author: bCALOGERO, Chief Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry TONEY.
    No. 2002-K-0992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.
    Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney. Leslie P. Tullier, Esq., for Appellant.
    Michael H. Idoyaga, Esq., for Respondent.
   bCALOGERO, Chief Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge properly quashed a multiple offender bill against defendant, Jerry To-ney, either because the bill was not timely filed by the State or because 17 months ensued between the filing of the multiple offender bill and the hearing on the matter. Finding on the basis of the facts reflected in the record that the bill was timely filed and that the 17-month delay was not unreasonable, we reverse the trial court decision and remand for a prompt hearing on the multiple offender bill. FACTS

The defendant was arrested on August 30, 1996, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On October 29, 1996, the defendant was charged with a violation of La.Rev.Stat. 40:967(A)(1). Following eleven continuances, eight of which were requested by the defendant and two of which were requested jointly by the State and the defendant, defendant was tried and convicted of the charged offense on December 2, 1998. Pursuant to the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 40:967(B)(1), the ^defendant was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor on March 14, 2000.

Also on March 14, 2000, the district attorney filed a multiple offender bill, asserting that the defendant was a fourth felony offender pursuant to the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1, and set the multi-pie offender bill for hearing on April 14, 2000. The hearing was then reset 13 times before it was finally set for hearing on June 29, 2001. According to the record, two of the continuances were requested by the defendant and two were requested jointly by the State and defendant; the record does not reflect the party requesting the other nine continuances.

On June 29, 2001, the defendant filed a formal motion to quash the multiple offender bill, incorrectly asserting that the multiple bill had just been filed. The defendant also stated that the district attorney had failed to indicate which of the five previous offenses he intended to use, meaning that the defendant was unable to obtain meaningful discovery. At the hearing on the motion to quash, held on August 7, 2001, the trial judge denied the State’s request for a continuance and granted the motion to quash. In support of his decision to quash the multiple offender bill, the trial judge referred to the “dilatory tactics of the State in handling the matter,” and found that the actions of the State “demón-stratela] an unwillingness for the prosecutor’s office to do what they’re supposed to do.” The transcript of the hearing indicates that the trial judge was frustrated by the fact that the assistant district attorney, who was apparently one of a series of assistant district attorneys to work on lathe case, was not prepared to defend against the motion to quash. After finding that the motion should be quashed because the hearing had not been timely held after the filing of the multiple bill, the trial judge directed defense counsel to file a motion to quash on those grounds. The defendant’s attorney then filed a second, handwritten motion to quash. The hearing was then interrupted by other matters.

When the hearing resumed, the trial judge suggested that, after consideration of good time served, the defendant’s sentence might be completed. The assistant district attorney responded by requesting a stay order, which the trial judge denied, again citing the fact that the State was not ready to try the case that day. The defense attorney then stated that the defendant’s sentence had not been completed, though it was “almost up.” When the assistant district attorney announced his intention to seek review of the granting of the motion to quash. The trial judge then stated as follows:

[L]et the record reflect not only the basis of the dilatory nature of resetting the case, Multiple bill hearing on top of Multiple hearing, the State not going forward with the case, the State is too tardy — is tardy in filing the bill on 3/14/2000.

The State appealed the trial court’s decision to quash the multiple offender bill. In an unpublished decision, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment, with one judge dissenting. The appellate court found that the trial court was in a better posture to determine who was responsible for the delays in hearing the multiple offender bill and deferred to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Toney, 2001-1657 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/6/02), 812 So.2d 161. The only issue addressed by the appellate court is the trial court’s finding that the State had been dilatory in proceeding with the multiple bill. This court granted the State’s application for supervisory review. State v. Toney, 2002-0992 (La.11/22/02),829 So.2d 1034-35.

IJDISCUSSION

Under the express provisions of Louisiana’s multiple offender sentence enhancement statute, a multiple bill may be filed against a defendant who has been convicted of a felony “at any time, either after conviction or sentence.” La.Rev. Stat. 15:529.1(D)(l)(a). Although the statute does not provide a specific time period during which a multiple bill may be filed, this court has held that it “does not allow an indefinite time in which the district attorney may file the multiple offender bill once the necessary information is available.” State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d 752, 755 (La.1975). In reaching this conclusion, the court in McQueen relied both on a defendant’s Constitutional right to a speedy trial and the provisions of La. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 874, which requires that criminal sentences be imposed without unreasonable delay. Id. This court then concluded that the multiple bill must be filed “within a reasonable time after the necessary information is available to the appropriate district attorney.” Id. See also State v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109, 110 (La.1982).

In the instant case, the multiple bill was clearly filed within the “reasonable time” mandated by McQueen and Broussard as it was filed on the same day the defendant was sentenced; thus, the trial court erred in his alternative finding that the multiple bill should be quashed because the State was tardy in filing the bill.

Thus, the pivotal issue raised by this appeal is whether a 17-month delay between the filing of the multiple bill and the holding of a hearing on the issue demands that the multiple bill be quashed. This court has not previously expressly considered that issue. However, given the fact that the rule adopted in McQueen and Broussard is based on the requirement of La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 874 that sentences be imposed without unreasonable delay, we find that the hearing on a ^multiple bill must be held within a reasonable time, under the facts and circumstances of the specific case, after the filing of the bill.

The State argues that the lower courts erred in quashing the multiple bill under the facts and circumstances of the instant case because the record is unclear concerning the party requesting most of the continuances. In the absence of record evidence that the State was actually responsible for the delay, the motion to quash should not have been granted, the State argues, because the delay was not per se unreasonable. In support of its argument, the State cites State v. Grimes, 2001-0576 (La.App. 4 Cir. 05/02/01), 786 So.2d 876, which was decided by a different panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal than the panel that affirmed the trial court decision quashing the multiple bill in this case. The State argues that the two decisions are inconsistent.

In Grimes, some 16-months passed between the filing of the multiple bill and the hearing; the matter was continued between 16 and 18 times during that period. Id. at 1, 786 So.2d at 877. Moreover, at the time the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to quash the multiple offender bill, the defendant had served 23 months of a three-year sentence. Id. Nevertheless, the court of appeal denied the defendant’s application for supervisory writs, finding that the 16 month delay was not unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of that case. Id. at 16, 786 So.2d at 885. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted as follows:

The defendant has failed to show who requested the continuances of which he complains; he has failed to show that the continuances were not justified; and he has failed to show that he was prejudiced thereby.

Id. In reaching its decision to deny the writ application, the Grimes court cited to numerous previous Fourth Circuit cases in which the passage of an extended period passed between the filing of the multiple bill and the hearing was found to be | (¡reasonable. See Id. at 6-14, 786 So.2d 876 and cases cited therein.

In the instant case, we cannot say that dilatory tactics of the district attorney caused the delay between the filing of the multiple bill and the holding of the hearing because the record does not reflect the party requesting most of the continuances. What the record does reveal is that the district attorney set the multiple bill for hearing at least six separate times. Further, nothing in the record of this case indicates that the continuances were not justified. Finally, under the overall facts presented by this case, we see no great prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. The multiple bill was timely charged, alerting the defendant to the possibility that his sentence would be enhanced. Thus, the defendant was not caught by surprise.

