintiff did receive an injury by a collision between said car and roller, as a result of any cause or causes other than the negligence above specified in this instruction, then she cannot recover in this case, and you must render the verdict for defendant company.

“5. You are further instructed that in this case, the mere fact, if true, that plaintiff was injured in a collision between the car on which she was riding and a steam roller on the railway track, gives her no right to sue defendant and recover damages in this case. Before, under any circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, you must believe and find from the greater weight of all the credible evidence in this case that her injury, if she was injured, was actually caused by the negligence of defendant’s servants in charge of the car in the manner submitted to your consideration in instruction numbered 4 given for defendant. If her injuries were not actually-caused by such specified negligence, then she has no case here and cannot recover, even though she did receive an injury in said collision between said ear and roller, and your verdict must be for defendant company.

“8. You are further instructed that the fact that the roller was going toward the track on which the car was running, and came near to the track, if you believe that to be a fact, was not enough in itself to impose any duty on the motorman to stop or check the speed of the car; there must have been something noticeable in the conduct of the man controlling the movements of the roller, to apprise the motorman on the car that the man in charge of the roller contemplated moving it into a place of danger of colliding with the car, before it became incumbent on the motorman to stop the car or check its speed; the motorman was not required to assume that the man controlling the roller would act carelessly or negligently in going upon the track in front of Mm. Plis duty' to stop the car, or to check its speed, began when, and only when, he saw that the man in charge of the roller was proceeding to a prob able collision, nnobserving and unaware of the approach of the car; and if the motorman, when he saw, or mightyliave seen, the conduct of the man in charge of the roller, attempted to stop his car and avoid a collision with the roller, and was unable to do so, having the necessary regard for the passengers, then I instruct you that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this suit, and you must render a verdict for the defendant company.

“9. If the defendant’s servants in charge of the car in controversy exercised all the care that was reasonably practicable in the management and control of the car, then there was no negligence on their part and the verdict must be for the defendant company, even though you may believe from the evidence that plaintiff was injured without any fault on her part. ’ ’

Reading the whole body of the given instructions together, as we are bound to do, defendant fared uncommonly well, and the points made against instruction 2 are disallowed.

(3) It is further argued that instruction 3 is vicious because in stating the elements of plaintiff’s case it left out the necessity of her proving negligence. As to that contention we observe:

This instruction palpably was on the measure of damages. It was not a general instruction covering the whole case and directing a verdict. Others did that. "We are not to apply the rule, then, which requires ■all the issues to be stated in a general instruction, undertaking to do that and directing a verdict in the event of a favorable finding for plaintiff on .all such issues.

Furthermore, it would have been a perfect instruction, in the view we take of it, if it had begun with the phrase, “Now, if you find for plaintiff.” All preceding that is surplusage, in the nature of an identifying earmark or caption. It should have been left off, but, being on, it could do no possible harm to defendant. Because:

On any view, under the facts of this record, plaintiff on the cold law was entitled to recover without proving negligence. It was defendants duty to show due care, not hers to prove negligence. So that in an instruction for plaintiff that does not direct a verdict it was not error to omit defendant’s defense. And this is true, -although in other instructions plaintiff had handicapped herself, and by still others defendant had handicapped her, by the burden of proving negligence, when negligence was presumed from proof, as here, of the relation of passenger and carrier, a collision and a resulting injury.

It is also argued that the instruction, instead of requiring the jury to find she was a passenger and that there was a collision, assumed those things as true. What if it did? There is no error in that. Facts not controverted but shown to exist and constituting the very basis of the theory of both litigants at the trial, as here, may be assumed in an instruction. (Vide, Davidson v. Transit Co., 211 Mo. l. c. 356 et seq., where the authorities are collated and canvassed.)

Plaintiff had a meritorious case and we should not reverse her judgment unless defendant puts its finger on error materially affecting the merits or affecting its substantial right. [R. S. 1909, sec. 1850; Ibid., sec. 2082.] We cannot say such error exists in the giving of instruction 3 for plaintiff. Accordingly we so rule.

