author: IVVICTORY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana BOARD OF ETHICS v. Corbett OURSO, Jr.
    No. 2002-C-1978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.

      R. Gray Sexton, Maris L. McCrory, Baton Rouge, for Applicant.
    John 0. Braud, Independence, for Respondent.
   IVVICTORY, J.

We granted a writ in this case to determine whether the time period found in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 for filing actions under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La. R.S. 18:1481 et seq. (the “CFDA”), is prescriptive or peremptive. Because we find that the time period is prescriptive, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the October 3,1998, primary and November 3, 1998, general elections, Cor-bett Ourso, Jr. (“Ourso”), a candidate for District Court Judge, 21st Judicial District, Division G, filed campaign finance disclosure reports as required by the CFDA. Believing that these reports evidenced his receipt of loans in excess of the contribution limits established in La. R.S. 18:1505.2(H), the Board of Ethics (the “Board”) ordered an investigation into these apparent violations. After reviewing a proposed consent opinion, Ourso requested an appearance before the Board, which was scheduled for July 15, 1999, and then rescheduled for August 19, 1999. The Board then gave him ten days to accept the consent opinion offer or suit would be filed against him to collect civil penalties. Thereafter, the time limit was extended until September 6,1999, and on September 3, 1999, Ourso suggested changes to the opinion and again requested an appearance before the Board. At Ourso’s request, on | ^September 22,1999, the Board forwarded a waiver of prescription to Ourso to allow him the opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999, meeting. The waiver provided as follows:

I, Corbett Ourso, Jr., do hereby acknowledge the following:
*my campaign for the October 1998 primary election has been subject to investigation by the Board of Ethics, acting as the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance, for the possible receipt of excessive loans;
*the Board of Ethics may take enforcement action for this alleged violation by virtue of the filing of a civil lawsuit for penalties;
*1 have been offered the opportunity to enter into a consent agreement with the Board concerning the alleged violation;
*1 have asked the staff of the Board for the opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999 meeting in order to request that any consent opinion reached allow me to seek judicial review of that opinion; and
*1 understand that the staff of the Board is opposed to allowing judicial review of the consent opinion.
In consideration of the foregoing, and to preserve my opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999 meeting, I do hereby agree to renounce, waive, and abandon any defense related to prescription or limitation of actions, particularly as to the provisions of R.S. 18:1500.11, that may have already accrued or which may accrue before November 19, 1999. (Emphasis added.)

On September 28, 1999, Ourso signed the document and on October 14, 1999, he appeared before the Board. The Board then gave Ourso until October 29, 1999, to accept or reject the consent offer. On November 11, 1999, Ourso informed the Board by telephone that he would not accept the consent offer and was notified that the Board would file suit by November 19, 1999.

On November 19, 1999, the Board filed suit against Ourso in the 21st Judicial District Court to collect civil penalties based on Ourso’s alleged receipt of loans in excess of his contribution limits under the CFDA. Trial was conducted on April 20, 2000, and the matter was taken under advisement. On June 13, 2000, Ourso filed a |,.¡“Peremptory Exception Raising the Objections of: Peremption and Prescription with Incorporated Memorandum.” On February 21, 2001, the trial court heard argument and found the exception of per-emption to be of merit and dismissed the Board’s petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 01-1417 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 838 So.2d 792. We granted the Board’s writ to determine whether La. R.S. 18:1511.11, which provides the time period in which an action under the CFDA must be filed, is prescriptive or peremptive. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 02-1978 (La.10/14/02), 827 So.2d 410.

DISCUSSION

La. R.S. 18:1511.11 contains the limitation of actions period for all CFDA enforcement actions, providing as follows:

B. Actions for violation of this Chapter must be commenced before three years have elapsed from the date of the violation or, if the violation is contained in a report, before one year has elapsed from filing of the relevant report.

At issue in this case is the one-year period, because the alleged violations, the receipt of loans in excess of the contribution limits, were disclosed in reports filed with the Board. The reports were filed on various dates, all before November 19, 1998. Therefore, in the absence of a waiver of prescription by Ourso, the Board’s case against him would have prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the filing of the reports on which the violations were based. In the waiver, Ourso clearly agreed to “renounce, waive, and abandon any defense related to prescription or | ¿limitation of actions, particularly as to the provisions of R.S. 18:1500.11, that may have already accrued or which may accrue before November 19,1999.”

Ourso argued, and the lower courts agreed, that the time period in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 is peremptive and that as such, it cannot be “renounced, interrupted, or suspended” under La. C.C. Art. 3461. The Board argues that the time period is prescriptive, and prescription may be renounced, La. C.C. arts. 3449-51, interrupted, La. C.C. arts. 3462-66, and suspended, La. C.C. arts. 3467-72. The court of appeal found that “considering the plain language of the statute, the clear legislative intent and public policy considerations on which this statute was based, we conclude that the time period set forth in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 is peremptive.” We disagree.

This Court recently discussed the difference between peremption and prescription:

Peremption differs from prescription in several respects. Although prescription prevents the enforcement of a right by legal action, it does not terminate the natural obligation (La. Civ. Code art. 1762(1)); peremption, however, extinguishes or destroys the right (La. Civ. Code Art. 3458). Public policy requires that rights to which peremptive periods attach are to be extinguished after passage of a specified period. Accordingly, nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period. It may not be interrupted or suspended; nor is there provision for its renunciation. And exceptions such as contra non valentem are not applicable. As an inchoate right, prescription, on the other hand may be renounced, interrupted, or suspended; and contra non valentem applies an exception to the statutory prescription period where in fact and for good cause a plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues.

Reeder v. North, 97-0239 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1298 (citing Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, 486 So.2d 717, 723 (La.1986)).

Because the Civil Code gives no guidance on how to determine whether a particular time limitation is prescriptive or peremptive, “this court has resorted to an exploration of the legislative intent and public policy underlying a particular time limitation, for it is primarily whether the legislature intended a particular time period |Kto be prescriptive or peremptive that is the deciding factor in such a case.” State of Louisiana, Division of Administration v. McInnis Bros. Constr., 97-0742 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, 940 (emphasis added). Thus, courts look to the language of the statute, the purpose behind the statute, and the public policy mitigating for or against suspension, interruption or renunciation of that time limit. See id. at 946 (“Considering the plain, explicit language of the statute, the obvious purpose behind the statute, and the readily apparent public policy which mitigates against suspension, interruption or renunciation of that time limit and in favor of certainty in the termination of causes of action,” La. R.S. 38:2189 establishes a peremptive time period.)

