text:
    James Robert SANDERS v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2001-KA-00795-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 16, 2003.

      Eugene A. Perrier, Vicksburg, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General, by Charles W. Maris, Jr., attorneys for appel-lee.
    Before PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER AND CARLSON, JJ.
   CARLSON, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. Having been indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced for murder and armed robbery, James Robert Sanders (Sanders) appeals from the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Warren County, claiming that the circuit court erred in holding that because Sanders had re-initiated conversation with law enforcement after he requested an attorney, his waiver of rights was effective, and thus, his confession could be admitted. Finding the correct standard was applied in determining Sanders’s confession was admissible, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 2. On March 13, 2000, James Robert Sanders (Sanders) was arrested for the murder of Paul Moore (Moore) after Sanders’s brother, Greg, told local law enforcement where Moore’s body could be found. After his arrest, Sanders confessed that he had shot Moore but the killing was not intentional.

¶ 3. On May 2, 2000, Sanders was indicted on the charges of murder (Count I) and armed robbery (Count II). Sanders filed a motion to suppress his confession, and a hearing was held prior to the trial. The trial court denied Sanders’s motion and allowed the confession to be admitted into evidence. The trial began on March 26, 2001, and at the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Sanders guilty of the crimes of murder and armed robbery. Two days after the guilty verdicts were returned, the circuit judge sentenced Sanders to a term of life imprisonment for murder (Count I) and to a term of life imprisonment without parole for armed robbery. Sanders filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. Sanders also asked the trial court to set aside the verdict and find him guilty of manslaughter, or in the alternative, grant him a new trial. Upon the trial court’s denial of all post-trial motions, Sanders appealed to this Court, raising only one issue which has been restated for the sake of clarity:

WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING SANDERS’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE SANDERS’S RECORDED AND TRANSCRIBED CONFESSION.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶4. The substantive facts of this case are not in dispute on this appeal. On the night of February 18, 2000, Sanders lured Moore into a remote wooded area in Warren County. Once they reached the woods, Sanders’s brother, Greg, led the way with Sanders bringing up the rear. Greg testified he heard the click of a gun, and when he turned around, Sanders had the gun aimed at the back of Moore’s head and fired. Although Sanders claims he and Moore were in the midst of a heated argument, Greg testified he never heard any raised voices. Sanders and his brother left the body in the woods and drove away in Moore’s car. Sanders claimed he never touched Moore’s body, nor did he take anything from him, but Sanders testified he did remember his brother, Greg, throwing Moore’s pager out of the car window as they were leaving the scene. Moore’s pager and wallet were both missing from the crime scene.

¶ 5. In due course, Sanders filed a motion to suppress his confession claiming the statement “was not freely and voluntarily given but was the product of duress and coercion, physical and mental fatigue, torture and harassment, coupled with promises of favor made by the Sheriff in order to get him to waive his rights and give a statement, without the benefit of counsel.... ” Pursuant to the motion, the trial court conducted a pre-trial suppression hearing. The following recitation of facts is gleaned from the transcript of that suppression hearing.

¶ 6. On March 13, 2000, at the request of the Warren County Sheriffs Department, the Rankin County Sheriffs Department arrested James Sanders. Sanders was advised of his rights by Rankin County Sheriff Ken Dickerson. He was then placed in the back of a patrol car and taken to Sutherland’s Lumber Company in Pearl where he was turned over to the Warren County Sheriffs Department. Both Sheriff Dickerson and Rankin County Investigator Chad Dixon testified that Sanders never made a statement of any kind in their presence, nor did he request an attorney. Sheriff Dickerson and Investigator Dixon also testified Sanders was informed that he was under arrest for capital murder.

¶ 7. Sheriff Martin Pace and Undersher-iff Jeff Riggs of the Warren County Sheriffs Department transported Sanders back to Warren County. Sheriff Pace informed Sanders of his rights as soon as Sanders was transferred into his custody. Sheriff Pace recorded those rights as he gave them through the E-911 Dispatch Center in Vicksburg. A printout from the E-911 recording indicates the time and date that the rights were given. There was also a recording made of Sheriff Pace advising Sanders of his rights. Sheriff Pace testified that no interrogation or questioning occurred during the trip from Rankin County to Warren County. Both Sheriff Pace and Undersheriff Riggs testified they did not recall Sanders ever requesting an attorney while Sanders was in their custody. Both officials also testified no promises were made to Sanders in exchange for his testimony, nor was he coerced or tortured in any way.

¶ 8. Sheriff Pace was questioned regarding Sanders’s statement made to him the night Sanders was arrested. Although Sheriff Pace testified he did not recall Sanders ever requesting an attorney, he was asked to refer to Sanders’s confession where Sanders stated “requested a lawyer but now I’ve [sic] waiving those rights.”

MARTIN PACE James, I first had contact with you this evening in Rankin County in the presence of Sheriff Ken Dickerson and a number of his deputies. As soon as you were in my car with Undersheriff Jeff Riggs and myself, I advised you of some rights. Do you recall that?
JAMES SANDERS Yes sir.
MARTIN PACE And what was your response to that?
JAMES SANDERS Uh ... at the time I said that I understood and ...
MARTIN PACE Okay.
JAMES SANDERS ... requested a lawyer but now I’ve [sic] waiving those rights.
MARTIN PACE Okay, which brings me to this point. I read you rights and you made that statement and then at some point before we got back to Vicksburg you said that you would like to talk to me if it was just me, is that correct?
JAMES SANDERS Correct.
MARTIN PACE Okay, and was there any coercion or for that matter, even any conversation leading up to that?
JAMES SANDERS No sir.

Sheriff Pace stated at the suppression hearing that he still did not recall a conversation where Sanders ever requested an attorney, but if Sanders did request an attorney, he would have to assume it would have been in response to their first contact with Sanders.

¶ 9. At the suppression hearing, Sanders attempted to refute the testimony of the law enforcement officials. He testified that after he was arrested by the Rankin County Sheriffs Department and he was read his rights by Sheriff Dickerson, he asked the sheriff if he could have a lawyer. He claims the sheriff informed him that would all be taken care of in Warren County. Sanders testified he was read his rights by Sheriff Pace when he was placed into the custody of the Warren County Sheriffs Department. He stated he understood the rights and was even able to repeat them back to Sheriff Pace. On direct examination Sanders testified at the suppression hearing:

Q. And what, after the, as you were being transported to Vicksburg, what occurred between you and the Sheriff and the Under Sheriff?
A. We were in the car for about an hour and a whole bunch of different things occurred. After we got in motion and we took off, we didn’t say anything for a good couple of minutes. I mean, it was just dead silence in the car. And he asked me if there was anything that I wanted to talk about. He said that he knows that there are two sides to every story and if I wanted to say something it would be okay. And I told him—
Q. Who is he?
A. Martin Pace.
Q. Okay and what did you say at that time?
A. I told him at that time that I wasn’t trying to be rude and I’m not trying to be hard or anything but I think I need to get a lawyer first. And he didn’t say anything else for a few more minutes.
Q. And did he try further to interrogate you further there after?
A. I mean, he was probably, in fact, the nicest guy you would ever meet on this trip. Ah, I mean, we talked a pretty good bit about my grandfather and stuff because he knew my grandfather. I talked with Riggs for a little while about, you know, my grandmother and everything else. And I asked him something about the charge, I don’t remember exactly what it was but I was told that I was under arrest for capital murder. And I was asking him about the variations between first degree and second degree murder. And he explained to me that in Mississippi there was no first or second degree murder or anything like that, it was capital murder and murder, and manslaughter, and that was it. Ah, he told me that if (sic) would go ahead and talk with him that he would see to it that I just got a murder charge and that way it wouldn’t be capital and that way there wouldn’t be any death penalty involved in it or anything like that. There’s just conversation, is the best I can put it. A couple of minutes after that I told him that if that was the case I would talk to him, just him, and nobody else but him and I wasn’t going to promise him anything.

(emphasis added).

¶ 10. Sanders was questioned regarding the confession he made the night he was arrested. He testified that he remembered waiving his rights and issuing the statement. He also testified that at the conclusion of his confession he stated he was made no promises and no one coerced him into making the statement.

