text:
    R.L. CARNES LOGGING CONTRACTORS, INC. v. Clarence WHITSETT.
    2010335.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2002.

      William E. Pipkin, Jr., of Sirote & Per-mutt, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
    J. Stephen Legg of York & Legg, Mobile, for appellee.
   YATES, Presiding Judge.

Clarence Whitsett sued his employer, R.L. Carnes Logging Contractors, Inc. (“Carnes Logging”), on May 5, 2000, seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for injuries he sustained to his left leg and lower back during the course of his employment. Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court, on December 6, 2001, entered an order finding that Whit-sett was permanently and totally disabled as the result of his work-related accident, and it awarded benefits accordingly. Carnes Logging appeals.

This case is governed by the 1992 Workers’ Compensation Act. This Act provides that an appellate court’s review of the standard of proof and its consideration of other legal issues shall be without a presumption of correctness. § 25-5-81(e)(l), Ala. Code 1975. It further provides that when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact, those findings will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evidence. § 25 — 5^81(e)(2). Our supreme court “has defined the term ‘substantial eyidence,’ as it is used in § 12-21-12(d), to mean ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 268 (Ala.1996), quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). This court has also concluded: “The new Act did not alter the rule that this court does not weigh the evidence before the trial court.” Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).

The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating, in part:

“5. At the time this matter came before this Court, Clarence Whitsett was 52 years of age, with a date of birth of April 9,1949.
“6. Mr. Whitsett attended High School in Grove Hill, through the ninth grade, but did not receive a diploma nor has he received the equivalent of a diploma.
“7. Mr. Whitsett testified at trial that he had been previously employed as a laborer, mechanic and truck driver. This history included work for James E. Bush, Pete Bush Honda, R & R Construction, Whatley Timber Co., Powell Trucking and Todd Overstreet Trucking.
“8. In 1995, Mr. Whitsett began working for [Carnes Logging] as a log truck driver. His job duties included assisting in the preparation of the logs for loading, including sawing off small limbs so that the logs would stack neatly on the truck, driving a skidder, running the loader and driving the truck to transport the logs to their destination.
“9. Mr. Whitsett testified that, on or about October 27, 1999, he was sawing logs to prepare them for loading onto the logging truck. While working within the line and scope of his employment, he suffered an injury to his lower back when he jumped back to escape from a log which unexpectedly rolled off of the pile.
“10. This Court heard Mr. Whitsett’s account of his accident and also heard testimony from Todd Barnes who was a coworker of Mr. Whitsett’s and witnessed the accident. Mr. Barnes testified that he saw Mr. Whitsett leaning over sawing the logs in preparation for loading on the truck when one of the logs slipped and rolled toward Mr. Whit-sett. Mr. Barnes saw Mr. Whitsett jerk back and jump away to avoid being hit by the log. He approached Mr. Whit-sett concerned that he may have been injured and learned that the rolling log had only scraped Mr. Whitsett’s leg and that Mr. Whitsett had injured his back as he jumped back to escape the rolling log.
“11. In addition to coworker Todd Barnes, this Court heard from coworkers Willie Mobley, Eddie Williams, and Timothy Booker. [The coworkers] testified that Mr. Whitsett was a hard-working, honest, conscientious and very reliable employee that always did his job and was willing to help others with their work whenever he could.
“12. Mr. Whitsett had problems with his back prior to his injury on October 27, 1999; however, any problem that he had with his back did not prevent him from working full time performing all of his required duties for [Carnes Logging]. His coworkers ... testified that any problems Mr. Whitsett had with his back before his injury did ■ not in any way affect his job performance or his ability to accomplish all of the tasks required of his job. This testimony was not disputed by any witness.
“14. Mr. Booker testified that he sometimes helped out Mr. Whitsett but that everyone, including Mr. Whitsett, always helped each other out to the get the job done. Mr. Booker stated that he helped Mr. Whitsett because of Mr. Whitsett’s age not because he wasn’t able to do the work himself.
“15. After his injury on October 27, 1999, Mr. Whitsett was seen and treated by, among others, Dr. Robert Cain who is a board-certified internist and Dr. Carter Harsh who is a board-certified neurosurgeon.
“16. Dr. Cain, based upon the results of an MRI performed on November 12, 1999, diagnosed Mr. Whitsett with spinal stenosis and partial paralysis of the left leg.
“17. Dr. Cain stated that Mr. Whit-sett had prior back problems before October 27, 1999. However, according to his records, Mr. Whitsett continued to work until his injury of October 27,1999.
“18. When Dr. Cain examined Mr. Whitsett on November 2, 1999, he noted that Mr. Whitsett had new symptoms which included numbness and paresthe-sias.
“19. Specifically, Dr. Cain noted in a letter, referred to in his deposition, that Mr. Whitsett had back pain on the left side ‘secondary to an accident that occurred on his job.’ Dr. Cain acknowledged that he had prior pain on the right but had not experienced the weakness and numbness that he had on the left as a result of ‘that’ accident. Dr. Cain further noted that Mr. Whitsett was severely debilitated from the accident on October 27,1999.
“20. Dr, Cain testified that Mr. Whitsett had back pain before October 27, 1999, but he was working. Following the accident, he was no longer able to work. He was more limited, in more pain and his complaints reflected the results of a more recent injury that was not present before. There was a noticeable difference in his complaints following the injury of October 27,1999.
“21. Dr. Cain further testified that the accident of October 27, 1999, combined with his pre-existing back problem, has rendered Mr. Whitsett totally disabled.
“23. Due to the injury to his back, and the pain that he experiences, Mr. Whitsett has not been able to return to work. Mr. Whitsett testified that he continues to suffer severe pain in his lower back with pain and numbness radiating into his hips and legs and limited use of the left side of his body.
“24. Plaintiffs vocational expert, Mr. James Cowart, stated in his report that he conducted a vocational evaluation on Mr. Whitsett. Based on his review of Mr. Whitsett’s medical records, as well as considering Mr. Whitsett’s education, background, and qualifications, Mr. Co-wart stated that Mr. Whitsett is totally disabled and that he was not aware of any type of gainful employment that Mr. Whitsett would be able to perform.
“25. [Carnes Logging] offered no vocational expert testimony to rebut the opinion of Mr. Cowart.
“26. This Court notes that Mr. Whit-sett has received no worker’s compensation disability payments to date.”

The trial court determined that the back problems Whitsett suffered before his workplace accident were not preexisting for the purposes of a workers’ compensation award, because he was able to perform all the duties required of his employment. The court concluded that Whitsett suffered a compensable injury to his back on October 27, 1999, while working within the line and scope of his employment and that he was rendered permanently and totally disabled.