While McQueen and Broussard tell us, properly so, that La.Code of Crim. Proc. art. 874 requires that a sentence be imposed without unreasonable delay, we do not believe the delay in this case was unreasonable. The district attorney in this case did not, as in McQueen and Broussard, desist from filing the multiple offender bill for an unreasonable length of time after imposition of the defendant’s felony sentence. In fact, our review of the record indicates that the district attorney’s most egregious error occurred when he requested a continuance on the day the defendant’s motion to quash came up for hearing. Most likely, the trial judge’s decision to grant the continuance was motivated, not so much by the delay between the filing of the bill and the hearing, as by the district attorney’s failure to be prepared to defend against the motion to quash when he should have been. That tardiness we do not perceive as adequate reason to quash the multiple bill.

Our decision in this case should not, however, be read to indicate that the dilatory tactics of a district attorney in setting a hearing following the filing of a multiple bill could never ripen into a favorable situation for a defendant, or result in [7the quashing of a multiple bill. If the record clearly reflected that the district attorney was solely responsible for a 17-month delay because he had asked for'multiple continuances, the result in this case might well have been different. However, under these facts and circumstances, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion when he quashed the multiple bill.

Conceivably, if evidence established an unreasonably long delay between the filing of the multiple offender bill and the hearing was attributable to a District Attorney who had developed a vindictive desire to prevent the defendant from getting out of jail, as the defendant neared that juncture, such evidence would be relevant. However, no such evidence exists in this matter.

DECREE

Accordingly, the trial court judgment quashing the multiple bill is hereby reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a prompt hearing on the multiple offender bill.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The defendant claims that he had 10 rocks of crack in a film canister.

      . La.Rev.Stat. 40:9676(B)(1) provides that a defendant who has been convicted of violation of La.Rev.Stat. 40:987(A)(1) "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years.”

      . According to the multiple bill, defendant actually had four previous felony convictions, as follows: (1) December 2, 1998 — possession of crack with intent to distribute in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 467(A)(1); (2) May 2, 1990-felon in possession of a firearm in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:95.1; (3) April 14, 1989 — possession of cocaine in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 40:967(C)(2); and (4) August 29, 1984 — burglary in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:62.

      .It appears that under the provisions of La. Rev.Stat. 15:529.1, as it existed at the time of defendant’s arrest, the defendant could be sentenced to life in prison without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, if convicted under the multiple bill.

      . La. Const, art 1, § 16 (1974), U.S. Const., amend. 6.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re SPECIAL GRAND JURY COMMENCING TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2003.
    No. 2003-CC-1191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2003.
   In re Dow Chemical Co.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 1978-01; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 0763.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Shirley MCCORD, Shirley Toni McCord, Professional Accounting Corporation v. Jay WEST.
    No. 2003-CC-0985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2003.
   In re West, Jay; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 586-785; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-210.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky Joseph LANGLEY.
    No. 2003-KD-1193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 10258-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 03-00519.

Granted. The trial court is ordered to excuse the juror for cause. The juror has clearly demonstrated that she will not accept the law as given to her by the Court and as instructed by the legislature. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(4).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Truman CLAVELLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Clavelle, Truman; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98 CR 1243; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00054.

Granted.


text:
    Susan McKneely FOWLER v. Claude Ed FOWLER.
    No. 2003-C-0590.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Fowler, Claude Ed; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 85,729; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0222.

Granted.


text:
    In re David C. WILLARD.
    No. 2003-OB-0712.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Willard, David C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Review of the Disciplinary Board’s Decision dated July 6, 2001 Office of Disciplinary Board, Nos. 00-PDB-217; 00-DB-005.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re JUDICIARY COMMISSION NO. 0135-0149.
    No. 2003-O-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Applying for Appeal of Decision of Judiciary Commission.

Denied. This Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction under La. Const, art. V, Section 25 is invoked only upon a recommendation of discipline by the Judiciary Commission. In re: Quirk, 97-1143 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172. No recommendation of discipline has been filed in this case. However, relator may request that the Judiciary Commission reconsider the ruling of which he complains in light of the arguments raised in relator’s supplemental memorandum filed in this Court on April 24, 2003.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 02-PDB-107.
    No. 2003-OB-0693.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Nuschler, Randy et al.; Nuschler, Beverly; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of The Disciplinary Board, No. 02-PDB-107.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Kathleen M. BILBE.
    No. 2002-B-1740.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Kathleen M. Bilbe, applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated February 7, 2003; Office of Disciplinary Board No. 00-DB-006.

Application for rehearing not considered. This Court’s judgment of February 7, 2003 is final and definitive.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence MELANCON.
    No. 2002-K-2407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Lawrence Melancon; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated March 21, 2003, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 408-778; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1656.

Reconsideration Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mercedes Arzu, Wife of/and H. Hugh WILSON. v. Wendy Kornegay, Wife of/and Horace Perez ROWLEY, III.
    No. 2003-CC-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
    Prior report: La.App., — So.2d-.
   In re Kornegay, Wendy; Rowley, Horace Perez III; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2001-14352; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 0324.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La.3/16/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    Louis Greg FONTENOT v. Janet Lynn Stark FONTENOT.
    No. 2003-CC-0624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Fontenot, Louis Greg; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2000-721; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01430.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    James DAVIS, Jr. v. T.A. MILLER, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Davis, James Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 1 W, No. 99-09425; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36-725-WCA.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nolan LEBANKS.
    No. 2002-KO-1329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re LeBanks, Nolan; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 386-852; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1990.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter Kendrick RILEY.
    No. 2002-KO-1352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Riley, Walter Kendrick; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 248,834; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-1358.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence ALFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Alford, Lawrence; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 358-359; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 'No. 2002-K-181.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marion J. AINSWORTH.
    No. 2002-KH-1433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Ainsworth, Marion, J.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 95 F 80; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 35905 KH, 36173-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kyle HEBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Hebert, Kyle; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 228-930; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 550.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregg J. STANLEY v. N. Burl CAIN Wdn.
    No. 2002-KH-1465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Stanley, Gregg, J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-3635; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02 KH 354.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    Roosevelt SMITH v. Richard STALDER, et al.
    No. 2002-CI-1519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Smith, Roosevelt; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 447,638; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CW 1806.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lloyd BRUMFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Brumfield, Lloyd; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. CR 273410; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 00 KW 1703.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Connie L. SLEDGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Sledge, Connie, L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 32,005; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36188 KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond M. FLOYD, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Floyd, Raymond, M. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 8589-91; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-1269.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David WATERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Waters, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 44’195.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas WATSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Watson, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 61,366, 63,479; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36258-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kent TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Taylor, Kent; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-0373; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02 KH 343.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Myron SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Smith, Myron; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 178-758; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36207 KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norton HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Hamilton, Norton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory anchor Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 273-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-394.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rogers ATKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Atkins, Rogers; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 82884 A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36203 KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rayvell FINCH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1563.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Finch, Rayvell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 390-132; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 323.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Walter COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1572.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Coleman, Walter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. O, No. 285-548.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roscoe David CORMIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1573.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Cormier, Roscoe, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Re- ■ medial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR 94-4037; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 01-01497.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alton P. CUREAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Cureaux, Alton, P.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 353-417; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 443.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175; State ex rel. Degreat v. State, 98-0690 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 205.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl G. SOILEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Soileau, Darryl G.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 111440-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 01-01356.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald A. BAILEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Bailey, Gerald, A; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 88-2763; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02 KH 395.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ferdinand MATTHEWS v. Baron KAYLO, Warden, Avoyelles Correction Center Cottonport, Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-2239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Matthews, Ferdinand; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 97-5052; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-660.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis BAILEY.
    No. 2003-K-0114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Bailey, Curtis; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 94-2590; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-591.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl Joseph DUPRE, Sr.
    No. 2003-K-0116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Dupre, Earl Joseph Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 355904; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1161.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Boris HACKNER.
    No. 2003-K-0138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Hackner, Boris; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 7505-99; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-755.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian Keith FRANCIS.
    No. 2003-K-0149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Francis, Brian Keith; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 84820; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0862.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carrol NARCISSE.
    No. 2003-K-0150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Nareisse, Carrol; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 20,860; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,-595-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paul E. PANKOW.
    No. 2003-K-0205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Pankow, Paul E.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 312243; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0839.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene WILSON.
    No. 2003-K-0216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Wilson, Eugene; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 60574; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-700.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose PEREZ.
    No. 2003-K-0221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Perez, Jose; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 01-6479; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-587.