(c) With the foregoing disposition of errors assigned in the giving of plaintiff’s instructions, we reach those assigned in the refusing of defendant’s. Two were refused of which complaint is made. One, marked “C,” reads:

‘ ‘ Gentlemen of the jury, the court admonishes you that all unusual incidents arising during the progress of the trial of this case outside of the evidence, must be disregarded by you; if any person, whether connected, or not, with this case or its trial, has spoken to you, or to any other person in your hearing, in any manner whatever, referring to this case, or to any party connected with this case-or its trial, except during the trial in open court, it is your duty to wholly disregard such remarks, if any, of any such person, and entirely withdraw yourselves from any influence, if any, of any and all such persons and remarks, if any. You owe a duty to yourselves, to this court, to the parties litigant and to the cause of justice, to decide this case only upon the evidence that the court has permitted to be given before you, and the law which the court has given to you by way of these instructions, to be by you applied to the evidence, as a g-uide to you in making up your verdict, and to render a fair, unbiased and impartial verdict, in this cause, only upon said evidence and under these instructions; and you have no right to allow any bias, prejudice or sympathy, if you have any such, for or against either of the parties, to influence you in the slightest degree, when you come to deliberate upon the evidence and the law as given you in this case, and to the rendition of your verdict in this cause.”

Another, numbered 7, reads:

“You are further instructed that even though you may believe and find from the evidence in this case that the motorman in charge of the car in question saw the steam roller traveling along the street, either on or approaching the street railway track, yet under the law said motorman had the right to assume that the operator of said roller would stop the same before going upon the track and wait for said car to pass, and not undertake to cross the track in front of said car in such manner as to expose said roller and himself to a collision with said car; or if he went upon the track with said roller that he would get across and out of danger of a collision with said car before it would reach him; and I further instruct you that said motorman was not required to stop said car, nor was he required to check or slacken the speed of said car, until there was apparent danger of a collision.”

Neither of them were proper. As to “0” it is apparent that it falls far short of explaining to the jury their whole moral duty. If some of it, why not all? If it he proper in a law suit to give such a homily on moral or ethical duty to the jury (for which, by the by, learned counsel cite no precedent) should not the court cover the whole ground while about it? An attempt is made, in part, to justify the instruction because of one incident of the trial. While plaintiff was on the stand she was overcome by weeping and hysteria. Here was a young woman mortally hurt .and in telling her story she broke down weeping and left the stand at the suggestion of the trial judge. Let the one who could have calmly told her story (and such a' story) without emotion, cast the first stone at her. I have neither heart- for the office or call to fill it, as I see it. The trial was adjourned to the next day and when resumed in the morning the court gave defendant an option to continue the case over the term. Defendant declined the option and chose to go ahead. That declination closed the incident once for all. The trial court had no more right to single out that incident to the exclusion of all others and comment on it, than it had to single out any one bit of testimony for comment. The instruction was well refused.

As to instruction number 7, whatever might have been the law if a person had been on the track ahead of the car or about to enter on it and had been injured by a collision, it is manifest that the instruction did not declare good doctrine as between the carrier and the passenger when a fifteen-ton roller is on the track ahead and is seen for two hundred feet away creeping at a snail’s pace across. Hnder such circumstances the motormaa owed the duty to his passenger to exercise a high, degree of care which precluded any presumption or assumption that the inanimate machine would stay off or get off. He should have brought his car under control and have stopped without taking a chance of a collision. The instruction was not the law of the case.

The earnestness of distinguished counsel representing defendant in contending for reversible error has caused a review of all the assignments at length. Our conclusion on the whole matter is that the case was well tried, well decided and that the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

All concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BROWN, 0.

license: Public Domain

text:
    LEANDER THOMPSON v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
    Division One,
    May 31, 1912.

