author: VALLIANT, J.

text:
    THE STATE ex rel. H. G. DUNHAM, Administrator, v. J. P. NIXON et al., Judges, etc.
    In Banc,
    December 31, 1910.
    1. JURISDICTION: Courts of Appeals: Act of June 12, 1909. The Act of June 12, 1909, empowering the judges of courts of appeals to transfer causes from one court of appeals to another court of appeals, is unconstitutional.
    2. -: -: Power to Hear and Determine. The Constitution, in giving a court of appeals power “to hear and determine” cases transferred to it by the Supreme Court, and authorizing one court of appeals, when another court of appeals is created by legislative act fixing its territorial district, to transfer to such new court of appeals cases which by the act do not come within its territorial limits and authorizing said new court “to hear and determined causes so transferred, did not create any new jurisdiction in the court of appeals to hear and determine causes, but used the words “to hear and determine” in reference to cases over which the court of appeals had already been given jurisdiction by the Constitution. Authority to transfer a case is not authority to confer jurisdiction.
    3. -: -:-: Delegation of Legislative Authority. The conferring of jurisdiction over a suit is a legislative act. Therefore, even if the General Assembly had constitutional power to confer appellate jurisdiction on a court of appeals over a case appealed to it from a county outside of the territorial limits of such court, the General Assembly would have no authority to delegate that power to a judicial tribunal by authorizing the judges of the courts of appeals to transfer a case from one of them to another.
    Prohibition..

      Peremptory writ awarded.

      Joseph S. Laurie and W. B. & Ford W. Thompson for .relator.

      Morrow & Kelley for respondents.
   VALLIANT, J.

Relator asks a writ to prohibit the Springfield Court of Appeals from entertaining jurisdiction of a case transferred to that court from the St. Louis Court of Appeals by authority of an act of the General Assembly entitled, “An act to empower the judges of the courts of appeals of this State to transfer causes from one court of appeals to another court of appeals in this State, providing the method for such transfer ando notice thereof to litigants and attorneys in the causes so transferred,” approved June 12, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 396). Relator contends that the act is unconstitutional, being contrary to section 12 of article 6 and sections 1, 2 and 3 of the amendment to that article of 1884.

The cause transferred from the St. Louis to the Springfield Court of Appeals was one wherein O. L. Houts, as plaintiff, obtained a judgment in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis in June, 1907, against George P. B. Jackson, as defendant, for $5038; Jackson took,an appeal to the Supreme Court, which at that time had jurisdiction of appeals in causes when the amount in dispute was over $4500'. But in 1909 the General Assembly passed an act giving jurisdiction to the courts of appeals where the amount in controversy did not exceed $7500, and requiring the Supreme Court to transfer causes then pending in this court and not under submission, to the proper court of appeals, “to be heard and determined.” In obedience to that requirement this court transferred the case of Houts v. Jackson to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. After-wards the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in December, 1909, transferred the cause to the Springfield Court of Appeals pursuant to the requirements of the Act of June 12, 1909, above mentioned, and the cause was set for hearing in that court at its March term, 1910'. In the meantime appellant, Jackson, died intestate, and relator herein was appointed administrator of his estate, and in due time, as such administrator, he filed a motion in the Springfield Court of Appeals to return the cause to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, on the grounds, first, that the Springfield Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction of the cause; second, that the Act of the General Assembly of June 12, 1909', was unconstitutional. The court overruled the motion and also overrul ed a motion for rehearing. Then the relator filed his petition in this court praying a writ of prohibition. The cause is now held in suspense in the Springfield Court awaiting the decision of this” court on the question involved.

The relator in his petition challenges the jurisdiction of the Springfield Court on only one ground, that is, the alleged unconstitutionality of the Act of June 12, 1909, and, on the other hand, the only ground on which that court claims jurisdiction is that the cause was regularly transferred to it under the requirements of that act, so, therefore, the constitutionality of the act is the only controversy in this case.

The purport of the act in question is to confer on the judges of the courts of appeals authority to transfer causes from one of those courts to another “so as to divide all cases pending equally among said courts as near as practicable.”

The governmental power to establish courts and to define their jurisdictions is legislative in its character, belongs to the General Assembly, and is limited only by the Constitution. Therefore the General Assembly has the power to pass this act unless its,power in that respect is restricted by some provision of the Constitution.

When the Constitution speaks on a subject, to the extent that it disposes of the matter, it ends all legislation concerning it. In section 1 of article 6 all judicial power of the State is given to certain courts therein named, and the sections following in that article specify the jurisdiction that is given to each court. When jurisdiction of a certain character is by that article conferred on a particular court, the jurisdiction'so conferred is exclusive unless in the clause conferring it or elsewhere in the Constitution the same jurisdiction, or jurisdiction of the same character, is conferred also- on another court. For example, when appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the State is conferred by section 2 of article 6 on the Supreme Court, all the judicial power appertaining to an appellate court would be disposed of if it were not for the fact that elsewhere in the Constitution jurisdiction of that character, in a limited degree, is conferred on other courts, and to that extent the jurisdiction conferred in section 2. on the Supreme Court is curtailed. Appellate jurisdiction in a limited degree is in other sections conferred on the courts of appeals, and section 22 of article 6 confers jurisdiction of that character, in a limited degree, on circuit courts.

Until the amendment of the Constitution in 1884 there was besides the Supreme Court but one appellate court, which was the St. Louis Court of Appeals, and its jurisdiction was limited in territory covering the city of St. Louis and four counties. [Section 12 of article 6.] But that court’s appellate jurisdiction in that territory was exclusive, all appeals being required to go to that court in the first instance, but in cases of certain characters appeals lay from that court to the Supreme Court. By the amendment of 1884 the territorial jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals was extended to embrace a large number of counties, and the Kansas City Court of Appeals was created covering the rest of the State. By that amendment also no appeal was allowed from a decision of one of those courts to the Supreme Court, but their appellate jurisdiction was limited to cases where the amount in dispute did not exceed $2500’, and within that limit they were courts of last resort. By that amendment also the General Assembly was authorized to create one more court of appeals, to change the limits of appellate districts, and to raise the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of those courts. Under that authority the General Assembly in 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 107) raised the pecuniary limit to $4500, and in 1909' created the Springfield Court of Appeals (Laws 1909', p. 393) and raised the pecuniary limit to $7500' (Laws 1909, p. 397). Then at the same session the General Assembly passed the Act of June 12, 1909, under which the case of Houts v. Jackson was transferred to the Springfield Court, which act is now assailed as being unconstitutional.

