author: SHARP, W., J.

text:
    Jose A. GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D04-782.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 16, 2004.
    Jose A. Gonzalez, Wewahithcka, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   SHARP, W., J.

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Gonzalez’ motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The dismissal is without prejudice to Gonzalez to refile a motion containing sworn, factual allegations. See Van Aernam v. State, 715 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

Gonzalez signed his motion below the following statement:

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing motion and that the facts as stated in it are true.

This affirmation would have been sufficient had the motion contained factual allegations upon which Gonzalez relied to obtain collateral relief.

However, he did not state in the motion the facts upon which he rests his case for collateral relief. The facts are stated in an attachment to the motion which is labeled a memorandum of law. Thus, technically, the motion is insufficient because it is based on facts contained in an unsworn memorandum of law. See Miller v. State, 848 So.2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Lambert v. State, 631 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Oramas v. State, 615 So.2d 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

Because we affirm based on a technical, not a substantive ground, our affirmance is without prejudice to file a properly sworn motion containing factual allegations.

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON and TORPY, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    A.C., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee.
    No. 4D03-4540.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 21, 2004.
    Gary L. Pickett, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jeffrey Dana Gillen, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   ON MOTION TO CLARIFY OR CORRECT DECISION

PER CURIAM.

On appellee’s motion we withdraw our original decision issued on March 24, 2004, and substitute the following in lieu thereof:

AFFIRMED.

GUNTHER, POLEN and MAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Andrea B. WEINER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard J. Weiner, Appellee.
    No. 4D02-4876.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Rehearing Denied April 28, 2004.
    March 3, 2004.

      Brett C. Powell and Mark Hicks of Hicks & Kneale, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Nancy W. Gregoire of Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A. and Richard E. Berman of Berman, Kean & Riguera, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Arnica Mutual Insurance Company (Arnica) appeals from a Final Judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of Andrea B. Weiner, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard J. Weiner (Weiner), in her claim for bad faith against Arnica. Arnica appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and its motion for new trial. We affirm.

Upon our review of the record on appeal, we find that there were disputed issues of fact as to whether or not Arnica acted in good faith towards its insured, Weiner, and, therefore, the question of the failure to act in good faith with due regard for the interest of the insured was for the jury to decide. See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So.2d 783 (Fla.1980) (citing Campbell v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 306 So.2d 525 (Fla.1974)).

AFFIRMED.

STONE, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Keith J. LABAT.
    No. 2004-B-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Keith J. Labat, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19658, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

/s/Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Melinda LEONARD.
    No. 2004-OB-0674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Melinda Leonard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24522, be and she hereby is transferred to disability inactive status until further order of this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, Mark Plaisance is hereby appointed to conduct an inventory of respondent’s files and to take action as appropriate to protect the interests of respondent’s clients.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: .PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Joann GINES.
    No. 2003-B-2827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

.PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, JoAnn Gines, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

FORMAL CHARGES

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent. The first, consisting of one count and bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 99-DB-095, was filed on September 27, 1999 and supplemented and amended on June 14, 2002. The second set of formal charges, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 00-DB-044, was filed on March 3, 2000 and encompasses three counts of misconduct. ■

99-DB-095

The Ferguson Matter

In July 1997, Martha Ferguson retained respondent to review and notarize documents relating to Ms. Ferguson’s sale of an annuity to the J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership (“Wentworth”). Respondent performed the services and charged Ms. Ferguson a fee of 20% of the sales price, amounting to approximately $4,000. Ms. Ferguson was dissatisfied with the fee retained by respondent, but 1 ^respondent declined to refund any portion of the fee, contending that it was fully earned. Furthermore, in connection with the sale, respondent instructed Went-worth’s representatives to wire transfer the sales proceeds to a specified bank account maintained by respondent at Hibernia National Bank. The wire transfer was accomplished pursuant to respondent’s instructions, and she later disbursed funds to Ms. Ferguson from that account. However, the Hibernia account contained respondent’s personal funds and was not a client trust account.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15(a) (failure to hold client property separate from the lawyer’s own property), and 1.15(c) (failure to deposit disputed funds in trust).

00-DB-0M

Count I — The Pipkins Matter

In July 1998, Joan Pipkins, a resident of South Carolina, paid respondent $1,146.01 to handle the succession of her late mother, a Shreveport resident. Ms. Pipkins gave respondent her mother’s will and other original documents. Respondent prepared some pleadings in the succession matter, but she did not file them, nor did she complete the matter. Ms. Pipkins made numerous attempts to communicate with respondent for over one year, but to no avail. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Ms. Pipkins.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a | ¡¡client), 1.5,1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II — The Edwards Matter

In August 1996, Calvin Edwards retained respondent to handle a medical malpractice matter against a Shreveport hospital. At the time of the retention, the hospital had an outstanding settlement offer to Mr. Edwards in the amount of $60,000.00. On September 3,1996, counsel for the hospital wrote to respondent increasing its settlement offer to $62,500.00. Respondent took no action in response to the settlement offer, nor did she file suit on behalf of Mr. Edwards or otherwise protect his interests before his malpractice claim prescribed.

When Mr. Edwards attempted to contact respondent in 1998 to inquire about his malpractice claim, respondent failed to return his telephone calls. Thereafter, when Mr. Edwards was finally able to speak with respondent, she falsely represented the status of the matter, asserting that prescription had been interrupted and that the case was pending before a medical review panel.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.8 (conflict of interest/prohibited transactions between a client and a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count III — The McClave Matter

In January 1999, Alice McClave paid respondent $500 to handle a sexual harassment and employment discrimination claim. While respondent forwarded a letter |4to Ms. McClave’s employer concerning the matter, she failed to take any further action. Ms. McClave made numerous attempts to contact respondent, but to no avail. When respondent finally spoke to her client, the statute of limitations had run on the claim. Notwithstanding, respondent demanded an additional fee to take further measures in the matter. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Ms. McClave.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,1.4,1.5, 8.1(c), and 8.4(c).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Respondent initially did not file an answer to either set of formal charges, and the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The disciplinary board consolidated the two sets of formal charges and recommended respondent be disbarred.

