text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward Ray TROTTER, Jr.
    No. 2003-KO-2764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Trotter, Edward Ray Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 205,540; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,-325-KA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ application.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joe Bradley BOUNDS.
    No. 2003-KP-2769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Bounds, Joe Bradley; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 119,631, 119-632, 119-633; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 38086-KW, 38087-KW, 38088-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sigmund L. VAN DYKE.
    No. 2003-K-2777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Van Dyke, Sigmund L.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 17068-96, 21327-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 03-437, 03-438.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin GROSS.
    No. 2003-K-2462.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Gross, Calvin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 14,778; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 2282.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Salvador ORDONEZ.
    No. 2003-KP-1742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Ordonez, Salvador; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85-2457; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-517.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.D. and E.D.
    No. 2004-CJ-0198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Confidential Party; Confidential Party; — Other(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. J-5868; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-713.

Denied.


text:
    Gloria SCOTT, et al. v. The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0008.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re American Tobacco Co., Inc., et al.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory, .and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 96-8461; to the Courttf Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1872.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    William Reese BROWN v. DEAL’S CARPET CARE.
    No. 2003-C-3363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Deal’s Carpet. Care; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Gertiorari and/or Review Office' .of Workers’ Compensation Dist.-5,. No. 01-06944; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0196.

Deniéd.


text:
    Eric GLYNN v. DIAMOND STATE INSURANCE, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Glynn, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, Pineville City Court, No. 01-663; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW03-0029.

Denied.


text:
    Billy A. BROWNING, et al. v. WEST CALCASIEU CAMERON HOSPITAL.
    No. 2003-CC-3354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2002-0060; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW03-332.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    David BORDELON v. THYSSEN DOVER ELEVATORS.
    No. 2003-C-3353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Thyssen Dover Elevators; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 05, No. 01-05911; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2578.

Denied.


text:
    Xavier TIMOTHY v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 206,502; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-327.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Carla BROWN and Jesse Brown v. ECKERD CORPORATION.
    No. 2003-C-3350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Brown, Carla; Brown, Jesse;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 98-10192; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0036.

Denied.


text:
    EPOCH WELLSITE SERVICES v. Corey ORTEGO.
    No. 2003-C-3348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Ortego, Corey; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist.-4, No. 01-07086; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 03-547.

Denied.


text:
    Lisa Wynne SMITH v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.
    No. 2003-C-3338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tan-gipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2000-003436; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0223.

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy EUKER and Charles Euker v. The CITY OF BATON ROUGE, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Euker, Dorothy; Euker, Charles; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 462,467; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2627.

Denied.


text:
    Darrell RANEL v. MCDONALD’S.
    No. 2003-C-3335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re McDonald’s; Golden Stock Enterprises Inc. d/b/a; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, Office of Worker’s Compensation District 02, No. 02-03699; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 03-484.

Denied.


text:
    NORTH AMERICAN FIRE & CASUALTY CO. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2003-C-3334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re North American Fire & Cas. Co.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 64033-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-300.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    NOLA EXPRESS, L.L.C. v. NEW ORLEANS AVIATION BOARD, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re NOLA Express L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2001-11280; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1167.

Denied.


text:
    Elwood L. HANO v. Mary Rose LATINO.
    No. 2003-C-3328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Hano, Elwood L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85,471; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0088.

Denied.


text:
    Scarlet Christine ADAMS v. TEMPLE INLAND, LA.
    No. 2003-C-3327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Adams, Scarlet Christine; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, Dist.-3, No. 01-06875; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-187.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA WORKER’S COMPENSATION CORPORATION v. Martha DUPREE.
    No. 2003-CC-3322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Worker’s Compensation #4, No. 03-05011; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 03-01344.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Paul BRAMANDE v. LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER.
    No. 2003-CC-3321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State University; Louisiana State Bd. Supervisors; Agricultural and Mechanical Col.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 00-7873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1442.

Denied-


text:
    Arn SMITH and Deidre Bell Smith v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-3320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Eunice Police Department, City of; Guillory, Varden Sr. Sergeant; Daigle, Richard Sergeant; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-C-3616-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-155.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin B. LORIO v. TECHE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, et. al.
    No. 2003-CC-3315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Melvin, Maxwell L.; Insured Title Company LTD; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2000-0214-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-01226.

Denied.


text:
    William P. CREWS, Jr. v. Hillard M. (Mitch) GRIFFITH.
    No. 2003-C-3273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Griffith, Hillard M.; Griffith, Linda Sue; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 54-013; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-322.

Denied.


text:
    William A. RAY, et al. v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Bossier City, City of et al.; Dison, Danny R.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 106032; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,708-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    William A. RAY, et al. v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Ray, William A. et al.; Patten, Thomas M.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 106032; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,708-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    Vila HARRIS v. CHRISTUS ST. PATRICK HOSPITAL.
    No. 2003-C-3193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Christus St. Patrick Hospital;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 3, No. 02-01869; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1502.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Elaine MURRAY v. GERMAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Murray, Elaine; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 98-3916; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,697-CA.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SHELL OIL COMPANY v. ST. CHARLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1823.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Shell Oil Company; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 56,712; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-116.

