author: BLAIE, J.

text:
    THE STATE ex rel. G. E. MUNS et al. v. GEORGE E. HACKMANN, State Auditor.
    In Banc,
    June 26, 1920.
    1. MANDAMUS: Demurrer to Writ: Facts. A demurrer to the petition for a writ of mandamus puts the cause at issue, and the allegations of fact stand admitted.
    2. SCHOOL BUILDING: Bonds to Erect High School. The statute (Sec. 10777, R. S. 1909) does not in terms distinguish between grade school buildings and high school buildings. In so far as it relates to buildings, it gives to the school board power to call an election -to vote bonds for “erecting school buildings,” and , those include buildings for use for any and all schools the. board may or must establish, whether they be grade schools or a high school. All schools under the authority and control of the district board form a system which constitutes the common or public ' school or schools of the district.
    3. -:-: Notice and Bonds. Where the notice of an election stated that the purpose was to authorize the board to issue bonds “for the erection of a school building,” the designation of the building in the' bonds and in the contract as a “high school building” is not of such consequence as to afford a just cause for a refusal by the State Auditor to register the bonds.
    4. -: Election: Hours from Two to Six. Section 10777, Revised Statutes 1909, does not fix the hours for holding a special election for voting bonds to erect a school building; and if such election must be conducted in the manner provided by law for other elections by the same body, all the statutes relating to such other elections become pertinen’t, and when all of them are considered it is clear that they do not require such election to be held from seven o’clock a. m. to six o’clock p. m. A special election for such purpose, held in pursuance to general instructions of the State Superintendent of Schools, from two to six o’clock p. m., is a legal election.
    5. -: -: Administrative Interpretation. Section 10920, Revised Statutes 1909, requires the State Superintendent of Schools to cause to be distributed to school officers and authorities copies of the school laws, “with instructions for carrying such laws into execution,” and long before the special election to vote bonds for the erection of a school building in a town district was held he had furnished a form of notice which fixed the opening hour for such an election at two o’clock p. m., and this instruction the school board followed. Held, that the Superintendent could not . amend the statute, but an administrative construction of a doubtful statutory provision is entitled to weight, particularly after it has been acquiesced in by the Legislature for years and. securities have been issued and bought and sold in dependence upon it; and a special election held for such purpose in pursuance to such instructions does not so conflict with the statute requiring that at the annual school election in town districts the polls shall be open from seven • o’clock a. m. to six p. m., as to render it illegal.
    Mandamus.
    Writ made peremptory.

      8. 8. Nowlin, IF. G. Hughes, E. P. Bosenberger and Glover E. Dowell for relators.
    (1) There is no statute providing for the time of holding special elections in city, town or consolidated school districts. Sec. 10879, R. S. 1909, provides for the holding of annual elections in such districts and says the annual election shall begin at seven o’clock a. m. and close at sis o’clock p. m., and this section further significantly provides that such elections shall be held in certain cities in conjunction with the municipal elections, and for that reason the law provides that the polls shall open and close at the annual elections at the same time provided for in the municipal elections. Sec. 10870, R. S. 1909, relates to elections involving the disorganization of town, city or consolidated school districts, a matter which is certainly of as much importance as the issuance of bonds, and that section is absolutely silent as to when the voters shall have the right to vote. Apparently that section provides for a mass meeting to be held at the school house where the voters vote and go home. Sec. 10865, R. S. 1909, provides for the organization of common or consolidated school districts into town or city school districts, and it expressly provides that the proposition shall be voted on at an annual or special meeting, notice having been given as provided in Sec. 10844, R. S. 1909, which section is in the article applicable to common schools and provides for the* meeting at two o ’clock p. m. without fixing the time for the close. Again Section 3, Laws 1913, p. 721, provides for a meeting at two o ’clock p. m. to vote on the organization of the district. (2) Sec. 10920, R. S. 1909, expressly makes it the duty of the State Superintendent to print in a separate volume and distribute for the use of school officers the school laws of the State with instructions for carrying such laws into execution. In obedience to such law, the State Superintendent has issued instructions for carrying such laws into effect. (3) Sec. 10777, R. S., 1909, relates to school-loan method of voting and sale of bonds, applicable to all classes of schools, it being the sole and only section in the statute providing for the issuance and sale of school bonds for building purposes, and it being the section under which the special bond election in question was held. This section is complete within itself, and while it specifically provides for the posting of the notices of election and the form of the ballot which must be used, saying that the propositions there referred to may be voted on at either annual or special elections, yet it in no way provides for the time of the elections. Therefore, clearly under that section, all the voters have a right to is a reasonable and fair opportunity to express their will by ballot without regard to the length of time the polls shall remain open. And further, the State Superintendent of Schools acting under Section 10920 has construed this Section 10777 by placing in the school laws by him published in a separate volume and distributed among the school officers, immediately following said Section 10777, his form of notice of special school elections is set up, and in this form he provides that -said election shall commence at two o’clock p. m. While the instructions of the State Superintendent of Schools are not binding on the courts, yet when such instructions are reasonable and practical they have great weight with the courts in determining the true meaning of the law. State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 1.

      Frank W. McAllister, Attorney-General, and G. P. Le Mire, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.
    (1) Respondent refused to register said bonds on the ground that since the notices of the special election stated that same was to be held for the purpose of voting bonds “for the erection of a school building," said school board had no authority to issue bonds or expend money derived from the sale thereof, for the erection of a high school. While we have been unable to discover a decision of our appellate courts involving this specific proposition, yet the remarks contained in the opinions rendered in the case of. Martin v. Bennett, 139 Mo. App. 237,. and Horsfall v. School District, 143 Mo. App. 541, seem to indicate that before a school board such as here involved is authorized to issue bonds and expend money in the erection of a high school building, such proposition must be specifically submitted to the vote of the people by proper notice and an election held in compliance therewith. ■ (2) Our statutes applicable to city school districts, such as are here involved, are silent as to the manner of conducting a special election called by the school board for the purpose of voting bonds to erect buildings, but it is by law provided that at the annual meeting of such districts the polls shall be kept open from seven o’clock a. m. until six o’clock p. m. It has generally been held that when a statute authorizes a municipal corporation to hold an election for the purpose of determining a given question, and describes no mode for the conducting of such election, then such election shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by law for other elections by the same body. Thus, since the law providing for a regular annual meeting of such districts provides that the polls shall be open between the hours of seven o’clock a. m. and six o ’clock, p. m., it would appear that likewise in special elections the polls should be kept open as aforesaid. It has been further held that where the hours for holding an election are prescribed by statute a slight deviation ' therefrom will not necessarily render such election void and the presumption will be that such deviation has not affected the result of said election, but, when the deviation from the legal hours is great or even considerable, the presumption will be that it has affected the result of the election and the burden will be upon him who seeks to uphold the election to prove affirmatively that it does not. McCrary on Election Laws, secs. 163, 164, 165; Penn. District Election, 68 Pa. St; 336; Shadwick v. Melvin, Bright’s Election Cases; p. 251; Yates v. Martin, 1 Ells, 52.
   BLAIE, J.

Pursuant to a special election held February 16, 1920, the directors of School District No. 39 of Montgomery County (Montgomery City School District) issued bonds to secure funds to be used in erecting a school building. The State Auditor has- refused to register these bonds (Art. 8, chap. 15, E. S. 1909), and this is a proceeding by mandamus to compel him to do so.

Eespondent has waived the issuance of the alternative writ and demurred to the petition therefor. This puts the cause at issue (State ex rel. v. Gordon, 238 Mo. 168) and the allegations demurred to stand admitted. [State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 256 Mo. 710.] In addition, the parties have filed an agreed statement of facts.

