author: J^CIACCIO, J.

text:
    Leonard HART v. RIVERSIDE MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2001 CA 2428.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 8, 2002.

      Wayne H. Carlton, New Orleans, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Leonard Hart.
    J. Douglas Sunseri, Bridgette D. Kae-zmarek, Metairie, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Riverside Medical Center.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE and CIACCIO, JJ.

      . The Honorable Philip C. Ciaccio, Judge (retired), Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   J^CIACCIO, J.

Plaintiff Leonard Hart appeals an Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1981, Leonard Hart began working at Riverside Medical Center (“Riverside”) in the housekeeping department. In May 2000, Mr. Hart filed a disputed claim for compensation form with OWC, alleging that prolonged exposure to cleaning solutions during the course and scope of his employment with Riverside caused asthma and chronic eye irritation. He alleged that he first experienced symptoms in 1995 or 1996, but did not seek treatment until 1998.

Riverside moved for summary judgment on the issue of causation and filed an exception raising the objection of prescription. OWC denied Riverside’s summary judgment and deferred the prescription issue until after a full trial on the merits. After trial, OWC found that Mr. Hart failed to show “a causal connection between [his] employment and the occupational disease” and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. OWC denied Riverside’s exception of prescription.

Mr. Hart now appeals, arguing that OWC erred in refusing to find a causal connection between his illness and his employment with Riverside. Riverside answered the appeal, contending that OWC erred in denying its exception raising the objection of prescription.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Mr. Hart has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from an employment-related disease that was contracted during the course and scope of his employment as a result of work performed. The plaintiff must establish a causal link between his illness and his work-related duties by a reasonable probability. A claimant will fail if he shows only a possibility that his employment caused the disease or if the defense shows that bother causes not related to the employment are just as likely to have caused the disease.

A trial court’s finding regarding causation is a factual determination reviewed under the manifest error standard. As an appellate court, we should not disturb a trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of fact upon review. If OWC’s finding was reasonable in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we may not reverse even if convinced that had we been sitting as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently.

The workers’ compensation judge, in his reasons for judgment, considered the medical evidence and testimony before concluding that Hart failed to meet his burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence:

Hart testified he was suspicious the exposure to chemicals at work were involved with his eye problems. However, no medical evidence sufficiently corroborated his allegation ....
Hart further claims exposure to various cleaning fluids used in furtherance of his job with [Riverside] caused him shortness of breath and respiratory/pulmonary problems.... Dr. [Mark] James treated Hart for several years and is significantly familiar with Hart’s history. Dr. James testified that Hart is a smoker of cigarettes. Other evidence illustrates Hart has smoked for many years in varying quantities.
Nevertheless, Dr. James stated that “It is my impression and still is that the chemicals were the primary, if not the main cause, for his pulmonary problems.” However, Dr. James also stated that asthma could have been caused from a number of things including cigarette smoke, dust, chemical exposure, bacterial and viral infection, as well as genetics. Furthermore, Dr. James testified that Hart needs to stop smoking cigarettes and marijuana and straighten out his act and his behavior causing his disease to progress.
Dr. [Steele] Rolston ... testified Hart is genetically an allergic individual and his respiratory issues are caused by a combination of smoking, chemical exposure, molds, pollen, and environmental factors ....
The Defendant sought and obtained the opinion of Dr. William J. Nassetta, a specialist in the field of occupational medicine and internal medicine.... Dr. Nassetta testified that chemically induced exposure usually arises from a single overwhelming event. He went Don to say ... that Hart’s respiratory condition is not caused by chemical aggravation and further that chemicals at his work have not developed his respiratory problems. (Emphasis ours.)

Louisiana law holds that expert testimony is to be weighed the same as any other evidence. In other words, the trial court has the discretion to accept or reject the expert’s opinion in whole or in part. The importance placed on an expert’s testimony is largely dependent upon his qualifications and the facts that form the basis of his opinion.

