author: 11 VICTORY, J.

text:
    Michael BONIN, et al. v. FERRELLGAS, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-C-3024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.

      Louis C. LaCour, Jr., Robert Markle, Adams & Reese, New Orleans; Steven G. Emerson, Thomas H. Davis, Stinson, Morrison, Hecker; John E. McElligottr, Jr., Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott & Swift, Lafayette; Larry A. Stewart, Stafford, Stewart & Potter, Alexandria; David R. Frohn, Frohn & Thibodeaux, Lake Charles, Counsel for Applicant.
    Jennifer A. Jones, Jennings B. Jones, III, Patrick K. Hebert, Jones Law Firm, Cameron; Philip G. Hunter, Hunter & Morton, Alexandria; John W. deGravelles, deGravelles, Palmintier, Holthaus & Fruge, Baton Rouge; Daniel K. Wall, Mar-cantel, Marcantel, Wall & Pfeiffer, Jennings; Allen L. Smith, Jr., Plauche, Smith & Nieset, Lake Charles; Peter B. Der-ouen, Michael C. McMullen, Michael J. Remondet, Jr., Jeansonne & Remondet, Lafayette; Michael L. Hyman, Edgar D. Gankendorff, Provosty, Sadler, Delaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel, Alexandria; Scott H. Fruge, Baton Rouge, Bruce D. Beach, Nora M. Stelly, Allen & Gooch, Lafayette, Counsel for Defendant.
   11 VICTORY, J.

We granted this writ to determine whether the court of appeal misapplied the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review in reversing a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Empiregas, Inc. of Lake Charles (“Empiregas”). After a review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court judgment in favor of Empiregas.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August of 1995, six young adults staying in a rental cabin, Cabin R-6, at the “Richard Cabins” in Holly Beach, Cameron Parish, Louisiana, were severely burned when their cabin caught fire. The fire department’s investigation discovered an open and uncapped propane gas line located along the cabin’s south wall. The fire was caused by propane gas that had leaked from the open, uncapped gas line valve. Defendant Lawrence Landos (“Landos”) owned and operated the Richard Cabins, comprising ten units, which he purchased in 1986. Propane gas for all of the cabins was originally provided by a single, red propane tank. Beginning in July of 1986, shortly after Landos acquired the property, Empiregas began servicing and providing propane gas to the cabins. Empiregas made ten deliveries of propane gas to the Richard Cabins, beginning on July 16, 1986 and ending on December 11, 1987. During this time period, Empiregas did not inspect the entire propane gas system at the | ¡.cabins as required by law. However, the gas line in Cabin R-6 was neither open nor uncapped during this time period as a space heater was attached to the outlet.

Landos had no records of receiving propane gas service from anyone after December of 1987 until a delivery was made' by Ferrellgas, Inc. (“Ferrellgas”) on May 12, 1989. Ferrellgas remained the sole servicing dealer for more than six years, including the time period when the fire occurred. Ferrellgas’s last delivery of propane gas to the cabins was one week before the accident. When Ferrellgas began servicing the account, it also failed to inspect the entire propane gas system at the cabins.

In addition, when the 1995 accident occurred, propane was being supplied by Ferrellgas to Cabin R-6 from a silver propane tank, which Landos himself had installed five months earlier. Landos had determined that the red tank was no longer safe, so he bought and installed the silver tank. This silver tank replaced the red propane tank that supplied gas to the cabins at the time Ferrellgas began servicing the cabins in 1989. Ferrellgas knew that the swap-out of the tank required an inspection of the entire system, but it -failed to perform the inspection. ,

LThe record reflects that had Ferrellgas conducted the required inspections, it would have discovered the uncapped line in Cabin R-6. Landos testified that sometime in 1988, he removed the space heater that was attached to the outlet but failed to cap it. This occurred after Empiregas had ceased servicing the account, but before Ferrellgas began servicing the account.

The victims of the fire, Michael Bonin, Brent Benoit, William John “Billy” Britt, John Perez, Jeffrey Kebodeaux, and Angela Thibodeaux, along with their respective parents and/or children (“plaintiffs”), all filed suit for their injuries against Landos and Ferrellgas. These suits were later consolidated. On June 27, 1996, plaintiffs and Ferrellgas entered into a “Mary Carter ” settlement for $18,000,000.00. The terms of the agreement required plaintiffs to sue Empiregas and to pay Ferrellgas, its insurer, and its counsel 56% of the first $18,000,000.00 recovered from Empiregas. Ferrellgas then aligned itself with plaintiffs and agreed to help them prosecute their claims against Empiregas.

Empiregas moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the risk that led to the accident, the uncapped valve in Cabin R-6, did not exist when Empiregas provided propane service to the cabin. Empiregas established this fact through several depositions given by Landos. Plaintiffs then produced an affidavit from Landos stating that after reviewing matters with plaintiffs’ counsel, he wished to recant his testimony. The trial court granted Empiregas’s motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed on the grounds that the trial court had based its decision on Lanclos’s testimony. Thibodeaux v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 98-0862 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/6/99), 741 So.2d 34. The court found that the “apparent contradictions and Lanclos’s explanations ... are arguable and best left to the jury.” Id. at 42.

Trial on the merits went forward in the 9th JDC on November 6-16, 2001. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Empire-gas, answering “No” to Jury Interrogatory # 1, | ¿which asked “Was Empire Gas, Inc., Empire Gas of Lake Charles, Inc., its agents, servants or employees negligent, and, if so, was such negligence a proximate cause of [each plaintiff’s] burn injuries?” The trial judge entered judgment in accordance with the verdict and also granted motions for directed verdict dismissing Lawrence Landos.

The Third Circuit reversed, finding no “reasonable basis upon which the jury could have reached the conclusion that Empire was relieved of all liability for the injuries Plaintiffs sustained.” Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 02-1031 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/6/03), 855 So.2d 781, 799. The court of appeal found that Empiregas breached its duty to inspect the entire Richard Cabins propane gas system before initially servicing the account, and that this duty extended to those who rented the cabins even after Empiregas had ceased servicing that account. Id. at 795-96. Then, recognizing that even if Empiregas was negligent, it would be excused from liability “if an intervening cause superseded the original negligence and, alone, produced the injury,” the court of appeal found that “the entire cause-in-fact inquiry turns on Mr. Landos’ knowledge of whether he needed to cap the valves.” Id. at 797. The court of appeal dismissed the argument that Empiregas’s failure to inspect the cabins was not a substantial factor contributing to the fire, even though at the time of Em-piregas’s service, the line in Cabin R-6 was not uncapped due to the existence of a space heater. Instead, the | F,court of appeal reasoned that if Empiregas had performed an inspection of the entire system, it would have discovered uncapped gas lines in other cabins and should have informed Landos of these defects, refusing to service the system until he corrected the defects by capping the lines, which would also have had the effect of notifying Landos that lines had to be capped, which would have prevented Landos from leaving the line in Cabin R-6 uncapped several years later. Id. at 798. The court of appeal found that the testimony of Landos was “uncontradicted” and failed to show that he knew a line with a valve had to be plugged or capped. Id. at 799. Thus, the court of appeal apportioned 65% of the fault to Ferrellgas and 35% of the fault to Empiregas, and fixed damages at more than $21,000,000.00, resulting in the imposition of more than $8,000,000.00 in damages against Empiregas.

We granted Empiregas’s writ application to consider whether the Third Circuit misapplied the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 03-8024 (La.2/13/04), 866 So.2d 805.

DISCUSSION

Under Louisiana jurisprudence, most negligence cases are resolved by employing a duty/risk analysis. The determination of liability under the duty/risk analysis usually requires proof of five separate elements: (1) proof that the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (2) proof that the defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) proof that the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (4) proof that the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiffs injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 00-1372 (La.3/23/01), 782 So.2d 606, 611; Boykin v. Louisiana Transit Co., Inc., 96-1932 (La.3/4/98), 707 So.2d 1225, 1230 (citing David W. Robertson, et al., Cases and Materials on Torts, 83-84 (1989); Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1 (La.1989) (on original hearing)).

Empiregas argues that the court of appeal erred by reversing the jury’s findings on the issue of causation. Cause-in-fact is generally a “but for” inquiry, which tests | (¡whether the accident would or would- not have occurred but for the defendant’s substandard conduct. Id. However, where there are concurrent causes of an accident, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. In this case, more than one party’s conduct allegedly caused the fire, i.e., Ferrellgas, Empiregas, and Landos. In considering the substantial factor test, this Court has stated that cause-in-fact clearly exists- when the plaintiffs harm would not have occurred absent the specific defendant’s conduct. Perkins, supra at 612 (citing Graves v. Page, 96-2201 (La.11/7/97), 703 So. 566, 570). This Court has considered “whether each of the multiple causes played so important a role in producing the result that responsibility should be imposed upon each item of conduct, even if it cannot be said definitively that the harm would not have occurred ‘but for’ each individual cause.” Perkins, supra at 612 (citing Graves, supra). Also considered is “whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm.” Id. (Quoting LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So.2d 471, 475 (La.1978)). Whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and thus, a cause-in-fact of the injuries, is a factual question to be determined by the fact finder. Perkins, supra at 612; Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93-2661 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 1305,1310.