Denied.


text:
    Kim MICELI v. Barbara Olivard Riso, Wife of/and Salvadore RISO and State Farm Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Miceli, Kim; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 493-102; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-810.

Denied.


text:
    GEOIL, L.L.C. v. ONLINE RESOURCE EXCHANGE INC.
    No. 2003-C-0448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Online Resource Exchange Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2000-17093; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1537.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas M. CLOUSTON, et ux. v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rap-ides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 191,101; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0912.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    MOUNT MARIAH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. PANNELL’S ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC, INC. and Acstar Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Pannell’s Associated Electric Inc. et al.; Acstar Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 11th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 60,616; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,361-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Salvador R. DUZON, Carolyn R. Duzon, on Behalf of the COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS, Individually and on Behalf of the Minor Children, Salvador Duzon, Jr. and John R. Duzon, and Tomas Paral, Personal Representative of the Estate of Andy S. Paral v. Thomas L. STALLWORTH, Queen Bee Transport, Inc., Venture Transports, Inc., Reliance National Indemnity, Cal-Dive International, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Cal-Dive International Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85,886; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 1187.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Lori BROWN, et al. v. THC OF NEW ORLEANS, LLC.
    No. 2003-CC-0592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re THC of New Orleans, LLC;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 02-13738; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0006.

Denied.


text:
    John DOE, M.D. v. Sr. Barbara GRANT, Nicholas J. Angelica, M.D., E.H. Goodier, M.D., and Mercy Hospital.
    No. 2003-C-0604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Doe, John M.D et al.; Zamanian, Bahram M.D.; Bahram Zamanian M.D. A Professional Corporation; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 93-11083; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-0175.

Denied.


text:
    SUNSET INSURANCE COMPANY v. John G. GOMILA, Jr., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Sunset Insurance Company;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 391-299; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-633.

Denied.


text:
    Sharon L. ANZALONE v. Jonathan A. JARMAN, M.D., and North Oaks Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc., d/b/a North Oaks Medical Center.
    No. 2003-CC-0608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Jarman, Jonathan A.M.D. et al.; North Oak Rehabilitation Hosp. Inc. d/b/a; North Oaks Medical Center; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2002-000077; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1941.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cassandra BRYANT.
    No. 2003-KK-0611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Bryant, Cassandra; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 429-460; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2207.

Denied.


text:
    Ivan L. HAND, Jr. v. Gwendolyn Robinson HAND.
    No. 2003-C-0612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Hand, Gwendolyn Robinson; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97,164; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 1999 CA 2420R.

Denied.


text:
    Frederick HILLS, Jr. v. CYPRESS BAYOU CASINO & Royal and Sun Alliance.
    No. 2003-C-0620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana d/b/a; Cypress Bayou Casino; Royal & Sunalliance Insurance; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist.-9, No. 01-06071; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-758.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jane W. MCKOIN, et al. v. Eugene A. HARPER, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re McKoin, Jane W. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 96-656; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36533-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Phill WILLIAMS v. CHURCH’S FRIED CHICKEN and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
    No. 2003-C-0628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Williams, Phill; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 94603-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1046.

Denied.


text:
    Teddy CAMPBELL v. HIGMAN BARGE LINES, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Higman Barge Lines Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2001-972; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0937.

Denied.


text:
    In the Matter of SUCCESSION OF Marjorie Ann Nosworthy RICE.
    No. 2003-C-0632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Nosworthy, Lloyd; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 16,063; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0715.

Denied.


text:
    Emerson J. JACKSON, Sr. v. SOUTHERN LIVESTOCK SUPPLY.
    No. 2003-C-0633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Jackson, Emerson; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Workers’ Compensation District 05, No. 97-05416; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2560.

Denied.


text:
    Sandra BERTRAND v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Acadia Parish Police Jury.
    No. 2003-C-0634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Bertrand, Sandra; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72500; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1163.

Denied.


text:
    Valeria PRICE and Mark Lacour v. AMERICAN SAFETY RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 548-288, 549-322; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-7.

Denied.


text:
    Amy KINCHEN v. Lenedray LEWIS, et al., Government Employees Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Kinchen, Amy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2001-000629; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2198.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    William D. WOODWARD, et al. v. William Kent CUTRER and Linda Arnold Cutrer, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Cutrer, William Kent et al.; Cut-rer, Linda Arnold; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 96-3040; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-423.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Harry A. LEBLANC v. W.J. TRAPPEY, Sr., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Transportation & Development Dept, of; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87,600; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1103.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Harold B. RAY v. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF LOUISIANA, L.L.C.
    No. 2003-CC-0655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Courtney Construction of Alexandria, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of La-salle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 30,747; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-640.

Denied.


text:
    D & J TIRE, INC. v. BANK ONE, LOUISIANA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION.
    No. 2003-C-0667.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re D & J Tire, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 199,615; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0935.

Denied.


text:
    Sharon ROGERS v. STATE of La., Through DOTD.
    No. 2003-C-0668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Louisiana State of; Transportation & Development Dept, of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 195,686; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-809.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    April Yvette GRAY v. INVESTMENT CARS UNLIMITED, INC. and/or Southeast Foods, Inc., d/b/a County Market.
    No. 2003-C-0670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Southeast Foods Inc. d/b/a; County Market; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 994461-H; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,691-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Amy KINCHEN v. Lenedray LEWIS, et al., Government Employees Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-0674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Lewis, Lenedray et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2001-000629; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2198.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roland Joseph PELTIER, Jr.
    No. 2003-KK-0675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Peltier, Roland Joseph; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 95374; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 08-00129.