Unless expressly authorized to do so a court has: no authority to transfer a* cause from it to another court and thereby give the other court possession of the case “to hear and determine it,” although the other court 'would have had jurisdiction of the case if it had come to it by due process. The conferring of jurisdiction belongs to the lawmaking power of the State. If, without the express power to transfer, a court should find itself in possession of a case of which it had no jurisdiction, the only thing it could do would be to dismiss it or strike it from its docket. But ever since the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, by which the St. Louis Court of Appeals was created, it has been the practice of this court to transfer to that court causes within its jurisdiction, which have been brought to this court on appeal, and in like manner that court has transferred causes on its docket to this court when they are within the jurisdiction of this court, and the same practice has prevailed in reference to the other courts of appeals since their creation. But those acts are expressly authorized either by the Constitution itself or by statutes passed with constitutional authority.

Section 19 of article 6, is: “All cases which may be pending in the Supreme Court at St. Louis at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, which by its terms would come within the final appellate jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, shall be certified and transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals to be heard and determined.” Section 7 of the Amendment of 1881 requires that all cases pending in the Supreme Court which after the adoption of the amendment are within the “territorial appellate jurisdiction of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, shall be certified and transferred to such court, to be heard and determined by it.” Section 3pf the Amendment, which is the authority under which it is claimed the General Assembly acted when it passed the Act of June 12, 1909, is as follows: “The General Assembly shall have power by law to create one additional court of appeals, with a new district therefor; to change the limits of appellate districts, and the names of the courts of appeals, designating the districts by numbers or otherwise; to change the time of holding the terms of said courts; to increase or diminish the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals; to provide for the transfer of cases from one court of appeals to another court of appeals; to provide for the transfer of cases from the court of appeals to the Supreme Court, and to provide for the hearing and the determination of such cases by the courts to which they may be transferred. ’ ’

Counsel for respondents say that conferring authority to hear and determine is the same as conferring jurisdiction, and since the authority is given the General Assembly in section 3 to provide for the transfer of cases and “to provide for the hearing and determining of such cases by the courts to which they may be transferred,” it is the same as. giving authority to the General Assembly to provide for conferring- jurisdiction on a court-which otherwise did not have jurisdiction. The counsel contend that the last words of that section, “and to provide for the hearing and determination of such cases by the courts to which they may be transferred,” have the same significance as if it had said, “and to provide for the conferring of jurisdiction of such cases on the courts to which they may be transferred,” and consequently the, General Assembly was thereby empowered to authorize the judges of those courts to transfer cases from one to the other, and to thereby confer on the court to which the cases are transferred jurisdiction to decide them. But that is not the language of the Constitution, nor its meaning. The Constitution itself had already declared the jurisdiction of those courts, both as to the amount in dispute and as to territory, and it had expressly authorized the General Assembly to alter the limit as to the amount and to alter the limits of the districts, and that was the extent to which it authorized the General Assembly to go in changing the jurisdiction. It did not authorize the General Assembly to make a change in the jurisdiction which the Constitution had already established by giving to a court of appeals authority to hear and determine an appeal in a case coming from a trial court outside of its territorial limits. The words “to be heard and determined” are used in two other sections in the Constitution in reference to the transfer of cases from an appellate court to another, and in both those sections the words, are used in reference to cases to be transferred to courts which already had jurisdiction of them and which no other court could hear and determine. Section 19, article 6, requiring the Supreme Court to transfer cases to the St. Louis Court of Appeals “to be heard and determined” specifies that the cases to be so transferred are those “which by its terms would come within the final apellate jurisdiction” of that court; The words “to be heard and determined” were certainly not used in that section as conferring jurisdiction, but were used in reference to eases over which that court had jurisdiction already. The same is true of the words “to be heard and determined” used in section 7 of the Amendment of 1884 in reference to the transferring of cases to the Kansas City Court of Appeals; they are there used in express terms in reference to cases that “would come within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. ’ ’ The jurisdiction was. not conferred by the authority to transfer “to he heard and determined,” but the authority to transfer to that court “to be heard, and determined” was given because the cases to be transferred belonged to that court, and came within the terms already prescribed by the Constitution conferring the jurisdiction, and that is the sense in which the same words are used in section 3.

If, without the express authority in the one court to transfer, and in the other to receive and to proceed to hear and determine, an appeal by mistake should go to one of the courts of appeals when it should have gone to another, and should by the one be transferred to the other, the latter could not hear and determine it, because it had not come in a way pointed out by law, but these provisions in our Constitution and statutes were designed to require the court to take possession of the case, if within the already prescribed limits of its jurisdiction, and to hear and determine it as if it had come into the right court in the first place by appeal.

That is the construction the General Assembly has always put on those words in this connection. In 1901 when the General Assembly raised the pecuniary limit of jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to $4500 it said: “All eases now pending in the Supreme Court, which have not been submitted, and which by the provisions of this act come within the jurisdiction of said courts of appeals, shall be certified and transferred to the proper courts of appeals to be heard and determined by them.” [Laws 1903, p. 108.] That is, if the ease was within the jurisdiction of one of the courts of appeals it should be transferred to that court, and since all the courts of appeals had jurisdiction of the same kind of cases the only fact to determine which was the “proper court of appeals” to which the case was to be transferred, was its territorial limits.

