text:
    MINNIE TRIGG v. WATER, LIGHT & TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant.
    Division One,
    December 23, 1908.
    1. NEGLIGENCE: Man Lying Near Track: Demurrer. Where the motorman, two hundred feet before his ear reached the injured man, saw him lying outside the rails on the track embankment, with the lower part of the body concealed by weeds and his head near to or between the ends of the ties and low enough down not to have been struck by the car had he remained still, and supposed he was a “clump of di-rt,” it was not his duty to stop the car in time to avoid hitting him. The humanitarian doctrine does not apply to such a case. [Distinguishing Werner v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 368, and Isabel v. Railroad, 60 Mo. 475.]
    2. -: -: Motorman's Duty to Look. If the track was a portion of the public street deceased had a technical right to be at the place where struck, and it was the duty of the motorman to be careful to look out for all persons who might be occupying that portion of the street to be occupied by the car; and the same duty rested upon the motorman to look out for'anyone on a track which by long use had been a general foot-path. But it was not the duty of the motorman to look out for a man lying outside the rails on the track’s embankment which the evidence fails to show had ever been used as a footpath or to lie upon.

      3. -: Reckless Speed: Twelve to Twenty Miles. A speed of a street car of from twelve to twenty miles an hour, on a dark night, over a track elevated upon an embankment three feet high and which had been used as a footpath, at a point where there were few residences and practically in the country, and where there was but little, if any, travel at that time of the night, is not such a dangerous and reckless rate of speed as, in the absence of an ordinance regulating the speed, would authorize the jury to find defendant guilty of negligence in striking a man lying outside the rails on the embankment.
    4. -: -: Contributory Negligence. Even though the speed, at which the car was being run was negligent, the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries received by her husband as he lay outside the rails on the embankment, if he was guilty of negligence contributing to his injury and plaintiff fails to show that, after the motorman saw his dangerous position, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have discovered it, defendant by the exercise of reasonable care could have avoided injuring him.
    Appeal from Carroll Circuit Court. — Hon. Jno. P. Butter, Judge.
    Reversed and remanded (with directions).

      hosier, Morris (& Atwood and Jones <& Conkling for appellant.
    (1) It was error to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant plaintiff a new trial. Where the verdict and finding of the jury is for the right party and where plaintiff’s own evidence shows that she is not entitled to recover, the order granting a new trial will he set aside whether the instructions are right or wrong. Ayers v. Railroad, 190' Mo. 228; Markowitz v. Railroad, 186 Mo. 350; Carrier v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 470; Yogg v. Railroad, 138 Mo. 172; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 216; Homuth v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 642; Bartley v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 142; Fox v. Windes, 127 Mo. 514; Carr v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 214; Moore v. Railroad, 176 Mo. 545- Zumault v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 290; Mockowik v. Railroad, 196 Mo. 550i (2) Even if the track had been so habitually used by pedestrians as a footpath that it became and was the duty of defendant’s employees to anticipate the presence of pedestrians on the track, it was their duty to anticipate the presence of- such footmen only as were using the track as a footpath and not those who were using the track or the side thereof as a bed to sleep upon. There is no allegation in the petition nor is there any proof that it was an habitual custom of long standing and acquiesced in with the knowledge and tacit consent of defendant for people to become intoxicated and use the side of defendant’s railroad dump as a bed upon which to sleep, Ayers v. Eailroad, 190* Mo. 228; Yarnall v. Eailroad, 75 Mo. 575; Thompson on Negligence, secs. 1791, 1792; Beach on Cont. Negl., sec. 391; Vizacchero v. Eailroad, 69' L. E. A. 188. (3) The court erred in overruling the demurer to the evidence tendered by defendant at the close of plaintiff’s case and refusing to give the peremptory instruction asked by defendant at the close of all the evidence in the case, for the reason that plaintiff’s own evidence showed she had no cause of action and the whole of the evidence showed no liability on the part of defendant. Deceased was guilty of negligence which was the sole and proximate cause of the injury. Defendant was not negligent. Davies v. Eailroad, 1591 Mo. 6; Mockowik v. Eailroad, 196 Mo. 550; Moore v. Eailroad, 176 Mo. 547; Petty v. Eailroad, 179 Mo. 666; Eeno v. Eailroad, 180 Mo. 489; Aldrich v. Eailroad, 101 Mo. App. 77; Markowitz v. Eailroad, 186 Mo. 350; Eoenfeldt v. Eailroad, 180 Mo. 554; Eies v.’Eailroad, 179' Mo. 7; Shanks v. Eailroad, 101 Mo. App. 707; Zumault v. Eailroad, 175 Mo. 290; Abbott v. Eailroad, 121 Mo, App, 582; Cole v. Eailroad, 121 Mo. App. 605 ; Bennett v. Eailroad, 122 Mo. App, 704. (4) Even admitting that at the point where deceased was struck and killed, at the time and for a long time prior thereto defendant’s railway track had been used by pedestrians as a footpath and so habitually as to create a duty on the part of defendant’s servants, agents and employees in operating the cars to anticipate the presence of pedestrians and to be on the lookout for them, yet defendant was not bound to anticipate that a person would be lying on the track or on the side of the dump thereof asleep in an intoxicated condition. Ayers v. Railroad, 1901 Mo. 228; McGauley v. Railroad, 179 Mo. 583; Coatney v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 35; Yamall v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 575; Lyons v. Railroad, 59 S. "W. 507; Hughes v. Railroad, 67' S. W. 984; Kendall v. Railroad, 123 Ga. 213; Thompson on Neg., secs. 1789; 1790; 1791, 1792; Beach on C'ont. Neg., secs. 391, 392; Vizacchero v. Railroad, 69 L. R. A. 188; Parrish v. Railroad, 40 L. R. A. 564. (5) There is no evidence in the record that the car at the time of the accident was being run and operated at a reckless, unusual or dangerous rate of speed. In fact, the evidence all shows that the car was being run at the usual and ordinary rate of speed — a safe rate of speed. Koegle v. Railroad, 181 Mo. 379; Schmidt v. Railroad, 191 Mo. 315; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 216; Stotler v. Railroad, 2001 Mo. 125; Lawson on Expert & Opinion Eiv. , (2 Ed.), 508; Rogers on Expert Testimony (2 Ed.), 245. (6) Plaintiff’s third instruction was properly refused and defendant’s second instruction properly given. There was no evidence upon which to base plaintiff’s third instruction. There was a total failure of proof in support of the allegation of the petition that the car at the time of the accident was being run at a reckless and dangerous rate of speed, hence the giving of defendant’s second instruction was proper. Stotler v. Railroad, 200, Mo. 107; Petty v. Railroad, 1791 Mo. 666; Campbell v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 161; Helm v. Railroad, 185 Mo. 122; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 216; Railroad v. Moseley, 57 Fed. 921; Holland v. Railroad, 109 S. W. 19; Koegle v. Railroad, 181 Mo. 379; Schmidt v. Railroad, 191 Mo. 315.

