author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS-STEPPARENT ADOPTION FORMS.
    No. SC02-516.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Oct. 3, 2002.
   PER CURIAM.

In our opinion dated March 28, 2002, Amendments to Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms — Stepparent Adoption Forms, 821 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2002), we adopted amendments to the stepparent adoption forms that were necessary due to legislation. We gave interested parties an opportunity to comment on the amendments and we received comments, which we carefully considered, from the Honorable John C. Lenderman, Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, attorney Nancy C. Holliday-Fields, Third Judicial Circuit, and attorney Jeanne Tate on behalf of the Florida Adoption Council.

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. We have considered the comments and adopt many of the suggestions therein, including an amendment to the instructions for form 12.981(b)(1), clearly indicating that the adopting stepparent will continue to have rights, including visitation and custody, where appropriate, should the natural parent and adopting stepparent later divorce. Further, we have changed language in form 12.981(a)(5), subdivision 4, from “address or location” to “current residence.” We also have eliminated the requirement in form 12.981(a)(6) that required a sworn statement. With regard to several comments received, we conclude that those comments address subdivisions in the forms that are based on statutory requirements and, thus, we are unable to change those subdivisions without changes in the statutes.

Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms (stepparent adoption forms) 12.981(a)(2), 12.981(a)(5), 12.981(a)(6), 12.981(a)(7), 12.981(b)(1), and 12.981(c)(1) are amended as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, effective for immediate use. Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(8), Indian Child Welfare Act Affidavit, is adopted as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, effective for immediate use. We make no changes to the remainder of the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms (stepparent adoption forms) that were adopted in our opinion dated March 28, 2002.

We express no opinion as to the correctness or applicability of these forms, or on the substance of the legislation. This opinion and the forms may be accessed and downloaded from this Court’s website at unvw.flcourts.org.

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.

APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(a)(2), TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION: CONSENT AND WAIVER BY PARENT

When should this form be used?

This form is to be completed and signed by the parent who is giving up all rights to and custody of the minor child to be adopted. This consent shall not be executed before the birth of the minor child.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. It must be signed in the presence of a notary public or deputy clerk and two witnesses other than the notary or clerk. You should file this form with the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights Pending Adoption by Stepparent, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(1).

After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights Pending Adoption by Stepparent, % □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(1) is filed and keep a copy for your records.

Special notes ...

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(a)(2)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE _JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR_ COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.:

Division: .

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION OF

Minor Children).

CONSENT AND WAIVER BY PARENT

1. I, {full legal name}_, am the [/ one only] ( ) father or ( ) mother of the minor children) subject to this consent who is/are:

Child’s Current Name Gender Birth date Birthplace [city, county, state]

a. b. d. f.’

2. I relinquish all rights to and custody of this (these) minor child(ren), {name(s)} _, with full knowledge of the legal effect of the stepparent adoption and consent to the adoption by the child(ren)’s stepparent whose name is:

[/ one only]

( ) {name} _

( ) not required for my granting of this consent.

3. I understand my legal rights as a parent, I have read and understand the following Consent Disclosure, and I understand that I do not have to sign this consent and release of my parental rights. I acknowledge that this consent is being given knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. I further acknowledge that my consent is not given under fraud or duress. I understand that there is a “grace period” in Florida during which I may revoke my consent. I understand that, in signing this consent, I am permanently and forever giving up all my parental rights to and interest in this (these) minor child(ren). I voluntarily, permanently relinquish all my parental rights to this (these) minor child(ren).

CONSENT DISCLOSURE

This consent is required by Florida Statute to include, (in at least 16-point boldfaced type,) all of the following information. The information in this disclosure may not apply to your particular situation.

You have the right to select at least one person who does not have an employment, professional, or personal relationship with the adoption entity or the prospective adoptive parents to be present when this affidavit is executed and to sign- it as a witness. You must acknowledge on this form that you were notified of this right and you must indicate the witness or witnesses you selected, if any. If you are selecting a witness, the witness you select is {full legal name} __

You do not have to sign this consent form. You may do any of the following instead of signing this consent or before signing this consent:

1. Consult with an attorney;

2. Hold, care for, and feed the child;

3. Place the child in foster care or with any friend or family member you choose who is willing to care for the child;

4. Take the child home unless otherwise legally prohibited; and

5. Find out about the community resources that are available to you if you do not go through with the termination of parental rights and adoption.

If you sign this consent, you are giving up all rights to your child. Your consent is valid and binding unless withdrawn as permitted by law. If you are giving up your rights to a child who is to be placed for adoption with identified prospective adoptive parents upon the child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth center following birth, a waiting period will be imposed before you may sign the consent for adoption. You must wait 48 hours from the time of birth, or until the birth mother has been notified in writing, either on her patient chart or in release papers, that she is fit to be released from a licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is sooner, before you may sign the consent for adoption. Once you have signed the consent, it is valid and binding and cannot be withdrawn unless a court finds that it was obtained by fraud or under duress.

If you are giving up your rights to a child who is not placed for adoption upon the child’s release from a licensed hospital or birth center following birth, you may sign the consent at any time after the birth of the child. While the consent is valid and binding when signed, you have time to change your mind. This time is called the revocation period. When the revocation period applies, you may withdraw your consent for any reason at any time prior to the placement of the child with the prospective adoptive parents, or if you do it within 3 business days after the date you signed the consent or 1 business day after the date of the birth mother’s discharge from a licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is later.

To withdraw your consent during the revocation period, you must:

1. Notify the adoption entity, by writing a letter, that you are withdrawing your consent.

2. Mail the letter at a United States Post Office within 3 business days after the date you signed the consent or 1 business day after the date of the birth mother’s discharge from a licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is later. The term “business day” means any day on which the United States postal service accepts certified mail for delivery.

3. Send the letter by certified United States mail with return receipt requested.

4. Pay postal costs at the time you mail the letter.

5. Keep the certified mail receipt as proof that consent was withdrawn in a timely manner.

Once the revocation period is over, or the child has been placed with the prospective adoptive parents, whichever occurs later, you may not withdraw your consent unless you can prove in court that consent was obtained by fraud or duress.

4. I consent, release, and give up permanently, of my own free will, my parental rights to this (these) minor children), for the purpose of stepparent adoption.

5. I waive any further notice of the stepparent adoption proceeding.

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this consent and waiver and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: _ _

Signature of Parent

Printed Name: _

Address: _

City, State, Zip: __

Telephone Number: _

Fax Number: _

Signature of Witness

Printed Name: _

Business Address: _

Home Address:_

Driver’s License or

State ID Card No.:

Signature of Witness

Printed Name: _

Business Address: _

Home Address: _

Driver’s License or

State ID Card No.:

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF _

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on {date}_at {time}

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced_

I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this executed Consent and Waiver.

Signature of Parent

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [<& fill in all blanks] I, {full legal name and trade name of nonlawyer}_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}_, {phone}-, helped {name}_, fill out this form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(a)(5), TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION: AFFIDAVIT OF DILIGENT SEARCH

When should this form be used?

Use this form to obtain constructive service (also called service by publication) in a case to terminate parental rights pending stepparent adoption, Petition to Terminate Parental Rights Pending Adoption by Stepparent, □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(1), when any required consent is unavailable because the address or location of the person whose consent is required is not known and cannot be determined.

This form includes a checklist of places you must look for information on the location of the person whose rights you seek to terminate. You do have to look in all of these places, and the court must believe that you have made a very serious effort to get information about the person’s location and that you have followed up on any information you received.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see rule 12.070, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure and Rule 1.070, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

Special notes ...