Denied.


text:
    Marie Elaine D’Amico RANSOME v. Al Jerome RANSOME.
    No. 2003-C-0677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Ransome, Marie Elaine D’Ami-co; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Family Court, No. 135,311; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2070.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Boyd MARTIN, et ux. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Health and Hospitals Department of et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rap-ides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 196,543; to the Court- of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1082.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Harry A. LEBLANC v. W.J. TRAPPEY, Sr., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0684.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re New Iberia City of; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87,600; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1103.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Salvador R. DUZON, Carolyn R. Duzon, on Behalf of the COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS, Individually and on Behalf of the Minor Children, Salvador Duzon, Jr. and John R. Duzon, and Tomas Paral, Personal Representative of the Estate of Andy S. Paral v. Thomas L. STALLWORTH, Queen Bee Transport, Inc., Venture Transports, Inc., Reliance National Indemnity, Cal-Dive International, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2003.
   In re Stallworth, Thomas L. et al.; Queen Bee Transport Inc.; Reliance National Indemnity; Venture Transports Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of La-fourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85,886; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 1187.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


author: JjTERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

text:
    Louise Racey BURNS, wife of/and Alastair H. Burns v. Randy L. HETLER, Dry Klean Carpet Maintenance, Inc., Travelers Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-CA-1733.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Feb. 26, 2003.
    Writ Denied May 9, 2003.
    Clifford E. Cardone, Catherine Hilton, Cardone Law Firm APLC, New Orleans, LA, for PlaintiffiAppellee.
    Sidney J. Angelle, Brant J. Cacamo, Lobman, Carnahan, Batt, Angelle & Nader, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY, Judge LEON A. CANNIZZARO JR.).
   JjTERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

Defendant, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, appeals a trial court judgment granting a partial motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Louise Racey Burns. The trial court found State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s rejection form for uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage failed to comply with La. R.S. 22:1406 and was therefore not a valid rejection. We reverse the trial court for the following reasons.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 1999, Dr. Alastair Burns (“Dr.Burns”) was struck while walking in the crosswalk, on Tulane Avenue at its intersection with South Robertson Street, by a van owned by Dry Klean Carpet Maintenance Services, Inc. (“Dry Klean Carpet”), and operated by its employee Randy Hetler. As a result of the impact Dr. Burns suffered a closed head injury. Dr. Burns died July 11, 1999. Dr. Burns’s wife, Louise R. Burns, filed suit against Randy Hetler, Dry Klean Carpet, Travelers Insurance and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (“State Farm”). State Farm was sued as plaintiffs UM insurer.

The parties conducted discovery and several supplemental petitions were filed. State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the dismissal |¡>pf plaintiffs claims against State Farm on the grounds that Louise Burns had rejected UM coverage under the policy. The trial court denied the motion. State Farm filed a writ with this Court, which was denied. State Farm filed a writ with the Supreme Court that was also denied.

Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting that the trial court find the rejection form issued by State Farm and signed by the plaintiff was invalid, thereby imputing UM coverage under the State Farm policy. The trial court granted the judgment and certified the judgment as final and appealable.

Louise Burns on July 18, 1994, executed an Acknowledgement of Coverage Selection/Rejection Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage form. The waiver was a pre-printed form prepared by State Farm. The pre-printed form, which was signed by Louise Burns, appeared as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COVERAGE SELECTION/REJECTION— UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE

In keeping with the terms of my state, I have been offered the opportunity to purchase Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage.
CHECK ONLY ONE:
□ I select Uninsured/Undermsured Motor Vehicle Coverage with full policy limits
□ on all vehicles. □ on automobiles only.
□ I select Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage with Limits of $500,000
□ on all vehicles. □ on automobiles only.
¡3 I reject Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
® on all vehicles. O on recreational vehicles only.
|3I understand that this Acknowledgment of Coverage Selection/Rejection will be applicable to the policy applied for, all future renewals of the policy, and on future policies issued because of a change of coverage or an interruption of coverage, unless I later request in writing a change in such coverage.
Applicant’s
Signature X_

The trial court found the State Farm rejection form was invalid. The judgment stated that the form was:

... [Therefore ineffective, because it implied that UM coverage is not mandated by law. The form’s language stated that the insured was being offered the opportunity to purchase UM coverage and that is misleading because it requires the insured to perform an affirmative act to choose coverage that is mandated by law and which the insured would receive even if she did nothing. Therefore, the form at issue here failed to place the insured in the position to make an informed rejection of UM coverage and, consequently, the insured’s rejection was not valid.

State Farm urges the following issues for review. First, State Farm argues the form provided the insured a clear meaningful choice. Second, State Farm argues the form is not required to advise the insured that UM coverage is mandated by law. Third, State Farm argues the form was a valid rejection of UM coverage. Finally, State Farm argues the form provided all options including UM coverage.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The appellate court reviews a judgment granting a motion for summary judgment de novo. Royal Street Grocery, Inc. v. Entergy New Orleans, Inc., 2000-1530, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir 2/20/02), 811 So.2d 120, 123; Freeman v. Hutson, 99-1438, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/23/99), 738 So.2d 148, 151. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. Freeman, 99-1438 at p. 6, 738 So.2d at 152. The procedure is favored and |4shall be construed to accomplish these ends. Id. A summary judgment shall be rendered where if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).

Uninsured motorist coverage is provided for by statute and embodies a strong public policy. Roger v. Estate of Moulton, 513 So.2d 1126 (La.1987); A.I.U. Insurance Company v. Roberts, 404 So.2d 948 (La.1981). The object of such coverage is to provide full recovery for automobile accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who is not covered by adequate liability insurance. Henson v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 585 So.2d 534 (La.1991). La R.S. 22:1406 D(1)(a)(i) mandates that every automobile liability insurance policy issued or delivered in this state shall include coverage, in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, for the protection of insureds who are legally entitled to recover from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles. Statutory coverage will be read into a policy as if it were in the policy itself. Henson, 585 So.2d at 537. However, the statute also provides that the insured may reject in writing that statutorily mandated coverage or select lower limits.

The Louisiana Supreme Court stressed in Daigle v. Authement, 96-1662 (La.4/8/97), 691 So.2d 1218, that much discretion is given to the insurance carrier in the design of the UM form:

Implicit in the legislature’s direction to insurers to design a form, was the responsibility to design a form that would fairly effectuate the intent of the law. The legislature did not mandate that the form be designed in any particular way, nor did it indicate that any particular language was sacrosanct. The legislature had to have anticipated that [Rvarious insurers might go about the design of the necessary form in different ways. Moreover, as in any case where the same type of document is drafted separately by multiple authors, it is to be expected that some forms will be better than others. Had the legislature believed that only one format was acceptable or that only certain words or phrases could be used, it would have included the required format in the statute.
In Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 195 (La.1992), we held that a rejection form used by an insurance company must inform the applicant of the available options regarding UM coverage so that the applicant can make a meaningful selection from among the options provided by the statute
In Tugwell, we noted that the task of informing the applicant of available options can be accomplished in several ways. It is not the job of the courts to draft insurance forms or to dictate the exact format or wording which must be used for a valid rejection of the mandated UM coverage. The legislature specifically left that task to the insurers.