Carnes Logging initially argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the facts of this case. We disagree. “It is well settled that no preexisting condition is deemed to exist for the purposes of a workers’ compensation award if the employee was able to perform the duties of his job prior to the subject injury.” Taylor v. Mobile Pulley & Mach. Works, 714 So.2d 300, 302 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). This court has stated:

“ ‘If the employee was able to perform his duties prior to the injury, no preexisting condition is present for [the] purpose of [workers’] compensation. If a job related injury combines with a preexisting condition to produce a disability, it does not affect a compensation award. Further, if a preexisting condition is aggravated by a work-related injury, the condition is still compensable even though the accident may not have caused the same injury in a normal person.’ ”

Id., at 302, quoting G.C. Colyer & Co. v. McAdams, 562 So.2d 1326, 1328-29 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (citations omitted). In McAdams, this court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled, where the employer had argued that the employee’s preexisting condition would have eventually led to the disability even in the absence of the on-the-job injury.

Before Whitsett’s workplace accident on October 27, 1999, he sought treatment from Dr. Robert Cain, an internist, on May 3, 1999, for a number of complaints, including back pain and leg pain. Whit-sett requested that Dr. Cain place him on disability. Dr. Cain diagnosed Whitsett with degenerative joint disease, hypertension, lower back pain, anxiety, headaches, and work-related stress. He recommended that Whitsett not return to work. Whitsett returned to Dr. Cain on several occasions complaining of lower back pain. X-rays revealed that Whitsett had disc space narrowing at the L4-L5 and L5-L6 levels. Dr. Cain’s diagnosis continued to be degenerative joint disease and low back pain.

Dr. Cain referred Whitsett to Dr. Peter Saway. Whitsett was seen by Dr. Saway on September 22,1999, complaining of lower back pain, which extended to his right leg. Whitsett informed Dr. Saway that he was a truck driver and that his pain was worse after driving for an extended amount of time. Dr. Saway found that Whitsett had osteoarthritis of the lumbosa-cral spine and low back pain with radicular symptoms emanating from his “SI” joint and possible lumbar radiculopathy. Dr. Saway treated Whitsett with pain medication and an injection and requested that he return in several months “provided his trucking schedule permits” or to call if “there are problems or ongoing difficulty.” Dr. Saway did not take Whitsett off work.

The injury Whitsett complained of occurred on October 27, 1999, as he was sawing limbs off a tree. Whitsett twisted his back as he jumped back, out of the way of a log rolling toward him. He returned to Dr. Cain following the work-related accident complaining of low back pain and an inability to lift things.

Dr. Cain’s record of December 3, 1999, indicates that Whitsett’s back pain was originally on the right side, but that following the work-related accident, the pain became progressively worse on the left side with numbness and paresthesias in the left leg. Dr. Cain’s diagnosis on December 3,1999, was paresthesias of the left leg and spinal stenosis. Dr. Cain testified that the numbness and paresthesias that Whit-sett experienced after the work-related accident were new complaints, in stark contrast to the previous complaints, and that the new complaints originated with the work-related accident. Dr. Cain testified that Whitsett had suffered from persistent back pain and degenerative joint disease before the work-related accident, and that the accident was “the factor that sort of threw him overboard in terms of not being able to regain his ability to work.” Dr. Cain testified that Whitsett’s work-related accident and his preexisting conditions combined to render him totally disabled.

On December 3, 1999, Dr. Cain dictated the following letter:

“Mr. Whitsett is a patient of mine who now has back pain on the left side secondary to an accident that occurred on his job. The patient, prior to that, did have pain on the right, but he did not experience the weakness and numbness that he now has on the left as a result of the accident. The patient is severely debilitated from that accident. Because of this, the patient is unable to use his left side as fully as he had before.”

Before the work-related accident of October 27, 1999, Whitsett suffered from low back pain and degenerative joint disease. Dr. Cain recommended that Whitsett stop working; however, Whitsett continued to work. The overwhelming evidence indicates that Whitsett was able to perform all of the regular duties required of his job. Although the evidence indicates that his job may have aggravated his symptoms, nothing indicates that it prevented him from performing his required duties. His coworkers all testified that he performed the duties required of his employment. After the work-related accident, Whitsett experienced new complaints of numbness, paresthesias, and pain on the left side. Dr. Cain testified that these new complaints originated with the work-related accident and combined with Whitsett’s already existing condition to render him totally disabled. We conclude that Whitsett presented substantial evidence indicating that he experienced new complaints after his work-related accident; that he was able to perform all of the regular duties required of his job before the work-related accident; and that following the work-related accident he was unable to return to work.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the back problems Whitsett experienced before the work-related accident were not a preexisting condition for the purposes of awarding him workers’ compensation benefits.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court erroneously ignored the records and findings of Dr. Peter Saway. We disagree. Whitsett was seen by Dr. Sa-way on one occasion. The records from that visit were admitted into evidence and were before the trial court. Simply because the trial court did not specifically mention those records or Dr. Saway’s examination of Whitsett in its order does not mean that the court did not consider that evidence. In reality, those records do not add anything to the evidence that already existed. The records indicate that Whit-sett suffered from right leg and back pain and that his job as a truck driver aggravated those symptoms. Dr. Saway told him to return “provided his trucking schedule permits” and to call if “there are problems or ongoing difficulty.” Whitsett did not return and did not call. He did continue to work, performing all of his regular duties. Accordingly, we find no error here.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court erred in failing to apply § 25-5-58, Ala.Code 1975. Section 25-5-58 provides: “If the degree or duration of disability resulting from an accident is increased or prolonged because of a preexisting injury or infirmity, the employer shall be liable only for the disability that would have resulted from the accident had the earlier injury or infirmity not existed.” However, this section is not applicable where the earlier injury or infirmity was not so disabling as to prevent the employee from performing the normal duties of his employment. Boothe v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 660 So.2d 604 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). We have already established that Whitsett’s preexisting back pain and degenerative joint disease did not prevent him from performing the normal duties of his employment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to apply § 25-5-58.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof in this case. Carnes Logging argues that Whitsett was required to prove medical and legal causation by clear and convincing evidence. This argument is completely meritless. Whitsett’s injury arose from an accident—the sudden jumping and twisting to avoid a loose log coming toward him unexpectedly. Therefore, he was required to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. § 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975. An employee is only required to prove a compensable injury by clear and convincing evidence when the alleged injury has resulted from gradual deterioration or cumulative physical stress. § 25-5-81(c), Ala.Code 1975.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Dr. Robert Cain. We disagree. Dr. Cain was Whitsett’s primary physician before and after the work-related accident. His opinions relative to Whit-sett’s back injury were based on diagnostic tests, physical examinations, and patient history, rather than, as Carnes Logging contends, contradicting recollections and assumptions. Such questions raised by Carnes Logging go to the weight and credibility of the evidence and not its admissibility. Obviously, the trial court resolved the weight and credibility issues in favor of Whitsett. Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of Dr. Cain’s testimony.

