text:
    Ivan REYES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D02-2668.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 29, 2004.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Dea Abramschmitt, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   SHAHOOD, J.

An eighteen-count information was filed against appellant, charging racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, seven counts of burglary of a structure, one count of attempted burglary of a structure, and eight counts of grand theft. The charges pertained to several burglaries of phone circuit boards from various hotels from Miami, Florida, to West Palm Beach, Florida.

We reverse appellant’s conviction on Count X, grand theft at Days Inn, Miami Springs, Florida. We affirm the convictions on all remaining counts without discussion.

In this case, although there was testimony at trial as to the value of the phone systems which were stolen from various other hotels, there was no testimony that any property was taken from Days Inn, Miami Springs, Florida. Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s conviction on Court X.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

FARMER, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: hPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Linward J. MARTIN, III.
    No. 2004-B-0444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 3, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from a total of 42 counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against the respondent, Linward Martin, III, who is currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public.

FORMAL CHARGES

On December 12, 2001, the ODC filed thirty-four counts of formal charges against respondent in the matter bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 01-DB-119. These charges were amended on January 22, 2002 to add two additional counts. On November 21, 2002, the ODC filed a second set of six counts of formal charges against respondent in the disciplinary board’s docket number 02-DB-121. The two sets of formal charges were considered by separate hearing committees, then Consolidated pursuant to an order of this court rendered on July 30, 2003. In re: Martin, 03-0818 (La.7/30/03), — So.2d -. On February 19, 2004, the disciplinary board filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both matters involving respondent.

U01-DB-119 Counts 1 and 2

In October 1999, respondent settled a worker’s compensation claim on behalf of Delorise Henderson. Respondent had previously received written notice of a statutory lien for medical services provided to his client by Dr. Anthony Zuppardo, and by letter dated September 28, 1999, respondent agreed to protect Dr. Zuppar-do’s interest in the settlement of the worker’s compensation claim. Nevertheless, respondent failed to pay the sums owed to Dr. Zuppardo, totaling $1,222.

In August 2000, Dr. Zuppardo filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent answered the complaint in September 2000, advising that he would pay Dr. Zuppardo. Thereafter, the ODC requested additional information concerning the matter, but respondent failed to reply to the supplemental requests for information.

Count S

Respondent represented Adam Sylve in a worker’s compensation claim against his former employer. In April 2000, respondent settled Mr. Sylve’s claim for $55,000. Mr. Sylve was unaware of the settlement and did not approve it. In August 2000, Mr. Sylve confronted respondent after learning of the settlement from the worker’s compensation judge. During the meeting, respondent confessed to Mr. Sylve that he had received the settlement proceeds, but was having financial problems and had spent the money. At respondent’s urging, Mr. Sylve signed a “Memorandum of Understanding,” stating that respondent’s law firm would disburse Mr. Sylve’s portion of the settlement to him in four installments over a period of time. Respondent |3gave Mr. Sylve four post-dated checks drawn on the law firm’s client trust account. When Mr. Sylve presented the first check for payment on August 30, 2000, there were insufficient funds in the account to cover the check; two weeks later, the firm’s bank froze the trust account.

Mr. Sylve reported respondent’s conduct to the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. On October 13, 2000, respondent was arrested and charged with felony theft, a violation of La. R.S. 14:67(A), stemming from the Sylve matter. State v. Martin, No. 419-252 on the docket of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. On July 9, 2001, respondent pleaded guilty as charged. On September 17, 2001, respondent was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor, suspended, and placed on active probation for five years. Respondent was also ordered to serve 52 weekends in Orleans Parish Prison beginning September 21, 2001 and ordered to pay $47,500 in restitution to Mr. Sylve.

Count k

In September 2000, Mr. Sylve filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On September 26, 2000, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Count 5

In June 2000, respondent was retained to represent Bryan Saulsberry in a worker’s compensation claim against his former employer. Respondent failed to Bcommunicate with Mr. Saulsberry for a period of time, but by September 2000, he had settled the worker’s compensation claim for $24,000. Upon receipt of the settlement check, respondent deposited the funds into his law firm’s operating account, rather than a client trust account.

On September 5, 2000, respondent gave Mr. Saulsberry a cashier’s check representing a portion of his share of the settlement, and paid the remainder with a postdated check of $700 drawn on the firm’s operating account. When Mr. Saulsberry presented the $700 check for payment on September 8, 2000, there were insufficient funds in the account to cover the check. Mr. Saulsberry complained to respondent, who said that he would replace the check with a cash payment of $700 on September 11, 2000; however, respondent could not be located on that date. On September 15, 2000, Mr. Saulsberry deposited the $700 check into his own bank account. The check was subsequently returned by the drawee bank marked “Account Closed.”