Daigle, 691 So.2d 1213 at 1214-1216

This Court has addressed this issue previously in Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2000-0349 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/24/01), 778 So.2d 1155; Boyd v. Schroeder, 98-0915 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/10/99), 735 So.2d 672; and Lefeaux v. Taylor, 97-0332 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/24/97), 700 So.2d 1027. The argument advanced by Louise Burns has been rejected in all of previously decided cases in this Circuit.

In Lefeaux, the plaintiffs challenged a waiver because the form did not advise the insured that he would be provided coverage by operation of Louisiana law without a proper rejection. The Court dismissed the argument by asserting:

The plaintiffs challenge the waiver executed by Matta’s, arguing that it does not meet the legal requirements for a valid waiver because it is ambiguous and failed to provide Matta’s with sufficient information to make an informed decision on whether to accept or reject UM coverage. The defect in the Pacto policy, the plaintiffs claim, is that it neglects to inform Matta’s clearly that UM coverage will be provided by operation of law unless rejected or that Matta’s is entitled to full UM coverage. Thus, argue the plaintiffs, Pacto’s UM rejection “creates the illusion” that the insured has only two options instead of the three options imposed by Tugwell. We disagree.

Lefeaux, 97-0332 at p. 4, 700 So.2d at 1029.

In Boyd, the Court found a similar insurance waiver form sufficient and explained, “The question is not whether the form is perfect or whether a better form could be drafted. The question is whether the form is good enough.” Boyd, 98-0915 at p. 7, 735 So.2d at 676. The Court said, “Rather, we believe that a reasonable person who reads the whole form will understand the available options.” Id. at p. 6, 735 So.2d at 676.

In Schaefer, which followed Lefeaux and Boyd, the Court found a similar waiver to the instant case valid, stating:

Case law has held that the insurance carrier only has a duty to provide a form that is unambiguous and gives the insurer a distinct opportunity to make a meaningful decision.... Ms. Schaefer had three clear-cut options for selecting automobile liability coverage and she freely chose the third option rejecting UM coverage.

Schaefer, 2000-0349 at p. 6, 778 So.2d at 1158.

Following our previous decisions on this issue, we find that the waiver form in the instant case was sufficient for .Louise Burns to make an informed meaningful decision about whether to reject UM coverage. As in Schaefer, Louise Burns had three clear options: to select UM coverage with full policy limits, to select UM coverage with limits of $500,000, or to reject UM coverage. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in not finding State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as there was valid rejection of the UM coverage provided in the policy in question. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

REVERSED.


author: |, WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Chief Judge. hGORBATY, J.,

text:
    Diane BREAUX, Wife of and Joseph Breaux v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC. (Formerly Avondale Shipyards, Inc.) and its Executive Officers, Steven Kennedy and Peter Terito; Texaco, Inc.; Eagle, Inc. (Formerly Eagle Asbestos & Packing Company); The McCarty Corporation; Reilly-Benton, Inc.; et al.
    No. 2002-CA-1713.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 12, 2003.

      Scott R. Bickford, John R. Martzell, Christopher H. Sherwood, Martzell & Bickford, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
    Francine Giugno, Stephen N. Elliott, Eugene M. McEachin, Jr., Bernard, Cassi-sa, Elliott & Davis, Metairie, LA, for Reilly-Benton.
    Claude A. Greco, Amy V. Seemann, C. Kelly Lightfoot, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, L.L.P., Metairie, LA, for Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc.
    Leon Gary, Jr., Olivia S. Tomlinson, William L. Schuette, Jr., Jones, Walker, Wae-chter, Poitevent, Carrere & DeNegre, Baton Rouge, LA, for Viacom, Inc., Etc.
    Blaine A. Moore, Kaye N. Courington, Lori P. Moser, Charlotte L. Gilman, Duncan, Courington & Rydberg, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Hopeman Brothers, Inc.
    Gary A. Lee, Richard M. Perles, Johanna G. King, Lee, Futrell & Perles, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Avondale Industries, Inc.
    Robert E. Caraway, III, Kenan S. Rand, Jr., Wendy K. Lappenga, Rebecca M. Go-forth, Plauche’, Maselli, Landry & Parker-son, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Steven Kennedy and Peter Territo.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR. and Judge DAVID S. GORBATY).
   |, WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Chief Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Prior to commencement of this litigation, the plaintiffs, Diane Breaux, wife of/and Joseph Breaux, sued a number of defendants in the 162nd Judicial District Court for Dallas County, Texas, contending that their conduct had exposed Mr. Breaux to asbestos resulting in various health problems, including mesothelioma, and seeking recovery of associated damages.

That case bore number 00-08271 on the docket of the Texas court and the original petition named defendants AcandS, Inc.; Alcoa, Inc.; Alcoa, Inc., successor in interest to Reynolds Metal Company; A.P. Green Industries, Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Building Materials Corp. of America; Combustion Engineering, Inc.; Crown Cork and Seal; Flintkote Company; Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation; GAF Building Materials Corporation, individually and as successor to GAF Corp. and Edgecliff Corp.; GAF Corporation, individually and as successor to New-co Holdings Corp. and GAF Corp.; Gar-lock, Inc.; Gasket Holding, Inc.; Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Guardline, Inc.; Dresser [¡¡.Industries, Inc., successor in interest to Harbison-Walker Refractories; Indresco, Inc.; Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp; Kelly Moore Paint Company; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing; North American Refractories Co.; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Proko Industries; Quigley Company; Riley Stoker Corp.; The Syn-koloid Company; T & N PLC f/k/a Turner & Newell PLC; T & N PLC successor in interest to Keasbey & Mattison; Turner & Newell Industries, Inc. d/b/a United Gasket Corp.; Turner & Newell, Ltd. d/b/a United Fabricated; Uniroyal Holding, Inc.; U.S. Gypsum Company; U.S. Mineral Products Company; and W.R. Grace & Go. — Conn.

The jury interrogatories in the Texas case include findings as to A.P. Green Industries, Inc.; Babcock & Wilcox; Fiberboard Corp.; Johns-Manville Sales Corp.; Philip Carey Corp.; Owens-Corning Fiberglass Company; and Pittsburgh-Coming Corp. as well.

Plaintiffs settled the Texas litigation with all defendants except North American Refractories. Following jury trial, the jury returned a verdict against that defendant; however, the trial court granted North American’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against North American on 11 December 2001. Plaintiffs chose not to appeal the Texas judgment.

Plaintiffs filed the instant suit in April 2001 against Avondale Industries, Inc., two of its executive officers, Steven Kennedy and Peter Territo; Texaco, Inc.; Eagle, Inc.; the McCarty Corporation; Reilly-Benton, Inc.; Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc.; Hopeman Brothers, Inc.; and Western Electric Corporation (now Viacom, Line.) for damages allegedly sustained as a result of Mr. Breaux’s exposure to asbestos. Plaintiffs allege their damages, including Mr. Breaux’s asbestosis and mesothelioma among other illnesses, were caused by exposures while he was working at Avon-dale’s main shipyard, and at a Texaco refinery located in Paradis, Louisiana.