MARTIN PACE Let me ask you this in conclusion. This is just a re ... recover what we talked about in the beginning. Is it your statement that this has been a ... a true and voluntary statement on your part? Is what you’ve told me tonight the truth?
JAMES SANDERS Yes sir.
MARTIN PACE And have you told me this for any reason other than you wanted to talk to me?
JAMES SANDERS No sir.
MARTIN PACE And are you satisfied that your rights have been protected and that you had ...
JAMES SANDERS And I’ve had every opportunity to get it right if I wanted.

¶ 11. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found that Sanders made an offer to talk with the Sheriff regarding the death of Paul Moore. The trial court also found the only evidence presented to the court that Sanders had ever requested an attorney came from Sanders. The trial court stated both Sheriffs’ Departments denied Sanders ever made such a request in their presence. Therefore, the trial court held that Sanders waived his right to an attorney when he told the Sheriff he wanted to talk to him when they arrived at the station. Pursuant to Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1123 (Miss.1997); Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82 (Miss.1996); Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731 (Miss.1992); and Gentry v. State, 416 So.2d 650 (Miss.1982), the trial court found no Sixth Amendment violation.

¶ 12. The trial court also determined according to the testimony that there was no evidence of coercion or torture and that Sanders voluntarily, freely and intelligently waived his rights when he gave his statement. Therefore, there was also no Fifth Amendment violation. Thus, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13. Sanders argues that he requested legal counsel after being informed of his constitutional rights by the Sheriff of Warren County. Sanders also claims the sheriff promised not to charge him with capital murder if he would give a statement regarding the death of Paul Moore. Sanders argues his constitutional rights were violated when the sheriff pursued the interrogation after Sanders requested an attorney without a significant intervening event or substantial passing of time.

¶ 14. The State argues even if Sanders did request an attorney, he re-initiated conversation with the sheriff regarding the crime, and thus, his later waiver of rights was effective. The State also correctly notes Sanders inaccurately states the law when he claims that if he was unable to consult with legal counsel, an “equally significant intervening event must have occurred.”

¶ 15. This Court in Baldwin v. State, 757 So.2d 227 (Miss.2000), discussed the heavy burden which must be met in order for an appellate court to overturn a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to suppress:

A trial court is also given deference in the admissibility of an incriminating statement by a criminal defendant. In Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996), this Court held that the defendant seeking to reverse an unfavorable ruling on a motion to suppress bears a heavy burden. The determination of whether a statement should be suppressed is made by the trial judge as the finder of fact. Id. “Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or the decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 742 (Miss.1992); Alexander v. State, 736 So.2d 1058, 1062 (Miss.Ct.App.1999).

Baldwin, 757 So.2d at 231. “Where, on conflicting evidence, the lower court admits a statement into evidence this Court generally must affirm.” Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998) (citing Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 87 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 16. The United States Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held when a suspect invokes his right to counsel, all interrogation must cease until the lawyer is present, unless the suspect himself reinitiates communication with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d 241 (Miss.2001); Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992). The United States Supreme Court in Edwards stated that:

[Wjhen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police — initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. [An accused], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85.

¶ 17. In Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992), the defendant, after killing a Panola County Deputy Sheriff in an attempt to escape custody, made a full confession and waiver of rights to law enforcement officials. Mettetal filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statement, but his motion was denied. Id. at 867. At the hearing, Mettetal argued he made repeated requests for an attorney, but he was never provided with legal counsel. Id. Law enforcement officials testified Mette-tal never requested an attorney, and had he made such a request, the interrogation would have stopped and an attorney would have been provided. Id. at 867-68. This Court held the trial court used the correct standard in denying the motion to suppress. Id. at 868. Mettetal testified he understood his rights, and his contention that he asked for an attorney was refuted by three different law enforcement officials. Id.

¶ 18. In Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d 241 (Miss.2001), the defendant was interrogated by law enforcement officials and requested a lawyer four times before the interview ceased. However, several days later the defendant re-initiated conversation with the Sheriffs Department and made a written statement during the interview. Id. at 246-47. This Court held the defendant “clearly waived any right to an attorney he might theoretically have had at the time he confessed.” Id. at 248.

¶ 19. According to the record, especially Sanders’s own testimony at the suppression hearing, Sanders did not request an attorney, if he requested an attorney at all, until after Sheriff Pace asked him if he would like to discuss his arrest. He stated he would rather wait until his attorney was present. His statement then indicates that Sanders re-initiated the conversation with the sheriff and undersheriff by discussing his charges and the possible punishment he could receive. The trial court used the correct standard in finding that Sanders offered to talk to the sheriff after being advised of his constitutional rights, and thus, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

¶ 20. Sanders also claims his statement was not voluntary due to the fact he was promised a charge of murder instead of capital murder if he confessed. However, both Sheriff Pace and Undersheriff Riggs testified no promises were made to Sanders to induce him to give a statement. The trial court again used the correct standard in finding Sanders’s statement was given freely and voluntarily. He was advised of his rights at least three times, and on one of those occasions was able to recite his rights back to the sheriff. In Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028, 1037 (Miss.1998), this Court stated:

[Wjhether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 742 (Miss.1992).

The trial court’s ruling is supported by the record and, therefore, is affirmed by this Court.

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. The trial court did not err in admitting the recorded and transcribed confession of Sanders. Although he claimed to have requested an attorney even though no law enforcement official recalled such a request, Sanders re-initiated conversation with the sheriff regarding his charges. There was no evidence to support Sanders’s claim that his confession was involuntary. Because the trial court used the correct standard to determine there had been no constitutional violations suffered by Sanders, the trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of Sanders’s confession is affirmed by this Court. Accordingly, the end result is that Sanders’s convictions and life sentences for murder and armed robbery are affirmed.

¶ 22. COUNT I: CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. COUNT II: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, WITHOUT PAROLE OR EARLY RELEASE, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED.

PITTMAN, C.J., McRAE AND SMITH, P.JJ., WALLER, COBB, DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J„ NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev.2000)

      . Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (Rev.2000), the jury had "unanimously fix[ed] [Sanders's] punishment for life in the state penitentiary;" therefore, the circuit judge sentenced Sanders to life without parole for armed robbery pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 4 7 — 7—3 (1) (d) (ii).

      . In Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss.1966), this Court made clear that once the State makes out a prima facie case on the voluntariness of the confession, and once the defendant offers testimony to refute the voluntariness of the confession, the State must offer "all the officers who were present when the accused was questioned and when the confession was signed, or give an adequate reason for the absence of any such witness.” The record reveals that all necessary officers were called by the State at the suppression hearing. See also Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876 (Miss.1994); Lettelier v. State, 598 So.2d 757 (Miss.1992); Scott v. State, 382 So.2d 1091 (Miss.1980).

      . The record clearly reveals that during the closing arguments on the motion to suppress, the trial judge was keenly aware of the fact that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, under the totality of the circumstances, the voluntariness of Sanders’s confession. Baldwin v. State, 757 So.2d at 234-35.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PITTMAN, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jack D. BODNE v. Alice Susan KING.
    No. 2000-CT-00610-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 23, 2003.

      Merrida Coxwell, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Donald W. Boykin, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PITTMAN, C.J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. Alice Susan King Bodne (Susan) was granted a divorce from her husband, Jack D. Bodne (Jack), on grounds of habitual cruel and unusual treatment. Jack appealed. A divided Court of Appeals decided that the trial court’s ruling was based on an insufficient finding of facts and reversed. Bodne v. King, 2001 WL 808357 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). We granted certiorari to address the matters raised by the Court of Appeals. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

¶ 2. The Bodnes were married in 1994. The couple made their home in Jackson and had no children together. Jack was about sixty years old and owned his own business. Susan was also middle-aged and had grandchildren by a prior marriage. She worked as a salesperson for a pharmaceutical company. Susan described her employer as “very straight-laced” and her position as one of “high profile” which required her to come in frequent contact with physicians. At the time of the marriage, Jack’s past included a conviction for possession of cocaine and a conviction for falsifying a federal document. Susan was aware of those parts of Jack’s past before the marriage.