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, % □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(a)(5)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE IN AND FOR_ _JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, . COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.: _

Division: _

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION OF

Minor Children).

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION: AFFIDAVIT OF DILIGENT SEARCH

I, {full legal name}_, being sworn, certify that the following information is true:

1. I am the child(ren)’s ( ) mother ( ) father.

2.The last known address of the child(ren)’s other parent {name}_, as of {date}_, was:

Address City State Zip

Telephone No.

Fax No.

His/her last known employment, as of {date}_, was:

Name of Employer

Address City State Zip

Telephone No.

Fax No.

3. The other parent is over the age of 18.

4. The other parent’s current residence is not known and cannot be determined, although I have made a diligent search and inquiry to locate him/her through the following:

You must search ALL of the following sources of information and state the results.

_ United States Post Office inquiry through the Freedom of Information Act for the person’s current address or any previous address. Result of search: _

_ Last known employment of the other parent, including name and address of employer. Addresses to which W-2 Forms or other wage and earning statements were mailed, and, if a pension or profit-sharing plan exists, then to what address any pension or plan payment is to be mailed. Result of search:

_ Regulatory agencies, including professional or occupational licensing, in the area where the other parent last resided. Result of search:

_ Names and addresses of relatives to the extent such can be reasonably obtained from the petitioner or other sources, contacts with those relatives and inquiry as to the other parent’s last known address. You are to follow up any leads of any addresses where the other parent may have moved. Relatives include, but are not limited to: parents, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, grandparents, great-grandparents, former or current in-laws, stepparents, and stepchildren. Result of search: _

_ Information about the other parent’s possible death and, if dead, the date and location.

__ Telephone listings in the area where the other parent last resided. Result of search: _

_ Law enforcement agencies in the area where the other parent last resided. Result of search: _

_ Highway Patrol records in the state where the other parent last resided. Result of search: _

_ Department of Corrections records in the state where the other parent last resided.

Result of search: _

_ Hospitals in the last known area of the other parent’s residence. Result of search: _

_ Records of utility companies, which include water, sewer, cable TV, and electric in the last known area of the other parent’s residence. Result of search: __

_ Records of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and their response as to whether or not there is any information about the other parent. (See Florida Supreme

Court Approved Family Law Form 12.912(a), Memorandum for Certificate of Military Service.) Result of search: _

__ Records of the tax assessor’s and tax collector’s office in the area where the other parent last resided.

Result of search: _

_ Search of one Internet databank locator service.

Result of search: _

_ Information held by all medical providers who rendered medical treatment or care to the mother and child, including the identity and location information of all persons listed by the mother as being financially responsible for the uninsured expenses of- treatment or care and all persons who made such payments. Result of search: __

_ Title IV-D (child support enforcement) agency records in the state of the other parent’s last known address. Result of search: __

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this affidavit and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: _ _

Signature of Petitioner

Printed Name: _

Address: _

City, State, Zip: _

Telephone Number: _!_

Fax Number: _

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF _

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on_by

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced_

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [/&> fill in all blanks] I, {full legal name and trade name of nonlawyer}_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}_, {phone}_, helped {name} __, who is the petitioner, fill out this form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(a)(6), NOTICE OF PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION AND NOTICE OF HEARING

When should this form be used?

For each person whose written consent is required, who has not executed an affidavit of nonpaternity, and whose location and identity is known, you must notify him or her of this proceeding. Additionally, this form should be used to notify those persons whose consent is required and who have not properly consented.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. You should then file the original and 1 copy with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights Pending Stepparent Adoption, ^ □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(1) is filed. A copy of this form must be personally served by personal service, at least 30 days before the hearing upon:

• anyone from whom consent is required who has not executed an affidavit of nonpaternity, whose location and identity have been determined.

If you absolutely cannot find an address or location for the parent, you may use constructive service. For more information about personal and constructive service, you should refer the “General Instructions for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms and the instructions to Summons: Personal Service on an Individual, □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Forms 12.910(a) and Affidavit of Diligent Search, ^ □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(5). However, the law regarding constructive service is very complex and you may wish to consult an attorney regarding that issue.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. See chapter 63, Florida Statutes, and Florida Family Law Rule 12.200(a)(2) for further information.

Special notes ...

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, % □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(a)(6)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE_JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR_COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.: _

Division:,_

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION OF

Minor Children).

NOTICE OF PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION AND NOTICE OF HEARING

A petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption by stepparent has been filed. A copy of the petition is being served with this notice. There will be a hearing on the Petition to terminate parental rights pending adoption by stepparent before Judge {name}_, on {date}_, at {time}_m., in Room_of the_Courthouse. The court has reserved ___ hour(s)/ __minutes for this hearing.

If you executed a consent to adoption or an affidavit of nonpaternity and a waiver of venue, you have the right to request that the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights be transferred to the county in which you reside. You may object by appearing at the-hearing or filing a written objection with the court.

UNDER SECTION 63.089, FLORIDA STATUTES, FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS NOTICE WITH THE COURT OR TO APPEAR AT THIS HEARING CONSTITUTES GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE COURT SHALL END ANY PARENTAL RIGHTS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THE MINOR CHILD.

This part to be filled out by the court or to be filled in with information you obtained from the court: If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact {name} _, {address}_, {telephone}_, within 2 working days of your receipt of this Notice of Hearing. If you are hearing or voice impaired, call TDD 1-800-955-8771.

Signature of Party

Printed Name: ___

Address:_

City, State, Zip:_

Telephone Number:_

Fax Number: _

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [#» fill in all blanks] I,{full legal name and trade name of nonlawyer}_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}_, {phone}_, helped {name}_, who is the petitioner, fill out this form. Form 12.981(a)(7)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE_JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR_COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.: __

Division: _:_

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION OF

Minor Children).

FINAL JUDGMENT TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS PENDING STEPPARENT ADOPTION

Upon consideration of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights Pending Stepparent Adoption and the evidence presented, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:

1. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights Pending Stepparent Adoption.

2. The Court has jurisdiction over the minor children), {name(s)}_, {date(s) of birth}_

3. The (_) mother (_) father was served with or waived notice of this action.

4. The parent’s parental rights should be terminated because: [/ all that apply]

_ a. Each person whose consent is required has executed a valid consent that has not been withdrawn.

_ b. The person whose consent is required has executed an affidavit of nonpa-ternity.

_ c. The birth parent abandoned the child(ren) as defined in s. 63.032.

_ d. The parent has been declared incapacitated by a court order, and restora-' tion of capacity is medically improbable. A copy of the order has been filed in this case.

__ e. The legal guardian or lawful custodian of the minor children), other than a parent, has failed to respond in writing to a request for consent for a period of 60 days, or his/her reasons for withholding consent are unreasonable.

_ f. The person to be adopted is married. The spouse of the person to be adopted has failed to consent and the failure of the spouse to consent to the adoption is excused because of prolonged, unexplained absence, unavailability, incapacity, or another circumstance constituting unreasonable withholding of consent. {Explain}: -

_ g. The birth parent died on {date}_, in_County, {state}

5. {This space is included for the judge to include specific findings of fact}

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. All legal relations between the child(ren) and the noncustodial parent, _{name} and between the children) and the relatives of that parent, are terminated, as are all parental rights and responsibilities of that parent.

2. This court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the minor child(ren) until a final judgment is entered on the stepparent adoption.

