author: CRAWLEY, Judge. YATES, Presiding Judge, MURDOCK, Judge, THOMPSON, Judge, PITTMAN, Judge,

text:
    USX CORPORATION v. Judith A. BRADLEY.
    2010599.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Jan. 17, 2003.

      Neil Richard Clement and Paul D. Sat-terwhite of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, LLP, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Samuel Maples, Birmingham, for appel-lee.
   CRAWLEY, Judge.

USX Corporation appeals from a judgment finding that Judith A. Bradley (“the worker”) is permanently and totally disabled as a result of two on-the-job accidents and awarding her workers’ compensation benefits accordingly.

The worker is a 51-year-old high school graduate who worked for USX from 1978 to 1980 and then from 1990 until April 26, 1999. The worker’s first injury occurred while she was performing her job as a bander for USX. A bander uses a control panel to wind up a large coil of sheet steel and to “kick” the coil out of a coiling machine. The bander then uses air tools to “band” the coil with a steel band and to crimp the band so that the coil will not unwind. The bander then sends the coil down a ramp to be picked up by a crane. The coils weigh between 10,000 and 50,000 pounds.

On March 26, 1997, the worker was banding a coil of steel when another coil “looped out” of the coiling machine, came over the coil on which she was working, and struck the worker on her hard hat, knocking her to her hands and knees and knocking her hard hat off. The steel coiling continued to pile on top of her as she tried to hold it off with her hands. Eventually the coiling-machine operator stopped the line and the worker was dragged out from under the coiling, bleeding from her head and complaining of pain to her wrist and knee. She was taken to Lloyd Noland Hospital for treatment. The hospital record indicates that the worker suffered abrasions to her left knee and right forearm and a laceration to her scalp.

After the accident, the worker returned to light duty at USX for three months. She complained to coworkers and family members about pain in her wrist, and she wore a wrist brace at work. She had difficulty performing her duties as a ban-der because of pain in her wrist and an inability to lift the banding tools. On April 2, 1998, she consulted Dr. Donald W. Au-try, an orthopedic surgeon, who noted that the worker had pain over the anterior margin of the ulnar side of the wrist. Dr. Autry ordered nerve-conduction studies to rule out an ulnar nerve entrapment, which would indicate carpal tunnel syndrome. Those studies indicated no evidence of entrapment. Dr. Autry, however, located a lipoma, or fatty tumor, on the ulnar nerve. On April 20, 1998, Dr. Autry performed surgery to remove the tumor and noted some scarring and inflammation around the flexor tendons. He testified by deposition that it was possible that the scarring could have been caused by the worker’s March 26,1997, accident.

In June 1998, the worker was moved to the position of entry end operator at work, a job that did not require lifting; nevertheless, she continued to experience pain in her wrist. The worker testified that she cried at work all the time. Her coworkers testified that they began to notice a change in her personality, from friendly and outgoing to withdrawn and depressed. In June 1998, Dr. Autry referred the worker to Dr. Robert Craddock for a neurological evaluation. Dr. Craddock found no neuror logical deficit but gave the worker several injections for pain. Dr. Autry continued to treat the worker for complaints of wrist pain, and in February 1999, he ordered another nerve-conduction study. On February 9, 1999, he diagnosed the worker as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. On April 28, 1999, he performed a carpal tunnel release on the worker’s right wrist. When Dr. Autry was asked during his deposition whether the worker’s March 26, 1997, accident could have “caused or contributed” to her carpal tunnel syndrome, he answered, “Carpal tunnel syndrome is primarily a repetitive type of problem. But it can be caused by acute problems.”

The worker returned to work after a period of recuperation from her carpal tunnel surgery, but she found that she was unable to perform her job duties without pain. She testified that she thought about suicide when she realized that she could not do her job anymore.

The worker’s second work-related injury occurred on September 2, 1998, when she stepped into a depression in the floor and fell, fracturing her left lower leg and ankle. She was out of work until January 12, 1999, at which time Dr. Joe Gerald, an orthopedic surgeon, assigned her a 10 percent permanent partial impairment to her left foot. When the worker returned to work, she could no longer wear her regular-sized work boots. She had to wear a brace on her left leg and a larger boot. The worker said that she limped and could not perform her work duties as she had before the September 2, 1998, accident. In addition, she continued to have pain in her wrist. She also began to have panic attacks and was unable to drive. She worked only a few more months before she quit her job at USX on April 26, 1999.

. The trial court rendered a judgment finding that, as a.combined result of the March 26, 1997, and September 2, 1998, accidents, the worker suffered physical and psychological injuries that rendered her permanently and totally disabled. USX presents three issues on appeal from that judgment.

I. The Standard of Proof for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

USX first argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof to the worker’s claim for disability benefits on account of her right carpal tunnel syndrome. It claims that the trial court failed to apply the clear-and-convincing standard of proof as it was required to do by § 25-5 — 81(c), Ala.Code 1975. That section states:

■ “The decision of the court shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence as contained in the record of the hearing, except in cases involving injuries which have resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders, which shall be deemed compensable only upon a finding of clear and convincing proof that those injuries arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”

Citing § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975, USX contends that carpal tunnel syndrome is a “cumulative trauma disorder” for which the clear-and-convincing standard of proof applies. Section 25-5-1(9) states, in pertinent part:

“Injury shall include physical injury caused either by carpal tunnel syndrome disorder or by other cumulative trauma disorder if either disorder arises out of and in the course of the employment. ...”

The Code definition of “injury” recognizes that carpal tunnel syndrome is usually classified as a “cumulative trauma disorder,” or, as Dr. Autry put it, “a repetitive type of problem.” But, as Dr. Autry also recognized, carpal tunnel syndrome “can be caused by acute problems.” Cf. Thomas v. Elephant Run, 814 P.2d 496, 498 n. 5 (Okla.1991) (noting that “[ajlthough [carpal tunnel] syndrome is widely associated with occupations involving repetitive hand movements, its causes are varied, including one-time acute trauma to the wrist” (citing Armstrong, “An ergonomics guide to carpal tunnel syndrome,” found in U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Selected References (March 1989))). See generally Jay M. Zitter, “Workers’ Compensation: Recovery for Carpal Tunnel Syndrome,” Annot., 14 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 11 (1993).

The trial court specifically found that the worker’s carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by an accident and not by repetitive trauma. The judgment states:

“Based on the testimony of the Employee, Dr. Autry’s deposition testimony, and the Employee’s witnesses, including co-employees Glen Weeks, Leslie Cox, and Ricky Bearden, along with the testimony of the Employee’s husband, Danny Bradley, and various medical records, all of which the Court finds credible, the Court finds that the Employee suffered a permanently disabling right wrist injury as a result of the accident of March 26, 1997, that required surgery on April 20,1998 and April 28,1999.”

Citing the preamble to the 1992 Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), as well as § 25-5-81(c) and the second sentence of § 25-5-1(9), Judge Pittman’s dissent argues that the Legislature intended to classify carpal tunnel syndrome as a cumulative-physical-stress disorder subject to the elear-and-convincing standard of proof. The dissent maintains that although it is medically possible for carpal tunnel syndrome to arise from sudden trauma, it is not legally possible for carpal tunnel syndrome to be classified under the Act as anything other than a cumulative-physical-stress disorder. That argument is unpersuasive.

“In cases of doubt in respect to an ambiguous legislative context, the preamble of an act must be resorted to to ascertain the intent [of the Legislature] and resolve the doubt.” Hamrick v. Thompson, 276 Ala. 605, 609, 165 So.2d 386, 390 (1964). The preamble to the Act makes it unmistakably clear that the Legislature meant to subject cumulative-stress or gradual-deterioration disorders to a higher standard of proof. In that context, and only in that context, the preamble mentions carpal tunnel disorder as an example of a disorder that should not be compensable unless it is clearly and convincingly established to be job-related. The Legislature simply did not mention its intent with regard to the proof requirement that must be met when carpal tunnel syndrome has been caused by an “accident,” or an acute trauma.

“If the legislative intent is clearly expressed in the preamble, and the body of the act is so constructed as to render its meaning and intent uncertain; and if the act admits of two constructions, one in accord with the intent clearly expressed in the preamble, and the other in conflict with it, courts should adopt that construction which harmonizes with the preamble.”

White v. Levy, 91 Ala. 175, 177, 8 So. 563, 564 (1890).

Although most of our decisions have dealt with the repetitive-motion or cumulative-stress manifestations of carpal tunnel syndrome, those decisions do not preclude a finding that, in an appropriate case, the syndrome may be caused by an “accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,” within the meaning of the first sentence of § 25-5-1(9). See Ogden Aviation Servs. v. Saghy, 32 Va.App. 89, 96, 526 S.E.2d 756, 759 (2000). In Saghy, the Virginia appellate court addressed the following question, which it stated was one of first impression:

“Because carpal tunnel syndrome has been treated as a cumulative trauma injury in numerous cases, and more recently the General Assembly has provided special coverage for the condition as an ‘ordinary disease of life’ under Code § 65.2-401, we must determine whether the condition may also be compensable as an ‘injury by accident’ when it is causally related to a single,, identifiable accident.”