Respondent then made her first formal appearance in the proceedings by filing an objection in this court to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. In her brief and at oral argument, respondent asserted that her failure to participate in the disciplinary process was unintentional and stemmed from her incapacity to respond to the charges of misconduct. After reviewing the evidence presented by respondent in support of her allegations, we agreed that she was unable to meaningfully participate in the disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, we vacated the orders of the hearing committee deeming the formal charges admitted, and we remanded the matter for a formal hearing before a hearing committee. In re: Gines, 01-2844 (La.4/19/02), 817 So.2d 1122.

| .^Following remand, respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct in connection with her handling of the ehent matters at issue. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on August 1, 2002. Despite notice, respondent did not appear at the hearing.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings and legal conclusions:

In 99-DB-095, the Ferguson matter, the committee found that respondent’s work on her client’s behalf consisted of reviewing some sixty pages of documents, with which she was already familiar, advising Ms. Ferguson, and notarizing her signature on several of the documents. This was an uncomplicated legal matter, and the work was performed in one day. There was no written retainer or contingency fee agreement between respondent and Ms. Ferguson, but respondent had previously performed similar legal services for Ms. Ferguson and had charged her a $500 fee. Nevertheless, after, respondent received the proceeds of the annuity sale from Wentworth, she deducted 20% or $3,995.00 as her fee . and delivered the remainder, $16,000.00, to Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Ferguson testified that until she received the $16,000.00 check, she was unaware that respondent intended to charge her 20%.to handle the sales transaction. The committee concluded that by her conduct in this matter, respondent charged an excessive fee in violation of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, after a dispute arose as to the fees, respondent |fifailed to deposit the disputed amount in trust until the dispute was resolved, in violation of Rule 1.15(c).

In Count I of 00-DB-044, the Pipkins matter, the committee found that respondent was paid $1,146.01 to handle a succession matter. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Pipkin, did little or no work in the succession matter, and did not account to her client for the legal fee she was paid. The committee concluded that by her conduct in this matter, respondent violated Rules 1.3,1.4, and 1.5.

In Count II of 00-DB-044, the Edwards matter, the committee found that in August 1996, Calvin Edwards retained respondent to handle a medical malpractice claim against a Shreveport hospital stemming from an injury that occurred in January 1996. ■ Respondent received the file from Mr. Edwards’ prior attorney well in advance of the prescriptive date, yet she failed to communicate with her client or to file suit or any claim with the medical review panel to protect her client’s interest. Rather, respondent allowed Mr. Edwards’ claim to prescribe, and then she deceived him as to the status of the case by falsely representing that she had filed a claim. The committee concluded that by her conduct in this matter, respondent violated Rules 1.3,1.4, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

Finally, in Count III of 00-DB-044, the McClave matter, the committee found that in January 1999, Alice McClave hired respondent to pursue a sexual harassment and discrimination claim against her employer. On January 22, 1999, Ms. McClave paid respondent $500.00 for her services. On February 12, 1999, respondent wrote a letter to the employer stating that she would file an EEOC claim within 10 days if she received no response. Ms. McClave repeatedly sought to contact respondent |7regarding her claim but never received a response. Respondent failed to account for the fee received or to refund the unearned portion of the same. An EEOC claim was never timely filed by respondent on behalf of Alice McClave. The committee concluded that by her conduct in this matter, respondent violated Rules 1.3,1.4, and 1.5.

The committee noted that respondent has demonstrated a consistent pattern of disregard for her obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that despite her earlier assertions of incapacity, she presented no evidence at the hearing on remand to substantiate her claims. The committee further found that respondent’s conduct was intentional in part, knowing in part, and negligent in part. Considering these facts, and in light of respondent’s failure to make restitution to her former clients, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

On February 20, 2003, five months after the hearing committee issued its recommendation, respondent filed a pleading with the disciplinary board in which she asserted that she is unable to participate in these proceedings due to depression. Respondent also objected to the sanction recommended by the hearing committee.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous, and that its application of the Rules of Professional Conduct was proper, with the exception of the committee’s failure to find that respondent did not cooperate with the ODC’s investigation in the Pipkins and McClave matters (Counts I and III, respectively, of 00-DB-044). In both of those matters, respondent’s | «initial failure to cooperate caused the ODC to have to take depositions and/or sworn statements. Accordingly, in addition to the rule violations found by the committee, the board concluded that respondent violated Rule 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The board determined respondent violated duties owed to her clients and to the profession. The board further determined that respondent’s conduct was knowing, if not intentional, and caused actual harm to her clients. The baseline sanction for this conduct ranges from suspension to disbarment.

The board found the following aggravating factors are present: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules and orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1984), and indifference to making restitution. The board also found that respondent suffers from depression and that the mitigating factor of personal or emotional problems is present.

In light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lauryer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to her clients, and that she be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

^DISCUSSION

Respondent’s misconduct includes a pattern of neglect of legal matters, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to account for her fees. Respondent has demonstrated a serious lack of concern for the welfare of her clients. Additionally, respondent has charged a clearly excessive legal fee and has failed to cooperate with the disciplinary authorities. The baseline sanction for such misconduct ranges from a lengthy suspension to disbarment.

Numerous aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. While some mitigating factors are apparent from the record, those factors pale m comparison to the applicable aggravating factors.

The record demonstrates in a convincing fashion that respondent lacks concern for the welfare of her clients and shows a total disregard for her professional obligations. She lacks the fitness to practice law in this state. Under these circumstances, she must be disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of JoAnn Gines, Louisiana Bar Roll number 8399, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. It is further ordered that respondent render a full accounting to Martha Ferguson, Joan Pip-kins, and Alice McClave and that she refund any unearned fees due those clients. All costs and | inexpenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent maintained that she suffered from depression and/or some other mental problem, which required that she be hospitalized for an extended period of time at a psychiatric facility.

      . Though the ODC did not raise the issue in this court, we observe that neither the hearing committee nor the disciplinary board made a finding as to the commingling allegations set forth in the ODC’s supplemental and amended formal charges.

      . In 1989, respondent was publicly reprimanded by the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Louisiana State Bar Association for improperly soliciting a client. In 1994, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in 94-ADB-033 for failing to cooperate with the ODC in a disciplinary investigation.


text:
    LAFAYETTE CITY-PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT v. Kevin FITCH and Bayou Land Investment, Inc.
    No. 2003-C-3352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2004.
   PER CURIAM.

