author: JjPER CURIAM

text:
    James HOWARD v. WEST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2003-C-1426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 20, 2004.

      Charles W. Rea, Baton Rouge, for applicant.
    Delise, Amedee & Hall, Patrick M. Ame-dee, Metairie, for respondent.
   JjPER CURIAM

In this matter, we are called upon to determine whether the lower courts have properly interpreted a prior judgment of this court ordering that plaintiff be reinstated to his former position as a teacher.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

James Howard was a tenured vocational instructor employed by the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board (“Board”) to teach a shop mechanics class. In October 1996, Mr. Howard was suspended with pay pending an investigation by the Board after he reported that a loaded gun was stolen from his wife’s car while it was parked outside of his classroom. On February 5, 1997, Mr. Howard was charged with willful neglect of duty concerning the loss of the firearm. After a tenure hearing on March 5, 1997, the Board voted to terminate Mr. Howard’s employment for willful neglect of duty.

| -.Mr. Howard appealed his termination to the district court, which affirmed the school board’s decision on June 17, 1998. Mr. Howard then appealed to the court of appeal, which likewise affirmed. Howard v. West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 98 2574 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/22/00), 770 So.2d 441.

Upon Mr. Howard’s application, we granted writs and docketed the case. On June 29, 2001, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. Howard v. West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 00-3234 (La.6/29/01), 793 So.2d 153 (hereinafter referred to as “Howard I ”). In our opinion, we concluded the Board did not have a rational basis supported by substantial evidence to terminate Mr. Howard for willful neglect of duty. Accordingly, we ordered that Mr. Howard be reinstated “to his former position with all salary,- compensation, and emoluments.” That judgment became final on August 31, 2001, when we denied the Board’s application for rehearing.

There is no evidence that the Board took formal action to reinstate Mr. Howard following the finality of our judgment. However, by letter dated October 18, 2001, the Board, through its Superintendent of Schools, Beverly Triche, advised Mr. Howard that the shop mechanics course he was teaching at the time of his separation from the school board in March 1997 had been discontinued from the West Baton' Rouge Parish curriculum in August 1997. According to Ms. Triche’s letter, this course was the only course Mr. Howard was certified to teach. As a result, she advised Mr. Howard of the termination of his employment as a result of program elimination, and further indicated that this notification was “retroactive to August, 1997.” Mr. Howard was informed that pursuant to the Board’s policy on reductions-in-force, he had fifteen days to submit a written request for review.

|aMr. Howard did not request review of the school board’s reduction-in-force action. However, on October 29, 2001, he filed a motion in the trial court seeking to enforce this court’s judgment in Howard I. In his motion, Mr. Howard argued that in order to give effect to the court’s opinion in Howard I, the Board could not take any action against him until he was reinstated. Accordingly, Mr. Howard argued that he should be paid all of the wages and benefits he would have received from the date of his last full paycheck in. March 1997 until he was reinstated, and thereafter until his relationship with the Board was severed.

The Board opposed Mr. Howard’s motion. As a result of the reduction-in-force which eliminated the only course Mr. Howard could teach, the Board contended that Mr. Howard was entitled only to the balance of his salary for the remainder of the 1996-97 academic year, when the shop mechanics class was eliminated from the curriculum.

Following a hearing, the district court ordered that Mr. Howard be reinstated to his former position and salary. The court further ordered that Mr. Howard be paid all back pay, benefits, and emoluments from the date he was terminated until he is reinstated, with legal interest from the date of judicial demand until paid. The trial court adopted the “[ojrders of the Louisiana Supreme Court as its written reasons for judgment.”

The Board appealed. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit amended the judgment of the district court to provide that Mr. Howard should be reinstated to his former position from March 1997 through August 1997, the date the shop mechanics class was eliminated by the Board. Howard v. West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 02-0803 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/28/03), 843 So.2d 511. In its opinion, the court of appeal .[^reasoned that the Board’s decision to eliminate the shop course effective August 1997 was not made in bad faith.

Upon Mr. Howard’s application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision.

DISCUSSION

Our opinion in Howard I clearly ordered the Board to reinstate Mr. Howard “to his former position with all salary, compensation, and emoluments.” The record before us is devoid of any evidence indicating the Board complied with the mandate of that judgment. Rather, the only evidence in the record of the Board’s action concerning Mr. Howard’s position is the October 18, 2001 letter which advised him for the first time that he was being terminated from his employment with the Board because the only course he was certified to teach had been eliminated from the curriculum as of August 1997.

The Board contends that this letter should be interpreted as reinstating Mr. Howard to his position as of March 1997, but terminating him retroactively to August 1997, the date the shop mechanics course was eliminated. We find the Board’s interpretation is at odds with language contained in the letter of October 18, 2001. Although that letter purports to make the notification of termination retroactive to August 1997, it also gives Mr. Howard fifteen days to request review of the action. By giving Mr. Howard fifteen days from the October 18, 2001 letter to challenge the Board’s action, the Board obviously recognized his termination did not become effective until October 18, 2001, despite language to the contrary in the letter.

| ¿Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Howard should be considered reinstated to his former position as of the date of his last paycheck in March 1997 through October 18, 2001, the date on which he was formally advised by the Board that he was terminated because the shop mechanics class was eliminated from the curriculum. Accordingly, we will amend the judgment of the court of appeal to this effect.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is amended to provide that the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board is ordered to reinstate James Howard to his former position with all salary, compensation, and emoluments, beginning on the date of his last paycheck in March 1997 through October 18, 2001, with legal interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid. All costs in this court are assessed against the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board.

JOHNSON, J., dissents.

       Retired Judge Robert J. Klees, assigned as Associate Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for Associate Justice John L. Weimer, recused.

      . Because Mr. Howard did not request such review, the question of whether the Board properly terminated him is not before the court.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy WILLIAMS v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden. State ex rel. Jimmy Ray Williams v. State of Louisiana.
    Nos. 2001-KP-0670, 2001-KP-1099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 27, 2002.
   In re Jimmy Ray Williams, filing Motion to Dismiss Writs as Moot; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. B., No. 7-94-871.

Motion to dismiss granted. Writs recalled.

WEIMER, J., would deny the motion.


text:
    MIKE M. MARCELLO, INC. v. LOUISIANA GAMING CONTROL BOARD.
    No. 2004-CC-0329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 4, 2004.
   In re Adams, Natalie;—Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 472-384; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CW 0186.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    CITY OF KENNER and Dominic Weilbecher v. W. Fox MCKEITHEN, Secretary of State of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-C-0304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 4, 2004.
   In re Kenner City of et al.; Weilbaecher, Dominic O.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 515,883; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CE 0141.

Denied.


text:
    Gary POCHE v. Harry F. CONNICK, District Attorney & Edwin A. Lombard, Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish.
    No. 2003-CI-0021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Poche, Gary;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 2000-17622; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-1709.

Granted. Relator’s incoming prison mail log indicates that he did not receive the 113 page district attorney file which he has apparently already purchased. If it has not done so already, respondent shall re-send it.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kirkland PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0002.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Parker, Kirkland;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 12-98-367; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2227.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The East Baton Rouge District Attorney’s Office is ordered to provide relator with an estimate of the costs of reproducing public records relator has requested and to which relator is entitled. La. Const, art. XII, Section 3; R.S. 44:31; R.S. 44:31.1; State ex rel. Leonard v. State, 96-1889 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 1325; State ex rel. Level v. State, 99-2266 (La.12/17/99), 751 So.2d 869; Range v. Moreau, 96-1607 (La.9/3/96), 678 So.2d 537. In all other respects, the writ is denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    In Re: Appeal of Decision of DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 03-PDB-024.
    No. 2003-OB-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Simon, Carol D.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 03-PDB-024.