Saghy, 32 Va.App. at 95, 526 S.E.2d at 759. The court concluded that carpal tunnel syndrome “may be compensable as an ‘injury by accident’ or an ‘occupational disease,’ depending on how it develops.” 32 Va.App. at 98, 526 S.E.2d at 760. The court reasoned:

“ ‘[Carpal tunnel syndrome], which is a condition that exhibits a characteristic set of symptoms caused by compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, will qualify as a disease when it develops as the body’s response to environmental factors, infective agents, or inherent defects of the body. [Carpal tunnel syndrome] may be caused by a number of precipitating factors or events, such as repetitive motion, cumulative trauma, obesity, rubella, pregnancy, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, and hypothyroidism, or a traumatic injury.’
“[Rocco Turkeys, Inc. v. Lemus, 21 Va.App. 503, 507, 465 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1996) ] (citing 2 Cecil Textbook of Medicine 1563 (19th ed.l992))(emphasis added [in Saghy) ]. Accordingly, we hold that carpal tunnel syndrome may qualify as an ‘injury by accident’ under Code § 65.2-101 or as an ‘occupational disease’ under Code § 65.2-401, depending upon its pathology or how it is incurred.”

Id. (footnote omitted). The court explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would differentiate one type of injury by accident from all others, an outcome not sanctioned by the Act.” Id.

This court has the duty to construe provisions within a statutory plan in harmony with each other. J.N.H. v. N.T.H., 705 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). In interpreting statutory language, a court does not look at one word or one provision in isolation, but rather looks to a whole statutory scheme for clarification and contextual reference. United States v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir.1994).

We find the Virginia court’s reasoning compelling, especially its conclusion that to treat carpal tunnel syndrome as noncom-pensable if there has been no clear-and-convincing proof that is causally related to an “accident,” would be to treat one type of job-related accidental injury differently from all others. Such a result is not permitted by the Act.

It is “settled that the trial court’s findings on disputed evidence in a workers’ compensation case are conclusive.” Ex parte Ellenburg, 627 So.2d 398, 399 (Ala. 1993). The trial court’s determination that the worker’s carpal tunnel syndrome was the result of a one-time accident and not the result of repetitive trauma' is supported by substantial evidence and is due, to be upheld. Because the trial court determined that the worker’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not, in this case, the product of repetitive trauma, it was not required to apply the. clear-and-convincing standard of proof.

II. Medical Causation of the Worker’s Psychological Injury

To be compensable under the Act, a psychological injury must have been “produced [or] proximately caused by some physical injury to the body.” § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975. See Goolsby v. Family Dollar Stores of Alabama, Inc., 689 So.2d 104 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). The physical injury, however, need not be “ ‘the ’ proximate cause” but only “a contributing cause” of the psychological injury. See Ex parte Vongsouvanh, 795 So.2d 625, 626, 627 (Ala.2000); Marley Erectors, Inc. v. Rice, 620 So.2d 31 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). Cf. Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 270 (Ala.1996) (stating that “to establish ‘medical causation’ in a workers’ compensation case, a claimant need only produce substantial evidence tending to show that the exposure to [an occupational] risk ... ‘was in fact [a] contributing cause of the injury’ ”) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 701, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (Ala.Civ.App.1975) (emphasis added in Trinity)); Ex parte Valdez, 636 So.2d 401, 405 (Ala.1994) (stating that “[t]o establish medical causation, the plaintiff need not show that the [occupational] hazard was the sole cause of the employee’s condition, but rather that the hazard-was a ‘contributing cause’ of the injury. A hazard can be a contributing cause if it is one of multiple factors acting in concert to bring about the occupational disease.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)).

USX contends that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the worker’s depression and panic disorder were “produced or proximately caused” either by her right carpal tunnel syndrome or by her left ankle injury. Instead, USX .claims, those injuries were, at most, remote causes of the worker’s mental disability. In support of that argument, USX cites Nix v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 624 So.2d 641 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). In Nix, the worker was injured when a machine roller fell and struck her on the head. Seven months later, a co-employee was killed on the same machine. Following the co-employee’s death, the worker suffered a disabling mental condition that was diagnosed as post-traumatic anxiety, panic disorder, severe depression, or organic mood disorder. 624 So.2d at 642. The trial court determined that the worker’s mental disability was not compen-sable because it had been proximately caused by the death of the co-employee, not by the physical injury the worker herself sustained. In Nix, the trial court made the following findings:

‘This court finds, from all the evi- ' dencé, that, but for the ... co-worker’s death, the [worker] would not have sustained her present ... disabling mental condition. This court further finds, however, that, had the [worker] not sustained physical injury on the same machine in the same manner, earlier, she also would not have suffered her present disabling mental condition. Therefore, as best as this court can determine, both events contributed to her present mental condition. The court finds, however, that the “precipitating cause” and the proximate cause of her present mental condition and disability was the death of her close friend and co-worker on August 7, 1990, and that, while the physical injury to the [worker] sustained some seven months earlier in January of 1990 was a contributing factor, it was not the proximate cause of her present mental condition and disability.’ ”

Nix v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 624 So.2d at 643 (emphasis added).

Nix was decided in 1993, before Valdez in 1994, Trinity in 1996, and Vongsouvanh in 2000. Valdez and Trinity clarified the test for medical causation and explained that “proximate cause” is not equivalent to “sole cause.” Before Vongsouvanh was decided in 2000, there may have been some doubt about whether the Valdez-Trinity “contributing cause” standard applied to causation issues involving psychological injuries. Any doubt was settled, however, when Vongsouvanh was decided.

In Vongsouvanh, the worker was traveling with a co-employee to a work site when he lost control of the vehicle he was driving and hit a tree. He and the co-employee were pinned in the vehicle for several hours. The worker suffered hand and ankle injuries; the co-employee died. After the accident, the worker developed depression, chronic-pain syndrome, and reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The worker’s psychiatrist testified that the worker was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident. The trial court denied the worker permanent-total-disability benefits because it determined that the worker’s “physical injuries were not ‘the’ proximate cause of his mental disorders.” 795 So.2d at 626.

“Instead, the [trial] court concluded that the proximate cause of [the worker’s] mental disorders ‘was and is the death of [his] co-employee and the guilt and remorse [he] feels as a result of being responsible for that death.’ ”

Id. This court affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, stating that, “as in Valdez, multiple factors” combined to cause the worker’s disability; that is, the worker’s “mental disorders originated from both physical and emotional factors.” 795 So.2d at 627 (emphasis added). The supreme court stated:

“[T]he trial court should have applied the ‘contributing-cause’ standard set forth in Valdez. If the court had used this standard, the evidence in the record would have been sufficient for the court to conclude that Vongsouvanh’s physical injuries were a contributing cause of his mental disorders.”

795 So.2d at 627. We conclude that, if the holding in Nix was still viable after Valdez and Trinity, it certainly did not survive Vongsouvanh.

In Marley Erectors, Inc. v. Rice, 620 So.2d 31 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), the worker was injured in June 1987, when a piece of concrete struck the hard hat she was wearing. The worker developed neck pain and, later, depression. Finding that the worker had suffered a “ ‘severe psychological disability,’ ” 620 So.2d at 32, the trial court awarded her benefits for a permanent partial disability. On appeal, the employer argued that the worker had failed to show that the workplace accident was the proximate cause of her depression. In support of that argument, the employer pointed out that after the accident, the worker “held various jobs following the 1987 accident at a pay rate equal to or higher than her pay prior to the accident, [but] that in November 1988, one week after a romantic relationship ended, [the worker] was admitted to the hospital for treatment of depression.” 620 So.2d at 34. This court affirmed the award of benefits, concluding that there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the worker’s physical injury was a contributing cause of her psychological injury, notwithstanding two significant facts: that there was a 17-month delay between the workplace accident and the worker’s treatment for depression, and that the worker’s treatment for depression followed what appeared to be a material intervening event — the worker’s breakup with her boyfriend.

In the present case, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the worker’s physical injuries, sustained in on-the-job accidents of March 26, 1997, and September 2, 1998, were contributing causes of her mental disability. At trial, the worker’s husband, daughter, and ■ several coworkers testified that before the accident of March 26, 1997, the worker w;as a happy, friendly, active, individual who enjoyed her work and worked hard. After the accident, however, the worker was withdrawn and depressed.

The worker testified that after both accidents she experienced pain and frustration at not being able to do her job. In addition to the pain in her wrist and foot that were the direct consequences of her work-related injuries, she also experienced lower-back, shoulder, and elbow pain that may not have been work-related. Taken in the light most favorable to the worker, the evidence established that the chronic pain she experienced — a part of which was' attributable to her work-related injuries— was a factor in bringing about her depression. The worker’s husband, who was also a USX employee, testified that before her accidents, the worker was a good employee and “worked harder than any man” on the line. The' worker’s daughter, who came three or four times a week to do her mother’s housework after the accidents, testified that before her mother’s physical and psychological injuries, her mother had been an active and positive person, but after the injuries she was “like an 80-year-old woman.” The worker’s husband and daughter both testified to changes in the worker’s personality and attitude after her injuries. The trial court was authorized to conclude that the worker’s delay in receiving professional help for her depression and panic attacks stemmed not from the worker’s attempt to “manufacture” a psychological injury from a remote physical injury, but from the worker’s commendable attempt to work through her pain, both physical and psychological.

