author: LPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Lloyd J. LeBLANC, Jr.
    No. 2004-B-0681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Lloyd J. LeBlanc, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In September 1986, Nancy Blackwell filed a defamation suit against her former employer, Brown & Root, Inc. Nancy Blackwell v. Brown & Root, Inc., No. 30,887 on the docket of the 29th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles. In September 1994, when Ms. Blackwell’s original attorney was no longer able to continue handling the matter, attorney James Quaid enrolled as Ms. Blackwell’s counsel of record. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Quaid was disbarred by this court.

In February 1995, Ms. Blackwell, who then resided in Arkansas, met with respondent at his office in Louisiana to discuss the pending suit. Respondent advised Ms. Blackwell that he would “look into her case.” After a short delay, respondent received Ms. Blackwell’s file from Mr. Quaid. Over the next five years, respondent had frequent telephone conversations with Ms. Blackwell in which they discussed the defamation suit and the efforts respondent was purportedly making to move the case forward. Nevertheless, during this time, respondent did not review Ms. Blackwell’s |2file or the court record, did not enroll as her counsel of record, and took no action in the litigation on her behalf.

In March 2000, Ms. Blackwell’s defamation suit was dismissed as abandoned on motion of Brown & Root. Ms. Blackwell was unaware of this turn of events because the trial court’s record did not contain her correct mailing address. Respondent learned of the dismissal sometime in November or December 2000, when he reviewed the court record for the first time. On December 6, 2000, respondent wrote Ms. Blackwell a letter notifying her that her case had been dismissed.

In August 2001, Ms. Blackwell filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. In January 2002, respondent returned Ms. Blackwell’s file to her by mail. On August 26, 2002, one year after the filing of the disciplinary complaint, but pri- or to the filing of formal charges against respondent by the ODC, respondent sent Ms. Blackwell a letter of apology, along with a check for $10,000. In the letter, respondent stated:

I am writing you now to do what I should have done a long time ago. I am writing to apologize for what happened in your case.
I should have either enrolled as counsel of record on your behalf, and taken steps to bring the case to a conclusion, or I should have told you that I was unable to represent you.
I deeply regret my failure in this regard.
Enclosed is my check in the amount of $10,000.00 which I hope will serve as some compensation for my failures. Accepting this check will not adversely affect any of your rights against me. You have the right to seek the advice of an independent attorney with respect to your claims against me.
I will understand if you do not accept my apology. I only wish I had given it earlier.

|3In September 2002, Ms. Blackwell filed a legal malpractice suit against respondent and his professional liability insurer, seeking damages for respondent’s failure to prosecute the defamation suit. Ms. Blackwell’s malpractice suit was eventually dismissed after the trial court granted an exception of prescription filed by the defendants.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Following its investigation, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging his conduct violated Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.2(a) (scope of the representation), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate -with a client), 1.8(h) (improperly settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In his answer to the formal charges, respondent denied the ODC’s allegations. Specifically, respondent asserted that he did not make any attempt to deceive Ms. Blackwell about her case. Alternatively, respondent sought a hearing in mitigation.

Formal Hearing

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing before the hearing committee. The ODC presented the testimony of Ms. Blackwell and James “J.D.” Monk, who was present at the initial meeting between respondent and Ms. Blackwell. Respondent testified on his own behalf. Additionally, he called as witnesses Sharon Lee, who ^initially referred Ms. Blackwell to him, and Rob Worley, the attorney for Brown & Root. Respondent also introduced testimony, both in person and by affidavit, concerning his good character and reputation in the community.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing committee filed its report with the disciplinary board. The committee determined that Ms. Blackwell possessed a reasonable subjective belief that respondent was representing her in the defamation suit. In particular, the committee relied on respondents admission that he never told Ms. Blackwell that he was not her attorney, nor did he advise her that she should hire an attorney to pursue her claims against Brown & Root. The committee found respondent discussed the case with Ms. Blackwell on a frequent basis, telling her that “I’ll try to help you,” “I’ll try to do what I can to help you,” and that he would see what he could do to “move [the case] along.”

Having found an attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and Ms. Blackwell, the committee concluded that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges. Respondent violated Rule 1.1(a) by failing to review the file or the court record of the case. The committee also found respondent did not abide by the scope of the representation, as required by Rule 1.2(a), because he advised Ms. Blackwell of a variety of actions that he would take in the lawsuit but failed to take any of these actions. It determined respondent violated Rule 1.3, which requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence, because he failed to take any action whatsoever on the record, or to advise Ms. Blackwell that he would not be able to represent her. Turning to. Rule 1.4, the committee found respondent failed to communicate with his client because he provided her with inaccurate information concerning the case and mislead her concerning his actions.

lsWith regard to respondent’s actions following the dismissal of the case, the committee found he violated Rule 1.8(h) by failing to promptly' advise Ms. Blackwell of the dismissal of her lawsuit or that she should seek the advice of independent counsel in connection with his malpractice. It also found he violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to promptly return her file.

Finally, the committee found respondent’s actions as a whole violated the prohibition against deceitful conduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in Rules 8.4(c), and (d), respectively. The committee observed that respondent told his client, Ms. Blackwell, about actions he was taking or was going to take, when in fact he had not even reviewed the file or the court record. It concluded such conduct is dishonest and deceitful. Moreover, it found that permitting a client’s case to be dismissed when the lawyer has failed to take any action on behalf of the client, and has failed to review the client’s file or the court record, is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

In determining a sanction, the committee found that respondent violated duties owed to his client, to the public, and as a professional. It concluded respondent’s actions were at least knowing and harm was caused to Ms. Blackwell in that her lawsuit was dismissed as abandoned. Thus, the committee found the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

As aggravating factors, the committee recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses (a successfully completed diversionary matter), refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1975). In mitigation, the committee acknowledged respondent’s good character and reputation. The committee did not consider respondent’s payment of $10,000 in partial restitution to Ms. | (¡Blackwell to be either an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, because the payment was made after the filing of the disciplinary complaint.

Considering all the facts of this case, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, with all but forty-five days deferred, to be followed by an eighteen-month period of supervised probation governed by specified conditions.

Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board concurred in the hearing committee’s factual findings and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board also made additional factual findings relating to the existence of the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Ms. Blackwell, specifically noting that Ms. Blackwell’s testimony at the hearing established her subjective belief that respondent was representing her in the suit against Brown & Root.

Respondent violated duties owed to his client, to the legal system, and as a professional. His actions were knowing and caused injury to Ms. Blackwell in that her suit was dismissed on grounds of abandonment; however, the board also noted that Ms. Blackwell has received restitution from respondent for his failure to pursue the legal action against Brown & Root.

