text:
    Adam J. CEASAR, Sr., Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Son, Adam J. Ceasar v. Dr. Richard J. BARRY and Lake Charles Memorial Hospital.
    No. 2002-C-2515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Ceasar, Adam J., Sr., et al.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 89-6006; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-52.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Layla ROBERTS.
    No. 2002-KP-2784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Roberts, Layla; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 179,481; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36914-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Phillip Wayne DEWOODY.
    No. 2002-KP-2867.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re DeWoody, Phillip Wayne; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 37,926, 37,927, 37,636; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 36977-KW, 36978-KW, 36979-KW.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert RAYFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-2930.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Rayford, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. W-96-8-754; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1522.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ira R. PITFIELD.
    No. 2002-KK-2952.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Pitfield, Ira R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 346230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1595.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmy Ray WASHINGTON.
    No. 2002-KO-2963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Washington, Jimmy Ray; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 204,532; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,224-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher CHERAMIE.
    No. 2002-KO-2964.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Cheramie, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 351599; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0073.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lee STEELE.
    No. 2002-KO-2992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Steele, Lee; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 00-3207; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1414.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy Lee SEARS.
    No. 2002-KO-3000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Sears, Randy Lee; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 326,310; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0506.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rondy VERNON, Sr.
    No. 2002-KO-3011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Vernon, Rondy Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97CR467763; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 2104.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin ALEXANDER.
    No. 2002-KO-3015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Alexander, Kevin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 01-597; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-427.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric BERNARD.
    No. 2002-KO-3028.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Bernard, Eric; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 98-CR-000083; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KA 1644.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin Ray WILLIAMS.
    No. 2002-KO-3071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Williams, Melvin Ray; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 218,766; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,456-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clifford DOLEMAN.
    No. 2002-KO-3101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Doleman, Clifford; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 372-773; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0957.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy JONES.
    No. 2002-KO-3117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Jones, Jeremy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 419-861; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0431.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leo STEWART.
    No. 2002-KO-3118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Stewart, Leo; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 420-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2172.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry BAGNERIS.
    No. 2002-KO-3119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Bagneris, Terry; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 419-333; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 02-KA-0773.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David Wayne SIMPSON a/k/a Wayne David Simpson.
    No. 2002-KO-3120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Simpson, David Wayne a/k/a; Simpson, Wayne David; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-0611; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1850.

Denied.


text:
    Louis COLEMAN, Individually and as Father of Louis Frank Coleman v. Dr. Richard DENO, Dr. Ivan Sherman and Joellen Smith Hospital.
    No. 2003-C-0166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Comp. Fund;— Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 90-14684; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-CA-2998.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Louis COLEMAN, Individually and as Father of Louis Frank Coleman v. Dr. Richard DENO, Dr. Ivan Sherman and Joellen Smith Hospital.
    No. 2003-C-0167.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Deno, Richard Dr. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 90-14684; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-CA-2998.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Louis COLEMAN, Individually and as Father of Louis Frank Coleman v. Dr. Richard DENO, Dr. Ivan Sherman and Joellen Smith Hospital.
    No. 2003-C-0168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Coleman, Louis; Coleman, Louis Frank; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 90-14684; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 99-CA-2998.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Della ANDERSON, et al. v. Dr. Jacqueline CLEGGETT-LUCAS, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Cleggett-Lucas, Jacqueline Dr.; J.C.L. Enterprises L.L.C.; Continental Casualty Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 02-7838; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2743.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence CHAPMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0547.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Chapman, Lawrence; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2-97-648; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0547.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matt W. SCHIEFFLER.
    No. 2003-K-0741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Schieffler, Matt W.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 97-5684; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-1047.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brad HARRIS.
    No. 2003-K-0742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Harris, Brad; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-6641; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-1048.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph “Jody” ANTHONY.
    No. 2003-K-0771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Anthony, Joseph “Jody , — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 298230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0906.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joe Ella BICKHAM.
    No. 2003-K-0773.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Bickham, Joe Ella; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-CR4-075946; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 1129.

Denied.


text:
    Ron OLIVER v. CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    No. 2003-C-1230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Cal Dive International, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 108,141; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1122.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    George H. BORNSIDE and Bette B. Bornside v. TENET HEALTHSYSTEM MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Memorial Medical Center (Formerly Mercy Hospital); Dr._Farhat (Believed to be David William Farhat, M.D.); Nicholas D. Pappas, M.D.; Rudolph M. Franklin, M.D.; and Jose L. Garcia-Oller, M.D.
    No. 2003-CC-1235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
    VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.
    TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.
    WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Dr. Dwight VINES and Dr. Van McGraw v. NORTHEAST LOUISIANA UNIVERSITY and the Board of Trustees, University of Louisiana System.
    No. 2003-C-1262.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re University of LA at Monroe;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-1770; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,747-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Norrene MCCALL v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
    No. 2003-C-1329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’, Dist 2, No. 01-06057; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1343.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Charles ROUNDTREE and Betty Roundtree v. The NEW ORLEANS AVIATION BOARD, New Orleans International Airport and/or, the City of New Orleans, Powell Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-1331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Scottsdale Insurance Company; New Orleans City of; Hamp’s Enterprises Inc.; New Orleans Aviation Board et al.;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 96-4058; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1757.

Denied.


text:
    Hideko HIGA v. David B. TOWNSEND.
    No. 2003-CC-1332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Townsend, David B.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 583-911; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-369.

Denied.


text:
    L.S. HUCKABAY, M.D. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. v. KPMG PEAT MARWICK, LLP, Donald H. LeBlanc, Jr., and J. Mark Garrett.
    No. 2003-C-1334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP et al.; LeBlanc, Donald Jr.; Garrett, J. Mark;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 30,371; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,775-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Jo Ann Ulmer, Wife of/and Louis J. ULMER v. Dan C. FRISARD.
    No. 2003-CC-1336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Frisard, Dan C.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 486-102; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03C-275.

Denied.


text:
    Ernest GRIFFIN and Lucy Griffin v. WICKES LUMBER COMPANY and/or Wickes, Inc. (Delaware), ABC Insurance Company, Ernest Gross, and Westaff, Inc. (f/k/a Western Temporary Services).
    No. 2003-C-1338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Griffin, Ernest et al.; Griffin, Lucy; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 454,109; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0294.

Denied.


text:
    Clotiel P. HOUSTON v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 2003-C-1342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 59,714; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,097.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.


text:
    Norrene MCCALL v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
    No. 2003-C-1343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re McCall, Norrene;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Worker’s Compensation Dis-triet 02, No. 01-06057; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1343. ^

Denied.


text:
    Mary GUIDROZ v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF the PARISH OF TERREBONNE, State of Louisiana, (The Owner and Operator of Terrebonne General Medical Center) and Connie Perkins, R.N.
    No. 2003-CC-1345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of Terrebonne; (The Owner and Operator of Terrebonne General Medical Center); Perkins, Connie R. N.; Louisiana State of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 127,499; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2520.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ella Mae AUTMAN v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Autman, Ella Mae; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00-1671; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,-981-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Billie KARNO, Testamentary Executrix of the Succession of Nick Karno and Rosemary Caracci, Successor to Frank Caracci v. JOSEPH FEIN CATERER, INC.
    No. 2003-C-1358.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Karno, Billie; Karno, Nick Succession of; Caracci, Rosemary Successor; Caracci, Frank; Caracci, Mark; Caracci, Vincent; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 99-16163; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1269.

Denied.


text:
    Sheila Brawley PITTMAN v. Chris A. PITTMAN.
    No. 2003-CC-1365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Pittman, Chris Albert; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 97-11639; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CW 2528.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ellis REED v. C. Jerome D’AQUILA.
    No. 2003-CP-1370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Reed, Ellis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 55,941-F.