Petition for leave denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel MaGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Daniel MaGee; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated December 19, 2003; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 410-075; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1821.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John POULLARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Poullard, John;—Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated December 19, 2003, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. “C”, No. 86-623-C, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit No. KH 02-00554.

Reconsideration denied.

KNOLL, J. recused.


text:
    Linda F. NINO v. Mario S. NINO.
    No. 2002-C-2942.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Nino, Mario S.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated February 7, 2003; Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 190,308; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-458.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert TATE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Tate, Robert;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 313566, 313567, 322407, 318274, 30,7000; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2002 KO 1142, 2001 KW 3007.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clifford OWENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Owens, Clifford;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 186,019; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36684-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy L. PEA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Pea, Roy L.,;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 56,628; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1964.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie TRIPLETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Triplett, Eddie;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 400-740; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2096.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marvin G. DEAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Deal, Marvin G.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 117,853.

Denied. Time-barred and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Henry BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Brown, John Henry;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98-F1282; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37028-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Armando MURRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Murray, Armando;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 96-5743; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 00-KA-1380.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary ANDREWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0163.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Andrews, Gary;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 92-6661; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-1196.

Denied.


text:
    Melvin GREEN v. Harry CONNICK, D.A.
    No. 2003-CI-0170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Green, Melvin;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2001-13280; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2388.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward ARRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Arrington, Edward;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 256227; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1494.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward Karl ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Robinson, Edward Karl;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 20,866; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36657-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher HODGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Hodge, Christopher;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 300788; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1602.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Isadore SYLVEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Sylvest, Isadore;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 243623; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1489.

Denied. Moot. The Court of Appeal has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Johnson, Earl;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 359-045; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2037.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Miguel A. CANTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Canton, Miguel A.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-201135; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH-02-01280.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daryl D. BUFFIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Buffin, Daryl D.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C1101; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00504.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin VEAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Veal, Kevin;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 00-5848; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-876.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelbert TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Taylor, Kelbert;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 394-986; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1776.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sugar Ray LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lewis, Sugar Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 406-677; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1939.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnie MAYFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Mayfield, Ronnie;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 44-529; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37122-KH.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelvin JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0246.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Jones, Kelvin;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 893546; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0874.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana Through the DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF the 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of Louisiana v. Robert L. HAMILTON.
    No. 2003-CI-0249.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Hamilton, Robert L.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 88-11349, 89-13510; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0606.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel Ray CYRIAK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0262.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Cyriak, Daniel Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 239,128; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-1669.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary MAGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0266.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Magee, Gary;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 284202; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KA 2519.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin RAYFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Rayford, Melvin;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 301-103; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2290.

Denied. Untimely, not cognizable on collateral review, and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. James JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Jackson, James;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 35,100, 35,340; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37120-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert C. WAGNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Wagner, Robert C.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 72,948; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2527.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 98-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven GARNER and Glenn Garner v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0291.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Garner, Steven; Garner, Glenn;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 347-080; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2468.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alonzo W. FORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Ford, Alonzo W.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 96-7172; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-1237.

Denied. Untimely, not cognizable on collateral review, and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Edward BOYD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Boyd, Charles Edward;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-6946; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2002-KH-826.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sugar Ray LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0494.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lewis, Sugar Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 406-677; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2325.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Conrad LAVIGNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KP-1440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lavigne, James Conrad;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 9-92-884; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0208.

Denied.


text:
    Shannon FREEMAN v. Allen P. PHILAN, Wray Ford, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Philan, Allen P.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 449,786; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37,685-CA, 37,684-CW, 37,687-CW.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Samantha K. LEVY and Lars Levy v. BAYOU INDUSTRIAL MAINTENANCE SERVICE, INC. and Transcontinental Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Bayou Industrial Maintenance Service Inc. et al.; Transcontinental Insurance Co.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 105,201; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0037.

Denied.


text:
    Shauna SOILEAU v. ALLSTATE INS. CO.
    No. 2003-C-3170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Soileau, Shauna;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 62484; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0120.

Denied.


text:
    Steven TEMPLE, Giddis Leon Temple and Nellie Temple v. Edward L. SHERMAN.
    No. 2003-C-3178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Temple, Steven; Temple, Giddis L.; Temple, Nellie;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 01-3475; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,668-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Vinod Kumar DAHIYA v. TALMIDGE INTERNATIONAL, LTD., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Talmidge International Ltd. et al.; Neptune Shipmanagement Services (Pte.) Ltd.; American Eagle Tankers Inc. Ltd.; American Eagle Tankers Agencies Inc.; Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Ltd.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, Plaquemines Div. B, No. 48-357; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1578.

Denied.


text:
    Ezeldia A. THOMPSON and Richard Thompson v. William T. SMITH, XYZ Insurance, State Farm Insurance Company, and All Star Motors Company of Greenville, Inc.
    No. 2003-CC-3181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re All Star Motors Co. of Greenville, Inc.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of La-fourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 90915; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1521.

Denied.


text:
    Melvin JACOBS v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY and Patrick R. Aubrey.
    No. 2003-C-3183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Coca-Cola Bottling Co.; Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 37,543; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,775-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    Gwendolyn DOBY and Lola D. Patrick v. BILL HOOD FORD, INC., Legion Assurance Company, Allstate Insurance Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Progressive Insurance Company and the Unopened Succession of Michael T. Hall.
    No. 2003-CC-3184.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Bill Hood Ford LLC;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2000-15766; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1588.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gilbert J. BURCIAGA.
    No. 2003-KK-3185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Burciaga, Gilbert;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 03-2833; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-K-1137.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    James Michael HAYS and Belinda Hays v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3187.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Grambling, Town of;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,608; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,-229-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Ruby BROOKS and Scott Ernest Cleveland v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2003-C-3189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2001-14657; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0389.

Denied.


text:
    Jerry EVANS, Husband of/and Iva Mae Naquin Evans v. Ronald K. CROWE, Christopher D. Landry, Clarendon National Insurance Company and Highlands Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-3190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Highlands Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipa-hoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 9601954-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1414.

Denied.


text:
    HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT 1, Parish of Terrebonne, State of Louisiana, as Owner and Operator of Terrebonne General Medical Center v. Cyrus Kurosh KIYANFAR.
    No. 2003-CC-3194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Hospital Service Dist. 1; Terrebonne Parish of; Louisiana State of; Terrebonne General Medical Center;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 135089; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1457.

Denied.


text:
    Samantha K. LEVY and Lars Levy v. BAYOU INDUSTRIAL MAINTENANCE SERVICE, INC. and Transcontinental Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Levy, Samantha K. et al.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 105,201; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0037.