ORDERED on_

CIRCUIT JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(a)(8), INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AFFIDAVIT

When should this form be used?

This form should be used in cases involving termination of parental rights pending stepparent adoption of a child. This affidavit is required.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or deputy clerk. You should then file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be mailed or hand delivered to the other party in your case, if it is not served on him or her with your initial papers.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in “bold underline ” in these instructions are defined there.

Special notes ...

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(a)(8)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE IN AND FOR__ _JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, . COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.: _

Division: ____

Petitioner,

and

Respondent.

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AFFIDAVIT

I, {full legal name}_, being sworn, certify that the following statements are true:

1. Upon information and belief the child_{name} subject to this proceeding: [/ one only] _ is not an Indian child. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to this proceeding.

__ is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

I certify that a copy of this document was [/ one, only] ( ) mailed ( ) faxed and mailed ( ) hand delivered to the person(s) listed below on {date}_

Other party or his/her attorney:

Name: _

Address: _

City, State, Zip: _

Fax Number: _

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this affidavit and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: _

Signature of Party

Printed Name: _

Address: _

City, State, Zip:_

Telephone Number: _

Fax Number: _

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF_

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on_by

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced_

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [¿» fill in all blanks] I, {full legal name and trade name of nonlawyer}_!_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}_, {phone}-, helped {name} _, who is the [/ one only] _ petitioner or _ respondent, fill out this form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(b)(1), JOINT PETITION FOR ADOPTION BY STEPPARENT

When should this form be used?

This form should be used when a stepparent is adopting his or her spouse’s child. Both the stepparent and his or her spouse must sign this petition. You must attach a certified copy of the court judgment terminating the parental rights of the other parent. You may not file this joint petition for adoption by stepparent until 30 days after the date the judge signed the judgment terminating the other parent’s rights.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. The name to be given to the child(ren) after the adoption should be used in the heading of the petition. The stepparent is the petitioner, because he or she is the one who is asking the court for legal action. After completing this form, you and your spouse must sign it before a notary public or deputy clerk. You should then file the original and 1 copy with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the petition for termination of parental rights was granted, unless the court changes the venue to the county where the petitioner or the petitioners or the minor resides.

What should I do next?

For your case to proceed, you must attach a certified copy of the court judgment terminating parental rights of the other parent. You may not file this joint petition for adoption by stepparent until 30 days after the order terminating the other parent’s rights is final.

When you have filed all of the required forms and met the requirements as outlined above, you are ready to set a hearing on your petition. You should check with the clerk of court, family law intake staff or the judicial assistant to set a final hearing.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. See chapter 63, Florida Statutes, and Florida Family Law Rule 12.200(a)(2) for further information.

Special notes ...

With this petition you must file the following:

• Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Affidavit, □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(d).

• Certified copy of the court judgment terminating parental rights.

These family law forms contain a Final Judgment of Stepparent Adoption, □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(b)(2), which the judge may use. You should check with the clerk, family law intake staff, or judicial assistant to see if you need to bring a final judgment form with you to the hearing. If so, you should type or print the heading, including the circuit, county case number, division, and the child(ren)’s names, and leave the rest blank for the judge to complete at your hearing.

You should decide how many certified copies of the final judgment you will need and be prepared to obtain them after the hearing. There is a charge for certified copies, and the clerk can tell you how much. The file will be sealed after the final hearing, and then it will take an order from a judge to open the file and obtain a copy of the final judgment.

AN ADOPTIVE STEPPARENT WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE PARENTAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING VISITATION AND CUSTODY, WHERE APPROPRIATE, IN THE EVENT OF A LATER DIVORCE, AND MAY BE LIABLE FOR CHILD SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF A LATER DIVORCE. YOU COULD BE LIABLE IN LITIGATION FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE ADOPTEE(S). THIS ADOPTION MAY ALSO AFFECT THE ADOPTEE’S INHERITANCE.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, % □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(b)(1)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE. IN AND FOR_ . JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, _ COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.:

Division: _

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF

{use name to be given to children)}

Adoptee(s).

JOINT PETITION FOR ADOPTION BY STEPPARENT

Petitioner, {full legal name}_, being sworn, joined by the above-named child(ren)’s ( ) mother ( ) father, {full legal name} _, being sworn, files this joint petition for adoption of the above-named minor children), under chapter 63, Florida Statutes.

1. This is an action for adoption of a minor child(ren) by his or her (their) stepparent.

2. I desire to adopt the following children):

Name to be given to child(ren) Birth date Birthplace

P

o-1

p

CL,

e. ____

f. ___

3.The child(ren) has (have) resided in my care and custody since {date} _I wish to adopt the children) because I would like to legally establish the parent-child relationship already existing between the child(ren) and me. Since the above date, I have been able to provide adequately for the material needs of the children) and am able to continue doing so in the future, as well as to provide for the child(ren)’s mental and emotional well-being. My facilities and resources are as described here:

a. Facilities: {descube residence} -

b. Resources: {describe employment, income and other financial resources}

4. I am_years old, and have resided at {street address},-{city} _, {county}_{state}_for_years.

5. I married the ( ) father or ( ) mother of the child(ren) on {date}-, in {city}_{county} __, {state}_, The following are the dates and places of my divorces, if any:

Date of Divorce Place of Divorce

a. ______-

b. _

6. A completed Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Affidavit (UCCJA), □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(d), is filed with this petition.

7. A description and estimate of the value of any property of the adoptee is as follows: -

8.The case style and date of entry of the judgment terminating parental rights of the other parent is:_A certified copy of the court judgment terminating parental rights is attached.

WHEREFORE, I request that this Court enter a Final Judgment of Adoption of the Minor Children) by Petitioner Stepparent and, as requested, change the name of the adoptee(s).

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this petition and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: _ _

Signature of Stepparent

Printed Name:-

Address:_

City, State, Zip:_

Telephone Number: -

Fax Number: _

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF_

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on_by

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced__

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this petition and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated: _ _

Signature of ( ) mother ( ) father

Printed Name:_

Address:_

City, State, Zip: __

Telephone Number:_

Fax Number: _

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF_

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on_by

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced_

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [A fill in all blanks] I, {full legal name and trade name ofnonlawyer}_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}_, {phone}_, helped'{wa.TOe}_, who is the petitioner, fill out this form.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.981(c)(1), PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ADULT BY STEPPARENT

When should this form be used?

This form should be used when a stepparent is adopting his or her spouse’s adult child. You must obtain the written consent of the adult child to be adopted, as well as the written consent of his or her birth parents and spouse (if married). This form should be typed or printed in black ink. The name to be given to the adoptee after the adoption should be used in the heading of the petition. The stepparent is the petitioner, because he or she is the one who is asking the court for legal action. You must have your signature witnessed by a notary public or deputy clerk.

After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where either you or the adoptee live and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

For your case to proceed, you must have the written consent of the adoptee, his or her spouse if married, and the birth parents or properly notify each of them of the petition and hearing. If you know where they live, you must use personal service. If you absolutely do not know where they live, .you may use constructive service. For more information about personal and constructive service, you should refer the “General Instructions for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms and the instructions to □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Forms 12.910(a) and 12.913(b) and Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.913(a). However, the law regarding constructive service is very complex and you may wish to consult an attorney regarding that issue.

When you have filed all of the required forms and met the requirements for consent as outlined above, you are ready to set a hearing on your petition. You should check with the clerk of court, family law intake staff, or judicial assistant to set a final hearing, and notify the other party(ies) using a Notice of Hearing (General), % □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.923, or other appropriate notice of hearing form.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. See chapter 63, Florida Statutes, and Florida Family Law Rule 12.200(a)(2) for further information.