Carnes Logging next argues that Whitsett refused medical treatment, and that, therefore, he is barred from receiving disability benefits pursuant to § 25-5-77(b), Ala.Code 1975. We disagree. Dr. Carter Harsh, one of Whitsett’s • treating physicians, recommended that he undergo surgery. Whitsett had received no workers’ compensation benefits, rather, he had sought treatment on his own accord payed for with his individual medical coverage through Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Whitsett testified that he was unable to have the surgery, because Dr. Harsh would not accept his insurance and he had no money to pay for it otherwise. Section 25-5-77(b), provides, in part:

“If requested to do so by the employer, the injured employee shall submit to examination by the employer’s physician at all reasonable times, but the employee shall have the right to have a physician of his or her own selection present at the examination, in which case the - employee shall be hable to the physician of his or her own selection for his or her services. The employer shall pay for the services of the physician making the examination at the instance of the employer. ... If the injured employee refuses to comply with reasonable request for examination, or refuses to accept the medical service or physical rehabilitation, which the employer elects to furnish under this chapter, the employee’s right to compensation shall be suspended and no compensation shall be payable for the period of the refusal.”

Section 25—5—77(b) is not applicable to this case, because Carnes Logging neither requested that Whitsett submit to a physical examination by one of its physicians nor was Carnes Logging providing any medical treatment for Whitsett. Whitsett had sought medical treatment on his own through his individual medical insurer.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court’s finding of permanent disability is premature, because, it says, there was no evidence indicating that Whitsett had reached maximum medical improve-merit and that he had not yet had the recommended surgery. We agree. In order to recover permanent total disability benefits, an employee must have reached maximum medical improvement. See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Lolley, 506 So.2d 343 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). As previously noted, Dr. Harsh had recommended surgery for Whitsett; however, Whitsett had not undergone surgery at the time of the trial. Dr. Harsh testified that Whit-sett would need surgery “to get better.” He further stated that he would not assign Whitsett an impairment rating until surgery had been performed. Dr. Cain testified that the work-related accident combined with Whitsett’s preexisting problems to render him totally disabled. However, Dr. Cain also testified that “with the type of work that [Whitsett] does, I could not imagine him being able to go back to work until his back is repaired.”

We conclude that Carnes Logging presented evidence indicating that Whit-sett had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and that his condition would improve with surgery. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that Whitsett was permanently and totally disabled is premature at this point in time. Therefore, the judgment as to this finding is reversed and the case is remanded for the trial court to enter an order consistent with this court’s opinion as it relates to this issue.

Carnes Logging next argues that the trial court failed to give it proper credit for certain advanced payments in violation of § 25-5-56, Ala.Code 1975. Carnes Logging has not paid any compensation benefits to Whitsett. However, Carnes Logging did make a loan of $700 to Whitsett after the work-related accident. Carnes Logging contends that it is entitled to a credit or set-off of $700 against any benefits due Whitsett. We disagree. Section 25-5-56, provides “All moneys voluntarily paid by the employer or insurance carrier to an injured employee in advance of agreement or award shall be treated as advance payments on account of the compensation.” In order to receive a credit or set-off, payments made pursuant to this section must be made as advanced payments of workers’ compensation. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. Clemons, 54 Ala.App. 150, 306 So.2d 18 (Ala.Civ.App.1975). Because the payments made to Whitsett were made as a loan and not an advance payment of workers’ compensation benefits, Carnes Logging was not entitled to a credit or set-off. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to give Carnes Logging a credit or set-off for the $700 it loaned to Whitsett.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.

      . Paresthesias is a tingling or burning sensation in the extremities.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CRAWLEY, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORPORATION v. George ROBERTS.
    2010060.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2002.

      Charles R. Johanson III and Alto Lee Teague IV of Engel, Hairston & Johanson, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Thomas A. Smith, Jr., of Smith & Smith, L.L.P., Cullman, for appellee.
   CRAWLEY, Judge.

Associates Commercial Corporation (hereinafter “ACC”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment awarding George Roberts $87,590 in storage fees and other costs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and render a judgment for Roberts.

On May 10, 2001, ACC sued B.R. Armstrong Transport, Inc., Bobby Ray Armstrong (B.R. Armstrong Transport and Bobby Ray Armstrong are hereinafter collectively referred to as “Armstrong”), and Roberts seeking to recover four Freight-liner trucks and five trailers as to which it alleged it held a purchase-money security interest. ACC alleged that it held a security interest based upon Armstrong’s default on loans it had made to Armstrong that were used to purchase the trucks and trailers. It also alleged that Roberts had possession of the trucks and trailers and that he was attempting to obtain titles to them. On that same day, ACC also filed a motion for a writ of seizure, with an attached supporting affidavit; the trial court set a hearing on the motion for June 5, 2001.

On June 1, 2001, Bobby Ray Armstrong filed in the trial court a notice of bankruptcy stating that his assets were the property of his bankruptcy estate and that the bankruptcy proceeding stayed this action against him. On June 5, 2001, the trial court reset the writ-of-seizure hearing to June 25, 2001. On June 7, 2001, the trial court stayed this action and placed it on its administrative docket. On June 19, 2001, ACC dismissed Bobby Ray Armstrong as a defendant and requested the trial court to transfer the case back to its active docket and to proceed with the writ-of-seizure hearing as scheduled. On June 20, 2001, Roberts filed an answer and counterclaim. Roberts’s counterclaim stated that he had title to three of the trucks, that three of the trailers had been stored on his property since September 1, 2000, and that each trailer had accumulated storage fees in the amount of $4,425 (for a total of $13,275 for the three trailers). Roberts asked the trial court (1) to determine whether he had valid ownership of the trucks, (2) to determine the reasonable storage fees for the trucks and trailers that ACC was claiming a security interest in; (3) to issue a judgment for those storage fees, and (4) to confirm his right to liens on the trucks and trailers. On June 21, 2001, the trial court granted ACC’s request to transfer this case to its active docket and to proceed with the writ-of-seizure hearing.

On June 25, 2001, after conducting a hearing on ACC’s motion for a writ of seizure, the trial court entered an order stating that B.R. Armstrong Transport, Inc., and Roberts were to surrender possession of three trucks and three trailers to ACC upon the clerk’s approval of a $50,000 detinue bond. The order further stated that Roberts reserved the right to pursue his claim for storage fees at a trial to be scheduled at a later date. On that same day, a notation was made on the case action summary scheduling the trial for August 20, 2001.

A bench trial was conducted on August 22, 2001, at which testimony was taken from Roberts and Jerry Luna, a representative of ACC. The trial court then allowed the parties the opportunity to file memorandum briefs. On September 4, 2001, both parties filed memorandum briefs, and ACC also filed an amended brief. In his brief, Roberts argued, in part, that he and Mike Hyatt, an ACC employee, had agreed that ACC would pick up the trucks and trailers and would pay storage fees, and that he was entitled to recovery of the storage fees on the theory of quantum meruit. ACC’s brief and amended brief argued that there was no specific agreement that ACC would pay Roberts’s storage fees, that the bankruptcy code provided the means in which Roberts could request payment of his storage fees as an administrative expense, and that Roberts had offered no proof that his fees were reasonable in support of his quantum meruit theory. On September 5, 2001, the trial court, without setting forth specific findings of fact, entered a judgment for Roberts in the amount of $37,590. On October 17, 2001, ACC filed a notice of appeal to this court.