Denied.


text:
    METAIRIE COUNTRY CLUB v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION, Lawrence J. Chehardy, in His Capacity as Assessor of Ad Valorem Taxes for Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana and Harry Lee, Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, in His Capacity of Ex-Officio Tax Collector for Jefferson Parish.
    No. 2003-C-3209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Chehardy, Lawrence J. Assessor;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 561-924; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-538.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Shannon FREEMAN v. Allen P. PHILAN, Wray Ford Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re RLI Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 449,786; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37,684-CW, 37,685-CA, 37,687-CW.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Earl D. ROBBINS, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State of et al.; Drennen, Mark C.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33,373; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01250.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Lee Hunter AUSAMA v. Loris AUSAMA.
    No. 2003-C-3217.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Ausama, Loris;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 96-3424; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-1082.

Denied.


text:
    James Michael HAYS and Belinda Hays v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3218.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State of et al.; University of LA System Bd. of Supervisors; Grambling State University;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 42,608; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,229-CA.

Denied.


text:
    David CARROLL v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, Mid-South CATV, and Linda Faye Carroll.
    No. 2003-C-3220.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Carroll, David;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 51,201; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-601.

Denied.


text:
    Don PUZZIO v. POLY TRUCKING INC. and Roger Brolsma.
    No. 2003-C-3223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Poly Trucking Inc. et al.; Brolsma, Roger;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2002-14462; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1217.

Denied.


text:
    Salvadore MIDENCE & Florinda Lopez Midence v. Keith WILLIAMS & XYZ Insurance Company and Hartford Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3226.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Hartford Ins. Co.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 536-994; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-598.

Denied.


text:
    Rufus and Barbara SHEPPARD v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE, et al.
    No. 2003-OC-3233.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Wilson, Richard “Buddy” Constable; Jackson, Alvin Deputy Constable;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 457,891; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2421.

Denied.


text:
    C & C CONTRACTORS, INC. v. CANTRELLE/BRAITHWAITE CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re J & R Amusement Co. Inc.; Palms Casino & Truck Stop Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 92-812; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1706.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin STRAHAN.
    No. 2003-KK-3235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Strahan, Kevin;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 367206, 367207; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 2374.

Denied.


text:
    Jerome TURNER v. ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Parish Truck Sales, Inc. and Marc E. Johnson.
    No. 2003-C-3247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Turner, Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 563-187; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-0224.

Denied.


text:
    Pierre SMITH v. AAA TRAVEL AGENCY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Smith, Pierre;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 457,997; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,728-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Raymond HARRISON v. LABOR READY SOUTHEAST, INC. and David Maintenance & Repair Service d/b/a Mud Hog Dump Truck Co.
    No. 2003-C-3249.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Labor Ready Southeast Inc. et al.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 7, No. 00-00508; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-600.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF NEW ORLEANS’ DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, etc. v. NEW ORLEANS PADDLEWHEELS, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re New Orleans City of Dept. of Finance et al.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, Nos. 2003-05903, 2003-8315; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1821.

Denied.


text:
    Penny Porche DEHART, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Wendy Marie Dehart v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILROAD CO., Chad D. Fisher, Edward Blondell and St. Charles Parish Government. Regina Dehart Hutchinson and Alfreda Little on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Niki Ann Dehart, and Tamara Marie Dehart v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILROAD CO., Chad D. Fisher, Edward Blondell and St. Charles Parish Government.
    No. 2003-C-3251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re DeHart, Penny Porche et al.; Hutchinson, Regina Dehart et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 51,419, 51,549; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 03-CA-279, 03-CA-280.

Denied.


text:
    Glenda CORMIER and Michael B. Miller v. Debra Talbot PARKER.
    No. 2003-CC-3252.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Parker, Debra Talbot;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 80167; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01155.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Pearl M. SEPULVADO & Willie R. Sepulvado v. Dale V. BAUMAN, M.D.
    No. 2003-CC-3255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Bauman, Dale V. M.D.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 433,917; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,-422-CW.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    James SMITH, Jr. v. Lutschia Ann SMITH, Shelley Marie Smith, James Smith, Jr. and Fredrico Jonas Smith.
    No. 2003-CC-3256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Smith, Lutschia Ann et al.; Smith, Shelly Marie; Smith, James Jr.; Smith, Fredrico Jonas;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 57,615; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-648.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Barbara L. FLEMING v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Fleming.
    No. 2003-C-3257.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Fleming, Barbara L.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 420-226; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2376.

Denied.


author: CALOGERO, C.J.,

text:
    Leroy LEWIS v. Kenton HILL and National Remodeling Center, LLC.
    No. 2003-C-3261.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lewis, Leroy;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 572-060; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-623.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J.,

concurs. This Court’s denial of this writ does not bar the right of either plaintiff or defendant, National Remodeling Center, L.L.C., to seek arbitration of the dispute, the merits of which dispute are yet to be addressed by the parties.


text:
    Diana WEEKS v. LOUISIANA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND.
    No. 2003-CC-3317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96-229; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-469.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Pierre SMITH v. AAA TRAVEL AGENCY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re TIG Ins. Co.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 457,997; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,728-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Shannon FREEMAN v. Allen P. PHILAN, Wray Ford, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Freeman, Shannon;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 449,786; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37,685-CA, 37,684-CW, 37,687-CW.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Craig WEST, et al. v. G & H SEED COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Aventis Cropscience USA LP;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-C-4984; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01386.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward HARRIS.
    No. 2003-KK-3549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Harris, Edward;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 03-0411; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-K-1165.

Denied.


text:
    Sherry WATTERS, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re American Equity Insurance Company;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, Nos. 01-17775, 01-18355, 2002-14043; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1130.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Sherry WATTERS, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Clarendon America Insurance Co.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, Nos. 2001-17775, 2001-18355, 2002-14043; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1130.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    James LEE, Sr., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Transportation and Development Department of et al.; Louisiana State of;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 93-751; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1927.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sugar Ray LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lewis, Sugar Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 406-677; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0850.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory Alan WYATT.
    No. 2003-K-2114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 330822; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 2368.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darren WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-KO-2300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Williams, Darren;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00 CR5 78732; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KA 0019.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry HALL.
    No. 2003-KO-2305.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Hall, Jerry;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 420-889; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1701.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodney WALKER.
    No. 2003-K-2343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Walker, Rodney;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 01-25; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-188.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy FINCH.
    No. 2003-KO-2379.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Finch, Randy;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 426-180; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-2481.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carnell PHILLIPS a/k/a Cornell Phillips.
    No. 2003-K-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Phillips, Carnell;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 425-959; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-0304.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clifford J. DUPLESSY.
    No. 2003-K-2416.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Duplessy, Clifford J.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 01-4066; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-185.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald GANSER.
    No. 2003-K-2421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Ganser, Ronald;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 98-4923; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-0318.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas B. BILLARD.
    No. 2003-KO-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Billard, Thomas B.;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 00-1041; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-319.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick Scott GRANT.
    No. 2003-KP-2463.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Grant, Patrick Scott;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 47,588; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37959-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John H. FREEMAN.
    No. 2003-KO-2466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Freeman, John H.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 99-F1112; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,-312-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Wesley DOWDELL.
    No. 2003-KO-2514.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Dowdell, John Wesley;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 426-272; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1645.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles E. BATES.
    No. 2003-KO-2565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Bates, Charles E.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 01-4636; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-352.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Julian ROBINSON.
    No. 2003-KO-2575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Robinson, Julian;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 390-135; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-0149.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie TRIPLETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Triplett, Eddie;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 400-740; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-1231.

