author: | KIMBALL, Justice.

text:
    Paul BURGUIERES, et al. v. Dr. O’Neill POLLINGUE, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied April 25, 2003.
    Roger J. Larue, Jr., Michael J. Moran, Metairie, for Applicant.
    Steven J. Koehler, Metairie, for Respondent.
   | KIMBALL, Justice.

This case involves a judgment of the court of appeal reversing the trial court’s denial of defendants’ exception of res judi-cata. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the judgment of the court of appeal is correct insofar as it granted the exception of res judicata as to those claims arising out defendant’s actions as executrix of her brother’s succession. The court of appeal erred, however, in maintaining the exception as to those claims that arise not out of one of the defendant’s capacity as executrix but out of an alleged breach of defendants’ fiduciary duties that occurred prior to decedent’s death. Because we find there is no identity of parties as to these claims and because the cause or causes of action unrelated to defendant’s duties as executrix asserted in the second suit did not exist at the time of final judgment in the first litigation, we conclude application of the principles of res judicata is inappropriate.

Facts and Procedural Histoiy

William Burguieres, Sr. (hereinafter referred to as “William, Sr.”) died on October 18, 1995, leaving an olographic testament. The testament was probated |?in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson and Barat B. Pollingue, the surviving sister of William, Sr., was named as executrix. After the will was probated, the decedent’s children, Paul Burguieres, William Burguieres, Jr., and Dion Burguieres, filed a Petition to Nullify Olographic Will and Petition to Disqualify Executrix and Attorney for Succession and Petition to Appoint Paul Bur-guieres as Administrator of Succession. In this petition, the decedent’s children sought to annul the testament based on William, Sr.’s lack of testamentary capacity or, alternatively, for fraud, duress and/or undue influence perpetrated by Mrs. Pollingue and persons acting in concert with her. By judgment dated June 28, 1999, the trial court annulled the testament, disqualified Mrs. Pollingue as executrix, and appointed Paul Burguieres as administrator for the succession. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s conclusion that William, Sr. lacked the capacity to execute a valid testament. Succession of Burguieres, 00-147 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/18/00), 802 So.2d 660. Because of its conclusion regarding William, Sr.’s lack of testamentary capacity, the court of appeal found it unnecessary to address the trial court’s ruling regarding the exertion of undue influence over William, Sr. Id. at p. 10-11, 802 So.2d at 667. The court found that because William, Sr. did not have the mental capacity to execute any valid testament, any attempts to improperly influence him were misdirected in that he could not comply with whatever suggestions were made to him. Id. at p. 11, 802 So.2d at 667.

On August 10, 2001, after the Jefferson Parish proceedings became final, decedent’s children, Paul Burguieres, William Burguieres, Jr., and Dian Burguieres, J^filed the instant suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against Mrs. Pollingue and her husband, Dr. O’Neill Pollingue. In their Petition for Damages and Attorneys Fees, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were liable to them for breach of their fiduciary responsibilities as trustee and curatrix and un-dercurator. Plaintiffs sought damages, attorney fees, and costs for the efforts they expended to have the testament declared null.

In response, defendants filed several exceptions, including an exception of res ju-dicata. In their exception of res judicata, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ second lawsuit clearly arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the earlier Jefferson Parish lawsuit. Thus, defendants contended, the second suit is barred by Louisiana’s res judicata law, which is contained in La. R.S. 13:4231.

The trial court denied defendants’ exception of res judicata. The court found that the first suit sought to annul the testament based on the premise that decedent was incapacitated, •while the present suit seeks damages for breach of fiduciary duty and attorney fees based on defendants’ failure to fulfill their obligations. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the facts giving rise to the present suit created a separate and distinct cause of action and denied the exception of res judicata.

The court of appeal granted defendants’ application for supervisory writs and reversed the trial court’s judgment denying defendants’ exception of res judicata. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-0232 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/6/02), unpub’d decision. The 14court of appeal reviewed the requirements of the res judicata statute, La. R.S. 13:4231, and concluded that a second action is barred if it arises out of the same occurrence as the prior action. The court found that the allegations of the present suit are clearly connected to and arise out of the succession proceedings brought in Jefferson Parish. The court of appeal concluded that the present actions should have been brought at the same time the succession proceedings were being litigated. Thus, the court of appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court denying defendants’ exception of res judicata.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a request for rehearing, asking that the court of appeal clarify its decision. The court of appeal denied rehearing. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-0232 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/16/02), unpub’d decision.

This court granted certiorari to review the correctness of the judgment of the court of appeal. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385 (La.10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1163.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs contend the court of appeal’s judgment is ambiguous in that it granted defendants’ exception of res judicata, but did not dismiss the case. Plaintiffs submit they cannot ascertain whether it was the court of appeal’s intent to dismiss their entire lawsuit or only those claims related to Mrs. Pollingue’s actions as executrix of the succession. Although plaintiffs requested clarification of the court of appeal’s judgment on rehearing, their request was denied. The portion of the court of appeal’s opinion about which plaintiffs complain states:

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs seek damages and attorney fees for their efforts expended in having their father’s will declared null and void. The plaintiffs assert claims concerning the defendants’ actions in the handling of their father’s estate before and after his death. The defendants specifically allege that Barat Pollingue violated her fiduciary duty as executrix of the decedent’s estate. These actions are clearly connected to and arise out of the | ^succession proceedings brought in the 24th JDC. These actions should have been brought at the same time the succession proceedings were being litigated. The present res judicata statute bars the pursuit of the present action filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The trial court erred when it denied the defendants’ exception of res judicata.
Accordingly, the defendants’ writ application is denied in part and granted in part. The trial court’s ruling on the exception of prescription is affirmed. However, the trial court’s ruling on the exception of res judicata is reversed and the defendants’ exception of res judicata is maintained.

While plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the court of appeal did not explicitly dismiss their suit, we read the court of appeal’s opinion to mandate a dismissal of their suit in its entirety. The court of appeal’s opinion clearly holds that the instant lawsuit is barred by operation of La. R.S. 13:4231, the res judicata statute. We therefore construe the judgment under review as one granting defendants’ exception of res judicata, thereby dismissing plaintiffs’ suit in its entirety.

In anticipation of the fact that this court might interpret the court of appeal’s judgment in this way, plaintiffs contend the court of appeal erred in concluding the current res judicata statute, La. R.S. 13:4231, mandates cumulation of a damage claim for pre-death breach of various fiduciary obligations with an action to annul a testament brought in a succession proceeding against a succession representative. Plaintiffs further assert that the issue of whether Mrs. Pollingue and her husband committed fraud in their capacities as trustee, curator and undercurator was neither necessary nor relevant in the nullity contest. In response, defendants argue that the court of appeal correctly determined that the instant suit is barred by res judicata as it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the prior litigation.

As amended by Act No. 521 of 1990, effective January 1, 1991, Louisiana’s | fires judicata statute, La. R.S. 13:4231, provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

The 1990 amendment to La. R.S. 13:4231 made a substantial change in the law. See La. R.S. 13:4231 cmt. a (1990). In order to appreciate the change in the law and to correctly apply the statute to the case at bar, we must begin our analysis by reviewing the history of res judicata in Louisiana.

Historically, the Louisiana doctrine of res judicata was civilian in origin. Prior to its amendment in 1990, Louisiana’s res judicata legislation was derived directly from Article 1351 of the Code Napoleon. Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So.2d 399 (1965) (quoting State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902)); Albert Tate, Jr., The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term — Procedure: Civil Procedure, 29 La. L.Rev. 269, 281 (1969). The source of Article 1351in the Code Napoleon was Pothier, Obligations, No. 889, with Pothier’s work being synthesized from the Roman jurisconsults. Quinette, 247 La. at 1135-36, 176 So.2d at 404-05; Tate, 29 La. L.Rev. at 282 n. 64.

The civilian concept of res judica-ta is based upon a presumption of correctness. Avenue Plaza, L.L.C. v. Falgoust, 96-0173, p. 6 (La.7/2/96), 676 So.2d 1077, 1080; Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-0654, p. 12 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624, 632; Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154, 156 (La.1978); Peter Wilbert Arbour, Comment, The Louisiana Concept of Res Judicata, 34 La. L.Rev. 763, 764 (1974). Under this concept, the prior legislation established that a decided case precluded a second suit only if the second suit involved the same parties, the same cause, and the same object of demand as the prior suit. Avenue Plaza at p. 6, 676 So.2d at 1080; Terrebonne Fuel at p. 12, 666 So.2d at 632. In contrast to the civil law, the common law doctrine of res judicata is based on a concept of extinguishment of the cause of action. Terrebonne Fuel at p. 12, 666 So.2d at 631; Arbour, 34 La. L.Rev. at 764 (1974). Under the federal res judicata law, a judgment bars a subsequent suit if both cases involve the same parties, the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits, and the same cause of action is at issue in both cases. Terrebonne Fuel at 633. Thus, as a result of our civilian heritage, Louisiana’s res judicata law, at least prior to the 1990 amendment, was much narrower in scope than its common law counterpart. Terrebonne Fuel at p. 11-12, 666 So.2d at 631; Welch at 156.

