author: | .PER CURIAM.

text:
    Donald John SCHULINGKAMP, on Behalf of Donald J. Schulingkamp, Jr; Donald Schulingkamp and Donna Schulingkamp v. OCHSNER CLINIC, A Professional Corporation, Robert Bauer and United Cab Incorporated.
    No. 2002-C-1537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2003.
    David Anthony Dalia, Camilo K. Salas, III, New Orleans, for applicant.
    Charles F. Gay, Jr., New Orleans, Amy Collier Lambert, Baton Rouge, Elisia E. Shofstahl, for respondent.
   | .PER CURIAM.

On application of the plaintiffs, we granted writs in this case intending to address an issue resolved differently by two appellate courts. That issue was whether a medical malpractice plaintiff may file a request for a medical review panel at any time during the pendency of a suit against tort defendants who were alleged to be solidarily liable with the medical malpractice defendants against whom the request is filed. The plaintiffs argued in their writ application that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s finding in this case, that their medical malpractice claim had prescribed, conflicts with the decision of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Acromed Corp., 32-590 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/99), 764 So.2d 81, writ denied, 2000-0422 (La.3/31/00), 759 So.2d 73.

Our review of the record in this case revealed, however, that no express allegation of solidary liability has been asserted by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the dramatic differences between the plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the medical malpractice defendant and their allegations concerning the only defendant remaining | Jn the case at the time the request for medical review panel was filed, preclude any legal finding of solidarity between the two defendants. Thus, the question we anticipated addressing is not posed in this ease. Accordingly, the order granting writs of certiorari is recalled as improvidently granted.

      . Schulingkamp v. Ochsner Clinic, 01-1137 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/02), 813 So.2d 524.

      . Concerning the medical malpractice defendant, the plaintiffs alleged liability for the unauthorized harvesting of organs from their decedent. Concerning the other defendant, the plaintiffs alleged liability for shooting their decedent.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: |, TRAYLOR, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mary Anna RIVET, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr., v. REGIONS BANK, Walter L. Brown, Jr., Perry S. Brown, and Fountainbleau Storage Associates.
    No. 2002-CC-1813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2003.

      Sidney A. Cotlar, Russ M. Herman, Herman, Herman, Katz Cotlar, New Orleans; Charles L. Stern, Jr., Steeg & O’Connor, New Orleans, for applicant.
    Salvador Anzelmo, New Orleans, Stuart E. DesRoches, Michael J. Laughlin, John G. Odom, Shreveport, for respondent.
   |, TRAYLOR, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this matter to consider whether an action for the nullity of a default judgment may be brought by the use of summary proceedings. For the reasons which follow, we answer that question in the affirmative, reverse the court of appeal, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises from a series of property transactions which began over thirty-five years ago. In 1957, Lois Stern Brown, the predecessor in interest of Walter L. Brown, Jr., and Perry S. Brown (the Browns), executed a lease in favor of the Pelican State Hotel Corporation. Subsequently, on September 15, 1983, Tulane Hotel Investors Limited Partnership (THILP), the plaintiffs’ (the Mirannes) investment vehicle, acquired a leasehold interest in the property. On that same day, THILP granted a first mortgage on the lease-hold to First Financial Bank (FFB), | ¡.formerly controlled by the Mir-annes, in order to secure a $15,000,000 collateral mortgage note pledged to the bank. On May 2, 1984, THILP granted to the plaintiffs (the Mirannes) a second collateral mortgage which was not recorded in the public records until August 17, 1984.

THILP defaulted on its FFB loan causing the bank to attempt to enforce its mortgage on the leasehold estate. On October 5, 1984, THILP filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. After converting the proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation, the bankruptcy court ordered the sale of the leasehold estate at public auction, free and clear of all liens and mortgages, including specifically the Mir-annes’ collateral mortgage.

The leasehold was sold at auction to FFB for the minimum bid of $5,250,000, and on August 14, 1986, the bankruptcy court approved the sale free and clear of all encumbrances. On December 29, 1993, Secor Bank, successor to FFB, purchased the property and thus terminated the 1957 lease as a matter of law by confusion. Immediately following the purchase, Secor sold the property to Fountainbleau Storage Associates (FSA), the current owner of the property.

One year later, on December 29, 1994, the Mirannes filed a “Suit to Enforce Mortgage Via Ordinaria or Alternatively for Damages” in Civil District Court against Regions Bank (Secor’s successor), the Browns, and FSA. On February 3, 1995, defendants removed the case to federal court. FSA filed an answer in federal district court on February 7, 1995, and the Browns filed their answer on February 14, 1995. The district court granted Regions’ motion for summary judgment and this decision |3was affirmed by the court of appeals. On February 24, 1998, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk of the federal district court apparently forwarded only the order of remand to Civil District Court and did not include the answers filed in federal court by the Browns and FSA. On August 7, 1998, Regions, the Browns, and FSA filed an action in federal court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against further proceedings in state court.

While the injunction action was ongoing in federal court, the Mirannes filed a motion for summary judgment against Regions. Three days later, on October 30, 1998, the Mirannes filed for preliminary defaults against the Browns and FSA, basing the defaults upon the fact that the Browns’ and FSA’s answers were not filed in the state court records. On November 4, 1998, a default confirmation hearing was held in Civil District Court. Documents filed in support of the default judgments failed to mention that the Browns and FSA had filed answers while the matter was in federal court, stating instead simply that no answer had been filed in state court. Neither was the court informed that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court had ordered the Mirannes’ collateral mortgage canceled in 1986. In fact, Edmond G. Miranne, Jr., testified at the default confirmation hearing that the collateral mortgage was still effective and enforceable on the date of the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court confirmed the default judgments against the Browns and FSA. The judgments each awarded $4,688,919.10 to the Mirannes, and recognized the collateral mortgage which the bankruptcy court had ordered canceled.

On January 26, 1999, the federal district court entered a preliminary injunction 14which stayed further state court proceedings in the matter. Regions then filed a motion for summary judgment to permanently enjoin the Mirannes from re-litigating issues related to the collateral mortgage which the bankruptcy court had already decided. The Browns and FSA also filed a motion for summary judgment asking that the Mirannes be permanently enjoined from prosecuting the state law suit, from enforcing the default judgments, and from initiating another action against them based upon the collateral mortgage.

On April 13, 1999, the federal district court permanently enjoined the Mirannes from relitigating in state court issues and claims related to the collateral mortgage which had been decided by the bankruptcy court, and further permanently enjoined the Mirannes from enforcing the default judgments entered in state court against the Browns and FSA. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on August 22, 2000, affirmed the district court’s judgment with relation to the permanent injunction barring the relitigation of the validity of the collateral mortgage, but reversed the judgment with relation to the injunction barring the enforcement of the default judgments for reasons of comity and federalism.

In January 1999, while the federal injunction action was pending, the Browns and FSA had filed nullity actions in state court, alleging that the default judgments were both relative and absolute nullities. No further action was taken in state court during the pendency of the federal injunction action. Following the court of appeals’ decision, the Browns and FSA filed motions to vacate the • default judgments, arguing that the judgments were absolute nullities, and as such could be attacked by means of motion; and that because the judgments did not resolve all issues against all parties, the default judgments were not final judgments, and thus could be vacated by the trial court. The Mir-annes, on their part, filed an exception to unauthorized use of summary 1 ^process to vacate the judgments. In a judgment dated Octobaer 29, 2001, the trial court overruled the Mirannes’ exception to unauthorized use of summary process and vacated the default judgments. In her oral reasons for judgment, the trial court indicated that the default judgments were interlocutory based upon Article 1915(B) of the Code of Civil Procedure as it read at the time the default judgments were taken, and, as interlocutory judgments, could be attacked by motion rather than by ordinary process. She further reasoned that she vacated the default judgments because the Mirannes did not advise the court that the Browns and FSA had filed answers in federal court at the time the defaults were confirmed.

