author:
BASCHAB, Judge.
     COBB, JUDGE,

text:
    Antwan Demetrius HARRIS v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-01-2585.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 29, 2003.
    James M. Sims, Anniston, for appellant.
    William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Kristi L. Deason Hagood, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
   BASCHAB, Judge.

The appellant, Antwan Demetrius Harris, pled guilty to second-degree assault, a violation of § 13A-6-21 (a)(2), Ala.Code 1975, and throwing a deadly or dangerous missile into an occupied vehicle, a violation of § 32-5-11, Ala.Code 1975. Applying the deadly weapon enhancement set forth in § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, the trial court sentenced him to serve concurrent terms of ten years in prison on each conviction. The appellant did not file any postjudgment motions. This appeal followed.

The evidence in the record established that the appellant threw a piece of a cinder block or concrete block through the passenger window of the vehicle Lora Chat-mon was occupying. The trial court described the object the appellant threw as “a jagged piece of concrete block, at least four or five inches high on one side, and maybe two inches or more on the other side, about an inch and half thick. And has very sharp edges.” (R. 26.) Chat-mon, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, was struck in the right temple and sustained “a large gash on the side of her head.” (R. 20.)

The appellant argues that the trial court improperly applied the enhancement set forth in § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, to his sentences. Section 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, requires that, “[f|or a Class B or C felony in which a ... deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony,” the sentence shall be “not less than 10 years.” The appellant specifically contends that the piece of a concrete block he threw did not constitute a deadly weapon, as defined in § 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975. Section 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, defines a “deadly weapon” as

“[a] firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury. The term includes, but is not limited to, a pistol, rifle, or shotgun; or a switch-blade knife, gravity knife, stiletto, sword, or dagger; or any billy, black-jack, bludgeon, or metal knuckles.”

(Emphasis added.) The Commentary to § 13A-1-2, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

“Many objects are not deadly per se and ordinarily have lawful functions and uses, but ... such object may constitute a ‘dangerous instrument’ because it was used, or attempted to be used, in a manner rendering it ‘readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.’ (A stick, rock, pencil or pen is capable of producing great harm or even death if jammed in a person’s eye, ear or throat.) This definition essentially states previously existing law. The mere showing of the use of a fist does not make out use of a weapon. Corcoran v. State, 18 Ala.App. 202, 89 So. 835 (1921). Normally a shoe does not constitute a deadly weapon under former section 13-1-43, but it could under given circumstances. Cozart v. State, 42 Ala.App. 535, 171 So.2d 77, cert. denied, 277 Ala. 698, 171 So.2d 84 [(1965)]. An instrument or weapon used in inflicting injury may or may not be esteemed deadly, according to the manner of its use, and the subject on which it is used. Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201 (1882). In other words, a deadly weapon is not only a weapon with which death may be easily and readily produced, but one which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm from the manner in which it is used. Williams v. State, 251 Ala. 397, 39 So.2d 37 (1948).”

(Emphasis added.)

In Ex parte Cobb, 703 So.2d 871, 876 (Ala.1996), the Alabama Supreme Court stated: “[W]e conclude that the legislature intended to include as deadly weapons only things that are similar to the listed weapons.” However, the court went on to state: “Only objects that are ‘designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury’ fit the definition of ‘deadly weapon.’ ” Id. See also Buchanan v. State, 602 So.2d 459, 460 (Ala. Crim.App.1992) (“This court has stated that an item may become a ... deadly weapon depending on the manner in which the item is used. Davis v. State, 470 So.2d 1340 (Ala.Cr.App.1985); Austin v. State, 555 So.2d 324 (Ala.Cr.App.1989).”). In fact, this court has repeatedly held that items that are not specifically listed in § 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, constituted deadly weapons based on the manner in which they were used. See Harris v. State, 705 So.2d 542 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (holding that a 16-ounce glass soft drink bottle was a deadly weapon as used in the case); Garrison v. State, 521 So.2d 997 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (holding that a board constituted a deadly weapon under the circumstances of the case); Jones v. State, 523 So.2d 518 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (holding that a tire tool constituted a deadly weapon based on the manner in which it was used); Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (holding that a baseball bat constituted a deadly weapon); Goolsby v. State, 492 So.2d 635 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (holding that a hammer, as used by the appellant in that case, constituted a deadly weapon). But see Ex parte Cobb, 703 So.2d 871 (Ala.1996) (holding that fists or other body parts cannot constitute deadly weapons); Buchanan, supra (holding that thrown plastic flashlight did not constitute a deadly weapon).