Most of the controversy and confusion in Louisiana surrounding res judicata prior to the 1990 amendment concerned whether there was an “identity of cause.” With the 1990 amendment to the res judicata statute, however, the chief inquiry is whether the second action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Avenue Plaza at p. 6, 676 So.2d at 1080. See also La. R.S. 13:4231 cmt. a (1990). While this is the central inquiry under the current statute, it is not the only inquiry. A reading of La. R.S. 13:4231 reveals that a second action is precluded when all of the following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.

There is no dispute in the instant case that the first two requirements of the statute, the existence of a valid and final judgment, are met. For purposes of res judicata, a valid judgment is one rendered by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties after proper notice was given. La. R.S. 13:4231 cmt. d (1990). Likewise, for purposes of La. R.S. 13:4231, a final judgment is one that disposes of the merits in whole or in part. Id. It is undisputed that the judgment in the first litigation was both valid and final, and we therefore find the first two requirements of La. R.S. 13:4231 are satisfied.

The third requirement of res judi-cata is that the parties in both suits are the same. Both the civilian law and the common law mandate that there must be “identity of parties” before the doctrine of res judicata can be used to preclude a subsequent suit. This requirement does not mean that the parties must have the same physical identity, but that the parties must appear in the same capacities in both suits.

In Louisiana prior to the 1990 amendment, it was clearly understood that res judicata applied only when both parties appeared before the court in the same |9capacity. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129, 141 (La.1974); Arbour, 34 La. L.Rev. at 767; Tate, 29 La. L.Rev. at 279. This requirement was consistent with Planiol’s explanation of Article 1351 of the Code Napoleon:

Is it necessary now to enter into the long explanations which are traditional here, in order to observe that the identity of the parties in the second ease, which is necessary in order that the exception of res judicata may be used, does not mean the material identity of persons, but identity of capacity or quality? Thus a tutor, after having lost a case brought in the name of his ward, may recommence it in his own name, without being subject to the defense of res judicata because he is not acting in the same capacity; it is not the same person who is pleading (Cass., 28 Aug. 1849, D.50.1.57).

2 Planiol, TRMté ÉlémentaiRE de DROit Civil, No. 54A(4), 36 n. 30 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 11th ed.1939).

Similarly, federal courts have recognized that res judicata does not apply when the parties appear in different capacities. Akin v. PAFEC, Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.1993); Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1990); Clark v. Amoco Production Co., 794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir.1986); In re: Sovereign Partners, 179 B.R. 656 (D.Nev.1995). See also 18 James Wm. MooRE et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 131.40[2][a] (3d ed. 2002) (“A person appearing in different legal capacities may bring or defend multiple actions involving the same transaction or occurrence without being bound by or entitled to the benefits of the claim preclusion doctrine.”). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states:

A party appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982). This principle is imposed to “safeguard the integrity of ... representative functions.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36 cmt. a (1982).

| inThus, in both the common law and the civil law, in order for a second suit to be barred by the doctrine of res judica-ta, the parties must appear in the same capacities in both suits. Although not explicitly stated in the amended statute, we find the requirement in La. R.S. 13:4231 that the parties be the same in order for a second suit to be precluded by operation of res judicata retains this “identity of capacity” component. That is, under La. R.S. 13:4231 the parties are the same when they appear in the same capacities in both suits. We reach this conclusion based on the language of La. R.S. 13:4231, the history of this requirement in the law of res judicata, and the application of the doctrine in both the civil law and common law systems.

Furthermore, when La. R.S. 13:4231 is read in para materia with other related laws, the determination that the requirement of identity of parties encompasses an identity of capacities becomes obvious. The same Act that amended La. R.S. 13:4231 in 1990 also amended La. C.C.P. art. 531 to provide:

When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the same capacities, the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided in Article 925. When the defendant does not so except, the plaintiff may continue the prosecution of any of the suits, but the first final judgment rendered shall be conclusive of all.

(Emphasis added.) The 1990 comment to this provision states the amendment was made to “conform to the changes made in the defense of res judicata.” Similarly, La. C.C.P. art. 532 was amended at the same time to provide:

When a suit is brought in a Louisiana court while another is pending in a court of another state or of the United States on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the same capacities, on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, the court may stay all proceedings in the second suit until the first has been discontinued or final judgment has been rendered.

ln(Emphasis added.) Again, the 1990 comment to this provision notes that this article was amended to conform to the new res judicata law. Thus, we find that in order for a second suit to be precluded pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4231, the parties must appear in both suits in the same capacities.

The first litigation at issue involved an action to annul a probated testament brought in the succession. In this proceeding, Mrs. Pollingue appeared in her capacity as executrix of the succession of William, Sr. Dr. Pollingue was not a party to the first suit. The second suit instituted by plaintiffs against Mrs. Pollingue and her husband alleges liability for breach of fiduciary duties occurring prior to William Sr.’s death as well as liability for certain acts committed as executrix. However, during oral arguments before this court, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that any claims against Mrs. Pollingue in her capacity as executrix should have been brought in the first proceeding. In light of this prudent concession, we will construe the second suit as concerning only those allegedly tor-tious actions committed while Mrs. Pol-lingue was acting as William Sr.’s trustee and curator and Dr. Pollingue acted as his undercurator.

Because the second suit concerns Mrs. Pollingue’s actions prior to William Sr.’s death, it follows that the second suit does not implicate her in her capacity as executrix of his succession. We recognize this distinction is somewhat blurred because of the unique facts of this case in which Mrs. Pollingue occupied several representative and fiduciary positions over many years for her brother. These functions often appear to have overlapped, which plaintiffs’ counsel recognized when |1?,he conceded that he should have brought all claims against Mrs. Pollingue arising out of her capacity as executrix in the first litigation. Nevertheless, we find that Mrs. Pollingue does not appear in the second suit in the same capacity in which she appeared in the first. Because of this difference in capacities, there is a lack of identity of the parties between the two suits. Therefore, we find the court of appeal was incorrect in granting Mrs. Pol-lingue’s exception of res judicata as to those claims that do not arise out of her capacity as executrix. However, as plaintiffs themselves concede, the court of appeal was correct insofar as it granted Mrs. Pollingue’s exception of res judicata as to those claims arising out of her capacity as executrix.

Similarly, Dr. Pollingue was neither a party to the first action, nor was he a privy to Mrs. Pollingue in her capacity as executrix. There is therefore a lack of identity of parties as to Dr. Pollingue as well. Accordingly, we find the court of appeal erred in granting Dr. Pollingue’s exception of res judicata.

While the lack of the same parties present in the same capacities is fatal to defendants’ exception of res judicata, we find that the court of appeal was incorrect in sustaining the exception of res ju-dicata as to those claims not involving Mrs. Pollingue’s capacity as executrix on an additional ground. For res judicata to apply, the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit must have existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation. In the instant case, plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants breached their fiduciary duties while acting as trustee, curatrix and undercurator all arise out of the writing of William, Sr.’s testament. While it is true that any cause of action related to Mrs. Pollingue’s duties as executrix of the succession were clearly in existence at the time of the finality of the first judgment, plaintiffs’ claims against the Pollingues for breach of their fiduciary duties while they acted as trustee, curator, and undercurator did not arise until the will was declared | ianull and the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court’s judgment of nullity became final. In the context of the facts of this particular case, it was necessary that the will contest be decided before any cause of action for breach of defendants’ fiduciary duties as trustee, curator, and undercurator arose in favor of plaintiffs. Thus, the court of appeal erred in sustaining the exception of res judicata as to those claims not involving Mrs. Pollingue’s actions as executrix of the succession.

Decree

For the above reasons, we find the judgment of the court of appeal is correct insofar as it granted Mrs. Pollingue’s exception of res judicata as to those claims arising out of her capacity as executrix. We further find the court of appeal erred in granting the Pollingues’ exception of res judicata as to those claims that do not arise out of Mrs. Pollingue’s capacity as executrix. The judgment of the court of appeal is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This opinion should not be read to express any opinion whatsoever as to the merits of plaintiffs’ second suit discussed herein or as to the propriety of damages sought in that suit.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

      . The record indicates that William, Sr. was severely injured, both mentally and physically, in a 1965 automobile accident. Following the accident, the parents of William, Sr. established a trust for the benefit of William, Sr. and named Mrs. Pollingue as a trustee. Subsequently, William, Sr. was interdicted, and Mrs. Pollingue and her husband were appointed curatrix and undercurator, respectively.

      . Defendants also filed exceptions of prescription and lis pendens, which were denied by the trial court. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying defendants' exception of prescription. Defendants did not seek review of the judgment relative to prescription and, therefore, the exception of prescription is not before this court. Likewise, the denial of the exception of lis pendens is not before this court as it was not discussed by the court of appeal and was not raised by the parties in this court.

