author: RAILET, C.

text:
    W. T. DAMERON v. JOHN N. HAMILTON, Appellant.
    Division One,
    March 2, 1915.
    1. LIBEL: Instructions: Commissions of Revenue Collectors. In an action for libel for publish ig in a newspaper that the plaintiff as county collector had illegally retained county funds, an instruction purporting to cover the whole case is held inconsistent and contradictory in its attempts to set out the law governing the commissions legally to be retained by county collectors.
    2. -: -: -: Illegally Retained: Fees for Collecting Back Taxes. Where, in an action for libel for pub-listing in a newspaper that the plaintiff as county collector had illegally retained county funds, the defendant pleaded the truth of his statement, an instruction purporting to cover the whole case should direct the jury to consider, with respect to the illegality of the plaintiff’s acts, any evidence that he had retained no commissions on back taxes collected during his incumbency, since it might thus appear that, whatever he may have retained as commissions on other funds, the general balance was not in favor of the county.
    3. -: -: -: -: Embezzlement. Since Sec. 3562, R. S. 1889 (the same as Sec. 1925, R. S. 1899, and Sec. 4563, R. S. 1909), makes it a felony for a collector of the revenue to retain unlawfully any .sum in excess of his commissions and fees, and provides that his neglect or refusal to pay any» such excess shall be prima-facie evidence of embezzlement, an instruction purporting to cover the whole case, in an action for libel for writing and publishing in a newspaper that the plaintiff as county collector had illegally retained county funds, to which action the defendant pleaded the truth of his statement, should submit the issue whether the plaintiff was primafacie guilty of embezzlement or whether he retained only so much as he was lawfully' entitled to, and it was error to instruct that if he retained more than his due, such retention was an illegal though not a criminal act, and that if the jury found that the defendant in his published statement did not so use the word “illegally” as to impute a crime to the plaintiff the defendant should have the verdict.
    4. -: -: -: -: “Illegally” and “Unlawfully:" Synonymous Terms. The words “illegally” and “unlawfully” are synonymous, and they are frequently used interchangeably to express the same idea.
    5. -r‘ -: -: -1 — : Retort: When Privileged. . One who has been attacked may retort upon his adversary, but even in rebutting an accusation he must not intrude unnecessarily into the private life of his assailant, or make counter-charges against his character, unconnected with the original charge, and accordingly, in an action for libel, the fact that a heated newspaper controversy, growing out of the defendant’s criticism of a city council, had continued for some time and finally grown personal, does not render privileged the defendant’s statement that the plaintiff as county collector had illegally retained county funds, a matter that had not previously found place in the controversy.
    Appeal from Randolph. Circuit Court. — Hon. A. H. Waller, Judge.

      Affirmed.

      Whitecotton & Wight for appellant.
    (1) Appellant insists that the court committed no error in this case in giving or refusing instructions on behalf of the defendant, for the reason that the instructions all taken together clearly submit the only issues in the case, namely: Was the article libelous? Was that article true? (2) The respondent complains that instruction B especially is misleading and confusing. The only thing as to said instruction that the respondent complains of is that the words “or less than $120,000” make the instruction confusing. The instruction as a whole clearly submits the proposition that if the amount of taxes collected, with the exceptions named, is iii excess of $80,000 then the collector was entitled to retain only two and one-half per cent as his commission and did not and could not confuse-any one as the argument before the jury at the time by counsel on both sides showed. The instruction was harmless, in view of the fact that the respondent admitted that he had retained one-half per cent more than he should have, but says it was by reason of a mistake of the law, and by way of further excuse says he did not take the commission allowed him on back taxes. In the light of these admissions, what harm possibly could these superfluous words have done? The instruction, as a whole clearly submitted the issue intended. (3) The appellant by instruction D clearly submitted the questions of the truthfulness of the article and whether, if not true, was it libelous. By this instruction, the court substantially said that the appellant had the right to reply or even retort to respondent’s article provided the reply or retort was the truth and provided further that it was not libelous. There was no claim of privilege in this instruction. It properly declares the law in this case and is not prejudicial to respondent’s right, especially as the jury are the sole judges of the law of libel and the facts that constitute libel. It was their province to say whether the alleged libel was, in view of all the facts and circumstances, including the articles published, libelous, or, if libelous, whether it was true. (4) Furthermore, the verdict of the jury was undoubtedly for the right party and could not and would not under any instructions, have been otherwise. An article in a newspaper called out in answer to a libelous article published by the respondent, which does not go beyond what would .Fe reasonably expected from a man who was justly exasperated, will not support an action for libel. Meyers v. Kaichen, 75 Mich. 273; Ritchie v. Staius, 73 Mich. 563. The worst that can be said against the appellant is that he permitted himself to be dragged into a newspaper war. The evidence clearly shows respondent to be unfriendly and malicious towards the appellant and unceasing in his efforts to injure appellant in his business and to provoke appellant into a newspaper controversy by false, unjust and unkind accusations and untrue insinuations and reflections upon the physical misfortunes of the appellant. Respondent also improperly and maliciously questioned the motives and private life of the appellant. At the very outset of the controversy the respondent declared himself ready for “a frolic or a fight.” He at first writes under an anonymous name in a city where he does not reside and uses such terms towards appellant as “lame duck,” harshly criticises the policy of appellant’s paper, and impugns severely the purposes and impulses of appellant. His vituperation grows with each succeeding article; he compares appellant to a hound; and insinuates that appellant is dishonorable, dishonest and unclean, and expressly charges appellant’s life has been one of hypocrisy and treachery to his home city. Finally, unable longer to conceal his identity, he admits the authorship and publication of the articles signed “Old Timer.” Then when appellant, for the first time cognizant of the identity of “Old Timer” replied to respondent’s articles, .respondent claimed, as he had no donbt intended to claim from the beginning, that he had been libeled.

      E. J. Howard and James P. Boyd for respondent.
    (1) Eespondent contends that the court committed no error in granting him a new trial for the reason that the instructions given at appellant’s request do not define the law of libel in this State, and are erroneous, and were misleading to the jury, conflicting with each other, and especially that instruction B was conflicting and confusing within itself. Instruction D is not the law of libel, nor is it the law in reference to privileged articles. The law of this State on the question of privileged articles, as a justification for the publication of an article, is very clearly stated in the case of Fish v. Pub. Co., 102 Mo. App. 20. In this instruction D, the court plainly told the jury that if the article complained of was a reply to an attack on him by plaintiff, the defendant had a right to reply and even retort upon the plaintiff in self-defense. It did not limit, as it should have done, the extent to which one might go in reply to an article, which may have been a previous libel. The appellant seems to have taken the view that, because the Constitution of our State makes the jury the sole judges of the law of libel as of the facts, they are not bound by the instruction of the court. In the case of Arnold v. Jewett, 125 Mo. 252, this court very closely sets forth just how far the Constitution makes the jury the sole judges of the law of libel and of the facts. (2) A few years ago one of the judges of this court, in referring to an instruction offered by a trial court in this State, denominated it “a legal curio.” If any instruction can thus be denominated, instruction B is that one. Not only is it erroneous, but it is absolutely conflicting and contradictory within itself in its attempted statement of the law in reference to the fees allowable to county collectors as their commissions. If such an instruction can be said not to be prejudicial, and if such an instruction can be said to be a clear, terse statement of the law, then it would not be possible to write an instruction that wonld confuse or mislead a jury, and this instruction, coming within instructions by which the .jury were bound, is sufficiently prejudicial to have justified the trial court in granting a new trial.
   RAILET, C.

Plaintiff sued defendant in the circuit court of Randolph county, Missouri, to recover damages on account of the alleged publication of a libel in defendant’s newspaper. After a trial upon the merits, the jury returned a verdict for defendant. A new trial was granted plaintiff, and defendant appealed from an order granting same.

The petition charges that on the 7th of April, 1911, defendant was the owner and publisher of the Huntsville Herald, at Huntsville, in the county aforesaid. After setting out the usual preliminaries, the petition charges:

“That said defendant on the 7th day of April, 1911, in the issue of said paper of said date, published in said paper, the Huntsville Herald, a certain article of and ■ concerning the plaintiff, which among other things, contained the following false, defamatory, malicious and libelous language. To-wit: ‘And again when the county court employed Judge W. P. Cave to examine the tax books of this county, and he reported to the county court that W. T. Dameron, the saintly hypocritical, Bible-back, amen corner model man, while county collector was shown by the books to have some of the county funds, which he had illegally retained, and which we are informed, he has never returned to the county, presumably because of some “poor little technicality of the law, ’ ’ which all shows that this great pure man, W. T. Dameron, to possess an official record that should he the pride of the county, and worthy of emulation hy coming generations of office holders.’ ”

It is then averred in the petition, that said publication was false, and known to be false by defendant when published; that it was published for the purpose of injuring plaintiff in his good name and reputation among his neighbors, acquaintances and others throughout said county and State; that defendant intended by said false and malicious publication to charge, and- did charge, that said Cave in his report to said court accused and charged plaintiff of being guilty of the crimes of exacting and retaining illegal fees from said county, and of being guilty of fraud in office, while plaintiff was tax collector of said county, and that plaintiff was subject to the pains and penalties provided by the laws of Missouri. It is further averred that said publication did, and does, provoke him to wrath and exposed him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; that it deprived him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse; that the same was wilfully and maliciously published and circulated by defendant as aforesaid, among a great number of persons in Randolph and adjoining counties in Missouri, to the damage of plaintiff in the sum of $20,000.

