text:
    Vincent FLORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D02-4264.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 12, 2004.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Monique E. LTtalien, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   STEVENSON, J.

Vincent Flores appeals his convictions for lewd and lascivious molestation on a child and lewd and lascivious battery on a child. The victim was Flores’s stepdaughter, L.R. While Flores raises three issues on appeal, we find that his claim regarding the inadequate Richardson- hearing is dis-positive and requires reversal.

The evidence substantiating the sexual abuse charges came largely in the form of the child’s testimony. The child had been examined for physical signs of sexual abuse in January 2000 and, again, in May 2000. The latter exam revealed no signs of ..trauma or injury. During the earlier exam, nurse practitioner Sandra Gibson had discovered a healed tear on the child’s hymen. At trial, it became apparent that defense counsel had not been provided a copy of Gibson’s report regarding the January'2000 exam.

Defense counsel sought a side bar, alleging a discovery violation. The prosecutor indicated that, two weeks prior to trial, she realized Gibson had not been listed as a witness. To-rectify the situation, the prosecutor called defense counsel, advised him that Gibson would be a witness, and offered to make her available for deposition. The prosecutor could not, however, provide an explanation for the failure to provide defense counsel Gibson’s report. Thereafter, the inquiry between the court and counsel turned to defense counsel’s failure to depose Gibson prior to trial. Ultimately, the court determined that the remedy for the State’s failure to disclose was to allow the State to continue with its questioning of Gibson after defense counsel was provided a copy of the report and afforded the opportunity to review it.

On appeal, Flores takes issue with the adequacy of the Richardson hearing conducted by the court and asserts that he was procedurally prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose. During a Richardson hearing, the trial judge is required to inquire

(1) whether the violation was inadvertent or willful, (2) whether it was trivial or substantial, and (3) whether noncompliance ... has prejudiced the opposing party’s ability to properly prepare for trial.

Acosta v. State, 856 So.2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Portner v. State, 802 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). The only factor that was adequately addressed here was whether the violation was willful or inadvertent. An inadequate Richardson inquiry does not, however, require reversal in all cases. Rather, the failure to conduct an adequate Richardson hearing can be harmless, but “[o]nly if the appellate court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation.” Id. at 1145.

Flores argues that he was procedurally prejudiced, pointing to the fact that Gibson’s testimony regarding the healed scar was the only physical evidence to substantiate the charges and asserting that, had he known of such evidence, he would have called additional witnesses to testify about unrelated sexual activity by L.R. to explain the injury. As we are bound to consider “ ‘every conceivable course of action,’” see Tarrant v. State, 668 So.2d 223, 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (quoting State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Fla.1995)), in assessing procedural prejudice, we cannot find the error harmless.

The State asserts that, here, any prejudice suffered by the defendant-procedural or otherwise-stems from defense counsel’s failure to depose Gibson prior to trial. According to the State, if defense counsel had deposed Gibson, he would have known about the healed tear and “[djefense counsel cannot fail to depose a witness that he knows about and . then claim to be prejudiced by that witness’s testimony.”

A similar argument was addressed in Lavigne v. State, 349 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). There, after the defendant filed his notice of alibi defense, the State provided the defense with the name of Officer Sciadini. Despite being aware that the defendant had made a statement to Sciadini, the State did not inform defense counsel. Rather, several days prior to trial, the State offered to make Sciadini available for deposition. Defense counsel neither interviewed nor deposed the ¡officer. Then, at trial, the officer testified to the undisclosed statement. Defense counsel objected, alleging there had been a discovery violation. Without conducting a full Richardson inquiry, the trial court overruled the objection.

On appeal, the State asserted that the defendant was in no position to claim procedural prejudice because he had been provided the officer’s name prior to trial and elected not to depose him to discover what he would say. The First District rejected the argument, reasoning that “La-vigne had' no reason to interview or take Sciadini’s deposition because he had not been informed by the State as required by a rule of criminal procedure that Sciadini was a witness to an oral statement made by him.” 349 So.2d at 179-80.

The instant case is analogous. While it is true that the report prepared as a consequence of the May 2000 exam mentions that there was a January exam, it does not mention Gibson’s name, the existence of an earlier report, nor the findings from that earlier exam. Perhaps as a consequence of the limited Richardson inquiry, there is nothing in the record indicating that defense counsel either was or should have been aware that Sandra Gibson was the individual who had performed the January 2000 exam and that there were physical signs of penetration. Thus, the State cannot avoid the consequences of its failure to provide Gibson’s report by simply asserting that defense counsel knew Gibson’s name and should have deposed her.

Accordingly, having concluded that the Richardson hearing was inadequate and that it cannot be' conclusively determined from this iecord that the discovery violation did not prejudice Flores’s trial preparation, we reverse the convictions appealed and remand for a new trial.

WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.

      . Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

      . Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(A) and (J) require that the State disclose to the defendant "a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto" and "reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations.” Clearly, the State should have provided Gibson's report to defense counsel.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Von D. HAYGOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D04-634.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 12, 2004.
    Von D. Haygood, Raiford, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Von D. Haygood appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for additional jail time credit. Haygood seeks credit of approximately forty-nine days associated with the time between his arrest for violation of probation and the resulting sentence. As Haygood provides the specific dates and alleges that court files will support his claim, we reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to either refute Haygood’s claims with record attachments or award the appropriate credit. See White v. State, 864 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

. STONE, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joshua John ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D04-1138.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 13, 2004.

      Joshua John Robinson, pro se, petitioner.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003).

ALLEN, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steve T. MALU, Appellant, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-0049.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 13, 2004.
    Appellant, pro se.
    Thomas M. Gonzalez and Jennifer Zu-marraga of Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s responses to the Court’s orders of February 18, 2004, and March 24, 2004, the Court has determined that the order is not final because, although the order grants a motion for summary judgment, it fails to enter judgment. C.f McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). A determination that “final judgment shall be entered,” is insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate finality. Id. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


author: WHATLEY, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Manuel Ramon FLOYD, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Nos. 2D03-1696, 2D03-3326.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2004.