      Russell Kneisley and Busby S Busby for respondent.
    (1) In reviewing the action of the trial court up op the demurrer, respondent is entitled to have her evidence taken as true; and to have appellant’s 'contradictory evidence taken as untrue; and is also entitled to every' reasonable and favorable inference of fact naturally deducible from her evidence. P'orbes v.Dunnavant, 198 Mo. 199'. A demurrer to the evidence admits every fact which the jurors might infer if evidence were before them. Moore v. Railroad, 194 Mo. 9. (2) The demurrer was properly overruled, because the motorman in charge of the car actually saw deceased upon or near the track, in position of danger, in time to avoid hitting him; at least, this fact may be inferred from the evidence. Appellant argues that the motorman was not required to check of stop his car simply because he saw an object upon or near the track which he thought was a clump of dirt; but this' same motorman had been in the employ of defendant three years, making four trips each night, and was familiar with the track, and testified that he knew people frequented the track at all hours of the night, and he had every reason to expect persons upon the track at time and place of collision, and when he saw an object ahead the size of a man upon or in dangerous proximity to the track, it was negligence for him. to drive ahead with indifference, until he got within twenty-five or thirty feet of the object, and too close to stop the car before striking it. Werner v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 373; Isabel v. Railroad, 60 Mo. 482. (3) The demurrer was properly overruled also because the motorman, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have seen Trigg in a position of danger in time to avoid striking him; at least, this fact may be inferred from the evidence. Abbott v. Railroad, 121 MO'. App. 584; Eppstein v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 720; Moore v. Railroad, 194 Mo. 1; Klockenbrink v. Railroad, 81 Mo. App-. 356; Kolb v. Railroad, 102 Mo-. App. 143; Mayes v. Railroad, 121 Mo. App. 618. And although Trigg may have been lying down in a state of intoxication, yet if appellant, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have saved him from his own negligence, and negligently failed to do so, then it is liable. Werner v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 368; F'earons v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 213; Shanks v. Railroad, 101 Mo. App. 707. (4) (a) The trial court after seeing and hearing the witnesses, was of the opinion that respondent’s case was meritorius, and! that the evidence tended to prove an unusual and reckless rate of speed at time of the collision, which the jury should have taken into consideration in determining whether appellant was negligent in operation of its car, and that the- court committed error against respondent in refusing to permit the jury to consider this evidence, by refusing respondent’s instruction 3, and in giving appellant’s instruction 2, and therefore granted respondent a new trial. “The rule of law in Missouri has been announced with incessant repetition, that the function or duty of granting a new trial rests peculiarly and specially within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless it is manifest and apparent that its judicial discretion has been abused or that injustice has been done, its ruling in that regard will not be disturbed by an appellate court.” Farrell v. Railroad, 103 Mo. App. 457; Fitzjohn v. Railroad, 183 Mo. 77. (b) If the order granting the new trial can be sustained upon any ground assigned in the motion for new trial, the judgment should be affirmed in the appellate court. Emmons v. Quade, 176 Mo. 22; ITewitt v. Steele, 118 Mo. 463; Lovell v. Davis, 52 Mo. App-. 342. (c) The testimony of all the witnesses show that Trigg was killed in a public street at a point frequented at all hours, day and night, by men, women and children, and that the car, in approaching this point in the night time, was run at the recldess rate of fifteen or twenty-miles an hour, without warning of its approach. The testimony of the motorman himself shows that he had every reason to expect persons on or near track, and yet ran the car at fifteen or twenty miles an hour without warning. The court hy giving a peremptory instruction that there was no evidence that the car was run at reckless rate of speed not only deprived respondent of an issue upon which she was entitled to go to the jury but thereby licensed appellant to take advantage of its own negligence by saying to the jury that the car could not be checked or stopped at the rate it was going. Appellant is not entitled to hide behind a negligent rate of speed. Morgan v. Railroad, 159' Mo. 266; Campbell v. Railroad, 59 Mo. App. 155; Duffy v. Railroad, 19 Mo. 383; Klockenbrink v. Railroad, 81 Mo. App. 35>9 ;• Stepp v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 234; Wasson v. McCook, 80' Mo. App. 489!; Heinzle v. Railroad, 182 Mo. 558.
   WOODSON, J.

The plaintiff instituted this suit in the circuit court of Carroll county against the defendant to recover the sum of $5,000' damages sustained by her for the alleged negligence in killing her husband, Charles Trigg. There was a trial had before the court and jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant, and in due time plaintiff filed her motion for a new trial, which was by the court sustained. From this order of the court sustaining said motion, the defendant duly appealed the cause to 'this court.

The petition in substance charges that the accident which resulted in the death of Charles Trigg, respondent’s husband, occurred on South Main street in the town of Carrollton, where the track of appellant was practically straight, the view unobstructed for a long distance; that pedestrians and footmen had for a long time prior thereto used said track traveling between the city of Carrollton and the town of South Carrollton; that appellant had knowledge of such user; that at the time of the accident the said Charles Trigg was upon appellant’s railway track in a sitting or reclining position; that appellant’s servants and employees seeing, or by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence could have seen, him in such dangerous position in time to have averted the injury and accident which resulted in his death, but negligently conducting themselves in the premises, and unskillfully managing and operating said car, and failing to sound the usual and ordinary danger signals, and running’ and propelling said car at a reckless and unusual rate of speed, ran its car against the said Charles Trigg’ and wounded, cut and bruised him, from the effects of which he died.

The answer contained, first, a general- denial of the allegations of the petition. Then after admitting the incorporation of defendant, specially pleaded contributory negligence as a defense to the action alleged in plaintiff’s petition in this:

First. That respondent’s husband, Charles Trigg, at a late hour of the night voluntarily went upon appellant’s railway track and assumed a place of danger by lying down upon the dump or embankment upon which the tracks of the railway were laid, in dangerous proximity to- cars passing on said track, and neglected to look and listen for the approach of cars on said track, when by looking he could have seen, or.listening could have heard, the approach of cars in time to have gotten to a place of safety.

Second. That said Charles Trigg was in such a state of intoxication that he did not exercise ordinary care, prudence and caution to prevent and avoid danger to himself..

It appears that the parties went to trial without a reply having been filed.

The facts of the ease as disclosed by the record are substantially as follows:

At the time of the injury and death of Charles Trigg he was the lawful husband of the plaintiff; that the defendant was a street railway corporation owning and operating a street railway with electric power in the town of Carrollton, a city of about four thousand inhabitants; the track was a single one, extending from the public square in said city south to the Wabash Eailway Company’s depot, located in South Carrollton, about one mile from the public square. The depots of the Burlington Eailway and Santa Fe are situated on the line of said street railway. The principal if not the only traffic defendant is engaged in w'as in carrying passengers to and from Carrollton to said depots. From the intersection of the tract of the street railway with those of the Santa Fe for a distance of some four hundred and fifty feet south, the former runs along the west side of South Main street, and is located on an embankment which is about three feet in height, and is about the same distance above the grade of the traveled portion of the street. About four hundred feet south of the Santa Fe crossing the street railway track has a slight curve, about three degrees, to the southwest, leaving the street and crossing the Wakenda creek bottom west of the Wabash depot. The Santa Fe depot is about one-half mile from South Carrollton; and the ground between the two is a low bottom, and the street railway track is located upon trestles much of that distance. There are but three houses located in this bottom along said street and track. The traveled portion of Main street lies east of the street railway track and runs almost parallel with it and due south across the Wabash tracks a short distance east of the Wabash depot. Pedestrians, with the knowledge and acquiescence of defendant, had for years prior to the time of the injury used said street car track as a path or passway between Carrollton and South Carrollton. The injury to Charles Trigg occurred at night on September 10,1904, about twelve; o ’clock, at a point on the east side of the track about four hundred and fifty feet south of the intersection of the street railway track with those of the Santa Fe.

The car which struck deceased had been to the Wabash depot to meet passengers who got off the Wabash train, due there between eleven and twelve o’clock. There were many passengers who got off that train and took passage on the street car for Carroll-ton. Between, the time the street car passed over the Santa Fe tracks going south to the Wabash depot and the time it returned with said passengers, a train from the west came into Carrollton on the Santa Fe road. Deceased resided in Carrollton and had been at Nor-borne that day, and had returned home on the Santa Fe train before mentioned. When Trigg left the train at Carrollton he was in a state of intoxication. He staggered about the platform and then went east in the direction of Main street, and turned south on Main street in the direction of the place where the injury occurred. He was seen no more until the' injury occurred. Mr. Trigg lay down on the east side of the embankment at the point where the street car track begins to curve to the southwest and where it is laid along and upon the embankment before mentioned. He was lying on his back with his head toward the top of the embankment between or near the east end of two cross ties, with his feet projecting down the slope of the embankment towards the traveled portion of Main street. The ends of the ties extended beyond the east rail some sixteen inches. The space between the two ties was not well filled with ballast, thereby leaving a depression, the exact depth of which is not clearly shown. No portion of his body extended much, if any, above the top> surface of the east end of the ties. Weeds had grown up along the east slope of the embankment but had been cut for a distance of some twelve inches east of the east end of the ties, but the evidence fails to show just how high the weeds were at the time of the accident, except that they obstructed the view of his body which was lying east of the strip from which the weeds had been cut.

As the car was returning from the Wabash depot in South Carrollton with its load of passengers it was running from twelve to twenty miles an hour; and when it reached a point about twenty-five feet from where Trigg was lying the motorman saw him in the position before stated. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the motorman in charge of said car said immediately after the accident occurred that he saw deceased when the car was about one hundred and seventy-five or two hundred feet from where he was lying but that he thought he was a clump of dirt lying by the side of the track. That immediately upon discovering Trigg the motorman applied the brakes and other appliances which were at his command and exerted every effort within his power to stop the car. and avert the injury. The efforts put forth by him were so effective that the speed of the car was so greatly and suddenly slackened that it was perceptibly noticed by all the passengers and caused the car to jump and bound as if running over the ties, and so alarmed some of them that they left their seats with a view of leaving the car. As the car approached Trigg no portion of his body was in a position that could have been struck by the car, had he remained still, for the reason that his head was several inches below the portions of the car which projected beyond the rail, and nearer the outer line of the east side of the car. No one saw him move, but after the injury he was found lying with his face almost down with a deep wound upon the top part of the back of the head and some slight bruises on his right shoulder. The injury on the back of the head fractured his skull and killed him almost instantly. The motorman was at all times at his place of duty and was keeping a vigilant outlook along the track in front of him, which was illuminated hy an electric head light attached to the front end of the car. While all of the witnesses testified that the car was running from twelve to twenty miles an hour when the motorman discovered Trigg, yet all of them testified that said speed was the usual and ordinary speed the car generally ran at the place of the accident, and that there was nothing in the rate of speed which indicated to any of them that the car was recklessly run or operated. After the motorman discovered the dangerous position in which Trigg was lying, it was impossible for him to stop or so slacken the car as to prevent the injury.

