text:
    Anthony J. TUSA, et al. v. MASTER VIDEO POKER, INC., et al.
    No. 2002-CC-3065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 13, 2002.
   In re Master Video Poker Inc. et al.; MVP; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 01-5197; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2480.

Stay denied. Writ Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 02-PDB-062.
    No. 2002-OB-2650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 16, 2002.
   In re Todd, Pat S., Jr.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of The Disciplinary Board, No. 02-PDB-062.

Remanded for further investigation. See order.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rene J. DECAY.
    No. 2001-K-2724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2002.
   In re Decay, Rene J.;—Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated August 30, 2002, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 98-6122; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-192.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of K.G. and T.G.
    No. 2002-CJ-2892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2002.
   In re Social Service Dept, of; Office of Community Services;—Other(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 01-177-18-W-A; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0820.

Granted. Consolidated with 2002-CJ-2886.


text:
    Kenneth Lamar SIMPSON v. Ashley STONER.
    No. 2002-CD-3105.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2002.
   In re Stoner, Ashley;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 55,607 A.

Writ application is transferred to Third Circuit Court of Appeal for expedited consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of K.G. and T.G.
    No. 2002-CJ-2886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2002.
   In re State In The Interest of K.G. et al.; State In The Interest of T.G.;—Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 01-177-18-W-A; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0820.

Granted. Consolidated with 2002-CJ-2892.


text:
    COLUMBUS METAIRIE PROPERTIES, L.L.C. and Galleria Inn, L.L.C. Galleria Court, L.L.C. v. METAIRIE HOTEL INVESTORS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.
    No. 2002-C-2477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Metairie Hotel Investors Limited Partnership;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 570-552; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-159.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne JOHNSON.
    No. 2002-KP-0389.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Johnson, Wayne;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 382-056; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2078.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Douglas CASSARD.
    No. 2002-K-0917.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Cassard, Douglas;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 00-1203; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-931.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick GRAVES.
    No. 2002-K-1397.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Graves, Patrick;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98 CR7 73712; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 1671.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George BLAKE.
    No. 2002-K-1423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 5-00-551; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 1399.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roderick IRVING.
    No. 2002-K-1614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Irving, Roderick;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 202,892; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,795-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alonzo AMBO.
    No. 2002-K-1638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Ambo, Alonzo;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 306632; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 0756.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dale K. ALLIEN.
    No. 2002-K-1671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Allien, Dale K;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 65806; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-1509.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew Aaron NIGHTENGALE.
    No. 2002-K-1685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Nightengale, Matthew Aaron;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 57,102; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,805-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny GRAHAM and Lucas Jefferson.
    No. 2002-K-1770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Graham, Johnny et al.; Jefferson, Lucas;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 98-6122; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-1232.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy HUGHES.
    No. 2002-K-1782.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Hughes, Randy;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-6510; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-11.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald W. COLE.
    No. 2002-K-1792.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Cole, Gerald W.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District f Court Div. E, No. 397-358; to the Court of

Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-0731.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tobias A. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2002-K-1803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Williams, Tobias A.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 60497; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0193.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andre CHACHERE.
    No. 2002-K-1863.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Chachere, Andre;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 416-114; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0388.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark STEIN.
    No. 2002-K-1882.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Stein, Mark;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 01-K-631-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-139.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Berry M. CHANDLER.
    No. 2002-KK-2569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Chandler, Berry M.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 01-F0230, 01-F0231; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 36675-KW, 36711-KW.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert C. WHITE.
    No. 2002-KK-2699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00-CR-018911; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 02-01105.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. Mary Prudhomme JONES, et al.
    No. 2002-C-2701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Louisiana State of; Transportation & Dev. Dept. of;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 149-446; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-279.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. HIRED TRUCKS, INC., Donald E. Cablente, and Clarendon National Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-2708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Hired Trucks, Inc.; Cablente, Donald E.; Clarendon National Insurance Company;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 96-12933; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2248.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William CHATTMAN.
    No. 2001-KO-3320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Chattman, William;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 98-6947; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-556.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Demond MACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Mack, Demond;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 7-93-1257; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 01-KW-1234.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David A. JACKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Jacks, David A.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR99-245; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-01163.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony ROBERTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Roberts, Anthony;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 95-5196; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KH-1374.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Lee BREWINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0347.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Brewington, David Lee;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 90,1238-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-01097.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael AUGUSTINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Augustine, Michael;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 303-158; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2119.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Byron DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Davis, Byron;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 376-747; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1918.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael GRIFFIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Griffin, Michael;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or • Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 90-3073; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KH-1360.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl SUTTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Sutton, Earl;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 381-447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2072.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mckinnon BAKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Baker, Mckinnon;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 345-963; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1919.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earnest WELCH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Welch, Earnest;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 11 — 93— 742; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000-KW-2924.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randal L. SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Scott, Randal L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 31,100, 31,100A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36028-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John R. WHEAT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Wheat, John R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 95-4238; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KH-1421.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Williams, Jerome;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 303-439; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1786.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8: State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wayne GORDON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Gordon, Wayne;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, Nos. 98-0213, 97-7363; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-734 C/W 00-KA-1013.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael D. BELTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Belton, Michael D.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C1751(B); to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-01225.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roland SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Scott, Roland;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2389-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-00922.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph GRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Gray, Joseph;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 63-89; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 1630.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8: State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas DUVALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Duvall, Thomas;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 144-491; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 1921.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth REED v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Reed, Kenneth;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 2-92-1227; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 1762.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald BURD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Burd, Ronald;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 276296.

Denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 02-PDB-028.
    No. 2002-OB-2513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Jenkins, Jerry;—Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of The Disciplinary Board, No. 02-PDB-028.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 02-PDB-057.
    No. 2002-OB-2606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Caillet, Linda V.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office Of The Disciplinary Board, No. 02-PDB-057.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Robert Lee BOXIE v. LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMMISSION.
    No. 2002-C-2686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Boxie, Robert Lee;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2001-6663; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-2405.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    LHO NEW ORLEANS LM, L.P. v. MHI LEASCO NEW ORLEANS, INC.
    No. 2002-C-3004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re MHI Leasco New Orleans Inc. et al.; Meridien Hotels Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 02-515; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0663.

Denied.


text:
    Raymond GARY v. CLARENDON NATIONAL INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2002-C-2742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Gary, Raymond;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 58729-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0237.

Denied.


text:
    Emile WILLIAMS v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY.
    No. 2002-C-2712.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Department of Agriculture & Forestry;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review State Civil Service Commission, No. S — 13809; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2205.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    ETHYL CORPORATION v. GULF STATES UTILITIES, INC.
    No. 2002-C-2709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Entergy Gulf States Inc.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 309,439; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2230.

Denied.


text:
    Johnny SAM v. ASPLUNDAH TREE EXPERT CO.
    No. 2002-C-2706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Sam, Johnny;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, Office Of Workers Compensation District 4, No. 00-009863; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0259.

