text:
    Ex parte AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL ZION CHURCH et al. (In re African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church a/k/a African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc., et al. v. Simmons Chapel Church et al.)
    1011947.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 17, 2003.

      Robert T. Meadows III of Capell & Howard, P.C., Opelika, for petitioners.
    Jim L. DeBardelaben of DeBardelaben & Westry, P.C., Montgomery, for respondents.
   HOUSTON, Justice.

This appeal involves a property dispute in an action brought by the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (“AME Zion Church”) against the congregation of Simmons Chapel Church, which is located in Macon County. The trial court granted Simmons Chapel’s motion to dismiss and determined that Simmons Chapel owned the property on which the church building was located. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals’ affir-mance, without an opinion, of the trial court's dismissal. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church v. Simmons Chapel Church (No. 2000762, May 17, 2002), - So.2d -(Ala.Civ.App.2002) (table). We now reverse and remand.

The AME Zion Church is a hierarchical church and member churches are located throughout the United States. The AME Zion Church was first organized in the United States in 1776. All AME Zion member churches follow “The Book of Discipline of the AME Zion Church,” which governs member churches with respect to such things as articles of faith, church government, title to church property, appointment of pastors and presiding elders, the power and authority of bishops, and the organization of annual and general conferences.

Simmons Chapel, which was known in its community as an AME Zion member church, has long provided a place of worship for its membership. In 1939, a portion of the property where the church building is located was conveyed from the Tuskegee Institute to the “Trustees of Simmons Chapel.” In 1944, Rayfield Cotton and Mattie Cotton conveyed the remainder of the property to the “Trustees of Simmons Chapel Church.”

In February 1975, Simmons Chapel was incorporated as “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.” The 1975 certificate of incorporation referred to the church as the “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church” and indicated that it was in the church’s best interest for the trustees of Simmons Chapel to convey the property to the corporation:

“Be it further resolved that after the filing of the certificate with the Judge of Probate of Macon County, Alabama, the Trustees shall execute a conveyance of all of the interests that the Trustees of Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church have in that certain real property described in Deed Book 32 at page 319 and Deed Book 38 at page 101, Probate Office, Macon County, Alabama, [the church property] to Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.”

There is no evidence indicating that a deed conveying the property to Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc., was ever recorded. However, on August 18, 1999, after Simmons Chapel’s congregation voted to withdraw from the AME Zion Church, the property was deeded from “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.,” back to the “Trustees of Simmons Chapel Church.” One week later, the church corporation was dissolved.

The AME Zion Church filed an action in the Macon Circuit Court seeking a declaration that the property on which the Simmons Chapel church building is located is owned by the AME Zion Church. Simmons Chapel filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., for failure to state a claim. After a brief hearing, the trial court granted Simmons Chapel’s motion to dismiss, determining that the property was owned by Simmons Chapel and not by the AME Zion Church.

The standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is set forth in Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993):

“On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. Jones v. Lee County Commission, 394 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.1981); Allen v. Johnny Baker Hauling, Inc., 545 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So.2d 640, 641 (Ala.1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So.2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Ala.1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garrett v. Hadden, 495 So.2d 616, 617 (Ala.1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So.2d 768, 769 (Ala.1986).”

Therefore, if the AME Zion Church could prove any set of circumstances justifying relief, the trial court should not have granted Simmons Chapel’s motion to dismiss. See Nance, 622 So.2d at 299.

The AME Zion Church argues that allowing Simmons Chapel to unilaterally sever its longstanding relationship with the AME Zion Church contradicts prior decisions of this Court. Specifically, the AME Zion Church points to African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc. v. Zion Hill Methodist Church, Inc., 534 So.2d 224 (Ala.1988), in which this Court held that the real property of Zion Hill Methodist Church, the local church, was the property of AME Zion Church in America, the hierarchical church, under the provisions of the hierarchical church’s governing laws. Here, the AME Zion Church contends that the Court of Civil Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal was incorrect in light of Zion Hill because, it argues, the AME Zion Church could prove circumstances justifying relief. We agree.

Although this Court cannot resolve disputes concerning the spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs of a church, we can resolve disputes concerning property rights. Central Alabama Conference of the AME Zion Church in America v. Crum, 746 So.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). “However, the First Amendment prohibits a court’s resolving property disputes on the basis of religious practice or doctrine.” Id. at 1015. Alabama courts have adopted the “neutral-principles-of-law” approach applied by the United States Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). Crum, 746 So.2d at 1016. Under the “neutral-principles-of-law” approach, the court considers, in secular terms, “the language of the deeds, the charter of the local church, any applicable state statutes, and any relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the national church” as a means of resolving disputes. Crum, 746 So.2d at 1015.