Plaintiffs claimed Avondale and Texaco were negligent in various particulars, generally resulting in their failure to provide Mr. Breaux a safe place to work and appropriate safety equipment and medical information.

Plaintiffs contend that the supplier defendants were liable because they knew or should have known the asbestos products they sold and supplied were unreasonably dangerous in normal use and failed to communicate this information to Mr. Breaux. McCarty, Eagle, Reilly-Benton, Taylor-Seidenbaeh and Hopeman were named as supplier defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that Viacom’s predecessor, the manufacturing defendant, breached implied and express warranties of fitness of its asbestos products in normal use. Furthermore, they contend Viacom’s predecessor was guilty of negligent failure to warn of danger, strict liability for unreasonably dangerous, defectively designed products, and production of asbestos products that were unreasonably dangerous per se.

In January 2002 Viacom filed an exception of no right of action for splitting a cause of action. The trial court heard and maintained the exception, entering judgment on 19 March 2002.

|40n 22 January 2002, Avondale, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Territo adopted Viacom’s exception and supporting memorandum. The trial court heard and maintained these exceptions on 8 March 2002.

On 21 February 2002 Reilly-Benton filed exceptions of res judicata and no right of action. On 1 March 2002 Taylor Seidenbach filed exceptions of res judicata and no right of action. On 7 March 2002 Hopeman Brothers filed an exception of no right of action for splitting a cause of action. On 13 March 2002 Eagle filed peremptory exceptions of no right of action, res judicata and violation of La. C.C.P. art. 425. On 26 March 2002 Texaco filed an exception of no right of action for splitting a cause of action.

The trial court heard the exceptions and on 20 June 2002 entered judgment granting the exceptions of no right of action for splitting a cause of action and of res judi-cata filed by Avondale, Mr. Territo, Mr. Kennedy, Reilly-Benton and Taylor-Seid-enbach. That judgment also granted exceptions of no right of action for splitting a cause of action and of res judicata filed by Texaco and Hopeman Brothers. The judgment also dismissed “with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants on the grounds of no right of action for splitting a cause of action and res judicata.”

Plaintiffs appeal these judgments. Having reviewed the record in its entirety and having found clear legal error in the judgment of the trial court, we reverse that judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.

J^FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR: The trial court erred in holding that res judicata bars plaintiff from bringing a lawsuit in Louisiana state court after entry of a Texas court’s judgment in favor of a defendant not a party to the Louisiana litigation. The trial court manifestly erred in granting exceptions of No Cause of Action for Splitting a Cause of Action and of res judicata denying plaintiffs’ right to institute an action against any of their solidary obligors, after having settled a cause of action against other solidary obligors and after a final Texas court judgment dismissing suit against a defendant not a party to the Louisiana litigation.

The purpose of both the federal and state laws of res judicata is to promote judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes by preventing needless relit-igation. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-0654, 95-0671 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624. Our civilian theory of res judicata is that matters actually litigated and finally adjudged are presumed correct and should not be relit-igated. Ortego v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Development, 95-830 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/96), 673 So.2d 1168. However, the doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt concerning application of the principle must be resolved against its application. Kelly v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La.2/25/94), 633 So.2d 1210.

In Louisiana, a valid, final judgment in favor of a plaintiff is conclusive between the same parties except on appeal or other direct review as to all causes of action existing at the time of the final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation. Furthermore, a judgment 1 «between the same parties is conclusive in any subsequent action between them with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment. LSA-R.S. 13:4231. The 1990 amendment to this issue preclusion/res judicata statute did not disturb the original requirement of identity of the parties.

Appellees contend that the status of the Louisiana and Texas defendants as soli-dary obligors under Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058 (La.1992) operates to bar the Louisiana suit. We are referred to no authority, nor has our independent research revealed any authority supporting the conclusion that solidary obligors are identical parties for purposes of res judica-ta under the law of Texas, Louisiana or the United States.

In order to accept the appellees’ argument, this Court, in effect, would hold that solidary obligation creates the type of privity that is required to find an unnamed party bound by a judgment in a court proceeding of which he had no notice or opportunity to be heard, the fundamental elements of procedural process under the federal and state constitutions. Appellees argue that the unbroken chain of causative exposure to asbestos that ran among the Louisiana and Texas defendants creates not only the solidarity spoken of in Cole, but also the privity requires for operation of res judicata.

In Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining, supra, the supreme court recognized that Louisiana’s res judicata law was broadened by the 1990 amendment and is now in line with federal provisions. Under federal law, the | .¡preclusive effect of a judgment binds the parties to the action and nonparties who are deemed the “privies” of the parties in these limited circumstances: (1) the nonparty is the successor in interest of a party; (2) the non-party controlled the prior litigation; or (3) the nonparty’s interests were adequately represented by a party to the action who may be considered the “virtual representative” of the nonparty because the interests of the party and the nonparty are so closely aligned. See, Hudson v. City of Bossier, 33,620 p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 08/25/2000), 766 So.2d 738, 743-44; Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1990). We find no authority and are not prepared to hold that mere solidarity operates to create such virtual representation and close alignment. Indeed, the record of asbestos litigation demonstrates that the various defendants demonstrate significant interest in presenting positions adverse to their co-defendants. We are particularly reluctant to extend the concept of privity to include solidarity in a case such as the instant case where the primary (Texas) judgment exonerated the only party before the court, thus making it impossible to declare that party to have been solidarity liable with anyone, including the Louisiana defendants.

Appellees rely on the Supreme Court’s 1943 opinion in Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943) for the proposition that Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the full faith and credit clause, commands that the law and jurisprudence of the state in which final judgment was rendered determines the effect of the prior proceedings and judgment. A close examination of the underlying facts of the Hunt case ^demonstrates that the opinion does not support appellees’ conclusion that res judicata bars plaintiffs’ Louisiana suit.

Magnolia Petroleum employed Mr. Hunt to work in its oilfields, which were located in the states of Texas and Louisiana. Mr. Hunt was injured during the course of this employment while working in Texas. Mr. Hunt sued only his employer in Texas for statutory compensation benefits, and was awarded a final judgment. Subsequently, Mr. Hunt sued the same defendant, Magnolia Petroleum, in Louisiana, seeking recovery under Louisiana’s statutory compensation law. The Supreme Court noted that the Louisiana suit, between the same parties and arising out of the same incident, was barred by res judicata and the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. The court held that when the employee who has recovered compensation for his injury in one state seeks a second recovery in another he may be met by the plea that full faith and credit requires that his demand, which has become res judica-ta in one state, must be recognized as such in every other.

The court found,

[T]he clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause [is] to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other. 320 U.S. at 439, 64 S.Ct. at 214 [emphasis added].