¶ 3. The marriage appears to have been at least tolerable to Susan for a time, although she would later complain of the strain caused by Jack’s frequent ridicule and his embarrassing brand of sexual humor. Their memories of their first years were vastly different. Susan recalled a lot of screaming and fighting, and her witnesses corroborated one or more of these episodes. One witness testified that it was a “common thing” for Jack to scream at Susan until a household chore was completed. Jack recalled their time together as a rather enjoyable period in which the couple “never” fought and he never had occasion to raise his voice.

¶ 4. The strains of marriage worsened considerably for Susan when Jack was indicted in 1997 for conspiring to murder three business competitors. The indictment was amended in 1999 to a three-count charge of attempted murder. Jack’s indictment was reported in the press, including the local TV news.

¶ 5. Jack and Susan separated shortly after Jack’s arrest and confinement in September of 1997. Susan testified that Jack put “a lot of pressure” on her to keep his company running in his absence. She struggled to maintain Jack’s business and her own job. Around the time of the separation, Jack found occasion to charge Susan with assault. Although Susan was required to go to court to face the charge, Jack did not appear to prosecute it.

¶ 6. Around this same time Susan received a call from an agent of the U.S. Customs Service. After she granted the permission the agent requested, federal and state officers showed up at the house to examine the couple’s home computer. What the officers hoped to find is not entirely clear but, with Susan standing by watching, what they did find was images of child pornography stored on the -hard drive. The officers then asked Susan to provide copies of her children and grandchildren for comparison to the pictures. At that point Susan’s corroborated testimony was that she ran outside with an acute attack of nausea.

¶ 7. Jack testified that the pornography must have been planted by a law officer out to get him. Jack did not explain how or when this evidence planting might have occurred. The discovery led to no additional charges against Jack by the time of the divorce trial two years later.

¶ 8. Susan testified that her mortification from these events led to depression marked by loss of weight and appetite, requiring her to seek psychiatric care and medication. She also testified that she began to fear for her physical safety, and she sought and obtained a restraining order against Jack.

¶ 9. Having heard the evidence, the chancellor made her findings and conclusions from the bench, immediately at the end of testimony. Those findings and conclusions were in part as follows:

This [Chancery] Court specifically finds on the grounds of divorce alleged by Ms. Susan King that she has met her burden of proof, that being by a preponderance of the evidence on her habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment. Our case law certainly has said that conduct is not necessarily limited in habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment that there be a threat of life, limb or health, that the Court should consider testimony that goes to the conduct, and if that conduct is so unnatural as to make the marriage revolting to the offended spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of the marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. Further, our Supreme Court has said, behavior is measured subjectively and by its effect on the offended spouse, offenses continuing in nature and not condoned by the mere continuation of cohabitation.
This Court is of the opinion based upon the credible testimony of not only Ms. King, but her two corroborating witnesses, that Mr. Bodne has inflicted habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment through the marriage, especially given the incidence of the indictments and the ultimate imprisonment — well, when he was in jail for the indictment. The Court recognizes that it is not considering the guilt or innocence of any indictment that has been handed to Mr. Bod-ne. That in and of itself has no specific bearing on the Court’s decision. However, what does have bearing is the testimony of Ms. King that throughout that period of time that she could not sleep properly, eat properly, that she was under the care of a psychiatrist, and that the pressure of trying to maintain the business of the parties created stress that was for Ms. King specifically something that she could not handle.
Additionally, the Court recognizes and finds credible her statements regarding her embarrassment, humiliation regarding the jokes and the fixation in terms of the types of jokes Mr. Bodne enjoyed and the profanity.
For those reasons, this Court would direct and order that a divorce be granted to Ms. King on the grounds of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment based upon a preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 10. Jack appealed two elements of the trial court’s judgment. He argued that Susan failed to prove sufficient facts to constitute cruel and unusual treatment and, also, that the chancellor erred in treating two parcels of real estate as marital property subject to equitable distribution.

¶ 11. The Court of Appeals found that the chancellor’s findings of fact were insufficient to justify a divorce on the fault-based ground of habitual cruel and unusual treatment. In reaching this conclusion, the court limited itself to a consideration of the conduct specifically referenced in the chancellor’s bench ruling. Thus constrained, the Court of Appeals found that Jack’s indictment and boorishness were the only matters which could properly be considered on appeal and that such conduct was not enough to justify the chancellor’s conclusion. In the absence of specific findings, testimony concerning other conduct would not be considered as proven if Jack offered a denial of the conduct. For example, the testimony regarding child pornography could not be considered. The judgment of divorce was therefore reversed, and the property division was made moot.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL TREATMENT TO SUPPORT THE CHANCELLOR’S DIVORCE DECREE.

¶ 12. We begin by referring to that portion of the chancellor’s bench decision which is excerpted above. That excerpt shows that the chancellor made some specific findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals later found insufficient to meet the standard of proof.

¶ 13. There is no question that there are areas of the law where specific findings are mandated. A division of marital assets is one such area. Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So.2d 364, 369 (Miss.2000); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss.1994). If findings are not mandated by the nature of the case, procedural rules are applied to determine whether findings should be made. Lowery v. Lowery, 657 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Miss.1995). In a casé tried without a jury, the court “may” make specific findings of facts and conclusions of law, but “shall” do so when requested by a party or by if required by another rule. M.R.C.P. 52(a). A uniform chancery court rule says essentially the same thing, and the uniform rule recites that it is made pursuant to Rule 52. Unif. Chan. Ct. R. 4.01. While a chancellor is not directed by rule to make findings and conclusions in the absence of a request, whether findings should be made is a separate question and depends largely on the complexities of the case. See M.R.C.P. 52 cmt.

¶ 14. Here Jack did not request, through objection at trial or post-trial motion, that the chancellor make amended or additional findings. Notwithstanding that failure, the rule permits him to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. M.R.C.P. 52(b). However, whether additional or amended findings are requested affects the standard of review.

¶ 15. If a request is made and no ruling is entered, the appellate court must consider the effect of the trial court’s missed responsibility, and overwhelming evidence may be required as a condition for affirmance. Lowery, 657 So.2d at 819. If no request is made, as here, the appellate court accepts facts specifically found unless manifestly wrong. The court will then review the record and presume that the chancellor resolved, in the appellee’s favor, those fact issues not specifically found. Owen v. Owen, 798 So.2d 394, 398 (Miss.2001); Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174, 179-80 (Miss.1985); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Miss.1983). Where the presumption applies, the chancellor’s decision will stand if it is supported by substantial and credible evidence. Owen, 798 So.2d at 398.

¶ 16. An appellate court will view the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the appellee. Richard v. Richard, 711 So.2d 884, 888 (Miss.1998). If specific findings are made without clear error, the appellate court will draw from those findings all reasonable inferences which support the trial court’s ruling. Bruce v. Bruce, 687 So.2d 1199, 1203 (Miss.1996); Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987).

¶ 17. Our determination of the proper scope of review is particularly applicable to appeals of fault-based divorces. In Fisher, 771 So.2d at 368, this Court affirmed a divorce for habitual cruelty after conducting its own examination of the record. A de novo review of another record resulted in a reversal of a finding of habitual cruelty where the only finding was that there was “sufficient testimony” to warrant a divorce. Potts v. Potts, 700 So.2d 321, 322 (Miss.1997). In a case involving the fault-based ground of adultery where no facts were found, the Court of Appeals reached similar conclusions to those stated here. After careful review of precedent, the Court of Appeals’ recent opinion demonstrates that an absence of findings is frequently decried, then followed by a de novo review to determine if the record supports the fault-based divorce Curtis v. Curtis, 796 So.2d 1044, 1047-50 (Miss.Ct.App.2001).

¶ 18. In a bench trial, the trial judge has sole authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 597 (Miss.1990). Here, the chancellor made a specific finding that Susan and her witnesses were credible. That finding is not qualified or limited, and there is a special endorsement of the testimony regarding the indictment. The finding is not manifestly wrong. No finding was made regarding Jack’s credibility. An entirely reasonable, if not inescapable, inference is that the testimony by and for Susan should be given substantial weight, while Jack’s testimony should be given correspondingly less weight.