The Mirannes then sought review of the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to vacate the default judgments. In a plurality decision, the court of appeal reversed the trial court and maintained the Mirannes’ exception of improper use of summary process. In the appellate opinion, two judges found that the default judgments were relative nullities which could not be attacked via summary process, one judge concurred because neither absolute nor relative nullities could be attacked by motion, and two judges dissented because the default judgments were absolute nullities which could be attacked by summary means.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the default judgments granted by the trial court in this case are absolute nullities which may be attacked at any time, in any court, and by either summary or ordinary process. We agree.

A final judgment may be annulled for either vices of form or substance. C.C.P. art.2001. Judgments suffering from vices of form are called “absolute nullities,” while those which contain vices of substance are called “relative nullities.” A default judgment confirmed against one whom a valid preliminary default has not been taken 1 fiis an absolute nullity. C.C.P. art.2002. Absolute nullities may be attacked collaterally, at any time, by rule, or any other method. C.C.P. art.2002, e.g. Hebert v. Hebert, 96-2155 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/19/97); 700 So.2d 958. A valid preliminary default may not be taken against one who has filed an answer in the matter. C.C.P. art. 1701. Our laws pertaining to default judgments are designed to provide a method for plaintiffs to obtain the relief to which they may be entitled when defendants do not answer. See Russo v. Au-coin, 7 So.2d 744 (La.App. 1st Cir.1942).

Here, the action had been removed to federal court and had been hotly contested there for over three years. While the matter was removed to federal court, all three defendants against whom the Mir-annes have taken defaults answered timely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter was argued at the federal district and appellate courts, and eventually before the United States Supreme Court, before being remanded back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

When a remand to the state court is based on want of jurisdiction on the part of the federal court, it is for the state court to determine what effect, if any, will be given to pleadings filed in the federal court. Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U.S. 187, 5 S.Ct. 90, 28 L.Ed. 693 (1884). Although this court has not previously ruled on the question of whether pleadings filed in federal court will be given effect in Louisiana state courts, the question has been answered in the affirmative on several occasions in the courts of appeal. See de Reyes, v. Marine Management & Consulting, Ltd., 544 So.2d 1259 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989); Armentor v. General Motors Corp., 399 So.2d 811 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1981); Bolden v. Brazile, 172 So.2d 304 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965).

As it is not necessary to the disposition of this matter for us to decide whether all pleadings filed in federal court during removal and prior to remand will be given effect in our state courts, we choose to restrict our holding to the following: An |7answer timely filed in federal court will be given effect in Louisiana courts.

Because both the Browns and FSA had timely filed answers in the matter while in federal court and because those answers are to be given effect, the preliminary defaults taken by the Mirannes in Civil District Court are not valid. Further, because the judgments taken against the Browns and FSA were not valid, the judgments are absolute nullities and subject to attack through summary process.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      .This factual history has been summarized from the factual history contained in Regions Bank of Louisiana v. Rivet, 224 F.3d 483 (5th Cir.2000). Our holding is not dependent upon this history, which is provided largely as an aid to understanding how this matter reached this court.

      . Maty Ann Rivet is the widow of Edmond G. Miranne and Minna Ree Winer is the wife of Edmond Miranne, Jr. Ms. Winer is also THILP’s president and general partner.

      . The fact that the defendants filed answers in federal court is not disputed by the Mirannes.

      . See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 108 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 1997).

      . See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998).


author: |,LANIER, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald K. SMITH.
    No. 2001-K-2574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 14, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied March 21, 2003.
    Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Douglas P. Moreau, District Attorney, D. Carson Marcantel, Richard C. Nevils, Brent M. Stockstill, Baton Rouge, for Applicant.
    James P. Manasseh, Baton Rouge, Kathryn F. Simino, for Respondent.
   |,LANIER, J.

Certiorari was granted to determine whether the court of appeal erred when it vacated the trial court’s sentence on the ground that it was unconstitutionally excessive. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court sentence was not excessive and reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 4, 1993, the defendant and Clenard Johnson entered Wilson’s Jewelers in Baton Rouge’s Cortana Mall. The defendant brandished a gun and ordered everyone in the store to lie on the floor. Johnson smashed a glass case with a mallet and grabbed approximately $400,000.00 worth of diamond rings. The defendant and Johnson fled the mall. They were chased by Jason Bassett, an army sergeant who had been shopping in the jewelry store. The defendant and Johnson attempted to escape in a stolen car. They abandoned the stolen car after a short distance. They then ran to an Oldsmobile Cutlass belonging to the defendant’s mother and continued their flight. Two shots were fired at their pursuers in the | ¡process. An off-duty security guard, who heard about the chase over his radio, saw one of the suspects fire. He chased Johnson and the defendant onto a highway and into a residential neighborhood on a dead-end street. A Baton Rouge City Police Officer, who also heard of the chase on the radio, pulled onto the dead end street in time to see the suspects running. The officer called in a canine unit and followed the suspects’ footprints. The canine unit arrived and located the suspects hidden in a nearby van.

The defendant was charged in a bill of information with armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64. He pled not guilty and, after a trial by jury, was convicted as charged. Subsequently, the State filed a “petition” charging the defendant as a second felony habitual offender in violation of La. R.S. 15:529.1. The foundation for the habitual offender charge was an Oklahoma conviction for “larceny from the house.” Larceny from the house is a felony under Oklahoma law. After a hearing, the trial court found the defendant to be a second felony habitual offender and sentenced him to serve forty-nine years and six months imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. He was given credit for time served. The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The court of appeal affirmed the defendant’s conviction, State v. Smith, 95-1826 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 980, writ denied, State v. Smith, 96-2568 (La.3/27/97), 692 So.2d 390. In a separate appeal, defendant also challenged his habitual offender adjudication and sentence asserting that the conduct leading to his predicate conviction in Oklahoma did not constitute a felony under Louisiana law. |sThe court of appeal agreed, vacated his habitual offender adjudication and sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Smith, 95-1827, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 978, 980.

The same trial court judge resentenced the defendant as a first offender and gave him the same sentence. The defendant again appealed his sentence. The court of appeal, in an unpublished opinion, found the trial court committed a patent error when it failed to dispose of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, vacated the sentence and remanded the case for a second resentencing. State v. Smith, 98-0710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 739 So.2d 1011.

On remand, a second trial court judge denied the motion for a new trial and resentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The court of appeal again reversed, finding the recent sentencing judge abused his sentencing discretion. State v. Smith, 00-2283 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 800 So.2d 446. This writ application by the State followed.

Excessiveness of Sentence

The defendant’s co-defendant, Clenard Johnson, was charged with, and convicted of, armed robbery and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to serve twenty years imprisonment at hard labor on each charge and the three sentences were ordered to run concurrently. State v. Johnson, 94-1564 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 461, writ denied, 95-2715 (La.2/16/96), 667 |4So.2d 1050. After reviewing the record in the instant case, the court of appeal concluded that there was “no justification in the record to support the great disparity in sentences on these co-defendants.”

In its only assignment of error, the State asserts the court of appeal erred when it vacated the sentence and remanded again for a new sentence. The State argues that the court of appeal disregarded significant portions of the record supporting the sentence and narrowly focused on the factors it used to justify setting aside the sentence. The State observes that the trial judge obtained and considered a supplemental presentence investigation report, conducted a sentencing hearing at which the defendant presented the testimony of witnesses, properly considered the statutory sentencing guidelines and recounted the facts pertaining to the offense in great detail. The State asserts the defendant was the “driving force” behind the armed robbery because he was the only person with a firearm during the robbery, he aimed the firearm at the persons in the store and ordered them to lie down, he drove his mother’s car as one of the “getaway” vehicles, he had a business card from the store in his pants and there was a map of the mall in his mother’s car. Finally, the State argues that the opinion of the court of appeal impermissibly infringes on the broad sentencing discretion of the trial court.