Granted in part and remanded to the 15th Judicial District Court solely for the purpose of setting a new date by which Kevin Fitch and Bayou Land Investment, Inc. must comply with the district court’s judgment dated February 13, 2003. Otherwise denied.


text:
    In re Vincent C. COFIELD.
    Nos. 2004-B-0033, 2004-B-0558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the record of these matters,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Vincent C. Cofield, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17514, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter bearing this court’s docket number 04-B-0033 be remanded to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the proceedings numbered 03-DB-056 and 03-DB-083. After appropriate consideration of the consolidated matters, the board is directed to issue a single recommendation of discipline to this court encompassing all disciplinary matters involving respondent.

/s/ Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Eddie L. STEPHENS.
    No. 2004-B-0398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Motion for Remand to the Disciplinary Board filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the pending investigative matter arising out of respondent’s conviction. After appropriate consideration of the consolidated matters, the board is directed to issue a single recommendation of discipline to this court encompassing all disciplinary matters involving respondent.

/a/ John L. Weimer

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Jo FLEMING.
    No. 2003-OB-3103.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 24, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status filed by respondent, Jo Fleming, and the report and recommendation of the hearing committee, this court finds that respondent’s claim of inability to defend is invalid. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Jo Fleming, Louisiana Bar Roll number 8393, be and she hereby is reinstated to active status from interim disability inactive status, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(C)(3). This order shall be effective immediately.

/s/ John L. Weimer,

Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: CURIAM.

text:
    In re Paul E. GRAUGNARD.
    No. 2003-B-2899.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Paul E. Graugnard, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

FORMAL CHARGES

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent. The first, consisting of one count and bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 99-DB-112, was filed on October 29, 1999. The second set of formal charges, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 00-DB-113, was filed on September 8, 2000 and encompasses three counts of misconduct. The two sets of charges were consolidated by order of the hearing committee chair dated October 26, 2000.

99-DB-112

The Hatten Matter

In August 1997, respondent received a $9,000.00 personal injury settlement on behalf of his clients, Robert Hatten and Mary Ann Loup. Respondent endorsed his clients’ names on the settlement check and deposited it into his client trust account. Thereafter, respondent withdrew the funds and placed them into a personal account. Respondent failed to remit to Mr. Hatten his portion of the settlement, amounting to | ¡>$5,000.00, despite receiving numerous inquiries from Mr. Hatten concerning the funds. On December 18, 1998, respondent gave sworn testimony to the ODC in which he claimed that he had disbursed the settlement funds to Mr. Hatten by check drawn on a Minden, Louisiana bank. However, no such distribution had ever been made, and Mr. Hatten has not received his settlement funds.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15(a)(b)(d) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

00-DB-113

Count I — The Larsen Matter

In June 1996, respondent received a $40,000.00 personal injury settlement on behalf of his client, Wayne Villar. Respondent had previously received written notice of a statutory hen for medical services provided to Mr. Villar by Larsen Physical Therapy, Inc. (“Larsen”), but he failed to pay the sums owed to Larsen, totaling $4,171.00. Instead, respondent purportedly deposited the settlement funds into his client trust account. Upon learning that Mr. Villar’s case had settled, Larsen filed suit and in March 1997, obtained a court order enjoining respondent from disbursing the settlement funds.

On June 4, 1998, a judgment was rendered against Mr. Villar in the amount of $4,171.00, plus judicial interest thereon from August 1, 1992 until paid. Mr. Villar was |aalso assessed with the costs of the proceeding and attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,750.00. Respondent nevertheless continued to refuse payment to Larsen, and he filed a meritless appeal of the trial court’s judgment, which he later abandoned.

In April 1999, in an effort to collect its judgment, Larsen propounded garnishment interrogatories to respondent. When respondent refused to answer, a judgment was rendered against him personally. Still, respondent refused to pay Larsen, and in January 2000, Larsen’s counsel filed a complaint against him with the ODC. Respondent subsequently admitted to the ODC in sworn testimony given in connection with another disciplinary matter that he has closed his client trust account and is “not holding any money for anyone.”

Finally, the ODC alleged that respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed against him by Larsen’s counsel.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II — The Thompson Matter

In early April 1997, Edward Thompson retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter stemming from an April 5, 1996 automobile accident. Respondent timely filed suit to interrupt prescription, but thereafter, he did nothing further in connection with the matter. As a result, Mr. Thompson’s personal injury claim was lost under the provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure relating to abandonment. Nevertheless, respondent failed to communicate this fact to Mr. |/Thompson, and he concealed his failure to act from his client. The ODC also alleged that respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed against him by Mr. Thompson.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 8.1(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g).

Count III — The Coleman Matter

In March 1999, Garland Coleman paid respondent $500 to obtain an uncontested divorce on his behalf. Respondent accepted the fee but then abandoned his law practice without notifying his client of his whereabouts. Respondent did not communicate with Mr. Coleman concerning the divorce and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee he was paid. The ODC also alleged that respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed against him by Mr. Coleman.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,1.4,1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After some delay in obtaining respondent’s answer to the formal charges, respondent and the ODC entered into a stipulation of facts. The matter then proceeded to a hearing in mitigation, which was conducted by the hearing committee on November 28, 2001.

|r,At the hearing, respondent admitted that the substance of the formal charges is correct and that he owes (and could make) restitution to his clients in each of the charges. The hearing committee chair agreed to leave the record open for 45 days to allow respondent time to make restitution and to file into the record evidence to that effect; however, respondent filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings and legal conclusions:

In 99-DB-112, the Hatten matter, the committee found that respondent converted Mr. Hatten’s funds to his own use, in violation of Rule 1.15, and that he lied to the ODC when he claimed he had disbursed funds to Mr. Hatten. This conduct violated Rules 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The committee found there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rule 8.1(c).

In Count I of 00-DB-113, the Larsen matter, the committee found that the sums owed by respondent to Larsen remain unpaid. By failing to pay Larsen, by failing to keep the funds in a client trust account, and by his subsequent use and conversion of the funds, the committee concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.15. Furthermore, respondent’s personal use of the funds upon which Larsen maintained its lien and the closure of his client trust account violated the injunction entered by the district court, and therefore constitutes conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c). The committee found there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(d), or 8.4(g).

Ifiln Count II of 00-DB-113, the Thompson matter, the committee found that respondent has taken no action in Mr. Thompson’s case other than to file the petition in April 1997. Although no formal order of abandonment has been entered in the matter, the time delays for abandonment set forth in La.Code Civ. P. art. 561 have run. Respondent has had no communication with Mr. Thompson and has provided him with no information concerning the status of the case or the objectives of the representation, including the probability that the action has been abandoned. The committee concluded that by his conduct in this matter, respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4. The committee found there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(c), or 8.4(g).