Denied.


text:
    ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. David COLLINS, et al.
    No. 2003-OC-1525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Assurance Company of America;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72727-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-30 CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Murphy J. EWING and Gwendolyn T. Ewing, et al. v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Ewing, Murphy J. et al.; Ewing, Gwendolyn T.; Ewing, Wilson; Ewing, Terry Paul; Ewing, Rodney; Bodin, Christine Ewing; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96-68014; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-918.

Denied.


text:
    Judge Mark D. PLAISANCE v. Mayor Leroy DAVIS, Mayor, City of Baker; Aristead Clayton, Treasurer; Julie Pittman, Finance Director; Phyllis Trisler, Personnel Director
    No. 2003-C-3362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Davis, Leroy Mayor et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or' Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 503890; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0767.

Denied.


text:
    Chandra REED v. MEDICAL CENTER OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS Formerly d/b/a Charity Hospital, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Medical Center of .Louisiana at New Orleans d/b/a; Charity Hospital;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, First. City Court Parish of Orleans, No. 03-50413; to the. Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-2079.

Denied.


text:
    N. Clark CROMWELL v. SIGNATOR INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., John Hancock Financial Services, Inc., and Joshua Drucker.
    No. 2004-CC-0208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Mt. Vernon Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 574-514; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1373.

Denied.


text:
    Ned FONT v. The ESTATE OF Erman MARLER, Jr., Allstate Insurance Company, and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2003-C-3467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Font, Ned; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 65,421-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1860.

Denied.


text:
    Ned FONT v. The ESTATE OF Erman MARLER, Jr., Allstate Insurance Company, and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2003-C-3465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Marler, Pansy; Marler, Joseph; Marler, Dean; Marler, Dennis; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 65,421-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1860.

Denied.


text:
    Cindi ADAMS v. VOYAGER INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Crescent Shippers of La., Inc., and Andy Leon.
    No. 2003-C-3390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Adams, Cindi; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 99-11105; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1333.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would gránt the writ.


text:
    Richard MCNABB v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Dr. Clinton E. Hart.
    No. 2003-C-3344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund; Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Board; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2001-002108; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). CW03-0565, CA03-0596.

Denied.


text:
    Newton J. BLANCHARD and Opal Esteve Blanchard v. GREENWICH INSURANCE CO., Douglas Battery Mfg. Co., & Blanchard Towing, Inc.
    No. 2003-C-3343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Greenwich Insurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 133836; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0821.

Denied.


text:
    Charles W. KRIEGER, Jr. v. Rickie L. MURRAY & Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board.
    No. 2003-C-3340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Krieger, Charles W. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 492,661; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1870.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Richard MCNABB v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Dr. Clinton E. Hart.
    No. 2003-C-3339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re McNabb, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2001-002108; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). CW03-0565, CA03-0596.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth W. MARTIN v. The CITY OF BATON ROUGE, Pat Screen, Wayne Rogillio, William Denicola Wolf, and Unknown Police Officers All in Their Official Capacities and Individually.
    No. 2003-C-3336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Litchfield, Elmer Sheriff; Dichar-ry, Dale Deputy; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 340,773; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 CA 0896.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ned FONT v. The ESTATE OF Erman MARLER, Jr., Allstate Insurance Company, and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2003-C-3332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; Department of Transportation & Development; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 65,421-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1860.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER,would grant the writ.


text:
    Julie M. CHRISTY v. Aron D. WASHINGTON and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3306.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Allstate Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2000-7012; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0147.

Denied.


text:
    Lucinda CANNON and Kado Cannon v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 2003-C-3304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Baton Rouge City of et al.; East Baton Rouge Par. of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 323,642; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0199.

Denied.


text:
    Francis CADWELL v. Brenda GRISWOLD, Windol Griswold, Griswold Properties and Republic Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3285.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Cadwell, Francis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2000-12770; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0136.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., recused.


text:
    Corey BOUDREAUX v. PRIME SERVICE, INC. OF TEXAS, Prime Service, Inc. of Arizona, Rental Service Corporation and Genie Industries, Inc.
    No. 2003-CC-3305.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Boudreaux, Corey; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 562-406; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1191.

Denied.


text:
    J. Robert WOOLEY as Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Louisiana v. The OATH FOR LOUISIANA, INC. and Venture Health Partnership Group of Louisiana, Inc. and KPMG, LLP.
    No. 2003-CC-3266.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Wooley, J. Robert Comm, of Ins.; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 494218; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 1814.

Denied.


text:
    Mary SEITHER, Individually and in Her Capacity as Tutrix of the Minors, Mark Seither and Stephen Seither v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC., Bernard J. Seither, AIU Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-2797.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Seither, Mary; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 99-17502; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-2091.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Mary SEITHER, Individually and in Her Capacity as Tutrix of the Minors, Mark Seither and Stephen Seither v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC., Bernard J. Seither, AIU Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-2799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re AIU Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 99-17502; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-2091.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jennifer HAMPTON v. Michael THOMAS, Robert Brian Webb, Enterprise Leasing Company, ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3308.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Webb, Robert B.; Safeway Ins. Co. of La.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St.' Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-3762; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-577.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Frances J. WIGGINS, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of the Minors, Christopher Wyatt Wiggins and Brittiany Danielle Wiggins v. Monica GAUTREAU, et al.
    No. 2003-C-3312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Wiggins, Frances J. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 368,977; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2506.