Denied on the showing made.


text:
    Timothy ALBRITTON v. CITY POLICE OF BATON ROUGE, et al.
    No. 2003-CP-1371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Albritton, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 494,043; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2003 CW 0046, 2002 CW 2069.

Denied.


text:
    Sister Carol FRANCIS, Individually, and on Behalf of Her Father, Jacob Francis, Sr. v. LAFON NURSING HOME OF THE HOLY FAMILY and Sisters of the Holy Family.
    No. 2003-C-1373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family et al.; Sisters of the Holy Family; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 94-2064; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1868.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    David HINKEL and Jacquelyn Hinkel, Lauren Hinkel Faust and Lisa Hinkel Mipro v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-1374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re MeCue Corporation; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 93-948; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0635.

Denied.


text:
    Leslie Lewinter, Wife of/ and Robert M. SUSKIND, M.D. v. Denese SHERVINGTON, M.D.
    No. 2003-CC-1376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Lewinter, Leslie et al.; Suskind, Leslie Lewinter; Suskind, Robert M. M.D.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2001-8339; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0037.

Denied.


text:
    Terry and Ruth CLELAND v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES, et al. Terry and Ruth Cleland v. City of Lake Charles, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Lake Charles City of et al.; Jones, Gerard; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 92-5347; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 02-805, 01-1463.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Eldridge P. PIERCE, et al. v. REILY-BENTON COMPANY, INC., et al. David Poche, et al. v. Reilly-Benton Company, Inc., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Amax Metals Recovery, Inc.; Murphy Oil USA, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 92-041, 92-040; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 02-C-2253, 02-C-2367.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick RICK.
    No. 2003-KK-1384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Rick, Derrick; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98,377; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0434.

Denied.


text:
    Terry and Ruth CLELAND v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES, et al. Terry and Ruth Cleland v. City of Lake Charles, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Calcasieu Parish School Board; Washington National Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 92-5347; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 02-805, 01-1463.

Denied.


text:
    John TEMERSON v. AUBREY-HANSEN, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Temerson, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 520-332; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-251.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.


text:
    Robert WEINGARTNER v. LOUISIANA ICE GATORS.
    No. 2003-C-1388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Ice Gators; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #4, No. 01-06629; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 02-1181.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SOUTHERN INGENUITY, INC. and Daryn R. Clark v. Effie BENJAMIN.
    No. 2003-C-1396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Clark, Daryn R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 73,243; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1426.

Denied.


text:
    In re Lillian JOHNS and Shalonda Johns Applying to Obtain an Order to Exhume the Body of the Deceased, Melvin Johns v. Dr. Naurang AGRAWAL, et al. In re Lillian Johns and Shalonda Johns v. Naurang Agrawal, M.D., et al.
    No. 2003-C-1399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Johns, Lillian; Johns, Shalonda;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, Nos. 95-1597, 96-20797; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-CA-1467, 2002-CA-1468.

Denied.


text:
    L.S. HUCKABAY, M.D. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. v. KPMG PEAT MARWICK, LLP, Donald H. Leblanc, Jr., and J. Mark Garrett.
    No. 2003-C-1400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re L.S. Huckabay M.D. Memorial Hospital Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 30,371; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,775-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roland R. GARIC.
    No. 2003-KK-1402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Garic, Roland R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 263-385; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0416.

Denied.


text:
    Bridgett WHITLOW v. The SHREVEPORT TIMES.
    No. 2003-C-1406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Whitlow, Bridgett K.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, Dist.-2, No. 01-4780; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1215.

Denied.


text:
    Christopher WITKO v. Ruth WATSON, Regina Coeli, Child Development Center, TIG Insurance Company, Ericka P. Donaldson, and Progressive Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-1408.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Progressive Security Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2002-11526D; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2699.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    George H. BORNSIDE and Bette B. Bornside v. TENET HEALTHSYSTEM MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Tenet Healthsystem Memorial Medical Center Inc. d/b/a; Memorial Medical Center-Mercy Campus; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2000-1864; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0490.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR the CLAIM OF Margaret J. ROY, (D), et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re St. Amant, Katherine A. Dr.;— Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2002-00518; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0666.

Denied. See Perritt v. Dona, 02-2061 (La.7/2/03), 849 So.2d 56.


text:
    Ron OLIVER v. CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
    No. 2003-C-1796.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Cal Dive International, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 108,141; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1122.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Tina Williamson WALTERS, et al. v. NEW DAY ENTERPRISES, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re KMC Chain Industrial Co. Inc.; Continental Chain Company; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-273; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37738-CW.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR the CLAIM OF George H. BORNSIDE.
    No. 2003-CD-2016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Pappas, Nicholas M.D.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 00-18304; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1272.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kelvin THOMAS.
    No. 2003-KH-2287.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Thomas, Kelvin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98313; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0951.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leon HARRIS.
    No. 2003-KH-2450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2003.
   In re Harris, Leon; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 02-3332; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-771.

Denied.


author: hMICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

text:
    Lisa S. GRANT v. TULANE UNIVERSITY and Coastal Catalyst Technology, Inc.
    No. 2002-CA-0848.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 23, 2003.
    Order on Rehearing Sept. 4, 2003.
    Clayton M. Connors, Leblanc & Wad-dell, Chalmette, LA, and Perry M. Nicosia, Murray Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, and Eileen McCarthy Brown, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Joseph H. Hart, IV, Lawrence E. Abbott, Abbott, Simses & Kuchler, New Orleans, LA for Defendant/Appellee, Coastal Catalyst Technology, Inc.
    Joseph J. Lowenthal, Jr., Rachel G. We-bre Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund d/b/a Tulane University.
    (Court composed of Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS Sr., Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY).
   hMICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

Plaintiff, Lisa S. Grant, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the exception of prescription filed by defendants Coastal Catalyst Technology, Inc. and Tulane University, and dismissing plaintiffs claims against defendants. We affirm.

On October 17, 2000, plaintiff filed a petition for damages against Tulane University (“Tulane”), Coastal Catalyst Technology, Inc. (“Coastal”) and their insurers. Plaintiff alleged in her petition that between 1992 and 1995, she was a chemical engineering student at Tulane and was employed by Tulane’s Chemical Engineering Department as a lab and/or research assistant from 1992 to 1994. She further alleged that during that time, she was assigned to a lab project conducted by Tulane and Coastal, in which her assignment was to remove metal deposits from a spent catalyst that had been used in cracking units to break down crude oil into shorter hydrocarbon chains. Plaintiff alleged that Tulane and Coastal knowingly and intentionally failed to provide her with proper documentation as to the dangers and health consequences of working with and around the chemicals used during the process of removing metal deposits from a spent catalyst. She alleged that during her work as a research assistant, she was exposed to unreasonably | ¡¡dangerous amounts of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals, and was subjected to progressive heavy metal poisoning causing her injuries.

According to plaintiffs petition, she was not informed of her exposure to toxic chemicals until on or about October 26, 1999, when she received test results from a physician confirming that she had sustained heavy metal poisoning. She alleged that Tulane and Coastal negligently failed to provide her with a safe place to work, and are liable to her for the intentional tort of battery and for punitive damages. She also alleged that Coastal is strictly liable for her injuries.

On October 4, 2001, Coastal filed an exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiff was aware of her alleged damages, the alleged tortious conduct and the alleged connection between the two over six years prior to filing her petition for damages. On October 17, 2001, Tulane joined with Coastal in excepting to plaintiffs petition on grounds that her cause of action prescribed. Tulane adopted the reasons asserted by Coastal in its memorandum for dismissal of plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff opposed the exception of prescription, arguing that she had no knowledge of toxic exposure until October 26,1999. She further argued that under the doctrine of contra non valentem, her petition for damages was timely filed.