Denied.


text:
    Alicia LEBLANC and Robert Leblanc v. MERCK & CO., Aventis Pasteur, Inc., American Home Products Corporation, Spectrum Chemical Mfg. Corp., Sigma-Aldrich, Corp., Eli Lilly, Corp., Louisiana Generating LLC, Dr. Patricia Peairs, Women’s Hospital of Baton Rouge, Ascension Parish Health Unit and Dr. John Doe.
    No. 2003-C-2979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Ascension Parish Health Unit; Doe, John Dr.; Louisiana State of;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 71,102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2573.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Patricia Ezell Wife of/and Sidney M. BACH v. GREATER LAKESIDE CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Greater Lakeside Corporation et al.; United States Fire Insurance Company; Lakeside Shopping Center; Causeway Associates;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2000-15281; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1559.

Denied.


text:
    Katherine Marie RUTLEDGE v. HIBERNIA CORPORATION d/b/a Hibernia National Bank.
    No. 2003-CC-3019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Rutledge, Katherine Marie;—Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. C-667-00; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01197.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Susan DEANO, John L. Deano & Mark Guilbeau v. Vidyadhar AKKARAJU, M.D., et al. and Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Board v. Susan Deano, John L. Deano & Mark Guilbeau.
    No. 2003-C-3020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Bd.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 20022726, 20022784; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 03-142, 03-143.

Denied.


text:
    CHURCH POINT BANK & TRUST CO. v. Lawrence H. OLIVIER.
    No. 2003-C-3031.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Olivier, Lawrence H.;—Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 76,825; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. OS-324.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Lorraine RICHARDSON v. James L. ALDRIDGE, et al. Kenneth Pollard v. Carsheneka Richardson, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Aldridge, James L. et al.; Indiana Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 57,786, 58,245; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37,192-CA, 37,193-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick Todd LEE.
    No. 2003-KK-3064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lee, Derrick Todd;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 06-03-655; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 1921.

Denied.


text:
    The MARRERO LAND AND IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, LTD. v. Cynthia Anne WEGMANN, in Her Capacity as the Executrix of the Succession of Maude Rodgers.
    No. 2003-C-3066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Marrero Land and Improvement Association Ltd.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2001-18542; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0662.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas P. LOWENBURG, Martin Adamo, Vern K. Baxter, Philip D. Carter, Bernard Gordon, Leonard Levine, Ivory S. Madison, Donetta Dunn Miller, and Maison St. Charles, L.L.C., d/b/a Quality Inn Maison St. Charles v. The COUNCIL OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Entergy New Orleans, Inc. The Alliance for Affordable Energy v. The Council of the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2003-C-3094.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 6, 2004.
   In re Lowenburg, Thomas P. et al.; Adamo, Martin; Baxter, Vern K.; Carter, Philip D.; Gordon, Bernard; Levine, Leonard; Madison, Ivory S.; Miller, Donetta Dunn; Maison St. Charles L.L.C. d/b/a; Quality Inn Maison St. Charles; Alliance for Affordable Energy;—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, Nos. 2002-14176, 01-19258; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-CA-0809, 2003-CA-0902.

Denied.


author: JjCOOKS, Judge.

text:
    Tanya HANKS, et al. v. COLUMBIA WOMEN’S AND CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, et al.
    No. 02-1394.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 25, 2003.
    J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff'Appellant, Tanya Hanks.
    C. Scott Carter, New Orleans, LA, for Intervenor/Appellee, C. Scott Carter.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD, and BILLY HOWARD EZELL, Judges.
   JjCOOKS, Judge.

In January 1998, Tanya Hanks gave birth to a child, Nicholas. The child sustained permanently disabling injuries, including brain damage, allegedly as a result of medical malpractice. On September 9, 1998, Hanks engaged J. Minos Simon as counsel to pursue a malpractice claim. On May 18, 1999, Simon retained C. Scott Carter to assist in handling the claim. There is a signed agreement in the record establishing the division of attorney fees between Carter and Simon. The record does not contain an agreement or amendment of the original agreement signed by the client acknowledging her intent to retain the services of Carter or assenting to the fee splitting arrangement existing between Simon and Carter.

A medical review panel rendered an opinion declaring Women’s & Children’s Hospital was at fault in causing injuries to Hanks’ minor child. Women’s & Children’s Hospital agreed to a partial settlement of Hanks’ claim by paying its maximum liability limit of $100,000.00. A check in the amount of $100,000.00 was tendered and made payable to Tanya Hanks, J. Minos Simon and C. Scott Carter. Carter sent the check to Simon, requesting that Simon endorse the check and return it to his office. Carter indicated he would deposit the check in his trust account on behalf of Tanya Hanks. Simon refused to sign the check. Instead, Simon forwarded the check to Carter’s office, and requested Carter endorse the check and return it to him. Carter eventually endorsed the check and returned it to Simon’s office. According to Simon, during the exchange “Carter in a telephone conversation with Tanya Hanks, fraudulently informed Tanya Hanks that [Simon] was illegally and improperly withholding delivery of those funds to her, by insisting on processing her funds through [Simon’s] trust account.” Hanks then confronted Simon concerning Carter’s representations to her.

laOn June 25, 2001, Carter received a letter from Simon advising him that Hanks was terminating his involvement as counsel of record. Simon obtained an ex parte dismissal of Carter as counsel of record on July 19, 2001. In order to protect his future right to attorney fees, Carter filed a Petition of Intervention on August 20, 2001. On August 23, 2001, the trial judge signed an order allowing the intervention.

Hanks filed exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action and prematurity to the petition of intervention. The trial court denied the exceptions on November 12, 2001. This court denied writs ruling as follows:

There is no error in the trial court’s ruling of November 12, 2001 disposing of Plaintiffs exceptions to the intervention of C. Scott Carter. Writ not considered as to applicant J. Minos Simon, Ltd. The judgment of November 12, 2001, signed November 28, 2001 does not include a ruling on applicant’s exceptions.

The Louisiana Supreme Court also denied writs on May 10, 2002.

On May 28, 2002, Simon personally and on behalf of his law corporation filed exceptions of no right of action, no cause of action and prematurity challenging Carter’s petition of intervention. After a hearing, the trial court granted the exceptions, finding Simon and his law corporation were not parties to the litigation and the intervention by Carter was not proper. However, the court ordered that any future disbursement made in payment of Hanks’ claim include Carter’s name on the check. Hanks filed for writs with this court, challenging this portion of the judgment. This court denied writs, holding:

We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The request for an award of sanctions is denied. Costs as to all matters are to await assessment by the trial court upon appropriate presentation.

Hanks filed this appeal, again attacking the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in considering “an ex parte oral request from an intervenor party to a pending litigation 1¡¡whereby the district court by a formal interlocutory order grants to the intervenor the equivalence of a privilege on funds due to plaintiff, where no such privilege is granted by law, and where such order was granted without notice to plaintiff and without any hearing whatsoever.”