Mr. Saulsberry reported respondent’s conduct to the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. On March 12, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged with issuing worthless checks over $500, a violation of La. R.S. 14:71(A), stemming from the Saulsberry matter. State v. Martin, No. 421-356 on the docket of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. On September 17, 2001, respondent pleaded guilty as charged and was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor, suspended, and placed on active probation for three years. Respondent was also ordered to serve 52 weekends in Orleans Parish Prison beginning September 21, 2001 and ordered to pay $715 in restitution to Mr. Saulsberry.

| fiCount 6

In September 2000, Mr. Saulsberry filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On October 23, 2000, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on January 4, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent appeared on that date, but failed to produce the records that had been requested in conjunction with the ODC’s investigation. Respondent promised to produce the records, but did not do so, necessitating the issuance of a second subpoena.

Counts 7 and 8

Respondent represented a number of clients whom he referred to Dr. Steven Katz for evaluation and medical treatment. Respondent agreed to protect Dr. Katz’s interest in the settlement of the clients’ personal injury or worker’s compensation claims. Nevertheless, respondent failed to pay the sums owed to Dr. Katz.

In September 2000, Dr. Katz filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On November 6, 2000, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on January 18, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date, but agreed to appear on February 2, 2001. On that date, respondent failed to produce the records that had been requested in conjunction with the ODC’s investigation.

| „Counts 9 and 10

In June 2000, Dorothy Brown retained respondent to represent her in two personal injury matters. Respondent periodically failed to communicate with Ms. Brown, but for the most part, he assured her that her cases were moving forward. Ms. Brown eventually learned that respondent had failed to enroll as her counsel of record and had failed to notify her of a deposition in one of the cases, despite receiving service of a subpoena on at least two occasions. As a result of respondent’s neglect, Ms. Brown’s cases were delayed.

In February 2001, Ms. Brown filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On March 19, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 11 and 12

In early 1998, Katherine Turnipseed paid respondent $2,000 to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on her behalf. Respondent filed the petition and supporting schedules, but in March 1998, the case was dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for respondent’s failure to file a timely bankruptcy plan. Thereafter, respondent filed four more bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of Ms. Turnipseed, and forged her signature on the pleadings filed in connection with these proceedings. Between August 1998 and October 2000, all of these cases were dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for respondent’s failure to file a timely bankruptcy plan, failure to pay filing fees, or failure to attend the requisite meeting of creditors. Ms. Turnipseed eventually lost her home |7in foreclosure and suffered a poor credit rating due to her numerous bankruptcy filings.

In March 2001, Ms. Turnipseed filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On April 3, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 13 and U

In August 1999, Mark Thomas Rihner retained respondent to represent him in a worker’s compensation and personal injury matter. Respondent filed suit on Mr. Rih-ner’s behalf, but failed to pay the filing fees to the clerk of court and failed to request that the petition be served upon the defendants. Respondent took no further action in the case and failed to communicate with his client, forcing Mr. Rih-ner to retain new counsel.

In March 2001, Mr. Rihner filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On April 18, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 15 and 16

In 1999, Ronald Higgins retained respondent to represent him in two separate legal matters. Respondent neglected the matters, failed to communicate with Mr. Higgins, and failed to return Mr. Higgins’ files.

| sIn April 2001, Mr. Higgins filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On May 8, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 17 and 18

In 2000, Sidney Domangue paid respondent $700 to file a bankruptcy proceeding on his behalf. Respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Domangue and did not file the bankruptcy, forcing Mr. Domangue to retain new counsel. Respondent also failed to refund the unearned fee he was paid.

In April 2001, Mr. Domangue filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On May 17, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Count 19

On May 2, 2001, respondent was inter-imly suspended from the practice of law by order of this court in In re: Martin, 01-1189 (La.5/2/01), 787 So.2d 282. On May 3, 2001, respondent filed a petition seeking a temporary restraining order in an attempt to halt foreclosure proceedings against his client, Linda Johnson Wright. Standard Mortgage Corp. v. Linda Johnson A/K/A Linda Wright, No. 99-11656 on the docket of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. In his petition, respondent falsely asserted that Mrs. Wright had not been served with notification of the sheriffs sale of|athe property at issue. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on May 3, 2001 and ordered that a hearing on permanent injunc-tive relief be held on May 14, 2001. Respondent failed to attend the hearing. The mortgage company was subsequently awarded attorney’s fees against respondent for various procedural defects in the TRO and in light of the false representations contained therein.

Count 20

In conjunction with the conduct subject of Count 19, a complaint was filed against respondent by counsel for Standard Mortgage Corporation. On May 31, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Count 21

On May 17, 2001, respondent was suspended from practice before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for his misconduct in numerous bankruptcy proceedings. In seven cases, respondent forged the debtors’ signatures on pleadings and failed to attend hearings, and as a result, contempt orders imposing sanctions were entered against him by the court. Furthermore, in three cases, the debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed due to respondent’s failure to file a mailing matrix or a timely plan, or his failure to pay filing fees even though fees had been tendered to him in advance. Finally, on May 3, 2001, the day after respondent was interimly suspended from the practice of law by order of this court, he attempted to file a pro se petition on behalf of a debtor when he had Unprepared the petition but had not included his name as attorney of record. The clerk of the Bankruptcy Court refused to accept the petition.