By the Amendment of 1884 the Constitution created a second court of appeals and defined the territorial ' jurisdiction of each court. Then it gave the General Assembly the power to create a third court of appeals, and to carve out a district for it, and “to change the limits of the appellate districts.” Thus the Constitution plainly indicated that each court of appeals was to have its territorial limits, and its jurisdiction to hear and determine 'cases was confined to those limits. The Legislature may change the limits, but it cannot give a court jurisdiction of a case outside its limits, the jurisdiction of the court is confined to the limits prescribed by law. In section 7 of the Amendment of 1884 we find the term “territorial appellate jurisdiction,” indicating that the jurisdiction of the court is confined to its territorial limits, and there is nothing to indicate an intention to confer a power on the General Assembly to undo what the Constitution itself had done.

Authority to transfer a case is not authority to confer jurisdiction. The conferring of jurisdiction, as-we have already said, is a legislative act. If therefore it should be conceded that the General Assembly, in the face of the constitutional provisions above mentioned, had authority to confer on- the Springfield Court of Appeals jurisdiction of appeals from the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, or on the St. Louis Court of Appeals jurisdiction of appeals from the circuit court of McDonald county, or on the Kansas City Court of'Appeals jurisdiction of appeals from Pemiscot county, it would not follow that the General Assembly could delegate that legislative power to a judicial tribunal. The Constitution requires that the judges of the courts of appeals be elected by the people in their respective districts, and it is the purpose to give to each district a court to be composed of judges of its own choice. So far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it- is within the power of the General Assembly only as it may be affected by change of the districts. We are not now saying that a court of appeals can under no circumstances acquire jurisdiction of an appeal coming from outside of its territorial limits, or that the General Assembly has no power under any circumstances to authorize a transfer of a case to a court outside of the district, as for example like the transfer of a cause from one circuit court to another on change of venue, though even as to that we are not to he understood as giving or intimating any opinion, but what we say now is in reference to the facts of the case at bar. In the Act of June 12, 1909, the power attempted to be conferred is not dependent on the existence of any fact that might interfere with justice in the administration of the law in a given case, but the purpose is only to “equalize the business of the courts.” The Constitution gives the General Assembly the power to equalize the business of those courts by prescribing their territorial limits, and if the General Assembly wishes to accomplish that purpose it must follow the method prescribed by the Constitution.

We hold that the act entitled “An Act to empower the judges of the courts of appeals of this State to transfer causes from one court of appeals to another court of appeals in this State, providing the method of such transfer and notice thereof to litigants and attorneys in the causes so transferred,” approved June 12, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 396), being now section 3939', Revised Statutes 1909, is unconstitutional and void. The-motion of respondents to dismiss this cause is overruled.

The writ of prohibition, as prayed in the petition of relator is awarded, but without costs.

Gantt, Woodson and Graves, JJ., concur; Lamm, J., not sitting; Kennish, J., dubitante; Burgess, G. J., absent.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRAVES, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    A. B. SOUTHWORTH et al., Appellants, v. MAYOR, COUNCILMEN AND CITIZENS OF GLASGOW et al.
    In Banc,
    December 31, 1910.
    1. NOTICE by PUBLICATION: Fifteen Days: One Publication Sufficient. Where the statute required that “fifteen days’ previous notice he given in a newspaper,” a notice published fifteen days before the election at which the bonds were vpted, and published only once, was sufficient. The law does not require a continuous publication. A single publication appearing fifteen days before the election is a compliance with the statute. If it said the notice must be given “once a week” or “daily” for fifteen days, that would oe a very different statute.
    2. -: -: Personal Notice. If the statutory notice was insufficient, a personal notice of the bond election sent to each voter would be of no avail; it would only tend to indicate absolute fairnéss.
    3. COUNTING VOTES: By Mayor and Council. The fact that the mayor and council, after the judges and clerks of election had counted the ballots and certified the result and returned the ballots to the secretary of the council, strung on strings but not sealed up, recounted the ballots and corrected the count, their count making no change in the result, there being no fraud, and the statute and ordinance authorizing them to cast up the result, was at most a mistake as to their powers under the law, and in no way invalidated the result of the election or affected the legality of the bonds.

      4. CENSUS-TAKER: Appointed by Mayor. Under. Sec. 6300, R. S. 1899, authorizing the city to pass an ordinance causing a census to be taken, the city had a right in 1904 to enact-an ordinance authorizing the mayor to appoint a census-taker, and the ordinance was not invalid because.it did not itself name „ the census-taker, but conferred the power to appoint him upon the mayor.
    5. PUBLIC SEWER: Insufficiency of Bonds. Where the ordinance provided for $4000 “to construct public sewers within the city limits," and the.evidence shows that no ordinance has been passed locating the sewers and that $4000 would not be •enough to construct a public sewer which would be available to the entire city, it cannot be held that only a district or private sewer could be constructed from the proceeds and the bonds are therefore void — for two reasons: first, a sewer does not necessarily have to accommodate the whole city in order to be a public sewer; and, second, it will be time enough to make that complaint when the council by ordinance undertakes to use the fund to construct a sewer other than a public sewer.
    6. BOND ISSUE: Sufficient Assessed Valuation: Railroad and Telephone Properties. It is not error to include the value of railroads and bridges and telegraph and telephone companies in the assessed valuation of the city property; and where the valuation 'of those things, added to that of the real and ordinary personal property, was $606,689, there was a sufficient valuation to authorize a bond issue of $30,000, whether the properties of merchants and manufacturers be included in the valuation or not, and hence it is not necessary to determine whether or not they should have been excluded from the valuation.
    7. -: -: Unplatted Lands. Unless a showing is made of the value of unplatted lands within the city limits which' it is claimed should not have been included as a part of the assessed valuation of the city property, the court will not determine whether or not they should have been excluded, because, without such showing, it could hot determine how much the aggregate valuation should be reduced.
    Appeal from Howard Circuit Court.— lion. A. E. Waller, Judge.
    Affirmed.

