author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, C.J., BELL, J.,

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.
    No. SC04-778.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 15, 2004.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Louis F. Hubener, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Scott Henry Carruthers, Chair, Tallahassee, FL; and Jon Mills and Timothy McLendon, Gainesville, FL, for Floridians for Patient Protection, Proponents.
    Stephen H. Grimes and Susan L. Kelsey of Holland and Knight, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of Florida Medical Association, Inc.; and Harold R. Mardenborough, Jr. of McFarlain and Cassedy, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, and Graham H. Nichol, General Counsel, and Don A. Dennis, Associate General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of Florida Dental Association, for Opponents.
   PER CURIAM.

The Attorney General has requested this Court to review a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution that would bar any person found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice from being licensed to provide health care services as a medical doctor. We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10; art V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.

I. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND BALLOT SUMMARY

The full text of the proposed amendment states:

a) Statement and Purpose:
Under current law, a medical doctor who has repeatedly committed medical malpractice in Florida or while practicing in other states or counties may obtain or continue to hold a professional license to practice medicine in Florida. The purpose of this amendment is to prohibit such a doctor from obtaining or holding a license to practice medicine in Florida.
b) Amendment of Florida Constitution:
Art. X, Fla. Const., is amended by inserting the following new section at the end thereof, to read:
“Section 20. Prohibition of Medical License After Repeated Medical Malpractice.
“a) No person who has been found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice shall be licensed or continue to be licensed by the State of Florida to provide health care services as a medical doctor.
“b) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
“i) The phrase ‘medical malpractice’ means both the failure to practice medicine in Florida with that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized in general law related to health care providers’ licensure, and any similar wrongful act, neglect, or default in other states or countries which, if committed in Florida, would have been considered medical malpractice.
“ii) The phrase ‘found to have been committed’ means that the malpractice has been found in a final judgment of a court of law, final administrative agency decision, or decision of binding arbitration.”
c)Effective Date and Severability:
This amendment shall be effective on the date it is approved by the electorate. If any portion of this measure is held invalid for any reason, the remaining portion of this measure, to the fullest extent possible, shall be severed from the void portion and given the fullest possible force and application.

The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice.” And the ballot summary for the proposed amendment states:

Current law allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be licensed to practice medicine in Florida. This amendment prohibits medical doctors who have been found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice from being licensed to practice medicine in Florida.

II. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Review of the validity of an amendment to the Florida Constitution proposed by initiative is limited to two issues: (1) whether the proposed amendment satisfies the single-subject limitation of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution; and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfy the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003). Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1998). This Court does not review the merits or the wisdom of the proposed amendment. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla.1998); see also Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 827 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla. 2002) (if initiative meets requirements of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, “then the sponsor of an initiative has the right to place the initiative on the ballot”).

III. SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT

Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution requires that an amendment proposed by initiative “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.” To comply with this single-subject requirement, a proposed amendment must manifest a “logical and natural oneness of purpose.” Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984). There are two primary purposes for imposing the single-subject requirement. The first is to prevent “logrolling,” which is a “practice whereby an amendment is proposed which contains unrelated provisions, some of which electors might wish to support, in order to get an otherwise disfavored provision passed.” See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.1994) (citing Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So.2d 997 (Fla.1993)). The second purpose is to prevent a single constitutional amendment from substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple aspects of government. See In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Fla.1994).

The opponents of the instant proposed amendment, the Florida Medical Association and the Florida Dental Association, do not argue that the proposed amendment presents any danger of logrolling, and we find that the proposed amendment contains only related provisions aimed at achieving a single goal. However, the opponents do argue that the proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement because it substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple aspects of government.

As we previously have stated, “[a]l-though a proposal may affect several branches of government and still pass muster, no single proposal can substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches.” Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d at 1340.

We recognize that all power for each branch of government comes from the people and that the citizens of the state have retained the right to broaden or to restrict that power by initiative amendment. But where such an initiative performs the functions of different branches of government, it clearly fails the functional test for the single-subject limitation the people have incorporated into article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution.

Evans v. Firestone, 457 So.2d 1351, 1354 (Fla.1984).

In the present case, the proposed amendment, if adopted, clearly would su-percede section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), and revoke any discretion the Board of Medicine previously had with regard to the discipline of any medical doctor found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice. It would also limit the Legislature’s power to enact any other law in conflict with the proposed amendment. However, we conclude that these effects on the legislative and executive branches are not sufficiently substantial to constitute the type of “multiple ‘precipitous’ and ‘cataclysmic’ changes” that the single-subject requirement is designed to prevent. We also find that this proposed amendment is clearly distinguishable from prior proposed amendments stricken by this Court because of the breadth of their effects. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Requirement for Adequate Pub. Educ. Funding, 703 So.2d 446 (Fla.1997) (concluding proposed amendment allocating minimum forty percent of state appropriations to education would substantially affect all other functions of government by limiting appropriations available to those functions); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re People’s Prop. Rights Amendments Providing Comp. for Restricting Real Prop. Use May Cover Multiple Subjects, 699 So.2d 1304 (Fla.1997) (concluding proposed amendment requiring full compensation when government restricts use of private real estate in certain circumstances would substantially affect Legislature’s power to enact legislation establishing standards and criteria for land use regulation, Legislature’s constitutional duty to protect natural resources and scenic beauty, multiple functions of the executive branch, and more than one level of government); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486 (Fla.1994) (concluding proposed amendment requiring full compensation for any exercise of police power damaging value of vested private property right would substantially alter functions of multiple branches of government).

Additionally, we conclude that the proposed amendment does not substantially alter or perform the functions of the judiciary. First, it “does not perform any judicial functions by adjudicating specific facts.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, 814 So.2d 415, 422 (Fla.2002). Second, it is too speculative to conclude, because the proposed amendment requires the revocation of some medical doctors’ licenses on the basis of findings reached under the preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the clear and convincing standard of proof required under Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla.1987), that the judiciary will be forced to either overrule Ferris or change the standard of proof in malpractice cases. Cf. Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d at 74 (finding scenarios raised by opponents relating to possible impacts on other branches of government or on the Constitution- were premature speculation); In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—English—The Official Language of Florida, 520 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla.1988) (“[I]t would be premature to speculate how the amendment might interact with other portions of the constitution as applied to a given factual situation. It may be that, if passed, the amendment could have broad ramifications. Yet, on its face it deals with only one subject.”). As for the related argument that the proposed amendment will substantially affect the due process provision of the Florida Constitution, this Court has repeatedly stated that “the possibility that an amendment might interact with other parts of the Florida Constitution is not sufficient reason to invalidate the proposed amendment.” Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d at 74.

IV. BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY

Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes, requires that the ballot title not exceed fifteen words, that the ballot summary not exceed seventy-five words, and that the two “state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure.” See Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 154-55 (Fla.1982). “This requirement provides the voters with fair notice of the contents of the proposed initiative so that the voter will not be misled as to its purpose and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re People’s Property Rights Amendments, 699 So.2d at 1307; see also Askew, 421 So.2d at 155 (“Simply put, the ballot must give the voter fair notice of the decision he must make.”). The ballot title and summary, however, “need not explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting Pub. Funding of Political Candidates’ Campaigns, 693 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla.1997). “Our responsibility is to determine whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Right of Citizens To Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d at 566.

The opponents to this proposed amendment attack the ballot title and summary on numerous grounds, the first of which relates to the use of the words “Public Protection” in the ballot title. The opponents argue that those words are misleading because they give a false impression that the public needs to be protected and constitute mere rhetoric rather than a disclosure of the chief purpose of the proposed amendment. For support, they cite this Court’s decision in Save Our Everglades. In response, the proponents of the proposed amendment, Floridians for Patient Protection, argue that the proposed amendment, like all laws regarding physician licensing, is designed to protect the public and that use of the term “protect” does not constitute impermissible political rhetoric. For support, they cite this Court’s decision in Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke.