Count 22

In conjunction with the conduct subject of Count 21, a complaint was filed against respondent by United States Bankruptcy Judge Jerry A. Brown. On May 31, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 23 and 2k

Morris Bigner retained respondent to handle a worker’s compensation claim on his behalf. In the course of the litigation, respondent requested and received a copy of the transcript of a deposition given by Mr. Bigner in July 2000. However, respondent failed to pay the court reporter for the costs of the transcript, despite numerous requests. In January 2001, the court reporter demanded that Mr. Bigner pay for the transcript. Respondent assured Mr. Bigner that he would handle the matter, but he failed to do so. In March 2001, after he was threatened with a lawsuit by the court reporter for non-payment of the outstanding costs, Mr. Bigner personally paid the sum of $167.70.

In May 2001, Mr. Bigner filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On June 20, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter In served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 25 and 26

In May 1999, William Enines retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter. Respondent neglected the matter and failed to communicate with Mr. Enines.

In May 2001, Mr. Enines filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On June 20, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 27 and 28

Robert and Eileen James paid respondent $1,000 to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on their behalf. Respondent filed the initial pleadings but did not file a proper mailing matrix; he also failed to pay the appropriate filing fees to the Bankruptcy Court, even though the fees were paid by Mr. and Mrs. James in advance. As a result, their bankruptcy case was dismissed. Mr. and Mrs. James were forced to retain new counsel to complete their bankruptcy, and they were faced with possible foreclosure on their home due to respondent’s inaction. To date, respondent has not refunded the legal fee Mr. and Mrs. James paid, and he has not returned their file.

In June 2001, Mr. James filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On June 28, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter | ^served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 29 and 30

Karen Thomas retained respondent to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on her behalf. She paid respondent $200 in attorney’s fees and $185 in filing fees, but respondent remitted only $5 in filing fees to the Bankruptcy Court. Respondent forged Ms. Thomas’ signature on several pleadings and failed to complete the bankruptcy proceeding. As a result, Ms. Thomas was forced to retain new counsel.

In June 2001, Ms. Thomas filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On July 11, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 31 and 32

In 1997, Michael James retained respondent to handle a personal injury matter. Respondent filed suit on Mr. James’ behalf, but failed to request that the petition be served upon the defendants. As a result, Mr. James’ suit was dismissed without prejudice in 1999. Respondent took no further action in the case and failed to communicate with his client.

In July 2001, Mr. James filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On July 18, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served 1 ^respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 33 and 3k

Desiree Black retained respondent to handle a worker’s compensation claim against her employer. On June 19, 2000, Ms. Black met with respondent to execute an affidavit relative to the proposed settlement of the case. Respondent informed Ms. Black that her claim would be compromised for $4,000 and that he would contact her upon his receipt of the settlement check and related documents. Thereafter, Ms. Black made numerous attempts to contact respondent, to no avail. Ms. Black then consulted another attorney for assistance. Ms. Black subsequently learned that her worker’s compensation claim had been settled by respondent on July 24, 2000 and that the settlement check and related documents had been hand-delivered to respondent on July 25, 2000. The $4,000 settlement check was endorsed by both payees, “Desiree Black and her attorney, Linward Martin, III,” and cashed on July 26, 2000. However, Ms. Black did not endorse the settlement check, nor did she receive any portion of the proceeds of the settlement of her worker’s compensation claim.

In June 2001, the ODC received a complaint against respondent filed on behalf of Ms. Black. On July 26, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on September 5, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

| uCounts 35 and 36

In 1999, Michael Peters retained respondent to handle a worker’s compensation claim. Respondent neglected the matter, failed to communicate with Mr. Peters, and failed to return Mr. Peters’ file.

In August 2001, Mr. Peters filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On September 11, 2001, and again on October 23, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified and regular United States mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on November 13, 2001 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

02-DB-121

Counts 1 and 2

In March 2000, Audrey Applewhite, a resident of Mississippi, retained respondent to handle a worker’s compensation claim for her brother, who is physically and mentally incapacitated. Respondent neglected the matter, failed to communicate with Ms. Applewhite, and failed to return Ms. Applewhite’s file.

In September 2001, Ms. Applewhite filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On October 30, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on January 3, 2002 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Ii ¿Count 3

In 1999, Lynette Pierce retained respondent to represent her in a claim for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Respondent presumably accepted the representation on a contingent fee basis, but he did not provide Ms. Pierce with a written agreement to that effect.

Respondent did not diligently handle the property damage portion of Ms. Pierce’s case; it was almost a year after the accident before Ms. Pierce was compensated for the damage to her vehicle. Respondent eventually settled Ms. Pierce’s personal injury claim for $5,800. Respondent failed to account to Ms. Pierce for the proceeds of her settlement, but he paid her $3,900 and told her that her medical expenses would be paid by the tortfeasor’s insurer in a separate check. In September 2001, Ms. Pierce received correspondence from an attorney representing one of her medical providers, seeking to collect unpaid medical expenses in the amount of $3,824 plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.