When it found that the piece of a concrete block constituted a deadly weapon, the trial court stated:

“The Court has considered the defendant’s motion objecting to enhancement of the defendant’s sentence under Section 13A-5-6(a)(5), by contending that the concrete block or portion of concrete block in this case does not constitute a deadly weapon as defined under Section 13A-l-2(7) of the Code of Alabama.
“The definition which we have, as everyone has conceded, is not a self-limiting or completely contained definition. It states, again, that a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or inflicting serious physical injury would constitute a deadly weapon. And it gives several other examples.
“The Court has the object before it. The Court notes that there’s been no exception to the stated testimony that the defendant threw this object toward the victim from some fairly short distance standing outside of the automobile in which she was still in the driver’s position; that the object was thrown with such degree of force as to break the passenger side glass, pass through into the automobile, and strike the victim who was seated in the driver’s position in the car, near the temple area on the right side of her head.
“As I look at this definition, I find that this concrete block object was adapted for the purpose in this particular situation of imposing serious physical injury.
“But for the grace of God, any slight movement where this object struck the victim, we may well have had serious physical injury to the victim’s brain, eyes, ears. And as such I do find that in this instance under the circumstances in which it was used that the cement— jagged cement concrete block constitutes a deadly weapon.”

(R. 29-30.)

In Harris, 705 So.2d at 548, we noted:

“To assist us in determining whether a glass soft drink bottle may be classified as a ‘deadly weapon’ for purposes of applying § 13A-5-6(a)(4), we look to the Alabama Supreme Court, which recently stated in Ex parte Cobb, 703 So.2d 871, 875 (Ala.1996), that ‘the legislature intended to include as deadly weapons only things that are similar to the listed weapons. Only [inanimate] objects that are “designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury” fit the definition of “deadly weapon.” ’ The issue in Cobb was whether a person’s fists could be considered a deadly weapon.
“Although a glass bottle is not specifically included in the list of weapons defined as ‘deadly weapons,’ a bottle may be ‘adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury,’ and may therefore be a ‘deadly weapon.’ In Cooper v. State, 584 So.2d 920, 921 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), we affirmed a sentence for first degree robbery enhanced pursuant to § 13A-5-6(a)(4), where the appellant used a broken bottle as a dangerous weapon. See also Christian v. State, 351 So.2d 616 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), rev’d on other grounds, 351 So.2d 623 (Ala.1977). Clearly, a bottle may be adapted and used as a deadly weapon.
“The record indicates that the appellant used the glass soft drink bottle to strike the victim on the head and in a manner unrelated to its innocent and useful purpose. The bottle was full of liquid and therefore had some weight, and was obviously hard. The bottle was capable of causing serious injury either broken or unbroken. As a result of the blow, the victim suffered a cut, bled profusely, and required an undetermined number of stitches.. Although the appellant was fortunate that the force of his blow to the victim’s head did not caúse death or permanent serious physical injury, the possibility of death or serious physical injury was present, given the size and weight of the bottle, the location of the blow, and the other circumstances that were proven. The manner-in which the appellant used the bottle was sufficiently similar to the manner in which one would use a billy club or bludgeon to qualify as a deadly weapon for purposes of the application of § 13A-5-6(a)(4). The trial court correctly determined that the glass soft drink bottle was a deadly weapon.” ,

The appellant argues that the definition of deadly weapon is limited to weapons that are similar to those listed iri § 13A-1-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, and that are used “to make direct contact while being -held in the perpetrator’s hand - and making contact with the body of the victim.” (Appellant’s brief at p. 9.) He also appears to contend that a thrown object cannot constitute a deadly weapon. However, such a reading of § 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, is too limited and would thwart the purpose of the statute.

We hold that a proper determination of whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon should be made based on the totality of the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and the circumstances surrounding its use. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the piece of a concrete block the appellant threw into Chatmon’s vehicle was “adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury.” § 13A-1-2(7), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, it constituted a deadly weapon, and the trial court properly applied the enhancement set forth in § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, to the appellant’s sentences. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

SHAW and WISE, JJ„ concur.

McMILLAN, P.J., dissents.

COBB, J., dissents, with opinion.

COBB, JUDGE,

dissenting.