On appeal, ACC argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment for Roberts because: (1) Roberts had no lien on the trucks and trailers upon which ACC would be liable for storage charges; (2) ACC had no contract with Roberts; (3) Roberts wás not entitled to recovery under the theory of quantum meruit; (4) Roberts had failed to prove the reasonableness of his storage charges; and (5) the amount of the judgment was not supported by the evidence.

Because the trial court conducted a bench trial in this case, the ore tenus standard of review applies.

“When ore tenus evidence is presented, a presumption of correctness exists as to the trial court’s findings on issues of fact; its judgment based on these findings of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. J & M Bail Bonding Co. v. Hayes, 748 So.2d 198 (Ala.1999); Gaston v. Ames, 514 So.2d 877 (Ala.1987). When the trial court in a nonjury case enters a judgment without making specific findings of fact, the appellate court ‘will assume that the trial judge made those findings necessary to support the judgment.’ Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank, 608 So.2d 375, 378 (Ala.1992). Moreover, ‘[u]nder the ore tenus rule, the trial court’s judgment and all implicit findings necessary to support it carry a presumption of correctness.’ Transamerica, 608 So.2d at 378. However, when the trial court improperly applies the law to facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the trial court’s judgment. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377 (Ala.1996); Marvin’s, Inc. v. Robertson, 608 So.2d 391 (Ala.1992); Gaston, 514 So.2d at 878; Smith v. Style Advertising, Inc., 470 So.2d 1194 (Ala.1985); League v. McDonald, 355 So.2d 695 (Ala.1978). ‘Questions of law are not subject to the ore tenus standard of review.’ Reed v. Board of Trustees for Alabama State Univ., 778 So.2d 791, 793 n. 2 (Ala.2000). A trial court’s conclusions on legal issues carry no presumption of correctness on appeal. Ex parte Cash, 624 So.2d 576, 577 (Ala.1993). This court reviews the application of law to facts de novo. Allstate, 675 So.2d at 379 (‘[Wjhere the facts before the trial court are essentially undisputed and the controversy involves questions of law for the court to consider, the [trial] court’s judgment carries no presumption of correctness.’).”

City of Prattville v. Post, 831 So.2d 622, 627-28 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).

I. Whether Roberts Had a Lien

ACC first argues that Roberts did not have a lien arising out of his storage of the trucks and trailers and cites supporting caselaw. See Faulk v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 549 So.2d 80, 81 (Ala.1989)(“Towing and storage charges result in neither a common law possessory lien nor a statutory lien.”)(citing Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lyle Serv. Ambulance-Wrecker, 395 So.2d 90 (Ala.Civ.App.1981)). Roberts replies by stating that this issue was determined by the trial court’s order on ACC’s motion for a writ of seizure, which awarded possession of the trucks and trailers to ACC. Our review of the record confirms that this issue was disposed of before the trial conducted on Roberts’s counterclaims; therefore, it could not have been a determinative consideration in the trial court’s award to Roberts.

II. Whether a Contract Existed

ACC argues that there was no contract between it and Roberts. The trial court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding whether an agreement existed between Roberts and ACC as to ACC’s payment of an agreed-upon storage fee and its taking possession of the trucks and trailers. At trial, Roberts testified that he first came into possession of the trucks and trailers in August 2000 and that he had spoken to Mike Hyatt, an employee of ACC, on December 7, 2000, and that they had agreed that ACC would pay Roberts a storage fee, shown through an exhibit that was admitted into evidence to be $2,250 for three trucks, and that ACC would pick up the trucks by December 11, 2000. Roberts further testified that ACC did not pick up the trucks and trailers until after the trial court issued its order on ACC’s motion for a writ of seizure on June 25, 2001. ACC asserts that it could not pick up the trucks and trailers until the stay in Bobby Ray Armstrong’s bankruptcy proceeding had been lifted, that by that time, Roberts had the titles to the three trucks placed into his name, and that the trucks and trailers were picked up on June 27, 2000, two days after the trial court had ordered Roberts to surrender them to ACC. In regard to the alleged agreement, Mike Luna, a representative of ACC testified that Hyatt was an employee of ACC and that he recalled that Hyatt had had a conversation with Roberts in December 2000, but that he had no knowledge that ACC had agreed to pay the storage fees.

In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lyle Service Ambulance-Wrecker, 395 So.2d 90 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), this court, after holding that a lien could not be acquired for towing or storage charges, stated, in pertinent part:

“There was evidence that Farm Bureau agreed to pay the towing and ambulance charges relating to the two vehicles previously released. They totaled a sum of $150. The contention of Farm Bureau that its promise to pay such charges is void under § 8-9-2(3) Code of Alabama (1975) as an oral promise to pay the debt of another is not acceptable. Farm Bureau made its own promise to pay in return for a valuable consideration — the release to it by Lyle of the particular vehicle involved. It received that consideration and the statute does not apply. Locke v. Kay, 257 Ala. 376, 59 So.2d 70 (1952); Waters v. Blackmon, 228 Ala. 462, 153 So. 739 (1934).”

395 So.2d at 93. We must presume that the trial court made findings necessary to support its judgment, City of Prattville, supra, and with the conflicting evidence presented, it could have reasonably found that a contract existed between Roberts and ACC upon which ACC was obligated to pay the storage fees.

III. Quantum Meruit

ACC argues that Roberts would not be entitled to his storage fees under the theory of quantum meruit. In Phillips v. Fuller, 814 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), this court stated:

“Both of these theories for equitable relief [work and labor done and quantum meruit] are methods of avoiding unjust enrichment, and both require the existence of a contract, either express or implied. See United States ex rel. Eastern Gulf, Inc. v. Metzger Towing, Inc., 910 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.1990); and G.S. Gothard & Son Contractors, Inc. v. Mansel, 611 So.2d 1101 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).
“ ‘There are two kinds of implied contracts — those implied in fact and those implied in law. Contracts implied in law are more properly described as quasi or constructive contracts where the law fictitiously supplies the promise [to pay for the labor or services of another] to prevent a manifest injustice or unjust enrichment.’
“Green v. Hospital Bldg. Auth. of the City of Bessemer, 294 Ala. 467, 470, 318 So.2d 701, 704 (1975). ‘The rule is that if one knowingly accepts services rendered by another, and the benefit and result thereof, the law implies a promise on the part of the one who so accepts with knowledge, to pay the reasonable value of such services rendered.’ Richards v. Williams, 231 Ala. 450, 453, 165 So. 820, 823 (1936). In order to succeed on a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that he had a reasonable expectation of compensation for his services. Utah Foam Prods., Inc. v. Polytec, Inc., 584 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Ala.1991).”