In mitigation, the board recognized respondent’s timely good faith effort to make restitution and to rectify the consequences of his misconduct, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, good character and reputation, and remorse. As aggravating factors, the board [.¡■acknowledged the vulnerability of the victim and respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the board noted the baseline sanction is suspension ' under the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Considering the mitigating factors and noting that it was impressed by respondent’s candor during oral argument, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, all but thirty days deferred, with any misconduct occurring during a one-year period following the finality of the court’s order being grounds for making the deferred period of suspension executory.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1816 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard | Sis applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude the hearing committee’s finding of fact that an attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and Ms. Blackwell is not clearly wrong. As we explained in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La.1986), the existence of an attorney-client relationship “turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it exists.” Ms. Blackwell’s testimony reveals that she clearly believed respondent was her attorney. Respondent’s actions over the five-year period at issue fostered Ms. Blackwell’s belief that he was taking action on her behalf in the defamation suit. At no time did respondent clearly and unequivocally advise Ms. Blackwell he did not intend to represent her.

Having found an attorney-client relationship existed, we conclude the hearing committee correctly determined that respondent violated Rules 1.1(a) and 1.2(a) by failing to represent Ms. Blackwell with competence. Likewise, we find he violated Rule 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness and violated Rule 1.4 by failing to fully communicate with Ms. Blackwell about the status of the case.

However, we do not find the record supports the conclusion that respondent violated Rule 1.8(h) by improperly attempting to settle his malpractice liability. Although respondent did send Ms. Blackwell a check for $10,000, his accompanying cover letter explained that accepting the check “will not adversely affect any of your rights against me” and advised her of her right to consult with independent counsel. We conclude respondent’s offer was in the nature of an unconditional tender, the acceptance of which would not prejudice Ms. Blackwell’s rights in any way. Accordingly, we do not believe respondent’s actions violated Rule 1.8(h).

|flWe also do not believe the record supports the conclusion that respondent violated Rule 1.16(d), which deals with an attorney’s obligations upon the termination of a representation. The record reveals that shortly after respondent learned the case had been dismissed, he sent a letter to Ms. Blackwell advising her of that fact and indicated that attempts to proceed further would be futile. Respondent also returned Ms. Blackwell’s file to her, albeit in a somewhat tardy fashion.

Likewise, we question whether the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent acted with deceit in violation of Rule 8.4(b) and whether his actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice for purposes of Rule 8.4(c). Respondent has consistently taken the position throughout these proceedings that he was not Ms. Blackwell’s lawyer and that his communications with Ms. Blackwell related only to actions he planned to take if he accepted the representation. Although we now find respondent’s position that no attorney-client relationship existed is legally incorrect, we cannot say his statements to Ms. Blackwell were based on an intent to deceive her or harm her pending litigation.

In summary, we find the record supports violations of Rules 1.1(a), 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4 and 8.4(a). The remaining rule violations alleged by the ODC are not supported by the record.

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a discussion of an appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards |inof the profession. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; In re: Lain, 00-0148 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 1152; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 400 So.2d 1355 (La.1981). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s failure to clearly communicate with his client is at the heart of the misconduct in this case. Any misunderstandings about the representation could have been easily dispelled had respondent merely taken the time to send a letter to Ms. Blackwell at the inception of their contact advising whether he intended to accept or decline the representation. Instead, respondent’s vague and ambiguous actions led Ms. Blackwell to believe her rights were being protected by respondent, when they in fact were not. As a result, Ms. Blackwell suffered harm due to the dismissal of her civil action on grounds of abandonment.

The jurisprudence of this court in bar disciplinary matters does not contain many cases involving analogous fact patterns, suggesting that such cases tend to be addressed by civil actions for legal malpractice rather than in a disciplinary context. In general, the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct appears to be a suspension in the range of one year, all or part of which may be deferred. See, e.g., In re: Cantrell, 03-0910 (La.5/2/03), 848 So.2d 507 (lawyer suspended by consent for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to an eighteen-month period of probation, where the lawyer neglected the complainant’s appeal due to a belief that he never agreed to handle the complainant’s case).

!■„ Several aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law and his prior disciplinary record. In mitigation, we recognize respondent’s good character and reputation and his efforts to make at least partial restitution to Ms. Blackwell through his $10,000 unconditional tender.

Considering these factors, we conclude the appropriate sanction is a suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year. We will defer all but thirty days of the suspension and place respondent on unsupervised probation for a period of one year, subject to the condition that any misconduct during the probationary period may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Lloyd J. Le-Blanc, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 8202, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. It is further ordered that all but thirty days of the suspension shall be deferred, and respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period of one year, subject to the condition that any misconduct by respondent during the probationary period may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme I^Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . See In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343.

      . Standard 4.42(a) suggests that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client; Standard 4.62 suggests that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. Here, respondent failed to perform any substantial work on Ms. Blackwell's file, causing the case to be dismissed on grounds of abandonment. Further, respondent misrepresented to her the extent of the services he planned to perform on the case.

      . A violation of Rule 8.4(a) occurs whenever a lawyer violates any other provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

      . We note that Ms. Blackwell instituted a legal malpractice action against respondent, although that action was later found to be prescribed.

      . As previously stated, respondent had been the subject of an unrelated complaint in 2000. This complaint was not the basis for formal discipline, but was referred by the ODC to diversion. The disciplinary board erroneously concluded that a complaint resolved by diversion could not constitute prior discipline. In fact, Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A)(9) makes it clear that "diversion may be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings in which the respondent has been found guilty of misconduct bearing upon the issue of sanction to be imposed in the subsequent proceeding.” Of course, in this context, a diverted matter may not carry the same weight as other forms of sanctions; nonetheless, it constitutes prior discipline which may be considered as an aggravating factor.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Christopher S. SUBA.
    No. 2004-OB-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the record of this matter, the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee, and the response thereto filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s conditional admission to the practice of law in the State of Louisiana be revoked, effective immediately. Respondent may not submit an application for readmission for a period of at least eighteen months from the date of this order. In the event respondent chooses to submit an application for readmission, it shall be filed with the Disciplinary Board, which shall appoint a hearing committee to take evidence and report to this court whether respondent should be readmitted to the bar and allowed to practice law in Louisiana. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel shall participate in the hearing and provide such information, evidence, and recommendations to the hearing committee as may be appropriate.

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Amy L. BARBER.
    No. 2004-OB-1839.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Amy L. Barber, is eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years. During this period, petitioner shall provide evidence to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, on at least a quarterly basis, demonstrating that she has made a good faith effort to satisfy her financial obligations. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy her financial obligations, or should she commit any misconduct during the period of probation, her conditional right to practice may be terminated or she may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.


text:
    In re Anthony M. BERTUCCI.
    No. 2004-OB-2394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Anthony M. Ber-tucei, Louisiana Bar Roll number 14080, be and he hereby is transferred to disability inactive status. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

/s/ Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana

TRAYLOR, J., would deny the petition.


text:
    In re David ROZAS.
    No. 2004-OB-2430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the application for admission to the practice of law filed by petitioner, David Rozas,

IT IS ORDERED that petitioner be and he hereby is granted admission to the practice of law in Louisiana.

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Samuel C. WARD, Jr.
    No. 2004-OB-2447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2004.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Samuel C. Ward, Jr., is eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of one year. Should petitioner commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

VICTORY, J., would appoint a commissioner.


author: hPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re John V. LAWRENCE.
    No. 2004-B-0019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 19, 2004.