Dr. Nassetta testified that chemically-induced asthma, known as Reactive Airways Dysfunction (“RADS”), generally results from a “single big blast” of chemicals. The effect is immediate, rather than a gradual result of years of low level exposure. Medical testimony established that several other causes not related to the employment were just as likely to have caused the disease.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we cannot say that OWC was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in concluding that Mr. Hart failed to estabhsh, by a reasonable probability, a causal hnk between his illness and his work-related duties. In fact, Mr. Hart failed because he was able to show only a possibility that his employment caused the disease. This assignment of error is without merit.

Because we find that Mr. Hart failed to prove the causation element, thereby nullifying his claim against Riverside, we need not address the prescription issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons noted above, we hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing Mr. Hart’s suit with prejudice. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Leonard Hart.

AFFIRMED. ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

      . King v. Stranco, Inc., 2000-2003 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/01) 818 So.2d 48, 52.

      . Id.

      . Short v. Plantation Management Corp., 99-0899 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/00), 781 So.2d 46, 55.

      . Id.

      . Shows v. Shoney's, Inc., 98-1254 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/29/99), 738 So.2d 724, 737.

      . Id.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    THOMPSON PACKERS, INC. v. George C. DOWNEY.
    No. 2001 CA 2550.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 8, 2002.

      John A. Keller, Madisonville, Counsel for PlaintiffiAppellant Thompson Packers.
    G. Brice Jones, Slidell, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee George Downey.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE and CIACCIO, JJ.

      . The Honorable Philip C. Ciaccio, Judge (retired), Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   J^CIACCIO, J.

Plaintiff Thompson Packers appeals a judgment rendered by the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”), dismissing its claim against George C. Downey for workers’ compensation fraud in accordance with LSA-R.S. 23:1208.

FACTS

George Downey allegedly injured his right arm and shoulder while in the course and scope of his employment with Thompson Packers. Thompson terminated Mr. Downey’s employment in August 1997, but since that time, Thompson has paid Mr. Downey’s weekly indemnity and medical benefits for the alleged work-related disability. In June 2000, Thompson filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging fraud.

At trial, William Scurich testified that Mr. Downey called him seeking employment installing vinyl siding. Mr. Downey allegedly said that he needed to be paid in cash because he was currently “out on comp.” Mr. Scurich testified that he told Mr. Downey that he could not pay cash and declined to hire him.

And Mr. Scurich testified that on a recent construction project, he saw Mr. Dow-ney finishing sheetrock. But on cross-examination, Mr. Scurich conceded that he was “almost sure” that the man he saw was Mr. Downey. Mr. Downey denied knowing Mr. Scurich or working in any capacity since leaving Thompson.

Before trial, the parties agreed to bifurcate the issues before the court. At a trial specifically to determine whether Mr. Downey committed fraud pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1208, counsel for Mr. Downey moved to dismiss Thompson’s claim of fraud at the close of Thompson’s case-in-chief. In response, OWC granted Mr. Downey’s motion and dismissed Thompson’s suit. Thompson now appeals, arguing that OWC erred in granting Downey’s motion and dismissing its suit for fraud.

JjLAW AND ARGUMENT

In a non-jury case, the appropriate standard for OWC’s determination of a motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence on its case-in-chief to establish its claim by a preponderance of the evidence. OWC need not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as is done when a party moves for a directed verdict in a jury case. A motion for dismissal pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672(B) requires a judge to evaluate the evidence and render a decision based on preponderance of the evidence without any special inferences in favor of the opponent. In other words, on a motion for involuntary dismissal, OWC is only required to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented to that point and grant the dismissal if plaintiff has failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that, taking the evidence as a whole, the fact or cause sought to be proved is “more probable than not.” And as an appellate court, we should not disturb a trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of fact upon review. Our role is to determine whether OWC’s findings were reasonable in light of the record viewed in its entirety. If so, we may not reverse even if convinced that had we been sitting as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently.