The basis of the appellees’ full faith and credit defense is the res judicata effect of the prior judgment. Thus, in the instant case, the trial court was required to determine whether the Texas judgment in plaintiffs’ favor against the Texas |fldefendants would be a res judicata bar to the Louisiana case against the Louisiana defendants. We find no basis for applying res judicata to bar a subsequent suit absent identity of the parties. This Texas result is fully consistent with the Louisiana law concerning issue preclusion and res judicata.

Appellees contend that this Court should apply Texas law and find that the Texas judgment operates as a bar to the Louisiana suit by reason of res judicata, issue preclusion and improper splitting of causes of action. Appellees have referred us to several Texas cases in support of their theory, which we have examined thoroughly-

In support of its contention that Texas preclusion doctrines express the state’s strong policy of preventing plaintiffs from filing multiple lawsuits for the same injury, appellees rely on Adler v. Beverly Hills Hospital, 594 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas, 1980) and Hartnett v. Adams & Holmes Mortgage Company, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana, 1976). Adler, which cited Hartnett, was a limitation of actions (civilian prescription) case in which the issue was when a cause of action for false imprisonment began to accrue. In discussing when the cause of action arose, the court noted that a plaintiff should not be permitted to bring a separate suit for each day of imprisonment, and regarded the entire period of detention as one continuing tort, for which a cause of action accrues when the detention ceases. The court noted the state’s strong policy against a multiplicity of suits, exemplified in the rule against splitting a cause of action, holding:

^l^EWJhen a party can enforce his rights by one action, he ought not to be permitted to resort to many. [Emphasis added.]

However, neither Adler nor any of the five cases cited therein illustrating the policy involved splitting the claims against different defendants. Furthermore, the Texas court limited its ruling to cases where the plaintiff could enforce his rights in a single action.

Appellants contend, and appellees offered no evidence of record to the contrary, that the Louisiana defendants were not within the jurisdiction of the Texas court and that the Texas defendants were not within the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court. Therefore, even under the Texas rule, appellants would be allowed to resort to more than one suit in order to enforce their rights fully.

Appellees cite Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, 1992) to support their contention that abatement, a stronger version of civilian lis pendens, provides that the original court acquires dominant jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiffs suit, and any subsequent suits must be dismissed in favor of the first filed suit. The Hartley court specifically recognized an exception to the rule requiring mandatory abatement of a second related suit where, as in the instant ease, “all persons cannot be joined in the first court, or the first court does not have the power to bring such parties before the court.” Hartley, 843 S.W.2d at 747. Thus, Hartley supports appellants’ position.

Appellees cite Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 455 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14 Dist.), 1970) for the proposition that once judgment is rendered in the initial suit, Texas precludes subsequent lawsuits through its prohibition against dividing a cause of action and res judicata. Martin sued in state court for interference with contract and in federal court under the Clayton anti-trust | ^act. The federal court determined adversely to issues that went to the foundation of the state court action. The defendants in the two suits were identical, thus establishing an initial distinction from the instant case. The court held:

Estoppel by judgment applies where a party is seeking to relitigate an issue that has previously been litigated and determined in a former suit between the same parties. [Citation omitted.] Texas authorities estop a party from relitigating an issue that was controverted, involved, and determined between the same parties in a prior suit by a court of competent jurisdiction, even though the latter suit may be upon a different cause of action. [Citations omitted.] Where an issue has been determined between the same parties by a prior final federal judgment, the Texas courts have consistently upheld a plea of estoppel by judgment. [Citations omitted.] Martin, 455 S.W.2d at 437. [Emphasis added.]

Appellees rely on Dennis v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 148 Tex. 387, 224 S.W.2d 704, (1949) to support their contention that only a single cause of action is created as a result of an injury to an individual, and the rights of all parties must be adjudicated in that suit. Dennis was brought under a railroad statute that specified venue for personal injury suits against railroad corporations. In that case, the surviving mother was a resident of Hardin County, where the injury occurred and where the railroad operates a line and has an agent. Decedent’s “next friend” and surviving children were residents of Orange County, where the railroad neither operated nor had an agent. Plaintiffs sued in nearby Jefferson County. Statutory venue was available in both Hardin and Jefferson counties. The court addressed only the certified question as to whether the railroad could resist venue in Jefferson County in favor of Galveston County. The court noted that under the statute’s explicit provisions, had the children been the only plaintiffs, they would have had the right to sue in Jefferson or Hardin Counties. The issue in the case was whether |12that right was defeated by joinder of the mother as a plaintiff. The court noted that while there may be many persons entitled to share in the damages recovered, only one suit may be brought, and the rights of all parties to recover damages must be adjudicated in that suit.

Obviously, Dennis does not support ap-pellees’ position. Dennis involved splitting actions among plaintiffs, and did not address the issue of lack of jurisdiction over a group of defendants that controls resolution of the instant case. The court held in Dennis only that joinder of the mother did not defeat venue in the children’s county of residence.

Appellees cite Marcus v. Huguley, 37 S.W.2d 1100 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas, 1931) for the proposition that the consequence of a party’s splitting his cause of action is preclusion of the second suit. Again, the cited case is inapposite to the instant case. Lenoa Huguley was killed in an automobile accident; her parents and two other persons were in the car in which Lenoa was a passenger. Theo Marcus’ car struck the Huguley vehicle. Lenoa’s parents successfully sued Marcus for their own personal injuries. Lenoa’s father, as administrator of her estate sued the executrix of the Marcus estate for Lenoa’s damages in a separate suit under a Texas survival statute. The court overruled the contention that Huguley was estopped, as a matter of law, from prosecuting this suit by reason of the action that accrued to him and to his wife for their own personal injuries.

The former suit was the prosecution of a separate and distinct cause of action from the one now prosecuted; though both suits are based on the commission of the same wrongful act. Marcus, 37 S.W.2d at 1104.

The court held that the bringing of the two separate suits was not a splitting of a single cause of action:

11¡tThe rule against splitting is that a single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made the subject of different actions. If this is done and separate actions are brought for different parts of such a demand, the pendency of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either will be available as a bar in the others.
... [The rule] refers to splitting a single cause of action, and has no reference to different causes of action accruing to the same parties in different rights, though the causes of action may have resulted from the same wrongful act. Marcus, 37 S.W.2d at 1104.

Once again, we note identity of the defendants in the two suits. The cited case does not support appellees’ contention that appellants’ Louisiana suit is barred by application of Texas law.

Appellees contend that Texas law makes a judgment conclusive of whatever might have been litigated in the action in which it was rendered, and a party must bring forward in one suit all the claims or defenses he has which are included in or applicable to the cause of action in the suit, citing Hoehn v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 42 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso, 1931). In that case, brought under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act, plaintiff sued the compensation insurer. The court of appeal reversed judgment in her favor because her claim had not been filed with the Industrial Accident Board within the time provided by statute. Thereafter, she sued the same insurer defendant, relying on the effect of a letter written on her behalf to the Board, to justify her delay. The court of appeal held that this additional evidence should have been presented in her first suit, and she failed to discharge her burden of bringing forward in the former suit all the facts upon which recovery depended. After having failed to do so, she could not be heard to say that there were other facts, which entitled the Board to pass upon her | udaim. We find nothing in this case to support the judgment of the trial court in the instant case.