Defendant’s answer contains a general denial and various other matters hereafter referred to. It avers that defendant was born and reared in Randolph county, Missouri; that he was admitted to the bar in 1875, and since that date has been a practicing lawyer in said county; that during said period he had held various offices of trust, among which was that of recorder of deeds of said county, from 1891 to 1899.

It is alleged that on February 1, 1911, the plaintiff sold and delivered to defendant the Huntsville Herald, a newspaper published in Huntsville, in said county, together with the machinery, etc., belonging to said office, for a consideration of $7500; that included in said sale, was the good will of said paper; that since said date, the defendant has been the owner and publisher of said paper; that on the 7th of April, 1911, and for a long time prior thereto, the defendant and plaintiff had been unfriendly and not on intimate terms.

It appears from the answer, that on the 17th of February, 1911, the defendant published in his paper an editorial commenting upon the manner in which the city officials of Huntsville were managing and controlling the electric light plant and the money derived from the sale of bonds belonging to said city. After the appearance of this criticism, the answer discloses that the city council' of Huntsville, on February 24, passed a resolution inviting defendant to examine into the official records and acts of said council, and requesting him to point out wherein the council had not been true to the trust imposed on them by the people.

On February 21,1911, the plaintiff, under the worn de plume of “Old Timer,” caused to be, published in the Moberly Democrat an article criticising defendant and purporting to defend the members of the city council in respect to their conduct, etc. Said article contained alleged statements of members of the council in regard to their views of the publication made by defendant criticising their acts, etc. (There was nothing in this article which in any manner referred to the report made by Mr. Cave hereafter referred to.) The answer avers that the article by “Old Timer” of February 21, supra, was published by plaintiff for the express purpose of provoking defendant to wrath, to a newspaper controversy, and for the purpose of harassing, worrying and injuring defendant in his business in the operation of said newspaper plant, etc.

On the 24th of February, 1911, defendant published in said Herald, in reply to the last article of “Old Timer, ’ ’ the following:

“The Moberly Democrat’s correspondent in this city, judging from its bawling, in that paper of the 21st, seems to be in the condition of the suckling calf, that has lost its mother and is hungry for attention. Be patient, when the Herald has the time and space to spare from furnishing its readers with all the news we will give you some attention if necessary.”

The answer further avers that on February 26, “Old Timer” published in the above Democrat another .■article referring to the last publication of defendant, .and indulged in some strictures as to defendant’s conduct in printing same, and in respect to his criticism <of the city council aforesaid.

On March 6, under the caption of “News of Huntsville,” the plaintiff, under the nom de plume of “Old Timer,” caused to be published in said Democrat a lengthy article criticising defendant in regard to his •conduct toward the city council, and in this communication purported to give the views of certain members of the council in regard to defendant’s criticism of their acts. The members of the city council referred to purported in said article to give their views of the controversy between defendant and themselves, and undertook to explain what had been done with refer•ence to the city affairs.

On March 10, 1911, defendant, under the caption •of “The Odiousness of Anonymous Correspondence,” published in said Herald a vitriolic attack upon the authors of anonymous communications, and especially “Old Timer.” On March 14, the plaintiff as “Old Timer” replied in the Moberly Democrat to the last attack, and indulged in some personal criticisms of defendant in respect to his attack upon “Anonymous ■Correspondence. ’ ’ In this communication the plaintiff denied that he had made any attack upon defendant or slandered him. On the 24th of March, defendant published in said Herald an article entitled ‘ Will History Repeat Itself % ’ ’ This communication indulges in cans-tie and severe criticism of “Old Timer” and seems to partake of a personal controversy, more than a discussion of any matters in which the public are concerned.

The answer then avers that on March 30 “Old Timer” published in the Democrat aforesaid an article designating defendant as a “lame duck” proprietor of the Herald. This article purported to be a reply to the preceding one of the defendant, and indulged in a great deal of criticism of defendant’s conduct and the language used by him in reference to “Old Timer’s” communications. It likewise referred to defendant’s alleged action in failing to pay a certain tax imposed, for the purpose of stamping out smallpox, etc. This article likewise intimated that there was something in defendant’s life which he could not afford to have made public, but said he would not enter into a discussion of this matter unless compelled to do so. This communication was signed by the plaintiff, and it was admitted therein that all the preceding articles under the nom de plume of “Old Timer” had been written by him. After the publication of this letter, the defendant, according to the answer, replied to same in the Herald on April 7,1911, and a portion of this communication is made the basis of plaintiff’s action as shown by the petition.

Defendant’s answer avers, that in using the alleged libelous language set out in plaintiff’s petition, he conveyed, and intended to convey, the fact that plaintiff had retained funds as the commissions, which he by law was not authorized to do, and had not since said report turned said funds into the county treasury; that he had failed and refused to make a correct statement to said county court after learning from the report of Mr. Cave that such settlements were incorrect; that such official conduct and official record was not worthy of emulation and the people of the county were not proud of .such a record; all of which he alleges was true and the defendant believed it to be true at the time the same was published; that the same is not libelous when properly seen and understood, in view of all the facts herein mentioned and set out in said articles and made in said report.

It is further averred in said answer that he was induced to publish the said alleged .libelous article by reason of the report of Judge Cave and the editorial that appeared in the Huntsville Herald when owned and edited by the plaintiff, and which was published in said paper on December 6, 1907; that but for said conduct of plaintiff, said article and extract would never have been published by defendant; that said articles published by plaintiff in the Democrat aforesaid, were designed by him to call public attention to 'his own grievances and wrongs of those for whom he had assumed to act without authority through motives of ill will, envy and jealousy, and thereby injured defendant, provoked him to wrath, and caused him to be embroiled in a newspaper controversy; that thereupon by reason of the foregoing, defendant was warranted in writing and publishing said alleged libelous article in comment and condemnation of plaintiff’s acts and conduct; that said articles were published in the reasonable defense of his own standing, conduct and course in life, and in defense of his own good name and reputation, and against plaintiff’s said alleged libelous articles.

It is further averred that the publications of the communications by plaintiff in the Democrat aforesaid, constitute a provocation to the defendant for the alleged libel complained of in the petition. The answer avers that said publications made by him were without any malice against the plaintiff and without any purpose or intention on his part to injure him personally or otherwise; that he did not believe, and does not now believe, under the circumstances and facts, that said extract contained criticisms beyond the bounds of reason, and he avers that the same were warranted by plaintiff’s conduct in the publishing of the articles in .the communications aforesaid.

The answer pleads, that, the course and conduct of plaintiff toward defendant prior to the publication of said alleged libelous article; said articles and publications, made by plaintiff against defendant; the report •of Judge Cave aforesaid; the admissions of plaintiff as to said report made in said article- published by him as alleged, and the facts and circumstances before set out, constitute a complete defense to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action. The answer concludes with the following allegation:

“The defendant for another and further answer and defense to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action set ■out in plaintiff’s petition, says that the statement in ,said extract, which plaintiff alleged in his petition to be libelous, was in fact true when made.”

The reply was a general denial of the allegation of ■defendant’s answer. The record discloses that the publications as set out in defendant’s answer are substantially correct and were published in the Moberly Democrat and on the dates heretofore referred to.

In passing, it should be kept in mind that the publications relating to-the city council, its conduct of the ■city affairs, and the publications of plaintiff in his personal criticism of defendant, do not in any manner refer to the report made by Judge Cave to the county •court, in reference to moneys collected by plaintiff as ■collector of said county, and a portion of which it is ■claimed he withheld illegally. We refer to this matter here in order that the instructions given by the court may be considered in reference to the facts.

The plaintiff at the trial introduced a large number of witnesses tending to show that his reputation for honesty, integrity, good citizenship, etc., was good. Many of these witnesses likewise gave it as their opinion that plaintiff’s character was equally as good after the publication of the alleged- libelous article complained of as it was before, and there was some testimony tending to show some injury to plaintiff by Tea's on of such publication, but as the jury returned a ver■dict for defendant this question is not material on the present record.

On the foregoing facts, the court gave a number of instructions in behalf of the respective parties, and the .jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiff filed a timely motion for new trial and specified therein eleven grounds of complaint. The court below sustained said motion in part and granted plaintiff a new trial on account of the giving of. defendant’s instructions B, C, D, and P. No affirmative ruling was made by the court on the other grounds specified therein.

This case is here upon defendant’s appeal from an order granting plaintiff a new trial. It was sustained on account of alleged errors in the giving, at the instance of defendant, of instructions B, C, D, and F over the objections of plaintiff. We will consider the above instructions in the order presented

I. Instruction B reads as follows:

“The court instructs the jury that under the law •of this State the truth of the words charged to be libelous is a completé defense; and you are further instructed that in counties where the total taxes and licenses levied any one year is $80,000 or less than $120,000 the county collector is entitled to a commission of three per cent on all such levy except for the railroad and telegraph taxes, for which one per cent commission is allowed, but when the amount of such levy is more than $80‘,000, then a commission of two and one-half per cent is allowed and one per cent on the railroad and telegraph taxes an the .amount collected. Now, if you find from the evidence that the total taxes and licenses levied and to be collected for any year while the plaintiff was collector, except amount of back taxes collected, exceeded the sum of $80,000, and that the plaintiff during any one or more of such years when the said amount was in excess of $80,000, retained three per cent on any amount of the taxes and licenses collected by him, other than back taxes, then such retention of said three per cent was in law an illegal act on the part of the plaintiff, although it was not a criminal act, and if you find that said defendant wrote and published in said article that plaintiff had illegally retained funds belonging to the county, and that defendant used said word ‘illegally’ in such a sense and connection as not to impute to plainiff a crime, and such writing and publication was true, then your duty is to find a verdict for the defendant. ’ ’

This instruction is complete within itself, and authorized a verdict in behalf of defendant if the jury found in favor of the latter upon the issues presented therein.