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Id. Although we have spelled out the appropriate standard of review under the manifest error standard on numerous occasions, it bears repeating, because the court of appeal in this case improperly applied this standard. As this Court has recently stated, the manifest error/clearly wrong standard is “now well-established doctrine.” Henderson v. Nissan Motor Corp., 03-0606 (La.2/6/04), 869 So.2d 62.

Under the manifest error standard, in order to reverse a trial court’s determination of a fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly |7erroneous. Stobart v. State through Dept, of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). On review, an appellate court must be cautious not to re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual findings just because it would have decided the case differently. Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dept. Ambulance Service, 93-3099 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216, 221. In sum:

[T]he reviewing court must give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The reason for this well-settled principle of review is based not only upon the trial court’s better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared with the appellate court’s access only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts. (Emphasis added.)

Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973); Ambrose, supra at 224 n. 1 (Lemmon, J., concurring).

However, this Court clarified in Ambrose that our purpose in Stobart was not “to mandate that the trial court’s factual determinations cannot ever, or hardly ever, be upset.” Perkins, supra at 613 (citing Ambrose, 639 So.2d at 221). Recognizing that great deference should be accorded to the fact finder, the court of appeal and this Court have a constitutional duty to review facts. Id. To perform its constitutional duty properly, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions were clearly wrong based on the evidence or clearly without evidentiary support. Id. That being said, we reiterate that when two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

The key .issue in this case is whether the jury’s finding, that Empire-gas’s failure to properly inspect the entire gas system at the Richard Cabins in July of 1986 was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, was clearly wrong based on the evidence or clearly without evidentiary support. The record clearly reflects that had Empiregas inspected all the cabins at that time they would have discovered uncapped lines in some of the cabins, but not Cabin R-6 where the fire occurred, because a space heater [¿was connected to the line during that time. In addition, evidence presented at trial established two other possible causes of this accident: (1) that Landos knew that an open valve needed to be capped from his prior experience with such valves at his mother’s house and from his experience in installing and connecting an entire new propane gas tank at the Richard Cabins; and (2) that Ferrellgas breached its duty to inspect the propane gas system at the Richard Cabins on at least two subsequent occasions, upon which they would have discovered the uncapped line in Cabin R-6.

While the Third Circuit characterized Lanclos’s testimony as “uncontroverted,” the record reveals that it was not. The Third Circuit relied on trial testimony which, in their view, “demonstrated that Mr. Landos knew that an ‘open valve’ was dangerous and believed that a valve was sufficient to close it and, thus, prevent a leak. However, Empiregas failed to show that he knew a valve had to be capped or plugged.” 855 So.2d at 799. However, upon further review of the record, it is clear that there was a conflict in Lanclos’s testimony about whether he knew an open line needed to be capped or plugged and that Lanclos’s credibility suffered as a result of his cross-examination, where he testified as follows:

Q. Do you remember testifying on numerous occasions, that R-6 had a heater in the cabin when you bought it?
A. Well, I might have said that that day because, you know.
Q. You might have said it?
A. But — -but, now, you know, when I go back, I mean, I’m not positive it was in there.
Q. Do you remember giving four depositions in this case?
A. I know. But now, I don’t remember if, you know, if — if it was in there, or I put it out there. I can’t — I don’t remember, you see.
Q. Mr. Landos, you remember giving four depositions in this case?
A. Yeah, at that time.
Q. And do you remember you gave your first deposition when Ferrellgas was a defendant?
A. Yes, I remember that, too.
Q. And, then you gave three more depositions after Empire — -after Ferrellgas sued, and then after Ferrellgas settled with the plaintiffs, ...
| qA. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q .... you gave three more depositions after ...
A. Yeah.
Q.... Ferrellgas sued Empire.
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q. And you remember, in every one of those depositions, we spent a lot of time talking about the space heater in R-6. A. Yeah, I remember that.
Q. Okay. And do you remember testifying over, and over, and over, again, that when you bought the Richard Cabins, there was a space heater connected to the line in Cabin R-6?
A. I — I—I—I told- — -I said that, but—
Q. You said it probably thirty times?
A. Maybe more, you know.
Q. During the four different.
A. Yeah.
Q. And are you now going to change that testimony?
A. It’s not changed. I don’t remember.
Q. Now you don’t remember. Have you met with anybody since you gave your last deposition?
A. I just met them a while ago, you know. I ...
Q. Who—
A .... talked with them.
Q. Who did you meet with?
A. With my lawyer and Mr. Jones [plaintiffs counsel].
Q. I see. And did you meet with Mr. Jones today?
A. Yeah, I — I met with him today.
Q. Okay. And Mr. Jones is suing you, is that correct? His clients are suing you?
A. I know. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Did you meet with Mr. Jones about two weeks ago, also?
A. I — I—Mister—my lawyer told me to go meet them where that thing had burned.

ImClearly, this testimony put Lanclos’s credibility at issue. Landos was further cross-examined on his knowledge and experience in working with propane gas systems, including the fact that he himself had disconnected and replaced the red propane tank with the silver propane tank. Landos was also cross-examined about installing a gas heater at his mother’s house, testifying as follows:

Q. And when you — when you took your mother — the heater out of your mother’s house, you put a cap on that gas line, didn’t you?
A. No, I didn’t put no cap on it.
Q. You didn’t?
A. No.
Q. Okay, the gas line was just opened? A. No, it had a- — a valve on it.
Q. Okay. Didn’t you testify that the gas line did not have a valve on it, in your depositions?
A. Oh, no. But you can’t—
Q. Okay. Do you remember testifying that there was a gas line coming out of the floor at your mother’s house?
A. Yeah.
Q. And did I — did'—were you asked this question, at Page 40 line 8, “Did it have a valve on it?” And do you remember giving the answer, “I don’t think so.” Do you remember?
A. Maybe I said it, but — you can’t have a line without no something on it. I would have burned the house.
Q. Uh-huh. And what — it didn’t have a valve on it, so you put a cap on it. Isn’t that the truth?
A. A valve on it. You know, a valve. Something you can open and close.
Q. Do you remember testifying that you put a plug in that line at your mother’s house several years before this accident?
A. Well, it could be, you know.
Q. Do you remember me asking you this question, “When you took mom’s gas stove off the system, did you put a cap on that line so gas wouldn’t escape?” “If it had a valve, or whatever you call it, but I took the valve, and I put a plug on it to put the line on it.” Do you remember giving me that answer?
InA. Well, I’d have to see the valve, you know.
Q. You remember?
A. I’ll have to see if — what’s on it now, you know.
Q. Okay, do you remember telling ... A. I—
Q .... us, under oath, you put a — you screwed a plug into the line?
A. Well, I didn’t go see, you know. I didn’t go see the — I’d have to go see it to — to know exactly what’s on it.
Q. Okay. Do you remember ask-me asking you these questions, and you giving this answer? This is on Page 20, counsel, on Line 5:
“Q. What did you just tell me about the plugs, Mr. Landos?
A. You can’t leave an open line. The gas is going to leak.
Q. And you knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. So you put a plug on it. Is that right?
A. Yeah.”
Do you remember giving those answers to those questions?
A. I might have gave you that answer, but ...
Q. Was it true?
A.... I didn’t go see the pipe, what’s on it, you know.
Q.' Where those — were those answers truthful when I asked you those questions? Did you tell me the truth?
A. Well, the truth in my knowledge. But I don’t ...
Q. Okay.
A_I don’t know if it’s right, or what.
Q. And you put that plug on that line in your mother’s house, that gas line, before, years before this accident happened in Holly Beach, didn’t you?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. It was before the fire at Holly Beach that you knew that you had to put a plug in an opened line, correct? A. I didn’t know you had to put a plug. Q. But you did that at your mother’s house, correct?
|1gA. Well, I have to go see the house to see if it’s there, what it is, if it’s a plug, or — or if it’s alive. I don’t — I don’t know.

In light of this testimony, the jurors could have reasonably believed that Láñe-los had previously disconnected an appliance and plugged the line at his mother’s house, and was not being truthful when he disclaimed any knowledge of the necessity to cap or plug the gas line in Cabin R-6 when he removed the space heater. Lanc-los’s credibility was clearly at issue, and the jury was in the best position to decide whether Landos was telling the truth. See Lasyone v. Kansas City Southern R.R., 00-2628 (La.4/3/01), 786 So.2d 682, 693 (when findings are based on determinations regarding witness credibility, the manifest error/clearly wrong standard demands great deference to trier of fact’s findings); Henderson, supra (where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong). As we have stated numerous times, “where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Perkins, supra (numerous citations omitted). The issue is not whether the jury’s determination was right or wrong, but whether it was reasonable.