In addition to the matter arising out of the automobile accident, Ms. Pierce requested that respondent file suit on her behalf against a mortgage company. Respondent never filed the lawsuit, but instead recommended that Ms. Pierce file for bankruptcy to keep from losing her home in a foreclosure proceeding. Respondent requested $185 for filing fees, which Ms. Pierce paid in February 2001; however, Ms. Pierce later learned that respondent had been suspended from practicing in Bankruptcy Court and that her bankruptcy case was dismissed for respondent’s failure to file a proper mailing matrix. Ms. Pierce also learned that respondent had remitted only $5 in filing fees to the Bankruptcy Court and, without her consent, had requested permission to pay the filing fees in installments.

1 ifíCount Ip

In conjunction with the conduct subject of Count 3, Ms. Pierce filed complaints against respondent with the ODC. On February 20, 2002, and again on March 5, 2002, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaints to respondent by certified and regular United States mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaints. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on May 2, 2002 and answer the complaints under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date.

Counts 5 and 6

In November 1996, Gerald Barnes retained respondent to handle a worker’s compensation claim on his behalf. Respondent referred Mr. Barnes for medical treatment and made contact with the insurance company involved in the claim, but thereafter, he neglected the case and failed to communicate with Mr. Barnes. In September 2000, respondent gave Mr. Barnes a $150 check to assist him in paying his child support; however, the check was returned NSF. Mr. Barnes subsequently discharged respondent and requested the return of his files. Respondent failed to comply with Mr. Barnes’ request.

In January 2002, Mr. Barnes filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On February 20, 2002, and again on March 13, 2002, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified and regular United States mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

As previously noted, the ODC filed two separate sets of formal charges against respondent. Collectively, the 42 counts of formal charges allege numerous violations |17by respondent of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as follows: Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.2 (scope of the representation), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15(a)(b) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 3.3(a) (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4(b) (a lawyer shall not falsify evidence), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 7.3(d) (lawyers shall not state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization when that is not the fact), 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(e) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent was served with both sets of formal charges. He failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written [isarguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration in either matter.

Hearing Committee Recommendations

01-DB-119

The hearing committee adopted the facts and rule violations as set forth in the formal charges. Finding no mitigating factors are present, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. The committee further recommended that respondent be ordered to pay restitution and that he be charged with all costs and expenses of these disciplinary proceedings.

02-DB-121

The hearing committee generally agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges. The committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committees’ recommendations.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board agreed that the facts alleged and deemed admitted support a finding that respondent violated each professional rule cited in the formal charges (though not in every instance where the rule was cited). The board found respondent violated duties owed to his clients, to the legal system, to the public, and as a professional. Respondent’s conduct was knowing in some instances and intentional in others. As a result of his conduct, | ^respondent caused actual damage, which was serious or potentially serious, to his clients whose legal matters were neglected, delayed, dismissed, and abandoned. As a result of respondent’s misconduct, some clients lost their causes of action, while others have suffered bad credit ratings, foreclosure on their homes, and garnishment of their wages. Respondent stole money from his clients, and for the most part has failed to pay restitution. His criminal acts caused serious injury not only to his clients, but also to the public and the legal profession. He damaged the profession, his clients, and the courts by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law when he knew or should have known he was on interim suspension. He also caused damage to the legal system by failing to expedite litigation, failing to follow court procedures, and by submitting an affidavit he knew or should have known contained false information. Additionally, respondent’s failure to respond to the ODC’s requests delayed the disciplinary process, diverted its limited resources, and impaired the system’s orderly functioning. Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as well as the prior jurisprudence involving multiple counts of conversion, neglect, failure to communicate, lack of candor, the unauthorized practice of law, and dishonest and criminal behavior, the board determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board recognized respondent’s dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. The board found no mitigating factors are present.

In light of the seriousness of respondent’s misconduct, and considering the absence of mitigating factors, the board then turned to a discussion of the sanction of [ gnpermanent disbarment. Respondent’s conduct fits within Guideline 1 of the permanent disbarment guidelines, which provides for permanent disbarment when an attorney engages in “repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.” The facts as admitted suggest that respondent intentionally converted client funds on at least three occasions — in Count 3 of 01-DB-119, respondent converted $47,500 from Mr. Sylve; in Count 5, he converted $700 from Mr. Saulsberry; and in Count 33, he converted Ms. Black’s settlement check in the amount of $4,000. Furthermore, Guideline 8 is applicable. That guideline provides that permanent disbarment may be warranted for an attorney who practices law “following notice” of suspension. The deemed admitted facts suggest that respondent practiced law aftef he knew or should have known he had been placed on interim suspension.