In order that such an instruction should stand the test of judicial criticism, it must be consistent within itself, and must reasonably cover the issues presented by the opposing parties. If its provisions are inconsistent, contradictory, or exclude from the consideration of the jury vital issues in the case, and it authorizes a recovery without any reference thereto, it should be condemned. [Goetz v. Railroad, 50 Mo. l. c. 474; Fitzgerald v. Hayward, 50 Mo. 516; Bluedorn v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 439; State v. Lentz, 184 Mo. 223; State v. Helton, 234 Mo. 559, 564; State v. Stubblefield, 239 Mo. 526; Patterson v. Evans, 254 Mo. l. c. 303; Pyburn v. Kansas City, 166 Mo. App. l. c. 152; Riegel v. Loose-Wiles Co., 169 Mo. App. 513; Kelley v. St. Joseph, 170 Mo. App. l. c. 360-1.]

The trial below took place on October 11, 1911. The. first portion of instruction B, supra, attempted to inform the jury as to the amount of commission plaintiff was authorized to charge under the law as it then •stood, instead of at the time when the settlements were made. The record discloses that plaintiff held the of-, fice of county collector from 1895 to 1899. The Revised Statutes of 1889 were in operation during said period.

Section 11481, Revised Statutes 1909, reads as follows:

“The collector shall receive as full compensation for his services in collecting the revenue, except hack taxes, the following commissions and no more: . . .

“VII. In all counties wherein the total amount of all such taxes and licenses levied for any one year •exceeds $60,000 and is less than $80,000, a commission ef four per cent, on the first $60,000 collected and one-half of one per cent on whatever amount may he collected over $60,000.

“VIII. In all counties wherein the total amount of all such taxes and licenses levied for any one year •exceeds $80,000 and is less than $120,000, a commission •of three per cent on the first $80,000 collected and one and one-half per cent on whatever amount may he collected over $80,000.”

Section 7640, Revised Statutes 1889, which was ■carried into the revision of 1899 without any changes, .and there known as section 9260, reads as follows:

“The collector shall receive as full compensation for his services in collecting the revenue, except hack taxes, the following commissions and no more: . . .

“VTI. In all counties wherein the total amount of all such taxes and licenses levied for any one year exceeds $60,000 and is less than $80,000, a commission of three per cent on the amount collected.

“VIII. In all counties wherein the total amount ■of all such taxes and licenses levied for any one year exceeds $80,000, and is less than $120,000, a commission of two and one-half per cent on the amount collected. ’ ’

The first part of instruction B reads as follows:

“And you are further instructed that in counties, where the total taxes and licenses levied any one year is. $80,000 or less than $120,000 the county collector is. entitled to a commission of three per cent on all such, levy except for the railroad and telegraph taxes, for-which one per cent commission is allowed.”

That part of said instruction above quoted in-plain, unequivocal language told the jury that if plaintiff’s collections amounted to $80,000 or more, and were less than $120,000 in any one year, he was entitled to-three per cent thereon, except for railroad and telegraph taxes.

The instruction, in respect to foregoing matter,, did not properly declare the law of either 1889, 1899 or 1909 as above quoted, in regard to the amount of commission plaintiff was authorized to charge upon his annual collections. After having misinformed the jury as to the law when plaintiff’s settlements were made-between 1895 and 1899, the central portion of said instruction continues as follows:

“But when the amount of such levy is more than-$80,000, then a commission of two and one-half percent is allowed and one per cent on the railroad and telegraph taxes on the amount collected.”

The two sections of instruction B above quoted are plainly contradictory and are in direct conflict with each other. Instead of being a guide to the jury in reaching a proper conclusion as to the law of the case, it was well calculated to have directly the opposite effect, and to confuse the jury. The subsequent portion of said instruction on this subject is still more confusing. It reads: “Now, if you find from the evidence-that the total taxes and licenses levied and to be collected for any year while the plaintiff was collector, except amount of back taxes collected, exceeded the-sum of $80,000, and that the plaintiff during any one or more of such years when the said amount was in excess of $80,000, retained three per cent - on any amount of the taxes and licenses collected by him, other than back taxes, then such retention of said three percent was in law ah illegal act on the part of the plaintiff, although it was not a criminal act.”

The first part of the instruction gave the jury to-understand that plaintiff was lawfully entitled to three per cent commission, except on railroad and telegraph taxes, upon his annual collections ranging from $80,000 to $120,000, while the latter portion, above-quoted, informed the jury that the charging of three per cent under such circumstances was illegal, though not a criminal act. The instruction is not only misleading, inconsistent with itself and contradictory, in respect to above matters, but does not properly declare the law of the case.

Defendant, in using the alleged libelous language-quoted in the petition, said, in speaking of Judge Cave: “He reported to the county court that W. lamerón, • • • while county collector, was shown by the books to have-some of the county funds, which he had illegally retained, and which we are informed he has-never returned to the county.”

The answer concludes as follows: “The defendant for another and further answer and defense to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action set out in plaintiff’s petition, says, that the statement in said extract, which plaintiff alleged in his petition to be libelous, was in fact true when made. ’ ’

Said instruction concludes as follows: “And if you find that said defendant wrote and published in said article that plaintiff had illegally retained funds belonging to the county, and that defendant used said word ‘illegally’ in such a sense and connection as not to impute to plaintiff a crime, and such writing and publication was true, then your duty is to find a verdict for the defendant.”

In the conclusion of his answer, defendant charges that plaintiff did illegally retain county funds, which he never returned to the county.

On turning to the report of Judge Cave to the county court of date November 26, 1907, read in evidence, we find that plaintiff’s name is not mentioned therein, nor is there any intimatioU found in said report that plaintiff retained more than was due him in the settlement with the county, court. In order to fill up this gap in the chain of testimony, the defendant read in evidence an editorial written by plaintiff, and published in the Herald while he was owner, commenting on Judge Cave’s report as follows:

“The Herald understands that Judge Cave’s investigation covered the period or terms of four former collectors, Ratliff, Dameron, Hogue and Grimes, and that he found that Ratliff and Dameron had been allowed three per cent on one year’s -collections each when only two and one-half per cent should have been charged. ... In four years of office, Dameron collected about $30,000 in back taxes, at three per cent, of this amount he was eititled to (but did not get) $900, but the county got it all and was the gainer, and Dameron the loser by $500.”

Turning to the back tax law in existence from 1895 to 1899; we find that section 7688, Revised Statutes 1889 (carried into the Revision of 1899, without change, as section 9309), provides that, “Fees shall be allowed for services rendered under the provisions of this chapter as follows: To the collector . . . four per cent on all sums collected.”

This court in the well considered case of State ex rel. Shannon County v. Hawkins, 169 Mo. 618, said:

“This action requires at our hands a construction ■ of sections 7640 and 7688, Revised Statutes 1889, now sections 9260 and 9309, Revised Statutes 1899. Defendant Hawkins was elected in 1896 and was collector of revenue for Shannon county for 1897 and 1898.”

The question before the court was whether the collector was entitled to a commission of four per cent on collections for back taxes, in addition to the general commission provided in section 7640, Revised 'Statutes 1889. The conclusion reached in the Hawkins case meets with our approval. It was held that Hawkins was entitled to the four per cent on back taxes, in addition to the commission allowed under section 7640, supra. It was decided in 1902; and the Legislature since said date has seemed to' be satisfied with the construction given the above law, as no substantial changes have been made in respect to same (see sections 11481 and 11511, Revised Statutes 1909).

If it be true that plaintiff collected $30,000 of back taxes during his term as collector, and that he retained no part of the fou/r per cent commission allowed him under section 7688, Revised Statutes 1889, in addition to the commission allowed by section 7640, Revised Statutes 1889, then it becomes a pertinent inquiry in the case, as to whether plaintiff retained illegal commissions, if allowed the benefit of his four per cent on said $30,000 of back taxes collected by him. If he paid over the money, including his commission, he would not now be entitled to recover any portion of it paid under a mistake of law. [Hethcock v. Crawford County, 200 Mo. 170; State ex rel. v. Shipman, 125 Mo. 436.] He would be entitled however, under the law, to have the jury legally instructed as to what facts were necessary to show that plaintiff had retained county funds illegally, etc.

If plaintiff actually collected back taxes during his term as collector, and retained no part of his commission when settling with the county court or other authorities, he was entitled to have the instruction covering the whole case inform the jury that his commission, on the back taxes collected should be considered in determining whether the county had received more than it was entitled to in its settlements with him. ' The' foregoing instruction authorized the jury to find against plaintiff in regard to his retaining funds illegally, although his unpaid commissions on bach tax collections might have been more than sufficient to square him with the county.