Special notes ...

With this petition you must file the following:

• Stepparent Adoption: Consent of Adoptee, □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(a)(3)
• Stepparent Adoption: Consent of Adult Adoptee’s Spouse, % □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(c)(2)
• Stepparent Adoption: Consent of Adult Adoptee’s Birth Parents, % □ Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.981(c)(3), if obtainable
• Certified copy of Adoptee’s Birth Parents’ death certificates, if deceased.

THIS ADOPTION MAY AFFECT THE ADOPTEE’S INHERITANCE.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of a Disclosure from Nonlawyer, % □ Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address; and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

Form 12.981(c)(1)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE_JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR_COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No.:

Division: .

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF

{use name to be given to adult}

Adoptee.

PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ADULT BY STEPPARENT

Petitioner, {full legal name}_, files this petition for adoption of the above-named adult, pursuant to chapter 63, Florida Statutes, and states: 1. This is an action for adoption of an adult by the adult’s stepparent, Petitioner.

2. I desire to adopt {adult’s full legal name}_, who was born on {date} _, at {city, county and state}_

3. I desire to adopt the adult because:_

4. I am_years old, and I have resided at {address} Florida for_years.

5. The adoptee’s name shall be: _

6. The adoptee’s birth parents are:

Father’s Name

Birth date

Address

Mother’s Name

Birth date

Address

7. Notice. Notice to the birth parents was made by:_

8. Consent.

[/ all that apply]

_a. The consent of the adoptee is attached.

— b. The adoptee is married to {full legal name of adoptee’s spouse} -, and the consent of the spouse is attached.

— c. The adoptee is not married.

— d. The consent of ( ) _, the birth mother, and ( ) -, the birth father, of the adult is (are) attached to this petition.

- e. The birth ( ) mother ( ) father is (are) absent, or does (do) not consent to the adoption, and proof of service of process of this petition on the birth ( ) mother ( ) father is attached.

—. f. The birth ( ) mother ( ) father is (are) deceased. A certified copy of the death certificate(s) is (are) attached.

WHEREFORE, I request that this Court enter a Final Judgment of Adoption of the adult by Petitioner Stepparent and change the name of the adoptee.

I understand that I am swearing or affirming under oath to the truthfulness of the claims made in this petition and that the punishment for knowingly making a false statement includes fines and/or imprisonment.

Dated:

Signature of Party

Printed Name:_

Address: _

City, State, Zip:_

Telephone Number:_

Pax Number:_

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF_ Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on_by

NOTARY PUBLIC or DEPUTY CLERK

[Print, type, or stamp commissioned name of notary or deputy clerk.]

_ Personally known

_ Produced identification

Type of identification produced_

IF A NONLAWYER HELPED YOU FILL OUT THIS FORM, HE/SHE MUST FILL IN THE BLANKS BELOW: [<& fill in all blanks] I, {full legal name and trade name of nonlauryer}_, a nonlawyer, located at {street}_, {city}_, {state}-, {phone}-, helped {name}_, who is the petitioner, fill out this form.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Domenic L. MASSARI, III, Respondent.
    No. SC01-724.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Oct. 31, 2002.

      John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, FL; and Brett Alan Geer, Assistant Staff Counsel, and Thomas Edward DeBerg, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, FL, for Complainant.
    John A. Weiss of Weiss & Etkin, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by Do-menic L. Massari, III. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation that Massari be disbarred for misconduct, including the misappropriation of client funds.

FACTS

The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Domenie L. Massari, III, alleging that he violated several Rules Regulating the Florida Bar in his handling of a client’s funds. After a hearing, the referee issued a report making detailed findings.

Massari represented Mr. Martinez and his Florida corporation in a civil case, which involved a contract dispute over money owed for a residence that Martinez’s corporation built for Dr. and Mrs. Steen. Martinez paid Massari $7000 in fees before the case settled. On February 14, 2000, the case settled at mediation with the Steens agreeing that Martinez’s company would receive $30,000 from funds held in escrow by First American Title Insurance Company. Martinez and Mas-sari agreed that, upon receipt of the $30,000, Massari would receive an additional $5000 in legal fees, plus any costs, to conclude the representation. The Steens’ counsel provided Massari with a blank “Satisfaction and Release of Lien,” to be signed by Martinez to effectuate the agreement. Massari’s longtime secretary, Judith Hebert, notarized the satisfaction and release of lien, attesting that Martinez had affixed his signature to it on March 8, 2000. However, the referee found that this document was forged because “[s]ome-one other than Ronald Martinez signed Mr. Martinez’s name to the Satisfaction and Release of Lien.” The referee specifically found that “Martinez did not sign the Satisfaction and Release of Lien on March 8, 2000; moreover, at no time did Mr. Martinez grant any power of attorney to respondent, nor did he otherwise authorize respondent to sign any legal document in his stead.”

On March 13, Massari traveled to First American Title Insurance Company and presented the forged satisfaction and release of lien to office manager Donna Dur-bin. She accepted the document Massari presented and gave him a check for $30,000 payable to Martinez’s corporation. Although the check did not identify Mas-sari as a payee, Massari then endorsed and negotiated the check and deposited the funds into his client trust account on the day he received it, March 13. Massari did not notify Martinez of his receipt of the funds.

Shortly thereafter, Massari made five separate disbursements that he admitted were for his own personal use or benefit, encompassing the entire $30,000: (1) on March 13, he disbursed $7,238.30 as his “fee” for the Martinez representation; (2) on March 16, he disbursed $4500 to himself; (3) on March 24, he disbursed $9,711.70 from the Martinez ledger account to another client ledger account, ostensibly to refund fees paid to him previously by another client; (4) on March 28, he disbursed $7800 to himself; and (5) on March 30, he disbursed the remaining $750 to himself. The referee found that Martinez was entitled to receive the funds in March 2000, when Massari received them. Massari never accurately advised Martinez of his use and disbursement of the funds.

Because Martinez did not receive his settlement proceeds in a timely manner, Martinez questioned Massari about the funds. Martinez was not satisfied by Mas-sari’s response, so in May 2000, Martinez discussed the situation with his friend, attorney Larry Rardon. At Rardon’s suggestion, Martinez called the title company holding the money, First American Title Insurance Company. In a phone conversation, escrow assistant Kirby Harlow informed Martinez that his account showed a zero balance because his proceeds had been disbursed back in March. Martinez went to the title company to meet with Durbin and Harlow, who showed him the satisfaction and release of lien that Mas-sari had delivered to the title company. Martinez informed Durbin and Harlow that the notarized signature oh the document was not his. They also showed Martinez the negotiated check, and he declared that he had not endorsed or negotiated the check. Durbin notified the Steens’ legal counsel of Martinez’s declarations. The Steens’ legal counsel contacted the Tampa Police Department and The Florida Bar, both of which initiated investigations. .

On June 13, 2000, Massari deposited $24,200 back into the client ledger account of Martinez’s corporation, paying $24,200 to Martinez and retaining $5800 out of the original $30,000 figure as his fee. Massari or his staff then prepared a letter to the Tampa Police Department, which Massari wanted Martinez to sign. Eventually,- after several days of attempting to revise the letter, Martinez reluctantly signed the letter and gave it to the police. The police did not pursue the criminal investigation of Mássari’s conduct because Martinez said he was satisfied to receive his money and he did not wish to see criminal 'charges pressed against Massari.