The AME Zion Church argues that Simmons Chapel is bound by “The Book of Discipline of the AME Zion Church.” The AME Zion Church contends that the Book of Discipline mandates a finding that the property belongs to the AME Zion Church; a contrary finding, it argues, would conflict with this Court’s decision in Zion Hill. In Zion Hill, the local church had withdrawn from its association with the hierarchical church. We found that the local church had agreed to the hierarchical church’s rules, and we held that the hierarchical church was the equitable owner of the property. The Court based its decision solely on whether the local church had been associated with the hierarchical church and whether the local church had agreed to be bound by the hierarchical church’s Book of Discipline. However, unlike the case before us, Zion Hill did not involve a deed, and the Court did not discuss the effect a deed would have had on the dispute.

In Haney’s Chapel United Methodist Church v. United Methodist Church, 716 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1998), the national United Methodist Church sued to quiet title when the congregation of a local church, Haney’s Chapel, voted to withdraw from the national United Methodist Church. After a hearing at which ore tenus evidence was presented, the trial court found in favor of the United Methodist Church based on the church’s governing discipline. However, this Court found that the evidence indicated “that the ... grantors intended to convey the property to the trustees of the local church and to exclude the involvement and control of the national church.” Haney’s Chapel, 716 So.2d at 1159-60. Thus, we reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the language of the deed, and not the governing discipline, was controlling. Id. at 1160.

Likewise, Central Alabama Conference of the AME Zion Church in America v. Crum, 746 So.2d 1013 (Ala.Civ.App.1999), involved another property dispute between a local and national church involving deeds. After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court found that because the deeds in question did not clearly state that the property belonged to the national church, and because the original grantors did not intend to deed the property to the national church, the local church owned the property. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Crum, 746 So.2d at 1017.

In the present case, there are several relevant conveyances and events concerning the church property: the 1939 and 1944 deeds conveying the church property to the trustees of Simmons Chapel; the 1975 incorporation of “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.,” and the fact that the certificate of incorporation states that after that incorporation the church property would be conveyed to “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.”; and the 1999 deed conveying the church property from “Simmons Chapel AME Zion Church, Inc.,” back to the “Trustees of Simmons Chapel Church.” These events create ambiguity and allow for differing interpretations as to the ownership of the property.

In both Haney’s Chapel and Crum, extrinsic evidence presented at ore tenus hearings helped determine the intent of the relevant conveyances. 716 So.2d at 1157, 746 So.2d at 1014. No such hearing was held in the present case. Further, the AME Zion Church has demonstrated that Simmons Chapel, throughout its history, has accepted benefits from the AME Zion Church. The AME Zion Church has provided the pastors, the pastors’ health insurance and retirement benefits, worship materials, and financial assistance in certain situations. Simmons Chapel has followed the provisions of the Book of Discipline; it has been known throughout the community as an AME Zion member church; and it has followed the customs and policies of the AME Zion Church. These facts support the claim by the AME Zion Church that a hierarchical relationship exists between the AME Zion Church and Simmons Chapel. In Zion Hill, this Court held that when national and local churches are in a longstanding hierarchal relationship, the local church may not unilaterally sever that relationship. 514 So.2d at 228.

The trial court’s dismissal of this case prohibits the AME Zion Church from presenting evidence at an ore tenus hearing (such as those held in both Haney’s Chapel and Crum) to help define the meaning of the conveyances in question. 716 So.2d at 1157, 746 So.2d at 1014. In such a hearing, the trial court would follow the “neutral-principles-of-law” approach and examine the deeds, the certificate of incorporation, the Book of Discipline, and other extrinsic evidence to help settle the current property dispute. See Crum, 746 So.2d at 1016.

When the allegations of the complaint are viewed in favor of the AME Zion Church, it appears that the AME Zion Church could prove facts entitling it to be deemed the owner of the church property. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Simmons Chapel’s motion for a dismissal. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.