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we turn to address Carter’s contention that a panel of this court has previously ruled on the matter now before us. A panel of this court voted to deny writs. Generally, review of an issue previously addressed by this court would be precluded by the law of the case doctrine. Barnett v. Jabusch, 94-819 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So.2d 1158. The doctrine applies to all decisions of an appellate court and not merely those arising from the full appeal process. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 96-89 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96), 676 So.2d 619, writ denied, 96-1650 (La.10/25/96), 681 So.2d 365. However, the doctrine is not an absolute bar to reconsideration; rather it is discretionary. Ducote v. City of Alexandria, 97-947 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 673, writs denied, 98-1061 & 98-1070 (La.5/29/98), 720 So.2d 671. Courts should apply the doctrine only when there is no obvious injustice or manifest error. Id; Martin v. Provencher, 97-1648 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/98); 718 So.2d 975. Because we find manifest error in our prior decision, we decline to accept as final our writ denial in Hanks.

Although there is no contract between Hanks and Carter in the record, Carter alleges Hanks was fully aware of his hiring. Carter represented Hanks for approximately two years, achieving a successful result with the Medical Review Panel. Carter was paid all attorney fees and expenses due him by virtue of his fee splitting arrangement up to the time he was terminated by Hanks. Carter filed a petition of intervention to protect his right to future attorney fees.

|4La.R.S. 37:218 allows an attorney to secure an interest in his client’s claim. It provides as follows:

A. By written contract signed by his client, an attorney at law may acquire as his fee an interest in the subject matter of a suit, proposed suit, or claim in the assertion, prosecution, or defense of which he is employed, whether the claim or suit be for money or for property. Such interest shall be a special privilege to take rank as a first privilege thereon, superior to all other privileges and security interests under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial laws. In such contract, it may be stipulated that neither the attorney nor the client may, without the written consent of the other, settle, compromise, release, discontinue, or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim. Either party to the contract may, at any time, file and record it with the clerk of court in the parish in which the suit is pending or is to be brought or with the clerk of court in the parish of the client’s domicile. After such filing, any settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition made of the suit or claim by either the attorney or the client, without the written consent of the other, is null and void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if no such settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition has been made.
B. The term “fee”, as used in this Section, means the agreed upon fee, whether fixed or contingent, and any and all other amounts advanced by the attorney to or on behalf of the client, as permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar Association.

Although the statute provides the attorney an interest in his client’s claim, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So.2d 102, 117 (La.1978) (on rehearing), held “the nature of that interest is not established by the provisions of the statute.” The Saucier court elaborated further:

Because the Disciplinary Rules prohibit the acquisition of an absolute ownership interest in the client’s claim prior to his performance of all or substantially all the legal services, the “interest in the subject matter of the suit, proposed suit or claim” safeguarded by the statute is, we believe, no more than a privilege granted to aid the attorney’s collection of a fully earned fee out of the fund which the satisfaction of the client’s claim yields.

Id., at 117. (Emphasis added)

| BThe supreme court in Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So.2d 66 (La.1979) expounding upon its holding in Saucier, discussed in detail the intervenor-attor-ney’s rights with respect to his fee. The Court stated:

We have already said that R.S. 37:218 affords the attorney a privilege on the proceeds of the settlement for payment of the fee which he has earned (Saucier v. Hayes, supra), and that where the settlement funds have not been disbursed, that privilege attaches in preference to the right of the client’s seizing creditor, even where the contract is not recorded. Calk v. Highland, [376 So.2d 495 (La.1979)]. See also R.S. 9:5001 for similar treatment of the proceeds from judgments and Roberts v. Hanover Insurance Co., 338 So.2d 158 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1976).
Beyond this however, may the attorney prevent settlement funds from being disbursed to his prejudice!?]
As we said in Calk, the legislative intent in passing R.S. 37:218 was to afford the contingency fee attorney comparable rights relative to settlements which he has relative to judgments and their proceeds. R.S. 9:5001. And while, for reasons above stated, we can not constitutionally apply R.S. 37:218’s concluding sentence literally, we can apply it so as to effect its purpose within permissible bounds.
The obvious intent of R.S. 37:218 is to prevent a client’s discharging an attorney and thereby depriving the attorney of his earned fee. Therefore, if the attorney with a written contingency fee contract bearing the no consent stipulation “file(s) and records it with the clerk of court in the parish in which the suit is pending ... ”, then a defendant who disburses the settlement proceeds without ascertaining and paying the fee to which the attorney is due, will do so to his prejudice. The extinguishing effect of the settlement will therefore be suspended, as the Court of Appeal determined in this case, until recognition and payment of the fee to which the attorney is entitled, determined in accordance with the principles established in Saucier.
Unlike the situation in Calk, where recordation of the contingency fee contract is irrelevant in a contest between an attorney and the client’s creditor, imposition of an obligation upon the client’s obligor in the suit to retain settlement funds until determination of fee entitlement, is dependent upon the attorney’s full compliance with R.S. 37:218, including the recordation of the contract as stipulated therein.
It is therefore proper to remand the case to the trial court, as didj^the Court of Appeal, to allow the intervenor to prove the amount of the fee to which he is entitled. However, that proof should be made in accordance with our opinion in Saucier v. Hayes, supra, and not simply on a quantum meruit basis. Saucier directed a method of calculation whereby the trial judge would determine first what was the highest of the contingency fee percentages contracted for by the client, and he would then divide that fee appropriately among the attorneys. Saucier stated “This solution envisions apportionment of only the highest agreed upon contingent fee in accordance with factors set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus the fee is to be apportioned according to the respective services and contributions of the attorneys for work performed and other relevant factors.”
Therefore, although the discharged attorney with a recorded contingent fee contract may not nullify his client’s later settlement or proceed with the litigation as though no settlement had been made, he is entitled to the substantial protection for his earned fee as outlined above.

The jurisprudence in Louisiana is clear that only one contingent fee will be paid by the client, the amount to be determined according to the “highest ethical contingency percentage” contractually agreed to in the contract signed with the attorney. Saucier, 373 So.2d at 118. Saucier provides the fee is to be allocated to the various attorneys involved in the case based on the amount each has earned under the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (formerly the Code of Professional Responsibility).

The present case differs from the facts presented in Saucier and Scott where there was an executed contingency fee agreement between the client and first attorney, followed by the first attorney being' discharged. A second contingency fee agreement was then entered into with a second attorney. Here there was no written contract executed between Carter and Hanks, but simply a contract between Simon and Carter, which provided for a division of fees between the two attorneys.

Saucier and Calk v. Highland Const. & Mfg., 376 So.2d 495, 499 (La.1979), clearly provide that “R.S. 37:218 gives the attorney who has a written contract 17affording him an ‘interest’ in the claim a privilege to the extent of his earned fee on any recovery obtained by settlement.” As mentioned, the record does not indicate there was any recorded nor signed contract between Carter and Hanks. As stated in Scott, the “imposition of an obligation upon the client’s obligor in the suit to retain settlement funds until determination of fee entitlement, is dependent upon the attorney’s full compliance with R.S. 37:218, including the recordation of the contract as stipulated therein.” Therefore, in the absence of any recorded contract between Hanks and Carter, the trial court erred in ordering the obligor to include Carter’s name on any check disbursed in payment of Hanks’ claim. See also Harvey v. Cole, 02-1704 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/03), 845 So.2d 591.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment ordering that any disbursement made in payment of Tanya Hanks’ claim include C. Scott Carter’s name on the check and require his authority before negotiation. All costs of this appeal are assessed to C. Scott Carter.

REVERSED.

WOODARD, J., concurs in the result.