Finally, in Count III of 00-DB-113, the Coleman matter, the committee found that respondent prepared the pleadings for Mr. Coleman’s divorce, but never had Mr. Coleman come into the office to sign them. Respondent did not file the divorce, nor did he refund the $500 fee he received from Mr. Coleman. Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that Mr. Coleman’s retainer fee should be refunded. The committee concluded that by his conduct in this matter, respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(6), and 1.15. The committee found there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 8.1(c) or 8.4(g).

The committee then turned to a discussion of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. Under Standard 4.11 of the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. In his representation of Mr. Villar, Mr. Coleman, and Mr. Hatten, respondent received funds belonging to his clients or third parties that he knowingly converted to his own use, causing actual injury to his clients, and in the case of Mr. Villar, to a third-party 17medical provider. Restitution has never been provided in these cases. Under Standard 4.42, suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. With respect to Mr. Thompson, respondent has failed to take any action in the case for years, allowing the time period for abandonment of the case to pass. Such conduct constitutes a neglect which causes potential injury to Mr. Thompson. Finally, Standard 7.1 provides that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. Respondent lied to the ODC while under oath, testifying that he had disbursed trust funds to Mr. Hatten, when in fact, he had not. This lack of respect for the standards of the profession clearly causes serious injury to his clients, the public, and the legal system.

In mitigation, the committee recognized that respondent has no prior disciplinary record. However, the committee found the following aggravating factors are applicable: dishonest or selfish motive; pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses; submission of a false statement during the disciplinary process; and indifference to making restitution.

Based on these facts, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred and ordered to make full restitution to the victims of his conversion.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

| ^Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous, and that its application of the Rules of Professional Conduct was proper. The board concluded that respondent violated duties owed to his clients, to the public, and to the profession. The board further determined that respondent’s conduct was knowing, if not intentional, and caused actual harm. Mr. Hat-ten and Larsen Physical Therapy have never been paid. Respondent’s actions also resulted in a judgment being rendered against Mr. Villar in favor of Larsen. Mr. Thompson may have lost his lawsuit due to respondent’s neglect, and Mr. Coleman paid a legal fee for services that he will never receive. The baseline sanction for this conduct is disbarment.

The board concurred in the aggravating and mitigating factors cited by the committee. In light of these considerations, the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence, the board concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The board also recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to his clients and to Larsen Physical Therapy.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports the detailed factual findings of the hearing committee. Respondent has converted and otherwise mishandled client and third-party funds, neglected client matters and failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund unearned fees, and engaged in conduct that is dishonest and is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s actions are clearly serious in nature. His neglect of his clients’ legal matters and failure to communicate with them resulted in undue delays and the loss of property interests. Most disturbing, however, is respondent’s conversion of client funds. In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), we set forth the elements which make disbarment appropriate in a conversion case:

In a typical case of disbarment for violation of DR 9-102 [now Rule 1.15], one or more of the following elements are usually present: the lawyer acts in bad faith and intends a result inconsistent with his client’s interest; the lawyer commits forgery or other fraudulent acts in connection with the violation; the magnitude or the duration of the deprivation is extensive; the magnitude of the damage or risk of damage, expense and inconvenience caused the client is great; the lawyer either fails to make full restitution or does so tardily after extended pressure of disciplinary or legal proceedings. [citations omitted]

These elements are readily identifiable in the instant case. The magnitude of the deprivation of funds, and resulting inconvenience to respondent’s clients and third parties, has been great. One of respondent’s clients, Mr. Hatten, has been waiting for his settlement funds since August 1997, and a health care provider, Larsen Physical Therapy, has been waiting since June 1996 for respondent to pay Mr. Vil-lar’s medical expenses. Respondent has made no restitution to his victims, even after he assured the hearing committee in 2001 that he would do so promptly. When confronted with evidence against him, respondent lied under oath. Under these circumstances, we can reach no other conclusion than that respondent has acted in bad faith and intended a result inconsistent with his clients’ interests.

Accordingly, the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. Several aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false statements during the disciplinary process, and indifference to making restitution. The sole mitigating factor, absence of a prior disciplinary record, is insufficient to justify a deviation from the sanction of disbarment.

Finding disbarment is appropriate, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation of discipline.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Paul Eugene Graugnard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20204, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. It is further ordered that respondent shall pay restitution to Robert Hatten in the amount of $5,000.00 plus legal interest, and to Garland Coleman in the amount of $500.00 plus legal interest. Finally, it is ordered that respondent shall satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of Larsen Physical Therapy, Inc. in suit number 95,-350 on the docket of the 26th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, State of Louisiana. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Though the ODC did not raise the issue in this court, we observe that neither the hearing committee nor the disciplinary board made a finding as to the Rule 3.1 violation alleged in the formal charges in connection with the Larsen matter.


text:
    In re Larry S. BANKSTON.
    No. 2004-OB-0350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2004.
   ON APPLICATION FOR READMISSION

PER CURIAM.

This proceeding arises out of an application for readmission to the practice of law filed by petitioner, Larry S. Bankston.

On March 8, 2002, this court disbarred petitioner retroactive to the date of his interim suspension on November 19, 1997. In re: Bankston, 01-2780 (La.3/8/02), 810 So.2d 1113. The underlying disciplinary matter arose from petitioner’s federal criminal conviction of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Essentially, while serving as a state senator, petitioner re-eeived a bribe in the form of a “sham” rental payment — purportedly for use of his Gulf Shores condominium — from a person seeking protection of his video poker interests. Five years after the effective date of his disbarment, petitioner filed an application for readmission to the practice of law, asserting that he has complied with the readmission criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel initially indicated that it would take no position concerning petitioner’s readmission, and accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

After considering the evidence presented, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law. The disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s findings and likewise recommended that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law.

| ?,After considering the record in its entirety, we conclude petitioner has met the criteria for readmission set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and order that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law in Louisiana.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Larry S. Bank-ston be immediately readmitted to the practice of law in Louisiana.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would deny admission.


author: PER CURIAM. JOHNSON, Justice,

text:
    In re Kenneth A. DOGGETT.
    No. 2004-B-0349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Kenneth A. Doggett, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18186, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, C.J., and TRAYLOR, J., dissent for the reasons assigned by JOHNSON, J.