We hold that the worker presented substantial evidence as to the causation element of her compensation claim based on her psychological disabilities.

“[Mjedical evidence of causation in a workers’ compensation case, whether in the form of testimony or treatise excerpts, need only show that the work-related [injury] could have been a precipitating factor in bringing about the onset of the disease.”

Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 271 (footnote omitted).

III. The Admissibility of Testimony by ' the Workér’s Vocational Expert

USX argues that the trial court erred by allowing the worker’s vocational expert, Dr. William A. Crunk, to state his opinion that there was a causal connection between the worker’s on-the-job accidents and her later depression and panic disorders. USX contends that Dr. Crunk was unqualified to render an opinion as to the medical cause of the worker’s psychological disability because he was neither a medical doctor nor a psychologist.

Dr. Crunk testified that he has a master’s degree in rehabilitation, a doctorate in vocational rehabilitation, and that he is board-certified as a rehabilitation counselor and evaluator. In response to USX’s objection that he was not qualified to state his opinion as to the cause of the worker’s psychological problems, Dr. Crunk stated:

“[UJnder my licensing, I am qualified to give an impression psychologically. That is a part of my training. I am licensed not only in the field of counseling but also as a therapist....”

Rule 702, Ala. R. Evid., states:

“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”

Whether a witness is qualified as an expert on a particular subject and, if so, whether the witness may express an opinion on the subject, are largely within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s judgment on those questions will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See Knapp v. Wilkins, 786 So.2d 457 (Ala.2000). Experience and practical knowledge may qualify one to make technical judgments as readily as formal education. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So.2d 505 (Ala.2000).

The Alabama rule concerning the necessity of expert testimony on the medical causation of psychological injuries is stated in Moore’s treatise on workers’ compensation:

“Since the existence, nature, severity, duration, and cause of psychological injuries are not commonly perceived by lay persons, expert testimony should be used to verify or substantiate a claim of mental injury in most cases. Such testimony is not a prerequisite to a finding of compensability in all cases, however. In appropriate circumstances, an award may be made for mental disability even though medical testimony relating to its existence or cause is inconclusive, or even nonexistent. For example, in Federal Mogul Corp. v. Campbell, [494 So.2d 443 (Ala.Civ.App.1986),] the court held that the existence of a mental disability and its causal link to the employee’s occupation may be established in the absence of clear expert opinions by lay testimony showing that the employee behaved normally and could perform his job before the accident and exhibited bizarre emotional behavior immediately afterwards that interfered with or precluded him from being able to work.”

1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers’ Compensation § 6:15 at 180-81 (1998) (footnotes omitted).

The worker’s medical and psychological records were admitted without objection at trial. Dr. Crunk testified that he had reviewed those records and that he had concluded that there was a causal connection between the physical injuries the worker sustained in her work-related accidents and the subsequent psychological injuries from which the worker was currently suffering. Dr. Crunk explained that the chronic pain the worker suffered after the accidents as well as the worker’s inability to go back to a job that she had enjoyed and in which she had been functioning well contributed to the worker’s depression and panic attacks. Crunk testified, without objection, that “You can’t separate a person’s mental condition ... when it is based on pain and when it is based on some aspects of the injury itself.... [T]he mental problem certainly impacts the overall ability to work.” Even the employer’s expert, a neuropsychologist, conceded that a physical injury can sometimes cause mental depression. Dr. Crunk stated that the medical records revealed that, before March 26, 1997, the worker

“was functioning well. She was doing her job. She was handling daily stresses. Then, she developed [depression and panic disorders] after [her] inju-riéis].”

Dr. Crunk acknowledged that no physician had noted the worker’s depression until January 27, 1999, almost two years after the worker’s first on-the-job physical injury, but he explained:

“It takes awhile for [psychological conditions] to get to the point where a doctor notices them to make a referral that it occurred and was occurring.
“[The worker] apparently was under a lot of medical treatment. She was getting a lot of surgeries and having these problems and couldn’t go back to work. And it takes a while for that to start developing as [the worker was] starting to see [her] life change drastically....”

Dr. Crunk’s explanation of the delay between a physical injury and its accompanying pain and the onset of symptoms of a mental disorder appears to substantiate what the worker’s primary-care physician, Dr. Frank D. Miller, recorded in his office notes for January 27, 1999 and March 15, 1999:

“1/27/99 — [The worker] is ... very tearful. She cries openly during the office visit and tells me that she had even thought about suicide due to the pain and persistent problems that she has had. She tells me otherwise that she is happy with her marriage and happy with her family. She insists that she is happy but quite obviously she is morbidly depressed at this point.
“IMPRESSION: Depression. She seems quite markedly depressed. I have given her samples of Celexa to take 20 mg. p.o. q.d. We will see her back in two to three weeks for reevaluation of her symptomatology regarding her depression.
“3/15/99 — Since her last visit overall her depression is doing much better. She feels better overall. Looks more calm and relaxed, is not as emotional and she is resting better at night. Tolerating the Celexa very well. At this point she makes the statement that she guesses she was depressed, though she did not realize it. I feel this most likely was the case.”

(Emphasis added.) On cross-examination, counsel for USX asked Dr. Crunk, “[I]t is also true, is it not, ... that [no] physician or psychiatrist relate[d] this depression and [the] panic attacks to [the worker’s] accident of March 2[6], 1999?” Crunk answered:

“Not directly. They all say this occurred since the accident and basically relate chronic pain and relate inability to go back to work and relate difficulty with coping given the situation.”

Citing Ex parte American Color Graphics, Inc., 838 So.2d 385 (Ala.2002), USX contends that, if a vocational expert is not qualified to render an expert medical opinion as to the extent of a worker’s disability, the expert is also not qualified to render an opinion as to the cause of a worker’s disability. In American Color Graphics, however, the Alabama Supreme Court did not hold that a vocational expert is unqualified to render an opinion relating to a worker’s disability. Instead, it held that when a vocational expert bases his or her opinion on inadmissible medical and psychological records and has no independent basis for his opinion — apart from his reliance on the inadmissible records — then the opinion is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment for the worker. In the present case, however, Dr. Crunk relied on medical and psychological records that were admitted without objection.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Dr. Crunk was qualified to express an opinion as to whether the worker’s physical injuries were contributing causes of her psychological injuries.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

YATES, P.J., and MURDOCK, J., concur in part and concur in the result.

THOMPSON and PITTMAN, JJ., dissent.

YATES, Presiding Judge,

concurring in part and concurring in the result.

I concur with Parts I and III of the main opinion. I concur only in the result as to Part II of the main opinion.

MURDOCK, Judge,

concurring in part and concurring in the result.

I concur in Part I of the main opinion and concur in the result reached in the remainder of that opinion. I write separately to note that I disagree with the statement in Part II of the main opinion that this court’s holding in Nix v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 624 So.2d 641 (Ala.Civ.App.1993), did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Vong-souvanh, 795 So.2d 625 (Ala.2000). I see no inherent tension between the holdings in those two cases.

An event causing a work-related disability can, of course, be either the sole cause of the disability or only a “contributing” cause thereof. If an event is only a contributing cause, it may be either a proximate cause or merely a “but-for” cause, i.e., a sine qua non, of the injury. The main opinion emphasizes that Ex parte Vongsouvanh stands for the proposition that an event need not be “the proximate cause” of an injury. The main opinion correctly quotes the Vongsouvanh opinion for its holding that the trial court in that case “should have applied the ‘contnbut-ing-cause’ standard set forth in [Ex parte] Valdez [, 636 So.2d 401 (Ala.1994) ].” 795 So.2d at 627 (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the Vongsouvanh opinion, however, our Supreme Court also repeatedly made it clear that, although an event need not be “the” proximate cause of an injury — i.e., the only proximate cause of an injury — it nonetheless must be “a” proximate cause of an injury. Indeed, the holding of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Vongsouvanh was “that the trial court erred when it held that Vongsouvanh had not proved that his physical injuries were a proximate cause of his mental disorders.” 795 So.2d at 626 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained:

“Under Alabama law, for an employee to recover for psychological disorders, the employee must have suffered a physical injury to the body and that physical injury must be a proximate cause of the psychological disorders.”

Ex parte Vongsouvanh, 795 So.2d at 628 (emphasis added) (concluding that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed because “[t]he evidence in the record indicate[d] ... that Vongsouvanh’s physical injury was a proximate cause of his mental disorders” (emphasis added)).