      X. EVIDENCE: Conflicting Testimony: Question for Jury. The plaintiff and his brother testify that the plaintiff was struck by a swinging door of a box car 'on defendant’s train and injured. In such case, even though the defendant introduced much testimony to prove physical facts inconsistent with the story told by the brothers, and also proved inconsistent statements in writing, to which one brother admitted his name was signed with his own hand, yet this evidence simply presents questions of veracity for the determination of the jury, with which the Supreme Court has nothing to do.
    2. PLEADING: Statutes of Sister State. Where no statute of the State where the cause of action arose is pleaded, the court will be guided by the laws of this State.
    3. NEGLIGENCE: Licensee on Railway Platform: Notice: Reasonable Care. Railway companies must take notice of the conditions created by the use of their roadways or premises by others with their encouragement or permission, either express or implied, -and they must use reasonable care, that is, care proportionate to the probability of injury, to avoid injuring those who may take advantage of such permission, so that, the running of a car with a loose door swinging out over a station platform over which much of the pedestrian travel of the town was accustomed to pass, under such circumstances as to injure the plaintiff, would be an act from which the jury would be at liberty to infer negligence.
    4. -: -: -: Defective Door on Car: Instructions. Where the testimony for the plaintiff goes to show that he was struck by a car door swinging over a station platform from a moving train, and that testimony is met by that of the conductor of the train, who testifies that he twice inspected the whole length of the train just before the injury to plaintiff, standing during the last inspection about 150 feet from the place of the injury and letting the slowly moving train pass him, finding the doors in good order, it was error to give an instruction for the plaintiff predicating his right to recover upon proof of the defective condition of the door and the resulting injury only, and to refuse to instruct that if the accident could not have been guarded against by the exercise of ordinary care, the jury should find for the defendant.
    5. -: Res Ipsa Loquitur. The maxim res ipsa loquitur is founded upon the feeling that every apparent wrong resulting in injury to another which may only be palliated or explained by facts within the peculiar knowledge of the perpetrator, carries with it the proof of its wrongful character and places upon him the burden of offering a just excuse.
    Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court. — Eon. J. L. Fort, Judge.
    Reversed and remanded (with directions).

      S. E. West, Boy F. Britton, Wammack & Welbourn for appellant.
    (1) Plaintiff was a mere licensee to whom appellant owed no duty except not wilfully or wantonly to injure him. Wencker y. Railroad, 169 Mo. 592; Carr v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 241; Mann v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 347; Woods v. Railroad, 149 Mo. App. 507 ; Dowd v. Railroad, 84 Wis. 105; Gillis v. Railroad, 59 Pa. St. 143; Railroad v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. St. 261; Heinlein y. Railroad, 147 Mass. 136; Railroad v. Fair-barns, 48 Ark. 491; Railroad v. Bingbam, 29 Ohio St. 364; Post v. Railroad, 123 S. W. 708; Woolwine v. Railroad, 36 W. Ya. 329; Penn. Railroad v. Martin, 111 Fed. 586; Means v. Railroad, 17 Am. Neg. Rpt. 1; 1 Thompson on Negligence (2 Ed.), 946; 3 Elliott on Railroads (2 Ed.), sec. 1250; White’s Personal Injuries, secs. 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 870, 871 and 872; Sullivan v. Railroad, 97 N. W. 114. (2) When the verdict is contrary to the physical facts, a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained. Oglesby v. Railroad, 177 Mo. 296; Spiro v. Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 250; Brown v. Lead Co., 149 Mo. App. 181. (3) Plaintiff’s instruction 3 is wrong. Railroad v. Brinson, 70 G-a. 207; Railroad v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. St. 258; Railroad v. Davis, 60 S. W. 14; Hicks v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 430; Railroad v. Carr, 126 S. W. 850; Lynch v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 420; Barr v. K. C., 105 Mo. 550; Weller v. Railroad, 120 Mo. 653; Webb’s Pollock on Torts (New Am. Ed.), 582. (4) Defendant’s instructions 8 and 11 should have been given.. Railroad v. Wade, 36 S. W. 1125; Hicks v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 430.-

      Johnson & Burr and N. A. Mosley for respondent.
    (1) Appellant owed respondent the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him. Ransom v. Union Depot, 142 Mo. App. 361; Ahnefeld v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 280; Hick v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 430; Fearons v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 208; Railroad v. Berry, 10 S. W. 472; Doss v. Railroad, 59 Mo. 27; Langan v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 392; Hudgens v. Railroad, 139 Mo. App. 44; Lovell v. Railroad, 121 Mo. App. 466. (2) Respondent and his brother had gone to the station to get an express package which they intended to take to their father’s home where they were stopping. Hence he was there on business with the company and was rightfully there. Butler v. Railroad, 136 S. W. 7291; Lovell v. Railroad, 121 Mo. App. 466; Hudgens v. Railroad, 139 Mo. App. 44; Nelson v. Railroad 132 Mo. App. 687; Railroad v. Pair-bairn, 48 Ark. 491. (3) Respondent, at the time of his injury, was walking in a' well beaten path made by public user, for a period' of ten years, with the knowledge and consent of appellant. Hence he was rightfully there whether he had business with the company or not and, on this ground, appellant owed him the duty of ordinary care. Ahnefeld v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 280; Fearons v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 208. (4) The use of the station platform as a foot way by the public was so extensive and general and for so long a period of time that appellant was afforded reasonable grounds to expect or anticipate the presence of persons on or near the track and it is wholly immaterial how respondent is denominated whether an invitee, licensee or trespasser, appellant owed him the duty to use ordinary care not to injure him. Ahnefeld v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 280. (5) It was gross negligence for appellant to operate its train through the populous city of Paragould and by its union station, where it had every reason to expect people would be assembled, with a box car door swinging out one and one half feet. The measure of appellant’s care is controlled by the circumstances of the case. The greater the hazard the greater the care required. 33 Cyc. 779-780; Scullin v. Railroad, 184 Mo. 695; Hicks v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 430; Oates v. Railroad, 168 Mo. 544; Eswine v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 296-297; Frick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 595; Brown v. Railroad, 50 Mo. 461; Maher v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 276. (6) Where the instructions that are given fairly cover the case and announce correct propositions of law, as is the case here, it is sufficient notwithstanding other instructions were asked and refused that stated the law correctly as applicable to the facts of the case. Railroad v. McElroy, 161 Mo. 584; Fruit Co. v. Lane, 101 Mo App. 712; Koenig v. Depot Co., 194 Mo. 564.
   BROWN, 0.

