author: JjPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Endesha JUAKALI.
    No. 2003-B-0143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from four counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Endesha Juakali, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before addressing the instant charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. In 1995, respondent was charged with collecting unauthorized legal fees in connection with his appointment as a curator in a domestic relations case, contacting an opposing party who was represented by counsel, delaying the resolution of the case, and faffing to cooperate with the ODC. Finding the ODC proved this misconduct by clear and convincing evidence, we suspended respondent for one year, with six months deferred, followed by a two-year period of probation with conditions. In re: Juakali, 97-1460 (La.9/5/97), 699 So.2d 361 (“Jua-kali I”).

Following Juakali I, the ODC learned that respondent had violated the terms of his probation, and filed a motion to revoke probation. This court granted the ODC’s motion in July 1998 and ordered respondent to serve the deferred portion of the suspension imposed in Juakali I. In re: Juakali, 98-1855 (La.7/16/98), 714 So.2d 720 (“Juakali II ”).

| .FORMAL CHARGES

Count I — The Jones Matter

In July 1997, Hilda Jones retained respondent to represent her son in a criminal matter. Over a two-month period beginning on July 3, 1997, Ms. Jones paid respondent a total of $1,300 to handle the case. Respondent accepted the last payment from Ms. Jones on September 5, 1997, the same day he was suspended from the practice of law by this court in Juakali I. Respondent failed to notify Ms. Jones of his suspension. Respondent also did not provide an accounting to Ms. Jones, nor did he refund the unearned portion of the legal fee he was paid.

In September 1997, Ms. Jones filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

Count II — The Boss Matter

In March 1997, Ella Boss paid respondent $300 to handle a succession matter on behalf of her daughter, a minor. Respondent failed to communicate with his client, despite her attempts to reach him by telephone and in person,.and he did not complete the succession matter. Respondent also did not provide an accounting to Ms. Boss, nor did he refund the unearned portion of the legal fee he was paid.

In December 1997, Ms. Boss filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

| -¿Count III — The Rose Matter

In July 1997, Patsy Rose retained respondent to represent her son in a criminal matter. Ms. Rose paid respondent $500 on July 21, 1997, and an additional sum of $500 on August 11, 1997. When respondent failed to appear in court on his client’s behalf on August 22, 1997, Ms. Rose attempted to contact him several times, but to no avail. Ms. Rose was later contacted by respondent’s paralegal about making another payment of legal fees. Ms. Rose paid respondent $300 on August 26, 1997, but on September 10, 1997, respondent again failed to make a court appearance on behalf of his client. Respondent subsequently advised Ms. Rose that he could not represent her son, but that he had referred the case to another attorney. Nevertheless, respondent did not provide an accounting to Ms. Rose, nor did he refund the unearned portion of the legal fee he was paid.

Count TV — The Williams Matter

In September 1998, Daisy Williams paid respondent $135 to handle a custody matter. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law during this period as a result of the revocation of his probation in Juakali II; however, Ms. Williams was unaware of this fact. When Ms. Williams sought a refund of the legal fee she paid, respondent refused her request.

|4In January 1999, Ms. Williams filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On April 20, 2000, the ODC filed four counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging his conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(6) (failure to account for and refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation). The ODC further alleged that respondent failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary-authority, in violation of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 9(c).

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

Noting the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), the hearing committee agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as | ¡¡charged. After consideration of the ODC’s submission in response to the deemed admitted order, the committee concluded that respondent’s conduct was intentional and caused injury to his clients. The committee recognized the baseline sanction for the misconduct at issue is disbarment. The committee recognized no mitigating factors, but determined numerous aggravating factors are present, namely respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, submission of false statements and other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1985), and indifference to making restitution. Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred. The committee also recommended that respondent be ordered to pay restitution to Ms. Jones, Ms. Boss, Ms. Rose, and Ms. Williams.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients and as a professional. The board further determined that respondent’s conduct was intentional and caused actual harm. The baseline sanction for this conduct is disbarment. The board concurred in the aggravating factors cited by the committee, and agreed the record does not support a finding of any mitigating factors.

|fiIn light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to his clients, and that he be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The deemed admitted facts in this case establish that respondent has neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to account for or refund unearned fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Therefore, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s misconduct includes a pattern of neglect of legal matters, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to account for his fees. Respondent has demonstrated a serious lack of concern for the welfare of his clients. Additionally, [7respondent has repeatedly failed to cooperate with the disciplinary authorities. The baseline sanction for such misconduct ranges from a lengthy suspension to disbarment.

Numerous aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, submission of false statements and other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. We are able to discern no mitigating factors from the record.

The record demonstrates in a convincing fashion that respondent lacks concern for the welfare of his clients and shows a total disregard for his professional obligations. He lacks the fitness to practice law in this state. Under these circumstances, he must be disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Endesha Juakali, Louisiana Bar Roll number 16994, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. It is further ordered that respondent render a full accounting to Hilda Jones, Ella Boss, Patsy Rose, and Daisy Williams and that he refund any unearned fees due those clients. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . In a sworn statement given in connection with the ODC's investigation, respondent testified that he advised Ms. Williams from the beginning that he was unable to practice law and was acting solely as a notary. However, in a letter to the ODC, Ms. Williams alleged that she did not learn respondent was suspended until after she paid him the $135 fee.

      . Respondent claimed that he earned the fee in his capacity as a notary by preparing an affidavit in an for Ms. Williams and by researching court records. However, we note that because respondent was suspended from the practice of law during this period, he was also prohibited from exercising notarial functions pursuant to La. R.S. 35:14.

      . Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee's consideration.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re: Raphael P. POIRRIER.
    No. 2003-B-0157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2003.

      See also 791 So.2d 94.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Raphael P. Poirrier, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY RECORD

Before addressing the instant charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Between 1996 and 1998, respondent accepted representation in six client matters. After being retained in these matters, respondent did no work on behalf of his clients and failed to return their files or refund unearned fees. The ODC filed formal charges against respondent. Finding the charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence, we disbarred respondent. In re: Poirrier, 01-1116, 01-1118 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 94 (“Poirrier I ”).

UNDERLYING FACTS

In May 1996, respondent assumed the representation of Tanya King in a pending personal injury case. In July 1996, respondent wrote to the defendant insurance company and offered to settle Ms. King’s claim. Thereafter, respondent neglected his chent’s legal matter, and in July 1998, the case was dismissed on grounds of abandonment. Respondent failed to inform Ms. King of this fact.

Lin November 2000, Ms. King filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On October 22, 2001, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging his conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation). The formal charges were served upon respondent by certified mail received on January 17, 2002.