      . As an AME Zion member church, Simmons Chapel was bound by a provision found in the Book of Discipline, which requires the following "trust clause” to be placed in any written instrument conveying the church's property:
      "In Trust that said premises shall be used, kept[,] maintained, and disposed of as a place of Divine Worship for the use of the Ministry, and Membership of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, subject to the provisions of the Discipline, Usage, and Ministerial appointments of said Church, as from time to time authorized and declared by the General Conference of said Church and by the Annual Conference within whose bounds the said premises are situated. This provision is solely for the benefit of the [grantee], and the grantor reserved no right or interest in said premises.”
      Although the deeds that conveyed the property to Simmons Chapel did not contain this trust clause, the Book of Discipline does contain the following provision:
      “[T]he absence of the trust clause ... in deeds and conveyances previously executed, shall in no way exclude a local church from, or relieve it of, its African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church connectional responsibilities nor shall it absolve a local congregation or Board of Trustees of its responsibility to the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, provided that the intent and desire of the founders and/or the later congregations and Board of Trustees is shown by any or all of the following indications: (a) the conveyance of the property to the Trustees of the local African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church or any Trustees of the local African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church or any of its predecessors; (b) the use of the name, customs and policy of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in such a way as to be thus known to the community as part of this denomination; (c) the acceptance of the pastorate of ministers appointed by a bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, or employed by the presiding elder of the district in which it is located.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MURDOCK, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL ZION CHURCH a/k/a African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc., et al. v. SIMMONS CHAPEL CHURCH et al.
    2000762.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 18, 2003.
    Robert T. Meadows III of Walker, Hill, Adams, Umbach, Meadows & Walton, Ope-lika, for appellants.
    Jim L. DeBardelaben of DeBardelaben, Norwood & Westry, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.
   After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

MURDOCK, Judge.

This court affirmed, without an opinion, the trial court’s judgment granting Simmons Chapel’s motion to dismiss. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church v. Simmons Chapel Church (No. 2000762, May 17, 2002) — So.2d - (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (table). This court’s judgment has been reversed and the cause remanded by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Ex parte African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So.2d 870 (Ala.2003). On remand to this court, and in compliance with the Supreme Court’s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

YATES, P.J., and CRAWLEY, THOMPSON, and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM. LYONS, Justice

text:
    Ex parte STATE of Alabama. (In re George B. Dodson v. State of Alabama).
    1020585.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 11, 2003.
    William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Hense R. Ellis II, asst. atty. gen., for petitioner.
    Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.
   PER CURIAM.

WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.

MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.

LYONS, J., concurs specially.

LYONS, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur in denying the petition for a writ of certiorari. I write specially to explain why I believe granting the petition could be inappropriate under the circumstances of this case.

George Dodson was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of two counts of negotiating a worthless instrument. The trial court sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment on each count. Those sentences were suspended, and he was ordered to serve two years’ probation. Dodson was also ordered to pay various fines, costs, and restitution. After the trial court denied his motion for a new trial, Dodson appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The State moved to dismiss Dodson’s appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was insufficient. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State’s motion on the authority of McLin v. State, 840 So.2d 937 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari; we denied the petition as prematurely filed. Dodson v. State (No. 1011984, August 19, 2002). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Dodson’s conviction, without an opinion. Dodson v. State (No. CR-00-2384-, November 15, 2002), 837 So.2d 902 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (table). The State then filed a second petition for a writ of certiorari.

According to the State’s second petition, the initial document in this record evidencing the taking of an appeal is a “Notice of Appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals by the Trial Court Clerk.” The State maintains that this document is not a notice of appeal, but is a document generated by the clerk of the trial court when the clerk gives notice to the Court of Criminal Appeals that an appeal has been taken. Furthermore, according to the State, this form is not signed by Dodson, nor is there any indication that Dodson, instead of the clerk or some other party, actually filed this form.

The essence of the State’s argument is that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not have jurisdiction to decide Dodson’s appeal. On further reflection, it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of the State’s motion to dismiss was a decision on the issue of that court’s jurisdiction; therefore, our previous determination that the State’s initial petition for a writ of certiorari was premature is questionable. Nevertheless, under the present posture of the case, Dodson, who lost his appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeals and did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari asking us to review the merits of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision, would not be a meaningful adversary in the present petition because he would have no interest in upholding the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals to enter a decision adverse to him. Because the State prevailed on the merits of Dodson’s appeal, I agree that this Court should deny the State’s second petition for the writ of certiorari. However, in the event the factual scenario presented by this case arises again and we are presented with a certio-rari petition by the State asking us to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground that the insufficiency of a defendant’s notice of appeal deprives the Court of Criminal Appeals of jurisdiction to hear that appeal, I would vote to grant the petition to consider the jurisdictional question on its merits at that time.


author: HOUSTON, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte John OWEN, M.D., and Norwood Clinic, Inc. (In re William Brian Collins v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., et al.)
    1012262.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 11, 2003.