Denied.


text:
    Mary FLANDERS v. MCDONALD’S RESTAURANT.
    No. 2002-C-2705.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Flanders, Mary;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office Of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 00-06662; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-184.

Denied.


text:
    Damon Pierce DEVILLE v. SOUTH CENTRAL INDUSTRIES, INC.
    No. 2002-CC-2704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re South Central Industries, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 982,590; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-00877.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jennifer HAMPTON v. Michael THOMAS, et al.
    No. 2002-C-2700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Hampton, Jennifer;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 74691; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0257.

Denied.


text:
    Raymond GARY v. CLARENDON NATIONAL INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2002-C-2695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Continental Casualty Company;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 58729-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0237.

Denied.


text:
    O.S. JOHNSON DIRT CONTRACTOR, INC. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT
    No. 2002-C-2664.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development; DOTD;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 454,621; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 CA 2765.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SMIT LAND & MARINE, INC. v. WHC, INCORPORATED, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-2659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re WHC, Incorporated;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 61611; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-00865.

Denied.


text:
    Shelia Smith COATES, et al. v. ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-2657.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 22,991; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,866-CW.

Denied.


text:
    John KUZOFF v. TIDEWATER MARINE, INC.
    No. 2002-C-2652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Tidewater Marine Inc. et al.; Tidewater Marine L.L.C.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2000-12086; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0845.

Denied.


text:
    FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE, et al. v. VALLEY FORGE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-2627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Valley Forge Life Insurance Company et al.; McNamara, Robert G.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 96-3024; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 02-C-0928, 2002-C-0908.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Michael Mark ALLEN v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Amy Slaton, and John Slaton
    No. 2002-C-2577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re State Farm Fire And Casualty Company; Slaton, Amy; Slaton, John;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 103,628; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,377-CA.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Amy Kelly DAY, et al. v. OUACHITA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.
    No. 2002-C-2532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Ouachita Parish School Board et al.; Green, John;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-4275; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35831-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Yolanda D. HORTMAN and Collin Hortman v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2002-C-2502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re State Farm Mutual Insurance Company; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 458,190; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,179-CA.

Denied.


text:
    B.F. SAMUEL, Sr. d/b/a Upstream Shopping Center v. COMMUNITY COFFEE COMPANY, INC. d/b/a C.C.’s Gourmet Coffeehouse.
    No. 2002-C-2703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Community Coffee Company Inc. d/b/a; C.C.’s Gourmet Coffeehouse;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 99-15095; to the Court of Appeal, Fust Circuit, No. 2001-CA-2267.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Cheryl Shirley, Wife of/and Larry D. SHIRLEY v. CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Shelter Insurance Company and Hartland Adams.
    No. 2002-C-2685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Centennial Insurance Co. et al.; Religious & Charitable Risk Pooling Trust Plan; Brothers of the Christian Schools & Affiliates; National Catholic Risk Retention Group Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 515-385; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-362.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jeffrey W. CLARK v. Herbert L. MATTHEWS, Allstate Insurance Company and Zurich American Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-CC-2681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Clark, Jeffrey;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 566-788; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-968.

Denied.


text:
    Theresa DUHON v. STATE of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals, Doing Business as University Medical Center.
    No. 2002-C-2647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Duhon, Theresa;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 482914; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 1895.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Queenester Banks RILEY, Fredonia Banks Peters, and Sylvia T. Banks Robinson, Each Individually, and Jointly on Behalf of the Estate of Lawrence Banks v. MAISON ORLEANS, II, INC. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-2646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Scottsdale Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 93-14301; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-0498.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Samuel W. PARRY, M.D., Individually and on Behalf of all Members of the Class Described Herein v. The ADMINISTRATORS OF the TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND, d/b/a Tulane Medical School.
    No. 2002-C-2478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Parry, Samuel W. M.D.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 97-18600; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0382.

Denied.


text:
    Gary L. HARRIS v. Stephen J. SOILEAU and Allstate Insurance Company. Shannon S. Weary, Carrie Owens, Michele Owens, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Children Danel Owens and Jashadrick Owens v. Allstate Insurance Company, Stephen J. Soileau and Gary L. Harris.
    No. 2002-C-2691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Harris, Gary L.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 97-13558, 97-13735; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2001 CA 1882, 2001 CA 1883.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Marvin J. POLLET v. Dr. John V. BARTON, East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Elmer Litchfield, Major Bud Conners, Lieutenant Paul Venable and Sergeant Dale Dicharry, Mike Barnett and Nutmeg Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-2682.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Pollet, Marvin J.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 425,157; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2584.

Denied.


text:
    Narlene CAPRON, as Natural Tutrix of the Estate of Her Minor Daughter, Richelle A. Sims, and Edward C. Capron, Jr. as Temporary Legal Custodian and Guardian of His Minor Granddaughter, Richelle A. Sims v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Vicky A. Harding, City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, and State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development Gena Dimiao v. Vicky and Larry Harding and Allstate Insurance Company and State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development
    No. 2002-C-2614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Sims, Richelle A.; Douglas, Richelle A. Sims;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 365,332, 372,170; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2001 CA 0834, 2001 CA 0835.

Denied.


text:
    Narlene CAPRON, as Natural Tutrix of the Estate of Her Minor Daughter, Richelle A. Sims, and Edward C. Capron, Jr. as Temporary Legal Custodian and Guardian of His Minor Granddaughter, Richelle A. Sims v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Vicky A. Harding, City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, and State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development. Gena Dimiao v. Vicky and Larry Harding and Allstate Insurance Company and State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2002-C-2528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Baton Rouge City of; East Baton Rouge Par. of;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 365,332, 372,170; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2001 CA 0834, 2001 CA 0835.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Queenester Banks RILEY, Fredonia Banks Peters, and Sylvia T. Banks Robinson, Each Individually, and Jointly on Behalf of the Estate of Lawrence Banks v. MAISON ORLEANS II, INC. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-2653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 19, 2002.
   In re Maison Orleans II Inc. et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 93-14301; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-0498.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


author: | .WHIPPLE, J. |xCARTER, C.J.,

text:
    TOWN OF WALKER v. Mary STAFFORD, Betty Marsh and Lance Elliot Milton.
    No. 2001 CA 2188.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Oct. 18, 2002.
    Opinion Denying Rehearing En Banc Jan. 16, 2003.

      John M. Sharp, Ross A. Dooley, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Town of Walker.
    A. Shelby Easterly, III, Connie M. Ev-ersberg, DenhamSprings, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Mary Stafford, Betty Marsh, and Lance Milton.
    Bradley C. Myers, Lana D. Crump, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Louisiana Municipal Association.
    Before: CARTER, CJ, WHIPPLE and CIACCIO, JJ.

      . Judge Philip C. Ciaccio, retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   | .WHIPPLE, J.