Concluding that respondent’s conduct is “some of the most serious professional misconduct an attorney can commit,” and that respondent is a threat to his clients, the profession, and the public, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board further recommended that respondent be required to account to the complainants and make restitution as appropriate, and that he be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an 121independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

The deemed admitted facts in this case reveal a pattern of professional misconduct that is unquestionably serious in nature and in scope. Respondent neglected the legal matters of numerous clients, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to account for and refund unearned fees, failed to timely pay third-party medical providers, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law after being placed on interim suspension by this court, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in more than twenty separate disciplinary investigations. Respondent has also been convicted of felony criminal charges stemming from his conversion of funds belonging to two clients. All told, respondent’s conduct violates Rules 1.1(a), 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16(d), 3.1, 3.2, 3.3(a), 3.4(b), 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 7.3(d), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s misconduct represents a significant breach of his professional duties and obligations. Indeed, we have seldom been called upon to discipline a lawyer who possesses such a complete and total disregard for the welfare of his 122elients, the public, the legal system, and our profession. We find the following aggravating factors are present in this case: dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct. We are unable to discern a single mitigating factor from the voluminous record before us.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that disbarment is appropriate. The sole remaining question is whether respondent’s conduct is so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law.

In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might warrant permanent disbarment. While these guidelines are not intended to bind this court in its decision-making process, they present useful information concerning the types of conduct we might consider worthy of permanent disbarment. For purposes of the instant case, Guidelines 1 and 8 are relevant. Those guidelines provide:

GUIDELINE 1. Repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.
GUIDELINE 8. Following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred.

Guideline 1 is clearly applicable to this case. Respondent converted more than $50,000 in settlement funds owed to his clients. His failure to account for and refund unearned legal fees also resulted in a conversion of funds to the detriment of his clients. When this conduct is considered in light of respondent’s demonstrated indifference to making restitution in these matters, the substantial harm is apparent. 12sLikewise, Guideline 8 is implicated, as the undisputed evidence shows respondent continued to represent clients after his license to practice law was suspended by this court in May 2001.

These proceedings have convincingly established that respondent does not possess the moral fitness to practice law and that he poses a threat of danger to the public in the event he is permitted to resume practicing law. Respondent has disregarded and ignored his obligation to uphold the high standards of honesty and righteousness that he assumed when he took the oath as a member of the bar of this state. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391, 392 (1967). He has used his law license not to foster the high standards of the profession, but to exploit his clients for his own benefit. This court cannot and will not tolerate such conduct. Without question, respondent must be permanently disbarred.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and impose permanent disbarment.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Linward Joseph Martin, III, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24542, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. Respondent is ordered to furnish complete accountings and full restitution to the clients and third persons subject of the formal charges. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, ] g4§ 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . On April 24, 2001, the ODC filed a motion for interim suspension pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2 based on some of the misconduct at issue in this case. We granted that motion on May 2, 2001. In re: Martin, 01-1189 (La.5/2/01), 787 So.2d 282.

      . The letterhead on which the “Memorandum of Understanding” is printed indicates the name of respondent’s firm as "Martin, Shepherd, and Favors L.L.C.” However, the Louisiana Secretary of State has no record of a limited liability company qualified under that name.

      . This sentence was consecutive with that imposed by the Criminal District Court in docket number 419-252, subject of Count 3 of the instant formal charges.

      . It is difficult to ascertain the number of clients and the dollar amounts involved in this matter; however, we note that Dr. Katz's complaint listed more than 40 clients for whom medical expenses totaling more than $65,000 remained outstanding.

      . In September 2001, Ms. Black reported respondent's conduct to the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office. By letter dated April 16, 2002, the Economic Crime Unit of the District Attorney's Office notified the ODC that respondent made full restitution to Ms. Black on April 11, 2002, "and that we have closed our investigation accordingly.”

      . As previously noted, respondent has made full restitution to Ms. Black.


author: LPER CURIAM. L JOHNSON, Justice, | jVICTORY, Justice 1 j TRAYLOR, J.,

text:
    In re Ann B. STEINHARDT.
    No. 2004-B-0011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 9, 2004.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 2004.

      Charles B. Plattsmier, Baton Rouge, Eric K. Barefield, Metairie, Counsel for Applicant.
    Kerry P. Cuccia, Ann B. Steinhardt, Counsel for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from five counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Ann B. Steinhardt, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Counts I & II — The Byer Matter

In 1998, Marcus Byer was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance. At his arraignment, Mr. Byer pleaded not guilty and advised the court that he would retain private counsel.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Byer retained respondent to represent him. Respondent requested a $2,000 fee, of which Mr. Byer paid $1,300. After being retained, respondent made several appearances on behalf of her client. However, on July 15, 1999, respondent failed to appear in court on behalf of her client. The court rescheduled the hearing for five days later, but again respondent failed to appear. The following day, July 21, Mr. Byer retained new counsel to assume his representation.

Subsequently, Mr. Byer filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. He alleged respondent failed to appear in court on his behalf, as well as neglected to respond to his requests for information about the status of his case. Moreover, he claimed respondent failed to return the unearned fee, despite his many requests.

| ¡^Respondent submitted an untimely response to the complaint that failed to adequately address the allegations of professional misconduct. As a result, the ODC issued a subpoena compelling respondent to appear and answer the complaint under oath. During her sworn statement, respondent testified that she had slipped and fallen on her way to court in Mr. Byer’s case, and was rendered unconscious. She stated she never regained her memory of the events of that day and the three subsequent days. Respondent further testified she was unaware Mr. Byer asked for a refund of his fee. Respondent admitted that she never returned any portion of the $1,300 fee Mr. Byer paid, because she believed she earned the fee during the eight months she represented him.