Thus, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vongsouvanh is consistent with its earlier decision in Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So.2d 262 (Ala.1996). As the Supreme Court noted in Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., “ ‘[f]or an accident to “arise out of employment” the employment must have been the cause and source of the accident and the resultant injuries must be traceable to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment.’ ” 680 So.2d at 265 n. 2 (quoting Alabama Textile Prods. Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183, 82 So.2d 204, 207 (1955)).

Recently, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 830 So.2d 741, 745 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), this court quoted from what we referred to as the “leading case in Alabama” governing whether an accident arises out of an employee’s employment:

“ ‘[I]n Alabama the employment must be the source and cause of the accident. Our supreme court in Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. [606,] 610, 71 So.2d [802,] 805 [ (1954) ], stated that in order to satisfy the “source and cause” requirement “the rational mind must be able to trace the resultant injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not otherwise

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 830 So.2d at 745 (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d 199, 201-02 (Ala.Civ.App.1981) (emphasis added)). “ ‘[T]he but-for test is clearly not the test for causation under Alabama’s [Workers’] Compensation Act.’ ” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 830 So.2d at 745 (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d at 202). See also Grider v. McKenzie, 659 So.2d 612, 616 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (“In order to meet the ‘arising out of requirement, the employee must show a causal connection between the injury and the employment. More specifically, the injury must be rationally traceable to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not otherwise.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)).

It is true that in Nix this court affirmed a judgment of the trial court in which the trial court wrote that the physical injury in question “ “was not the proximate cause’ ” of the employee’s disability. 624 So.2d at 643 (emphasis added). Despite the trial court’s use of the word “the,” I do not read Nix as suggesting that an event must be the only cause of an injury. Instead, upon reviewing this court’s opinion in Nix, I conclude that that is a ease in which the trial court simply found, based on substantial evidence, that there was only one proximate cause of the employee’s disability, and that that proximate cause was not the employee’s work-related physical injury. While the employee’s work-related physical injury in Nix might have been a “but-for cause” of the employee’s disability, the trial court found that it was not a proximate cause of that injury. As this court stated:

“The physical injury to Nix, occurring several months prior to the death of her fellow employee, and from which she had recovered and returned to work, could at best be termed a remote cause of her subsequent mental disability. To paraphrase, the law, in its practical administration, regards only proximate or immediate, and not remote, causes.”

Nix, 624 So.2d at 643. I therefore disagree that this court’s holding in Nix did not survive Ex parte Vongsouvanh.

Because I conclude that substantial evidence was presented in the present case that both of the accidents in question were contributing, proximate causes of the employee’s disability, I concur in the result.

THOMPSON, Judge,

dissenting.

I agree with Judge Pittman that in order to prove that her carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by an on-the-job accident, the worker was required to meet the clear-and-convincing-proof standard. Therefore, I join Judge Pittman’s dissent.

I write to add that I believe the main opinion also errs in affirming the trial court’s decision to allow Dr. Crunk, a vocational expert, to testify on the issue of the causation of the worker’s depression. USX objected to Dr. Crunk’s testimony on the basis that Dr. Crunk was not qualified to render an opinion on the cause of the worker’s depression. In making that objection, counsel for USX argued that “[Dr. Crunk] has no psychiatric qualifications, no medical licensing in the psychiatric field, and no medical licensing in the field of psychology.”

In Tidwell v. Upjohn Co., 626 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Ala.1993), our supreme court allowed a witness to testify as an expert where the witness’s “education, experience, study, and background” and his employment as both a pharmacist and a pharmacologist established his qualifications to render an opinion regarding the effect of a particular medication on the decedent. In this case, Dr. Crunk is a licensed vocational rehabilitation counselor; he is not a medical doctor, a psychologist, or a psychiatrist. Dr. Crunk testified only that he believed he was qualified to “give an impression psychologically.” The record does not indicate, however, that Dr. Crunk has had any experience with, or has any expertise pertaining to, depression, or that his “education, experience, study, and background” qualified him to testify regarding the cause of the worker’s depression. Tidwell v. Upjohn Co., 626 So.2d at 1300. Dr. Crunk established that he was qualified to render an opinion on the effect of the worker’s depression on her ability to obtain or maintain employment. However, I do not believe that the record establishes that Dr. Crunk “ha[d] sufficient knowledge to testify as an expert” regarding the cause of the worker’s depression. Id. I believe that the main opinion errs in affirming the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Crunk’s testimony as to the cause of the worker’s depression.

PITTMAN, Judge,

dissenting.

As the main opinion notes, the trial court treated the employee’s right-wrist carpal tunnel syndrome as a workplace injury arising from an accident; that court’s judgment states as a finding of fact that the worker’s “claim of a permanent disabling compensable injury to her right wrist is supported by substantial evidence ” (emphasis added). The main opinion concludes that because carpal tunnel syndrome may be caused either by repetitive hand movements or by a single acute event, the trial court did not, as a matter of law, err in applying the general “preponderance-of-the-evidence” standard of proof set forth in Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81(c), rather than the specific “clear-and-convincing-proof” standard applicable to “injuries which have resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders.” Based upon my review of the Legislature’s 1992 amendments to our workers’-compensation law in Act No. 92-537, 1992 Ala. Acts, as well as cases decided before and after those amendments became effective, I believe that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof.

“Carpal tunnel syndrome” does not appear in any reported Alabama appellate opinion issued before 1986; however, between that year and the effective date of Act No. 92-537, this court decided several cases involving claims in which workers sought workers’ compensation benefits based upon claims that their work had caused them to suffer from carpal-tunnel syndrome. In the first of these cases, we implicitly held that that condition could be a compensable accidental “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). However, this court also affirmed, in pertinent part, a judgment determining that a worker who suffered from tenosynovitis, a condition similar to carpal tunnel syndrome, had demonstrated that she had sustained an “occupational disease” as a result of repetitive hand movements in her work on a conveyor belt. W.Y. Shugart & Son, Inc. v. Cox, 578 So.2d 1332 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). Although we affirmed several judgments denying compensation where trial courts had concluded that the claimants had not proven that their carpal tunnel syndrome had arisen out of and in the course of their employment, we also reversed a judgment denying benefits where an employee complained of symptoms of developed carpal tunnel syndrome only two days after beginning work for her employer.

In the preamble to Act No. 92-537, the Legislature made a number of findings and stated a number of conclusions pertaining to workers’ compensation claims based upon carpal tunnel syndrome:

“It is ... the intent of the Legislature ... to address difficulties in the current scheme that are producing a debilitating and adverse effect on the state’s ability to retain existing industry and attract new industry. The Legislature finds that the current Workmen’s Compensation Law of Alabama and other means of compensation or remedy for injury in the workplace ha[ve] unduly increased cost to employers in the state, driven away jobs, and produced no concomitant benefit. There is a total absence of any reliable evidence that the current act has resulted in fewer injuries on the job, and a considerable body of evidence that any added benefit to the worker is significantly offset by the resulting reduction in job opportunities.
“The Legislature has reviewed substantial evidence related to various types of cumulative physical stress disorders, cumulative trauma disorders and certain ‘natural aging’ disorders, including carpal tunnel syndrome, repetitive motion syndrome, and even back and neck infirmities that result from gradual deterioration or the natural process of aging. The Legislature has concluded that it is extremely difficult for the adjudicator of fact to determine whether these disorders are related to work or whether they result from some congenital defect, aging processes, or simply the routine activities of daily living.
“These claims also account for a substantial percentage of the workers’ compensation claims in this state and are one of the contributing causes of the current workers’ compensation crisis facing this state.”

Act No. 92-537, among other things, amended the term “injury” appearing in § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975, so as to include “physical injury caused either by carpal tunnel syndrome disorder, or by other cumulative trauma disorder if either disorder arises out of and in the course of the employment.” Act No. 92-537, § 2 (emphasis added). The Legislature simultaneously amended § 25-5-81, Ala.Code 1975, to include a provision that the standard of proof in workers’ compensation cases would be proof by the preponderance of the evidence “except in cases involving injuries which have resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders, which shall be deemed compen-sable only upon a finding of clear and convincing proof that those injuries arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.” Act No. 92-537, § 26 (emphasis added), now codified as Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81 (c).

The Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended by Act No. 92-537 and viewed in light of the preamble to that Act, leaves no doubt that the Legislature specifically intended to classify carpal tunnel syndrome allegedly arising out of and in the course of employment as a cumulative-physical-stress injury subject to the higher “clear- and-convincing” standard of proof of causation. Simply put, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “[cjarpal tunnel syndrome is a ‘cumulative stress disorder,’ and a worker seeking benefits based on that disorder must present clear and convincing evidence indicating that her carpal tunnel syndrome ‘arose out of and in the course of [her] employment.’ ” Thompson v. Akzo Nobel Ind. Fibers, Inc., 796 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). Although it is possible that carpal tunnel syndrome, as a medical matter, may well arise in some cases from a sudden trauma rather than a gradual deterioration process, the legal classification of carpal tunnel syndrome with respect to a claimant’s entitlement to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a legislative policy determination that the courts of this state should not disregard.