In this expropriation matter, the Town of Walker appeals the judgment of the trial court, awarding defendants attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $65,575.52 and an expert witness fee of $450.00. For the following reasons, we amend and, as amended, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In connection with the construction of a Super Wal-Mart on adjacent property, the Town of Walker gave written notice to plaintiffs, Mary Stafford and Betty Marsh by letter dated September 10, 1999, that it wanted to acquire a drainage right of way across their properties, which were located on the east side of Walker South Road (Louisiana Highway 447). The intended drainage ditch was to be approximately forty feet in width.

On that same date, the Town of Walker filed a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, naming as defendants Marsh and Stafford and seeking a declaration that the actual roadway of Old Walker South Road and any associated drainage channels are owned by the Parish of Livingston and subject to public use or, alternatively, that an eighty-foot servitude exists along the stretch of roadway that authorizes the Town of Walker to construct and maintain a roadway and drainage channels. By judgment dated January -10, 2000, the trial court rejected the Town of Walker’s claim of ownership of the bed of the former Old Walker South Road through the properties of either Stafford or Marsh and declared that a public servitude of drain existed across the properties of Stafford and Marsh to the extent that it had previously existed, on either side of the existing blacktop that remained from the former bed of Old Walker South Road, but “no further.”

After the Town of Walker failed to receive all of the relief sought in its declaratory judgment suit, it again informed defendants by letter dated | ¡¡February 3, 2000, that it still planned to expropriate that portion of their property needed for drainage along the east side of Old Walker South Road. By letters dated May 18, 2000, the Town of Walker formally, offered Marsh and Stafford what it contended was fair compensation for the expropriation of portions of their property to effect drainage improvements. Thereafter, when ■ it learned through defense counsel that a portion of Stafford’s property had been previously transferred to her son, Lance Milton, the Town of Walker, by letters dated July 17, 2000, submitted an amended offer to Stafford and an offer to Milton for their respective interests.

Eventually, on August 4, 2000, the Town of Walker filed a petition for expropriation, naming as defendants Stafford, Marsh and Milton, and the matter was set for trial on November 2, 2000. Although not documented in the record on appeal, the parties do not dispute that shortly before trial, on Monday, October 30, 2000, the Town of Walker prepared a motion to dismiss its expropriation petition without prejudice and provided defendants with a copy of'its motion. Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss the suit with prejudice and to assess attorney’s fees and costs against -the Town of Walker, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 19:201.

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court rendered judgment, dismissing the petition for expropriation without prejudice and casting the Town of Walker for attorney’s fees and expenses (including expert fees) in the amount of $59,552.05, and a separate expert witness fee of $450.00 for testimony at the hearing on the motion to assess attorney’s fees and court costs. In response to defendants’ motion for new trial, the court rendered an amended judgment dated May 16, 2001, increasing the amount of the attorney’s fee award to $65,575.52.

pFrom these judgments, the Town of Walker appeals, contending that the trial court erred in:

(1) awarding defendants attorney’s fees allegedly incurred from the filing of the prior declaratory judgment/injunction suit to February of 2000;

(2) awarding defendants attorney’s fees allegedly incurred from February of 2000 to the filing of the expropriation petition on August 4, 2000;

(3) awarding defendants court costs, litigation expenses and expert fees allegedly incurred in connection with the declaratory judgment/injunction suit;

(4) awarding defendants expert fees allegedly incurred in connection with the expropriation proceeding;

(5) awarding defendants attorney’s fees for work performed on October 28, 2000, the day immediately subsequent to the mediation;

(6) awarding defendants attorney’s fees allegedly incurred subsequent to the filing of their motion for assessment of costs;

(7) awarding defendants attorney’s fees for services performed by their attorney’s staff;

(8) awarding defendants litigation expenses allegedly incurred in connection with the expropriation suit; and

(9) awarding defendants attorney’s fees allegedly incurred after the filing of the expropriation petition.

AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES (Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 & 9)

While the Town of Walker challenges many aspects of the attorney’s fee award herein, we first address its contention, asserted in assignment of error number two, that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees [ ¡¡incurred prior to the actual filing of the petition for expropriation, and its contention that there is no statutory basis for such an award. The legislature has recognized that the filing and eventual dismissal of an expropriation suit can cause a monetary loss to the property owner in the form of attorney’s fees. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 v. Schneider, 2000-0247, p. 8 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 808 So.2d 576, 584. Accordingly, the legislature has mandated the award of attorney’s fees in certain unsuccessful or abandoned expropriation suits, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 19:201, which provides, as follows:

A court of Louisiana having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by the State of Louisiana, a parish, a municipality or an agency of any of them vested with the power of expropriation, to acquire real property by expropriation, shall award the owner of any right, or title to, or interest in such real property such sum as will, in the opinion of the court, reimburse such owner for his reasonable attorney fees actually incurred because of the expropriation proceeding, if the final judgment is that the plaintiff cannot acquire the real property by expropriation or if the proceeding is abandoned by the plaintiff. Any such award shall be paid from the same funds from which the purchase price of the property would have been paid.
The rights of the landowner herein fixed are in addition to any other rights he may have under the Constitution of Louisiana. (Emphasis added).

As noted by the trial court in its reasons for judgment, the term “expropriation proceeding” is not defined in the statute. The Town of Walker suggests that an expropriation proceedings commences only upon the filing of a petition for expropriation and, accordingly, that no attorney’s fees could be awarded prior to that time. However, we note, as did the trial court, that the process of expropriation by municipalities as set forth in LSA-R.S. 19:102 requires the municipality to first make good faith negotiations with the property owner prior to the filing of the actual petition for expropriation. City of Thibodaux v. Hillman, 464 So.2d 370, 372 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985); Coleman v. Chevron Pipe Line Company, 94-1773, p. 5 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/24/96), 673 So.2d 291, 296, writ denied, 96-1784 (La.11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1259; Town of Jonesville v. Griffing, 95-1365, p. 2 n. 1 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/6/96), 670 So.2d 737, 738 n. 1, writ denied, 96-0825 (La.5/10/96), 672 So.2d 928.

As stated above, the Town of Walker first notified defendants in writing of its intent to expropriate a portion of their property by letter dated September 10, 1999. Shortly thereafter, on September 27, 1999, defendants hired counsel to represent them in the ensuing negotiations and to defend against this expropriation matter. Given that the Town of Walker had unequivocally announced its intention to expropriate in September of 1999 and the requirement that the expropriating authority first enter into good faith negotiations prior to filing a petition for expropriation, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that defendants were entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in connection with this expropriation matter prior to the actual filing of the formal petition for expropriation. We agree with -the trial court’s analysis that it is reasonable for a landowner, when confronted with an announced intention to expropriate property, to consult with an attorney and to thus begin to incur legal expenses, which are directly related to the issue of expropriation, even if the actual suit for expropriation has not yet been filed. This assignment of error lacks merit.

