author: | .PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Jacqueline CARR.
    No. 2003-B-3138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2004.

      Charles B. Plattsmier, G. Fred Ours, Baton Rouge, for Applicant.
    Jacqueline Carr, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

| .PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary proceeding arises from charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Jacqueline Carr, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana, but currently on interim suspension.

UNDERLYING FACTS

James Moses, a St. Tammany Parish resident, died in 1977. Shortly thereafter, the decedent’s brother, Joseph Moses, who lived in Ohio, retained respondent to handle the decedent’s succession and represent his four minor children. Joseph Moses was appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate and tutor of the four minor children. Through the following years, respondent handled numerous legal matters connected with this succession and tutorship. However, between April 6 and June 12,1984, respondent, without authorization, removed from the succession and/or tutorship accounts a total of $97,000 by writing eight separate cheeks and depositing them into her personal accounts.

Subsequently, Joseph Moses learned that respondent had removed these funds without authorization and demanded she make immediate repayment and render an 1 ?,accounting. When respondent failed to do so, Mr. Moses filed various complaints with law enforcement authorities and with the Louisiana State Bar Association.

The Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility (“COPR”), conducted an investigation into respondent’s actions. In 1986, the COPR instituted disciplinary charges against respondent, alleging she converted $97,000 in succession funds.

While the disciplinary charges were pending, the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney’s Office instituted criminal charges against respondent. The case proceeded to a jury trial. On December 1, 1989, respondent was convicted of six counts of theft of $500 or more and two counts of unauthorized use of a movable valued in excess of $1,000. For each of the six theft convictions, respondent was sentenced to six years incarceration at hard labor, fined $3,000, and ordered to pay court costs. As to the two unauthorized use of a movable convictions, respondent was sentenced to two years at hard labor, fined $3,000, and ordered to pay court costs. The trial court ordered the jail sentences to run concurrently and all fines and court costs to run consecutively.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Interim Suspension

Following her conviction, the COPR moved to place respondent on interim suspension. On February 22, 1990, this court granted the motion and placed respondent on interim suspension based upon her conviction.

|aFormal Charges

On April 1, 1990, shortly after respondent was placed on interim suspension, we adopted Supreme Court Rule XIX, which created the current disciplinary system. We then remanded the case to the disciplinary board for proceedings in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX. On December 3, 1990, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent based on her criminal conviction. The charges alleged violations of the following provisions of the former Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(1) (violating a disciplinary rule), DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), DO 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), DO 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), DO 1-102(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law), DO 7-101(A)(3) (zealous representation) and DO 9-102(A)(B) (commingling and conversion of client funds).

Formal Hearings

A formal hearing commenced in respondent’s disciplinary proceeding in May 1993. The ODC presented its entire case and rested. Subsequently, respondent began presenting her defense and attempted to argue facts which were inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime of which she was convicted. The hearing committee chair ruled respondent had t.o limit her case to the presentation of mitigating evidence, 1 ¿citing Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E). The hearing was recessed so respondent could take writs to this court.

On June 25, 1993, the court denied respondent’s writ application insofar as she sought to introduce evidence inconsistent with her criminal conviction. However, we granted her request to stay the proceedings pending her appeal of her criminal conviction. In re: Carr, 93-1467 (La.6/25/93), 620 So.2d 828.

Respondent’s criminal conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State of Louisiana v. Carr, 618 So.2d 1098 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993). This court denied her application for writs on April 4, 1994. State of Louisiana v. Carr, 94-0670 (La.4/4/94), 635 So.2d 1116.

In January 1996, the ODC sought to recommence the disciplinary hearing. However, before the hearing formally commenced, respondent claimed she was unable to assist in her defense due to a mental and physical incapacity. After lengthy proceedings, respondent filed a “Motion to Withdraw Petition for Disability Inactive Status,” asserting that she was fully and mentally competent.

The hearing finally recommenced on July 23, 2002. At that time, the ODC introduced the evidence it submitted in the prior formal hearing that took place nine years earlier. Respondent again sought to argue the merits of her conviction, contending she was given an automatic first offender pardon. Over respondent’s objection, the committee limited her argument to the presentation of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E) and this court’s ruling nine years earlier.

| &Recommendation of Hearing Committee

On September 17, 2002, the hearing committee issued its recommendation finding clear and convincing evidence of violations of the professional rules cited in the formal charges based on her conviction. It found the crime of which respondent was convicted involved fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in connection with the utilization of funds entrusted to her.

As aggravating factors, the hearing committee recognized respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of her conduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victim, indifference to making restitution and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the committee recognized respondent’s first offender pardon and lack of a prior disciplinary record.

Relying on jurisprudence from this court, the committee recommended imposition of disbarment. The committee further proposed that respondent make full restitution prior to her readmission to the practice of law.

Recommendation of Disciplinary Board

The disciplinary board concurred with the hearing committee’s factual and legal findings. Addressing the issue of sanctions, the disciplinary board concluded respondent intentionally violated duties to his clients, the public and the legal system. As evidence, it pointed out respondent deprived her clients of funds, causing serious or potentially serious injury. Additionally, the board noted respondent’s criminal proceedings received extensive coverage in the local media and observed such adverse publicity causes harm to the public’s perception of the legal profession.

Relying on Guideline 1 of Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, the board found permanent disbarment may be appropriate for “repeated or multiple instances | fiof intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.” The board found this guideline was applicable under the facts of this case, because respondent wrote eight separate checks on her client’s succession account over a period of two months and deposited the funds into her personal account. The board concluded respondent exhibited little regard for her clients or for the legal system and that she does not possess the moral fitness to practice law in Louisiana. Accordingly the board unanimously proposed that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of law.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the matter was docketed for briefing and argument in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G).

DISCUSSION

In brief and argument to this court, respondent continues to argue that her conviction was not supported by the evidence and should not form a basis for professional discipline. However, it is well-settled that in an attorney disciplinary proceeding based on the lawyer’s criminal conviction, the issue of his or her guilt may not be relitigated. Because the lawyer’s conviction, whether based on adjudication or guilty plea, is tantamount to a finding of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the clear and convincing standard of proof that applies to disciplinary proceedings has already been satisfied. Supreme Rule XIX, §. 19(E); In re: Bankston, 01-2780 (La.3/8/02), 810 So.2d 1113; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La.1990). In this type of proceeding, the sole issue to be determined is whether the crime warrants discipline and, if so, the extent thereof. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n. v. Frank, 472 So.2d 1 (La.1985). While the lawyer may offer evidence of mitigating circumstances, he |7or she may not make any arguments inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 389 So.2d 51 (La.1980); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Quaid, 368 So.2d 1043 (La.1979); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hennigan, 340 So.2d 264 (La.1976); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Loridans, 338 So.2d 1338 (La.1976).

In the instant case, respondent was convicted of six counts of theft of funds of $500 or more, in violation of La. R.S. 14:67, and two counts of unauthorized use of a movable valued in excess of $1,000, in violation of La. R.S. 14:68. The essential elements of both of these crimes involve taking property belonging to another without the consent of the other. Thus, we find respondent’s conviction conclusively establishes that she took nearly $100,000 in funds belonging to the succession of Mr. Moses without the consent of the heirs.

1 ^Intentional conversion of client funds is among the most serious professional misconduct a lawyer can commit. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986). In Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, we provided guidelines for the imposition of permanent disbarment. Guideline 1 provides permanent disbarment may be appropriate when the misconduct involves “repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.”

It is clear respondent’s misconduct falls within the parameters of Guideline 1. She engaged in multiple instances of conversion of funds from Mr. Moses’ succession. Her actions caused substantial harm, as she deprived her clients of a significant sum of money and has made no efforts at restitution for over fifteen years.

We do not lightly impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that we would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sánction here. Respondent’s complete disregard for the welfare of her clients and her utter refusal to acknowledge her wrongdoing lead us to the inescapable conclusion that she does not possess the requisite moral fitness to practice law in this state. In order to protect the public and maintain the high standards of the legal profession in Louisiana, respondent must be permanently disbarred.

IflDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Jacqueline Carr, Louisiana Bar Roll number 3875, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent had invested heavily in two campgrounds, apparently believing that she would realize a substantial profit because of the expected increase in tourism associated with the 1984 World’s Fair in New Orleans. Respondent documented these checks as “loans” which she intended to repay with interest. However, when the World’s Fair did not bring the great numbers of tourists expected, respondent apparently experienced financial difficulties and was unable to fully repay the “loans.”

      . In addition to the charges arising from the criminal conviction, the ODC filed a second count of formal charges against respondent. This second count was based on a complaint filed by B.E. Kramer stemming from respondent's alleged failure to pay an expert witness in a legal matter. The disciplinary board ultimately dismissed this count, and the ODC has not objected to that dismissal. Accordingly, we will not address this count further.

      . Supreme Court Rule XDÍ, § 19(E) provides an attorney convicted of a crime for purposes of disciplinary proceedings "may offer evidence only of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime for which he/she was convicted as determined by the statute defining the crime.”