In Save Our Everglades, this Court held:

The title of the present initiative— “SAVE OUR EVERGLADES” — is misleading. It implies that the Everglades is lost, or in danger of being lost, to the citizens of our State, and needs to be “saved” via the proposed amendment. Yet, nothing in the text of the proposed amendment hints at this peril. Section (a) avers only that the Everglades was polluted at some point in the past by the sugarcane industry. The severity of pollution is unmentioned — it could be extensive, or relatively minor. Further, the text of the amendment clearly states that the purpose of the amendment is to “restore” the Everglades to its original condition, not to “save” it from peril. A voter responding to the emotional language of the title could well be misled as to the contents and purpose of the proposed amendment. “A proposed amendment cannot fly under false colors; this one does.” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d at 156.

636 So.2d at 1341. However, in Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, we held that use of the term “protect” in the title did not constitute impermissible political rhetoric or the adjudication of a fact, stating that “our authorization for this proposed amendment to appear on the ballot [does not] constitute an adjudication of ... whether the proposal will be effective in protecting citizens from any actual or perceived harm attendant to second-hand smoke.” 814 So.2d at 421.

With regard to the instant ballot title, we conclude that it is not misleading nor does it “fly under false colors.” First, similar to the term “protect” in Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, the term “protection” in the instant case does not constitute impermissible political rhetoric nor does our approval of the title amount to an adjudication of a fact. Second, we find that the phrase “public protection” does not “rise to a comparable level of political and emotional language and subjective evaluation” as did the use of the word “save” in Save Our Everglades. Third, the chief purpose of the proposed amendment is to provide a stricter law with regard to physician licensing than presently exists under the Florida Statutes. Thus, the proposed amendment is clearly a measure designed to protect the public, as are all other laws regarding professional licensing.

We next turn to the argument advanced by the opponents that the description of the current law contained in the ballot summary is misleading and omits material information. That description is found in the first line of the ballot summary, which reads: “Current law allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be licensed to practice medicine in Florida.” For support of their argument, the opponents cite Askew, 421 So.2d at 153, and Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, 656 So.2d 466 (Fla.1995). In response, the proponents argue that the description is an accurate statement of both the discretion currently granted to the Board of Medicine and the actual outcome of most cases under current law and that this ballot summary is distinguishable from those involved in the cases cited by the opponents.

In Askew, this Court struck a ballot summary that did not set out the chief purpose of the amendment. The summary stated that the amendment “[prohibits former legislators and statewide elected officers from representing other persons or entities for compensation before any state government body for a period of 2 years following vacation of office, unless they file full and public disclosure of their financial interests.” 421 So.2d at 153. We found that the summary flew under false colors because it did not convey the true purpose and meaning of the amendment, which was to override statutory law providing for a complete two-year ban on lobbying. See id. at 155-56. Similarly, in Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, this Court found a ballot summary was misleading for multiple reasons, including the following:

[W]e find that the first line of the summary is misleading in that it suggests that the amendment is necessary to prohibit casinos in this state. The summary uses the following language: “This amendment prohibits casinos unless approved by the voters.... ” This language is misleading not because of what it says, but what it fails to say.... [T]he summary creates the false impression that casinos are now allowed in Florida. It fails to inform the voter that most types of casino gaming are currently prohibited by statute. See generally ch. 849, Fla. Stat. (1993). Without this admission, the summary suffers from the same defect as did the summary in Askew.

656 So.2d at 469.

We agree with the proponents that the instant case is distinguishable from Askeio and Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation. In those cases, this Court found that the summaries flew under false colors because they suggested that the proposed amendments would result in new limitations or impose stricter limitations with regard to certain activities than had prior law, when in fact, the chief purposes of the proposed amendments were to create exceptions to preexisting limitations on those activities. Here, the descriptions of current law and the proposed amendment contained within the summary suggest that the proposed amendment will impose a stricter limitation with regard to physician licensing than provided under current law. That is not misleading because the chief purpose of the proposed amendment is to create a bright-line rule with regard to medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice that is stricter than what is currently provided under section 458.331(l)(t).

The opponents to the proposed amendment further argue that the ballot summary contains terms that are ambiguous and omits certain information necessary for the voter to make an informed decision. First, they note that the summary fails to warn the voter that definitions of “medical malpractice” and “found to have committed” are contained in the proposed amendment. Second, they assert that the phrase “medical doctor” is ambiguous and should be defined because it could be construed to include only “physicians” licensed under Chapter 458 or the wider range of health care providers subject to malpractice under chapter 766. Third, they assert that the phrase “three or more incidents” is ambiguous and should be defined because it could be construed to mean three separate lawsuits, acts involving three different patients, or even three separate acts of negligence arising from treatment of the same patient.

It is worth repeating that section 101.161 requires that the ballot title and summary “state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154-55. However, we find the opponents’ arguments to be without merit because, as our prior case law states, “an exhaustive explanation of the interpretation and future possible effects of the amendment [is] not required” in the ballot title and summary. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re: Amendment to Bar Gov’t from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 899 (Fla.2000). We also specifically reject the opponents’ arguments that the ballot summary is defective because of its use of the term “medical doctor” and the phrase “three or more incidents” because those words derive from the text of the proposed amendment itself.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the proposed amendment and ballot title and summary meet the legal requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003). This opinion encompasses no other issues than those addressed herein and should not be construed as favoring or opposing the passage of the proposed amendment. Accordingly, we approve the placement of this proposed amendment on the ballot.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

BELL, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J.,

concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion, and write separately in response to Justice Bell’s assertion that the summary misleads voters as to the current state of the law. In Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7 (Fla.2000), this Court reiterated its statement in Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982), that a ballot summary must convey the “true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment.” See 773 So.2d at 16. In Askew, the summary violated this requirement because it indicated that the amendment would restrict lobbying activities by former legislators and elected officials, whereas the amendment would actually have removed a two-year ban on lobbying already contained in the state constitution. See 421 So.2d at 155-56. In Armstrong, we struck a constitutional amendment in which the ballot summary failed to inform voters that the amendment would nullify an existing state constitutional prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishments,” and instead implied that the amendment would promote the rights of Florida citizens through United States Supreme Court rulings construing the Eighth Amendment. See 773 So.2d at 17. See also Advisory Opinion to Attorney General re Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, 814 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the summary adequately stated the amendment’s chief purpose of banning smoking in enclosed indoor workplaces even though it did not state that smoking was already limited in certain public places). Thus, our focus in assessing whether a ballot summary conveys the true meaning and ramifications of the amendment has been whether the summary misleads voters into concluding that the amendment would provide greater citizen protection than current law, when in fact it would provide less protection than the Constitution or law currently provided.

As explained in the majority opinion, the ballot summary for this proposed amendment clearly conveys that the amendment will provide greater protection than under the current law from being treated by doctors who have repeatedly engaged in medical malpractice. The amendment will replace the current law, under which physicians with three malpractice “strikes” may be allowed to continue to practice medicine in this state, with a bright-line rule, under which suspension is mandatory. This change toward greater protection, the chief purpose of the amendment, is clearly conveyed in the summary.

ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

BELL, J.,

dissenting.

The lead sentence of the ballot summary states that “[cjurrent law allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be licensed to practice medicine in Florida.” Although this sentence is technically correct, it fails to give “ ‘fair notice’ of the meaning and effect of the proposed amendment.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018, 1021 (Fla.1994). A summary that gave voters fair notice would inform them that current Florida law gives a professional licensing board discretion to decide whether or not a medical doctor who repeatedly commits malpractice may continue to be licensed. The chief effect of the amendment would be to remove any such discretion. By reading the current ballot summary, a voter of reasonable intelligence could easily assume that there is currently no mechanism in place to revoke the license of a medical doctor who has repeatedly committed malpractice. This misleading language in the summary is exacerbated by the title of the amendment, “Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice,” which amplifies the implication that current law provides no protection for the public from medical doctors who commit repeated acts of malpractice.

In her concurrence, Chief Justice Par-iente states:

The amendment will replace the current law, under which physicians with three malpractice “strikes” may be allowed to continue to practice medicine in this state, with a bright-line rule, under which suspension is mandatory. This change toward greater protection, the chief purpose of the amendment, is clearly conveyed in the summary.