In order to prove a claim for fraud under LSA-R.S. 23:1208, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee willfully made a false statement or representation for the purpose of obtaining any benefit payment. Mr. Downey collected workers’ compensation benefits based on his contention that he was injured during the course and scope of his employment with Thompson and is now disabled. At trial, Mr. Scurieh testified for Thompson |4that Mr. Downey called him seeking employment and that he saw Mr. Downey on another job, all while allegedly disabled and collecting compensation benefits from Thompson. On cross-examination, Mr. Downey’s counsel questioned Mr. Seurich’s memory, his credibility and his sister-in-law’s relationship with Mr. Downey. In his deposition, Mr. Downey denied knowing Mr. Scurich and denied either seeking or engaging in any other employment while disabled. Faced with two conflicting views of the evidence, we cannot say that the fact-finder’s choice between them was clearly wrong. If the trial court did not accept Mr. Scurich’s testimony as reliable and credible, Thompson did not prove that Mr. Downey “more probably than not” made a fraudulent workers’ compensation claim. This assignment of error has no merit.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the OWC judgment dismissing Thompson’s suit is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Thompson Packers.

AFFIRMED.

      . See Ross v. Premier Imports, 96-2577 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/97), 704 So.2d 17, 20, writ denied, 97-3035 (La.2/13/98), 709 So.2d 750.

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Id.

      . Stobart v. State, through Dept. of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882-883 (La.1993).


author: FITZSIMMONS, J.

text:
    Everette BERCEGEAY v. COASTAL PRODUCTION SERVICES.
    No. 2001 CA 2318.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 8, 2002.
    Marvin Gros, Donaldsonville, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Everette Berce-geay.
    Henry H. Lebas, Jenny M. Matte, Lafayette, Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Coastal Production Services.
    Before: FITZSIMMONS, GUIDRY and PETTIGREW, JJ.
   FITZSIMMONS, J.

In this workers’ compensation case, the plaintiff, Everette Bercegeay, alleged that he was injured in a work accident. He sued his employer, Coastal Production Services (Coastal), for benefits. The workers’ compensation judge made a credibility determination based on the testimony of two witnesses who were present at the scene of the alleged accident, but did not work for Coastal. Both witnesses denied that an accident occurred, and disputed Mr. Becegeay’s account of the alleged accident. Based on her credibility determinations, and various significant contradictions throughout the medical record, the workers’ compensation judge found that Mr. Bercegeay did not meet his burden to prove that an accident occurred at work. The claim was dismissed. Mr. Bercegeay appealed.

A workers’ compensation claimant seeking benefits must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an employment accident occurred and that it had a causal relationship to the disability. If the evidence leaves the probabilities evenly balanced, the claimant fails in his burden. Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc., 97-2945, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 719 So.2d 1130, 1131. On appeal, we review the record in its entirety to determine whether the workers’ compensation judge’s factual findings were clearly wrong. Only upon a finding of manifest or clear error will the judge’s findings be disturbed. Sanders v. Grace Nursing Home, 98-1344, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1024, 1026, writ denied, 99-3090 (La.1/7/00), 752 So.2d 868; Harvey v. Bogalusa Concrete, Inc., 97-2945 at p. 3, 719 So.2d at 1132.

After a thorough review of the record, we see no manifest or clear error in the findings of the workers’ compensation judge, or legal error in the judgment of ^dismissal. Mr. Bercegeay failed to meet his burden of proof on whether he sustained an employment accident. Therefore, we affirm. The costs of the appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Mr. Bercegeay.

AFFIRMED.

      . Coastal answered the appeal. However, the issues raised by Coastal are mooted by this court’s affirmance of the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim.


author: J^PETTIGREW, J.

text:
    Hawatha MITCHELL, Zachary Mitchell, and Rosalind Smith, as Parent of Starshema Mitchell v. Russell BASS, Nobel Insurance Company and Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana.
    No. 2001 CA 2217.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 8, 2002.

      Robert Carter, Greensburg, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Hawatha Mitchell, Zachary Mitchell, and Rosalind Smith.
    Steven M. Spiegel, Metairie, for Defendant-Appellant Russell Bass.
    Colette Ranatza, Metairie, for Defendant-Appellee Nobel Insurance Company.
    Keith Borne, Lafayette, for Defendant-Appellee Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana.
    Before: FITZSIMMONS, GUIDRY, and PETTIGREW, JJ.
   J^PETTIGREW, J.