The majority in this case affirms Antwan Demetrius Harris’s sentences for throwing a dangerous missile into an occupied vehicle and for second-degree assault, violations of §§ 32-5-11 and 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975, respectively, finding that the piece of a concrete block Harris threw into Lora Chatmon’s vehicle was a deadly weapon, and, therefore, that his sentence for each conviction was properly enhanced under § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975. Harris claims that his sentence was improperly enhanced under § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, because, he argues, the concrete rock he used to shatter the car window and injure Lora Chatmon was not a “deadly weapon” as that term is defined by the relevant statute. I agree with Harris. Therefore, I dissent.

In Ex parte Cobb, 703 So.2d 871 (Ala.1996), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

“The definition states that a deadly weapon is a ‘firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury.’ [The statute, § 13A-1-2(7), Ala.Code 1975,] then lists 12 specific objects that are ‘designed as weapons and are easily and readily susceptible of producing death or serious injury.’ Commentary, Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-1-2(11).[] Included in that list are various types of firearms, knives, and objects designed to deliver blunt force trauma. Applying the rule of ejusdem generis to § 13A-1-2(11), we conclude that the legislature intended to include as deadly weapons only things that are similar to the listed weapons. Only objects that are ‘designed, made or adapted for the purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury’ fit the definition of ‘deadly weapon.’ ”

703 So.2d at 875-76.

The majority supports its holding by noting that the Alabama Supreme Court, in Cobb, after stating that “the legislature intended to include as deadly weapons only things that are similar to the listed weapons,” Id. at 876 also stated that any object designed, made or adapted for purposes of inflicting death or serious physical injury is a deadly weapon. The majority also states that “this court has repeatedly held that certain items not specifically listed in § 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, constituted deadly weapons based on the manner in which they were used.” 873 So.2d at 1172-73. While this Court has held that many items not specifically listed in § 13A-l-2(7), Ala.Code 1975, constitute deadly weapons, existing caselaw indicates that only items similar to the listed weapons and items used in a manner similar to the weapons listed in the definition can be considered to be deadly weapons. In Jones v. State, 523 So.2d 518 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), this Court held that a tire tool used to strike the victim in the head was a deadly weapon. This Court has also held that a baseball bat, when used to strike the victim, was a deadly weapon. See Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). In Harris v. State, 705 So.2d 542, 548 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), this Court held that a glass bottle may be a deadly weapon because “[t]he manner in which the appellant used the bottle was sufficiently similar to the manner in which one would use a billy club or bludgeon to qualify as a deadly weapon.” Thus, when an object, other than a knife of gun, is used in a manner similar to a manner in which one uses a billy club or bludgeon, we have held that the object was a deadly weapon.

In only a few cases has this Court been presented with a question whether a thrown object constitutes a deadly weapon. In Buchanan v. State, 602 So.2d 459, 460 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), this Court held that a flashlight thrown by the defendant was not a “dangerous weapon” within the second-degree assault statute because it was not used in “so-called hand-to-hand combat and was not used in a beating in close contact with the victim.” Therefore, it appears that when an object was not used in a manner similar to the weapons listed in the definition, this Court has concluded that the object was not a deadly weapon.

While a rock may be used to bludgeon someone, the rock was not used in such a manner in this case. Harris threw the rock at the windshield of an automobile. Harris used the rock in a manner similar to the way the flashlight was used in Buchanan. Thus, it is my opinion that the rock, as it was used in this case, did not constitute a deadly weapon and that the trial court erred when it applied the § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, sentence enhancement to both convictions.

Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm Harris’s sentences.

      . This case was originally assigned to another Judge on this court. It was reassigned to Judge Baschab on June 12, 2003.

      . Before he entered his guilty pleas, the appellant reserved the right to raise this argument on appeal.

      . Section 13A-1-2 was amended effective September 26, 2001. The definition of "deadly weapon” is now found in subsection (7).

      . In a case presenting other facts, such as a rock of this size being thrown at a moving vehicle from a highway overpass, further analysis would be required, and I would perhaps reach a different result. However, those facts are not before us today.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION ex rel. Tyrone McCLOTHAN v. STATE of Alabama.
    CR-01-1508.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 29, 2003.
    Matthew Walton Theus, Birmingham, for appellant, Tyrone McClothan.
    Nancy S. Jones, Tuscaloosa, for appellant, Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
   On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu

PER CURIAM.