The school district in question is a town school district. The notice of election stated that the. purpose, was “to authorize the school board to issue bonds to the amount of $28,000 for the erection of a school building.” The'notice, among other things, fixed the voting-places and, following the order,of the board, informed the voters that the polls would open “at two o’clock p. m. and remain open until 6 o’clock p.m.” The election was held on the date named in the notice and the polls were opened and closed at the hours fixed therein. Three hundred and twenty-three votes were cast; two hundred and thirty-seven fpr the loan, and eighty-six against the loan. The bonds issued recited that they were issued for the purpose of erecting a high school building, and a contract for such a building was entered into by relators.

Respondent raises two questions: (1) that since the notice of election “stated that same was to be held for the purpose of voting bonds ‘for the erection of a school building,’ said board had no authority to issue bonds or expend money derived from the sale thereof, for the erection of a high school;’ ” and (2) that the election was void because the “polls were not kept open from seven o’clock a. m. to six o’clock p. m.,” but were “kept open only from two o’clock p. m. until six o’clock p. m. on the day on which the election was held.”

School18’'

I. It is conceded that the authority of relators to hold the election in question is found in Section 10777, Revised Statutes 1909. The amendment of 1911 (Laws of 1911, pp. 394, 395) does not affect any question in this case. Section 10777, as amended, provides timi “for the purpose of purchasing school house sites, erecting school houses, library buildings and furnishing the same, and building additions to or repairing old buildings, the board of directors shall be authorized to borrow money, and issue bonds for the payment thereof, in the maimer herein provided. . . Notice of said election shall be given, at least fifteen days before the same shall be held, by at least five written or printed notices, posted in five public places in the school district where said election shall be held, and the amount of the loan required, and for what purposes; it shall he the duty of the clerk to sign and post said notices. The qualified voters at said election shall vote hy ballot. Those voting in favor of the loan shall have written or printed on their tickets, ‘For the loan;’ those voting against the loan, the words, ‘Against the loan;’ and if two-thirds of the votes cast shall be ‘for the loan’ the district hoard shall he vested with the power to borrow money, in the name of the district, to the amount and for the purpose" specified in the notice aforesaid, subject to the restrictions of the following section. . . . .” The remainder of the section and the succeeding section are not relevant to the question in this case.

The authority of the district to vote bonds for school buildings is found in this section. The statute does not in terms distinguish between grade school buildings and high school buildings. The power given, so far as this case is concerned, is one to call an election to vote b8nds for “erecting school houses.” Even the section which authorizes the board of a town district to establish schools does not use the term high schools, but empowers such hoard to establish schools “in which studies not enumerated in Section 10941 may be pursued.” It is clear the word “school houses” as it is used in Section 10777 includes buildings for use for any and all schools the board may or must establish, both grade schools and those “of a higher grade” than contemplated by Section 10941, i. e. such as are usually referred to as high schools. [Roach v. The Board, 77 Mo. 484; Carling v. Jersey City, 71 N. J. L. l. c. 158; American Asylum v. Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. 172; Board of Education v. Hyatt, 152 Calif. l. c. 519.] All these schools are under,the authority and control of the district board. The whole form a system which constitutes the common or public school or schools of the district. In Board of Education v. Welsh, 51 Kan. l. c. 806, 807, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:

“Under our liberal and beneficent system of common schools, .we perceive no good reason why the higher branches prescribed by the board of education of the City of Topeka may not in its discretion be taught in the public schools, and no good reason why scholars desiring to be instructed in such branches may not be provided with a separate school building, properly furnished, whéther it be called a public school, a graded school or a high school.' The Legislature, within the terms of the constitution, has established a system of common schools. High schools are referred to as a part of the system. Under the provisions of Chapter 196, Laws 1891, if certain preliminary proceedings are taken by boards of education, the qualified electors may vote bonds for the purchase of school sites and the’ construction of school buildings. Whether the school buildings proposed to be constructed and voted for shall be called a graded school or a high school is immaterial, if, finder the control of the board of education, it.is carried on in accordance with the statute concerning common schools.”

The purpose- of the election involved here was to secure authority to issue bonds to obtain funds to erect a building designed, necessarily^ to house some part of the schools of the district. The statutes do not, in terms, distinguish, in this connection between the schools of lower and-higher grade with respect to elections for voting bonds for school houses. One is as much a school as the other, and a building for one is as much a school house as is a building for the other. The designation of the building as a high school building in the contract and in the bonds is not of such consequence as to afford just cause for respondent’s refusal to register the bonds. The cases cited by respondent (Martin v. Bennett, 139 Mo. App. 237; Horsefall v. School District, 143 Mo. App. 541) decide nothing to the contrary.’

Election'

II. It is insisted the polls should have been opened at seven o’clock a. m. and kept open until six o’clock jj. m. instead of from two o’clock p. m. to six o’clock p. m. They were opened and closed at the fi01ir fixed by the order of the board and the notice of election. The position of respondent is that the board had no power to fix the hours if did and that, therefore, the election is void. It is stipulated that the-number of qualified voters in the district was approximately four hundred; that only once in seven years had the number of votes cast exceeded the number cast in the election in question; that there was no congestion at the polls and that “the officers of said election- could easily have accommodated twice the number of voters that actually voted.” There is no contention that any voter was prevented from voting by-reason of the hours fixed by the board or that the result was in any way affected. The statute (Sec. 10777, R. S. 1909) fixes no hours for opening and closing the polls at bond elections. Election by ballot is provided and the form of the ballot is prescribed. It is .argued that since the hours are not prescribed, “then such election shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by law for other elections by the same body.” [State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 218 S. W. 1. c. 324.] If this principle be conceded to be applicable, the “other elections” provided by the statute, become pertinent. At the annual election in town districts (Sec. 10879, R. S. 1909) it is provided that the polls shall be open from seven o’clock a. m. to six o ’clock p. m. If this were the only provision for the elections in such district, the question presented would be easily solved, under the concession already, made. This not the only one. In Section 10870, Revised Statutes 1909, it is enacted that the election for disorganizing a town district shall be held at a meeting; after notice, and if two-thirds of the resident voters and taxpayers vote at such meeting for dissolution, the district stands dissolved. In the same article (Sec. 10865, R. S. 1909) the method of organizing city, town and consolidated school districts is provided. The voting is by ballot and it to be done at a meeting held for that purpose, pursuant to notice. Respondent does not point out any reason for selecting one rather than another of these methods under the rule he invokes.

By Section 10920, Revised Statutes 1909', the State Superintendent of Schools is required to cause to be distributed to school officers and authorities, copies of the school laws, separately bound, “with instructions for carrying into execution of such laws.” It is stipulated that in his' instructions for carrying on an election under Section 10877, the State Superintendent had long before furnished a form of notice.of election which fixed the opening hour at two o’clock p. m. This “instruction” relators followed in calling the election here involved, as many school boards, doubtless, had previously followed it in calling like elections. Of course, the State Superintendent cannot amend a statute, but an administrative construction of a doubtful statutory provision is entitled to weight, particularly after it has been acquiesced in by the Legislature for years and securities issued and bought and sold in dependence upon it. There is a reason for the provision that at annual elections the polls shall be kept open from seven a. m. to six p. m., which reason’ does not apply to bond elections called for special dates; i. e., such elections are held in conjunction with municipal elections at which the time during which the polls shall be open is fixed by other statutes. In the circumstances, there is no sound reason which compels a holding that the established practice which has long prevailed in pursuance of instructions authorized by the Legislature so conflicts with the law that the act of the relators in following it renders the election in this case void. The alternative writ is made peremptory.

All concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WALKER, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    J. W. McMURRY, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY and THOMAS KELLEY & SON.
    In Banc,
    June 26, 1920.
    1. INTERSTATE SEWER: Legislative Rower. As far as authority can he predicated upon state and municipal legislation, Kansas City has been invested with power to establish a joint sewer district and to co-operate with public corporations in the State of Kansas for the construction of Turkey Creek Sewer and the extension of it beyond the city and state lines to the Kansas River as its outlet, and to pay for the same by special tax bills levied against the lots of land within the joint sewer district.
    2. -: Limitations Upon Municipal Action: Judicial Notice. The only limitations upon the right of a city in the exercise of its charter powers to establish sewer districts and provide for the construction of sewers therein are that .acts or ordinances in furtherance of said powers shall not be creatures of fraud, whim or caprice, or in violation of common right, or impose a burden on the citizen or community without corresponding benefit. The courts recognize the public necessity oi sewer systems for municipalities, take judicial notice that they promote the public health, elevate the moral tone of the people -and encourage right living, and do not interfere with a reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in the municipality to act.
    3. -: Joint Sewer District: Special Tape Bills. Kansas City has charter power to establish a joint sewer district composed of 144 existing districts, embracing one-eighth of the city’s area, hot embracing therein any land which is not within the natural drainage area of the valley or watercourse in which the joint district sewer is to be constructed, and the City Council has the discretion to require that the entire cost of construction shall be paid by special tax bills against the lots therein.
    4. —-: -: Benefit: Legislative Matter. The question of whether the lots in a joint sewer district will or will not be benefited by the construction of a sewer is a legislative and not a judicial question; and the municipal legislature having determined that they would be benefited, and fixed the ratio of such benefit, and there being no question of fraud or oppression in the enactment of the ordinance, and the proceedings being regular and in conformity with the charter, its determination is conclusive.
    5. --: Outlet in Another State. An outlet to a sewer is necessary, and where the legislatures of 'two adjoining states authorize it, the city may provide for its outlet outside of its corporate limits and extend the sewer beyond the state line- into the other state, and provide for the emptying of the sewage into a river in that state.
    6. -: Drainage of Area of Another State: Dominant and Servient Estate. The ordinance provides for a joint sewer district of 4762 acres situate in Kansas City and in tlie watershed of Turkey Creek, and for the construction of a joint district sewe.r of sufficient size to receive the entire volume of water carried by this stream in flood time. Adjacent to. the proposed district and across the state line in Kansas is the City of Rosedale, which is afforded drainage in part by the natural channel of said stream, which has its source in Kansas; and if the channel is destroyed, as is contemplated by the construction of the proposed sewer, that city will be deprived of any means of disposing of its sewage. To meet the situation, the plan of construction provides for inlets to the- joint district sewer for the drainage of an area of 250 acres in Rosedale, and it is contended that the increased*‘capacity of the sewer, made necessary. by providing drainage for said Rosedal area, is unauthorized. Held, that the Rosedale area is the dominant estate, and the Kansas City area drained by the creek is the servient estate, and it is elementary that the servient owners must suffer the consequences of the unrestricted flow of drainage onto their lands from the dominant estate, and the enlargement of the sewer so as to provide for inlets which drain said dominant estate is authorized.
    7. -: Pumping Stations: Implied Power. The cost of pumping stations, necessary to force the sewage and water from the' low-level sewers into the main pressure sewer, in times of high water in the river into wbich it has its outlet, thereby preventing the water from hacking up into basements of buildings,' etc., may be assessed against the lots in the joint sewer district as a part of the cost of the sewer, under the provision- of the charter which provides that “the city may construct and maintain sewers, drains and all works necessary for the disposition of sewage and garbage.” While the charter does not' expressly mention pumping stations, their necessity being conceded, the power is necessarily implied from those thus expressly given.
    8.. -: -: Part of Sewer. Necessary outlets, pumping sta- ■ tions, local laterals, extensions and connections are as much a part of a sewer system as manholes, catch basins and other appliances, and can be paid for imthe same way as other portions of the sewer.
    9. -: Laterals in Lowlands. Although the low lands in the valley are already equipped with sufficient lateral sewers discharging into the creek, if in the construction of a main pressure sewer to carry the entire volume of water of the creek and watershed the usefulness of many of them will be'destroyed and they must be reconstructed so that when the water is high in the river it cannot flood basements and the low lands, they are no longer local lateral or district sewers, hut a part of the entire' system being installed, and made necessary by the changed conditions, and should he paid for in the same way as the main sewer, by the issuing of special tax hills upon the lots of the district; to compel the low lands to pay the entire cost of their construction and extensions, would result in the imposition of unequal burdens upon them.
    Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. C. A. Burney, Judge.
    Affirmed.

      Clarence S. Palmer for appellant.
    (1) The Kansas City Charter does not authorize the construction of any part of a joint district sewer outside the limits of the joint sewer district. The proposed outlet of the sewer in this case, of the estimated cost of $347,500, is located outside of the' joint sewer district* outside the limits of the city, and outside the limits of the State. Sec.'8, Art. 8, Charter; City of Fort Scott v. Kaufman, 44 Kan. 137; Rector v. Board of Improvements, 50 Ark. 116; Deyo v. City of Newburg, 122 N. Y. Supp. 835. (2) The sewer provides for receiving drainage from the City of Rosedale in the State of Kansas. It is submitted that the power of special assessment does not authorize the construction' of sewers for that purpose and charging the cost of the same against the land within-the joint sewer district. Boyder v. Brattleboro, 65 Vt. 504; Park Ave. Sewers, Appéál of'Parker, 169 Pa. St. 433. (3) There is no authority in the Kansas City Charter for the construction of pumping station's and the payments of the cost thereof by special assessment. (4) The construction of laterals so great in number and extent, provided for herein at an expense, of nearly $400,000, is unauthorized as'par t of the joint district sewer. Suc-h appurtenances properly belong to a district sewer. Sec. 7, Art. 8, Charter. (5) The sewer is of such magnitude and character that it is unreasonable that it should be constructed as a joint district sewer. Benefits, obviously, differ greatly in different parts of the district and the assessment of the whole cost at a uniform rate per square foot renders the ordinance unreasonable and, therefore, invalid. State ex rel. v. Wilder, 217 Mo. 261; Hill v. Swingley, 159 Mo. 49; Blue v. Wentz, 54 Ohio St. 254; Commerce Trust Co. v. Blakely, 274 Mo. 52; Sehwabe v. Moore, 172 S. W. 1157.