Having reached the conclusion that defendant’s instruction B was clearly erroneous, as well as contradictory, we have deemed it .proper to call attention to the questions heretofore discussed, in order that the court, in the retrial of the cause, may duly consider the same.

II. The latter part of instruction B, supra, informed the jury, that if the taxes collected, by plaintiff as collector, exclusive of the hack taxes, exceeded $80,000 for any one year, and plaintiff retained three per cent commission thereon, the said act in retaining said three per cent was illegal, though not a criminal act. If plaintiff was only entitled to retain two and one-half per .cent on said sum, and wilfully retained three per cent as aforesaid,'when nothing, was due him above said two and one-half per cent, then prima facie plaintiff was guilty of a felony. Section 3562, Revised Statutes 1889 (the same as section 1925, Revised Statutes 1899, and 4563, Revised Statutes 1909), reads as follows: “If any collector of revenue, . . . whose compensation or salary is fixed or limited by law, and who is required to account for and pay into the treasury of the State, ... of which he is such officer, any and all fees and emoluments received in his official capacity, or on account of his office, which shall be in excess of the sum allowed to such officer, shall wilfully neglect or refuse to keep and render a true account of the moneys, fees and emoluments so earned and received by bim, or shall unlawfully retain, use or withhold the same, or any part thereof, in excess of the amount justly due and allowed to him by law, every such officer so offending shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and a neglect or refusal to pay over said excess of fees or moneys at the proper time, or on demand, shall be deemed prima-facie evidence of his having embezzled and converted the same to his own use; and every person who shall be convicted under any of the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years.”

In the alleged libelous article complained of in the petition, plaintiff was charged with illegally retaining funds as county collector. The words illegally and unlawfully as used in said - section 3562, Eevised Statutes 1889, are synonymous terms, and are frequently used interchangeably to express the same idea.

If plaintiff retained the three per cent in any year when the collections for said year, aside from back taxes, exceeded $80,000, and there was nothing due him from commissions or otherwise as collector from some other source, then he was prima-facie guilty of embezzlement under section 3562, supra. If, on the other hand, the commissions due him under section 7640, supra, when added to his commission of four per cent allowed on back taxes, were in excess of the amount retained by him, then he was not guilty of retaining county funds illegally, under such circumstances. In Hethcock v. Crawford County, 200 Mo. l. c. 175, this court, speaking through Judge Lamm, upon this subject, said: “The manifest theory of the statutes is that the collector report his commissions in his settlements, and that it is his privilege and duty to keep back the commissions allowed by the law on tax collections and not the county court’s duty to see that he does. The county court does not prepare his settlements, nor does it furnish the data therefor. The county court does not allow his commissions; it has no lot or part in that; the. law allows them on settlements and statements made by him. . . . The law presumes an officer does his duty. His duty in this case, under the law, was to keep back his commission on back taxes.”

If the county and State got all they were entitled to from plaintiff as collector, then he was not guilty of retaining funds that belonged to the county or State. If, on the other hand, he retained funds of the county or State, which he received as collector and which he knew were in excess of that which was due him, then he was subject to the penalties prescribed by section 3562, Revised Statutes 1889, supra. Instruction B was intended to cover the whole case, and authorized a recovery within itself. It should have submitted to the jury the issue, as to whether plaintiff was prima-facie guilty of embezzlement under the statute aforesaid, or whether he was lawfully entitled to the funds which it is claimed he illegally retained.

If the jury, when propertly instructed, should find that plaintiff was lawfully entitled to retain as his. commission all the funds which it is charged he illegally retained, then the jury would be justified in finding that the matters complained of in the petition constituted a libel, etc. The foregoing instruction does not come up to our conception of that which the law required, as heretofore indicated, and by reason thereof, a new trial was properly granted on account of the-giving of said instruction B.

IH. At the instance of defendant, the trial court, gave to the jury instruction D, as follows: ‘ ‘ The court. instructs the jury that in considering this case, you will consider the circumstances under which the article complained of was. written by the defendant, and whether or not said article was provoked, or in answer to one-written by the plaintiff attacking defendant; and you are instructed that if you find that the plaintiff wrote said article in reply to an attack on him by plaintiff, then the defendant had the right to reply and even retort upon the plaintiff in self-defense; and if the jury believe that the defendant in said article as a whole, stated the truth, or in taking said article as a whole it is not libelous, you will return a verdict for the de-, fendant.”

The correspondence in the record discloses that the controversy between the parties to this action grew out of an editorial, published by defendant in the Huntsville Herald of February 17, 1911, in which the city council of said town was criticized, on account of its alleged mismanagement of the water and light plant, etc., of said city.

The plaintiff, over the nom de plume of “Old Timer,” assumed to defend the city council, and published in the Moberly Democrat various articles set out in the record, which were replied to by the defendant through the Herald. These communications gradually became exceedingly personal, and although relating in. a general way to the council proceedings aforesaid, the controversy finally culminated in the publication by defendant, in his paper of April 7, of the alleged libelous article, a portion of which is set out in the petition as a basis of this action. It is asserted by defendant that plaintiff, by his acts and conduct aforesaid, provoked him to wrath, by indulging in personal criticisms, over an assumed name; that plaintiff forced him into a newspaper controversy for the purpose of injuring him in his business; that by reason of the foregoing, he was justified in repelling said assaults by the publication of the editorial of April 7, 1911, supra.

It is manifest that said instruction was requested and given upon the theory that defendant was justified in using the language referred to in said conxmunication, although it did not relate to the subject-matter of any of the previous correspondence or controversy between the parties. In Odgers on Libel and Slander (5 Ed.), p. 292, the learned author declares the law, with reference to this subject, as follows: “A man who has been attacked may, in rebutting the charges, at the same time retort upon his adversary where such a retort is a necessary part of his defense or fairly arises out of the charges made against him. [O’Donoghue v. Hussey, Ir. R. 5 C. 124.] A man who himself commenced a newspaper war, cannot subsequently come to the court as plaintiff, to complain that he has had the worst of the fray. But even in rebutting an accusation, the defendant must not intrude unnecessarily into the private life of his assailant, or make counter charges against his character, unconnected with his original charge against the defendant. The privilege extends only to such retorts as are fairly an answer to the plaintiff’s attacks.”

This is a very fair general statement of the law upon this subject, and is well supported by authority. In Newell on Slander and Libel (3 Ed.), sec. 619 and following, the same principle is announced as in the preceding authority. In section 620 of Newell it is said: “The law does not allow independent wrongs, of the nature treated of in this work, to be set off against each other and a balance found in favor of the less culpable party. The principle which allows proof of provocation in mitigation of damages is the same as that which is applicable in the case of a provoked assault; and if there has been time and opportunity for hot blood to cool and calm reason to resume its. ordinary control, a mere provocation not connected with the wrong cannot be shown. If in this respect, there is any distinction between the cases of personal encounter and assault and written defamation, it would seem that the rule should be applied with at. least as great strictness in the latter class as in the-former, since the composition and publication of a libel in general involves necessarily some degree of deliberation and opportunity for reflection. There are plain reasons of public policy for this limitation of the right to reply in extenuation of such wrongs, upon remote provoking inducements not connected with the matter in issue. If the law were less strict there would be less self-restraint from acts of violence and wrong calculated to disturb the peace of society. Men would be too ready to take it upon themselves to avenge their personal grievances; and again, in the trial of causes for alleged wrongs, the principal issue would be embarrassed and confused, if not overwhelmed, by numerous collateral issues.”

”We are strongly impressed by this clear, forceful announcement of the law upon this subject. The principles announced apply with much force to the facts disclosed by the record in this cause. In Fish v. St. Louis County Printing & Publishing Co., 102 Mo. App. l. c. 21, the above authorities are referred to, and Judge Bland, speaking upon the subject upder consideration here, said: “The article published by defendant is not a denial or explanation of the Argus and the Watchman articles, but is an irrelevant attack upon the personal and professional character of the plaintiff and is therefore not privileged.” Other authorities can be found announcing the same principle: Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526; Smurthwaite v. News Publishing Co., 124 Mich. l. c. 385; Sternberg Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 170 Fed. 298.

The question in the case at bar, as to whether plaintiff, while county collector of Randolph county, from 1895 to 1899, retained county funds illegally, was not involved in any of the newspaper controversies which are set out in the answer, and could not, therefore, in our opinion, be -made the basis of a privileged attack upon plaintiff because of collateral language used by the latter in communications relating to another and different subject. We are satisfied, both upon principle and authority, that the rule should not be extended in respect to these matters, and that instruction D, as -well as others upon the same subject, was improperly given in behalf of defendant. The court, evidently having reached the conclusion that these instructions were erroneous, granted a new trial, and its action in so doing is approved.

IY. Defendant’s instruction F is subject to the same criticism as that made upon his instruction D, supra, and should not have been given. The action of the court in granting a new trial on account of the giving of this instruction was fully justified and is hereby sustained.

Y. Instruction C, given in behalf of defendant as mo'dified by the court, has been fully covered in the review of defendant’s instruction D, supra. The action of the court in granting a new trial on account of the giving of said instruction meets our approval.

We have given careful consideration to all the questions involved, and have reached the conclusion that the trial court properly granted plaintiff a new trial. The judgment below is accordingly affirmed.

Brown, C., concurs.