The injury occurred at the point where the street railway track curves to the southwest. The east rail at that point was one or two inches higher than the west rail. The evidence tended to show that the height of the east rail and the shadow cast thereby, and the curve in the track prevented the rays of the headlight falling full upon Trigg, and that in consequence thereof he was more or less obscured from the sight of the motorman, as the car approached him from the south.

The car in passing over the trestles made a great deal of noise and could have been heard for half a mile or more, and there was nothing to have prevented deceased from hearing the same or from having seen the headlight of the car had he been looking and listening.

Where counsel for plaintiff contends that any of the facts before stated are not supported by the evidence we will consider same later in the opinion.

At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendant tendered a demurrer to the evidence, which was by the court overruled, and again at the close of all the evidence in the case defendant requested a peremptory instruction requiring the jury to find and return a verdict for the defendant, which was also hy the court refused.

The court refused to give the third instruction requested hy plaintiff, which is as follows:

“3. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the track of the defendant at the place where Charles Trigg was struck and killed was laid along and upon a public street in the city of Carrollton, and that defendant’s track at such point was on the 10th day of September, 1904, and for a long time prior thereto had been frequented by persons and used by pedestrians as a passway or footpath with the knowledge of defendant and its employees in charge of its cars, and that the car that struck and killed Charles Trigg in approaching such point upon the track was being run at unusual and reckless rate of speed and that no warning of the approach of said car was given by the sounding of the gong or bell thereon, then the jury may take into consideration all such facts as tending to show and prove negligence on the part of defendant in the operation of said car.”

On behalf of the defendant, the court instructed the jury as follows:

“2. The court instructs the jury that there is no evidence in this case that the car at the time deceased was killed was being run at an improper or reckless rate of speed, and they will conclusively presume that the car was being run at a safe rate of speed at the time the accident occurred. ’ ’

Because of the refusal of the court to give plaintiff’s third instruction above quoted, and because of the giving of the second instruction for defendant, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was by the court sustained and a new trial ordered, from which order and ruling appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The errors assigned are as follows:

1st. The court erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer to the evidence.

2d. The court erred in not giving defendant’s, peremptory instruction tendered hy defendant at the close of all of the evidence in the case.

3d. The court committed error in sustaining plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

I. The first insistence of counsel for appellant challenges the correctness of the action of the trial court in refusing to give the demurrer to the evidence asked at the close of respondent’s case. It is the contention of appellant that the record discloses beyond question that the deceased was guilty of negligence which contributed directly to his injury and death, and for that reason respondent failed to make out a prima-facie case, and, consequently, the case should have been taken from the jury.

Counsel for respondent do not dispute the fact that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, but upon the contrary he was guilty thereof, and seek to escape the effect of that concession by interposing the “humanitarian doctrine.” In fact, the petition is bottomed upon that doctrine.

It is earnestly insisted by counsel for respondent that the testimony introduced in her behalf tended .to prove that the motorman who was in charge of the car which collided with her deceased husband saw him lying in the dangerous position in which he was struck about the time the car left the north trestle, which was about two hundred feet south of the point where deceased was struck, and that by the use of ordinary care he could have stopped the car in time to have prevented the injury or could have given him timely warning of its approach, which would have caused him to have moved to a place of safety before the car reached him.

The substance of that evidence was as follows: That a few seconds after the accident occurred, and while the motorman and the passengers were standing there discussing the matter, the motorman stated in the presence of. some of them, that about the time the car left the north end of the trestle he said, in substance, that he saw an object ahead and thought it was a clump of dirt, and as soon as he got close enough to distinguish what it was he reversed his car, but that he was then too close to deceased to stop it in time to avoid striking him.- Upon objections made by counsel for appellant, other testimony of similar import was by the court excluded, but as that admitted was sufficient to properly present the legal proposition involved, we will not discuss the action of the court in so excluding it.

There is other evidence in the record which tends to show that had the motorman attempted to stop the car when he first discovered the object lying up against the embankment, he could have done so in time to have averted the injury, and having failed to do so, he was guilty of such negligence as authorizes a recovery for respondent.

Her counsel insist that the evidence of this case brings it within the spirit of the cases of Werner v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 368, and Isabel v. Railroad, 60 Mo. 475.

In the former case the evidence showed that the deceased was lying between the rails of a street car track on Olive street, in the city of St. Louis, and that the driver of the car saw him lying there in time to have stopped the car before it struck him, - but in the darkness of the night he mistook him for a sack of oats and made no attempt to stop- the car until it was too late to do so. In discussing that case this court on pages 373, 374 and 375- used the following language:

“If the darkness of the night had prevented the driver from' seeing the object on the track, it may be conceded that no negligence would be imputed, to him; but the fallacy of the argument lies in the deduction from the fact that a total obscuration of his sight would release him from the charge of negligence, that a partial obscuration to the extent it went and the effect it produced would relieve him of the charge. This is a non seqmtur. There would have been nothing to call into activity more care and prudence on the part of the driver than was necessary to guide the horses when no danger was apparent, or reasonably apprehended, but when he could see an object on-the track as large as a sack of oats, he had reason to apprehend danger, not only to his passengers and the property in his care, but to strangers or their property, and to hold that he might drive on'with the same indifference as if he had seen nothing on the track, because he could not discern what it was, would be to sanction recklessness and ignore the duty of carriers to avoid injuring persons and property when aware of the danger to which they are exposed, or when they have reasonable grounds for an apprehension that by proceeding as usual with their vehicles, injury will be inflicted upon persons or property. Counsel indulges in a criticism of the cases in which this court has held that if the negligence of a defendant which contributed directly to cause the injury, occurred after the danger in which the injured party had placed himself by his own negligence, was, or by the exercise of reasonable care, might have been, discovered by the defendant in time to have averted the injury, then defendant is liable, however gross the negligence of the injured party may have been in placing himself in such position of danger. Such is the well-established doctrine of this court. [Isabel v. Railroad, 60 Mo. 475; Harlan v. Railroad, 65 Mo. 26; Zimmerman v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 484; Frick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 595; Kelley v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 140.] And the case at bar is an apt illustration of the wisdom of the rule. In a populous city, on one of its public thoroughfares which pedestrians are crossing at all hours of the day and night, the driver of a street car on a dark night discovers an object fifteen feet ahead of his horses, which he supposes to be a bundle of hay or a sack of oats, with but little reason to suppose, and which he could have ascertained to be a human being if he had checked his horses and driven slowly up to the object, instead of recklessly driving ahead, looking, not at the object, but over his horses’ heads, not endeavoring to determine what the object was, but indifferent to its character, not stopping the car or checking its speed until he had run over and killed a human being, when the exercise of ordinary care and prudence involving a delay of only ten or fifteen seconds would have disclosed that it was a human being, and saved a human life. It is contended by the defendant’s counsel that the discovery of the danger in which Werner had placed himself, and the infliction of the injury, were simultaneous, and that, therefore, this doctrine has no application. The facts of the case, as testified to by defendant’s witness, do not sustain that theory. The driver testified that he saw the object fifteen feet ahead of the horses. That he could have stopped the car in two feet; so that he had ample time, after seeing the object on the track, to stop the car before the horses reached it. ”

In the latter case a child twenty-one months old escaped from its keeper and had strayed upon a railroad track and sat down between the rails; the agents in charge of the train saw the child in time to have avoided the injury had they exercised ordinary care in doing so, but they mistook the child for a dog and made no attempt to stop the train until it was too late to prevent the injury. In discussing that case this court, on pages 482 and 483, said:

“Moreover, it is clearly shown that the engineer and fireman discovered the infant, and had abundance of time to have stopped the train and saved its life; but they debated as to what it really was till it was too late. Might they not, by a close scrutiny and a proper observance, which it was their duty to give when they discovered an object on the track, have discovered that it was a child? The testimony is conclusive that the child was dressed in red, and that would have very easily distinguished it from a hog or dog. The instruction, if it was intended to convey the idea that the employees, by using ordinary skill and caution after they observed the object on the track, could have distinguished that it was a child, was entirely proper. . . .
“The case presented, then, is, that the persons running the train saw something on the track in time to avoid collision or injury; and if, after they observed it they could, by the exercise of that care and caution which the law imposes upon them, have perceived that it was a child, in time to stop' the train, and they were negligent, the company is liable.”