¶ 19. Different standards of proof apply to the different grounds of fault-based divorce. Adultery, for example, requires clear and convincing proof. Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So.2d 911, 917 (Miss.1998). Habitual cruel and unusual treatment is proved by the less stringent preponderance of the evidence standard. Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 396 (Miss.1993). If that standard is met to the chancellor’s satisfaction, the judgment below will not be disturbed unless we find a manifest error of law or fact. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 437 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss.1983).

¶ 20. Habitual cruel and unusual treatment is defined as conduct that (1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the offended party, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the offended spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. Daigle v. Daigle, 626 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss.1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 618 So.2d 108, 113-14 (Miss.1993); Rawson v. Buta, 609 So.2d 426, 431 (Miss.1992).

¶ 21. While the facts in this case just breach the threshold of conduct sufficient to support granting a divorce based upon habitual cruel and unusual treatment, we find the chancellor’s judgment to be supported by the evidence. Most of the conduct in this case correlates to the second category of habitual cruelty described in Daigle. Proof on this ground does not require maltreatment which is intended for or directed at the offended spouse. Instead, it can be established by the effect of “unnatural and infamous” conduct upon the offended spouse.

¶ 22. Seldom will conduct fit neatly into a single category, and the facts in this case present elements which somewhat overlap the two categories. For example, it is undisputed that Jack filed assault charges against Susan, subjecting her stress and embarrassment. The pressure put on Susan to carry on Jack’s business is another example. Those are types of behavior which were specifically directed at Susan.

¶ 23. The words “unnatural and infamous” have not been precisely defined by precedent because the plain meanings of those words are sufficient. Such conduct is found or not found on a case by case basis. Cases involving cruel and unusual conduct have typically presented unusual and unique factual situations, and it is impossible to provide a list of unmistakable bright-line markers of such conduct. There are, however, some guidelines which give a sense of the conduct necessary to provide a threshold. Physical violence directed at the offended spouse is not required. Richard, 711 So.2d at 889 (slovenly behavior coupled with accusations of incest held sufficient). Mere unkindness, rudeness, petty indignities, frivolous quarrels, incompatibility or lack of affection are not sufficient. Steen v. Steen, 641 So.2d 1167, 1170 (Miss.1994); McKee v. Flynt, 630 So.2d 44, 48 (Miss.1993). One set of conduct evincing habitual cruel and unusual conduct is ill-founded accusations, threats and malicious sarcasm, insults and verbal abuse which cause such mental suffering as to destroy health and endanger the life of an innocent spouse. Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 859 (Miss.1994).

¶ 24. There is a dual focus on the conduct of the offending spouse and the impact of that conduct on the offended spouse. Fisher, 771 So.2d at 368. The effect of the conduct on the offended spouse is determined by a subjective standard, which is to say that an attempt is made to weigh the likely effects of the conduct on the offended spouse, as opposed to a normative standard. Morris v. Morris, 783 So.2d 681, 688 (Miss.2001); Talbert v. Talbert, 759 So.2d 1105, 1110 (Miss.1999); Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1209 (Miss.1992).

¶ 25. While a criminal indictment obviously does not equate to a conviction, an indictment for three counts of attempted murder is serious business for all concerned. An indictment is a determination by a grand jury that probable cause exists to hold the person indicted for trial. Stevenson v. State, 244 So.2d 30, 33 (Miss.1971). The indictment against Jack was introduced into evidence at the trial for divorce. Unfortunately for him, the stain of the indictment might never be removed completely from Jack or his family, even in the event that he is acquitted. It has become a matter of public record and media fixation. Susan testified of matters relating to the charges against Jack which gave her cause for grave concern. The chancellor apparently found this testimony “especially” compelling and credited this testimony towards the ultimate finding. Under the precise facts of the case, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong.

¶ 26. The indictment is not all there is to consider and weigh. There is the testimony that Susan was frequently subject to verbal abuse in the time before the indictment. There is the assault charge Jack brought against Susan but never prosecuted. There is the testimony regarding the pressure Jack placed on Susan to continue his business in his absence. There was testimony regarding Jack’s selfish use of marital assets. Those are among the matters which can be deemed to have been proved to the chancellor’s satisfaction under the standard of review and given the ruling on credibility.

¶ 27. Finally, there are the questions surrounding the child pornography on the home computer. The parties were the only ones with access to the computer. Both testified that Susan was computer illiterate or barely literate. Jack made no claim that Susan had planted the pornography. Instead he blamed a law enforcement officer who, Jack said, had a personal vendetta against him. Yet Susan testified that she watched the officers boot the computer and stayed until they found the offensive materials, and she said the officers never inserted anything into the computer. Jack never revealed what the officer stood to gain or did gain from the alleged vendetta. Susan’s testimony was corroborated and credible; there was no finding regarding Jack’s.

¶ 28. We accept circumstantial evidence as proof of adultery because of its typically secretive nature, even though adultery has a higher standard of proof than habitual cruelty. Holden v. Frasher-Holden, 680 So.2d 795, 798 (Miss.1996). Child pornography is likewise of a secretive nature. In these facts we can infer that the chancellor counted the facts surrounding the child pornography as additional proof of unnatural and infamous conduct.

¶ 29. The sum of the evidence supports a finding of unnatural and infamous conduct. The chancellor found that such conduct had an impact on Susan’s health. These findings are not manifestly wrong. The chancellor applied the correct standard of proof. The chancellor’s judgment granting a divorce should be reinstated.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY.

¶ 30. The appeal also challenged the division of marital property, but only insofar as two parcels of land. The chancellor deemed the two parcels to be marital property subject to division. Each party got one of the parcels.

¶ 31. Jack believes that one of the parcels should have been classified as his separate property. Therefore, he argues, the property division was inequitable because Susan was credited with a share of his separate property. The Court of Appeals did not reach that issue because of its reversal of the divorce made the matter moot.

¶ 32. The fact is that by the time of the divorce Jack had conveyed to Susan the property he now claims as separate property. Although the property may have had separate status before the marriage, it appears to have been commingled by this conveyance. Maslowski v. Maslowski, 655 So.2d 18, 20 (Miss.1995). Also, there was conflicting testimony about contributions, and use and misuse of marital assets by the two parties.

¶ 33. The chancellor attached credibility to Susan’s testimony. Jack concedes that the chancellor followed the rules for equitable division set out in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994). The equitable distribution of marital assets is committed to the discretion of the chancellor and is not disturbed absent clear error or application of an erroneous legal standard. Arthur v. Arthur, 691 So.2d 997, 1003 (Miss.1997) (citing Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 930). This issue has no merit.

CONCLUSION

¶ 34. In summary, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated and affirmed.

¶ 35. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED AND CHANCERY COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

SMITH, P.J., WALLER, COBB, DIAZ, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.


author: CARLSON, J., DIAZ, J.,

text:
    Randell G. TAYLOR v. Donald E. TAYLOR. Steve R. Taylor, Individually and as Guardian of the Minor, Randell G. Taylor v. General Motors Corporation and Allstate Insurance Company.
    Nos. 2001-CA-01097-SCT, 97-CA-00610-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 23, 2003.

      John D. Smallwood, Tupelo, Glenn Louis White, Samuel Pearson Westmoreland, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellant.
    Harold Waits Melvin, Laurel, Patricia Francine Melvin, Columbia, SC, attorneys for appellee.
    Gene D. Berry, Jackson, James (Jay) R. Foster, II, Robert W. Atkinson, Gulfport, attorneys for appellees.
   CARLSON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Randell G. Taylor appeals from the judgment of the trial court which dismissed his lawsuit against Donald E. Taylor with prejudice pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b), Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995), and the legal doctrine of res judica-ta. Because we find this action was properly dismissed, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Pearl River County.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. On July 22, 1993, a single-car accident occurred while Randell G. Taylor (“Randell”), then a minor, was a passenger in the car driven by his uncle, Donald E. Taylor (“Donald”). On July 19, 1996, Randell’s father, Steven R. Taylor, filed suit in state court on behalf of Randell against Donald, Allstate Insurance, Company and General Motors Corporation. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all three defendants because Randell’s counsel, a Louisiana attorney, did not qualify pro hac vice. The complaint was also dismissed as to Donald for failure to serve personal process. These orders dismissing the complaint did not include the phrase “with prejudice,” but were labeled “full and final orders.”