      E,. W. Earber, City Counselor, and Burr N. Mos-man and J. G. Petherbridge, Assistant City Counselors, for respondent; M. A. Fyke of counsel.
    (1) Kansas City has express power, under its charter to construct and maintain sewers, drains and all works riécessary for the disposition of sewage; to declare the class to which the sewer.belongs, and to provide for the manner of payment for each class. Sec. 1, Art. 1, p. 96, Charter; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Idem, 181 U. S. 402; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409;-Secs. 5, 6, 7, 8, Art. 8, pp. 323-326, Charter, (2:) Kansas City has express power, under its charter, to create and establish joint sewer districts and to construct therein joint district sewers and to pay for the same by issuing special tax bills on the lands in such district. Sec. 8, Art. 8, Charter, p. 326; South Highland Land & Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523; Prior v. Const. Co., 170 Mo. 450. (3) Whether or not the property of appellant and all of the property in the joint sewer district will be benefited by the construction of the proposed improvement, is a legislative and not a judicial question; the municipal legislature adjudged that all such property would be benefited thereby when it established the joint sewer district for this improvement; there being no fraud or oppression of the municipal legislature in passing the ordinances (and none is charged), such judgment of the municipal legislature is conclusive. Prior v. .Const. Co., 170 Mo. 451; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Shumate v. Heman, 181 U. S. 402; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409; Barber Asphalt Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534; Idem, 181 U. S. 324; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 366; McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. 283. (4) Appellant concedes the regularity of the proceedings up to and including the confirmation of the contract to do the work, and that they were in conformity with the Kansas City Charter relating to such matters. If they were in conformity with the charter, then they are valid and conclusive against appellant. Land & Imp. Co. v. St. Louis, 257 Mo. 301; McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. 284. (5) Kansas City having the power to construct sewers, has also the power, expressed and implied, to construct an outlet to a sewer, although such outlet lies outside of the city limits and outside of the state, and to pay for the same as a necessary part of the cost of the sewer, by issuing special tax bills therefor upon the joint sewer district created and established for the purpose of constructing therein such sewer and its outlet. Sec. 1, Art. 1, p. 96, Charter; Par. 13, sec. 1, art. 3, p. 145, Charter; Sec. 10, art. 8, Charter; Sec. 25, art. 6, Charter; Laws 1911, pp. 334-335; Amendment to Chai’ter, 1913; Hall v. Sedalia, 232 Mo. 355 ; Sbhuelerv. Kirkwood, 191 Mo. App. 575; Land & Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523; Page & Jones on Taxation by Assessment, pp. 507-8, secs. 329, 330; Page & Jones on Taxation by Assessment, p. 1085, sec. 636; 5 McQuillin, Mun. Corp.' secs. 2037, 1434; . 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), sec. 776; 3 Dillon Mun. Corp, secs'. 1148,1028, and notes; Land & Imp. Co. v. City of Billings, 111 Fed. 976; Kraft v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 269; City of Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 476; Maywood Co. v. Village of May-wood, 140 111. 216; Briggs v. Union Drainage Dist., 140 111. 53; Albertson v. Town of Chicago, 120 111. 226; Gage v. Chicago, 191 HI. 210; Church v. People ex rel., 179 111. 205; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. 377. (6) Kansas City has all the necessary implied powers to fully carry out and effectuate its express powers; having the express power to construct sewers, it has all the necessary implied power to construct outlets therefor, sewer pumping stations, laterals, connections and extensions, and all appliances and accessories necessary to make the sewer effective and usable and perform the function for which it was designed and planned. State ex rel. v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 105; Nevada to use v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 557-8; St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 628; Sedalia Uas Light Co. v. Mercer, 48 Mo. App. 651; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App. 492; Plattsburg v. Trimble, 46 Mo. App. 459; Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo. 575; State v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 210 ; Springfield v. Weaver, 137 Mo. 667; State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 313; St. Louis v. Klaime, 180 Mo. 321; Chillicothe ex rel. v. Henry, 136 Mo. App. 474; Hayes v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 531; Hill v. Union E. L. & P. Co., 260 Mo. 73; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34; Sasse v. Barkwell, 195 S. W. (Mo. App.) 542; Haussler v. St. Louis, 205 Mo. 656; 4 McQuillin, Mun. Corp., pp. 3035, 3036, 3080, 3084; Cunningham v. Ponca, 27 Okla. 853; Schueler v. City of Kirkwood, 191 Mo. 586. (7) The lands in Missouri are the servient estate, the lands in Rosedale, are the dominant estate; the servient owners must suffer the consequences of drainage flowing unrestrained on to their lands from the lands of the dominant owner. Land & Imp. Co. v. St. Louis, 257 Mo. 301. (8) The pumping stations, being a necessary and indispensable part of the sewer, can be paid for as a part of the cost of the sewer in the same manner as the sewer is paid for. McChesney v. Village of Hyde Park, 151 111. 634; Schueler v. City of Kirkwood, 191 Mo. App. 575; Fischer v. Chicago, 213 111. 268; Hall v. Sedalia, 232 Mo. 355; Northwestern University v. Wilmette, 230 HI. 80; 5 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. sec. 2037, p. 4370; Page.& Jones, Taxation by Assessment, sec. 330. (9) Since the laterals are a necessary part of the .sewer system so devised and planned, they can be paid for in the same way by special tax bills issued upon the district established for that purpose. Page & Jones, on Taxation by Assessment, p. 509, secs. 330, 331; Prior v. Construction Co,, 170 Mo. 450 ; 5 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. sec. 2037, p. 4370; Heman v. Lyon, 277 Mo. 640; Schlapfer v. Town of Union, 53 N. J. L. 68. (10) It is within the power of Kansas' City, under its charter, to provide for and construct this sewer as a joint district sewer, and cause it to he paid for in- special tax hills on the district, irrespective of its size or cost. Whether the sewer could have been paid for in some other manner is immaterial and does not lessen nor deprive the city of its power to pay for it in the manner proposed by issuing special tax bills upon the joint sewer district created for that purpose. Sec. 5, art. 8, p. 323, Charter; Sec. 8, art. 8, Charter ; Land & Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. '523; Prior v. Const. "Co., 170 Mo. 439; Kansas City v. Richards, 34 Mo. App. 521; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 545; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19; Hill v. Swingley, 159 Mo. 45; McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. 266.
   WALKER, C. J.

Appellant brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County to enjoin respondents from constructing a joint district sewer in Kansas City, Missouri, the outlet or termination of which was to be in the State of Kansas. Appellant is a property owner in the joint sewer district whose land would be subject to assessment for its proportionate part of the cost of the work. The contract for same has been awarded by said city to the other respondent.

Upon a hearing in the Circuit Court of Jackson County on the 1st day of April, 1920, there was a finding for defendants denying the application for an injunction, from which an appeal has been perfected to this court.

The contemplated joint district sewer is designed to receive the entire volume of the water carried by a stream designated as Turkey Creek, which now affords surface drainage to a large area of said city, and to divert this water into the proposed sewer.

The purpose sought to be accomplished is the prevention in the future of overflows after freshets, from which this section of Kansas City has heretofore suffered; the more complete removal of the sewage from that part of Kansas City drained by tbe proposed joint district sewer and its laterals and feeders; and tbe improvement of sanitary conditions, which it is stated will result therefrom.

There is no dispute about the facts, the case having been submitted to the trial court upon an agreed statement of same. That the condition existing should be met by the city is not questioned; no contention is made that the plan proposed and embodied in the contract is not practicable; and the salutary effect which will result from an improvement of present conditions is conceded. The sole contention is that Kansas City is attempting in this matter to exceed its charter powers.

' It is contended: First, that, under the charter providing for the construction of joint sewer districts ( Sec. 8, Art. VIII) there is no authority to construct any part of a joint district sewer outside- the limits of the city. In this case the outlet for a distance of 447 feet, at an estimated cost of $347,500, is to be constructed not only beyond the city limits, but outside the State of Missouri. Second, that the sewer provides drainage facilities for about 250 acres of land in the city of Rosedale in the State of Kansas, and that the burden of caring for this drainage should not be assessed against the owners of land in the joint sewer district in Kansas City, Missouri. Third, that there is no authority in the charter to construct sewer pumping stations for the purpose of operating the sewer in times of high water by mechanical means. Fourth, that lateral sewers of the extent herein provided for are necessary appurtenances to joint district sewers, and that the districts in which the former are located should bear their proportionate share of the cost of the latter, instead of assessing said cost against the property alone within the joint sewer district. Fifth, that the sewer is of such magnitude and character, and its cost so great, that it should not be constructed as a joint district sewer, but should be paid for out of the general city revenue or by the proceeds of bonds issued by the city.

Authority6

I. The powers granted to Kansas City under its charter, adopted in 1908, pertinent to the matter at issue, are as follows: “To construct and maintain sewers, drains and all works necessary for the disposition of sewage.” [See. 1, Art. I, p. 90.]

“To divide the general sewer system of the city into four classes, to-wit: public, district, joint district and private sewers. The city may, by ordinance, find and determine the class to which any sewer belongs, and the finding and determination of the city in that respect shall be final and conclusive.” [Sec. 5, Art, VIII, p. 323.]

“To pay for public sewers out of the general fund of the city.” [Sec. 6, Art. VIII, p. 325.]

“To construct districts sewers and pay for same by special tax bills issued upon the district created for that purpose.” [Sec. 7, Art. VIII, p. 325.]