The order of dismissal issued on January 7, 2003, and the opinion on application for rehearing issued on April 25, 2003, are hereby withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.

The Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (“the Department”) and Tyrone McClothan appeal the trial court’s ruling denying the Department’s motion filed pursuant to Rule 25.8(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., seeking to release McClothan from its custody. In 1993, McClothan was indicted for arson in the first degree. A jury found McClothan not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court held an involuntary commitment hearing pursuant to Rule 25.3, Ala. R.Crim.P., and ordered that McClothan be involuntarily committed to the custody of the Department. Since McClothan’s commitment, the Department has on four occasions — in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 — filed motions in the circuit court seeking to release McClothan from its custody conditionally. After a hearing on the latest motion, the trial court denied the Department’s request. The Department and McClothan then filed a notice of appeal with this court. On January 7, 2003, we dismissed this case by an order, citing our decision in Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation ex rel. McClothan v. State, 819 So.2d 113 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), the Department’s appeal from the 1999 denial of its motion to release McClothan. McClothan then filed an application for rehearing requesting that we reconsider our earlier dismissal.

There is no right to appeal granted in the Alabama Constitution of 1901. This Court’s appellate jurisdiction is prescribed in § 12-3-9, Ala.Code 1975, which states:

“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post conviction writs in criminal cases.”

Amend. No. 328, § 6.03(a), Ala. Const. 1901, also states that this Court shall “exercise” its appellate jurisdiction “under such terms and conditions as shall be provided by law and by rules of the Supreme Court.”

As we recently stated in Dixon v. City of Mobile, 859 So.2d 462, 463 (Ala.Crim.App.2003):

“ ‘The right of appeal is wholly statutory and is authorized in criminal cases from a judgment of conviction.’ McCray v. State, 46 Ala.App. 588, 589, 246 So.2d 475, 476 (Ala.Crim.App.1971). ‘Appeals lie only from judgments of conviction, and then only on those counts upon which there is a finding of guilt.’ Thornton v. State, 390 So.2d 1093, 1096 (Ala.Crim.App.1980). ‘An appeal cannot be taken from an order subsequent to the judgment of conviction unless authorized by statute.’ Harris v. State, 44 Ala.App. 632, 632, 218 So.2d 285, 286 (1969).”

“An appeal in a criminal case can only be taken from a judgment of conviction, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary. Hughes v. State, 45 Ala.App. 250, 228 So.2d 862 (1969).” Forrest v. State, 344 So.2d 231, 232 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). The appellants concede “that the right to appeal is statutory and that a defendant must be ‘convicted’ in order to appeal. Ala.Code § 12-22-130.” (The Department’s brief to this Court at page 17.)

A verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect acquits the defendant of all criminal liability as to the charge upon which the verdict is directed. Cf. § 15-16-24, Ala.Code 1975. The defendant can never again be tried for that offense. After such a verdict has been accepted, a separate hearing may be held if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant is mentally ill and is a danger to himself and the community. Because the commitment hearing does not occur until after the trial court has accepted a jury’s verdict acquitting the defendant, a commitment proceeding under Rule 25 cannot be a postconviction proceeding within the meaning of § 12-3-9, because it does not follow a “conviction.”

Before the passage in 1988 of the Criminal Psychopath Release Restriction Act, codified in § 15-16-60 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (the “Act”), and before the adoption of Rule 25, Ala.R.Crim.P., the Court of Civil Appeals routinely reviewed the rulings of lower courts on release requests filed by individuals acquitted and adjudged insane, because, as that Court stated, the appeals involved the enforcement of administrative agency rulings from the Department — rulings that are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals based on § 12-3-10. See Nix v. State, 512 So.2d 121 (Ala.Civ.App.1987), and Winchester v. Bartlett, 532 So.2d 1258 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). We also observe that exclusive jurisdiction was granted to that Court by § 22-52-33 and § 22-52-15, Ala. Code 1975, because the action to commit a defendant acquitted on the basis of a mental disease or defect was initiated by the Department in the probate court of certain counties and was classified as a civil commitment proceeding. Section 22-52-33, Ala.Code 1975, states:

“Where any person who is currently in the custody of the department of mental health has been adjudicated ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ pursuant to the provisions of Sections 15-16-24, 15-16-25 and 15-16-40, the commissioner or his designee shall petition the judges of probate of Tuscaloosa or Mobile Counties or any judge of probate where such facility exists for an order of civil commitment to the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.”