The defendant responds that it is fundamentally unfair for him to be sentenced to twice the term of incarceration as Johnson when Johnson was convicted of two more felony offenses and the parties are otherwise similarly situated. When Johnson was sentenced, the Felony Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) were in effect and | .^provided for a minimum sentence of twelve and one-half years and a maximum of fifteen years for Johnson. La.C.Cr.P. art. 891.1 prior to Acts 1995, No. 942. The sentencing judge deviated from the Guidelines and imposed, in effect, a twenty-year sentence. Johnson was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder and had similar charges pending against him in Texas. The defendant lost the opportunity to be sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines because of a change in the law. Johnson’s conduct was more egregious than that of the defendant because he shot twice at the pursuers during the escape attempt and was convicted of the additional two attempted second degree murder charges.

A review of the second trial judge’s extensive reasons for sentencing shows that he did a thorough job of reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors. He emphasized that the defendant aimed a firearm at six persons in the store and jeopardized their lives. The value of the items stolen during the robbery was approximately $400,000.00 and the judge observed that this was a “significant economic loss.” The items were recovered with the assistance of the defendant’s co-defendant, Johnson. Conversely, the record does not reflect that the defendant assisted in the recovery of the stolen goods. At the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant was on probation under a suspended sentence of five years for a conviction of “larceny from a house” in Oklahoma. He had prior arrests for attempted rape and kidnapping in 1990 and robbery with a firearm in 1994. A stolen car was used in the attempt to flee the scene of the crime. The defendant then drove his mother’s car in a dangerous, high speed chase that was unsuccessful. During the chase, Johnson fired two shots at the pursuers. The trial judge observed “you [Smith] | ¿were a principal, and to that extent you share equally to the extent of this robbery.” La. R.S. 14:24. The defendant showed no remorse. In particular, the trial judge observed as follows:

Whether you [Smith] should receive less than he [Johnson] is a factor for me to consider based upon your involvement and his involvement, but it is not an absolute factor there; because he receives a twenty year sentence that you should receive less than he or more than he. You must stand on your own feet as you are today and receive your individual punishment recognizing your involvement and recognizing your past criminal conduct.

At the time of the offense herein, the authorized sentence for armed robbery was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The sentence of forty years is in the lower half of the sentencing range.

Louisiana Constitution of 1974, art. I, § 20 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o law shall subject any person to ... excessive ... punishment.” (Emphasis added.) Although a sentence is within statutory limits, it can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La.1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive when it imposes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355, 357 (La.1980). A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Cann, 471 So.2d 701, 703 (La.1985). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant 17question is not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate but whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion. State v. Walker, 00-3200, p. 2 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 461, 462; cf. State v. Phillips, 02-0737, p. 1 (La.11/15/02), 831 So.2d 905, 906. The court of appeal failed to apply this principle and fell into error. This sentence is within the thirty-five to fifty-year range this Court has found acceptable for first offenders convicted of armed robbery. State v. Thomas, 98-1144, p. 2 (La.10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49, 50; State v. Augustine, 555 So.2d 1331, 1332 (La.1990) and the cases cited therein. The trial court judge did not abuse his broad sentencing discretion.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and the sentence imposed by the trial court is reinstated.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

JOHNSON, J., dissents.

       Retired Judge Walter I. Lanier, Jr., assigned as Associate Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., recused.

      . This opinion sets forth the facts pertaining to the commission of the offenses in great detail.

      . Judge Donald R. Johnson succeeded Judge Ralph E. Tyson after he was appointed to serve as a United States District Court Judge.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

      . Pursuant to Acts 1999, No. 932, La. R.S. 14:64 was amended to increase the minimum sentence for armed robbery from five to ten years. This is a legislative expression of policy pertaining to the seriousness of the offense.


author: _JjKNOLL, Justice. h CALOGERO, Chief Justice | jVICTORY, J., | TRAYLOR, J., 11WEIMER, J.,

text:
    Michael SMITH v. SOUTHERN HOLDING, INC. and Southern Scrap Material Company, L.L.C.
    No. 2002-CC-1071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied March 21, 2003.

      Michael D. Meyer, Counsel for Applicant.
    Ruben Hernandez, Jr., Robert A. Len-ter, Metairie, Counsel for Respondent.
   _JjKNOLL, Justice.

In this workers’ compensation case, we are asked to decide whether an employee who submits to surgery and treatment by an employer-referred physician, makes a de facto choice of treating physician within the meaning of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B). There is a split among the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Fourth Circuit as to the proper resolution of this question. The First and Third Circuits recognize de facto selection of a physician and the Fourth Circuit finds the statute does not so provide. Finding that the Fourth Circuit’s resolution of the issue is correct as a matter of law, we affirm.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Michael Smith (Smith), injured his left knee on August 21, 2000. This injury occurred when Smith missed a step with his right foot as he was getting out of his truck while in the course and scope of his employment with Southern Scrap | ¡Material Company, L.L.C. (Southern Scrap). Smith was referred by Southern Scrap to Chalmette Medical Center, where he sought treatment on August 24, 2000. He was treated by Dr. A. Friedri-chsen, who in turn referred him to Dr. Gordon Nutik, an orthopedic surgeon.

Smith first saw Dr. Nutik on September 1, 2000, and returned to him on September 18, 2000. On October 11, 2000, Dr. Nutik recommended arthroscopic surgery. Smith saw Dr. Nutik on October 23, 2000, for the purpose of a pre-operative examination. The surgery was performed by Dr. Nutik on October 31, 2000. Following the surgery, Smith saw Dr. Nutik six more times, the last visit occurring on February 19, 2001.

After the surgery, Smith informed Dr. Nutik that he continued to experience pain. Smith also continuously complained to Dr. Nutik that the therapy was inadequate and that his leg was not improving, leaving him unable to drive a truck with a clutch that requires ninety pounds of pressure. Subsequently Smith learned he had the right to be treated by a physician of his choice. Claiming that he had not chosen Dr. Nutik to treat him, Smith sought to be treated by Dr. John Watermeier, an orthopedic surgeon. Southern Scrap refused Smith’s request on the grounds that he made a de facto choice of physician. Smith filed a claim with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) seeking an appointment of a physician of his choice.

Southern Scrap argued that by submitting to medical treatment over a period of almost six months, including surgery, Smith had defacto chosen Dr. Nutik as his treating physician. The hearing officer rejected the employer’s argument and ruled that Smith had shown cause why he was dissatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Nu-tik and that Smith had a right to choose an orthopedist under La. R.S. 23:1121(B).

Southern Scrap took a supervisory writ to the court of appeal, which denied the writ. It then applied to this court for a supervisory writ, which we granted, remanding |sthe case to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion. Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2001-2258 (La.9/28/01), 798 So.2d 104. On remand from this court, the court of appeal affirmed the OWC. The court of appeal recognized that the employer relied upon cases from the First and Third Circuits, which have adopted a theory of de facto selection of physicians in workers’ compensation cases. However, citing Santacruze v. INA Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 323 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), the court of appeal noted the Fourth Circuit had never adopted such a theory and held the statute gives an injured employee an absolute right to choose one physician in any field without the approval of the employer. Southern Scrap again sought this Court’s review. We granted the employer’s writ application to resolve the split among the circuits. Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2002-1071 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 336.

DISCUSSION

Southern Scrap asserts that the failure of the hearing officer and the Fourth Circuit to recognize the defacto selection of a physician under the provisions of La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B) is erroneous. It argues that when an employee submits to treatment by an employer-referred physician it constitutes a selection of a physician within the intendment of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B).

La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) provides:

The employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty. The employee shall have a right to the type of summary proceeding provided for in R.S. 23:1124(B), when denied his right to an initial physician of his choice. After his initial choice, the employee shall obtain prior consent from the employer or his workers’ compensation carrier for a change of treating physician within that same field or specialty. The employee, however, is not required to obtain |4approval for change to a treating physician in another field or specialty.

A review of the jurisprudence shows the Fourth Circuit was the first appellate court to address La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), in Santacruze. In that case the employer had sent Santacruze to Dr. Mímeles. In support of its argument to uphold the hearing officer’s finding that Dr. Mímeles was Santacruze’s de facto choice of physician, the employer pointed out that Santa-cruze had willingly consulted Dr. Mímeles for years and allowed him to perform surgery. The employer argued Santacruze began claiming Dr. Mímeles was not his physician of choice only when Dr. Mímeles released Santacruze to return to work. Santacruze testified consistently at trial that he never selected Dr. Mimeles’s treatment as his orthopedist, but that he submitted to Dr. Mimeles’s treatment because the employer had told him to go there. The hearing officer found that Santacruze had defacto selected Dr. Mímeles.