      J. H. Denny and E. W. Henry for appellants.
    (1) Section 6276, R. S. 1899, provides that not less than fifteen days’ previous notice shall be given by publication in some newspaper published in such city or town. There was only one publication of notice of the election in this case, -which was published in a weekly paper. One publication of such notice was not sufficient. Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 66. This decision has never been overruled or criticised. It is cited by the Supreme Court in Patterson v. Fagan, 38 Mo. 80, and in German Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 315. It is the general understanding and practice in the country, where the statute requires fifteen days ’ previous notice by publication of an election to issue municipal bonds, that the notice — if it be published in a weekly paper— shall be inserted not less than fifteen days before the election and be continued in every issue up to the time of the election. This is the construction of the statute in question, and other similar statutes, by this court. State ex rel. v. Allen, 178 Mo. 555; Drainage District v. Campbell, 154 Mo. 151. Where a statute is construed by a judicial opinion, published and generally known, and afterwards is re-enacted, the judicial construction is embodied in the re-enactment. Northcutt v. Eager, 132 Mo. 265; Handlin v. Morgan County, 57 Mo. 114; Sanders v. Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26; State ex rel. v. Withrow, 133 Mo. 501; Camp v. Railroad, 94 Mo. App. 272; Sedalia v. Gold, 91 Mo. App. 32. When in 1897 the Legislature enacted Sec. 6276, R. S. 1899, directing how notice of election to- issue municipal bonds shall be given, and incorporated therein the words “not less than fifteen days’ previous notice shall be given by publication in some newspaper published in such city or town,” it intended to express the meaning previously put upon them. It has been uniformly and consistently ruled that where judicial construction has put a certain meaning on the words of a statute and then the Legislature in a subsequent act in pari materia uses the same words, the presumption arises that the Legislature intended to express the meaning previously put up-on them. State v. Harney, 168 Mo. 167. The statute requiring a notice of special election to be given is mandatory, and if such requirement is not strictly followed, the election is void. State ex rel. v. Smith, 129 Mo. App. 49. (2) Section 3 of article 8. of the Missouri Constitution prohibits a recount of'the ballots except in eases of contested elections, and section 9 of the same article provides that such contests shall be in courts of law. Constitution, art. 8, secs. 3 and 9? State ex rel. v. Francis., 88 Mo. 557; State ex rel. v. Board of Schools, 112 Mo. 213. The judges and clerks of election, and the canvassers, were designed to act independently of each other, and the latter were not intrusted with the power of revising and correcting the mistakes of the former. In every election a tribunal has been selected to revise the actions of all the officers concerned and to correct any mistakes or injustice which have been committed, and the canvassers do not constitute that tribunal. Mayo v. Freeland, 10 Mo. 629; Windes v. Nelson, 159 Mo. 76. In this ease the mayor and city councilman, after the votes had been counted, where there was no contest, and where no voter or citizen could be heard, opened the ballots and recounted them, and certified and cast up the result of the election on the count made by them. The mayor and councilmen were under no oath as were the judges and clerks of election, and in their unauthorized action were not amenable to any law, civil or criminal. The admission of ballots in evidence depends upon the primary proof that they have remained in the same condition in which they were cast; that they have remained in the custody of the officer charged .with their keeping and that no opportunity has been afforded'whereby they might have been changed or tampered with. Windes v. Nelson, 159 Mo. 68; McCrary on Election (2 Ed.), sec. 277; Ex parte Arnold, 128 Mo. 288; Coglan v. Beard, 67 Cal. 303; Ex parte Brown, 97 Cal. 83. (3) As to the proposed $4000 sewer bonds, it is. apparent from the testimony that the proposed sewers will be either private or district sewers and not public sewers. No action had been taken or. ordinance enacted to locate the proposed sewers. The mayor says they were meant for sanitary sewers to carry off 'slops, toilets, baths and such as that. That it would not be possible on $4000 to construct public sewers available to the entire city, but that it was to be left to the city council as to where the sewers would be placed. A public sewer is one that is open and available to the whole city, and not -limited to any particular part of it. South Highland Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523; Laws 1909, p. 329.

      Percival Birch and W. M. Williams for respondents. .
    (1) (a) The notice given of the special election fully complied with the statutory requirement. “Fifteen days’ previous notice by publication” in a weekly newspaper published in said city was given. “The statute does not direct that the notice shall be published any specified number of times.” It merely requires that fifteen days’ previous notice shall be given of the- election by publication in some newspaper published in such city. R. S. 1909, sec. 9595; Bank v. Stumpfe, 73 Mo. 314; State ex rel. v. Allen, 178 Mo. 574; State ex rel. v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 103; In re Wooldridge, 30 Mo. App. 619; Railroad v. Shipiey, 19 Atl. (Md.) 2; Bank v. Mayor, 18 Atl. (Md.) 809; McGilvery v. Lewiston, 90 Pac. 348; Aldis v. Comrs., 49 N. E. 565; Smith v. Atlanta, 51 S-. E (Ga.) 741; Montford v. Allen, 36 S. E. (Ga.).305; Royal Ins. Co. v. Comrs., 51 N. E. (111.) 558; Stone v. Chicago, 69 N. E. (111.) 974; In the Matter of Basford, 50 N. Y. 500 ; Erickson v. Cass County, 92 N. W. 841; Cleveland v. Calvert, 31 S. E. (S. C.) 871; 2 Paige and Jones on Taxation by As-, sessment, sec. 763. (b) Certainly no complaint can be made that the voters were misled for want of actual notice or that sufficient publicity in fact was not given. The testimony shows that, in addition to the frequent reference to the election by the press of the city, the mayor mailed notices of the election and circulars in regard to the city’s affairs and the reasons for the issue of the bonds to each qualified voter. "While this may not supply the notice required by the statute, it eliminates any possible ground of complaint because of a want of actual notice. (2) The election having been properly conducted by the judges and clerks appointed for that purpose and the ballots having been counted and the result duly certified by them at the close of the polls,’the recount of the ballots by the mayor and board of councilmen, with the same result- as' that reached by the judges, will not invalidate the election or defeat the expressed will of the voters. Windes v. Nelson, 159 Mo. 51; 15 Cyc. 382; Atkinson v. Loben, 111 Cal. 419. The mayor and board of councilmen were empowered by the statute to prescribe regulations for conducting the election and the Australian ballot law is inapplicable. E. S. 1909', secs. 5921 and 9595. (3) The property of railroad, bridge, telegraph and telephone companies in the city of Glasgow was properly included in the value of the taxable property of said city- in ascertaining the extent of its debt-creating power under the Constitution. E. S. 1909, see. 11553; State ex rel. v. Eailroad, 116 Mo. 24; Thornburg v. School District, 175 Mo. 28. Merchants’ and manufacturers’ stock and property is now assessed and the valuation equalized as other property and was properly included in the estimate. E. S. 1909, sec. 11623. There is no authority under the Constitution for excluding from the ag*gregate válue of the property of the city in determining this question land not divided into lots, even though such lands should not be subject to city taxes. 'Sec. 12, art. 10, Constitution of 1875; Thornburg v. School District, 175 Mo. 28; Darlington v. Trust Co., 16 C. C. A. 35. No evidence was introduced and there is nothing in the record to show the value of any such real estate, and no basis is furnished upon which a deduction on that account can be made from the taxable value of the property in the city as “ascertained by the assessment next before the last assessment for State and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness,” which is the rule prescribed by the Constitution for determining the debt-creating power of the city.
   GRAVES, J.