Citing Ogden Aviation Servs. v. Saghy, 32 Va.App. 89, 526 S.E.2d 756 (2000), the main opinion posits that to treat carpal tunnel syndrome as noncompensable in the absence of clear and convincing proof of a causal relationship to an accident would be to improperly classify one type of accidental injury as different from other such injuries. Ogden Aviation addressed the effect of certain amendments to Virginia’s workers’ compensation laws that classify “ordinary diseases of life,” such as carpal tunnel syndrome, as potentially compensa-ble “occupational diseases.” In that case, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that before the legislature of that state had permitted “ordinary diseases of life” to be deemed compensable upon proof by clear and convincing evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court had held that repetitive-motion injuries such as carpal tunnel syndrome were not compensable under that state’s workers’ compensation laws. 32 Va.App. at 95-96, 526 S.E.2d at 759 (citing The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996)). However, the Ogden Aviation court nevertheless affirmed an award of workers’ compensation benefits to an employee who testified to having suffered carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms after sustaining a puncture wound in the course of his employment, concluding that Stenrich Group and related cases did not preclude a claim that carpal tunnel syndrome had instead resulted from an “identifiable incident” and that such a claim would be subject to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. Ogden Aviation, 32 Va.App. at 96-100, 526 S.E.2d at 759-61.

However, in this case, this court is called upon to interpret workers’ compensation laws enacted by the Legislature of Alabama, not of Virginia. As noted above, before the 1992 amendments to our Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee’s allegedly work-related carpal tunnel syndrome was held generally to be compensable in Alabama (although it was unclear at that time whether carpal tunnel syndrome should be classified as an occupational disease or as an accidental injury). Both the preamble and text of Act No. 92-537 reveal that the Legislature intended that workers’ compensation benefits based upon claims of cumulative-physical-stress disorders should not be awarded in the future except upon clear and convincing evidence (not merely substantial evidence) of a causal connection between the employment and the disorder. The Legislature further indicated in Act No. 92-537 that it considered “carpal tunnel syndrome” in particular to be a product of cumulative stress.

While treating one or more types of injury in a different manner than others may not normally be appropriate, it is the Legislature of this state, for good or ill, that has singled out carpal tunnel syndrome as a “natural aging” disorder that prompts “a substantial percentage of the workers’ compensation claims in this state” and as being “one of the contributing causes” of a “workers’ compensation crisis.” The Legislature has therefore decided that carpal tunnel syndrome should only result in employer liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the rare case where causation of that condition by a worker’s employment can be proved by clear and convincing evidence. It is the role of the courts of this state to give effect to that legislative intent.

Instead of applying the “clear-and-convincing” standard to the employee’s claim involving an alleged workplace injury to her right wrist (i.e., the wrist upon which Dr. Autry performed carpal-tunnel release surgery), the trial court stated that her claim of a compensable injury to that wrist was “supported by substantial evidence.” Because the trial court patently did not apply the “clear-and-convincing-evidence” standard, I believe that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to apply the correct standard. See Tallassee Super Foods v. Hepburn, 771 So.2d 477 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000). I therefore respectfully dissent from the affirmance.

THOMPSON, J., concurs.

      . Padgett v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 510 So.2d 277 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Alverson v. Fontaine Fifth Wheel Co., 586 So.2d 216 (Ala. Civ.App.1991); and Clanton v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 594 So.2d 141 (Ala.Civ.App.1991).

      . Malone v. ConAgra Poultry, Inc., 595 So.2d 897 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. STUART, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte USX CORPORATION. (In re USX CORPORATION v. Judith A. BRADLEY).
    1020684.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 2003.

      Neil Richard Clement of Adams & Reese/Lange Simpson, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner.
    Samuel Maples, Birmingham, for respondent.
    Gregory C. Cook and Ed R. Haden of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Self-Insurers Association, in support of the petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

Judith A. Bradley worked for the USX Corporation (“USX”) from 1978 to 1980 and then again from 1990 until April 26, 1999, when she quit her job. Bradley was injured on March 26, 1997, while she was employed as a bander for USX. While Bradley was banding one coil, another coil of sheet steel came out of the coiling machine and struck her on her head. The impact knocked Bradley to her hands and knees, and she lost her hard hat. The steel coil began to pile on top of Bradley, and she attempted to hold it off with her hands. When Bradley was pulled from under the coil by her coworkers, she was bleeding from her head and complaining of pain in her right wrist and left knee.

Bradley’s hospital record for the March 26, 1997, injury indicates that she suffered abrasions to her left knee and right forearm and a laceration to her scalp. According to Bradley, she returned to light-duty (office) work for three months following the accident but during this time complained to coworkers and family of pain in her right wrist. Also during this three-month period Bradley wore a wrist brace at work that was prescribed by Dr. Cheryl Szabo, the plant doctor. When Bradley returned to her duties as a bander, the pain in her right wrist rendered her unable to lift her work tools and thus unable to perform her duties as she had before the injury.

In April 1998, Bradley consulted an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Donald W. Autry. Dr. Autry noted that Bradley complained of pain over the anterior margin of the ulnar side of her wrist. He ordered a nerve-conduction study; the study indicated no evidence of ulnar nerve entrapment, which would indicate carpal tunnel syndrome. However, a lipoma (a fatty tumor) was located on her ulnar nerve and there was inflammation in the flexar carpal ulnar area. When the lipoma was removed, Dr. Autry noted scarring and inflammation around Bradley’s flexor tendons, which could have been caused by the March 26, 1997, accident.

In May 1998, Bradley saw Dr. Szabo and asked whether the lipoma could have been related to her March 26, 1997, accident. Dr. Szabo told Bradley that it was not related because no injury to the right wrist had been documented at the emergency room following the March 26 accident and because Bradley had not complained to Dr. Szabo of wrist pain during her prior visits. Dr. Szabo also indicated that a lipoma is rarely caused by a trauma.

In June 1998, Bradley was moved to a different position at work — one that did not require lifting. She continued to suffer pain in her wrist. Bradley’s personality at work had changed from friendly and outgoing to withdrawn and depressed, and she tended to cry while she was at work. Also in June 1998, Dr. Autry referred Bradley to Dr. Robert Craddock for a neurological evaluation. Dr. Craddock did not find a neurological deficit in Bradley’s wrist, but he did give her injections to alleviate her pain. Dr. Autry released Bradley to return to work without restriction in August 1998.

Bradley’s second work-related injury occurred on September 2, 1998, when she stepped into a depression in the floor at the plant and fell, fracturing her left lower leg and her left ankle. When Bradley returned to work in January 1999, she was assigned a 10% permanent partial impairment to her left foot. Bradley could no longer wear her regular-sized work boots and had to wear a brace on her left leg and a larger boot. Bradley claimed that wearing the brace and the oversized boot caused her to limp and that she could not perform her work duties as she had before the September 1998 accident.

In late January 1999, Bradley saw Dr. Frank Miller, complaining of bilateral shoulder pain, weakness in her hands, back pain that radiated to her hips, and pain in her lower legs. During her office visit Bradley became emotional and told Dr. Miller that she had considered suicide because of the pain and the persistent problems relating to her injury. Dr. Miller stated that Bradley was “morbidly depressed” and ordered numerous tests, including a nerve-conduction velocity electro-myogram on her wrist. USX asserts that this visit was the first time in the two years following the first accident that Bradley had mentioned being depressed.

In February 1999, Dr. Autry ordered another nerve-conduction study to determine the source of Bradley’s wrist pain. After the study, Dr. Autry diagnosed Bradley as having right carpal tunnel syndrome in her right wrist. On April 26, 1999, Bradley quit her job at USX. On April 28, 1999, Dr. Autry performed carpal-tunnel-release surgery on Bradley’s right wrist. According to Dr. Autry, carpal tunnel syndrome is primarily caused by repetitive motion, but it can also be caused by a one-time acute trauma.

In July 1999, Dr. Autry attempted to obtain light-duty work for Bradley at USX but was informed that no light-duty work was available. Additionally, Bradley reported to Dr. Miller in September 1999 that she continued to have pain in her wrist, that she had begun having panic attacks, and that she was unable to drive.

The trial court found, based upon Bradley’s testimony, Dr. Autry’s deposition testimony, the testimony of Bradley’s witnesses, and various medical records, that “[Bradley’s] claim of permanent disabling compensable injury to her right wrist [was] supported by substantial evidence.” The trial court concluded that the disability was a combined result of the March 1997 and September 1998 accidents. The trial court concluded that Bradley’s physical and psychological injuries rendered her permanently and totally disabled.

The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. USX Corp. v. Bradley, 881 So.2d 421 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Although the Court of Civil Appeals was split over the several issues that were before the court, a majority of the court concurred as to the proper burden of proof to be applied in carpal-tunnel-syndrome cases. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the trial court that carpal tunnel syndrome may be caused by a one-time acute trauma and in that event would thus require proof by a the preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Civil Appeals also held that the trial court’s findings based upon disputed evidence were conclusive in a workers’ compensation case. We granted certiorari review on the sole issue whether the burden of proof in all carpal-tunnel-syndrome cases — whether the carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by repetitive motion or by acute trauma — must be clear and convincing evidence.