The facts of those two cases are so radically different from those of this case that the law as there enunciated is inapplicable to the facts of this one. In each of those cases the injured person was lying between the rails of the track where obstructions of no kind had a right to be, neither man nor beast nor inanimate objects of any kind, and the mere fact that he or it was in a position where the train necessarily had to pass over imposed an imperative duty upon those in charge of the train after observing their position, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have discovered it, to have used proper care to have avoided the injury. A railroad company has no right to run its cars over man or beast, nor over any species of personal property; and when those in charge of a train saw those persons on the track, it was their duty to stop the train, or to nse sneh other appliances as were at their disposal to prevent an injury, and it was no excuse for their failure to do so to say they thought the one was a sack of oats and the other was a dog, for the reason they had no more right to kill the dog or destroy the oats than they had to injure a person. The difference being the degree of care to be exercised and not a difference in the principle applicable to each. But in the case at bar Mr. Trigg was not lying between the rails of defendant’s track where the car must of necessity have passed over him, nor did the motorman believe in this case, as the employees did in those cases, that the object he saw lying by the side of the track was a person or property of any kind, but upon the contrary all the evidence upon that point shows conclusively that he thought it was a clump of dirt. That being true, clearly he was under no legal duty to stop the car or slacken the speed thereof before reaching it. If he had done either, or had he sounded the gong, when he really believed the object was a dump of dirt, his act would have been indicative of a flighty mind rather than the act of a prudent person.

"We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the rule announced in those cases is not controlling in the case at bar.

II. It is next contended by counsel for respondent that since the evidence discloses the fact that pedestrians had, with the knowledge and acquiescence of appellant, used its track as a foot path for years in going to and returning from South Carrollton, those who were in charge of the car which struck Mr. Trigg should have apprehended persons were likely to have been upon the track, and that it was their duty to have kept a constant outlook for those who might have been upon the track, and to have used all reasonable care and caution to have prevented injury to them; and that having failed to do so, the company is liable for said injury.

Counsel for appellant concede the law to be as contended for by counsel for respondent, but insist that it has no application to the facts of this case, for the reason that the evidence totally fails to show Mr. Trigg was using the foot-path at the time the accident occurred, and that he was several feet east of it, lying down on his back against the embankment upon which the street car track and path were located with his head resting in a depression of several inches in depth, near to or between the ends of two cross-ties, and that his feet extended downward and eastward from the track, with weeds obstructing the view of his body excepting portions of his head.

We have carefully read this voluminous record of more than five hundred pages of printed matter and have failed to find any evidence whatever therein which tends in the slightest degree to disprove appellant’s contention as to how the injury occurred, without it can be said that the physical facts of the case as they existed immediately after the accident occurred tend to disprove it, that is, the position the body was in at-the time, the location of the wound upon the head, the place where deceased’s hat was found, and the blood and hair found upon the roadway and rails. If these physical facts were viewed alone they would indicate that Mr. Trigg was sitting up or was leaning’ against the east rail when struck and killed by the car, and that if the servants in charge of the ear had exercised ordinary care in keeping an outlook for him, they could have discovered his dangerous position in ample time in which to have stopped the car and thereby averted the injury; but when viewed in the light of the testimony of all of the eye-witnesses as to the position Mr. Trigg was in just before he was struck, and the fact that he had been struck by the car and killed before all other witnesses saw his body, deprives their testimony of all weight it otherwise would have been entitled to, for the reason that both propositions may have been true, and doubtless were, due to the fact that when the car struck deceased, going at the rate of speed at which the evidence showed it was running, it must have thrown the body in the position in which it was found immediately after the accident, and all the other facts mentioned were incidents to the blow and of the injury which followed. In that view of the evidence there is no conflict between the testimony of any of the witnesses, but it harmonizes all the testimony in the case.

We must, therefore, hold that the uncontradicted evidence shows that deceased was not using the path mentioned in the evidence when struck, and that there is no evidence that pedestrians or any one else ever used the embankment upon which Mr. Trigg was killed for any purpose whatever.

The case at bar is on all-fours with the case of Ayers v. Railroad, 190 Mo. 228, with the exception that in that case the accident occurred on a bright, clear day, while this one occurred at night, and that there was no evidence in that case which tended to show the injured party was obscured from the view of the engineer by weeds or other obstruction, as was the fact in this ease. These facts, however, are only additional reasons why the respondent should not be entitled to recover. In discussing that case, this court, on pages 237 and 238, through Valliant, J., said:

“There is no statute requiring defendant to give a signal by bell or whistle on approaching a, private crossing; its duty to do so depends on the circumstances of the case. There was, therefore, no negligence per se in failing to sound the bell or whistle. The plaintiff was guilty of' negligence in placing himself in the position of danger. And taking the plaintiff’s own account of his condition it leaves little room to infer that the sound of the bell or whistle would have had any effect on him. This reduces the case to a question of whether the engineer, after seeing the plaintiff in the position of danger, or after he could have seen him if he had been looking, could by the exercise of ordinary care, with the means at hand, have avoided the accident.
‘ ‘ The evidence showed that although this occurred on defendant’s right of way and where there was no public crossing, yet it was where the defendant knew that the public was in the habit of using the railroad track for a foot-path and therefore it was the duty of the engineer to be on the lookout for persons so using the track. If this man had been walking or standing on the track he could have been seen by the engineer in time at least for a danger signal to have been given, but lying as he was on the west side of the track he was not as conspicuous as a person walking or standing would have been.
“ The engineer was not chargeable with notice that a man was liable to be found lying on the track, and therefore the fact that the engine struck the plaintiff in that position is not in itself sufficient to justify the inference either that the engineer saw him or that he failed to use ordinary care to discover him in time. The plaintiff’s testimony, aside from that of the engineer, does not undertake to expressly show his attitude. He sat down on the west end of a cross-tie and there the stupefaction of intoxication overcame him, and there the plaintiff’s evidence leaves the result to inference. The natural inference is that he fell into a recumbent position.”

Technically speaking, the deceased had the legal right to be at the point where he was struck and killed, because it was a portion of a public street, which of itself carries with it the legal right to use all portions of the street consistent with the legal uses to which it was at the time devoted, and for that reason, technically, it was the duty of the servants in charge of the car to have heen careful in looking out for all persons who might have been occupying that portion of the street; but when we come to look at the situation from a practical and common sense standpoint, which is the essence of all law, then the duty to have looked was only commensurate with the amount of travel shown to have existed upon that portion of the street at the time the injury occurred. In this case there is not a scintilla of evidence which tends to prove any one ever used that portion of the embankment for any purposes whatever.

Defendant, therefore, owed him no actual duty to look out for deceased at the place where lying.

III. Counsel for respondent finally insists that the car at the time it collided with deceased was running at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed, and for that reason the trial court erred in refusing her thii’d instruction asked, and in giving appellant’s second, which in effect told the jury that there was no evidence in the case tending to show the car was running at a dangerous or reckless rate of speed at the time it struck and killed Mr. Trigg.

The evidence shows that the track upon which the car was running was elevated upon an embankment, some three feet high, and that at the point where the accident occurred there were but few residences, practically in the country, and where there was but little, if any, travel at the hour of night when the accident occurred; and that the car was running from twelve to twenty miles per hour.

In the absence of an ordinance of the city regulating the speed of the cars, we are asked to hold that the foregoing facts are sufficient evidence of the fact that the car was being run at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed at the time it struck deceased, and would warrant a jury in finding for respondent upon that ground. We are unable to grant that request or to hold that such evidence would be Sufficient to sustain a verdict if found in favor of respondent. It is common knowledge that in our great cities ordinances are enacted permitting street cars in the outskirts thereof and in the sparsely settled districts to run from fifteen to twenty miles per hour, and no one to our knowledge has ever questioned their reasonableness. It is also generally known that steam railways are constantly running their trains at as high a rate of speed as the car in question was running at the time this unfortunate accident occurred, and that, too, through districts which are as thickly populated as is South 'Carrollton, yet we have never seen or heard of a case where it was contended that the speed of a car running fifteen or twenty miles an hour under the circumstances surrounding this one was of itself suffioient evidence of negligence to sustain a verdict. In our judgment no such case exists, and even if it did we would be reluctant in following it. Such speed under different circumstances, such as running through a populous city, or when connected with other facts and circumstances, doubtless would be sufficient evidence of negligence to support a verdict.