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

Noting the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), the hearing Lcommittee agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. After consideration of the ODC’s submission in response to the deemed admitted order, the committee concluded that respondent undertook to represent Ms. King and actually attempted to settle her case before allowing it to be abandoned. The committee found respondent’s conduct was knowing and intentional and caused actual harm to his client, Ms. King, whose lawsuit was dismissed due to abandonment and who therefore was deprived of the right to pursue her personal injury claim. Respondent’s conduct further harmed the legal profession, the legal system, and the public at large. The committee recognized no mitigating factors, but determined the aggravating factors present include respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct. Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board agreed respondent acted knowingly when he violated duties owed to his client, to the legal system, and as a professional. The conduct caused actual harm to Ms. King, whose lawsuit was dismissed as abandoned. Respondent’s failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation impaired the efficient operation of the disciplinary process and caused harm to the legal profession as a whole. Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board | ¿determined the baseline sanction for this conduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

Nevertheless, the board recognized that when a second attorney disciplinary proceeding involves misconduct which occurred during the same time period as the first proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were being considered simultaneously. The board pointed out that the misconduct at issue in Poirrier I arose out of respondent’s representation of six clients between 1996 and 1998, the same time frame in which respondent represented Ms. King. Moreover, the same type of misconduct is involved in the instant case as was at issue in Poirrier I. Accordingly, the board determined that additional discipline is not warranted for respondent’s conduct in the King matter; rather, the board recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty of additional violations warranting suspension which would be considered in the event he applies for readmission from his disbarment in Poirrier I. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The deemed admitted facts in this case support the conclusion that respondent neglected his client’s legal matter, resulting in the dismissal of her personal injury suit on grounds of abandonment. Therefore, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

[BIn determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in fight of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s neglect of Ms. King’s legal matter caused actual harm to her. Furthermore, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, thereby impairing the efficient operation of the disciplinary process. No mitigating factors are supported by the record; however, some aggravating factors are present. Under these circumstances, we conclude a suspension from the practice of law is the proper sanction.

Nevertheless, as the disciplinary-board properly recognized, the instant misconduct occurred in the same time frame as the misconduct forming the basis of respondent’s earlier disbarment. In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), we observed that when the underlying conduct occurs within the same period as the misconduct forming the basis for a previous disbarment, the discipline imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously. Applying this procedure in Chatelain, we declined to extend the minimum period for readmission. Instead, we adjudged the respondent guilty of additional violations warranting disbarment which were added to his record for consideration in the event he applied for readmission after becoming eligible to do so.

In determining an appropriate sanction in the instant case, we believe the approach of Chatelain is instructive. Accordingly, our determination of a sanction IfiWill be based upon the appropriate sanction we would have imposed if these charges had been before the court at the same time as the charges in Poirrier I.

Had the instant charges been filed simultaneously with those charges forming the basis of Poirrier I, they would have only reinforced our view that respondent lacks the moral fitness to practice law and must be disbarred, both as a sanction for his misconduct and to protect the public. Therefore, as in Chatelain, we will adjudge respondent guilty of additional violations which warrant discipline and which will be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. We further emphasize that although respondent may have a procedural right to apply for readmission, we retain absolute discretion to grant or deny readmission, and will carefully scrutinize any application for readmission with a critical eye.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that Raphael P. Poirrier be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant discipline and which will be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The return receipt card was signed by respondent personally.

      . Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.


author: LPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Amy E. WATLEY.
    No. 2003-B-0233.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from six counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Amy E. Watley, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I — The Beckham Matter

In September 1999, Susan Ann Beck-ham paid respondent $830 to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Respondent failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

Count II — The Hatfield Matter

In June 1999, Brenda Hatfield paid respondent $600 to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Respondent failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

| ¡,Count III — The Guillory Matter

In February 1999, Charles Guillory retained respondent to handle a personal injury matter. Respondent agreed to accept the case on a contingency fee basis, but thereafter she failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

Count IV— The Berry Matter

In November 1999, George Berry paid respondent $750 to represent him in a child custody proceeding. Respondent failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

Count V — The Broum Matter

Liza Ann Brown retained respondent to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Ms. Brown paid respondent a retainer fee; however, respondent failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

Count VI — The Greene Matter

In December 1999, Deborah Greene retained respondent to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Ms. Greene paid respondent a retainer fee; however, respondent failed to complete the matter and abandoned her law practice without protecting the interests of her client.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After investigation, the ODC filed six counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that her conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable | ¡¡diligence and promptness in representing a client) and 1.16 (termination of the representation) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

Noting the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), the hearing committee agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. After consideration of the ODC’s submission in response to the deemed admitted order, the committee concluded that respondent accepted cases but did not complete the work or communicate with her clients, and left no way for her clients or the ODC to reach her. The committee found respondent’s conduct was knowing and caused injury to her clients, the profession, and the disciplinary system. The committee recognized no mitigating factors, but determined numerous aggravating factors are present, namely respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1993). Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

RNeither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation. However, on March 27, 2002, the day before this matter was scheduled to be considered by the disciplinary board, respondent submitted a handwritten response to five of the six counts of formal charges, essentially denying any misconduct.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board agreed respondent violated duties owed to her clients and as a professional. The board further determined that respondent’s conduct was knowing, if not intentional, and caused injury to her clients. The baseline sanction for this conduct is disbarment.

The board concurred in the aggravating factors cited by the committee, and agreed the record does not support a finding of any mitigating factors.

In light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to her clients, and that she be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The deemed admitted facts in this case establish that respondent has neglected the legal matters of six clients and has abandoned her law practice without protecting _|¿the interests of her clients. Therefore, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent's misconduct.

In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary-proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

In cases involving neglect and abandonment of multiple clients, we have frequently held that disbarment is an appropriate sanction. See In re: Poirrier, 01-1116, 01-1118 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 94; In re: Smith, 98-0619, 98-0620 (La.5/8/98), 710 So.2d 241. Numerous aggravating factors are present in the instant case, including respondent’s prior disciplinary record, dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law. We are unable to discern any mitigating factors from the record.

We conclude the record demonstrates in a convincing fashion that respondent lacks the fitness necessary to practice law in this state. She must be disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Amy E. Watley, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22223, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. It is further | ^ordered that respondent render a full accounting to Susan Ann Beckham, Brenda Hatfield, Charles Guillory, George Berry, Liza Ann Brown, and Deborah Greene and that she refund any unearned fees due those clients. AH costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent was suspended by this court for one year and one day in December 2001 for entering into a fee-splitting agreement with "We the People” Paralegal Services, LLC, a non-lawyer agency that provided paralegal and secretarial services to respondent's law firm. In re: Watley, 01-1775 (La.12/7/01), 802 So.2d 593.

      . Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee's consideration.


author: liPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Walter J. CRITTENDEN.
    No. 2003-B-0321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

liPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Walter J. Crittenden, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before addressing the instant charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent’s first contact with the disciplinary system occurred in 1991, when he was admonished by the disciplinary board for failing to cooperate with the ODC. One year later, in 1992, we suspended respondent for a period of thirty days based on his failure to appear before the ODC pursuant to a subpoena. In re: Crittenden, 604 So.2d 1297 (La.1992). In 1993, respondent was again admonished by the disciplinary board for failing to cooperate with the ODC.

In January 1996, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for fading to act with diligence in representing his clients, failure to communicate with his clients, misleading his clients concerning the status of their cases, failure to account for and refund unearned fees, and failure to cooperate with the ODC. In re: Crittenden, 95-2050 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 649. Upon completing his suspension, respondent was reinstated to practice in April 1997 and placed on supervised probation for one year, subject to certain conditions. The ODC [^subsequently learned that respondent had violated the terms of his probation, and had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his 1996 suspension. The ODC filed a motion to revoke probation, which we granted effective July 2, 1998. In re: Crittenden, 98-0970 (La.7/2/98), 845 So.2d 1035. In the same order, we also placed respondent on immediate interim suspension and remanded the matter to the ODC “to conduct further investigation of the unauthorized practice of law allegations and [to] file formal charges as appropriate.”