After a hearing on November 30, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment on December 11, 2001 granting the exceptions of prescription filed by Tulane and Coastal, and dismissing plaintiffs claims with prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissing her claims. She listed the issues presented as (1) whether the petition for damages was prescribed on its face; (2) whether the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof with regard to ^prescription to the plaintiff; and (3) whether the doctrine of contra non valentem is applicable in this case.

A party generally must assert a delictual claim within one year from the date the injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492. Hoerner v. Wesley-Jensen, 95-0553, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/20/96), 684 So.2d 508, 510. When it is not obvious from the face of the petition that the claim is prescribed, the burden rests on the defendant or party pleading prescription. Stett v. Greve, 35,140, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/27/02), 810 So.2d 1203, 1208. However, if the face of the petition shows that the prescriptive period has already elapsed, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that suspension, interruption or renunciation of prescription has occurred. Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992).

Under the judicially created doctrine of contra non valentem, prescription is suspended (1) when there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs action; (2) when there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of this cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Landry v. Blaise, 2002-0822 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/23/02), 829 So.2d 661, citing Corsey v. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319, 1321-22 (La.1979).

Plaintiff claims that the fourth category of the contra non valentem doctrine, commonly referred to as the discovery rule, applies in this case. Under this category, prescription is suspended until the plaintiff knows or should know of the Rdamage, the wrongful act and the connection between them. Branch v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 92-3086 (La.4/28/94), 636 So.2d 211; Hoerner v. Wesley-Jensen, supra. Prescription does not begin to run against a plaintiff who is unaware of the facts upon which his or her cause of action rests unless his or her ignorance is willful, negligent or unreasonable. Hoerner v. Wesley-Jensen, supra. A plaintiff will be deemed to know what he or she could have learned through reasonable diligence. Corsey v. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Corrections, supra.

We initially note that the transcript of the November 30, 2001 hearing on the exceptions of prescription does not include any statement by the trial court indicating that she found that plaintiffs petition for damages is prescribed on its face or that she shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff. The transcript is only two pages long, and does not include arguments of counsel or any statements by the trial court regarding burden of proof. The transcript shows that counsel for Tulane identified and introduced into evidence the exhibits attached to the exception of prescription. The trial court stated that it was maintaining the exception, and did not give reasons. Furthermore, the record does not include any written reasons for judgment.

Our review of the petition reveals that plaintiff alleges that she suffered damages from exposure to dangerous amounts of toxic chemicals when she worked in the Tulane chemical lab from 1992 through 1995. Her petition for damages was filed in 2000. The prescriptive period for a tort action is one year, and according to the petition, the allegedly tortious acts of defendants occurred more than one year pri- or to the filing of the petition. Therefore, plaintiffs petition is prescribed on its face.

^Furthermore, we find no merit in plaintiffs argument that the recent Louisiana Supreme Court case of Campo v. Correa, 2001-2707 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502, supports her position that her petition should not be found to be prescribed on its face because it was brought within one year of her alleged discovery of the causal connection between her symptoms and the defendants’ conduct. In Campo v. Correa, su pra, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it granted writs in that case “to resolve a split among the circuits on the issue of whether to consider the date of discovery in determining whether the petition in a medical malpractice action is prescribed on its face, and to examine the correctness vel non of whether the Campos were reasonable in not discovering the alleged malpractice acts sooner than alleged.” Id. at p. 6, 828 So.2d at 507 (Emphasis ours.) The Campo v. Correa case addressed the interpretation of special statutory prescriptive periods applicable to medical malpractice actions. The instant case is not a medical malpractice action, and there is no indication in the Campo v. Correa opinion that the holding regarding prescription in that case has application in actions other than those involving medical malpractice claims.

Because the face of plaintiffs petition shows that the prescriptive period elapsed, plaintiff had the burden of establishing that suspension, interruption or renunciation of prescription has occurred. Hoerner v. Wesley-Jensen, supra. All parties filed memoranda prior to the hearing on the exceptions of prescription. At the hearing, the following evidence was introduced by defendants: (1) plaintiffs responses to Coastal’s first set of interrogatories; (2) plaintiffs petition for damages; (8) depositions of plaintiff taken on May 18, 2001 and May 21, 2001; and (4) certified medical records from Tulane Student Health Center dated April |fi28, 1993, April 29, 1993, July 7, 1993, December 6, 1994 and December 13, 1994. Plaintiff offered no evidence.

The evidence offered at the hearing established the following: Plaintiff worked as a research lab assistant through the Tulane chemical engineering department on a joint project conducted by Tulane and Coastal from August 1991 through October 1993. She knew that the purpose of her assignment was to remove nickel and vanadium from the spent catalyst. In April 1993, plaintiff sought medical treatment and complained of nausea and vomiting, including vomiting blood. Her symptoms persisted and she underwent diagnostic testing.

While still working at the lab, plaintiff went to the Tulane Student Health Center in July 1993 after learning from a poison control center that nickel and vanadium can cause the symptoms that she was experiencing. Plaintiff asked to be tested for nickel and vanadium poisoning. The record includes a physician’s note from July 7, 1993 indicating that plaintiff would be tested for vanadium and nickel poisoning, but the record does not include the results of those tests. Although plaintiff alleges that those test results were negative, a medical report from Tulane Student Health Center shows that plaintiff visited a Dr. Mushatt in December 1994, over one year after she left the lab, and told Dr. Mushatt that her medical history included vanadium poisoning.

In arguing that the doctrine of contra non valentem suspended the prescriptive period in this case, plaintiff argues that she did not know and could not have reasonably known that she had heavy metal poisoning until October 26, 1999 when Dr. Charles Mary allegedly related plaintiffs symptoms to her exposure to lead, cadmium, antimony, vanadium and nickel. The only evidence in the record 17of Dr. Mary’s diagnosis is found in plaintiffs depositions. The record does not contain any records, reports or deposition testimony of Dr. Mary.

Until October 26, 1999, plaintiff claims that her short-term and long-term symptoms of metal poisoning were not sufficient enough to put her on notice that a tort had been committed against her or to allow her to appreciate the possible connection between her symptoms and the exposure to chemicals at the defendants’ lab. Plaintiff acknowledges that she underwent testing for nickel and vanadium poisoning at her request in July 1993, but she alleges that the tests were negative, and that those results dismissed her suspicions that her exposure to nickel and vanadium could have caused her symptoms.

However, one and one-half years later in December 1994, plaintiff related to Dr. Mushatt a history of vanadium poisoning when she sought treatment for her recurring symptoms. The medical records show that plaintiff associated her symptoms with her exposure to chemicals at defendants’ lab in July 1993 and again in December 1994.

We conclude that the evidence introduced at the hearing on the exceptions of prescription established that plaintiff knew or should have known of a causal connection between defendants’ allegedly tortious conduct and the manifestation of her injuries more than one year before she filed suit on October 17, 2000. Plaintiff did not carry her burden of proving that the doctrine of contra non valentem suspended the running of prescription until October 26, 1999. Accordingly, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in maintaining the exceptions of prescription filed by Coastal and Tulane.

IsFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment maintaining the exceptions of prescription filed by Coastal and Tulane, and dismissing plaintiffs petition.

AFFIRMED.