But for the sake of the argument, suppose we concede we are in error in the foregoing observations, still we are unable to see in what manner respondent could recover, even though it was negligence in appellant to run the car from fifteen to twenty miles per hour at the place where deceased was struck, for the reason that the law is well settled that where the plaintiff is guilty of negligence which contributes to his injury, before he is entitled to a recovery he must first show that, after the defendant saw his dangerous position, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have discovered it, defendant could by the exercise .of reasonable care have avoided injuring him. [Harlan v. Railroad, 64 Mo. l. c. 483; Prewitt v. Eddy, 115 Mo. 283.] As shown in the previous paragraph of this opinion, there'is no evidence contained in this record which tends to show defendant conld have prevented the injury after discovering the dangerous position in which the deceased had piaced himself.

We must, therefore, hold that under no view of the case was the respondent entitled to a recovery, and that the verdict of the jury was for the right party; and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions to reinstate the verdict of the jury, and to enter judgment thereon in favor of the appellant.

All concur except Lmnm, J., who dissents as to what is said in the last two lines of paragraph two.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRAVES, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    JAMES M. MORRISON, Trustee for HARRY MORRISON et al., Appellant, v. HARRY T. ROEHL et al.
    Division One,
    December 23, 1908.
    1. NOTES: Payment or Assignment: Release of Deed of Trust. Where the payee and holder of notes secured by a deed of trust, in his lifetime, wrote on the back of said notes that for value received he thereby assigned them without recourse to the maker’s widow, and signed his name thereto, and the trustee in, the deed of trust testified that the payee’s signature thereon was his genuine signature, and the evidence shows that at .a sale under the deed of trust the widow became the purchaser, the finding of the trial court that the notes were not paid off but purchased by the deceased wife, will not on appeal be disturbed, notwithstanding the fact that thereafter the executor of the payee released the deed of trust on the record, and the trustee testified that in his opinion the notes had been paid but had no personal knowledge of the payment.
    2. -: Assignment: Subsequent Release. If the payee of the notes assigned them in his lifetime to the maker’s widow, then the payee’s executor had no authority after the payee’s death to release the lien of the deed of trust securing their payment. The assignment of the notes carried with it the deed of trust, and all control over the deed of trust by the payee or his executor was thereafter lost, and any attempted release hy either was void.
    3. LIMITATIONS: Deed of Trust: Act of 1891. The Act of 1891, requiring suits or proceedings to foreclose an existing mortgage which secured a debt itself barred, to be begun or had within two years, applies only to those mortgages or deeds of trust whose debts were barred at the time of the passage of the act. So that where the deed of trust was dated April 1, 1880, and was given to secure three notes payable in one, two and three years, the last becoming due on April 1, 1883, the Act of 1891 did not prevent the foreclosure of the deed of trust on August 12, 1893, for at the time of the passage of the act in 1891 at least two of the notes were not then barred.
    4. DEED OF TRUST: Purchase By Life Tenant: Contribution. Where the mortgaged premises were a homestead, and after the maker of the notes died, his widow purchased them and at a foreclosure sale bought in the homestead and received a deed therefor, she in law purchased for the benefit of herself and her heirs, the remaindermen, subject to their right to enjoy the benefits of such purchase by contributing their share of the purchase price. But they cannot share in the purchase until they do make contribution. The life tenant’s purchase and deed are not void.
    5. -: -: -: Theory at Trial. Where after the purchase of the homestead hy the homesteader’s widow under the deed of trust, she died, leaving a will hy which she devised the property to one of her children, and plaintiff brought suit on the theory that the mortgage debt had been paid and not the notes purchased hy her, and that therefore the title descended to the mortgagor’s heirs and that he had at execution sale bought the share of one such heir and was entitled to partition, but neither he nor the remainderman whose interest he bought had ever offered to contribute his share of the purchase price, plaintiff will not he heard to contend on appeal that contribution is a privilege of the heir, since he tried the case below on the theory that the widow had paid the notes and thereby extinguished the deed of trust.
    Appeal from Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas. ■ — Hon. Benj. F. Davis, Judge.
    Aeeirmed.

      M. A. Dempsey for appellant.
    (1) Mrs. Roehl, at the time of the sale by the trustee, was in possession of the premises as tenant for life. She had a dower and homestead interest. Raymond E. Roehl, to whose interest plaintiff has succeeded, was a minor until after the death of the mother, lived with her upon the premises continuously, and as an heir of his father, Julius Roehl, had a vested interest in remainder. Under the circumstances the attempted purchase of absolute title, as an effort to cut off and destroy the remainder, was a breach of the trust relation existing between the life tenant and those entitled to the remainder and was absolutely ineffectual. Such is the law as between tenants in common and life tenants and remaindermen, who are of legal age, have separate and diverse interests, and have legal capacity to manage their own affairs. Pecot v. Page, 26 Mo. 416; Dillinger v. Kelly, 84 Mo. 568; Jones v. Stanton, 11 Mo. 433; Hickman v. Link, 9'7 Mo. 482; Yan Horne v. Fonda, 5 John. Oh. 406; Glass v. Water-house, 61 S, W. 450; Fiéis v. Bank, 22 Ky. L. R. 1708; Brown v. Hoyle, 30 111. 119; Patrick v. Sherwood, 4 Blatchf. 112. For greater reasons the sale here was invalid. Maria Roehl was the natural guardian of Raymond Roehl; his age at the time of the sale, fourteen years, necessitated absolute trust and confidence in her management and care of his property interests. (2) All the circumstances indicate that the indebtedness was treated as paid. More than ten years after the notes had matured Maria Roehl suddenly assumed a position antagonistic to her minor children and attempted by a colorable sale to divest them of their inheritance. (3) If there ever was a case within the true spirit of the Statute of Limitations this one is. After the other parties who have knowledge of the original transaction are all dead, the principle of estoppel, which is the underlying principle of statutes of limitations should intervene and of itself render null and void the attempt to obtain adverse title by foreclosure. After more-than ten years have elapsed since the maturity of the indebtedness and by solemn declarations of record it is treated as paid.

      R. G. Ranney for respondents.
    (1) The rule that one cotenant cannot purchase an outstanding title and assert it against his cotenants does not apply in this case. Maria Roehl was not a cotenant with the heirs of Julius Roehl, but was entitled to the entire control of the property as a homestead. Freeman on Cotenancy & Partition, see. 52; Martin v. Castle, 91 S. W. 980. (2) But a cotenant has the right to buy the interest of the other cotenants at public sale. Peck v. Lockridge, 97 Mo. 559'; Freeman on Cotenancy & Part., sec. 165'. (3) And if Mrs. Roehl should be considered a joint tenant she had the right to buy under the deed of trust to protect her homestead. Ailey v. Burnett, 134 Mo. 313; Smith v. Stephens, 164 Mo. 415'; Burrough v. Howell County, 79 S. W. 682. (4) The purchase made by a ootenant of an outstanding title or incumbrance is not void, nor does the interest so acquired by him, or any part of if, by operation of law, vest in his cotenants. Freeman on Cotenancy & Part., sec. 156. (5) It follows, therefore, that any interest in the property which appellant’s grantors may have inherited from their father, Julius Roehl, was foreclosed and sold under the deed of trust. The whole tifie became vested in Mrs. Roehl by virtue of the trustee’s deed, and no part of it vested in the children. Meads v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 620; Cockrill'v. Hutchinson, 135' Mo. 67. (6) The only right they had left, if any at all, was a mere equitable right to demand from her an interest in the property, upon payment to her of their proportionate part of the incumbrance which she had purchased. But this was a mere personal privilege which they could exercise or not as they saw proper. Brant v. Robertson, 16 Mo. 129; Allah v. De Groodt, 105 Mo. 442. (7) Bnt at the time of the sales under the executions against Raymond E. and Charles F. Roehl they had not chosen to exercise that privilege, nor have they since done so; and having failed to pay to her the money necessary to give vitality to their equitable claim, they had no such interest in the land as could be sold under execution. Brant v. Robertson, 16 Mo.-129; Quell v. Hamlon, 81 Mo. 441; Mcllvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45; Bartlett v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 62. This personal privilege might be compared to the right of a pre-emptor to- accept. Bray v. Ragsdale, 53 Mo. 170’.
   GRAVES, J.

The facts shown and matters pleaded can be well stated together in this case.