“To create and establish joint sewer districts for the purpose of constructing therein joint district sewers, and provide for the payment for the construction of same in special tax bills issued upon the joint district, or partly in cash and partly in special tax bills, as determined by ordinance of the Common Council.” [Sec. 8, Art. VIII,

The power conferred on the city to construct and maintain sewers, drains and all works necessary for the disposition of sewage appears in Section 1 of Article I of the charter before quoted. A subsequent provision of the charter, which is a necessary supplement of the power to construct and maintain sewers and mthout which the latter could not be rendered practically effective, authorizes the Common Council to establish, erect and keep in repair .... sewers, sewer outlets within or without the corporate limits of the city. [Par. 13, Sec. 1, Art. II, p. 145, Charter.] This power is further and more definitely defined in relation to the construction and manner of payment therefor of outlets for joint district in Section 10, Article VIII, p. 327, of the charter, as follows:

“Whenever the city shall deem it necessary, it may, by ordinance, provide for the construction within or without the limits of the city, of septic tanks or other sewer reduction devices, for the purpose of purifying the discharge from public,- district or joint district sewers, or outlet thereof; the cost of such septic sewer tanks or devices may be paid for in part or in whole out of the general fund, or in case of a district or joint district sewer, or outlet therefor, in part or in whole, in special tax bills, as a part of the cost of constructing or extending the district or joint district sewer, or outlet therefor, as may be designated by ordinance providing therefor. ’

Further authority for constructing outlets for sewers outside of the city limits, and paying for the same in the manner there proposed, is found in Section 25 of Article VI of the charter. That section provides for the acquisition of lands outside of. the corporate limits as may be required for a right of way for any such outlet-sewers, and further provides, among other things, that the cost of constructing such outlets and all appurtenances may be paid for in special tax bills against the lands embraced within the district deemed to be benefited.

That portion of the section relating to the cost of such outlets is as follows:

‘ ‘ The cost of constructing such outlet and all appurtenances which may be constructed in connection with such- outlets, less such sum as may be appropriated by the city for that purpose or otherwise paid, shall be paid for in special tax bills, as hereinafter provided, against all lands, exclusive of highways, streets and alleys embraced within the said district or districts.” [P. 285, Charter.]

Section 35 of Article VI, p. 289, of the charter, further provides for the cost of outlet sewers, as follows:

“The cost of constructing any outlet sewer, appurtenances and works in connection therewith or to be used in connection therewith on or along said right of way course or drainage or watercourse or on said land or any part thereof, less such sum as may have been appropriated by the city for that purpose or otherwise paid as aforesaid, shall be paid for wholly or in part in special tax bills against all lands embraced within said district or districts, exclusive of public highways, streets and alleys, in proportion to the area of each tract, the work to be done and the special tax bills to be issued in accordance with the provisions of this charter concerning the construction of district sewers and the issuing of special tax bills therefor-so far as,the same may be applicable.”

In addition to the foregoing, the Legislature of this State in 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 334) passed a general enabling act by which cities of the class to which Kansas City belongs are empowered to ‘ ‘ contract with drainage districts or with other public corporations in this or any adjoining state for co-operation or joint action in building sanitary and storm sewers in watersheds extending into the territorial limits of all districts, or corporations so co-operating, and in constructing levees along the banks of, or shortening, diverting or otherwise improving any natural watercourse to prevent its overflow, where the same overflow is likely to cáuse injury or damage to lands situated within the territorial limits of all the districts or corporations so co-operating.”

Other sections of this act peculiarly appropriate to the discussion of the issues here involved, more comprehensively declare the extent of the power conferred and provide the manner in which the improvement thus authorized shall be paid for. These sections are as follows:

‘ ‘ Sec. 2. Where a watershed located partly within any such city and partly within an adjoining state requires, for the health, safety and comfort of the inhabitants of such city, the construction of sewers and. .protection against flood, such city may, with consent of such adjoining state, but with or without the co-operation of public corporations of such adjoining state, build sanitary or storm sewers, construct levees along the banks of, or shorten, divert or otherwise improve any natural watercourse in such watershed. Such city may, by purchase or eminent domain proceedings, acquire rights of way for any such sewers or improvements of watercourses.

“Sec. 3. Such city shall have power to pay for all such work and rights of way herein provided for in part or in whole out of the general funds, or by the imposition of special assessment upon lands located in such city and within the district deemed to be benefited by the construction of such sewers or such levees, or the shortening, diversion or improvement of such watercourse'.

‘ ‘ Sec. 4. Any such city is hereby given power by its charter or amendment thereto to determine the manner, method and distribution of the cost of the work and rights of way to be paid for in special assessments and to establish thereby the procedure in such cases and the form of obligation to be issued.”

In' 1911 the Legislature of the State of Kansas (Laws, Kan. 1911, p. 303) passed an act authorizing municipalities of other states “to contract with drainage districts and other public corporations of this state for the building and maintenance of sewers, dikes and. levees and for the diverting and improving of watercourses in watersheds extending into the territorial limits of such municipalities, drainage districts and public corporations and prescribing the conditions upon which such contracts shall take effect, and providing a method of commencing suits against such foreign municipalities.”

In harmony with these state and municipal enabling acts and to render it possible more plenary the power conferred upon the city to malee this improvement, the. people of Kansas City, in January, 1913, adopted an amendment' to Article XII of the charter by adding thereto sections numbered respectively 28, 29 and 30, having particular reference to sewers and drainage. Section 28 adds to the power of the city then possessed to co-operate with other cities and states in the diversion of Turkey Creek and the building of sewers to afford protection against floods in the Turkey Creek valley and the West Bottomsiof Kansas City or to malee this improvement alone. Section 29 confers' specific authority upon the city, among other things, to build this projected outlet and other works outside of the State. Section 30 provides for the payment of the cost of any or all such improvements, including the pumping stations, and the extension of the sewér outside of the city and outside of the State, by special assessments therefor upon the property located within the city and within the district deemed to be benefited by such improvements.

A subsequent section provides that powers granted by the foregoing amendments ‘ shall be deemed cumulative in character and shall not revoke or restrict but shall enlarge the powers heretofore possessed by the city. ’ ’

From all of which it appears, so far as authority can be predicated upon state and municipal legislation, that Kansas City has been panoplied with ample.power to define the joint sewer district and as well to construct and maintain the proposed sewer therein and the outlet thereof and to pay for same in special tax bills to be assessed and levied upon the lands within said joint sewer district as the boundaries of the latter have been by ordinance defined by the Common Council of said city in establishing such district. The only limitation imposed upon the Common Council in the creation of the district being that no land not within the drainage area shall be including therein. It is conceded that only lands within such area are included. Among other things, the ordinance numbered 38847, approved May 22, 1919, establishing this district for the purpose of constructing therein the Turkey Creek sewer, provides:

“That said sewer districts are hereby united into a joint sewer district for the purpose of constructing and paying for a joint district sewer therein, to be known as ‘The Turkey Creek Sewer,’ and various laterals and tributary sewers thereto, an extension of the main sewer from the Missouri-Kansas state line into the Kansas River as an outlet of said sewers,” etc., etc.

“All of which are necessary parts of the main Turkey Creek Joint District Sewer and essential for a full, complete and successful operation thereof, and the Common Council deems that such Joint District Sewer, with its laterals and tributaries, the outlet therefor, the connections with existing sewers and the pumping stations, the necessary appurtenances thereto and appliances therefor, including the accessories above mentioned, are all necessary in order to successfully sewer and drain said joint sewer district, and should be paid for in special tax bills, made, levied, assessed and issued upon and against the lots of land within said joint sewer district, in the manner provided therefor in the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, relating to the construction of joint district sewers and outlets therefor.”

Included within the boundaries of this joint sewer district there are 144 sewer districts, comprising about 4762 acres of land. The sewage from said 144 districts now draining into Turkey Creek will, upon the completion of this improvement, drain into the proposed joint district sewer.

Approval.

II. The power here sought to be exercised having been shown to be authorized by legislation, it remains to be determined whether the acts and ordinances declaratory of this power are in contravention any rule of construction the application of which is necessary to their validity.

First, as to the recognition by the courts of acts and ordinances authorizing an improvement of the character of that at bar.