Following remand, the ODC- filed five counts of formal charges against respondent in December 1998, alleging numerous violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in February and August 1997, while respondent was suspended or otherwise ineligible to practice for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education ■ requirement. Finding the ODC proved these charges by clear and convincing evidence, we disbarred respondent. In re: Crittenden, 01-1960 (La.1/24/03), 839 So.2d 936.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2000, while he was on interim suspension, respondent accepted a fee from Theresa Matthews and Stephone Hamilton to handle a criminal matter on behalf of Mr. Hamilton. Respondent did not advise Ms. Matthews or Mr. Hamilton that he had been on interim suspension since July 2,1998.

Respondent performed little work on his clients’ behalf and failed to adequately communicate with Ms. Matthews and Mr. Hamilton. Respondent also did not provide an accounting to his clients, nor did he refund the unearned portion of the legal fee he was paid.

|3In February 2000, Ms. Matthews filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After investigation, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct in the Hamilton matter violated numerous provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate' with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.

| ¿Hearing Committee Recommendation

Noting the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), the hearing committee agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. After consideration of the ODC’s submission in response to the deemed admitted order, the committee determined the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law. The committee recognized no mitigating factors, but found numerous aggravating factors are present, namely respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1980). Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession. Ms. Matthews and Mr. Hamilton were harmed by respondent’s fraudulent representations that he was eligible to practice law and to handle Mr. Hamilton’s legal matter. These representations deprived Ms. Matthews and Mr. Hamilton of the opportunity to timely obtain competent legal representation. Additionally, respondent fraudulently accepted funds from Ms. Matthews and Mr. Hamilton with the full knowledge that he was unable to practice law. The legal profession has been harmed by respondent’s unauthorized | .¡practice of law. Restrictions on the practice of law are designed to protect the public and the integrity of the judicial system, and to provide a means of regulation of the legal profession. Respondent’s failure to abide by these restrictions created the potential for injury to the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Finally, the legal profession has also been harmed by respondent’s failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation of the complaints filed against him. An attorney’s failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation unjustly delays and imposes an additional burden upon the disciplinary system. The board determined the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment.

The board concurred in the aggravating factors cited by the committee, and agreed the record does not support a finding of any mitigating factors.

In light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board found that disbarment is an appropriate sanction. However, recognizing that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended, the board concluded that the sanction of permanent disbarment is warranted. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to his clients, and that he be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Our review of the record demonstrates that the formal charges have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, we find respondent intentionally | fiengaged in the authorized practice of law when he knew he was prohibited from doing so. The baseline sanction for such misconduct is unquestionably disbarment.

Having determined respondent must be disbarred, the only remaining question is whether his conduct is so reprehensible that he should be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law. In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we have set forth several guidelines illustrating the types of cases which might warrant permanent disbarment. Guideline 8 applies to conduct involving the unauthorized practice of law during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred. Respondent’s conduct clearly falls within the scope of this guideline.

We do not lightly impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that we would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sanction here. Respondent’s actions in the instant matter, combined with his lengthy disciplinary record, convincingly demonstrate he does not possess the requisite moral fitness to practice law in this state. By his callous disregard for his clients and for the authority of this court, respondent has forfeited his right to practice law in the State of Louisiana. He must be permanently disbarred.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and impose permanent disbarment.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Walter J. Crit-tenden be permanently disbarred. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), he shall be |7permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.


author: 11 VICTORY, J. | JOHNSON, J.,

text:
    CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    Nos. 2002-C-1812, 2002-C-1815.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 9, 2003.

      Loretta G. Mince, James R. Swanson, Joseph C. Peiffer, Correro, Fishman, Hay-good Phelps & Weiss, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant (No. 2002-C-1815).
    Gilbert R. Buras, Jr., Metairie, Charles L. Rice, City Attorney, Franz L. Zibilich, Sherry L. Landry, Joseph V. DiRosa, Jr., Michael E. Botnick, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent (No. 2002-C-1815).
    Scott R. Bickford, Elwood Francis Xavier Cahill, Jr., Donna DiMarino Fraiche, David A. Marcello, Richard C. Stanley, Randall A. Smith, Harry A. Rosenberg, James M. Garner, New Orleans, Counsel for The Business Council (Amicus Curiae).
    Marian M. Berkett, New Orleans, Counsel for Louisiana Civil Service League (Amicus Curiae).

      Robert R. Boland, Jr., Counsel for State Civil Service Commission (Amicus Curiae).
    Charles L. Rice, Jr., City Attorney, Franz L. Zibilich, Sherry L. Landry, Joseph V. DiRosa, Jr., Michael E. Botnick, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant (No. 2002-C-1812).
    Gilbert R. Buras, Jr., Metairie, Loretta G. Mince, James R. Swanson, Joseph C. Peiffer, Correro, Fishman, Haygood Phelps & Weiss, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent (No. 2002-C-1812).
   11 VICTORY, J.

We granted this writ to determine whether rules promulgated by the New Orleans Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”), which require that privatization contracts entered into by the City must be reviewed and approved by the Commission prior to their implementation, are a constitutional exercise of the Commission’s rulemaking authority under La. Const. Art. X, § 10.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 1, 1999, the City of New Orleans (the “City”) published a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for operation of the New Orleans Cultural Center (the “Cultural Center”), which includes the city-owned Morris F.X. Jeff Municipal Auditorium and the Mahalia Jackson Theater of Performing Arts. Under City management, the Cultural Center operated at large annual deficits to the City; for example, in 1999, a $915,000.00 deficit was attributable to the Cultural Center. Thus, in order to reduce | gthe annual deficits, the City issued the RFP seeking bids from professional entertainment venue managers specializing in this type of entertainment complex. SMG Crystal, LLC (“SMG”), an international theater and arena management company which operates, among other facilities, the state-owned Superdome, the adjacent New Orleans Arena, and the City of Baton Rouge Centroplex, was awarded the contract on September 8, 2000, to become effective on October 1, 2000, for a period of ten years (the “Agreement”). The Agreement requires SMG to expend $25,000.00 annually to market and promote the Cultural Center, and, in consideration for its services, the Agreement requires the City to pay SMG an annual fee of $175,000.00, plus an incentive fee based on the amount by which SMG reduces the operating deficit.

Prior to the Agreement, the Cultural Center was operated by the Department of Property Management and employed 19 classified civil service employees. Following the Agreement, each of the 19 civil servants previously assigned to the Cultural Center were offered lateral transfers with the Department of Property Management: ten of these civil servants were offered, and accepted, positions of employment with SMG and resigned from City employment. The remaining nine remain employed by the City within the Department of Property Management at the same pay rate.

After SMG took over the operation of the Cultural Center, the Commission filed suit in Civil District Court, alleging that the Agreement was entered into in violation of its rules which require that the City obtain the Commission’s approval prior to privatizing any governmental function. The Commission sought a permanent injunction, declaring the Agreement void ab initio and prohibiting its implementation until such time as the Agreement had been submitted to and approved by the Commission. In response, the City challenged the constitutionality of the Commission’s rules on the grounds that the Commission overreached its authority in ^enacting rules that extend beyond the scope of its constitutionally granted powers.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment on December 8, 2000, enjoining: (a) the City from (1) transferring any employee employed at the Cultural Center, absent Commission approval, until such time as the Commission has approved the Agreement and (2) executing any other contracts for services to be performed at or for the Cultural Center during the pendency of this action without the Commission’s approval; and (b) SMG from discharging any SMG employee formerly employed by the City, absent Commission approval, until such time as the Commission has approved the Agreement. The City and SMG appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which affirmed the district court judgment in a 2-1 decision. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 01-0635 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/10/02), 826 So.2d 23. We granted writ applications to consider whether the Commission’s rules are a constitutional exercise of its rulemaking authority under Art. X, § 10 of the Louisiana Constitution. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 02-1812 c/w 02-1815 (La.11/1/02), 828 So.2d 581.