Standard of Review

Am appellate court reviews the burden of proof applied at trial and other legal issues in workers’ compensation claims without a presumption of correctness. § 25 — 5—81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975; Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831, 832 (Ala.2002). A circuit court’s judgment based on pure findings of fact will not be reversed if those facts are supported by substantial evidence. § 25-5-81 (e)(2), Ala. Code 1975; Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d at 832. Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 269 (Ala.l996)(quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)); Ceasco, Inc. v. Byrom, [Ms. 2010541, Nov. 15, 2002] — So.2d-(Ala.Civ.App.2002). An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court. Ceasco, — So.2d at-.

Issue and Analysis

Burden of Proof for Carpal-Tunnel-Syndrome Claims

We granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether the burden of proof for all carpal-tunnel-syndrome claims is clear and convincing evidence, as USX and the two dissenting judges on the Court of Civil Appeals suggest. We hold that clear and convincing evidence is not the required burden of proof in all carpal-tunnel-syndrome claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals as to that issue.

Whether the burden of proof for all carpal-tunnel-syndrome claims must be clear and convincing evidence

The Legislature provided the proper burden of proof in a workers’ compensation case:

“The decision of the court shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence as contained in the record of the hearing, except in cases involving injuries which have resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders, which shall be deemed compensa-ble only upon a finding of clear and convincing proof that those injuries arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”

§ 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). Thus, for a clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden to apply, the injury must be the result of gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders. § 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975.

The Workers’ Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), defines injury as “only injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employment” or an “occupational disease or [a disease that] results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.” § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975. Injury also includes “physical injury caused either by carpal tunnel syndrome disorder or by other cumulative trauma disorder if either disorder arises out of and in the course of the employment.” § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added).

When determining medical causation in a workers’ compensation case, the trial court should look at the totality of the evidence, including both medical and lay testimony, and determine causation on a case-by-case basis. Clanton v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 594 So.2d 141, 143 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). Furthermore, the trial court is given wide discretion in workers’ compen sation cases. Malone v. ConAgra Poultry, Inc., 595 So.2d 897, 899 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).

“When interpreting a statute, [a court] must read the statute as a whole because statutory language depends on context; [a court] will presume that the Legislature knew the meaning of the words it used when it enacted the statute.” Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, 855 So.2d 513, 517 (Ala.2003)(citing Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405, 406-07 (Ala.1993)). Additionally, legislative intent should be given effect whenever it is manifested within a statute. State v. Union Tank Car Co., 281 Ala. 246, 248, 201 So.2d 402, 403 (1967). If a statute uses plain language a court must interpret the language to mean exactly what it says and give the words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Bean Dredging, L.L.C., 855 So.2d at 517 (citing Ex parte Shelby County Health Care Auth., 850 So.2d 332 (Ala.2002)).

USX asserts that because carpal tunnel syndrome is referred to as a cumulative trauma disorder in the preamble to the Act and in the definition of injury provided by the Legislature, the trial court in determining whether the worker has suffered a cumulative physical stress disorder must apply the clear-and-eonvincing evidentiary standard, regardless of whether the injury was cumulative or traumatic. We disagree.

USX is correct in noting that the Legislature recognizes carpal tunnel syndrome as a cumulative stress disorder, but it fails to recognize that the Legislature mentions carpal tunnel syndrome as an example of a cumulative stress injury. See § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975; Act No. 92-537, § 1, Ala. Acts 1992. The Legislature also included within the definition of injury a disease that results naturally and unavoidably from the accident. § 25-5-1(9), Ala.Code 1975. The Legislature specifically stated that workers’ compensation cases should be decided based upon the merit of each individual case and that the Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate the Act’s intended purpose, i.e., to protect workers, using the proper burden of proof. Act No. 92-537, § 1, Ala. Acts 1992; Cooper v. Nicoletta, 797 So.2d 1072, 1078 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Usrey, 777 So.2d 66, 72 (Ala. 2000) (citing Culbreth v. Woodham, 599 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Ala.1992)).

The Legislature’s intent is clear, and the language of the statute unambiguous. The Act does not provide that the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof should apply to all carpal tunnel injuries. Rather, it states that the clear- and-convincing-evidence burden of proof shall apply to injuries resulting from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders. Thus, the burden of proof that should apply depends upon whether the injury was caused by a traumatic accident or by a gradual deterioration or cumulative stress. The cause of the injury is a determination for the trial court, just as is the applicable burden of proof. Therefore, if the trial court determines that the injury is not caused by gradual deterioration or cumulative stress but rather by a one-time acute trauma, or accident, the proper burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence.

The trial court should look at the totality of the evidence in determining the cause of the injury. Additionally, the trial court is given wide discretion in workers’ compensation cases. If the medical evidence indicates that a carpal tunnel injury was caused by a one-time acute trauma, it is not only within the trial court’s discretion, but it is its duty under the Act, to apply the preponderanee-of-the-evidence burden of proof.

We recognize that the majority of carpal tunnel injuries are caused by gradual deterioration or repetitive motion and, thus, that the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof will apply. However, we cannot ignore the medical possibility, as evidenced by the testimony in this case, that in some cases it is medically possible for carpal tunnel syndrome to result from a one-time acute trauma. The trial court must determine the cause of the carpal tunnel injury and then apply the proper burden of proof. If the trial court determines that the injury was caused by a onetime acute trauma or accident, the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof will apply, in accordance with the burdens set forth by the Legislature in § 25-5-81, Ala.Code 1975.

The Court of Civil Appeals was correct in holding that the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof did not apply to Bradley’s carpal-tunnel-syndrome claim. Because Bradley’s carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by a one-time acute trauma, the correct burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.

STUART, J., concurs specially.

STUART, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur with the majority opinion, but I disagree with the majority’s refusal to address the trial court’s improper use of the “substantial evidence” standard and the Court of Civil Appeals’ application of an improper standard of review. USX is challenging the trial court’s application of the burden of proof to the facts of this case. While USX’s statement of its ground of conflict is inartful, I believe that by drawing this Court’s attention to the trial court’s use of the substantial-evidence standard, USX seeks our review of the burden of proof applied in these type cases. Indeed, the main issue before us is whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s determination regarding the burden of proof to be applied in this case.

The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, provides two evidentiary burdens in workers’ compensation cases. The burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, except in those cases where the injury is caused by gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress disorders, in which case the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. § 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, there are only two possible evi-dentiary burdens of proof applicable in a workers’ compensation claim — a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden or a clear- and-convincing-evidence burden, depending upon the injury.

Preponderance of the evidence is “[t]he greater weight of the evidence; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed.1999). See also Germany v. State, 630 So.2d 132, 136 (Ala.Crim.App.l993)(stating “[a] ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is ‘[ejvidenee which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to .it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1064 (5th ed.1979)”); Johnson v. Wyoming, 23 P.3d 32, 36 (Wyo.2001)(court, addressing a worker’s compensation claim, stated, “[t]he concept of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is defined as ‘proof which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence’ ”); Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 990 F.2d 730, 733 (3d Cir.1993); and Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.1984). Clear and convincing evidence, for purposes of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, means

“evidence that, when weighted against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt”

§ 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975. These are the only two burdens of proof that may apply in a workers’ compensation case: clear and convincing evidence and a preponderance of the evidence.

In addition to the two burdens of proof that may apply in the trial court, there are two appellate standards of review for workers’ compensation claims. See § 25-5-81(e)(l) and (2), Ala.Code 1975. An appellate court must review the burden of proof applicable in the trial court and other legal issues without a presumption of correctness and must apply a substantial-evidence standard when reviewing pure findings of fact. Id.

A presumption is “[a] legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (7th ed.1999). Thus, “without a presumption of correctness” means that the appellate court indulges no legal inference or assumption that the ruling by the trial court on a legal issue is correct. Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 269 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co., 547 So.2d at 871); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 580 (7th ed.l999)(substantial evidence is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”).

In this case a substantial-evidence burden of proof was applied in the trial court — a lower burden than the preponderance of the evidence required by the Act. Cf. Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del.l981)(“Substantial evidence has been defined to mean ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ... Substantial evidence is ‘more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance.... ’ ”). Because substantial evidence is the appellate standard of review and is a lesser burden of proof than the minimum preponderance burden required by the Act in trials of workers’ compensation claims, the trial court erred in weighing the evidence.

Moreover, I note that the Court of Civil Appeals improperly applied a substantial-evidence standard in determining whether the proper burden of proof for the carpal-tunnel-syndrome claim was applied in the trial court — specifically, whether the burden should have been clear and convincing evidence. Because the Court of Civil Appeals was reviewing the burden of proof used in the trial court in a workers’ compensation claim — a legal rather than factual issue — the Court of Civil Appeals should have been reviewing the trial court’s decision without a presumption of correctness, the proper standard of review under the Act.