PER CURIAM. — The foregoing opinion by Railet, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

AH the judges concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BROWN, C.

license: Public Domain

text:
    PHILOMENA JORDAN v. JAMES W. RUDLUFF et al., Plaintiffs in Error.
    Division One,
    March 2, 1915.
    HOMESTEAD: Set Out by Commissioners: Greater Than Widow’s Dower Interest: Remarriage of Widow: Dower not Extinguished. The Homestead Act of 1866 (G-. S. 1865, p. 449) provided that a widow should take the same estate in the homestead as that of which her husband died seized, and directed that the commissioners appointed • to set out such homestead should also set out her dower, first setting off the homestead and then her dower, the latter to he diminished by the amount of the widow’s interest in the homestead, and no dower to he assigned if her homestead interest should equal or exceed one-third of all the realty. The law of 1875 reduced her homestead interest to a life estate, and provided that after deducting from its value the value of the estates of minor children, the balance was to he charged against her dower, which was fixed at a one-third interest in all the deceased’s lands. The Act of 1895 made the widow’s homestead interest terminable upon her remarriage. Held, that a widow whose husband died in 1901, and whose homestead, exceeding her dower interest, was set out. to her in partition, was entitled upon her remarriage to have her dower, of one-third in value of all the lands of which her first husband died seized, assigned and admeasured to her out of the homestead tract.
    Error to the Perry Circuit Court. — Hon. Charles A. Klein, Judge.
    Affirmed.

      T. B. Whitledge for plaintiffs in error.
    (1) The dower in this case was merged in the homestead by the action of the commissioners, who found that the homestead value exceeded the dower interest of the widow in all the lands owned by the deceased; hence when homestead was destroyed by her remarriage the dower was also destroyed and lost. Chrisman v. Linderman, 202 Mo. 619; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 588. (2) It is not insisted that the Homestead Statute ex vi termini destroys the dower where the homestead exceeds or is greater than one-third of the real estate of which the husband died seized. But where as in this case in an action to assign dower and homestead, the. homestead was found to exceed the dower, and by decree of court it was so adjudged, and no dower was or could he assigned, the acceptance of that decree, and voluntarily choosing the larger estate and occupancy of it, until remarriage, did merge the lesser estate — the dower — into the homestead and it was lost by remarriage.

      John V. Noell for defendant in error.
    Defendant in error lost her homestead by her remarriage after the death of her first husband, but did not lose her dower. R. S. 1909, sec. 6710; Chrisman v. Linderman, 202 Mo. 605; Gore v. Riley, 161 Mo. 238; Graves v. Cochran, 68 Mo. 74; Bryan v. Rhoades, 96 Mo. 485; Keeney v. McYoy, 206 Mo. 54.
   BROWN, C.

This is a suit for the admeasurement and assignment of dower in 150 acres of land in Perry county, of which William Cambrón died seized in October, 1901, intestate, leaving the plaintiff, his widow, and certain -children and grandchildren, the interests of all of whom are now in the defendants, as his only heirs. The petition states these facts and that afterward on August 14, 1905, plaintiff was married to one Milster, who died in 1907, and that in 1909 she married Jordan, who still lives. It further states that in 1903 some of these heirs brought a suit in partition against her and the other heirs, in the circuit court for Perry county, in which 32.31 acres of the land, comprising the mansion house and messuages, were set off to her as her homestead by the commissioners, who found and reported that her interest in the homestead equaled or exceeded a one-third interest for her life in and to all said lands, and that they did not for that reason assign any dower to her; and divided the remaining lands, after setting out the homestead, to the parties to the suit entitled thereto. The report was approved by the court and judgment entered thereon. It then 'sets out the interest of these defendants as the sole owners in fee of the homestead tract subject tó plaintiff’s dower, that her dower has not been assigned in any of said lands, and that on the first day of March, 1909, the defendants wrongfully entered upon the 32.31 acres comprised in the homestead tract, deforcing her of her dower in the entire tract. She lays her damages at $200, and the value of her dower at $25 a month, and prays for the admeasurement and assignment of dower in the entire tract out of the 32.31 acres. The petition is sufficient if the facts above stated are not inconsistent with her right to recover.

The defendants demurred generally. The demurrer was overruled by the court, and the defendants refusing to plead further, the cause was submitted on-the pleadings and evidence taken, and the court found that the plaintiff became, at the death of the said William Cambrón, entitled to both homestead and dower in the 150-acre tract; that her dower had not been assigned in the partition suit; ascertained and declared the interests of all the parties subject to her dower; that she was entitled to be endowed of the one-third part in value of all said land for and during the period of her natural life, to be admeasured and set out to her out of the 32.31 acres heretofore mentioned; that no dower had ever been assigned to her out of any of the lands of Cambrón, her former husband; and that the defendants on March 1, 1909, wrongfully entered upon all the 32.31-acre homestead tract and have ever since held exclusive and wrongful possession thereof, denying her right to its possession and thereby deforcing her of her dower in the lands of which Cambrón died seized. It assessed her damages at $163.80, the rental value of her dower estate at $100 per annum, and its ' monthly value at $8.33 1-3. It found also that at the time of Cambrón’s death his mansion house and principal messuage were situated on said 32.31-aere tract. It thereupon adjudged that dower be assigned and ad-measured to her out of the 32.31-acre homestead tract equal in value to one-third in value of the 150 acres of which Cambrón died seized, excluding valuable improvements made thereon since the setting out of the homestead in the partition case; that she recover said ' damages and monthly rentals, together with her costs, and appointed three commissioners to assign and ad-measure the dower.

The commissioners at the April term, 1911, reported that they had assigned her 30'. 14 acres, which ■ they fully described, out of the 32.31-acre tract, as her dower. This report was duly approved and confirmed by the court by its final judgment at the same term, and on July 3, 1911, this writ of error was issued and is properly returned here.

The learned counsel for the plaintiffs in error have placed us under obligation by stripping their case to the single naked point which they present for our consideration: They relieve us from going again upon the ground over which we traveled in Chrisman v. Linderman, 202 Mo. 619, and Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, by stating that they do not insist that the Homestead Statute ex vi termini destroys the dower where the widow’s homestead interest is greater than one-third in value of the real estate of which the husband died seized; and concede that where dower and homestead ■have not been assigned by legal proceedings, occupancy and delay do not destroy or in any way affect her right to dower. They do insist, however, that where, as in this case, in an action for the partition of the lands of the deceased husband, the homestead was found to exceed the dower, and the court so adjudged, so that no dower could be assigned in such proceeding, the acceptance of that decree, and voluntarily-choosing “the larger estate,” and the occupancy of it until remarriage, did merge “the lesser estate,” the dower, into the homestead, so that it was lost by such remarriage. This, as we shall see, necessarily involves the question whether under our statute the element of forfeiture by remarriage is to be taken into consideration in fixing the value of her homestead in connection with the assignment of dower. If it is to be considered, so that other dower must be assigned to her in payment for the disability so imposed, it introduces an element into the valuation of homesteads which is impracticable to the point of absurdity. It is true the lady might pass in review before the commissioners to give them an opportunity to judge how long the homestead estate would probably continue until she might reasonably be expected to have an opportunity to remarry, but her own capricious disposition would be more difficult to estimate, affected, as it would be, not only by temperamental idiosyncrasies but by the impression left by previous connubial experience. If her prospect of widowhood is not to be so valued, we must, in construing the Act of 1895, which limits the homestead right to the time of its continuance, interpret it, if it is clearly susceptible of such interpretation, so as to avoid the imputation that the Legislature intended to penalize the offense of remarriage by loss of her immemorial right to be endowed. The maxims, “in doubt the response is in favor of dower” and “the law favoreth life, liberty,‘dower” (Donaldson v. Donaldson, 249 Mo. 228), flow naturally from the regard for widows “running like a thread of gold through common and statutory law and evidenced again and again by the decisions of this court. ’ ’ [Keeney v. McVoy, supra, 55; Chrisman v. Linderman, supra, and cases cited.] There is another principle to be reckoned with in this interpretation. Although there is an anomaly in the common law which recognizes an interest of a husband in the widowhood of his wife, it stops so short at that point that it will not even recognize the common justice of permitting the wife the same interest in her husband, and nothing is better settled than that honest marriage is encouraged by the law to the extent of avoiding all provisions of contracts, conveyances and testamentary dispositions attempting to restrain it. So in interpreting the Homestead Acts we are forbidden the presumption that the Legislature intended to violate this healthy principle, and must look to its very words for the exhibition of such an intent. In considering whether the judgment of the Perry County Circuit Court limited the dower of plaintiff in her husband’s property to the period of her widowhood, we have only to go to the statutes which authorized that judgment. The court in rendering it was simply executing the statutory mandate to segregate from the general mass of the Cambrón lands the part to which the widow was by its terms entitled, and in so far as it sought to limit or extend the statutory title the judgment was void. [Gore v. Riley, 161 Mo. 238; Davison v. Davison, 207 Mo. 702, 708.] In construing these statutes their history gives us valuable aid.