DISCUSSION

The City’s Powers as a Home Rule Government

Under New Orleans’ Home Rule Charter, the power to make budgetary decisions is shared between the mayor and the city council. City of New Orleans, Home Rule Charter, Art. Ill, §§ 3-115— 3-119; Art. IV, §§ 4-206(l)(f)-(g), 4-302(6). The Home Rule Charter gives the mayor and city council authority to contract for professional services through competitive selection procedures, which are fixed separately by Mayoral Executive Order for the executive branch of government and by Council Rule for contracts let by the legislative branch of city government. City of New Orleans, Home Rule Charter, Art. IV, § 4-1401; Art. VI, § 6-308. Necessarily, Lfiscal decisions within the City’s domain include decisions affecting classified employees. For instance, the City has the unrestricted authority to lay off civil servants for budgetary reasons, with the Commission playing only a ministerial role in administering the layoffs in accordance with certain constitutionally based preferences for civil servants who are veterans. La. Const. Art. X, Part I, § 10(A)(3).

In considering the City’s authority, it is well settled that the state’s political branches retain plenary authority to do all things not expressly forbidden by the Constitution. Louisiana Dep’t of Agric. & Forestry v. Sumrall, 98-1587 (La.3/2/99), 728 So.2d 1254, 1259. Pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution, a municipal authori ty governed by a home rule charter possesses powers, in affairs of local concern within its jurisdiction, that are as broad as those of the state, except when limited by the Constitution, laws permitted by the Constitution or its own home rule charter. La. Const. Art. VI, §§ 4-5; Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168, 1171 (La.1984). Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution expressly prohibits legislative interference in the powers of a municipal authority governed by a home rule charter. These constitutional grants-of authority to.home rule bodies were intended to prevent the legislature from substituting its judgment for that of the home rule government with respect to the arrangement of the various offices, departments, and agencies of the local government and the assignment, allocation or distribution of purposes, work, authority, and capacities among and within such offices, departments, and agencies. Francis, 455 So.2d at 1171. “Unless the Constitution elsewhere provides express authority for such an intrusion, any state law that changes or affects, i.e., produces an alteration in or material influence upon, the local government’s structure and 1 ^organization or the distribution of its powers and functions is prohibited.” Id. at 1171-72. “[H]ome rule abilities and immu--nities are to be broadly construed, and any claimed exception to them must be given careful scrutiny by the courts.” City of New Orleans v. Board of Comm’rs, 93-0690 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 243.

The City urges that in evaluating the City’s revenues' and budgetary needs, the mayor and council have a right and a duty to determine and expeditiously implement the most efficient and economical modes of delivery of public services, even if the may- or and council determine that a particular governmental function could best be delivered through an independent contractor, rather than through civil servants. Thus, the City argues that once the duly elected officials have deemed the privatization of a governmental function to be fiscally imperative, the Commission may not infringe upon the governing authority’s constitutionally protected right to enter into a contract with an independent contractor for the provision of such services.

The Objectives and Powers of the Civil Service Commission

The Louisiana Constitution establishes a “city civil service” that includes “all persons holding offices and positions of trust or employment in the employ of each city having over four hundred thousand population.” La. Const. ■ Art. X, Part I, § 1(B). “Civil service is designed to abrogate the ‘spoils system’ under which public employees are not selected for employment and promotion on the basis of merit or qualifications for the position but as rewards for faithful political activity and service, so that the job holders and their families become economic slaves of a particular political organization and have to vote and work for the candidates of their faction regardless of the character "or qualifications of the candidates.” New Orleans Firefighters Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 422 So.2d 402, 410 (La.1982) (“Firefighters I”) (citing 3 C.E. Dunbar, Jr., Projet of a Constitution for State of \JjjQuisiana 500 (1954)). Because of the tumultuous history of civil service in Louisiana, detailed provisions on civil service are included in our constitution so that the merit system can be repealed or amended only by á vote of the people, to protect against “repeal or weakening amendments and sabotage by a temporary majority vote of a spoils-minded and partisan legislative faction.” Id.

Thus, the prime objectives and purposes of the constitutionally created civil service system are to ensure that non-policymaking, i.e., “classified,” city employees are (1) competitively selected on the basis of merit, free from political influence, and (2) protected from discriminatory dismissal or treatment for religious or political reasons. New Orleans Firefighters Ass’n Local 632 v. New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1172, 1175 (La.1991) (“Firefighters II”) (citing 3 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana, 504 (1954)).

|7The Commission’s rulemaking powers in that regard are provided in the Constitution as follows:

Each commission is vested with broad and general rulemaking and subpoena powers for the administration and regulation of the classified service, including the power to adopt rules for regulating employment, promotion, demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, removal, certification, qualifications, political activities, employment conditions, compensation ... to employees, and other personnel matters and transactions; to adopt a uniform ... classification plan; ... and generally to accomplish the objectives and purposes of the merit system of civil service as herein established.

La. Const. Art. X, Part I, § 10(A)(1). Rules adopted by the Commission have the effect of law. Firefighters II, supra at 1175; Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 246 So.2d 800 (1971). “Thus, a city civil service commission has the exclusive power to adopt rules regulating the classified service in the areas specifically enumerated in Section 10(A)(1), and the city governing authority cannot constitutionally infringe on the commission’s exercise of this power.” Firefighters II, supra at 1175. “Moreover, the convention debates surrounding the adoption of Section 10(A)(1) indicated an intent that this provision should be construed liberally in favor of fulfilling the goals of civil service.” Id.

In 1988, pursuant to Art. X, § 10(A)(1), the Commission adopted Rule III, Sections

6.1through 6.4, in force at the time the Agreement was entered into, which states, in pertinent part:

6.1 All contracts for personal and professional services, and amendments thereto, shall be reviewed and approved by the Director well in advance of their effective dates to insure compliance with the Civil Service Law and to determine whether such services should be provided within the classified service. Such contracts shall become effective only when approved by the Director. When so approved, they may thereafter continue for a period not to exceed one (1) year from the effective date of the contract.
6.2 Contracts for personal or professional services ... shall be approved only when such services require unique or specialized skills not presently required of positions in the classified service ...
|s6.3 All contracts for personal or professional services ... first shall be transmitted to the Civil Service Department for initial consideration and review, and again for final approval after all other aspects of contractual review have been completed ...
6.4 The prior provisions of this Rule notwithstanding, if due to fiscal restraints or some other cause it becomes necessary to privatize either a traditional governmental function or one unique to the City which has been performed by classified employees, or to privatize an existing or newly established organization unit of city government which is or could be staffed by classified city employees, no action or decision toward this end by any agency of the City, State, or Parish of Orleans shall become binding and effective until approved by the City Civil Service Commission, subject to the following conditions:
(a) Any contract for privatization of a governmental service shall contain a provision that thoroughly explains the effects of privatization on the status of current employees, as well as any specific contractual commitments entered into by the parties, which affect the interests of the displaced employees.
(b) Any contract for privatization of a governmental service shall contain an additional provision which has the effect of prohibiting unlawful discriminatory treatment of employees.
(c) Any contract for privatization of a governmental service shall contain an additional provision which affords regular employees an opportunity for a full and fair hearing prior to any disciplinary action.
(d) Employees who choose to remain in the classified service of the City may request the City Civil Service Commission to invoke the application of Rule XII, Layoffs, in order to preserve their classified status.
(e) Commission approval of a contract for privatization shall be effective only for the term of the contract actually reviewed.
(f) A copy of the proposed contract, and such other evidence to be presented to the Commission to justify the necessity for privatization, shall be reviewed with the Commission at a public meeting. The Commission shall not approve the contract prior to a subsequent meeting, with due notice given to the public of the proposed provisions of the privatization contract. Due notice shall 19include individual notification to affected employees.