In reversing the OWC, the Fourth Circuit held that La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), “gives an injured employee an absolute right to choose one physician in any field without the approval of the employer.” Santacruze, 614 So.2d at 324. The statute does not impose any time limits, nor does it prohibit an employee from choosing a physician in a particular field after he was treated by another physician in that field, unquestionably chosen by the employer. See Santacruze, 614 So.2d at 324.

In the present case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision of the hearing officer that Smith has the right to choose a treating physician under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B). Relying upon its Santacruz decision, the court stated that it has not adopted the theory of de facto selection of a treating physician.

The theory of a de facto choice of physician under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) first appeared in Guillotte v. Dynamic Offshore Contractors, 628 So.2d 234 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993). There the employer referred the injured employee, Guillotte, to Dr. | ^Comeaux. Dr. Comeaux subsequently referred Guillotte to Dr. Shepherd, an orthopedist. After Dr. Shepherd released Guillotte to return to work, Guillotte complained he was unhappy with Dr. Shepherd and sought authorization to see an orthopedist of his choosing. The hearing officer found that Guillotte had chosen Dr. Shepherd as his treating orthopedist. The hearing officer found that by, (1) failing to specify an orthopedist and, (2) undergoing treatment by Dr. Shepherd, Guillotte had de facto chosen Dr. Shepherd as his treating physician. See Guillotte, 628 So.2d at 236. The Third Circuit concluded that the hearing officer’s finding was not manifestly erroneous. Id. See also Comeaux v. Sam Broussard Trucking, 94-1631, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/95), 657 So.2d 449, 452-453, which affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that the employee had de facto chosen a physician, where the employee clearly submitted to treatment and did not request a change in physicians until the doctor released the employee to return to work.

The First Circuit, relying upon Co-meaux and Guillotte, has also held that an employee can de facto choose a treating physician. Moore v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 95-2042, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir.5/10/96), 674 So.2d 478, 484, unit denied 96-1399 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 106. In that decision the court of appeal overturned the decision of the hearing officer, which had found Moore was deprived of an opportunity to seek treatment from a physician of her choice pursuant to La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B). The First Circuit found that even though the physician was chosen by the employer, Moore had de facto chosen him as her treating physician by clearly submitting to treatment and further stating she never had. a problem with him. Id Likewise, in Fenyes v. Highland Park Med. Ctr., 97-0120, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir.2/20/98), 708 So.2d 493, 495, the First Circuit overruled the decision of the hearing officer and found the employee had de facto chosen a treating physician. Even though the English language was not the employee’s primary language and she testified that she did what the insurance I (¡company told her to do, the court held that she had de facto chosen a treating physician by continuously treating with the physician. Id.

“The [Workers’ Compensation] Act was long silent on the matter of the respective rights of employer and employee to select the physician who is to treat the worker.” 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 287 (4th ed.2002). Before the Legislature addressed this subject, Professors Malone and Johnson adopted the view that the employee should have the right to choose the physician of his choice. At that time, their treatise on this issue stated:

In view of the fact that the success of the treatment may depend upon the patient’s confidence in the physician chosen, it is suggested that the primary right of choice should rest with the patient, unless his choice is shown to be unreasonable, or solely for the purpose of tactical advantage at trial. The right of primary choice may be an important one in view of the fact that on trial the opinion of the treating physician is frequently preferred over that of other experts. 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 287 (2d ed.1980).

See also Kinsey v. Travelers Ins. Co., Inc., 402 So.2d 226, 228 (La.App. 1 Cir.1981) (citing this passage from Malone & Johnson in an opinion which held the employee is entitled to choose the physician for treatment of his injury). “The trust and confidence needed in a patient-doctor relationship is important to successful treatment which can best be obtained if the injured employee has the choice of a physician for treatment purposes.” Kinsey, 402 So.2d at 228.

The history of the legislation on this issue shows that the Legislature added subsection B of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121 by Acts 1987, No. 492, § 1. Representative Thompson explained that this bill was part of a package that was an attempt to fine-tune the workers’ compensation system to address problems that both employer and employee representatives had encountered. Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, June 12, 1987, p. 3. The intent of this law was to provide that the employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any | ffield or specialty. Testimony before the committee indicated the amendment was needed because the current system allowed the employee to “doctor shop;” this law allows the employee to choose one physician. The same opportunity is given to the employer. Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, June 12, 1987, p. 4 (emphasis ours).

“[T]he amendment! ] [adding subsection B] codified the principle that the employee has the right to select one treating physician in each specialty, but required that he obtain the employer’s consent to change specialists after that initial choice.” Malone, § 287; see also H. Alston Johnson, Workers’ Compensation, 48 La. L.Rev. 519 (1987) (emphasis ours). “[T]he 1987 amendment ... was designed to reduce the occurrence of “doctor shopping” by claimants while preserving the employee’s right to select the treating physician.” Denis Paul Juge, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation, § 13:3 (2d ed.1999). “The employee’s choice of physician is carefully respected, ... if the employer refers the employee to a physician, it might be difficult to establish that this was the employee’s choice.” Malone, § 287.

It is firmly established that legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will; therefore, interpretation of a law is primarily the search for the Legislature’s intent. See La. Civ Code art. 2; O’Reagan v. Preferred Enterprises, Inc., 98-1602, p. 4 (La.3/17/00), 758 So.2d 124, 128; Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198. When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. Civ.Code art. 9; Cat’s Meow, 720 So.2d at 1198. The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Lenard v. Dilley, 2001-1522, p. 4 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, 178; Cat’s Meow, 720 So.2d at 1198. The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. CivjCode8 art. 11. Statutes are to be interpreted in ways effectuating their purpose. Wise v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 97-0684, p. 8 (La.1/21/98), 707 So.2d 1214, 1218.

The language of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) is clear on its face. La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B) grants the employee “the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty.” Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La.Rev.Stat. 1:3. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines select as, “to choose in preference to another or others; pick out.” The same dictionary states the synonym for select is “choose” and defines choose as, “to select from or in preference to another or other things or persons.” We find the well accepted standards of statutory interpretation require that we find the employee has the right to choose his treating physician, even though he or she submitted to treatment by the employer’s physician.

We find the statute clear and unambiguous and thus, no need to search for legislative intent. Notwithstanding, a review of the legislative history corroborates our finding. The legislative history shows that the purpose of adding subsection B was to allow the employee to select one treating physician and after that initial choice, employer consent was required if the employee wanted to change treating physicians. It is clear that the legislation addressed the employers’ concern of employees “hopping” from one physician to another. In response to this concern, the Legislature enacted subsection B which limits the employee to his choice of one treating physician in a specialty, unless the employer consents to a change in treating physicians.

Interpreting this statute in a way to effectuate its purpose, results in finding that the employee has a right to select one treating physician. The right to select one treating physician is clearly conferred upon the employee, not the employer. Southern Scrap strongly argues that because Smith submitted to treatment by its physician, he | flmade a de facto choice of a physician. It further contends that Smith did not become unhappy with Dr. Nutik’s treatment until Dr. Nutik released Smith for sedentary work. Contrary to this argument, the hearing officer found that Smith showed he was dissatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Nutik, and under La. Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), Smith had a right to choose a physician of his choice.