The only limitations upon the right of a city in the exercise of its charter powers to establish sewer districts and provide for the construction of sewers therein are that acts or ordinances in furtherance of such power shall not be the creatures of fraud, whim or caprice, or in violation of common right, or impose a burden on the citizen or the community without any corresponding benefit. Absent these limitations and the courts with uniformity recognize the public necessity of sewer systems for municipalities and are loth to interfere with the exercise of their power in that behalf. Even the superficial student of civic-conditions knows that the freedom of modem cities from plagues which in other centuries decimated centers of population, is due' more to the present system of sewers than to any other single cause. Moreover, health is a primary postulate to right living and the maxim of mens sma in cor-pore sano is not a mere phrase, but is worthy to be ranked as a proverb. The wisdom of the Talmud is but further attested by the trite but terse truth that cleanliness is next to godliness; and was it not my Lord Verulam who sententiously said that “cleanness of body was ever deemed to proceed from a due reverence to God.” It is evident, therefore, that the end to be attained in an improvement of the character here under review, whether or not it be presently recognized, is not limited to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of a city, but has a wider and deeper effect in elevating their moral tone and thereby encouraging right living.

The courts, conscious of these facts, of which they cannot but take judicial notice, have, as is evident from their rulings striven, without unduly straining municipal power, to sustain and encourage plans for the construction of sewer systems. In so doing the end sought to be effected is classified as of like public importance with that of the building and lighting of streets, the establishment and maintenance of a means for supplying water and the removal of garbage. The conclusion, therefore, reasonably deducible from the foregoing is that municipalities in the exercise of their powers in such matters of public importance as we have indicated, are, in addition to the mere power to act, vested with a discretion not subject to review by the courts unless it is affirmatively shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, fraudulently or oppressively. Confirmatory of this conclusion are the following oases: Heman Const. Co. v. Lyon, 277 Mo. 628, 211 S. W. l. c. 72; St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 263 Mo. l. c. 455, 174 S. W. 78; Prendergast Const. Co. v. Goldsmith, 273 Mo. l. c. 191, 201 S. W. 354; State ex rel. K. C. v. K. C. Term. Ry. Co., 260. Mo. l. c. 493, 168 S. W. 1144.

rustrió^61

III. The city’s right to construct a sewer established, a pertinent inquiry, prompted by this conclusion and necessary to the determination of the matter issue, is its right to create and establish a joint sewer district, to construct therein a joint district sewer and to provide for the payment of same by issuing special tax bills on the land in- the district. A section of the city charter heretofore referred to satisfatorily answers this inquiry in the affirmative unless it be found subject to the limitations we have stated as inimical to the validity of enactments of this character. This section is as follows:

“ Whenever the city may deem it necessary that a sewer should be constructed or reconstructed in any part of the city containing two or more sewer districts, it may, by ordinance, unite such sewer districts into a joint sewer district and cause a sewer to be constructed therein in like manner in all respects as is provided in section seven of this article in cases of district sewers, except in cases of .joint district sewers the city may, if deemed proper, provide in the ordinance creating such joint district sewer that the city shall pay a certain sum, to be specified in said ordinance, toward the payment of the cost of such joint district sewer; and should the Common Council, by ordinance, unite two or more sewer districts into a joint sewer district for the purpose of constructing the joint district sewer therein, the action of'the Common Council shall be conclusive for all purposes and no special tax bills shall be held invalid or be affected on account of the included drainage area thereof, or the size, character or purpose of such sewer; Provided, however, that no sewer district shall be included in such joint district which is not included in the natural drainage area of the valley or water course, in which the joint district sewer is proposed to be constructed. The contract for the construction of such sew.er shall specify that the city shall be liable for the sum. so specified to be paid by the city, and that the remainder of the cost thereof shall be paid in special -tax bills to be issued in any manner that is or may be provided for the issuing of tax bills for the construction of sewers.” [Sec. 8, Art. VIII, p. 326, Charter.]

• The joint sewer district created in this case does' not contain any land which is not within the natural drainage area of the valley or of the natural watercourse discharging into this sewer. In providing for the construction of this sewer and its equipment to take care of the sewage and drainage of the area included within this joint sewer district, the Common Council took into consideration, among other things, the fact that it drained and benefited directly only about one-eighth of the entire area of the city, and hence determined, by ordinance establishing the district, to make this a joint district sewer and not a public sewer, and to pay for it by issuing special tax bills upon the district so created. The resolution of the Board of Public Works, proposing the improvement, the contract and the ordinance confirming the contract, all provide for the payment of this sewer and its equipment by issuing special tax bills upon the joint sewer district.

The whole matter was one involving the exercise of the discretion of the Common Council, and its determination to construct the sewer and pay for it in the manner proposed, in the absence of fraud or abuse of discretion, is not, as we have.shown, subject to review by this court.

In Land & Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523, we construed the power given to Kansas City to create a joint sewer district embodying and combining a great number of sewer districts therein for the purpose of constructing a joint district sewer, and determined that question in favor of the city. That case, decided in 1903, was very similar to the one here, in which it was song-fit to join 105 sewer districts containing about one-fourth of the then area of the city into a joint sewer district for the purpose of constructing therein a large joint district sewer. In that case, as here, an injunction suit was instituted to prevent the city from constructing the sewer upon the ground that it did not have the power to join all the districts into such a joint district sewer because within the district thus created many district sewers had been constructed and paid for by each district and that the districts were already sewered;- and for the further reason, - as here, that because of the size and cost of the sewer it should be paid for as a public sewer out of the general funds of the city. The court denied all of these contentions and held that the sewer was not a public sewer as defined by the charter; that the city had the power to unite the 105 districts or any other number into a joint sewer district for the purpose of constructing a joint district sewer therein and to pay for the same by issuing special tax bills upon the joint district thus formed.

In Prior v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 439, the question arose in St. Louis, the charter of which is similar in the matter at issue to that of Kansas City, as to whether the city had the power to declare the sewer under consideration a joint district sewer and pay for it by issuing special tax bills upon the district. This court held, among other things, -that the people of St. Louis had the right in adopting their charter to provide for the different kinds of sewers-and determine the class to which they belong and the manner of paying for each. The court’s language in thus ruling is as follows:

‘ ‘ The people of St. Louis had the power to so amend-their charter as to provide for public, district, joint district and private sewers, instead of public and district-sewers only as formerly. They1 also had the power to require that any or all sewérs of whatever kind should-; be paid for out of the public revenues or by special assessments against the property - benefited thereby.' •

“A sewer created by an ordinance uniting more than one district and providing a main outlet or intercepting sewer for the joint benefit of such districts, to be paid for by special taxes assessed upon all property in a joint sewer district, is a joint district sewer, within the meaning of charter provisions which define a joint district sewer to be a sewer constructed or acquired under the authority of ordinances, uniting one or more districts or unorganized territory, for the purpose of providing main -outlet or intersecting sewers, for the joint’ benefit of such districts or territory, to be paid for by special taxes assessed against all property in said joint sewer district. And such sewer is none the less a joint district sewer because the purpose of its construction is to supplement an inadequate sewer which under the old charter was a public sewer constructed .out of public revenues ” (p. 449).

A like power to that above defined has been conferred upon the poeple of Kansas City. Having such power, the Common Council, upon the recommendation of the Board of Public Works acting upon the advice of the city engineer and the engineer of sewers, determined, by ordinance, to construct this improvement as a joint district sewer and to pay for it in special tax bills upon the joint sewer district created for that purpose. The action of the Council, in the absence of fraud, in that regard, under the decisions of this court, is conclusive.

We held, in effect, in the Prior case, supra, (p. 451) that the question of whether the plaintiff’s lots would or would not be benefited by the construction of a sewer is a legislative and not a judicial question, and the municial Legislature having adjudged that they would be benefited and fixed the ratio of such benefit, when it established the joint sewer- district, and as there »was no question of fraud or oppression of the municipal assembly in so passing such ordinance (even if such allegation would convert the question into a judicial one, as to which it is not necessary now to decide), such judgment of the assembly is conclusive.