      Michael A. Florie, Joseph S. Miller, J. Will Axon, Jr., and Alicia M. Harrison of Starnes & Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham, for petitioners.
    M. Clay Alspaugh of Smith & Alspaugh, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
   On Application for Rehearing

HOUSTON, Justice.

The opinion of February 7, 2003, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.

The defendants in the underlying action, John Owen, M.D., and Norwood Clinic, Inc. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the petitioners”), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its August 6, 2002, order granting the plaintiffs motion to set aside the dismissal of the underlying action and to reinstate the case. We deny the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 19, 2000, the plaintiff, William Brian Collins, filed a medical-malpractice action against Marc Michelson, M.D., Carraway Methodist Health Systems (“Carraway”), and the petitioners. The action was the result of corrective laser eye surgery the petitioners performed on Collins at a Carraway facility, with Dr. Michelson acting as a consultant. After a status conference, the trial court ordered Collins to identify his expert witnesses by July 15, 2001. Collins failed to identify those witnesses.

Carraway and Dr. Michelson separately filed motions for a summary judgment. Both motions were granted. The correctness of those summary judgments is not before this Court; this petition involves only Dr. Owen and Norwood Clinic.

On September 10, 2001, the petitioners filed a motion for a summary judgment. After multiple continuances, a hearing was held on January 31, 2002, to address the petitioners’ motion. The following day, the trial court issued an order purporting to enter a “nonfinal” summary judgment in favor of the petitioners, allowing Collins 60 days to disclose the required information regarding expert witnesses, after which, if he did not disclose the information, the order would become final. Collins never provided the requested information, and on April 29, 2002, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the petitioners and dismissed the case.

On May 28, 2002, Collins filed a “Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and for Reinstatement,” pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. The entirety of the grounds stated in Collins’s motion were:

“1. That this is a meritorious action with issues that need to be completely and totally adjudicated.
“2. Through inadvertence, oversight, excusable neglect, or other actions, no response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed timely but, nevertheless little [or] no discovery has proceeded in the case so that to reinstate this action would be in the best interest of justice for all parties.”

On August 6, 2002, after a hearing on Collins’s Rule 59(e) motion (for which there is no transcript), the trial court entered an order granting the motion, setting aside the dismissal, and reinstating the case. The trial court’s order stated that the motion was “well taken” and that it was being granted “for good cause shown”; no other basis for granting Collins’s motion was stated in the order.

Analysis

Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it will be issued only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Ex parte Cassidy, 772 So.2d 445, 447 (Ala.2000). “Abuse of discretion by a trial court in granting a Rule 59(e) motion can be found only where a legal right was abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial court was in error.” Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So.2d 1353, 1354 (Ala.1986) (citing Coker v. Farmers Mut. Exch., 425 So.2d 489 (Ala.Civ.App.1983)). Collins states in his brief to this Court that “[t]he single issue for this Court’s consideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the order of dismissal of the case entered on April 29, 2002.” We agree.

Initially, Collins was given until July 15, 2001, to provide the defendants in his medical-malpractice action with the names of his expert witnesses. After the petitioners filed their motion for a summary judgment, Collins was given 60 days from the entry of the order on their motion to provide his expert evidence. After Collins failed to meet this extended deadline, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the petitioners on April 29, 2002. In his subsequent Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, Collins alleged that “no response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed timely” because of his “excusable neglect.” In his written motion, Collins offered no proof that his neglect in failing to respond to the petitioners’ summary-judgment motion was in fact excusable; however, Collins was able to present his evidence of “excusable neglect” during the August 6, 2002, hearing on the motion.

In McDowell v. Burford, 646 So.2d 1327, 1328 (Ala.1994), this Court stated:

“When a party against whom a summary judgment has been entered seeks to have that judgment set aside, contending that it was entered because he or she had delayed in opposing the summary judgment motion, and contending that the delay was excusable, that party has the burden of showing that even though the delay appeared unreasonable, the party was in fact acting with due diligence.”