Concurring op. at 674. Respectfully, I disagree. Chief Justice Pariente’s statement provides much more context for the suggested change in current law than does the ballot summary. Nowhere does the ballot summary describe replacing the current law regarding suspension of medical doctors; it simply states that current law allows the licensing of medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice. The replacement of the current law that gives discretion to a professional licensing board to suspend physician licenses with “a bright-line rule, under which suspension is mandatory” is, at best, only implied. Only those actually aware that a Board of Medicine exists and that current law vests it with discretion over the suspension of physicians’ licenses would understand the unstated. The summary could have clearly stated this vital point with the thirty more words available but unused by the proponents. In my opinion, this failure is fatal.

In conclusion, the ballot summary fails to adequately explain the chief purpose of the amendment. Without a clearer statement of the current law, it does not fairly contey the true change in the law intended by the amendment. Fair notice of the “meaning and effect” of the amendment is not given. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

      . Under current Florida law, the Board of Medicine has the discretion to revoke or suspend a physician's license to practice medicine for “[g]ross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances.” § 458.331(l)(t), Fla. Stat. (2003). Repeated malpractice is defined to include "three or more claims for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in indemnities being paid in excess of $50,000 each to the claimant in a judgment or settlement and which incidents involved negligent conduct by the physician.” Id.

        . Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d at 1353.

      . Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, 814 So.2d at 420.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
PER CURIAM.
      PARIENTE, C.J., LEWIS, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE THE MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMANT’S COMPENSATION AMENDMENT.
    No. SC04-310.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 15, 2004.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Louis F. Hubener, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Stephen H. Grimes and Susan L. Kelsey of Holland and Knight, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for Citizens For a Fair Share, Inc., Proponents.
    Timothy McLendon and Jon Mills, Gainesville, Florida and Barnaby W. Zall of Weinberg and Jacobs, LLP, Rockville, Maryland, on behalf of Floridians for Patient Protection; and Arthur I. Jacobs and Lisa G. Satcher of Jacobs and Associates, P.A., Fernandina Beach, FL on behalf of Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar, for Opponents.
   PER CURIAM.

The Attorney General has requested this Court to review a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution that would limit the contingency fee agreement between injured claimants and their attorneys in medical liability cases. We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10; art V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we approve the amendment and the ballot title and summary for placement on the ballot.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND BALLOT SUMMARY

The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “The Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment.” The summary for the proposed amendment provides:

Proposes to amend the State Constitution to provide that an injured claimant who enters into a contingency fee agreement with an attorney in a claim for medical liability is entitled to no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant, and 90% of damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This amendment is intended to be self-executing.

The full text of the proposed amendment reads as follows:

Section 1.
Article 1, Section 26 is created to read “Claimant’s right to fair compensation.”
In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and does not require implementing legislation.
Section 2.
This Amendment shall take effect on the day following approval by the voters.

STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 778 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000), this Court summarized its standard of review in initiative petition cases:

The Court’s inquiry, when determining the validity of initiative petitions, is limited to two legal issues: whether the petition satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, and whether the ballot titles and summaries are printed in clear and unambiguous language pursuant to section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1999). In order for the Court to invalidate a proposed amendment, the record must show that the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective on either ground. In determining the propriety of the initiative petitions, the Court does not review the merits of the proposed amendments.

Id. at 890-91 (citations omitted).

SINGLE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT

Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part that proposed amendments based on citizen initiative petitions “shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.” This Court has held that the single-subject requirement serves the following purposes: (1) it prevents “logrolling,” a practice that combines separate issues into a single proposal to secure passage of an unpopular issue; and (2) it “prevent[s] a single constitutional amendment from substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple aspects of government.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Florida Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla.2000). A proposed amendment must manifest a “logical and natural oneness of purpose” in order to satisfy the single-subject requirement. Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984). This determination requires the Court to consider whether the proposed amendment affects separate functions of government, as well as how it affects other provisions of the constitution. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen.-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1994).

The amendment’s opponents assert that the proposed amendment would have a “precipitous” and “cataclysmic” effect on multiple branches of state government. The opponents argue that the amendment therefore improperly affects separate functions of government and portions of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, the opponents allege that the amendment’s ambiguous wording will impact the judiciary’s involvement in regulating attorneys and the fees they charge.

While we find the proposed amendment at bar to be extremely brief, we also find its language to be straightforward as to who it affects or who is involved in its implementation. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 565-66 (Fla.1998) (“[I]t is imperative that an initiative identify the provisions of the constitution substantially affected by the proposed amendment in order for the public to fully comprehend the contemplated changes and to ensure that the initiative’s effect on other unnamed provisions is not left unresolved and open to various interpretations.”). We agree that the amendment does relate to the judicial branch because at the very least, the amendment would functionally override or interfere with the Rules of Professional Conduct as they relate to fee contracts between attorneys and their clients. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5. However, beyond the aforementioned effect, the amendment does not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches of government or the constitution. Further, to expand our consideration to the merits of the amendment would go beyond this Court’s scope in giving proposed amendment advisory opinions. See In re Advisory Opinion to Attorney General ex rel. Authorizes Miami Dade And Broward County Voters To Approve Slot Machines In Parimutuel Facilities, 880 So.2d 522, 523, 2004 WL 1064930 (Fla. May 13, 2004) (“[T]he Court does not review the merits or the wisdom of the proposed amendment.”).

We likewise find no merit in the arguments that the amendment should be stricken from the ballot on the basis that it violates the single-subject requirement because the Judiciary and the Legislature would be burdened with having to interpret and define the amendment’s terms. The proposed amendment has a limited scope because it involves contractual fee agreements between attorneys and clients, which do not inherently involve the executive or legislative branches.

Although the proposed amendment logically relates to the judicial branch and could possibly result in some collateral ramifications for the other two branches, the proposal will not substantially alter or perform the functions of those branches. “[T]he possibility that an amendment might interact with other parts of the Florida Constitution is not sufficient reason to invalidate the proposed amendment.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Fla.1996) (quoting Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d 71, 74 (Fla.1994)). Likewise, “[a] proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail.” Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353-54, (Fla.1998). Rather, “it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the single-subject test.” Id. at 1354. See also Advisory Opinion To Atty. Gen. re Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation, 818 So.2d 491, 496 (Fla.2002) (“[T]he proposed amendment may ‘affect’ several branches of government but it does not substantially ‘alter’ or ‘perform’ the functions of those branches.”).

The opponents also argue that the amendment impermissibly affects portions of the Florida Constitution, specifically article I, sections 2 and 10. See Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”). However, we are not persuaded by the argument that the amendment affects portions of the Florida Constitution prohibiting the impairment of citizens’ contract rights because it does not propose to transcend similar limitations on attorney-client fee arrangements that are currently in place. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5. As previously discussed, the proposed amendment could impact the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct, but it does not appear to otherwise have a wide-reaching impact on other constitutional provisions.

Thus, we conclude that the amendment, as proposed, does not violate the single-subject requirement.

REVIEW OF BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY

Section 101.161(1) of the Florida Statutes governs the requirements for ballot titles and summaries and provides, in relevant part:

Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot....

§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Thus, the statute requires that the ballot title and summary “state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. — Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So.2d 225, 228 (Fla.1991); accord Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d at 566. Above all, the title and summary must be accurate and informative. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d 798, 803 (Fla.1998). These requirements make certain that the “electorate is advised of the true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla.1994) (quoting Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982)).

This Court has concluded that the purpose of ballot title and summary statute was “to provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the voter will not be misled as to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot.” Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d at 803 (quoting Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d at 566). In sum, it is this Court’s “responsibility ... to determine whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d at 566. “When the summary of a proposed amendment does not accurately describe the scope of the text of the amendment, it fails in its purpose and must be stricken.” Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.2d at 804.

In Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, this Court struck an amendment from the ballot because there were discrepancies between the amendment and the summary that were “material and misleading.” 705 So.2d at 566. The Court described such ambiguity as being a “divergence in terminology” and found that it caused the amendment to be “fatally defective.” Id. However, in the proposed amendment before us, we do not find material or misleading discrepancies between the summary and the amendment. In fact, the summary in this amendment comes very close to reiterating the briefly worded amendment.