The court of appeal found that these rules are squarely within the constitutional authority granted to the Commission in that they relate to the selection, hiring, promotion, demotion, suspension, and removal of public employees. 826 So.2d at 30. The City and SMG argue that the court of appeal erred in holding that the Commission’s privatization rules are within the scope of the Commission’s constitutional authority.

Analysis

As stated above, pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution, a municipal authority governed by a home rule charter possesses powers, in affairs of local concern within its jurisdiction, that are as broad as those of the state, except when limited by the Constitution, laws permitted by the Constitution, or its own home rule charter. La. Const. Art. VI, §§ 4-5; Francis v. Morial, supra at 1171. Thus, the issue here is whether Rule III, Secs. 6.1-6.4, under which the Commission claims its authority to review and approve privatization contracts entered into by the mayor, are laws permitted by the Constitution.

This Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether rules enacted by the Commission are within the Commission’s constitutional authority:

In evaluating the constitutionality of Commission rules, this Court has applied the two-part analysis developed in [Firefighters I] and [Firefighters 77], and reaffirmed by this Court in Police Ass’n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 94-1078 (La.1/17/95), 649 So.2d 951, 959. In the Firefighters II case, we described the authority granted to state and city commissions under Article X, Section 10(A)(1) as the “exclusive power to adopt rules regulating the classified service in the areas specifically enumerated in Section 10(A)(1).” [Firefighters II], 590 So.2d at 1176 (emphasis added). Thus, our initial inquiry when | ^evaluating the Commission’s authority to enact a rule is whether the rule in question falls within an area specifically enumerated in Article X, Section 10(A)(1).
“However, in areas of power affecting public employees which are not enumerated in Section 10(A)(1), a commission’s powers should not be expanded beyond those necessary to effectuate the objectives and purposes of the civil service.” [Firefighters II], 590 So.2d at 1176 (citing [Firefighters I], 422 So.2d at 411) (emphasis added). “Thus, if the Commission has adopted a rule in an area not specifically enumerated in Section 10(A)(1), a court must ask whether it is necessary for the commission to have the power to enact the rules in question to effectuate the objectives and purposes of the civil service.” Id.

Sumrall, supra at 1261.

Thus, we first must determine whether the power to make rules concerning the approval of contracts to manage and operate City facilities is specifically enumerated by Art. X, § 10(A)(1) of the Constitution. As with statutory interpretation, “when interpreting a constitutional provision, the starting point is with the language of the provision.” Id. at 1258. Further, when “a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, its language must be given effect.” Id.

As noted above, the constitutional provision governing this case is Article X, § 10(A)(1) which vests the Commission with:

broad and general rulemaking and subpoena powers for the administration and regulation of the classified service, including the power to adopt rules for regulating employment, promotion, demotion, suspension, reduction in pay, removal, certification, qualifications, political activities, employment conditions, compensation and disbursements to employees, and other personnel matters.

Here, the Commission has adopted rules which require that all contracts for personal or professional services and all privatization contracts be submitted to the Commission for their review and approval. The Commission’s rules governing the approval of the City’s contracts do not appear to have anything whatsoever to do with “reduction in pay,” “certification,” “qualifications,” “political activities,” “employment conditions,” 1 n “compensation,” or “disbursements” as those terms have been defined. Therefore, the question is whether the Commission is authorized to make these rules under the Commission’s powers to regulate civil service “employment,” “promotion,” “demotion,” “suspension,” “removal,” or “other personnel matters.” This Court has defined those terms as follows:

(1)“employment” refers in context to the selection and hiring of employees;
(2) “promotion” and “demotion” refer to the raising or lowering in position of employees after employment;
(3) “suspension” refers to the temporary removal of a public employee from service;
(4) “removal” refers to the permanent separation from employment; and
(5) “other personnel matters” allows the Commission some flexibility in rulemak-ing with respect to administration of personnel.

Firefighters II, 590 So.2d at 1173; Sum-rail, 728 So.2d at 1262. In a privatization contract, the only possible effect on civil service employees would be their “removal” from civil service. However, this Court has twice previously held that the City, not the Commission, has the power to make rules that incidentally affect “employment” of classified workers and even result, in their “removal,” where the ability to make such rules are not a part of the Commission’s constitutionally enumerated powers. For instance, in Firefighters II, the City enacted an ordinance that required elassi-fied 11 ¿workers to be domiciled in Orleans Parish. The ordinance authorized the “removal of a public employee who violates” the residency requirement. The Commission challenged the ordinance claiming it intruded on the Commission’s ability to regulate “employment” and “removal” of classified workers. This Court disagreed with the Commission and upheld the ordinance, finding that the ordinance did not fall under the Commission’s ability to regulate the “removal” of classified employees in that a “commission’s power to regulate removal deals more with fairness and procedural safeguards in the removal process” and that the right to regulate removal speaks more to “the prohibition against subjecting a permanent employee to disciplinary action except for cause.” Firefighters II, supra at 1176.

This Court reaffirmed its holding in Firefighters II a few years later in Police Association, 649 So.2d at 960. In Police Association, the City passed an ordinance that allowed policemen to live outside of New Orleans, but required policemen to move into the city to be eligible for a promotion. This Court was again called upon to decide whether it was the City or the Commission that had the power to impose this requirement. The plaintiffs argued, and the appeals court held, that Firefighters II “pertained only to domicile requirements as related to initial employment and not to promotions ...” See id. at 958. This Court reversed, holding that Firefighters II “goes beyond dealing with initial employment” and the opinion analyzed “the effect of the domicile requirement not only on initial employment, but on promotion, suspension, removal, political activities, etc., holding that the domicile requirement did not impinge on any of these functions and powers of the Civil Service Commission.” Id. at 958-59.

In this case, SMG and the City argue that no classified civil servants were even “removed” from employment under the Agreement, and therefore, the Commission has |iano review power over the Agreement at all. Further, even if one or more classified employees were displaced as a result of a privatization contract, such displacement would be more akin to a “layoff’ that to a “removal.” Under Art. X, § 10(A)(3), the Commission does not have the power to regulate when a layoff can occur, but can only regulate the administration of the layoff. Art. X, § 10(A)(3) provides in pertinent part: “When a position in the classified service is abolished, or needs to be vacated because of stoppage of work from lack of funds or other causes, preference employees ... whose length of service and efficiency ratings are at least equal to those of other competing employees shall be retained in preference to all other competing employees.” The City and SMG argue that this decision by the framers of the Constitution not to grant the Commission the power to prevent, affect, or even to review proposed layoffs is significant because there is no greater action that can affect the classified service employees than layoffs.