      James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surbér, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chandra Waite Dasrat, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   WHATLEY, Judge.

The State appeals the downward departure sentence imposed on Manuel Ramon Floyd upon his conviction of robbery by sudden snatching, and Floyd cross-appeals his conviction. We reverse Floyd’s conviction, thereby rendering the State’s appeal moot.

At Floyd’s jury trial, the victim testified that she was sitting in her car smoking a cigarette when Floyd, a man she knew but had not seen for years, walked up and asked for a cigarette. After the victim gave him a cigarette, Floyd asked if he could sit and talk with her. The victim responded affirmatively, and the two sat and talked for about ten minutes. When Floyd left the car, he grabbed the victim’s purse, which she said was sitting on the car seat between the outside of her right leg and the center console of the vehicle. The victim grabbed Floyd from the back of his pants, which resulted in her being pulled over onto the passenger’s side of the car, but he got away.

■ After the State rested, Floyd’s defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the robbery by sudden snatching statute requires that the property be taken from the person of the victim rather than from the person or custody of the victim as required by the robbery statute. Because the victim testified that her purse was taken from the seat of the car, defense counsel argued that the charge against Floyd should be reduced to theft.

The trial court denied the motion, finding that because the victim grabbed Floyd as he was exiting the car, there was actual contact with the victim. When defense counsel moved at sentencing for a determination notwithstanding the verdict and a reduction of the conviction to petit theft, the court again denied the motion, this time finding that the victim had constructive possession of the purse because she had possession of Floyd.

Section 812.131(1), Florida Statutes (2002), defines robbery by sudden snatching in pertinent part as “the taking of money or other property from the victim’s person.” (Emphasis supplied). As the Fourth District has explained, this statute:

[Pjointedly omits any reference to the person’s “custody,” a term that would have indicated that a snatching might occur from nearby the person.
With the sudden snatching offense, the clear import of the statute’s words is to require that the property be abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of. the person, not from that person’s figurative biosphere.

Brown v. State, 848 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

In the present case, the victim’s purse was not “plucked from [her] embrace” because Floyd grabbed it from the seat of the car. The fact that the victim grabbed Floyd after he grabbed her purse does not convert his taking of her purse from the seat of her car into the taking of her purse from her person. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Floyd’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and Floyd’s conviction of robbery by sudden snatching cannot stand.

Accordingly, we reverse Floyd’s conviction and remand with directions that a judgment of petit theft be entered against him and that he be resentenced. Our holding renders the State’s appeal of Floyd’s sentence moot.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.


author: NORTHCUTT, Judge.

text:
    Claude Lee LYELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D01-2747.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2004.
    Claude Lee Lyell, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   NORTHCUTT, Judge.

On September 16, 1998, the circuit court placed Claude Lyell on thirty-six months’ probation based on his guilty plea to two charges of aggravated battery. In April 2001, Lyell admitted violating his probation. The court revoked his probation and sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment on April 23, 2001. On May 13, 2001, he filed an unsworn motion to withdraw his plea, in which he attacked the volun-tariness of his September 1998 plea, not the voluntariness of his admission that he violated probation. The circuit court correctly found that the unsworn motion was insufficient under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. It treated the motion as one pursuant to rule 3.170(Z) and denied it as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after sentence was imposed on the contested plea.

We affirm the order denying Lyell’s motion to withdraw his plea. Our affirmance is without prejudice to his rights, if any, to file a sufficient rule 3.850 motion concerning his probation violation. We note, however, that the time has run to file a rule 3.850 motion attacking the voluntariness of his September 1998 plea. Lyell did not appeal his judgment and sentence based on that plea, so it became final on October 16, 1998. His two-year window to challenge that plea under rule 3.850 expired in October 2000. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b).

Affirmed.

ALTENBERND, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J„ concur.


text:
    Calvin McCLUSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D03-5233.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 14, 2004.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the order of the trial court without prejudice to any right appellant might have to file a facially sufficient motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), or a timely facially sufficient motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising the claim that the written sentences in counts three and four are illegal because they do not comport with the oral pronouncement.

NORTHCUTT, KELLY and VILLANTI, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Earl Nathan STROM, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-1234.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Cynthia S. Tunnicliff and Martha J. Edenfield of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel, and Gail Scott Hill, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon appellee’s confession of error, the final order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. See Resort Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. & Profl Regulation, 795 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA2001).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Donna MOULTON, Appellant, v. David MOULTON, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-1198.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Nancy N. Nowhs of Zisser, Robison, Brown, Nowlis & Crumbie, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Lyman T. Fletcher of Fletcher & Fletcher, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s response to the Court’s order of March 30, 2004, the Court has determined that the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is not a final order. See generally Klein v. Klein, 551 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(holding that an order of dissolution of marriage that reserves jurisdiction to consider such issues as alimony is not a final order). Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant’s request that jurisdiction be relinquished is denied.