There is no language in La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B) which indicates the legislature’s intent that the time period is per-emptive, and we have held that it is unnecessary for the legislature to state in a statute that it is peremptive in order for this Court to hold that it is in fact peremp-tive. See id. at 947. But, in some other cases where this Court has found a time period to be peremptive, specific language in the statute clearly indicated the legislature’s intent in that regard. See, e.g., Reeder, supra (La. R.S. 9:5605 expressly stated that the period is “peremptive” and “in accordance with Civil Code Article 3461, may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended”); Metropolitan Erection Co., Inc. v. Landis Const. Co., 627 So.2d 144 (La.1998) (La. R.S. 9:4813(E) provided that the surety’s liability was extinguished unless the claim is filed within one year).

The legislature did, however, clearly state its intent in Acts 1997, No. 286, § 1, which reenacted and amended La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B). Prior to 1997, there was a time limitation of one year from the date of the violation for the Board to file suit under the CFDA. Former Representative David Vitter presented House Bill No. 1549, which ultimately extended the period to one year from the date of the report 1 ficontaining a violation, or three years from the date of the violation. Vitter explained that the Board had requested him to file the bill because the prior “prescriptive period of one year for prosecution from the date of the violation often makes it impossible to prosecute.” Minutes of Meeting, 1997 Regular Session, April 24, 1997, Committee on House and Governmental Affairs.

Thus, La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B) was amended and reenacted by Acts 1997, No. 286, § 1, with the following intent:

To amend and reenact R.S. 18:1511.11(B), relative to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; to change the prescriptive period for instituting actions for violations of campaign finance laws; to provide that actions for violations, except those contained in a report must be commenced within three years from the date of the violation; to provide that actions for violations contained in a report must be commenced within one year after filing of the relevant report; and to provide for related matters. (Emphasis added).

In Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, supra, this Court considered whether the limitations period in La. R.S. 9:5628, the medical malpractice act, was prescriptive or peremptive. The Court noted that 1975 La. Acts No. 808, § 1 was entitled:

AN ACT

To amend Code Title XXIII of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding thereto a new Section to be designated as Section 5628, to provide for a maximum prescriptive period and abandonment with respect to medical malpractice claims. (Emphasis added).

486 So.2d at 721.

[7In finding the statute to be prescriptive, the Court stated:

Of significance is the title to 1975 La. Acts No. 808, § 1, which enacted La. Rev.Stat. § 9:5628. As recited earlier in this opinion, it states that the purpose of the act is to establish a new section to provide for a “maximum prescriptive period” with regard to medical malpractice claims. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal majority pointed out in Chalstrom v. Desselles, 433 So.2d 866, 868 (La.App. 4 Cir.1983) that to be constitutional, a bill enacted into law must contain a title indicative of its object. La. Const. Art. Ill, § 15(A). Weight must clearly be given to this statement of the act’s object in determining the Legislature’s intent in passing this statute. And, it is the legislative purpose sought to be achieved by a particular limitation period which has been found to be one of the most significant factors in distinguishing peremption from prescription. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So.2d at 1199-1200 (1979).

Id. at 724. The Court further found that “had the Legislature meant it to be per-emption they could have so entitled the act rather than calling it ‘a prescriptive period.’” Id.

We recognize that while “the presence or absence of certain words may be beneficial to a court in its inquiry into the legislature’s intent, [and that] the use or non-use of certain words, while relevant, should not be determinative factor in the analysis,” McInnis, supra at 942, just as in Hebert, we find it significant that the legislature labeled it a prescriptive period in Acts 1997, No. 286, § 1, when they could have called 'it a peremptive period if that was their intent.

Next, we look to the purpose behind the statute. For in McInnis, we held that while “some weight” should be given to the use of the term “prescription” in the body or title of a statute, “it is the legislative purpose sought to be achieved by a particular limitation which is the most significant and determinative factor in distinguishing a peremptive statute from a prescriptive one.” McInnis, supra at 946 n. 8.

In La. R.S. 18:1482, the legislature enunciated its purpose as follows:

Statement of purpose

The legislature recognizes that the effectiveness of representative government is dependent upon a knowledgeable electorate and the confidence of the electorate in their elected public officials. The ^legislature, therefore, enacts this Chapter to provide public disclosure of the financing of election campaigns and to regulate certain campaign practices.

The court of appeal made the following finding with regard to this stated purpose:

The timeliness of actions against public officials is critical to the goal of maintaining an effective representative government based on a knowledgeable electorate. An extension of the delay for instituting actions under this legislation would hinder or defeat this goal. Therefore, the intent of the legislature, as well as public policy, dictate a conclusion that the statute is peremptive rather than prescriptive.

State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, supra at 3, 838 So.2d 792. We disagree. As stated by Judge Whipple in her dissent:

The conclusion that the time period contained in R.S. 18:1511 is preemptive (sic) not only frustrates the public policy behind the CFDA, but also adversely affects candidates and elected officials subject to the restrictions contained in the CFDA. If faced with a short per-emptive period, the Board would have no choice but to hurriedly investigate alleged violations of the CFDA, which often times are prompted by political adversaries of the candidate or elected official, and file a civil suit against the candidate or elected official alleging various violations of the CFDA.

Id. at 5, 838 So.2d 792. An interpretation that the statute is peremptive would also restrict the Board’s ability to offer a candidate the chance to resolve his violations through a consent opinion, which the Board stated at oral argument is how the vast majority of CFDA violations are handled. A peremptive period would also restrict the candidate’s ability to meaningfully consider a consent opinion and his chances to present his side of the story to the Board.

Further, public policy weighs in favor of finding that the time period is prescriptive as the enforcement provisions of the CFDA are designed to protect the public. Allowing such actions to be extinguished by the passage of a year would only serve to hinder the legislature’s stated policy of providing public disclosure and regulating campaign practices. Candidates could conceivably take advantage of delay tactics, including failing to turn over campaign materials during an investigation or | flseeking to present arguments directly to the Board, in order to claim that any enforcement action by the Board has been lost. This would only serve to dimmish the public’s confidence in its elected officials, something the CFDA is specifically designed to prevent.

Finally, this statute does not contain another characteristic that this court has historically found to be relevant in determining whether a time limitation is prescriptive or peremptive, that is, the statute, La. R.S. 18.1511, does not create the right of action and also stipulate the time within which the right may be executed. See McInnis Bros. Const. supra at 941; Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry. Co., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899 (1900).

CONCLUSION

Thus, considering the explicit language of the statute contained in the Act, the stated purpose behind the statute, the public policy which mitigates in favor of renunciation of that time limit by the candidate, and the absence of any other | mcharacteristics that would tend to indicate that the legislature intended the statute to be peremptive, we conclude that La. R.S. 18:1511.11 establishes a prescriptive time limitation. As the time period is prescriptive, it can be renounced. Ourso’s argument that, even if the statute is prescriptive, some or all of the claims against him have prescribed in spite of his waiver may be considered by the trial court on remand.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . Ourso argues that even if this period is prescriptive rather than peremptive, the Board’s action has prescribed. First, he argues that he only agreed to waive prescription “that may have accrued or which may accrue before November 19, 1999,” and that, because the Board did not file its action until November 19, 1999 and not before, the action is prescribed. Secondly, he argues that at the time the waiver was presented to him, more than a year had elapsed since the filing of the reports setting forth six of the eight alleged violations, and therefore, any claims relating to those six violations have prescribed. These issues can be considered by the trial court on remand.