Counts III & IV — The Toney Matter

In 1996, Jerry Toney was arrested and charged with possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was initially represented by an indigent defender. In August 1997, Mr. Toney retained respondent to represent him in the criminal proceedings, paying her $700 of her requested $900 fee. The indigent defender also remained as counsel of record for Mr. Toney.

In October 1997, the court conducted a hearing to address motions, including a motion to suppress filed by Mr. Toney and his co-defendant. Respondent did not appear at the hearing, and Mr. Toney was represented solely by the indigent defender. Subsequently, trial was rescheduled several times. According to court minute entries, either respondent or the indigent defender appeared at various times on Mr. Toney’s behalf. Additionally, on occasion, the attorney for Mr. Toney’s co-defendant would represent both the co-defendant and Mr. Toney when neither respondent nor the |sindigent defender appeared on Mr. Toney’s behalf. Ultimately, in early December 1998, the case proceeded to a two-day jury trial, at which time respondent represented Mr. Toney.

In April 2000, Mr. Toney filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent, alleging that she accepted a fee to handle his criminal matter while she was ineligible to practice law. He subsequently alleged that respondent failed to communicate with him and failed to appear for a hearing on the motion to suppress.

The ODC issued a subpoena compelling respondent to appear and answer Mr. To-ney’s complaint under oath. During her sworn statement, respondent testified that she performed adequate work on Mr. To-ney’s behalf, including making court appearances, interviewing witnesses, and preparing for trial. Respondent maintained she earned the $700 fee Mr. Toney paid based solely on her involvement in the two-day jury trial.

Count V — Respondent’s Criminal Conviction

In February 2000, while driving a vehicle owned by her passenger, Patrick Coates, respondent was stopped by state troopers in Chambers County, Texas. A consensual search of the vehicle uncovered over eight pounds of marijuana in the trunk, marijuana cigarette papers, and a marijuana cigarette in respondent’s purse. In an indictment filed on May 26, 2000, respondent and Mr. Coates were charged with the felony crime of “Unlawful Possession of Marihuana in an Amount of Fifty Pounds or Less, But More than Five Pounds.”

|4On July 23, 2001, respondent pleaded guilty to the lesser misdemeanor offense of “Unlawful Possession of Marihuana in an Amount of Four Ounces or Less But More than Two Ounces.” In connection with her guilty plea, respondent executed an affidavit stating that she was aware the marijuana was in the vehicle at the time of the search. Based on respondent’s lack of a prior criminal record, she was sentenced to two years probation and fined $3,000.

Respondent failed to self-report her conviction to the ODC following her guilty plea. However, she sought extensive ongoing substance abuse treatment, and in April 2002, respondent executed a recovery agreement with the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

In January 2001, six months after respondent’s criminal indictment was filed, but prior to her guilty plea, the ODC filed five counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging violations of Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in the representation of a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (failure to refund unearned fees), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.3(a) (failure to report professional misconduct), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. | sFollowing her criminal sentencing, respondent filed a response to the formal charges admitting that she had been convicted of a drug offense.

The matter proceeded to a formal hearing. The committee heard testimony from Mr. Byer, Mr. Toney, and respondent.

Recommendation of the Hearing Committee

The hearing committee found insufficient evidence to support the allegations that respondent neglected, failed to communicate and failed to return fees in the Byer and Toney matters, which were the subject of Counts I and III, respectively.

As to the Byer matter, the committee determined Mr. , Byer’s testimony was “evasive and argumentative, giving rise to a question of his reliability as a witness.” It noted that the record of the criminal proceedings indicated respondent appeared on several occasions. While it recognized that on occasions other attorneys appeared on Mr. Byer’s behalf, the committee observed this situation was not uncommon in the practice of criminal law. The committee pointed out that the record did not contain any evidence Mr. Byer requested a refund of the partially paid fee. Based on the evidence in the record, the committee found respondent’s fee was fully earned.

As to the Toney matter, the committee noted respondent appeared on Mr. Toney’s behalf at the trial and other stages of the case, and that her representation appeared to be appropriate. After considering the testimony of Mr. Toney as well as the record of the criminal proceedings, the committee determined respondent acted IfiWith diligence in her defense of Mr. To-ney. The committee further determined that the $700 fee charged by respondent was not excessive.

Although the committee found no substantive misconduct in the Byer and Toney matters, it concluded respondent violated Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g) by failing to cooperate in the ODC’s investigations of these complaints. The committee recognized that respondent did ultimately cooperate fully in the process, but it determined this later cooperation did not excuse her initial failure to cooperate.