¶ 3. Randell appealed that decision to this Court. While on appeal, attorneys for Randell and Donald filed a motion to dismiss Donald as a party to the appeal which contained a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. This Court then rendered a decision which included only General Motors and Allstate as appellees finding that the trial court had properly dismissed the case, without prejudice, because Randell’s attorneys had failed to qualify pro hac vice.

¶ 4. Randell then filed a second suit in circuit court on December 7, 1998, against Donald, General Motors and Allstate. Process was again never served on Donald. The circuit court also dismissed this suit with prejudice as to Donald. Randell reached a settlement with General Motors and Allstate. Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 717 So.2d 747 (Miss.1998).

¶ 5. On October 9, 2000, Randell filed a third suit against Donald in circuit court alleging that Donald was negligent in driving the car the day of the accident. The trial court granted Donald’s motion to dismiss under the doctrine of res judicata because the first suit against Donald was dismissed for lack of service of process and, on appeal, both parties entered into a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. The trial court further found that the statute of limitations had run. It is from this judgment that Randell now appeals and asserts the following issues which have been restated for the sake of clarity:

I.WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING THE SUIT BECAUSE A DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(H) IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN IN AN ACTION WHERE A MINOR CHILD WAS THE INJURED PARTY.

III. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING RANDELL’S CASE BASED ON MISS. R. CIV. P. 41.

IV. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING RANDELL’S CASE WAS BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDI-CATA.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING THE SUIT BECAUSE A DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(H) IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

III. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DISMISSING RANDELL’S CASE BASED ON MISS. R. CIV. P. 41.

¶ 6. In the interest of brevity and clarity, this Court will discuss Issues I and III together. Two suits were filed by Randell’s father, on Randell’s behalf, against Donald. Both were dismissed for failure to properly serve process on Donald. The first suit was also dismissed under Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b) because Randell’s attorney failed to qualify pro hac vice.

¶ 7. Randell argues that these dismissals were without prejudice and do not bar his third suit against Donald. However, Donald argues that a dismissal under Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is with prejudice and operates as an adjudication upon the merits citing the comment to Miss. R. Civ. P. 41.

¶ 8. In Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 717 So.2d 747 (Miss.1998) (“Taylor I”), this Court specifically stated that the dismissal under Rule 41(b) was without prejudice as to the claim of Randell, a minor.

However, the dismissal is without prejudice as to the claim of Taylor’s minor son, against whom the statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995), does not begin to run until the son attains his twenty first birthday. The minor’s claim remains viable for this time period should a determination be made to pursue the same.

Id. at 750.

IV. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING RANDELL’S CASE WAS BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDI-CATA.

¶ 9. The first case in this trilogy, which was filed in Pearl River County Circuit Court, was styled “Steve R. Taylor, both individually and as guardian of the minor, Randell G. Taylor versus General Motors Corporation, Donald S. Taylor and Allstate Insurance Company,” and was assigned cause number 96-0174 on the docket of that court. On April 7, 1997, Judge Prichard entered an Order Denying Motion for Admission to Practice Pro Hac Vice, and on the same date, Judge Prich-ard likewise entered an Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Donald S. Taylor, because of the plaintiffs failure to obtain Rule 4 process upon Donald. More specifically the circuit judge found that Steve had failed to effect proper process upon Donald within the required 120 days as set out in Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(h). While the dismissal order did not contain the language “with prejudice” or “without prejudice,” the clear language of Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(h) states that such dismissal shall be “without prejudice.”

¶ 10. It is clear as to what the issue was in Taylor I. We find the following language in Taylor I:

Due to [the lawyer’s] rejected affidavit, the trial court denied him admission to practice before the court in the instant matter and entered an order dismissing the complaint and cause of action. It is from this dismissal that Taylor appeals to this Court asserting the following issue:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF TAYLOR’S CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A PENALTY FOR HIS OUT-OF-STATE ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO SUBMIT A PROPER AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE, IS AN INAPPROPRIATELY EXTREME AND HARSH SANCTION WHEN TAYLOR IS REPRESENTED BY TWO DULY LICENSED MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE PROPERLY ENTERED AN APPEARANCE IN THE CASE.

717 So.2d at 748.

¶ 11. On September 8, 1997, while Taylor I was pending on appeal before this Court, Steve and Donald filed in this Court a document entitled “Stipulation of Dismissal of Appellee, Donald S. Taylor [M.R.A.P. 42(b)].” The stipulation was signed by the attorneys for Steve and Donald and stated in pertinent part:

COMES NOW the Appellant, Steve R. Taylor, and Appellee, Donald S. Taylor, and under M.R.A.P. 42(b) files this Stipulation to Dismiss Appellee, Donald S. Taylor, with prejudice, and costs being assessed to the Appellant.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant, Steve R. Taylor, and Appellee, Donald S. Taylor jointly move the Court to dismiss the Appeal, as pertains to this Appellee, and assess all costs to the Appellant.

(emphasis added). M.R.A.P. 42 provides the procedure for dismissing a party from an appeal:

(b) Dismissal in the Appellate Court. After the appeal has been docketed with the clerk of the Supreme Court, an appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the Supreme Court or, if the case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals, by the Court of Appeals. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding or their attorneys agree that the proceeding be dismissed, they may file a joint motion to dismiss specifying the terms as to the payment of costs and that all fees have been paid.

(emphasis added).

¶ 12. Pursuant to the filing of this Stipulation, this Court entered the following Order, dated December 8, 1997, and filed on December 12,1997:

This matter came before a panel of this Court consisting of Prather, P.J., Pittman and McRae, JJ., on motion of ap-pellee Donald Taylor to be dismissed from the appeal of this matter. Appellant has joined in the motion and the remaining appellees have filed no objection. The Court finds that the motion should be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss be and is granted and that appellee Donald Taylor shall be dismissed as a party to this appeal upon entry of this order.

Although this Court, in its order dismissing Donald as a party to the appeal, did not indicate the dismissal was with prejudice, the stipulation clearly stated the parties agreed to dismiss Donald with prejudice. Therefore, pursuant to M.R.A.P. 42(b), the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the parties pursuant to the terms agreed upon in their stipulation. Those terms specifically included the dismissal of Donald from the appeal with prejudice.

¶ 13. With Donald no longer a party to the appeal in Taylor I, this Court, in due course, issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the circuit court, and concluded by stating:

Therefore, the lower court’s decision to dismiss this case is affirmed. However, the dismissal is without prejudice as to the claim of Taylor’s minor son, against whom the statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995), does not begin to run until the son attains his twenty first birthday. The minor’s claim remains viable for this time period should a determination be made to pursue the same.

717 So.2d at 750.

¶ 14. That is all well and good as to Randell’s claims remaining viable under the savings clause, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995). But Randell’s claims could only be asserted as to those parties who might have potential liability. A party, who has been dismissed, with prejudice, such as Donald, has no further liability as to Steve or Randell as a result of the cause of action which accrued on July 22, 1993. Otherwise, what does the phrase “dismissal with prejudice” mean?

¶ 15. Steve Taylor appeared in the first lawsuit as “next friend” of Randell Taylor as authorized by Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(c). Once a minor, through competent representative and legal counsel has filed suit, he is bound by the actions of his representatives. A parent appearing as next friend has authority under Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(c) to enter into a stipulation, subject to approval by the court, which approval was given. As Steve and Randell have never denied the stipulation, or attacked it for fraud, mistake, accident or misrepresentation by an adverse party (Miss. R. Civ. P. 60), then Steve and Randell are stating to the Court that the stipulation was knowingly, correctly, knowledgeably entered into by a competent Mississippi counsel for Steve and Randell.

¶ 16. The effect of a consent judgment or decree has been addressed by this Court in holding that a “consent judgment acquires the incidents of and will be given the same force and effect as, judgment rendered after litigation.” Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 556-57, 102 So.2d 381, 383 (1958). In addition, “consent judgments receive the same force as regular judgments, in binding parties under collateral estoppel and res judicata.” Id.