      . La. R.S. 9:5628 provides in part:
      A. No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this state, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims must be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect.

      . The court of appeal in the case sub judice found that the CFDA, which was enacted by Acts 1980, No. 786, effective January 1, 1981, set forth both the right of action and stipulates the delay during which the right must be exercised, therefore meeting this characteristic. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, supra, 01-1417 at p. 3, 838 So.2d 792. However, such reasoning is erroneous.
      The provision at issue, La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B), merely creates the time period within which the Board has to file an enforcement action. The actual statute violated and the source of the Board's right to file an enforcement action >are found in La. R.S. 18:1505.2(H) and (J). Section H provides the contribution limits, and Section J provides the penalties for a violation of Section H and the Board’s authority to file civil suit to collect penalties for the violation. These statutes are contained in Part V entitled "Prohibited Practices and Limitations; Penalties,” completely separate from La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B) containing the limitation of actions provision, which is found in Part VI, entitled "Enforcement.” In fact, La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B) was originally enacted in 1980, and then amended and reenacted in 1997, but the contribution limits and enforcement authority for those limits in La. R.S. 18:1505.2 were added to the CFDA in 1988.
      In Hebert, we noted that peremption statues generally create the right of action and stipulate the delay during which the right may be exercised. There we found that, although La. R.S. 9:5628 created the delay, the right of action long preceded 9:5628. Hebert, supra, 486 So.2d at 721.
      Finally, in Hebert, we noted that "other factors suggestive of a peremptive period are the existence of a claim of a public law nature, and a period of less than one year....” Id. While a claim under the CFDA might be characterized as a claim of a public law nature, the period involved here is not less than one year.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JjPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Charles WILLIAMS.
    No. 2002-B-2698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.
    Charles B. Plattsmier, Baton Rouge, James T. Daly, Plaquemine, for Applicant.
    Charles Williams, New Orleans, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Charles Williams. We previously suspended respondent from practice for a minimum term of two years. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 498 So.2d 727 (La.1986) (“Williams F). Our judgment in Williams I provided that respondent could petition for and obtain reinstatement at the end of the two-year period, provided" that he had fulfilled certain conditions; however, if respondent had not fulfilled all of the specified conditions, “his suspension from the practice of law shall continue indefinitely.” 498 So.2d at 730. To date, respondent has not complied with the conditions set forth in Williams I, and accordingly, he remains suspended from the practice of law.

UNDERLYING FACTS

On April 8, 1998, while employed as a paralegal by the Law Office of Louis A. Gerdes, Jr., respondent accompanied two of the firm’s clients to sworn statements taken by counsel for the insurance company in a personal injury claim. Respondent actively participated in the sworn statements, indicated that he is an attorney, and advised the clients how to answer questions asked of them.

Lin addition, during the course of the ODC’s investigation of this matter, respondent was requested on several occasions to schedule a meeting with the ODC. Respondent did so, but he failed to appear on any occasion, including a meeting for which he had been ordered to appear pursuant to a subpoena.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On December 28, 1999, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Attempts by the ODC to serve respondent with the formal charges were initially unsuccessful. Following this court’s appointment of a curator to facilitate service, respondent was personally served with the formal charges on April 10, 2001. Respondent answered the charges and essentially denied any misconduct. Specifically, respondent stated he has not “done anymore depositions nor do I intend to do any more depositions, since counsel for the other party seemingly tried to get me to admit, I was a lawyer, by trickery.” Respondent also denied that he failed to cooperate with the ODC, pointing out that he had recently been living out of state but that “Mr. Gerdes knew how to contact me.”

13Hearing Committee Recommendation

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits on June 18, 2001. At the hearing, respondent admitted the misconduct charged in the formal charges. He also consented to the introduction of the ODC’s documentary evidence, including the transcripts of the two sworn statements respondent attended and participated in on behalf of clients of Mr. Gerdes. The transcripts reveal that on April 8, 1998, respondent accompanied Ms. Raas-hand Frazier to a sworn statement taken by William Stephens, counsel for GEICO Insurance Company, in connection with a personal injury claim. At the beginning of the statement, the following colloquy took place on the record:

By Mr. Stephens: Good afternoon. My name is Bill Stephens, and I represent GEICO Insurance Company. Before we get started, we’re just going to get a couple [of] prerequisites done. First of all, just for the record, I’d like to know who is appearing.
By Mr. Williams: Charles Williams, standing in for Louis Gerdes.
By Mr. Stephens: Mr. Williams, you are an attorney?
By Mr. Williams: Yeah.

Respondent went on to actively participate in the statement, including advising Ms. Frazier how to answer several questions asked of her by Mr. Stephens.

|40n the same day and in connection with the same personal injury claim, Ms. Frazier’s mother, Sandra Frazier, also gave a sworn statement. Respondent did not correct Mr. Stephens when he stated on the record that respondent “is acting as [Mrs. Frazier’s] attorney in this particular matter.” Furthermore, as respondent had done during the statement given by Ms. Frazier, he advised Mrs. Frazier how to answer several questions asked of her by Mr. Stephens.

Before the hearing committee, respondent testified that Mr. Gerdes frequently asked him to “cover” .depositions, and he claimed he was present at the two Frazier sworn statements as Mr. Gerdes’ “agent.” Respondent suggested that he remained silent throughout most of the proceeding, and claimed that when he did speak, he did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or this court’s rule relating to “paralegals and their participation in depositions” because he did not offer “specific legal advice.” Respondent also claimed that he did not accept any money from these clients under the false pretense that he is a practicing lawyer. When asked specifically about his affirmative response in Ms. Frazier’s statement to the question, “Are you an attorney?” respondent admitted that he should have responded in such a manner to make it clear that he is not a practicing attorney; however, respondent maintained that he is, in fact, an attorney because he graduated from law school and passed the bar examination. Respondent testified that he thought opposing counsel was making fun of him and was trying to belittle him by asking whether he is an attorney.

Following respondent’s admission to the formal charges, the hearing was converted to a hearing in mitigation. The only mitigating evidence offered by respondent at the hearing was his testimony that his wife died in December 1996 after |Ka long battle with breast cancer. In a post-hearing memorandum, respondent suggested he had other personal problems that should be considered in mitigation, including a 1987 automobile accident that killed his half-sister and caused his brother to suffer severe brain damage, and the 1993 and 1994 deaths of two brothers-in-law.