ALLEN, PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael ANDERSON, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-1190.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Michael Anderson, pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Carrie R. McNair, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wilson MORALES, Appellant, v. TIBOR, INC., and Associated Industries Insurance Company, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 1D04-1052.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Richard E. Zaldivar, Miami; Philip D. Parrish, Miami, for appellant.
    Carol C. Kamel of Stiles, Taylor & Grace, Boca Raton, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

This appeal is dismissed without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek review upon entry of a final order. See Mintz v. Broward Correctional Institute, 800 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    EUBANKS EXCAVATING, INC., Joe Eubanks, and Priscilla Eubanks, Appellants, v. ULICO CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-0739.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Davisson F. Dunlap of Dunlap, Toole, Shipman & Whitney, L.L.C, Tallahassee, for Appellants.
    Edward Etcheverry and Guy W. Harrison of Etcheverry & Harrison, L.L.P., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellants’ response to the Court’s order of March 4, 2004, the Court has determined that the order on appeal is not a final order. See S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1974). Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellants’ Motion to Extend Deadlines for Trial Transcript, Record on Appeal and Briefs, filed on April 8, 2004, is denied as moot.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lenair A. HENRIQUEZ, Appellant, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D04-0161.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Lenair A. Henriquez, pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Merle D. MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D03-5090.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Merle D. Miller, pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffrey PATE, Appellant, v. James CROSBY, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D03-4565.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Jeffrey Pate,'pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217(Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    MICHAEL TITZE COMPANY, INC., t/a Village Inn, Appellant, v. Virginia MORTENSEN, Appellee.
    No. 1D03-4044.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Kim E. Wells and Julie K. Narhi of Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller, Katz, Craig, LLP, Tampa, for Appellant.

      Granville E. Petrie, Jr., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

REVERSED. See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210 (Fla.2003).

KAHN, DAVIS and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Thomas SPENCER, Appellant, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D03-4029.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Thomas Spencer, pro se, appellant.
    Rosa Carson, General Counsel, and Chris Korn, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Paul R. CONLEY, Appellant, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D03-3962.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Paul R. Conley, pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Roy WOMBLES, Appellant, v. Don GLADISH and James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellees.
    No. 1D03-3948.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 17, 2004.
    Roy Wombles, pro se, appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Joy A. Stubbs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

•The order of dismissal is reversed on the authority of Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Leon County for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, DAVIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    Jovon Tyrese MIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D03-2468.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 19, 2004.

      James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jenny Scavino Sieg, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

Jovon Tyrese Mims appeals his judgment and sentence for two counts of sale or delivery of cocaine, two counts of possession of cocaine, and felony fleeing and eluding. Mims argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence his statement to a deputy that he had not sold drugs “in at least four months.” We agree and reverse Mims’ judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Deputy Ethan Taylor conducted two undercover cocaine purchases, occurring on August 20 and 23, 2002, with a person in a maroon Ford Escort known to him as “Pete.” Deputy Taylor later identified the seller as Jovon Mims.

Deputy Michael Hasty testified that on August 24, 2002, he came into contact with Mims and had a conversation with him. Over a defense objection, Deputy Hasty testified that Mims stated, “I haven’t sold dope in at least four months, so it couldn’t have been me.”

Law enforcement’s investigation revealed that the maroon Ford Escort was registered to Ayesha Campbell, who testified for the defense. She testified that she never allowed Mims to use her vehicle and that he was not in her car on August 20 or 23, 2002. She also testified that her former boyfriend, Jeffrey Clark, who at the time of trial was in jail on a charge of sale of crack cocaine, lived with her on August 20, 2002. She recalled that one evening Clark used her car; later that evening, while she was watching “American Idol” on television, Clark ran into the house, turned off the lights and television, and said that the police were after him. Campbell testified that Mims was the wrong person and that the person sought by law enforcement was already in jail. In rebuttal, Deputy Taylor testified that he was sure it was Mims and not Jeffrey Clark who sold him cocaine on August 28, 2002. The jury found Mims guilty as charged.

Mims contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Deputy Hasty to testify to Mims’ statement that “I haven’t sold dope in at least four months, so it couldn’t have been me.” He argues that the statement amounts to the introduction of evidence of Mims’ propensity to sell drugs and a prior criminal offense. We agree that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce Mims’ statement to the officer.

Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), provides as follows:

Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.

Under section 90.403, “[rjelevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” We recognize that our review of the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of Mims’ statement is for an abuse of discretion. See Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997); Hinojosa v. State, 857 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, “[tjhe trial court should exercise discretion to exclude, modestly relevant evidence when the danger of unfair prejudice from its admission substantially outweighs its probative value.” Hill v. State, 768 So.2d 518, 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

In Abbott v. State, 622 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), this court held that an officer’s spontaneous remark that “the appellant was ‘known to be a larger scale drug dealer’ ” during her trial for drug offenses “was relevant only to the appellant’s bad character and criminal propensity.” Therefore, this court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In Clark v. State, 742 So.2d 824, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), a witness testified that the appellant had been on probation when the current charges arose, and this court stated that “[tjhe testimony constituted an improper implication of collateral crimes, which is presumptively prejudicial.” This court determined that the error was not harmless and reversed and remanded for a new trial.'

In Delgado v. State, 573 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), this court held that the appellant’s boast that he had killed ten men and a witness’s testimony about the appellant’s drug use were irrelevant in a murder prosecution and should have been excluded. In discussing similar fact evidence under section 90.404(2)(a) and the Williams rule, this court explained, “The fact that the evidence of collateral crimes comes from prior statements of the defendant does not exempt it from the Williams rule.” Id. Rather, when “the collateral crime evidence consists of prior statements of the defendant, ‘[tjhe argument for inadmissibility is, in fact, more cogent.’ ” Id. (quoting Green v. State, 190 So.2d 42, 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)).

In the present case, the State argued at trial that Mims’ statement, even though it was hearsay, was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The defense acknowledged that hearsay was not the basis of the objection, but rather that Mims’ statement must be excluded because it was only relevant to show propensity. In ruling on the issue the trial court stated, “I think if he made a statement and there’s no doubt about that statement, I’ll let that in.” Thus, it appears that the trial court did not balance the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of the evidence. See State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1988).