      . Identity of parties can also be satisfied when a privy of one of the parties is involved. Welch, 359 So.2d at 156; Arbour, 34 La. L.Rev. at 767. The concept of privity, however, is not implicated in the instant case and we need not address it at this time.

      . In the first litigation, the trial court did conclude that Dr. and Mrs. Pollingue exercised undue influence over William, Sr. when the olographic testament was executed. However, in a judgment that is now final, the court of appeal determined it was unnecessary to reach this conclusion in light of the fact that William, Sr. lacked the mental capacity to execute any valid will.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re M. Daniel LAGRONE, Jr.
    No. 2002-B-2974.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied May 9, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, M. Daniel LaGrone, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In the spring of 1994, James and Melanie Hutchinson incurred significant medical expenses resulting from complications of Mrs. Hutchinson’s pregnancy and the subsequent premature birth of the couple’s son, Kyle. Seeking relief from these and other debts, Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson retained respondent to institute bankruptcy proceedings on their behalf. On May 23, 1994, respondent filed a Chapter 13 petition on behalf of his clients. In re Hutchinson, No. 94-BK-30513 on the docket of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division. On June 28, 1994, respondent filed schedules in the bankruptcy case in which Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson attested that their assets totaled $10,220.00 and their liabilities totaled $73,623.92. The largest liability listed in the bankruptcy schedules was a $57,272.56 unsecured debt owed by the Hutchinsons to St. Francis Medical Center, the Monroe hospital where Mrs. Hutchinson and Kyle were treated. There was no insurance claim disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules as an asset owned by the Hutchinsons; notwithstanding this fact, at the time his wife and son were treated | ¡.at St. Francis, Mr. Hutchinson had medical insurance provided through his employer by Blue Cross of Louisiana.

St. Francis filed claims with Blue Cross for the medical expenses incurred by Mrs. Hutchinson and Kyle. Blue Cross paid the claims in a series of four checks that were dated June 27, 1994; June 28, 1994; July 1,1994; and July 26,1994. However, Blue Cross sent these checks — which totaled more than $70,000 — directly to Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson, rather than to St. Francis, because the hospital had not perfected an assignment of the Blue Cross insurance proceeds.

It appears from the record that respondent first learned of the existence of the insurance claim and the Blue Cross proceeds sometime in late July or early August 1994. It is important to note, however, that respondent believed (erroneously) the insurance proceeds were assigned to St. Francis. On August 1, 1994, a representative of St. Francis telephoned respondent’s office to inquire about the issuance of the Blue Cross checks to the Hutchin-sons. Unfortunately, by this time, Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson had already spent several thousand dollars of the money sent to them by Blue Cross. On August 12, 1994, pursuant to respondent’s direction, the Hutchinsons delivered the remainder of the insurance proceeds in their possession — two checks totaling $61,242.56 — to respondent. Respondent’s paralegal gave the checks to the office manager and instructed her to “lock these checks up in a safe place until [respondent] has finalized his attempts and settlements [sic] with the hospital.”

On August 17, 1994, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee, Paul Davidson, conducted a meeting of creditors (known as a “341 meeting”) in the Hutchinson case. Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson appeared at the hearing, and were represented by respondent’s associate, Stacy Sessum. The transcript of the 341 meeting reveals that|3Ms. Sessum made no reference to the insurance proceeds that had been received by the Hutchinsons in June and July.

On August 19, 1994, respondent sent a letter to St. Francis offering to compromise the medical bills owed for the care of Mrs. Hutchinson and Kyle:

Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson are having significant financial problems and have, frankly, spent some of the insurance funds due you on the above referenced accounts related to the premature birth of their child.
I am inquiring as to your position, as they can send $52,000 of the $57,300 they owe, but would like the balance of their debt canceled so that they do not have to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Please advise as to your position as soon as possible. Your time and attention in this matter are greatly appreciated.

On August 25, 1994, respondent deposited the insurance proceeds into his client trust account. The following day, he sent letters to the rest of Mrs. Hutchinson’s medical providers (substantially similar to the August 19 letter to St. Francis), offering to compromise the accounts for a portion of the amount owed.

One of Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson’s non-medical creditors, Friendly Finance Service, subsequently objected to the Chapter 13 plan the couple had proposed. This objection triggered a hearing before the bankruptcy court on September 14, 1994. Once again, Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson were represented at the hearing by respondent’s associate, Ms. Sessum. The transcript of the hearing reveals that Ms. Ses-sum disclosed to the court and to the trustee that “There’s substantial insurance proceeds that we are holding and we’re going to be paying off a substantial portion of the | unsecured creditors with that money. And then we’ll, in addition, put that in our modification ...” Nevertheless, when the amended Chapter 13 plan was filed on September 28, 1994, no mention was made of the Blue Cross proceeds. Rather, respondent simply proposed to (1) increase the amount of the payments required of the Hutchinsons duripg the pendency of the Chapter 13; (2) modify the treatment of several creditors, including Friendly Finance; (3) add previously omitted creditors; and (4) request additional attorney’s fees. By order dated October 28, 1994, the bankruptcy court confirmed Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson’s Chapter 13 plan, as amended.

On October 20, 1994, Mr. Hutchinson had a heart attack. On November 17, 1994, without notice to the creditors, the trustee, or the court, respondent disbursed $1,000 to the Hutchinsons for living expenses. The cover letter accompanying the check specifically noted that the funds came “from the insurance funds we are holding in trust for you.”

On March 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Hutchinsons’ bankruptcy. The court granted the motion on March 20, 1995. Thereafter, between March 27, 1995 and April 18, 1995, respondent disbursed the remaining sums in his trust account as follows: $850 to the Hutchinsons to repay an unspecified creditor; $1,627 to The Woman’s Clinic, one of Mrs. Hutchinson’s health care providers; $2,500 to himself as attorney’s fees (in addition to the fees he collected through the bankruptcy proceeding); and $55,265.56 to the Hutchinsons. By the time St. Francis [¿earned of this turn of events, the Hutchinsons had spent nearly all of the money respondent had returned to them.

In July 1999, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging respondent with bankruptcy fraud in connection with his handling of the Hutchinson matter. United States v. Murlyn Daniel LaGrone, Jr., No. 99-CR-50069 on the docket of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division. Following a jury trial in January 2000, respondent was acquitted on the first count of the indictment. The second count was subsequently dismissed by the government because the jury could not reach a verdict as to that count.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In April 1997, United States Bankruptcy Judge Stephen V. Callaway filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On July 24, 2000, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct in the Hutchinson matter violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(b) (failure to give the client sufficient information to participate intelligently in the representation), 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable legal fee), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third ^persons), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct in his handling of the Hutchinson bankruptcy case. Specifically, respondent asserted that he had not intentionally concealed from the court the existence of the insurance funds, and that in any event, the Blue Cross proceeds did not form a part of the Hutchinsons’ bankruptcy estate because the proceeds had been assigned by the Hutchinsons to St. Francis.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits on February 6, 2001. The ODC introduced a volume of documentary evidence in support of the formal charges and called Judge Callaway to testify in person before the committee. Respondent appeared and cross-examined Judge Callaway; he also testified on his own behalf.

In its July 9, 2001 report, the hearing committee relied heavily upon the testimony given by Judge Callaway, which was accepted as “factual and authoritative.” Based upon that testimony, the committee found:

1.Schedules are filed in a bankruptcy proceeding and provide a listing of the assets, debts, income, and expenses of the debtors. The bankruptcy judge, trustee, and creditors rely on these schedules when making decisions regarding the bankruptcy.
[72. The right to receive insurance proceeds is an asset of the debtor and should be listed in the schedules.
3. If the debtor’s counsel discovers that assets, including cash, have been received by the debtor during the period of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy, or that the debtor has assets that were not listed in the schedules, then these assets should be included in the bankruptcy estate by the filing of an amended schedule, and such amended schedule should be filed as soon as possible.