Plaintiffs are resident taxpaying citizens of the city of Glasgow, Missouri, a city yet existing under an old special charter granted by the Legislature, and subsequently amended by subsequent acts of the same body. Defendants are the mayor and secretary of said city, the city of Glasgow in its corporate capacity, and the State Auditor.

The purpose of the suit is to restrain by writ of injunction the issuance and registration of $30,000' of municipal bonds for three separate municipal purposes alleged to have been voted by the voters of said city at a special election held on October 18, 1909. The petition assails the legality of these proposed bonds upon some six grounds, but as these are made the basis of the several assignments of error in this court they need not be stated here, but will be discussed in the opinion. The petition sets out the ordinance and pleads many facts which are admitted in the answer,

The answer, after some formal admissions as to the official character of the defendants and the corporate capacity of the said city, proceeds as follows:

“These defendants further admit the passage of the ordinance set out in said petition, and the holding of the election therein referred to, and that the propositions set out in said ordinances were carried by a majority of more than two-thirds of the qualified voters of said city of Glasgow, voting at the election referred to in said petition, and that these defendants intended and are about to carry out and execute the directions of the voters as expressed at said election and to issue bonds of said city for the purpose and in the amount authorized by said qualified voters at said election, and that the said defendant Gordon as Auditor of the State of Missouri is about to register the same as .required by law.
“Defendants for further answer deny each and every allegation in said petition contained, and having fully answered, ask to be hence dismissed with their costs.”

Upon trial the circuit court entered its judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill and for costs against plaintiffs.

After proper steps plaintiffs have perfected an appeal to this court from such judgment. The pertinent facts can best be stated in connection with the points made in the course of the opinion.

I. The first point made in the brief of plaintiffs is that the election was void because fifteen days’ previous notice was not given according to law. By proof it appears that the notice of the election was published in the Glasgow Missourian, a newspaper of that city, on September 30, 1909, but was only published the one time. By proof it further appears that the mayor notified each voter by letter. It was not a personal letter, but he mailed to each voter literature showing why the ordinance should be adopted and the date of the election was called to the attention of the voter. The question was likewise discussed in the public press of the city.

Section 6276, Revised Statutes 1899 (now Sec. 9595', R. S. 1909), in speaking of the notice to be given of an election to take the sense of the voters upon the question of increasing the municipal debt, says:

“Of which (meaning the election) not less than fifteen days’ previous notice shall be given by publication in some newspaper published in such city or town.” Plaintiffs claim that this language means that such notice must be published in each issue of the paper from the date of the first publication to the date of the election. Defendants of course contend contra.

Plaintiffs rely upon the wording of the statute, supra, and the old ease of Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo-. 75. There is language in this case- which supports the contention of counsel for plaintiffs, yet intermingled with it is other language that is not so plain, thus: “The deed of trust does not specify particularly the number of times when the notice shall be published, but enough can be collected from that instrument which, when taken in connection with the acts of Stine, the defendant, show what must have been the intention of the parties.” Why the court used this expression we do not know, because the short excerpt from the deed of trust found in the opinion is in this language: “. . . proceed to sell said land and premises at public auction •for cash to the highest bidder, at .the courthouse door in St. Louis, first having given twenty days’ previous notice of the time and place and terms of sale, and property to be sold, by advertisement in some newspaper printed in the city of St. Louis.” But notwithstanding the uncertain language used by the court, suffice it to say that there was. one publication twenty days before the sale, and the court held such notice bad.

The Stine case is cited with approval in Washington v. Bassett, 15 R. I. 563. That court in discussing the question said: “The complainant brings this bill to redeem, claiming that there has been no valid sale under the power claimed in the mortgage, because the requirement of the power, ‘first giving twenty days’ notice of such sale in some one of the public newspapers printed in said city of Providence,’ has not been complied with. The mortgage sale took place August 12, 188-5. The notice was published in The Evening Mail, a daily newspaper printed in Providence, seven times, viz., July 22d, 25th, 29th, August 1st, 5th, 8th, and 11th. The question is, whether such publication of the notice satisfies the requirement of the power. We do not think it does. The evident purpose of the requirement is. to secure ample notice of the sale, for the mutual advantage of the mortgagor and mortgagee. The mortgagee' is allowed to select the newspaper in which he will give the notice; hut the extent of the notice is definitely expressed. It must he ‘twenty days’ notice.’ We think the fair and natural interpretation of that phrase is, that the notice is to he continuous, in the paper selected, for twenty days. The defendants contend that, inasmuch as the notice covered a period of twenty days, it was ‘twenty days’ notice.’ But if seven insertions in a daily paper, covering the time, is to he held equivalent to twenty days’ notice, why would not two, say on the first and last days of a period of twenty days, or even one twenty days before the sale? If anything less than a continuous notice is sufficient, we do not see why one or the other of these would not also be sufficient.”