In this case, the trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of cross-claimant, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, and against cross-defendant, Russell Bass, in the amount of $17,500.00. Mr. Bass appeals, alleging the default judgment should be declared a nullity because no proof of service exists. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs, Hawatha Mitchell, Zachary Mitchell, and Rosalind Smith, as parent of Starshema Mitchell, were involved in an automobile accident on September 11, 1999, in Tangipahoa Parish. Alleging that they sustained injuries in the accident, plaintiffs filed suit naming as defendants Mr. Bass, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident; his Lability insurer, Nobel Insurance Company (“Nobel”); and the UM insurer of the vehicle in which they were traveling at the time of the accident, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana (“Safeway”). In response to the plaintiffs’ petition, Nobel and Safeway filed answers generally denying all of plaintiffs’ allegations. Moreover, Safeway filed a cross claim against Mr. Bass, requesting judgment against him for all sums paid to plaintiffs under the uninsured motorist provisions of the Safeway policy.

On April 16, 2001, Safeway filed ,a motion and order for preliminary default alleging that domiciliary service had been made on Mr. Bass on December 29, 2000, and that no responsive pleadings or answers had been filed on his behalf. A preliminary default against Mr. Bass was subsequently entered by the trial court on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 1702(B)(2), Safeway submitted evidence by way of affidavit testimony seeking confirmation of the default. The default was confirmed on May 24, 2001, at which time the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Safeway and against Mr. Bass in the amount of $17,500.00, together with legal interest from the date of judicial demand.

It is from this judgment that Mr. Bass has appealed, assigning the following specification of error:

|3The trial court erred when it rendered a judgment by default against Russell Bass without adequate proof of service showing that Russell Bass received service of the citation and Cross-Claim filed by Safeway Insurance Company.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Bass argues that the May 24, 2001 default judgment must be declared null because there is no evidence in the record of service of process. He maintains that without proof of service, all subsequent proceedings are an absolute nullity. Based on our review of the record, we agree with Mr. Bass.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1701(A) provides that a judgment of default or preliminary default may be entered if the defendant in the principal or incidental demand fails to answer within the time prescribed by law. Pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 1001, a defendant shall file his answer within fifteen days after service of citation upon him. If no answer is filed timely, a judgment of default may be confirmed two days, exclusive of holidays, after entering of the judgment of default, by proof that establishes a pri-ma facie case. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1702(A).

It is well settled that a default judgment may not be taken against a person who has not received citation and service thereof. Clay v. Clay, 389 So.2d 31, 35-36 (La.1979). See also Spinks v. Caddo-Bossier Services, Inc., 270 So.2d 604, 607 (La.App. 2 Cir.1972). In order for a default judgment to be valid, the court must have jurisdiction over the parties. Ansalve v. Tucker, 617 So.2d 116, 118 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993). Jurisdiction over the person must be based upon service of process on the defendant. La.Code Civ. P. art. 6. Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and executo-ry proceedings. Without them all proceedings are absolutely null. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1201.

We have carefully examined the record and fail to find evidence of service of process on Mr. Bass. Although Safeway contends in its motion for preliminary default that domiciliary service was made on Mr. Bass on December 29, 2000, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to confirm this assertion. In fact, Mr. Bass alleges on appeal that he was incarcerated at the time that service was allegedly made. As previously indicated, |4Safeway submitted its evidence by way of affidavit seeking confirmation of the preliminary default. Thus, there was apparently no confirmation hearing before the trial court. This finding is buttressed by the fact that there is no transcript of any court proceedings in the record, nor is there a minute entry indicative of same. Moreover, the exhibits attached to Safeway^ affidavit do not contain any evidence regarding the alleged December 29, 2000 domiciliary service on Mr. Bass.