Significantly, we note the statute does not make the employee’s choice of selection of a physician contingent upon the employee’s dissatisfaction with the employer’s physician. Nor does the statute limit the employee’s right of selection of a physician by submitting to treatment by the employer’s physician, even for an appreciable amount of time. The statute is clear and mandatory that the “employee shall have the right to select one treating physician.... ” Southern Scrap’s argument does not take into view the injured employees who submit to treatment by the employer’s physician because the employee did not know he or she could go to a physician of their choice. In the present case, Smith did not know he had a right to choose a physician until sometime after Dr. Nutik performed surgery on him. Southern Scrap’s theory would impose a serious infringement on the employee’s statutorily created right under these circumstances. To adopt the employer’s argument would be changing a clear and statutorily mandated law which we cannot do. Under these circumstances, the employer’s argument is more properly addressed before the Legislature, whose function is to make and amend laws if it so chooses.

Accordingly, we find the Fourth Circuit’s holding that La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) gives an injured employee an absolute right to select one physician in any field without the approval of the employer, is correct as a matter of law. If the Legislature had intended for theie to be a de facto selection of a physician, it could have so provided.

|inDECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgments of the OWC and the court of appeal are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., dissents and will assign reasons.

TRAYLOR and VICTORY, JJ., dissents and assigns reasons.

h CALOGERO, Chief Justice

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

I agree with the majority decision holding that an injured employee in a workers’ compensation case has a right to select a physician, as allowed by La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B).

This is a difficult case because the method by which an employee chooses a physician is not as clear as it might be. Nevertheless, the Legislature has stated that the “employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty.” La.Rev.Stat. 28:1121(B). Because the majority decision is consistent with that provision, I cannot disagree.

On the other hand, if the Legislature would have this law be more sensitive to situations where the employee has made a near de facto selection of a physician by voluntarily continuing treatment or allowing the physician to perform surgery, then it might consider more specifically addressing those situations. However, I read the language of the existing statute to entitle an employee to choose a physician even after allowing considerable treatment by a physician to whom he was referred by the employer, or, whose treatment resulted from a series of circumstances beginning with the employer’s choosing the facility that would provide initial treatment to the injured employee.

| jVICTORY, J.,

dissenting.

Although I am in agreement with many of views expressed in Justice Traylor’s dissent, I write separately in order to express a few additional thoughts.

The majority opinion emasculates the statute that was passed in order to prevent claimants from “doctor shopping” and to allow the claimant to choose only one physician in a speciality. Unfortunately, neither the legislature nor the majority tells us how that choice is to be made. Yet, one does not choose only by saying “I choose,” but may also choose by his or her actions.

The facts in this case are clear. Dr. Nutik was not chosen by the employer, but by the claimant. He chose Dr. Nutik by going to him for evaluation and treatment, not at the suggestion of the employer, but at the suggestion of an independent physician who saw him at the hospital closest to where his injury took place. He chose to accept that doctor’s suggestion, chose to be examined and treated on numerous occasions over several months by Dr. Nutik, and chose to have Dr. Nutik perform consensual surgery on him.

Finally, the majority’s implication that the claimant’s choice is somehow abrogated because he claims he did not know his rights is clearly covered by Article 5 of our Civil Code: “No one may avail himself of ignorance of the law.”

| TRAYLOR, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority because I would find that the instant claimant unequivocally selected Dr. Nutik as his treating physician.

First, as required under La. Civ.Code art. 9, “when the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written” and no further interpretation of “legislative intent” is necessary. The majority recognizes that the wording of Section 1121(B) is clear on its face. Therefore, the majority’s discussion of the legislative intent and reliance on treatise commentary on this subject is dicta and does not aid this court in determining the issue before it. Op. pp. 9-10.

Next, while I agree with the majority’s pronouncement that an employee has a right to choose his treating physician, I do not agree that he was ever required to submit to treatment by the employer’s physician. During oral argument, the claimant was not able to show that there was any real link between Dr. Nutik and the employer. The employer did not refer claimant to Dr. Nutik. Claimant was referred to Chalmette Medical Center after his injury. As circumstance would have it, he was attended to by Dr. Friedrichsen three days after his injury, who then referred claimant to Dr. Nutik. Claimant acquiesced all the while, treated with Dr. Nutik, never complained to his employer about Dr. Nutik or asked that he choose his own physician, agreed to undergo surgery at the hands of Dr. Nutik, then complained after almost six months of treatment with Dr. Nutik, and then only when he was released to return to work. |? We do not have a case before us where the claimant had no choice but to treat with his employer’s physician because he was denied his own choice at the outset. The instant case is distinguishable from such cases. See Santacruze v. INA Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 323 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993); Skelton v. Hunt Forest Products, 01-0158 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/01), 787 So.2d 1216.

Furthermore, there is no requirement in the Statute that a choice of physician form be completed before a claimant can be deemed to have selected his treating physician. In my view, there is no clearer manner of selection than when a claimant acts as the instant one has: in allowing and acquiescing to continued treatment with a physician and choosing to undergo surgery with this physician, all the while making no requests to the employer to select a treating physician. The Fourth Circuit, the very court relied upon by the majority in this case, has recognized that this course of conduct qualifies as a claimant’s selection of a treating physician under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B). Dabney v. Boh Brothers Construction Company, 97-1041 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/11/98), 710 So.2d 1106.

For the above reasons, I would find that the claimant had chosen this physician as a result of his actions and denied the claimant’s request to change physicians.

11WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I agree with most of what Justice Knoll states in her well-reasoned opinion. I believe an employee has an absolute right to select a physician of his choice and agree with the statement in the opinion:

“The trust and confidence needed in a patienNdoctor relationship is important to successful treatment which can best be obtained if the injured employee has the choice of a physician for treatment purposes.” Kinsey [v. Travelers Ins. Co., Inc.], 402 So.2d [226] at 228 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1981)].

The only point upon which we disagree is that I believe the statute is silent as to how the selection is made. Although the statute is clear as to the fact that the employee has an absolute right to choose a physician, there is no indication regarding how that selection is made. I would not use the term de facto selection because if the employee continues to treat with a certain physician, a selection has in fact been made.

I suggest the following non-exclusive factors are relevant:

a) Was the employee informed he or she had a choice?
b) What is the relationship between the doctor and the employer?
c) What is the length of treatment?
Ld) What is the nature of the treatment and did the physician perform surgery?
e) Is the change being made solely for the purpose of achieving a tactical advantage at the hearing?

Clearly, the statute was enacted to prohibit the practice of doctor-shopping. The following hypothetical illustrates a problem. An employee is referred to a doctor and treats with that doctor for two years. He likes the doctor so much he recommends the doctor to his family and friends. The doctor performs surgery with excellent results. The doctor tells the employee he is healed. The employee decides he wants another opinion for tactical purposes at a hearing and claims a right to make a selection. Should the employee be allowed to then select another physician?

      . Compare Guillotte v. Dynamic Offshore Contractors, 628 So.2d 234 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993); Comeaux v. Sam Broussard Trucking, 94-1631 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/95), 657 So.2d 449; Moore v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 95-2042 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 674 So.2d 478, writ denied, 96-1399 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 106; and Fenyes v. Highland Park Med. Ctr., 97-0120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 708 So.2d 493 to Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2001-1185 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/27/02), 814 So.2d 656 and Santacruze v. INA Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 323 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993).

      . The opinion states that ‘'[t]he employer relies upon cases from the Second and Third Circuits...." This is an error, as immediately following this sentence the opinion cites cases from the First and Third Circuits, and there are no cases from the Second Circuit addressing de facto selection of a physician pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B).

      . “The employee's choice of physician is carefully respected, 327 if the employer refers the employee to a physician, it might be difficult to establish that this was the employee’s choice.” 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Workers' Compensation Law And Practice § 287 (2d ed. 1980).


author: | KIMBALL, Justice |! CALOGERO, Chief Justice, concurs

text:
    Ronald J. BOQUET, Sr. v. TETRA TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and Travelers Property & Casualty Corp.
    No. 2002-C-1634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2003.

      Patricia McKay Clotiaux, New Orleans, for Applicant.
    Joseph J. Weignand, Jr., for Respondent.
   | KIMBALL, Justice

The sole issue presented for our review in this workers’ compensation case is whether an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits interrupts prescription as to the employee’s claim for medical benefits. For the reasons that follow, we find the payment of indemnity benefits does not interrupt prescription on claimant’s claim for medical benefits. We conclude the language of La. R.S. 23:1209 is clear and unambiguous and requires a finding that when medical benefits have been paid, the time limitation for making additional claims for medical benefits is three years from the last payment of medical benefits.