In McDowell, we stated that the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate the circumstances that had prevented them from presenting evidence to counter the evidence offered in support of the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment. 646 So.2d at 1328. There is no rule, however, that requires those circumstances to be demonstrated through affidavits or other evidence submitted with the written motion; it is sufficient if the trial court considers oral testimony to support a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment. See Wiggins v. Tuscaloosa Warehouse Groceries, Inc., 396 So.2d 91, 92 (Ala.1981) (involving Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.); Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663, 670 n. 6 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (“ ‘[Attorneys are officers of the court and “ ‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath,’ ” ’ ” quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)); Sanders v. Sanders, 342 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala.Civ.App.1977).

Moreover, when the trial judge makes no specific findings of fact as to an issue, we will assume that the judge has made findings necessary to support the judgment, unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Casey v. Manning, 571 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Ala.1990). In the present case, there are no specific findings of fact in the trial judge’s order granting Collins’s Rule 59(e) motion, and there is no transcript of the hearing on the motion; we simply have the statement in the judge’s order that the motion was granted “for good cause shown.” Despite this, we must still apply the appropriate legal principles and assume that the trial judge made the necessary findings to support his granting Collins’s motion. See Casey, 571 So.2d at 1025; see also Williams v. Williams, 628 So.2d 752 (Ala.Civ.App.1993)(affirming the trial court’s grant of a Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, despite the unusual statement by the trial judge that he was granting the motion to vacate “[f]or reasons known only to me”).

Because we must assume that the trial judge’s findings were proper and because we do not find his judgment to be clearly erroneous, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted Collins’s Rule 59(e) motion to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the case. Therefore, the petition is denied.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF FEBRUARY 7, 2003, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; PETITION DENIED.

MOORE, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.

WOODALL, J., recuses himself.

      . The petitioners argue that the trial court’s "nonfinal” summary judgment entered on February 1, 2002, was in fact a final judgment because, they say, at that point the petitioners were the only defendants left in the case. We agree that a court's ruling disposing of all claims against the only remaining defendants in a case constitutes a final judgment. See Osborn v. Roche, 813 So.2d 811, 814 (Ala.2001). However, we do not view the February 1, 2002, order as a summary judgment; rather, we view it as a declaration giving Collins 60 more days to identify his expert witnesses before a summary judgment would be entered.

      . The petitioners contend that Collins’s motion was filed "almost 4 months after the granting of summary judgment in behalf of [the petitioners].” However, we view Collins's motion as having been filed 29 days after the entry of the summary judgment. See n. 1.
      Although not styled as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, both parties agreed that Collins’s “Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and for Reinstatement” was in fact a Rule 60(b) motion. However, because the motion was made 29 days after the judgment was entered, this Court, on appeal, will treat it as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. See Lockhart v. Phenix City Inv. Co., 488 So.2d 1353, 1354 (Ala.1986) (citing City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 396 So.2d 692, 696 (Ala.1981)("The label placed on a motion does not bind our substantive review.”)).

      . Additionally, Collins's briefs refer to the oral evidence presented at the August 6, 2002, hearing as either “critical information on which the trial court relied in making its decision" or "sufficient proof" of his excusable neglect, neither of which provides any indication as to precisely what that evidence was.


author: THOMPSON, Judge. PITTMAN, Judge,

text:
    CITY OF DOTHAN PERSONNEL BOARD v. Stanley E. DEVANE.
    2010809.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Dec. 20, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 2003.

      D. Kevan Kelly, asst, city atty., Dothan, for appellant.
    Kevin Walding of Hardwick, Hause & Segrest, Dothan, for appellee.
   THOMPSON, Judge.

The City of Dothan (“the City”) terminated the employment of Stanley E. De-Vane, a police officer employed as a member of the City’s classified-service system. The Civil Service Act of Dothan, Act. No. 92-442, Ala. Acts 1992 (hereinafter “the Civil Service Act”), governs the procedures for the termination of employees within the City’s classified-service system. Pursuant to the provisions of the CM Service Act, DeVane appealed the City’s termination of his employment to the City of Dothan Personnel Board (“the Board”). The Board conducted a hearing at which it received evidence, and it later entered an order affirming the City’s decision to terminate DeVane’s employment. DeVane then appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. See § 33 of the Civil Service Act. DeVane named the City and the Board as defendants in his appeal to the trial court from the Board’s decision.

During the course of those proceedings in the trial court, the Board filed in the Supreme Court of Alabama a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the recusal of the trial court judge. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied that petition. Ex parte City of Dothan Pers. Bd., 831 So.2d 1 (Ala.2002).