¶ 17. Mississippi law on res judica-ta is well established. Generally, four identities are required to establish collateral estoppel, as well as res judicata: identity of the subject matter of the action, identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties to the cause of action, and identity of the equality or character of person against whom the claim is made. Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Assocs., Inc., 422 So.2d 749, 751 (Miss.1982).

¶ 18. This third suit is based on the same accident as the earlier suit, by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, seeking the same relief for the same injuries in the same court. The only difference is that Randell Taylor is no longer a minor and has brought this suit on his own behalf. Donald has long ago been dismissed from this cause of action “with prejudice.” As Donald’s counsel so ably inquired in his brief, “Can the Appellant be faced with his signed Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice and contend he is not bound by the strongest words in legal practice?”

¶ 19. The circuit court did not err in dismissing the suit by Randell based on res judicata.

II. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN IN AN ACTION WHERE A MINOR CHILD WAS THE INJURED PARTY.

¶ 20. Because we find Randell’s suit is barred under the doctrine of res judicata, this issue will not be addressed by this Court as it is moot.

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. This Court finds the trial court did not err in dismissing this case based on Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and res judicata. Therefore, the final judgment of dismissal entered by the Circuit Court of Pearl River County is affirmed.

¶ 22. AFFIRMED.

PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., WALLER AND EASLEY, JJ„ CONCUR. COBB, J„ CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McRAE, P.J., AND GRAVES, J.

DIAZ, J.,

dissenting.

¶23. The first suit brought in circuit court was dismissed as to Donald E. Taylor for failure of personal process and because the attorney for Randell G. Taylor did not qualify pro hac vice. Randell appealed this decision to this Court. Attorneys for Randell and Donald moved to dismiss Donald as a party to the appeal. This Court then rendered a decision which included only General Motors Corp. and Alstate Insurance Co. as appellees finding that the trial court had properly dismissed the case, without prejudice, because Randell’s attorneys had failed to qualify pro hac vice. Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 717 So.2d 747 (Miss.1998) (Taylor I). The stipulation agreement entered into by Randell’s father, on Randell’s behalf, and Donald under M.R.A.P. 42(b) only dismissed Donald as a party in the appeal.

¶ 24. This Court dwells on the fact that the agreement stated that Donald was to be dismissed with prejudice, but the order issued by this Court granting the stipulation says nothing about whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. This question of whether the stipulation or order is controlling should have no effect on this suit because this case was brought in circuit court, not an appeals court. The comment to Rule 42(b) notes that once an appeal is voluntarily dismissed, no further appeal may be brought, but this suit was not an appeal.

¶ 25. Moreover, even if it did have an effect, it would still not bar this suit because the “stipulation agreement” Donald relies upon including the language “with prejudice” is, in reality, merely a motion to dismiss presented to this Court pursuant to M.R.A.P. 42(b). The order which dismisses Donald as a party to that appeal makes no mention of whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The comment to Rule 42(b) recognizes, “an appellant’s right to dismiss an appeal is not absolute, but subject to the discretion of the court.” See also Wolf v. Miss. Valley Trust & Co., 130 Miss. 144, 93 So. 581 (1922). Although the majority’s argument that “the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the parties pursuant to the terms agreed upon in their stipulation” was modeled after the language of Rule 42(b), that rule also includes the language “upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties or as fixed by the Supreme Court.” (emphasis added).

¶ 26. This suit is simply the suit Randell was entitled to bring because his first case was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to M.R.C.P. 4(h), and because his attorney did not qualify pro hac vice, which this Court determined was also without prejudice. By concluding that Randell could bring suit against General Motors and Místate and not Donald, the majority says in effect, that the law applies differently to people although the first suit was dismissed against all parties for the same reason.

¶ 27. Furthermore, since Randell’s suit was not barred under the doctrine of res judicata, the question of whether the statute of limitations has run must be addressed. Randell was fifteen years old when the accident occurred. He turned twenty-one on September 22, 1999. Don-aid argues, and the circuit court found, that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Randell’s father filed suit on Randell’s behalf.

¶ 28. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995) provides:

If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. However, the saving in favor of persons under disability of unsoundness of mind shall never extend longer than twenty-one (21) years.

The statute does not state that the statute of limitations will not be tolled if the minor is represented by a next friend or guardian. Furthermore, in Taylor I, this Court specifically found that:

the dismissal is without prejudice as to the claim of Taylor’s minor son, against whom the statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995), does not begin to run until the son attains his twenty first birthday. The minor’s claim remains viable for this time period should a determination be made to pursue the same.

717 So.2d. at 750.

¶ 29. The agreed statute of limitations for this cause of action is three years. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). As Randell turned twenty-one in September 1999, the statute of limitations began running three years from that date. Randell filed the current suit against Donald in October 2000, well within the required period of time. Thus, this suit is not barred by the statute of limitations either.

¶ 30. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

McRAE, P.J., AND GRAVES, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Randell was born on September 22, 1978.

      . See M.R.A.P. 46(b). This Rule has been amended as published on January 16, 2003, effective on March 1, 2003; however, the amended Rule does not apply in the case sub judice.

      . This second suit was styled "Randell Taylor v. General Motors Corporation, Donald E. Taylor, and Allstate Insurance Company." Though Randell was only twenty years of age, this suit makes no mention of Randell’s minor status. In fact, it is interesting to note that Paragraph 2 of the Complaint states "[t]hat the Plaintiff has filed a timely action under Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-59,” which is the minor’s savings clause.

      . This third suit was styled "Randell Taylor v. Donald Taylor.” By then, Randell was twenty-two years of age.

      . This order not only denied the request of the plaintiff's attorney to be admitted to practice in this case pro hac vice, but also struck all pleadings and dismissed the case.

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

      . The appellant and remaining appellees to which reference is made in the order, as so noted in the style of the order, were "Steve R. Taylor, Both Individually and as Guardian of the Minor, Randell G. Taylor” and "General Motors Corporation, Donald S. Taylor and Allstate Insurance Company.”


author: WALLER, J.,

text:
    PILGRIM REST MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH By And Through its BOARD OF DEACONS v. G.W. WALLACE, Elijah Cooper, Lewis Williams, Bobby Wallace and Leonard Wilson.
    No. 2002-CA-00070-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 23, 2003.

      Doug Douglas Wade, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
    Ramel Lemar Cotton, Jackson, Attorney for Appellees.
    Before PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER and CARLSON, JJ.
   WALLER, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. This appeal concerns the consolidation of two actions in Hinds County Chancery Court in which the chancellor ordered a determination of voting members of a church and an election to decide whether to terminate the services of its pastor. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. This case arose as a result of the efforts of members of the Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church in Terry, Mississippi, to remove Reverend W.R. Griffin as pastor because of disputes over the business practices of the Church. Church members held two meetings at which they voted to remove Griffin. Deacon Sylvester Crisler and Reverend Griffin sought in-junctive relief in chancery court as Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church By and Through Its Board of Deacons (the Board of Deacons) to enjoin Deacon G.W. Wallace and Trustees Elijah Cooper, Lewis Williams, Bobby Wallace, and Leonard Wilson (the Board of Trustees) from doing any act relating to the business affairs of the Church which is against the Church’s by-laws.

¶ 3. The Board of Trustees responded with a complaint, also on behalf of the Church, seeking a declaration that the Church membership had the right to relieve Reverend Griffin and a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the Board of Deacons and Griffin from spending any Church funds as well as to require them to provide an accounting and reimburse the Church for funds spent. They also answered the initial complaint arguing that the Deacons had not been authorized by the membership to bring the action and that, pursuant to the by-laws, neither the pastor nor deacons were authorized to pursue a legal action on behalf of the Church. Specifically, the Board of Trustees alleged that Deacon Crisler and Reverend Griffin on their own and without authorization closed the Church’s bank account and moved the funds to an undisclosed location and hired counsel to represent the Church. The chancellor granted the Trustees a preliminary injunction freezing the Church’s funds and appointed Drs. Obadiah Myles and Jay T. Smith consulting experts to complete an accounting of all funds deposited and to reconcile Church finances.