This is the strongest and practically the only case which we have found directly upholding the Stine case. We agree with the Rhode Island court, that if anything less than the continuous notice is meant by the words of the deed of trust in that case, and the words of our statute in this case, then one publication is sufficient. We think, however, that the weight of authority, so far as the construction given to these words “fifteen days’ notice” or “twenty days’ notice” is against the holding of the Stine case, as well as that decided by the Rhode Island court. Much language used in our own later eases would so indicate, although in precise terms the exact point is not made by reason of the facts of the several cases.

Thus in German Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. l. c. 315, it is said: . “When thirty days’ notice is required, thirty days should, of course, intervene between the first publication and the day of sale, and although it may be customary and prudent to continue the notice in every issue of the paper from its first insertion to the day of sale, yet it has been expressly decided that ‘thirty days’ notice in a daily paper’ does not mean thirty days’ daily notice in such paper. [White v. Malcolm, 15 Mo. 543. Vide also Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 Gill 286; Leffler v. Armstrong, 4 Iowa 482.] We think, however, that where the notice has not appeared in every issue of the paper from its first insertion to the day of sale, and the omission to make continuous publication thereof is of such a character, or is attended by such circumstances as to mislead the public and work injury to the party whose property is sold, the sale may be set aside. [Stine v. Wilks on, 10 Mo. 96.] To avoid such a contingency, therefore, in all cases where notice is required to be published in a. daily paper, the notice should be published in every issue of such paper from the first insertion up to' and including the day of sale.” Summarizing this opinion it holds in effect that one publication thirty days prior to the sale meets the requirements of the deed of trust, but that if the omission to further publish is attended by such circumstances as to mislead the public and work injury to the party whose property is sold, the sale may be set aside, not must be set aside. Had Judge Hough, who then spoke for the court, thought thirty days’ continuous notice was required he would not have spoken as he did.

Again, in State ex rel. v. Allen, 178 Mo. l. c. 574, we said: “It is said that the writ should be dismissed, because fifteen days’ notice of said special election was not given in a newspaper published in said town, or in any other way. The resolution required that fifteen days’ previous notice should be given of the election, by publication in the Canton News, a weekly newspaper published in the town of Canton. It appears from the record that the notice of the election was published in the Canton News, a weekly newspaper published in said town, the first insertion being made on September 4, 1902, the second on the 11th, and the third on the 18th of said month, while the election was held on the 23d day of the same month; nineteen days having elapsed from the time of the first insertion and the election. It was held in the case of German Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 311, that where a deed of trust required that thirty days’ notice of sale be given by publication in a daily newspaper, thirty days must intervene between the first publication and the day of sale, but while it was customary and prudent, it is not essential that the notice appear in every issue of the paper. The same rule is announced in In re Wooldridge, 30 Mo. App. 612; Nishnabotna District v. Campbell, 154 Mo. 151, and Kellog v. Carrico, 47 Mo. 157. It therefore seems that the notice was published in conformity with the resolution. ’’

In State ex rel. v. Wilder, 200 Mo. l. c. 103, this court said: “Itis conceded that the notice of election provided for by said ordinance was published in the Chillicothe Constitution, a daily newspaper, for seventeen consecutive issues of said paper, beginning with the issue dated the 6th of January, 1906, and continuing from day to day until and including the 25-th day of January, 1906, and that the election was held on the 29th day of January, 1906. Counsel for the respondent, the State Auditor, makes the point that this publication, was insufficient because it did not continue up to and including the day of election. Upon the authority of German Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 311, and State ex rel. v. Allen, 178 Mo. 555, we hold that the notice was published fifteen days, before the said election, and that the failure to publish it on the three days before the election did not render it bad. ’’

It thus appears that the doctrine of the Stumpf case, supra, has since been approved, and that doctrine is that continuous publication is not required.

When we go to other States the authority is overwhelming as to the meaning of such words as we find in our statute. In Maryland the statute required “sixty days’ notice.” The Court of Appeals of that State, in Central Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council, 71 Md. 518, said: “The power to pass the ordinance depends on the performance of this condition. In this case the first publication of the notice was more than sixty days before the passage of the ordinance. The statute does not direct that the notice shall be published any specified number of times; it merely requires that it shall be given. A notice may be given once, twice or a dozen times, and it may be repeated at distant intervals, but it is difficult to infer that it must be repeated, from the mere requirement that it shall be given. The statute prescribes a limitation under which the legislative power of the mayor and city council is to be exercised. If it were possible for us to change the terms of this limitation, we should be met with a very serious difficulty when we attempted to define the extent to which we should carry the change. Should we say that the notice was to be published ten, twenty or thirty times? Or should we say that the number of publications should be determined by the judgment which we might form of the exigencies of each particular case? The statute by its terms requires only one publication as a condition precedent to the valid passage of an ordinance of the kind under consideration. If this limitation be considered, insufficient, it is in the power of the Legislature to make it more stringent; but courts ought to be extremely cautious of every construction which would virtually insert in a statute words which it does not contain. ’ ’

The same court in the later case of Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Shipley, 72 Md. l. c. 94, after reviewing all of their previous cases construing such words, adds: “But, as we have said, the statute requires only one publication of this notice in each of the two papers, and, having complied with the law in that respect, it was entirely within the discretion of the examiner whether any additional publications should be made, or any further expense incurred thereby.” In this case there were two separate notices to be .given under language such as ours. The first requirement was a “ten days’ notice” and the second a “fifteen days’ notice. ’ ’ There was a 'third notice, but it dealt with ‘ ‘ successive weeks.” It was of the first two that the court was spealdng.

The Idaho court thus passes upon the meaning of “twenty days’ notice” in the very recent case of McGilvery v. Lewiston, 13 Id. 354: ‘ ‘ Appellant complains because this notice was not published in every issue of the paper for twenty days. There is no merit in this contention. The statute does not undertake to specify the number of issues of the paper in which the notice shall appear. The requirements of this statute will be fully met if the notice is published once, and. the date of publication is at least twenty days prior to the date of the meeting or other action of which the publication purports to give notice. [Royal Ins. Co. v. Commissioners, 175 Ill. 491; Aldis v. Commissioners, 171 Ill. 424; P., W. & B. R. Co. v. Shipley, 72 Md. 88.] ” That court followed the Shipley case, supra, and some Illinois cases and cites them in the opinion.