The circumstances here reflect that the State’s introduction of Mims’ statement was not relevant to any fact that the State needed to establish to prove its case. While the identity of the person who sold the drugs was an issue at trial, Mims denied that he committed the drug transactions with which he was charged. Because Mims’ statement served only to establish Mims’ propensity to sell drugs, we conclude that it was unfairly prejudicial and that the trial court erred in allowing the statement into evidence.

The State contends that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless because Deputy Taylor affirmatively identified Mims as the person who sold him drugs on two occasions. However, “[t]he admission of improper collateral crime evidence is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to commit the crime as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.” Sims v. State, 839 So.2d 807, 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). For the harmless error rule to apply, the State must prove that there is “ ‘no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)). The State has not done so in this case, where a single witness identified Mims as the seller and Mims presented evidence that another person committed the crimes. See Kulling v. State, 827 So.2d 311, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (determining that abuse of discretion in admitting similar fact evidence was not harmless when the “identification of Kull-ing as the perpetrator rested on the testimony of a single witness”); Sims, 839 So.2d at 812.

Accordingly, we reverse Mims’ judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

DAVIS and COVINGTON, JJ., Concur.

      . Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959).


text:
    B.B., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D03-1451.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    May 19, 2004.

      Manuel L. Casabielle, Coral Gables, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Roberta G. Mandel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before GODERICH, FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

B.B., a juvenile, appeals from an order adjudicating her in contempt of court for committing perjury. We reverse.

C.R. was charged with battery upon J.A. At C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing, B.B., a witness to the alleged battery, testified. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered B.B. to show cause why she should not be held in criminal contempt of court for “committing perjury by knowingly offering untruthful testimony while testifying” at the adjudicatory hearing.

B.B. responded by asserting that she had not perjured herself at C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing. Further, at the hearing on the Rule to Show Cause, B.B. testified that she did not lie. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that B.B.’s testimony at C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing was inconsistent with the written statement that she gave to the police. The trial court ordered that B.B. be held in criminal contempt of court “based on her untruthful testimony” at C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing “and her handwritten statement.” This appeal followed.

B.B. contends that the trial court erred by finding her in criminal contempt of court. We agree.

The record does not support the trial court’s finding that B.B. either testified untruthfully at C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing or that there was a conflict between B.B.’s written statement and her testimony at C.R.’s adjudicatory hearing. Therefore, we reverse the order under review. See M.L. v. State, 819 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Reversed.


text:
    James L. KELLY, Appellant, v. DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, and Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellees.
    No. 3D03-2040.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    May 19, 2004.
    La Verne M. Kelly, for appellant.
    John D. Maher (Tallahassee), for appel-lee, Unemployment Appeals Commission.
    Before GERSTEN, GREEN, and SHEPHERD, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

James Kelly (“appellant”) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission, affirming the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. We disagree with the conclusion that the appellant left his employment without good cause and reverse.

“Good cause for leaving employment turns on whether the circumstances in a given case would have impelled the average, able-minded, qualified worker to give up his employment.” Eulo v. Florida Unemployment Appeal Comm’n, 724 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Appellant alleges that he is entitled to benefits as he left his employment with good cause attributable to his employer. The school board did not present any witnesses with personal knowledge of the facts in appellant’s case or rebut the appellant’s claims that he was constructively discharged from his employment.

As there is not substantial, competent evidence to support the referee’s finding that appellant voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer, we reverse the order disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits.

Reversed.


author: hPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Sheila Ann WHARTON.
    No. 2003-B-1816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 17, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from two sets of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Sheila Ann Wharton, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Two sets of formal charges were filed against respondent by the ODC. The first, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 01-DB-034, was filed on April 4, 2001 and encompasses four counts of misconduct. The' second set of formal charges, 02-DB-013, was filed on February 7, 2002 and encompasses three counts of misconduct. The two sets of formal charges were considered by separate hearing committees, then consolidated by order of the disciplinary board on April 14, 2003) On June 25, 2003, the disciplinary board filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both matters involving respondent.

Ol-DB-OSk .

Count I — The Thornton Matter

In October 1996, Mary Thornton retained respondent to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Ms. | ¡/Thornton paid respondent $365 to handle the matter. Ms. Thornton .thereafter had difficulty communicating with respondent, and on February 10, 1998, she filed a complaint with the ODC.

Respondent filed a response to the complaint in which she indicated that she had filed Ms. Thornton’s divorce petition in April 1997. However, the court record revealed that the petition was not actually filed until February 13, 1998. Ms. Thornton eventually obtained a divorce in proper person.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II — The Arkansas Matter

In August 1996, Stephanie Arkansas retained respondent to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Ms. Arkansas paid respondent more than $600 to handle the matter. The pleadings were filed and served on the defendant, and when he failed to answer the petition, the court entered a preliminary default. However, respondent took no further action in the matter, and Ms. Arkansas eventually discharged respondent. Respondent failed to account for any earned portion and to refund the unearned portion of the legal fee Ms. Arkansas paid. In June 1998, Ms. Arkansas filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5(f)(6) (failure to refund an unearned fee).

IsCount III — The Barkman Matter

In March 1998, Michelle Barkman retained respondent to represent her in a child custody proceeding. Ms. Barkman paid respondent $1,500 to handle the matter. However, respondent filed no pleadings on her client’s behalf, even after Ms. Barkman was served with a rule involving several contested issues. On July 1, 1998, Ms. Barkman discharged respondent. Respondent failed to account for any earned portion and to refund the unearned portion of the legal fee Ms. Barkman paid. In August 1998, Ms. Barkman filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 and 1.5(f)(6).

Count IV — The Grady Matter

Kimberly Grady "paid respondent $475 to represent her in a divorce proceeding. Respondent filed the petition, but never obtained the divorce for Ms. Grady, who eventually obtained a divorce in proper person. Respondent failed to account for any earned portion and to refund the unearned portion' of the legal fee Ms. Grady paid. In October 1998, Ms. Grady filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 and 1.5(f)(6).