JOHNSON, Justice,

dissenting.

This Court should use this opportunity to strongly disapprove conduct where an attorney, without first obtaining the client’s informed consent, approves of a settlement and disburses funds therefrom. A public censure is far too lenient for these serious offenses. A more severe penalty is warranted under these circumstances.

This court has determined that a public reprimand is appropriate discipline for this respondent, who, pursuant to an improper power of attorney clause in his contingency contract, received, endorsed, and negotiated his clients’ settlement checks without their informed consent, and partially disbursed settlement funds without communicating with his clients. Paragraph seven of respondent’s contingency fee contract provides:

Attorney is hereby granted special power of attorney to sign, endorse and negotiate in client’s name any checks or drafts of any nature whatsoever issued in connection with this matter, to sign any settlement documents, to receive and demand payment, and Attorney is hereby authorized and directed to withhold from said payment(s) the appropriate attorney’s fees, expenses, and/or advances associated with the handling of my claim.

Such a power of attorney clause is expressly prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part:

As a general principle, all transactions between client and |2lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit his representation of a client or information relating to the representation to the client’s disadvantage. Examples of violations include, but are not limited to, the following:
* * *
(k) A lawyer shall not solicit or obtain a power of attorney or mandate from a client which would authorize the attorney, without first obtaining the client’s informed consent to settle, to enter into a binding settlement agreement on the client’s behalf or to execute on behalf of the client any settlement or release documents. An attorney may obtain a client’s authorization to endorse and negotiate an instrument given in settlement of the client’s claim, but only after the client has approved the settlement.

Rule 1.4 provides:

(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) The lawyer shall give the client sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.

Respondent has admitted .that the power of attorney clause “is in clear violation of Rule 1.8(k).” Respondent also admitted that his actions in disbursing the settlement funds without communicating with his clients and without obtaining their consent or approval “present a clear violation of Rule 1.4.”

For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent.


text:
    In re Pierre F. GAUDIN, Jr.
    No. 2004-B-0532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Pierre F. Gaudin, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 5977, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Robert W. STRATTON.
    No. 2003-B-3198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Robert W. Stratton, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Beginning in January 1990, attorneys Dennis Weber and Philip Dugas leased office space from respondent', who practiced' law in a building he owned in Baton Rouge. Each attorney agreed to pay one-third of the office expenses, including the cost of a secretary. In February 1990, Ann Purvis, who had worked for respondent previously, was employed to do secretarial work for all three attorneys. In September 1991, Mr. Weber and Mr. Dugas relocated their law offices and terminated their lease and expense-sharing arrangement with respondent. On September 30, 1991, Mrs. Purvis resigned her position with respondent and went to work for Mr. Weber and Mr. Dugas.

On July 20, 1992, respondent filed suit against Mrs. Purvis, claiming that she intentionally interfered with his contractual relationship with Mr. Weber and Mr. Dugas. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Ann C. Purvis, No. 385,406 on the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. Respondent alleged that Mrs. Purvis’ conduct was the cause of the dissolution of his lease and expense-sharing arrangement with Mr. Weber and Mr. Dugas. On July 2, 1993, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Mrs. Purvis and dismissed respondent’s suit. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed on appeal, and writs were denied by this court. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Ann C. Purvis, 94-0022 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/95), 658 So.2d 843 (not designated for publication), writ denied, 95-1875 (La.11/3/95), 661 So.2d 1385.

On December 13, 1995, after the judgment in respondent’s suit against her became final, Mrs. Purvis filed suit against respondent for malicious prosecution. She later amended her petition to allege the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ann C. Purvis v. Robert W. Stratton, APLC and Robert W. Stratton, No. 423,-166 on the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. After protracted pre-trial maneuvering, the ease was finally tried over three days in February 1999. The jury returned a verdict in Mrs. Purvis’ favor, awarding $100,000 in general damages and $25,000 in attorney’s fees on the malicious prosecution claim, and $90,000 for respondent’s intentional infliction of emotional distress, for a total of $215,000. The jury award was affirmed on appeal, and writs were denied by this court. Ann C. Purvis v. Robert W. Stratton, APLC and Robert W. Stratton, 99-1594 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/00) (not designated for publication), writ denied, 00-2659 (La.11/17/00), 774 So.2d 980.

In February 2001, respondent filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. Mrs. Purvis’ claim • against respondent in the bankruptcy proceeding totaled more than $419,000. As of mid-2002, respondent had paid, approximately $159,000 of this amount, leaving some $260,000 still due to Mrs. Purvis.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On March 26, 2001, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 4.4 (respect for rights of third persons), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Respondent answered the formal charges and generally admitted the factual allegations set forth therein. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on June 25, 2002.

_J¿Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found that respondent used his position as an attorney in an abusive manner “to seek some sort of satisfaction from his secretary and one of his tenants.” The committee rejected respondent’s suggestion in his testimony at the formal hearing that he was simply trying to recover “a financial loss” caused by Mrs. Purvis, noting that the numerous pleadings in the various suits filed by respondent belie that assertion. Furthermore, once a judgment was rendered against respondent, he continued his legal battle by seeking to annul previous rulings in other cases and sought the protection of the bankruptcy court.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent pursued claims against Mrs. Purvis and Mr. Weber with no good faith basis for doing so. Rather, these meritless claims were solely intended to burden third persons, especially Mrs. Purvis. The committee concluded that respondent’s conduct in these matters violated Rules 3.1 and 4.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rules 8.4(a) and (d).

As aggravating circumstances, the committee recognized “the tenacity with which Respondent pursued his claims which were apparently baseless from the beginning,” and respondent’s personal and emotional problems. The committee also observed that Mrs. Purvis was harmed by ten years of litigation. In mitigation, the committee recognized that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

| r,Considering these factors, as well as the prior jurisprudence of this court involving similar misconduct, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation, seeking the imposition of disbarment; respondent objected to the committee’s recommendation and argued that the appropriate sanction is a one-year suspension with probation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter, the disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous, and that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the legal system by pursuing meritless claims for the purpose of harassing Mrs. Purvis and Mr. Weber. Mrs. Purvis was harmed to the extent that she was involved in protracted litigation, and the legal system was burdened with frivolous claims.