Section 22-52-15, further provides, in part:

“An appeal from an order of the probate court granting a petition seeking to commit a respondent to the custody of the department or designated mental health facility as the court may order lies to the circuit court for trial de novo unless the probate judge who granted the petition was learned in the law, in which case the appeal lies to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals on the record.”

It is now impossible to comply with § 22-52-33, Ala.Code 1975, because two of the three sections cited in that Code section — §§ 15-16-25 and 15-16-40 — have been repealed. McSwain v. Stricklin, 540 So.2d 81 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Moreover, those statutory provisions that conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Civil Appeals were effectively repealed, in part, by the adoption of the Act. The Act and Rule 25 both provide that the action to commit a defendant acquitted on the basis of a mental disease or defect is initiated by the trial court and not the Department and that an action to release the acquittee is commenced in the trial court of the county where the criminal act occurred, not in the probate court of the county where the mental-health facility at which the acquittee has been committed is located. Section 15-16-62 states that an insanity acquittee may not be released “unless authorized to do so by court order as provided in this article.” (Emphasis added.)

However, the Act, passed in 1988, provides a procedure for the Department to petition a circuit court for the release of a person who has been involuntarily committed following a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Absent from the Act were any provisions that allowed a person so committed to petition for his release from custody. In part in response to this void, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted Rule 25, Ala.R.Crim. P., effective January 1, 1991. Rule 25.8 specifically addresses the filing of a motion for release by the defendant, by another person on his behalf, or by the commissioner of the Department. This rule and the Act effectively amend and replace § 15-21-3, the habeas corpus statute, with respect to persons who are committed after the entry of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Both the Act and the rule provide entirely new procedures for, and venues in which to seek, release of a defendant who has been involuntarily committed. Rule 25.8(b) states:

“Upon receipt by the court of a motion from the defendant, a motion on behalf of the defendant, or a motion from the commissioner, alleging that the defendant is no longer mentally ill or no longer poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others by being at large, or no longer poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others by being at large if certain conditions are imposed upon the defendant’s release, and accompanied by the certification of a mental health expert stating that, in the expert’s opinion, those allegations are correct, the court shall give notice to the district attorney (who shall then notify the victim pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 15-14-50 et seq.), the commissioner, and the regional or community mental health facility which is or may be involved if the defendant is released, and the defendant, the defendant’s guardian, or the defendant’s attorney, and unless an order of release is stipulated by the parties with consent of the court, shall hold a hearing to determine whether said defendant is still mentally ill or still poses a. real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others. The court may not be required to give notice or to, hold a hearing on such motion for any defendant more frequently than every six (6) months. The court shall conduct the hearing without empaneling a jury.”

Unlike the habeas corpus statute that defines the court of jurisdiction as the court nearest to the defendant’s place of confinement, Rule 25.8, defines the court of jurisdiction as the court that originally committed the individual — the court that presided over the criminal case.

Both the Act and Rule 25, AJa.R.Crim. P., prescribe the procedures for initiating an involuntary commitment proceeding after a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect has been returned by a jury. They also address the procedure to petition a circuit court for release. However, neither the Act nor the rule provides for appellate review of a circuit court’s ruling denying a motion for release made by the Department, the person involuntarily committed, or by a person on the committee’s behalf.

Because there is no provision in Rule 25 for an appeal from a ruling on such a motion, we have no choice but to dismiss this appeal. If the Department or McClo-than disagrees with this holding, we invite them to seek certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court. We also recommend that the Department seek legislative action to address appellate review of adverse rulings, a matter that was apparently inadvertently overlooked by the drafters of the Act.

ON REHEARING EX MERO MOTU: ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF JANUARY 7, 2003, WITHDRAWN; OPINION OF APRIL 25, 2003, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

McMILLAN, P J, and COBB, BASCHAB, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      .The records of the office of the clerk of this Court reflect that initially the notice of appeal in this case listed only Tyrone McClothan as the appellant. However, this Court received an amended notice of appeal adding the Department as an appellant. Also, our records show that McClothan filed a brief in this Court and that the Department accepted and adopted the facts and arguments in McClo-than's brief. We have styled this case as "Department of Mental Retardation and Mental Health ex rel. Tyrone McClothan. The phrase “ex rel.” is an abbreviation for "[o]n the relation or information of.” Black's Law Dictionary 603 (7th ed.1999). In this case both the Department and McClothan are interested parties to the actions in the circuit court.