We also note that it is not necessary for the title and summary to explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Prohibiting Public Funding of Political Candidates’ Campaigns, 693 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla.1997). Even the terms “claim for medical liability” and “medical liability claim” do not represent a discrepancy between the amendment and summary because those terms are used consistently between the summary and the amendment. Although the opponents argue that the efficacy of the amendment is at issue because of the vague “medical liability” term, the issue as to the precise meaning of this term is better left to subsequent litigation, should the amendment pass. Under the scope of our review, we find the wording of the title and summary sufficient to communicate the chief purpose of the measure. Thus, we conclude that the ballot summary explains the “chief purpose” of the proposed amendment and meets the statutory requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we hold that the initiative petition and proposed ballot title and summary for “The Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment” meet the legal requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2003). We therefore approve the amendment for placement on the ballot. We note, however, that no other issue is addressed here and this opinion should not be construed as expressing either favor for or opposition to the proposed amendment.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.

LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

PARIENTE, C.J.,

concurring.

Although I agree with much of what Justice Lewis says in his dissenting opinion as to the practical effect of this proposed amendment, I conclude that these concerns are beyond the scope of our current review. The chief purpose of an amendment, which must be conveyed in a ballot summary, is distinct from its potential effect or the motivations of the proponents. As I stated in my concurring opinion in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Public Protection From Repeated Medical Malpractice, No. SC04-778, 880 So.2d 667, 674, 2004 WL 1574024 (Fla. July 15, 2004), “our focus in assessing whether a ballot summary conveys the true meaning and ramifications of the amendment has been whether the summary misleads voters into concluding that the amendment would provide greater citizen protection than current law, when in fact it would provide less protection than the Constitution or law currently provided.”

The summary in this case does not mislead voters into concluding that they would receive more legal protection than under current law. It says nothing whatsoever concerning greater or lesser protection. It merely guarantees them a particular percentage of their recovery in a medical liability claim. Thus, it does not purport to create a right when in fact it restricts that right, as in cases in which we have disapproved ballot summaries. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla.1998) (“We also find that the proposed amendment creates an illusory right to choose a health care provider when in fact it would severely limit an individual’s ability to enter into a health care contract.”).

If approved, the amendment may well hamper citizens’ ability to press their medical liability claims because its ceiling on contingency fee percentages would discourage the participation of knowledgeable and experienced counsel. Nonetheless, nothing within the text of the amendment points to that result. The fact that one may reasonably anticipate particular consequences of the amendment does not render a summary that omits these potential consequences misleading as to the current state of the law.

As Justice Lewis has stated, the proponents of this amendment appear to have an ulterior purpose. However, that is not a fatal flaw at this stage of the process. Advocates of a constitutional amendment may have different motives. We cannot say with confidence that all who might favor this amendment and are aware of its potential impact on legal representation would favor its passage solely for that reason. To ascribe one primary motive to advocates of a measure, and then require that this motive be conveyed in a seventy-five word ballot summary, is impractical if not impossible.

I conclude that the task of informing the public as to the possible motivations behind the proposed amendment and its potential practical effects must fall on the proponents and opponents of the measure. The following observations we made in reviewing another summary hold true here:

It is true ... that certain of the details of the [text] as well as some of its ramifications were either omitted from the ballot question or could have been better explained therein. That, however, is not the test. There is no requirement that the referendum question set forth the [text] verbatim nor explain its complete terms at great and undue length. Such would hamper instead of aiding the intelligent exercise of the privilege of voting. Under our system of free elections, the voter must acquaint himself with the details of a proposed ordinance on a referendum together with the pros and cons thereon before he enters the voting booth. If he does not, it is no function of the ballot question to provide him with that needed education. What the law very simply requires is that the ballot give the voter fair notice of the question he must decide so that he may intelligently cast his vote. That requirement has been more than adequately met in this case.

Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen. re Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation, 818 So.2d 491, 498 (Fla.2002) (quoting Metropolitan Dade County v. Shiver, 365 So.2d 210, 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).

Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s approval of this ballot title and summary for placement on the ballot.

QUINCE, J., concurs.

LEWIS, J.,

dissenting.

It is well settled that the intent of section 101.161(1) is to ensure that voters are advised of the true meaning and purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment. See Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982). This Court has recognized that “[a] ballot title and summary cannot either ‘fly under false colors’ or ‘hide the ball’ as to the amendment’s true effect.” Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 16 (Fla.2000). I must dissent from the majority’s - holding approving the proposed ballot title and summary in the instant action, as it is clear that the singular and only purpose of this proposed amendment is not as printed, but is instead the unstated ulterior purpose of interfering with the relationship between injured citizens of Florida and representatives they may wish to secure to protect their, interests and, as a direct result, impact access to the courts as guaranteed in article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.

In Armstrong, this Court considered the following ballot title and summary:

BALLOT TITLE: PRESERVATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY; UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT BALLOT SUMMARY: Proposing an amendment to Section 17 of Article I of the State Constitution preserving the death penalty, and permitting any execution method unless prohibited by the Federal Constitution. Requires construction of the prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment to conform to United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Prohibits reduction of a death sentence based on invalidity of execution method, and provides for continued force of sentence. Provides for retroactive applicability.

Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 16. The Court there held that the title and summary were misleading because they implied that the amendment would protect the rights of Florida citizens, when in fact the effect of the amendment would be to nullify rights. See id. at 17-18. This Court held that the ballot title and summary could not “fly under false colors” in such a manner. Moreover, the Court also held that the title and summary “hid the ball” from the voters by asserting that the purpose of the proposed amendment was - to “preserve” the death penalty, when the actual purpose was to nullify the Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause of the Florida Constitution. See id. at 18. As the main target of the proposed amendment was not mentioned in the title and summary, this Court held that the ballot title and summary were defective. See id.

In a similar manner, in Askew, this Court rejected an amendment because a proposed ballot title and summary failed to adequately inform the voters of the amendment’s true chief purpose. There, we considered the following ballot title and summary:

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BEFORE LOBBYING BY FORMER LEGISLATORS AND STATEWIDE ELECTED OFFICERS. Prohibits former legislators and statewide elected officers from representing other persons or entities for compensation before any state government body for a period of 2 years following vacation of office, unless they file full and public disclosure of their financial interests.

Askew, 421 So.2d at 153. We held that the title and summary were defective because they neglected to inform the public that the constitution already contained a two-year ban on lobbying, and the proposed amendment would actually abolish that provision. See id. at 155. We reasoned: “[T]he ‘proposal of amendments to the Constitution is a highly important function of government, that should be performed with the greatest certainty, efficiency, care and deliberation.’ ” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963, 968 (1912)). Further, we emphasized that “lawmakers who are asked to consider constitutional changes, and the people who are asked to approve them, must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal from a fair notification in the proposition itself that it is neither less nor more extensive than it appears to be.” Id. (quoting Smothers v. Smith, 338 So.2d 825, 829 (Fla.1976)). See also Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, 656 So.2d 466, 469 (Fla.1995) (finding a ballot title and summary misleading because they created the impression that casinos were allowed in Florida and failed to inform voters that most types of casino gaming were actually prohibited by statute).

FALSE PROMISE

The ballot title and summary presented here similarly fail, as they both fly under false colors and attempt to “hide the ball” from the voters and disguise a very clear end. They make false promises of benefits when they really take away and restrict existing rights. The sponsors of the proposed amendment assert that the chief purpose of the amendment is to guarantee that a claimant for medical liability with a contingency fee agreement will receive no less than seventy percent of the first $250,000 in damages and ninety percent of damages in excess of $250,000, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. Clearly, the proposed amendment as written portrays that it will provide protection for citizens by ensuring that they will actually personally receive a deceptive amount of all money determined as damages in any medical liability action. However, the amendment actually has the singular and only purpose of impeding a citizen’s access to the courts and that citizen’s right and ability to secure representation for a redress of injuries. Its purpose is to restrict a citizen’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice on terms chosen by the citizen and selected counsel and to thereby negatively impact the right of Florida citizens to seek redress for injuries sustained by medical malpractice. This is truly a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

Pursuant to Florida law, medical negligence actions are currently highly regulated, and, unquestionably, Florida’s citizens require the assistance of knowledgeable and experienced attorneys to navigate through the extensive and complicated process. Those attorneys who have worked years to gain expertise in this highly specialized field are certainly entitled to reasonable compensation. If enacted, the proposed amendment will not eliminate the process an injured citizen must follow, but is designed to and will undoubtedly eliminate the willingness of counselors to accept the responsibility for such matters with the economic restrictions imposed.