Denied.


text:
    Jennifer HAMPTON v. Michael THOMAS, Robert Brian Webb, Enterprise Leasing Company, ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-3318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.;' — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-3762; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-577.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    DEZAIRE OF FLORIDA, L.L.C. v. Bonnie Chatellier FRUGE and Successors in Interest to Louis (Lewis) Baham, Son of/and Juan Baptiste Baham, John Baptiste Baham, Numa L. Chatelier, Frederick Perrin, Ezra Sewezey Wager, John Fourstaken, Francois Beranger, Casimier Baham, Thomas J. Baham, Isabella Baham, Angelle Binaghi, Mary Constance Morgan, Colette Lesassier, Louis Lesassier, Simon Rodrigues, John Ramon, John B. Gibaud, Antoine Raby, Lazare Baham, Salvadore Baham, Louis Baham, Joseph Baham, Norbett Baham, Honore Baham, Pedro Baham, Celestine Baham, Honorey Baham, Catto Tyler, Modeste Baptiste, and Marian Raby.
    No. 2003-C-3323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Fruge, Bonnie C., et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2001-14531; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0085.

Denied.


text:
    Ashli RICHARDSON, Karl M. Beattie, and Bobbie G. O’Bryan, Jr. v. Bobby Gerald LOTT, Jr., Bobby Gerald Lott, Sr., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government.
    No. 2003-C-3324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 125,981; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0189.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joyce ACOLATSE, Individually and as Guardian, Mother and Next Friend of Michael Acolatse (A Developmentally Disabled Individual), David Eaton, Individually and Gail Peterson, Individually v. Jim EASTERWOOD, Martin De Porres Nursing Home, Inc., A Louisiana Non-Profit Corporation and Developmental Services of Nebraska, A Nebraska Non-Profit Corporation.
    No. 2003-C-3341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
   In re Acolatse, Joyce; Eaton, David; Peterson, Gail; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-6898; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-201.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry Lee LEONARD.
    No. 2004-KK-0476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-03-497; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 2843.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    James DEMORUELLE v. Clarence DUDLEY, et al.
    No. 2004-CD-0479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 27, 2004.
   In re Dudley, Clarence et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, New Iberia City Court, No. 35908-E.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    In the Interest of M.A.
    No. 2004-CJ-0474.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 3, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State of; Social Services Dept, of; — Other(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ter-rebonne, City Court of Houma, No. J-415-02; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2004 CW 0336, 2003 CW 2841.

Writ denied; stay denied.


author: I,CLAIBORNE, J.

text:
    MANDALAY OIL & GAS, L.L.C. and Voyager Petroleum, Inc. v. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORP., Michael X. St. Martin, Virginia Rayne St. Martin and Quality Environmental Processes, Inc.
    No. 2001 CA 0993.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    July 3, 2002.

      Bernard F. Levy, Houma, Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Mandalay Oil & Gas, L.L.C. and Voyager Petroleum, Inc.
    David R. Richardson, James Barton,. Ill, New Orleans, Raymond G. Hoffman, Jr., Metairie, Patrick W. Gray, Jamie D. Rhymes, Lafayette, Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Energy Development Corp.
    A.J. Gray, III, Lake Charles, Timothy C. Ellender, Jr., Houma, Counsel for De~ fendants-Appellants Michael X. St. Martin, Virginia Rayne St. Martin, and Quality Environmental Processes, Inc.
    Before: CARTER, C.L, PARRO and CLAIBORNE, JJ.

      . Judge Ian W. Claiborne, retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   I,CLAIBORNE, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a concursus proceeding. On appeal, appellants have filed a peremptory exception raising the issue of res judicata for the first time in this matter. For the reasons that follow, we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the issue of res judicata, but we retain jurisdiction of the appeal of the judgment on the merits pending disposition of the issue of res judicata.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 14, 1998, Mandalay Oil & Gas, L.L.C. (Mandalay) and Voyager Petroleum, Inc. (Voyager) jointly filed this concursus proceeding against Michael X. St. Martin, Virginia Rayne St. Martin (the St. Martins), Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. (Quality), and Energy Development Corporation (EDC). Mandalay and Voyager initiated the proceeding to determine the proper parties entitled to the distribution of a portion of natural gas royalty proceeds attributable to production from two tracts of land — Concursus Tract 1 and Concursus Tract 2.

The pertinent tracts are contained within the KBR RA SUA unit of the Sunrise Field in Terrebonne Parish. In their joint pre-trial statement, the parties stipulated that Concursus Tract 1 lies within a section of the Sunrise Field known as the Protective Area. Concursus Tract 2 lies outside and to the northeast of the Protective Area. According to the petition, Mandalay leased the relevant tracts from the St. Martins and Quality (collectively, the St. Martin Group), while Voyager leased the same tracts from EDC. The St. Martin Group and EDC each claim the right to receive all of the royalty proceeds at issue.

EDC argues that it is entitled to all of the royalties because it is the owner of a mineral servitude covering the two concur-sus tracts and other contiguous lands. According to EDC, a single, large, contiguous servitude was conveyed to its | ,qpredecessor-in-titIe pursuant to a mineral conveyance dated May 3, 1971. EDC further alleges that it has adequately maintained this servitude through operations and production either on the subject con-cursus tracts or on other contiguous lands contained within its servitude. Because the' servitude is contiguous, EDC argues, maintenance of a part of the servitude constitutes maintenance of the whole in order to prevent extinguishment of the servitude through prescription for nonuse.