¶ 4. The Hinds County Chancery Court consolidated the two actions. After a hearing, the chancellor ordered a list of qualified voters to be compiled and a formal election for the members to decide if Reverend Griffin would remain as pastor. The chancellor’s Final Judgment states in pertinent part:

III.
The Court being reluctant to become involved in church affairs and church business, and to that extent this Court will limit its ruling to the following provisions in terms of its findings.
IV.
The Court references the document that has been marked as Exhibit 1, the Official Christian Handbook According to the Teachings of the Holy Bible for the Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church of Terry, Mississippi, which in other words has been referred to as the By-Laws.
V.
The Court finds that based upon the testimony of all witnesses and particularly the spiritual leader of the church, Reverend Griffin, very few of these ByLaws have been followed, and even those alleged to have been attempted to be followed actually did not purport to actually reflect the By-Laws. As an example of the fact that only the ByLaws have been referenced in this Court’s opinion when it fits or matches the benefit of someone who is trying to enforce the By-Laws on the other [sic]. This Court finds that these By-Laws do not give Reverend Griffin or Deacon Crisler the right to go out and pay an attorney before bringing it to the body of the church over $4,000 in fees before the Church has had an opportunity to vote or determine whether or not that that is the will of the body of the church.
VI.
The Court finds in regard to other instances where the By-Laws have not been followed as they relate to the pastor under charge that it agrees with the respondents that the procedure was not followed verbatim; and the Court finds that it is not sure if it could have been followed because it’s so much ambiguity and so much unclearness, or lack of clarity in regard to these By-Laws that this Court is not sure even if one attempted to follow it verbatim that they could follow it.
VII.
The Court finds for the reasons stated that the issue of the By-Laws in terms of who followed the By-Laws and who didn’t follow the By-Laws is really not one that the Court can concern itself with at this juncture because there are insufficient By-Laws to determine whether either one of the parties should be held accountable for not following the By-Laws.
* * *
IX.
The Court finds that it is the responsibility of the Court to put a procedure in place to enable the membership to determine who is to be its pastor.

¶ 5. The ambiguity about which the chancellor was chiefly concerned was that contained in the provisions dealing with charging a pastor. The by-laws state that “[a]ll accusations against the Pastor shall be in writing signed by the accuser(s) and submitted to chairman of the Deacon Board.” Article VII, subdivision E.2. Furthermore, “The Deacon Board shall give a written notice to the accused Pastor, signed by the chairman and the Secretary of the Deacon Board [Deacon Crisler] before they confer with him.” Article VII, subdivision E.3. When asked how the attempts at his ouster failed to comply with the by-laws, Reverend Griffin testified that the two accusers were inactive members of the church and that there was no investigation as required by Art. VII, subdivision E.5. Also, the initial meeting where members voted to remove him was improper because it was not held on church property, and it was not set by the Board of Deacons and presided over by the pastor. Since the attempted ouster did not comply with the by-laws totally, Reverend Griffin simply ignored the letter announcing his removal.

¶ 6. The result of the election was 54-0 in favor of removing Reverend Griffin. Aggrieved, the Board of Deacons and Griffin appeal and assert various constitutional and procedural errors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. We will not interfere with or disturb a chancellor’s findings of fact unless those findings are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis ex rel. Francis, 825 So.2d 38, 43 (Miss.2002); Miller v. Pannell, 815 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss.2002).

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REQUIRING THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

¶ 8. The Board of Deacons and Griffin argue that the chancellor’s judgment violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that a civil court became involved in a ecclesiastical dispute. Their only supporting authority is the Court of Appeals decision in Mallette v. Church of God International, 789 So.2d 120 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). In Mallette, a pastor sued the Church of God International and others for defamation after his ministerial license was revoked. 789 So.2d at 121. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Church holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred such a civil suit. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to determine if the pastor’s claim was in fact barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and the trial court again granted summary judgment. Id. On a second appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and stated

the United States Supreme Court held that in accordance with the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention, “civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them.... ” This abstention includes church-related questions of discipline, faith, rule, custom, or law.

Id. at 124 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976)).

¶ 9. The Church of God International in Mallette and the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in Milivojevich are quite different than the Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church in the instant case. Both of those aforementioned churches are hierarchical in that they are subject to a general or higher church authority. Baptist churches, on the other hand, are congregational in that “[e]aeh church is a distinct organization, independent of others.” Allen v. Roby, 109 Miss. 107, 67 So. 899, 900 (1915). Such an arrangement bears on the extent of a civil court’s jurisdiction over disputes within the church or among its members.

¶ 10. This case presents an interesting situation in that it questions not the propriety or justification for dismissing a pastor but whether the court had the authority to order an election in the first place. The Ohio Court of Appeals addresses this dilemma in Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio App.3d 35, 637 N.E.2d 397 (1994). Collecting authorities from many states, the court summarized the extent of a trial court’s jurisdiction: “If the church is congregational, a civil court retains jurisdiction to determine whether the decision concerning ‘who shall preach from the pulpit’ • was made by the proper church authority. The court’s jurisdiction is limited to purely secular issues, and the court must not be involved in ecclesiastical issues.” 637 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted).

¶ 11. It clear in this case that the chancellor merely established a procedure whereby the members of Pilgrim Rest could vote on whether they wanted to retain Reverend Griffin as their pastor. She did so in the absence of clear by-laws and a higher church authority. We are keenly aware, as was the chancellor in her order, of a civil court’s extreme reluctance to meddle in the ecclesiastical affairs of a church and impotence to rule on matters pertaining thereto. See Stegall v. Newsom, 326 So.2d 803, 807 (Miss.1976); Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 216, 44 So.2d 52, 55 (1950). However, we cannot say that the chancellor overstepped her bounds of jurisdiction in ordering an election when doing so was secular in purpose and sanctioned by other jurisdictions. See McKinney v. Twenty-Fifth Ave. Baptist Church, Inc., 514 So.2d 837 (Ala.1987) (finding no abuse of discretion in ordering members of competing church factions to compile a list of church members eligible to vote in an election); Beulah Missionary Baptist Church v. Spann, 132 Mich.App. 118, 346 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1984) (holding that the trial court “properly ordered the parties to compile a list of eligible voters not only to assure a fair election, but also to assure that any eligibility questions be resolved before the election was held.”). The chancellor did not rule on whether Reverend Griffin was entitled to be pastor. See Blue v. Jones, 230 So.2d 569 (Miss.1970) (finding question of who were proper trustees, pastor and deacon of congregational church to be ecclesiastical that must be decided by congregation); Grantham v. Humphries, 185 Miss. 496, 188 So. 313 (1939) (holding that “church authorities and such tribunals as they may set up for themselves are supreme in such matters. Their decision is final as to who shall be the pastor and other officers. Such disputes are ecclesiastical in their nature and the courts have no control over them.”). The problem with applying Blue and Grantham is that they assume the church has a viable means of passing on such questions. It is clear that Pilgrim Rest did not.

¶ 12. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized the dilemma courts face when confronted with discord within a congregational church:

It is not for this court to determine who shall or shall not be members of the Mount Zion Baptist Church. It is not for this court, to dictate procedure for the church to follow. It is the function of this court, however, in these circumstances, to assure that the church itself has spoken. If it has, this court inquires no further. If it has not, this court may restore the status quo to enable the church to act.
We note that this case deals with a congregational church. The situation is substantially different when a hierarchical church is involved. In that situation any judicial relief, if appropriate, would ordinarily await final determination by the highest hierarchical tribunal having jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters.

Bowen v. Green, 275 S.C. 431, 272 S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (1980) (emphasis added).