Pursuant to the Bar’s investigation, Massari and his. counsel met with the Bar’s assistant staff counsel in October 2000. At this meeting, Massari presented a document for the first time, titled “Martinez Escrow Instructions” (hereinafter “escrow document”). . The document, allegedly contained notarized signatures of Massari and Martinez. Massari claimed this notarized document was a grant of authority from Martinez to himself that explained his conduct involving his receipt, possession, and use of Martinez’s funds. The referee noted that the escrow document indicated it was signed on. February 14, 2000, but the referee specifically found that Martinez never signed the document. Relying on testimony from the Bar’s handwriting expert, Ray Green, the referee found that Martinez’s signature appearing on the escrow document was a “transposition” (ie., cut and pasted from another document), of his actual signature from a document titled the “Contractor’s Final Affidavit.” The referee concluded that the escrow document was a forgery. The referee acknowledged that no direct proof was adduced showing who was responsible for concocting the document, but found that Massari “is the only person who had motive and reason for transposing the signatures.” The referee also found that the transposed signature on the escrow document was evidence of a deliberate and knowing act to deceive.

The referee recommended that Massari be found guilty of violating the following Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: rule 4-1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation); rule 4-1.15(a) (a lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer’s own property, funds and property of clients or third persons that are in the lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation); rule 4 — 1.15(b) (upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person, and the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client any funds or other property that the client is entitled to receive); rule 4-3.4(b) (a lawyer shall not fabricate evidence, or counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely); rule 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another); and rule 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Applying the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the referee found as aggravating factors: (1) dishonest or selfish motive (standard 9.22(b)); (2) pattern of misconduct (standard 9.22(c)); (3) multiple offenses (standard 9.22(d)); (4) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process (standard 9.22(f)); (5) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct (standard 9.22(g)); and (6) substantial experience in the practice of law (standard 9.22(i)). As a mitigating factor, the referee found the absence of a prior disciplinary record (standard 9.32(a)). As to discipline, the referee recommended that Massari be disbarred for five years. The referee also recommended that Mas-sari pay the expenses incurred by the Bar, which total $8,440.48.

Massari petitioned this Court to review the referee’s report, claiming that the referee’s findings of fact were not supported because the only direct evidence supporting the Bar’s allegations came from Martinez, whose testimony was unworthy of belief. Massari also claims that disbarment is not the appropriate discipline for this case.

ANALYSIS

We first consider whether competent, substantial evidence in the record supports the referee’s factual findings and whether those findings support the referee’s legal conclusion that Massari misappropriated client trust funds. We note that Massari’s stated version of events differs substantially from the facts found by the referee.

Massari claims that the case against him rests entirely on the testimony of Martinez, who is unworthy of belief. Massari states that the Steens’ civil case against Martinez was based on Martinez filing a fraudulent contract with a bank for his own financial gain, and that Martinez’s credibility is suspect and his word cannot be taken over that of Massari, who has practiced law for twenty-four years without being the subject of a prior disciplinary case. Massari also challenges the referee’s finding that the escrow document was not valid. He argues that Martinez should not be believed when he testified that he did not sign the February 14, 2000, escrow document.

According to Massari, when he and Martinez returned from the settlement mediation on February 14, 2000, Martinez asked Massari if he could place his settlement funds in certain investments with Massari’s business partner Mr. Brad Muller. Massari claims that he then introduced Martinez to Muller. Massari claims that later that evening, Martinez provided him with written authorization to invest the settlement proceeds in various ways. Massari, his secretary Hebert, and his business partner Muller, testified that Martinez signed the escrow document on February 14, 2000. Massari claims that he cannot produce the original document because he gave the original to Martinez. Also, Massari alleges that Martinez instructed him to keep these financial matters secret, which is why Mas-sari’s statements to Durbin and the Bar were inconsistent. Massari argues that when he received the $30,000 check from First American Title, he endorsed the check and deposited it into his trust account pursuant to the escrow instructions he received from Martinez, even though the specified investment opportunities were no longer available. Based on these allegations, Massari claims that Martinez cannot be believed when he said he did not sign the escrow document and, therefore, the referee’s conclusion that Massari misappropriated client funds is clearly erroneous.

This Court has stated that if a referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we are precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting this Court’s judgment for that of the referee. See Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Fla.1998). The record demonstrates that the referee’s findings of fact and conclusion that Massari misappropriated client funds are supported by competent, substantial evidence. This Court has also noted that the “referee is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his judgment regarding credibility should not be overturned absent clear and convincing evidence that his judgment is incorrect.” Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So.2d 975, 978 (Fla.1999) (quoting Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla.1991)). Our review of the record in this case indicates that the referee was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of Martinez’s testimony, and we find no basis in the record to reject the referee’s reliance on that testimony. In addition, the referee also relied on testimony from other witnesses as well as documentary evidence.

Contrary to Massari’s arguments, the evidence relied upon by the referee came not only from Martinez, but also from other witnesses such as handwriting expert Green, attorney-friend Rardon, title company manager Durbin, escrow assistant Harlow, and even Massari himself. Handwriting expert Green testified, in detail, that he examined the signatures on the original satisfaction and release of lien that was in the title company’s files, the original canceled cheek for $30,000, the escrow document, and the “Contractor’s Final Affidavit.” Green also examined and evaluated the signatures on the letter Martinez gave to the police department and twenty-eight checks that it is known Martinez signed. Green examined some of these items under a microscope. His testimony supports the referee’s findings that Martinez’s signature on the original satisfaction and release of lien is a forgery; Martinez did not endorse the check for $30,000; and Martinez’s signature on the escrow document is actually a transposition of Martinez’s signature from the “Contractor’s Final Affidavit.” Green’s statements also support Martinez’s version of events, because Martinez claims that he did not sign these documents. Further, as the referee pointed out, it belies common sense that Martinez would transpose his own signature onto the escrow document, rather than sign the document.

Rardon’s testimony indicates that Martinez told Rardon that he was not satisfied by Massari’s answers to his questions about the funds. Also, Rardon’s testimony confirms Martinez’s version- of events, in that Rardon suggested that Martinez contact the title company. The testimonies of title company manager Durbin and escrow assistant Harlow confirm Martinez’s testimony about his phone call, when he learned that the $30,000 check had already been disbursed, and his subsequent visit to their office, when he discovered the forged satisfaction and release of lien and the forged signature on the $30,000 check. The statements of Durbin and Harlow corroborate Martinez’s version of the events, including the basic point that Martinez was surprised to learn that Massari had already picked up the settlement check and deposited it.

Massari also admitted making five separate disbursements for his own personal use or benefit that encompassed the entire $30,000 of settlement funds. Contrary to Massari’s initial claims about intending to invest the settlement funds, Massari admitted that he actually used his client’s funds for his own purposes.

After reviewing the testimonies of Green, Rardon, Durbin, Harlow, Martinez, and Massari, we find there is competent, substantial evidence in the record that supports the referee’s findings and conclusion that Massari misappropriated client trust funds. Therefore, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations of guilt.

DISCIPLINE

Next, Massari challenges the referee’s recommended discipline of disbarment. Generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess a referee’s recommended discipline as long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla.1999). Massari argues that the appropriate discipline is a two-year suspension because the record establishes, at worst, a single instance of the misuse of trust funds.

The facts establish that Massari fraudulently obtained his client’s settlement funds, misappropriated those funds, and committed fraud when attempting to conceal his misconduct. Under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanes. 4.11 (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury.”), and 5.11(f) (“Disbarment is appropriate when ... a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”).