The court of appeal also ignored uncon-tradicted testimony from Ferrellgas employees that established that Ferrellgas, who supplied gas to the cabins from 1989 up to, and including, the time of the fire, should have inspected the propane system at least twice during that time period, once upon beginning service and again when the new silver propane tank was installed, and that it would have discovered and remedied the uncapped gas line in Cabin R-6 had it conducted either of these required inspections. Whereas there was never an uncapped gas line in Cabin R-6 while Em-piregas delivered propane to the cabins, the line in Cabin R-6 was uncapped during the entire time that Ferrellgas serviced them. One employee even testified that it would have been “stupid” for Ferrellgas’s employees to rely on an inspection Em-piregas might have done years earlier in light of Ferrellgas’s independent safety inspection obligations. Finally, unlike Em-piregas, whose last delivery of propane gas was nine |13years before the accident, Fer-rellgas delivered propane gas to the cabins as late as one week before the accident.

The evidence presented enabled the jury to reasonably conclude that the accident was not caused by Empiregas as they reasonably could have inferred that Landos knew that an open gas line needed to be capped, yet failed to do so. If he already had that knowledge, Empiregas’s failure to inspect the system in 1986 and advise Landos that open gas lines needed to be capped would not have prevented the accident. Further, the jury could have reasonably concluded based on the evidence presented that Ferrellgas had an independent duty to inspect the entire propane gas system at the Richard Cabins at the time they started providing propane gas in 1989 and again in 1995 when Landos installed the new propane gas tank. The jury could have reasonably concluded that, because an inspection at either of these times would have disclosed the uncapped valve in Cabin R-6, Empiregas’s breach did not cause the accident.

CONCLUSION

We find that the court of appeal erred in reversing the jury’s verdict in favor of Empiregas under the manifest error standard of review. Analyzing this case properly under that standard and considering the testimony of Landos and the Ferrell-gas employees, we hold that the jury’s finding in favor of Empiregas was supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

      . The gas line had a valve with a short handle which was located at the end of the line.

      . The jury was instructed as to the regulations applicable to the Louisiana Liquefied Petroleum Gas industry as follows:
      1.2 Bonded Dealers, (m): A dealer shall not serve any liquefied petroleum gas system which the dealer knows or should know is not installed pursuant to the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Commission Regulations or is in a dangerous condition. All new installations or reinstallations must be checked by the dealer for tightness of lines, poor workmanship, use of unapproved pipe or appliances or use of poor piping design. All improper installation shall be corrected before the dealer services such installation or reinstallation with fuel for the first time. Any subsequent servicing dealer shall not be responsible for unauthorized changes in or failures of an existing system or connected appliances.
      (n): Each dealer shall transmit a notice once a year to each customer stating that liquefied petroleum gas systems are potentially dangerous, that a leak in the system could result in a fire or explosion, and that systems should be inspected periodically.
      5.10: Piping, Tubing and Fittings, (a) Piping Material: Piping shall be wrought iron or steel (black or galvanized), brass or copper pipe, or seamless copper, brass or steel.
      (f) Cap Outlets: Each outlet, including a valve or cock outlet shall be securely closed gas-tight with a positive threaded plug or a cap if appliance is not to be connected. When an appliance is removed from an outlet, and the outlet is not to be reconnected at that time, it shall be securely closed gas-tight. In no case shall the outlet be closed within tin caps, wooden plugs, corks, etcetera.
      5.14: Transfer of Liquids, (g) Must Not Serve Illegal Installations: Bonded dealers must not serve any liquefied petroleum gas containers installed illegally in the state of Louisiana or posted by the Liquefied Petroleum Gas commission. Ignorance will not be accepted as an excuse, as it is the duty of the dealer to investigate before serving any doubtful liquefied gas container.

      . The week before trial, a purported public service announcement aired on a local television station, showing pictures of the propane tank, a raging house fire, and a woman being loaded into an ambulance. The trial court interrogated potential jurors and determined that the announcement would prejudice jurors against Empiregas, and on Empiregas's motion, ordered that venue be changed to the 9th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Rapides, a parish outside the station's viewing area. The Third Circuit reversed that order, but this Court vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and reinstated the trial court's change of venue order. Thibodeaux v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 00-2635 (La.9/20/00), 767 So.2d 707.

      . On the issue of causation, the jury was instructed as follows:
      As to the requirement that plaintiff’s injury be caused by defendant's conduct, I do not mean that the law recognizes only one cause of any injury, consisting of only one factor or thing, or the conduct of only one person. On the contrary, many factors or things may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage. You should resolve this question by deciding whether plaintiff would probably not have suffered the claimed injuries in the absence of defendant’s conduct.
      If plaintiff probably would have suffered those injuries regardless of what the defendant did, then you must conclude that the injuries were not caused by the defendant, and render a verdict for that defendant.
      If, on the other hand, plaintiff probably would not have suffered the claimed injuries in the absence of defendant’s conduct, then you must conclude that defendant’s conduct did play a part in plaintiff’s injuries, and you must proceed to the next element.
      An original tort feasor will not be relieved of the consequences of its negligence, unless the intervening cause superseded the original negligence and, alone, produce the injury. If the original tort feasor could or should reasonably foresee the incident that might occur, he will — he will be liable notwithstanding the intervening or superseding cause.

      . As stated on pages 92-93, supra, the jury verdict form asked whether Empiregas’s negligence was a "proximate cause” of the accident, although the jury was instructed as to the law regarding causation under the "substantial factor” test.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. TRAYLOR, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melissa WALKER.
    No. 2003-K-2871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
    Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Iley H. Evans, District Attorney, Frederick A. Duhy, Asst. Attorney General, Kathleen E. Petersen, Asst. Attorney General, Counsel for Applicant.
    Dina F. Domangue, Counsel for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

After conducting an independent review of the record, and considering the arguments of counsel, we conclude that the decision of the court of appeal does not require the exercise of our supervisory authority. Accordingly, our order of March 12, 2004 is recalled as improvidently granted.

TRAYLOR, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

TRAYLOR, Justice,

dissenting.

In the present case, the state responded to the defense request for discovery and inspection by providing counsel with open-file discovery. Testimony presented at the preliminary hearing provided further detailed notice of what conduct the state had charged against respondent and informed respondent of the legal basis upon which it charged her with criminal culpability. Moreover, the bill of information itself initially provided the defendant with notice of the charges against her. Although the bill of information could have been more specifically worded, the bill of information itself, plus the open file discovery and the preliminary hearing testimony provided the defendant sufficient notice of the crime charged.

Under these circumstances, because the state has provided respondent with sufficient notice of the crime charged, and because the record reveals at least one set of facts which, if proved to the satisfaction of a trier of fact, may support a conviction for violation of LSA-R.S. 14:93.3,1 believe the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

      . As noted by the court of appeal, "if the prosecution is able to draft a bill of information which validly charges Walker with a crime, it may be possible to reinstitute prosecution [within the time limits set by La. C.Cr.P. art. 572(A)(2)].” State v. Walker, 37, 493, p. 8, n. 6 (La.App. 2nd Cir.8/20/03), 853 So.2d 746, 751.


author:
      TRAYLOR, Justice.
     VICTORY, J.,

text:
    Rose DETILLIER, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Sally E. Detillier and Tyler M. Detillier, Cory M. Detillier, Heidi T. Detillier, Joby J. Detillier and Dain P. Detillier v. KENNER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2003-CC-3259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2004.

      Block Law Firm, Matthew Ferdinand Block, Thibodaux, for applicant.
    Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Jude David Bourque, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   TRAYLOR, Justice.

We granted this writ application to determine whether a state health care provider covered under the Malpractice Liability for State Services Act, LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39 et seq. (“MLSSA” or “Public Act”), may be named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit. After considering the language of the statute itself, and other statutes in pari materia, as well as the legislature’s purpose in enacting the MLSSA, we conclude that the special substantive sui generis statutory grant to patients and their representatives of a right to recover certain losses provided in the MLSSA allows for a covered state health care provider to be named individually as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit but prohibits the entry of a judgment against the covered health care provider.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Terrance Detillier, who had been previously diagnosed with congestive heart failure, died on December 13, 2000, while admitted to Kenner Regional Medical Center (“Kenner Regional”) for treatment for insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, | aright charcot foot and acute osteomyelitis.

Plaintiffs, the decedent’s wife and children, filed complaints with the Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund and the Division of Administration, alleging that substandard medical care rendered at Kenner Regional directly caused Mr. Detillier’s death. Claimants sought review of the care rendered by Kenner Regional pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., which sets forth the procedure for a medical malpractice claim against a private health care provider (“Private Act”). Claimants also sought review of the care rendered by state-employed physicians Dr. Robert Dehne, Dr. Chris Ferguson, and Dr. David Borne; LSU Faculty Care Comprehensive Medicine (“LSU Faculty Care”); and the State of Louisiana, Louisiana State University Medical Center pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39 et seq., the Public Act, which sets forth the procedure for a medical malpractice claim against a state health care provider.