Based on these findings, it is clear that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bass when the preliminary default was entered on April 18, 2001, and subsequently when the final default judgment was rendered on May 24, 2001. The effect of a judgment rendered under these conditions was addressed by this court in Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Patterson, 589 So.2d 9, 10 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), wherein we stated, “A final default judgment obtained without a valid preliminary default is an absolute nullity.” Because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bass at all pertinent times herein, there was no valid preliminary default in the instant case. Accordingly, the final default judgment of May 24, 2001, is an absolute nullity and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the final default judgment rendered by the trial court on May 24, 2001, is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against defendant-appellee, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


author: | ^PETTIGREW, J.

text:
    RIVER CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK (The CADLE COMPANY) v. VIDEO ASSOCIATES, INC., Robert F. Killingsworth, Jr., John H. Skaggs and Wayne M. Bettoney.
    No. 2001 CA 2453.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 8, 2002.
    Mark C. Landry, Metairie, for Plaintiff-Appellee the Cadle Co.
    Clayton S. Knight, Franklinton, for Defendant-Appellant Wayne M. Bettoney.
    Before: FITZSIMMONS, GUIDRY, and PETTIGREW, JJ.
   | ^PETTIGREW, J.

In this case, defendant challenges the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and dismiss plaintiffs claim as against defendant, for failure to state a cause of action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 25, 1988, River City Federal Savings Bank (“River City”) filed a “Petition On Note And For Recognition Of Mortgage And Assignment Of Accounts Receivable” against Video Associates, Inc., Robert F. Killingsworth, Jr., John H. Skaggs, and Wayne M. Bettoney, seeking judgment in the amount of $740,000.00 plus interest, attorney fees, and costs, representing the balance owed on a promissory note executed by the parties on December 17, 1987. The record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the defendants were ever served with this original petition. In fact, the citations remain in the record with no returns made by the sheriffs office. River City filed an amending and supplemental petition on November 2, 1988, and included the following notation regarding service: “PLEASE SERVE THE DEFENDANTS WITH COPY OF ORIGINAL AND AMENDING PETITION.” However, there is handwriting next to this service request that instructs that the defendants only be served with the amended petition. It is unknown who placed this writing on the pleading.

The clerk issued a supplemental and amending citation and all defendants were personally served with the amending and supplemental petition on November 14, 1988. Apparently, a question subsequently arose as to whether the defendants ever received service of the original petition. In a March 31, 1989 letter addressed to Deputy Knight, the sheriffs deputy who had effected service of the amending petition, counsel for River City asked that the returns be amended to reflect service of the original petition as well as the supplemental and amending petition. In a handwritten note at the bottom of the letter, Deputy Knight indicates as follows: “orig Pet & cit not served atty notified 4-6-89.”

Notwithstanding these problems with service, a preliminary default was entered against all defendants on April 5,1989, and a default judgment was subsequently ^confirmed in favor of River City on June 2, 1989. Thereafter, on October 9, 1992, Wayne M. Bettoney filed a motion for nullity of judgment, alleging that the June 2, 1989 judgment was obtained by fraud or ill practices and that he was never served with the original petition. A hearing was scheduled for December 4, 1992; however, there is no minute entry in the record for this date. On October 19,1992, Mr. Betto-ney filed a “Motion For Dismissal” in which he moved for dismissal, with prejudice, of “this matter.” There is a handwritten note at the bottom of the motion that reads “writ involved.” Said dismissal was signed by the trial court on November 2, 1992. While the parties intimate in brief to this court that this dismissal related to Mr. Bettoney’s motion for nullity, we are unable to discern from the record exactly what was dismissed via this motion.

On May 28, 1999, The Cadle Company (“Cadle”) filed a petition to revive the June 2, 1989 judgment. Cadle alleged that it was the owner of said judgment by virtue of the following transactions:

a. On October 5, 1989, the Office of Thrift Supervision, appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation as receiver for River City Federal Savings Bank. As a result, all of the assets of River City Federal Savings Bank were transferred unto the receiver, including but not limited to the judgment sued upon herein.
b. Resolution Trust Corporation as receiver of River City Federal Savings Bank did transfer the said judgment to Premier Financial Serviees-Texas, L.P.
c. Premier Financial Serviees-Texas, L.P. did transfer the said judgment to The Cadle Company, all as evidenced by a bill of sale dated October 5, 1998.