This is a suit for damages on account of personal injuries which are alleged to have been received by plaintiff at the joint passenger station of defendant and the St. Louis Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company at the city of Paragould, Arkansas. The petition states that while he was lawfully there, walking at the side of defendant’s track, he was struck by the door of one of defendant’s freight cars in a passing train; that the door had been negligently permitted by the defendant to project and swing a considerable distance outward from the side of the car so that it struck him and pulled him along with the moving car for several yards and violently threw him into and against a mass of iron and track rails negligently and wrongfully left by defendant where the public were accustomed to travel and to get off the cars at the station, thereby throwing bim to the ground and under the moving train which ran over his right arm crushing and mangling it so that it had to be amputated at the shoulder. Judgment is asked for $15,000.

The answer was a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence. The following plat of the vicinity where the accident occurred will be of assistance in understanding the facts.

The station building, a little over 156 feet long and 30 feet wide, contains, in the order named from north to south, the waiting rooms of the railway companies, the ticket offices, and the colored waiting rooms, all of which occupy perhaps two-thirds of the length of the building; then a hall or passage about twelve feet wide running through the building from east to west; next the baggage room; and at the south end the office of the Pacific Express Company, which is occupied by it under a lease from the owners of the station. On the east or defendant’s side of the building, near the south end, is a double sliding door of the express office; opposite it on the Iron Mountain side is a similar door through one of the sliding parts of which a smaller door had been cut by the express company. The express company had four trucks for the handling of its traffic, and the railroad companies from four to six for baggage. These last were frequently stored in the passage when not in use. The entire space occupied by the railroad companies around the station building and south between the tracks of the two companies was paved with crushed stone. This was kept smooth and in good condition and constituted the only platform of the station. It was not only used for the purposes incident to the handling of the passenger and express business of the railways, hut also for the passage of the general public backwards and forwards between Main street on the north and Garland avenue on the south, and even beyond Garland avenue. A well worn path extended along the west side of the defendant’s tracks upon this pavement and entered Garland avenue on a wooden walk built across the ditch. Passenger trains running north over defendant’s road usually stopped with the locomotive obstructing Main street, and the train extended about three hundred and fifty feet to the south. The passengers entered and alighted from the cars on that portion of the pavement between the avenue and the south end of the station.

There was no witness to the accident except the plaintiff himself, and Orville Thompson, a younger brother twenty-seven years of age. The two together left the Thompson store on the east side of Pruett street some distance north of Main, at sometime, from nine to half past nine o’clock in the evening, to go to their father’s house, which was on the north side of Main street a little more than a block east of the depot. Going down Pruett street they stopped at Empfield’s jewelry store some ten or fifteen minutes, then went on to a restaurant where they stopped a few minutes and ate some chili, then went on to Main street, where the plaintiff stopped and talked with Mr. Jackson while Orville went on to the northeast corner of the depot and waited for him. At this time a freight train of defendant, called in the evidence second fifteen, consisting of 41 loads with its engine and caboose, stood immediately north of Main street where it waited on a side track to permit the passage of a north bound passenger train (No. 2) which it met at that point. At this time the Thompsons were seen on Main street near the depot by Mr. Wright, a witness- introduced by defendant apparently to prove that fact. Second fifteen pulled out for the south at 10:35, its movement hiding the Thompsons from Mr. Wright’s view. Up to this time there is no dispute as to the facts, and it is also admitted that Orville Thompson then had a package of whiskey in the express office for delivery which he did not receive until the next day.