After the private medical review panel reviewed the claim against Kenner Regional and issued its opinion, the plaintiffs filed suit in the 24th Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson, against Kenner Regional on January 13, 2000. After the state medical review panel reviewed the claim against the state health care providers and issued its opinion, plaintiffs amended their lawsuit to add as defendants Dr. Dehne, Dr. Ferguson, Dr. Borne, LSU Faculty Care and the State of Louisiana, Louisiana State University Medical Center.

Dr. Dehne, Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Borne responded to the petition by filing an exception of no cause of action, arguing that the Public Act provides the sole remedy for the medical malpractice alleged and does not recognize a cause of action against the individual state health care providers themselves. After a hearing on the exception, the trial court overruled the doctors’ exception.

l3The court of appeal granted these defendants’ writ application, vacated the judgment of the trial court, and granted the defendants’ exception of no cause of action. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ cause of action is limited by the MLSSA to a claim against the State of Louisiana and that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the covered state health care providers. This Court granted the plaintiffs’ writ to consider whether state health care providers may be named as individual defendants in a medical malpractice suit under the provisions of the Public Act.

In this Court, plaintiffs contend there is nothing in the language of the MLSSA which would prohibit them from naming covered state health care providers as defendants in medical malpractice lawsuits and argue that failure to do so will result in confusion as to the applicable standard of care. Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that state health care providers who commit medical malpractice will be shielded from being reported to national medical malpractice data banks, in violation of public policy, if the individual state health-care providers are not named as defendants in medical malpractice lawsuits. The State counters that the law clearly states that only the state may be held liable for damages or losses caused by the medical malpractice of state health care providers covered by the Public Act.

LAW

The law on statutory interpretation is well-defined. Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, interpretation of a law involves primarily the search for the legislature’s intent. La.Code Civ. art. 2; Lockett v. State, Dept. of Tramp. and Dev., 2003-1767 p. 2 (La.2/25/04), 869 So.2d 87; Perritt v. Dona, 2002-2601 p. 13 (La.7/2/03), 849 So.2d 56, 65; Batson v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 1999-0232, p. 9 (La.11/19/99), 750 So.2d 949, 956; Ruiz v. Oniate, 1997-2412, p. 4 (La.5/19/98), 713 So.2d 442, 443. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La.Code Civ. art. 9; Lockett, 2003-1767 p. 2; Perritt, 2002-2601 p. 15, 849 So.2d at 65-66; Batson, 1999-0232 p.- 9, 750 So.2d at 956; Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 4, 713 So.2d at 443. When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, however, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the meaning of ambiguous words must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. La.Code Civ. arts. 10 and 12; Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 4, 713 So.2d at 444; Conerly v. State, 97-0871 p. 4 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 709, 710-711. Moreover, laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. La. Code Civ. art. 13; Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 5, 713 So.2d at 444; Conerly, 97-0871 p. 4, 714 So.2d at 711.

In this instance, we are asked to interpret the MLSSA, which “limits the liability of certain health care providers in derogation of the general rights of tort victims.” Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 4, 713 So.2d at 444. This' Court has previously held that “if application of the foregoing rules of interpretation fails to illuminate definitively the legislature’s intent, only then should the rule of strict construction apply to the interpretation of laws in derogation of common rights such as the MLSSA.” Id., 1997-2412 p. 5, 713 So.2d at 445; see Batson, 1999-0232 p. 9, 750 So.2d at 956; Conerly, 1997-0871 p. 4, 714 So.2d at 711.

DISCUSSION

It is not in dispute that the state-employed physicians Dr. Dehne, Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Borne are health care providers covered under the provisions of the Public Act. Subsections C and D(l) of the Public Act provide as follows:

C. Since the Louisiana Civil Code was enacted only in the domain of the private law, governs only the legal relationships of private persons among themselves alone, and is inapplicable to public entities and their legal relationships, there is no right nor legal basis ex delicto, or ex quasi delicto, for an action by a patient or his representative to recover damages or any other losses, including those for the death of the patient, from the state or a state health care provider as defined in this Section as a result of malpractice in connection with state-provided or state-related health care; however, a patient, his representative properly acting for him, or his after-death representative shall have a right to recover from the state certain losses to the extent and within the limitations defined and allowed by this Section of public law due to malpractice as defined in this Section, in the circumstances and within the parameters provided by this Section, on the sole basis of this Section as a special substantive sui generis statutory grant in the domain of public law. This Section shall not be construed to limit, waive, or prohibit claims for lack of informed consent or breach of contract as defined by statutes or otherwise provided by law.
D. (1) Whenever in the same circumstances, but not more than to the same extent, that a patient would, under the private law, including the Louisiana Civil Code, which is applicable only to private persons among themselves alone, be allowed a recovery, due to malpractice, from a private person not employed by nor acting on behalf of a public entity, a patient, his representative properly acting for him, or his after-death representative shall have a right to recover, from the state, losses, including the death of said patient, but only to the degree and within the limits allowed by, and subject to the terms and conditions of, this Section of public law, when and insofar as such losses proximately result from malpractice as defined in this Section and not from victim fault, third party fault, acts of God, acts of third parties, or contributory negligence or fault and when there exist no breaches of duty by such patient or his agents or representatives with respect to the damages sued for, no assumption of risk by patient with respect thereto, nor any other circumstances which would otherwise provide a defense or a basis of nonrecovery in any action in contract or quasi-contract or in any action | .arising out of any offense or quasi-offense. Whenever victim fault, third party fault, acts of God, acts of third parties, contributory negligence, or contributory fault is a substantial factor in causing such losses, the amount of recovery available from the state under this Section shall be reduced by the same percentage or proportion as such losses were brought about or resulted from such victim fault, third party fault, acts of God acts of third parties, contributory negligence, or contributory fault. Otherwise than as provided by this Section of public law, a patient shall not have a right to recover losses due to malpractice from the state or from a state health care provider as defined in this Section. (Emphasis added)

Although these subsections set forth that it is the state alone from whom a successful claimant may recover damages or losses for the medical malpractice of a covered state health care provider, Subsections C and D do not address against whom a medical malpractice lawsuit is to be filed.

Subsections G and K refer to “claims” lodged against the state health care provider; however, neither subsection definitively addresses the issue of naming the individual state health care provider as a defendant in a lawsuit for medical malpractice. Subsection G echoes the Legislature’s intention found in Subsections C and D that a plaintiff may recover from the state alone for any acts of medical malpractice committed by a covered state health care provider:

G. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, the state shall pay any damages, interest, cost of investigation and defense, and any other costs in connection with any claim lodged against any state health care provider (person covered by this Part) for an alleged act of medical malpractice, resulting in the injury or death of a patient up to the limits set forth in this Part. The coverage provided herein shall apply only when the state health care provider (person covered by this Part) is acting within the terms of the definition of “state health care provider” or “person covered by this Part” as provided in Paragraph (1) of Subsection A of this Section. (Emphasis added)

Subsection K states that prescription is suspended as stated in the procedures for the state medical review panel for a health care provider “who is answerable in solido with a qualified state health care provider against whom a claim has been filed for preview.”

Other subsections of the Public Act, highlighted below, make clear the fact that the successful plaintiffs recovery is to be obtained from the state. Subsection A(9) defines the “right to recover losses due to malpractice” as the “substantive right ... of a patient ... to receive ... some measure of compensation in money or services or both from the state.... ” Subsection F(3) states that, if the total amount of recovery does not exceed $500,000, “judgment may be rendered for the total amount and paid by the state.... ” Subsection F(5) allows for “a claimant and the state” to enter into a court-approved settlement. Subsection F(7) states that payments for medical care and related benefits “shall be paid by the office of risk management (a state' agency).... ” Subsection F(12) provides that “all reasonable fees and costs of medical examinations and the costs and fees of the medical expert witnesses ... shall be paid by the office of risk management.” Subsection H states that “the office of risk management may pay all defense and investigative costs, costs as established by the state medical review panel, and any other costs incurred in connection with the defense of these actions as said costs accrue.” Subsection 1(1) authorizes the state to appoint attorneys who will defend medical malpractice claims filed under this Part. Subsection 1(2) speaks of compromises, and settlements “between the state and the claimant....” Subsection J authorizes the office.of risk management, along with the concurrence of state-appointed counsel, to compromise or settle any suit or claim up to $25,000. Subsection L(l) states that “all future medical care and related benefits shall be paid by the office of risk management as are awarded in final judgments, settlements or compromises in accordance with this Section.” This language in the Public Act clearly evinces the legislature’s intent that a successful plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit is to recover damages and losses from the state |salone. The state relies upon this language to maintain that, since the state must pay any recovery, only the state may be named as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit. However, the language of the statute does not clearly answer whether a plaintiff may name a covered health care provider as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit.