02-DB-013

Count I — The Cameron Matter

In 1998, Milton and Kris Cameron retained respondent to handle an intrafamily adoption proceeding. Mr. and Mrs. Cameron attempted to contact respondent on numerous occasions, to no avail. The adoption was filed in 2000, but remains | incomplete primarily due to respondent’s failure to move the case forward. Furthermore, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. and Mrs. Cameron.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(e) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II — The Pardue Matter

In August 2000, Mr. and Mrs. Willard Pardue paid respondent $130 to revise their wills. Five months later, the revisions had not been completed. The Par-dues requested that respondent refund the legal, fee she received, but respondent did not comply with this request. Furthermore, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. and Mrs. Pardue.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.5(f)(6), 8.1(c), and 8.4(g).

Count III — The Holland Matter

In July 2000, Christopher and Kathryn Holland retained respondent to represent them in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Hollands paid respondent $675 to handle the matter. Mr. and Mrs. Holland had difficulty communicating with respondent, and as of November 2000, the bankruptcy had not been completed. The Hollands discharged respondent in March 2001 and requested a refund of the legal fee they paid. Respondent did not comply with this request. Furthermore, respondent failed to |ficooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. and Mrs. Holland.

The ODC alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4,1.5(f)(6), 8.1(c), and 8.4(g).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the two sets of formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration in either matter.

In its submission in 01-DB-034, the ODC argued that .respondent primarily violated duties owed to her clients. In each instance, respondent neglected her client’s case, failed to communicate with her client, and failed to refund -the unearned fee she was paid. The ODC contended that the baseline sanction for this conduct is a suspension from the practice of law. The ODC suggested numerous aggravating factors are present in this case, including dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern.of ■misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1972), and indifference to making restitution. The only mitigating factor identified by the ODC is the absence of a prior disciplinary record. Under these circumstances, the ODC recommended respondent serve a period of suspension.

|fiIn its submission in 02-DB-013, the ODC argued that respondent’s misconduct was negligent and knowing, and caused injury to her clients. The ODC contended that the'baseline sanction for this conduct is a suspension from the practice of law. In light of the aggravating factors present, including a pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, and substantial experience in the practice of - law, the ODC recommended respondent serve a period of suspension.-

Hearing Committee Recommendations

Ol-DB-OSJp

Based on the facts that were deemed admitted, the hearing committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges. Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law. In aggravation, the committee recognized multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction- of the disciplinary proceeding, submission of false statements during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and indifference to making restitution. The committee found no mitigating circumstances are present. Noting the similarity of the misconduct at issue in this case as com-* pared with In re: Boudreau, 00-3158 (La.1/5/01), 776 So.2d 428, for which the respondent received a three-year suspension, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 'three years. -

02-DB-013

Based on the facts that were deemed admitted, the hearing committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal |7charges. Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law. Under the circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months.

No objections were filed to the recommendation of the hearing committee in either matter.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in both sets of formal charges. The board found that on multiple occasions, respondent knowingly and intentionally violated, duties owed to her clients. Respondent failed to perform services for her clients, thereby jeopardizing their legal matters and delaying resolution of their cases. With regard to the Thornton matter (Count I of 01-DB-034), respondent compounded the harm by deliberating leading her client to believe that her legal matter had been filed, when in fact it had not been filed. Finally, respondent’s failure to refund any unearned portion of the fees received from her clients continues to deprive the clients of funds rightfully owed them. The board determined the baseline sanction for this misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

As aggravating factors, the board recognized a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, and submission of false statements during the disciplinary process. In mitigation, the board recognized that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

1 ^Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the prior jurisprudence, the board concluded that a thrée-year suspension is appropriate discipline for respondent’s misconduct. Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running -thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The deemed admitted facts in this case establish that respondent has failed to communicate with her clients, neglected the legal matters she was retained to handle, failed to refund unearned legal fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. The sole issue presented for the court’s consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

In fashioning an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Guidry, 571 So.2d 161 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

|9In prior cases involving similar misconduct, this court has imposed sanctions ranging from disbarment to fully deferred suspensions. After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find the aggravating factors present in this case support a lengthy suspension from the practice of law. While respondent has no prior disciplinary record, she has engaged in a pattern of misconduct that has caused actual harm to her clients. Furthermore, she has displayed surprising indifference to rectifying the consequences of her misconduct. Based on this reasoning, we conclude the three-year suspension recommended by the disciplinary board is an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for three years.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board, and considering the record filed herein, it is ordered that Sheila Ann Wharton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 13391, be suspended from the practice of law for three years. It is further ordered that respondent make full restitution to her clients of any unearned legal fees. All costs and expenses in these matters are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Paul GOWDER.
    No. 2004-OB-0411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 28, 2004.
   In re Gowder, Paul, applying for admission to the Bar.

ORDER

Considering the application for admission to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Paul Gowder,

IT IS ORDERED that petitioner be and he hereby is granted admission to the practice of law in Louisiana.

VICTORY, J., would conditionally admit.

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Clark C. ROY.
    No. 2004-B-0635.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, misled his clients concerning the status of their legal matters, and failed to refund unearned legal fees. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Clark C. Roy, Louisiana Bar Roll number 8220, be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of three years. This suspension shall be retroactive to April 25, 2001, the date of respondent’s interim suspension.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    In re Walter E. MOAK.
    No. 2003-B-2892.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Walter E. Moak, an attorney licensed to practice law in the States of Louisiana and Arizona, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State Bar of Arizona charged respondent with three counts of attorney misconduct under the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct. The most serious charge against respondent arose out of his representation of Julian Reed in two separate actions arising from two automobile accidents that occurred approximately three years apart. Essentially, in the action based upon the first accident, respondent failed to disclose the serious brain injuries that Mr. Reed received in the second accident, and failed to distinguish appropriately the injuries Mr. Reed sustained in the first accident from those he sustained in the second. These failures misled the defendants from the first accident and deprived them of an opportunity to prove that Mr. Reed’s injuries resulted, at least in part, from the second accident. Respondent’s failures also misled the judge and jury in the trial involving the first accident.