The Supreme Court of Georgia had for consideration the meaning of the words “after advertising for thirty days” in the case of Montford v. Allen, 111 Ga. l. c. 20. Cobb, J., after a full consideration of the subject, uses this language: “Treating it. as settled that the Legislature did not intend by this provision in the charter of Americus that a tax sale should be advertised every day for thirty days, what was its intention with reference to the number of times a notice should be inserted within that period? There can be but one answer to this question and that, is that an advertisement appearing at one time .at least thirty days before the day of sale, and as nearly as practicable immediately preceding the beginning of that period, would be an advertising within the meaning of the charter. That would be giving thirty days’ public notice of the sale, or announcing publicly that the sale was to take place at the expiration of that time; and if the charter is to- be construed as requiring advertisement in a newspaper, but one insertion of the advertisement at least thirty days before the sale, and as nearly as may be immediately preceding the beginning of that, period, would be a compliance with the law. ’ ’

In New York a statute provided for two days’ notice and it-was held that one publication fulfilled the requirements of the statute. [50 N. Y. 509]

The Supreme Court of South Carolina had under consideration the phrase “three weeks’ notice” in the case of Cleveland v. Calvert, 31 S. E. l. c. 872, and through Jones, J., said: “The statute in question does not require a publication 'once a week’ nor does it require advertisement for three weeks. Since it merely requires notice to be advertised at least three weeks before the election, a single publication appearing three weeks previous is a compliance. To hold otherwise would be to interpolate words which the Legislature did not see fit to employ, and which, in reference to other matters, it is accustomed to employ when the intention is to require publication at least once a week.”

What is said here is applicable to our Missouri statute, for we have statutes which do direct the number of publications and as to when the last publication shall be made with reference to the date the act is to be done.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Royal Ins. Co. v. Commissioners, 175 Ill. 491, in construing the term “ten days’ notice,” said: “The next objection made by the plaintiffs in error is that the court below is without jurisdiction to enter judgment of confirmation, upon the alleged ground that the notice of application for the confirmation was insufficient. Such insufficiency is alleged to consist in the fact that only one day’s notice was given and that a ten days’ continuous notice should have been given. In Aldis v. Commissioners, supra, this objection was considered, and it was there held that a single publication ten days before the application, was sufficient, .and that the Park Act did not require such notice to be published for ten successive days.” Several other Illinois cases, as indicated above, are to the same effect.

Other authorities in point might be collected and quoted from, but these sufficiently show the trend of judicial opinion as to the construction of the words' we are called upon to construe. With the trend of our own court and with the almost unbroken line of cases from other States we feel constrained to rule that the publication of the notice of election in the ease at bar was sufficient, and we so hold.

Of course, the personal notice sent out by the mayor to the voters would be of no avail; if the statutory notice was insufficient the election would fail. Such personal notices would only tend to indicate absolute' fairness in the election.

II. Prom the evidence it appears that the judges and clerks of the election counted the votes and made return thereof under proper certificates, and that, thereafter the mayor and city council recounted the votes, finding some slight discrepancy, but not sufficient to chamg-e the result. The three propositions were separately stated on one ballot, so that the voter had to scratch either “yes” or “no” after each of the three propositions being submitted to the voters. All propositions carried by much more than a two-thirds ma - jority.

Plaintiffs ’ second contention is couched in as short terms as we can use, and we borrow their language. It reads: “The action of the mayor and councilmen in opening and recounting the ballots, after the same bad been counted by the judges and clerks of the election, and entering the result of the recount as the official result of the election, was forbidden by section 3 of article 8 of the Missouri Constitution and made the election void. ”

The ballots were returned to the council by the election officers. They were strung' upon a string and not sealed in boxes as required by the general law. No complaint is made as to any of the proceedings save and except the action of the mayor and council in recounting the ballots. . What was in fact done is thus described by one of the witnesses., the mayor:

“Q. What was done with reference to counting the ballots of the special election held on the 18th of October, 1909, with reference- to counting the- ballots ? A. The judges and clerks first counted the ballots and made a return on the poll books, and the council then met and cast up the ballots and made an official record.
“Q. What do you mean? A. They recounted the ballots. ,
“Q. They opened'the ballots? A. They did, they were on a string, you know.
“Q. And the result of this election was officially declared according to the count made by the city council — is that correct? A. Yes, sir.”

The witness further said:

“Q. When the returns were made — did they certify to the returns, the clerks and judges ? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. How did the count made by the council compare to the count made by the clerks and the judges? A. Just a few votes differeriee.
“Q. It did not change the result at-all? A. No, sir.”

It is the facts disclosed by this evidence that plaintiffs urge invalidate the election.

Section 8 of the ordinance concerning the election provided for the appointment of judges ánd clerks, and provided that they should take an oath to impartially discharge their duties and not to disclose how any voter may .have voted unless compelled sq to do as a witness in a proper judicial proceeding.

Section 9 required the clerks to keep a record in well hound hooks of the name of each voter and number of his ballot set opposite the name.

Section 10 thus reads: “It shall be the duty of the several judges and clerks, of election to count the votes cast, and to keep a record thereof, and to cast up the results of such election, and to verify the same, and to publicly announce the results of the election a,s soon as the same is known to them, and they shall deliver to the city secretary the ballots, tally sheets and poll books properly certified. Afterwards, on the 18th day of October, 1909', the mayor and board of councilmen shall meet for the purpose of casting up the said ballots and shall declare the results of the election, on the several propositions aforesaid, by ordinance.”

The Australian ballot law does not apply to the election with which we are now dealing. [2 R. S. 1909, sec. 5921.]

We have outlined this ordinance and quoted one section thereof for the reason that to our minds it explains the conduct of. the mayor and city council. The statute, 3 Revised Statutes 1909, section 9595, provides: “Such election shall be held and judges and clerks thereof appointed as in ease of other elections in such city or town, or in such mariner and under such regulations as may be prescribed by ordinance.”