In that case we held further that where it appeared that the officers and agents of the city acted within the purview of the powers conferred upon them by the charter in the passage of the ordinance authorizing the construction of the joint district sewer we would affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the regularity of the proceedings.

From all of which this general conclusion, as expressly announced in Hernán v. Allen, 156 Mo. 1 e. 543, is authorized, “that, as a general rule, in the absence of fraud in establishing a sewer district, or in letting the contract for the sewer’s construction, and in the absence of unreasonableness of the ordinances providing for the establishing and constructing of the sewers, the courts will not interfere.”

Other cases of like import are as follows: Shumate v. Heman, 181 U. S. 402; Heman v. Shulte, 166 Mo. l. c. 415; French v. Barber Asp. Pav. Co., 158 Mo. l. c 547, affd. 181 U. S. l. c. 343; Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. l. c. 376; McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. l. c. 280. In which case last cited it is held that:

“It is well settled in this State that the matter of establishing the sewer districts in a city is intrusted by the Legislature to the common council thereof, and that the act of such common council is conclusive in a collateral attack. ” [Citing cases.]

Further, that “it is within the power of the Legislature to create special taxing districts and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in said districts, ether according to valuation or superficial area or frontage.” [Citing cases.]

The regularity of the proceedings up to and including the ordinance confirming the contract to do the work, having been conceded and found upon a review of the record to be in conformity with the charter and authorized by ordinances adopted under conditions attesting their validity, may, so far as the right of the city is concerned to construct and pay for the proposed sewer, be held to be immune from criticism and hence conclusive.

Provide0 Outlet.6

IV. Despite the power, which has been demonstrated, of the city to construct' sewers and provide for the payment of same as here proposed, it is contended that an outlet for same is unauthorized because of its proposed location outside of the corporate ILnaits. We have set forth at some length the acts of the Legislatures of Missouri and Kansas and the charter provisions and ordinances, original and amendatory, of Kansas City declaratory of this power. , The two state sovereignties having recognized same and the adjacent city in the latter state having formally consented thereto by ordinance regularly adopted, it is difficult to conceive upon what grounds appellant can base his objections to this alleged lack of power. We said in Hall v. Sedalia, 232 Mo. l. c. 355, that “a sewer system without a place to dispose of the contents would be useless;” and in Land Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 532), that “the duty of a city in respect to its sewers is not performed until it has given them an outlet.” In the further discussion of this self-evident truth we said in Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. l. c. 377:

“The charter provides that district sewers shall connect with a public sewer, or other district sewer, or with the natural course of drainage.’ The efficacy of the sewer, as a means of drainage, depends entirely on this requirement of the charter. A sewer with no proper outlet would create a nuisance, instead of im-' proving the sanitary condition of the locality. The requirement, then, is of a substantial matter, and, if not followed by an ordinance establishing a sewer, the cost of construction could not be enforced by local assessments.” [Citing eases.]

The necessity of the proposed outlet is, therefore,, apparent; and the legislation authorizing same has been shown to he ample. In addition, judicial approval of legislation of this character is not lacking. In Haeussler v. St. Louis, 205 Mo. l. c. 680, the City of St. Louis sought to build a bridge across the Mississippi River into the State of Illinois. It was contended that the city lacked power to construct and pay for a bridge a part of which was outside of the city limits and in another state. After demonstrating the fact that the power thus sought to be exercised had been expressly granted by State and Federal statutes and the city charter, the court said (p. 681): “The right to construct bridges over rivers and streams separating two cities or towns, by one or both of the municipalities concerned, has been recognized as a public city purpose. Nor is it any the less a city purpose because a part of the public highway is located beyond the city limits.” [Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543.]

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York had under consideration in People ex rel. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. l. c. 487, the right of the city to construct a bridge and incur a debt therefor across East River connecting it with the City of Brooklyn. After some general observations to the effect that in cases of this character each must depend upon its own facts, the court ,held that where the contemplated improvement was for the common and general benefit of all of the citizens it was to be regarded as within the scope of municipal government. That it could not- well be held that what is meant by a city purpose is some work or expenditure' within the city limits. That there could be no good reason for such a limitation. It could be. no worse for a city to incur a debt for a city purpose outside of than within its corporate limits, and that there is as much reason for allowing it to be incurred in the one case as in the other.

In South St. Paul v. Lamprecht Bros., 88 Fed. l. c. 453, in which the City of South St. Paul sought to incur a debt to aid in the building of a bridge across the Mississippi River, the U. S. Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit held: “The power to issue bonds) which was granted by Section 18 of tbe Act of April 23, 1891 (Spcl. Laws, Minn. 1891, p. 674), was doubtless conferred for the express purpose of enabling tbe city to aid in tbe construction of a bridge across tbe Mississippi River, a part of which structure would necessarily be on tbe opposite or east bank of tbe river, and outside of tbe city limits; and.tbe bridge so bad in view was of as great advantage to tbe city as it would have been if located wholly witbin tbe corporate boundaries. Ample authority is found in tbe “act for tbe construction of tbe bridge now in question.”

In the Matter of the Application of the Mayor et al. of the City of New York, 99 N. Y. 569, tbe general rule was announced that an act authorizing tbe city to incur a debt for tbe purchase of lands outside of tbe corporate limits was not witbin tbe inhibition of the constitution against incurring a debt except for city purposes; 'such purpose not being limited to a work or expenditure witbin tbe city.

In Pittsburgh v. Brace Bros., 158 Pa. 174, an act of. tbe Legislature (March 7, ■ 1843, sec. 4) empowered tbe City of Pittsburg to recover water rents due and unpaid beyond tbe limits of the city, as well as witbin the same, in the same way as city taxes are now recoverable. Tbe court, in construing tbe act, held that tbe city may furnish water to property owners outside of tbe municipal limits, and enforce tbe collection of tbe water rents by the entry of a lien therefor against tbe real estate upon which tbe water was furnished, according to tbe contract made with tbe customer.

In Minn. Imp. Co. v. City of Billings, 111 Fed. 972, tbe U. S. Circuit Court for tbe Ninth Circuit held a city, authorized by its charter to construct sewers and drains, and to do all other acts necessary for tbe promotion of health and to prevent tbe spread of contagious diseases witbin tbe city, has power, in constructing a general system of drainage, to extend tbe same to a proper outlet without tbe limits of tbe city.

In Newman v. Ashe, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 380, it was held that tbe City of Knoxville under a- legislative enactment was empowered to purchase and hold real estate outside of the corporate limits for the purpose of constructing waterworks. That while the act was not express in its terms the power was conferred by necessary implication. “The power,” said the court, at page 383, “to construct waterworks — a legitimate corporate purpose —is expressly given, and the authority is given to the mayor and aldermen ‘to protect from injury by adequate penalties . . . the pipes, hydrants or fixtures, buildings or improvements belonging to or'in any way appertaining to said waterworks, whether within or without the limits of said corporation.’ ”

In view of all of which we conclude that Kansas City has the right to provide for the construction of such sewer and the outlet to same, within as well as without, its corporate limits, such improvement having been shown to be for a legitimate public purpose.

Adjacent °f Territory.

V. The City of Rosedale in the State of Kansas lies adjacent to and is now afforded drainage in part by the natural channel of Turkey Creek, which has its source in that state. If this channel be destroyed, as is contemplated by the construction of the proposed joint district sewer, Rosedale will be deprived of arLy meails of disposing of its sewage. To obviate this condition provision is made for inlets to the joint district sewer for the drainage of the area of Rosedale now drained into Turkey Creek. This area consists, according to the agreed statement of facts, of about 250 acres. The contention, therefore, that the capacity of the sewer must be increased, for which no authority exists, to provide for the sewage from this adjacent area, does not appeal to the impartial mind with any convincing force and is not supported by any relevant or analogous facts. Aside from the basic principle sounding in justice that the power in this behalf possessed by Kansas City must be so exercised as to work no injury to others or, to put it coldly in the language of the law, leaving out of consideration for the moment any view of the situation based on a high moral sense of justice, the Rosedale area now naturally drained by Turkey Creek constitutes the dominant estate, while the Missouri lands along which the creek runs are in the nature of a servient estate. It is elementary that the servient owners must suffer the consequences of the- unrestrained flow of drainage onto their lands from those of the dominant owners. The existence of the stream, as we said in Land & Imp. Co. v. St. Louis, 257 Mo. l. c. 302, .is due to the topography of the watersheds and that fact makes it the duty of the city to provide a sewer adequate to the demands created by natural conditions in the locality to he drained. Be this as it may, the record discloses— and by that is our conclusion to he determined — that the capacity of the sewer as now provided for is ample to afford complete drainage to not only the area within Kansas City hut that of Rosedale. Appellant’s contention, therefore, lacks any material merit.