We find no specific language under Art. 10, Sec. 10(A)(1) which gives the Commission the power to make rules concerning the approval of contracts to manage and operate City facilities. We must now consider whether it is necessary for the Commission to have the power to enact the rules in question to effectuate the objectives and purposes of the civil service.

As noted above, the primary objectives and purposes of the civil service system are to (1) ensure that classified employees are competitively selected on the basis of merit, free from political influence, and (2) protect classified employees from dismissal or disciplinary actions for religious or politically motivated reasons. The issue here is whether it is necessary for the Commission to enact rules requiring its review and approval of all privatization contracts in order to accomplish these objectives.

[uIn making this determination, we recognize that there is a delicate balance to be reached between the Commission’s duty to protect against the spoils system, either by privatization or otherwise, and the may- or’s power and authority to operate the city in a fiscally responsible manner and to enter into contracts to fulfill that duty. Although res nova in this Court, many state supreme courts have addressed the issue of whether the privatization of governmental functions through the use of independent contractors runs afoul of constitutionally created civil service systems. Certain courts have held that privatization by a governmental entity does not necessarily violate the state civil service system, although these courts did not determine the circumstances under which private contracts were acceptable. See Moore v. State, Dept. Of Tramp, and Public Facilities, 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994); Maryland Classified Employees Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 846 Md. 1, 694 A.2d 937 (1997); Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Hall County, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74, 80 (1979) (holding that merit system does not prohibit governing authority from discontinuing a department of county government in the best interest of serving the public); Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 Md. 448, 727 A.2d 369, 378 (1999) (finding its conclusion that the privatization of civil service positions does not violate civil service protections to be “[i]n accord with the clear majority of cases throughout the country, ... that general provisions establishing a merit system for government employees ... [do not] preclude the government from privatizing”). Other states have taken the position that privatization may be undertaken only pursuant to specific authorization. See Colorado Ass’n of Public Employees v. Department of Highways, 809 P.2d 988 (Colo.1991); Horrell v. Department of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194 (Colo.1993); Vermont State Employees’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council, 167 Vt. 191, 704 A.2d 769 (1997). Some courts have held that services customarily and historically provided by civil servants |1Rmay not be contracted out to private parties, at least so long as civil servants are able to provide the services sought to be contracted out. Konno v. County of Hawai'i, 85 Hawai'i 61, 937 P.2d 397 (1997); Washington Federation of State Emp., AFL-CIO, Council 28 v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wash.2d 698, 585 P.2d 474 (1978). California courts have held that the government is not permitted to privatize services that are adequately and competently provided by civil servants, State Compensation Ins. Fund. v. Riley, 9 Cal.2d 126, 69 P.2d 985 (1937); Burum v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 30 Cal.2d 575, 184 P.2d 505 (1947); California State Employees’ Assn. v. State of California, 199 Cal.App.3d 840, 245 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1988); Department of Transportation v. Chavez, 7 Cal.App.4th 407, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 (1992), but have created an exception for new state services. California State Employees’ Assn. v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 86 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1970). Some courts have held that, under the civil service system, a governmental entity is permitted to enter into a private contract, or lay off or abolish the positions of civil servants in order to enter into a private contract, only in good faith. Connecticut State Employees Ass’n v. Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut, 165 Conn. 757, 345 A.2d 36 (1974); Ball v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 251 Md. 685, 248 A.2d 650 (1968); Michigan State Employees Ass’n v. Civil Service Com’n, 141 Mich.App. 288, 367 N.W.2d 850 (1985); University of Nevada v. State Emp. Ass’n, Inc., 90 Nev. 105, 520 P.2d 602 (1974); Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO v. State, 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1982); Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135 (1951); State ex rel. Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc., 45 Ohio St.2d 308, 345 N.E.2d 61 (1976); Dougherty v. Com., Dept. Of Health, 113 Pa.Cmwlth. 620, 538 A.2d 91 (1988); Moncrief v. Tate, 593 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1980).

|1fiThe Supreme Court of Alaska provided a thoughtful discussion of the issue in Moore v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Public Facilities, supra, when confronted with the argument that the establishment of the civil service in the state constitution prohibited privatization of state jobs. The court found that the answer involved balancing two competing factors: the merit principles goal of insulating state workers from political influence and the state government’s basic function “which is to govern, not to employ, and to govern effectively, the state must govern efficiently.” 875 P.2d at 769. Recognizing that, just as in this case, the constitution allows state agencies broad discretion to eliminate positions and order layoffs for reasons of efficiency and economy, provided that their decisions are not politically motivated, the court described the remaining issue as whether a different, more restrictive rule is constitutionally compelled in the specific context of privatization, when the decision to cut spending by ordering layoffs is accompanied by a plan to enter into lower-cost private contracts for the same services. After recognizing that nothing in the applicable law prohibited the state from reducing its workforce and laying off personnel for reasons of economy, and that the state procurement code specifically vests the executive branch with broad authority to enter into contracts for services and professional services, the court concluded that there appeared to be little danger that privatization could successfully be used as a device for subverting the merit principle’s primary goal of shielding state workers and jobs from political influence. State personnel rules that deal with layoffs offer protection against political influence, the court declared, by ensuring that state workers who are potential targets of layoff are treated fairly and that the effects of any actual layoff are mitigated. Furthermore, the court continued, the procurement code establishes extensive control over agency contracting procedures. Thus, the court held that while the social costs of privatizing 117the state workforce might justify legislative scrutiny, and while situations requiring judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis may arise from time to time, the risk that privatization poses to the merit system did not warrant the somewhat drastic measure of declaring it constitutionally barred. The court also emphasized that any risk arising from privatization must be balanced against the countervailing dangers of an unduly rigid reading of the constitution’s merit system language, a reading that could extend the merit system provision beyond its originally intended scope. Id. at 770-772.

We agree with the vast majority of courts that privatization does not necessarily run afoul of the constitutionally created civil service system for the following reasons. The Home Rule Charter gives the mayor and city council broad authority to enter into contracts for professional services. Significantly, the mayor and city council have the authority to layoff city workers and close city-run facilities for reasons of efficiency and economy, without any regulation by the Commission. Further, nothing in the Constitution regarding the mayor’s powers under the Home Rule Charter or the Commission’s powers restricts the City from reducing its workforce and laying off employees for reasons of economy. Conversely, the constitution provides certain | ^protections for civil servants laid off for economic or other reasons. La. Const. Art. X, § 10(A)(3). Finally, privatization may provide important benefits by reducing costs and increasing governmental efficiency and productivity, which the mayor and city council have the responsibility to determine. Thus, in light of these factors, and considering the above jurisprudence from other states, we see that the City has the broad discretion to enter into privatization contracts for reasons of efficiency and economy, provided that the decision to privatize is made without political motivation as to civil servants.

However, we also find that the mayor and city council do not have the unfettered discretion to potentially decimate the civil service system by eliminating all civil servant positions through privatization,- and, therefore, we find that checks on that discretion are necessary and authorized by the Constitution. In fact, until the instant contract, the City routinely submitted proposed contracts for privatization to the Commission for its review and the Commission routinely approved these contracts. In order to exercise its authority to protect the civil service under the Constitution, we find that the Commission has the right to review all contracts that directly affect civil service employees within a reasonable period of time, prior to the contract’s implementation.