      . The formal hearing was scheduled at the Louisiana Correctional Center for Women in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, where respondent was incarcerated.

      . La. R.S. 14:67 provides, in pertinent part:
      A. Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.
      B. (1) Whoever commits the crime of theft when the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of five hundred dollars or more shall be imprisoned, with or without hardlabor, for not more than ten years, or may be fined not more than three, thousand dollars, or both.

      . La. R.S.14:68 provides, in pertinent part:
      A. Unauthorized use of a movable is the intentional taking, or use of a movable which belongs to another, either without the other's consent, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any intention to deprive the other of the movable permanently. The fact that the movable so taken or used may be classified as an immovable, according to the law pertaining to civil matters, is immaterial.
      B. Whoever commits the crime of unauthorized use of a movable having a value of one thousand dollars or less shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Whoever commits the crime of unauthorized use of a movable having'a value in excess of one .thousand dollars shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, or both.

      .It is of no moment that respondent’s misconduct occurred prior to the adoption of the amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A) and § 24(A) which provide for permanent disbarment. These amendments do not represent a substantive change to the bar disciplinary rules, nor do they result in the adoption of a new sanction which did not previously exist. Rather, these amendments simply represent a procedural change to Supreme Court Rule XIX in order to recognize a power this court has always possessed. In re: Pinkston, 02-3251 (La.5/20/03), 852 So.2d 966, cert denied, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1413, 158 L.Ed.2d 81; In re: Laudumiey, 03-0234 (La.6/27/03), 849 So.2d 515, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 814, 157 L.Ed.2d 697 (2003)


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: hCALOGERO, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Parrell MERCADEL.
    No. 2003-KA-3015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2004.

      Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney, Claire A. White, Valentin M. Solino, for applicant.
    William R. Campbell, Jr., Katherine M. Mattes, New Orleans, Pamela R. Metzger, for respondent.
   hCALOGERO, Chief Justice.

In this direct appeal, the State challenges a judgment issued by an Orleans Parish Criminal District Court judge that declared unconstitutional various articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as various provisions of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, all related directly or indirectly to grand jury process in Orleans Parish. The district court found that the provisions were prohibited local or special laws under La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A) (1974), as interpreted by this court’s 12decision in State v. Dilosa, 02-2222 (La.6/27/03), 848 So.2d 546. As a result of this finding, the district judge granted the motion filed by defendant, Parrell Mercadel, to quash his indictment for first-degree murder. Finding that the defendant has no standing to challenge the laws because he has failed to establish that application of the subject criminal code articles and statutes had a serious effect on his rights, we reverse the district court judgment declaring the code articles and statutes unconstitutional and quashing the defendant’s indictment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was indicted by an Orleans Parish grand jury on January 9, 2003, for the first degree murder of Antoine Can-trelle, a charge to which he pled “not guilty” on January 14, 2003. Defense counsel was appointed on February 10, 2003, and a number of pretrial motions were filed by the defendant and the State, but no hearings had been conducted before this court issued the Dilosa opinion on July 27, 2003.

pin Dilosa, this court struck down La. Code of Crim. Proc. arts. 412, 413(C), and 414(C) and La.Rev.Stat. 15:114 in their entirety, as well as the first sentence of La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 413(B), all governing Orleans Parish grand jury proceedings, as unconstitutional local laws prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A)(3), which provides as follows:

Except as otherwise Provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law:
íj: % %
(3) Concerning any civil or criminal actions, including changing the venue in civil or criminal cases, or regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcement of judgments, or prescribing the effects of judicial sales.

The provisions struck down by this court in Dilosa gave judges in Orleans Parish, and only in Orleans Parish, the unique authority to select all of the grand jurors from the grand jury venire, as opposed to the system of random selection from the venire prevailing elsewhere in the State of Louisiana for selection of all of the grand jurors with the exception of the foreperson. The offending provisions together established procedures, applicable only in Orleans Parish, for the selection of the grand jury venire, the impaneling of the grand jury, selection of the grand jury foreperson, the time for impaneling grand juries and the period of service, and the | ¿rotation of judges who select and control the grand jury. The court’s finding that the subject provisions were unconstitutional was based on the State’s failure to offer “any viable geographic or demographic necessity which would justify the existence of the unique grand jury procedures in Orleans Parish mandated by the statutes.” Id., 02-2228 at 5, 848 So.2d at 550.

Before this court’s decision in Dilosa, the Louisiana Legislature had made significant changes in the grand jury selection process for Orleans Parish under which the defendant in that case had been indicted, most recently by Act 281 of the 2001 legislature. Act 281 of 2001 rewrote La. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 412, governing selection of the grand jury venire in Orleans Parish, to subject all grand juries in the State, including those in Orleans Parish, to the rules established by La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 411, governing selection of grand juries. By the same act, La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413(B) was amended to eliminate the exclusion of Orleans Parish from the requirement of random selection of grand juries, and La.Code' of Crim. Proc. art. 413(C), authorizing Orleans Parish district court judges to set the date for the drawing of the grand j.ury venire by the jury commission, was repealed. As a result of these changes, Orleans Parish was brought in line with the rest of the State relative to the requirement that all grand jurors be chosen by random selection. Because Dilosa addressed an indictment returned by an Orleans Parish grand jury under the law that | ¡¡existed prior to the 2001 amendments, the court noted specifically that the constitutionality of the amended articles was not before the court. Id. at 1, n. 1, 848 So.2d at 548. Because of these changes, the Dilosa decision apparently did not impact indictments returned after August 15, 2001,- the effective date of Act 281 of the 2001 Louisiana Legislature.

However, some of the provisions declared unconstitutional by this court in Dilosa were not rewritten or otherwise amended by Act 281 of the 2001 Legislature. Significantly, La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 414(C), which provided for the drawing of the grand jury venire and the impaneling of the grand jury from the venire in Orleans Parish in March and September of each year, was left unchanged. Also not amended was La.Rev. Stat. 15:114, which calls for selection of the grand jurors by Orleans Parish trial judges on a rotating basis. Nevertheless, because of the revisions made to La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413(B) and art. 413(C), Orleans Parish judges are no longer authorized to select the grand jurors, meaning that the only remaining viable provision of La.Rev.Stat. 15:114 is the provision authorizing Orleans Parish Criminal District Court judges on a rotating basis to supervise previously-selected .grand juries.

Shortly after this court issued the Dilo-sa decision, on July 9, 2003, defendant’s attorney filed a motion to quash his indictment, asserting that the last vestige of La.Rev.Stat. 15:114, governing supervision of Orleans Parish grand juries by Criminal District Court judges on a rotating basis, is unconstitutional because it is a local law prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A)(3). Another attorney for the defendant subsequently filed a supplemental motion to quash on the morning of the hearing on |6the original motion to quash. That motion challenged the constitutionality of La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 414(C), providing for the drawing of grand jury venire and impaneling of grand jurors in March and September of each year in Orleans Parish, which was previously declared unconstitutional in Dilosa. Defendant’s supplemental motion to quash also challenged a number of other laws relative to grand jury proceedings in Orleans Parish not challenged by the defendant in Dilosa, including La.Code of Criminal Proc. art. 404(A)(2), providing for the selection of jury commissioners by the governor; La.Code of Crim. Proc. arts. 409 and 409.1, providing for an enlarged general jury venire from which the grand jury venire is selected and establishing a central jury pool; La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 415(A)(2), providing for the filling of vacancies on grand juries; La.Rev.Stat. 15:111, providing for salaries of jury commissioners and the secretary of the board of commissioners; La.Rev.Stat. 15:112, providing for the appointment and payment of a chief process server and deputies; and La.Rev.Stat. 15:113, establishing the duty of the registrar of voters to provide quarterly reports concerning additions to and deletions from the voter registration rolls. Finally, defendant’s supplemental motion to quash challenged a number of provisions related to petit jury venires, including La.Code of Crim. Proc. arts. 416, 416.1, and 417, governing the selection of petit jury venires in all parishes except Orleans Parish; and La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 418, governing selection of Orleans Parish petit jury venires.

At the hearing on defendant’s motions to quash, defendant’s attorney noted this court’s finding in Dilosa that La.Rev.Stat. 15:114 is unconstitutional, and insisted that the only problem is determination of the appropriate remedy. The State asserted that the defendant had failed to allege any of the statutory grounds set forth in La. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 533 to support his motions to quash, and that defendant’s 17conclusory allegations were insufficient to support his motions. In ruling on the defendant’s motions, the district court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

I don’t think that ... the defendant in this case and the defendants in all of the cases; similarly situated, that they’ve suffered any real harm by these statutes or by the way these statutes are constituted as would result in the Court granting a motion to quash and ordering that they be reindicted.
But I also believe that we need some finality in these cases. We need the Supreme Court to speak to these issues and to tell, us, one way or the other, what we have to do in these matters. So because of that, then this Court is going to ... grant the defendant’s motion to quash in this case. The Court is granting the defendant’s motion to quash.