LAfter the parties stipulated to most of the relevant facts, a hearing officer considered the remaining factual issues, as well as aggravating and mitigating factors. The hearing officer concluded that the State Bar had established all counts and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Arizona for six months' and one day. On review, the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court accepted the hearing officer’s findings of fact and agreed with his conclusions of law, but recommended a six-month suspension. Neither party sought review of the Commission’s decision; however, the Supreme Court of Arizona exercised its right of sua sponte review to consider further the appropriate discipline to be imposed. On June 16, 2003, the Supreme Court of Arizona ordered that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months and one day. In re Moak, Number SB-03-0007-D on the docket of the Arizona Supreme Court.

The ODC then filed a petition to initiate reciprocal discipline in Louisiana. By order of this court dated March 4, 2004, respondent was given thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

DISCUSSION

The imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent based upon the Arizona judgment is clearly appropriate under the facts of this case. Respondent has failed to file any pleadings in this court demonstrating that the imposition of identical discipline in Louisiana would be unwarranted, and there is no suggestion of such upon the face of the record. Moreover, there is little doubt that respondent’s conduct would warrant discipline in Louisiana, given his pattern of serious ethical lapses involving deceitful conduct.

| ¡¡Accordingly, we will impose reciprocal discipline pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21.

DECREE

Considering the motion for reciprocal discipline filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record herein, it is ordered that Walter E. Moak, Louisiana Bar Roll number 11606, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for six months and one day.


text:
    In re Jo Anne FLEMING.
    No. 2004-B-0977.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 5, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the “Motion for Remand” filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the pending investigative matters numbered 15650, 15818, 15859, 16395, 16591, 16719, 16805, 16885, 17235, 17434, 17519, 17914, 17992, 18184, 18190, 18268, 18431, and 18465. After appropriate consideration of the consolidated matters, the board is directed to issue a single recommendation of discipline to this court encompassing all disciplinary matters involving respondent.

/s/ John L. Weimer Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Dana Patrick KARAM.
    No. 2004-OB-1031.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   LORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into numerous complaints of serious professional misconduct filed against respondent. The complaints allege that respondent practiced law while he was ineligible to do so for failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment, engaged in a sexual relationship with a female client who retained him to represent her in a divorce and child custody matter, converted client funds, neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to account for or refund unearned legal fees, failed to return files and to protect his clients’ interests upon the termination of his representation, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation.

Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent filed a petition seeking to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Voluntary Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Dana Patrick Karam, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18279, and the concurrence thereto filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Dana Patrick Karam for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended March 24, 2004.

LIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dana Patrick Karam shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.


author: hPER CURIAM. hKNOLL, J.,

text:
    In re Stanley R. AARON.
    No. 2004-B-0739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent converted his client’s settlement funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in the form of disbarment. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Stanley R. Aaron, Louisiana Bar Roll number 2265, be and hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

KNOLL, J., dissents.

hKNOLL, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion accepting the petition for consent disbarment. I would reject the petition and refer this matter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for further proceedings to consider whether permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction under these facts.


text:
    Jeannie FOLSE v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE USA, INC.
    No. 2004-CC-1069.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   PER CURIAM.

Writ granted. The ruling of the trial court denying relators’ motion to recuse is reversed. Judge Pro Tempore Bruno is hereby recused. See Canon 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“[a] judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned ... ”). The case is remanded to the trial court for random reallotment to another judge.


text:
    In re Barry G. FEAZEL.
    No. 2004-B-0859.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected his client’s legal matter, failed to communicate with his client, and failed to refund an unearned legal fee. This misconduct occurred in the same time frame as the misconduct forming the basis of respondent’s earlier disciplinary matters. Prior to the filing of new formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Barry G. Feazel, Louisiana Bar Roll number 5494, be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant discipline and which may be considered in the event he applies for reinstatement from his suspension in In re: Feazel, 98-2060 (La.10/9/98), 718 So.2d 969, and In re: Feazel, 01-2309 (La.11/9/01), 800 So.2d 771, after becoming eligible to do so.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    William Albert SOURS, IV v. Lee Ochiltree Bancroft SOURS.
    No. 2004-C-0543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2004.
   In re Sours, William Albert IV; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 99-1062; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,-055-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph F. GREFER, et al. v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 28, 2004.
   In re Gray Insurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 572-152; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-C-338.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    CITY OF DENHAM SPRINGS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF the DENHAM SPRINGS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, AND NONRESIDENTS OWNING PROPERTY OR SUBJECT TO TAXATION THEREIN, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1006.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 28, 2004.
   In re Jones, A. Ponder; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 103,565; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004-CW-0831.