That being said, we must emphasize that the Commission’s review is limited to that which is necessary to ensure that classified city employees are competitively selected on the basis of merit, free from political influence, and to protect classified employees from dismissal or disciplinary actions for religious or politically motivated reasons. Thus, the City must turn over all documents and other evidence which will enable the Commission to determine: (1) whether any civil service employees will be | ^involuntarily displaced from the civil service; and, if so (2) whether the contract was entered into for reasons of efficiency and economy and not for politically motivated reasons. However, in conducting its review, the Commission has no constitutional authority to determine whether a service should or could be provided within the classified system, whether a contract is in the best interests of the City, or to second guess whether the fiscal restraints presented by the City justify privatization. Rule III goes much too far in this regard. For instance, Sec. 6.1 provides that all contracts for personal and professional services shall become effective only when apprpved by the Director. Further, Sec. 6.1 gives the Commission the authority to “determine whether [personal or professional] services should be provided within the classified service.” Sec. 6.2 provides that personal and professional services contracts will be approved “only when such services require unique or specialized skills not presently required of positions in the classified service, or where such services cannot be provided within the classified service.” Sec. 6.4 refers to the Commission’s review in situations where it becomes necessary to privatize due to “fiscal restraints or some other cause,” and that no action by any agency of the City, State, or Parish Orleans to privatize shall be binding or effective until approved by the Commission. These are examples of the type of review that is beyond the Commission’s constitutionally limited scope of review over City contracts.

If, after conducting the above two-part review, the Commission finds that no civil servants will be involuntarily displaced from the civil service, or, if they will, that the contract was entered into for reasons of efficiency and economy and not for politically motivated reasons as to the civil servants, it should approve the contract. However, if the Commission has good reason to believe that civil servants will be involuntarily displaced and that the contract was entered into, not for reasons of 1 ¡^efficiency and economy, but for politically motivated reasons, it may refuse to approve the contract. However, it may not enforce its rule that the contract only becomes effective when approved by the Commission Director, as there is no provision in the Constitution that allows it to adopt such a rule, which effectively gives the Commission an ex parte injunction. Instead, the Commission has the right to challenge in court any privatization or other contract that it has good cause to believe was entered into by the mayor or city council as a pretext for the discriminatory dismissal or treatment of civil servants for religious or political reasons. Jurisdiction for this type of lawsuit lies in the state district courts pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 16(A) (A district court has original jurisdiction “of cases involving ... the state, a political corporation, or political subdivisions ... as a defendant”).

Based on the above reasoning, we find that the portions of Rule III, Sec. 6.1-6.4 which give the Commission the ex parte authority to suspend the effectiveness of such contracts entered into by the City for personal or professional services, are beyond the power that is granted to it by Art. X, § 10(A)(1), and therefore unconstitutional. However, we find that the Commission Rules that generally provide for Commission review are constitutional, subject to the limitations expressed herein, that the Commission determine only whether civil servants will be involuntarily displaced, and, if so, whether the contract is being entered into for reasons of efficiency and economy and not as a pretext for the discriminatory dismissal of civil servants for religious or politically motivated reasons. Otherwise, we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of any other particular rules, as that would be premature.

CONCLUSION

In this case, the record reveals that the City did not properly submit the Agreement and all other evidence regarding privatization to the Commission. The ^Commission has therefore never approved or disapproved the Agreement, but held its ruling in abeyance and sought and obtained an injunction which was approved by the court of appeal.

We hold that the City must now properly submit the Agreement and all other evidence regarding privatization to the Commission for its approval or disapproval following a public hearing. If the commission approves the Agreement, the matter is resolved. If the commission disapproves the Agreement, the Commission may bring an action in court, including injunction proceedings to temporarily enjoin the enforcement of the Agreement. Ultimately, the issue on the merits will be whether the Commission’s decision to disapprove the Agreement is warranted under the guidelines discussed herein. At trial on the merits, the burden of proof will be on the Commission to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agreement was not approved by the Commission after a full public hearing, and on the City to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that no civil servants will be involuntarily displaced, or, if they will, that the Agreement was entered into in good faith for non-political reasons as to the civil servants.

DECREE

The judgments of the lower courts with regard to the preliminary injunction are affirmed. However, the case is remanded to the trial court to establish a deadline for the city to submit the Agreement and its evidence to the Commission for review.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED.

JOHNSON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

| JOHNSON, J.,

concurs in part and dissents in part.

We granted this writ application to determine whether the City Civil Service Commission in enacting Rule III, Sections 6.1 through 6.4 had attempted to regulate beyond its jurisdiction.

The majority finds that portions of Rule III exceed the powers granted to the Commission by Constitution Article X, Section 10(A)(1) but ultimately concludes that the Commission rules that provide for review and approval of privatization contracts, prior to their implementation, are constitutional. While we pay lip service to the broad powers granted to the Mayor and Council over operation of City government under the City’s Home Rule Charter, in fact, we have given the City Civil Service Commission veto power over any reorganization of City government.

The jurisprudence has long recognized that the Mayor and Council of the City of New Orleans have broad powers to reorganize government for reasons of efficiency and economy. The only limitation on this broad power is the requirement that the city act in good faith. The change must be a real and not a sham reorganization. The city is prohibited from any action for political or other prohibited reasons.

While the City Mayor and Council have acquiesced in the past to the | ^Commission’s demand that all contracts that eliminate civil service positions be submitted for review and approval prior to implementation, I am not convinced that we should elevate this practice to a constitutional right, and I respectfully dissent.

If the Commission believes that the City has acted in bad faith, or for a prohibited reason, the Commission should bring an action for injunctive relief in the District Court, as was done in this case.

In the proceeding for injunctive relief, the Commission, in my opinion, has the burden of proof as to all issues. It is the Commission’s burden to establish that the City acted in bad faith, for political or some other prohibited reasons.

      . “Privatization” has been defined as “any process aimed at shifting functions and responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to the private sector.” Donald G. Featherstun, et al., State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 Pub. Cont. L.J. 643, 646 (2001). "Contracting out, the most prevalent form of privatization, occurs when a government entity uses a private contractor instead of public resources to provide a government service.” Id.

      . Section 6 provides as follows: “The legislature shall enact no law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision which operates under a home rule charter.” La. Const. Art. VI, § 6.

      . The first civil service system under which the City operated was provided in the City Charter of 1896, Art 45 of 1896. This first act was emasculated two years later by Act 113 of 1898 and Act 89 of 1900. The Charter of 1912, Act 159 of 19Í2, Section 20 constituted the Board of Civil Service Commissioners as the mayor and two commissioners selected by the Commission Council. Its powers and duties were prescribed by Act 89 of 1900 as amended. Then in 1936 the system came under the control of the mayor. Act 338 of 1936 constituted the Board of Civil Service Commissioners as the mayor and two citizens of the City appointed by the mayor. The system was left to the Commission to devise by rule and regulation, and authority was given to include parochial employees. This was the prevailing law when Act 171 of 1940 was passed setting up the City Civil Service System which was to go into effect in 1943 and which laws could be repealed or amended by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. In 1948, the legislature abolished the civil service system in Louisiana by a two-thirds vote. Thus, scholars recommended that civil service be given constitutional status beyond control of the legislature. In 1952, the state legislature put forth a proposed amendment to the 1921 Constitution, Acts 1952, No. 18, which was submitted to and approved by the voters, enacting Article 14, § 15 of the 1921 Constitution creating both a state civil service commission and a New Orleans civil service commission. “To avoid discrimination and favoritism, to promote efficiency of governmental operation, and to encourage promotion based on merit, the electorate, by adoption of Section 15, has placed certain aspects of state and municipal classified employment beyond the pale of state and local governmental control.” Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129, 143 (La.1974). The 1974 ..Constitution reaffirmed civil service’s position as organic law by placing civil service for the City of New Orleans directly in the Constitution. The delegates to the 1974 Constitution rejected proposals which would have allowed the legislature by a two-thirds, or even three-fourths, vote to amend or modify the constitutional civil service provisions. "The interest and intent of a majority of the delegates in formulating the 1974 Constitution was to create an independent, autonomous, non-political state and city civil service 'safeguarded and removed as far as humanly possible from any form of political influence or any suspicion of political influence or control.’ ” Civil Service Com. v. Guste, 428 So.2d 457, 461 (La.1983) (citing Dunbar at 504).