Although an act exempting homesteads from sale under executions was passed and approved March 23, 1863, its provisions shed little or no light upon these questions. The homestead law upon which our present system was constructed, and from which it has developed to its present form, was enacted in 1866. [General Statutes 1865, chap. 111, p. 449.] It provided (sec. 5) that upon the death of the housekeeper or head of the family leaving a widow or any minor children his homestead should pass to and vest in such widow or children, or if there should be both, in such widow and children, who should take the same estate of which the deceased died seized; and that the interest of the children should endure until they should attain their majority. The same section provided further that the probate court should, when necessary, appoint three commissioners to set out such homestead to the person or persons entitled. The rule established in the next section for the guidance of these commissioners was applicable to all proceedings in which it became necessary to admeasure and assign homestead and dower to the widow. It is as follows: ‘ ‘ Sec. 6. The commissioners appointed to set out such homestead shall, in cases in which a right of dower shall also exist, also set oJit such dower; and they shall first set out such homestead, and from the residue of the real estate of the deceased, shall set out such dower, but the amount of such dower shall be diminished by the amount of the interest of such widow in such homestead; and if the interest of siich ividow in such homestead shall equal or exceed one-third of all the real estate of which such housekeeper or head of a family shall have died seized, no dower shall be assigned to such widow.”

While with the clause in which it occurs standing alone there might be doubt as to whether the words “amount of such dower” as used in the foregoing section refers to the value of the land or of the dower estate, it is set completely at rest by the plain words of the following clause, which we have taken the liberty to italicise. Under its provisions had the householder died seized of country lands in fee, leaving a widow without children, the homestead to the value of $1500 would be set out to her absolutely. If the value of the remaining lands added to this did not exceed $4500, no dower would be assigned. If the total value exceeded that sum, lands to the value of one-third the excess would be set out to her for life. This closes the transaction; for her homestead being a broader estate, and including her dower both in quantity and'estate, would amount of itself to an assignment of dower to that extent. Should the decedent have left minor children the homestead would be set out the same in all respects to the value of $1500. To this the value of all the other lands would, be added. The value of the interest of the children, considered as cotenants with the wife during minority, would then be deducted from the value of the homestead, and if the remainder should equal or exceed one-third of the total value, no dower would be assigned, for the widow’s life estate in the homestead would include it, as in case where there are no children.

We have gone into these details to enable us to understand the change made by the Act of 1875. [Laws 1875, p. 60.] This limited the widow’s estate in the homestead to the term of her life, leaving it the same in all other respects, and the interests of minor children untouched. The effect of this was to leave her estate in the homestead and dower lands the same — ■■ a simple life estate, so that her homestead estate could not yet fall from under her dower. Her homestead was still diminished by the estates of the minors, any one of which might, in the course of events, prove greater than her own. To meet these conditions another amendment provided a new rule of assignment. The estate in the homestead for the life of the widow was to be valued instead of the fee; and after deducting from this the value of the estates of the minor children the balance was to be charged against her dower, which was fixed at one-third interest for her life in all the lands of which the householder died seized. Thus the extent of her estate in homestead and dower was made equal, and possession under the former would still support the latter until the same event should put an end to both. The Act of 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 186, sec. 2) however, introduced a new element which has rendered this controversy possible. It reduced her homestead estate to a base or determinable one (if we may be permitted such an expression about an estate less than a fee), subject to be determined while her dower interest was still alive, but the statute requiring it to be first assigned carried with it the primary right of possession, so that if the homestead exceeded in extent the amount of land to which she would be entitled as dower in the absence of a homestead right, nothing was left to be assigned as dower unless and until a subsequent marriage should devest her homestead estate with its right to the possession of the whole. As a party to the partition she was entitled to have her interest ascertained and declared by the court the same as would any other party to the proceeding having a contingent interest that might at some time develop into a possessory right. For this reason the Act of 1895 made no change in the method of ascertaining, admeasuring and assigning the homestead or the dower, but left it the same as it was under the Act of 1875, when in case the homestead exceeded in extent the extent of the dower to which the widow would be otherwise entitled, the assignment of the homestead forever closed the transaction. In the partition case the court declared by its judgment her interest as doweress, and the judgment in this case gives it effect. We see no error in the record and the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

PER CURIAM. — The foregoing opinion of Brown, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

All the judges concur.


author: GRAVES, P. J.

text:
    ADA H. HARDWICKE, Appellant, v. ALBERT C. WURMSER, Appellant.
    Division One,
    March 2, 1915.
    APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Constitutional Question: Raised for First Time in Appellate Court. If no constitutional question was presented to the trial court for its determination, no such question is in the record, and none can thereafter be injected into the case. If the appellate jurisdiction, at the time the appeal was taken, was in the Court of Appeals, appellate jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the Supreme Court . ' by a motion for a rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals, after it has reversed the judgment, raising the point that the opinion therein is violative of both the Federal and State Constitution in certain specified matters.
    Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Ron. Walter A. Powell, Judge.
    Transferred to Kansas City Court of Appeals.

      Pence é Sanford for plaintiff.
    (1) Courts of Appeals have no jurisdiction of appeals involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States, or of this State. Constitution of Missouri, art. 6, sec. 12, and Sec. 5. of the Amendment to said article. (2) A cause involving- the faith or credit that shall be given to the public acts, records or judicial proceedings of another State, or the legal effect thereof, involves the construction of the Constitution of the United States; and such constitutional question becomes involved whenever the faith, credit or legal effect of such an act, record or judicial proceeding becomes an issue. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 7 Wall. 139; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87; Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S. 334; Huntington v. Attull, 146 U. S. 657; Dupasseur v. Eocheneau, 21 Wall. 130; Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 111 IT. S. 738. (3) A constitutional question is necessarily involved, whenever the conclusion reached could only be arrived at after construction of the Constitution. State ex rel. v. Smith, 141 Mo. 1; State ex rel. v. Smith, 152 Mo. 444; State ex rel. v. Smith, 176 Mo. 44; State ex rel. v. Smith, 177 Mo. 69.

      Scarritt, Scarritt & Jones for defendant.
   GRAVES, P. J.

This is an action in equity broug'ht in the circuit court of Jackson county, whereby the plaintiff seeks to charge the defendant as a trustee and compel him to account to her for certain profits or proceeds in the purchase and sale of certain real estate in which she claims an interest. The plaintiff had a judgment in the circuit court for $899.86. Both parties appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. By unanimous opinion the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that plaintiff under her own proof was not entitled to recover at all. This disposed of both appeals. Motion for rehearing was sustained and the cause reheard, and in a second opinion that court adhered to its former judgment that the judgment of plaintiff be simply reversed, thus again disposing of both appeals — and adversely to plaintiff throughout.

The character of the suit and the amount involved does not give this court jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction was in the Kansas City Court of Appeals. No constitutional question was raised in any way in the trial court, nor in the Court of Appeals, until the plaintiff filed her last motion for rehearing in the Kansas City Court of Appeals. In that motion it is claimed that the opinion of the Court of Appeals does violence to both State and Federal Constitutions, specifying. Upon the motion of the plaintiff the Kansas City Court of Appeals transferred the case (both appeals) to this court.

Defendant lias moved to retransfer to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and that motion we have taken with the case. This motion to retransfer to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, we think is well taken and should he sustained.

In Trust Co. v. Donnell, 145 Mo. 431, this court has said:

“Action on special tax bill for $82.41 with ten per cent, interest, plaintiff being the assignee of such bill, and judgment for defendant.

“No constitutional question was raised in the trial court nor in the Kansas City Court of Appeals (which court affirmed the judgment of the lower court), until in a motion for rehearing, which motion was denied by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and thereupon that court transferred this cause to this court ‘for its determination. ’

“Inasmuch as no constitutional question was presented to the court of first instance for its determination, no such question is contained in the record; we therefore grant the motion filed by defendant to transfer this cause to the Kansas City Court of Appeals from whence it came. All concur.”

Again in Bennett v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 642, we had previously given an outline of the law on the point involved. In the Bennett case the St. Louis Court of Appeals had transferred the case here on the ground that a constitutional question was involved. In re-transferring the case to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, this court said:

“The question here presented is whether this court or the St. Louis Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this case. It is quite clear that the jurisdiction is to be determined, not from what has been done in the appellate court, but from the record as it was when the appeal was taken. The jurisdiction is then fixed, and nothing the parties can do afterwards will change it.

“The proposition then is, did the record in this case, when the appeal was allowed, present a question involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States, or of this State. This must be determined by an inspection of the record itself as it came from the St. Louis Circuit Court.

“The word involving as used by the Constitution, in fixing the appellate jurisdiction of this court, implies that a constitutional question was raised in and submitted to the trial court, and that such court had the opportunity to pass upon it. It cannot be laid down by rule how every such question must be raised in the trial court, but it should, at least, be fairly and directly presented by some of the methods recognized by the practice and procedure of the court. [State ex rel. Campbell v. St. Louis Court of Appeals, 97 Mo.. 278; Railroad v. Seifert, 41 Mo. App. 37.]

“An examination of the record of proceedings of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis fails to show that any question involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States, or of this State, was raised. This court has no jurisdiction of the appeal. The cause is remanded to the St. Louis Court of Appeals.”

In the later case of Brown v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co., 175 Mo. l. c. 188, this court said:

“But in order that the case can involve a constitutional question, the protection of the Constitution must be timely and properly invoked in the trial court and that protection must have been denied to the party invoking it, by that court, and such party must have been the losing party in the trial court, and proper exception saved to the ruling of the trial court. [Ash v. Independence, 145 Mo. 120; Ibid., 169 Mo. 77; Parlin & Orendorff Co. v. Hoard, 145 Mo. 117; Vaughn v. Railroad, 145 Mo. l. c. 61; Shewalter v. Railroad, 152 Mo. 544; Coleman v. Cole, 158 Mo. l. c. 258.]