814 So.2d at 888.

The evidence presented at trial was that on December 7, 2000, ACC became aware that Roberts was storing the trucks and trailers. Roberts also submitted into evidence an invoice for $2,250 for his storage of the three trucks, which, he testified, ACC had agreed to pay. There was suffi-dent evidence from which the trial court could have determined that Roberts expected to be compensated for his storage services, Utah Foam Prods. Inc. v. Polytec, Inc., 584 So.2d 1345 (Ala.1991), and was entitled to the reasonable value of those services, Richards v. Williams, 231 Ala. 450, 165 So. 820 (1936). However, the alleged agreed-upon amount of $2,250 for Roberts’s storage of the three trucks until December 7, 2000, precludes any award on a theory of quantum meruit for storage fees for the trucks before that date.

IV. Reasonableness of Storage Fees

ACC argues that Roberts failed to prove that his storage fees were reasonable. At trial, Roberts testified that his storage fees were $25 per day for each truck and $15 per day for each trailer. ACC filed an objection before Roberts testified concerning his rates, arguing that those rates had to be shown to be reasonable. The trial court overruled ACC’s objection. Our review of the record shows that Roberts failed to present any evidence to support the reasonableness of his fees; he only stated what those fees were. Accordingly, there was no evidence before the trial court from which it could determine that Roberts’s storage fees were reasonable and from which it could award storage fees on a quantum meruit basis. See Utah Foam Prods., supra, at 1351 (“because there was no evidence as to the reasonable value of [the] services, the jury verdict ... is unsupported and cannot stand”); Loggins v. Robinson, 738 So.2d 1268, 1271 (Ala.Civ.App.1999)(“We also note that although Loggins testified to the amount he billed Robinson, he did not testify that his charges represented the reasonable value of his services and that he did not present any evidence regarding the reasonable value of his services. An essential element of a claim for work and labor done is proof of the reasonable value of the services.”)(citing Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Perkins & Assocs., Inc., 578 So.2d 1061 (Ala.1991)). Thus, we must reverse the trial court’s award of storage fees except to the extent there was evidence to support a finding that on December 7, 2000, ACC agreed to pay $2,250 for Roberts’s storage of three trucks.

V. Amount of Judgment

ACC argues that the amount of the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence. At trial, Roberts presented an exhibit that itemized and totaled the amounts he sought to be compensated by ACC. That exhibit listed those amounts as follows:

“3 Trailers @ $15 for 358 days $16,110.00
“3 Tractors @ $20 for 358 days 21,480.00
“Sub-total $37,590.00
“Towing expense 175.00
“Publication expense 97.00
“Expenses 70.00
“TOTAL $37,932.00”

As we have already determined, the only amount for storage that the trial court could have properly awarded was $2,250, which it could have determined ACC had agreed to pay on December 7, 2000. Roberts testified that he no longer sought to be compensated for the listed towing expense because the company that had performed the towing had been paid by another source. ACC does not challenge the remaining publication expense and undes-ignated expenses. Accordingly, Roberts is entitled to a judgment for the total of the amounts of $2,250, $97, and $70, which is $2,417, and we render a judgment for Roberts in that amount.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

YATES, P.J., and THOMPSON and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.

      . ACC similarly argues in brief that the alleged contract between Roberts and it would be in violation of the statute of frauds. However, our review of the record shows that that issue was not raised to the trial court below, either as an affirmative defense or in ACC's briefs to the trial court following the bench trial. “Our review is limited to the issues that were before the trial court — an issue raised on appeal must have first been presented to and ruled on by the trial court.” Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Ala.1992)(citing Bechtel v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 451 So.2d 793 (Ala.1984)).

      . However, Roberts asked the trial court to award him only a $20 daily storage fee for each of the three trucks.


author: YATES, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Susan TUCKER v. MARSHALL MEDICAL CENTER SOUTH.
    2010022.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2002.
    Gina D. Coggin of Rhea, Boyd, Rhea & Coggin, Gadsden, for appellant.
    R. Larry Bradford and Perry G. Jackson of Bradford & Donahue, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
   YATES, Presiding Judge.

Susan Tucker sued her employer, Marshall Medical Center South (“the Medical Center”), on May 14, 1999, seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for injuries she sustained to her back during the course of her employment with the Medical Center. Tucker amended her complaint to allege that she suffers from severe.depression as the result of her back injury. Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court on June 25, 2001, entered the following order, which reads, in part:

“2. Tucker received a back injury on December 3,1997. She was acting within the line and scope of her employment by [the Medical Center] at the time of the accident. [The Medical Center] received timely notice of the accident.
“8. Tucker’s average weekly wages were in the amount of $191.59. Thus, her compensation rate was in the amount of $127.73.
“4. [The Medical Center] has paid Tucker her temporary total compensation benefits for three weeks and six days during the time that she was off work before she reached maximum medical improvement.
“5. Tucker received fringe benefits in the amount of $11.75 each week from [the Medical Center]; those benefits were continued through her last day of work on December 31,1998.
“6. [The Medical Center] has paid the medical expenses for Tucker in the amount of $14,708. It has denied payment for treatment by Dr. James White (as well as related surgery by him), contending that the treatment was not authorized.
“7. Tucker is 40 years old. She quit school in the ninth grade but later received her GED certificate around 1991. She received certification as a nursing assistant around 1992.
“8. Tucker has worked at various times as a nursing assistant, restaurant waitress, and daycare worker. She was employed by Katy’s Katfish [restaurant] from June 1993 to September 1995. She then worked at Wal-Mart around the Christmas holidays in 1995.
“Tucker then worked at Presbyterian Daycare in Texas from approximately January 1996 to November 1996. She was off work until she began working for Western Sizzlin’ [restaurant] from April 1997 to August 1997.
“9. Tucker was employed by [the Medical Center] on September 13, 1997, approximately 2 1/2 months before this work-related injury. She worked continuously (except for approximately three weeks when she received temporary total compensation benefits) until she last worked on December 31,1998.
“10. Tucker had a prior back injury in 1991 while playing with her nephew who dropped her. She had a herniated disc at L5-S1 as a result of that accident. Surgery was performed by Dr. James White in 1992 for the back injury. Tucker has experienced occasional backaches since the surgery.
“11. Tucker was initially treated at Occupational Health [Services] for this December 3, 1997, accident. She was prescribed medication and released to return to work on December 6, 1997.
“Next, Tucker saw Dr. Clayton Davies from January 1998 to February 1998. He is a neurosurgeon in Birmingham. Dr. Davies reviewed a lumbar MRI which was taken in December 1997; it showed a disc bulge at L5-S1 (which was the same level as Tucker’s prior back surgery).
“In Dr. Davies’s opinion, Tucker did not have any permanent impairment as a result of her work-related accident. He did not impose any restrictions. Tucker was displeased with the treatment by Dr. Davies because of the manner in which he told her that he could find nothing wrong with her.
“12. Next, Tucker selected Dr. Perry Savage from a panel of four physicians. He is an orthopedic surgeon in Birmingham.
“Dr. Savage noted that the lumbar myleogram and lumbar CT scan showed degenerative changes. A lumbar MRI showed degeneration; however, a subsequent discogram in January 1999 showed an abnormal disc at L5-S1.
“Dr. Savage was of the opinion that Tucker reached maximum medical improvement on June 15, 1998, as a result of the work-related accident; however, she continues to have pain due to the pre-existing arthritis and degeneration. He assigned a 0% physical impairment rating and released Tucker to return to work.
“Dr. Savage agreed that Tucker needed a lumbar spine fusion. Approximately 90 to 95% of the reason for that surgery was because of Tucker’s prior degeneration and surgical changes while the remaining 5 to 10% was because of the irritation from this work-related accident.
“18. Finally, Tucker returned on her own to Dr. James White who performed the prior lumbar surgery in 1992. Dr. White noted that Tucker had a degenerated disc at L5 which had collapsed. He performed surgery for decompressive lumbar laminectomy at that level.
“14. The court finds Tucker has suffered an 80% permanent disability and reduction in ability to work as a result of the December 3,1997, accident.