Our recent case law further demonstrates that the presumptive penalty for the misuse of client funds is disbarment. Florida Bar v. Spears, 786 So.2d 516, 519 (Fla.2001). This Court has recognized that the “overwhelming majority of cases involving the misuse of client funds have resulted in disbarment.” Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So.2d 689, 691 (Fla.2000). Further, this Court has stated that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for misuse of client funds because it is unquestionably one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit. Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So.2d 810, 813 (Fla.1996).

This Court’s decision in Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So.2d 586 (Fla.2000), provides guidance. In that case, the respondent misappropriated funds from his uncle’s estate, of which he was the personal representative, for his own use. He also submitted a false final accounting to the other residual beneficiaries. The referee recommended a ninety-day suspension and cited a number of mitigating factors. This Court found that a ninety-day suspension was “far too lenient” and, instead, disbarred Korones for a period of five years. Like Massari, Korones had the aggravating factors of a dishonest or selfish motive and substantial experience in the practice of law. This Court stated that, when determining the discipline to be imposed in a case involving the misappropriation of funds, it is important to look at the circumstances surrounding the misappropriation.

In Korones, this Court stated that “we are faced with a situation in which an attorney with an exemplary career has intentionally and wrongfully misappropriated money from clients and diverted it for his personal use.... Further, this attorney affirmatively filed a false accounting with the beneficiaries of his uncle’s estate and paid his son so that he would not be reported to the Bar. The latter actions clearly indicate that the attorney was well aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct.” Id. at 591. Like Korones, Massari misappropriated client funds for his personal use and created a fraudulent document to conceal his misconduct. Also, the instant referee found the transposed signature appearing on the forged escrow document was “evidence of a deliberate and knowing act,” which is similar to Korones’s being “well aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct” when he engaged in the false accounting and payment to his son.

CONCLUSION

We reiterate once again that we will not tolerate the misappropriation of client funds. As this Court stated in Korones, 752 So.2d at 589 (quoting Florida Bar v. Ward, 599 So.2d 650, 652 (Fla.1992)):

The single most important concern of this Court in defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection of the public from incompetent, unethical, and irresponsible representation. The very nature of the practice of law requires that clients place their lives, their money, and their causes in the hands of their lawyers with a degree of blind trust that is paralleled in very few other economic relationships. Our primary purpose in the disciplinary process is to assure that the public can repose this trust with confidence. The direct violation of this trust by stealing a client’s money, compounded by lying about it, mandates a punishment commensurate with such abuse.

We find the referee’s recommendation that Massari be disbarred is well supported by the rule violations, the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, case law, and the fundamental precept of attorney discipline that misappropriation of client funds merits disbarment. Therefore, we approve the referee’s recommended discipline and disbar Massari. We also approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt.

Domenic L. Massari, III, is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Florida. The disbarment will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that Massari can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If Massari notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the disbarment effective immediately. Domenic L. Massari, III, shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed. Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Domenic L. Massari, III, in the amount of $8,440.48, for which sum let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ„ and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.


author: QUINCE, J.

text:
    Elizabeth L. DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Helen K. MONAHAN, Respondent.
    No. SC01-1157.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 7, 2002.
    Gregg W. McClosky and David J. Pas-cuzzi of McClosky, D’Anna, Ioannou & Dieterle, LLP, Boca Raton, FL, for Petitioner.
    Amy D. Shield of Amy D. Shield, P.A., Boca Raton, FL; and Barry A. Eisenson of the Law Office of Barry A. Eisenson, Coconut Creek, FL, for Respondent.
   QUINCE, J.

We have for review Monahan v. Davis, 781 So.2d 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinions in Yusuf Mohamad Excavation, Inc. v. Ringhaver Equipment Co., 793 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal, 641 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), on the issue of whether the delayed discovery doctrine, which delays the commencement of the statute of limitations, is applicable to these causes of action. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we quash the Fourth District’s decision holding that the delayed discovery doctrine does operate to bring Monahan’s causes of action within the statute of limitations. We reinstate the trial court’s order of partial final summary judgment in favor of the petitioner.

Facts

The following facts are taken from the Fourth District’s opinion:

Helen Monahan is an elderly woman who suffers from senile dementia. Her niece, Barbara Sadler, was appointed her guardian in February, 1999. Beginning in 1997, Monahan filed suits against various family members concerning their misappropriation of her financial assets. In April, 1998, the court entered a final judgment against three nieces to quiet title to a condominium.
Monahan’s fifth amended complaint contained six counts seeking damages from her sister Betty Kish and her niece Elizabeth Davis. The counts included breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft, conspiracy, conversion, and unjust enrichment, arising from the wrongful taking of cash, stocks, bonds, interest, dividends, and pension and social security payments. After her husband died, Monahan placed her financial affairs in the hands of Kish and Davis. The complaint estimated that Kish and Davis wrongfully appropriated $587,267 of Monahan’s assets. A paragraph of the complaint asserted that the statute of limitations did not bar the action because Monahan did not find out about the misappropriations until October, 1995, when she first discovered that Davis had wrongfully attempted to transfer partial title to the Florida condominium.

Monahan, 781 So.2d at 437. The fifth amended complaint was filed on April 15, 1998. The trial court granted partial final summary judgment, dismissing Monahan’s ease against Elizabeth Davis (Davis) with prejudice, and barring recovery against Betty Kish (Kish) for tortious acts that occurred before 1994. The trial court ruled that the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment were barred by a four-year statute of limitations, but the cause of action for civil theft, with a five-year statute of limitation, was not barred.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. The Fourth District held that “genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the ‘delayed discovery’ doctrine applies to bring Monahan’s causes of action within the statute of limitations.” Monahan, 781 So.2d at 437. The Fourth District relied on Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.2000), where we applied the delayed discovery doctrine to intentional torts arising from childhood sexual abuse of the plaintiff. See Id. at 1182. The Fourth District found that the application of the delayed discovery doctrine is not limited to the factual situation in Heamdon, and then extended the doctrine to this case.

Delayed Discovery Doctrine

We quash the decision of the Fourth District because the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply to the claims alleged in this case. The Florida Legislature has stated that a cause of action accrues or begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs. An exception is made for claims of fraud and products liability in which the accrual of the causes of action is delayed until the plaintiff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred. The Legislature has also imposed a delayed discovery rule in cases of professional malpractice, medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse.

Section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 2000), provides:

Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ....
(7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE. — An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.

(Emphasis added.) Aside from the provisions above for the delayed accrual of a cause of action in cases of fraud, products liability, professional and medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse, there is no other statutory basis for the delayed discovery rule.

In Heamdon, we applied the delayed discovery doctrine to the plaintiffs cause of action against her stepfather for injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse. We explained the difference between the delayed accrual of a cause of action and the tolling of limitations once the limitations period is triggered. We cited the specific statutory grounds for tolling the limitations period and recognized that lack of memory was not among those enumerated grounds. Although the Legislature did not specifically provide for delayed accrual, we reasoned that in the narrow circumstance of lack of memory in childhood sexual abuse cases, the doctrine was appropriate because the lack of memory was caused by the abuser — a situation similar to the statutory circumstances to which the doctrine applies. See Hearndon, 767 So.2d at 1185-86.