The district court provided no other reasons for quashing the defendant’s indictment.

STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY

The fundamental question raised by the State’s appeal of the district court judgment to this court is, whether the defendant was entitled to relief in the form of the quashing of his indictment when he has failed to prove that he has suffered injury resulting from application of the code articles and statutes he challenges. That issue was not raised or addressed in the Dilosa decision. In order to answer that question, we turn to general principles of constitutional law regarding legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of code articles and statutes.

Although this court generally possesses the power and authority to decide the constitutionality of the provisions challenged in defendant’s motions to quash his indictment, it is required to decide a constitutional issue only “if the procedural posture of the case and the relief sought by the appellant demand that [it] do so.” Ring v. State, DOTD, 2002-1367, pp. 6-7, 835 So.2d 423, 428. Further, a court should avoid constitutional questions whenever the case can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. Id. at 4, 835 So.2d at 427. One of the threshold non-constitutional issues that must be decided by a court before it may consider a constitutional challenge to |sa legal provision is whether the person challenging the provision has standing. Id. at 9, 835 So.2d at 429. See also Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co., Inc. v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697 (La.1993). In order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legal provision, the person bringing the challenge must have rights in controversy. Id. at 7, 835 So.2d at 428. More specifically, “[a] person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his or her rights.” Latour v. State, 2000-1176, p. 560 (La.App.1/29/01), 778 so.2d 557, 560, citing Louisiana Paddlewheels v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission, 94-2015 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 885.

In this case, the district court specifically found that the defendant had not suffered any real harm as a result of any of the subject criminal code articles and statutes challenged. Thus, the district court implicitly found that the defendant had failed to show that the code articles and statutes he has challenged seriously affected his rights, as required, in order for a person to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge. Once the district judge found that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the subject criminal code articles and statutes, it should have denied defendant’s motions to quash, rather than granting the motions for the purpose of inviting this court to “speak” to the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. We decline that invitation, and vacate the district court judgment declaring the subject criminal code articles and statutes unconstitutional and granting the motions to quash.

CONCLUSION

The district court judgment declaring the specified articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and specified portions of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes related to grand jury process in New Orleans unconstitutional, and | squashing defendants indictment, is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT.

      . Specifically, defendant challenged the following provisions of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure specific to Orleans Parish: art. 404(A)(2), art. 409 and Art. 409.1, art. 414(C), art. 415(A)(2), and art. 418. Defendant also challenged La.Code of Crim. Proc. arts. 416, 416.1, and 417, relative to all parishes except Orleans Parish.

      . Specifically, defendant challenged the following provisions of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes specific to Orleans Parish: 15:111, 15:112, 15:113, and 15:114.

      . La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A) provides as follows:
      Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law:
      (1) For the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting.
      (2) Changing the names of persons; authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children or the emancipation of minors; affecting the estates of minors or persons under disabilities; granting divorces; changing the law of descent or succession; giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds or to any illegal disposition of property.
      (3) Concerning any civil or criminal actions, including changing the venue in civil or criminal cases, or regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcement of judgments, or prescribing the effects of judicial sales.
      (4) Authorizing the laying out, opening, closing, altering, or maintaining of roads, highways, streets, or alleys; relating to ferries and bridges, or incorporating bridge or ferry companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other state; authorizing the constructing of street passenger railroads in any incorporated town or city.
      (5) Exempting property from taxation; extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes; relieving an assessor or collector of taxes from the performance of his official duties or of his sureties from liability; remitting fines, penalties, and forfeitures; refunding moneys legally paid into the treasury.
      (6) Regulating labor, trade, manufacturing, or agriculture; fixing the rate of interest.
      (7) Creating private corporations, or amending, renewing, extending, or explaining the charters thereof; granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.

        (8) Regulating the management of parish or city public schools, the building or repairing of parish or city schoolhouses, and the raising of money for such purposes.
      (9) Legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, employee, or agent of the state, its agencies, or political subdivisions.
      (10) Defining any crime.

      . La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 412 concerns “Drawing of grand jury venire and subpoena of veniremen; Orleans Parish.”

      . La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413 concerns “Method of impaneling of grand jury; selection of foreman.” At the time of the Dilosa decision was issued, subsection C of the article provided special rules for Orleans Parish.

      . La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 414 concerns "Time for impaneling grand juries; period of service." Subsection C of that article provides special rules for "Orleans Parish.”

      . La.Rev.Stat. 15:114 concerns "Parish of Orleans; rotation and selection of grand jury; control of grand jury.”

      . At the time of the Dilosa decision, the first sentence of La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413(B) excluded Orleans Parish from grand jury selection procedures applicable throughout the rest of the state.

      . Act 281 was passed by the legislature as part of its response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998), which granted white defendants third-party standing to raise equál protection claims of African Americans excluded from grand jury service on account of race by former La.Code of Criminal Proc. art. 413(B). That article authorized Louisiana district court judges to select one person from the grand jury venire to serve as foreperson, while all other jurors were selected by the sheriff by random lot. Initially, the 1999 Louisiana Legislature passed Act 984, which amended La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413(B) to require random selection of all grand jurors followed by the selection of the foreperson by the district court judge from the selected jurors in all parishes, except Orleans. The 1999 legislature left unchanged La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 413(C), which gave Orleans Parish district judges authority to select all grand jurors, as opposed to one grand juror to serve as the foreperson. The defendant in Dilosa was indicted under the law as it existed after the adoption of Act. 984 of the 1999 Louisiana Legislature.

      . The supplemental motion to quash is not included in the record on appeal, but was appended to the brief filed in this court on behalf of the defendant by the Tulane University Law School Criminal Law Clinic. However, the transcript of the hearing held on July 16, 2003, clearly reveals that a supplemental motion to quash was filed and that the district court's ruling was intended to embrace all the statutory provisions challenged in the original and supplemental motions to quash.


author: | .PER CURIAM. pKNOLL, Justice

text:
    Edward SCOTT, Jr. v. POOLE’S CLASSIC TRAVELS, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-2748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2004.
    Raymond R. Egan, Leake & Andersson, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.
    Terry B. Loup, Shreveport, and Robert M. Lucky, James P. Meyer, Aubert & Christensen, Covington, Counsel for Respondent.
   | .PER CURIAM.

Poole’s Classic Travels, Inc. (“Poole’s”) seeks review of a ruling of the district court which excluded a surveillance videotape of plaintiff, on the ground that the evidence was obtained by a person acting in violation of La. R.S. 17:416.10, which prohibits unauthorized visitors on school grounds. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Edward Scott, filed a petition for damages against Poole’s. In his petition, plaintiff alleged the vehicle in which he was traveling was rear-ended by a bus owned by Poole’s. As a result of the accident, plaintiff alleged he sustained serious back and neck injuries. He testified in his deposition that his doctors recommended he undergo neck and back surgery.

During the course of discovery, Poole’s hired a private investigator in order to conduct surveillance of plaintiff. The investigator obtained videotape of plaintiff working as a teacher at Cuillier Career Center. The tape, which was apparently filmed from a vehicle in the school parking lot, shows plaintiff teaching masonry to his students outdoors. On the tape, plaintiff is seen engaging in various physical activities. .JjxAccording to Poole’s, these activities are inconsistent with his alleged injuries.

Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude the videotape. He argued that the tape was obtained in violation of La. R.S. 17:416.1o, as the private investigator was not authorized to be on school grounds.

In response, Poole’s denied any violation of the statute, noting that the parking lot was not designated as a restricted area. According to Poole’s, the tape was taken through a chain link fence, and at no time did the investigator enter the actual school grounds. In the alternative, Poole’s contended that even if the court determines the private investigator violated the statute, there is no basis to exclude the clearly relevant evidence captured on the videotape.

After a hearing, the district court granted plaintiffs motion in limine, prohibiting laPoole’s from utilizing the videotape or still photographs that the private investigator obtained at the school. The order also prohibited Poole’s from relying on the testimony of the private investigator as it relates to the surveillance he conducted while in the school parking lot.

From this ruling, Poole’s applied for supervisory writs. The court of appeal denied the writ in a split decision. The majority reasoned that “[ajlthough this tape would be allowed into evidence under normal circumstances, to do so in the instant case would reward relator’s violation of the statute.” The dissenting judge would have granted the writ and reversed, stating:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding that the relator violated La. R.S. 17:416.10 when the surveillance video tape was obtained. Rather, I find that relator’s surveillance captured the plaintiffs activities outside of the school building in an open area to public view. Accordingly, it is not reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had any expectation of privacy that was violated by the surveillance.

Upon Poole’s application, we granted certiorari to consider the correctness of the district court’s judgment granting plaintiffs motion in limine. Scott v. Poole’s Classic Travels, Inc., 03-2748 (La.1/9/04), 864 So.2d 608. The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether a surveillance videotape made by a person on school grounds in violation of the provisions of La. R.S. 17:416.10 must be excluded in a civil case.