In a related argument set forth in assignment of error number one, the Town of Walker asserts that the trial court erred in awarding defendants any attorney’s fees incurred prior to February of 2000, arguing that any fees prior to that date were incurred in connection with the declaratory judgment/injunction suit and were not related to the expropriation proceeding. The Town of Walker further notes that the judgment in the [ 7declaratory judgment/injunction suit specifically provided that the parties were to bear their own costs in connection with that action. Thus, it contends, the trial court erred in awarding defendants any attorney’s fees incurred prior to the resolution of the declaratory judgment/injunction suit.

As set forth above, on the same date that it gave defendants written notice of its intent to expropriate portions of their property, the Town of Walker also filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that the actual roadway of Old Walker South Road and any associated drainage channels were owned by the Parish of Livingston and subject to public use. • Alternatively, the Town of Walker sought a declaration that, an eighty-foot servitude existed along the stretch of roadway, which authorized the Town of Walker to construct and maintain a roadway and drainage channels. That suit was resolved by judgment dated January 10, 2000, wherein the trial court rejected the Town of Walker’s claim of ownership of the bed of the former Old Walker South Road traversing defendants’ properties.

In awarding defendants attorney’s fees incurred prior to February of 2000, the trial court found as a fact that there was “at least some ‘linkage’ between the prior declaratory judgment suit and the present expropriation proceeding,” noting that if the Town of Walker had been successful in its attempt to be declared owner of the old roadbed, the effect would have been to greatly minimize the amount it had to pay for expropriation. Thus, the trial court concluded that some of the attorney’s fees incurred prior to the resolution of the declaratory judgment/injunction suit were “fairly related” to the expropriation proceeding, given that there were “overlapping ... issues and purposes.” While noting that it was “somewhat difficult to ascribe various activities” to one suit or the other, based on its review of the time | ^sheets, the trial court concluded that one-third of the attorney’s fees billed through February of 2000 were attributable to the expropriation proceeding. Based upon our review of the record and the finding of the trial court of overlapping issues, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in determining that defendants were entitled to this sum for services provided in connection with the expropriation proceeding pri- or to February of 2000. Clearly, these efforts by defense counsel were necessary to fully protect his clients’ interests in the expropriation of their property. Accordingly, we find that this assignment of error also lacks merit.

In its ninth assignment of error, the Town of Walker further contends that defendants were not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees allegedly incurred after the filing of the expropriation proceeding, because defense counsel was representing defendants on a contingency fee basis. The attorney-client contract at issue provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Clients agree to pay the sum of Two Hundred and No/100 ($200.00) Dollars per hour for services rendered by Attorney and the sum of Seventy-Five and No/100 ($75.00) Dollars per hour for Attorney’s associate and/or Fifty and No/ 100 ($50.00) Dollars per hour for Attorney’s paralegals, to the extent such individuals may more efficiently assist in the efforts to secure the objective of Clients.
In the alternative, in the event the Town of Walker or other parties are successful in the claim for expropriation of all or part of Clients’ properties, Attorney shall be paid the sum of one-third (1/3) of any sums recovered by way of agreement or judgment (after deducting expenses paid by Clients) with a credit for any fee previously paid including the retainer provided above and/or any attorney’s fee award by way of litigation.

Courts are bound to give legal effect to all contracts, according to the true intent of the parties, and the intent is to be determined by the words in the contract when they are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences. LSA-C.C. arts.2045 and 2046; Spohrer v. Spohrer, 610 So.2d 849, 852 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992). By its clear words, the contract provides for payment of an hourly fee. The only contingency arrangement set forth was in the event the Town of Walker was successful in its efforts to expropriate the property, which did not occur herein. Additionally, while defense counsel acknowledged that he did not always send his clients bills on a monthly basis, he explained that he stopped sending the bills at a point when he became satisfied that the Town of Walker would eventually pay the charges. He further explained, however, that his clients understood that they were ultimately responsible for paying his fees.

Considering the clear and explicit language of the contract and the record as a whole, including defense counsel’s testimony, we find no error in the trial court’s obvious conclusion that the contract was not orally modified in any way to provide only for a contingency fee arrangement. This assignment of error also lacks merit.

In its fifth assignment of error, the Town of Walker challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees incurred by defense counsel on October 28, 2000, the day following mediation in this matter. Specifically, the Town argues that defense counsel unnecessarily billed 4.40 hours for trial preparation on that day, when he was aware of the Town’s intent to dismiss this action. Thus, the Town of Walker contends that the trial court should not have awarded any sum for this work.

At trial, defense counsel testified that on the day of the mediation, Friday, October 27, 2000, the Town of Walker indicated its intent to dismiss its petition for expropriation. Thus, defense counsel requested that the mediator reduce the result of the mediation (ie., dismissal) to writing so that it would be enforceable. However, according to defense counsel’s testimony, the mediator indicated to him that the Town of Walker did not | inwant to do that, but that the Town of Walker would send defense counsel a letter that Friday afternoon, indicating its intent to dismiss its petition. Defense counsel further explained that when the Town of Walker failed to send him a letter that Friday afternoon, clearly indicating an intent to dismiss, he was compelled to begin preparing for trial, which was scheduled for the following week.

Given that defense counsel had no confirmation at that point of the Town of Walker’s intent to dismiss and the impending trial date, we find no error in the trial court’s apparent finding that defense counsel’s efforts on this day were reasonable and were subject to reimbursement. This assignment of error also lacks merit.

In its sixth assignment of error, the Town of Walker contends that defendants were not entitled to reimbursement of attorney’s fees incurred subsequent to the filing of their motion for assessment of costs, averring that those fees could not have been “actually incurred because of the expropriation proceeding” as contemplated by LSA-R.S. 19:201. We disagree.

In State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, 464 So.2d 401, 404 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), this court held that an appeal in an expropriation matter is clearly part of the expropriation proceeding and rendered an award for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 19:201. Similarly, we conclude that defendants’ efforts below to recover attorney’s fees to which they are statutorily entitled due to the Town of Walker’s dismissal of its petition for expropriation, is likewise recoverable as part of the expropriation proceeding. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees incurred in connection with those efforts.

11 Finally, the Town of Walker’s remaining challenge to the attorney’s fee award, as set forth in assignment of error number seven, is that the trial court erred in including in the award any charges for services performed by paralegals on defense counsel’s staff. Our research reveals cases wherein attorney’s fee awards have considered and included charges for paralegal work performed on behalf of the attorney. See Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 2000-2221, pp. 24-28 (La. App. 4th Cir.3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1263, 1279-1281, writs denied, 2002-1350, 2002-1224 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 337, 343; Salsbury v. Salsbury, 27,062, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 2nd Cir.6/21/95), 658 So.2d 734, 738-739. As noted by David Robinson, an attorney accepted by the court as an expert in establishing the value of attorney’s fees, work performed by a paralegal should be considered part of the entire attorney’s fee to the extent that it is work that the attorney otherwise would have had to perform himself. Considering that this work was billed at one-fourth the rate that defense counsel reasonably billed for his own efforts and that this work would otherwise have had to be performed by defense counsel at the higher rate, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s inclusion of these fees in the attorney’s fee award. This assignment of error also lacks merit.