      . The Commission has since adopted new rules, effective February 1, 2001, which provide more specific guidelines for the review of personal and professional services contracts and privatization contracts. Rule III, Secs. 6.1-6.6.

      . In Firefighters II, certain of these terms were defined as follows:
      (1) "qualifications” for employment refer to requirements as to education, experience or similar factors; (2) "compensation,” "reduction in pay” and "certification” are related to a commission’s express power to adopt a uniform pay and classification plan; (3) "political activities” involves the power of a commission not only to limit the political activities of public employees, but also conversely to protect public employees from discrimination and intimidation on the basis of political beliefs; and (4) “employment conditions” concern safety, hours of work, freedom from intimidation and the like.

        Firefighters II, 590 So.2d at 1176-77.

      . We further address this issue, infra, at pages 335-36.

      . The Supreme Court of Maryland has held that the same rules that allow a state agency to layoff a merit system employee by abolishing the position which he holds, with the limitation that it be for a bona fide reason and not a subterfuge to evade the merit system laws, also governs the legitimacy of privatization of jobs performed by state classified employees. Ball, supra. Acknowledging the concern that privatization constituted a nefarious precedent whereby the protection afforded state employees under the merit system could be materially and substantially eroded by the wholesale contracting out to private contractors work performed by state employees, the court replied that it thought such a fear to be unwarranted, because unless such an action is done in good faith it is subject to challenge in court. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Nevada has held that the statute permitting the layoff of classified employees in case of the "abolition of a position or of other material changes in duties or organization” also permits the government to privatize positions originally held by state classified employees, if done in good faith, to effect a real and not fundamentally sham reorganization and also for substantial, rather than arbitrary and capricious reasons. University of Nevada v. State Emp. Ass'n, Inc., supra.

      In Michigan, the supreme court has held that good faith can be established by showing that the position is to be abolished for reasons of efficiency and economy. Michigan State Employees Ass’n v. Civil Service Com'n, 141 Mich.App. 288, 367 N.W.2d 850 (1985).

      . This is basically the way it has been done prior to this Agreement with no complaint.


text:
    Edward Lewis BECKER v. Lynn B. DEAN, in His Capacity as Candidate for the Office of Councilman-at-Large (East), St. Bernard Parish, and Lena R. Torres, in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court, Etc.
    No. 2003-C-2493.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2003.
   In re Dean, Lynn B. Candidate Councilman at Large et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-760; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1561.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nikimba Lamont WILSON.
    No. 2003-KK-2633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Wilson, Nikimba Lamont; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 37,427; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38174-KW.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ application, reverse the court of appeal, and reinstate the trial court ruling.


text:
    Leo Joseph BABIN, Jr. v. Shirley Ann Schilling BABIN.
    No. 2003-C-2460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 24, 2003.
   In re Babin, Leo Joseph Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, The Family Court, No. 126,676; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0396.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey MILLER.
    No. 2003-KK-2680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 25, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-0404; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-K-1127.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Spencer MORGAN.
    No. 2002-K-3196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 389-902; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-KA-2685.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Lewis, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 11 — 96— 292; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 0914.

Writ granted. The district court is directed to consider relator’s request for a cost estimate of his district attorney file. Range v. Moreau, 96-1607 (La.9/3/96), 678 So.2d 537.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald A. ROSS.
    No. 2003-KH-2475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Ross, Donald A.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 76393, 79728.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Demetruis CARTER.
    No. 2003-KH-2507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Carter, Demetruis; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 427-235.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew PEARSON.
    No. 2003-KH-2511.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Pearson, Matthew; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. none.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Quincy HERBERT.
    No. 2003-KH-2569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Herbert, Quincy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 03A-118244.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. Randy R. DENT.
    No. 2003-KH-2512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Dent, Randy R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Municipal Court, No. F53240D.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the municipal court for its consideration. The court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony HOPSON.
    No. 2002-KO-2373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Hopson, Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated June 27, 2003; Parish of FranMin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-430; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit No. 36,244-KA.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Samuel HERON v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD.
    No. 2003-CC-1090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Dixie Machine Welding and Metal Works, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Action dated April 15, 2003; Parish of Orleans Civil District Court Div “J”, No. 02-10182; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0492.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    William DECKER v. L.O. ABINGTON.
    No. 2003-C-1112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Decker, William; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated June 27, 2003; Court of Appeal Third Circuit, No. 02-1256; Parish of Rapides, 9th JDC, Div. A. No. 199,919.

Not considered. See La, S.Ct. Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    Craig WEST, Troy West, and W.B. Farms Inc., et al. v. G & H SEED COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-2146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Aventis Crop Science USA LP;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-C-4984-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-00693.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gill HARRIS.
    No. 2001-K-1225.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Harris, Gill; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 389-103; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-KA-2845.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian Michael LUMPKIN.
    No. 2002-K-1124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Lumpkin, Brian Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99 CR8 76587; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 1721.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cynthia GORDON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Gordon, Cynthia; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. CR 3631-98-2, CR 7517-00; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 01-1024, 01-1025.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Patrick D. ASHLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2238.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Ashley, Patrick D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 390-587; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1222.

Denied.


text:
    ANR PIPELINE COMPANY, High Island Offshore System, L.L.C., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, Southern Natural Gas Company, UT Offshore System, L.L.C., and Mid-Louisiana Gas Company v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION, Malcolm B. Price, Jr., Chairman of the Louisiana Tax Commission, Kenneth P. Naquin, Jr., Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission and Russel R. Gaspard, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission.
    No. 2002-CC-2261.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Tax Commission et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 491,897; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0576.

Denied. See ANR Pipeline Company v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 02-1479 (La.7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1145.

WEIMER, J., recused.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emanuel WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Williams, Emanuel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 348-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1056.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jory WALKER.
    No. 2003-KH-2576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Walker, Jory; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 440019.

Denied on the showing made.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy WILKERSON.
    No. 2003-KH-2550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Wilkerson, Troy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 439-460.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone WIGGINS.
    No. 2003-K-0894.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Wiggins, Tyrone; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 01-3207; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-966.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence J. JONES.
    No. 2003-K-0895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Jones, Terrence J.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 97-7165; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-908.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mario A. MARSHALL.
    No. 2003-K-0909.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Marshall, Mario A.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 00-6865; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-1067.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrin HAYES.
    No. 2002-KP-3129.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Hayes, Darrin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 366-876; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1945.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher SANBORN.
    No. 2002-KO-3130.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Sanborn, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-0313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-257.

Denied.