Finally, regarding the criminal conviction, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 8.3(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) stemming from her criminal conviction and failure to report such to the ODC. It concluded the conviction adversely reflected on respondent’s fitness to practice law, and her failure to report was prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Addressing the issue of sanctions, the committee determined respondent’s initial failure to cooperate did not impede the ODC’s presentation of the case, but required the ODC to invest considerably more time in the development of the case. It concluded this misconduct warranted at a minimum a public reprimand. As to respondent’s criminal conviction, the committee concluded a sanction in the form of a deferred suspension, practice management, continued substance abuse treatment and limiting respondent’s practice would be appropriate.

Accordingly, the committee recommended respondent be suspended for a period of three years, but proposed the suspension be full deferred and subject to a one-year period of practice management with conditions.

| Recommendation of the Disciplinary Board

The disciplinary board adopted the factual and legal findings of the hearing committee. Specifically, it agreed respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC, engaged in criminal activity adversely reflecting on her fitness to practice law, and failed to report her criminal conduct. The board determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the public, the legal system, and as a professional. It noted respondent knowingly engaged in conduct “detrimental to the order of society” based on her drug conviction. It further pointed out her failure to self-report her misconduct and cooperate with the disciplinary investigation needlessly wasted the resources of the disciplinary system.

Addressing the issue of sanctions, the board found respondent’s misdemeanor conviction did not rise to a level warranting disbarment. Nonetheless, it concluded her deliberate possession of an illegal drug runs contrary to her obligation as an attorney to perform her duties within the confines of the law.

As aggravating factors, the board recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary history, failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1979), and illegal conduct, including the use of a controlled dangerous substance. In mitigation, the board considered respondent’s mental disability or chemical dependency.

In determining a sanction, the disciplinary board cited In re: Mitchell, 95-0983 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 385, and In re: Mullins, 94-2245 (La.6/2/95), 655 So.2d 323, in which this court disbarred lawyers for felony drug convictions. However, the | aboard determined respondent’s conduct was not as egregious as in Mitchell and Mullins, because the offense of which she was convicted was a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

Based on its findings, the disciplinary board recommended respondent be suspended for a period of three years. The board determined such a suspension would serve to protect the public and educate the bar as to the seriousness of the misconduct.

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the matter was docketed for briefing and argument in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Having reviewed the record, we find no error in the hearing committee’s factual conclusion that the ODC failed to prove substantive misconduct in the Byer and Toney matters by clear and convincing evidence. The ODC relied on the testimony of Mr. Byer and Mr. Toney to establish that respondent failed to represent these 19clients diligently and failed to refund unearned fees; however, the hearing committee found these witnesses were not credible. Although this court is the trier of fact in bar disciplinary cases, we are not prepared to disregard the credibility evaluations made by those committee members who were present during testimony of the witnesses and who act as the eyes and ears of this court. In re: Bolton, 02-0257 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 548.

While we find no substantive misconduct in the Byer and Toney matters, we find the record supports the conclusion that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC during its disciplinary investigation of these complaints. In both instances, the ODC was required to issue subpoenas to respondent for sworn statements when she failed to respond to its inquiries in a complete and forthright manner. Although respondent later cooperated with the ODC, this does not excuse her failure to comply with her duty as a lawyer to fully cooperate with the ODC at all stages of the disciplinary investigation.

Finally, as to respondent’s criminal conviction, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that respondent was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Respondent served no jail time but was placed on probation for two years. Thereafter, respondent failed to report her conviction to the ODC, despite the clear requirement that she do so under Rule 8.3(a). Both her conviction and failure to report this conviction to the ODC represent clear breaches of her fundamental duty as a lawyer to uphold the integrity of the bar. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Weysham, 307 So.2d 336 (La.1975).

hnHaving found professional misconduct, the next issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Fazande, 436 So.2d 549 (La.1983); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Jacques, 260 La. 803, 257 So.2d 413 (1972). Rather, disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s failure to cooperate harmed the disciplinary system by requiring the ODC to expend its limited resources needlessly. Respondent’s criminal conviction adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law and her subsequent failure to report the conviction was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Nevertheless, the record contains significant mitigating evidence which bears on the determination of an appropriate sanction. In particular, the record demonstrates that respondent has acknowledged her substance abuse problems and has taken positive steps to address these problems. She has successfully completed a residential substance abuse treatment program and has entered into a recovery agreement with LAP. By the time of oral arguments in this case, respondent had been alcohol and drug free for more than three years. While we in no way condone respondent’s past illegal drug use, nor do we minimize the seriousness of her drug conviction, we find the imposition of the entirety of the three-year suspension recommended by the disciplinary board would ^require us to ignore respondent’s sincere attempts at rehabilitation and would be excessively punitive. Considering all the circumstances, we conclude it is appropriate to defer two years of the suspension, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation during which respondent shall fully and completely adhere to all terms of her LAP recovery agreement and with such other conditions as may be imposed upon her by the LAP. We caution respondent that any violation of this condition, or any other misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory or imposing other discipline, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Ann B. Steinhardt, Louisiana Bar Roll number 12437, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. Two years of this suspension shall be deferred. Following the completion of the active portion of her suspension, respondent shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of two years, during which she shall fully and completely adhere to all terms of the recovery agreement that she executed with the Lawyers Assistance Program, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon her by the Lawyers Assistance Program. Any violation of this condition or any other misconduct during the probationary period may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory or imposing other discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

L JOHNSON, Justice,

dissenting.