The trial court reviewed the evidence presented to the Board. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered that DeVane be reinstated as a police officer with the City. The City did not challenge the trial court’s judgment; however, the Board filed a notice of appeal. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

DeVane contends that the Board is not a party to the dispute that forms the basis of this appeal and that, therefore, the Board does not have standing to appeal the trial court’s judgment reversing its decision. See Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers’ Comp. Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So.2d 252, 253 (Ala.1996) (“To say that a [party] has standing is to say that that [party] is a proper party to bring the action.”). DeVane and the Board have argued this issue in their briefs submitted to this court, and, in response to a request by this court, each submitted additional arguments in letter briefs. The issue of standing is jurisdictional. Kid’s Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Human Res., 843 So.2d 164 (Ala.2002); McCurdy v. L.C. Props., L.L.C., 781 So.2d 991 (Ala.2000); State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025 (Ala.1999). Therefore, because the issue has been squarely presented to this court and argued before it, we address the issue whether the Board has standing to bring the appeal in this matter.

Initially, we note that the Board asserts that it is an administrative agency governed by the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (“the AAPA”), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. The Board is correct that the AAPA allows any person aggrieved by an adverse decision to appeal under that Act, see § 41-22-20, Ala.Code 1975. However, the AAPA governs state agencies — not local entities such as the Board. See §§ 41-22-2 and 41-22-3(1), Ala.Code 1975. See also Ex parte Boyette, 728 So.2d 644 (Ala.1998) (holding that Boy-ette’s appeal from a county personnel board decision was governed by a special enabling act and not by the AAPA). Thus, the AAPA does not govern this case; therefore, it does not afford the Board standing to appeal in this matter.

The Board maintains that it has standing to appeal in this case for several reasons. The Board first contends that DeVane failed to raise the issue of standing when the Board petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus during the course of the proceedings before the trial court. See Ex parte City of Dothan Pers. Board, supra (holding that the Board was not entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the trial judge to recuse). The Board implies, without explicitly arguing, that DeVane is now precluded, on res judicata grounds, from raising the issue of its standing. An issue or action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata when a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a judgment on the merits in an earlier action that involved substantially identical parties and that presented the same cause of action. Parmater v. Amcord, Inc., 699 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Ala.1997). The issue of standing was not mentioned or addressed in Ex parte City of Dothan Personnel Board, supra. Therefore, we conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to foreclose this court’s consideration of the merits of that issue. Further, the denial of a petition for mandamus does not have a res judicata effect as to other issues. Jack Ingram Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 768 So.2d 362 (Ala.1999) (citing Quality Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. v. Yassine, 730 So.2d 1164, 1167 n. 4 (Ala.1999)).

The Board also contends that it has standing to bring this appeal because the appellate courts of this state have “consistently allowed cases to proceed on appeal in the name of the Board.” The Board cites a number of cases in support of this contention. See Ex parte City of Dothan Pers. Bd., 791 So.2d 353 (Ala.2000); Tucker v. Personnel Bd. of Dothan, 644 So.2d 8 (Ala.Civ.App.1994); City of Dothan Pers. Bd. v. Herring, 612 So.2d 1231 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Williams v. City of Dothan Pers. Bd., 579 So.2d 1350 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). Although the Board is correct that Alabama appellate courts have considered appeals brought or defended in the name of the Board alone, it does not appear in any of those earlier cases that the Board’s standing was challenged or that the courts considered the issue of standing ex mero motu. Therefore, the cases the Board relies upon are not determinative of the Board’s standing in this case.

The Board, citing § 11-44E-45, Ala.Code 1975, argues that the Legislature, by enacting that provision, clearly intended to prevent the City from taking part in personnel matters involving members of the classified service. However, § 11-44E-45 governs the manner in which a city commission for a Class 5 municipality may deal with employees in the city’s administrative system.

Assuming that the City is a Class 5 municipality governed a city commission, § 11-44E-45 specifically prohibits the city commission or its members from directing or requesting that a person be appointed to or removed from service in the city’s administrative system, and it prohibits the commission from taking part in the appointment or removal of officers or employees in the administrative service of the city; the section provides that the commission may “deal” with matters concerning the City’s administrative service through the city manager. § 11-44E^15, Ala.Code 1975. We do not interpret § 11^44E-45 as divesting the City of its status as a party to an action appealing the City’s decision to terminate the employment of an employee in its classified-service system.