      . A "bander” uses a control panel to wind large coils of sheet steel and then uses air tools to "band” the coil with a steel band so the coil will not unwind. The coils weigh between 10,000 and 50,000 pounds.

      . Dr. Cheryl Szabo, the plant medical doctor, testified that she saw Bradley on March 27 and 31, 1997, and that Bradley did not complain of wrist pain. According to Dr. Szabo, Bradley returned to full-duty work without restrictions on April 27, 1997. Bradley stated that she did complain of wrist pain to Dr. Szabo on both occasions.

      . USX asserts that Bradley was released for work with no limitations and that her ankle had healed with good alignment.

      . In Malone, the employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome after only a few days on the job. 595 So.2d at 898. There was medical testimony indicating that the time it takes a worker to develop carpal tunnel syndrome is highly variable and that it is possible for carpal tunnel syndrome to develop within only a few days of beginning repetitive work. Id.

      . We note that USX, when stating this ground of conflict, questioned in a footnote the trial court's reference to “substantial evidence” as Bradley's burden of proof. USX notes that § 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975, specifically provides that the burden of proof could be only a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Because USX did not specifically state the trial court's reference to "substantial evidence” instead of one of the proper burdens of proof as a ground of conflict, we do not address this issue.


author: PITTMAN, Judge. YATES, Presiding

text:
    STATE TENURE COMMISSION v. Lucy M. JACKSON.
    2010872.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Jan. 31, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied April 25, 2003.

      Bob Sherling of Campbell, Duke & Sherling, Mobile, for appellant.
    Gregory B. Stein of Stein & Brewster, Mobile, for appellee.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

The State Tenure Commission appeals from a judgment of the Mobile Circuit Court reversing an order of the Commission upholding the cancellation of the employment contract of Lucy M. Jackson, a teacher previously employed by the Mobile County Board of School Commissioners (“the school board”). We reverse and remand.

The record reveals that on February 7, 2001, the principal of Howard Elementary School recommended to the Mobile County school superintendent that Jackson, who had been employed as a teacher at Howard Elementary School, be terminated from her employment. The superintendent, in turn, recommended that the school board notify Jackson of the proposed termination; at its February 21, 2001, meeting, the school board unanimously agreed that notice should be sent to Jackson. Jackson was subsequently notified by a letter dated April 4, 2001, and sent by certified mail that the school board had proposed to cancel her employment contract on specified grounds, that she had the right to appear at a hearing, and that she could contest the proposed cancellation by timely filing notice of her intention to do so.

Jackson subsequently gave notice of her intent to contest the proposed cancellation of her employment contract. On May 16, 2001, the school board held a hearing on whether to cancel Jackson’s contract. At that hearing, the school board and Jackson, through counsel, presented evidence and arguments in support of their respective positions. After the hearing, the school board voted 4-0, with one abstention, to terminate Jackson on the bases of incompetence, neglect of duty, and “other good and just cause.”

Pursuant to § 16-24-10(b), Ala.Code 1975, Jackson sought review by the Commission of her termination by the school board. A transcript of the proceedings before the school board and copies of the parties’ evidentiary exhibits were transmitted to the Commission, and the parties filed briefs and presented oral argument. On August 30, 2001, the Commission issued an order upholding the cancellation of Jackson’s employment contract, finding that the cancellation “was in accordance with the tenure law and was neither arbitrarily unjust nor for personal or political reasons.”

Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Commission. The circuit court, after a hearing, entered a judgment on April 1, 2002, issuing the writ, determining that the cancellation had been improper because the April 4, 2001, notice sent by the school board had improperly failed to specify “poor attendance” or “absenteeism” as grounds for proposing the termination of Jackson’s contract. The circuit court subsequently denied the Commission’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment. The Commission appeals.

As we noted in State Tenure Commission v. Pike County Board of Education, 349 So.2d 1173 (Ala.Civ.App.1977), “[t]he statutory duty to administer and supervise the public schools in a county is charged to the county board of education,” and “[t]he setting of educational policy and the conduct and management of the schools is the responsibility of the county board of education.” 349 So.2d at 1175. Those responsibilities necessarily include personnel decisions, such as whether to cancel the contract of a teacher on continuing-service status, such as Jackson, for cause. To that end, § 16-24-8, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that the employment contract of any teacher on continuing-service status “may be [canceled] for incompetency, insubordination, neglect of duty, immorality, failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner, justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions or other good or just cause.”

By statute, the action of the Commission upholding Jackson’s dismissal by the school board for cause is “final and conclusive” unless it is “unjust” or is not in compliance with laws governing teacher tenure. Ala.Code 1975, § 16-24-38. Although Jackson was authorized to seek mandamus review in the circuit court of the Commission’s decision, that review was “ ‘limited to two determinations, first, whether the Tenure Commission’s action was made in compliance with the provisions of the chapter, and second, whether th[at] action was unjust.’ ” Ex parte Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 555 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Ala.1989) (quoting Sumter County Bd. of Educ. v. Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 352 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Ala.1977)). Our Supreme Court has stat ed that “the decision of the Commission should not be reversed unless the overwhelming weight of the evidence dictates otherwise.” Ex parte Alabama State Ten ure Comm’n, 555 So.2d at 1073 (emphasis added).

Neither in the circuit court or in this court has Jackson contended that the Commission’s decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment issuing the writ of mandamus to reverse the Commission’s order upholding Jackson’s termination was not based upon a determination that the evidence is insufficient. Rather, Jackson’s challenge to her termination at each level of administrative and judicial review has consistently focused upon whether that termination was in compliance with applicable law. Specifically, she contends that her termination is invalid because, she says, (1) the school board did not provide proper written notice of the reasons upon which it sought to rely for canceling her employment contract, in contravention of § 16-24-9, Ala.Code 1975, and (2) the school board violated the Education Employees Records Act, § 16-22-14, Ala.Code 1975, by failing to provide her with records critical of her performance. We will address these two contentions in turn.

Section 16-24-9, Ala.Code 1975, states that an employing authority may cancel a tenured teacher’s employment contract after giving that teacher notice in writing “stating in detail the reasons for the proposed cancellation” and naming a time and place for a hearing at which the teacher may answer the notice. In this case, the school board stated the following specific reasons for Jackson’s termination in its April 4, 2001, notice to Jackson:

“INCOMPETENCY
“You did not manage your class time or your students’ behavior in such a manner that maintained a learning environment. You were unable to implement good instructional strategies and suggestions that would have improved your teaching. You did not maintain discipline in your classroom. On at least two (2) occasions teaching strategies for improvement were pointed out to you, but you were unable to implement the suggestions of other teachers. Improper testing procedures were used in your classroom.
“NEGLECT OF DUTY
“It was pointed out to you that you needed to write instructions for your lesson plans, but you failed to do so. You were given suggestions for managing class time, but you were unable to implement those suggestions. On more than one occasion you left class without notifying your principal or arranging for a substitute. You were late for morning duty.
“OTHER GOOD AND JUST CAUSES
“You insisted on using old lesson plans or did not write lesson plans. You were late for morning duty. You did not turn in your lesson plans. You showed no evidence of instructional planning. You used letter grades instead of using numerical grades despite having been instructed to use numerical grades.”

The principal of Howard Elementary School testified before the school board that she had based her recommendation to terminate Jackson’s employment in part upon Jackson’s “[p]oor attendance” and because of difficulties in having a substitute teacher replace Jackson because no lesson plans had been left for the substitute to use. Although Jackson contends that “poor attendance” is not separately listed in the April 4, 2001, notice as a ground for termination, the school board was not required to provide a detailed statement of the evidence that would be presented against Jackson. See Dunson v. Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 653 So.2d 995, 998 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). The charges specified in the school board’s notice were sufficiently detailed to provide an adequate opportunity for Jackson to prepare a defense to those charges, see Sanders v. Broadwater, 402 So.2d 1035, 1036 (Ala.Civ. App.1981); thus, the circuit court erred in reversing the Commission’s decision because of the school board’s failure to use the specific words “poor attendance” or “absenteeism” in its April 4, 2001, notice to Jackson of the school board’s proposal to cancel her employment contract.

We cannot agree with Jackson that the circuit court’s judgment should be affirmed on the alternative basis that § 16-22-14, Ala.Code 1975, mandates reversal of the Commission’s decision. Subsection (e) of that statute provides that “materials pertaining directly to [an educational employee’s] work performance may be placed in the record of the employee,” and adds that “all materials to be placed in an employee’s record which may tend to diminish the employee’s professional or work status or reflect adversely on the employee’s record of performance or character shall be provided to the employee” (emphasis added). Those provisions afford discretion to school administrators in making entries in an employee’s personnel record — they permit an administrator to include in a teacher’s personnel file something less than every complaint, regardless of merit, made against the teacher.