In September, 1883, Julius Roehl, who was then the owner of the real estate in dispute, died. This property was his homestead and was acquired in 1874. Upon this homestead, he, being joined therein by his wife Maria, had placed a deed of trust of date April 1, 1880, to secure the payment of three several notes of the sum of $226.10 each, bearing interest at ten per cent compound interest, and payable in one, two and three years. No administration was had upon his estate, but the probate court of Cape Girardeau county, said county being the situs of this property and the birthplace of this suit, made an order refusing to grant letters of administration. The notes secured by this deed of trust were payable to John P. Hitt. A disputed matter in the case is as to whether-or not these notes were paid, or whether they were purchased by the widow. The defendant Powers claims that the widow purchased these notes, and they were assigned to her by John P. Hitt in his life time. This purchase as alleged was in November, 1883. The contention on the other side is that they were paid, and that thereafter, in 1891, one Albert as executor of John P. Hitt undertook and did release said deed of trust by a quitclaim deed to the heirs of Julius Roehl. The notes, with an assignment from John P. Hitt without recourse to Maria Roehl, of date November 191, 1883, were in evidence. The Albert deed was of date March 14,1891, and purports to release the deed of trust. Later in 1893, Robert L. Wilson, the trustee in the deed of trust, at the request of Maria Roehl or her attorney, advertised and sold the premises for $2,000, the purchaser being-Mrs. Roehl. The commission of the trustee and the expenses of sale were paid, and the notes credited with the remainder. Mrs. Roehl died in 1896, one of her seven children, Chester, having previously died. Prior to her death she executed a will which among other things provided: “Second, I give, devise and bequeath to my youngest child, Mary Eloise Roehl, my residence property, being Lots number one and twelve in Range “H” in the city of Cape Girardeau, county of Cape Girardeau and State of Missouri, together with all the furniture of every kind in said residence, to have and to hold the same until her marriage; and after her marriage, or if she should never marry, then after her natural death, I give, devise and bequeath the same in fee to said Thomas Powers, as executor and trustee, in trust, for the use and benefit of all of my six children, to-wit: Harry T., Charles F., Raymond E., Arthur B., and Mary Eloise Roehl and Geraldine Roehl Isaacs, and I authorize, empower and direct said executor and trustee to sell the same at either private or public sale, and make conveyances thereof as fully a5» I could do, if living, and to divide the net proceeds thereof equally, share and share alike, among my said six children.”

The plaintiff, as trustee for other parties named in the deed, is a purchaser at an execution sale- of whatever interest, if any, was held by Raymond E. Roehl, on May 7, 1901, the date of sale, and defendant Davis claims through a similar sale of the alleged interest of Charles F. Roehl. Defendant Anderson is the tenant in possession under Powers as landlord. The other defendants are the children of Julius Roehl, except defendant, Isaacs, who is merely the husband of one of the daughters.

Plaintiff, by the petition, asks in the first count that the court ascertain and define the title of the parties to the property involved, and in the second count for a partition of the premises. The petition, among other things, proceeds on the theory that the sale under the deed of trust was void, because of the debt having been previously paid. The answer in detail pleads the facts as contended for by Powers, to the effect that there was a valid sale under the deed of trust. This issue is sharply drawn in the evidence. The court entered judgment thus:

‘ ‘ The court, having been duly advised of and concerning the matters and things in issue herein, finds that Maria J. Roehl at the time of her death was the owner in fee of the real estate described in plaintiff’s petition; that she had the right to and did devise the same to Thomas Powers in trust to Eloise Roehl, her daughter, and that the said Thomas Powers is now rightfully in possession of said premises.
“It is therefore considered, adjudged and decreed by the court that plaintiff’s hill be dismissed and that he take nothing by his writ, and that the defendants recover of the plaintiff their costs in this behalf expended and have thereof execution. ’ ’

From this judgment plaintiff appeals, but defendant Davis, although claiming an interest in the land in his answer, abided the judgment of the court. Such are the facts of this ease.

I. There is a sharp conflict of the testimony on the question as to whether or not the notes were paid off or purchased. Robert L. Wilson, who was trustee in the deed of trust, and afterward attorney for Albert, tbe executor of John P. Hitt, was of tbe opinion that the notes had been paid, but when pressed on cross-examination seemed to have no personal knowledge of the payment. There are also some bits of testimony tending to show that the foreclosure of the deed of trust was had because of friction between Mrs. Roehl and some of her children. Mrs. Roehl seems to have been a very practical and successful business woman, and left considerable estate. Judge Wilson examined the signature of John P. Hitt to the several assignments on the notes, and pronounced it the genuine signature of John P. Hitt. The assignments are all identical and one will suffice. The language used, is:

“For value received, I herewith assign the within note to Mrs. Maria Roehl, without recourse, this 19th day of November, 1883.
“John P. Hitt.”

The purported quitclaim deed with release clause, from Albert to the heirs of Julius Roehl, recites that the debt was fully paid to Hitt in his lifetime. There is no showing that Mrs. Roehl had anything to do with this deed, nor is there any showing to whom or when it was delivered. This deed was made in 1891, some two years prior to the sale under the deed of trust. So that, opposed to the vague testimony of Judge Wilson as to payment and the purported deed of release, we have the assignment of these notes by Hitt in his lifetime to Mrs. Roehl. Under this condition of the proof, the trial court was fully justified in finding that there had been a purchase of the outstanding mortgage indebtedness rather than a payment. The finding of the court upon this point will not be disturbed.

II. If John P. Hitt in his life time executed the assignments of the notes' hereinabove indicated in 1883, then there was no power or authority in his executor to make this deed of release in 1891. The assignment of the notes carried with them the deed of trust, and all control of the deed of trust was thereafter lost, both as to Hitt and his personal representative, the executor. [Borgess Investment Co. v. Vette, 142. Mo. l. c. 574, and cases cited.]

Such instrument was void. So that this part of the case merely turns upon the question discussed in the preceding paragraph, i. e., was there a sale or payment of the indebtedness? If a sale as indicated by the written assignment, then the deed of release is void. If a payment, the question would be different. It is hardly probable, however, that a shrewd business woman, as Mrs. Roehl was shown to have been, would be more apt to pay a debt of her husband than to purchase the same, in a. case where she secured the same protection of her homestead and dower rights by either course. Business sagacity would have suggested a purchase when the money was coming from her. The husband had left no estate out of which she could pay, as shown by the probate record.

III. Another contention is that the sale under the deed of trust was void, because the debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The sections of statute relied upon are Revised Statutes 1899, sections 4276 and 4277, which are as follows:

“Section 4276. No action to foreclose mortgage after note barred. No suit, action or proceeding under power of sale to foreclose any mortgage or deed of trust, executed hereafter to secure any obligation to pay money or property, shall be had or maintained after such obligation has been barred by the Statutes of Limitations of this State.
“Section 4277. Mortgage notes executed prior to 1891 barred, when. Nor shall any such suit be had or maintained to foreclose any such mortgage or deed of trust heretofore executed to secure any such obligation after the expiration of two years after the passage of this act. ’ ’

These two sections have their origin in the Act of the General Assembly, approved February 18, 1891, and first went into effect June 22, 1891. The notes and deed of trust were given some eleven years before the passage of this act, i. e., April 1, 1880: The last note became due April 1, 1883. The trustee’s sale was had August 12, 1893, some four months more than ten years after the last note became due. It will be noticed also that the sale was not within two years from the date the Act of 1891 became effective: All these notes were more than ten years past due at this sale, and the notes themselves were barred by the Statute of Limitation, but was the right to foreclose under the deed of trust barred by reason of the statute aforesaid? Prior to these statutes the deed of trust was not barred within twenty years. [Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 26; Long v. Long, 141 Mo. l. c. 368; Bumgardner v. Wealand, 197 Mo. l. c. 436.]

None of these notes were barred when the act was passed, February 18, 1891. It is true that one note became barred prior to the time the act took effect, June 22, 1891, but the other two notes were not barred at either date.

In Bumgardner v. Wealand, supra, we said: “We think it was the purpose of the General Assembly to provide that all deeds of trust and mortgages executed after the act of 1891 (now sections 4276 and 4277, R. S. 1899) should continue in force only so long as the debts they were given to secure were not barred by the Statute of Limitations, and to repeal the right to enforce them for twenty years and after the obligations they secured were barred, as had been repeatedly held before the enactment of 1891. [Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 26; Long v. Long, 141 Mo. l. c. 368.] But the Legislature obviously intended this legislation to be prospective in its operation and carefully provided that it should take effect after the passage of the act. It was also in the mind of the Legislature that there were doubtless many deeds of trust and mortgages which had been given to secure debts which were barred by the Statute of Limitations, but which were nevertheless enforceable, and accordingly it was determined to shorten the period of limitations as to such deeds of trust and mortgages by providing they should not be foreclosed after the expiration of two years after the passage of the act. We think to apply it to obligations which had been executed prior to the act and which would be barred within two years after the act went into effect would be to import into the act a contingency for which the Legislature made no provision, and this, of course, we cannot do. If the act is not to be held applicable to those mortgages and deeds of trust only in which the debts were barred at the time of the passage of the act, then it would result that those mortgages whose debts were barred when the act was passed would have two years in which to foreclose, but a creditor whose debt might be barred only a month or a day even before the two years after the passage of the Act of 1891 expired, would only have the fraction of that two years left in which to foreclose. We do not think such a result was in the mind of the Legislature. We think the act was applicable only to those whose debts, secured by mortgages or deeds of trust, were barred when the act was passed.” [See, also, the recent case of Stockton v. Teasdale, 212 Mo. 611, wherein Lamm, J., cites all- of our cases.]