DISCUSSION

We begin our inquiry by examining the language of La. R.S. 17:416.10. The 1¿stated purpose of that statute is to “provide learning environments that are humane, just, and designed to promote excellence and to better maintain safety and good order at public elementary and secondary schools, in this state_” To that end, the statute provides that “no person shall go on public elementary or secondary school grounds or in any public elementary or secondary school building or other school facility as a visitor during school hours without authority of the appropriate school official as provided by rules adopted pursuant to this Section.” The statute further provides “[wjhoever violates the provisions of this Subsection shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.”

Nothing in the statute addresses exclusion of evidence in civil proceedings. Nonetheless, plaintiff urges us to find that evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded, because otherwise, a person violating the statute would be “rewarded” for doing so.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when a law--is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written without further interpretation in search of the intent of the legislature. La. Civ.Code art. 9; Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall, 04-0211 (La.3/18/04), 867 So.2d 651. La. R.S 17:416.10 is clear and unambiguous, providing criminal penalties for violations of its provisions. In the absence of legislative direction, we decline to graft a civil exclusionary rule into the statute.

Moreover, suppressing the surveillance videotape under these facts would have the effect of eliminating a critical aspect of Poole’s defense and frustrating the search for the truth. As we explained in Wolford v. JoEllen Smith Psych. Hosp., 96-2460 (La.5/20/97), 693 So.2d 1164, surveillance materials serve an important function in Isthe search for the truth:

This serves the overarching purpose of our system of justice'_i to search for the truth. Ours is an adversarial system of justice that relies on the ability and resources of adversaries to uncover the truth by testing each other’s evidence through a variety of methods, the most important of which is cross-examination. Moreover, in an adversarial system, the defendant has a right to a defense and to cross-examination. In a personal injury case, surveillance videotape can be critical to the defendant’s defense and ability to effectively cross-examine the plaintiff. Surveillance materials may thus serve an important function in the search for truth....

In summary, we find nothing in the clear language of La. R.S. 17:416.10 which mandates the exclusion of civil evidence purportedly obtained in violation of its provisions. The proper sanction for such a violation is found in the criminal penalties set forth in the statute. Accordingly, we find the district court erred in granting plaintiffs motion in limine. That ruling must be reversed.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court granting the motion in limine filed by plaintiff, Edward Scott, Jr., is hereby reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. All costs in this court are assessed against plaintiff.

KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

KIMBALL, J., dissents for reasons assigned by KNOLL, J.

pKNOLL, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent from the majority’s decision to exercise this court’s supervisory jurisdiction to review an interlocutory ruling of the district court on a motion in limine. As Justice Kimball observed in her dissenting opinion in Lenara v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, it is poor policy for this court to grant certiorari in cases where the decision appealed is one granting a motion in limine, a motion which is not provided for by our Codes, but has come into being by trial practice. Reviewing decisions stemming from motions in limine is an inefficient allocation of this court’s already strained judicial time and resources because decisions relating to such motions are generally made prior to trial, are interlocutory rulings that can be changed by the trial court during the course of trial, and often reach this court without a developed record upon which to review the trial court’s decision.

An essential task for the highest court in a multi-level appellate system is the proper apportionment of its limited time and energy among cases that are eligible for its consideration. The question involved in considering a petition for review is not whether a case is meritorious, or even whether it arguably might have been decided the other way, but whether it is more important for decision than other cases competing for the attention of the court. Boudreaux v. State, 01-1329 at p. 3, n. 6 (La.2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7, 9 (quoting the ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.10,16-18 (1976)).

| ¡Applying these standards to the case sub judice, I cannot say this matter is of such importance to the jurisprudence of this state to justify the extraordinary exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction. Relator’s proper remedy is by appeal.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, and would have denied the writ application.

      . La. R.S. 17:416.10 provides in part:
      A. (1) To provide learning environments that are humane, just, and designed to promote excellence and to better maintain safety and good order at public elementary and secondary schools in this state, effective with the beginning of the 1994-1995 school year and thereafter, no person shall go on public elementary or secondary school grounds or in any public elementary or secondary school building or other school facility as a visitor during school hours without authority of the appropriate school official as provided by rules adopted pursuant to this Section.
      (2) Whoever violates the provisions of this Subsection shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.
      (3) For purposes of this Section, "visitor” shall mean any person except:
      (a) An employee of the school or school system.
      (b) A member of the school or school system's governing authority.
      (c) A student enrolled in the school system.
      (d) A parent, guardian, or other person authorized by a parent or guardian who is delivering the pupil to school at the beginning of the school day or is picking up the pupil from school at the end of the school day.

      . For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the videotape was made by a person on school grounds in violation of La. R.S. 17:416.10. In doing so, we acknowledge Poole’s argument that there are questions of fact as to whether the investigator actually entered school grounds. However, because of our holding, we need not reach this factual issue.


author: |! TRAYLOR, Justice.

text:
    Sylvia GREEN v. K-MART CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2003-C-2495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 25, 2004.

      Robert E. Kerrigan, Jr., Isaac H. Ryan, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Gulfport; Ian A. MacDonald, Perret Doise, Lafayette, for applicant.
    Steven P. Shea, James Wattigny, Lafayette, for respondent.
   |! TRAYLOR, Justice.

We granted the writ application in this personal injury matter to determine whether the court of appeal erred in its findings that the plaintiff proved that her injuries were caused by the accident at issue, in awarding general damages and in increasing the award of special damages. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the court of appeal in part and reverse in part.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sylvia Green (“Green” or “plaintiff’) was injured on February 12, 1998, when a shelf broke in a New Iberia K-Mart store and caused a stack of plastic crawfish platters to fall, one or more of which struck plaintiff in the forehead.

Plaintiff filed suit against K-Mart in May of 1998, alleging she suffered injuries in the February, 1998 incident. In October of 2000, a jury assessed K-Mart with ninety-five percent of fault for the accident and its store manager with the remaining five percent. The jury awarded to Green total damages of $1,452,000. The damage award consisted of the following elements: $49,000 for past medical expenses, $1,000,000 for future medical expenses,$26,000 for past loss of income, $357,000 for loss of future earning capacity, and $10,000 each to plaintiffs two children for loss 12of consortium. The jury did not award Green any general damages; that is, the jury did not award any amount for past or future physical and mental pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life and lifestyle. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or motion for new trial limited to damages, contesting the jury’s failure to award general damages and inadequate loss of consortium award. The trial court denied the motions.

On appeal, plaintiff argued that the jury erred: (1) in failing to award general damages, (2) in awarding a deficient amount for future medical and rehabilitative care, (3) in awarding an unreasonably low amount for loss of consortium, and (4) in failing to find K-Mart liable for the negligence of its store manager. K-Mart also appealed, assigning as error: (1) the trial court’s removal of a juror, (2) K-Mart’s liability for the accident, and (3) whether Green established that her damages were causally related to the accident.

The court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court found no error in the dismissal of the juror. The court of appeal affirmed the jury finding that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by the falling crawfish platters and that K-Mart was liable for the injuries. The court of appeal found that the jury erred in finding the store manager five percent at fault and assessed K-Mart with 100% of fault for the accident. Finally, the court of appeal increased the award for future medical expenses from $1,000,000 to $3,458,453, awarded $500,000 in general damages, and increased the loss of consortium awards from $10,000 to $25,000 per child.

laK-Mart sought review of certain of the appellate court’s rulings. We granted a writ to consider those issues. Green v. K-Mart Corp., 03-2495 (La.12/19/03), 864 So.2d 608.

DISCUSSION

K-Mart complains that the evidence does not support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs injuries are causally related to the accident which occurred at the K-Mart store. In addition, K-Mart argues that the court of appeal, rather than increasing the special damage award and awarding general damages, should have affirmed the jury’s failure to award general damages and eliminated the special damage award altogether.

Causation

K-Mart asserts that the court of appeal erred in affirming the jury finding that plaintiffs physical and psychological injuries were caused by the falling craw-fish platters. Causation is a question of fact. Estate of Adams v. Home Health Care of Louisiana, 00-2494 p. 1 (La.12/15/00), 775 So.2d 1064. An appellate court’s standard of review of a jury’s factual finding is clear:

“Factual determinations of the trier of fact may not be reversed absent manifest error or unless they are clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). In order to reverse a trial court’s determination of fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the factfinder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). The appellate court must be cautious not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual findings just because it would have decided the case differently. Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Department Ambulance Service, 93-3099, 93-3110, 93-3112, p. 8 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216, 221.”

\J Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 01-2217 p. 11 (La.4/3/02), 816 So.2d 270, 278-279.

In determining that the evidence did, indeed, support the jury’s finding that the accident caused plaintiffs injuries, the court of appeal correctly pointed out that “[n]umerous experts testified regarding the cause of [plaintiffs] problems, and evaluations by specialists provided conflicting information as to the cause of her problems.” Green, 01-675 p. 13, 849 So.2d at 825. A review of the medical evidence shows that not less than seven medical doctors testified as to plaintiffs injuries. Several of these doctors believed that Green’s physical and psychological problems were caused by, or were aggravated by, the accident at K-Mart.