Jackson complains that records other than those contained in her personnel file or those provided to her in the course of her employment were improperly admitted at the hearing before the school board, including computer entries made by the principal and assistant principal of Howard Elementary School concerning their personal perceptions of Jackson’s job performance or their recollections of certain incidents involving Jackson. Assuming, without deciding, that the original creation or retention of such materials by school administrators would contravene § 16-22-14(e), we note that administrative boards such as the school board and the Commission “are not restricted to a consideration of evidence which would be legal in a court of law and may consider evidence of probative force even though it may be hearsay or otherwise illegal.” Estes v. Board of Funeral Serv., 409 So.2d 803, 804 (Ala.1982) (emphasis added). A review of the record shows that the challenged materials were corroborative of testimony offered before the school board by the principal and the assistant principal that tended to prove that Jackson was, in fact, guilty of the acts and omissions specified in the school board’s April 4, 2001, notice. To the extent that the school board may have deemed the challenged materials to be probative evidence warranting the cancellation of Jackson’s employment contract, it did not err in admitting them.

Because it is undisputed by the parties that the Commission’s order upholding the school board’s cancellation of Jackson’s employment contract is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and because Jackson has not demonstrated that her termination was not in compliance with teacher-tenure laws, the trial court’s judgment in favor of Jackson on her petition for a writ of mandamus to the Commission is due to be reversed. The cause is remanded for the entry of a judgment denying the writ of mandamus.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, J., concurs.

MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result.

YATES, P.J., and CRAWLEY, J., dissent.

YATES, Presiding

Judge, dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Therefore, I dissent.

CRAWLEY, J., concurs.

      . Jackson's counsel did not object to that testimony.


author: HOUSTON, Justice. BROWN, Justice JOHNSTONE, Justice

text:
    Ex parte Lucy M. JACKSON. (In re State Tenure Commission v. Lucy M. Jackson).
    1021330.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Nov. 21, 2003.
    Gregory B. Stein of Stein & Brewster, Mobile (reply brief filed by Gregory B. Stein of Stein, Brewster & Pilcher, L.L.C., Mobile), for petitioner.
    Robert C. Campbell III and Bob Sher-ling of Campbell, Duke & Sherling, Mobile, for respondent.
    Daniel L. McCleave of McCleave & Den-son, L.L.C., Mobile, for amicus curiae Ala-baraa Education Association, in support of the petitioner.
   HOUSTON, Justice.

Lucy M. Jackson seeks review of a judgment of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversing the issuance by the Mobile Circuit Court of a writ of mandamus ordering the Alabama State Tenure Commission (“the Commission”) to reverse its decision to uphold Jackson’s termination as a public school teacher. We affirm.

Lucy Jackson was a teacher at Howard Elementary School in Mobile. The principal at Howard Elementary recommended that Jackson’s employment be terminated, and the Mobile County School Board voted 4-0 to terminate her employment. Jackson appealed her termination to the Commission. As part of discovery during her appeal, she requested all documents that would be presented against her at the Commission’s hearing. She was timely provided with those documents and with summaries of the testimony that would be presented against her at the hearing. Many of the documents came from her personnel file — to which all public-school teachers have access upon request. However, some of the documents had been retained outside her personnel file; Jackson was unaware of the existence of those documents until the documents were provided to her pursuant to her discovery request. After the hearing, the Commission upheld the decision of the school board to terminate Jackson’s employment.

Jackson petitioned the Mobile Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to reverse its decision. The circuit court issued the writ, holding that Jackson was not properly notified of the grounds of her termination. The Commission appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court issuing the writ. State Tenure Comm’n v. Jackson, 881 So.2d 445 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Judge Pittman, writing for the court, stated that the notice provided to Jackson of the grounds for her termination was sufficient. That court also rejected an alternative argument made by Jackson that the Board violated Ala.Code 1975, § 16-22-14, by not providing Jackson with copies of all records concerning her work performance.

The relevant portions of § 16-22-14 are as follows:

“(a) Definitions. When used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:
“(1) Employee. Any person employed by a school board.
“(5) Personnel Record. All records, information, data, or materials pertaining to an employee kept by the executive officer of the school board or other employees of the school board in any form or retrieval system whatsoever.
“(b) Establishment and maintenance of records. Each board shall establish and maintain a personnel file on each employee....
“(c) Employee access and response. The employee ... may, upon request, review all of the contents in his or her personnel file and receive copies of any documents contained in the file. No document shall be withheld from the employee....
“(e) Work performance records. Any materials pertaining directly to work performance may be placed in the rec ord of the employee and a copy of the materials shall be provided to the employee. Statements, reports, and comments relating to work performance, disciplinary action against the employee, suspension of the employee, or dismissal of the employee shall be reduced to writing and signed by a person reasonably competent to know the facts or make a judgment as to the accuracy of the subject information. Additional information related to the written materials previously placed in the personnel file may be attached to the material to clarify or amplify them as needed. A copy of all materials to be placed in an employee’s record which may tend to diminish the employee’s professional or work status or reflect adversely on the employee’s record of performance or character shall be provided to the employee.”

(Emphasis added.)

Jackson argues that § 16-22-14(e) requires that any and all documents relating to her employment performance be placed in her personnel file and made available to her upon request. She argues that various documents that were not placed in her personnel file but used against her in the termination hearing were “illegally obtained” evidence and the use of those documents at the hearing violated her right to due process.

This Court interprets statutes according to traditional rules of statutory construction. First, we try to apply the statute based upon the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275 (Ala.1998). When the words are confusing or conflicting, we resort to other rules courts have formulated to most faithfully interpret the statute. DeKalb, 729 So.2d at 276. The statute we are now charged with construing is quite confusing and internally inconsistent; we encourage the Legislature to reexamine and to clarify it.

One example of the confusion in the statute will suffice. The Legislature defined the term “personnel record,” but then never used the term in that section. The initial reaction would be to read the term “personnel file,” which is used many times in the section, as the equivalent of “personnel record.” However, this construction yields a nonsensical conclusion: any materials directly pertaining to work performance may be placed in the record of the employee, but the “record” by definition contains all “records, information, data, or materials pertaining to an employee kept ... in any form or retrieval system whatsoever.” (Emphasis added.) This language creates a black hole, sucking all “records, information, data or materials” into the “optional” record. That is, the permissive language of the statute is overwhelmed by the language broadly defining what is by its very nature part of the “record,” no matter where it is kept. It is difficult to interpret this statute; however, for the reason stated below we need not attempt to do so in this case.

Jackson claims that some of the records at issue were “unlawfully obtained” and that their later production for use at the termination hearing before the Commission violated her right to due process. However, we see nothing wrong with the actual “collection” of these records. Jackson does not argue that the information contained in the record was not collectible. Rather, she seems to argue that the records were unlawfully “retained,” because their retention anywhere outside her “personnel file” was inconsistent with § 16-22-14. Therefore, she argues, the admission of those records as evidence at the termination hearing before the Commission was unjust.

Even assuming that the retention of the records violates § 16-22-14, Jackson’s argument lacks merit, because she asserts no recognizable injury stemming from this alleged violation. Due process requires notice and a hearing. Jackson was given advance notice of all documents to be used in her termination hearing: those in her personnel file and those kept elsewhere. She was given a hearing at which she had a full opportunity to respond to the factual content of those documents. Because she received all that is required for due process, her due-process claim is without merit. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.

BROWN, J., concurs in the result.

JOHNSTONE, J., dissents.

BROWN, Justice

(concurring in the result).

I believe that Lucy Jackson failed to demonstrate that her employer’s alleged failure to comply with § 16-22-14 violated her due process rights. Therefore, I concur in the result.

JOHNSTONE, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The employee does not argue only that § 16-22-14, Ala. Code 1975, required the documents to be placed in her “file.” Her cardinal argument is that the documents were, by definition, included within her “record” and therefore should have been provided to her contemporaneously and that the very purpose of the statute was frustrated by the admission of these documents to terminate her.

Section 16-22-14(a)(5) defines “personnel record.” This definition plainly and unambiguously includes the documents at issue. Section 16-22-14(e) equally plainly and unambiguously, indeed twice, requires that those documents which are placed in the employee’s “record” “shall be provided to the employee.”

The purpose of the statute is obviously to prevent the employer from secretly building a case for discipline against the employee over a period of weeks, months, or years. The benefit to the employee, obviously intended by the Legislature, is that contemporary notice of adverse documents being placed in the employee’s “record” would allow the employee contemporaneously to improve his or her conduct or to identify errors in the documents and to notify the employer of the errors in order to avoid disciplinary action against the employee.

This legislative intent is not fulfilled by the employer’s providing the documents only in response to the employee’s discovery request after the employer has already instituted disciplinary proceedings against the employee to be proved, as in the case before us, largely by those very documents. The admission of these only-belatedly-disclosed documents into the termination proceedings against this employee frustrated the legislative purpose of the statute. Thus, I respectfully submit that the Circuit Court was right in reversing the employee’s termination, the Court of Civil Appeals was wrong in reversing the Circuit Court, and today’s decision is wrong in affirming the Court of Civil Appeals.

      . See Ala.Code 1975, § 16-22-14(c).