ORDER

The application for rehearing filed by plaintiff/appellant Lisa S. Grant is denied on the merits. Plaintiff/appellant’s motions to supplement the record are denied. Defendants/appellees The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund d/b/a Tulane University and Coastal Catalyst Technology’s motion to dismiss plaintiff/appellant’s application for rehearing as untimely is denied. Defendant/appellee The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund d/b/a/ Tulane University’s motion to substitute the first page of the pleading filed on June 16, 2003 in order to correct a clerical error is granted.

/s/ Michael E. Kirby JUDGE MICHAEL E. KIRBY

/S/ James F. McKay III JUDGE JAMES F. McKAY III

/s/ Dennis R. Bagneris Sr. JUDGE DENNIS R. BAGNERIS SR.


author: L SULLIVAN, Judge.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF Marcel J. VOORHIES, Jr., Helen Voorhies, Individually as Widow of Marcel J. Voorhies, Jr. v. Stephen VOORHIES, et al.
    No. 03-163.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    July 16, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 2003.

      Edward B. Benjamin, Jr., Edward D. Wegmann, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poi-tevent, Carrére & Denegre, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Succession of Marcel J. Voorhies, Jr., Helen E. Voorhies.
    Harry J. Philips, Jr., Mary L. Dougherty, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Stephen Voorhies, Sherrie Voorhies, Golden David Voorhies, Deborah Voorhies Morrison.
    Court composed of BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN, Judges.
   L SULLIVAN, Judge.

Helen Voorhies, individually and as trustee of The Voorhies Family Living Trust (The Trust), appeals the trial court’s determination that, pursuant to Louisiana law, The Trust is invalid as to form and cannot inherit immovable property situated in Louisiana. For the following reasons, we reverse.

Facts

The facts are not disputed. During his lifetime, Marcel J. Voorhies, Jr. inherited an interest in immovable property situated in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana. He was married twice. He had four children with his first wife who died in 1986. In 1991, he married Helen, who had two children from a previous marriage. They did not have any children together.

Marcel moved from Louisiana to California, then to Arizona. In December 1993, while living in Arizona, he and Helen, jointly executed The Trust. Immediately after executing The Trust, Marcel and Helen separately executed their Last Wills. Thereafter, they moved back to California, where Marcel died on October 26, 2000. His Last Will was probated in California in June 2001. In September 2001, an exemplified copy of his Last Will was filed in the records of the Clerk of Court for St. Martin Parish to open an ancillary probate.

Even though The Trust provided for the transfer of “all of our ... property ... wherever situated ... to our Trustee,” neither Marcel’s Louisiana-land interests nor all of his stock certificates were transferred, of record. Marcel made the following bequests in his Last Will:

Section 1. Pour-Over to My Living Trust

All of my property of whatever nature and kind, wherever situated, shall be distributed to my revocable living trust. The name of my trust is MARCEL J. VOORHIES, JR. and HELEN E. VOORHIES, Trustees, or | gtheir successors in trust, under the VOORHIES FAMILY LIVING TRUST, dated _, and any amendments thereto.

Section 2. Alternate Disposition

If my revocable living trust is not in effect at my death for any reason whatsoever, then all of my property shall be disposed of under the terms of my revocable living trust as if it were in full force and effect on the date of my death.

Helen is the sole income beneficiary named in The Trust; she has the right to withdraw any or all of The Trust’s principal. Marcel’s and Helen’s children are named equal beneficiaries of any principal that Helen does not withdraw. All of the children are of the age of majority, and none of them are residents of Louisiana.

Helen filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment to determine her rights, individually and as Trustee, under Marcel’s Last Will and The Trust. In the event her Petition for Declaratory Judgment is granted, her children waived any rights they have in The Trust. After a hearing on May 9, 2002, the trial court held that The Trust did not satisfy the requirements of Louisiana law and that Marcel’s bequests were invalid. Consequently, the trial court also held that Marcel’s interest in the Louisiana immovable property passed by intestacy to his four children.

Standard of Review

As noted by the parties, this appeal presents a question of law. Appellate review of a question of law is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Weeks v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 420 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), writs denied, 93-2909, 93-2936 (La.1/28/94), 630 So.2d 794.

| ^Discussion

As we begin our review, we are mindful that Louisiana law favors liberal construction and interpretation of trusts. See La.R.S. 9:1724 which provides:

The provisions of this Code shall be accorded a liberal construction in favor of freedom of disposition. Whenever this Code is silent, resort shall be had to the Civil Code or other laws, but neither the Civil Code nor any other law shall be invoked to defeat a disposition sanctioned expressly or impliedly by this Code.

See also La.R.S. 9:1753.

Was The Trust in valid form under Louisiana law?

The first issue presented is whether The Trust was executed in a form valid under Louisiana law. La.R.S. 9:1752 provides:

An inter vivos trust may be created only by authentic act or by act under private signature executed in the presence of two witnesses and duly acknowledged by the settlor or by the affidavit of one of the attesting witnesses.

The parties agree that The Trust was not in authentic act form. Therefore, we must determine if it was an act under private signature which meets the requirements of Section 1752. The Trust was executed by Marcel and Helen in the presence of two witnesses who did not sign the document. A notary public present when Marcel and Helen signed The Trust executed acknowledgments, which represent that Marcel and Helen each acknowledged the trust agreement before him. Marcel’s acknowledgment states: “The foregoing living trust agreement was acknowledged before me on Dec 22 1993, by MARCEL J. VOORHIES, JR. as Trustmaker and Trustee.” In June 2001, one of the witnesses present when Marcel and Helen signed The Trust executed an acknowledgment in which she described herself as “an attesting witness” to The Trust and acknowledged the signatures of Marcel and Helen.

LHelen asserts that Section 1752 provides three methods for creating an inter vivos trust: 1) authentic act; 2) act under private signature executed in the presence of two witnesses and duly acknowledged by the settlor; and 3) act under private signature executed in the presence of two witnesses and duly acknowledged by the affidavit of one of the witnesses. She contends that the acknowledgment by the notary public satisfies the requirements of Section 1752 and that the acknowledgment by the witness who was present when she and Marcel signed The Trust satisfies the requirements of this section, even though the witness did not sign as a witness on The Trust document. She also argues that, if we do not accept her interpretation of Section 1752, it is “unclear,” and we must resort to the laws of Arizona to determine whether The Trust is valid. Defendants contend that Section 1752 requires that the witnesses must always sign the trust document.

The trial - court determined that The Trust was not in valid form, reasoning:

[T]he Voorhies Trust instrument does not satisfy the alternate requirement of an act under private signature with an acknowledgment of the settlor or a witness, because there are no attesting witnesses who have signed- the document contemporaneously with the settlor. The settlor has not acknowledged his signature and is now deceased. It cannot be acknowledged by a non-attesting witness, someone who claims to have witnesse[d] the document six years ago, but did not sign it.

Attesting Witnesses

Helen argues on appeal that Section 1752 requires that the witnesses to an inter vivos trust in the form of an act under private signature need only be present with the settlor for the execution of the trust. Defendants contend that witnessés to an inter Lvivos trust must always sign the trust document. This issue arises from the phrase “affidavit of one of the attesting witnesses” in Section 1752.

By definition, an act under private signature does not have to “be attested by witnesses.” Catalanotto v. Assoc. Disc., 207 So.2d 180, 183 (La.App. 1 Cir.); writ denied, 252 La. 105, 209 So.2d 38 (1968). And, “[a]n act under private signature, acknowledged by the party against whom it is adduced, or legally held to be acknowledged, has the same effect as an authentic act.” Id., citing former La.Civ.Code art. 2242, now La.Civ.Code art. 1836. The acknowledgment of the act causes “its evidential character [to undergo] a decided change.” Reeves v. So. Kraft Corp., 1 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 2 Cir.1941). Thus, Section 1752’s requirements of witnesses being present for the execution of the trust and an acknowledgment by the settlor or an affidavit by a witness when a trust is in the form of an act under private signature are elements of proof. Consequently, we see that Section 1752 appears to combine form requirements with proof requirements: an authentic act is self-proving and an act under private signature with witnesses present and an acknowledgment by the settlor or affidavit by an “attesting witness” is “regarded prima facie as the true and genuine act of a party executing it.” La.Civ.Code art. 1836. See also La. R.S. 13:3720.