Finding the language of the MLSSA ambiguous or non-existent on the point at issue, we must ascertain the legislature’s intent with regard to whether the state alone, or the state and the individual state health care provider, may be named defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit under the Public Act. As this Court stated in Lockett:

One particularly helpful guide in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature is the legislative history of the statute in question and related legislation. Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895, p. 4 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186. Moreover, the Legislature is presumed to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter and court decisions construing those statutes, and where the new statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the Legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 95-0200, p. 5 (La.6/30/95), 656 So.2d 1000, 1002-03. Thus, when the Legislature amends a statute that has been subject to interpretation by the courts, a court interpreting the amended statute must take into consideration the entire history of the amended statute, including its original form, the court decisions interpreting the statute in its original and amended forms, and any subsequent amendments.

J¿ockett, 2003-1767 p. 3.

Legislative History of the MLSSA and Analysis

As originally enacted, the MLSSA specified that medical malpractice lawsuits against state health care providers were to be filed against the state alone and that “the state assumed [the state health care provider’s] liability and defense costs.” See Sibley, All So.2d at 1101; see also Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 5, 713 So.3d at 445 (“a suit for that [state health care provider’s] malpractice could be instituted solely against the state and defended by the state, with the state paying any damages awarded in the suit.”). The enacting legislation, Acts 1976, No. 66, provided in pertinent part:

B.... Any suit arising out of any act of malpractice by a person covered by this Part shall be instituted solely against the state, defended by the state and the state shall be liable for any attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred and for damages awarded by a judgment of court or by compromise reached after institution of suit. (Emphasis added)

In that same year, the Public Act was amended. The minutes of the legislative committee considering the amendment reflect “[t]he bill would allow joinder of person alleged to have committed malpractice as defendant, but without liability.” The amendment, contained in Acts 1976, No. 660, provided:

C. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law to the contrary, any health care provider (“person” as defined herein) acting within the course and scope of his employment, health care facility staff appointment or assignment for or on behalf of the State to any health care institution whether or not he receives compensation for such services, shall not be held liable for any amount of damages in excess of 500,-000 dollars plus interests and costs for any injury or death of the patient due to any alleged act of malpractice within the
course and scope of such employment, staff appointment, or assignment. The State shall pay from the State Health Care Provider Fund created by Subsection A of this section any costs of legal defense and damages awarded by judgment of a court or by a compromise after institution of a suit for |ina medical malpractice claim or claims against such health care provider (“person” as defined herein) not to exceed 500,000 dollars plus interests and costs.
D. Any such judgment, settlement or compromise, including any costs of legal defense, rendered against any health care provider, as defined herein, shall be paid by the State of Louisiana. (Emphasis added)

Of this amendment, this Court has previously stated that “Act 660 of 1976 superseded [Act No. 66] by providing that a person providing health care on behalf of the state would not be liable for damages in excess of 500,000 dollars plus interests and costs for any injury or death of a patient due to malpractice, and that any judgment rendered against a health care provider would be paid by the state.” Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1101; see Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 5, 713 So.2d at 445 (“The amendment ... changed the provision that the malpractice, suit must be instituted solely against the state and instead allowed damages to be awarded against a covered “Person,” while .limiting his liability to $500,000 and providing the state shall pay that, judgment subject to the $500,000 limitation.”).

Thus, after its first amendment, the Public Act provided that lawsuits could be filed against the individual state health care provider, that a judgment could be rendered against an individual state health care provider, and that the state would pay any judgment rendered up to $500,000, plus interest and costs.

In 1977, the legislature approved an amendment to allow the state to file an incidental demand against a state health care provider or his medical malpractice insurer for reimbursement or indemnification for costs paid after a judgment in a malpractice action had become definitive. See Acts 1977, No. 744; Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1101. This provision was suspended, however, by House Concurrent Resolution No. 49. See R.S. 40:1299.39 “Historical and Statutory Notes”; Sibley, 477 So.2d at |nllOl. At this time, the legislature also amended Subsection (D) to provide that the state would pay any judgment “rendered against any health care provider” by legislative appropriation.

In Acts 1978, No. 611, the legislature rewrote portions of the Public Act regarding the limitation of liability and coverage, as follows:

B. Limitation of liability. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law to the contrary, no judgment shall be rendered, and no settlement or compromise shall be entered into for the injury or death of any patient in any action or claim for an alleged act of malpractice in excess of five hundred thousand dollars plus interests and costs.
C. Coverage. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary the state shall pay any damages, interest, cost of investigation and defense, and any other costs in connection with any claim lodged against any health care provider (“person” as defined herein) for an alleged act of medical malpractice, resulting in the injury or death of a patient up to the limits set forth in this Part.... (Emphasis added)

This 1978 amendment added new subsection (D), which provided that all malpractice claims “against the state” would be submitted to and administered by the Division of Administration of the state. Subsection (D) authorized the Division of Administration to investigate each malpractice claim, assemble all relevant data and coordinate with legal counsel designated by the attorney general for the defense of such cases. ■ The Division of Administration was given the authority to compromise and settle “any suit or claim” up to the $500,000 limit and to pay all defense and investigative costs, and any other costs incurred in connection with the defense of “these actions” as they accrued. A new subsection (G) was added which provided that “[a]ny person covered by this Part shall be considered as a named insured, and the coverage provided herein shall be primary.”

|1gActs 1986, No. 965 added the requirement to the Public Act that all malpractice claims against state health care providers which were not compromised or settled must be reviewed by a state medical review panel, and enacted LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39.1, which set forth the procedures and requirements for state medical review panels. Together, R.S. 40:1299.39 and R.S. 40:1299.39.1 comprise the complete procedure for the review and adjudication of medical malpractice suits involving the state and state health care providers. Reading these statutes in pari materia as they existed in 1986, their language evinced the legislature’s clear intention that individual state health care providers would be named as defendants in medical malpractice lawsuits.

The following emphasized language of R.S. 40:1299.39.1, as originally enacted, supports this conclusion. Subsection (A)(2)(a) provided that the filing of the request for a review of a claim would suspend the time “within which suit must be instituted ... in the case of the state or persons covered by this Part.” Subsection (B)(l)(a)(i) stated that “[n]o action against the state, its agencies, or a person covered by this Part, or his insurer, may be commenced in any court before the claimant’s complaint has been presented to a state medical review panel established pursuant to this Section.” Subsection (B)(1)(b) provided that if an opinion was not rendered within a stated period of time, “suit may be instituted against the state or a person covered by this Part.” Subsection (B)(3) suspended the running of prescription with respect to the state or person until a specified time. Thus, in 1986, when the legislature initially required medical malpractice claims against state health care providers to be first reviewed by state medical review panels, the legislature clearly intended that medical malpractice lawsuits would be filed against individual state health care providers covered under the Public Act.

|13In 1988, the Legislature added a new definition to the Public Act. Acts 1988, No. 786 added Subsection (A)(9) to R.S. 40:1299.39 which defined the “[r]ight to recover losses due to malpractice” as:

the substantive right in favor of a patient or his representative to receive, subject to the fiscal legislative discretion of appropriation, some measure of compensation in money or services or both from the state as and to the extent allowed by this Section, toward repairing any injury or losses proximately caused to him by an act of malpractice committed by a state health care provider as defined in this Section. [Emphasis added]

This addition was consistent with the other subsections of the Public Act which stated that it is the state alone from whom a successful malpractice claimant may recover damages or loss for the medical malpractice of a covered state health care provider. More important to our inquiry here, the 1988 act amended Subsections C, D and G to substantially their current forms. At the same time, the act reenacted all of the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.39.1 cited above as they were originally enacted. Thus, although the legislature rewrote the language establishing the right of recovery in Subsections C and D of R.S. 40:1299.39, with the effect that these subsections no longer described against whom lawsuits may be filed, it did not change the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.39.1 which clearly detail that lawsuits may be filed against the covered state health care providers. Later amendments to R.S. 40:1299.39.1 have not changed the cited language.

Considering the legislative histories of R.S. 40:1299.39 and R.S. 40:1299.39.1, we hold that a plaintiff may name an individual state health care provider covered | Uunder the Public Act as a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The practical effect of our holding is- that the plaintiff will be able to treat the covered state health care provider as a party, instead of a witness, and will enjoy the corresponding discovery and evidentiary benefits of this distinction. We believe this effect comports with the legislature’s intent to provide a patient/plaintiff with a special substantive sui generis statutory right to recover losses due to medical malpractice committed by a state health care provider.

Providing a right to recover losses due to the medical malpractice of state health care providers is but one legislative goal of the Public Act. In addition, “the [MLSSA] was passed to insure an adequate supply of physicians and other professionals providing health care services on behalf of the state (1) by prohibiting judgments based on an act of such a person’s malpractice in excess of $500,000, exclusive of medical expenses; and (2) by providing the state shall pay the judgments and costs of defense associated with such malpractice.” Conerly, 1997-0871 p. 9, 714 So.2d at 714; Ruiz, 1997-2412 p. 7, 713 So.2d at 446-47; Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1100 and 1102.