“The constitutional protection must be properly invoked in the trial court. It cannot be invoked for the first time in an appellate court. [Vaughn v. Railroad, 145 Mo. l. c. 61; Pim v. St. Louis, 165 U. S. 273; Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Co., 166 U. S. 648.]”

It is clear that under these authorities this cause should not have been transferred to this court. The motion to retransfer is sustained and the cause, and both appeals therein, are therefore retransferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.

All concur.


author: BLAIR, J.

text:
    ARCHIBALD W. JAGGARD, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.
    Division One,
    March 2, 1915.
    1. NEGLIGENCE: Speed of Car: Before Discovery of Traveler At Street Crossing: Humanitarian Rule: Instruction: Plaintiff’s Own Theory. Where the petition pleads neither an ordinance restricting the speed of the street car, nor that the actual speed of the car which struck plaintiff’s wagon at a street crossing was negligent at common law, but founds the cause of action solely upon the humanitarian doctrine, an instruction for defendant which tells the jury that unless, after the motorman saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen, that the wagon in which plaintiff was riding was going to cross the track in front of the car so as to be in danger of being struck by said car, he did not exercise ordinary care to stop the car and avoid the collision, then the verdict must be for defendant, is not erroneous, if, on the theory of liability, it is in every respect equivalent to plaintiff’s instruction given. The two instructions being substantially the same, defendant’s is not reversible error on the theory that it eliminates the speed of the car prior to the time the motorman saw or might have seen the wagon on the track. Nor are the words “after” and “then” objectionable.
    2. ARGUMENT TO JURY. It is not error, in argument to the jury, to draw reasonable conclusions from the evidence. It is not error for defendant’s counsel to call the jury’s attention to the fact that plaintiff testified that, as he was about to cross the street ear track in a wagon, he looked and saw the approaching car as soon as he could, and draw from that testimony the conclusion that the motorman could not have seen plaintiff’s wagon any sooner than plaintiff could have seen the car, and that consequently the motorman was not guilty of negligence, if after he discovered plaintiff’s peril he used all diligence to avert a collision.
    Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Ron. James R. Slover, Judge.
    Affirmed.

      Gage, Ladd $ Small for appellant.
    (1) Counsel for defendant, in spite of objection by plaintiff, was permitted to make improper remarks in his argument to the jury. This was error. Nephler v. Woodward, 200 Mo. 187; Allen v. Lumber Co., 171 Mo. App. 506; Cain y. Wintersteen, 144 Mo. App. 5; Ramp v. Railroad, 133 Mo. App. 704; Allen v. Transit Co., 183 Mo. 423; Benjamin y. Railroad, 245 Mo. 614; Hudson y. Railroad, 101 Mo. 30; Collett y. Kuhlman, 243 Mo. 591; White v. United Railways, 250 Mo. 476. (2) Defendant’s instruction number 4 was error.

      John R. Lucas, W. R. R. Piatt and Thomas B. Marks for respondent.
    Appellant cannot complain of respondent’s instruction number 4. The instruction is more onerous upon respondent than the law requires, but it follows appellant’s instruction number 1. The criticism of the instruction by appellant is, in last analysis, an attempt to submit in this court an issue or charge of negligence not submitted in the trial court nor alleged in the petition, viz., negligence in running the car at a rate of speed in excess of the rate prescribed by city ordinance. Negligence in this respect was abandoned by plaintiff when he submitted the case under the last chance rule and moreover the appellant saw the ear coming and knew the dangerous and excessive speed at which it was running and that same was in violation of the ordinance. Under such circumstances he has no case. Schmidt v. Railroad, 191 Mo. 215; Roenfeldt v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 566.
   BLAIR, J.

The judgment appealed from was rendered on a verdict for defendant in an action for . damages for injuries plaintiff alleges he received when a wagon in which he was riding was struck at a street crossing by defendant’s car.

In substance, the petition charges defendant’s employees negligently ran the car against the wagon in which plaintiff was riding and that such employees discovered or, in the exercise, of ordinary care, could have discovered plaintiff’s peril in time to have stopped the car and to have averted the danger but negligently failed to do so, etc.

The collision occurred at the point at which the Nineteenth street car line crosses Cherry street. The wagon was being driven by an employee of plaintiff and proceeded along Cherry street and thence into Nineteenth street and upon the crossing and was. struck.

The evidence varied as to the distance the car was. west of the crossing at the moment the wagon first could have been seen by the motorman. The evidence as to the speed of the car was conflicting, estimates, ranging from fifteen to twenty-five or more miles per hour. Plaintiff testified he saw the car before the wagon reached the track, and testified it was approaching with great rapidity, ■ using a profane but striking hyperbole to indicate its speed. There was also a conflict of evidence on the questions whether the motorman made sufficient effort to stop the car and whether it could have been stopped at all after he saw plaintiff’s peril and before the collision occurred.

Three instructions were given at plaintiff’s request. The second defined ordinary care, and the third dealt with the measure of damages. The first stated the motorman’s duty to keep a vigilant watch, and proceeded :

“If, therefore, you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was, at the time and place in question, in a position of imminent peril of being struck by the car mentioned in the evidence by reason of the fact that the team or the wagon attached thereto in which he was riding was upon the railroad track or upon Nineteenth street and approaching the track upon which said car was running and that the motorman saw him or said wagon and the persons therein, in such position of danger, if any, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have so seen it or them in time to have slackened the speed of said car or to have stopped the same by the exercise of ordinary care and thus have avoided striking the wagon and injuring the plaintiff, but negligently and carelessly failed to do so, and if you further believe from the evidence that by reason of the foregoing careless and negligent acts of the said motorman, if you find them to have been careless and negligent, the wagon in which plaintiff was riding was struck and plaintiff was thrown out of the same and injured, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff, even although you may also believe and find from the evidence that the plaintiff or his driver, or both of them, were guilty of negligence contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries, by negligently driving said wagon or causing the same to be driven upon said track, in dangerous proximity to the street car mentioned in the evidence, at said crossing of Cherry and Nineteenth streets..”

Among the instructions given at defendant’s instance was the following:

“4. The court instructs the jury that unless you find and believe from the evidence that after the motorman saw, or by tbe exercise of ordinary care could have seen, that tbe wagon in which plaintiff was riding was going to cross the track in front of the car so as to be in danger of being struck by said car, he did not then exercise ordinary care to stop Ms car or to avoid the collision, then your verdict will be for the defendant. ’ ’

During the argument the following occurred: Mr. Piatt made the following remarks:

“I don’t believe the plaintiff is entitled to recover. I believe that the plaintiff’s own statement of the case, entitles this company to a verdict at your hands. He tells you that he looked out there and saw the car— that he looked and saw it just as soon as he could; and I say that there is no law, written or unwritten, that presumes that the motorman could have seen Mm or ■ought to have seen him any further away or any sooner than he could have seen the motorman: And he tells you how close that was.”

Mr. Small: £ £ There is no question of contributory negligence here.”

Mr. Piatt: “That isn’t a question of contributory negligence, as I understand it.”

The Court: “Proceed.”

To which ruling of the court the plaintiff then and there duly excepted.

■ Mr. Piatt: (Continuing) “That being the case there seems to me to be no escape from the conclusion that this man in this wagon came out there- in a position where it was impossible to stop that car after the motorman by the exercise of ordinary care could have . ¡seen them in a position of danger or did see them in a position of danger.”

Í. It is contended defendant’s instruction number four is erroneous. The argument is that there is -evidence- the car was being run at a negligently Mgh rate of speed prior to the moment the motorman saw or should have seen plaintiff’s peril and that, but for the instruction mentioned, the jury might have found for plaintiff on the theory that it was this negligent speed which made it impossible for the motorman to avert the injury, though he discovered plaintiff’s peril at the earliest possible moment and thereafter did all he could to prevent the collision.

The petition pleads neither an ordinance restricting the speed of cars nor that the actual speed of the car was negligent at common law. It is founded solely upon the humanitarian doctrine.

Defendant’s instruction number four is, in the respect complained of, in legal effect the equivalent of plaintiff’s first instruction. The use of the words “then” and “after” in the former is unobjectionable and adds nothing thereto which is not, substantially, found in the latter. This appears, without detailed analysis, from the instructions themselves.

We do not mean to intimate that, in any case, there would have been error in the respect mentioned, in the instruction objected to, but simply rest our conclusion upon the doctrine that plaintiff, having requested the submission of the case solely upon the same theory, cannot complain even if, for argument’s sake, it ■could be conceded the instruction is erroneous.

II. The objection to the argument of defendant’s counsel is not tenable. The argument was merely that plaintiff could have seen the car as soon .as the motorman could have seen plaintiff and (remembering plaintiff’s testimony as to the car’s speed when he first saw it) that it was impossible to stop the car after they first saw or could have seen each other.

The judgment is affirmed.