      Charles B. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Shana M. Broussard, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel for Applicant.
    John V. Lawrence, Mandeville, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, John V. Lawrence, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 1, 1997, respondent was employed as an associate by the Gretna law firm of Windhorst, Gaudry, Ranson, Higgins & Gremillion, L.L.C. (the “Windhorst firm”). In June 1997, Allison Curtis retained the Windhorst firm to represent her in a personal injury matter. The firm accepted the representation on a one-third contingent fee basis, and respondent was thereafter assigned to handle certain tasks in connection with the file. On April 24, 1998, respondent filed a petition for damages on behalf of Ms. Curtis in the matter entitled Allison Curtis v. Beaver Productions, Inc., et al., No. 98-7317 on the docket of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. On July 6, 1998, the Metairie law firm of Aubert & Pajares, L.L.C. (the “Aubert firm”) filed an answer to the petition on behalf of the defendants. On July 14, 1998, respondent resigned from the Windhorst firm to accept a position as an associate with the Aubert firm, working in its Covington office.

| ¡¿Following respondent’s departure from the Windhorst firm, a partner of the firm, Daryl Higgins, assumed responsibility for the handling of Ms. Curtis’ personal injury case. On August 11, 1998, Mr. Higgins filed a motion to disqualify the Aubert firm from the continued representation of the defendants in the Curtis matter. In support, Mr. Higgins alleged that the time records maintained by the Windhorst firm reflected that respondent had worked on the Curtis case for approximately fifteen hours, performing such tasks as interviewing the client, writing correspondence to the client, medical providers, and others, reviewing correspondence, drafting pleadings, and making telephone calls. Consequently, Mr. Higgins argued that respondent had knowledge of relevant, confidential information that must be imputed to the other members of the Aubert firm under the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In opposition to the motion, the Aubert firm submitted an August 13, 1998 affidavit prepared by respondent attesting that he did not possess any privileged information about the Curtis case that would require the disqualification of his new firm from the matter. Furthermore, respondent stated that regardless of what his timesheets reflected, he only worked on the Curtis case for one hour during the period of his employment with the Win-dhorst firm. According to respondent, while he was associated with the Win-dhorst firm he “padded” his timesheets with hours he did not actually work. Respondent explained that he did so because he “frequently had too little work to do to occupy all my time,” and that when he brought his concern to the partners, he was “encouraged, both specifically and by implication, to ‘pad my bills.’ ” Believing “it is wrong to bill clients for work that is not done,” but fearing he would lose his job if he did not do so, respondent decided

to “pad” my bills in the plaintiffs personal injury contingency fee cases on which I was working by logging time that I did not actually work. I felt this was the most acceptable solution to my dilemma, because (a) bills in [¡¡plaintiffs personal injury contingency fee cases are not paid by the client, so there was no real damage done to anyone by a “padded bill,” and (b) when my total hours were checked by the partners of the firm, the amount would be high enough to keep my job. While this was not a perfect solution to a tough dilemma, it was the best, in my view, under the circumstances.

Therefore, to the extent that his time-sheets from the Windhorst firm reflected more than one hour of work on the Curtis case, respondent explained in his affidavit that it was “simply work that was logged but not done ... to satisfy the billing requirements of the firm to save my job.” Respondent’s affidavit was placed under seal pursuant to an order of the trial court signed on September 16,1998.

The motion to disqualify was set for hearing before Judge Max N. Tobias, Jr. on September 18, 1998. On the day of the hearing, the Aubert firm withdrew its opposition to the motion; accordingly, Judge Tobias granted the motion and disqualified the Aubert firm. The same day, Judge Tobias mailed the ODC a copy of respondent’s affidavit (as well as a countervailing affidavit offered by a partner of the Win-dhorst firm) “for such actions as you may wish to take in the matter.”

On September 22, 1998, the Windhorst firm filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The Windhorst firm also sought the imposition of sanctions against respondent and the Aubert firm and filed a rule for contempt against them in the trial court. On February 17, 1999, respondent gave a deposition under oath in connection with the civil matter. Although respondent invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to any questions concerning the affidavit or its contents, in response to a question whether he “put work down on the Allison Curtis file that was 14not truly reflective of the time that [he] spent doing the work,” respondent answered “yes.”

In September 1999, Ms. Curtis settled her personal injury claim against the defendants. The parties filed a motion to dismiss in connection with the settlement, which purported to reserve Ms. Curtis’ right to pursue the contempt and Rule 863 motions against respondent and the Au-bert lawyers. Nevertheless, on February 11, 2000, Judge Tobias dismissed those matters, concluding they are properly addressed in the context of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On July 12, 2002, the ODC filed formal charges alleging that respondent’s conduct (specifically the “padding” of his time-sheets in the Curtis case) violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made a factual finding that a question exists concerning the actual amount of time respondent spent working on the Curtis file while employed by the Win-dhorst firm. Nevertheless, the committee found that prior to an offer of employment being extended by the Aubert & Pajares firm, respondent disclosed that he had worked on the Curtis matter, which was then being defended by his prospective employer. The | ¿firm inquired whether respondent had performed substantial tasks on the Curtis matter, and he assured them that he had not.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent submitted false billing statements to his former firm, knowing the information was dishonest, and induced the firm to consider his bills as a determining factor regarding compensation. Respondent’s actions also caused his former firm financial hardship and resulted in a delay in having the Curtis matter timely resolved. The committee specifically rejected respondent’s assertion of a “no harm, no foul” defense, noting such thinking “belies the true meaning of Rule 8.4(c) which prohibits] giving false or dishonest statements.” The committee found the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

The committee considered in aggravation respondent’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and observed that respondent’s lack of truthfulness cannot be condoned, for doing so “would serve to further damage the public perception of lawyers.” The committee made no finding that mitigating factors are present, but nonetheless deviated downward from the baseline sanction to recommend that respondent be publicly reprimanded.

The ODC filed an objection to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the hearing committee. Respondent objected to the entirety of the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

ORDER OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD

On November 18, 2003, the disciplinary board ordered that respondent receive a public reprimand and that he be required to attend Ethics School.

| fiBased on its review of the record, the board found the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence:

1. Respondent was admitted to practice law on October 5, 1990;
2. Respondent was hired to work at the Windhorst firm on May 1, 1997;
3. On June 17, 1997, respondent and Daryl Higgins of the Windhorst firm met with a potential client, Allison Curtis;
4. At the conclusion of this meeting, Ms. Curtis entered into a contingent fee contract with the Windhorst firm;
5. Following the meeting respondent was assigned to complete various tasks in connection with the Curtis matter. These tasks included, but were not limited to, arranging for medical treatment for Ms. Curtis, obtaining releases from Ms. Curtis, and preparing a petition for damages;
6. On April 24, 1998, respondent prepared and filed in Orleans Parish a petition for damages in connection with the Curtis matter;
7. On July 14,1998, respondent accepted employment with the law firm of Aubert & Pajares, which represented the defendants in the Curtis matter;
8. Prior to extending an offer of employment to respondent, Christopher Aubert asked respondent about his prior involvement in the Curtis matter;
9. Respondent advised Mr. Aubert that he had only worked on the Curtis matter for one hour;
10. Subsequently, Mr. Higgins filed a motion to disqualify Aubert & Pa-jares from continuing their representation of the defendants in the Curtis matter;
11. In the motion, Mr. Higgins stated that respondent had worked fifteen hours on the Curtis matter while Semployed at the Windhorst firm;
|712. In response, respondent prepared and submitted an affidavit “to explain to the [cjourt the fifteen hours that [he] was claimed to have worked on the Curtis file by Mr. Higgins”;
13. Respondent stated that in response to a conversation he had had with one of the partners in the Win-dhorst firm “pointing] out the necessity of producing more billable hours,” respondent “found the answer in the contingency fee files that [he] had ...” Specifically, respondent “put time down to contingency fee files knowing that it made no difference to the client, or his recovery, how many hours [he] worked on that file. In this manner, [respondent] could keep [his] job and no client would receive a bill for unnecessary or non-existent work”; and
14. While at the Windhorst firm, in connection with the Curtis matter, respondent listed hours on his timesheets for work not actually performed.