The St. Martin Group, on the other hand, bases its claim to ownership of the mineral royalties on the St. Martins’ ownership of the surface of the concursus tracts. They also assert that EDC does not own any servitude affecting the con-cursus tracts. In support of this assertion, the St. Martin Group alleges that the 1971 mineral conveyance, upon which EDC bases its claim to a servitude, did not contain an adequate property description to put third parties on notice that a servitude would burden the concursus tracts. They further argue that any servitude EDC may have had in the concursus tracts has been extinguished by prescription of nonuse for a period of at least ten years. According to the St. Martin Group, EDC’s servitude, if one existed, was not contiguous such that maintenance of a part of the servitude would constitute maintenance of the whole.

A trial on the merits was held in this matter in April of 2000, after which the judge took the matter under advisement. On September 29, 2000, the trial judge issued a written judgment declaring EDC to be the owner of all of the natural gas royalty proceeds attributable to production from the two concursus tracts. On October 16, 2000, the trial judge issued written findings of fact and reasons for judgment, in which he specifically found that the property description in the 1971 mineral conveyance was sufficient to put third parties on notice that a mineral servitude would burden the concursus tracts. The trial judge further found that EDC had established the existence of a single, large, contiguous servitude, which |4had been maintained sufficiently to avoid prescription. This appeal by the St. Martin Group followed.

In addition to its appeal of the trial court’s decision on the merits, the St. Martin Group filed a peremptory exception in this court raising the issue of res judicata for the ' first time in this matter. The instant lawsuit is one of at least four suits between these parties concerning their respective claims to the mineral rights in the concursus tracts and other surrounding lands. The exception is based on a judgment rendered by the 24th Judicial District Court in the Parish of Jefferson in a suit filed by EDC against the St. Martin Group.

EDC filed the Jefferson Parish suit on July 7,1997, prior to the commencement of the instant concursus proceeding in Terre-bonne Parish by Mandalay and Voyager. In the Jefferson Parish suit, EDC sought a declaratory judgment recognizing it to be the owner of a mineral servitude in the Protective Area of the Sunrise Field in Terrebonne Parish. EDC additionally sought a permanent injunction preventing the St. Martin Group from interfering with its right to the use and enjoyment of the servitude. The St. Martin Group reconvened, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Jefferson Parish suit went to trial in October of 1999. On December 17, 1999, the trial judge in that matter rendered a judgment against EDC and in favor of Quality. In his judgment, the trial judge specifically determined that the property description in the 1971 mineral conveyance was not adequate to put third parties on notice as to which properties were being encumbered. In addition, the trial judge found that any servitudes or mineral rights EDC may have had in the | ^Protective Area were created by an instrument dated August 31, 1966, and had been extinguished by prescription of nonuse for ten years. Finally, the trial judge specifically stated in his written reasons for judgment that the area over which EDC claimed a servitude was not contiguous.

EDC filed a suspensive appeal of the Jefferson Parish judgment with the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. At the time the instant cdncursus proceeding went to trial in Terrebonne Parish, the Fifth Circuit had not yet ruled on that appeal. The St. Martin Group and EDC advised the trial judge in Terrebonne Parish of the Jefferson' Parish suit and‘the pending appeal, but no exception of any kind was filed. In addition to this oral notification of the trial court about the suit, EDC had previously submitted the signed Jefferson 'Parish judgment and written reasons as an attachment to a pretrial memorandum filed by EDC. Although the attorney for EDC acknowledged the potential res judicata effect of the Jefferson Parish judgment before the Terre-bonne Parish trial court, he opposed the motion for continuance made by the St. Martin Group. Consequently, the motion was denied, and‘the matter proceeded to trial.

DISCUSSION

■Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
Ib(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

In addition, article 531 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides:

When two or more suits are pending in a Louisiana court or courts on the same transaction or occurrence, between the same parties in the same capacities, the defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed by excepting thereto as provided in Article 925. When the defendant does not so except, the plaintiff may continue the prosecution of any of the suits, but the first final judgment rendered shall be conclusive of all. (Emphasis added.)

Res judicata is an issue and claim preclusion device found both in federal law and state law. The purpose of both federal and state law on res judicata is essentially the same — to promote judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes by preventing needless relitigation. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-0654, pp. 11-12 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624, 631.

Under LSA-R.S. 13:4281, res ju-dicata bars relitigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence as a previous suit. Thus, the chief inquiry is whether the second action asserts a cause of action that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Terre-bonne Fuel, 95-0654 at p. 12, 666 So.2d at 632. Furthermore, the doctrine of res ju-dicata is not discretionary and mandates the effect to be given to final judgments. Leon v. Moore, 98-1792, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/1/99), 731 So.2d 502, 505, writ denied, 99-1294 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 20; cf. LSA-R.S. 13:4232.

Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 embraces the broad usage of the phrase “res judicata” to include both claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Under claim preclusion, the res judicata effect of a judgment on the merits precludes the parties from relitigating matters that were or could have been raised in that action. Under issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, however, once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision 17precludes relitigation of the same issue in a different cause of action between the same parties. Thus, res judi-cata used in the broad sense has two different aspects: 1) foreclosure of relitigat-ing matters that have never been litigated but should have been advanced in the earlier suit; and 2) foreclosure of relitigating matters that have been previously litigated and decided. Hudson v. City of Bossier, 33,620, p. 7 (La.App.2d Cir.8/25/00), 766 So.2d 738, 743, writ denied, 2000-2687 (La.11/27/00), 775 So.2d 450.