After considering the record, the committee found the factual allegations contained in the formal charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that respondent violated the professional rules as charged. The committee found that respondent violated duties owed primarily to the profession and to clients. Rejecting respondent’s contention that there is an “overlap” between the roles of attorneys and paralegals, the committee concluded respondent’s conduct and his representations that he is an attorney were willful and knowing. The committee noted that this court has routinely imposed suspension as the minimum sanction in cases in which an attorney has engaged in the practice of law while ineligible to practice for any reason.

In aggravation, the committee noted respondent’s prior disciplinary record, as well as a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. The committee recognized that mitigating factors may exist in the form of the personal problems cited by respondent, but it ultimately gave no consideration to these circumstances because they are too remote in time to the offenses committed by respondent in 1998. In light of the substantial aggravating factors present, and considering the absence of mitigating factors, the committee concluded there is no reason to impose a sanction in this case less than the one year and one day suspension ordered in In re: Brough, 98-0366 (La.4/3/98), 709 So.2d 210.

Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The committee further | firecommended that this period of suspension commence to run after respondent has satisfied the conditions of the two-year suspension imposed in Williams I.

The ODC filed an objection to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the hearing committee.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board generally agreed with the hearing committee’s factual findings and its application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board found that respondent has violated duties owed to the profession and to clients. The board noted that respondent’s conduct was knowing and caused injury to the clients of the Gerdes firm. The board agreed with the hearing committee’s finding that no mitigating factors exist; however, the board did not agree with the committee’s assessment of the aggravating factors. The board found the following aggravating factors are supported by the record: prior disciplinary offenses, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1977).

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board agreed that the baseline for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension under Standard 7.2 of the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The board noted the relevant jurisprudence, including the Brough, Withers, and Ellis cases cited by the hearing committee, also supports a suspension. Because respondent’s misconduct in this matter involves two instances of the unauthorized practice of law, as well as misrepresentation and failure to cooperate with the ODC, and considering the ^aggravating factors present, the board determined that the more stringent sanction of Brough—a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law—is warranted here.

Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended for one year and one day. The board further recommended that this period of suspension commence to run upon the finality of this court’s judgment. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection in this court to the disciplinary board’s recommendation; however, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(a), we ordered the parties to submit written briefs addressing the appropriateness of the proposed sanction.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

IsThe evidence in the record demonstrates respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in connection with his participation in the sworn statements of Ms. Raashand Frazier and Mrs. Sandra Frazier. In both matters, respondent implied he was authorized to practice law, and at no time informed the court reporter or the opposing counsel that he was suspended from practice. Moreover, in both matters, respondent acted as an attorney by asking questions of the persons being deposed.

Having found professional violations, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for this misconduct. In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The unauthorized practice of law by a suspended or disbarred attorney is very serious misconduct. Our legislature has made it a felony to engage in such conduct. La. R.S. 37:213. Likewise, we have listed unauthorized practice of law by a suspended or disbarred attorney as a possible ground for permanent disbarment under the Guidelines Depicting Conduct Which Might Warrant Permanent Disbarment contained in Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX.

|9In general, when the attorney has manifested a conscious intent to flout the authority of this court by practicing after being prohibited from doing so, we have not hesitated to impose disbarment. See, e.g., In re: Jones, 99-1036 (La.10/19/99), 747 So.2d 1081 (attorney disbarred for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law on four occasions, after being suspended in the past for similar misconduct). However, not all instances of the unauthorized practice of law warrant the most severe sanction. For example, in In re: Ellis, 99-2483 (La.9/15/99), 742 So.2d 869, we imposed a ninety-day suspension on a previously suspended attorney who failed to remove the “attorney at law’’ designation from his office. See also In re: Withers, 99-2951 (La.11/19/99), 747 So.2d 514 (attorney suspended for six months, followed by an eighteen-month period of probation, for representing a client while ineligible to do so).

The instant case falls somewhere between those two extremes. There is no indication from the record that respondent consciously attempted to practice law in blatant disregard of the orders of the court; on the other hand, it appears respondent’s actions were more deliberate and far-reaching than the actions of the respondent in Ellis.

Under these circumstances, we find the appropriate baseline sanction is a two-year period of suspension. However, in mitigation, we conclude that respondent lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, in that he received no benefit from his appearance at the two sworn statements. Accordingly, we will defer all but one year and one day of the suspension. If and when respondent applies for reinstatement to the practice of law, he shall satisfy all conditions set forth by this court in Williams I. If reinstatement is granted, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of one year.

ImDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Charles Williams be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of two years. It is further ordered that all but one year and one day of this suspension shall be deferred. If and when respondent applies for reinstatement to the practice of law, he shall satisfy all conditions set forth by this court in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 498 So.2d 727 (La.1986). If reinstatement is granted, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of one year. Any misconduct during that time will be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension ex-ecutory. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . These conditions included the following: (1) restitution of $8,000 to Mary Hollander; (2) restitution of $275 to the owners of Travis Grocery and Market in Bogalusa; (3) attainment of a satisfactory score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination; and (4) payment of all costs of the proceedings.

      . See In re: Williams, 01-0043 (La.2/9/01), 780 So.2d 348.

      . The formal charges against respondent relate solely to his conduct in connection with the sworn statements of Ms. Raashand Frazier and Mrs. Sandra Frazier, which are discussed at length in this opinion. However, at the formal hearing, evidence was introduced relating to other similar misconduct by respondent not charged in the formal charges. As this court has previously held, it would be a denial of due process of law to find respondent guilty of charges based on evidence adduced at the hearing if he was not given notice of these charges prior to the hearing. See In re: Nevitte, 02-1962 (La.9/30/02), 827 So.2d 1135. Accordingly, we have not considered the uncharged conduct in this case and have made no reference to it in this opinion.

      . We know of no such rule. However, we recently amended Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to impose certain requirements upon attorneys who hire suspended lawyers in any capacity in connection with the practice of law. For purposes of the rule, the "practice of law” is specifically defined to include “[a]ppearing as a representative of the client at a deposition or other discovery matter.”

      . The committee cited In re: Withers, 99-2951 (La.11/19/99), 747 So.2d 514 (six-month suspension); In re: Ellis, 99-2483 (La.9/15/99), 742 So.2d 869 (90-day suspension); and In re: Brough, 98-0366 (La.4/3/98), 709 So.2d 210 (one year and one day suspension).

      . Standard 7.2 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

      . The board did not adopt the hearing committee’s recommendation that the suspension commence to run after respondent has satisfied the conditions in Williams I, stating that such a recommendation "does not give the parties or the Board an official starting date for the suspension.”

      . Guideline 8 of Appendix E provides:
      Following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred.


author: JjlPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Darryl JACKSON.
    No. 2002-B-2764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.
    Charles B. Plattsmier, Eric K. Barefield, New Orleans, for Applicant.
    Darryl Jackson, New Orleans, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

JjlPER CURIAM.