Facts and Procedural History

This case involves a claim for benefits pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The facts are undisputed. On April 2, 1990, claimant, Ronald J. Bo-quet, Sr., was injured while in the course and scope of his employment with Tetra Technologies, Inc. (“Tetra”). Tetra paid workers’ compensation indemnity benefits I ¡.to Mr. Boquet until April 2000, a period of 520 weeks. Additionally, Tetra paid some of Mr. Boquet’s medical expenses, with the last medical expense being paid on February 18,1994.

On May 23, 2000, Mr. Boquet filed a disputed claim for compensation against Tetra and its insurer, Travelers Property and Casualty Corp., contending that he is permanently and totally disabled as a re-suit of his work-related accident and, consequently, is entitled to additional workers’ compensation indemnity benefits and medical benefits. In response, defendants filed an exception of prescription as to Mr. Boquet’s claim for medical benefits. Defendants argued that pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1209(0, the prescriptive period for payment of claimant’s medical expenses is three years from the last payment of medical benefits. Accordingly, defendants contend, Mr. Boquet’s claim for medical benefits is prescribed on its face. Claimant opposed defendants’ exception, asserting that prescription was interrupted by defendants’ payment of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits and citing Levatino v. Domengeaux & Wright, P.L.C., 593 So.2d 721 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 196 (La.1992), in support of this proposition.

After a hearing on the matter, the hearing officer sustained defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissed Mr. Boquet’s claim for medical benefits.

Claimant appealed the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation. The First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. Boquet v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 01-0856 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 941. In its opinion, the court of appeal adhered to its previous judgment in Leva-tino and held that defendants’ payment of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits interrupted the prescriptive period for Mr. Boquet’s Lclaim for medical expenses.

We granted certiorari upon defendants’ application to address an apparent split among the circuits of the courts of appeal on the issue of whether an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits interrupts prescription on the employee’s claim for medical benefits. Boquet v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 02-1634 (La.11/1/02), 828 So.2d 580.

Discussion

The applicable prescriptive period for making claims for workers’ compensation benefits is provided by La. R.S. 23:1209. The instant ease involves a claim for medical benefits, which is specifically addressed in subsection (C) of La. R.S. 23:1209. That subsection provides:

All claims for medical benefits payable pursuant to R.S. 23:1203 shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or death the parties have agreed upon the payments to be made under this Chapter, or unless within one year after the accident a formal claim has been filed with the office as provided in this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in any case, this limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of three years from the time of making the last payment of medical benefits.

La. R.S. 23:1209(C) (emphasis added). Thus, in a case such as this where medical payments have been made, a claimant has three years from the date of the last payment of medical benefits to file his claim for additional medical benefits.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendants’ last payment of medical [ ¿benefits was made on February 18, 1994. Because Mr. Boquet’s claim for payment of additional medical benefits was not filed until May 23, 2000, the claim for medical benefits is prescribed on its face. When a workers’ compensation claim is prescribed on its face, the claimant bears the burden of showing the running of prescription was suspended or interrupted in some manner. Jonise v. Bologna Bros., 01-3230, p. 6 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 460, 464.

In support of his claim that defendants’ payment of indemnity benefits interrupted prescription as to his claim for medical benefits, claimant relies on the decisions by the fifth circuit in Manuel v. River Parish Disposal, Inc., 96-302 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/1/96), 683 So.2d 791, and the first circuit in Levatino v. Domengeaux & Wright, P.L.C., 693 So.2d 721 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), unit denied, 596 So.2d 196 (La.1992), which held that payment of indemnity benefits interrupts prescription on a claim for medical benefits. Claimant suggests that such a conclusion is required in light of fact that workers’ compensation laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the injured worker.

In response, defendants rely on the plain language of La. R.S. 23:1209(C) in support of their argument that payment of indemnity benefits does not interrupt prescription as to claims for medical benefits. Additionally, defendants point out that the third and fourth circuits have held that such payment does not serve to interrupt prescription on claims for medical benefits.

The parties are correct in that there is a split among the circuits of the courts of appeal on the issue of whether an employer’s payment of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits interrupts prescription as to the employee’s claim for medical benefits. In Levatino, the first circuit considered the provisions of La. R.S. 23:1209(C) and explicitly held that “the payment of weekly benefits for a disabling | ¡jnjury interrupts a claim for medical expenses incurred in connection with that injury.” Levatino, 593 So.2d at 724. The court reached this conclusion based primarily on policy grounds, stating:

There are sound reasons to allow weekly benefits to interrupt a claim for medical expenses. It is grossly unfair for a claimant, such as the one in this case, to be disabled from a job-related injury and drawing weekly benefits for that disability, and yet be denied medical benefits for the disabling injury. Further, a disabled employee drawing weekly benefits would be encouraged to incur unnecessary medical expense for the sole purpose of keeping the claim viable.

Id. It should be noted, however, that while the Levatino court did hold that payment of weekly benefits interrupts a claim for medical benefits, it appears the court was dealing with a situation in which no medical benefits had previously been paid pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1203 and, consequently, the court did not examine the last sentence of La. R.S. 23:1209(C), which deals with prescription of claims for medical benefits when such benefits have previously been made.

In Manuel, the fifth circuit followed the first circuit’s decision in Levatino and held that claimant’s claim for compensation interrupted the running of prescription on his claim for medical expenses. Manuel, 96-302 at p. 11, 683 So.2d at 797. Again, however, as in Levatino, it appears the factual situation in Manuel was one in which no payments for medical payments had been made by claimant’s employer or its insurer and, therefore, the court did not discuss the last sentence in La. R.S. 23:1209(C).

In contrast to the decisions by the first and fifth circuits in Levatino and Manuel, the third and fourth circuits refused to find that payments of anything other than medical benefits interrupt prescription on claims for medical benefits. In Rapp v. City of New Orleans, 95-1638 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/18/96), 681 So.2d 433, writ denied, 96-2925 (La.1/24/97), 686 So.2d 868, the court held that offsets against collateral sources by defendant were a tacit acknowledgment of plaintiffs’ entitlement to indemnity benefits. However, the fourth circuit determined the offsets, which plaintiffs reasoned were the equivalent of indemnity benefits, did not interrupt prescription of plaintiffs’ claims for medical benefits. In reaching this decision, the fourth circuit declined to follow Levatino, finding the language of the three-year prescriptive period in subsection (C) was clear and unambiguous such that the payment of indemnity benefits does not interrupt the prescription of medical benefits.

Similarly, in situations involving payments of medical benefits prior to the claim at issue, the third circuit has held that payment of indemnity benefits does not interrupt prescription on claims for medical benefits. In Bellard v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 98-651 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 1171, writ denied, 99-0059 (La.3/12/99), 739 So.2d 202, the third circuit declined to follow Levatino, agreeing instead with the Rapp court’s conclusion that the language of La. R.S. 23:1209 is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the third circuit concluded, “[a]s the statute is written, nothing other than payments of medical benefits interrupts the three year prescription provided in the second sentence of paragraph C.” Rapp, 98-651 at p. 5, 722 So.2d at 1173. Subsequently, in Dequeant v. City of Jennings, 01-0141 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01), 784 So.2d 860, the third circuit reaffirmed its Bellard decision, holding that an employer’s payments of supplemental earnings benefits did not interrupt prescription on claimant’s medical benefits claim.

Turning now to the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1209(C) in a case in which medical benefits have previously been paid to claimant, we must keep certain principles of judicial interpretation of statutes in mind. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, therefore, the interpretation of legislation is | .¡.primarily the search for the legislative intent. Burnette v. Stalder, 00-2167 (La.6/29/01), 789 So.2d 573. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4. The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La.1993).