“It is therefore ORDERED by the court as follows:

“A. Tucker’s average weekly wages were in the amount of $191.59, and, therefore, her compensation rate is in the amount of $127.73. Tucker has been paid for temporary total compensation benefits for three weeks and six days which shall be credited against the permanent partial compensation award.
“B. Tucker shall receive a weekly compensation benefit in the amount of $102.35 (80% x AWW x .6667). [The Medical Center] owes compensation benefits for an additional period of 296 weeks, of which 104 weeks have accrued since Tucker reached maximum medical improvement based upon Dr. Perry Savages’s deposition testimony. The remaining 192 weeks are due to be commuted to 172.194 weeks. Thus, Tucker is entitled to permanent partial compensation benefits for 276.194 weeks.,
“C. A judgment is hereby entered in favor of Tucker and against [the Medical Center] in the amount of $28,268.46 (weekly benefit x 276.194 weeks) for her permanent partial disability and reduction in ability to earn. “D. Tucker is entitled to any future medical expenses which are reasonable, necessary, authorized, and related to her back injury. The court orders [the Medical Center] to reim- , burse Tucker for the co-payments and deductibles which she paid to her health insurer; however, the court defers ruling on whether Tucker’s health insurer is entitled to any rights of subrogation or reimbursement from [the Medical Center].”

Tucker filed a postjudgment motion, which was denied. She appeals,

Tucker argues, among other things, that the trial court’s judgment is due to be reversed and the case remanded because the trial court failed to make a determination on several issues. We agree. The court determined that Tucker suffered a work-related injury to her back on December 3, 1997, during the course of her employment with the Medical Center. She initially received treatment from Occupational Health Services, and was then referred to Dr. Clayton Davies, a neurosurgeon, for treatment. Dr. Davies ordered a lumbar myleogram, an EMG, and a nerve conduction study, which he noted were normal and did not reveal a herniated disc. Dr. Davies returned Tucker to work on February 5,1998.

Tucker requested to see a new physician and she was provided a panel of four physicians from which to choose. She chose Dr. Perry L. Savage, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Savage first treated Tucker in February 1998. Dr. Savage initially treated Tucker conservatively with a series of steroid injections and exercises, and he restricted her to light-duty work. On August 12, 1998, Dr. Savage noted that the pain Tucker was experiencing at that point was related to a pre-existing back injury and surgery. The Medical Center denied Tucker’s workers’ compensation claim based on the August 12, 1998, assessment by Dr. Savage.

Tucker continued to be treated by Dr. Savage and she reported on January 8, 1999, that her pain had increased. Dr. Savage performed some tests and then recommended surgery. Tucker requested authorization for the surgery recommended by Dr. Savage, contending that the prior back injury and surgery she had experienced in 1992 did not prevent her from performing the duties required by her employment with the Medical Center, and, therefore, that her prior injury was not considered preexisting under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Medical Center refused to authorize the surgery.

In October 1999, Dr. Savage testified in his deposition that the workplace accident of December 3, 1997, contributed to Tucker’s symptoms and to the need for surgery. Following Dr. Savage’s deposition, Tucker again requested that the Medical Center provide her with medical treatment. The Medical Center continued to refuse to provide Tucker with medical treatment. Tucker, on her own initiative, ultimately sought treatment in February 2000 from Dr. James G. White III, the physician who had treated her for the previous back injury in 1992. Dr. White noted that at that time Tucker was complaining of lower back pain and that she was depressed. Dr. White ordered an MRI, which revealed a collapsed degenerated L5 disc. In March 2000, Dr. White performed surgery in order to repair the disc. He testified that Tucker’s injury was caused by the December 3, 1997, accident, and, further, that the injury had caused Tucker pain that has contributed to her depression. Dr. White referred Tucker to Dr. Paul Muratta for pain management.

Before the trial court were, among other things, issues regarding the authorization of Tucker’s medical treatment by Dr. White and Dr. Muratta and the payment of her related medical expenses; whether Tucker was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits; and whether Tucker’s alleged depression was compensable under the Act. The trial court, in its order, deferred ruling on the issue regarding the authorization of her medical treatment by Dr. White and Dr. Muratta. The trial court did not address whether Tucker was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits and whether her alleged depression was com-pensable under the Act. The trial court in a workers’ compensation case “ ‘is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and these findings should encompass each and every issue presented to and litigated in the trial court; where this is not done, the judgment should be reversed.’ ” Ex parte Valdez, 636 So.2d 401, 404 (Ala.1994), quoting Thompson & Co. Contractors v. Cole, 391 So.2d 1042, 1046 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). If this court were to make a determination as to the issues in this case, it would be weighing the evidence and would become the finder of fact. That is a function for which this court is ill suited and one which it is not permitted to perform. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Domingo, 764 So.2d 1287 (Ala.Civ.App.2000).

Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and remand the case for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the treatment by Dr. White and Dr. Muratta and the related medical expenses should have been authorized; whether Tucker is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits; and whether Tucker’s alleged depression is compensable. Because the trial court’s finding relating to the extent of Tucker’s disability may change upon remand, we pretermit discussion of that issue at this time.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PITTMAN, J., concurs.

THOMPSON, J., concurs in the result.


text:
    JACKSON LANDSCAPING, INC. v. Randy HOOKS.
    2010625.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Sept. 20, 2002.

      Michael J. Cohan of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, P.C., Montgomery, for appellant.
    Cathy B. Donohoe of Donohoe & Staple-ton, L.L.C., Montgomery, for appellee.
   YATES, Presiding Judge.