¶ 13. The chancellor’s resolution also complies with Mississippi’s Nonprofit Corporations Law. Pilgrim Rest is a “religious society” under the Nonprofit, Nons-hare Corporations and Religious Societies Law. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-31 (2001). It is also a “religious corporation” under the Mississippi Nonprofit Corporation Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-ll-127(cc). In the event a corporation is unable to conduct a meeting and vote, directors, officers, delegates or members can seek assistance in chancery court pursuant, to Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-131 which states in pertinent part:

(1) If for any reason it is impractical or impossible for any corporation to call or conduct a meeting of its members, delegates or directors, or otherwise obtain their consent, in the manner prescribed by its articles, bylaws or Sections 79-11-101 et seq., then upon petition of a director, officer, delegate, member or the Attorney General, the chancery court of the county where the corporation’s principal office ... is located may order that such meeting be called or that a written ballot or other form of obtaining the vote of members, delegates or directors be authorized in such a manner as the court finds fair and adequate under the circumstances.
(2) The court shall, in an order issued pursuant to this section, provide for a method of notice reasonably designed to give actual notice to all persons who would be entitled to notice of a meeting held pursuant to the articles, by-laws and Sections 79-11-101 et seq., whether or not the method results in actual notice to all such persons or conforms to the notice requirements that would otherwise apply. In a proceeding under this section the court may determine who the members or directors are.

(emphasis added). Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-401, dealing with applicability of the Nonprofit Corporation Act to religious corporations, does not except Miss.Code Ann. § 79-11-131.

¶ 14. We recognize the chancellor’s awareness of the “religious thicket” in which she was entangled. There is absolutely no indication of her imposing an ecclesiastical dictate on the congregation of Pilgrim Rest. On the contrary, she merely sought to establish a procedure in which the majority of the Church could be heard thereby preserving the peace. We hold that the chancellor was not hamstrung to resolve by secular and statutorily-justifiable means a dispute which could likely lead to a breach of peace.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR VIOLATED MISS. R. CIV. P. 62(a).

¶ 15. The Board of Deacons contends the chancellor violated Miss. R. Civ. P. 62(a) because she held a hearing to enforce her final judgment less than ten days after its entry. Their entire argument consists of a partial quote of Rule 62(a). The Board of Trustees responds that these consolidated actions sought in-junctive relief and were, therefore, not stayed under Rule 62(a). Rule 62(a) provides:

Except as stated herein or as otherwise provided by statute or by order of the court for good cause shown, no execution shall be issued upon a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of ten days after the later of its entry or the disposition of a motion for new trial. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, an interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an injunction or in a receivership action shall not be stayed during the period after its entry and until an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The provisions of subdivision (c) of this rule govern the suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting of an injunction during the pen-dency of an appeal.

(emphasis added).

¶ 16. For whatever reason, the Board of Deacons never quoted the italicized portion of Rule 62(a) in its brief. It clear, however, that Rule 62(a) excepts injunctions from the automatic stay. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 62 cmt.; 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2902 (2d ed.2002). This assignment of error is without merit.

III. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR VIOLATED MISS. R. CIV. P. 52(a).

¶ 17. The Board of Deacons next argues that the “Final Judgment entered by the trial court in this cause on January 8, 2002, does not contain anything resembling the required finding of fact or conclusion of law. It is a somewhat rambling statement from the bench.... ” They cite no authority for the proposition that the chancellor’s order was in some way in violation of Miss. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

¶ 18. Rule 52(a) states that in bench trials, “the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly.” The seminal case on this point is Tricon Metals & Servs., Inc. v. Topp, 516 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss.1987), in which we held where “a case is hotly contested and the facts greatly in dispute and where there is complexity involved therein, failure to make any findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law will generally be regarded as an abuse of discretion.” While it is true the chancellor failed to cite any legal authority, this case is not terribly complex from a factual standpoint, and the facts as stated in her five-page Final Judgment adequately state her findings of fact and aptly explain what she did. See 9 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 52.02[1], at 52-12 (3d ed.1997) (main purposes of Rule 52 are “to provide the appellate court with an adequate record for review[ ] and to guarantee that the trial court carefully reviews the evidence”). The Final Judgment provided us with an adequate record to review and established that the chancellor reviewed the evidence. This assignment of error is without merit.

IV. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR VIOLATED MISS. R. CIV. P. 54(c).

¶ 19. The fourth assignment of error presented by the Board of Deacons is that the chancellor violated Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(c) by granting relief for which no party prayed. Neither party cites any authority whatsoever in support of their respective arguments. That aside, it is axiomatic that the relief need not be limited in kind or amount by the demand but may include relief not requested in the complaint. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 54 cmt.; Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 39 (Miss.2001); Tuck v. Blackmon, 798 So.2d 402, 410 (Miss.2001).

¶ 20. It is unclear why the Board of Deacons would assign such an error. They filed their complaint alleging that there was in the by-laws a specific method for removing a pastor and that the Board of Trustees and members were in violation of those by-laws. All the chancellor did was prescribe a method of election, since it was clear the congregation’s intentions could not be carried out under the by-laws. This assignment of error is without merit.

V. WHETHER THE FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED WAS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, OR UNCERTAIN.

¶ 21. The final assignment of error is that the Final Judgment was vague, ambiguous, and unclear because it did not set forth a procedure to validate the election. The Board of Deacons’ entire argument consists solely of a block-quote from a non-binding treatise stating in effect that a decree should be reasonably certain and fairly precise. They provide no examples of vagueness, ambiguity, or lack of clarity in the Final Judgment.

¶ 22. With regard to the regulation of the election, the Final Judgment clearly stated:

The Court orders Dr. Myles and Dr. Smith to regulate an election to be held January 19, 2002, from 2:00 P.M. until 4:00 P.M. at the Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church, Terry, MS[,] for the purpose of determining what the members of the church want to do. The Court finds that a ballot should be prepared. It is Ordered that if Dr. Myles and Dr. Smith do not accept to conduct the stated election, there shall be someone independent of the church present at the date, time and place stated to set a procedure in place for conduct of this election.

¶ 23. Also, with regard to the eligible voting membership, the chancellor ordered that those eligible to vote would be those members over twelve years of age who five in the Terry area and regularly attend services, regardless of the amount or lack of tithing. Clearly, the chancellor was certain and quite clear in the regulation of the election. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶ 24. The chancellor did not err in ordering the compiling of a voting list and an election on whether to terminate Reverend Griffin as pastor. We also find the procedural issues raised by the Board of Deacons to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Hinds County Chancery Court is affirmed.

¶ 25. AFFIRMED.

PITTMAN, C.J., McRAE AND SMITH, P.JJ., COBB, DIAZ, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Deacon D.W. Wallace's name was also removed from the Church's checking account.

      . An example of the ambiguity within the bylaws is the provision concerning who is vested with responsibility to hold Church property. The by-laws state in Article XI, subdivision D.l. that it is the duty of the trustees "[t]o hold the Church's property in trust, to care for the Church's property and to keep oversight of Church property.” Article XI, subdivision A also states, "Trustees shall be held responsible for the business affairs of the Church.” Reverend Griffin testified that by custom the trustees were vested with responsibility over the Church’s real property and that the Board of Deacons had control over the bank account and financial affairs of the Church. The trustees counter that the Board of Deacons had no authority to hire an attorney or pursue a legal action on behalf of the Church.

      . Perhaps the best known example of a hierarchical church is the Roman Catholic Church.

      . Police had to be called to the church on several occasions to keep the peace.

      . Academic commentary has expressed concern over the distinction between hierarchical and congregational churches in the context of pastor terminations:
      [I]t is difficult to see any difference between a civil court deciding whether a minister was properly defrocked in a hierarchical church, and a court adjudicating that same issue when it arises in a congregational setting. In each case, the court is defining criteria which the church, hierarchical or congregational, must employ in selecting its spiritual leaders, a doctrinal matter of purely ecclesiastical concern. Absent any principled distinction, the courts should defer jurisdiction whenever a question of doctrinal interpretation arises in a dispute concerning church discipline, organization, or government, regardless of whether the church is hierarchical or congregational.
      David J. Young & Steven W. Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket — Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 475, 493 (1986). While we certainly agree with the authors that such a distinction between a hierarchical and congregational church need not be always drawn, the problem with such an analysis in the instant case is that it presumes a congregation has terminated its pastor in an orderly fashion following clear and established church law.

      . The Act defines a "religious corporation” as "a corporation organized and operating primarily or exclusively for religious purposes.” Miss.Code Ann. § 79-ll-127(cc).

      . See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 719, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976).