A close look at Section 1752 also reveals that it makes at least one distinction between the proof required: an acknowledgment by the settlor, but an affidavit by a | fiwitness. An affidavit is a higher standard of proof than an acknowledgment. An affidavit requires that the affiant take an oath, Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Steele, 542 So.2d 1154 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989); an acknowledgment does not. La.R.S. 35:511. Is the witness requirement another such distinction? We believe it is.

The term “witnesses” is used twice in Section 1752: first, requiring that an act under private signature be “executed in the presence of two witnesses” and, second, providing for an affidavit by “one of the attesting witnesses.” If Section 1752 requires that the witnesses present for the execution of a trust have to sign the document, it could have been written clearly to provide so, e.g., “or by act under private signature executed in the presence of and attested by two witnesses and duly acknowledged .... ” However, the construction of Section 1752, with “attesting” describing witnesses only in that segment which provides for an affidavit by a witness, leads us to conclude that when a trust is executed as an act under private signature, the witnesses present during the settlor’s execution of the document must sign only when the method of proof is an affidavit by a witness, not when the method of proof is an acknowledgment by the settlor.

Acknowledgment by Marcel

Helen also argues that Marcel did acknowledge The Trust. There is more than one form of acknowledgment. See, e.g., La.Civ.Code art. 1836, La.R.S. 13:1320, and La.R.S. 35:511. The Trust Code does not specify the use of a particular acknowledgment form.

The trial court did not explain its conclusion that Marcel did not acknowledge his execution of The Trust, but we surmise it is because he did not sign the 17acknowledgment. La.R.S. 35:511 entitled “Forms of acknowledgment” provides in part:

Either the forms of acknowledgment now in use in this State, or the following, may be used in the case of conveyances or other written instruments, whenever such acknowledgment is required or authorized by law for any purpose:
(Begin in all cases by a caption specifying the state and place where the acknowledgment is taken).
1. In the case of natural persons acting in their own right:
On this . day of ., 19.., . before me personally appeared A B '(or A B and C D), to me known to be the person (or persons) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that he (or they) executed it as his (or their) free act and deed.
(In all cases add signature and title of the officer taking the acknowledgment.)

(Emphasis added).

This provision does not require that the maker/settlor sign the acknowledgment. Compare La.Civ.Code art. 1836, La.R.S. 13:3720, and La.R.S. 9:5501.1. Article 1836 provides for two forms of acknowledgment, one signed by the maker and one “in any other manner authorized by law.” La.R.S. 13:3720 provides for an acknowledgment in the form of an affidavit, which also requires the signature of the maker/settlor. La.R.S. 9:5501.1 is the form for an affidavit of distinction with an acknowledgment by a judgment creditor, which unlike La.R.S. 35:511, requires that the acknowledgment by the judgment creditor be signed by the creditor before the notary public.

The acknowledgment at issue substantially complies with the requirements of La.R.S. 35:511: it sets forth the state and city where the acknowledgment was taken | gand the date the acknowledgment occurred, December 22, 1993; Marcel acknowledged The Trust to the notary public; and the notary public signed his name and stated his title. Additionally, the evidence establishes that the notary public was present when Marcel executed The Trust and his Will.

Under the facts presented herein, we find the requirements of Section 1752 have been satisfied.

Disposition

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

      . This blank appeared in Marcel’s Last Will but is not an issue in this case.

      . See League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery, 251 La. 971, 207 So.2d 762 (1968), where the supreme court, in the context of a chattel mortgage, accepted Wigmore’s definition of an attesting witness, quoting: "Who is the attesting witness. The notion of an attesting or subscribing witness is that of a person who, at the request or with the consent of the maker, places his name on the document for the purpose of making thereby an implied or expressed statement that the document was then known by him to have been executed by the purporting maker.” 4 Wigmore on Evidence 1292, p. 584.


author: | .MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

text:
    HOLLYWOOD CASINO SHREVEPORT, v. SHREVEPORT PADDLEWHEELS, L.L.C., Warren L. Reuther, Jr., and James E. Smith, Jr.
    No. 2002-CA-2134.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    July 23, 2003.

      J. Kelly Duncan, Robert T. Lemon II, Christopher S. Mann, Jones, Walker, Wae-chter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Robert G. Harvey, Sr., Jonathan Walsh, Harvey, Jacobson & Glago, APLC, New Orleans, LA, and W. Patrick Klotz, Klotz & Early, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellees (Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C. and James E. Smith, Jr.).
    Randall A. Smith, Andrew L. Kramer, Smith & Fawer, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant (Warren L. Reuther, Jr.).
    (Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY).
   | .MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

Defendant, Warren L. Reuther, Jr., appeals a trial court judgment granting a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff, Hollywood Casino Shreveport. We vacate the injunction and remand for further proceedings.

The record sets forth the procedural history pertinent to this appeal as follows: On May 24, 2002, Hollywood Casino Shreveport (“hereinafter referred to as Hollywood Casino”) filed a petition for con-cursus proceeding, declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendants Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C. (“hereinafter referred to as Shreveport Paddle-wheels”), Warren L. Reuther, Jr. and James E. Smith, Jr. Citing Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 4651-4662 and articles 1871-1883, the plaintiff asked the court to determine the obligation of Hollywood Casino to send notices and payments to Shreveport Paddlewheels as required and provided in the Marine Services Agreement dated September 22, 1998, and as required and provided in the Amended and Restated Assignment of Joint Venture Interest dated September 22, 1998, and as required and provided in the Third Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement of Hollywood Casino dated July 21, 1999, as amended, and to further enjoin defendants from instituting Lor prosecuting any actions or proceedings against Hollywood Casino for payment of amounts pursuant to the aforesaid agreements or any other claim at issue herein.

The petition further alleges that Mr. Reuther claims to be the General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of Shreveport Paddlewheels, and Mr. Smith claims to be the President and Chief Executive Officer of Shreveport Paddlewheels. Hollywood Casino acknowledges that it is obligated to pay Shreveport Paddlewheels the sum of $30,000.00 per month under the Marine Services Agreement. It also states that under the Assignment of Joint Venture Interest, it is obligated to pay to Shreveport Paddlewheels the sum of “one percent of any Complex Net Revenues” as defined in that agreement. Hollywood Casino and Shreveport Paddlewheels are parties to the Marine Services Agreement and the partners of those two entities are parties to the Joint Venture Agreement. According to both agreements, Hollywood Casino is to send all notices and payments to Shreveport Paddlewheels as follows:

Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C.
610 S. Peters Street
New Orleans, Louisiana
Facsimile (504) 587-1740
Attention: Warren L. Reuther, Jr.,
Chief Executive Officer
With Copy to:
Smith Martin
700 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana
Facsimile (504) 525-0163
Attention: James E. Smith, Jr., Esq.