Randy Hooks sued his employer, Jackson Landscaping, Inc., on November 13, 2000, seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for injuries he allegedly sustained to his lower back and his left ankle and foot during the course of his employment with Jackson Landscaping. Following an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court, on February 4, 2002, entered an order finding that Hooks’s alleged back injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Jackson Landscaping and that Jackson Landscaping was liable for the medical treatment necessarily related to the injury. Jackson Landscaping appeals.

This case is governed by the 1992 Workers’ Compensation Act. This Act provides that an appellate court’s review of the standard of proof and its consideration of other legal issues shall be without a presumption of correctness. § 25 — 5—81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975. It further provides that when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact, those findings will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evidence. § 25 — 5—81(e)(2). Our supreme court “has defined the term ‘substantial evidence,’ as it is used in § 12-21-12(d), to mean ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 268 (Ala.1996), quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). This court has also concluded: “The new Act did not alter the rule that this court does not weigh the evidence before the trial court.” Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).

The sole issue on appeal is whether Hooks’s back injury is causally related to his work-related accident. For an injury to be compensable, it must be “caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of’ the employee’s employment. § 25-5-51, Ala. Code 1975. The phrase “arising out of’ an employee’s employment requires a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pettus, 623 So.2d 313, 314 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). The phrase “in the course of’ the employee’s employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. Id. In accident cases, i.e., those involving a sudden and traumatic event, an employee must produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged accident occurred and must also establish medical causation by showing that the accident caused, or was a contributing cause of, the injury. Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d at 266 n. 3. The trial court may find medical causation without testimony from medical doctors. Ex parte Price, 555 So.2d 1060 (Ala.1989). The totality of the evidence, including both lay and expert testimony, may satisfy a showing of medical causation. U.S. Steel, A. Division of USX Corp. v. Nelson, 634 So.2d 134 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).

Hooks was employed by Jackson Landscaping as a laborer. On June 3, 1999, Hooks, while a passenger in an automobile driven by a coworker, was injured in a single-vehicle accident. It is undisputed that the automobile accident occurred within the line and scope of Hooks’s employment with Jackson Landscaping and that Hooks injured his left ankle and foot during the automobile accident. Hooks also claims that he ruptured a disc in his lower back as a result of the accident. Jackson Landscaping contends that Hooks’s back injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.

Hooks was transferred to the emergency room at Jackson Hospital after the automobile accident. He testified that when he arrived at the emergency room both his foot and lower back were in pain, but that the pain in his foot was the most severe. He stated that he reported his lower back pain to the emergency room physician and that he received an injection in his back for the pain. He further testified that he was bleeding from his lower back and that he received sutures in his lower back.

The records from the emergency room at Jackson Hospital indicate that after the automobile accident, Hooks complained of neck pain and left ankle pain. Contrary to Hooks’s testimony, the emergency room records indicate that he did not complain of lower back pain. The records do indicate that Hooks was treated for a three-centimeter superficial laceration to his left buttock, and that, rather than being given an injection in the back for the purported back pain as Hooks claims, he was injected with lidocaine, a local anesthesia, and given sutures in the left buttock to repair the laceration. Hooks was released from the emergency room with a diagnosis of “sprained left foot & ankle; cervical strain; sutures.”

Hooks was positive at trial that he had informed the emergency room physician that he was suffering lower back pain and that the only laceration he had was to his lower back. When confronted with the fact that the emergency room records do not indicate that he complained of lower back pain and that the sutures he received were to repair a laceration to his buttocks and not his lower back, Hooks explained that the records contained a “misprint.” We note that the emergency room records refer to a laceration to the buttocks no less than six times and contain three diagrams depicting a laceration to the buttocks, rather than to the lower back.

Hooks was referred to Dr. Charles W. Hartzog, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, for treatment of his ankle and foot injury. Hook was first seen by Dr. Hartzog on June 8, 1999, complaining of left foot pain. Dr. Hartzog noted that Hooks had a significant bruise to the calcaneal nerve in the foot with a hematoma or superficial blood-clot formation. Dr. Hartzog diagnosed Hooks with a contusion to the foot with a medial ankle sprain. He took Hooks off of work.

Hooks continued to be treated by Dr. Hartzog on numerous occasions between June 8, 1999,- and February 11, 2000. On July 26, 1999, Hooks was seen by Dr. Hartzog for his ankle and foot injury. At that time, Hooks described some shooting pains down his left leg. Dr. Hartzog noted that the foot injury was improving. Hooks returned to Dr. Hartzog on August 10, 1999, complaining of “pins-and-needles” type pain, which Dr. Hartzog related to “peripheral nerve return.” Dr. Hartzog noted that the ankle and foot injury continued to improve. He determined that Hooks had reached maximum medical improvement on August 31, 1999, with no permanent impairment and he returned Hooks to work at full duty on that date. Hooks returned to Dr. Hartzog on December 30, 1999, and February 11, 2000, complaining of pain and swelling in his left foot; however, Dr. Hartzog continued Hooks on his normal work duties.

Dr. Hartzog’s records do not indicate that Hooks ever complained of any lower back pain during the time that he treated him from June 8, 1999, to February 11, 2000. Hooks testified as follows:

“Q. Did you ever tell Dr. Hartzog you hurt your back?
“A. I didn’t specifically go to the back.
“Q. Did you in any way talk about the back, specifically or not specifically?
“A. No, I didn’t. I didn’t know it was the back.
“Q. You didn’t know it was the back?
“A. No.”

This testimony contradicts earlier testimony in which Hooks stated that he had told the emergency room physician that he was having pain in his lower back. Hooks did inform Dr. Hartzog, however, that he had pain radiating up and down his left leg. Hooks stated that he was on crutches after the accident, but that as he began to bear weight on his left leg he began experiencing pain radiating up into his back.

Hooks testified that he returned to work at his normal duties, but that he walked with a limp and was not as productive as he had been before the accident. He ultimately quit his employment with Jackson Landscaping on February 18, 2000. He testified at trial that he quit because of pain and a lack of transportation to and from work. However, he testified under oath at an unemployment compensation benefits hearing that he quit solely because of a lack of transportation to and from work and he did not mention a back injury at the hearing.

Dr. Hartzog referred Hooks to Dr. D.D. Thornbury, an orthopedic surgeon, for evaluation of Hooks’s continued complaints with his ankle and foot. Dr. Thornbury first saw Hooks on February 23, 2000, and diagnosed him with chronic foot pain at that time. Hooks returned to Dr. Thorn-bury on October 19, 2000, with continued complaints regarding his ankle and foot. Additionally, Hooks complained of lower back pain with pain radiating down his left leg. A physical exam revealed some limited forward flexion and some minor muscle spasm. This is the first documented complaint of lower back pain by Hooks in the 16 months following the automobile accident. Hooks testified as follows:

“Q. Dr. Thornbury treated you for your back; is that right?
“A. He did a preliminary examination on my back.
“Q. Isn’t that true that’s the first time you told a doctor that your back hurt?
“A. Yes, that’s the first time that my back actually started hurting.”