      . See note 1.

      . We held in that earlier opinion that the State had no right to appeal the ruling denying McClothan’s release because there was no statute or rule authorizing such an appeal by the State. We noted that the State has only a limited right to appeal. The State may appeal a ruling holding a statute unconstitutional, a pretrial ruling suppressing evidence, a pretrial ruling dismissing the charges, a ruling quashing an arrest or search warrant, or a ruling granting a habeas corpus petition and ordering an individual's release from custody. See §§ 12-12-70, 12-22-90, and 12-22-91, Ala.Code 1975; and Rule 15.7, Ala.R.Crim.P.

      . In Dixon, we held that there was no right to appeal a circuit court's dismissal of a de novo appeal.

      . Rule 25.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., states:
      “Whenever the court finds probable cause pursuant to Rule 25.2(b), the court shall hold a hearing within seven (7) days of the order issued pursuant thereto to determine whether the defendant shall be involuntarily committed. For good cause shown, the court may continue the hearing to a later date not to exceed thirty (30) days from the determination of the finding of probable cause.”

      . Neither this Court nor the Court of Civil Appeals has been consistent about handling these cases. Our research has revealed three cases in which this Court has reviewed an acquittee’s request to be released: Carlisle v. State, 512 So.2d 150 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (this case notes that the defendant was not found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; rather, the State joined issue with his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect); Knight v. State, 460 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (this case was considered before the adoption of the Act or Rule 25, Ala.R.Crim.P.); and Cooley v. State, 695 So.2d 1219 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (this Court never reached the question whether Cooley suffered from a mental disease or defect because the only issue presented was whether the motion was filed in the proper county).
      The Court of Civil Appeals has considered the following cases after motions were filed to release a defendant acquitted on the basis of insanity: Nix v. State, 512 So.2d 121 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Winchester v. Bartlett, 532 So.2d 1258 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Reed v. Taylor Hardin Secure Med. Facility, 545 So.2d 782 (Ala.Civ.App.1989); Canidate v. Stricklin, 568 So.2d 1234 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). Nix was clearly decided after the effective date of the Act. Winchester was decided before the effective date of the Act; this Court transferred the case to the Court of Civil Appeals. Reed was decided before Rule 25, Ala.R.Crim.P., was adopted. Canidate was clearly decided after the Act was in place. More recently we have transferred an appeal from a motion of the Department to release Canidate to the Court of Civil Appeals. See Canidate v. State (No. CR-01-0420). That Court accepted jurisdiction of the case, affirmed the lower court's decision, and certiorari review was denied in August 2002. See Ex parte Canidate, 842 So.2d 648 (Ala.2002). See also Dexter v. State, 842 So.2d 717 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (denial of motion for release by a defendant acquitted on the basis of mental disease or defect and committed to a mental-health facility was affirmed because the defendant failed to file a brief on appeal that cited any legal authority).

      . See Reed v. Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, 545 So.2d 782, 783 (Ala.Civ.App.1989), “The Criminal Psychopath Release Restriction Act (Act) codified beginning at § 15-16-60, Ala.Code 1975 (1982 Repl.Vol.), provides the procedure when the Department initiates a release, but does not provide a procedure for the insanity acquittee to initiate release.”

      . Although Rule 25 is contained in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, we note that a rule’s placement is not always indicative of what court has jurisdiction. For example, this Court has jurisdiction of habeas corpus petitions, and those petitions are governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule 81(13), Ala.R.Civ.P. Also, petitions filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim. P., are routinely considered by this Court even though they have been classified as civil actions. See Ex parte Wright, 860 So.2d 1253 (Ala.2002).

      .This Code section is entitled, "Persons entitled to prosecute writ — Persons confined as insane.” This section states provides:
      “Any person confined as insane may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus as provided in this chapter; and, if the judge or the jury, when the petitioner demands the issues arising to be tried by a jury, shall decide at the hearing that the person is insane, such decision does not bar a second application alleging that such person has been restored to sanity.”

      . We note that under § 15-16-23, a death-row inmate may petition in the circuit court to be declared insane. This section provides, in part, "This mode of suspending the execution of sentence after conviction on account of the insanity of the convict shall be exclusive and final and shall not be reviewed or revised by or renewed before any other court or judge.” We have held that this finding is not reviewable by any court. See Weeks v. State, 663 So.2d 1045 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).