From this holding at least two' of these notes had life sufficient to support the foreclosure sale, and it is unnecessary to discuss the situation of the first maturing note. The point that the deed of trust was barred is therefore ruled against appellant.

IV. It is next contended that Mrs. Roehl was merely the holder of a life estate, and that she could not purchase an outstanding title to defeat the remainderman. It is true that she held such an estate by way of her homestead and dower rights, but does it follow that she cannot protect such an estate by the purchase of an outstanding title? The general rule is that when a cotenant purchases an outstanding title, said purchase is presumed to be for the benefit of all the parties in interest. The same rule is applied to the case of a life tenant and a remainderman. [Allen v. DeGroodt, 105 Mo. l. c. 452.]

The purchase is not void, but the title passes to the cotenant or life-tenant, subject to- the rights of the other cotenants or remaindermen, as in this case, to come in and contribute their share of the purchase price, and thereby secure their interest in the estate. In the case last cited we said:

“It is a general rule that a tenant in common cannot purchase an outstanding title or incumbrance on the common property, and then set it up as against his cotenants. Such a purchase will be deemed to have been made for all, if they shall consent to pay their proper share. [Jones v. Stanton, 11 Mo. 433; Barnes v. Boardman, 91 L. R. A. 571, and notes.] And these rules apply as between a tenant for life in possession and a remainderman, so that a purchase of an incumbrance on the common property by a tenant for life in possession will be deemed to have been made for the benefit of himself and those in remainder, if the remaindermen see fit to pay their share. [Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 John. Ch. 29; Whitney v. Salter, 36 Minn. 105; Myers v. Daviess, 10 B. Mon. 394; 1 Wash. Real Prop. (5 Ed.), 129; Bowling’s Heirs v. Dobyns’ Admr., 5 Dana 446.]
“But the purchase of an outstanding title or incumbrance by a cotenant is not void (Freeman, Co-tenancy & Part., sec. 156), and Washburn says, ‘If a tenant for life purchase an outstanding-incumbrance upon the estate it is regarded as having been done for the benefit of the reversioner as well as himself, if the latter will contribute his proportion of the sum paid therefor.’
“It is, therefore, clear that when Marshall S'. Allen purchased the property at the trustee’s sale he obtained the full title, but he held it subject to the right of the remaindermen to come in and obtain the benefit of the purchase by contributing their share of the purchase price. Thus far the plaintiffs have never signified their desire to redeem, and this probably for the reason that for many years the incumbrance equaled, if not exceeded, the value of the land. The life-tenant and those claiming under him are in possession, and it is just and equitable that the remaindermen should redeem by paying* their proper share of the incumbrance before they are allowed to recover in ejectment. ’ ’

The plaintiff (appellant) in this case claims the interest of on© of the remaindermen. There is no evidence of an offer to contribute and repay to Mrs. Roehl the share of this remainderman for the purchase of the outstanding title. Years have elapsed and neither the remainderman nor his purchaser, this plaintiff, has ever offered to make good the proportionate part of the price paid for the incumbrance, which was an outstanding title. Respondent urges that this matter of contribution is a personal privilege and could only be exercised by the remainderman. This question it is not necessary to discuss, for the plaintiff has proceeded upon the theory that the conveyance was void, and has made no offer of contribution. Upon that theory the case must proceed here. It follows that the deed to Mrs. Roehl made by the trustee is not void, but passed the fee to her, and until contribution was made, neither the remaindermen nor their grantees can attack the title thus conveyed.

Y. It is not seriously urged that the provisions of the will made by Mrs. Roehl are not sufficient to pass title to Thomas Powers, as trustee. Not being urged we will not discuss the provisions of the will. From what has been said it follows that the judgment of the trial court is right, and the same is affirmed.

All concur.


author: VALLIANT, P. J.

text:
    SAMUEL B. COOPER v. JOHN GUNTER, Appellant.
    Division One,
    December 23, 1908.
    1. JUDGMENT: Collateral Attack. A judgment to be safe from collateral attack must on its face or upon tbe whole record appear to be lawful.
    2. -: -: Taxes: No Year Stated. A petition in a suit for taxes which fails to state the years for which the taxes are due fails to state a cause of action. And a judgment rendered in pursuance to such petition which itself fails to state the years for which the taxes were due does not on its face appear to be lawful, and can be collaterally attacked, for instance, in a suit to quiet title.
    3. -: -: -: -: Shown by Whole Record. As a general proposition a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is not to be set at naught for that it does not show an essential fact if on the whole record that fact otherwise appears. But it is not sufficient to support a judgment for taxes which does not state the year for whicn the taxes were due, that the order of publication issued by the clerk in vacation and the sheriff’s deed executed after sale under the judgment show the years. The statute requires the years for which the taxes are due to be stated in the petition, taxbill and judgment, and if the petition omits that essential averment the court cannot go to the order of publication to supply it in the judgment; and if the petition was lost at the trial, and its contents not shown, and the judgment fails to show the years the taxes were due, the judgment cannot be held to be good on a showing that the year was stated in the order of publication and the sheriff’s deed.

      4. -: -; -; -: -: Sheriff’s. Deed. The sheriff’s deed is hy statute prima-facie evidence of title and that the matters and things therein stated are true, hut it cannot be made to contradict the record or furnish data with which to supply a material defect in the record. Where the deed recites the years for which the taxes were due and the record does not show that recital, the prima-facie evidence of the deed is overcome. The sheriff cannot supplement or amend the court’s record.
    5. -: -: -: Payment. A judgment of the circuit court in a tax suit cannot he set aside in a collateral attack hy a showing that in point of fact the taxes for the year specified in the judgment had been paid before the suit was begun.
    Appeal from Texas Circuit Court. — Hon. W. E. Barton, Special. Judge.
    Affirmed.

      Dooley & Salyer for appellant.
    In an action under Sec. 650', R. S. 18991, when the validity of a judgment is called in question, the attack upon the judgment is collateral in its nature. Evarts v. Lumber & Mining Co., 193 Mo. 433; Johnson v. Realty Co., 167 Mo. 325. The rule in this State is that a judgment in a tax suit can not be collaterally attacked by one who was a defendant in that suit, and who was properly brought in by personal service or by publication, nor can the title of. a purchaser under such a judgment be defeated by showing that the taxes for which the judgment was rendered had been paid before the institntion of the suit, before the judgment was rendered or before the sale under the judgment. E'varts v. Lumber Company, 193 Mo. 444; Hill v. Sherwood, 96 Mo. 125; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190; Gibbs v. Southern, 116 Mo. 204. A judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, however erroneous or irregular, can not be impeached or attacked collaterally by a party to it. Brennan v. Maulé, 108 Mo. App. 336; Burnside v. Wand, 108 Mo. App. 539; Bedford v. Sykes, 168 Mo. 8; Warren v. Manwarring, 173 Mo. 34; Talbot v. Roe, 171 Mo. 433 ; Morrison v. Turnbaugli, 192 Mo. 444; Randall v. Snyder, 112 S. W. 529. In applying the doctrine that a final judgment, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, imports absolute verity, and is not open to inquiry in a collateral proceeding, it is often necessary to resort to the pleadings to clearly interpret what is spread upon the record as the judgment of the court. Burnside v. Wand, 108 Mo. App. 539; State ex rel. v. Hunter, 98 Mo. 386; Morrison v. Turnbaugh, 192 Mo. 445; Randall v. Snyder, 112 S. W. 529. In all suits for the collection of delinquent taxes, the general laws of the State as to practice and proceedings in civil cases shall apply, so far as applicable and not contrary to this chapter. R. S. 1899, sec. 9303. The judgment upon which the sheriff’s deed to A. S. Cameron was executed, Cameron being a remote grantor of defendant, is in substantial compliance with Sec. 9304, R. S. 1899'.

      Lamar <3 Lamar for respondent.
   VALLIANT, P. J.