      . We note in passing, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized “where an attorney retained in a case employs or procures the employment of another to assist him, as regards the division of fee, the agreement constitutes a joint venture or special partnership." McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631, 14 So.2d 469, 472 (1943) [quoting 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client p. 1038 § 174]. The first circuit in Scurto v. Siegrist, 598 So.2d 507 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 683 (La.1992), discussed agreements to share contingency fees between attorneys, holding: In the situation where a retained attorney associates, employs or procures the employment of another attorney to assist him in handling a case involving a contingency fee, the agreement regarding division of the fee is a joint venture which gives the parties to the contract the right to participate in the fund resulting from the payment of the fee by the client. Thus, the suit by an attorney to recover pursuant to that agreement is a suit to recover for breach of the agreement to share in the fund resulting from payment of the fee. It is not a suit for recovery of attorney's fees. Duer & Taylor v. Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts, 354 So.2d 192 (La.1978). When the attorneys in a Duer situation have entered into an agreement regarding the division of the fee the Code of Professional Responsibility (or Rules of Professional Conduct) does not prohibit enforcement of that agreement and does not require apportioning of the fee on a quantum meruit basis.... See Lloyd v. Tritico, 527 So.2d 57 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 528 So.2d 154 (La.1988); Defrancesch v. Hardin, 510 So.2d 42 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513 So.2d 819 (La.1987).


author: |,WILLIAMS, Judge.

text:
    Andrew J. LAWRENCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 37,554-WCA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 12, 2003.
    Donald Wilson, for Appellant.
    Frank K. Carroll, Shreveport, for Appel-lee.
    Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY and MOORE, JJ.
   |,WILLIAMS, Judge.

The claimant, Andrew Lawrence, Jr., appeals a judgment in favor of the defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denied claimant’s request for permanent total disability benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The parties stipulated that in February 1990, the claimant sustained an injury arising in the course of his employment as a package driver for UPS. Claimant injured his lumbar spine when he slipped and fell while delivering packages. After a period of conservative treatment, claimant was sent for therapy at the Liberty Mutual Back Institute in Boston, Massachusetts. In July 1992, claimant underwent back surgery performed by Dr. Thomas Whitec-loud at Tulane Hospital. Dr. Whitecloud removed herniated discs at the L4-5 level, fused claimant’s spine and attached a steel device to the spinal vertebrae. During a ten-year period from February 12, 1990 through February 22, 2000, Liberty Mutual, as the workers’ compensation carrier for UPS, paid claimant 520 weeks of benefits.

In 1991, claimant was treated by Dr. Paul Ware, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed claimant with depression secondary to his back injury and prescribed anti-depressant medication. In 1994, claimant saw George Hearn, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist and vocational consultant, who conducted a vocational evaluation of the claimant. Dr. Hearn administered psychological tests and interviewed claimant regarding his education, work history and complaints of chronic pain and depression related to his injury. [ 2 Hearn recommended psychotherapy, rehabilitation counseling and work hardening. Hearn re-evaluated claimant in 2001 and opined that he could not perform any job on a consistent basis.

In 1996, the defendants referred the claimant to a rehabilitation counselor, Ron Mayeux, Ph.D., who reported that claimant possessed good verbal skills, but was a difficult client. In July 1998, Dr. Phillip Osborne performed a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) of claimant. Based on the results, Dr. Osborne opined that claimant demonstrated good strength with some endurance problems, and that he was capable of performing almost any job in the sedentary, light or medium categories for a normal eight-hour work day. Following the FCE, Dr. Mayeux submitted several Department of Transportation (DOT) job descriptions to claimant’s surgeon, Dr. Whitecloud, for an assessment of claimant’s ability to perform the required duties. Dr. Whitecloud approved the jobs of auto salesman, retail business manager and transport driver, if limited to not more than one hour of continuous driving.

In 1999, claimant began seeing Dr. Roland Ponarski, a family practitioner in Rayville, Louisiana. Dr. Ponarski treated claimant for chronic back pain related to his 1990 work injury and for diabetes. Dr. Ponarski prescribed pain relief medication.

In February 2000, the defendants terminated workers’ compensation benefits to claimant. Subsequently, claimant filed a claim with the Office of Worker’s Compensation (OWC) seeking permanent and total disability benefits. At the OWC hearing, the claimant acknowledged that after his 13injury, he had occasionally helped out in his wife’s cigarette store over a period of eight years, performing such duties as operating the cash register, assisting customers and making bank deposits. Defendants introduced into evidence surveillance videos, which showed claimant performing various physical activities, such as lifting and moving shelves with another person at the store and carrying sheets of tin at his fishing camp.

The WCJ issued reasons for judgment finding that claimant’s physicians had approved his return to work at the sedentary or medium duty level, that claimant had performed job duties at his wife’s store and had failed to comply with rehabilitation efforts by declining to enroll in vocational school or to participate in physical therapy. The WCJ noted that the surveillance videos demonstrated claimant’s ability to work and opined that the claimant’s request for permanent total disability benefits, when considered with his activity shown in the video, was “tantamount to fraud.” The WCJ rendered judgment denying claimant’s request for permanent and total disability benefits. The claimant appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

In one assignment of error, the claimant contends the WCJ erred in finding that profits derived from his wife’s store constituted earnings of the claimant and disqualified him from receiving permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. For the purposes of our discussion, we will assume that the claimant was not engaged in any employment or self-employment. The claimant also contends the WCJ erred in denying him PTD benefits.

A claimant is entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits for |4any injury which produces permanent total disability of an employee to engage in any self-employment or occupation for wages, whether or not the same or similar occupation as that in which the worker was engaged when injured. LSA-R.S. 23:1221(2)(a). PTD benefits shall not be awarded if the claimant is engaged in any employment or self-employment. LSA-R.S. 23:1221(2)(b). When the employee is not engaged in any employment or self-employment, PTD compensation shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the employee is physically unable to engage in any employment or self-employment, including any and all odd-lot or sheltered employment or while working in pain. LSA-R.S. 23:1221(2)(e).

In the present case, the claimant testified that he continued to feel back pain at the time of trial and that he could not stand or sit for extended periods. Claimant stated that he occasionally helps at his wife’s store by operating the cash register, stocking shelves, assisting customers and making store bank deposits. Claimant testified that he is physically able to perform these cashier duties for two or three days in a row, for up to eight hours per day, because he is able to sit or stand as needed.

The claimant acknowledged that he had engaged in the physical activities depicted in the surveillance videos, such as lifting and loading large display shelves onto a truck with another person, unloading plywood from a trailer and climbing a ladder to attach a tin roof to his fishing cabin. Claimant stated that he had been able to climb up into a fixed stand to hunt deer and had driven eight hours in a day during a trip to Colorado. Claimant |r,explained that participating in such physical activity increased his back pain and required him to spend the next day or two lying down to rest and relieve the pain, preventing him from doing any other activities.

The July 1998 FCE results showed that claimant had completed the cardiovascular endurance test, but with a poor recovery, indicating that he was deconditioned. The claimant was able to do a 115 pound squat lift, a 53 pound dead back lift and frequent lifting of 31 pounds with adequate grip strength. Dr. Osborne wrote that claimant’s endurance problems could be improved with a reconditioning program. Dr. Osborne opined that even with limited endurance, claimant would be able to perform sedentary or light duty work if restricted to a maximum lift of - 50 pounds and frequent lifting of 25 pounds, with occasional bending, squatting and kneeling. Dr. Osborne estimated that claimant could sit or stand for two hours before taking a break and could work a normal eight-hour day.