Cost of Pumping stations.

YI. It is- insisted that there is no authority for assessing the cost of pumping stations as a part of the cost of the sewer. The agreed statement of .facts not only concedes the necessity of pumping stations, hut with some detail states tpg reasong therefor;. The language of same can but emphasize this conclusion. It is as follows:

“These sewer pumping stations are a necessary and essential part of the entire sewer system so designed and planned and are provided for in said resolution, contract and. ordinances; the main sewer is what is known as a ‘pressure sewer;’ that is, in times when the ■water is low in the Kansas River, this and all the sewers connecting with it will flow and. discharge by gravity; but at times of high water in the river it will be necessary to set the pumps in action to force the sewage and water from the low level sewers into the pressure sewers against the pressure of the high water in' the Kansas River at that point. Without the pumping stations, at times of high water in the river, the water would back up from the river through the sewers into the basements of buildings, out of the manholes and flood the adjacent territory, and the sewers without such pumping stations, owing to such physical conditions, would he of no value.”

The powers of a city may be tersely stated as (1) those expressly granted by its charter; or (2) those fairly and necessarily implied from those granted; or (3) those essential to the objects and purposes sought to be attained. While the Kansas City Charter does not expressly mention pumping stations, the necessity of their construction having been conceded as an essential part of this system, that portion of the charter (Sec. 1, Art. I, p. 96) which provides, “The city may construct and maintain sewers, drains, and all works necessary for.the disposition of sewage and garbage,” may reasonably be construed to include them as a part of the “works necessary.” If, as the agreed statement of facts, which we cannot gainsay, discloses, as it does, that the sewer system would at times become not only inoperative but a menace to health without the pumping stations, then no cogent reason can be urged against their being made a part of this plan to be paid for in the same manner as the sewer. The reasons stated and conclusion reached for holding that there exists ample authority for the construction of the outlet applies with like force to the construction of the pumping stations under the facts applicable to this case.

In Schueler v. City of Kirkwood, 191 Mo. App. 575, where it was sought to construct and pay for a septic tank to receive the discharge from the sewers, there was no 'express power in the law authorizing the City of Kirk-wood to build and pay for the tank by assessments upon the sewer district; but the court held that the city had implied power to build the tank as a necessary part of the sewer system of the city, in order to make it effective, notwithstanding the fact that the statute under which the City of Kirkwood was operating at that time had no express provision which authorized the installation of septic tanks. The language of the court was as follows:

“But, though such be true, it would seem that the city possessed a clear, implied power to install these septic tanks as parcel of its public sewer system. The question of power involved here relates to the public sewers, which the statute expressly authorizes the board of aldermen to construct. The ordinance provides for the septic tanks as parcel of such public sewer system and expressly declares such tanks to be a part of such system.” [P. 586.]

In Sasse v. Barkwell, 195 S. W. 542, the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in a case brought to cancel certain tax bills for district sewer improvements on account of the alleged failure of the City of Brunswick to provide for the establishment of a general sewer system before the establishment of said district sewer, the court said:

“Of course, when the legislative authorities of the city, by virtue of the taxing power, attempt to create any kind of a sewer, whether public or district, it must be such as will operate and effectually dispose of the sewage. Otherwise, property might be taxed for the construction of a so-called public improvement that could in no way be used, and which would in no sense constitute a public benefit. So that the only thing in the statute which would require a ‘sewer system’ or a public sewer before or at the time of the creation of a sewer district, is the implied requirement, that before any such public improvement should be created, the certainty that it will be effectual and operate to dispose of the sewage must be provided for. And whenever the certainty of the final disposal of the sewage is not provided for, the prior creation of any sewer, either public or district, is unauthorized. Certainly the city would have no right to tax private property to create a public improvement when there was no assurance it would be effective or could be used for the purpose for which it was created.” [P. 543'.]

, Therefore, if outlets, pumping stations, or local laterals, extensions and connections are necessary, as appellant concedes, to render the sewer operative and effective, then they are as much a part of the sewer system as manholes and catch basins or any other appliance; and can be paid for in the same way as the remaining portion of the sewer. [Hall v. Sedalia, 232 Mo. 344; McChesney v. Hyde Park, 151 Ill. 634; Fisher v. Chicago, 213 Ill. 267; N. W. University v. Wilmette, 230 Ill. 80.]

Sewers.

VII. The necessity for the construction of what are here termed lateral sewers is rendered apparent by the agreed statement of facts. The portion of same in regard thereto, briefly stated, is that, while that part of the district in the lowlands near the main sewer in the Turkey Creek valley is now equipped with sufficient lateral sewers discharging into the old creek bed, in the construction of the main sewer as a pressure sewer the usefulness of many of these old laterals will be destroyed and it will become necessary in the construction of the new sewer to reconstruct and rearrange these laterals and build new ones, all of which will connect with the sewers in the highlands, to meet the new conditions; some of them will have to be converted into pressure sewers, that is, sewers with closed manholes, so that when the water is high in the Kansas River it cannot escape through the manholes into the basements of buildings and flood the lowlands. In times of high water in the river, they will be operated by means of the pumps. They are not local laterals or district sewers, as ordinarily understood, but are a part of the entire system being installed, made necessary by the changed conditions in the construction of the sewer as a pressure sewer.

Since they are a necessary part of the sewer system and are for the benefit of the 'entire joint sewer district, they should be paid for in the same way as the main sewer, by the issuing of special tax bills upon the joint sewer district. It would result in an unequal imposition of burdens to compel the people in the lowlands to pay the entire cost of these lateral sewers and extensions, made necessary for the reasons aforesaid, and also to pay their proportionate share of the main sewer, when the entire district is benefited by them. [Prior v. Const. Co., 170 Mo. 439; McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. 266; Heman Const. Co. v. Lyon, 277 Mo. 628; Schlapfer v. Town of Union, 53 N. J. L. l. c. 68.]

Sewer°f

III. The right of the city to pay for the sewer and the necessary appliances to render its services effective is challenged. The charter of Kansas City, among, other things, provides: “The general sewer system of the city shall be divided into four classes, to-wit, public, district, joint district and private sewers. The city may, by ordinance, find and determine the class, to which any sewer belongs, and the finding and determination of the city in that respect shall be final and conclusive.” [Sec. 5, Art. VIII, p. 323.]

The Common Council, by Ordinance No. 38847, ap-' proved May 22, 1919, heretofore set forth, declares that this sewer should be a joint district sewer, and that it should be paid for in special tax bills.

Section 8 of Article VIII of the Kansas City Charter, as we have shown, provides that the Common Council may, by ordinance, unite two or more sewer districts into a joint sewer district for the purpose of constructing therein a joint district sewer, and also that the council may, by ordinance, provide for the payment of the sewer by the issuing of special tax bills upon such joint district. That was done in this case.

The authority for this action we have discussed and determined in favor of the respondents ’ contention in the consideration of other phases of this case.

Satisfied of the public importance of this undertaking, we have given the subject much time and thought— not omitting to examine the authorities cited and arguments adduced by the learned counsel for appellant, which we have concluded do not sustain his contentions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court, and it is so ordered.

All concur except Woodson, J., absent.