After reviewing the evidence, the committee made numerous additional findings, including:

1. Respondent was not aware of the Hutchinsons’ claim against Blue Cross when the initial bankruptcy schedules were prepared and filed with the bankruptcy court on June 28, 1994. The debt to the hospital was listed as a liability in the schedules, but there was no mention of any insurance proceeds due the Hutchinsons.
2. On September 14, 1994, the confirmation hearing on the Hutchinsons’ Chapter 13 plan was held. Ms. Stacy Sessum, respondent’s associate, made specific mention of the insurance proceeds in court. The plan was not approved as the debtors were behind in their payments and there was an objection to the plan.
3. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Ses-sum filed material modifications to the Hutchinsons’ Chapter 13 plan, but still no amendment of the schedules was filed which would show that respondent was holding $61,242.56 in his trust account for the Hutchinsons.
4. The Chapter 13 plan was confirmed as amended on October 28, 1994, but still no amendment of the schedules was filed.
5. On November 17, 1994, respondent issued a $1,000 check to the Hutch-insons from his trust account without approval from the Bankruptcy Court.
| «6. On March 20, 1995, the Chapter 13 case was dismissed; to this point, there had still been no amended schedules filed which would disclose the funds that respondent was holding in his trust account.
7. Respondent initially contended that the proceeds had been assigned by the debtors to St. Francis Medical Center, and therefore, were not part of the bankruptcy estate. Respondent subsequently abandoned this position.
8. Respondent obviously knew of the insurance proceeds when he deposited them into his trust account on August 25,1994.
9. Respondent acknowledged that at least by November 17,1994, he was aware that the Chapter 13 plan had been confirmed on October 28,1994 and that it had been confirmed based on disclosures that were not appropriate.
10. Respondent had a duty to amend the schedules and make the proper disclosure as soon as possible.
11. Instead of amending the schedules, respondent continued his efforts to work out settlements with creditors outside the course of the bankruptcy proceeding.
12. Respondent ultimately turned the funds over to the Hutchinsons with the instructions that Mr. Hutchinson should pay the funds to various creditors.
13. The insurance proceeds were not properly administered in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code. Respondent should have handled the funds in the manner described by Judge Callaway. Respondent’s actions caused harm to the Hutch-insons, their creditors, and the legal system.
14. As a result of respondent’s mishandling of the case, the Hutchinsons had to file another bankruptcy in 1996.
15. Respondent is an experienced bankruptcy attorney, having practiced bankruptcy law in the Western District of Louisiana for many years.

|gBased on these factual findings, the committee found that respondent faded to provide competent representation to Mr. and Mrs. Hutchinson, a violation of Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct; failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the Hutchin-sons, a violation of Rule 1.3; knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of the bankruptcy court, in violation of Rule 3.4(c); and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d). The committee further stated that it was “unsure about a violation of Rule 1.5(a) (fees) and therefore does not find that sufficient evidence was produced to conclude that there was a violation of this rule.” The committee made no findings as to the alleged violations of Rules 1.4(b), 1.15, and 8.4(a).

The committee determined that respondent’s conduct caused harm to his clients, their creditors, and the legal system. The committee explained that it did not accept respondent’s explanation or excuse that “he did not know what to do with these funds, and that when he ultimately turned the funds over to Mr. Hutchinson, he did so with instructions that Mr. Hutchinson should pay the funds to the various creditors,” citing the fact that the respondent is an experienced bankruptcy attorney in the Western District of Louisiana. The committee noted two aggravating factors are present, namely respondent’s prior disciplinary record and his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

11(>Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter, the disciplinary board found that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the record and that the committee correctly applied Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board specifically rejected respondent’s assertion, raised for the first time before the hearing committee, that his handling of the insurance proceeds was appropriate because the funds were exempt property under state law. The board noted that property claimed by the debtor to be exempt must nevertheless be disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules. The board further found that the committee erred in failing to find violations of Rules 8.4(a) and 1.15(b). The board concluded that upon receipt of the Blue Cross insurance proceeds, respondent failed to protect the interests of third parties (St. Francis Medical Center, the other bankruptcy creditors, and/or the bankruptcy trustee) in the funds when he failed to notify these parties of his receipt of the funds and failed to subsequently protect these funds for the appropriate distribution through the bankruptcy proceeding. Finally, the board agreed that the committee properly found that no violations of Rules 1.4(b), 1.5(a), or 1.15(c) are present, given that the ODC failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting those allegations.

The board found respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal sys-tern. The amount of injury was substantial — the insurance proceeds were not properly administered in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, and as a result, St. Francis Medical Center was paid only $100 of the amount it was owed and the Hutch-insons later had to file another bankruptcy proceeding. The board concurred in the two aggravating factors cited by the hearing committee, and added respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1971) as a third such factor.

lulu light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed a timely objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343;. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in anyway by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

haBased on our independent review, we agree that the factual findings of the hearing committee are well supported by the evidence. We also agree that these factual findings support the disciplinary board’s conclusion that respondent’s mishandling of his clients’ bankruptcy matter violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(b), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found professional violations, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for this misconduct. In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We have never before been confronted with a disciplinary matter involving misconduct substantially similar to respondent’s at issue here. Nevertheless, we find that under the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the appropriate baseline sanction for respondent’s knowing misconduct is a suspension. The aggravating factors present include respondent’s prior disciplinary record, his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and his substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the record supports a finding that respondent lacked a dishonest or selfish motive and that he displayed a cooperative attitude toward the | ^disciplinary proceedings. In light of all these factors, we cannot say that the six-month suspension recommended by the disciplinary board is inappropriate.

Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that M. Daniel La-Grone, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of six months. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Conducted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341, such meetings are non-judicial hearings in which the creditors and the trustee have an opportunity to orally examine the bankruptcy debtor.

      . Respondent later claimed that just prior to the start of the 341 meeting, he had a private conversation with Mr. Davidson in which he alerted the trustee that he was holding $60,000 in insurance proceeds on behalf of the Hutchinsons. Mr. Davidson denied any recollection of such a conversation. He admitted that he knew the Hutchinsons had received some insurance money, but he believed the sum to be only about $10,000, not $60,000. In any event, Mr. Davidson trusted that respondent would take care of reporting the post-petition insurance proceeds to the bankruptcy court.

      . Ms. Sessum did not know exactly how much the insurance proceeds were, but thought the amount was about $10,000. Respondent later conceded that Ms. Sessum was unaware the amount involved was more than $60,000.

      . Respondent later claimed that the $1,000 represented a "rebate” on his attorney’s fees.

      . One witness candidly stated that the Hutch-insons spent the funds as though they had just "won the lottery.” The Hutchinsons later admitted to having purchased a new pickup truck, a boat and trailer, and a jet ski. They also paid off the balance of their mobile home loan and acquired the land on which the home was situated, made loans to various relatives, took a vacation to Hot Springs, Arkansas, and paid other medical expenses.

      . In Count I of the indictment, the government charged that respondent "did knowingly and fraudulently conceal and cause to be concealed from creditors, from the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee of the estate, and from the United States Trustee checks in excess of $57,000.00,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) and § 2. Count II charged that respondent, "with the intent to defeat the provisions of Title 11, knowingly and fraudulently received a material amount of property from James W. Hutchinson under Title 11, to-wit: insurance checks in excess of $57,000.00,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(5). The government filed no criminal charges against the Hutchinsons.

      . In support of this legal principle, respondent cited case law holding that insurance proceeds which have been assigned belong to the assignee, not to the estate of the debtor, and hence are not required to be reported to the bankruptcy court or turned over to the trustee. See, e.g., In re Moskowitz, 14 B.R. 677 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981). However, such law is inapplicable to the facts of the Hutchinson case, in which no assignment had been perfected on the Blue Cross insurance proceeds.

      . Respondent has been admonished by the disciplinary board on two occasions, both relating to improper advertising of his legal services. See 95-ADB-090 (improper newspaper advertisements and recorded messages) and 99-ADB-022 (false and misleading advertising).

      . Finding no reported disciplinary cases involving facts substantially similar to the instant matter, the board analogized this case to Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Harrington, 585 So.2d 514 (La.1990), and In re: Wahlder, 98-2742 (La.1/15/99), 728 So.2d 837. In Harrington, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for nine months for misconduct including, among other things, knowingly making a false statement of a material fact to a tribunal and to a third person. There, the respondent misrepresented to the court and prosecutor in a criminal proceeding that he was unaware of his client's whereabouts, when in fact he had just spoken to his client in the hallway. In Wahlder, the respondent was suspended for six months, fully deferred, for permitting his client to place the signature of the client’s wife on documents, witnessing that signature, and then attempting to prevent the client’s wife and the court from discovering the misconduct. The board felt that in all three cases, the attorneys "failed to reveal to the court and other parties to the litigation information which was significant to the outcome of the legal proceeding.”

      . We believe Standard 6.12 accurately describes the heartland of respondent's misconduct:
      Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.


text:
    In re Edwin W. EDWARDS.
    No. 2003-OB-0722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 2003.
   ORDER

In re Edwards, Edwin W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Petition for Voluntary Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 00-DB-087.

Considering the Petition for Voluntary Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Edwin W. Edwards, and the concurrence thereto filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Edwin W. Edwards for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edwin W. Edwards shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: | t CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    Kenneth Ray HATLEY v. COB SAND & GRAVEL, L.L.C.
    No. 2003-CC-0754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2003.
   In re C.O.B. Sand & Gravel, L.L.C.— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Office of Worker’s Compensation Dist. 6, No. 01-02938; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1642.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs in denial and assigns reasons.

| t CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

concurs in the denial of the writ of application and assigning reasons:

I’m agreeing with the majority’s decision to deny this writ application, not because I necessarily believe that the Court of Appeal was right in finding that The Shipping Post is not “a bonafide commercial mailing service,” but because at the time the Court of Appeal originally denied the writ application on July 29, 2002, the Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal 2-13 did not allow an applicant to prove that a writ application was timely'mailed by any method other than an official receipt or certificate of the United States Postal Service. The amendment to that rule, allowing parties to prove the timely mailing of a writ application with an official receipt or certificate of a “bonafide commercial mail service such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service” was not adopted until October 29, 2003. The amendment should not be given retroactive effect to enliven a concluded case rejected by the Court of Appeal.