The board found the record supports the following mitigating factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, imposition of other penalties or sanctions, and remorse. The board also | (¡noted in mitigation that respondent is paying Mrs. Purvis from his own funds (as opposed to a collateral source such as insurance) and that he has sold his home and rental and vacation properties and deposited the proceeds with the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee. The aggravating factors present are selfish motive and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1972).

The board noted that the lawyer in Boy-dell compounded his mishandling of a fee dispute by engaging in harassing and vexatious litigation tactics against his former client. However, respondent herein did not fail to segregate and remit funds owed to a client, and his conduct toward Mrs. Purvis was less egregious than Boydell’s actions toward his client. Furthermore, respondent has no prior discipline, has cooperated with the disciplinary system, and has incurred other substantial sanctions.

Based on this reasoning, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, and that he be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard inapplicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

After reviewing the record of this matter, including the voluminous records of the underlying litigation between respondent and his former secretary and tenant, we agree with the hearing committee that respondent did not act in good faith, but rather with the intent to burden third persons, particularly Mrs. Purvis. Respondent’s claims were largely frivolous and were designed to harass Mrs. Purvis for quitting her job. Furthermore, respondent caused Mrs. Purvis significant emotional distress when he engaged in nearly ten years of protracted litigation over what should have been a relatively simple administrative matter.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s actions caused actual and substantial harm to Mrs. Purvis, as well as to the legal system. As we recognized in Boydell, the baseline sanction for the perpetuation of vexatious litigation is disbarment. Nevertheless, the mitigating factors present in this case suggest that it is appropriate to deviate downward to a three-year suspension. Respondent has no prior disciplinary record in more than thirty years of practice, and he has cooperated in the disciplinary process. Additionally, he was |ssubject to other penalties, in the form of the significant award of damages made by the jury to Mrs. Purvis in the malicious prosecution case.

Under the circumstances, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation of discipline.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Robert W. Strat-ton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 11596, be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of three years. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent originally Sled suit in Livingston Parish, but the matter was subsequently transferred to East Baton Rouge Parish pursuant to a joint motion for change of venue.

      . In addition to the suit against Mrs. Purvis for tortious interference with a contract, respondent also filed a series of other lawsuits against Mrs. Purvis and/or Mr. Weber, including the following:
      On September 30, 1992, respondent filed suit against Mr. Weber for tortious interference with q contract. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Dennis C. Weber, No. 385,997 on the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. Respondent voluntarily dismissed this suit in 1993, but a dispute arose thereafter with respect to whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. In April 1994, the trial court awarded sanctions in favor of Mr-. Weber and against respondent in the amount of $3,500. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment and awarded Mr. Weber $1,500 in damages for frivolous appeal; this court denied writs. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Dennis C. Weber, 94-1910 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/95), 658 So.2d 843 (not designated for publication), writ denied, 95-1874 (La.11/3/95), 661 So.2d 1385.

        On September 30, 1992, respondent filed suit against Mrs. Purvis and Mr. Weber, claiming they were liable for the tortious conversion of his computer files. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Ann C. Purvis and Dennis C. Weber, No. 385,998 on the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.' Respondent voluntarily dismissed this suit in 1993.
      On October 8, 1992, respondent filed suit against Mrs. Purvis for breach of contract, alleging that she did not give him telephone messages and thereby caused him to lose clients. Robert W, Stratton, APLC v. Attn C. Purvis, No. 67,171 on the docket of the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Livingston. This suit has been abandoned by respondent.
      On November 19, 1993, respondent filed suit against Mrs. Purvis, for defamation, claiming that in her answer to the original lawsuit she "did cause to be published defamatory and false words,” including allegations that respondent was frequently out of the office and often late in preparing and filing pleadings. Robert W. Stratton, APLC v. Ann C. Purvis, No. 70,076 on the docket of the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Livingston. This suit has been abandoned by respondent.
      On November 9, 1996, respondent filed suit against Mrs. Purvis and Mr. Weber, seeking the nullity of various judgments rendered in the earlier cases. Robert W. Stratton, APLC and Robert W. Stratton, Sr. v. Ann C. Purvis and Dennis C. Weber, No. 433,113 on the docket of the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

      . The committee felt that respondent was primarily interested in punishing his former employee for exercising her right to leave his employment.

      . See In re: Boydell, 00-0086 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 326, and In re: DuBarry, 01-2836 (La.4/12/02), 814 So.2d 1273. Mr. Boydell and Ms. DuBarry were law partners who were sued by a former client in 1986 to recover disputed attorney’s fees. Over the next several years Mr. Boydell and Ms. DuBarry filed innumerable bad faith and meritless motions, reconventional demands, and other pleadings in an effort to harass and intimidate their client and her counsel. In 1992, the trial court awarded the client the disputed attorney’s fees and awarded sanctions against Mr. Boydell and Ms. DuBarry for abuse of process, unethical practices, fraud and conversion, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. That judgment was affirmed on appeal in 1996. In the disciplinary proceedings that followed thereafter, this court concluded that the baseline sanction for perpetuating vexatious litigation is disbarment. Considering the mitigating factors present in Mr. Boydell’s case, the court suspended him from the practice of law for three years. Ms. DuBarry, who was found to be less culpable for the institution of the vexatious litigation, was suspended for one year.


text:
    In re LeRoy A. HARTLEY.
    No. 2003-B-2828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

Respondent was charged by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) with several violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including violations of Rules 5.1(c) and 8.4(c). The thrust of the allegations were that respondent directed another attorney at his firm to notarize a document which stated that the affiant and one witness had “personally appeared” before the notary when they in fact had not done so. The hearing committee dismissed the charges. The disciplinary board reversed the dismissal of the charges and imposed a public reprimand on respondent. Respondent | gnow appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G).

We agree that respondent’s actions constitute a minor violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, we find his actions were not the product of an evil or dishonest motive nor did they cause any actual harm. Respondent has been a practicing attorney since 1971 and has an unblemished disciplinary record. Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not find formal discipline is warranted by this court. See, e.g., In re: Marullo, 96-2222 (La.4/8/97), 692 So.2d 1019.

Accordingly, while we in no way condone respondent’s actions and caution him to refrain from similar professional lapses in the future, we decline to impose formal discipline in this matter, and therefore dismiss the charges.