Prior to filing a legal action, a claimant is required to notify all prospective defendants of the claims. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2003). At times, it is often difficult to initially identify those responsible for dear injuries. Once a claimant has filed notice with the prospective defendants, there are specific time periods and limitations that must be precisely followed before the actual legal action is considered timely filed. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2003). Unlike all other areas of Florida law, our law now mandates that prior to initiating a medical negligence action, a claimant must conduct an entire presuit investigative process as a condition precedent to proceed with any claims. See §§ 766.203-766.206, Fla. Stat. (2003). Failure to follow this required presuit screening process constitutes a basis to defeat any claim even if the claim is absolutely valid and the damages enormous. See § 766.106, Fla. Stat. (2003).

Once an action has been filed, the court may require, upon motion by a health care provider, that the claim be submitted to an arbitration process that is totally nonbinding. See § 766.107, Fla. Stat. (2003). In the alternative, the parties may mutually agree to binding arbitration. See § 766.207, Fla. Stat. (2003). If the parties do not agree to binding arbitration, section 766.108 of the Florida Statutes (2003) requires that the parties participate in mandatory mediation and settlement conference activities prior to any trial. See § 766.108(l)-(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). Clearly, before a claim is ever filed or a trial may begin or damages are awarded, a litigant with a medical negligence claim must proceed through a lengthy, time-consuming, and certainly, costly process. This mandatory pretrial screening process will remain in effect even if the proposed amendment is adopted. Florida citizens need, and are entitled to, assistance to guide them through this process. As evidenced by the numerous decisions concerning the pretrial medical negligence process, the existing law has been a series of traps and a minefield for many Floridians. See, e.g., Goradesky v. Hickox, 721 So.2d 419, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming dismissal of claim for failing to file corroborating expert affidavit and failure to conduct reasonable presuit investigation before filing notice of intent); Kukral v. Mekras, 647 So.2d 849, 850-51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (affirming dismissal of claim and holding no reasonable investigation was conducted), quashed, 679 So.2d 278 (Fla.1996); Archer v. Maddux, 645 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (affirming dismissal of claim for failure to provide corroborating expert opinion within statute of limitations). The district courts have recognized that the presuit investigation requirements are “complex and confusing,” Coffaro v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth, 752 So.2d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), approved, 829 So.2d 862 (Fla.2002), and that the “interrelationship of [the] tolling and extension periods has produced [a] type of mathematical puzzle.” Id. at 714. Further, they have recognized that while the procedures were not designed to function as traps for the litigants, they have nonetheless become just that — a trap. See id. at 715; Zacker v. Croft, 609 So.2d 140, 141-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Unquestionably, without competent counsel, the process is impossible.

It is also vital to note the damage caps which now exist within the medical negligence statutory provisions, which are rarely mentioned but will continue to remain in effect should the proposed amendment be adopted. If the parties agree to binding arbitration pursuant to section 766.207, economic damages, including past and future medical expenses and eighty percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity can be awarded, offset, however, by collateral source payments. In this process, noneconomic damages are capped at $250,000 with future economic losses available, but they must be paid in periodic installments. Punitive damages are not available no matter how egregious the conduct may be. See § 766.207, Fla. Stat. (2003). If a claimant rejects a medical provider’s offer to enter voluntary binding arbitration, the only damages awardable at trial are limited to net economic damages and noneconomic damages are absolutely capped not to exceed $350,000 per incident. See § 766.209, Fla. Stat. (2003).

If the parties proceed to trial, and damages are awarded to a claimant, noneco-nomic damages for the negligence of practitioners, regardless of the number, are capped at $500,000 per claimant if the negligence resulted in personal injury or wrongful death, and $1 million for all practitioners if the negligence resulted in a permanent vegetative state or death. See § 766.118, Fla. Stat. (2003). Similarly, noneconomic damages for the negligence of nonpractitioners are capped at $750,000 per claimant if the negligence resulted in personal injury or wrongful death, and $1.5 million from all nonpractitioners if the negligence resulted in a permanent vegetative state or death. See § 766.118, Fla. Stat. (2003). Finally, for the negligence of practitioners providing emergency services, noneconomic damages are capped at $150,000 per claimant, and a total claim of $300,000. See § 766.118, Fla. Stat. (2003). All of these seldom discussed damage caps demonstrate that injured claimants are not eligible to receive enormous sums of money even if they are totally correct, suffer the consequences of absolutely clear negligence, and have been egregiously injured. In this highly specialized field, damages are currently artificially limited, and if the proposed amendment is adopted, these damage caps, along with the expensive and túne consuming pretrial process, will remain in effect.

Several statutes which relate to the rights of third parties to enforce hospital liens and receive reimbursement or subro-gation are also substantially implicated by the enactment of the proposed constitutional amendment. Pursuant to chapter 27032, Laws of Florida (1951), (commonly known as the “Hospital Lien Act”) many of Florida’s counties have adopted hospital lien acts that entitle hospitals to liens upon all causes of action for all reasonable charges for hospital care, treatment and maintenance. See, e.g., ch. 78-552, Laws of Fla. (Lee County’s hospital lien act); ch. 57-1688, Laws of Fla. (Palm Beach County’s hospital lien act); ch. 57-1644, Laws of Fla. (Orange County’s hospital lien act); ch. 30615, Laws of Fla. (1955) (Broward County’s hospital lien act). Additionally, there are both state and federal laws pertaining to the reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare payments and the right of insurance and health maintenance organizations to be reimbursed for payments to subscribers who suffer injury, disease, or illness by virtue of the negligent act of a third party. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395; § 409.910, Fla. Stat. (2003); § 641.31(8), Fla. Stat. (2003). If the proposed amendment is adopted, these provisions for payments to entitled third parties may be impacted, and due to the statutory damage caps, damage awards in some situations may not be sufficient to ensure that all eligible third parties receive full payment after the claimant receives seventy percent of the first $250,000 and ninety percent of all damages over $250,000, as mandated by the amendment. Common law and traditional subrogation rights are also implicated. Most importantly, the true purpose of the proposed amendment is, truly revealed in the convergence of the proposed amendment, the unique presuit process, the statutes pertaining to the rights of third parties, and the damage cap statutory provisions. All converge to leave little, if any, funds remaining for Florida citizens to obtain counsel. Without knowledgeable and experienced attorneys to provide representation, the citizens of Florida will have no meaningful access to the courts, and the end result will be that the courthouse door will be open to only those wealthy enough to afford to compensate an attorney on some non-contingency fee basis.

CONCLUSION

As in Armstrong,. Askew, and Casino Authorization, Taxation and Regulation, the proposed ballot title and summary here are patently misleading. They promise benefits while taking away important rights. The chief purpose of the proposed amendment is to render it economically impossible for claimants and their legal representatives to proceed with actions to redress legitimate injuries. With the artificial percentages of recovery mandated by the proposed amendment, unquestionably, legal counselors will be unable to accept responsibility for processing medical actions. Due to the complex nature of medical negligence claims, including the requisite statutory screening process, injured citizens will be unable to navigate the field alone. Moreover, health care providers will not be similarly handicapped, as the proposed amendment will in no way impact their rights to retain counsel on any terms or limit the funds available to secure defense counsel.