I would also note that the amendment to Uniform Rules — Court of Appeal 2-13, allowing applicants to prove the timely filing of a writ application with an official receipt or certificate of a “bonafide commercial mail service such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service” is, in my opinion, ill-advised because it creates uncertainty and ambiguity, as demonstrated by this case. Since the term “bonafide commercial 1 ¡.mail service” is not defined, litigants have no criteria, other than the phrase “such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service” for determining which services qualify as “bonafide commercial mail services.” The Court of Appeal in this case referred to The Shipping Post as “a local mail depositary,” and specifically found that such a depository “is not the same as ‘a bonafide commercial mail service”; however, the distinction between the two phrases is oblique. The Uniform Rules should inform litigants of the requirements in a clear and straight-forward manner. Another problem with the amended rule is that it provides that parties can provide timely filing with a receipt or certificate from an entity that qualifies as a “bonafide commercial mail service such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service.” Does that mean that the writ will be considered timely filed if the party produces such a receipt or certificate, even if the papers are never delivered to the court?

If the current version of Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal 2-13 is to be retained by the Courts of Appeal, consideration should be given to providing more guidance for determining which businesses qualify, either through the listing of businesses that qualify or through the listing of the qualifications to be met by those businesses. In fact, I would consider it preferable for the Courts of Appeal to delete the October 2002 amendment and return to the prior rule which tracks this court’s rule concerning the filing of papers. Such a rule would not recognize any substitute for a postmark except a certificate from the United States Postal Service, and would not allow commercial carriers to be treated like the United States Postal Service.


author: pCALOGERO, Chief Justice. hWEIMER, J., 11 VICTORY, J.,

text:
    Pamela DUFRENE v. VIDEO CO-OP and LOUISIANA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CORPORATION.
    No. 2002-C-1147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.

      Michael L. Hebert, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Applicant.
    Merilla B. Miller, Counsel for Respondent.
   pCALOGERO, Chief Justice.

At issue in this case is the proper construction of two workers’ compensation statutes dealing with an employee’s right to collect supplemental earnings benefits (“SEB”). Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1209(A) provides that an employee may file a claim for SEB within three years of the date of the last indemnity benefit payment. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1221(3)(d)(i), on the other hand, states that the right to SEB shall terminate at the end of any two-year period commencing after termination of temporary total disability payments (“TTD”), unless SEB has been payable for at least thirteen consecutive weeks. Plaintiff filed the current claim for SEB after two years, but before the expiration of three years, from the discontinuance of TTD; thus, |¡>her claim falls between the time periods set forth in the two statutes.

The First Circuit Court of Appeal below held that § 1221(3)(d)(i) served as a two-year prescriptive period, which abrogated plaintiffs right to file her claim within the three-year provision of § 1209(A), because SEB had not been payable to her for thirteen consecutive weeks during the two-year period commencing after TTD payments had ended. Another state appellate circuit, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, treats § 1221(3)(d)(i), not as a prescriptive period cutting off a worker’s right to file a claim for SEB, but as a provision setting forth the duration, and subsequent termination, of SEB payments -once a worker has filed a claim for SEB. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting interpretations by the courts of appeal. We reverse the court of appeal below, adopt the statutory interpretation espoused by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, and hold that plaintiffs claim for SEB has not prescribed under § 1209(A).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Pamela Dufrene (“plaintiff’) was employed by the defendant Video Co-op on November 13, 1996. While working at the checkout counter, Ms. Dufrene was beaten and stabbed, and thus severely injured by an assailant. The parties do not dispute that Ms. Dufrene was injured in the course and scope of her employment. She received TTD payments from November 14, 1996 through March 11, 1997. No further indemnity benefits were paid, but Ms. Du-frene continued to receive reimbursement for medical expenses. On October 7, 1999, Ms. Dufrene underwent cervical fusion surgery made necessary by the November 13, 1996 injury. On October 27, 1999, about two and a half years after her TTD payments ended, she filed a claim with the Office of Workers’ Compensation seeking to have indemnity benefits reinstated in the form of SEB.

1 ¡¡Video Co-op and the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation (“defendants”) filed a peremptory exception of prescription, alleging that La. Rev. Stats. 23:1209(A) and 23:1221(3)(d)(i) bar plaintiffs claim for SEB. Specifically, defendants admit that plaintiffs claim falls within the three-year prescriptive period of § 1209(A), yet they urge that § 1221(3)(d)(i) sets forth another, more specific two-year prescriptive period or, they say, peremptive period, which cuts off plaintiffs right to file a claim for SEB under § 1209(A). Because plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot prove, that SEB was payable for thirteen consecutive weeks during the two-year period after termination of her TTD payments, defendants contend that her right to file a claim for SEB has prescribed or perempted under § 1221(3)(d)(i).

Plaintiff contends, however, that per-emption is not involved in this situation, and that § 1209(A) is the only prescriptive statute governing the time in which a party must file a claim for indemnity benefits. According to plaintiff, § 1221(3)(d)(i) is neither a prescriptive nor a peremptive statute. Rather, it establishes the period of entitlement to SEB once a claim is filed. In other words, plaintiff contends that § 1221(3)(d)(i) addresses the length of time a claimant can receive SEB payments, and the conclusion or end period of such entitlement under specified circumstances.

The Office of Workers’ Compensation granted defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissed plaintiffs claim for SEB with prejudice. The workers’ compensation hearing officer agreed with plaintiffs contention that § 1221(3)(d)(i) did not set forth a prescriptive period and that plaintiffs claim was timely under § 1209(A); however, hearing officer stated that she was bound to rule in accordance with First Circuit precedent supporting defendants’ position. The First Circuit Court of Appeal thereafter affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, choosing to follow its prior decisions in Smith v. State of Louisiana through Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 94-1533 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/3/95), 652 So.2d 635, and Sept v. City of Baker, 98-1190 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/18/99), 733 So.2d 748.

The court of appeal held that plaintiffs claim was prescribed under § 1221 (3)(d)(i), reasoning that this statute required her to file the claim within two years of the discontinuance of TTD payments. The court additionally noted that, had SEB been payable to plaintiff for at least thirteen consecutive weeks during the two-year period following termination of TTD, § 1221(3)(d)(i) would not have been applicable, and plaintiff could have availed herself of the three-year prescriptive period of § 1209(A). Dufrene v. Video Co-op & La. Workers’ Compensation Corp., 01-0261, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/28/02), 813 So.2d 619, 621.

In a controlling case from the First Circuit Court of Appeal, the Smith court was faced with a claimant who, like Ms. Du-frene, filed a claim for SEB within the three-year period of § 1209(A), but outside the two-year period of § 1221(3)(d)(i). See Smith, 94-1533, p. 2, 652 So.2d at 636. That court held that the claimant’s request for SEB (on August 20, 1993) was barred by the two-year limitation of § 1221(3)(d)(i). The claimant had previously received SEB, but only for a seven-week period within the two-year period following termination of TTD, which is less than the thirteen weeks stipulated in § 1221(3)(d)(i). See Smith, 94-1533, p. 3, 652 So.2d at 636-37. The Smith court went on to note that, had SEB been payable to the claimant for thirteen consecutive weeks within the two-year period after TTD payments ended (April 22, 1991 to April 22, 1993), she could have taken advantage of the longer three-year prescriptive period provided in § 1209(A).

The precise issue before the Sept court, on the other hand, does not necessarily command the result reached by the court of appeal in the present case. In Sept, the | .¡claimant, who had previously received benefits classified as TTD, argued that these very benefits should have been classified as SEB because he was able during that time to perform light-duty work. Sept, 98-1190, p. 3, 733 So.2d at 749. Essentially, the claimant was making an attempt to reclassify the TTD benefits as SEB to avoid prescription. Sept, 98-1190, p. 4, 733 So.2d at 750. The Sept claimant apparently conceded, correctly or not, that § 1221(3)(d)(i)’s two-year period was a prescriptive one. Id. The court applied the manifest error standard of review and upheld the lower court’s findings that the claimant’s benefit payments were TTD rather than SEB. Sept, 98-1190, p. 9, 733 So.2d at 752. The Sept opinion focused on the nature of the payments received by claimant and did not address the relationship between §§ 1209(A) and 1221(3)(d)(i) or the accuracy of the Smith court’s holding. Instead, the Sept court applied the law of Smith regarding prescription of claims for SEB, presumably because that was the applicable precedent in the First Circuit. Sept, 98-1190, p. 5, 733 So.2d at 750 (citing Smith, 94-1533, p. 3, 652 So.2d at 636).

Therefore, in the First Circuit, beginning with the decision in Smith, a claimant must prove that SEB had been payable to him for at least thirteen consecutive weeks during the two-year period commencing after termination of TTD to take advantage of the three-year prescriptive period of § 1209(A).