They say that Orville had told the plaintiff of this whiskey and that they started down to the express office on the east side of the station to get it, and that as they started the train had also started and was pulling along opposite them. When they got to the door of the express office they knocked and no one answering they started around the south end of the station to go to the door on the Iron Mountain side making a considerable detour to go around some trucks and a telephone pole at the southeast corner of the building. This brought them pretty close to the train and before they turned away from it again something hit the plaintiff on his head or back which proved to be a loose and swinging door hanging by its upper left corner alone; that plaintiff became entangled in or attached to this dooy and was carried forward so that as the train increased its speed Orville, who was all the time trying to pull him loose from the door, was compelled to run to keep'up with it. Finally they reached the point in Garland avenue shown on the map by crosses where two or three ■ steel rails and some angle bars were lying, over which the plaintiff stumbled, coming loose from the car door, and fell so that his right arm extended across the rail and was run over and crushed by the wheels. The entire dispute as to facts is included within the time that elapsed after they left Main street to the consumma-' tion of the injury. Orville, after extricating plaintiff from beneath the train, went back to the east door of the express office, and knocked, and Mr. Barton, the agent of the express company, Mr. Martindale, its transfer clerk, Mr. Newberry, the town marshall, and Mr. Crowell were in. To use the words of Mr. Barton in his testimony, he “knocked like everything” and commenced calling, and Mr. Barton rushed to the door and opened it, and Orville said: “Come back here quick, Leander is hurt, the train has hit him.” Mr. Martindale and Mr. Newberry ran out and brought plaintiff to the office, and sent Crowell for the doctor. Mr. R. J. Tucker was standing in the back door of his restaurant, which fronts west on Pruett street opposite the northwest corner of the depot. Crowell, as he passed, told him that Leander was hurt. Tucker stepped across to the depot, and finding the west door closed, walked around the south end and came to the other door, which was also closed. Thinking they wanted nobody in there he came up to the north end of the depot and started to the restaurant, when he met the plaintiff’s father coming from home. He told Mr. Thompson that plaintiff was in the express room. They went back and knocked, and Mr. Martindale came to the door and opened it and they went in. As Mr. Tucker came around the southeast corner of the depot he met Mr. Haley, conductor of second fifteen, running. Mr. Haley called to him to take his way bills, which he had forgotten to leave when he took out his train. Mr. Tucker took the bills and Mr. Haley ran back to the Iron Mountain crossing and signaled to pull ahead, and got on the caboose at that point. When he found he had forgotten the bills, he had put on the air from the caboose, stopped the train, ran back to the depot, given his way bills to Tucker and got back to his train, without knowing that anything had happened.

Plaintiff was so badly injured that the doctors advised that his life was in extreme danger. The bones of his arm were crushed and projecting through the flesh and skin. He had a cut on his forehead and one on the back of his head, and numerous bruises on other portions of his body; having one long bruise on his back and hip, looking, as the doctor said, as if he had been “drug over some object or some object drug over him.”

The conductor stated that when he came out of the depot with his lantern and signaled his train to. go on, he stood on the west side of the track and inspected it as it went by; that it was his duty to inspect the train whenever he had an opportunity, and that he saw no car with a door hanging down by one hook. He got on the caboose at the rear of train when it passed. Defendant introduced much evidence tending to discredit the testimony of Orville Thompson, including a written statement purporting to have been made the following day, to which his name was admitted to have been .signed. The. important details of this evidence were disputed.

At the close of the evidence the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant which the court refused to do and thereupon, gave the following instructions for plaintiff of which the appellant complains:

‘ ‘ 1. The court instructs you gentlemen, that if you believe and find from the testimony in this case, at the date of the alleged injury to the plaintiff, he was at the Union Station, in the city of Paragould, in the state of Arkansas, for the purpose of getting a package from the express office of said station, then he was rightfully there, and, if you further believe that while the plaintiff was passing along the platform of said station to said express office, if you believe that he did so pass along, the defendant, railway company, ran its freight train by said station with a car door swinging or projecting from the side of one of the cars of said train a sufficient distance to strike or injure persons who might be upon said platform, and that the plaintiff, without notice or warning of said swinging or projecting door, if you believe it existed, was struck thereby, at said time and place, upon the back of his head and body without fault upon his part, and forced or carried forward with the movement of said train to and upon a mass of angle bars, track rails or other railroad irons, and by reason thereof was thrown upon said railroad track and under said moving freight train and crushed, wounded and mangled so as to necessitate the amputation of his right arm, then the verdict will be for the plaintiff.