Every citizen of Florida needs and is entitled to assistance of counsel in all legal matters, particularly in connection with medical negligence actions, and to be free to engage counsel on terms the citizen deems appropriate. The proposed ballot title and summary fly under false colors and hide the ball by completely failing to inform the voters of the actual chief purpose of the proposed amendment, which is to so adversely impact representation in such actions as to eliminate most, if not all, such actions by restricting the terms of any representation agreement between the citizen and selected counsel. Without being informed regarding the current state of the law, voters will unquestionably be unable to comprehend the extensive sweep of the proposed amendment. If the sponsors of this amendment seek to restrict or eliminate medical liability actions involving contingency fee agreements, then they should say exactly that, as mandated by this Court’s precedent. They should not falsely claim they are providing a benefit to those injured by medical malpractice when they are in fact restricting their rights to secure adequate legal representation. There really is no other purpose of this proposed amendment. The title and summary are not required to disclose all ramifications, but the purpose must be disclosed. In my view, the proposed ballot title and summary are defective for failing to inform the voters of the true chief purpose of the proposed amendment and, therefore, I must dissent.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

      . I must note that although I dissented from the majority's opinion in Armstrong, my dissent was not premised upon Armstrong’s admonition that the ballot title and summary must not either "fly under false colors” or "hide the ball” with regard to the amendment’s true effect. Instead, I dissented from the Armstrong majority on an entirely separate basis, not at issue here. In my view, this Court’s review of the ballot title and summary at issue in Armstrong after the proposed amendment had appeared on the ballot and had been approved by the voters in the general election was untimely. As I expressed in my dissent in Armstrong, there I would have applied the principle of law that:
      [Ojnce an election has been concluded and the result determined, it is the duty of the judicial system to uphold that result, if possible, if the process has been essentially free and fair, the voters have not been essentially deprived of their right to vote due to the alleged defect, and the result has not been so tainted by irregularities as to suggest that the result is not the intent of the electorate.

        Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 33 (Lewis, L, dissenting). Despite my dissent with regard to the procedural posture of Armstrong, I concurred with the views expressed in the majority opinion with respect to "the role of judicial system in connection with proposed constitutional amendments.” Id. at 32 (Lewis, L, dissenting).

      . The Legislature expressly found that "[t]he recovery of 100 percent of economic losses constitutes overcompensation because such recovery fails to recognize that such awards are not subject to taxes on economic damages.” § 766.201(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003).

      . It should also be noted that the Legislature has created the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The purpose of this plan, as expressed by the Legislature, is to provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for birth-related neurological injuries. The compensation plan is the exclusive remedy for such injuries, and limits recovery to $100,000. See § 766.303, Fla. Stat. (2003); § 766.3l(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2003).


author: LEWIS, J., WELLS, J., QUINCE, J.,

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.
    No. SC04-1053.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 15, 2004.
   The Attorney General has asked the Court for an advisory opinion as to whether the financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference on the constitutional amendment, proposed by initiative petition, entitled “Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice,” is in accordance with section 100.371, Florida Statutes. The financial impact statement provides as follows:

The direct financial impact on state and local governments resulting from the proposed initiative would be minimal. There will likely be additional costs to the state of less than $1 million per year, but these costs will be offset by licen-sure fees. Beyond the direct impact, if the amendment results in shortages of physicians, there could be some increase in Medicaid and health insurance costs paid by state and local governments.

Article XI, section 5, Florida Constitution, addresses financial impact statements and provides as follows in relevant part:

(b) The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to article XI, section 5(b), the Legislature amended section 100.371(6)(a), Florida Statutes, to provide as follows in relevant part:

[T]he Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall complete an analysis and financial impact statement to be placed on the ballot of the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative.

Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Further, the Legislature amended section 100.371(6)(b), Florida Statutes, to provide as follows in relevant part:

3. Principals of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall reach a consensus or majority concurrence on a clear and unambiguous financial impact statement, no more than 75 words in length, and immediately submit the statement to the Attorney General. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the Financial Impact Estimating Conference from setting forth a range of potential impacts in the financial impact statement. Any financial impact statement that a court finds not to be in accordance with this section shall be remanded solely to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting. The Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall redraft the financial impact statement within 15 days.

Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Reading section 100.371(6)(b)(3) in conjunction with section 100.371(6)(a), as well as with article XI, section 5(b), Florida Constitution, the phrase “range of potential impacts” in section 100.371(6)(b)(3) must relate to the phrase “probable financial impact” set forth in the constitution.

The Court finds that the third sentence in the financial impact statement does not comply with section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes, as amended by chapter 2004-33, section 3, Laws of Florida, and the Court remands the statement to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting pursuant to section 100.371(6)(d)(l).

No motion for rehearing will be allowed.

PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., specially concurs with an opinion.

BELL, J., concurs in result only.

WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.

QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion in which WELLS, J., concurs.

LEWIS, J.,

specially concurring.

I write to address the related positions asserted in the dissenting opinions. One offers that, “[t]he statute requires only that there be ‘a clear and unambiguous financial impact statement, no more than 75 words in length.’ ” The other posits that the majority has too narrowly interpreted the statutory provision governing financial impact statements, and that such statements may include potential impacts and ranges of items beyond dollar estimates, and apparently whether possible, speculative, or otherwise, and without reference to that which is “probable” as set forth in our constitution. My concern is that these constructions will render financial impact statements a vehicle for any manner of content and language, including politicized statements designed as an attempt to sway the voters of this state, as long as those statements are clear and unambiguous. I submit that this process cannot be divorced from its constitutional base of authority and if the statute does so, as the dissents posit, the entire legislative scheme is of very questionable constitutional validity.

In Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 827 So.2d 959 (Fla.2002), this Court determined that the statutory requirement for the placement of a fiscal impact statement on an initiative to amend the constitution was contrary to the constitutionally based initiative process, did not ensure ballot integrity, and therefore, was unconstitutional. See id. at 963. Subsequent to this decision, Florida voters adopted a constitutional amendment creating a constitutional basis for the legislature to provide a “statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative.... ” Art. XI, § 5(b), Fla. Const, (emphasis added). The Florida Legislature implemented that constitutional charge by amending sections 101.161(1) (addressing ballot titles and summaries) and 100.371(6) (addressing substantive requirements for financial impact statements) of the Florida Statutes. Section 100.371(6)(b)(3) sets forth several criteria governing financial impact statements, providing as follows:

Principals of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall reach a consensus or majority concurrence on a clear and unambiguous financial impact statement, no more than 75 words in length, and immediately submit the statement to the Attorney General. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the Financial Impact Estimating Conference from setting forth a range of potential impacts in the financial impact statement.

Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla.

The statutory sections implementing Article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution have their origins, and only source of existence, in the language of that underlying constitutional provision, and the subject statutes cannot be interpreted in a manner that would override the constitutional authority. The Constitution limits financial impact statements to providing the “probable financial impact” of any amendment. See Art. XI, § 5(b), Fla. Const. Regardless of how clear or unambiguous, a statement which exceeds or is contrary to that constitutional parameter due to editorializing or politicizing comments should not appear within a financial impact statement of a citizen’s ballot initiative.

Moreover, I disagree with the interpretation that the statutory language permitting a “range of potential impacts” that may be included in financial impact statements overrides and erases the constitutional foundation to broadly encompass potential impacts beyond financial estimates. As provided in the constitutional amendment approved by the voters of this state, the language and content appearing in a financial impact statement must be the “financial” (ie., monetary, economic-type) impacts of any proposed amendment that are “probable.” While a “range” of “probable financial” impacts may be consistent with the constitutional basis, a mere “range of potential impacts” standing alone fails to honor the limited constitutional grant. I conclude that there is no constitutional basis to support the statutory scheme without reference to the underlying constitutional provision.

WELLS, J.,

dissenting.

The Attorney General has requested the Court for a review only as to whether the financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference is in accordance with section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes (2004). This scope of review tracks the language of the statute.

The statute requires only that there be “a clear and unambiguous financial impact statement, no more than 75 words in length.” § 100.371(6)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. Therefore, the scope of the requested review is necessarily limited to whether the financial impact statement is “clear and unambiguous,” and contains no more than seventy-five words. I do not find the financial impact statement unclear, ambiguous, or more than seventy-five words in length. Therefore, I find no basis for rejecting the financial impact statement. I would approve the statement for placement on the ballot.