AWARD OF EXPERT FEES, COURT COSTS AND LITIGATION EXPENSES (Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 4 & 8)

In assignments of error numbers four and eight, the Town of Walker contends that the trial court erred in awarding expert fees and litigation expenses incurred in connection with the expropriation proceeding, asserting that there is no statutory basis for these awards. Additionally, in its third assignment of error, the Town of Walker contends that defendants are not entitled to reimbursement of court costs, litigation expenses or expert fees h {.incurred prior to the filing of the expropriation petition, contending that these expenses were incurred in connection with the declaratory judgment/injunction suit.

The only costs which can be taxed against a litigant are those specifically provided for by statute, a rule that has been recognized in expropriation cases. State Through Department of Highways v. Salemi, 249 La. 1078, 1083, 193 So.2d 252, 253 (1966); St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, 2000-0247 at p. 15, 808 So.2d at 588. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1920 authorizes a court to render judgment for costs against any party as it may consider equitable. Additionally, with respect to litigation expenses, we note that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held, in the context of workers’ compensation, that a statutorily-authorized award of attorney’s fees “is intended to provide full recovery, without statutory limitation, for attorney’s services and expenses in connection with the litigation.” McCarroll v. Airport Shuttle, Inc., 2000-1123, p. 10 (La.11/28/00), 773 So.2d 694, 700 (emphasis added); see also Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 2001-0198, pp. 9-10 (La.6/29/01), 792 So.2d 721, 726.

Further, this court has previously allowed the recovery of costs and expenses in connection with an attorney’s fee award made pursuant to LSA-R.S. 19:201. See Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, 464 So.2d at 404; LSA-C.C.P. art.1920; but see Louisiana Resources Company v. Noel, 499 So.2d 1016, 1023 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) (Court found that expenses did not constitute part of an attorney’s fee award authorized by LSA-R.S. 19:8). Applying the rationale of McCarroll, and in light of this court’s previous decision of Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its award of a portion of these costs and expenses herein as part of the award authorized by LSA-R.S. 19:201.

is However, more recently, this court has affirmed the trial court’s denial of an award of expert fees in a dismissed expropriation proceeding. This court noted that although LSA-R.S. 13:5112 allows the court to impose expert fees on a political subdivision, such an award is only appropriate when a substantive judgment has been rendered in favor of the party requesting such an award. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, 2000-0247 at p. 15, 808 So.2d at 589. Additionally, this court further held that, unlike the situation involving attorney’s fees, there is no comparable statute mandating, or even allowing, an award of expert fees when an expropriation suit has been abandoned or dismissed. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, 2000-0247 at p. 16, 808 So.2d at 589.

In the instant case, there was no substantive judgment in favor of defendants; rather, there was only a dismissal without prejudice of the expropriation action on the motion of the Town of Walker and an award of attorney’s fees, expert fees and costs. Thus, under the holding of St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, there is no legal basis for an award of expert fees. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, 2000-0247 at pp. 15-16, 808 So.2d at 588-589. Given that this is the latest pronouncement from this court on the issue of recovery of expert fees, we feel constrained to likewise conclude that, under the facts presented, where the Town of Walker moved to dismiss its case and where there is no substantive judgment in favor of defendants, there is no statutory basis for an award of expert fees herein.

u Accordingly, the judgment will be amended to delete the award of expert fees. In all other respects, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its award of attorney’s fees and costs.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the May 14, 2001 amended judgment is amended to reduce the award of attorney’s fees and costs including expert fees from $65,575.52 to $51,174.76. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $2,350.00 are assessed one-fourth to defendants, Mary Stafford, Betty Marsh and Lance Milton, and three-fourths to plaintiff, the Town of Walker.

AMENDED AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

CARTER, C. J., concurs with reasons.

|xCARTER, C.J.,

Concurs.

Louisiana Constitution article 1, § 4 clearly mandates that a property owner must be “compensated to the full extent of his loss.” In the case sub judice, the property owner has incurred expert fees in the amount of $14,400.76, and clearly has not been fully compensated for this loss as required by Art. 1, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution.

Although I agree that the majority opinion is legally correct, I have serious reservations about the portion of the judgment that eliminates the award of expert fees. However, this panel is bound to follow St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 v. Schneider, 2000-0247 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 808 So.2d 576, until that decision is reversed by the Supreme Court or overruled by an en banc panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeal.

hPER CURIAM.

This panel’s request that this case be set for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of the First Circuit Conference. Our result in the original opinion was required by St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 v. Schneider, 2000-0247 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 808 So.2d 576. All three panel members desired to revisit whether that ease violated Article 1, Section 4, of the Louisiana Constitution. As set forth by Judge Carter in his concurrence, the panel believes that the landowner in this case will not be “compensated to the full extent of his loss” as required by the Constitution. The landowner will be fully compensated only if allowed to recover the experts’ fees incurred in the litigation. The Conference’s vote against granting en banc rehearing leaves the original opinion intact.

REHEARING EN BANC DENIED.

      . Based on our review of the record, it appears that the trial court awarded $14,400.76 in expert fees, which it found as a fact to be related to the expropriation proceeding, and the judgment will be amended to delete this amount. However, the award of $450.00 for the expert testimony of David Robinson, who testified as an expert witness at the hearing to set the attorney's fee award, will not be disturbed.

      . LSA-Const. Art. 1, § 4 provides in pertinent part as follows:
      Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
      Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question. In every expropriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss.


author:
| .PETERS, J.
      hDECUIR, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Stacie Cady v. Carl THIBODEAUX.
    No. 02-0586.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 30, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 2002.
    Gemine Mailhes, Assistant District Attorney, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services.
    Walter M. Sanchez, Lorenzi, Sanchez & Palay, L.L.P., Lake Charles, LA, for De-fendani/Appellee, Carl Thibodeaux.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and JIMMIE C. PETERS, Judges.
   | .PETERS, J.

The State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services (state), appeals a trial court judgment enjoining it from seizing the state and federal tax refunds due to Carl Thibodeaux. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment in all respects.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are not in dispute. Carl Thibodeaux and Stacie Landry Thibodeaux, now Stacie Cady, were married on November 25, 1978, and divorced on May 22, 1986. This marriage produced one child, Kelly Elaine Thibo-deaux, who was born on August 15, 1984. The judgment of divorce designated Ms. Cady as custodial parent and ordered Mr. Thibodeaux to pay his former wife $250.00 per month as child support. Thereafter, Mr. Thibodeaux timely paid his monthly child support obligation.