The Board also maintains that it is a “party” entitled to appeal under the Civil Service Act. The relevant portion of the Civil Service Act provides:

“Section 33. COURT PROCEEDINGS. Orders of the personnel board may be enforced by mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, or other appropriate proceedings, in any court of competent jurisdiction. Any person or city official directly interested may, within five days, appeal to the Circuit Court of Houston County from any order of said board by filing notice thereof with the board, whereupon said board shall certify to a transcript of the proceedings before it and file the same in said court. The findings of fact by said board, duly set forth in the transcript, if supported by substantial evidence adduced before said board, after notice to the interested party or parties and after affording such parties an opportunity to be heard, shall be conclusive on any appeal. The issues on such appeal shall be made up under the directions of the court and within 30 days after such transcript is filed in court; and the trial thereof shall proceed on the evidence contained in such transcript, if it appears that the evidence was taken after such notice and opportunity to be heard. If upon such appeal, the court finds that the ruling, order, or action appealed from is unlawful or unreasonable, within the meaning of this act, it shall have power to vacate or modify the same.”

(Emphasis added.) In making its argument on this issue, the Board does not assert that it is a party to the appeal to the Board. Rather, the Board contends that when one of the parties that had appeared before it appeals its decision to the circuit court, the Board becomes a party to that action in the circuit court. However, in discussing the standard by which the circuit court reviews the Board’s decision, the Civil Service Act provides for “notice to the interested party or parties.” We believe that provision refers to the parties that appeared before the Board, and we conclude that the provision does not expressly provide that the Board is a party to an appeal of its own decision to the circuit court.

The Board next argues that, assuming that it is not a “party” under the Civil Service Act, it has standing to appeal the trial court’s judgment because the Civil Service Act authorizes such an appeal for any “person or city official.” The Board contends that in providing a right of appeal to a “person or city official,” the Civil Service Act includes the Board as a “person” entitled to appeal. In making this argument, the Board ignores the fact that the provision allowing an appeal by a “person or city official” provides for an appeal from the Board’s own decision to the trial court. Also, the term “person” is not defined in the Civil Service Act. However, it seems apparent that there would be no need to include the Board as a “person” that would find it necessary to appeal its own decision to the circuit court.

Further, the right of appeal to the circuit court is given to a “person or city official directly interested ” in the dispute. The Civil Service Act contains no provision authorizing an appeal from the circuit court’s judgment. The Board assumes that the “any person” provision entitles it to appeal the circuit court’s judgment to an appellate court. In so assuming, the Board maintains that it is “directly interested” in the outcome of the dispute over whether DeVane was properly terminated and that the City may not assert any rights in this matter.

In essence, the arguments in the Board’s brief on appeal that it is “directly interested” in the outcome of this matter are assertions that the Board, rather than the City, is the proper party or real party in interest in the appeal to this court from the circuit court’s judgment. See Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. (governing real parties in interest); Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers’ Comp. Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So.2d at 253 (“To be a proper party, the person [or entity] must have a real, tangible legal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit.”); Eagerton v. Williams, 433 So.2d 436, 447 (Ala.1983) (a party must have “an interest in the right to be protected” in order to be a proper party); Bagley v. City of Mobile, 352 So.2d 1115, 1118 (Ala.1977) (in order to be proper parties to an action, the plaintiffs “must have, either individually or in a representative capacity, an interest in the right to be protected”). In making those arguments, however, the Board confuses the concepts of real party in interest with the concept of standing.

Our supreme court has discussed the issue of proper parties or real parties in interest under Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and has differentiated that concept from the issue of whether a party has standing in an action:

“There are fundamental differences between the principles of ‘real party in interest’ and ‘standing.’ ‘“[T]he real party in interest principle is a means to identify the person who possesses the right sought to be enforced. Therefore, the term directs attention to whether [the] plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he has instituted.” ’ Dennis v. Magic City Dodge, Inc., 524 So.2d 616, 618 (Ala.1988) (quoting 6 Chai'les Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1542 (1971)).
“Standing, on the other hand, turns on ‘whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected 'right.’ Romer v. Board of County Comm’rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (emphasis [on “legally protected right”] added [in State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive ]). See also NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 892 F.Supp. 46 (D.Conn.1995). ‘One has standing to bring his complaint into court “if his stake in the resolution of that complaint assumes the proportions necessary to ensure that he will vigorously present his case." Smith v. Potts, 293 Ala. 419, 422, 304 So.2d 578, 580 (1974) (emphasis added [in State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive]).”