It appears that this’ city council adopted the latter course. It passed an ordinance for the regulation of this election. The ordinance quoted speaks of the mayor and council “casting up the said ballots,” and it was no doubt from this clause that they got the idea of recounting the ballots upon these strings. We do not desire to discuss the propriety of this language in the ordinance, but mention it as tending to show that there was no malicious wrong committed by this canvassing board. They evidently understood that they had the right to recount the ballots and in so doing acted in good faith and with no fraudulent intent. The waterworks proposition was carried by a vote of 236 to 71; the sewer proposition by a vote of 222 to 84; the light-plant proposition by a vote of 224 to 79'. The evidence shows that there was but a few votes difference in the two counts. The propositions carried, as will be seen, by a big vote for a city having little more than 2000 inhabitants. Absolute fairness seems to have characterized the acts of the city officials, both in notifying the respective voters and in casting up the votes. If the canvassing board made a mistake under the law and their ordinance in recounting this vote the will of the people should not be thwarted thereby. At most it was but an erroneous judgment upon their part. No fraud is charged or could be charged. If the will of the voters could be thwarted by such an act, designing canvassing boards could always so do. Much is -said in the briefs about the secrecy of the ballot. Many cases are cited, discussed and quoted from, but all this is beside the question in the case at bar. The ballots were not sealed, but they did not have to be sealed under the ordinance. The canvassing board did not compare the ballots with the poll lists, and the secrecy of no ballot was exposed, so far as this evidence shows, and we have quoted it in full. There- is nothing in the point and it is ruled against the plaintiffs.

III. To show the population of the city of Glasgow the defendants offered a special census taken by said city in 1904. To this evidence the plaintiffs objected. They now urge that the census was not taken in accordance with law, because- the- ordinance providing for the taking of the census did not name the census-taker, but authorized the mayor to name’ and appoint such person.

The law governing the taking of a census in 1904 was Revised Statutes 1899, section 6300. It is now Revised Statutes 1909, section 9639. There was an act in 1905 (Laws 1905, p.. 80) relating to cities of the fourth class. But this is immaterial in this case, and we only mention it now because counsel cite us to State ex rel. v. Wilder, 211 Mo. 305, where we discuss that act. It is sufficient to say that this census was under section 6300, Revised Statutes 1899, and could not be affected by this Act of 1905, because taken before that time. Further the Act of 1905 applies to cities of the fourth class solely.

The law does not undertake to say that the council shall designate by ordinance the census-taker. The law authorizes the city to pass an ordinance causing a census to be taken. Under the law the council could pass an ordinance authorizing the census, to be taken and also empowering the mayor to select and appoint the census-taker or census-takers. The ordinance in this ease authorized the appointment of a census-taker by the mayor. Singular to say, plaintiff, A. B. Sonthworth, was the mayor of the city at the time, and appointed E. W. Henry, his present attorney, as the census-taker. The mayor’s authority to appoint does not seem to have been questioned at that time. Of course we do not say they are estopped from questioning it, but it only demonstrates how rapidly a person’s views of the law may change.

Mayor Sonthworth was right in appointing the census-taker in 1901, and is wrong in his contention urged here. *

IV. The ordinance provided for $1000' “to construct public sewers within the city limits.” The objection is that no ordinance had been passed or action taken toward locating these sewers. There is testimony tending to show-that $1000 would not construct a public sewer which would be available to the entire city. From this it is argued that such a sewer as could be constructed would be a district or private sewer.

There are two answers to this contention. In the first place, counsel are wrong in what is a public sewer. A sewer does not necessarily have to accommodate the whole city to be a public sewer. Counsel cite us to the case of South Highland Land and Imp. Co. v. Kansas City, 172 Mo. 523, for a definition of a public sewer, and some of the language of that ease hears out the contention. This question was again threshed out in Court in Banc in the very recent case of State ex rel. v. Wilder, 217 Mo. l. c. 271. The meaning of the term “public sewer” is discussed in the separate opinion of Woodson, J., in the case supra, and, to his opinion a majority of the court agreed. Counsel therefore are in error as to what constitutes a public sewer.

Secondly, it will be time enough 'for plaintiffs to complain when the council by ordinance undertakes to use the funds for a sewer other than a public sewer.

This contention is ruled against the plaintiffs.

Y. Another contention is that there was error in the including in the abtsract of the assessed property within the city of Glasgow, the assessed valuation of the merchants and manufacturers, and of the railroads, bridges, telegraph and telephone companies.

That railroad property is taxable for such purpose is clearly shown by the statute. [3 R. S. 1909, sec. 11,553.] This section says that such property “shall be subject to taxation for State, county or other municipal or local purposes.” What would apply to railroads, would and should apply to bridge, telegraph and telephone companies.

In this case the evidence shows that, excluding the merchants’' and'manufacturers’ assessments, which was $40,500, and the railroad, bridge, telegraph and telephone companies’ assessment, which was $20,429', there was left an assessment of personal and real property of $586,260. Add to this last sum the assessment of the railroad, bridge, telegraph and telephone companies, and we have a total of $606,689, which is more than sufficient to carry the proposed bond issue.

Under these circumstances it becomes unnecessary to discuss the question as to the merchants’ assessment.

VI. Last it is contended that there was error in including in the real estate assessment some unplatted ground within the city limits, which plaintiffs claim should not have been included. It is not necessary to go into the legal question as to whether or not such land was exempted from the city taxes, for the reason that plaintiffs have made no proof as to what were the assessed values of these lands, so that we could deduct the same, if under the law they should have been deducted, in determining what was the assessed value of the property within the city. Had plaintiffs been serious in this matter, and desired the court to pass upon the law, they should have shown the assessed value of these alleged exempt lands. Without such showing, we.would have no way of determining the question as to what was the real assessed value of the taxable property.

Upon the whole this cause has been well tried and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

All concur, except Burgess, G. J., absent.