This attorney disciplinary proceeding arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Darryl Jackson, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Lee Morris Brown, a Texas resident, retained a Louisiana attorney to institute medical malpractice proceedings in Louisiana arising from the death of his mother. After the matter proceeded through the medical review panel, Mr. Brown’s attorney sent him a letter in March, 1997 indicating he would not pursue the case further. He informed Mr. Brown he had until June 17, 1997 to file his claim in the district court, or his rights would be barred forever.

Several days after receiving this letter, Mr. Brown contacted respondent by telephone. Respondent told Mr. Brown to forward the documentation he had and respondent would take a look at it “when he got a chance.” On April 16, 1997, Mr. Brown mailed his mother’s medical records to respondent. Thereafter, respondent and Mr. Brown communicated by telephone on several occasions, although it is disputed whether they discussed the approaching prescription deadline of June 17, 1997. While Mr. Brown later testified that he made several calls to respondent as the deadline | ¡>approached, respondent maintains Mr. Brown did not notify him of the deadline until the day it ran, June 17, 1997. Respondent informed Mr. Brown he could not file the suit on that day because he was out of town. However, respondent later filed the suit after the deadline had passed. Although respondent stated he knew the suit was prescribed, he indicated he filed it at the insistence of Mr. Brown. The suit was eventually dismissed as being prescribed.

In August, 1999, approximately two years following the dismissal of the malpractice case, Mr. Brown filed the instant disciplinary complaint. During the course of the ODC’s investigation, respondent gave a statement in which he denied Mr. Brown had ever been his client.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

Following its investigation, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent. The charges alleged respondent violated Rule 1.3 (lack of diligence) of the Rules of Professional Conduct based on respondent’s failure to properly review the medical materials forwarded to him by Mr. Brown, as well as his failure to expedite the legal matter and failure to timely file the petition. The charges also asserted respondent violated Rule 1.4 (failure to communicate) of the Rules of Professional Conduct insofar as he failed to keep Mr. Brown aware of the status of the case.

Respondent filed an answer generally denying the allegations of misconduct.

13Recommendation of the Hearing Committee

The hearing committee conducted a formal hearing. At the hearing, it received testimony from Mr. Brown and respondent, as well as documentary evidence.

Following a formal hearing, the hearing committee determined the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and Mr. Brown. It determined Mr. Brown was credible when he testified that he reasonably believed respondent was acting as his attorney in light of their numerous telephone discussions and respondent’s representation that he would review the forwarded medical records.

Having found respondent was acting as Mr. Brown’s attorney, the committee concluded respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4 by failing to ascertain the applicable prescriptive period and failing to advise Mr. Brown when the filing period expired. Particularly, the committee stated:

This is precisely the type of advice that clients look to attorneys to provide, and respondent failed to provide this advice even though respondent was aware that the case had already been dismissed once because the matter had not been referred to the Medical Review Panel. In our view, respondent should have determined whether the matter was ever brought before a Medical Review Panel, if so, when the ruling was issued, and how long Complainant had to file suit after the ruling was issued. Moreover, respondent failed to review documents provided by Complainant in a timely fashion, and failed to advise Complainant in a timely fashion concerning the applicable prescriptive period. In addition, if respondent did not wish to represent Complainant for any reason, he had an obligation to advise him of this promptly after receiving the medical records.

As a sanction, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months, fully deferred, subject to completion of the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School program. The ODC filed an objection to the leniency of the proposed recommendation.

14Recommendation of the Disciplinary Board

The disciplinary board concurred in the committee’s findings of fact that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4., noting “[rjespondent failed to grasp the significance of being an attorney and being asked by a layperson to review his claim for malpractice.” It concluded respondent’s actions resulted in irreparable harm to Mr. Brown, by depriving him of his day in court on the malpractice claim.

As a mitigating factor, the board recognized the delay in the disciplinary proceedings, as Mr. Brown waited two years before filing his complaint. As aggravating factors, the board recognized respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and pattern of misconduct during the same time period as the instant misconduct. Considering all these factors, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months and be required to complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School program.

Both respondent and the ODC filed an objection to the board’s findings and recommendation. Accordingly, the matter was docketed for briefing and argument in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. Y, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an | ¡Independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444, 445 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports the factual finding of the hearing committee. While respondent disputes an attorney-client relationship existed between him and Mr. Brown, the hearing committee determined Mr. Brown was credible when he testified he believed respondent was his attorney. It is well-settled that the existence of attorney-client relationship turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it exists. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567 (La.1986). Based on our review of the record, we cannot say the hearing committee was clearly wrong in finding Mr. Brown had a subjective belief respondent was his attorney.

Respondent next contends that even assuming he was Mr. Brown’s attorney, he was not at fault for failing to file the suit timely because Mr. Brown never clearly informed him of the approaching prescription date. This argument is so specious, it scarcely merits discussion. Accepting, for sake of argument, respondent’s assertion that he was never advised by Mr. Brown of the approaching prescription date, it is abundantly clear that this is of no moment. A layperson hires an attorney in order to have the benefit of the attorney’s skills, which includes the attorney’s ability to determine when the claim must be filed. The attorney’s responsibility is to analyze the appropriate information supplied by the client and make an independent ^determination of when the claim must be filed. Respondent’s failure to do so is unquestionably a violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each ease and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s actions resulted in actual injury to Mr. Brown, causing him to lose his right to assert his claims in the underlying litigation. While an isolated instance of such harm might be ordinarily addressed in a legal malpractice action rather than by disciplinary proceeding, respondent’s 1999 admonition by the disciplinary board for strikingly similar conduct gives us cause for concern that respondent fails to grasp his fundamental responsibilities as a lawyer. Under these circumstances, we believe an actual period of suspension is warranted to impress upon respondent that this court will not tolerate disregard by an attorney of the interests of his client. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months, three months of which shall be deferred. Following the active portion of his suspension, respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of one year, subject to the requirement that he successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School program. Any misconduct by respondent during the period of probation shall be grounds for imposition of the deferred portion of the suspension, or additional discipline, as appropriate.

| .DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Darryl Jackson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, three months of which shall be deferred. Following the active portion of his suspension, respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of one year, subject to the requirement that he successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School program. Any misconduct by respondent during the period of probation shall be grounds for imposition of the deferred portion of the suspension, or additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Mr. Brown's telephone records indicate he made calls to respondent on one occasion both on June 11 and June 12, and twice on June 13. He called respondent six times on June 16. Finally, on June 17, the date the delay for filing expired, Mr. Brown attempted to contact respondent on three occasions. According to the telephone records, these calls were each one minute long, indicating Mr. Brown either left a message or was paging respondent.

      . Respondent was admitted to the practice of law for seven years at the time of his misconduct.

      . Respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in May, 1999 based on misconduct which occurred in 1997. In that case, respondent filed suit after the prescriptive period had run. Respondent was ultimately able to obtain a settlement for his client, but failed to inform her that her claim was prescribed. Because this misconduct occurred at approximately the same time as the instant misconduct, the board followed our opinion in In re: Vaughan, 01-1948 (La.10/26/01), 801 So.2d 1058, and declined to consider it as prior discipline.


author: | T JOHNSON, Justice. | TTRAYLOR, Justice,

text:
    Lorraine G. PALMER v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION.
    No. 2002-C-2043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.

      Jeffrey N. Boudreaux, Houma, David K. Nelson, Baton Rouge, Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Armond McCowan & Jarman, for Applicant.
    Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Veronica L. Howard, Baker, for Respondent.
   | T JOHNSON, Justice.

In this wrongful discharge action, plaintiff contests the ruling of the court of appeal, which reversed the trial court’s finding that the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) failed to comply with the applicable law when it dismissed her from employment without reasons supplied by the Superintendent. We granted the plaintiffs writ to determine the correctness of the court of appeal’s decision. Palmer v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education. 2002-2043 (La.11/8/02), 828 So.2d 1123.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lorraine Palmer was employed by the Special School District # l(SSD) as a probationary special education teacher at the Jetson Correctional Center for Youth for the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. Each contract set forth that it was to be effective for that school year only. Ms. Palmer was not new to the teaching profession, but was a “new” teacher with respect to her employment by BESE at Jet-son. Prior to her employment at Jetson, Ms. Palmer had eighteen years of teaching experience. Ms. Palmer did not, however, have tenure as a teacher in the IgSSD.

On June 19, 2000, Mr. Calvin Dees, Principal of Jetson, wrote a letter to Mr. Lester Klotz, the State Director for SSD, recommending that Ms. Palmer’s employment not be renewed for the 2000-2001 school year. Ms, Palmer was subsequently notified by letter dated June 20, 2000, that her employment would not be renewed and that her last day of work for SSD would be June 30, 2000.

Mr. Klotz prepared and submitted an executive summary to the Louisiana Board of Element ary and Secondary Education (BESE), which included a recommendation that Ms. Palmer not be offered a contract for the 2000-2001 school year. The record reflects that there were no “valid reasons” accompanying this recommendation. On June 22, 2000, BESE accepted and approved the executive summary presented by SSD.

On July 25, 2000, Ms. Palmer filed suit against BESE asserting that she was a probationary teacher whom BESE could not dismiss or discharge during the probationary period absent a written recommendation of the head of the special school accompanied by valid reasons pursuant to La. R.S. 17:45. She asserted that BESE attempted to circumvent La. R.S. 17:45 by discharging her under the guise of a “non-renewal” of her contract. Ms. Palmer sought a judgment ordering her reinstatement as a probationary teacher at Jetson, together with back wages and all other emoluments of her position.

BESE answered, urging that it was under no legal mandate to offer Ms. Palmer an employment contract for the 2000-2001 school year. It alleged further that the action at issue was the “non-renewal” of a probationary teacher’s contract, and not a “dismissal” or “discharge” which had to be accompanied by valid | ¡¡reasons.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial judge granted Ms. Palmer’s motion on the issue of liability, finding that she was improperly dismissed. The court, however, left open the question of the type of damages to be awarded to Ms. Palmer, granting the parties time to meet and agree upon stipulated relief. BESE appealed from this ruling.

The court of appeal reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that “the non-renewal of a probationary teacher’s contract after completion of the school term for which she was hired to teach, prior to the expiration of the three-contract-year probationary term, does not fall within the purview of La. R.S. 17:45.” Palmer v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Education, 822 So.2d 90, at 93 (2002). The court of appeal further found that Ms. Palmer’s argument attempts to destroy one of the crucial distinctions between tenured and non-tenured status.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before this court is whether BESE violated La. R.S. 17:45 when it decided not to offer Ms. Palmer a contract for a third year during the probationary period without receiving valid reasons from the school superintendent accompanying the written recommendation not to renew her contract. La. R.S. 17:45 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Each teaeher shall serve a probationary term of three contract years to be computed from the date of his first appointment in the special school in which the teacher is serving his probation. During the probationary term, the board may dismiss or discharge any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation of the superintendent or other head or director of the special school accompanied by valid reasons therefor. Any teacher found unsatisfactory by the board, at the expiration of the probationary term, shall be notified in writing by the board that he has been discharged or dismissed; in the absence of such notification, such probationary teacher shall automatically become a regular and permanent teacher in the employ of the special school where he has | ¿successfully served his three year probationary term; all teachers in the employ of a special school as of September 1, 1979, who hold proper certificates and who have served satisfactorily as teachers in the special school where employed for more than three consecutive years, are declared to be regular and permanent teachers in the employ of the special school. (Emphasis added)

Ms. Palmer interprets this statute to require that a “new” or “probationary” teacher serve a probationary period of three consecutive years. Under this interpretation, the employment continues during the three year probationary period unless and until the employing authority recommends dismissal in writing accompanied by valid reasons. Thus, Ms. Palmer asserts that she was a probationary teacher at the time she was terminated and, therefore, she was entitled to continued employment during the three-year probationary period absent BESE’s compliance with the termination procedures set forth in La. R.S. 17:45.

BESE asserts that it was not the legislature’s intent to give probationary teachers a right to continued employment. Instead the legislature’s use of the words “three contract years” denotes that a probationary teacher shall serve three separate one year probationary contracts. BESE argues that Ms. Palmer’s “probationary term” ran concurrent with each school year. At the end of each contract year, BESE contends that it had the right of “non-renewal” of her contract, which is not the same as “dismissal” or “discharge” under La. R.S. 17:45. Thus, according to BESE, because Ms. Palmer was not discharged during one of the two contract probationary years that she served, La. R.S. 17:45 does not apply and valid reasons are not required. The court of appeal agreed with BESE’s interpretation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the court of appeal’s interpretation of La. R.S. 17:45.

Principles of judicial interpretation of statutes are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. SWAT 21 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 2000-1695 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294 Citing Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766; State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819 (La.1992). The fundamental question in all cases of statutory construction is legislative intent and the reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. Succession of Boyter, 99-0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further inquiry made in search of the legislative intent. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4. However, when a law is susceptible of different meanings, “it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art. 10.

The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws concerning the same subject matter and construing the provision in a manner that is consistent with the express terms of the statute and with the obvious intent of the lawmaker in enacting it. Bond, supra at 302; Boyter, supra at 1129; Stogner, supra at 766. The statute must therefore be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed fair purpose and intention the legislature had in enacting it. Boyter, 756 at 1129. Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute and should not adopt a statutory construction that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Langlois v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 99-2007 (La.5/16/00), 761 So.2d 504, 507; Boyter, 756 at 1129. Furthermore, “the object of the court in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislative intent and, where a literal interpretation would produce absurd consequences, the letter must give way to the spirit of the law and the statute construed so as to produce a reasonable result.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Mach. Co., 94-2065, p. 8 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 1148, 1153 (quoting Smith v. Flournoy, 238 La. 432, 115 So.2d 809, 814 (1959)).