“3. You are further instructed that one is not required to anticipate unknown danger, or danger arising from the negligence of another; all that is required is that he exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, for his safety from known danger. Hence, if you believe from the testimony in this case that at the time of plaintiff’s alleged injury he was walking along the platform of said station at a sufficient distance from the moving freight train of the defendant, to permit the cars thereof to pass him in safety, and if you further find and believe that the occasion of Ms being struck and injured (if you find that be was struck and injured) was a swinging or projecting door on tbe side of one of tbe cars of said train, and that plaintiff bad no notice or warning of tbe condition of said door, then you are instructed that be was not required to anticipate danger from said door and was not' guilty of contributory negligence in walking where said door would strike bim.”

Tbe court refused tbe following instructions asked by defendant.

“5. The jury are instructed that notwithstanding they may find from tbe evidence in this case that tbe accident to tbe plaintiff resulted from a car door swinging open and striking bim and throwing bim under tbe wheels of tbe car, that alone will not entitle Mm to recover in this action. He must go further and prove that tbe defendant knew, or by tbe use of ordinary care should have known, that tbe door of tbe car was loose, and was likely to swing open while in motion from which such accidents as tbe plaintiff sustained might probably result.

“11. Tbe court instructs tbe jury that to entitle tbe plaintiff to recover in this suit, it must appear from tbe evidence that tbe injury complained of was occasioned by tbe want of attention, carelessness or negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant, or its servants, as charged in tbe petition and was not simply tbe result of an accident, and if tbe jury believe from tbe evidence that tbe injury resulted from an accident which could not have been foreseen or guarded against by tbe exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and prudence on tbe part of tbe defendant then tbe plaintiff cannot recover and the jury should find for tbe defendant.”

Tbe verdict was for tbe plaintiff for ten thousand dollars.

Error is assigned on the- giving and refusal of tbe foregoing instructions, and also ■ that tbe verdict is excessive and the result of the passion and prejudice of the jury.

I. The defendant complains, first of all, of the action of the court in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor.

It is charged as the foundation of the action that while the plaintiff was lawfully at a union station used by the defendant in the city of Paragould, Arkansas, in a place where the public were accustomed to travel, and get on and off the cars at said station, he was struck by the door of a freight car which the defendant had negligently and wrongfully permitted to project and swing a considerable distance .outward from the side of one of the ears of a passing train, and was thereby thrown down so that his right arm was run over and crushed by the wheels of the train, and was necessarily amputated at the shoulder. Both the plaintiff and a brother who was with him at the time, testified directly and positively to the facts. They said that the plaintiff was struck by the door of an ordinary box car swinging out from the car, hanging only by the upper corner toward the rear of the train; that it carried him along a considerable distance, and then threw him down with the result in the petition described. The defendant says that this testimony is not only unreasonable, but is inconsistent with physical facts of which we must take notice. In short it says that the story is an impossible one. We have carefully examined all the evidence and cannot agree' with this proposition. It is true that the defendant introduced much ’ testimony to prove physical facts inconsistent with this story, and also proved inconsistent statements in writing, to which one of the. witnesses admitted that his name was signed with his own hand, but this evidence simply presents questions of veracity for the determination of the jury with which we have nothing to do. For instance the conductor of the train, whose duty it was to do so, testified that he inspected the cars by standing at the side of the train as it passed, going toward the place of the accident about 300 .feet away, and that no car was in the condition described by the plaintiff and his brother. Another employee of the defendant testified that he inspected the same side of the train at the end of the run, and that the cars were in good condition, We can find nothing in the record that calls upon ns to invade the province of the jury to determine how far these statements are irreconcilable with each other, or if they should prove, in our opinion, to be irreconcilable, to determine which is true and which is false. The injury is admitted. No other explanation is offered, and it rests with the jury to determine whether or not this oiie is true.

The defendant insists that according to plaintiff’s own testimony he was, at the alleged time and place of the accident, a mere licensee on the premises of defendant, which, therefore, owed him no duty except not wilfully or wantonly to injure him; and there being no evidence that the injury was either wilful or wanton, a verdict for the defendant should have been directed. As no statute or other law of Arkansas is pleaded, we will, in the examination of this and other like questions, have to be guided by the laws of this State. [Flato v. Mulhall, 72 Mo. 522, 525; Johnston v. Gawtry, 83 Mo. 339; Tennent v. Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 345, 352.]