All concur/


author: EAILEY, C.

text:
    GEORGE M. HART et al. v. G. M. ELDRED Appellant.
    Division One,
    March 2, 1915.
    1. COTENANCY: Adverse Possession. As a general rule, the possession of one tenant in common is the possession of all; hut if he deals with the property as absolute owner, knowingly encumbers it by mortgage or deed of trust, and by his acts conveys the impression that he is holding adversely to his cotenants, he may acquire a good title by adverse possession.
    2. -: -: Evidence. The evidence, in a suit to ascertain and determine title to land, brought by tenants in common against one claiming through conveyances and encumbrances made by a cotenant, held not to show title in the defendant by adverse possession.
    Appeal from Camden Circuit Court. — Hon. G. H. Skinker, Judge..
    Affirmed.

      W. 8. Jackson and Roy D. Williams for appellant.
    (1) The court erred in finding for the plaintiffs,, as the evidence clearly shows that John H. Hart, under and through whom the defendant claimed his title,, had become the absolute owner of the land in controversy, and by his repeated acts of ownership thereof' and his continuous use and appropriation of the rents and profits for practically 25 years had ousted the' plaintiffs and each, of them and had acquired thereby the absolute right to the land under1 the ten-year Statute of Limitations. Hendricks v. Musgrove, 183 Mo. 311; Papeyre v. Paul, 47 Mo. 586; Peck v. Lock-ridge, 97 Mo. 560; Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 562; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), pp. 1116, 1117; Dunlap v. Griffith, 146 Mo. 293. (2) The four rnortgages placed upon the land by John H. Hart in his lifetime and recorded in the deed records of Camden county, imparted the same notice and were as effective in all respects to constitute an ouster of his co-tenants, as though he had placed of record the same number of warranty deeds. Cockrell v. Baine, 94 Mo. 444; Blanchard v. Haseltine, 79 Mo. App. 248; Boyd v. Haseltine, 110 Mo. 203.

      Sid G. Roach, and G. E. Shubert for respondents.
    (1) The record title of plaintiffs being clear, the burden is on defendant to establish his alleged countervailing title under adverse possession by a preponderance of the evidence. Douthett v. Stinson, 63 Mo. 268; Long v. McDow, 87 Mo. 203; Eodney v. McLaughlin, 97 Mo. 426. (2) Possession of real estate may be open and notorious and still not adverse, but under license or subordination no matter how long continued. Crawford v. Ahrens, 103 Mo. 88; Handlan v. McManus, 100 Mo. 124; Long v. McDow, 87 Mo. 203; Seibert v. Hope, 221 Mo. 630; Feller v. Lee, 225 Mo. 319; Sanford v. Kern, 223 Mo. 616. (3) Mere claim to land will not ripen into title, however long and persistent. Golterman v. Schiermeyer, 125 Mo. 291. (4) Possession apparently adverse will not be presumed to be continuous. Lynde v. Williams, 68 Mo. 360.
   EAILEY, C.

The above named plaintiffs in May, 1911, filed in the Camden Circuit Court their petition to quiet title to the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the north quarter of the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 25, township 38, of range 19, containing 50 acres more or less. It is averred in the petition, that said plaintiffs are tenants in common with said defendant; that the latter is in possession of said land; denies plaintiffs’ right and title thereto, and claims to own said land adversely to plaintiffs. The petition concludes as follows:

“Wherefore the plaintiffs pray the court to ascertain and determine the estate, title and interest of the said parties, respectively, in such real estate, and to define and adjudge by its judgment and decree the title, interest and estate of the parties severally in and to such real property.

“And the plaintiffs further pray the court may hear and finally determine any and all rights, claims,, interests, liens and demands whatsoever of the parties,, or of any one of them, concerning or affecting said real property, and to award full and complete relief by order of sale for partition between the said parties as their interests shall appear, with the same force and effect as the court might or could in any other or different action brought by the parties or any one of them to enforce such rights, claim, interest, lien or demand,, and for all necessary and proper relief at law or equity.”

Defendant in his answer denies every allegation in said petition, except that which alleges he was in possession of said land and claims the same adversely to plaintiffs. The answer avers that plaintiffs and each of them claim and assert title to said real estate; that their said claims are adverse and prejudicial to the title and interest of defendant in and to said property. The answer then concludes as follows:

“Wherefore defendant prays the court to try, ascertain and determine the estates, title and interests of defendant and plaintiffs of, in and to the real estate above described, and by its decree to adjudge, determine, settle, quiet and define the respective rights, titles, interests and estates of defendant and plaintiffs, to said property; and defendant further prays that if the court finds that he is sole owner of the real estate hereinbefore described that an order and decree be entered of record forever barring and precluding the plaintiffs, and each of them, as well as all persons claiming by, through or under said defendant, from hereafter setting up any title or claim to said property, for all proper orders and relief in the premises.

A jury was waived and the cause tried by the court. The latter found the issues in favor of plaintiffs, and decreed that the latter were entitled to five-sixths, and defendant to one-sixth, of said property through conveyances and encumbrances made by John H. Hart, son of Catherine J. Hart, in his lifetime. The court, in accordance with the pleadings, ascertained that said property could not be partitioned in kind, and hence directed the sale of same, etc. The land was sold, the sale approved, and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant duly appealed from said decree, and contends that on the facts disclosed by the record, John H. Hart, and those claiming under and through him, acquired a good title to said real estate by adverse possession, and that by reason thereof defendant is the legal owner of all said property. On the other hand, it is insisted by respondents that the record discloses that plaintiffs and said John H. Hart were tenants in common; that the latter did not hold said property adversely to plaintiffs; that some of the plaintiffs were in possession of said land within ten years before the commencement of this action, and that by reason thereof said defendant has not acquired title to said property by adverse possession, etc.

The facts necessary to a decision of the case will be considered with the opinion.

As a general rule the possession of one tenant in common is the possession of all, but there are exceptions to this general rule. If the cotenant is in possession, deals with the property as absolute owner, knowingly encumbers the same by mortgage or deed of trust, and by his acts conveys to the public the impression that he.is holding adversely to Ms co-owners, lie may, under such circumstances, acquire a good title by adverse possession in ten years. [Allen v. Morris, 244 Mo. 357; Nickey v. Leader, 235 Mo. l. c. 30-43; Hendricks v. Musgrove, 183 Mo. 300; Dunlap v. Griffith, 146 Mo. 283.]

Let us turn to the record for the facts. The evidence tends to show that Catherine J. Hart died intestate, November 9, 1879, the owner of the .50 acres in controversy, in Camden county, Missouri. At the time of her death, John H. Hart was about 16 years of age, and inherited through Ms mother one-sixth of said 50 acres. The remaining five-sixths belonged to plaintiffs. George Hart was in possession of the 50 acres at the time of his mother’s death, and continued to cultivate it until he moved away in 1885. John H. Hart had been living on the land with George until the latter left. John remained on the place after George left. The latter raised a crop of wheat on part of the 50 acres in 1903. He never paid John any rent, nor did John pay any rent for the place. George Hart, on cross-examination by defendant’s counsel, testified in respect to the 50 acres in controversy, as follows:

“Q. When you had a part of it in wheat, didn’t you rent it from John H. Hart? A. No, sir; we sold the wheat together, him and me cropped together and divided it; I threshed it myself with my own thresher.

“Q. What year was that? A. 1903; I lived then upon the big Niangua, near where I now live.’’

George further testified, upon cross-examination: “John Hart and my brother Marshall never claimed this land as their own at any time in his life.”

Marshall Hart testified:

“Q. Well, have you any knowledge or has anybody called your attention, or the attention of the other heirs, to the fact that John H. Hart was claiming that land against the rest of the heirs? A. No, sir; I don’t reckon he was; he never claimed it to me.”

Leaving ont of consideration the deeds of trust hereafter mentioned, there is nothing in the • record which tends to show that John H. Hart ever made any claim of sole ownership to any of the plaintiffs or to any other person. He was only one of sis heirs and there was no reason for his asserting title to that which clearly belonged to his brothers and sisters.

He was not of age when the first deed of trust was given for $65, in 1884. There is no evidence that John knew he was conveying anything but his one-sisth interest in any of the deeds of trust given by him. The record does not show that John had any actual knowledge he was conveying anything more than his onesisth interest in said property. Judge Lea, who loaned the boy this $65, does not claim that he relied upon the fact that John was the sole owner of said 'land. Some of these plaintiffs were the near neighbors of Judge Lea, and yet he does not claim to have made the slightest effort to ascertain from them, or either of them, whether John owned any other than a one-sisth interest in said land.

.■ This suit was brought in May, 1911. The uncontradicted evidence of George Hart discloses that he and John were jointly cultivating this land in 1903, as tenants in common. They cropped together and divided the wheat. George testified positively that he did not rent the land from John. The record is utterly barren of facts tending to show any actual intention upon the part, of John to appropriate the interests of his brothers and sisters, or to esclude them from the joint use of said land whenever they desired to use the same. We are not satisfied that the facts disclosed by the record herein bring home to these plaintiffs either actual or constructive notice that John had changed, or attempted to change, his friendly holding, as tenant in common, to that of a hostile holder, without at least some semblance of claim upon which to base it. But regardless of our views upon the foregoing question, we are of the opinion that defendant has failed to show a valid title by adverse possession, and that the finding and judgment of the trial court should he affirmed.

The equities of the case are clearly with the respondents, and the judgment below is accordingly affirmed.

Broivn, G., concurs.

PER CURIAM. — The foregoing opinion of Railet, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

All the judges concur, Bond, J., in result.