I conclude that the majority has exceeded the scope of review requested by the Attorney General and contemplated in the statute.

In response to the specially concurring opinion, I do not believe that this Court has jurisdiction in this proceeding to decide the issue which that opinion argues.

QUINCE, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this financial impact statement to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference. I conclude that the statement complies with the requirements of section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes, as amended by chapter 2004-33, section 3, Laws of Florida. The statute provides that “[njothing in this subsection prohibits the Financial Impact Estimating Conference from setting forth a range of potential impacts in the financial impact statement.” Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). This phrase broadly encompasses potential impacts beyond a mere dollar estimate. As interpreted by the majority, the statutory phrase becomes a redundancy. I would approve this financial impact statement for placement on the ballot as it complies with the statutory requirements.

WELLS, J., concurs.


author: WELLS, J.,

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE AUTHORIZES MIAMI-DADE & BROWARD COUNTY VOTERS TO APPROVE SLOT MACHINES IN PARIMUTUEL FACILITIES.
    No. SC04-1057.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 15, 2004.
   The Attorney General has asked the Court for an advisory opinion as to whether the financial impact statement prepared by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference on the constitutional amendment, proposed by initiative petition, entitled “Authorizes Miami-Dade and Broward County Voters to Approve Slot Machines in Parimutuel Facilities,” is in accordance with section 100.371, Florida Statutes. The financial impact statement provides as follows:

This amendment alone has no fiscal impact on the state or local governments. However, if the voters in Miami-Dade County, Broward County, or both counties authorize slot machines at parimutuel facilities, expenditures by the state and local governments related to problem gambling may increase by an unknown amount. If the Legislature also chooses to tax slot machine revenues, the estimated state tax revenues from both counties would range from $200 million to $500 million annually.

Article XI, section 5, Florida Constitution, addresses financial impact statements and provides as follows in relevant part:

(b) The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to article XI, section 5(b), the Legislature amended section 100.371(6)(a), Florida Statutes, to provide as follows in relevant part:

[T]he Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall complete an analysis and financial impact statement to be placed on the ballot of the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative.

Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Further, the Legislature amended section 100.371(6)(b), Florida Statutes, to provide as follows in relevant part:

3. Principals of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall reach a consensus or majority concurrence on a clear and unambiguous financial impact statement, no more than 75 words in length, and immediately submit the statement to the Attorney General. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the Financial Impact Estimating Conference from setting forth a range of potential impacts in the financial impact statement. Any financial impact statement that a court finds not to be in accordance with this section shall be remanded solely to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting. The Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall redraft the financial impact statement within 15 days.

Ch.2004-33, § 3, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Reading section 100.371(6)(b)(3) in conjunction with section 100.371(6)(a), as well as with article XI, section 5(b), Florida Constitution, the phrase “range of potential impacts” in section 100.371(6)(b)(3) must relate to the phrase “probable financial impact” set forth in the constitution.

The Court finds that the second sentence in the financial impact statement does not comply with section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes, as amended by chapter 2004-33, section 3, Laws of Florida, and the Court remands the statement to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting pursuant to section 100.371(6)(d)(l).

No motion for rehearing will be allowed.

PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

CANTERO, J., concurs in result only.

WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.

QUINCE and BELL, JJ., dissent.

WELLS, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent here on the same basis that I dissented to the order in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice, No. SC04-1053, 880 So.2d 686, 2004 WL 1575059 (Fla. order filed July 15, 2004), and agreed with the dissent of Justice Quince to the order in that case.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Benjamin J. EVERIDGE, Appellant, v. ADVANTAGE VENTURE PARTNERS, LTD., et al., Appellee.
    No. 5D03-1953.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 23, 2004.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 2004.
    Arthur J. Ranson, III of Shuffield Low-man, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Frank M. Hamner and Richard E. Mitchell of Gray Robinson, P.A., Orlando and Christine A. Donoghue of Gray Robinson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Benjamin J. Everidge appeals a final order dismissing his fourth amended complaint with prejudice. Everidge argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint as it adequately stated causes of action for breach of an oral contract, fraud in the inducement, and defamation. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In reviewing the propriety of an order dismissing a complaint, we confine our analysis to the four corners of the complaint and accept all well pled allegations as true. Because the matter presents a question of law, we review the matter de novo. Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Having carefully reviewed the complaint, we agree that the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice each of the counts in Everidge’s fourth amended complaint except for counts III and IV for defamation. Those counts plead the requisite facts to establish causes of action for defamation. See Bass v. Rivera, 826 So.2d 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (setting forth the four elements that must be pled in an action for defamation). With respect to those claims, the matters raised in the appellees’ motion to dismiss are more appropriately asserted as defenses.

We reverse the order dismissing Ever-idge’s claims for defamation, but affirm the remainder of the order dismissing the other counts with prejudice.

■ AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

PLEUS, PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    MANATEE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the state of Florida, Appellant, v. Julie M. REARDON, Anna Doris Woods, Deborah J. Dearhold, Alice Barron, Kaye Garms, and Gulfview Park L.L.C., Appellees.
    No. 2D03-4032.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 28, 2004.
    James A. Minix, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Bradenton, for Appellant.

      John P. Harllee, III and Adam Moham-madbhoy of Harllee & Bald, P.A., Braden-ton, for Appellee GulMew Park, L.L.C.
    No Appearance for Appellees Julie M. Reardon, Anna Doris Woods, Deborah J. Dearhold, Alice Barron, and Kaye Garms.
   PER CURIAM.

On the face of the record and on the issues presented, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court was correct in determining that the parties were bound by the joint stipulation and order of court dated April 13, 1988. However, we are likewise compelled to conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant, Manatee County, was in contempt because the trial court had not previously ordered Manatee County to specifically issue the permit in question. The finding that this was proper density regarding the subject property was not a directive to issue the permit. Thus, the County’s actions in failing to comply were not a wilful violation of a court order.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling insofar as it determines that the density of the property shall be in accordance with the joint stipulation and order of court dated April 13, 1988. However, we reverse as to the finding of contempt.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WHATLEY, CASANUEVA, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.


author: COVINGTON, Judge. SILBERMAN, Judge,

text:
    Paul Donald WIGHT, Appellant, v. Melissa Anne WIGHT, Appellee.
    No. 2D02-4036.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 28, 2004.

      Dorothy C. Venable and Edward M. Brennan of Gallagher & Howard, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Ingrid Anderson and Ann Loughridge Kerr, Clearwater, for Appellee.
   COVINGTON, Judge.

In this postjudgment dissolution proceeding, the husband appeals from an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the wife. Because we agree that the trial court erred in establishing the amount of the attorney’s fees, we reverse and remand for recalculation of the attorney’s fees award.

After conducting discovery, the husband and wife entered into settlement negotiations hoping to resolve their disputes. Part of their agreement called for the husband to pay $3000 per month in child support and obtain, as security for this obligation, a $500,000 life insurance policy. Some time thereafter, since the husband did not obtain the life insurance policy, the wife filed several motions to enforce the agreement. In addition, the wife filed motions for contempt relying on the fact that the husband had not timely remitted the child support payments. Before the hearing on the contempt motions was held, the husband paid the arrearage and became current with respect to his obligations.

The wife’s attorney then filed a motion for attorney’s fees for the time spent litigating both the life insurance matter and the contempt issues. Pursuant to section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2000), the trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the wife in the amount of $27,833.21. On appeal the husband raises several claims in support of his contention that the attorney’s fees award should be set aside. While we affirm the award in all other respects, we do find merit to one of the husband’s arguments.

A portion of the fee awarded to the wife included time billed for litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. Relying on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 833 (Fla.1993), the husband submits that while it may be permissible to award attorney’s fees for litigating entitlement to fees, such an award should not include the time spent litigating the amount of the fees. In denying fees for fees, the Palma court reasoned that work performed by an attorney concerning the amount of the fee “inures solely to the attorney’s benefit and cannot be considered services rendered in procuring full payment of the judgment.” Id. at 833.