We find the language at issue in La. R.S. 23:1209(C) is clear, unambiguous, and does not lead to absurd consequences. Subsection (C) applies to “all claims for medical benefits payable pursuant to R.S. 23:1203.” The first sentence of the subsection goes on to establish a one year prescriptive period for such claims in certain situations. The second sentence, however, deals with situations in which medical benefits have previously been paid: “Where such payments have been made in any case, this limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of three years from the time of making the last payment of medical benefits.” The plain language of these provisions leads to the inescapable conclusion that when medical benefits have been paid, the time limitation for making additional claims for medical benefits is three years from the last payment of medical benefits. Because the legislature chose to qualify the three-year period with the last payment of “medical” benefits, instead of simply the last payment of “benefits,” we are constrained to find that only defendants’ payment of medical benefits serves to interrupt the three-year prescriptive period established in La. R.S. 23:1209(0).

In the instant case, the claim for medical benefits was made more than three years after the last payment of medical benefits. Therefore, we must find his claim for medical benefits has prescribed pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1209(0). We recognize this is a harsh rule applied to a sympathetic claimant. Nevertheless, we cannot use lathe policy considerations espoused by the Levatino court, however valid they may seem to us, to override the plain wording of the statute. Such considerations are within the province of the legislature and, although we may invite them to look again at the implications and consequences of La. R.S. 23:1209(0), we are not free to ignore their clear expressions.

Decree

For the reasons expressed above, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal that the claim for medical benefits has not prescribed. The exception of prescription is sustained and claimant’s claim for medical benefits is dismissed.

REVERSED.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.

|! CALOGERO, Chief Justice, concurs

and assigns the following reasons.

Although I agree with the majority that the unambiguous language of La. R.S. 23:1209(0) commands the conclusion that payments for workers’ compensation indemnity benefits do not interrupt prescription on an employee’s claim for medical benefits, I write separately to emphasize the resulting injustice to workers and urge the legislature to re-examine the policy behind, and consequences of, this statutory provision. I recognize that prescriptive statutes serve many valid and necessary functions, such as protecting the employer from stale claims and enabling the employer to determine when potential liability for an accident will cease. See Malone & Johnson, 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice, § 384, at 323 (4th ed.2002). I do not believe, however, these purposes are served by § 1209(C). Equity requires that indemnity benefit payments should interrupt prescription on a claim for medical expenses, when these medical expenses are made necessary by the same workplace injury for which indemnity benefits are being paid.

Policy considerations support the well-established law of this state that medical expense payments do not interrupt prescription on a claim for indemnity benefits. Most notably, this particular rule encourages the employer to furnish medical assistance in all cases without fear that, by so doing, he may prejudice his position Lwith respect to a possible claim for indemnity benefits. Malone & Johnson, supra. In the reverse situation implicated here (indemnity benefit payments interrupting prescription on claim for medical expense payments), the only policy § 1209(C) furthers is one that encourages the injured employee who is drawing weeMy indemnity benefits to incur unnecessary medical expenses for the purpose of keeping his claim for medical expenses alive. See Levatino, 593 So.2d at 724.

Employers are not unfairly prejudiced by medical expense claims made during a time when an employee is drawing weeMy indemnity benefits. When an employer is making weeMy payments to compensate an employee for a workplace injury, he is aware of the existence and extent of the employee’s injuries. In fact, by making indemnity benefit payments, an employer is arguably assuming responsibility for the workplace injury. If an employee is sufficiently disabled to qualify for weekly indemnity benefit payments, one can reasonably assume that his injuries are genuine. Under the quid pro quo scheme of workers’ compensation law, the employee surrenders the right to sue his employer in tort and thereby seek full damages for his injury, and accepts instead a more modest claim for essentials, payable regardless of fault, and with a minimum of delay. Section 1209(C) needlessly operates in this case to deny a validly injured worker expense reimbursements for medical treatment received after a three-year period where the worker did not, often for commendable reasons, seek treatment from a physician.

As the majority correctly recognizes, courts must take the law as they find it and cannot legislate on the pretense of equity. It is the province of our duly elected legislators to re-examine inequitable statutes such as § 1209(C), keeping in mind its questionable consequences and the benevolent purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

      . The record reveals that Mr. Boquet received temporary total disability benefits of $276.00 per week from the date of the accident through November 15, 1994, at which time his benefits were converted to supplemental earnings benefits and paid at the rate of $835.75 per month.

      . The prescriptive provisions of La. R.S. 23:1209 did not always contain an explicit provision related to claims for medical benefits. Before the passage of La. R.S. 23:1209(C), this court, in Lester v. Southern Casualty Ins. Co., 466 So.2d 25 (La.1985), held that the prescriptive provisions of La. R.S. 23:1209 did not apply to claims for medical expenses. Consequently, this court determined that claims for medical expenses were governed by the Civil Code’s ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions. After this court's opinion in Lester was rendered, the legislature passed Acts 1985, No. 926, effective January 1, 1986, which amended La. R.S. 23:1209 to provide a specific prescriptive period for claims for medical benefits payable pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1203.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ken E. NEWMAN.
    No. 2003-KK-0563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2003.
   In re Newman, Ken E.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 103720; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0090.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry Paul LANDRY.
    No. 2003-KK-0575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 2003.
   In re Landry, Larry Paul; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 263,915; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 02-01456.

Denied.


text:
    Willie TURNER, Walter Kyle and Winnie Jones v. Billy JAMES and Carolyn Caldwell, Clerk of Court for Madison Parish.
    No. 2003-C-0618.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 3, 2003.
   In re James, Billy et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-77; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,405-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Enrique ORTIZ v. Delta Peggy THOMPSON.
    No. 2003-CC-0572.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 6, 2003.
   In re Thompson, Delta Peggy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 99-19029; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2739.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Clifford DAVIS, Jr., et al. v. Charles WITT, et al.
    No. 2002-C-3102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Louisiana, State of; Public Safety and Corrections Department; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97-58,061; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-894.

Granted. Consolidated with 2002-C-3110.


text:
    Clifford DAVIS, Jr., et al. v. Charles WITT, et al.
    No. 2002-C-3110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Fuselier, Charles A., Sheriff St. Martin Parish; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97-58,061; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-894.

Granted. Consolidated with 2002-C-3102.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel FISHER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Fisher, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-4943; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KH-986.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. If it has not done so already, the district court is ordered to supply relator with a copy of his guilty plea colloquy. State ex rel. Simmons v. State, 93-0275 (La.12/16/94), 647 So.2d 1094. In all other respects, the application is denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Richard GALLEGOS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-1444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Gallegos, Richard Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 318970; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0481.

Writ granted in part; case remanded to the district court. The district court is ordered to grant relator’s motion for out-of-time review. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336, 339-40 (La.1985).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Glenard T. JULES.
    No. 2003-KH-0495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Jules, Glenard T.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 409-923; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2083.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the court of appeal, Fourth Circuit, for enforcement of its order in State v. Jyles, 02-1631 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/28/02), if it has not done so already.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur R. ERVIN.
    No. 2003-KH-0601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Ervin, Arthur R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 00000.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the writ to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jesse Eric GENTRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Gentry, Jesse Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 19546-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01392.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration under La.C.Cr.P. art. 701(F).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Toby MATEN.
    No. 2003-KH-0487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Maten, Toby; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 10-00-572; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2192.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration under La.C.Cr.P. art. 701(F).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest SERIO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Serio, Ernest; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2003; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court No. 99-0605, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit 01-KH-1408.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest M. SERIO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Ernest M. Serio; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated January 10, 2003, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-6727; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-24.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    Kevin PETERSON v. Mickey HUBERT, Tommy Glover, Carol Poole, Todd Thomas, Pamela Horne, Michael Trent, Raymond Byrd, Virgil Lucas.
    No. 2002-CI-0384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Peterson, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2003, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 470,977; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 CA 2097.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory WARNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Warner, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2003; Parish of Washington 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 91-CR-47615, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 01-KW-2007.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph LANDIX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Joseph Landix; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated January 24, 2003; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 385-402 to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2001-K-1983, 2001-K-1935.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    Alfonso RHONE v. Charles LEWIS, et al.
    No. 2002-CP-2435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Rhone, Alfonso Plaintiff(s).; — Applying for Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated November 22, 2002; Parish of Claiborne, 2nd JDC Div. “A” No. 35244; Court of Appeal, Second Circuit No. 36,210-CA.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    Captain Kenneth P. PUCKETT v. LOUISIANA HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-2739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Puckett, Kenneth P. Captain;— Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 24, 2003; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 482,601; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1211.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy D. BRADFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0228.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Bradford, Timothy D.,; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. CR-458-97, CR97-96; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-01032.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy D. ALEMAN.
    No. 2002-KO-0481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Troy D. Aleman; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 95-6019; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-743.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Scott STANSELL.
    No. 2002-KP-0637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Stansell, Scott; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 5435-99; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2375.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Renaldo SANDERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Sanders, Renaldo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 345-072; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0007.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0859.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Williams, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 387-647; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2398.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0876.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Parker, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 12-86-2, 2-87-750; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2194.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Francis P. TULLIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0881.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Tullier, Francis P.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 971754; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2308.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glen MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Miller, Glen; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 252,945; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-KW-1901.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carolyn HOLLINGSWORTH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0893.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Hollingsworth, Carolyn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 27-100-B.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard, v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James COOLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0894.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Cooley, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 219-806.