On August 20, 2000, at the request of Ms. Cady, the state filed pleadings on her behalf, seeking an increase in Mr. Thibodeaux’s child support obligation. The issues raised by these pleadings were ultimately resolved by a written joint stipulation apparently presented to the trial court on June 15, 2001, but filed of record on June 19, 2001. Concerning the child support obligation, the stipulation provided the following:

IT IS HEREBY AGREED that [Mr. Thibodeaux] be ordered to maintain child support in the amount of $587.00 a month, payable on the 1st and 15th of each month, plus a 5% administrative fee thereof per month, through the DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, P.O. Box 260222, Baton Rouge, LA 70826-0222, effective September 7, 2000. Payable by money order or certified check only. It is further agreed that [Mr. Thibodeaux] shall pay an additional $25.00 a month towards arrears due to the retroactive effect of the modification of support, plus a 5% administrative fee thereon, through the DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, P.O. Box 260222, Baton Rouge, LA 70826-0222, effective July 1, 2001, and upon the termination of monthly on-going child support in accordance with LSA-R.S. 9:315.22, [Mr. Thibodeaux] shall thereafter continue paying the amount of $587.00 a month, plus the [ ¡,5% administrative fee thereon, through the Department of Social Services, until all remaining arrears are paid in full.

The trial court accepted this joint stipulation and executed a written judgment including its terms. Mr. Thibodeaux immediately began complying with the judgment’s terms and, at all times during this phase of the litigation, was in compliance with his judicially mandated obligations.

Mr. Thibodeaux’s timely compliance with the stipulated judgment apparently did not satisfy the state. In the latter part of 2001, the state informed Mr. Thibo-deaux that it intended to seize any federal and state income tax refunds to which he might be entitled for the year 2001. On January 15, 2002, Mr. Thibodeaux filed a pleading requesting that the trial court enforce the terms of the June 2001 judgment and enjoin the state and Ms. Cady from seizing any state or federal income tax refund to which he might be entitled for the tax year 2001. After a March 21, 2002 hearing, the trial court granted in-junctive relief prohibiting the state and Ms. Cady from seizing the 2001 state and federal tax refund due to Mr. Thibodeaux. The state has appealed this judgment.

The state argues on appeal that the trial court erred in prohibiting it from using every means available to collect Mr. Thibo-deaux’s “arrearage.” In brief, the state directs us to La.R.S. 13:4291 and certain provisions of the Louisiana Department of Social Services Policy System in support of its position. We find nothing in the state’s internal policy to be persuasive, as the internal policy has no effect absent statutory or jurisprudential authority. Furthermore, we find La.R.S. 13:4291 to be inapplicable to the facts in the matter before us.

The state relies on a portion of La.R.S. 13:4291(A), which provides that “[e]ach payment of child support that is past due under the provisions of an award for child support rendered in a court of this state ... shall on and after such payment is due be | adeemed a judgment by operation of law.” However, reliance on this limited portion of the language of La.R.S. 13:4291(A) as authority to seize the income tax refunds is flawed. The portion cited by the state does not reflect the intent of the statute when read as a whole. In fact, it is not even a complete sentence within the statute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4291(A), in its entirety, provides as follows:

Each payment of child support that is past due under the provisions of an award for child support rendered in a court of this state, or under a foreign child support order registered under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act shall on and after such payment is due be deemed a judgment by operation of law and shall be executory in all respects except that the court shall, in a summary proceeding, determine the amount actually owed. A judgment rendered in such summary proceeding shall not have the effect of a judicial mortgage until it is final and has been recorded in the manner provided by law.

(Emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

This statute clearly contemplates a situation wherein the child support obligation has not been timely paid. We do not find that any payment imposed upon Mr. Thi-bodeaux is past due. On the contrary, even the state acknowledges that he has complied with all aspects of the stipulated judgment and has made every payment on or before such payment was due.

No one disputes the fact that “[t]he support obligation imposed on a parent is firmly entrenched in Louisiana law and is a matter of public policy.” Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349. The child support obligation is a continuous one imposed on both the father and mother, and retroactive awards are recognized in our law for the purpose of filling any gap in the support obligation. Id. Concerning the collection process, “this state has placed a high priority on the enforcement of child support obligations.” Id. at 350. In doing so, the legislature has provided a number of collection tools which may be used to enhance collection, including the suspension of a driver’s license and certain professional, occupational, |4business, industrial, hunting, or fishing licenses pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.30, et seq, La.R.S. 32:432, La.R.S. 37:2952, La.R.S. 56:647; and the withholding of lottery prizes and the interception of state and federal income tax refunds, pursuant to La.R.S. 46:236.15. However, a common thread in the use of each of these collection tools is some failure on the part of the child support obligor to comply with a prior or current court order.

That common thread does not exist in the matter now before us. Mr. Thibo-deaux has neither neglected nor failed to fulfill his support obligation pursuant to the June 15, 2001 judgment. He was in full compliance with the stipulated judgment at the time the state attempted to use this secondary collection method. Mr. Thibodeaux entered into the joint stipulation in good faith. Both the state and Ms. Cady have stipulated that they, too, consented to the method of repayment of the arrearage created by the joint stipulation. Thus, we must assume that they also negotiated the joint stipulation in good faith. Having consented to the repayment procedure, the state and Ms. Cady cannot now ignore the clear terms of the joint stipulation. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s grant of the injunction.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court judgment in all respects. We assess all cost of this appeal to the State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services, to the extent allowed by law.

AFFIRMED.

DECUIR, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

hDECUIR, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority makes much of Thibodeaux’s exemplary record in meeting his child support obligation. While Thibodeaux was paying regularly on his obligation, the fact remained that an arrearage was owed. Under the circumstances, I believe that the legislature and courts of this state have placed a higher priority on children receiving support than on parents receiving income tax refunds.

The majority correctly proclaims that no one disputes the supreme court’s assertions in Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4-6 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, regarding the importance of the child support obligation as a matter of public policy and legislative priority. However, the balance of the opinion clings to the alleged thread of noncompliance with a court order as the basis for enforcement actions. Surely, the backbone of all enforcement provisions is the paramount importance of the child support obligation. When there is a delinquency that obligation is not being met. Where the obligor has means, it is immaterial whether the delinquency was created by noncompliance with or retroactivity of the judgment.

“[Tjhis state has placed a high priority on the enforcement of child support obligations.” Id at 350. With regard to the seizure of income tax refunds, the 12legislature has provided that the intercept of refunds is in addition to, and not in substitution of, any other means of enforcement. La.R.S. 47:299.1. In prioritizing claims for seizure of income tax refunds, the legislature has provided that child support obligations must be fully satisfied before any other claim may be paid. La.R.S. 47:299.11. In this case, the majority finds that the state waived its to right to seize Thibodeaux’s refund by entering into a joint stipulation providing a repayment plan. I find no such waiver in the stipulation. To suggest that the state waives its right to a statutorily authorized additional means of enforcement by exercising another mode of enforcement defies logic. How can the remedy be both additional and precluded by other means of enforcement?