Eailroad companies, like many other business enterprises that depend upon contact with the public for the transaction and development of their business, naturally seek locations that are easy of access by public highways to the centers of population and commercial activity. It is natural that in some instances they should desire to improve and enlarge these facilities for approach to their depots and warehouses by devoting their own lands to such purposes, and it often occurs that in the attempt to obtain the greatest possible benefit from facilities of this character the general public are encouraged to make the freest use of them consistent with the interests of the owner. To what extent such use is to the advantage or detriment of the owner is a matter of opinion resting upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. In this case the evidence is clear and the fact undisputed that much of the pedestrian travel between the northern and southern portions of the city was over the smooth, clean pavement about the station, and between the tracks of, the railroad companies that used it in the transaction of their business. There is no suggestion that either of the companies discouraged this travel, and nothing in the record to weaken the force of such reasons as may naturally suggest therifselves for its encouragement.

In Commonwealth v. Power, 48 Mass. 603, it was held that “the opening of depots and platforms for the sale of tickets, for the assembling of persons going to take passage, or landing from the cars, amounts in law to a license to all persons, prima facie,, to enter the depot, and that such entry is not a trespass; but that it is a license conditional, subject to reasonable and useful regulations.” This language is quoted with approval by this court in Hicks v. Railroad, 64 Mo. 430, 437, and the doctrine stated in Gillis v. Railroad, 59 Pa. St. 129, disapproved. That case grew out of an unfortunate accident connected with the memorable western trip of President Johnson in 1866. He and the distinguished gentlemen who accompanied him were furnished a special train, with a special time-schedule for their accommodation, by which it was required to stop at Johnstown, Pennsylvania, long enough to enable the president to speak to the people of that vicinity, who were notified by the railroad company of the time of the arrival and departure of the train. It was stopped at an unusual point, to give the people an opportunity to use a platform maintained by the company at the station to listen to the president, who spoke from the rear of the train. The platform fell under the weight of those who occupied it, and many were killed and injured. The court held that although the plaintiff might not have been technically a trespasser, because the platform was open, and there was a general license to pass over it, yet the company stood in no relation to him which required care on its part, and that it was accordingly liable only for wanton or intentional injury.

Were the court now called upon for the first time to make its choice we would not hesitate to adopt the doctrine quoted from the Massachusetts court, but it is no longer, with us, a question of first intention. Whatever maf be the rights growing out of contract relations, such as that of passenger and carrier, it is well settled by a long line of judicial decisions in this state, that railroad companies and others' similarly situated, must, so far as their relations to the general public are concerned, take notice of the conditions created by the use of their roadways or premises by others with their encouragement or permission either expressed or implied; and that they thereby assume the duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring those who may take advantage of such permission. [Hicks v. Railroad, supra; Doss v. Railroad, 59 Mo. 27; Langan v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 392; Ahnefeld v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 280; Crawford v. Stock Yards, 215 Mo. 394; Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. 56.] And that alone is reasonable care which is proportionate to the probability of injury growing out of the situation.

If one had a delightful grove and should place a sign over the gate inviting the public to come in and walk in its shade, he would be negligent if, without warning, he should, by blasting on the premises, make it dangerous to pedestrians who might take advantage of Ms invitation, and Ms liability in such a case would extend to one wbo bad come in to lie upon tbe grass, as well as to'those wbo were walking, according to tbe strict terms of bis invitation. Tbis is illustrated by tbe decision of tbis court in tbe case last cited. It was a suit for damages on account of tbe killing of one Fletcber, at a place where defendant’s track bad been “used for a long time, with its tacit acquiescence, by tbe inhabitants of Kirksville going from tbe southwest and south parts of tbe town to tbe northeast, where tbe principal business section lay, and vice versa. Especially was tbis so mornings, noons, and evenings. Tbis custom bad g*one on for many years and no attempt was made to show that defendant took any steps to pre.vent such open, continuous and extensive use by tbe public” (p. 76). Mr. Fletcber, wbo was a railroad section foreman by occupation, living and working in another city, was visiting Enrksville, in which be bad formerly resided. He took advantage of bis leisure to become intoxicated, and went out and lay down to rest himself on the track at this very place, where be was struck by one of defendant’s trains. Tbe court ñeld that Mr. Fletcber was entitled to such protection as tbe performance by tbe company of its duty to tbe general public would afford; and that a failure to perform that duty was such negligence as enabled any person injured.by it to recover compensation for such injury. There is nothing in Carr v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 214, which conflicts with tbe doctrine of tbis case. In that case it was conceded that it would be no defense to tbe action that plaintiff, at tbe time of tbe injury, was walking along tbe roadbed of defendant. He was, said tbe court, a licensee, and was entitled to protection from negligence, and there was no evidence whatever to show any negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant contributing to tbe injury. We have also carefully examined tbe other Missouri cases cited by tbe defendant, and find nothing in them inconsistent with tbe doctrine of this court as held in the Hicks and Murphy cases already cited, and expressed in this opinion. That the running of a car with a loose door swinging out over the platform used by the public in the manner indicated in the evidence would be an act from which the jury would be at liberty to infer negligence under the circumstances of the present case is evident. [Hicks v. Railroad, supra; Crawford v. Stock Yards, supra; Langan v. Railroad, supra.] We hold therefore that there was no error in submitting the case to the jury.