Denied. See, e.g., Deloch v. Whitley, 96-1901, p. 1 (La.11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349; see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 352-55 (6th Cir.1998).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leo GILL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0912.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Gill, Leo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 82,531; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2307.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles HUTCHINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0914.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Hutchinson, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 226539; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2311.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John HOSFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0930.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Hosford, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 1-89-447; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-KW-1874.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marvin COBB v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2008.
   In re Cobb, Marvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 257742; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2309.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome SMITH.
    No. 2002-KP-1324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Smith, Jerome; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 310-757; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2347.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph JORDAN.
    No. 2002-KP-1337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Jordan, Joseph; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 374-678; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0086.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory BRIGHT.
    No. 2002-KP-1427.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 252-514.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederick JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Jones, Frederick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 386-250; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2285.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carley J. PROVOST, II v. Ed C. DAY, Jr.
    No. 2002-KP-1436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Provost, Carley J. II; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97 CR 870720; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2934.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory BRIGHT.
    No. 2002-KP-1441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 252-514.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alan T. SIMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Sims, Alan T.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-91-147; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-KW-0241.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth T. ROBERTS.
    No. 2002-K-2054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 09-96-475; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 3030.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick DAVIS.
    No. 2002-K-2055.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Davis, Derrick; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-32; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 2952.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ray A. BRIGHT.
    No. 2002-KK-2140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Bright, Ray A.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge City Court, No. 97CR109126S; 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2-99-0264; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-KW-2169.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Javar JOHNSON.
    No. 2002-K-2200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Javar; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-31; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-1362.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy Randell ODOM.
    No. 2002-K-2213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Odom, Randy Randell; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 103,729; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,103-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marshall T. BATCHELOR.
    No. 2002-K-2247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Batchelor, Marshall T.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 87508-11; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,478-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilfred E. CORTEZ, Jr.
    No. 2002-K-2274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Cortez, Jr., Wilfred E.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 1-01-144; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2094.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cylvia A. COLEMAN.
    No. 2002-K-2287.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Coleman, Cylvia A.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 420-449; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2198.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kentrell VANCE.
    No. 2002-K-2296.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Vance, Kentrell; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 413-739; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0483.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry W. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2002-K-2381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Williams, Larry W.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 426-748; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1100.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sylvester MEAD.
    No. 2002-K-2384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Mead, Sylvester; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 211,460; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,131-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory Polite REED.
    No. 2002-K-2391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Reed, Gregory Polite; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR-2000-849; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-214.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings Florence Reidling, Wife of/and Lawrence REIDLING v. Roger D. SMITH, M.D., Charles Benedetto, M.D., J. Saputo, CRNA, Jane Doe, R.N., Lloyd F. Locascio, Sr., M.D., Memorial Medical Center-Mercy Campus, Tenet HealthSystems Hospitals, Inc., and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-2487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Comp. Fund;— Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 99-7182; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0778.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl TRUVIA.
    No. 2002-KP-2688.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2008.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 252-514.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES, STATE EMPLOYEES GROUP BENEFITS PROGRAM v. John A. LEBLANC & Jo Ann Leblanc.
    No. 2002-C-2694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Leblanc, John A.; Leblanc, Jo Ann; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 57,625; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0414.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    TIGER AIR & HEAT, LLC and Berg, Inc. v. JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Star Services of New Orleans, Inc.
    No. 2002-C-2762.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Tiger Air & Heat LLC; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 569-056; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-610.

Denied.


text:
    Darken W. SMITH v. BFI.
    No. 2002-C-2862.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Smith, Darleen W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 8, No. 01-04077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0675.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    LION INVESTBANC CORPORATION v. RIVER PRODUCTS, INC., Gary L. Smith, Glen D. Smith, Henry A. Smith, Jr. a/k/a Henry A. Smith and Aquatic Towing, Inc.
    No. 2002-C-2905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Lion Investbanc Corporation;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 35,624, 35,623, 35,635; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 02-CA-481, 02-CA-482, 02-CA-483.

Denied.


text:
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON v. SFS CONSULTATION GROUP.
    No. 2002-CC-2950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re SFS Consultation Group Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 551-382; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-996.

Denied.


text:
    Frances GLASS v. ALTON OCHSNER MEDICAL FOUNDATION (OCHSNER FOUNDATION HOSPITAL) Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C. and Warren R. Summer, M.D.
    No. 2002-C-2977.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation (Ochsner Foundation Hospital); Ochsner Clinic L.L.C.; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 01-10057; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0412.

Denied.


text:
    Jeffery HUDSON v. Tammy L. NEWMAN.
    No. 2002-C-2980.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Hudson, Jeffery; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 40,147; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CU 1439.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Robert W. WEBB v. Alberta C. WEBB.
    No. 2002-C-3001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Webb, Robert W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 16,722; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 1577.

Denied.


text:
    Frances GLASS v. ALTON OCHSNER MEDICAL FOUNDATION (OCHSNER FOUNDATION HOSPITAL) Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C. and Warren R. Summer, M.D.
    No. 2002-C-3018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Summer, Warren R. M.D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D-16, No. 2001-10057; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0412.

Denied.


text:
    BOSSIER MEDICAL CENTER v. Deborah HARGRAVES.
    No. 2002-CC-3083.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Hargraves, Deborah; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 104,450; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36717-CW.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Leonce Jennings MILLER, III v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2002-C-3093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Miller, Leonce Jennings III;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2001-06876; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0158.

Denied.


text:
    The SPORTSMAN’S COVE, INC. v. The BRUNSWICK CORPORATION and Travis Boating Center Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2002-CC-3097.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Brunswick Corporation et ah;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 52,799; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-970.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    PREMIER RESTAURANTS, INC., et al. v. KENNER PLAZA SHOPPING CENTER, L.L.C.
    No. 2002-C-3109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Premier Restaurants, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 519-541, 519-542; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 02-CA-296, 02-CA-297.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Casey BILLIESON, et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-3116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Scottsdale Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 94-19231; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2049.

Denied. Adequate remedy on appeal.


text:
    Inaray WOODS v. METROPOLITAN HEALTH GROUP, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-3128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Woods, Inaray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 98-10926; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2092.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Sonya J. WILLIAMSON and Her Minor Children, Abner Williamson, Dixie Williamson, and Jolie Williamson Through Their Natural Tutor, Robert Williamson v. HAYNES BEST WESTERN OF ALEXANDRIA, INC., American General Fire & Casualty Company, Maryland Casualty Insurance Company, Best Western International, Inc., and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, M/M H.L. Haynes, Individually, et al.
    No. 2002-OC-3135.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 14, 2003.
   In re Williamson, Sonya J. et al.; Williamson, Abner; Williamson, Dixie; Williamson, Robert; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 95-16175; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1076.

Denied.