Although we hold that a plaintiff may name as a defendant an individual state health care provider covered under the Public Act, a judgment entered against an individual state health care provider in favor of a successful medical malpractice claimant would be inharmonious with the express language of the MLSSA. If it were otherwise, state health care providers would not be protected by the very act which was specifically intended to protect them from liability from judgments. The language of the MLSSA clearly provides that it is the state alone from whom a successful claimant may recover damages or loss for the medical malpractice of a covered state health care provider. Moreover, the legislative aim of ensuring an adequately supply of state health care professionals would be frustrated if judgments were entered against state health care providers. The essence of the MLSSA is that a person qualified or covered under the Public Act is insulated from being cast in judgment. As was stated in Ruiz, “the entire purpose of the MLSSA was to entice professionals to provide health care to patients on behalf of the state by protecting them against malpractice judgments.” Id, 1997-2412 p. 10, 713 So.2d at 448 (emphasis added).

As was argued by the state before this Court, if judgments are entered casting both the state and the individual state health care provider as liable for damages, the covered worker would suffer real harm even though it is the state who would ultimately indemnify the state health care provider. The practical consequences of casting a state health care provider in judgment jointly with the state are succinctly described by the dissenting opinion in Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center; with regard to state-employed physicians:

|iriTo allow the physicians to be cast in judgment jointly with the State renders the protection afforded by the act to be meaningless. It is no consolation to declare that they suffer no harm because they will be indemnified by the State. The recordation of the judgment will place a judicial mortgage on all of their real property, thereby preventing a sale of the physicians’ real property unless the judgment were paid out of the proceeds. They would be unable to purchase any real property, as the judgment would prevent a lender from financing the purchase. Their salaries could be garnished and their other assets seized.
Since the assets of the State are exempt from seizure, and should the State delay in satisfying the judgment for fiscal or other reasons, there would be nothing to prevent the judgment holder from proceeding to execute his judgment against all of the assets of the physicians that are not exempt from seizure.
The intent of the Act, to protect them from malpractice judgments in order to entice health care providers to work for the state, would be frustrated.

Thus, we hold that in a medical malpractice suit brought against the state and a qualified state health care provider, if the court finds the state health care provider committed medical malpractice, judgment must be entered for the successful claimant against the state alone.

CONCLUSION

Considering the foregoing holdings, we reverse the court of appeal ruling which granted the defendants’ exception of no cause of action and reinstate the judgment of the trial court which allows the plaintiffs to file a medical malpractice lawsuit against the individual state health care providers covered under the Public Act. We further hold that, in the event that the state health care providers are found by the court to have committed medical malpractice, any judgment in favor of the successful claimants will be entered against the State of Louisiana alone.

[ ^REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED; REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

VICTORY, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.

HIGHTOWER, J., ad hoc, dissents in part for the reasons expressed by VICTORY, J.

VICTORY, J.,

dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority’s opinion insofar as it holds that the MLSSA “prohibits the entry of a judgment against the covered health care provider,” but dissent from the portion of their opinion that allows a state health care provider to be named as defendant. La. R.S. 40:1299.39(0 alone provides the mechanism by which private individuals may recover from the state for medical malpractice. This subsection provides the general rule that “there is no right nor legal basis ex delicto or ex quasi delicto, for an action by a patient ... to recover damages ... from the state or state health care provider” However, it goes on to provide that “a patient ... shall have a right to recover from the state certain losses ...” Thus, this section lays out the general rule that no action may be taken against either the state health care provider or the state, and then gives the right to recover from only the state in certain cases. Among the statutory authority cited in the majority opinion, this provision alone provides a cause of action for medical malpractice, and only against the state. Thus, the right to name a state health care provider in an action does not seem to logically comport with the | ¡.language of the statutes.

Furthermore, in my view, the legislature, having clearly declared any right of recovery within the MLSSA to exist solely against the state, did not intend for individual public physicians to be named as defendants in such actions. As the court of appeal noted, this Court has recognized that the purpose of the malpractice statute was to “afford or enhance protection of physicians and other persons providing health care to patients on behalf of the state.” Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094, 1102 (La.1985). The approach taken by the majority seems to undermine and diminish the protections afforded by the statute in favor of those professionals who provide health care on behalf of the state.

hHIGHTOWER, J., ad hoc, dissenting in part.

I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part for the reasons expressed by Justice Victory.

       Retired Judge Lemmie O. Hightower, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting in place of Associate Justice Jeannette T. Knoll.

      . Detillier, et al. v. Kenner Regional Medical Center, et al., 03-1042 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/6/03) (unpublished).

      . Detillier, et al. v. Kenner Regional Medical Center, et al, 2003-3259 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 835.

      . The MLSSA defines a "state health care provider” or "person covered by this Part” to mean "(i) the state ... and employees thereof when acting within the course and scope of their duties in providing health care in connection with such state entity; or (ii) A person acting in a professional capacity in providing health care services, by or on behalf of the state....” LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39(A)(l)(a)(i) and (ii).

      . The other subsections of the Public Act do not address this issue. Subsection A sets forth the definitions applicable to the Public Act. Subsection B specifies the standard of care. Subsection E sets forth the requirement that all medical malpractice claims which are not first compromised and settled must be submitted to administrative review in the form of a medical review panel in accordance with LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39.1, unless the state waives such review. Subsection E also provides requirements for medical review panel claims and complaints and gives these actions priority once they are filed in district court. Subsection F limits the liability of an alleged act of malpractice covered under the Public Act to $500,000 plus interest and costs, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits and, in Paragraphs (1)-(12), details the procedures applicable to recovery of those specific types of damage. Subsections H, I, J, and L sets forth the internal administrative management of medical malpractice claims against the state. Subsection M excludes political subdivisions from the scope of the state's liability under the Public Act. Subsection N limits the state’s liability to encompass only sums arising from medical malpractice.

      . The MLSSA has been amended many times since its enactment. Only those amendments which impact upon the question at issue herein will be discussed in this legislative history.

      . See Minutes of House Comm, of Civil Law and Procedure, July 21, 1976, p. 4.

      . At this time, there was no procedural mechanism for "claims” to be brought before a state medical review panel; thus, the use of the term "claim” as used here is assumed to include the filing of a lawsuit.

      . Later amendments to Subsection C substituted "action by a patient” for "action in a patient,” changed "section” to "Section,” and deleted a final sentence which stated "Such right and action shall also be subject to legislative appropriation, as required by the Constitution.” See Acts 1989, No. 547. Later amendment to Subsection D separated the section into subsections (1) and (2)

      . See Acts 1991, No. 661; Acts 1992, No. 107; Acts 1997, No." 664; Acts 1999, No. 610; Acts 2003 Nos. 644, 961 and 1263.

      . We reach our conclusion on grounds other than those urged by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that failure to name a covered state health care provider as a defendant in a medical malpractice law suit would result in confusion as to the applicable standard of care. We believe that a well-pleaded petition properly alerts the defendants as to applicable standard of care which a plaintiff claims has been breached.
      The plaintiffs also asserted that state health care providers who committed medical malpractice would be shielded from being reported to national medical malpractice data banks in violation of public policy if individual state health care providers were not named as defendants in medical malpractice lawsuits. However, the provisions of 45 CFR § 60 et seq., which set forth the reporting and disclosure requirements for the National Practitioner Data Bank, show otherwise. These regulations apply to entities making payments as a result of medical malpractice actions or claims. 45 CFR § 60.2. In the case of covered state health care providers, who are "considered as a named insured” under the Public Act at R.S. 40:1299.39(K), the state pays all damages and losses as a result of their medical malpractice. Therefore, it is the state, which is the "entity ... which makes a payment ... for the benefit of a ... health care practitioner in settlement of or in satisfaction in whole or in part of a claim or a judgment against such ... health care practitioner for medical malpractice,” which is required to report “the act or omission upon which the medical malpractice claim is based,” and other information, to the National Practitioner Data Bank. 45 CFR § 60.7(a). Under the procedures applicable to the National Medical Malpractice Data Bank, it is the payment of a medical malpractice claim, and not whether a health care provider is a named defendant in a lawsuit or judgment, which triggers the responsibility of the entity making payment to report medical malpractice.

      . 2002-1559 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/14/03), 858 So.2d 454, 468-469, writ denied, 2003-1748 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 761.

      . We note that a recent amendment to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.39.l(I)(3)(b) and (4)(b) appears to be inconsistent with the legislative scheme of the MLSSA and our holding today. Acts 2003, No. 1263 amended these subsections to provide for payment by the state "or person covered by this Part” to reimburse a successful claimant for the cost of obtaining the cash or surety bond posted by the claimant for the state medical review panel. The provisions of these subsections are not directly before the Court, therefore, we decline to render an opinion as to whether they violate the statutory scheme of the MLSSA.


author: hKNOLL, Justice. WEIMER, J., VICTORY, J;, | ¶ TRAYLOR, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie CAMPBELL, Jr.
    No. 2003-K-3035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2004.

      Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, Geary S. Aycock, Assistant District Attorney, Stephen T. Sylvester, Assistant District Attorney, for applicant.
    Bobby R. Manning, for respondent.
   hKNOLL, Justice.