In this case, the Fourth District interpreted Heamdon broadly, calling the delayed discovery doctrine a common law remedy and holding that “[njothing limits the application of the doctrine to the causes of action at issue in this case.” Monahan, 781 So.2d at 438. Once the Fourth District extended the delayed discovery doctrine to causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, civil theft, conspiracy, conversion and unjust enrichment arising out of the wrongful taking of Mona-han’s assets, the Fourth District then found that there was a question of fact whether Monahan knew, or reasonably should have known, of the wrongful acts earlier, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded the case for trial. No other Florida Court has interpreted Heamdon as broadly.

In fact, the Fifth District has specifically refused to extend the doctrine, which properly gives rise to the basis of conflict jurisdiction in this case. See Yusuf Mohamad Excavation, Inc. v. Ringhaver Equipment Co., 793 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In Yusuf Mohamad, the Fifth District considered whether the delayed discovery doctrine would operate to delay the accrual of a cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship and unfair and deceptive trade practice claims. The Fifth District held that Heamdon was intended to be limited to its unique facts. Relying upon Federal Insurance Co. v. Southwest Florida Retirement Center, 707 So.2d 1119 (Fla.1998), the Fifth District applied the principles of statutory construction, and found that it was clear the Legislature did not intend for the doctrine to apply to all causes of action. To decide otherwise, the Fifth District reasoned, would require the court to write into the statute a delayed discovery rule even though the Legislature had not done so. See Yusuf Mohamad, 793 So.2d at 1127. The Fifth District distinguished Heamdon by likening Heamdon with cases of fraud or where the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes a mental condition which results in the plaintiffs delay in filing suit.

In so doing, the Fifth District followed the Second District’s decision in Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal, 641 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Halkey-Roberts, the Second District considered section 95.031, and held that the delayed discovery rule could not operate to delay the accrual of a cause of action for the intentional tort of breach of fiduciary duty because this cause of action is not specified in the statute. We find the Fifth District’s rationale to be the better view. To hold otherwise would result in this Court rewriting the statute, and, in fact, obliterating the statute.

We have considered Monahan’s suggestion that Yusuf Mohamad and Halkey-Roberts can both be distinguished from the facts in this case because those cases involve arms-length commercial transactions, whereas this ease involves a personal, family power of attorney. Monahan provides no legal theory or authority to support this distinction. We have also considered Mon-ahan’s arguments that California has extended the delayed discovery doctrine to causes of action arising out of principal-agent relationships involving a power of attorney and to cases involving confidential and fiduciary relationships. However, California’s statutory scheme is different from that in Florida and our application of the delayed discovery doctrine is in accord with Florida law.

Monahan relies on case law from Iowa and Nebraska which, she argues, supports her position that when there is an agency relationship, the statute of limitations for claims arising out of that relationship begins to run from the time the agency is terminated. While the Florida Legislature created a statute codifying the limitations period for claims against a trustee, which is triggered after the beneficiary receives an accounting, there is no similar statutory provision in the case of an agency relationship. See § 737.307, Fla. Stat. (2001). The Legislature could have enacted a similar provision applicable to agency relationships but chose not to do so. The Iowa and Nebraska cases cited by Monahan are therefore not persuasive.

Monahan also relies on cases from New York which hold that, in the case of a principal-agent relationship, the cause of action accrues when a demand for an accounting is made. Davis responds that the rule of law set forth in the New York cases is based on New York statutory law which provides that the limitations period in an action against a trustee, agent, attorney, or other person acting in a fiduciary capacity arising from their detention of money or property begins to run upon demand or upon discovery of the cause of action. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990). There is no similar statutory provision in Florida. The fact that New York has a specific statute allowing the delayed discovery rule in these types of relationships only illustrates the need for legislative action if expansion of the doctrine is desirable.

While we applied the delayed discovery doctrine to causes of action arising out of childhood sexual abuse and repressed memory in Heamdon, we did so only after considering the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse, as well as the fact that the doctrine is applicable to similar cases where the tortious acts cause the delay in discovery. We also considered the Legislature’s endorsement in amending section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1999), to include intentional torts based on abuse and the fact that the application of the doctrine among the states is both the majority rule and modern trend. In this case, there is no modern trend or statutory endorsement, and Monahan did not allege fraud, so there was no specific allegation that Davis or Kish’s actions caused Mona-han’s delayed discovery.

The majority of the transactions complained of occurred from 1990 to 1992. The initial complaint was filed in 1997. Because the Florida statutory scheme does not allow for the delayed discovery rule in this particular type of case, and Heamdon is limited to the specific facts in that case, we quash the Fourth District’s decision and reinstate the trial court’s order granting limited summary judgment.

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.

PARIENTE, J., recused.

      . Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (Supp. 2000), provides:
      95.031 Computation of time. — Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.

      (1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. ...

      (2)(a) An action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.
      (b) An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection. (Emphasis added.)

      . We view Monahan's complaint in a light most favorable to her case. See Nova Southeastern University, Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86 (Fla.2000).


author: HARDING, Senior Justice. LEWIS, J.,

text:
    In re REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF FLORIDA ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS.
    No. SC02-659.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 7, 2002.
    Honorable Jacqueline R. Griffin, Judge, Fifth District Court of Appeal, Daytona Beach, FL, on behalf of the Judicial Management Council of Florida.
    Jonathan D. Kaney, Jr. of Cobb, Cole & Bell, Daytona Beach, FL, on behalf of Attorneys for First Amendment Foundation; Daniel Nestel, Director, State Government Affairs, Washington, DC, on behalf of Lexis Nexis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc.; Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director, Arlington, VA, on behalf of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; William O’Neil, Longboat Key, FL; and Steven G. Mason, Orlando, FL, Responding.
   HARDING, Senior Justice.

This matter is before the Court based on the December 17, 2001, submission of the report entitled “Privacy and Electronic Access to Court Records — Report and Recommendations” by this Court’s Judicial Management Council (“Council”). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The balancing of individual privacy rights against access to court records has been made increasingly difficult in the context of electronic transmission of documents. This is especially so in Florida, where open access to public records is both a constitutional right and a cornerstone of our political culture. See art. I, § 24, Fla. Const. The problem becomes more acute when court records are stored electronically and are widely available to the general public via the Internet. Therefore, as part of this Court’s 2000-2002 operational plan, we requested that the Council examine issues relating to balancing privacy interests and the public’s access to information in the context of the electronic access to court records.

In particular, the following questions were posed to the Council as part of its preliminary inquiry into the issue of electronic access to court records:

1. Does the Supreme Court have a role in formulating statewide policies on access to court records, or does responsibility for policy in this area rest elsewhere?
2. If the Court does have a responsibility to develop statewide policies, what steps should be taken to ensure that such policies are developed and implemented?
3. If statewide policies are to be developed, should there be a moratorium on electronic access to certain court records until such policies are developed and implemented?

In addressing these questions, the Council educated itself through a series of workshops which included a teleconference discussion with Justice John Dooley of the Vermont Supreme Court, who led a policy development committee in that state and is a national leader in this area; a presentation by Hayden Dempsey, Deputy General Counsel, Office of the Governor, who staffed the Governor’s Task Force on Privacy and Technology; and a video conference discussion with staff of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with responsibility for developing policy for the federal courts. The Council also received a demonstration tour of the Charlotte County Clerk of Court website, consulted by teleconference with Alan Carlson of the Justice Management Institute, and heard comments from Karl Youngs, General Counsel to the Manatee County Clerk of Court, and Walt Smith, Court Administrator of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Council ultimately formed an ad hoc work-group that met on three occasions via video-teleconference to specifically address these three questions. On April 15, 2002, the Council’s report was published in The Florida Bar News, and interested persons were invited to comment on the Council’s report and recommendations.