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has also addressed the relationship between the time periods of §§ 1209(A) and 1221(3)(d)(i). In Bibbins v. Boh Construction, 99-349 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/13/99), 746 So.2d 154, a worker filed a claim for SEB [¿more than two years after the termination of TTD benefits, but before the lapse of three years. The defendant in that case, like the defendant in the instant case, asserted that § 1221(3)(d)(i) terminated the worker’s right to receive SEB because thirteen consecutive weeks of SEB had not been payable in the two-year period commencing after the last payment of TTD. Bibbins, 99-349, p. 7, 746 So.2d at 158. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that the three-year prescriptive period of § 1209(A) is the only statute governing a claimant’s right to file a claim for SEB. Bibbins, 99-349, p. 8, 746 So.2d at 159. The court further held that § 1221(3)(d)(i) addresses itself to the termination of SEB once entitlement has been proven and the benefits have been awarded, but does not pertain to the case where a claimant is asserting his outset entitlement to SEB. Id. Because he filed his claim within three years of the last indemnity benefit payment (TTD in this case), the Bibbins plaintiffs claim for SEB was timely under § 1209(A). Id.

We granted certiorari to resolve this split in the First and Fifth Circuits and to determine the proper application of two confusing, if not conflicting, SEB statutes. We hold that the court of appeal below erred in finding that plaintiffs claim for SEB is prescribed through the application of § 1221(3)(d)(i). The Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Bibbins v. Boh Brothers Construction correctly resolves the issue. Therefore, for these and the following reasons, we find it necessary to remand this action to the Office of Workers’ Compensation for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Louisiana workers’ compensation law provides that an employee who suffers a workplace injury, and thus becomes unable to earn 90 percent of his pre-injury wages, is entitled to receive SEB. La.Rev. Stat. 23:1221(3)(a). Section 1209 is entitled “Prescription; timeliness of filing; dismissal for want of prosecution,” and 17it provides in pertinent part:

A. In case of personal injury ... all claims for payments shall be forever barred unless ... within one year after the accident a formal claim has been filed.... Where such payments have been made in any case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment, except that in cases of benefits payable pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(3) [supplemental earnings benefits] this limitation shall not take effect until three years from the time of making the last payment of benefits pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(1) [temporary total disability], (2) [permanent total disability], (3) [supplemental earnings benefits], or (4) [permanent partial disability]. (emphasis and bracketed words are added).

Plaintiff filed her current claim for SEB on October 27, 1999. Because she filed this claim within three years of the date of her last TTD payment, which occurred on March 11, 1997, § 1209(A)’s prescriptive period had not expired when the claim was filed.

Our analysis does not end with a discussion of § 1209(A) because the court of appeal below found that § 1221(3)(d)(i) sets forth a conflicting two-year time period, which it perceived to be prescriptive, and which serves to truncate the amount of time an employee otherwise has for filing an SEB claim under § 1209(A). Section 1221, entitled “Temporary total disability; permanent total disability; supplemental earnings benefits; permanent partial disability; schedule of payments,” provides in pertinent part:

(3) Supplemental earnings benefits:
(d) the right to supplemental earnings benefits pursuant to this Paragraph shall in no event exceed a maximum of five hundred twenty weeks, but shall terminate:
(i) As of the end of any two-year period commencing after termination of temporary total disability, unless during such two-year period supplemental earnings benefits have |sbeen payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks.

Contrary to the court of appeal below, the Fifth Circuit in Bibbins interpreted this statute as addressing the duration of time an employee is entitled to receive SEB payments. Bibbins, 99-349, p. 8, 746 So.2d at 159. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that § 1221(3)(d)(i) sets forth a circumstance under which an employee’s SEB payments will terminate, and is not a prescriptive statute. The statute that governs prescription of an employee’s claim, i.e., within what period of time an employee must file a claim, is § 1209(A).

Before beginning our analysis, we note that H. Alston Johnson, III, the author of the workers’ compensation section of the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, expresses a view contrary to the First Circuit’s interpretation of the two pertinent statutory provisions. He believes that § 1221(3)(d)(i) addresses duration and subsequent termination of SEB payments, much like the Fifth Circuit found in Bib-bins. Regarding the Smith case, Mr. Johnson states:

See generally Smith v. State through DOHH, 652 So.2d 635 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1995), in which the claim was held to be prescribed as to all benefits other than SEB, and SEB was not available in the court’s view because fewer than 13 weeks of such payments had been made during the preceding two-year period prior to suit. This is a doubtful conclusion in light of the intended three-year period to be able to seek such benefits; the two-year provision is a “termination” provision, not a prescriptive period.

Malone & Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice, § 384, at 325 & fn. 78 (4th ed.2002).

An examination of the history of these two statutory provisions will help us determine the legislature’s intent regarding them. With the 1975 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act, the legislature shifted the emphasis of the Act from benefits for total and permanent disability to benefits based on partial disability. |9 Malone & Johnson, supra, § 276, at 655. After the 1975 amendments, § 1221(3) of the Act addressed computation of partial disability benefits, and set forth the maximum amount of time an employee would be entitled to receive such partial disability benefits. In 1983, the legislature renamed “partial disability” benefits as “supplemental earnings benefits,” and amended § 1221(3) to include this new terminology. Id. The amended statute continues to address the computation of SEB and the maximum amount of time an employee is entitled to draw SEB.

Thus, in 1983, the legislature provided an extended 520-week maximum duration for receipt of SEB, subject to termination sooner under § 1221(3)(d)(i) if SEB is not payable for thirteen consecutive weeks during any two-year period commencing after TTD ends, or if the employee retires. Malone & Johnson, supra, § 283, at 697 (“In 1983, the legislature introduced some other concepts which can affect the duration of payments. The worker’s SEB payments ‘shall terminate’: (1) at the end of any two-year period following the end of TTD, unless during that two-year period, SEB payments have been payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks....”). Neither the pre-1983 nor the posb-1983 version of § 1221 contains a prescriptive period setting forth the time period an employee has to file a claim.

Prior to the 1983 amendments, § 1209 provided the applicable prescriptive periods for each type of workers’ compensation benefit. Similar to the time periods set forth in the present version of the statute, a claim for payment of “partial disability” was forever barred unless filed: (1) within one year after the accident; or (2) within three years of the last payment of any type of compensation. In the 1983 | inamendments, wherein SEB was adopted, the legislature chose to carry over the three-year prescriptive period applicable to claims for partial disability, and apply that prescriptive period to claims for SEB.

In sum, with the 1983 amendments, the legislature amended both § 1221(3)(d)(i) and § 1209(A) to govern the newly designated SEB. It is unlikely that the legislature would enact two conflicting prescriptive periods in the same year without referencing how they fit together or should be coordinated. We find that these two statutory provisions do not conflict at all. Section 1209(A) is the only prescriptive period setting forth the amount of time a worker has to file a claim for benefits. Section 1221(3)(d)(i), on the other hand, establishes the substantive period an employee is entitled to receive SEB payments, and when and how they may terminate.

Established rules of statutory construction further support our interpretation of §§ 1209(A) and 1221(3)(d)(i). If the language of a statute is susceptible of different meanings, the law must be interpreted as having the meaning which best conforms to the purpose of the law. La. Civ.Code art. 10. The intent of § 1221(3)(d)(i) is to end SEB when the employee no longer needs the payments because he has, over a two-year period without interruption by a thirteen consecutive week period, consistently been able to earn at least 90 percent of his pre-injury wages. H. Alston Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1988 Amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Statute, 44 La. L.Rev. 669, 678 (1984); Denis Paul Juge, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation, § 11:3, at 11-30 (2d ed.1999 & supp. 2002). This legislative purpose of § 1221(3)(d)(i) — to end payments when they are no longer needed — is thwarted by the court of appeal’s analysis, which denies the right to file a claim for SEB to a claimant who has not been working and is in need of the benefits.

1 n Furthermore, the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 1221(3)(d)(i) as a prescriptive statute abrogates the right of certain claimants, such as plaintiff, to file a claim for SEB in accordance with the prescriptive period clearly set forth in § 1209(A): three years from the last payment of any type of indemnity benefit. This interpretation fails to give full effect to the language of § 1209(A). Because the two statutes deal with the same subject matter, SEB, they should be harmonized if possible. See City of Pineville v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 00-1983, p. 4 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 609, 612. Our determination that § 1221(3)(d)(i) does not govern prescription of claims, but sets forth termination of the period of entitlement to benefit payments, gives full effect to both statutes and allows them to work together in a logical fashion.

Although we recognize that the title of a statute is not the law, we can look to the title to get a general understanding of the meaning of the statute’s words. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Department of City Civil Service, 214 La. 683, 38 So.2d 385, 389 (1949). The legislature chose to entitle § 1209 as a prescriptive statute, whereas neither the title nor the language of § 1221 speaks of prescription, or when an employee must file a claim.