In view of the fact that the child support obligation is a matter of public policy and enforcement is a priority of the legislature, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment enjoining the State from seizing Thibo-deaux’s income tax refunds. Nothing in the majority opinion convinces me that Thibodeaux’s right to receive his income tax refund is a higher priority than his child’s entitlement to support. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

      . The record reflects that the written joint stipulation and stipulated judgment were filed on June 19, 2001. However, the judgment was signed by the trial court on June 15, 2001.


author: JjUOOKS, Judge. | JETERS, J.,

text:
    William B. CRAWFORD v. Teri Groth CRAWFORD.
    No. 02-168.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 13, 2002.

      Grady M. Spears, Attorney at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant: Teri Groth Crawford.
    Susan L. Theall, Attorney at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee: William B. Crawford.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, SYLVIA R. COOKS, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and GLENN B. GREMILLION, Judges.
   JjUOOKS, Judge.

Appellant Teri Groth Crawford (Groth) appeals the judgment of the trial court ordering a reduction of child support in favor of William B. Crawford (Crawford), Groth’s ex-husband. The court ordered Crawford to pay $631.00 per month, payable one-half on the first of each month and one-half on the fifteenth of each month, plus medical benefits. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court with instructions in accordance with the decision herein.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 1998, Groth’s and Crawford’s marriage ended in divorce when Crawford filed a petition for divorce. The marriage produced two minor children. On July 31, 1998, Groth and Crawford entered into a stipulation and consent judgment agreeing to share the custody of the children by alternating seven days of physical custody with each parent. In addition, Crawford agreed to pay $1,250.00 per month for support and maintenance of the children, plus medical insurance, and private school tuition for both the children “from Kindergarten through Twelfth Grade.”

On December 15, 1999, Crawford filed a rule to reduce child support in the 15th Judicial District Court (JDC) in Lafayette Parish. Pursuant to La.R.S. 46:236.5, the matter was scheduled for a conference before a hearing officer. On February 2, 2000, the hearing officer, Dennis Bundick (Bundick), conducted the conference and subsequently made a recommendation. Bundiek’s report noted the couple had substantial assets that exceeded the guidelines. His report recommended that Crawford pay $1,014.10 per month in support. To determine this figure, Bundick used a worksheet which was attached as page two (2) of the report. We note, however, page one of Bundick’s report contains a box that is usually checked by hearing officers to indicate to the parties that a worksheet was used to calculate the 12figures. Bundick, through inadvertence, did not check the box indicating use of a worksheet. Moreover, the first page of his report did not state how the minor children’s school tuition would be paid, nor did it state the percentage of support each parent was required to pay. Bundick’s report, on page one, under the heading “HEARING OFFICER’S RECOMMENDATIONS,” stated the following:

That defendant [Crawford] be order to pay support of $1,014.10, per month, payable lk on the 1st & 15th day of each month, commencing on the 15th day of December, 1999.... That defendant be ordered to provide medical insurance for his minor child(ren). Extraordinary medical expenses as defined in RS 9:315.1(3) should be paid by the parties in the same percentage their income bears to the whole.

Page two of Bundick’s report was the worksheet he used. It contained notations indicating who should pay school tuition and what percentage of support each parent should pay. Based on the parties’ incomes, the worksheet recommended Groth pay 22.2% of the support ($466.00 per month) and Crawford pay 77.8% of the support ($1480.00 per month). Under the “Comments” section of the worksheet appears the following: “Using the Nixon set-off, [the] father [Crawford] would owe $l,480[.00]-$466[.00] = $1,014.00. If he paid tuition directly, it recommended he pay $631.00 plus tuition.” Crawford agreed to pay the tuition directly.

On February 3, 2000, Crawford filed an exception to Bundick’s recommendations which was scheduled for hearing on March 22, 2000. Crawford’s petition disputed Bundick’s recommendation and requested continuation of the child support payments in accordance with the previous stipulations between the parties.

On August 9, 2001, apparently under the advisement of new counsel, Crawford moved to dismiss the exception he filed attacking Bundick’s recommendation and requested that Bundick’s recommendations be accepted as a final judgment. Groth did not object. However, because the parties could not agree on the wording of the | ajudgment, each submitted proposed judgments for the trial judge’s consideration. Groth submitted a judgment based only on page one of Bundick’s recommendation, thereby excluding the worksheet. Crawford submitted a judgment based on page one of Bundick’s recommendations, but included the worksheet. The trial court subsequently signed Crawford’s proposed judgment on August 31, 2001. It is that judgment Groth now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Groth contends the trial court committed manifest error by signing Crawford’s proposed judgment which incorporated Bundick’s worksheet as part of his recommendation. Because Bundick did not check the appropriate box on page one of the report to indicate a worksheet was used, she suggests that only the first page of the hearing officer’s report constituted his written recommendation pursuant to La.R.S. 46:236.5(0(5).

Pursuant to local rules, the 15th JDC utilizes hearing officers to facilitate pretrial adjudication and is authorized to do so under La.R.S. 46:236.5. La.R.S. 46:236.5. reads in pertinent part as follows:

C. An expedited process for ... the establishment and enforcement of support using hearing officers shall be implemented as follows:
(1) The judge or judges of the appropriate court or courts for the ... establishment and enforcement of support shall appoint one or more hearing officers to hear paternity, support, and support-related matters.
(3) The hearing officer shall act as a finder of fact and shall make recommendations to the court concerning the following matters:
(a)Establishment and modification of support.
|4(5) The written recommendation of the hearing officer shall contain all of the following:
(a) A statement of the pleadings.
(b) A statement as to the findings of fact by the hearing officer.
(c) A statement as to the findings of law based on the pleadings and facts, including his opinion thereon.
(d) A proposed judgment.

(Emphasis added). Under La.R.S. 46:236.5(0(8), if a defendant disagrees with the findings of the hearing officer, he or she is entitled to a de novo standard of review by a court of competent jurisdiction. La.R.S. 46:236.5(0(6) and 236.5(C)(7) further state,

(6) Any party, within the time and manner established by court rule, may file an exception to the findings of fact or law of the hearing officer. Upon filing of the exception, the court shall schedule a contradictory hearing to be held before the judge who shall accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings of the hearing officer. If the judge in his discretion determines that additional information is needed, he may receive evidence at the hearing or remand the proceeding to the hearing officer.
(7) If no exceptions are filed within the time established by court rule, an order shall be signed by the judge, which shall be a final judgment and be appealable to the appropriate court of appeal.

(Emphasis added). The 15th JDC’s Local Rule 65(C), authorized by La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(6)-(7), granted Groth three days from the date of the hearing conference report to object to Bundick’s recommendations. If a hearing officer’s conference report is not contested within the three day delay, the recommendation should be |5presented to the trial court for signature as a final order. See Local Rule 65(C) and La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(6)-(7). “A certification to the hearing officer’s recommendation must be attached to the final order.” Local Rule 65(C); See C.G.D. v. M.W.D, 00-1492 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/28/01), 782 So.2d 1128. In addition, the hearing officer’s recommendation shall contain a proposed judgment. La.R.S. 46:236.5(0(5).