Based upon these facts, the board determined that respondent violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent intentionally indicated on his timesheets that he performed work in a client’s legal matter that he now states he did not actually perform.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board found respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his client, to the public, and as a professional. Respondent’s actions did not result in actual injury to Ms. Curtis, but did result in actual injury to the legal profession. By his actions, respondent has violated the ethical standards of the legal profession and has tarnished the image of the profession. Respondent also owes the public a duty to maintain standards of personal integrity. By misrepresenting the number of hours on his timesheets, respondent has failed to [smaintain such standards. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct ranges from a public reprimand to a suspension.

The board found the only mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior disciplinary record. In aggravation, the board recognized respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.

Under these circumstances, the board concluded that a public reprimand is appropriate. Accordingly, the board ordered that a public reprimand be issued against respondent, with the condition that within one year, respondent attend and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School.

One board member dissented and would recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months.

Both parties sought review of the board’s ruling by this court. We ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue of whether the record supports the disciplinary board’s report. After reviewing the briefs filed by both parties, we docketed the matter for oral argument.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has |flbeen proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

The record of this matter demonstrates that over a period of eleven months, respondent deliberately submitted false documents to the Windhorst law firm misrepresenting the number of hours he worked on his client’s personal injury matter. The fact that respondent’s timesheets were not used for the purpose of client billing does not impact our determination that a sanctionable ethical violation occurred. Rather, we focus on respondent’s admission that the entries on the time-sheets were inflated and that they reflected more time than he had actually spent working on the Curtis file. There is no doubt that such conduct is dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful, in violation of Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the highest court of the District of Columbia observed in In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206, 209 (D.C.1989):

Documents are an attorney’s stock in trade, and should be tendered and accepted at face value in the course of professional activity. If an attorney knowingly proffers altered documents in a context where the attorney knows or should know that action may be taken thereon, the attorney has engaged in conduct involving deceit in violation of [Rule 8.4(c) ], whatever the ultimate intent or motives may have been in making such alterations. The latter may go to sanction, but not to the threshold issue of violation vel non. [internal footnote omitted]

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a discussion of an appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards |inof the profession. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; In re: Lain, 00-0148 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 1152; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 400 So.2d 1355 (La.1981). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We find that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the public and to the legal system. Respondent’s actions in padding his timesheets caused harm to the Windhorst firm by compromising the integrity of its billing system, and caused harm to Ms. Curtis, whose personal injury matter was delayed unnecessarily while the lawyers involved in the case battled over the motion to disqualify and the ancillary rule for contempt and motion for sanctions. Under such facts, we conclude that the applicable baseline sanction is a suspension from the practice of law.

In mitigation, we acknowledge that respondent has no prior disciplinary record. However, this solitary factor is insufficient to justify any downward deviation from the baseline, given the aggravating factors present, which include respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1990). Perhaps most persuasive, however, is respondent’s persistent refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Respondent has not demonstrated a scintilla of remorse in these proceedings, and to this day feels that his actions were correct, and indeed, completely appropriate. Under the circumstances, and taking into account all of the interests to be served by the lawyer disciplinary process, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of three months.

_[^DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that John V. Lawrence, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20265, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The affidavit was sealed at the request of the Aubert firm to protect the reputation of the Windhorst firm.

      . Standard 5.13 provides for a reprimand when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. By contrast, Standard 7.2 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

      . Respondent made numerous admittedly false entries on his timesheets between June 17, 1997 and May 11, 1998.

      . Of course, had the false timesheets resulted in the client being billed for more work than was actually performed, the sanction we would impose would be harsher.


author: _[jWEIMER, Justice. It CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael A. JOHNSON.
    No. 2003-K-2993.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 19, 2004.

      Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Doug Moreau, District Attorney, R. Christopher Nevlis, Assistant District Attorney, Mark A. Dumaine, Assistant District Attorney, Dylan Alge, Assistant District Attorney; Counsel for Applicant.
    Louisiana Appellate Project, Prentice L. White, Counsel for Respondent.
   _[jWEIMER, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider the continuing validity of our decision in State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649, 650 (La.1992) (on reh’g), which held that in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent, Act 688 of 1982, amending Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, did not eliminate a sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders.

The correctness of our holding in Mims was first called into question, albeit in dicta, by our decision in State v. Everett, 00-2998 (La.5/14/02), 816 So.2d 1272, wherein we revealed that, in the course of examining a different aspect of the Habitual Offender Law, legislative material unavailable at the time of the Minis decision had been uncovered. We suggested that the newly discovered legislative material “calls into question the underpinnings of the Mims decision,” but declined to expound further on the question because it was not squarely presented by the case before the court. Everett, 00-2998 at 18, 816 So.2d at 1283.

This case brings the issue of the continuing validity of Mims squarely before the court. Defendant, who was sentenced by the district court as a fourth felony [¡.offender, argued on appeal that he was improperly adjudicated a fourth felony offender because two of the predicate convictions relied on to enhance his sentence were entered on the same date. Relying on our decision in Mims, the court of appeal held that the two convictions entered on the same date lack the proper sequencing to constitute more than one offense for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 and vacated the defendant’s habitual offender adjudication and sentence. The State applied to this court for writs, asking that we re-examine our decision in Mims in light of our comments in Everett. We granted the State’s application.

After consideration of the additional legislative materials now available, and further study of the issue, we find that our original interpretation of the effect of Act 688 of 1982, amending LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, was incorrect. We hold that the 1982 amendment removed the statute’s sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders and legislatively repudiated the rule of law pronounced in State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 288 So.2d 210 (La.1973).