In response to this petition, Mr. Bettoney filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. Mr. Betto-ney alleged that the June 2,1989 judgment was an absolute nullity because he “was not served with the pleadings setting forth the basis for any judgment” and that Ca-die had no right of action to proceed against him. On October 12, 1999, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of Cadle overruling the no right of action exception.

Thereafter, on July 17, 2000, Cadle filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law reviving the June 2, 1989 judgment against Mr. Bettoney. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Cadle submitted l4various documents concerning the assignment and sale of the judgment in question and the affidavit of its account officer, Reva Held. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bettoney filed an opposition wherein he alleged that Cadle “did not have a right to proceed against [him] ... as it had not acquired any right or title to the judgment and further, even if any right had been acquired, the right had prescribed on its face on the date of acquisition.” After hearing from the parties, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cadle and rendered judgment on July 10, 2001, reviving the June 2, 1989 judgment. It is from this judgment that Mr. Bettoney has appealed, assigning the following specifications of error:

1. The Trial Court erred in denying and dismissing defendant’s Exception of No Right of Action.
2. The Trial Court erred in granting warranty rights to transfer documents, changing the stated dates on the documents, and further, in granting a Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff despite the lack of title. The court erred in finding plaintiff did have ownership or right to the judgment at the time of bringing the suit all despite the fact that the matter had prescribed at the time of the filing of the motion granting summary judgment.
3.The Trial Judge erred by changing a date on a document. The date the judge changed appears in three separate places in the document. The date change moves the document date to before the prescriptive date. No evidence or law cited by the Trial Judge in the Reasons for Judgment which support the assertion of “obvious error” or justify a change in the date of the document.

Moreover, in addition to the instant appeal, Mr. Bettoney has also filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and prescription for our consideration.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we note that failure to disclose a cause of action may be noticed by an appellate court on its own motion. La.Code Civ. P. art. 927; Capital City Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 97-0098, p. 5 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 709 So.2d 248, 251. The function of an exception raising the objection of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1235 (La.1993). The question, therefore, is ^whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Home Distribution, Inc. v. Dollar Amusement, Inc., 98-1692, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1057, 1060.

As set forth in La.Code Civ. P. art.2002, a final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered against “a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction.” Moreover, La.Code Civ. P. art. 1201 mandates that absent an express waiver, citation and service are essential in all civil actions; without them all proceedings are absolutely null. Personal jurisdiction is defined, in pertinent part, in La. Code Civ. P. art. 6 as follows: “Jurisdiction over the person is the legal power and authority of a court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding. The exercise of this jurisdiction requires: (1) The service of process on the defendant, or on his agent for the service of process, or the express waiver of citation and service under Article 1201.” This court recently addressed the importance of personal jurisdiction, a tenet that we guard very closely.

The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.

Sanders v. Sanders, 2000-2899, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02), 812 So.2d 749, 752, writ denied, 2002-1145 (La.6/14/02), 818 So.2d 780 (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)).

It is evident from a review of the instant record that although Mr. Bettoney received personal service of the supplemental and amending petition on November 14, 1988, he never received service and citation with regard to the original October 25, 1988 petition. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Mr. Bettoney ever waived citation and service; nor did he file an answer to the petition. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed River City to proceed with confirmation of a default judgment, resulting in the June 2, 1989 judgment that is now at issue before this court. Because this [¿judgment was clearly obtained without proper service of process, the trial court rendering said judgment had no personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bettoney, thereby resulting in a judgment that is an absolute nullity. See Sam v. Feast, 2000-1163, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/01), 802 So.2d 680, 683. Accordingly, Cadle’s subsequent petition to revive the judgment fails to state a valid cause of action against Mr. Bettoney. Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cadle and this judgment must be reversed. Moreover, Ca-dle’s petition is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, as it relates to Mr. Bettoney. All other issues raised in the instant appeal are pretermitted.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the June 2, 1989 judgment is declared to be an absolute nullity as to Mr. Bettoney. The judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Cadle is reversed. Further, judgment is rendered in favor of Mr. Bettoney, dismissing Ca-dle’s suit against him for failure to state a cause of action. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against Cadle.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FITZSIMMONS, J, concurs in the result.