In its report, the Council recognizes that while there are great benefits to gained by providing electronic access to records (e.g., more convenient access to court records; greater openness and accountability; cost efficient storage and retrieval of information; and improved operational efficiencies via simultaneous access of information), serious concerns are presented regarding confidentiality, privacy, and the administration of the courts. As the Council points out in its report,

Perhaps no part of government gathers a range of information that is as broad or as intimate as that gathered by the courts. The sensitive nature of information in court files must be carefully considered as Florida contemplates electronic access to court records.

Council Report at 2.

Indeed, digital storage and transfer of information changes how information can be manipulated and retrieved. Previously obscure information can be located quickly and anonymously for essentially no cost. This expanded capability permits personal information to be copied, transmitted, and analyzed in ways previously impossible or impracticable. These and other issues raise deep concerns about the use of information for purposes other than those for which the information was initially provided.

Two specific areas of concern noted by the Council are as follows: (1) while information that is made confidential by statute or court rule is contained in many court documents, it does not appear at present that the clerks of court have in place reliable mechanisms to identify such information and protect it from disclosure; and (2) court records also contain a great deal of information which is not confidential or exempt from the right of access, but which is nonetheless of a very sensitive or problematic nature. Increased availability of such records may have negative long-term effects, including an undermining of the very ability of the courts to administer justice.

The introduction of technologies which allow remote, electronic access to court records is upsetting the tentative balance between privacy and access. The increased availability of court records— with the concomitant risks of exposure of personal information and interference with the administration of justice — becomes a new factor to be added to the balance. In light of the increased availability that electronic access promises, the existing statutory, court rule, and policy framework must be examined to see if it is adequate to support the achievement of a new balance.

Council Report at 25.

Accordingly, the Council recommends that based upon this Court’s broad responsibility under article V, section 2, of the Florida Constitution for the administrative supervision of all courts — including setting policies regarding court records, it should be directed by this Court to oversee the development of policy and recommendations in this area. Along these lines, the Council recommends that it should create a committee for the purposes of addressing this specific issue and, following a policy development process, it should advance specific substantive recommendations to this Court, including proposed rules of court.

We agree that, in the management of court records, information protected by statute or court rules must remain secure from improper disclosure. Furthermore, in addressing this issue, we must ensure that public trust and confidence in the courts is not undermined, citizens’ privacy rights are respected, and access and privacy policies are consistently applied in all parts of the state. Therefore, we agree that the potential impacts of electronic access must be considered and that comprehensive policies that set out guidelines on electronic access to court records must be developed and uniformly implemented.

While no party disputes that this Court has a role in formulating statewide policies on access to Court records, we are also mindful of the Legislature’s parallel initiative in forming and funding a study committee, including members of the judiciary, to specifically examine electronic access to court records. Thus it appears that any effort proposed by the Council on this Court’s behalf would likely only be redundant to the Legislature’s Study Committee on Public Records.

We also recognize that CS/SB 1679 establishes a temporary limited moratorium on unrestricted electronic access of court records, which prohibits any clerk from placing on a publicly available Internet website an image or copy of an official record if that image or copy is of (1) a military discharge; (2) a death certificate; or (3) a court file, record, or paper relating to matters or cases governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, or the Florida Probate Rules, until appropriate policies are developed. See ch.2002-302, § 2, Laws of Fla. We agree that such a moratorium is appropriate and will substantially reduce the risk of inadvertent disclosure of exempt information until appropriate policies are developed and uniformly implemented.

Accordingly, we defer any decision concerning the Council’s recommendations pending the completion of the report by the Study Committee on Public Records as established by CS/HB 1679 during the 2002 Legislative Session.

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J. and SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

LEWIS, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The majority outlines some of the important reasons for concern with regard to electronic access and dissemination of highly sensitive information from judicial records, but proceeds to only defer action. In my view, we do and should have a significant role in formulating policy in this area with regard to court records and we should respond accordingly. Second, we should not only support the legislative steps directed to the protection, of Florida citizens, but we should also move forward with a blue-ribbon committee from the judicial perspective with Florida expertise in this rapidly expanding area of technology. This is an area which involves serious and complex issues which, when resolved, will impact all Floridians having contact with this branch of government. While I do not encourage any unnecessary duplications of effort or expenditures, the subject is far too important to simply defer to others without active analysis.

      . See Objective IV D of Horizon 2002, The 2000-2002 Operational Plan for the Florida Judicial Branch, Florida Supreme Court, June 2000 ("Policies controlling electronic access to court records should be examined and policy adjustments considered that appropriately balance public access to information and the privacy interests of litigants.”).

      . A workgroup was assembled that included the following individuals: The Honorable Jacqueline Griffin, Judge, Fifth District Court of Appeal; The Honorable Jerry Parker, Judge, Second District Court of Appeal; The Honorable Catherine Brunson, Circuit Judge, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit; The Honorable Judith Kreeger, Circuit Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit; The Honorable Sheri Chappel, County Court Judge, Lee County; The Honorable Christina Pereyra Shuminer, County Court Judge, Dade County; The Honorable Elijah Smiley, County Court Judge, Bay County; Mr. Thomas D. Hall, Clerk of Court, Florida Supreme Court; Mr. Walt Smith, Court Administrator, Twelfth Judicial Circuit; Mr. Mark Weinberg, Court Administrator, Seventh Judicial Circuit; Mr. Fred Dudley, ■ Attorney; and Ms. Barbara Peterson, First Amendment Foundation. Staff support was provided to the workgroup by: Mr. Stephan Henley, Court Operations Consultant, Strategic Planning, Office of the State Courts Administrator, and Ms. Elaine New, Senior Attorney, Legal Affairs, Office of the State Courts Administrator. The Court wishes to extend its sincere appreciation to the Council and, in particular, members and support staff of this workgroup for their hard work and diligence in reporting on this very important matter.

      . The following persons or organizations submitted comments for this Court's consideration: Mr. Steven G. Mason, Attorney (Orlando, Fla.); Mr. Daniel Nestel, Director, State Government Affairs, LexisNexis (Washington, D.C.); Mr. William O'Neil, Attorney (Longboat Key, Fla.); Ms. Lucy Dalgish, Executive Director, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (Arlington, Va.); and Mr. Jonathan D. Kaney, Attorney, First Amendment Foundation (Daytona Beach, Fla.). We wish to extend our appreciation to each of these parties for their submissions.

      . The provisions of CS/HB 1679 became law upon approval of the governor on June 5, 2002, see ch.2002-302, Laws of Fla., and it creates a twenty-one member Study Committee on Public Records to comprehensively address issues regarding electronic access to court records and requires a report to the Legislature by January 1, 2003.

      . It should also be noted that the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators Joint Court Management Committee has been exploring issues of privacy and access as presented in model state court policies. A project of the Justice Management Institute and the National Center for State Courts, with support of the State Justice Institute, is underway to develop a model policy concerning electronic access to court records. The purpose of the model policy is to assist and guide state judiciaries and local courts in drafting their own policies on public access to electronic court records. During Phase I of this project, a draft policy was developed along with supplemental commentary and materials. Phase II was scheduled to include a public comment period from February 15, 2002, to April 30, 2002, as well as two public hearings in April 2002. The final draft model policy was presented and approved at the annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators in July 2002.

      .It was reported at oral argument that, at least in some instances, clerks have posted court record information on the Internet containing information that has been classified as exempt by the Legislature. This practice is unacceptable as it clearly violates the statutory provisions that protect against the release of exempt information.