Res judicata cannot be invoked unless all its essential elements are present and each necessary element has been established beyond all question. The res judicata doctrine must be strictly construed, and any doubt concerning its applicability is to be resolved against the party raising the objection. Berrigan v. Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP, 2001-0612, p. 5 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/2/02), 806 So.2d 163, 167, writs denied, 2002-0388, 2002-0341 (La.4/12/02), 813 So.2d 410.

Res judicata is an objection usually raised in the trial court by a peremptory exception. Such an exception may be filed at any point in the proceedings in the trial court prior to the submission of the case for a decision. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 927 & 928. In addition, the peremptory exception may be filed in the appellate court for the first time pursuant to article 2163 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:

The appellate court may consider the peremptory exception filed for the first time in that court, if pleaded prior to a submission of the case for a decision, and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record.
If the ground for the peremptory exception pleaded in the appellate court is prescription, the plaintiff may demand that the case be remanded to the trial court for the trial of the exception.

The St. Martin Group asserts that the evidence in the record is sufficient to prove all the essential elements of res judicata. In the alternative, the St. Martin, |sGroup requests that this matter be remanded to the trial court in Terrebonne Parish for a trial on the issue of res judica-ta.

EDC has argued that article 2163 prohibits this court from remanding the matter to the trial court for a hearing on the exception. Specifically, EDC asserts that remand is only proper when the peremptory exception pleaded is the objection of prescription. We disagree.

The first paragraph of article 2163 authorizes the appellate court' to consider and rule on a peremptory exception, when proof of the ground of the exception appears of record. The second paragraph of the article allows the plaintiff to demand that the case be remanded to the trial court for a trial if the ground is prescription.. This circuit has determined that once such a demand is made, the court is without discretion in remanding the matter for consideration by the trial court. Blanchard v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 93-1155, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/8/94), 635 So.2d 742, 744. The Code of Civil Procedure is silent, however, as to the remand of the matter for consideration of other peremptory exceptions.

In reaching the conclusion that a remand of the matter is the best option under the circumstances of this case, we are guided by the approach taken under similar circumstances in Lewis v. Lewis, 155 La. 231, 99 So. 202 (1923), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that the plea of res judicata could be filed in the supreme court, but nevertheless remanded a motion to dismiss an appeal based on res judicata to allow the moving party to prove the finality of the underlying judgment and to allow the respondent an opportunity to contradict the facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. See also National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Cagle, 94-322, p. 14 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/2/94), 649 So.2d 642, 651, writs denied, 94-2932 & 94-3002 (La.3/17/95), 651 So.2d 266; Stansell v. Stansell, 622 So.2d 1203, 1205 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). We believe that the evidence in the record does not clearly prove the elements necessary to sustain the exception. It is not clear whether some or all of the property and servitudes involved in the prior suit are the same as those involved in the present suit. Therefore, we hereby remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing on whether, and to what extent, the ruling by the Jefferson Parish trial court is conclusive of this matter.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and in the interest of justice, we remand this matter to the trial court for a trial on the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata filed by Michael X. St. Martin, Virginia Rayne St. Martin, and Quality Environmental Processes, Inc., but we retain jurisdiction of the appeal of the judgment on the merits pending disposition of the issue of res judicata. The costs of this appeal will be assessed once the appeal of the judgment on the merits has been considered by this court.

REMANDED; APPEAL STAYED.

      . Quality owns a 10% interest in the mineral rights pursuant to a transfer from the St. Martins.

      . As noted previously, Concursus Tract 1 in the instant proceeding is contained within this Protective Area.

      .The Jefferson Parish trial court judgment, which was introduced into the appellate record of the instant proceeding by EDC, initially lists the defendants as Quality Environmental Processes, Inc., et al. Later in the judgment, however, only Quality is listed, despite the fact that the St. Martins are listed throughout the trial judge's written reasons. At oral argument before this court, the parties indicated that the trial judge' had added the St. Martins’ names in the judgment as defendants on motion of the St. Martin Group subsequent to the initial appeal of the merits of the matter to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. That amendment of the judgment is now on appeal before the Fifth Circuit.

      . The Fifth Circuit did subsequently rule on the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court in EDC v. Quality Environmental Processes, 2000-314 (La.App. 5th Cir.12/4/00), 777 So.2d 481, writ denied, 2001-0010 (La.3/9/01), 786 So.2d 734.

      . This case applies article 902 of the former Code of Practice, the source provision for current article 2163 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The comments to article 2163 de-dare that this artide does not change the law and simply restates the jurisprudence interpreting its source provision:


author: laGAIDRY, j; |, KUHN, Judge,

text:
    MOTOROLA, INC. v. ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION, Continental Casualty Company, National Surety Company, Transportation Insurance Company, Zurich American Insurance Company, Harbor Insurance Company, Hartford Accidental & Indemnity Co., Illinois National Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company, and St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company.
    No. 2002 CA 0716.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    April 30, 2003.
    S.Gene Fendler, Harold J. Flanagan, New Orleans, J.W. Montgomery, III, Pittsburgh, PA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Motorola, Inc.
    Philip R. King, Chicago, IL, David P. Salley, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Zurich American Insurance Company.