Although the evidence as a whole was conflicting, the jury did not err in its determination where there are two reasonable interpretations of the evidence. “Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Pinsonneault, 01-2217 p. 12, 816 So.2d at 279, citing Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883. We hold that the record contains a reasonable factual basis for the jury’s finding that Green’s injuries were causally related to the accident in the K-Mart store; the court of appeal’s ruling in this regard is affirmed.

Future Medical Expenses

K-Mart next complains that the court of appeal erred in increasing the award for future medical expenses from $1,000,000 to $3,458,453.

The record shows the plaintiffs rehabilitation expert testified at length as to [Ka life care plan for the plaintiff and its attendant cost. He testified that plaintiff would incur one-time costs of $121,522, and yearly costs of $92,127 for sixteen hour per day care, or $132,277 for twenty-four hour per day care. The total amount required to meet his estimate of plaintiffs future medical expenses for the plaintiffs statistical life expectancy of thirty-nine years was $3,458,453 for sixteen hour per day care or $4,927,899 for twenty-four hour per day care.

In rejecting the jury’s award of $1,000,000 for plaintiffs future medical expenses, the court of appeal stated that a “trier of fact should accept as true the uncontradicted testimony of a plaintiff witness absent a sound reason for its rejection.” Green, 01-0675 p. 27, 849 So.2d at 832, citing Johnson v. Ins. Co. of No. America, 454 So.2d 1113, 1117 (La.1984). The court of appeal further stated that the jury had overlooked the principal that “[w]here medical expenses are linked to the injuries suffered ... a plaintiff must be made whole.” Id.

We believe the court of appeal erred in increasing the award for future medical expenses. Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact, even as to the evaluation of expert witness testimony. Sportsman Store v. Sonitrol Sec. Systems, 99-0201 p. 6 (La.10/19/99), 748 So.2d 417, 421; Lirette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 850, 853 (La.1990). A fact-finder may accept or reject the opinion expressed by an expert, in whole or in part. Lirette, 563 So.2d at 855. The trier of fact may substitute common sense and judgment for that of an expert witness when such a substitution appears warranted on the record as a whole. Sportsman Store, 99-0201 p. 9, 748 So.2d at 422; see also Barber Bros. Contracting Co. v. Cuccia, 98-0675 p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 734 So.2d 820, 825, writ denied, 99-1258 (La.6/18/99), 745 So.2d 31; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 618 So.2d 579, 586 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1340 (La.1993).

| fiAlthough K-Mart did not present its own rehabilitation specialist to directly contradict the opinions of the plaintiff’s rehabilitation specialist, the underlying expert medical testimony upon which the specialist’s opinion was based was not uniform as to the need for or type of future medical treatment or care. The plaintiffs rehabilitation expert testified that plaintiff required either sixteen hour per day or twenty-four hour per day care. The jury was aware that Green’s older sister had been appointed her curator to handle her finances. However, the jury could also have considered conflicting expert medical testimony that Green was capable of taking care of activities of daily living and other day-to-day activities in its determination of the amount to award for future medical, expenses.

Moreover, the jury had' the opportunity to observe Green as she testified and responded to cross-examination. The jury was not prevented from using its collective “common sense” that fewer hours of daily assistance were needed by plaintiff to meet her needs than the period specified in the recommendation of the expert witness. For these reasons, the court of appeal erred in increasing the amount the jury awarded to plaintiff for future medical expenses. We reverse the court of appeal’s decision in this regard and reinstate the jury’s award of $1,000,000 for future medical expenses.

General Damages

Finally, K-Mart complains that the court of appeal erred in finding that the jury abused its discretion in failing to award general damages and by awarding plaintiff $500,000 for pain and suffering.

The court of appeal stated that, in general, it was legal error for a jury to award special damages for medical expenses while at the same time denying general damages, citing this court’s opinion in Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492 (La.10/19/00),7 774 So.2d 70. However, in Wainwright, this Court also pointed out, that “a jury ... can reasonably reach the conclusion that a plaintiff has proven his entitlement to recovery of certain medical costs, yet failed to prove that he endured compensable pain and suffering as the result of defendant’s fault.” Wainwright, 00-0492 p. 8, 774 So.2d at 76; see also Sallinger v. Robichaux, 2000-2269 p. 1 (La.1/5/01), 775 So.2d 437. When, as here, the jury has awarded special damages but has declined to award general damages, the reviewing court must determine whether the jury’s finding “is so inconsistent as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Wainwright, 00-0492 p. 8-9, 774 So.2d at 76. If so, only then can the reviewing court perform a de novo review of the record. Id.

In Wainwright, the jury awarded special damages for medical expenses of a hospital stay but did not award general damages. This Court held the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was a reasonable precaution for prudent parents to place their minor son in the hospital for observation after finding out that the defendant pharmacy had erroneously filled then-son’s prescription resulting in his ingestion of four times the medication prescribed for him. This Court found no abuse of the jury’s discretion in its award of medical expenses but failure to award general damages. Wainwright, 00-0492 p. 10, 774 So.2d at 77. Similarly, in Coleman v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 213 (La.App. 3 Cir.1990) and Olivier v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 499 So.2d 1058 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986), writ denied, 501 So.2d 198 (La.1986), the appellate court found that the juries in those cases could reasonably have found that, although the plaintiffs did not receive any injuries in the accidents at issue, they were entitled and justified in getting a medical checkup after the accidents. See Coleman, 571 So.2d at 215 and Olivier, 499 So.2d at 1063. Therefore, in those cases in which previewing courts have examined “inconsistent” jury awards where special damages for medical expenses, but not general damages, were awarded, the courts have determined that no abuse of jury discretion occurred where the medical expenses were incurred only to determine whether injuries were, in fact, sustained.

Here, the court of appeal correctly determined that the jury abused its discretion in failing to award general damages while awarding a substantial amount for past and future medical expenses. In this case, the jury determined that plaintiff suffered injuries causally related to the accident which required medical attention, and is still suffering an injury that will, in fact, require medical attention in the future. Failing to make a general damage award in such circumstances was an abuse of discretion.

The court of appeal conducted a de novo review of the record and determined that the extensive changes in plaintiffs physical, psychological, and emotional state, along with attendant changes in her life style, detailed in the appellate opinion, mandated the award of $500,000 for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. We agree. The court of appeal’s decision to award general damages in the amount of $500,000 is affirmed.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the court of appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

      . See Green v. K-Mart Corp., 01-675 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/20/02), 834 So.2d 1084. K-Mart sought a writ of review from this ruling to this Court, arguing that the court of appeal erred in proceeding with oral argument and opinion despite K-Mart's filing of bankruptcy proceedings. This Court granted K-Mart's writ, vacated the earlier decision of the court of appeal and remanded the matter to that court for re-argument and decision to afford counsel for all of the parties the opportunity for participation therein. See Green v. K-Mart Corp., 02-3198 (La.4/4/03), 840 So.2d 1209. After re-argument, the appellate court issued an opinion essentially the same as its earlier opinion. See Green v. K-Mart Corp., 01-675 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/03), 849 So.2d 814.

      . K-Mart does not seek review of the court of appeal's increase in the award for loss of consortium, the dismissal of the juror or the percentage of fault assessed against K-Mart.

      . The court of appeal opinion contains an excellent synopsis of the medical evidence. Green v. K-Mart Corp., 01-675 p. 13-23, 849 So.2d at 825-830.

      . See Green, 01-0675 p. 27, 849 So.2d at 832.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dustin DRESSNER.
    No. 2004-KD-1199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 21, 2004.
   In re Dressner, Dustin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 02-4386; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-K-581.

Stay denied; writ denied. If defendant is found guilty of first degree murder, the issue of the admissibility of the evidence at the penalty phase of the proceeding may be reurged.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny the stay and the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dustin DRESSNER.
    No. 2004-KK-1202.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 21, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 02-4386; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-K-519.

Stay denied; writ denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary MORRISON.
    No. 2003-KK-2790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 24, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Courts order dated April 8, 2004; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 6-00-925; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003-KW-1554.

Rehearing denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant a rehearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Taft WILSON.
    No. 2004-KK-1230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 26, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 444-198; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-K-0855.

Stay denied; writ denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


author: LKUHN, J.

text:
    SIMONS PETROLEUM, INC. v. Dane FALGOUT, Sales Tax Collector, for the Sales and Use Tax Department of the Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury Through its Sales and Use Tax Department v. Simons Petroleum, Inc.
    No. 2003 CA 2600, 2003 CA 2601.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    March 4, 2004.
    See also 873 So.2d 65.

      Robert R. Ranier, Frederick Mulhearn, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appel-lee Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury through its Sales and Use Tax Department.
    Stephen H. Myers, Richard H. Morgan, Lafayette, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Simons Petroleum, Inc.
    Before: WHIPPLE, KUHN, and McDonald, jj.
   LKUHN, J.