The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198; Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La.1993). The pertinent language of La. R.S. 17:45 at issue reads,

[e]ach teacher shall serve a probationary term of three contract years to be computed from the date of his first appointment. During the probationary term, the board may dismiss or discharge ... upon the written recommendation ... accompanied by valid reasons ... (Emphasis added).

BESE argues that it is only required to adhere to the procedural requirements of providing valid reasons with its recommendation when it dismisses a probationary teacher in the middle of a school year. We find that this interpretation does not conform with the language of the statute. The statute does not provide that the procedural requirements must be met only when a teacher is dismissed “during a contract year.” Instead, it states that the requirements must be met when a teacher is dismissed “during the probationary period,” i.e. “during the period of three contract years.” Thus, we find that any time during the probationary period, even at the conclusion of a “school year,” BESE is required by statute to give valid reasons along with its recommendation of a probationary teacher’s dismissal or discharge. This interpretation is strengthened by the statute’s directive that the three year probationary period is “to be computed from the date of [the teachers’] first appointment” or first contract year, and would not begin anew with the renewal of each contract.

We also reject BESE’s argument that a “non-renewal” of a teacher’s one year contract during the probationary period does not constitute a “dismissal” or discharge “within the meaning of La. R.S. 17:45 and the statute is, therefore, inapplicable in this case. According to BESE, it did not “dismiss” or discharge” |7Ms. Palmer, but simply decided not to renew her teaching contract. La. R.S. 17:45 does not distinguish between terminating a teacher in the middle of the school year and not renewing a teacher’s contract at the end of the school year. Further, our jurisprudence has recognized that a “discharge” or dismissal “as used in La. R.S. 17:45 and La. R.S. 17:442 includes the decision to not renew a probationary teacher’s contract during the probationary term. See Noel v. Andrus, 810 F.2d 1388, 37 Ed. Law Rep. 494 (5th Cir.1987), which, applying Louisiana law, held that a school board’s decision not to renew the employment of a nontenured probationary teacher must be based upon the written recommendation of the parish or city superintendent of schools, as the case may be, accompanied by valid reasons” Id., 810 at 1392. See also McKenzie, supra and Nobles, supra.

Even the Attorney General has rejected the proffered distinction between dismissal and non-renewal offered by BESE. In an Opinion Letter dated October 20, 1939, the Attorney General opined that a “non-renewal” is the equivalent to a discharge under Act 58 of 1936 (now La. R.S. 17:442). The opinion stated:

Under the provisions of Act 58 of 1936, which amended and reenacted Section 48 of Act 100 of 1922, each teacher is required to serve a probationary term of three years; such probationary term to be reckoned from the date of his first appointment in the parish in which the teacher is serving his probation. The act contains the further provision, “during said probationary term the parish school board may dismiss or discharge any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation, accompanied by the valid reasons therefor, of the superintendent of schools of that parish.”
In view of the statement in your letter that the teacher in question was simply not reemployed and was not given reasons for, or |Rnotice of non-reemployment, it would appear the provisions of Act 58 of 1936 were not complied with by the parish school board and, in our opinion, the teacher has not been discharged in accordance with law. (Emphasis added)

Our interpretation of La. R.S. 17:45 conforms with the legislative intent in drafting the statute. The Louisiana Teachers Tenure Law is designed to protect and insulate all teachers from political reprisal. Smith v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 29-873 (La.App. 2 Cir.9/24/97), 702 So.2d 727, writ denied, 97-2721 (La.1/16/98), 706 So.2d 978. The provisions of the Teachers Tenure Law must be liberally construed in favor of teachers, since teachers are its intended beneficiaries. Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 93-1916 (La.2/28/94), 633 So.2d 1235.

In 1979, the legislature enacted La. R.S. 17:45 for the purpose of providing some level of protection to teachers who had not acquired tenure status in the special school system. Non-tenured teachers in the public elementary and secondary school systems already had benefit of this protection by virtue of article 17:442. La. R.S. 17:45 is the parallel provision to La. R.S. 17:442. In fact, La. R.S. 14:43 expressly states:

It is declared to be legislative policy that the special schools ... shall provide all benefits, privileges, rights, and powers as provided for certificated teachers in the public elementary and secondary schools in the interest of statewide uniformity of administration of teacher welfare benefits, including but not limited to the benefits enumerated in this Part.

According to La. R.S. 17:43, the scope and applicability of La. R.S. 17:45 is coextensive with the scope and applicability of La. R.S. 17:442. The tenure statutes governing teachers in special schools, La. R.S. 17:45, et seq. provide the same rights and privileges afforded regular school teachers under R.S. 17:442, et seq. There is no statutory or jurisprudential distinction as to the purpose or intent behind tenure laws affecting special school teachers versus regular school teachers.

13Further, a review of the legislative comments surrounding the enactment of La. R.S. 17:45 (House Bill 317) reveals the legislature’s intent that teachers in special schools are to be given the same benefits, privileges, rights and protection as teachers in other public schools under La. R.S. 17:442. Speaking in support of the Bill was Dr. Bill Baker of the Louisiana Association of Educators. Dr. Baker stated “these teachers should be put in the law just as the elementary and secondary teachers are. These teachers want the same protection as the elementary and secondary teachers.” Representative Forest Dunn stated that “these teachers were protected but with the bill it would be put in the law.”

In State ex rel. Nobles v. Bienville Parish School Board, 198 La. 688, 4 So.2d 649 (1941), we discussed a teacher’s probationary term and the requirements for dismissal during that term under then article 17:442, which applies to public school teachers.