      Robert A. Vosbein, William J. Kelly, III, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Ap-pellee Continental Casualty Company.
    Michael Durand, Lafayette, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Associated Indemnity Corporation and National Surety Corporation.
    Edward A. Rodrigue, Jr., New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company.
    Eavelyn T. Brooks, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg Pennsylvania and Illinois National Insurance Company.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., FOIL, WHIPPLE, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, DOWNING, GAIDRY, McDONALD, & McClendon, jj.
   laGAIDRY, j;

This is an appeal of a summary judgment rendered in a declaratory judgment action, relating to the issues of an insurance company’s coverage and duty to defend its insured in various class action lawsuits. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff-appellant, Motorola, Inc. (Motorola), but granted the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-appellee, Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich). Motorola appeals the summary judgment dismissing its claims against Zurich. Because of the importance of consistency in the application of La. C.C.P. art.1915 in determining the appealability of partial judgments, and with the consent of the parties, we review this issue en banc prior to rendition of judgment on the merits by the original panel to which this appeal was assigned.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Motorola is a manufacturer of cellular wireless handheld telephones (“cell phones”). It was named as a defendant in a number of class action lawsuits (the “Underlying Actions”) seeking recovery of sums of money allegedly owed by Motorola and numerous other cell phone manufacturers and distributors to alleviate customers’ allegedly harmful exposure to radio frequency radiation.

^Motorola filed this action for declaratory judgment and breach of contract against ten of its primary and excess liability insurers, seeking a determination that their policies provide coverage for the claims in the Underlying Actions, that they have the duty to defend Motorola for those claims, and that they are liable for damages to Motorola for their failure to defend it in the Underlying Actions. Zurich issued a comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy to Motorola, in effect from July 1, 1985, to July 1, 1987. In addition to denying liability in its answer, Zurich asserted a reconventional demand for declaratory judgment “that it has no obligation to either defend and/or [sic ] indemnify Motorola.”

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich, and denied Motorola’s motion on the same issues. The summary judgment dismisses Zurich as a party defendant in this declaratory judgment action.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. McGehee v. City/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2000-1058, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/12/01), 809 So.2d 258, 260. A final judgment of the trial court can be appealed. La. C.C.P. art.2083. A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. Whether a partial final judgment is appeal-able is determined by examining the requirements of La. C.C.P. art.1915. It is appropriate for us to examine the basis for our jurisdiction before addressing the merits of this appeal.

The judgment before us is a summary judgment rendered in an action for declaratory judgment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1871 provides that a declaratory judgment “shall have the force and effect of a | ¿final judgment or decree.” Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1877 further provides that declaratory judgments “may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees.” Accordingly, the character of this action as one seeking declaratory judgment does not prevent appellate review of a partial final judgment rendered by the trial court.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915 authorizes the immediate appeal of partial final judgments, including partial summary judgments. It provides, in pertinent part:

A. A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court:
(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors.
* * *
(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).
B. (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
1 fi(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any order or decision which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Our emphasis.)

The portion of the judgment presented for our review is that granting Zurich’s motion for summary judgment, not that portion denying Motorola’s motion. Motorola does not seek to appeal the denial of its motion. In its judgment, the trial court certified the partial summary judgment in favor of Zurich as a partial final judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B), since it addressed only the merits of the issues between Motorola and Zurich.

Despite the complex basis of the Underlying Actions and the numerous parties involved therein, the present action seeks only the determination of the obligations of the insurers of only one defendant manufacturer involved in those actions. The judgment at issue is even narrower: it grants summary judgment in favor of Zurich specifically “on its Reconventional Demand, as supplemented and amended,” declaring that Zurich has no duty under its policies to defend, indemnify, or reimburse Motorola or any vendors or other parties to whom Motorola may owe indemnity for the claims or defense of the Underlying Actions. It resolves the merits of all issues between Motorola and Zurich presented in the context of the declaratory judgment action.

The judgment “[gjrants a motion for summary judgment,” as provided in article 1915(A)(3), as to “all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories ... |7in [a] reconventional demand.” It grants Zurich all of the relief sought in its reconven-tional demand, and dismisses all claims by Motorola against it in the principal demand with prejudice. Arguably, however, this might be viewed as a partial judgment under article 1915(B)(2) as to the principal demand, being a judgment as to less than all parties and all claims. The jurisprudence since the effective date of the 1999 amendment is inconsistent in its interpretation of those partial judgments of dismissal governed by article 1915(A), as opposed to article 1915(B). For the following reasons, however, we conclude that the judgment is immediately appeal-able by virtue of its status as a final judgment under article 1915(A), without any need for an express determination of the propriety of immediate appeal and a designation (“certification”) under article 1915(B).

The divergent interpretations of the necessity of certification of partial judgments alone demonstrate the ambiguity of article 1915’s language. Under the general rules of statutory construction where such ambiguity exists, courts begin their review with the premise that legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and, therefore, the interpretation of the law involves, primarily, the search for the legislature’s intent. See Cole-Miers Post 3619 V.F.W. of DeRidder v. State, Department of Revenue & Taxation, 99-2215, p. 3 (La.1/19/00), 765 So.2d 312, 314. See also La. C.C. arts. 2, 10.