This criminal cases concerns whether La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 prohibits the State from adjudicating repeat DWI offenders as habitual offenders under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to quash and dismissed the State’s habitual offender bill. The court of appeal affirmed, holding a defendant convicted of a third DWI cannot be sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 for prior felonies. We granted the State’s application to resolve the conflict between the DWI sentencing provisions in La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 and the Habitual Offender Statute, codified at La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. State v. Campbell, 03-3035 (La.3/12/04), 869 So.2d 802. For the following reasons we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged the defendant, Willie Campbell, Jr., with driving on March 16, 2002 while intoxicated — third offense. The defendant had prior DWI convictions entered in March 1993 and July 1996. After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as charged.

The State filed an habitual offender bill under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1, alleging prior felony convictions for attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling in | ¡.December 1990 and for simple burglary in July 1996. The defendant moved to quash the bill, arguing the filing of an habitual offender bill under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1in relation to a conviction for DWI — Third Offense irreconcilably conflicts with the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(D)(l)(a) which states, in pertinent part: “... Thirty days of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The remainder of the sentence of imprisonment shall be suspended and the offender shall be required to undergo an evaluation to determine the nature and extent of the offender’s substance abuse disorder.” After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to quash. The court sentenced the defendant to five years imprisonment at hard labor, thirty days to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence, suspended the remainder of the term, in lieu of which defendant was sentenced to home incarceration, and imposed a two thousand dollar fine. Additionally, the court allowed the defendant to keep his vehicle but ordered him to pay four hundred dollars to the criminal court fund, the amount determined as the value of the car.

The State appealed the district court’s grant of the motion to quash, arguing it was not the Legislature’s intent to give multiple DWI offenders probated or suspended sentences when they had prior non-DWI felony convictions. The State contended the district court judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for the sentencing of defendant in accordance with the habitual offender statute, which prohibits probation or suspension of sentence. The court of appeal affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding express legislative prohibition in La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 that “circumscribes the district attorney’s discretion to seek enhancement under the habitual offender statute.” State v.Campbell, 37,485 p. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/16/03), 859 So.2d 223, 224.

JjDISCUSSXON

Recently, this court addressed the amendments made by the Legislature to the sentencing provisions for third or subsequent DWI offenses in State v. Mayeux, 01-3195 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 526. There we noted “while the new law retains the sentencing ranges provided for third and fourth DWI offenders, it radically changes the way in which the offender serves the sentence imposed by the court.” Id., p. 3-4, 820 So.2d at 528.

Before the amendments to La.Rev.Stat. 14:98, a third DWI offender faced a penalty from one to five years with or without hard labor, six months of which ran without suspension of sentence, probation or parole. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:98(D)(l)(West 2001). If a portion of the sentence was imposed with benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, the offender was required to participate in court-approved substance abuse and driver improvement programs. Id.

The Legislature made substantial changes to La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 in 2001 La. Acts 1163. The penalty ranges remained the same, but the mandatory jail time was reduced from six months to thirty days for a third DWI offender and from two years to sixty days for a fourth offender. The enactment revised La.Rev.Stat. 14:98, which now reads, in pertinent part:

D. (l)(a) On a conviction of a third offense, notwithstanding any other pro visions of law to the contrary and regardless of whether the offense occurred before or after an earlier conviction, the offender shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than one year nor more than five years and shall be fined two thousand dollars. Thirty days of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The remainder of the sentence of imprisonment shall be suspended and the offender shall be required to undergo an evaluation to determine the nature and extent of the offender’s substance abuse disorder.
(b) The treatment professional performing the evaluation shall recommend appropriate treatment modalities which shall include substance abuse treatment at an inpatient facility recommended by the Department of Health |4and Hospitals, office for addictive disorders and approved by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for a period of not less than four weeks and not more than six weeks.
* * *
(d) Upon successful completion of the inpatient substance abuse treatment required by this Paragraph, the offender shall be sentenced to home incarceration for not less than the period of time remaining on the offender’s suspended sentence....
(e) If the offender fails to complete the substance abuse treatment required by the provisions of this Paragraph or violates any condition of home incarceration, he shall be imprisoned for the original term of his suspended sentence with no credit for time served under home incarceration. La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 (emphasis added).'

The Legislature, in the same Act, added the following significant language:

G. The legislature hereby finds and declares that conviction of a third or subsequent DWI offense is presumptive evidence of the existence of a substance abuse disorder in the offender posing a serious threat to the health and safety of the public. Further, the legislature finds that there are successful treatment methods available for treatment of addictive disorders.... La.Rev.Stat. 14:98.

Thus, it is evident the Legislature revised the law in order to mandate treatment for third and subsequent DWI offenders. The Legislature decided to give those suffering from this addictive disorder a chance at recovery in lieu of imprisonment; the “legislation is an attempt to treat the disease [alcoholism] and give the offender a chance at a normal life.” Hearings on House Bill No. 665 Before the House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice, April 10, 2001, at p. 11. Should the offender fail to complete the treatment or violate any term of the home incarceration, he would then be imprisoned for the remainder of his sentence.

Therefore, pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 the defendant here, as a third DWI offender, was subject to a sentence of five years at hard labor, with all but thirty days of which “shall be suspended.” The first thirty days must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant was placed on probation for the remainder of the suspended sentence, sentenced to home | fiipcarceration and ordered to pay a fine of two thousand dollars, all in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(l)(a).

Before we address the State’s argument and our-resolution of the conflict between La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 and La.Rev.Stat. 14:98, an error patent review reveals the district court allowed the defendant to keep the car he was driving at the time of the offense, ordering him to pay an extra four hundred dollars to the criminal court fund before the end of his probation. However, this appears to be in contravention of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(2)(a), which orders that the vehicle being driven by the offender at the time of the offense shall be impounded and sold at auction. The district court apparently took notice of the fact that the defendant’s girlfriend was a co-owner of the vehicle. The vehicle is exempt from sale if the owner was not the driver and did not know the driver was operating the vehicle while intoxicated. La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(2)(b). Even though the State apparently acquiesced in this judgment and does not complain of this potential error, we do not ignore patent errors favorable to the defendant when the State does not complain about them. State v. Williams, 2000-1725, p. 9-10 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798. Under the provisions of La.Code Cr. Pro. art. 882, “[a]n illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by ... an appellate court on review.”

However, we find there are questions that need to be answered before determining the car co-owned by the defendant and his girlfriend should be seized and sold. First, the vehicle “shall be exempt from sale if ... the owner did not know that the driver was operating the vehicle while intoxicated.” La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(2)(b). There was no determination by the court below as to whether the defendant’s girlfriend, co-owner of the subject vehicle, knew the defendant was driving the vehicle while intoxicated. If it is proven the co-owner had knowledge the defendant was | Bdriving the vehicle while intoxicated, then the vehicle must be seized and sold, in accordance with the clear dictates of La.RewStat. 14:98 D(2). Second, if it is proven the co-owner did not have knowledge the defendant was driving the car while intoxicated, it should then be determined whether the statutory exemption provided by La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(2)(b) applies to a co-owner who does not have knowledge the other co-owner is driving the vehicle while intoxicated. These factual determinations are best made by a trial court after a hearing in which the judge has the benefit of full briefing and argument. Therefore, we will remand this matter to the district court, for it to determine whether the co-owner of the vehicle had knowledge the defendant was driving the vehicle while intoxicated. If she did, then the court must refund any portion of the four hundred dollars paid by the defendant and order the car to be seized and sold in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 14:98. Should the district court find the co-owner did not have knowledge the defendant was driving while intoxicated, then the court must decide whether the vehicle is subject to seizure and sale, considering the statutory exemption from sale when an owner of the ear does not know the driver is driving while drunk.

Turning to the issue for which we granted writs, we must now determine whether the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 preclude a third DWI offender, who has two prior felony convictions for non-DWI offenses, from being sentenced under Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law. The State argues the defendant is subject to the recidivist punishment provisions of La. Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 A(l)(b)(i), which provide for a mandatory punishment of not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the [third] conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. The State further contends the sentence 17should be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 G. According to the State, it was not the Legislature’s intent for third and fourth DWI offenders to escape the recidivist punishment provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 when the defendant has other non-DWI felony convictions.

The defendant contends the State, in its haste to circumvent the legislative purpose for amending the sentencing of DWI offenders, overlooks the clear reading of the act itself. The defendant further argues in order to give the appropriate deference to the legislative branch, the judiciary must give great weight to the unambiguous legislative purpose of a statute.

The district court sentenced the defendant in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(l), which provides, inter alia, “notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary ... the offender shall be imprisoned ... no[ ] more than five years ... [t]he remainder of the sentence of imprisonment shall be suspended ...” (Emphasis added).

Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation, and rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute. State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819 (La.1992). The rules of statutory construction applicable in this case are those pertinent to conflicting statutes.

|Jt is presumed the Legislature enacts each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dish, 02-0439, p. 13 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 24. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption that the Legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial decisions interpreting those statutes. Id. at p. 13-14; State v. Bedford, 01-2298, p. 3 (La.1/28/03), 838 So.2d 758, 760. It is further presumed the legislative branch intends to achieve a consistent body of law. Piazza, 596 So.2d at 819; 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23:9, p. 461 (6th ed.2002). Therefore, we proceed under the premise that in amending La.Rev.Stat. 14:98, the Legislature was aware that mandating suspension of the sentence would necessarily preclude enhancing the sentence as a third felony conviction pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law, which prohibits any sentence imposed under the provisions of 15:529.1 to have the benefit of probation or suspension. As we have previously observed, the Legislature has clearly stated its intention to embrace treatment measures in preference to incarceration. Mayeux, at p. 5, 820 So.2d at 529; La.Rev. Stat. 14:98 G. Representative Odinet, one of the sponsors of the bill that contained the amendments at issue here, explained the purpose of the legislation was “(1) to give treatment to those in need of treatment; and (2) to allow incarceration to be reduced to allow more space in state prisons for violent criminals.” Hearings on H.B. No. 665, supra, at p. 9.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character. Fontenot, p. 20, 836 So.2d at 28; City of Pineville v. American Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3352, 2000-1983, p. 4 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 609, 612. While Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law prohibits probation or suspension of sentence for any sentence imposed under its provisions, the more specific statute, which applies solely to operating a vehicle while intoxicated, specifically provides “notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary ... the remainder of the sentence shall be suspended....” Not only is La. Rev.Stat. 14:98 the statute specifically directed to DWI third offenders, but the plain language of that statute instructs the sentencing court in no uncertain terms that it must not stray from the sentencing provisions contained in that statute, even in the event those terms conflict with other provisions of law.

A criminal statute must be given a genuine construction consistent with the plain meaning of the language in light of its context and with reference to the purpose of the provision. La.Rev.Stat. 14:3; State v. Anders, 01-556, p. 3 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 513, 515. Moreover, it is a well-established tenet of statutory construction that criminal statutes are subject to strict construction under the rule of lenity. State v. Carr, 99-2209, p. 4 (La.5/26/00), 761 So.2d 1271, 1274. The rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal laws, but also to the penalties imposed by those laws. Piazza, 596 So.2d at 820, (citing Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980)). When a criminal statute provides inconsistent penalties, the rule of lenity directs the court to impose the least severe penalty. Piazza, 596 So.2d at 820. It naturally follows that in giving a genuine construction consistent with the plain language of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(l), and keeping in mind the strict construction mandated under the rule of lenity, the defendant’s sentence cannot be enhanced without benefit of suspension pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. The plain language of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(l) mandates a suspended sentence and treatment for the substance abuse disorder, notwithstanding [many other provision of law to the contrary.

The provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 B(l) cannot be harmonized with La.Rev. Stat. 15:529.1 A(l)(b) and G. In accordance with the intent evidenced by the Legislature in enacting 2001 La. Acts 1163, and the principle that the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue should prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character, we find the district court correctly applied the sentencing provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98. The trial court did not err in quashing the State’s habitual offender bill.

For all these reasons, we find a DWI third-offender cannot be sentenced pursuant to Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law, even where that defendant has two prior non-DWI felony convictions. Habitual offender adjudication under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 would preclude the trial court from crafting a sentence which complied with the requirements of La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D. The Legislature’s intent to mandate treatment of the addictive disorder for a third DWI offender is clearly evident. The revision to La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(l)(a), mandating suspension of the sentence in order for the defendant to receive treatment, is the more specific statute. Finally, the rules of statutory construction and well established jurisprudence of this state direct the resolution of any conflict in criminal statutes is made in favor of the defendant.

Additionally, we note that while the record demonstrates the trial judge, was aware the defendant was to receive substance abuse treatment from the State once he was released from prison, the court failed to include the appropriate order in the judgment. Therefore, we will further remand this matter to the district court in order for that court to amend the judgment, ordering the defendant to undergo an evaluation to determine the nature and extent of his substance abuse disorder, and to undergo the treatment recommended, which shall include substance abuse treatment at an inpatient | ^facility recommended by the Department of Health and Hospitals and approved by the Department of Public Safety.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the lower courts are affirmed. This case is remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the vehicle should be seized and sold, and to amend the judgment so as to order evaluation and treatment of the substance abuse disorder.

AFFIRMED.

WEIMER, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, J., dissents.

VICTORY and TRAYLOR, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring.

I concur in the result except, as a practical matter and because the State apparently acquiesced and does not complain of a potential error, I would not remand for a determination of whether this vehicle should be seized and sold.

VICTORY, J;,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Under the majority’s opinion a defendant who has two prior felonies and then is convicted of DWI a third time is exposed to no more jail time than the defendant who has three DWIs, but no prior felony convictions. In my view, it is clear that La. R.S. 14:98(D) addresses those who are only third time DWI offenders, and should not effectively limit the “Habitual Offender Law” as written in La. R.S. 15:529.1 et seq.

| ¶ TRAYLOR, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority opinion, and would vacate the trial court’s granting of the motion to quash the habitual offender bill. In my opinion, the mandatory sentence imposed by La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(D)(l)(a) does not preclude enhancement of third offender DWI sentence. A person convicted solely of a third offense DWI is subject to its provisions. A DWI sentence, however, is still a felony offense which falls under the rubric of La.Rev. Stat. 15:529.1, the habitual offender law. When an offender is convicted of a DWI third offender offense and has prior convictions, he is then subject to sentencing as an habitual offender. Although La.Rev. Stat. 15:529.1(G), provides, “[a]ny sentence imposed under the provision of [the habitual offender law] shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence,” this provision addresses only the enhanced sentence and does not conflict with the mandatory sentence imposed by La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(D)(l)(a).

      . The State argues for a minimum sentence of forty months and a maximum sentence of ten years. While the calculation of forty months is correct (two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction [third offense DWI]) as the longest possible term for that conviction is five years (sixty months), the calculation of ten years is problematic. The maximum sentence is "not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]” Here that would translate to one year, as the longest possible sentence for a first DWI conviction is six months. La. Rev.Stat. 14:98 B(l). The State is obviously arguing for a maximum based upon twice the longest possible sentence for the third DWI conviction; the longest possible sentence for a third DWI conviction is five years. A reading with the calculation based on correct application of the statutes would result in a minimum sentence that is longer than the maximum sentence. This application could lead to absurd consequences. We note this ambiguity for the sake of thoroughness, but we will not decide what the correct calculation of the maximum sentence should be, as we find the defendant is not subject to the sentencing provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. We reserve this issue for another time, as it could arise in the penalty enhancement calculation for other crimes subject to the habitual offender statute. -


text:
    Dallas ANTOINE, Jr. v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2004.
   In re Arnold, Louise T.; Continental Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2000-3733; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 04-00754.

Granted. There are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the second surgery was necessitated by the first accident. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of causation is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

KIMBALL, J., would deny the writ.

KNOLL, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    In re LOUISIANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ASBESTOS CASES.
    No. 2004-0-1435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2004.
   In re Honeywell International Inc.; Amax Metals Recovery Inc.; Columbian Chemicals Company; Blount Inc.; Rust Engineering Company; H.B. Zachry Company; Colfax Corporation; Ajax Boiler & Heater Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Motion to Vacate Appointment of Ad Hoc Judge and Alternative Application for Rehearing, Parish of Morehouse, and Parish of Ouachita.

Denied.


text:
    In re LOUISIANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ASBESTOS CASES.
    No. 2004-0-1479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2004.
   In re Olin Corporation; — Defendant; Applying for Motion to Vacate Order Appointing Ad Hoc Judge, Parish of More-house, and Parish of Ouachita.

Denied.


text:
    Shirline Saulny FRANCIS v. Ezetta SAULNY, Dollar Rent-A-Car, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-CC-1591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2004.
   In re DTG Operations, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 487-511, 487-613; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CW 1359.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Curtis MANUEL, Jr. v. Edith MANUEL, Born McFarland.
    No. 2004-CC-1588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2004.
   In re Manuel, Edith; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-16147; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 04-00462.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Gregory T. BENNETT/Ava M. Thomas v. Yvonne HUGHES.
    No. 2004-C-1599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2004.
   In re Hughes, Yvonne; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Second City Court of New Orleans, No. 35941; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1727.

Denied.


text:
    Tameko BENJAMIN, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Darione BENJAMIN v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2004-C-1058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Housing Authority of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 96-13597; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1918.

Granted.


text:
    Linda FRITH v. RIVERWOOD, INC.
    No. 2004-C-1086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Frith, Linda; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist.-5, No. 00-07932; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 1340.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Milton LAWRENCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-3270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Lawrence, Milton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, Nor. 197-348. *

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed on or about January 2003. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jessie SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-3460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Simmons, Jessie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 262-364.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion for production of Boykin transcript filed on or about July 28, 2003. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry KELLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0835.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Kelly, Terry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 256-341.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed on or about November 5, 2003. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.