As in the instant case, the plaintiff in Nobles had been hired for two school years, 1938-39 and 1939-40. In each instance, the contract was issued to the plaintiff for that particular school year only. The plaintiff was notified that his employment as principal of the high school would not be renewed. There was no written recommendation for the dismissal of the plaintiff by the Superintendent accompanied by valid reasons therefor to the School Board. The plaintiff filed suit to compel the school board for reinstatement. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering his reinstatement. We affirmed that decision, holding:

The fact that the school board employed the plaintiff by the year or for a period of a year is of no moment. To conclude otherwise would defeat the purpose of the Teachers’ Tenure Act. In other words, it would permit school boards to fix a probationary term in derogation of the expressed provisions in the Act. The Act expressly provides that the probationary term of three years begins from |10the date of the first appointment or employment of the teacher irrespective of whether the contact of employment is for one year or more.
The statute fixes the probationary term at three years beginning from the date of the first appointment of the teacher. There is no provision for the employment of a probationary teacher for a different period of time. This in our opinion clearly shows that the act contemplates that the employment should cover a period of three years. The period of employment being fixed by statute the school board is without authority to change it by contract or otherwise. To hold that school boards could escape the provisions of the act by employing probationary teachers for a shorter period of time would render the provisions of the Act with reference to probationary teachers meaningless and permit the dismissal of probationary teachers without cause in derogation of the provisions of the Act. (Emphasis added)

The rights of probationary teachers under La. R.S. 17:442 were also explained in McKenzie v. Webster Parish School Board, 609 So.2d 1028 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992). There, a probationary teacher’s contract was not renewed. The court explained:

Probationary teachers do not have a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in the renewal of their teaching contracts which entitle them to procedural due process and their discharge does not involve substantive due process. Thus, a teacher who does not enjoy tenure in his position may be discharged by the school board without notice or a hearing so long as valid reasons for his discharge have been expressed in writing by the superintendent. (Emphasis added)

Thus, the McKenzie court recognized that, although a probationary teacher is not entitled to a constitutionally protected interest in the renewal of their contracts, BESE must be provided a recommendation with valid reasons before the decision is made not to renew a probationary teacher’s contract during the probationary term.

Based on the above jurisprudence, we find the law to be clear that under La. R.S. 17:45, the probationary term for special school teachers is three years. The In dismissal of a teacher during the probationary period requires the Superintendent to provide a recommendation with valid reasons to BESE for the teacher’s dismissal. We find no statutory or jurisprudential precedent to the effect that teachers in a special school system should receive less protection than those in other public elementary and secondary schools. As explained above, the very purpose of enacting La. R.S. 17:45 was to extend the rights and privileges recognized in La. R.S. 17:442 to teachers in special schools.

Lastly, we find no merit in BESE’s argument that La. R.S. 17:442 and La. R.S. 17:45 are to be distinguished because 17:442 states that the probationary term is “three years” while 17:45 states that the probationary term is “three contract years.” A review of the legislative history of section 17:45 reveals that the word “contract” was added after discussion of the purpose of the House Bill, and as part of “technical amendments.” There was no indication from the legislative comments that the addition of the word “contract” should have any effect on the substantive meaning or purpose behind the enactment. In any event, we do not find it logical to infer a distinction between the meaning and purpose of La. R.S. 17:442 and La. R.S. 17:45 because of this technical amendment, when the legislative history and jurisprudence dictate that there should be no distinction.

Damages

Because we have concluded that Ms. Palmer was illegally discharged from her employment, our next inquiry is what relief should be granted. Ms. Palmer argues she is entitled to damages in the form of lost salary, plus all emoluments that she would have received had she not been illegally terminated. BESE argues that even if Ms. Palmer was illegally discharged, these damages should not be awarded to Ms. Palmer because the mandate or duty to receive valid reasons is owed to BESE, not to Ms. Palmer. Thus, according to BESE, it should be allowed |12to waive a duty owed to it, without being penalized.

To accept BESE’s argument would give BESE the unfettered right to disregard the mandates of La. R.S. 17:442 and La. R.S. 17:45, as the case may be, without worry of any penalty for their actions. Essentially, BESE would like this Court to declare its violation of the statute as “harmless error.” We decline to do so. The Teacher Tenure Law is not designed to protect BESE, it is designed to protect teachers.

In considering damages for the school board’s violation of La. R.S. 17:442 in the Nobles case, we found that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment reinstating him to his original status as principal of the high school from which he had been discharged. We further found, “to award the plaintiff with the amount of the salary without reinstating him to the status from which he had been illegally dismissed would not give the relief that plaintiff is entitled to.” Nobles at 4-651. Also, in Booker v. Richland Parish School Bd., 393 So.2d 785 (La.App. 2 Cir.1981), the court awarded reinstatment and back pay from the date of the termination together with legal interest from the date of judicial demand until paid after finding that the school board failed to comply with La. R.S. 17:45.

We, therefore, remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Ms. Palmer is entitled to damages, and an award of damages if the trial court determines that damages are due.

DECREE

We hereby reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the decision of the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TRAYLOR and VICTORY, JJ„ dissent.

| TTRAYLOR, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Ms. Palmer was illegally discharged from her employment. Pursuant to La. R.S. 17:4s, each teacher, before being eligible for tenure, must serve a probationary term of three contract years. The successful completion of the probationary term of three years merely earmarks a teacher’s status of tenure. In the instant case, Ms. Palmer successfully completed two of those three probationary contract years. Because she was not dismissed or ^discharged during one of those two contract probationary years that she served, La. R.S. 17:85 does not apply and written reasons are not required. Rather, BESE merely elected not to renew her contract for a third probationary year. The non-renewal of a probationary teacher’s contract after completion of the school term for which she was hired to teach, prior to the expiration of the three year probationary term does not fall within the purview of La. R.S. 17:45.

Any teacher found unsatisfactory by the board, at the expiration of the probationary term, shall be notified in writing by the board that he has been discharged or dismissed; in the absence of such notification, such probationary teacher shall automatically become a regular and permanent teacher in the employ of the special school where he has successfully served his three year probationary term; all teachers in the employ of a special school as of September 1, 1979, who hold proper certificates and who have served satisfactorily as teachers in the special school where employed for more than three consecutive years, are declared to be regular and permanent teachers in the employ of the special school.

Additionally, I would note that the second paragraph of La. R.S. 17:45, which discusses what occurs after the expiration of the probationary term when a teacher is found unsatisfactory, does not require written reasons, only that the teacher be notified in writing that he has been discharged or dismissed. The statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner which is consistent with logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the legislature in passing it. In the instant case, it would only seem consistent and logical that valid reasons would not have to accompany a non-renewal of a subsequent contract year when valid reasons are not required at the expiration of the probationary term. Accordingly, I would affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling, reversing the trial court’s judgment and dismissing the lawsuit.

      . It is undisputed that Ms. Palmer was, at all relevant times, a "teacher” as the term is defined under the Teachers Tenure Law.

      . La. R.S. 17:442 applies to probation and tenure of parish or city school teachers. It provides, in pertinent part:
      Each teacher shall serve a probationary term of three years to be reckoned from the date of his first appointment int he parish or city in which the teacher is serving his probation. During the probationary term the parish or city school board, as the case may be, may dismiss or discharge any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation of the parish or city superintendent of schools, as the case may be, accompanied by valid reasons therefor.

      . At the time of the Nobles decision, the relevant provision was Act 58 of 1936, which is now the current La. R.S. 17:442.

      . La. R.S. 17:45 provides, in pertinent part:
      Each teacher shall serve a probationary term of three contract years to be computed from the date of his first appointment in the special school in which the teacher is serving his probation. During the probationary term, the board may dismiss or discharge any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation of the superintendent or other head or director of the special school accompanied by valid reasons therefor.