When considered within the context of the entire statute, it becomes apparent that § 1221(3)(d)(i) addresses the duration of SEB, and does not establish a prescriptive period for the assertion of a claim. This disputed provision is a subsection of § 1221(3)(d), which sets forth the maximum number of weeks an employee can receive SEB payments: “the right to supplemental earnings benefits pursuant to this Paragraph shall in no event exceed a maximum of five hundred | ^twenty weeks.... ” Numerous courts have recognized that § 1221(3)(d)’s 520-week period addresses the maximum duration of SEB payments. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, DOTD, 615 So.2d 305, 307 (La.1993); Daigle v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 545 So.2d 1005, 1009 (La.1989); Breuhl v. Hercules Concrete Plumbing, Inc., 94-2311, p. 11 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/16/95), 656 So.2d 1055, 1061; Hinton v. Scott Hydraulics, Inc., 614 So.2d 820, 825 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993); Woolsey v. Cotton Bros. Bakery Co., 535 So.2d 1119, 1127 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988).

A simple reading of § 1221(3)(d)(i) indicates that it provides one exception to the typical 520-week duration of SEB payments set forth in § 1221(3)(d). In fact, this court has recognized in dicta that the statute sets out circumstances under which the employee’s usual 520-week entitlement to SEB will be terminated sooner. See, e.g., Duncan, 615 So.2d at 308 & fn. 6 (holding that worker was entitled to acceleration of SEB payments as penalty against recalcitrant employer under La. Rev.Stat. 23:1333, and that maximum duration of benefits would be accelerated). The legislature apparently intended the statutory exception of § 1221(3)(d) to benefit the employer by decreasing the period of time it could be liable to provide SEB for a employee who has been working at full capacity for a substantial period without the need for these payments. Juge, suyra, at 11-30. This limitation makes sense. If the worker has consistently been able to earn at least 90 percent of his pre-injury wages in any two year period after termination of TTD, the legislature has determined that SEB will no longer be necessary to supplement the worker’s income.

The court of appeal’s holding that § 1221(3)(d)(i)’s two-year “prescriptive” period begins to run from the date TTD terminates, before an employee even files claim for SEB, and serves to terminate an employee’s right to seek SEB, is not supported by the statute’s plain language. Again, the statute states that the right to | iSSEB cannot exceed a maximum of 520-weeks, but shall terminate “as of the end of any two-year period commencing after the termination of [TTD], unless during such two-year period [SEB] have been payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks.” (Emphasis added). The legislature’s use of the word “any” is significant. Had the .legislature intended the result reached by the court of appeal, it could have simply stated that the right to claim SEB shall terminate two years after TTD terminates. The placement of “any” indicates that § 1221(3)(d)(i) will serve to terminate an employee’s SEB payments, and thus benefit the employer, at any time during the 520-week duration of payments where SEB is not payable for at least thirteen consecutive weeks during any two-year period. Of course, a worker will not be able to begin receiving SEB unless the claim has not prescribed under § 1209(A).

Additionally, it is worth noting that § 1221 addresses not only SEB, but also TTD, permanent total disability, and permanent partial disability. In each of its subsections, § 1221 sets forth only the computation and duration of benefit payments and does not address the amount of time an employee has to file a claim.

In interpreting these statutes, we must keep in mind the policies and purpose behind the workers’ compensation laws. It is axiomatic that the Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial in nature. To effectuate its humane policies, we are bound to construe the law liberally in favor of providing compensation to the injured worker. Breaux v. Hoffpauir, 95-2933, p. 4 (La.5/21/96), 674 So.2d 234, 237; Pinkins v. Cardinal Wholesale Supply, Inc., 619 So.2d 52, 55 (La.1993); Lester v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 466 So.2d 25, 28 (La.1985). Furthermore, in keeping with the beneficent intent of the Act, “the time limits on institution of a claim for benefits have been very liberally interpreted over the years.” Malone & Johnson, supra, § 384, at 307; see also Jackson v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 98-1335, p. 4 (La.App. 3d Cir. 4/7/99), 732 So.2d 733, 737. Our interpretation of these statutes conforms with these well-established tenets of workers’ compensation law because it provides an injured employee with the longest time period provided in the Act to file a claim for benefits.

We also note that the court of appeal’s interpretation of §§ 1209(A) and 1221(3)(d)(i) leads to results that are at best inconsistent with the remedial nature of workers’ compensation law, and at worst absurd. Consider a worker who is injured on the job, but not so badly that he cannot work at all, and who begins to collect SEB, followed by a time period where he does not need SEB. Under § 1209(A) this worker will have three years from the termination of SEB payments to file a renewed claim for SEB if his condition worsens (§ 1209(A) gives a prescriptive period of three years from the last payment of any type of indemnity benefit). Section 1221 (3)(d)(i) would not serve to shorten the time within which to file the worker’s claim in this hypothetical situation because TTD was not paid, and that statute only provides for termination of SEB after TTD ends.

However, under the First Circuit’s analysis, a worker such as plaintiff, who is seriously injured and thus must collect TTD payments because she is incapable of working at all, will have only two years from the termination of TTD to file a claim for SEB unless the worker can prove that SEB was payable for thirteen consecutive weeks, i.e., that she was not able to earn 90 percent of her pre-injury wages for thirteen consecutive weeks of the given two-year period. We choose not to interpret these statutes in such a way as to cause inequitable results, when the logical reading of these statutes adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal gives effect to the substance of both statutes and conforms to the long-established purpose and intent l1Rof the workers’ compensation laws.

Like many aspects of the 1983 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act, our legislature borrowed the language of § 1221(3)(d)(i) from a strikingly similar Florida statute. Johnson, 44 La. L.Rev. at 678. Consequently, the Florida courts’ interpretation of that state’s analogous provision provides guidance in the comparable situation presented by this case. In 1983, Florida statute 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) stated that the right to wage-loss benefits (the Florida equivalent of SEB) shall terminate “[a]s of the end of any 2-year period commencing at any time subsequent to the month when the injured employee reaches the date of maximum medical improvement, unless during such 2-year period wage-loss benefits have been payable during at least 3 consecutive months.” The substance of the Florida statute is almost identical to § 1221(3)(d)(i). Like Louisiana, Florida has a separate statutory provision governing when an employee must file a claim for benefits, Fla. Stat. 440.19.

In Wood v. McTyre Trucking, 526 So.2d 739, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), the court encountered the argument that § 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) was a statute of limitations governing the time period in which to file a claim for benefits. The Florida appellate court rejected this argument, holding that § 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) did not function as a statute of limitations. It held, instead, that this statute establishes 11 fithe length of time that wage-loss benefits may be paid to an employee. The court noted that Fla. Stat. 440.19 was the applicable statute of limitations in workers’ compensation cases.

Additionally, in Monroe Furniture Co. v. Bonner, 509 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987), the court noted that the purpose of § 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) was to prevent overcompensation of claimants who are able to secure adequate earnings. The court accordingly found that the statute’s two-year limitation applied only where wage-loss benefits were not payable during three consecutive months for the sole reason that the amount of income received by the worker would disqualify him for wage-loss benefits. The court found that the statute did not terminate an employee’s right to wage-loss benefits where those benefits were not paid or payable for any other reason, such as the employee’s inability to work. See also American Airlines v. Miller, 575 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (adopting the rule of Bonner).

Although these decisions were statutory interpretations of § 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) by the Florida courts of appeals and not its supreme court, we find persuasive their uniform interpretation, and apply this rule analogously to strengthen our holding today. Section 1221(3)(d)(i) does not set forth a prescriptive period dictating when an employee must file a claim for SEB, but, rather, addresses termination of payments after an employee has filed a claim and has been awarded benefits. We additionally find, similar to the Florida court in Miller, that the purpose of § 1221(3)(d)(i)’s two-year termination period is to prevent employer liability to claimants who no longer need SEB. Again, this purpose is not furthered by the court of appeal’s application of the statute to an employee, like Ms. Dufrene, who has not been working, and who has never before filed a claim for SEB.

17 We will now address defendants’ alternative argument that § 1221(3)(d)(i) sets forth a peremptive period, which completely extinguishes plaintiffs entitlement to SEB. This argument was raised for the first time in the court of appeal, which did not discuss its merits, perhaps because the controlling precedent, Smith and Sept, disposed of the issue on the basis of prescription. According to defendants, because plaintiffs right to claim entitlement to SEB ceased to exist two years after her last TTD payment, she could no longer file suit within the three-year prescriptive period of § 1209(A) to enforce this right. This argument necessarily must fail for the basic reason, previously detailed in our discussion of prescription, that § 1221(3)(d)(i) addresses only duration and subsequent termination of SEB payments, and has nothing to do with the time period within which an employee must file a claim.

To further address the merit of defendants’ contention that § 1221(3)(d)(i) sets forth a peremptive period, we note that no court has ever discussed peremption in connection with § 1221(3)(d)(i), including the Smith and Sept courts, which ruled favorably to the employers. Civil Code article 3458 defines peremption as “a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right.” Further, “unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period.” La. C.C. art. 3458. Liberative prescription merely prevents the enforcement of a right by action, whereas, in contrast, peremption destroys the right itself. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So.2d 1195 (La.1979). As applied to plaintiffs claim for SEB, the outcome would be the same if § 1221(3)(d)(i)’s two-year period were prescriptive or peremp-tive: plaintiff could not file her claim in either event under § 1209(A)’s three-year prescriptive period. Because § 1221(3)(d)(i) establishes the duration and subsequent termination of SEB payments once the employee has proved entitlement, we find that peremption, at least as it applies to a period of time in which an employee must file |isa claim or suit to enforce a right, is not applicable.