Appellant-taxpayer, Simons Petroleum, Inc. (Simons Petro), appeals the trial court’s judgment, denying its exceptions and enjoining the taxpayer from further pursuit of business until payment of delinquent taxes to appellee-tax collector, Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury through its Sales Tax Department (Pointe Coupee Parish). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Simons Petro was notified in a formal assessment letter that it owed Pointe Cou-pee Parish unpaid sales tax, interest, and penalties in the amount of $86,135.50 for January 1, 1997 through March 31, 1999. The taxpayer remitted the assessed amount under protest and filed a lawsuit for its recovery. Along with its answer to the lawsuit, Point Coupee Parish filed a reconventional demand seeking, among other things, additional taxes based on allegations that the amount the tax collector had formally assessed Simons Petro incorrectly calculated the tax at a lower than the full parish-wide sales tax rate for which the taxpayer was liable.

On October 15, 2002, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of Pointe Cou-pee Parish, expressly dismissing Simons Petro’s lawsuit and affirming the tax collector’s entitlement to the assessed amount that the taxpayer had paid under protest. The judgment also granted the tax collector the requested relief on the reconven-tional demand, awarding additional sales taxes of $18,080.42 plus interest, which represented the difference between the assessed amount Simons Petro paid under protest and the total amount of sales taxes owed by the taxpayer. Simons Petro de-volutively appealed that judgment, which was recently affirmed 13by this court. See Simons Petroleum, Inc. v. Falgout, 2003-0610 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/23/04), 873 So.2d 65.

Subsequent to the trial court’s rendition of judgment, Pointe Coupee Parish instituted this action by filing a rule to show cause, seeking to enjoin Simons Petro from further pursuit of its business until the taxpayer paid the outstanding delinquent sales taxes in the amount of $18,080.42, plus interest, as determined by the trial court in its October 15, 2002 judgment. Simons Petro answered the rule and filed various exceptions.

After a hearing, the trial court denied all the exceptions and rendered judgment in favor of Pointe Coupee Parish, enjoining Simons Petro “from the further pursuit of business until ... it has paid to [the tax collector] delinquent [sales] taxes in the amount of $18,080.42 plus applicable interest, as shown in the judgment signed on October 15, 2002 ... or until reversal of said judgment.” Simons Petro appeals, urging the trial court was erroneous in denying its exceptions.

RULE TO CEASE BUSINESS

According to La. R.S. 33:2841:

A political corporation may through the officer whose duty it is to receive and collect the taxes and moneys due the corporation, enforce the collection of any taxes due to it, within the time and in the manner provided for the collection of taxes due to the state.

Relying on Section 40 of the Pointe Cou-pee School Board Sales and Use Tax Ordinance (Section 40); which the taxpayer does not dispute was enacted pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2841, Point Coupee Parish claims entitlement to enjoin LSimons Petro from further pursuit of business until the delinquent tax is paid. Section 40 states:

Failure to pay the Tax as provided in this Ordinance shall ipso facto, without demand or putting in default, cause the tax, interest, penalties, and costs to become immediately delinquent, and the Tax Collector has the authority, on motion in a court of competent jurisdiction, to take a rule on the [taxpayer], to show cause in not less than two or more than ten days, exclusive of holidays, why the [taxpayer] should not be ordered to cease from further pursuit of business .... This rule may be tried out of term and in chambers, and shall always be tried by preference. If the rule is made absolute, the order rendered thereon shall be considered a judgment in favor of the Tax Collector, prohibiting the [taxpayer] from the further pursuit of said business until such time as he has paid the delinquent tax, interest, penalties and costs, and every violation of the injunction shall be considered as a contempt of court, and punished according to law.

See also La. R.S. 47:314 (permitting the State to enjoin taxpayers delinquent in payment of state sales taxes from further pursuit of business until payment) and La. R.S. 47:337.33 (expressly effective after date of enforcement of this sales tax, permitting political subdivisions to enjoin taxpayers delinquent in payment of local sales taxes from further pursuit of business until payment).

LIS PENDENS

According to La. C.C.P. art. 531:

When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same [ .^parties in the same capacities, the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed ....

Simons Petro urges that Pointe Coupee Parish’s pleading seeking to enjoin the taxpayer from the further pursuit of business is actually the same cause of action, involving the same parties, and seeking the same object, namely collection of $18,080.42 awarded to the tax collector in the October 15, 2002 judgment in addition to the taxes paid under protest. But the record establishes that the pleading, initially instituted as a separate action in a different division of the district court, was subsequently transferred to and prosecuted in the same proceeding which yielded the October 15, 2003 judgment. Simons Petro has not raised any contentions challenging the order of transfer. Because “two or more suits” are not pending, the trial court correctly denied the exception of lis pendens.

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF

SUMMARY PROCEEDING

Summary proceedings may be used for trial or disposition of those matters in which the law permits summary proceedings to be used. See La. C.C.P. art. 2592(11).

Simons Petro contends that the Section 40 summary procedure may not be used after rendition of a judgment in favor of the tax collector obtained by the assessment and distraint procedure set forth in La. R.S. 47:1562-1573.

We find nothing in the “Assessment and Collection Procedures” of Part III of Chapter 18 of Title 47 of the Revised Statutes that limits the tax collector from initiating a summary proceeding in this case. Louisiana Revised Statute 47:1561 provides alternative remedies by which the tax collector may proceed to enforce the collection of any taxes due and states “the fact that the [tax] collector has | (¡initiated proceedings under the assessment and dis-traint procedure will not preclude him from thereafter proceeding by summary or ordinary court proceedings for the enforcement of the same tax obligation.” And the plain language of La. R.S. 47:1561 does not otherwise circumscribe to the time before judgment is rendered the tax collector’s discretionary choices of proceeding by summary or ordinary court proceedings after initially having commenced enforcement of a tax obligation by assessment and distraint.

Simons Petro also urges that in taking this Section 40 rule subsequent to rendition of the October 15, 2002 summary judgment in favor of the tax collector, Point Coupee Parish attempts to utilize a procedure to enforce its money judgment that is “intended to enable the [tax collector] to judicially make a determination of the taxes owed.” But Simons Petro offers no support for this assertion, and we find nothing in the Section, 40 that requires us to so construe it.

In this case, the tax collector used the October 15, 2002 judgment to prove the taxpayer failed to pay the judicially-determined tax due under the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board Sales and Use Tax Ordinance in the amount of $18,080.42. With this showing, the tax collector requested the injunction ordering the taxpayer to cease from further business. Nothing done by the tax collector is in derogation of the terms of Section 40. Synchronizing Section 40 with the Assessment and Collection Procedures, see La. R.S. 47:1561-1581, and cognizant of the express grant to tax collectors in La. R.S. 47:1561 giving them the discretion to proceed by summary or ordinary court proceeding for enforcement of tax obligations originally initiated by assessment and dis-traint, it appears to us Section 40 simply provides sales and use tax collectors with another summary-proceeding? remedy to enforce collection of a delinquent tax obligation. See and compare La. R.S. 47:1574.1 (expressly effective after the date of collection of this sales tax permitting the State to enjoin delinquent taxpayers from further pursuit of business for amounts due as a result of assessments of judgments which have become final and non-appealable).

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly overruled Simons Petro’s dilatory exception of unauthorized use of summary proceedings.

RES JUDICATA

Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to |sany issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

Simons Petro asserts that Pointe Cou-pee Parish is precluded from taking the rule to show cause ordering the taxpayer to cease from further pursuit of business since the tax collector failed to plead entitlement to that Section 40 relief in the summary judgment proceeding which resulted in the October 15, 2002 judgment. The crux of Simons Petro’s contention .is that the Section 40 rule was a cause of action which existed at the time of October 15, 2002 judgment that arose out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, Simons Petro reasons, under La. R.S. 13:4231(2), the tax collector’s pleading asserting entitlement to that Section 40 relief was extinguished and is, therefore, barred by the October 15, 2002 judgment.

Simons Petro overlooks that in taking the Section 40 rule, Pointe Coupee Parish is not asserting a different cause of action but merely seeking to execute or give effect to the liability arising from the same cause of action which resulted in the October 15, 2002 judgment, which the taxpayer did not suspensively appeal. According to La. C.C.P. art.2088(7), a trial court retains jurisdiction in the case over those matters not reviewable under the appeal including the right of the tax collector-appellee to execute or give effect to the judgment when its execution or effect is not suspended by the appeal. See also La. C.C.P. art.2087. None of the terms used in Section 40 precludes the tax collector from taking the rule ordering the taxpayer’s cessation from further business in the execution of or giving effect to a judgment determinative of the issue of whether any tax is due under the Pointe 1¡¡Coupee Parish School Board Sales and Use Tax Ordinance. We find no error in the trial court’s overruling of the exception of res judicata.