Hollywood Casino alleges in its petition that it received information that the Board of Directors of Shreveport Paddlewheels removed defendant Warren L. Reuther, Jr. as its General Manager and Chief Executive Officer sometime between laOctober 30, 2001 and November 2, 2001, and subsequently appointed defendant James E. Smith, Jr. as its Chief Executive Officer. By letter dated February 7, 2002, Mr. Reuther directed Hollywood Casino to send all notices, correspondence and payments to Shreveport Paddlewheels to his attention at 68 Lakewood Place, New Orleans, Louisiana 70131. By letter dated February 13, 2002, attorneys representing Mr. Smith instructed Hollywood Casino that the correct legal address of Shreveport Paddlewheels is 610 South Peters Street in New Orleans, and instructed that all notices, payments and other correspondence from Hollywood Casino to Shreveport Paddlewheels be sent to that address.

Hollywood Casino requested by letter to Mr. Reuther dated February 14, 2002 that he provide satisfactory evidence of his authority to act on behalf of Shreveport Pad-dlewheels and change the mailing address of that company. By letter dated March 4, 2002, Mr. Reuther responded to Hollywood Casino’s letter of February 14, 2002, and attached documentation allegedly supporting his claim that he has the authority to act on behalf of Shreveport Paddlewheels. In that same letter, Mr. Reuther instructed Hollywood Casino to send all future notices and payments to Shreveport Pad-dlewheels to his attention at 530 Natchez Street, Suite 110, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130. Mr. Reuther indicated in the March 4, 2002 letter that he would pursue legal action against Hollywood Casino if these instructions were not followed. Following Mr. Reuther’s letter of March 4, 2002 to Hollywood Casino, attorneys for Mr. Smith sent a letter dated March 14, 2002 to Hollywood Casino, stating that Mr. Reuther lacked any authority to redirect the mailing address of Shreveport Paddle-wheels, and instructed Hollywood Casino not to comply with Mr. Reuther’s instructions.

| Jn a separate action brought by Mr. Smith and other parties against Mr. Reuther, Lloyd Medley granted a preliminary injunction on April 4, 2002 enjoining, restraining and prohibiting Mr. Reuther, his agents, employees, and all persons, firms or corporations acting or claiming to act on his behalf, from using the corporate stationery, from using the title of chief executive officer and from acting- as - an agent of the plaintiff corporations in any way without the approval of the Board of Directors of the corporations, including with regard to the affairs of Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C. Based on the April 4, 2002 injunction in that separate case, Hollywood Casino notified Mr. Reuther by letter dated April 8, 2002 that it would continue to direct payment of fees owing to Shreveport Paddlewheels as it had done in the past, i.e. the payments would be mailed to the 610 South Peters Street address.

Hollywood Casino stated in its petition that due to the conflicting demands and instructions of Mr. Reuther and Mr. Smith regarding the correct address to which notices, correspondence and payments owed by Hollywood Casino to Shreveport Paddlewheels should be sent, it is “in great doubt” as to which defendant has the authority to act on behalf of Shreveport Pad-dlewheels. Alleging that these conflicting demands constitute competing claims against Hollywood Casino, and under the threat of imminent legal action against it, Hollywood Casino filed the petition in the instant matter requesting (1) a declaratory action to determine the correct, proper and true address of Shreveport Paddle-wheels for notices, correspondence and payments; (2) a coneursus proceeding so that funds owed to Shreveport Paddle-wheels, can be rightfully deposited into the registry of the court pending determination of the conflicting claims; and (3) in-junctive relief enjoining and restraining defendants from instituting.or prosecuting any legal |Kaction for recovery of amounts due Shreveport Paddlewheels by Hollywood Casino or any other claim at issue herein. The correspondence referred to by Hollywood Casino in its petition is attached to the petition. Upon the filing of its petition, Hollywood Casino was granted leave, without the necessity of any further order of the court, to deposit into the registry of the court all payments owed to Shreveport Paddlewheels that accrue from time to time in the future, and to which the defendants have conflicting and competing claims.

The trial court scheduled a hearing for June 6, 2002, ordering defendants Mr. Reuther, Mr. Smith and Shreveport Pad-dlewheels to appear and show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued prohibiting, restraining and enjoining the defendants from instituting or prosecuting any other action or proceeding against Hollywood Casino in any court relative to any issues raised by Hollywood Casino in its petition. Following that hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on June 10, 2002, granting a preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting defendants . Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C., Warren L. Reuther, Jr. and James E. Smith, Jr. “from instituting or prosecuting any action or lawsuit in any court seeking to direct or cause Hollywood Casino Shreveport to send notices, correspondence and payments due Shreveport Pad-dlewheels, L.L.C. to any address other than the legal domicile address of Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C. as set forth in the Marine Services Agreement dated September 22, 1998, and in the Amended and Restated Assignment of Joint Venture Interest dated Séptember 22,1998, namely 610 S. Peters Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130.” The trial court granted Mr. Reuther’s motion for appeal of the June 10, 2002 judgment, but denied his request for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending a final ruling on appeal. Following the trial court’s order granting Mr. Reuther’s motion for appeal, 1 ^Shreveport Paddlewheels filed a motion to withdraw funds from the court registry. The trial court granted the motion, and further ordered that Hollywood Casino continue to send payments owed to Shreveport Pad-dlewheels to 610 South Peters Street in New Orleans.

On appeal, counsel for Mr. Reuther argues that the trial court erred when it entered an injunction ordering Hollywood Casino to send payments to Shreveport Paddlewheels at the 610 South Peters Street address even though Hollywood Casino filed a petition for concursus proceeding stating that there are competing claims to the funds. Mr. Reuther further argues that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not allow a concursus action to be decided on a summary basis.

In response, counsel for Mr. Smith and Shreveport Paddlewheels argues that the trial court correctly found that this matter was not appropriate for a concursus proceeding because there were no competing claims to the funds at issue. According to Mr. Smith and Shreveport Paddlewheels, it is undisputed that Hollywood Casino owes the funds to Shreveport Paddle-wheels, and any dispute between shareholders Mr. Reuther and Mr. Smith as to the address where these funds should be sent is a matter internal to Shreveport Paddlewheels and is not grounds for a concursus proceeding. Therefore, they argue that the trial court was within its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction at issue on appeal after the court determined that this matter was not appropriate for a concursus proceeding.

Hollywood Casino, the party that invoked the concursus proceeding and stated in its petition that it is “in great doubt” as to whether Mr. Reuther or Mr. Smith has the authority to act on behalf of Shreveport Paddlewheels, now argues that the trial court’s questioning of counsel for Mr. Reuther at the June 6, 200217hearing demonstrated that Mr. Reuther was not authorized to act on behalf of Shreveport Paddlewheels at the time he sent the letters to Hollywood Casino designating a different address to which payments to Shreveport Paddlewheels were to be sent. Hollywood Casino states that the trial court recognized that there was no dispute as to who had authority to act on behalf of Shreveport Paddlewheels, and that the court correctly converted the matter to a summary proceeding. While acknowledging that the injunction granted by the trial court was broader than that requested in its petition, Hollywood Casino argues that the injunction granted by the trial court was correct and should be affirmed.

La. C.C.P. art. 4651 defines a con-cursus proceeding as “one in which two or more people having competing or conflicting claims to money, property, or mortgages or privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their respective claims contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding.” As stated above, Hollywood Casino invoked a concursus proceeding, stating that the conflicting demands of Mr. Reuther and Mr. Smith as to where to send funds owed to Shreveport Paddlewheels constituted competing claims. The June 6, 2002 hearing was scheduled to determine whether a preliminary injunction should be issued prohibiting, restraining and enjoining the defendants from instituting or prosecuting any other action or proceeding against Hollywood Casino in any court relative to any issues raised by Hollywood Casino in its petition. Yet the preliminary injunction granted by the court after that hearing essentially dismissed the concursus proceeding, and summarily adjudicated the competing claims between Mr. Reuther and Mr. Smith that are the subject of Hollywood Casino’s petition.