In 1997, Dr. Whiteeloud recommended that claimant attend additional physical therapy and in February 1998, he prescribed work hardening to improve claimant’s condition. However, claimant did not comply with either instruction. In February 1999, Dr. Whiteeloud approved the jobs of auto salesman and retail store manager as within claimant’s physical abilities. He also approved the job of transport driver if claimant was not required to drive continuously for over one hour.

Despite the evidence that he is capable of performing sedentary or light duty work with some restrictions, claimant argues that his physical limitations, combined with his psychological and emotional problems and | (¡his lack of education render him unemployable with poor prospects for rehabilitation.

LSA-R.S. 23:1226(D) provides that prior to the adjudication of an injured employee as permanently totally disabled, the WCJ shall determine whether there is a reasonable probability that with appropriate training or education, the employee may be rehabilitated to the extent that he can achieve suitable gainful employment and whether it is in the individual’s best interest to undertake such training or education. The supreme court has stated that the requirement of R.S. 23:1226 must be construed in pari materia with R.S. 23:1221(2), which defines permanent total disability. Comeaux v. City of Crowley, 01-0032 (La.7/3/01), 793 So.2d 1215.

In support of his contention that he is permanently disabled, claimant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. George Hearn, who testified that he conducted vocational evaluations of claimant in January 1994 and September 2001. Hearn administered vocational and psychological testing to evaluate claimant’s intellectual capacity, academic ability and personality factors. Hearn stated that claimant demonstrated a limited education, with reading and math skills at the sixth grade level. Hearn opined that this limited education could make it more difficult for claimant to pursue many vocational training opportunities requiring a certain amount of reading. Hearn stated that the claimant’s psychological tests indicated moderate depression, which if not treated, could impair his interaction with others and reduce his chance for rehabilitation. Given claimant’s pain, academic level and psychological status, Dr. Hearn opined that claimant was not j 7employable in any job on a consistent basis.

However, Hearn acknowledged that positive factors for claimant’s rehabilitation were that he was relatively young at 49 years old and that he possessed the intelligence to improve his academic performance. Hearn stated that he would “strongly encourage” rehabilitation to enhance claimant’s educational level through the GED program. Hearn agreed that enrolling in a vocational technical school would “definitely” help to broaden claimant’s marketable job skills. He acknowledged that the claimant needed to put forth some effort himself along with the vocational assistance to return to the job market. Hearn also agreed that claimant ought to try physical therapy and work hardening to increase, his endurance and improve his emotional state.

In his deposition, Dr. Ronald Mayeux testified that he first met with claimant in May 1996 and administered an occupational preference test. Mayeux recommended that claimant enroll in vocational technical school for retraining and contacted the Northeast Louisiana Vocational Technical College in Winnsboro, where claimant resided. Although Mayeux believed that vocational training was a more realistic option at the time, he agreed that claimant should enroll in a GED program because of his expressed interest in attending college. Mayeux testified that claimant never enrolled in either the vocational school or the GED program.

Mayeux stated that he received claimant’s medical information from Dr. Whitec-loud, who had recommended that claimant participate in physical therapy and work hardening. Mayeux located the North Louisiana ^Rehabilitation Hospital (NLRH) in Ruston and contacted claimant, who toured the facility. Mayeux stated that claimant insisted on attending physical therapy at the Liberty Mutual facility in Boston, but the insurer denied this request. Mayeux testified that he conducted a labor market survey to find jobs that would fit within claimant’s physical restrictions.

The claimant testified that he told May-eux that he wanted a job with a salary equal to his wage at UPS. Claimant stated that he was unable to do algebra or geometry, but could multiply and read a newspaper. He testified that he requested therapy in Boston because the Liberty Mutual Center seemed like a better facility than the NLRH. Claimant acknowledged that he never tried to enroll in vocational technical school or in a GED program and did not attempt physical therapy at NLRH. Claimant testified that when he was in pain, he sometimes felt depressed and was irritable, impatient and did not get along with others.

In March 1991, Dr. Paul Ware, a psychiatrist, performed a psychiatric evaluation of claimant. Dr. Ware diagnosed claimant as having adjustment disorder of adulthood with depressed mood. Dr. Ware reported that claimant expressed symptoms of clinical depression and prescribed antidepressant medication. Dr. Ware opined that claimant’s depression would respond to supportive therapy and medication.

The claimant contends the Comeaux case required the WCJ to consider a number of factors in addition to physical limitations in the determination of his PTD status, including age, literacy, skills, experience, likelihood of rehabilitation and psychological condition. However, contrary |flto claimant’s contention, in Comeaux, the supreme court expressly declined to extend to permanent total disability cases the “totality of factors” standard stated in Pinkins v. Cardinal Wholesale Supply, Inc., 619 So.2d 52 (La.1993), which addressed supplemental earnings benefits. Rather, the supreme court stated that the issue of whether or not claimant had successfully attempted the rehabilitation required by R.S. 23:1226 was a proper factor to consider along with physical incapacity in deciding claimant’s disability status.

Claimant argues that given his symptoms of chronic pain, depression and his limited academic ability, he is effectively incapable of being educated or retrained and could not successfully attempt rehabilitation. However, the expert witness testimony does not support claimant’s argument. Dr. Hearn opined that at the time of his evaluation, claimant was unable to perform even sedentary work on a consistent basis. Nevertheless, Dr. Hearn testified that he would encourage rehabilitation to enhance claimant’s educational level and that claimant possessed the intelligence to improve his academic skills. Additionally, although Dr. Ware opined that claimant showed symptoms of depression, he did not indicate that claimant’s condition would prevent him from working. To the contrary, Dr. Ware stated that claimant’s condition should respond to treatment.

The evidence presented demonstrates that the defendants’ vocational rehabilitation consultant, Dr. Mayeux, offered claimant the opportunity to attend vocational technical school and to participate in physical therapy at a local facility. However, the claimant failed to enroll in a vo-tech school or ajjjGED program and refused to attend physical therapy at NLRH, despite the recommendation of his treating physician. Thus, unlike the injured worker in the Comeaux case, claimant cannot show that he attempted rehabilitation and was unsuccessful. To the contrary, the testimony suggested that the claimant would have benefitted from vocational training and physical therapy if he had made a reasonable effort. Nor did claimant show that his depression was so severe as to prevent him from participating in rehabilitation or from performing strenuous activities when he so chose.

Based upon this record, the WCJ could reasonably have found that claimant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was physically unable to perform any employment, including while working in pain, and that claimant failed to cooperate with reasonable rehabilitation efforts. Consequently, we cannot say the WCJ was clearly wrong in denying PTD benefits to the claimant. The assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the claimant, Andrew Lawrence.

AFFIRMED.


author: L GREMILLION, Judge.

text:
    TOWN OF CHURCH POINT, et al., v. ACADIA PARISH POLICE JURY, et al.
    No. 03-1268.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Sept. 19, 2003.

      J. Lee Wimberley, Jr., Vidrine & Wim-berley, Church Point, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Town of Church Point, et al.
    André Doguet, Rayne, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Acadia Parish Police Jury, et al.
    Court composed of MARC T. AMY, GLENN B. GREMILLION, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.
   L GREMILLION, Judge.