Denied.


text:
    Percy BROWN, et al. v. WESTPORT INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 29, 2004.
   In re Westport Insurance Co. et al.; Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello APLC; Talbot, Carmouche, Marchand & Marcello APLC; Carmouche, Donald T.; Car-mouche, John H.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 57,203; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-C-372.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur MAJOR, III.
    No. 2003-K-3522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 97-180297; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR03-249.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher DAVID.
    No. 2004-KH-0918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re David, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 03-5840.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rudolph B. FLANAGAN.
    No. 2004-KK-0634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Flanagan, Rudolph B.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 36,217; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,757-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William J. CANCIENNE, Jr. (Sentenced as William J. J Cancienne).
    No. 2003-KO-3284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Cancienne, William J. Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 01-0331; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-366.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank ALLEN, Jr.
    No. 2004-KO-0012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Allen, Frank Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. ¿60,502; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0543.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank BERNATH.
    No. 2004-KO-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Bernath, Frank; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-CR-361; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0337.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald BELL.
    No. 2004-KO-0024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Bell, Ronald; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 86095; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-737.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Odell CASH.
    No. 2004-K-0027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Cash, William Odell; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR7493-00-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-853.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Orlando OROSTEGUI.
    No. 2004-K-0032.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Orostegui, Orlando; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 01-212,972; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-710.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Troy CARMICHAEL.
    No. 2003-KP-1731.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Carmichael, Troy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Second Parish Court of Jefferson Parish, No. S807565; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2003-KH-533.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elmore J. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-KH-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Williams, Elmore J.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 332-868; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0338.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D). '


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paul JONES, Jr.
    No. 2004-KK-0692.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Jones, Paul Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 104837, 104838; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 38651-KW, 38652-KW.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robbin ZACHARIE.
    No. 2004-KH-0905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Zacharie, Robbin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 401-829.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for enforcement of its order of January 20, 2004 in which it directed relator’s transfer to the East Louisiana State Hospital, if it has not done so already. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen ANDERSON.
    No. 2003-KP-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Anderson, Allen; — Defendant (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts order dated January 30, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 233762.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nathaniel MITCHELL.
    No. 2004-KH-0982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Mitchell, Nathaniel Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 67,603.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph C. ZENON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Zenon, Joseph C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 97-183347; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 03-01303.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Abdullah MUHAMMAD a/k/a Kirk Spencer v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Muhammad, Abdullah a/k/a; Spencer, Kirk; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 344-124; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-2127.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alfred WADE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Wade, Alfred; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 10-03-1085; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 2599.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Smith, Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 94-6830; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KH-93.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cleon FLOYD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0773.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Floyd, Cleon; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-6479.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John F. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Williams, John F.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 442-790.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth DELAGARDELLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1269.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Delagardelle, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 96-5477; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-10.

Application dismissed. Relator is deceased.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin ENGLISH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0929.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re English, Calvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 196,848; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37281-KH.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George JARRETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Jarrett, George; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1-94-1507; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0123.

Denied. Relator must first address his request to the record’s custodian. R.S. 44:31; State ex rel. Skelton v. State, 00-1901 (La.9/14/01), 796 So.2d 672; State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freddie D. CASTILLO, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Castillo, Freddie D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 423-410; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-2264.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Monique RICHARDSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Richardson, Monique; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 391-218; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-KA-1050.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clent SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Smith, Clent;' — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-1084; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-350.

Denied. Moot. The Court of Appeal has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick MAXIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1041.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Maxie, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 84311; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37322-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis WALTERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Walters, Curtis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 34536; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2333.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marshall WHITLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Whitley, Marshall; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 390-042; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0287.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry James SIMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Simons, Larry James; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR-3839-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01026.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald ANDREWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1049.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Andrews, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 36-438.

Denied. Untimely. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard WOODARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1083.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Woodard, Leonard;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-2295; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2002-KH-1229.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence R. PITTMAN, Sr. a/k/a Terry Hill v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Pittman, Lawrence R., Sr. a/k/a; Hill, Terry;- — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 328-026; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0323.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric Peter HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Hamilton, Eric Peter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 335541; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 1344.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kerry JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1107.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Jackson, Kerry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 98-1373; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2003-KH-372.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keenan BUCKLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Buckley, Keenan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 423-032; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2281.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930:3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La:1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hilton WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Wright, Hilton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 268-605; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0345.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Lewis OVERBEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Overbey, John Lewis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. F-96-169; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37367-KH, 37219-KH, 35112-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Byron YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Young, Byron; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. II, No. 385-095; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0342.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Jackson, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 96,885, 96,885 A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,187-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Taylor, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 71,536; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37429-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Garland J. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Smith, Garland J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 397-408; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0248.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren JORDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Jordan, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-3680; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-343.

Denied. State v. McKinney, 406 So.2d 160, 161 (La.1981).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert J. BILLIOT, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Billiot, Robert J. Jr.;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 358-522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-K-1948, 2003-K-0216.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William WEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re William West; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 00-4838; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-262.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick W. CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Carter, Derrick W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W-92-9-845; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 EA 1954.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl DEDEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Dedeaux, Darryl; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, Nos. 99-3711, 99-3712, 99-3713; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-413.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony Wayne HUTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Hutson, Anthony Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 98,050, 98,050A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,433.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry J. FORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Ford, Larry J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 395-385; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1977.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles MANUEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Manuel, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 62,292; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37411-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1266.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Smith, Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial

Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 94-6830; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-321.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy A. VANDERHOFF Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1267.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Vanderhoff, Roy A. Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 235-877; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0347.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy ELLIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Ellis, Randy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 17,570; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37379-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Kevin WOODS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Woods, James Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 61277, 63382; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0097.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Travis HICKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Hicks, Travis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 97-5112; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-337.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald L. SELDERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1274.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Selders, Gerald L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 00-5315, 00-5316; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-298.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clent SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1307.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Smith, Clent; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-1084; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-350.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Williams, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 362-846; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-0443.

Denied. Relator must first address his request to the records’ custodians. R.S. 44:31; State ex rel. Shelton v. State, 00-1901 (La.9/14/01), 796 So.2d 672; State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Norman, Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-6753; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-345.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Norman, Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 91-1679; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-342.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Norman, Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-6753; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Norman, Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-6753; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Lewis OVERBEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Overbey, John Lewis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. F-96-169; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37896-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard WOODARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-3117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Woodard, Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 98-2295; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 03-KH-1109, 03-KH-981.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Kevin WOODS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-3147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Woods, James Kevin;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 61277, 63382; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW1698.