Finally, appellees cite Press v. Davis, 118 S.W.2d 982 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth, 1938) in support of their contention that matters not submitted for adjudication are waived because judgment extinguishes the entire cause of action. In that case, Ms. Foley loaned Davis money for which Davis executed two promissory notes secured by a deed of trust of real (immovable) property. Davis made payments for a few years, whereupon he suffered financial difficulties and his creditors foreclosed upon property covered by the deed of trust. Ms. Foley instituted foreclosure proceedings for the unpaid balance of Davis’ notes. Ms. Foley subsequently married and joined her husband, Marvin Press, as plaintiff in her suit for the unpaid balance on the debt, alleging fraudulent inducement. The issue on appeal was whether the statute of limitations had run in light of a jury finding of the date on which Ms. Foley discovered the value of the security to be less than as represented by Davis. The case did not involve the issue of multiple defendants, or the jurisdictional issue inherent in the instant case, and does not support the judgment of the trial court.

Thus, if we accept appellees’ contention that Texas law applies, we must reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Furthermore, the same result obtains under Louisiana law. As discussed above, res judicata is not available absent identity of parties. LSA-R.S. 13:4231.

Appellees seek alternatively to interpose preclusion by judgment, relying on article 425(A) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a party shall assert all causes of action, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation. We reject appellants’ procedural |1Kargument that this type of abatement defense is not properly raised by exception of no right of action. See McConnell v. Webb, 226 La. 385, 76 So.2d 405 (1954), overruled on other grounds, Dumas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 241 La. 1096, 134 So.2d 45 (1961).

The rule of LSA-C.Civ.Pro. art. 425(A) requiring joinder of claims is not absolute, and will yield to the interests of justice. See Craig v. Adams Interiors, Inc., 34,591 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/6/01), 785 So.2d 997. We have been directed to and our independent research has found no authority for the proposition that the join-der rule would require a plaintiff in the position of Mr. and Mrs. Breaux, when faced with asserting claims for long-term, continuing torts, under circumstances where no single court has jurisdiction of all defendants, to choose, in effect, which defendants to pursue, waiving their claims against those not amenable to jurisdiction in the “chosen” court. Clearly, under the circumstances of the instant case, the join-der rule must yield to the interests of justice. The liability of all the various defendants must be determined in order to effectuate a just result. There is no indication that plaintiffs seek or intend to seek multiple recovery for their damages; it appears to be clear from the record that they seek judicial determination of all parties who may be liable and against whom they may recover an amount not to exceed their actual, proven damages.

CONCLUSION AND DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting appellees’ exceptions is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GORBATY, J., dissents.

hGORBATY, J.,

dissents with reasons.

I respectfully dissent. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires that Louisiana give the Texas proceedings and judgment the same force and effect as they would have in Texas. The preclusive effects of the Texas proceedings and judgments are incorporated in doctrines of claim-splitting, abatement, collateral estoppel, and res ju-dicata. These Texas policies preclude a second suit for the same injury. Under Louisiana law, the suit is also improper. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425(A), which states that all claims arising from a personal injury must be asserted in a single suit, embodies a prohibition against splitting a cause of action that precludes plaintiffs second suit. Accordingly, for these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

REVERSED AND REMANDED


author: 1TTERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

text:
    William A. DWYER v. Mavis EARLY, City Attorney for the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2002-CA-1545.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 12, 2003.
    Writ Denied May 30, 2003.

      William A. Dwyer, Eric R. Goza, New Orleans, LA, for PlaintiffAppellant.
    Charles L. Rice, Jr., City Attorney, Evelyn F. Pugh, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Dawn E. Segura, Assistant City Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY, Judge LEON A. CANNIZZARO JR.).
   1TTERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

Willard Dwyer (“Dwyer”) appeals a trial court judgment, denying his request for an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and statutory penalties, against the City of New Orleans (“City”), for its failure to comply with a request for public records. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dwyer made several public records request for documents relative to agencies of the City of New Orleans, pursuant to La. R.S. 44:1, et seq. The City filed responses; however, the responses were incomplete. Dwyer then made personal visits to the City Attorney’s office to obtain the missing responses, but to no avail.

Dwyer, after several months, filed a Writ of Mandamus against the City. The trial court issued an order directing the City Attorney to either comply with Dwyer’s requests for public records or show cause why the City should not comply with his request and why attorney’s fees, costs, and penalties should not be awarded.

I ¿The matter was set for hearing. The trial court at the hearing on December 26, 2001, ordered Dwyer to produce a “Master List” of the entire public records request he made which had not been answered, and the City was to respond to the “Master List” at the hearing scheduled a month later, on January 18, 2002. The City produced all documents sought by Dwyer.

The trial court set a third hearing, on February 26, 2002, to decide the issue of attorney’s fees, costs, and statutory penalties. The parties submitted memoranda. The trial court heard testimony from Dwyer and issued a judgment denying his requests for attorney’s fees, costs, and statutory penalties.

DISCUSSION

Dwyer alleges three assignments of error. First, the trial court erred in failing to obtain testimony at the first hearing on December 26, 2001. Second, the trial court erred, as a matter of law in finding an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and statutory penalties was discretionary. Third, the trial court erred in finding the City was not arbitrary and capricious, thereby denying his request for attorney’s fees, costs, and penalties.

As to Dwyer’s first assignment of error, we find the trial court’s ruling from December 26, 2001, is not properly before this Court. The appeal lodged in this matter is relative to the judgment of February 27, 2002. Therefore, we will not address that assignment.

As to the two remaining assignments, we will address those issues jointly. The trial court in its reasons for judgment stated:

^Although the La. R.S. 44:35 calls for an award of attorney’s fees for failure to comply with a request for public records, the courts have held that the granting of such an award, and the amount to be awarded is within the discretion of the trial judge. See, Times Picayune Publishing Corporation v. New Orleans Aviation Board, 99-273 (La.App. 5th Cir.8/31/99), 742 So.2d 979, writ denied, 99-2838 (La.12/10/99), 751 So.2d 257; Hunter v. Pennington, 98-1821 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/20/99), 726 So.2d 1082. An award of penalties and costs is appropriate only when the trial court determines the custodian of the records has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. Hunter v. Pennington, Supra.
In light of the confusion inherent in plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Mandamus and numerous attachments (letter requests to the City) and upon review of the nature of the requests, the City’s responses to same and the City’s response to the court-ordered Master List. The court finds the City did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in responding to the plaintiffs varied and over-lapping public records request. The totality of the City’s responses to the plaintiffs requests and the court-ordered Master List demonstrate that there was a good-faith effort on the part of the City to respond to all of the plaintiffs requests in a reasonable time frame for a public body.

We find the trial court’s recitation of the law is correct as to the discretionary nature of the award. Further, the trial court’s factual finding that the City was not arbitrary requires great deference and will not be disturbed by this court absent a clear and manifest error. See Syrie v. Schilhab, 96-1027, p. 3 (La.5/20/97), 693 So.2d 1173, 1176. We find that the trial court did not commit such error.

The ruling of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.