      . Rule 5.1 provides:
      (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the rules of professional conduct if:
      (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

        (2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

      . Rule 8.4(c) provides:
      It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
      (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

      . The ODC also alleged respondent violated the rules dealing with conflicts of interest. These charges were dismissed by the hearing committee and disciplinary board. The ODC did not contest these dismissals; accordingly, we will not address these other rule violations.


text:
    MORSE HOMES, INC. v. Johnette MARTIN.
    No. 2004-CC-207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2004.
   In re Martin, Johnette; — Defendant (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts order dated February 20, 2004; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 586-141; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1404.

Reconsideration denied. This Court considered relator’s supplemental brief filed on February 18, 2004.


text:
    Erin Elizabeth BOH v. JAMES INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTORS, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 5, 2004.
   In re Boh, Erin Elizabeth; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, Nos. 2001-8418, 2001-16964 to 2001-16969, 2001-16972 to 2001-16975, 2001-16977 to 2001-16987, 2001-16989 to 2001-16991, 2001-16993 to 2001-16995, 2003-2779; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-C-1211, 2003-C-1912, 2003-C-1913, 2003-C-1914.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    LOUISIANA PUBLIC FACILITIES AUTHORITY v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA and Nonresidents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, et al. Donald C. Hodge, Jr. v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College.
    No. 2004-C-0213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 11, 2004.
   In re Hodge, Donald C. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 512,930, 512-751; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s).' 2003 CA 2738, 2003 CA 2739.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stephen Verner ANDERSON.
    No. 2004-KK-0610.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 11, 2004.
   In re Anderson, Stephen Verner; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR1049-03; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 04-00200.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melissa WALKER.
    No. 2003-K-2871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 63747; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37493-KA.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie CAMPBELL, Jr.
    No. 2003-K-3035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 02F0930-4; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,-485-KA.

Granted.


text:
    Curtis P. MEDINE, Individually and Michael Buck As Tutor and Legal Guardian of John Michael Kramer, Minor Child of Janice Buck Medine v. Dr. Richard R. RONIGER.
    No. 2003-C-3436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Medine, Curtis P.; Kramer, John M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 452-272; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-819.

Granted.


text:
    CHAILLAND, INCORPORATED v. Keith CHAISSON.
    No. 2003-CC-3526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Chailland, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 594-785; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1354.

Granted. Because relator’s application to the court of appeal was filed within the deadline as extended by the trial court, the court of appeal erred in declining to consider the application. See Barnard v. Barnard, 96-0859 (La.6/24/96), 675 So.2d 734. Accordingly, the ruling of the court of appeal is vacated and set aside, and the application is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration on the merits.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George Albert JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Jackson, George; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 219,489, 218,592; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38505-KH.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for enforcement of its order of October 9, 2002 in which it ordered documents produced, if it has not done so already. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl COLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Coleman, Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 03-6483; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KH-11.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration as a motion for reduction of bail. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    William Dale WALKER, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, et. al.
    No. 2003-C-2113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Price, Meredith Ashley Walker and Walker, Brooke Katherine, Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated December 19, 2003; Parish of Cad-do, 1st. Judicial District Court, Div. B, No. 439,086; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 387,068-CA.

Reconsideration granted. The writ was timely filed; writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Poydras, David Wayne; — Plaintiff (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts order dated January 9, 2004; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 52,685; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00564.

Reconsideration denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the reconsideration.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-3220.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Robert Norwood, applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 9, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Division D, No. 279-452; Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1627.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George TILLMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0006.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Tillman, George; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts order dated January 16, 2004; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 8-97-149, 4-98-98; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-KW-1681.'

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Henry TAYLOR, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re John Henry Taylor, Jr.; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated January 16, 2004, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 18,907.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald ROSS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KP-1130.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Ross, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 16, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 374-033; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0447.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George WEBER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KP-1172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Weber, George;Plaintiff(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated January 16, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. E, No. 323-962; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0574.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony ROBINSON.
    No. 2003-KO-1361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Robinson, Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 26, 2003, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 00-6416; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-1253.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    William Dale WALKER, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE et al.
    No. 2003-C-2117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re William Dale Walker et al., applying for reconsideration to this court’s action dated December 19, 2003, from Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Division B, No. 439,086; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,063-CA.

Reconsideration denied. The judgment is definitive.


text:
    Tilden HARRIS v. Anthony MARABELLA, et al.
    No. 2004-CP-0021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Harris, Tilden; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 0.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    Raleigh LANDRY and Clailee Aucoin Landry v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Garlock Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2002-5103; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-C-1112, 2003-C-1174.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 2166 D; Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    Ricky Dale MARTIN v. Cynthia Anderson Martin HARRISON.
    No. 2004-C-0481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Harrison, Cynthia Anderson Martin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, Caddo Juvenile court, No. 100,934; 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 449,931; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,958-CA.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keary WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-KK-3535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Williams, Keary; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR-36784; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,379-KW.

Writ denied, motion denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert MATTHEWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Matthews, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 05-96-619; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 2785.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Johnson, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 184221-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2475.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth E. AINSWORTH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0463.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Ainsworth, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 55114; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-00418.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tommy MOUTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Mouton, Tommy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. unknown; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-KW-2172.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy Joseph LUKE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0548.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Luke, Roy Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 241,854; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 1043.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Claude ROBERSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Roberson, Claude Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-93-278; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KW 2406.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby STRICKLAND, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Strickland, Bobby Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 284467; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-KW-2562.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0573.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re White, Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 121,481; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37140-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl BROWN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Brown, Earl Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 396-157; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 1999-KA-1481.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmie R. BURNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Burnett, Jimmie R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 189,914; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37123-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Baryl S. BAYLIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Baylis, Baryl S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-893; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-46.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James W. GREEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Green, James W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 43094.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Haywood CEASAR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0594.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Ceasar, Haywood; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 21,906; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37228-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Preston G. DEMOUCHETTE, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Demouchette, Preston Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 95-141810, 89,969.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenisha DUNCAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Duncan, Kenisha; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 329035-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 200 KA 509.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John MORRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0635.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Morris, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 9-98-486; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2002 KW 2259, 99 KA 0947.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn CHOPIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Chopin, Shawn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-1106; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-1284.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0640.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Pierre, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 6-97-846; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2895.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky SHEPPARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0642.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Sheppard, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 61,623; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37257-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John E. SPELLMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Spellman, John E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-250; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2499.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric D. HILLIARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0658.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Hilliard, Eric D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 06-00-584; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0505.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rita HAYES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Hayes, Rita; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 422-925; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2235.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michel J. PORCHE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Porche, Michel J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 418-022; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2086.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tuan TRAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0707.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Tran, Tuan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 8-97-389; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1640.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George CRAWFORD.
    No. 2003-KP-1085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Crawford, George; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 376-596; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-2048.