DECREE

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment denying the exceptions and enjoining Si-mons Petro from the further pursuit of business until the taxpayer pays delinquent taxes in the amount of $18,080.42, plus applicable interest, as shown in the October 15, 2003 judgment, affirmed by this court in Simons Petroleum, Inc. v. Falgout, 2003-0610 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/23/04), 873 So.2d 65, is affirmed. Appeal costs in this case are assessed to Simons Petroleum, Inc.

AFFIRMED.

      . At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that resulted in the October 15, 2002 judgment, which concluded that the tax collector was entitled to levy and impose the tax on Simons Petro's sales of off road diesel fuel during the assessed period, the parties stipulated that the parish-wide tax rate in effect included 1% pursuant to the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board Sales and Use Ordinance. And Pointe Coupee Parish’s re-conventional demand in the underlying summary judgment proceeding alleged that Si-mons Petro's total off road diesel sales during the assessed period exceeded $2,000,000.00. Mindful that the quantum of the taxes awarded in the October 15, 2002 judgment was not an appealed issue in Simons Petro’s devolutive appeal, see Simons Petroleum, Inc. v. Falgout, 2003-0610 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/23/04), 873 So.2d. 65, we note the amount of $18,080.34 awarded to the tax collector in addition to the taxes Simons Petro paid under protest, is less than 1% of the total sales subject to Pointe Coupee Parish's assessment.

      . Simons Petro asserts that the tax collector’s claim Section 40 relief is prescribed. The taxpayer again claims that because the formal assessment letter failed to include the amount of $18,080.42, which is the difference between the amount stated in the formal assessment letter and the total amount calculated at the full parish-wide rate, the tax collector's claim to collect that amount was untimely. Since Pointe Coupee Parish did not issue another formal assessment letter in compliance with the notice requirements of Article III, Chapter 13 of the Code of Ordinances of Pointe Coupee Parish, advising the taxpayer of the additional amount, Simons Petro suggests that, having paid under protest the total amount stated in the formal assessment letter, there is no tax "due” under Section 40 to support a cause of action in favor of the tax collector. For the reasons stated in Simons Petroleum, Inc. v. Falgout, 2003-0610 at pp. 5-8, 873 So.2d at 68-71, we find no error in the trial court’s action overruling Simons Pe-tro’s peremptory exception of prescription. Having concluded that the tax collector’s claim for the additional amount of $18,080.42 is not prescribed, the assertion that Pointe Coupee Parish's pleading does not state a cause of action for relief under Section 40 because the tax collector cannot allege that Simons Petro failed to pay a "tax due” is without merit.

      . Simons Petro avers that Pointe Coupee Parish’s Section 40 rule actually seeks to determine the additional tax of $18,080.42 again urging this because of the lack of notice of that additional amount as specified in Article III, Chapter 13 of the Code of Ordinances of Pointe Coupee Parish. Thus, suggesting that the trial court could not have properly included the additional amount of $18,080.42 in its October 15, 2002 judgment, the taxpayer asserts that the relief sought by the tax collector herein is the same as that sought in the earlier proceeding and is precluded under La. R.S. 13:4231. But in the October 15, 2002 judgment, the trial court implicitly denied Simons Petro’s objections of prescription and no cause of action, expressly awarding the additional amount sought by Pointe Coupee Parish. The tax collector’s ability to execute or give effect to that judgment, devolutively appealed by Simons Petro, was not suspended. See La. C.C.P. art.2087. Moreover, in Simons Petroleum, Inc. v. Falgout, 2003-0610 at pp. 4-8, 873 So.2d at 68-71, we found no merit in the taxpayer's contention that the claim for the additional amount of $18,080.42 in sales taxes was untimely and affirmed the trial court's award of that additional amount. Accordingly, we disagree with the taxpayer’s characterization that in this rule under Section 40 the actual relief the tax collector seeks is a determination of the additional amount of sales taxes due.


author: 1,CARTER, C. J.

text:
    Deanna O. DOWELL v. OCHSNER CLINIC OF BATON ROUGE and The Neuromedical Center
    No. 2003 CA 0460.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    March 10, 2004.

      Daniel J. Dazet, New Orleans, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Deanna 0. Dowell.
    Amanda H. Carmon, Baton Rouge, for Defendants-Appellants, The Neuromedical Center and Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., PARRO, and GUIDRY, JJ.
   1,CARTER, C. J.

This is a workers’ compensation case in which the Office of Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) rendered judgment in favor of claimant, Deanna 0. Dowell, and against her former employer, The Neu-romedical Center (Neuromedical), for benefits, penalties, and attorney’s fees in connection with claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome. Neuromedical and its insurer, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation, appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Claimant was employed as a medical transcriptionist at Ochsner Clinic of Baton Rouge (Ochsner) from October 1997 through June 7, 1999. Her job involved typing medical notes/reports from doctors’ dictation. After leaving the Ochsner job, she began the same kind of transcriptionist position at Neuromedical on June 9, 1999. Less than six weeks later, on July 17, 1999, claimant stopped working for Neuromedical because of hand pain and numbness that interfered with her ability to type. Thereafter, claimant performed periodic contract work from her home, worked during January and February 2000 as a secretary/receptionist in a hospital, and worked during May and June 2000 as a secretary/receptionist in a small law firm. Due to continuous problems with pain and numbness in her left hand, claimant underwent surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome in August 2000. She was able to return to full-time employment in October 2000 as a medical transcriptionist for a different employer.

Ochsner paid claimant medical and indemnity benefits from July through December 1999. When her benefits were terminated, claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation against Ochsner and Neuromedical. She ^settled her claim against Ochsner and proceeded to trial on the merits against Neuromedical. After a trial, the WCJ rendered judgment against Neuromedical, awarding claimant medical and indemnity benefits, with a credit given for payments made by Ochsner, plus attorney fees, penalties, and interest. Neu-romedical appeals, arguing that the WCJ erred in requiring it to pay workers’ compensation benefits based upon an occupational disease allegedly contracted during claimant’s brief six-week employment, and the WCJ erred in finding that Neuromedical had not reasonably controverted claimant’s claim.

Claimant admitted at trial, and her medical records confirm, that she first sought treatment for her hand pain on March 10, 1999, while employed at Ochsner. She saw her family physician, Dr. Harold Ish-ler, and reported that she had suffered for several days with increasing neck and left shoulder pain, as well as swelling in her left hand. Dr. Ishler diagnosed tendonitis/bursitis in claimant’s left shoulder and “probable carpal tunnel syndrome” in her left wrist. This was the first mention of carpal tunnel syndrome in claimant’s medical records that were admitted into evidence. Claimant followed up with Dr. Ish-ler on March 15, 1999, for continued pain and decreased range of motion in her left shoulder and upper arm. She was treated with a cortisone injection in her left shoulder.

Approximately four months later on July 19, 1999, claimant returned to Dr. Ishler. She reported that she was experiencing left-hand numbness and pain after a long day of typing at her Neuromedical job. She also complained of having had similar symptoms in her right hand in the past. |4Pr. Ishler referred claimant to Dr. William J. Hubbard for a surgery consult for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. On July 23, 1999, claimant reported to Dr. Hubbard that she had a one-year history of bilateral hand numbness, with her left hand having worse symptoms than her right. Claimant specifically related her hand problems to her transcription work at both her jobs at Ochsner and Neu-romedical. At trial, claimant testified that although she had experienced mild soreness in her hands before the July incident at Neuromedical, she had never experienced pain, numbness, and “freezing up” in her hands until July 1999. Claimant stated that due to her hand problems, she could not perform her typing job after July 1999. Dr. Hubbard diagnosed left carpal tunnel syndrome, recommended a nerve conduction study, administered cortisone injections, and restricted excessive use of claimant’s left hand for six weeks.

Ochsner requested that claimant see Dr. Gray W. Barrow while paying her workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant saw Dr. Barrow several times in August and October 1999 for her hand problems. She explained to Dr. Barrow that her symptoms had been present for approximately one year, but had become progressively worse over time. She complained of left-hand numbness when she typed. Dr. Barrow conducted an EMG nerve conduction study, ruled out carpal tunnel syndrome, and diagnosed claimant with overuse myal-gia (muscle pain). Claimant’s medical treatment from the various doctors included a splint, cortisone injections, physical therapy, and restrictions on repetitive wrist/hand motions. After a cortisone injection and physical therapy, claimant went without medical treatment for approximately six months. In April 2000, approximately ten months after claimant’s employment at Neuromedical Pended, she resumed medical treatment for increased pain and numbness in both hands. Dr. Hubbard eventually performed successful left carpal tunnel release surgery for claimant on August 25, 2000. After healing from the surgery, claimant returned to full-time employment as a transcriptionist in October 2000.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In workers’ compensation cases, the appellate court’s review is governed by the manifest error or clearly wrong standard. Banks v. Indus. Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 551, 556. Appellate courts should not disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. The WCJ’s determinations as to whether claimant was credible and has discharged her burden of proof are factual determinations. However, where one or more legal errors on the part of the WCJ interdicts the fact-finding process, and the record is otherwise complete, the reviewing court should make an independent de novo review of the evidence, giving no deference to the WCJ’s factual findings, and render judgment. Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502, 510; Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 747; Davies v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36,498 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/23/02), 830 So.2d 462, 465, writ denied, 02-2855 (La.1/31/03), 836 So.2d 70.

Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1031.1A entitles every employee who is disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease to receive compensation benefits, provided that the employee’s illness arises out of and in the course of his employment. An injury due to work-related carpal |fitunnel syndrome is specifically included as an occupational disease under LSA-R.S. 23:1031.IB. However, LSA-R.S. 23:1031.ID creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the employer against coverage where the employee has not been performing work for that employer for twelve months or more prior to contracting the occupational disease. The statute further provides that any occupational disease contracted within the twelve months’ limitation shall become compensable when the claimant proves that the occupational disease was contracted during the course of the prior twelve months’ employment. LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1D was amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 1189, § 1, effective June 29, 2001, to change the burden of proof necessary to overcome the mandatory statutory presumption against coverage from an “overwhelming preponderance” to a mere “preponderance” of the evidence. The amended version of LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1D provides, in pertinent part:

Any occupational disease contracted by an employee while performing work for a particular employer in which he has been engaged for less than twelve months shall be presumed not to have been contracted in the course of and arising out of such employment, provided, however, that any such occupational disease so contracted within the twelve months’ limitation as set out herein shall become compensable when the occupational disease shall have been proved to have been contracted during the course of the prior twelve months’ employment by a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis added.)

17Neuromedical does not dispute that claimant suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. Rather, Neuromedical contends that because claimant was employed at Neuromedical for less than six weeks, the statutory presumption against coverage applies, and claimant failed to carry her burden to overcome the presumption. Neuromedical contends that the heightened burden of proof (overwhelming preponderance) required in the former version of LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1D applies in this case, because the former version of the statute was in effect in 1999 at the time of claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome, at the time of her employment at Neuromedical, and when she sought treatment for her carpal tunnel condition. In support of this argument, Neuromedical cites this court’s recent decision, Hurst v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 02-1334 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 846 So.2d 954, 957-958, wherein another panel of this court specifically held that the governing version of this particular statute is the one that was in effect at the time of the alleged injury.

The supreme court has held that statutes changing the burden of proof and statutes creating rebuttable presumptions are to be considered procedural and are to be applied retroactively. See Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 97-0785 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 724, 729, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 940, 118 S.Ct. 2347, 141 L.Ed.2d 717, (1998). See also Marmino v. City of Crowley, 02-0472 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1117, 1121, writ denied, 02-2914 (La.2/7/03), 836 So.2d 105; 13 H. Alston Johnson III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation, § 222 n. 21 (4th ed.2002). Although that portion of the holding in Hurst dealing with the applicable version of the burden of IsProof is subject to question in light of other jurisprudence, we find it to be of no consequence in this case which burden of proof is applied, because claimant has not met either standard.

The WCJ relied on the last injurious employer doctrine outlined in Gales v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prod., 493 So.2d 611 (La.1986), to find that Neuromedical was responsible for claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome. In oral reasons, the WCJ discussed Gales and the fact that Neuromed-ieal was the last injurious employer with regard to causation. However, we believe the WCJ erred in relying on the last injurious employer doctrine in this case. Gales did not involve a situation where the employee was employed for less than twelve months. Therefore, the statutory presumption of LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1D was not an issue. The record in Gales established that the final employer contributed to the employee’s occupational disease. See Ball v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 36,922 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1208, 1216, writ denied, 03-0978 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1056.

In the case sub judice, the WCJ legally erred by ignoring the mandatory statutory presumption in favor of Neu-romedical, stating in oral reasons, “the presumption in this type of case simply does not apply.” The statutory presumption automatically arose because claimant was employed at Neuromedical for less than twelve months. Therefore, it follows that the WCJ’s factual finding regarding causation based on the last injurious employer doctrine was also in error. Based on the legal error of the WCJ, |9we must review the record de novo regarding claimant’s burden of proof and causation.

Claimant’s uncontradicted testimony at trial was that she first experienced problems with numbness and pain in her hands in March 1999, while employed by Ochsner. She stated that she performed transcription services at Ochsner that were essentially the same as those that she performed at Neuromedical. Claimant’s medical records confirm that she was first diagnosed with probable carpal tunnel syndrome in March 1999, prior to her employment with Neuromedical. Neuromedical does not dispute that claimant first suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome while employed at Ochsner. Neuromedical simply argues that all of the evidence reveals that claimant in fact contracted carpal tunnel syndrome before she was employed at Neuromedical.

We agree and find merit to Neuromedical’s argument. To overcome the statutory presumption against coverage, claimant must prove the occupational disease was “contracted” during her employment at Neuromedical. However, our review of the record reveals that claimant contracted the carpal tunnel condition prior to her employment at Neuromedical. The medical evidence and claimant’s testimony reasonably support this conclusion.

Furthermore, our review of the record reveals no evidence from any objective or independent source linking the cause of claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome to any trauma during her employment at Neu-romedical or to the performance of her job duties as a medical transcriptionist while at Neuromedical. The only statements in the record regarding causation are those made by claimant to her physicians and in her self-serving testimony |1(lat trial, stating that she experienced pain and numbness after a particularly long day of typing at Neuromedical. Additionally, the record contains claimant’s hearsay statement that her doctor told her the underlying cause of her condition was too much typing. However, no doctor testified at trial, and claimant introduced no doctors’ depositions or medical reports suggesting that claimant’s job at Neuromedical contributed to or caused her carpal tunnel syndrome. Although the medical records confirm the diagnosis and treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome, there is simply no medical evidence establishing with any degree of medical certainty or reliability that claimant’s condition developed from her employment activities at Neuromedical. To the contrary, the record reasonably supports the conclusion that claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome predated her employment at Neuromedical.

The WCJ’s apparent belief in the claimant’s self-serving and uncorroborated testimony alone is insufficient to prove causation. Stuart v. New City Diner, 99-2270 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/15/00), 758 So.2d 345, 351. Expert testimony of an objective quality, focusing on probabilities, in addition to claimant’s testimony, is required to support a finding of an occupational disease. Ball, 839 So.2d at 1214; Dibler v. Highland Clinic, 27,274 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/95), 661 So.2d 588, 592. The causal link between the claimant’s occupational disease and the work-related duties must be established by a reasonable probability. Seal v. Gaylord Container Corp., 97-0688 (La.12/2/97), 704 So.2d 1161, 1165; Lee v. Schumpert, 36,733 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/29/03), 836 So.2d 1214, 1221. The claimant will fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused the occupational Indisease or if other causes not related to the employment are just as likely to have caused it. Ball, 839 So.2d at 1214.

Considering ■ the strong presumption against finding an occupationally related disease in an employee who had been on the job less than twelve months (in this case for less than six weeks), we find that the claimant’s self-serving testimony and the lack of medical evidence relating her carpal tunnel condition to her employment at Neuromedical was insufficient to overcome the presumption against coverage set forth in either version of LSA-R.S. 23:1301.ID.

Accordingly, considering the law and the evidence, we find that the WCJ’s conclusion that Neuromedical was responsible for claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome was unreasonable and manifestly erroneous. Claimant failed to overcome the presumption by proving by even a mere preponderance, much less an overwhelming preponderance, of the evidence that her carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by her employment as a medical transcriptionist at Neuromedical. Therefore, we reverse the WCJ’s judgment against Neuromedical and its insurer, and hereby render judgment dismissing claimant’s suit. Because we reverse the WCJ on the awarding of workers’ compensation benefits, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by Neuromedical. Costs of this appeal are to be paid by claimant, Deanna 0. Dowell.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

GUIDRY, J., concurs in the result.

      . The specific dollar amounts of the judgment are not outlined in this opinion because Neu-romedical does not complain on appeal about the amounts awarded.

      . The former version of LSA-R.S. 23:1031.ID provided the following:
      Any occupational disease as herein listed contracted by an employee while performing work for a particular employer in which he has been engaged for less than twelve months shall be presumed to be non-occupational and not to have been contracted in the course of and arising out of such employment, provided, however, that any such occupational disease so contracted within the twelve months' limitation as set out herein shall become com-pensable when the occupational disease shall have been proved to have been contracted during the course of the prior twelve months' employment by an overwhelming preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis added.)

      . See Sudwischer, 705 So.2d at 729; Marmino, 829 So.2d at 1121; Balt v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 36, 922 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1208, 1215 n. 4, writ denied, 03-0978 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1056; Davies v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 830 So.2d at 465. But see Jackson v. Conagra Poultry Co., 02-492 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1079, 1083, writ denied, 03-0986 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1054.

      . The 2001 amendment changed the burden of proof required to rebut the presumption, but the presumption itself remained intact.