The present version of La. C.C.P. art. 1915, as amended by Acts 1999, No. 1263, § 1, became effective as to all actions filed on or after January 1, 2000. Prior to that effective date, article 1915(B)(1) provided that its certification requirement applied to any partial judgment “as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, theories, or parties.” The official Comment relating to the 1999 amendments states that the purpose of the change was “to eliminate confusion with Article 1915(A) by the elimination of ‘parties’ from (B)(1).” La. C.C.P. art.1915, Comment 1999. Thus, it would seem that a judgment adjudicating all claims relating to “one or more but less than all of the ... parties” would henceforth be governed by article 1915(A).

That the above-described result is what the legislature intended is confirmed by examination of the pertinent legislative history. Intent expressed at the appropriate legislative committee meetings is an aid to the courts in determining the true legislative intent and purpose behind the law. Bridges v. Smith, 01-2166, p.5 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/27/02), 832 So.2d 307, 311. House Bill No. 780, which, as amended, was enacted as Acts 1999, No. 1263, § 1, was proposed by the Louisiana State Law Institute, pursuant to its statutory duty “[t]o consider needed improvements in both substantive and adjective law and to make recommendations concerning the same to the legislature.” La. R.S. 24:204(A)(1). Among the extensive recommendations made were the elimination of the word “parties” from La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1) and exclusion of summary judgments rendered pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(E) from article 1915(A)(3). The minutes of the House 19Committee on Civil Law and Procedure relating to House Bill No. 780 are particularly revealing:

Professor [Howard W.] L’Enfant [of the -Louisiana State University Law Center] ... explained the changes to Article 1911, which would clarify the ap-pealability of-final judgments and partial final judgments and specify that (1) a partial judgment pursuant to C.C.P. Art. 1915(A), other than a partial summary judgment, is appealable without more, and (2) a partial judgment under C.C.P. Art.l915(B), and a partial summary judgment, are appealable only if designated by the court.
Professor L’Enfant continued with the changes to Article 1915 which' would clarify the confusion that presently exists. Article 1915(A) specifies those partial final judgments that are appealable and Article 1915(B) describes other partial judgments which may or may not be final appealable judgments, depending on whether so designated by the trial court. He stated that the problem with the way Article 1915(B) is written is an overlap with respect to Article 1915(A). Article 1915(A) provides that if a final judgment dismisses a party, it is an appealable judgment, but Article 1915(B)(1) provides that, when a court renders a partial judgment or a partial summary judgment as to one or more but less than all of the parties, then it is not a final judgment unless specified as such by the court. Therefore, a judgment that dismisses a party must designate whether it would be appealable under (A)(1) or it was hot appealable under (B)(1). Professor L’Enfant stated that the bill would strike “or parties” from (B)(1) and return the law as it was before the adoption of (B)(1), which was that whenever a judgment dismisses a party, that judgment is- a partial final judgment and would be- appealable.
'Jr- * *
Representative McMains [co-author of Bill No. 780 and committee chairman] explained that the net effect of the changes to Article 1915 would be that a partial final judgment would unquestionably exist whenever a party were [sic ] dismissed, but as to a partial summary judgment that dismissed an issue or cause of action, .the court would be required to certify that it was indeed a partial final judgment.
Professor L’Enfant agreed with Representative McMains’ statement, that the courts of appeal have taken very seriously the language in Article 1915(B)(1) and have said that, without reasons from the trial court stating why an appealable partial judgment should exist, the appeal courts are prepared to dismiss the appeal as inappropriate. Therefore, the language of 110the bill is reinforced by the opinions of the courts of appeal that have been rendered so far. (Our emphasis.)

Commentators have expressed the view, consistent with the foregoing expressions of the legislative purpose, that the 1999 amendment to La. C.C.P. art.1915 served “the purpose of making a judgment dismissing one or more but not all of the parties immediately appealable under Article 1915A without the necessity of designation by the trial court as a final judgment under Article 1915B.” 1 Frank L. Maraist and Harry T. Lemmon, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Civil Procedure § 14.3(1) (1999 ed., 2002 pocket part). See also Roger A. Stetter, Louisiana Civil Appellate Procedure, § 3.18 (2002 ed.). At'this time, it would appear that the prevailing rule in the Second and Fourth Circuits is in accord with this interpretation, while the Third and Fifth Circuits have generally held that a judgment dismissing less than all the parties is controlled by article 1915(B)(1).

We hold that the summary judgment at issue is clearly a partial final judgment governed by the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (A)(3), and that the trial court’s designation or “certification” of the judgment as final for appeal was unnecessary. La. C.C.P. art.1911. As the judgment dismisses one party from the principal demand and resolves all issues between the parties to Zurich’s reconven-tional demand, it is a final Injudgment immediately appealable under both La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1)and (A)(3) in the context of either demand.

DECREE

As we have determined this judgment is immediately appealable pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A), we hereby maintain the appeal.

APPEAL MAINTAINED.

KUHN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

|, KUHN, Judge,

dissenting.

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company and dismissing the insurer from this lawsuit is a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1915A.

According to Louisiana Civil Code article 9, when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written. No further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. See also La. R.S. 1:4 (when the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit).

The appropriate starting point for statutory interpretation then is the language of the statute itself. In re Louisiana Health Service and Indent. Co., 98-3034 (La.10/19/99), 749 So.2d 610; see also A.K. Dumin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Jones, 2001-0810 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/10/02), 818 So.2d 867. And when a statute is clear, unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, there is no justification for considering comments to the enactment as persuasive sources or interpretive aids. Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So.2d 811 (La.1991). It is only when | athe language of a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation that the determination of the legislature’s intent in enacting the provision becomes necessary. Louisiana Mun. Ass’n v. State, 2000-0374 (La.10/6/00), 773 So.2d 663.