Based on our interpretation of Louisiana’s Habitual Offender Law, we conclude that the district court properly adjudged defendant to be a fourth felony offender because at the time of the commission of the armed robbery for which he now stands convicted, he had earlier been convicted three times (for armed robbery, felony theft, and simple robbery). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal insofar as it vacates the defendant’s habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and remand this case to the court of appeal for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In so doing, we expressly overrule our decision in Mims.

| oFACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Michael Anthony Johnson, was charged by bill of information with the armed robbery of a clerk at a Circle K convenience store, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:64. He pleaded not guilty. After waiving his right to a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged following a bench trial. The State then filed a bill of information seeking to establish habitual offender status. The State asserted that defendant was a fourth felony offender based upon the following:

1) a June 8, 1982 arrest for armed robbery resulting in a conviction on November 15, 1982, for which defendant received a sentence of twenty years at hard labor;
2) a January 4, 1993 arrest for felony theft auto occurring on December 23, 1992, to which defendant pleaded guilty as charged on August 16, 1993, receiving a sentence of two years at hard labor;
3) a January 4, 1993 arrest for attempted first degree robbery occurring on December 27, 1992, to which defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of simple robbery on August 16, 1993, receiving a sentence of five years at hard labor to run concurrently with the felony theft conviction; and
4) the April 24, 2002 armed robbery conviction for which sentence enhancement was being sought.

At the hearing conducted to determine defendant’s habitual offender status, the State presented the testimony of a criminal identification specialist who matched defendant’s fingerprints to the arrest cards for his three prior convictions. The State also introduced bills of information and court minutes documenting defendant’s three Lprior convictions. Finally, the State asked the district court to take judicial notice of the defendant’s current conviction for armed robbery.

For his part, the defendant did not contest the 1982 armed robbery conviction, the 1993 felony theft conviction, or the current armed robbery conviction. Rather, the defendant argued that the district court could not use the 1993 simple robbery conviction to enhance his sentence because (1) it was entered on the same day as the felony theft conviction and (2) it was not the defendant’s conviction and sentence but that of another Michael Anthony Johnson.

After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the district court rejected the defendant’s arguments and adjudged him a fourth felony offender. As such, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant appealed his conviction and habitual offender adjudication.

The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, but vacated the habitual offender sentence, finding that the State’s proof did not suffice to demonstrate defendant’s status as a fourth offender because two of his predicate convictions had been entered on the same date. State v. Johnson, 855 So.2d 437, 03-0127 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), unpublished. More particularly, the court noted that defendant pleaded guilty on August 16, 1993, to both a felony theft charge based on an incident which occurred on December 23, 1992, and to simple robbery based on an incident which occurred a few days later, on December 27, 1992. Relying on this court’s decision in Mims, the court of appeal held that the two convictions entered on the same date lack the proper sequencing (commission of a crime, followed by conviction, then commission of another crime, [¿followed by conviction and so forth) to constitute more than one offense for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1. The court vacated the defendant’s habitual offender adjudication and sentence and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for the State, should it elect to file a new, third felony habitual offender bill, to select which predicate felony (felony theft or simple robbery) it wishes to use, as both cannot be utilized to enhance the defendant’s sentence.

Given our dicta in Everett, we granted the State’s application for writs to revisit our holding in Mims that multiple convictions entered on the same day must be treated as a single predicate under the habitual offender law, even when the convictions stem from separate and distinct criminal episodes. State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La.5/21/04), 874 So.2d 159.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Habitual Offender Law, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, provides, in relevant part:

A. (1) Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ... or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction;
(b) If the third felony is such that....
(c) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that....
B. It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or that an offender has been adjudged in a prior | ^prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime.

Prior to 1956, the statute did not include section B. It did, however, include the contents of section A. In State v. Clague, 224 La. 27, 68 So.2d 746 (1953) and State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 77 So.2d 515 (1955), we were called upon to determine whether the statute, as written, imposed a sequential requirement such that there must be the commission of a crime, followed by conviction, then commission of another crime, followed by conviction and so forth in order for a prior conviction to qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of sentence enhancement under the habitual offender statute. In other words, we were asked to determine whether multiple convictions entered on the same day must be treated as a single predicate for purposes of the habitual offender law. In both decisions, the court held that the statute is clear and unambiguous and susceptible of only one construction: it does not impose a sequential requirement on the prior convictions. More precisely, we observed:

We do not think that it is necessary for the defendant to have been charged as a double offender in order that he might be charged as a triple offender. What is mandatory is that he has been tried and convicted of two previous offenses.
The punishment is for the third crime, and it is heavier because the accused has become an habitual offender. The defendant becomes a third offender at the time he commits the third crime, and the punishment is incurred at that time.

State v. Williams, 77 So.2d at 516, quoting State v. Clague, 68 So.2d at 747 (citations omitted). In so holding, the court rejected Williams’ argument that “under multiple offender legislation, which is directed at recidivism, ‘The increased penalties for habitual offenders are not intended to follow according to a numerical count of the offender’s crimes, but are imposed for his successive failures to rehabilitate himself,’" Williams, 77 So.2d at 516, suggesting that such arguments, which find no support in the precise language of the statute, are more appropriately addressed to the legislature. Id.

Apparently, this court’s comments in Williams did not fall on deaf ears, as the next year the legislature passed Act 312 of 1956, which engrafted a paragraph onto section 529.1. This new paragraph provided:

It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as, and adjudged to be, a third offender, or that an offender have been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime. Provided, however, that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction; that one shall be deemed a third offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the third conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a second offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a second offender in the -prior instance; and that one shall be deemed to be a fourth offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the fourth conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a third offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a third offender in the prior instance. [Emphasis added.]

The amendment was considered to be a “legislative repudiation of the Williams case.” State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So.2d 210, 212 (La.1978) (quoting Bennett, Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 La.L.Rev. 60-61 (1956)). As a consequence of the amendment, the jurisprudence interpreting section 529.1 between 1956 and 1982 consistently recognized that section B of the statute imposed a specific sequential requirement for sentence enhancement and, thus, “consistently held that under the Habitual Offender Law, second offender status could only result from an offense committed after a first conviction, and third offender status after a conviction | ¿which would have qualified as a second offender conviction, and so on.” Mims, 601 So.2d at 652.

In 1982, the legislature effected another major change in the Habitual Offender Law. In that year, with the passage of Act 688 of 1982, the legislature deleted the second sentence of section B, leaving that section in the form in which it appears today. In Mims, this court was asked to determine the effect of that legislative action on the sequential requirement that had been imposed through the past “nineteen years of jurisprudence.” Mims, 601 So.2d at 650. In other words, the court was asked to determine whether the legislature’s deletion of the second sentence of section B reflected an intent to return multiple offender sentencing to the pre-1956 era where, according to Williams, no sequential requirement existed and any number of felonies committed are counted separately for sentence enhancement, even if all are committed prior to a conviction.

The facts in Mims are strikingly similar to those presented in this case. The defendant, Ira Joe Mims, was convicted on November 28, 1978, of two felonies arising from independent criminal conduct occurring on separate dates. Thereafter, on January 12, 1985, he committed the crimes of second degree battery and purse-snatching. He was subsequently convicted of both crimes and sentenced as a third felony offender for the purse snatching offense. In an application for post-conviction relief, Mims argued that his sentence as a third offender was improper because his two predicate convictions occurred on the same day.

|flOn original hearing in Mims, we held that Act 688 of 1982 legislatively overruled the sequential requirement rule of State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, supra, and as a result, Mims was properly sentenced as a third offender. Thereafter, a sharply divided court granted rehearing and reversed itself. The court held that the sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders survived the 1982 amendment of section 529.1. Mims, 601 So.2d at 650.