Groth argues she was entitled to a contradictory hearing under La.R.S. 46:236.5(6) — a hearing she would have requested but for Bundick’s failure to mark the box indicating a worksheet was used. She essentially contends that only page one of Bundick’s report should have constituted the hearing officer’s “recommendation” as provided under Local Rule 65(C) and La.R.S. 46:236.5, and that only page one should have been submitted as a final order to be signed by the trial court pursuant to Local Rule 65(C). She suggests had she been made aware of Bundick’s use of the worksheet, she would have requested the hearing within the three-day time period and likely would have been successful in contesting Bundick’s recommendation. She now requests this court reverse the trial court’s judgment and make page one of Bundick’s report a final judgment or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the trial court, ordering it to conduct a contradictory hearing.

Based on our review, we find the hearing officer failed to include in his recommendation a proposed judgment as required by La.R.S. 46:236.5(0(5). The statute states the hearing officer’s written recommendation shall contain: a statement | fiof the pleading, a statement as to the finding of fact by the hearing officer, a statement as to the finding of law based on the pleadings and facts, including his opinion thereon, and a proposed judgment.

Furthermore, though it is obvious Bun-dick mistakenly did not check the box indicating use of a worksheet, it is equally obvious his failure to do so misguided Groth and Crawford. Because the parties could not agree on the wording of the judgment, each submitted a proposed judgment. Groth’s submission incorporated the language found on page one of Bundick’s report, while Crawford’s submission incorporated page one and the attached worksheet. Although the submissions clearly indicated the parties were confused and a problem existed in the form of the his report, Bundick still failed to prepare his own proposed judgment as required.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court instructing that the hearing officer comply with Local Rule 65(C) and La.R.S. 46:236.5 and that he prepare and forward a proposed judgment to the trial judge. Both parties then will have opportunity to request a contradictory hearing as provided by La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(6) if he or she wishes to contest the hearing officer’s recommendation. The trial court cannot alter the hearing officer’s recommendations without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard. See C.G.D. v. M.W.D., 00-1492 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/28/01), 782 So.2d 1128.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions. All costs of this proceeding are equally assessed against Teri Groth Crawford and William B. Crawford.

PETERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns written reasons.

GREMILLION, J.; concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by PETERS, J.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

| JETERS, J.,

concurs in part and dissents in part.

I agree with the majority that the trial court judgment should be reversed. However, I disagree with the decision to remand the matter and would simply render judgment in accordance with the hearing officer’s recommendation. In my opinion, the dispute over the failure of the hearing officer to check a box on the front of the HEARING OFFICER CONFERENCE REPORT to indicate that he prepared a ^worksheet in reaching his recommendation is of no import in resolving the issue on appeal. The only issue is whether the trial court had the authority to sign a judgment that varied from the hearing officer’s recommendation without holding a contradictory hearing. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:236.5(C)(6) clearly states that the trial court does not have that authority. While the majority concludes that the hearing officer’s failure to check the appropriate box somehow misguided the litigants, I agree with Ms. Crawford that the recommendation of the hearing officer was clear and unambiguous and that the trial court exceeded its authority in changing that recommendation.

As the majority correctly points out, La. R.S. 46:236.5(0 establishes a procedure whereby hearing officers can effect an expedited process to dispose of, among others, child support issues. Specifically, La. R.S. 46:236.5(C)(3)(a) provides |¡¡that “[t]he hearing officer shall act as a finder of fact and shall make recommendations to the court concerning ... [establishment and modification of support.” Additionally, La. R.S. 46:236.5(0(5) provides:

The written recommendation of the hearing officer shall contain all of the following:
(a) A statement of the pleadings.
(b) A statement as to the findings of fact by the hearing officer.
(c) A statement as to the findings of law based on the pleadings and facts, including his opinion thereon.
(d) A proposed judgment.

The majority concludes that the failure of the hearing officer to provide his recommendation in judgment form somehow renders his recommendation invalid and proposes to remand for the hearing officer to prepare a judgment, separate from his written recommendation, for submission to the trial court. I do not find that La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(5)(d) requires that the hearing officer prepare and submit a separate formal judgment, a task normally reserved for the attorneys for the litigants. Rather, I conclude that it only requires that the hearing officer prepare language to suggest the content of a formal judgment. The hearing officer did so in this case by providing the language in the section of the HEARING OFFICER CONFERENCE REPORT designated as the HEARING OFFICER’S RECOMMENDATIONS. This language specifically provided:

That the defendant be ordered to pay support of $1,014.10 per month, payable on the % on 1st & 15th day of each month, commencing on the 15th day of December, 1999.
That defendant be ordered to provide medical insurance for his minor children).
Extraordinary medical expenses as defined in RS 9:315.1(3) should be|spaid by the parties in the same percentage their incomes bear to the whole.

(Italic emphasis added.)

This is clearly language that might be incorporated into a formal judgment. Furthermore, La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(5)(d) requires that the “proposed judgment” of the hearing officer be a part of the “written recommendation,” and not a separate document.

Even assuming that La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(5)(d) requires the hearing officer to prepare a separate formal judgment, the litigants failed to timely object to that failure in this matter. Thus, that issue is not properly before us. To remand for the hearing officer to prepare a formal judgment allows him an opportunity to make substantive changes in his recommendation based on a procedural error.

In summary, I find that the hearing officer’s recommendation was clear and unambiguous. The trial court had no power to modify that recommendation based on a written comment on the attached worksheet without holding a contradictory hearing. In fact, the trial court has no power to hold a contradictory hearing absent a request of one of the parties. La. R.S. 46:236.5(0(6). Simply stated, the trial court cannot alter the hearing officer’s recommendations without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard. See C.G.D. v. M.W.D., 00-1492 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/28/01), 782 So.2d 1128.

I would reverse the trial court judgment and render judgment on the specifics of the hearing officer’s recommendation.

      . Rule 65(c) provides:
      4. After the hearing officer makes the recommendation, the parties will have three (3) days, exclusive of legal holidays, from the date of the hearing, to object to the hearing officer’s recommendation.
      5. If the hearing officer's recommendation is not objected to within three (3) days, then the hearing officer's recommendation becomes a final order and may thereafter be presented to the court for signature. A certification to the hearing officer’s recommendation must be attached to the final order.

      . La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(6) provides:
      Any party, within the time and manner established by court rule, [here Rule 65(C)5,] may file an exception to the findings of fact or law of the hearing officer. Upon filing of the exception, the court shall schedule a contradictory hearing to be held before the judge who shall accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings of the hearing officer. If the judge in his discretion determines that additional information is needed, he may receive evidence at the hearing or remand the proceeding to the hearing officer.