We are cognizant that under certain limited circumstances, Florida courts have determined that they are not bound by Pal-ma and have permitted the awarding of fees for litigating the amount of fees. See, e.g., Condren v. Bell, 853 So.2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (permitting fees for fees because the fee awarded was a sanction); Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank v. Sandel, 766 So.2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (permitting fees for fees because federal law controlled the award of fees); Diaz v. SantaFe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (permitting fees for fees in claim for lost wages filed pursuant to § 448.08, Fla. Stat. (1995)).

However, this court has declined to apply Palma only to contingency fee actions or to otherwise limit Palma’s holding. We have denied fees for litigating the amount of fees in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., Fleet Servs. Corp. v. Reise, 857 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concerning fees sought pursuant to § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (1997), in a case involving the collection of a promissory note); Barron Chase Sec., Inc. v. Moser, 794 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (involving arbitration award against securities dealer pursuant to § 517.211(6), Fla. Stat. (1997)); Nat’l Portland Cement Co. v. Goudie, 718 So.2d 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (denying fees for litigating amount of fees in wrongful termination action filed pursuant to § 448.08, Fla. Stat. (1995)); and Pelaez v. Persons, 664 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (denying fees for litigating amount of fees sought pursuant to § 45.061, Fla. Stat. (1987), in an action involving breach of home repair contract).

This court is not alone in its interpretation of Palma. Generally speaking, courts throughout Florida have interpreted Pal-ma to apply not only to contingency fee cases, but to other matters as well. See, e.g., Mediplex Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (barring fees for fees under § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat. (2003), in contract dispute); Oruga Corp., Inc. v. AT & T Wireless of Fla., Inc., 712 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (barring fees for fees under offer of judgment statute § 768.79(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Robbins & Robbins, Inc., 700 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (barring fees for fees under §§ 73.091 and 73.092, Fla. Stat. (1993), in eminent domain proceeding).

We recognize that Palma was a case against an insurance carrier involving a contingency fee, while the case at bar is a dissolution proceeding. However, the fact that this is an hourly fee case, as opposed to a contingency fee case, should not make a difference. McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir.2002) cert. denied sub nom. Nemesis Veritas, L.P. v. Toto, 539 U.S. 914, 123 S.Ct. 2273, 156 L.Ed.2d 129 (2003). In McMahan, the party who sought fees for litigating the amount of fees argued that because his was an hourly fee case and Palma was a contingency fee case, Palma’s reasoning should not apply. Id. at 1086. The Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law, was tasked with deciding whether Palma was distinguishable. Id. The court analyzed Palma and concluded that its holding applied to hourly fee cases as well as contingency fee cases. Id. The McMahan court stated, “[T]he Florida Supreme Court has explained that whether attorney’s fees should be awarded for litigating the amount of fees due depends on the purpose of the statute under which the fees are sought; it does not depend on the method of calculating them. Palma, 629 So.2d at 833.” McMahan, 311 F.3d at 1086.

“In awarding fees for litigating all issues relating to attorney’s fees, the federal courts have noted that such awards comport with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, namely to encourage attorneys to represent indigent clients.” Palma, 629 So.2d at 833. Following the Palma court’s analysis, if a statute’s intent is to promote the representation of the poor, attorneys would be permitted to recoup fees for litigating the amount of fees. However, when the purpose of the statute is “ ‘to discourage the contesting of valid claims against insurance companies and to reimburse successful insureds for their attorney’s fees,’ ” such fees are not recoverable. Palma, 629 So.2d at 833 (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lexow, 602 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla.1992)).

In a dissolution proceeding, the determination of an appropriate attorney’s fee is governed by section 61.16, Florida Statutes, which specifically provides that “the financial resources of both parties” are to be considered in awarding attorney’s fees. Unlike the federal statutes referred to in Palma, there is no indication of legislative intent in this statute to encourage lawyers to represent indigent clients. Rather, “[t]he statute’s purpose is to ensure that both parties possess a similar ability to retain competent legal counsel.” Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

The rule limiting fees for fees has the advantage of encouraging parties to litigate fees in an efficient manner. If litigants are able to obtain fees for litigating the amount of fees, then the party who expects to win lacks an incentive not to excessively litigate the issue. The opposing party is left with little choice but to do the same. While there certainly are valid reasons why fees should be awarded for litigating the amount of fees, it is the role of the legislature, rather than the courts, to broaden the statute. See Palma, 629 So.2d at 833; Mediplex, 856 So.2d at 15.

Because we find that Palma controls, we reverse on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the award, eliminating those fees incurred for time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. In all other respects the order of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KELLY, J., concurs.

SILBERMAN, J., concurs specially.

SILBERMAN, Judge,

Specially concurring.

Based on the precedent cited in the majority’s opinion, I reluctantly concur in the conclusion that the former wife cannot recover attorney’s fees to establish the amount of attorney’s fees that the former husband must pay. However, I am concerned that in the context of dissolution of marriage proceedings, the “usual” considerations supporting the denial of such fees do not necessarily apply.

In dissolution proceedings, one party (the “monied party”) may be required to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the other party (the “needy party”) based on a consideration of the financial resources of both parties. See § 61.16, Fla. Stat. (2000). An existing limitation under the law is that if the parties litigate the amount to be paid by the monied party, the monied party is not liable for those fees incurred by the needy party to establish the amount.

When the amount of recoverable fees is in dispute, the issue may be vigorously litigated. Yet the needy party may have no ability or a limited ability to pay counsel to undertake such litigation. In contrast, the monied party has no similar limitation to being able to afford counsel to litigate the issue. This imbalance, which may hamper the needy party’s ability to properly litigate the matter, does not comport with the requirements of section 61.16 concerning the determination of need and ability to pay in relation to an award of attorney’s fees.

In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993), the court noted that the work performed by the plaintiffs attorney concerning the amount of fees was for the benefit of the attorney, rather than the client, because the insurer was responsible for the payment of fees. Other cases cited in the majority’s opinion apply the Palma rationale in a variety of contexts. In a dissolution action, however, the client has an interest in and benefits from the recovery of fees because the client would otherwise be responsible for payment to his or her attorney.

The majority states that the limitation on the recovery of fees for litigating the amount of fees encourages parties to litigate fees in an efficient manner. Unfortunately, a monied party may engage in litigation as to the fee amount simply because he or she is financially able to do so and the other party does not have similar resources. If the monied party will not have to pay the fees incurred by the needy party to litigate the amount of fees, the monied party may have less of an incentive to litigate efficiently and more of an incentive to use litigation as leverage or as a means of vexation or vindictiveness.

The Florida Supreme Court has reiterated that dissolution proceedings are in equity and are governed by basic rules of fairness and that trial judges have wide leeway to work equity in dissolution cases. See Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697, 700 (Fla.1997). Concerning attorney’s fees, the court stated that “section 61.16 should be liberally — not restrictively — construed to allow consideration of any factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties.” Id. Moreover, a significant purpose of section 61.16 “is to assure that one party is not limited in the type of representation he or she would receive because that party’s financial position is so inferior to that of the other party.” Id. at 699 (quoting Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828, 885 (Fla.1990)). In my view, that purpose may be undermined, at least in part, when a needy party is unable to recover the fees that are incurred to establish the amount that the monied party must pay. The needy party, who must pay his or her attorney to the extent that the monied party is not required to do so, may be forced into making litigation decisions based on the needy party’s limited or nonexistent financial resources. The monied party is able to make decisions knowing that he or she is able to afford to litigate and knowing that he or she has no exposure to pay the needy party’s fees to litigate the amount of fees.

Although the cases cited by the parties and noted in the majority’s opinion are not dissolution eases, this court has stated without reservation that fees cannot be awarded for the time spent litigating the amount of fees. See Barron Chase Sec., Inc. v. Moser, 794 So.2d 649, 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). If I were writing on a clean slate, I would affirm the decision of the trial court; however, based on the existing case law, I reluctantly concur in the result reached by the majority.

      . In Goudie, this court certified conflict with Diaz.