Denied.


text:
    Melba Margaret Schwegmann BROWN v. John F. SCHWEGMANN and Melinda B. Schwegmann.
    No. 2004-C-0425.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Schwegmann, John F.;- — -Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2000-4795; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1509.

Denied.


text:
    Melba Margaret Schwegmann BROWN v. John F. SCHWEGMANN and Melinda B. Schwegmann.
    No. 2004-C-0499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Brown, Melba Margaret Schweg-mann;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2000-4795; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1509.

Denied.


text:
    Robert KELLY, Jr. and Harvey Porter, Jr. v. Antoine M. MERRIELL, Marc E. Davis, Progressive Security Insurance Company and Philadelphia Insurance Company. Robert Kelly, Jr. and Harvey Porter, Jr. v. Antoine M. Merriell, Marc E. Davis, Progressive Security Insurance Company, Philadelphia Insurance Company, Lockett Federal Funeral Home, Inc. and Lafayette Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Lockett Federal Funeral Home Inc.; Lafayette Insurance Co.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 00-7199; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-CA-0931, 2002-CA-2345.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    B.C., on Behalf of Her Minor Son, J.C. v. The ESTATE OF George PAGE.
    No. 2004-C-0509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re B.C., et al.; J.C.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 98-5832; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0576.

Denied.


text:
    Benitta WESCO v. COLUMBIA LAKELAND MEDICAL CENTER, Individually and d/b/a Lakeland Medical Center and Lakeland Medical Center, Dr. Sarah Laine and Dr. Washington Bryan.
    No. 2004-C-0525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Wesco, Benitta; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 97-11597; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0328.

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy MATHEWS, et al. v. HIXSON BROTHERS, INC., et al.
    No. 2004-C-0554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Hixson Brothers, Inc., et al.; Hix-son Brothers Funeral Home; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 196,044; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1065.

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy MATHEWS, et al. v. HIXSON BROTHERS, INC., et al.
    No. 2004-C-0564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 196,044; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1065.

Denied.


text:
    Cecil BROOKING & Elizabeth Brooking v. Victor P. VEGAS & Betty Rives Vegas.
    No. 2004-C-0577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Brooking, Cecil et al.; Brooking, Elizabeth; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 37484; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 03-1114.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Neil J. TREGRE v. CATHOLIC MUTUAL RELIEF SOCIETY OF AMERICA and the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux.
    No. 2004-CC-0603.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Catholic Mutual Relief Society of America et al.; Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terre-bonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 130,702(E); to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 2113.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Loren JEFFRESS and Cari Gehegan v. PHARAOH’S PALACE, INC., d/b/a Triple A Bar & Grill and St. Paul Reinsurance Company, Ltd.
    No. 2004-CC-0619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re St. Paul Reinsurance Co. Ltd.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 494534; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1944.

Denied.


text:
    John A. MAGEE v. Mark Anthony LABORDE, Waste Management of Louisiana, Inc. and Acord Farm Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0623.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Magee, John A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 76,815; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0403.

Denied.


text:
    LONG’S PREFERRED PRODUCTS, INC. v. Linda Long MINTON.
    No. 2004-C-0625.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Long’s Preferred Products Inc.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 204,291; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1020.

Denied.


text:
    Gary L. RING, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. STATE of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development, and the Division of Weights and Standards.
    No. 2004-OC-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State of et al.; Transportation and Development Dept, of; Weights and Standards Div. of; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 481-767, 508-176, 510-865, 510-866.

Denied. Moot. See disposition in 2004-CA-0671.


text:
    Earl J. FRANZ v. FIRST BANK SYSTEM, INC., St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Real Estate Management Corporation, Schindler Elevator Corporation, d/b/a Schindler Enterprises, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Vernon Christoff and Gilda Christoff v. First Bank System, Inc., Schindler Elevator Corporation, d/b/a Schindler Enterprises, Real Estate Management Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Constitution State Insurance Company, and Travelers Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Franz, Earl J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, Nos. 96-3536, 96-1762; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-CA-0448, 2003-CA-1470.

Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. Elmer LUCAS, or His Succession and Heirs, If Deceased.
    No. 2004-C-0656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Alden, Wes M.D. d/b/a; Crescent City Property Services; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2001-19460; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1406.

Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. Elmer LUCAS, or His Succession and Heirs, If Deceased.
    No. 2004-C-0659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Lucas, Elmer; Lucas, Elmer Succession of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2001-19460; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 3003 CA-1406.

Denied.


text:
    Rae MOLLERE v. WATCH SYSTEMS, LLC.
    No. 2004-C-0673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Moliere, Rae; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2001-14351; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0897.

Denied.


text:
    Andre ZERINGUE, et al. v. Eric CHOUEST, et al.
    No. 2004-C-0676.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins., Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 474,308; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CA 0645.

Denied.


text:
    Jodonna HARDY, et al. v. WESTPORT INSURANCE CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2004-C-0677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Hardy, Jodonna et al.; Hardy, Bessie Mae Carter; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 74,291-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-790.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Elsie N. HARDESTY v. Andrea L. SNOW and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re Snow, Andrea L. et al.; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 473,957; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0845.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Earl J. FRANZ v. FIRST BANK SYSTEM, INC., St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Real Estate Management Corporation, Schindler Elevator Corporation, d/b/a Schindler Enterprises, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Vernon Christoff and Gilda Christoff v. First Bank System, Inc., Schindler Elevator Corporation, d/b/a Schindler Enterprises, Real Estate Management Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Constitution State Insurance Company, and Travelers Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
   In re First Bank System, Inc., et al.; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Real Estate Management Corp.; Schindler Elevator Corp. d/b/a; Schindler Enterprises; Westinghouse Electric Corp.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, Nos. 96-3536, 96-1762; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-CA-0448, 2003-CA-1470.

Denied.