This testimony by Hooks again contradicts his earlier testimony in which he stated that he told the emergency room physician that he was experiencing lower back pain after the automobile accident.

X-rays taken by Dr. Thornbury revealed a narrowing of the L5-S1 disc space. Dr. Thornbury diagnosed Hooks with degenerative disc disease and probable L5-S1 rad-iculopathy. Dr. Thornbury stated the following in a letter to Jackson Landscaping’s workers’ compensation administrator:

“At that time [October 19, 2000] he said he was beginning to have some low back pain that radiated all the way down his leg to his foot. His x-rays demonstrated L5-S1 disc space narrowing, suggestive of degenerative disc disease.
“The patient, at that time, tried to relate this to his injury but I have looked through his entire chart and this was the first mention of any low back pain and radicular pain this patient has had.
“So, my professional opinion, while he may very well have some legitimate lower back problems and radicular type pain, I cannot relate it to his injury to his foot from June of 1999....
“I have referred him to Dr. Holt for his back problems as I think they probably are legitimate but not related to his ankle injury.”

Dr. Thornbury referred Hooks to Dr. Timothy A. Holt, an orthopedic surgeon, for evaluation of his lower back complaints. Hooks was first seen by Dr. Holt on November 3, 2000, complaining of lower back pain that radiated down the left leg. An MRI revealed a large extruding disc fragment at the L5-S1 disc level with narrowing of the spinal canal at the L4-L5 level. Dr. Holt recommended that Hooks have surgery to repair the disc. Dr. Holt testified as follows regarding the causal connection between the back injury he diagnosed in November 2000, to the June 1999 automobile accident that Hooks was involved:

“Q. Is it possible that he didn’t experience his back pain that was due to the injury or the car wreck until later?
“A. That would be highly unusual.
“Q. I noticed in your notes that you had stated that he had been on crutches for a foot injury in the wreck.
“A. Correct.
“Q. And I’m referring to the 11/10 notes ... where you said that he had been keeping the weight off that side and this was probably — this could have been the reason why he didn’t experience the pain sooner?
“A. Could have been.
“Q. I know from personal experience that it was about six months after a car wreck that I started feeling pain in my back. Is that possible?
“A. It is possible. It’s just unlikely.... Especially in the situation he’s in, being on crutches.
“Q. What do you mean by that?
“A. Well, he wasn’t weight-bearing on the left leg. Then, when he started weight-bearing on the left leg, he began having the radicular pain.
“Q. So could you state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that this injury was caused by the wreck?
“A. I can say there’s a probability it could have been, yes.”

Jack Jackson, the owner of Jackson Landscaping, testified that at no time did Hooks ever inform him that he was experiencing back pain and that the first time he learned that Hooks was alleging a back injury was when the complaint was filed in this case. Jackson further testified that when Hooks returned to work he did not observe any problems with his work performance. The first report of injury indicates that Hooks stated that he hurt his ankle and suffered a laceration to his buttocks. Jackson testified that he completed the first report of injury and that Hooks did not report that he had injured his back. Additionally, two of Hooks’s coem-ployees testified that he never mentioned any back pain or back injury to them after the automobile accident.

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Hooks failed to prove that his back injury was causally related to the automobile accident and that the trial court’s finding on that issue is not supported by substantial evidence. Hooks’s testimony that he received sutures in his lower back and that he informed the emergency room physician that he was experiencing lower back pain after the accident is completely contradicted by the emergency room records regarding Hooks’s complaints and the treatment he received. Hooks explains the discrepancy as a “misprint,” even though a laceration to the buttocks area is referred to on six occasions and depicted in a diagram on three occasions.

Hooks did not complain of lower back pain until approximately 16 months after the automobile accident. He stated that he did not tell Dr. Hartzog of the back pain because he “didn’t know it was the back.” This contradicts earlier testimony in which he stated that he informed the emergency room physician that he was experiencing back pain. Hooks testified that he did not complain of back pain to Dr. Thornbury until October 2000, because, he says, that was the first time “that [his] back actually started hurting.” Again, this contradicts earlier testimony. Dr. Thornbury specifically testified that the back injury was not related to the June 3, 1999, automobile accident. Dr. Holt testified that Hooks’s back complaints, coming approximately 16 months after the accident, were “highly unusual.” When asked if the back injury and the automobile accident were causally related he could only say that there was a “probability [that] it could have been.”

Additionally, we note the following exchange between the trial court and counsel for Jackson Landscaping:

“[The Court]: Okay. Let me tell y’all, I am obviously going to have to go read the doctors’ depositions because I haven’t read them. But I will just tell y’all my feelings about from just sitting here. First of all, I don’t think Mr. Hooks is making one thing up. I mean, I think this is a classic case of, yeah, his ankle was hurt and his back was hurt. And, you know, I know how men are. And you ask them what — I mean, I ask my husband how do you feel. Oh, I feel fine. Then five days later, you know, he has got this horrible flu. And I am like why didn’t you say anything? Well, it wasn’t that bad or whatever. It doesn’t mean much to me about what the guy was saying or not saying. He is saying my leg is hurting. He obviously had trauma to his back. That’s evident from the medical report with the cut on the back. The doctors referring him. Obviously there is a problem with his back.
“[Counsel for Jackson Landscaping]: We don’t dispute that Mr. Hooks has a back problem. I think that’s clear from Dr. Holt’s opinions.
“[The Court]: I don’t dispute that the back problem started from the accident. I mean, that trauma, that getting those stitches and it’s developed. I mean, it might not have hurt right then. I think the man legitimately tried to go back to work and worked his hardest. And guys don’t sit and complain to each other I am hurt. That’s just not guys. They don’t say anything. Some do. But then if you do, you’re a whiney. You just don’t say anything. I mean, I think he did legitimately go back and do the best he could do, which obviously was pretty good. Everyone said it was. But I think, as he has gone on, his back has gotten worse and worse because that’s what happens when you get one of those injuries.
“[Counsel for Jackson Landscaping]: I think what our position is with regard to the initial injury though is that there was no back injury. If the medical records from the emergency room don’t touch on the back—
“[The Court]: Well, it says cervical from Jackson. It says that he has a cervical sprain.
“[Counsel for Jackson Landscaping]: That’s in the neck. That’s up here. And he has no complaints about his back.
“[The Court]: He has got those stitches in his back. We can all agree on that.
“[Counsel for Jackson Landscaping]: No, Judge, he has got stitches in his butt.
“[The Court]: Well, the back area right back — when I say butt or back, it’s basically the same thing, that whole area down there where your spine — your spine goes all the way into your buttocks area. I mean, I am not going to sit and be — I am not going to be picky about how far down into your buttocks area. I mean, that’s your back.”

We conclude that the trial court misinterpreted the evidence; therefore, the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the court is reversed and the case is remanded for the trial court to enter an order consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.

      . The compensability of the ankle injury was not disputed, and it is not an issue on appeal.