II. The court, at the instance of the plaintiff, and against the defendant’s objection, instructed the jury, in substance, that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant ran its train by the station with the car door swinging from the side of one of the cars far enough to strike or injure persons on the platform and the plaintiff while there for the purpose of transacting business with the express company, was struck thereby, and injured as stated in the petition, their verdict should be for the plaintiff; and refused to instruct for the defendant, that if the injury resulted from an accident which could not have been foreseen or guarded against by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and prudence they should find for the defendant.

This action .of the court amounts to an assertion that the swinging door, if it existed as described in the evidence, was, of itself, in its relation to the plaintiff, either conclusive evidence of the negligence of defendant in permitting it, or prima facie evidence of such negligence; and that there was no evidence tending to rebut it.

There was nothing in the relation of the plaintiff to the defendant as set forth in plaintiff’s instruction which indicated a duty on the part of the defendant to insure him against injury in the manner detailed in the evidence. The real question is whether the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts detailed in the instruction so that they would raise a prima facie presumption of negligence. This maxim is founded upon the feeling that every apparent wrong resulting •in injury to another which may only he palliated or explained by facts within the peculiar knowledge of the perpetrator, carries with it the proof of its wrongful character and places upon him the burden of offering a just excuse. [Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373; Tateman v. Railroad, 96 Mo. App. 448; Rattan v. Electric Co., 120 Mo. App. 270, 279; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 65, 74; Sharp v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 94; Gannon v. Gas Light Co., 145 Mo. 502.] In this case the testimony tended to show that the defendant ran its train along the side of a platform which was rightfully used by the public, not only for the transaction of business, connected with it and its tenants, but also for the general purpose of traveling from place to place, with' a loose door hanging by a single corner near the top of the ,car and projecting and swinging outward over the platform so far as to be dangerous to persons walking thereon, and that the plaintiff walking on the platform where it would otherwise have been safe was injured by being struck by the door. "We think that this was not only evidence of negligence (Hicks v. Railroad, supra), but that it made a prima facie case calling for explanation on the part of the defendant. To meet this burden the defendant introduced the conductor of the train who testified that while his train was standing in the yard north of Main street, before the accident, he walked along its west side from the rear to the front of the engine and examined the cars as to their fastenings; that afterward, when the train pulled out, he stood upon the same side, which was the one where the accident occurred, and examined the doors as they successively passed him; that the train was composed entirely of loaded cars which it was his duty to inspect whenever an opportunity offered, to see that the doors were properly closed and sealed; and that in both these inspections he found them in .apparent good order. We think that this testimony tended not only to disprove the evidence of plaintiff that a door was swinging outward by a single corner when the car had arrived at a point a hundred and fifty feet beyond the position of the conductor during the second inspection, but it also tended to prove the exercise of reasonable care in the inspection of the cars to prevent such situations as plaintiff claims resulted in the accident. This being so that question should have been submitted to the jury, and it was error to give the first instruction for the plaintiff, which predicated the right to recover upon proof of the defective condition of the door and the resulting injury only; and that the jury should have been instructed as requested by defendant that if the accident could not have been guarded against by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and prudence on the part of defendant they should find for the defendant.

For these errors the judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with the principles stated in this opinion.

Bond, G., concurs.

PEE CUEIAM. — The foregoing opinion of Brown, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

All the judges concur except Vattiant, J., absent.