La. C.C.P. article 4655 states as follows:

I «Service of citation and a copy of the petition in a concursus proceeding shall be made in the same form and manner, and the delays for answering are the same, as in an ordinary proceeding.

La. C.C.P. article 4662 states:

Except as otherwise provided in this Title and by law, the rales applicable to an ordinary proceeding apply, so far as practicable, to a concursus proceeding.

Based on the provisions of these code articles, we find that the trial court erred in adjudicating the merits of the concursus proceeding on a summary basis. Once Mr. Reuther was named as a defendant in the concursus proceeding, he was entitled to avail himself of the rules applicable to ordinary proceedings. The record does not contain any sufficient evidence indicating that following the rules applicable to ordinary proceedings is impracticable in this case.

La. C.C.P. article 4660 allows a trial court to grant certain injunctive relief to a plaintiff in a concursus proceeding. That article states:

The court may grant the plaintiff in a concursus proceeding injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from instituting or prosecuting in any court of this state or of the United States any other action or proceeding on the claim involved in the concursus proceeding.

However, in this case, the trial court exceeded its authority by granting an injunction broader in scope than that authorized by La. C.C.P. article 4660.

For these reasons, we vacate the preliminary injunction granted by the trial court on June 10, 2002, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

      . Arguments of counsel for Mr. Smith and Shreveport Paddlewheels as to the impracticability of applying the rules of ordinary proceedings to this concursus proceeding are not sufficient to invoke an exception to the general rule of La. C.C.P. article 4662.


author: Jj_MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dayshawn BROWN.
    No. 2003-KA-0732.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    July 23, 2003.

      Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney, Claire Adriana White, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Mary Constance Hanes, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS JR.).
   Jj_MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

On April 2, 2002, Dayshawn Brown was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27(30.1), and with armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. On April 12th at his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. After a hearing on May 13th the trial court found probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial and denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The State filed motions noticing its intent to invoke the firearm sentencing provisions and the hate crimes provision. On October 23rd a twelve-member jury found the defendant to be guilty of the responsive verdict of aggravated battery and not guilty as to the armed robbery charge. He was sentenced on November 22nd to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The motion for reconsideration of sentence was denied, and the motion for an appeal was granted.

At trial Officer Roland Doucette, Sr. testified that he responded to a shooting in the Iberville Housing Development on September 11, 2001. The incident occurred in the rear driveway that encompasses the 1500 block of Bienville Street and the 200 block of Marais Street. About seventy-five people were in the area when the officer arrived, and he saw there a man who had suffered several gunshot | ¿wounds but was still conscious and stretched out on the ground. The wounded man told the officer that three people jumped him and robbed him of $100, and that he did not know who shot him. Officer Doucette observed a purse, a red cup, a red shirt, and a blue bandanna on the ground. While looking for witnesses, the officer noted a woman in a window whom he recognized from his work in the area, and he spoke with her. Later he received information via a series of phone calls which enabled him to develop suspects in the case. The first anonymous caller named the defendant as the person who fired the gun and also said that two other men were with him. A second caller said that a man named “Ears” and another named “Mike” as well as a third man were involved in the shooting. The officer knew “Ears” to be a man named Rickey Glover and “Mike” to be a younger person living in the 300 block of Marais Street. The description of the third man — as being about twenty-one years old and having a dark complexion, large bulging eyes, and short twisted braids — fit the defendant, Dayshawn Brown. The officer then turned over the investigation to Detective Eskine; however, Officer Doucette was involved in the arrest of the defendant. In October he went to the defendant’s apartment where he met Brown’s mother on the porch. The officer told her he wanted to speak to Dayshawn whom he observed in the living room. When she called to her son, he ran out the back door and was apprehended.

Detective Michael Eskine testified that he conducted the investigation into the shooting of David Baham, the victim. Officer Doucette gave him the names of three suspects, including Dayshawn Brown. The detective prepared two photographic line-ups which he showed to the victim. From one, Mr. Baham selected the photo of the defendant and named him as the man who shot him. |3 However, he did not select anyone from the line-up containing the picture of Ricky Glover. When interviewed, David Baham told the detective that he had gone to the area to purchase crack cocaine. He bought the drug from Dayshawn Brown who then pulled out a gun and shot him. There was a struggle for the gun, and it fell to the ground. Someone yelled, “Finish him,” and he was shot a second time. Several residents of the complex screamed that they were calling the police, and three men fled. David Baham told the detective that he knew the other two men as Dale and Oliver.

David Baham, who works on Bourbon Street, told the court that he went to the Iberville Development to purchase cocaine about 9 a.m. on September 11, 2001. As Baham was buying the drug from a man named Mike, he noticed the defendant standing nearby with two other men. Ba-ham walked toward his jeep and Day-shawn Brown walked toward him; when they got close to each other, Baham said to Brown, “Don’t I know you?”, and Brown answered, “No, Bitch, you don’t know me,” and began shooting. Baham tried to get the gun and they struggled. Baham grabbed the red shirt Brown was wearing and tugged at it until Brown pulled it over his head to free himself. Brown and the other two men began kicking Baham in the face. They also went through his pockets and his purse and took about $400. Ba-ham said he recognized the defendant because they had “dated.” He also said he used cocaine anytime he felt like partying, but he did not use it every day. David Baham admitted he had a prior conviction for solicitation for a crime against nature. Sometime after the shooting, the defendant’s sister called David Baham and offered to pay him if he did not come to court to testify against her brother.

|4Pr. Ami Raafat, an expert in trauma surgery, testified that she was working at Charity Hospital on September 11, 2001, when the victim came in with multiple gunshot wounds. He was immediately taken to the operating room where he was treated for a collapsed lung; also his spleen was removed, and his diaphragm repaired. The doctor reported that David Baham had six gunshot wounds: two on the front of his left arm, one in his left upper abdomen, one in his left upper back, another mid-back, another in his right buttock, and one in his right knee. When asked if any of his injuries were life-threatening, she replied that if his spleen had not been removed, David Baham would have bled to death, and if the two holes in his diaphragm had not been repaired, he would have suffered many complications.

Dionne Brown, the defendant’s sister, testified that her brother left school in the sixth grade and that he was a very poor student. When Ms Brown was asked if she knew anything about a “rock-rental” between her brother and the victim about a month prior to the shooting, she answered that one day her brother and his friend, Tyrell, drove up in a Jeep they had rented from David Baham. Later, Ba-ham called her house and told Dionne that her brother had not returned the Jeep. Dionne became aware that Baham had been shot after she saw a fight in the courtyard and then heard shots. She went to the scene and saw that it was “Bashia,” the name David Baham was called by the defendant. Dionne claimed that her brother, Dayshawn, was on the porch with her when the crime occurred and that two men named Tyronne and Tyrell were seen with the gun. (Tyrell was also involved in the “rock-rental” of the Jeep). Some time after the shooting when Dayshawn was in jail, Dionne called David Baham to tell him that her brother had been charged with attempted second degree murder, and at the same time, her brother called from jail. She was able to connect the calls to have a three-way conversation. She reported that David Baham was surprised to find that Dayshawn had |5been charged and that he promised to go to the D.A.’s office the next day to drop the charges. Dionne told of another three-way conversation between herself, her father and David Ba-ham in which Baham again stated that Dayshawn had not shot him.

Mr. William Massey, the defendant’s father, corroborated the testimony of his daughter, Dionne, as to the conversation with the victim and the victim’s statement that the defendant had not shot him.

A review of the record reveals no errors patent.

The defendant through counsel makes two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant without benefit of parole for the entirety of his ten-year sentence, and (2) the sentence is excessive.