The holding on rehearing was ultimately premised on a perceived ambiguity in the intent of the legislature in passing Act 688 of 1982. The Mims court opined that “[i]f the Legislature intended to change the law so as to permit enhancing punishment for subsequent crimes by simply adding up the number of prior crimes committed, they did a poor job.” Mims, 601 So.2d at 654. The court’s criticism of the legislative effort was prompted by two considerations. First, the court noted that while the sequencing requirement was deleted from section B, no changes were made to section A, which continues to retain the requirement that the defendant commit his or her second offense after conviction of a first felony offense. Second, the court expressed concern with the title of the act, finding that it “is less than revealing if it were meant to reflect an intent to change the law,” and voiced frustration over the inability of counsel and the court to locate any committee or floor debate materials that might shed light on the legislative intent. Mims, 601 So.2d at 654-655. Comparing Act 688 of 1982 to Act 682 of 1978, which amended the provisions of LSA-R.S. 14:98, the DWI statute, to provide that a person can be convicted for a second, third, or fourth offense DWI regardless of whether the arrest for the second, third, or fourth offense occurred before or after conviction of the earlier offense, the court concluded that the sequencing requirement of section 529.1, recognized in State ex rel. Jackson v. | 1(IjHenderson, supra, survived the 1982 amendment because the legislature failed to give crystal clear guidance of its intent to change the law, as it did when it amended the DWI provisions.

“Without the benefit of any clear indication of the Legislature’s intent during the 1982 session,” the Mims court ultimately turned to “generally accepted methods of statutory interpretation” to determine the effect of Act 688 on the jurisprudentially sanctioned sequencing requirement. Mims, 601 So.2d at 655. Applying the rule of strict statutory construction and the doctrine of lenity, the court held that the sequencing requirement survived the amendment and that because Mims’ two prior convictions had been entered on the same day, he could only be treated as a second offender upon commission of a subsequent felony.

Mims remained the controlling rule for ten years, until this court revisited the Habitual Offender Law in State v. Everett, supra. In that case, in the course of examining a different section of the Habitual Offender Law, legislative material was uncovered that had not been available at the time Mims was decided.

[T]he Mims court relied on generally accepted methods of statutory interpretation because the court was unable to locate committee or floor debate materials in order to discern the legislative intent behind the amendment more precisely. In conducting research for the instant opinion, however, the minutes of the house committee meeting in which the amendment was discussed were located. These minutes call into question the court’s interpretation of the 1982 amendment. The minutes reflect that the bill was one of a package of bills proposed by the Louisiana District Attorney’s Association and dealt with “the determination of habitual offenders and time of commission and conviction of offenses.” Minutes of the House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice, June 9, 1982, p. 2. Moreover, the minutes report that the bill was explained as follows:
[U]nder the old law it was necessary to have a commission of a crime, a conviction, etc., in that order but under the proposed bill certain language would be removed allowing for simpler conviction of multiple offenders.
J[¡¿Id. It therefore appears the bill was intended to expand the application of the Habitual Offender Law. Because we are not directly presented with the issue of whether subsection (B) should continue to be interpreted as incorporating a sequential requirement for enhanced-penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders, we will not expound further on this question. Suffice it to say that this new information calls into question the underpinnings of the Mims decision.

Everett, 00-2998, at 17-18, 816 So.2d at 1282-1283.

Given the legislative material uncovered in Everett that was not available at the time Mims was decided, and the ramifications of that material on the finding on which the Mims decision was premised— that the legislative intent behind Act 688 of 1982 was ambiguous and “less than revealing” — we believe that it is appropriate to revisit the decision in Mims and once again consider the impact of Act 688 of 1982, amending LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, on the sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders.

We begin our analysis with the proposition that the starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Theriot v. Midland Risk Insurance Co., 95-2895 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186; Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 888 (La.1993). As the provisions of the Revised Statutes instruct: “When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” LSA-R.S. 1:4. This instruction is mirrored in the provisions of our Criminal Code, and in the Civil Code. See, LSA-R.S. 14:3 (“The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words,-taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.”); |1PLSA-G.C. art. 9 (“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.”).

As we have often noted, the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. Theriot, 95-2895 at 3, 694 So.2d at 186; Touchard, 617 So.2d at 888. “Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation; rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute.” Theriot, 95-2895 at 3, 694 So.2d at 186. What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. State v. Williams, 00-1725, p. 13 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 800. However, in many cases, the legislative history of an act and contemporaneous circumstances may be helpful guides in ascertaining legislative intent. Exxon Pipeline Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 98-1737, 98-1738, p. 8 (La.3/2/99), 728 So.2d 855, 860.

In addressing the effect of Act 688 of 1982 in the Mims opinion, the foregoing precepts were generally followed. However, upon re-examination of that opinion, we believe that the analysis was ultimately flawed and deviated from well-established rules of statutory interpretation.

As noted above, Act 688 of 1982 deleted from section B of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1the language that imposed an explicit sequential requirement for sentence enhancement under the habitual offender statute. Prior to the amendment, the sequential require-merit in section 529.1 was plain, unambiguous, and explicit. Section B provided:

|13It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or that an offender has been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime. Provided, however, that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction; that one shall be deemed a third offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the third conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a second offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a second offender in the prior instance; and that one shall be deemed to be a fourth offender under this Section only if the crime resulting in the fourth conviction shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a third offender, whether or not he was adjudged to be a third offender in the prior instance. [Emphasis added.]

Following the amendment, section B states:

It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or that an offender have been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime.

This language is simple and straightforward; it mentions nothing about a sequential requirement.

In Mims, it was acknowledged that the precise language deleted by Act 688 had been engrafted onto the statute in order to legislatively alter the holding in Williams that the statute did not contain a sequential requirement. Mims, 601 So.2d at 652. Nevertheless, the Mims court refused to hold that the deletion returned the law to the state in which it appeared under Williams, holding instead that the legislative intent as to the “overall effect” of the amendment was “ambiguous” because section A remained unchanged, and section A “continues to establish a multiple offender status only for a person committing a (subsequent) felony after having been convicted of a | ufelony.” Mims, 601 So.2d at 653. However, the language in section A was in the statute when the court considered, and held, in Williams that there was no sequential requirement in the habitual offender statute. Contrary to the court’s suggestion in Mims, a plain reading of section A reveals that it requires no more than that the subsequent felony be committed after the predicate convictions. It does not create ambiguity, nor does it impose a specific sequence requirement for the predicate convictions. It provides only that subsequent felonies committed after a conviction expose one to being adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual offender.