In this election suit, the plaintiffs-appellants, The Town of Church Point and Roger Boudreaux, the Mayor of the Town of Church Point, are contesting the statutory and constitutional authority of the Police Jury of Acadia Parish to create Mosquito Control Sales Tax District No. 3 (hereinafter the “District”) and authorize the District to levy taxes. The plaintiffs are appealing a judgment of the trial court denying their relief sought in their Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Contest of Tax Election and to Declare Election a Nullity. We find that the Acadia Parish Police Jury acted within its constitutional and statutory authority to create District No. 3 and levy taxes for the District, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 20, 2003, the Acadia Parish Police Jury, relying on La.R.S. 33:2721.6, adopted Ordinance 854 creating the District. On that same date, the Police Jury acting as the governing authority of the District, adopted a resolution calling for a July 19, 2003 special election to place the proposition before the voters authorizing the District to levy and collect the tax. The election was held on July 19, 2003. The electors cast 2311votes in favor of the proposition and 1766 votes against the proposition. Therefore, the proposition passed by 545 votes. On August 5, 2003, the Police Jury passed a Resolution declaring and proclaiming that the proposition was duly carried by a majority of the qualified voters, voting in the special election held July 19, 2003. On September 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to La.R.S. 18:1405(E) contesting the legality of the election and the tax authorized by the passing of the proposition.

A hearing on the merits occurred on September 10, 2003. On September 11, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment finding that the District was entitled to levy and collect a sales and use tax and that the proposition submitted to the voters of the [2District constituted voter approval sufficient to satisfy the provisions of La.R.S. 33:2721.6 for the Police Jury to collect and levy the sales and use tax. Further the trial court held that the proposition was not unconstitutional. On September 11, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Motion for an Appeal.

Police juries as local governmental subdivisions or political subdivisions have the authority to levy and collect sales taxes. La. Const. Article YI, sections 29 and 30.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2721.6A provides that the governing authority of any parish may levy and collect additional sales tax as long as the rate, combined with the rate of all other sales and use taxes, does not exceed five percent. The governing body can create a special district to utilize the additional tax so authorized. La.R.S.33:2721.6(C). Such special district shall be created by ordinance of the police jury which shall set forth the boundaries to be included in the district. La.R.S. 33:2721.6(C)(2). Such special districts, once created by the police jury, are to governed by the police jury and the officers of the policy jury are the officers of the special district. La.R.S. 33:2721.6(0(3).

The additional tax is to be imposed by ordinance of the police jury but only after the question of imposition of the tax has been submitted to the qualified electors of the special district at an election in which the majority of those voting vote in favor of the adoption of the ordinance. La.R.S. 33:2721.6(E).

In Louisiana Recovery District v. All Taxpayers, 88-C-1621 (La.6/24/88), 529 So.2d 384, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional basis for the creation of special districts and their power to levy taxes. The court said:

One of the main objectives of Article VI of the Constitution on local government was to remove from the Constitution the great mass of material on the subject of special districts and to leave to the Legislature the responsibility for providing for special districts by statutory law. Another objective was to make parishes and municipalities more than |3mere creatures of the Legislature through constitutional grants of self operative powers.
By pursuing these objectives the delegates hoped to eliminate the need for continual amendment of special district and local government provisions and to grant a greater degree of self-government and independence from the Legislature to municipalities and parishes.
To facilitate these objectives a special district is classified by the local government article as a “political subdivision”, which is the basic substate unit of government and generally subject to legislative control. On the other hand, municipalities and parishes are specially classified as “local governmental subdivisions” and granted significant self operative powers. In two instances a political subdivision, i.e., a special district and others, is granted self operative powers also, viz., to levy special taxes for public works and to issue general obligation bonds. La. Const. 1974, Article VI, §§32 and 33. In some instances, to guard against abuse of self operative powers, the local government article expressly provides that a political subdivision must obtain voters’ approval before exercising the self-operative power.
In place of the great mass of special district provisions which had been contained in the previous constitution, Article VI, § 19 simply confirms the Legislature’s plenary power to create any type of special district and to confer upon it any power the Legislature deems proper, including the power to tax and to issue debt. Article VI, § 19 provides: Subject to and not inconsistent with this constitution, the legislature by general law or by local or special law may create or authorize the creation of special-districts, boards, agencies, commissions, and authorities of every type, define their powers, and grant to the special districts, boards, agencies, commissions and authorities so created such rights, powers, and authorities as it deems proper, including, but not limited to, the power of taxation and the power to incur debt and issue bonds. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied).

In Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 87-0476(La.App. 1 Cir. 11/10/87), 517 So.2d 192, writ denied (La.2/26/88), 520 So.2d 424, in addressing various constitutional challenges to the creation of a special sales tax district, the court recognized that because the Police Jury is the governing body of the special district that it has duly created, the Police Jury can conduct regular business and the business of the district at the same meeting. The court said:

| ¿Lastly, as regards the issue of authority to call the election, we note that the statute providing for the creation of a sales tax district provides that the governing authority of such district is the parish police jury. LSA R.S. 33:2721.6(C)(3). The trial court determined that the Police Jury conducted both its regular business and the business of the district at its regularly scheduled meetings, refusing to hold that its authority as the governing body of the district was not properly exercised because of a special meeting for the conduct of district business was not held. We agree. LSA R.S. 33:2721.6 does not require a separate meeting for district business. (Emphasis supplied).

In effect, the court in Campbell is recognizing the fact that at times the Police Jury is acting in its capacity as the District which it has created pursuant to La.R.S. 33:2721. The statute itself provides that the officers of the Police Jury are the officers of the District. The court in Campbell refused to read into the statute a requirement that when the police jury officers are acting in their capacity as officers of the district it must be only in a separate specially called meeting.

In the instant case, the Acadia Parish Police Jury followed the procedure set forth by La.R.S. 33:2721.6. The Police Jury adopted Ordinance 854 creating a special district, Mosquito Control Sales Tax District No. 3, and described its boundaries as the Parish of Acadia (excluding the municipalities of Crowley and Rayne). La.R.S. 33:2721.6(C)(2). The Police Jury then adopted a resolution calling for an election presenting to the electors of the District the proposed imposition of the tax. La. R.S. 33:2721.6(E).

The proposition placed before the voters of the District read, in pertinent part, as follows:

Shall Mosquito Control Sales Tax District No. 3. of the Parish of Acadia, State of Louisiana (excluding the municipalities of Crowley and Rayne) (the “District”), under the provisions of Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana of 1974, and other constitutional and statutory authority, be authorized to levy and collect as tax

The Acadia Parish Police Jury acted within its constitutional authority to levy taxes and its statutory authority under La.R.S. 33:2721.6 to create a special district to levy an additional sales tax. The proposition presented to the voters of the District was the act of the Police Jury functioning in its capacity as the District to obtain the necessary voter approval to impose the tax to be utilized by the District. The trial court was correct in finding that the election of July 19, 2003 was a constitutional exercise | Rof the Police Jury’s authority and sufficient to satisfy the provisions of La.R.S. 33:2721.6 for the District to levy and collect sales and use tax and/or to fund the tax proceeds into bonds. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants’ cost.

AFFIRMED.