Dayshawn Brown was sentenced under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(D), the firearms statute which provides:

D. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a firearm was actually used or discharged by the defendant during the commission of the felony for which he was convicted, and thereby caused bodily injury, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment of fifteen years; however, if the maximum sentence for the underlying felony is less than fifteen years, the court shall impose the maximum sentence.

At the sentencing hearing on November 22, 2002, the trial court stated:

I am convinced that you did fire your weapon and you did strike the victim in this matter with the weapon.And I want to let you know that I’ve taken that into consideration. [The court read aloud section “D” of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3]. In this case the maximum sentence for aggravated battery is ten years. So the court has no | fiother alternative but to impose a sentence of 10 years in the Department of Corrections.

The defense attorney then addressed the parole issue. He argued that under Paragraph “G” of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3, parole should be restricted for only the term of the minimum sentence. The trial court disagreed and imposed the entire sentence without benefit of parole.

The defendant now argues that under La. R.S. 14:34 there is no minimum sentence; the statute provides for a fine of not more than $5000 and imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than ten years or both. The defendant would read La. R.S. 14:34 with La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(G) which provides:

A defendant sentenced under the provisions of this Article shall not be eligible for parole during the period of the mandatory minimum sentence.

Because there is no mandatory minimum sentence under La. R.S. 14:34, a defendant so convicted should not be denied parole eligibility according to the defendant’s reading of the law.

However, as the State points out, the language of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(G) explicitly states that anyone “sentenced under the provisions of this Article” is not eligible for parole during the period of the mandatory minimum sentence. Under section D of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3, which applies to cases where the offender uses a firearm in the commission of a felony and causes bodily injury, the term of imprisonment is fifteen years unless the “maximum sentence for the underlying felony is less than fifteen years” as it is for aggravated battery; under these circumstances the court must impose the maximum sentence of the underlying felony. The maximum term under La. R.S. 14:34 is ten years, and La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(G) unambiguously prohibits parole for that period.

^Furthermore, in three recent cases where defendants were sentenced under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3, the article was treated as an enhancement statute and parole was governed by that article and not the underlying statute. In State v. Lee, 2002-1793 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/2/03), 844 So.2d 970, this Court considered a case in which the defendant was sentenced under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(A) which provides that after a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony, the court should impose a sentence of two years, but if the maximum sentence for the underlying offense is less than two years, the court shall impose the maximum sentence. The defendant in Lee was convicted of five counts of forcible rape and three counts of second degree kidnapping. He was sentenced on each of the counts under the appropriate statute and then he was sentenced to serve an additional two years under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(A) for possessing a firearm during the commission of the crimes. This Court, finding the additional two-year sentence illegal, explained the purpose and history of the firearms statute:

La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3 is nothing more than a sentencing enhancement statute that provides for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense for which the defendant has been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, with such sentence not exceeding the maximum statutory sentence for that offense ....
The original firearms sentencing provision was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure by Acts 1981, No. 139, § 1. It provided:
When the court makes a finding that a firearm was used in the commission of a felony and when suspension of sentence is not otherwise prohibited, the court shall impose a sentence which is not less than:
Is (1) The maximum sentence provided by law, in the same manner as provided in the offense, if the maximum sentence is less than five years, or
(2) Five years, in the same manner as provided in the offense, if the maximum sentence is five years or more.
Imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended and the offender shall not be eligible for probation or parole.
This statute clearly provided for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, not for the imposition of a separate sentence in addition to the sentence for the crime for which the defendant was convicted. La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.1 was amended and reenacted by Acts 1988, No. 319, § 1 to enact La.C.Cr.P. arts. 893.2, 893.3 and 893.4 “to provide for the imposition of minimum mandatory sentences in certain cases.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.1 now simply sets forth the procedure the State follows if it intends to move for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3. There was no legislative intent expressed to change the existing law from merely providing for mandatory minimum sentences to providing for separate sentences in addition to the ones imposed for the crimes for which the defendant has been convicted.
That La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3 merely provides for a mandatory minimum sentence is also evident by a reading of the language in the statutory scheme itself. La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.2 refers three times to “the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of Article 893.3.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(G) states that “[a] defendant sentenced under the provisions of this Article shall not be eligible for parole during the period of the mandatory minimum sentence.” These references make it clear that the enhanced sentences pro-; vided by La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3 are simply mandatory minimum sentences for the crimes for which the defendant has been convicted.

State v. Lee, 2002-1793, pp. 47-49, 844 So.2d 970, 999-1000.

In State v. West, 2001-0969 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01), 801 So.2d 619, a case similar to the instant case in that the defendant was convicted of aggravated 1gbattery and appealed his ten-year sentence imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(D), (F), and (G); the Third Circuit, after finding the sentence was not excessive, affirmed the ten-year term without benefits. Also, in State v. Taylor, 34,823 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/11/01), 793 So.2d 367, remanded for resentencing, 35,921 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/02), 813 So.2d 1151, a defendant convicted of manslaughter was initially sentenced to twenty-six years at hard labor with the first twenty years without benefit of parole under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3; however, on remand, the Second Circuit reduced the defendant’s term to twenty-two years without benefit of parole for the first five years under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(C) as it existed in 1997 when the crime occurred. In these cases the eligibility for parole was governed by the firearms statute rather than the underlying statute.

In the case at bar, we find that the defendant’s sentence, which the trial court emphatically stated was imposed under the firearm sentencing provisions and was the mandatory minimum term of ten years, is governed by Section G of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3 which prohibits parole.

There is no merit in this assignment of error.

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive.

Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that “[n]o law shall subject any person ... to cruel, excessive or unusual punishment.” A sentence, although within the statutory limits, is constitutionally excessive if it is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” or is “nothing more than the | ^purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” State v. Caston, 477 So.2d 868, 871 (La.App. 4 Cir.1985). However, the penalties provided by the legislature reflect the degree to which the criminal conduct is an affront to society. State v. Brady, 97-1095 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/3/99), 727 So.2d 1264.

Generally, a reviewing court must determine whether the trial judge adequately complied with the sentencing guidelines set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and whether the sentence is warranted in light of the particular circumstances of the case. State v. Black, 98-0457, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 757 So.2d 887, 892. If adequate compliance with Article 894.1 is found, the reviewing court must determine whether the sentence imposed is too severe in light of the particular defendant and the circumstances of his case. State v. Caston, 477 So.2d at 871. The reviewing court must also keep in mind that maximum sentences should be reserved for the most egregious violators of the offense so charged. State v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009, 1014 (La.1982).

The trial court has great discretion in sentencing within the statutory limits. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983). The reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D).

The defendant argues that he does not deserve the maximum sentence for aggravated battery. He suggests that when the jury found him not guilty of the charge of armed robbery, it must have reasoned that he attacked the victim for some reason other than robbery, and he further proposes that the homosexual victim provoked the attack by taunting him and suggesting that they had a relationship.

|T1We find the record in this case supports the defendant’s sentence. The defendant can offer no justification for shooting the victim several times and inflicting life-threatening injuries. Certainly the fact that the victim was homosexual and indicated he knew the defendant provided no reasonable provocation for the attack. The ten-year sentence is the mandatory term. In light of the seriousness of the crime, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

This assignment is without merit.

Accordingly, for reasons cited above, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . In cross-examination the officer testified that the defendant was actually only seventeen at the time of the incident.

      . According to Dionne Brown, David Baham rented the Jeep to Dayshawn Brown and Ty-rell in return for rock cocaine.

      . In none of the cases was eligibility for parole an issue.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(F) provides:
      A sentence imposed under the provisions of this Article shall not be suspended....