In finding ambiguity in the legislative intent behind Act 688, the Mims court failed to accord proper significance to several important rules of statutory construction. First, those who enact statutory provisions are presumed to act deliberately and with full, knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and well-established principles of statutory construction, and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view. Theriot, 95-2895 at 8-4, 694 So.2d at 186-187; State v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission and Horseshoe Entertainment, 94-1872, 94-1914, p. 17 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 292, 301 n. 10. Second, when the legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to have intended a change in the law. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 00-1695, p. 17 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294, 305 (“ ‘[W]here a new statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law.’ ”) (quoting Brown v. Texas-LACartage, Inc., 98-1063, p. 7 (La.12/1/98), 721 So.2d 885, 889); Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 414, 246 So.2d 800, 809 (La.1971) (“[T]he Legislature is presumed to have enacted a statute in light of preceding statutes involving the same subject matter |1fiand decisions construing such statutes, and, where the new statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the Legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law”).

The opinion in Mims does not apply either of these well-settled rules of statutory construction. To the contrary, instead of applying the rule that when a new statute is worded differently from the preceding statute, the legislature is presumed to have intended to change the law, a reverse presumption was created, holding that if the legislature intended to overturn years of jurisprudence, it had a duty to state that intent affirmatively and in a “crystal clear manner.” Mims, 601 So.2d at 654. The fact that the legislature could have done a better job in drafting, and failed to, does not permit the court to abandon long-established tools of statutory construction, of which the legislature is clearly presumed to be aware. Theriot, 95-2895 at 3-4, 694 So.2d at 186-187.

The holding in Mims that Act 688 of 1982 did not eliminate a sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders does not give adequate weight to the legislative history of section 529.1 and does not give proper effect to the amendment. Prior to 1956, the statute did not include a sequential requirement, and the jurisprudence interpreting the statute so held. State v. Williams, supra; State v. Clague, supra. In 1956, presumably in response to Williams, the legislature acted to amend the statute to include a clearly delineated sequential requirement. That sequential requirement remained in place for twenty-six years when, in 1982, the legislature amended section 529.1 to delete the language that had been inserted in response to Williams. Clearly, we can presume that by changing the wording of section 529.1 to delete the language setting forth the sequential requirement, 11fi(l) the legislature was aware of the interpretation that had been given the language of section B by the jurisprudence (in particular by State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, supra) and (2) it intended to change the law. New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 94-2223, p. 11-12 (La.4/10/95), 653 So.2d 538, 544.

While the presumption we apply is not conclusive, and can be challenged, in this instance it is buttressed by the legislative material that has subsequently become available. As explained in Everett, the minutes of the house committee meeting in which the amendment was discussed were located. Also located were the minutes of the senate committee meeting. Both sets of minutes underscore our conclusion that the legislature intended to remove- the sequential requirement and expand the application of the habitual offender law. In particular, the minutes from the Senate Committee on Judiciary B are most enlightening. They report:

Senator Barham introduced this bill and Pete Adams, representing the Louisiana District Attorney’s Association, presented the bill which provides for time limitations for use of convictions for habitual offender purposes. It states that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or that an offender has been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime. It erases the present necessary crime conviction sequence to determine a criminal as a habitual offender. [Emphasis added.]

Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary B, July 6, 1982, p. 6. While we recognize that as a general proposition, comments made during one committee meeting are not evidence of the intent of the legislature as a whole, Cacamo v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 99-3479, 99-3480, 99-3481, p. 9 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 41, 47, as respects those parts of a bill passed as introduced by a standing committee without change, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature adopted the 11vintent of the committee. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 48:06, p. 441 (6th ed.2000). The minutes of the Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary B and the House Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice clearly reflect that the amendment of section 529.1 effected through Act 688 of 1982 was not intended as a mere “housekeeping” measure, as we suggested in Mims. Rather, the amendment was intended to expand the application of the habitual offender law by removing the sequential requirement.

Furthermore, although not a part of the final enrolled act, the Digest of House Bill 543 also states that the purpose of the amendment was to delete the sequence requirement in the habitual offender law.

The legislative material uncovered in Everett dispels any ambiguity the Mims court found in the intent of the legislature in enacting Act 688 of 1982. With the passage of Act 688, the legislature removed the sequential conviction requirement that had previously been imposed in section B of the statute.

We therefore hold today that the habitual offender statute, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, as it appears post-amendment, is clear and unambiguous. There is no statutory bar to applying the law in sentencing for more than one conviction obtained on the same date based on unrelated conduct. The statute simply does not contain a sequential 118conviction requirement. Rather, the only requirement in the statute is one which has been imposed from the inception: for sentence enhancement purposes, the subsequent felony must be committed after the predicate conviction or convictions. See, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A) (“Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ... thereafter commits any subsequent felony.”).

Such a construction of the statute is entirely consistent with the language and the purpose of the law, which is to deter and punish recidivism. State v. Johnson, 97-1906, p. 8 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 677. An accused becomes a recidivist at the time of the commission of the subsequent crime, whether or not he has previously been exposed to sentencing as a habitual offender.

CONCLUSION

With the passage of Act 688 of 1982, the legislature deleted the sequential conviction requirement from the habitual offender law. The Act legislatively repudiated State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, supra, and removed any statutory bar to sentencing defendant as a fourth felony offender under section 529.1. Our holding to the contrary in Mims, which was based on an incomplete legislative record, is expressly overruled.

At the time he committed the armed robbery of which he most recently stands convicted, defendant had previously been convicted of three separate felonies, although two of the convictions had been entered on the same date. On those grounds, the district court properly adjudged defendant to be a fourth felony offender. The judgment of the court of appeal, insofar as it vacates the defendant’s habitual 11floffender adjudication and sentence, is therefore reversed. This case is remanded to the court of appeal for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO COURT OF APPEAL.

CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, J„ dissents.

It CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion holding that the 1982 amendment to La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 removed the statute’s sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders and that this amendment legislatively repudiated the rule of law pronounced in State ex. rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So.2d 210 (La.1973). Even in hindsight, with the belated discovery of legislative committee hearing minutes, I see no compelling reason to upset jurisprudence that has been settled for over thirty years, especially given that we reaffirmed the law in 1992 in State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649 (La.1992) (on rehearing), and the legislature has not in the twelve years since then deemed our interpretation of the statute as requiring legislative action.

As can be seen even by the history of the statute before us, the legislature is not hesitant to act if it believes this court has interpreted a statute contrary to the legislative intendment. Less than one year after our decision in State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 77 So.2d 515 (1955), the legislature by Act No. 312 of 1956 added the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1(B) to require that in order for one to be considered a third offender, the third offense must have been committed after the conviction which caused him to be a second offender, and the fourth offender is one who commits a felony after the conviction which caused him to be a third offender. Jackson, 283 So.2d at 212. In Jackson, we found the 1956 legislative repudiation of our decision in Williams to be clear and unambiguous.