This suit is aimed to come under section 650, Revised Statutes 1899', to quiet title to a quarter section of land in Texas county. The petition alleges that it is wild land in the possession of no one, that plaintiff is the owner in fee, that defendant claims title adverse to plaintiff, that both plaintiff and defendant claim from a common source, but that defendant’s title comes through a sale for taxes which was illegal and void. The prayer is for a decree adjusting the title. The defendant in his answer does not assert title in himself but only denies that plaintiff has title. But the cause was tried by both parties as if by the pleadings each was asserting a title in conflict with the other, it was so treated by the court and so we will treat it.

On the trial the plaintiff as proof of his title introduced a warranty deed from Lamar dated June 3, 1899, to himself, and then he undertook to prove what the defendant’s title was and to do so he introduced a sheriff’s deed to one Cameron of date May 21, 1901, purporting to be the result of a sale under special execution on a judgment of the circuit court rendered November 21, 1900, for delinquent taxes for -the year 1898, in a cause wherein the county collector was plaintiff and this plaintiff was defendant; then ■followed mesne conveyances from Cameron to the defendant. The plaintiff introduced evidence, over the defendant’s objection, tending to show that the taxes on this land for the year 1898 were paid before the suit in which the judgment was rendered was begun, and he also introduced the judgment under which the sheriff’s sale was made, which judgment did not state the year or years for which the taxes that were adjudged delinquent were found to be due. With that the plaintiff rested. Then the defendant, to show the source of the plaintiff’s title, introduced a deed dated November 15, 1898, from the sheriff under special execution on a judgment in a tax suit against one Long and others conveying the land to Lamar, the plaintiff’s grantor. There was no question raised as to the regularity of that proceeding, sale and deed. In defense of his own title defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the petition in the case in which the judgment under which he claims was rendered was lost and could not be found, but no effort was made to prove its contents, but defendant also introduced the order of publication against the plaintiff here, the defendant in that suit, as a non-resident, in which publication it was stated that the suit was to recover the taxes due for the year 1898. Defendant also introduced the sheriff’s execution docket, the sheriff’s notice of sale and the judge’s docket. These last three offers were seemingly to help to supply the omission in the judgment to state the year for which the taxes were delinquent, hut if so they do not, so far as Ave can see from the abstract, answer that purpose; they do not give that information. In the sheriff’s notice of sale it is recited that the sale was “for certain delinquent taxes and interest thereon as set forth in a judgment,” etc., giAdng the date of the judgment referred to, the court and the names of the parties, thus referring to the judgment itself for the necessary information. There was also some evidence tending to show that the taxes for 1898 were not paid. The finding and judgment of the court were for the plaintiff decreeing the fee simple title in him. Defendant appealed.

Defendant’s main proposition is that he claims under the judgment in the tax suit against the plaintiff, that that judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is not subject to a collateral attack. The proposition as so stated is a correct declaration of law and is sustained by the cases cited in appellant’s brief. [Evarts v. Lumber & Mining Co., 193 Mo. 433; Johnson v. Stebbins-Thompson Realty Co., 167 Mo. 325; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190.] But a judgment to be safe from, a collateral attack must on its face or on the whole record appear to be lawful. Wien a court is proceeding to render a judgment in conformity with a statute authorizing a particular proceeding which was unknown to the common law, though it be a court of general jurisdiction and though the court be proceeding in accordance with the course of the common law, as far as it is applicable to' the statutory proceeding, yet the judgment must conform to- the requirements of the statute under the authority of which alone it is rendered, when the requirements of the statute are mandatory and when the points are essential. The statute says: “In all suits under this chapter, the general laws of the State as to practice and proceedings in civil cases shall apply, so far as applicable and not contrary to this chapter.” [Section 9303, R. S. 1899; 4 Ann. Stat., pp. 4274-5.] The same section also prescribes what the petition shall contain, among which: “all lands owned by the same person or persons may be included in one petition and in one count thereof, for the taxes of all such years as taxes may be due thereon, and said petition shall show the different years for which taxes are due, as well as the several hinds of taxes or funds to which they are due, with the respective amounts due to each fund; all of which shall be set forth in a taxhill of said back taxes, duly authenticated by the certificate of the collector, and filed with the petition.” The next section, 9304, prescribes what shall he shown on the face of the judgment: “The judgment, if against the defendant, shall describe the land upon which taxes are found to be due; shall state the amount of taxes and interest found to be due on each tract or lot, and the year or years for which the same are due. ’ ’

It would perhaps not be contended in the face of this statute that a petition in such case which failed to state the year for which the taxes are claimed to be due would state a cause of action. In Bland v. Windsor, 187 Mo. 108, the court said that the taxes for each year was a separate and distinct cause of action and that a petition that failed to state the year the taxes sued for were claimed to he due would be fatally defective. The General Assembly deemed it essential to require that fact to be shown not only in the petition but also in the taxhill filed therewith, so that the person whose land was threatened would know exactly what was the demand of the tax collector. And, to give further emphasis to this as an essential point, the lawmaker in the very next, section, prescribing what shall be put into the judgment to be spread on the record of the court, industriously repeats that it shall state the year or years for which the taxes are found to be due. How can we say that is not essential which the General Assembly has, with so much pains, insisted is essential? Appellant contends that a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is not to be set at naught because it does not show an essential fact if on the whole record that fact otherwise appears. That is a correct statement of the law as a general proposition, and there is no occasion for us, in this case, to say that in this statutory proceeding that rule does or does not apply, or that this essential fact, which the Legislature has said must appear in the judgment, cannot be supplied by referring to other parts of the record, because, in this case, that fact does not appear elsewhere in the record, at least not elsewhere in the record where it should be to have that effect. It appears in the order •of publication which the clerk made in vacation and .it appears also as a recital in the sheriff’s deed, but neither of those is sufficient to support the judgment in this particular. The statute prescribes three places wherein this fact must appear, and the statute uses the imperative word, “shall,” viz: the petition, the tax-bill filed with the petition and the judgment. Suppose when the court came to render judgment in this case it discovered that there was no statement either in the petition or taxbill filed with it showing for what year the taxes were claimed to be due, could the court go to the order of publication made by the clerk in vacation for that information and insert it in the judgment by default, and thus condemn to he sold for the taxes of that year the land of a non-resident who was before the court on proof of publication only?

In such case the court could not even have allowed the petition to be amended, because a judgment by default on proof of publication only must rest for its validity on the petition as it was when the order of publication was made. The petition in that case has disappeared from the files and could not be produced in evidence in the trial of this case, therefore we do not know what it contained on this point, if the judgment had recited the fact we might presume that it was contained in the petition but we have no right to presume that the petition contained this necessary averment in this instance because the judgment that was based on it does not contain it. If presumption is to be indulged it should rather be that the fact, was omitted from the judgment because the petition-did not contain it and because there was no lawful record evidence giving the court that information. The only thing in the record in that case going to show the year for which the tax was alleged to be due was the clerk’s order of publication in vacation. The clerk cannot by such an order supply a missing necessary averment in the petition.

As to the recital in the sheriff’s deed it is of no value in this particular. The statute, section 9305, makes the sheriff’s deed “prima-facie evidence of title and that the matters and things therein stated are true,” but it cannot.be made to contradict the record or. furnish data with which to supply a material defect in the record; in any instance it is only primafacie evidence and is subordinate to the record. Its recitals are made prima-facie evidence of the facts recited because it is presumed that the record facts recited in the deed were copied from record and the other- facts recited were the sheriff’s: own acts in executing the fieri facias, but when the deed recites a fact as appearing on the-record, and reference to the record does not sustain the recital, the prima-facie evidence- of the-deed is overcome. The sheriff cannot supplement or amend the court’s record. Appellant in his brief cites: cases to show that an essential omission in a judgment of a court of record may be supplied by reference to the petition, for example, in a case where title to land is the controversy and the judgment adjudges the title but omits to describe the land we may refer to the petition for the description and sustain the judgment. [Talbot v. Roe, 171 Mo. 421.] There is no dispute as to that proposition, but here we have a judgment vacant in a material point and we have no petition to refer to. Going to the petition for a description of an essential fact in the cause of action which the judgment sustains, is very different from going to the order of publication made by the clerk in vacation.

It is true as contended by appellant that a judgment of the circuit court in a tax suit cannot be set aside in a collateral attack by showing that in point of fact the taxes for the year specified in the judgment had been paid before the suit was begun.

Therefore the testimony introduced showing- that the taxes for the year 1898 .were paid was incompetent, but that incompetent evidence is not taken into account by us. We judge this tax judgment on its own face and on its own record and pronounce it void. The judgment of the trial court was for the right party and it is affirmed.

All concur.