Respondent was arrested in Texas driving a vehicle with over eight pounds of marijuana stored in the trunk and a marijuana cigarette in her purse. Respondent was charged with “Unlawful Possession of Marihuana in an Amount of Fifty Pounds or Less, But More than Five Pounds,” a felony in the State of Texas. After pleading guilty to a lesser charge, respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years.

The possession of this quantity of marijuana would suggest that the contraband was not for personal consumption and generally indicates an intent to distribute. In Louisiana, such a crime is a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966, which is punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than thirty years.

The public becomes cynical about our justice system when lawyers and other professionals are perceived to be receiving preferential treatment that is not available to the average citizen. When this case is compared to similar cases decided by our state courts, it is clear that from the jurisprudence this respondent has already received the benefit of lenient treatment that is usually not available to citizens who are charged with drug offenses.

Since this is serious misconduct, and respondent has already enjoyed the benefit of leniency in the criminal proceedings against her in Texas, I believe we should impose a full three-year suspension from the practice of law.

| jVICTORY, Justice

(dissenting).

I would follow the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and impose a three-year suspension with no portion deferred.

1 j TRAYLOR, J.,

dissenting.

The majority concludes that a three-year suspension from the practice of law, with two of the three years deferred and subject to a two-year period of supervised probation, is a sufficient penalty for the respondent’s actions. It is my opinion the respondent’s conduct warrants a more severe penalty.

The majority bases its conclusion regarding appropriate punishment on the respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC during its disciplinary investigation of the complaints against her, as well as on the respondent’s misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana. Ordinarily, a disciplinary proceeding based upon criminal conduct takes as fact the criminal conviction and does not make an independent assessment of the respondent’s guilt. While I accept the fact of respondent’s misdemeanor conviction, I find this case different from other cases in that during the course of the criminal prosecution respondent admitted in a sworn affidavit to the knowing possession of marijuana in an amount between five and fifty pounds, a felony offense. Moreover, possession of this quantity of marijuana suggests that respondent was involved in the trafficking of marijuana.

The majority correctly states that this court has not hesitated to disbar lawyers convicted of drug offenses. See In re: Mitchell, 95-0983 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 385; In re: Mullins, 94-2245 (La.6/2/95), 655 So.2d 323. In disciplinary cases involving drug offenses, the respondent is generally sanctioned based upon a conviction. See Louisiana State Bar Association v. Vesich, 476 So.2d 811 (La.1985); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Frank, 472 So.2d 1 (La.1985); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Porobil, 444 So.2d 613 (La.1984); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Loridans, 338 So.2d 1338 (La.1976); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Shaheen, 338 So.2d 1347 (La.1976). When an attorney has been convicted of a crime, the sole issue to be determined in a disciplinary hearing before this court is whether the crime warrants discipline, and if so, to what extent. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Wright, 538 So.2d 279 (La.1989). However, the degree of discipline to be imposed depends in each ease on the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Pinkston, 02-3251 (La.5/20/03) 852 So.2d 966, 974; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Garraway, 520 So.2d 400, 401 (La.1988); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Price, 495 So.2d 1311 (La.1986). I believe that the factual circumstances of the respondent’s criminal conviction in the instant ease merit a more burdensome sanction, up to and, perhaps including, disbarment.

For the foregoing reasons, I would find the conduct in the instant case warrants a more severe penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

      . Apparently, neither Mr. Toney nor his co-defendant objected to this arrangement.

      . Respondent was ineligible to practice between August 16, 1996 and August 24, 1998 due to her failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

      . Initially, respondent requested additional time to answer the formal charges because she was entering a residential substance abuse treatment program in Texas for a period of several months to address her drug and alcohol dependency, and was unable to assist in her defense. As respondent's criminal proceedings had not been concluded, the hearing committee panel granted a continuance, giving respondent twenty days after the final judgment in her criminal proceedings to file a response. In accordance with the hearing committee's order, the ODC received correspondence from respondent stating that she had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana, had been placed on probation, and enrolled for follow-up substance abuse treatment.

      . The committee recommended the following conditions:
      1. Respondent shall continue treatment for substance abuse;
      2. Respondent shall fully complete all continuing legal education requirements; and 3.Respondent's law practice shall be limited to misdemeanor and traffic offenses.

      . Respondent was admonished in April 1999 for failing to cooperate with the ODC in a disciplinary investigation. Additionally, respondent has been declared ineligible to practice on several occasions based on her failure to pay her bar dues or comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

      . Although respondent executed an affidavit stating that she knew there was marijuana in the car she was driving, the only evidence in the record establishes the marijuana belonged to her boyfriend who was the owner of and a passenger in the vehicle.

      . This is particularly so when the ODC did not seek respondent’s interim suspension while she was actually addressing her substance abuse problem.