That the Williams decision was an anomaly is indicated by more than the alacrity with which the legislature acted to repudiate it. The 1928 version of Louisiana’s habitual offender law provided that “[a]ny person, who, after having been three times convicted within this State, of felonies ... then commits a felony within this State, shall be sentenced, upon conviction of such fourth, or subsequent offense, to imprisonment in a state prison for the term of his natural life.” 1928 La. Acts 61, §§ 2 (emphasis added). In response to an inquiry whether three convictions on the same day would render the defendant a fourth offender under the 1928 law upon commission of a subsequent offense, the Attorney General’s Office issued an opinion stating that “it appears to have been the intention of the law that the second and subsequent offenses should have been committed after conviction or sentence on one or more of the other offenses committed by the person against whom the habitual criminal penalty is sought.” Attorney General Opinion 1938^40, p. 154, 155-56. In 1942, the legislature changed the wording and format of the statute, but what has not changed in nearly 80 years has been the sequential requirement that the defendant commit his second offense after conviction of his first felony offense. See 1928 La. Acts 15, §§ 1 (“[A]ny person, who, after having been convicted of ... a felony commits any felony ... upon conviction of such second offense, shall be punished as follows.... ”); 1942 La. Acts 45, §§ 1 (“[A]ny person who, after having been convicted of ... a felony, commits any felony within this state, upon conviction of |ssuch felony, shall be punished as follows.... ”); 1956 La. Acts 312, §§ 1 ( [A]ny person who, after having been convicted .... [of a felony] thereafter commits any subsequent felony....”). In my view, the sequential rule we reaffirmed in Mims has been in effect in Louisiana since 1928, interrupted only once, by Williams, and then for less than a year before the legislature acted to reject the decision’s interpretation of the statute and write the rule explicitly into the statute.

As to the import of the 1982 legislation, passed some nine years after our decision in Jackson, a majority of this court addressed that legislation in the Mims ease and determined, rightly in my view, that the amended statutory language was not clear and unambiguous. I do not subscribe to this majority’s determination that the majority in Mims misapplied the rules of statutory construction and failed to give sufficient weight to the removal of the language in La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1(B). Despite the language from the committee hearings now cited by the majority here, whether the legislature intended to change the law is not as clear as the majority opines. Because the legislature used asterisks to offset the changes made by 1982 La. Acts 688 to R.S. 15:529.1(B), as opposed to the current (vastly improved) style that employs strike-throughs in existing language to indicate deletions, Mims in my view reasonably | ¿concluded that the effect of the 1982 act was ambiguous as to the overall impact of the amending act.

The Mims court’s conclusion that the legislature could have done a better job in amending the statute in 1982 had it wanted to eliminate the sequential requirement pronounced nine years earlier in Jackson holds true today, regardless of the committee hearing minutes. For example, the legislature just four years earlier in 1978 immediately reacted to the court’s decision in State v. Neal, 347 So.2d 1139 (La.1977)(sequence requirement applies to habitual offender D.W.I. prosecutions) by adding an express proviso to the habitual offender provisions of the D.W.I. law stating that “[o]n a second conviction, regardless of whether the second • offense occurred before or after the first conviction, the offender shall.... ” La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(0(1); 1978 La. Acts 682; see also La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(D)(l)(a)(third offense); La.Rev.Stat. 14:98(E)(l)(a)(fourth and subsequent offense).

Although this Court decided Mims over twelve years ago, the legislature has not responded to the decision, in sharp contrast to its immediate response to Williams. | .¡Furthermore, the legislature, notably, also did not act when this court in State v. Everett, 00-2998 (La.5/14/02), 816 So.2d 1272, questioned the viability of the Mims decision. As we recognized in Mims, a general rule of statutory construction holds that when the legislature changes the wording of a statute it is presumed to have intended a change in the law; however, the question today remains as pertinent as it was in Mims, and perhaps even more so in light of legislative inaction over the past twelve years, as to what the legislature intended in 1982 La. Acts No. 688. That the legislature has retained an explicit sequence requirement for a qualifying second offense, has failed to disavow Mims since it was decided over twelve years ago, and has recently made significant ameliorative changes in the habitual offender law with regard to the sentencing of third and fourth felony offenders, the rules of construction we reasonably applied in Mims dictates retaining the sequential requirement that has been the law of Louisiana for at least three decades.

      . While the court of appeal recognized Mims to be the controlling law, it did note in a footnote that this court had "questioned the wisdom of its holding in Mims" in Everett.

      . Amendments in 1958 (Acts 1958, No. 469 § 1), 1978 (Acts 1978, No. 424 § 1) and 1979 (Acts 1979, No. 199 § 1) did not affect those provisions of the statute at issue in this case and, therefore, need not be addressed here.

      . The Digest of Reengrossed House Bill No. 543 states:

        Proposed law deletes present law provisions that the offender shall be deemed a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction was committed after his first conviction; and that a person shall be deemed a third offender only if the crime resulting in the third conviction was committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be a second offender, whether or not he was adjudged a second offender in the prior instance; and that a person shall be deemed a fourth offender only if the crime resulting in the fourth conviction was committed after his conviction for a crime which in fact caused him to be third offender, whether or not he was adjudged a third offender in the prior instance.
      Reengrossed H.R. 543, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1982).

      . It is clear from the record that the convictions entered on the same date arose from separate and distinct events, occurring on different dates, and not as part of a single criminal episode.

      . Specifically, the court of appeal is to address the issue raised by defendant on appeal that was pretermitted given the finding of the appellate court that defendant could not be sentenced as a fourth felony offender because two of his predicate convictions had been entered on the same date. That issue involves defendant's claim that one of the predicate convictions was not actually his, but that of another individual named Michael Anthony Johnson.

      . At stake in Williams was 1942 La. Acts 45, §§ 1(3), which provided that "[i]f the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for such fourth subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest term prescribed for a first conviction and not more than his natural life and in no case less than twenty-years."

      . By contrast, the original version of Louisiana’s general habitual offender law did not include a sequence requirement for any level of offender. See 1855 La. Acts 120, §§ 118 ("[T]he Judge shall have the power to sentence any person who may be convicted for a second or third offence to double and triple the penalty imposed by law, and for a fourth offence, the person so convicted may be sentenced to perpetual imprisonment.")

      . 1982 La. Act 688 reads as follows:
      Section 1. R.S. 15:529.1(B) is hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows: §§ 529.1 Sentences for second and subsequent offenses; certificate of warden or clerk of court in the state of Louisiana as evidence
      S{í }¡4 S}5
      B. It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or than an offender has been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime.
      Sis * * *
      The Digest of House Bill 109, although not a part of the final enrolled act, states expressly that the purpose of the amendment was to delete the sequence requirement in subsection (B). However, the title of the act contains no such direct expression of intent and the face of the act with its use of offsetting asterisks leaves it uncertain whether the second sentence of subsection (B) was deleted or left unchanged, just as the legislature left subsection (A) unchanged, although it too contained an explicit sequence requirement for a qualifying second offense.
      The legislature appears to have recognized the confusion that may arise from the use of off-setting asterisks to serve multiple purposes. In 1997, the legislature began using strike-throughs in existing language to indicate deletions from existing law, and beginning in 1998, the published volumes of legislative acts include an explanatory preface indicating that "Words in struck through type are deletions from existing law; and words underscored are additions.” The use of struck-through language to indicate deletions from existing statutory language serves the salutary purpose of removing the kind of ambiguity that surrounds the 1982 amendment of La.Rev.Stat. 15:5291.(B).

      . By 2001 La. Acts 403, the legislature amended La.Rev.Stat. 15:529. l(A)(l)(b)(ii) and (c)(ii) to provide that only a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than ten years, as opposed to five years, could serve as a predicate conviction.