Denied.


text:
    Peapso OUCH v. ALLEN CORRECTIONAL CENTER.
    No. 2003-KP-1516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Ouch, Peapso; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 01-2754; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-430.

Denied. Result correct.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henri BROADWAY.
    No. 2003-KP-1520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Broadway, Henri; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2-94-1720.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James “T. K.” ALEXANDER.
    No. 2003-K-2822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Alexander, James T.K.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 000-507; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0167.

Denied. The result is correct. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139-40, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1901, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (Erroneous admission of accomplice s confession subject to harmless error analysis).


text:
    Harward SOILEAU, et al. v. MED-EXPRESS AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-C-3037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Soileau, Harward et al.; Corbin, Sheila S.; Dodson, Phyllis S.; Soileau, Montie; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-4883; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-351.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J-, would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paxton GRAYER.
    No. 2003-KO-3059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Grayer, Paxton; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 9,856; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 2678.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andy MAGEE.
    No. 2003-KO-3060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Magee, Andy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 01CR9 81002; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KA 0071.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Prince FRANKLIN.
    No. 2003-KO-3062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Franklin, Prince; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 01-03038; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-287.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herbert FOSTER.
    No. 2003-K-3073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Foster, Herbert; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 388-809; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1663.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Benjamin BLANCHE.
    No. 2003-KO-3104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Blanche, Benjamin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 6425-01; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-629.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thurman T. COOLEY, III and Paul Franklin.
    No. 2003-KO-3107.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Cooley, Thurman T. Ill et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-2396; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-418.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert C. GIRTLEY, Sr.
    No. 2003-K-3111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Girtley, Albert C. Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 265,027; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR03-0654.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry L. COLEMAN.
    No. 2003-KO-3112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Coleman, Henry L.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-0585; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-1138.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark BULLER.
    No. 2003-KO-3113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Buller, Mark; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR-2000-4979; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-248.

Denied.


text:
    Oreste James BROUSSARD and Bernadette Broussard v. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, d/b/a Royal and Sunalliance Insurance Co., and Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana, d/b/a Cypress Bayou Casino.
    No. 2003-C-3173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Broussard, Oreste James et al.; Broussard, Bernadette; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 476178; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1872.

Denied.


text:
    Kathleen DUCOTE and Norman Ducote v. TOURO INFIRMARY.
    No. 2003-C-3215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Ducote, Kathleen et ah; Ducote, Norman; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 98-21846; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0755.

Denied.


text:
    Vorsha TADLOCK, Individually, and for and on Behalf of His Minor Daughter Vorchall Daman v. William TAYLOR, Southern United Fire Insurance Company and, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2003-C-3265.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Transportation & Development, Louisiana Dept, of; State of Louisiana;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 76-601; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0712.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Wayne KRAEMER v. Virginia DUVALL, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2003-C-3313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Kraemer, Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9303008-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0684.

Denied.


text:
    EVANGELINE HEALTH CARE, INC., The Esplanade Group, L.L.C., Dynastar Development, L.L.C. and Horizon Builders, L.L.C. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, State of Louisiana and City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 2003-C-3391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Evangeline Health Care Inc. et ah; Esplanade Group L.L.C.; Dynastar Development L.L.C.; Horizon Builders L.L.C.; — Plaintiff(s);. Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 455,564; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2327.

Denied.


text:
    Mark J. DAVIS v. LOUISIANA WEEKLY PUBLISHING CO., INC. and Joseph C. Jones.
    No. 2003-C-3394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Jones, Joseph C.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 95-13869; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-2448.

Denied.


text:
    Carrie RUSSELL v. Charlie WOOLIE.
    No. 2003-CC-3414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Woolie, Charlie; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 488,379; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1857.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lamar HOLLAND and Rebekah Fisher.
    No. 2003-KK-3475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Holland, Lamar; Fisher, Rebekah; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 309-02; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 1896.

Denied.


text:
    SOUTHERN TOOL & SUPPLY, INC. v. BEERMAN PRECISION INC., Industrial Welding Supply Co., Black & Decker Inc.
    No. 2003-C-3481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Industrial Welding Supply Co.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2000-16478; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0960.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    AUDUBON TRACE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BRIGNAC-DERBES, INC., Ronald L. Brignac, Individually, John J. Derbes, Individually, Lawrence Derbes, Individually, et als.
    No. 2003-C-3483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Gulf Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 483-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-746.

Denied.


text:
    CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. HALTER-CALCASIEU, INC., L.L.C., et. al.
    No. 2003-C-3492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Citgo Petroleum Corporation;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2000-5364; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-00137.

Denied.


text:
    CONOCO INC. v. HALTER-CALCASIEU, L.L.C. et al.
    No. 2003-C-3493.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re ConocoPhillips Co.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 2000-5364, 2001-1911; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-00136.

Denied.


text:
    A. Remy FRANSEN, Jr. and Allain F. Hardin v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3498.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Fransen, A. Remy; Hardin, Allain F.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2002-5170; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-2384.

Denied.


text:
    Jules H. DUPERON, Jr. v. Henry MAAS.
    No. 2003-CP-3501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Duperon, Jules H. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 79-5880; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1910.

Denied.


text:
    Kimerly and Sherwin ROY, Jr. v. Dr. James T. AUSTIN, Jr.
    No. 2003-C-3507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board; — Other(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-4730; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 03-657.

Denied.


text:
    Darlene SLAGEL, et al. v. Jack Carol ROBERSON. Michael Wilson v. Jack Carol Roberson. Jack Carol Roberson v. Marty Hawkins, as Administrator for the Estate of Rodney Dean Wood.
    No. 2003-C-3508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Roberson, Jack C.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 95,624, 95,964', 95,977; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37,791-CA, 37,792-CA, 37,-793-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    DAN RHODES ENTERPRISES, INC. v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES.
    No. 2003-C-3510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Dan Rhodes Enterprises Inc.;'— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2001-6308; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0195.

Denied.


text:
    Pamela R. DORAN v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY and House of Hubcaps.
    No. 2003-C-3517.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 12, 2004.
   In re Lafayette Ins. Co., et ah; House of Hubcaps; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 488-819; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-849.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.