Additionally, any merit to defendants’ peremption argument is overridden by the principles of statutory interpretation. It is unlikely that the legislature would have meant to perempt a claim through an employee’s non-assertion in a given two-year period when simultaneously in the same Act it speaks to three-year prescription. There is a fundamental conflict between a two-year peremptive period and a three-year prescriptive period for asserting the same claim. In fact, one appellate court has recognized that the Workers’ Compensation Act contains no provision reducing an employee’s time to file a claim under § 1209, much less one that peremptively terminates the cause of action. Rich v. Geosource Wireline Servs., Inc., 490 So.2d 1165, 1170 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986). For these reasons, we reject defendants’ contention that § 1221(3)(d)(i) provides a two-year peremptive period for fifing an SEB claim.

CONCLUSION

To summarize the SEB scheme put in place by the legislature, § 1209(A) sets forth the applicable three-year prescriptive period from the date of the last indemnity benefit payment for fifing a claim for SEB. Once a worker begins to receive SEB, § 1221(3) governs the calculation and termination of these benefits. In any week where the worker is unable to earn at least 90 percent of his pre-injury wages, SEB will be payable to him, for a máximum of 520-weeks. If the worker is able to earn his full pre-injury salary in any given week, the employer will not owe SEB, but these weeks will not be counted toward the 520-week maximum time period. § 1221(3)(d)(ii). |1fl Under certain circumstances, the worker’s SEB payments will end before the expiration of 520-weeks. One of these circumstances arises under § 1221(3)(d)(i), where a worker has begun to draw SEB, but where SEB has not been payable to him for any given thirteen consecutive weeks in any two-year period after termination of TTD, presumably because the worker is able to work at full earning capacity during this period of time. This situation is distinguishable from the situation of the current plaintiff, who has never filed a claim for SEB and has never received SEB payments, and where, consequently, § 1221(3)(d)(i) has not been triggered.

In this action, plaintiff is asserting that she is entitled to begin receiving SEB payments for the first time. Her claim is timely under § 1209(A) because it was filed within three years after termination of her last TTD payment, and the court of appeal incorrectly found that § 1221(3)(d)(i) bars this action.

DECREE

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the case remanded to the Office of Workers’ Compensation for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION.

WEIMER, J., concurs with reasons.

TRAYLOR, J., concurs for reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.

VICTORY, J., dissenting in part, with reasons.

hWEIMER, J.,

concurring.

The determinative issue in Sept v. City of Baker, 98-1190 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/18/99), 733 So.2d 748, referenced by the majority, was whether the claimant could change the classification of benefits he collected from TTD to SEB in order to avoid prescription. The court ruled that the claimant could not change the contemporaneous classification of TTD to a classification of SEB at a later date. The seemingly conflicting provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1209(A) and 23:1221(3)(d)(i) were not directly before the court; therefore, the court applied the precedent established in Smith v. State Department of Health & Hospitals, 94-1533 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 635.

When specifically addressing the prescription issue posed by LSA-R.S. 23:1209(A) and 23:1221(3)(d)(i), the proper construction is that of the majority in this matter.

11 VICTORY, J.,

dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that La. R.S. 23:1209 “is the only prescriptive period setting forth the amount of time a worker has to file a claim for benefits” and that “Section 1221(3)(d)(i), on the other hand, establishes the substantive period an employee is entitled to receive SEB payments, and when and how they may terminate.” Op. at 1073. In this case, plaintiffs claim has not prescribed because she filed her suit within three years of the last payment of TTD’s. However, she is not entitled to SEB unless she can prove that SEB was payable for thirteen consecutive weeks during the two-year period after termination of TTD payments. As stated by the majority:

A simple reading of § 1221(3)(d)(i) indicates that it provides one exception to the typical 520-week duration of SEB payments set forth in § 1221(3)(d).... The legislature apparently intended the statutory exception of § 1221(3)(d) to benefit the employer by decreasing the period of time it could be liable to provide SEB for a[sic] employee who has been working at full capacity for a substantial period without the need for these payment. Juge, supra, at 11-30. This limitation makes sense. If the worker has consistently been able to earn at least 90 percent of his pre-injury wages in any two year period after termination of TTD, the legislature has determined that SEB will no longer be necessary to supplement the worker’s income. (Emphasis added.)

Op. at 1074. Like the majority, I too think the legislature’s use of the word “any” is significant, and it certainly includes the immediate two-year period following the 12termination of TTD. There is nothing in La. R.S. 23:1221(3)(d)(i) that states it only applies to any two-year period commencing after a claimant has begun to receive SEB. This is simply a creation of the majority.

Thus, while I agree with the majority that La. R.S. 23:1209 is the only prescriptive period applicable to SEB, and La. R.S. 23:1221(3) (d) (i) is a termination or duration statute, a plaintiffs right to SEB will be terminated if he or she cannot show that during any two-year period commencing after termination of TTD, including the first two-year period commencing after termination of TTD, supplemental earnings benefits have been payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks.

As plaintiffs counsel stated to this Court at oral argument, since plaintiffs claim has not prescribed, this case should now be remanded to the trial court to determine if her rights to SEB have terminated under La. R.S. 23:1221(3)(d)(i).

      . Section 1209(A) states in pertinent part:
      In case of personal injury ... all claims for payments shall be forever barred unless ... within one year after the accident a formal claim has been filed.... Where such payments have been made in any case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment, except that in cases of benefits payable pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(3) this limitation shall not take effect until three years from the time of making the last payment of benefits pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(1), (2), (3), or (4).

      . Section 1221(3) provides in pertinent part: (d) the right to supplemental earnings benefits pursuant to this Paragraph shall in no event exceed a maximum of five hundred twenty weeks, but shall terminate:
      (i) As of the end of any two-year period commencing after termination of temporary total disability, unless during such two-year period supplemental earnings benefits have been payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks.

      . Under § 1209(A), the claimant would have had three years from the date of her last SEB payment on June 2, 1991, to file a subsequent claim for SEB.

      . Compensation for TTD shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence that he is physically unable to engage in any employment. La.Rev. Stat. 23:1221(l)(c).

      . The Louisiana Civil Law treatise recognizes that this appellate circuit treats the termination provision of § 1221(3)(d)(i) as only a “sort of prescriptive period,” a somewhat quizzical reference to that court’s opinions in Smith and Sept. Malone & Johnson, infra, § 276, at 661.

      . Unlike the title of § 1209, the title of § 1221 does not contain a reference to prescription or when an employee must file a claim.

      . An employee was entitled to a maximum of four hundred weeks of partial disability benefits from injury occurring on and after September 1, 1975, and on or before August 31, 1976; a maximum of four hundred twenty-five weeks from injury occurring on and after September 1, 1976, and on or before August 31, 1977; and a maximum of four hundred fifty weeks from injury occurring on and after September 1, 1977.

      . As previously noted, § 1209 is entitled “Prescription; timeliness of filing; dismissal for want of prosecution/’ and § 1221 is entitled "Temporary total disability; permanent total disability; supplemental earnings benefits; permanent partial disability; schedule of payments.”

      . Interestingly, while § 1209(A)’s three-year period begins to run from the date of the last payment of any type of workers’ compensation, § 1221(3)(d)(i)'s two-year period commences upon termination of TTD only. Therefore, if an employee never receives TTD, § 122l(3)(d)(i) is not implicated.

      . In 1989, the provision was moved from Fla. Stat. 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) to Fla. Stat. 440.15(3)(b)(4)(a). In 1994, the provision was removed from Florida’s statutory scheme.

      . In Florida, the date of "maximum medical improvement” begins the running of the two-year period. This is defined as the date after which further recovery from an injury or disease can no longer be reasonably anticipated. Fla. Stat. 440.02. "Maximum medical improvement” is similar to "termination of temporary total disability” used in § 1221(3)(d)(i) to begin the running of the two-year period because TTD terminates when the employee’s condition has improved to the point that regular treatment by a physician is not required. La.Rev.Stat. 23:1221(l)(d).

      . Fla. Stat. 440.19, entitled "Time bars to filing petition for benefits,” provides that all petitions for workers’ compensation benefits shall be barred unless the petition is filed within two years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment. The statute further states that payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of medical care shall toll the limitations period set forth above for one year from the date of such payment.

      . The Rich court distinguished between a claimant’s right to reject the Office of Workers’ Compensation’s recommendation under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1310.1, and the right to file a claim for benefits under § 1209. The court held that, although the claimant’s right to reject the OWC’s recommendation regarding his entitlement to benefits had perempted, he could, nonetheless, still file suit to collect benefits because prescription had not run under § 1209(A). The Rich court applied post 1983 law.