Because La. C.C.P. art. 1915A(3) is clear, unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, all summary judgments rendered in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 966E are not final judgments under La. C.C.P. art. 1915A and must be certified as set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1915B.

According to the plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1915A(3):

A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court:
* * *
Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).

Under La. C.C.P. art. 966E,

A summary judgment may be . rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of. recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, under the plain language of'La. C.C.P. art. 1915A, a final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but this does “not includ[e] a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article |a966(E)” according to the unambiguous language of subsection (3). Subsection B instructs:

(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories, whether in an original demand, recon-ventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after, an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any order or decision which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and. shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued may -be revised at any time''prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added.)

In properly construing La. C.C.P. art. 1915, it is of no moment that the words “or parties” in subsection B(l) was deleted by Acts 1999, No. 1263,. § 1 because no ambiguity exists in the plain language of the present version of the statute when read in its entirety. Subsection A(l) permits rendition- of a final judgment when the court “[dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors”; and subsection A(3) simply excludes from the category of final judgments, those summary judgments rendered under La. C.C.P. art. 966E.

The majority’s holding has the effect of removing from the province of the trial court the management of its cases. Requiring certification by the trial judge who is familiar with the claims in the lawsuit is not an overly burdensome or dilatory measure. Such an approach does not mean that all insurers, for example, who are dismissed from a lawsuit by 'the trial court will be required to endure the entirety of the case until it can be released] A | ¿trial judge, who after a meaningful consideration expressly determines there is no just reason for delay, may well certify that the released party is iñ a posture to raise all potential claims that would relieve it from appearing in the lawsuit, i.e., entitled to an immediate appeal. The approach of requiring certification for all summary judgments rendered under La. C.C.P. art. 1915A(3) pursuant to Article 966E simply places regulation of a lawsuit in the trial judge’s hands.

Accordingly, I dissent.

      . The original and first amended petitions named "Zurich Insurance Company” as a defendant. Zurich American Insurance Company is the legal successor in interest to Zurich Insurance Company, U.S. Branch, and has answered those petitions in that name and capacity.

      . The Underlying Actions include Naquin v. Nokia Mobile Phones, Inc. (originally filed in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana); Pinney v. Nokia, Inc. (originally filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, State of Maryland); Farina v. Nokia, Inc. (originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County, State of Pennsylvania); Gillian v. Nokia, Inc. (originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County); and Gimpelson v. Nokia, Inc. (originally filed in the Superior Court for Fulton County, State of Georgia). All of the Underlying Actions were removed to federal court and joined as one multi-district action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. On March 5, 2003, the Underlying Actions were dismissed, but as of this writing the appeal delay from the order of dismissal had not expired.

      . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966(E) states, "A summary judgment may be rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case.” As we interpret this language, the type of partial summary judgment rendered under article 966(E) to which article 1915(A)(3) refers is limited to that which does not dismiss a party from the action. Article 1915(A)(1) addresses the situation where a party is dismissed in a multiple-party action, whether by summary judgment or otherwise, while article 1915(A)(3) addresses the specific situation where summary judgment dismisses a party. Thus, a partial summary judgment dismissing one or more parties, but leaving some opposing parties in the proceeding, could fall under the ambit of both article 1915(A)(1) and article 1915(A)(3).

      . Cf La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1), which governs partial judgments as to “less than all of the claims, demands, issues or theories” of a cause of action.

      . Zurich's reconventional demand is compulsory under La. C.C.P. art. 1061(B), since the causes of action asserted “arise out of the • transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the principal action.” If Zurich had instituted the principal action instead of Motorola, the summary judgment in its favor would clearly be appealable as a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A), with no need for certification by the trial court under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). The fact that it was brought by Zurich in the capacity of plaintiff in reconvention does not logically warrant a different conclusion. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1036(B) and 1040.

      . Cf. Brossett v. Progressive Insurance Company, 01-0986 (La.App. 3rd Cir.12/12/01), 801 So.2d 668, and Costello v. Hardy, 01-583 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/15/02), 807 So.2d 950, with Weeks, Kavanagh & Rendeiro v. Blake, 02-0964 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/14/02), 826 So.2d 577.

      . This action was filed on August 11, 2000.

      . Meeting of House Committee on Civil Law and. Procedure, 1999 Regular Session, April 20, 1999 (La.1999)(statements of Prof. Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr., and Rep. F. Charles McMains, Jr., chairman).

      . See Mayhorn v. McKinney, 34,789, p. 3 n.6 (La.App. 2nd Cir.6/20/01), 793 So.2d 225, 227-28 n. 6 (dictum as to interpretation of present language of La. C.C.P. art.1915); Grant v. Boh Brothers Construction Company, Inc., 00-1227, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/25/01), 785 So.2d 1041, 1044-45 (dictum; court erroneously applied present version of La. C.C.P. art.1915 to case filed before January 1, 2000); and cases cited in n. 5, supra.

      . This article specifically provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from a final judgment under Article 1915(A) without the judgment being ... designated [a final judgment under Article 1915(B)].”