State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1027-28 (some emphasis original; some emphasis added). See also Battle v. Alpha Chem. & Paper Co., 770 So.2d 626, 634 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (“While the real-party-in-interest principle directs attention to whether the plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he or she has instituted, standing requires that the plaintiff demonstrate an injury to a legally protected right.”).

Thus, in order to determine whether the Board has standing to bring this appeal, we must determine whether the Board has a legally protected right in the matter forming the basis of the trial court’s judgment. State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, supra; Battle v. Alpha Chem. & Paper Co., supra. DeVane contends that the Board acted in a quasi-judicial manner in this case, and, therefore, that the Board has no legally protected interest in the dispute that forms the basis of the circuit court’s judgment and that it is precluded from appealing the circuit court’s judgment reversing the Board’s decision. The Board disagrees; it argues that it serves only an administrative, and not a quasi-judicial, function. The Board maintains that the Civil Service Act precludes the City from taking any part in the termination of a classified employee and, therefore, that the Board’s role is to administer all aspects of the City’s classified-service system; the Board maintains that for these reasons it has a statutory right and a legally protected interest in the outcome of the matter currently before this court.

The statement of legislative intent contained in the Civil Service Act indicates that the Act was intended to create a personnel system and department, and that the Board was created “for the supervision and administration of the system and [personnel] department herein created.” See also City of Dothan v. Lucas, 47 Ala.App. 336, 340, 254 So.2d 341, 344 (1971) (also explaining the purposes of the Civil Service Act). The majority of the Board’s duties, as set forth in the Civil Service Act, are administrative. For example, the Board’s duties include, among other things, the adoption of rules or regulations to administer the act and the classified-service system; the approval, modification, revision, or rejection of recommendations made by the director of the personnel department; the investigation of charges or complaints against members of the classified-service system; and the adoption of rules and regulations designed to administer the Civil Service Act. § 8, Civil Service Act.

The Civil Service Act also specifies that if an employee in the classified service is discharged by an “appointing authority,” the employee may appeal that decision to the Board. § 21. Hearings before the Board are also provided to an employee in the classified-service system who is transferred or demoted. §§ 15 and 16. Thus, in addition to its administrative duties, another of the Board’s functions is “[t]o conduct hearings and to render decisions ... on charges preferred against persons in the classified service.” § 8(j).

In establishing the duties of the Board, the Civil Service Act sets forth a number of administrative or regulatory functions. We conclude that in addition to the Board’s administrative duties with regard to its regulation of the classified-service system, the Civil Service Act sets forth distinct duties that require the Board to function as an appellate body in determining the validity of charges against employees in the classified-service system. Thus, we think it clear that in conducting hearings and appeals of complaints against persons serving in the classified-service system in its capacity as an appellate body, the Board serves a quasi-judicial, rather than an administrative, function. See Stallworth v. City of Evergreen, 680 So.2d 229 (Ala.1996) (the personnel review board for the City of Evergreen serves as a quasi-judicial body when it considers appeals by employees in the classified-service system); Walker v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 292 Ala. 548, 297 So.2d 370 (1974), overruled on other grounds, 520 So.2d 507 (Ala.1987) (although many of the functions of the public service commission are legislative, it serves in a quasi-judicial capacity when it acts as a fact-finder in hearings); Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 132 So.2d 120 (1961) (a board of zoning adjustment for a town or city performs quasi-judicial functions).

The Board in this case has asserted that it has a right to appeal in this matter because the Civil Service Act assigns to it the sole responsibility for adopting rules and regulations pertaining to employees in the City’s classified-service system. However, in making that argument, the Board fails to distinguish between its administrative or regulatory functions, which would include rule-making, and its actions as a quasi-judicial body in hearing appeals such as DeVane’s appeal in this case.

In Ball v. Jones, supra, certain property owners appealed a zoning ordinance enacted by the Board of City Commissioners of the City of Montgomery. Our supreme court determined that the provision allowing such an appeal was invalid because the enactment of a zoning regulation was a legislative function, as opposed to a quasi-judicial function. “Hence, the statute seeking to impose upon the circuit court a non-judicial function, a matter exclusively within the power and discretion of -the legislative body of the city, cannot be conferred on the judicial branch of government.” 272 Ala. at 314, 132 So.2d at 128. Another issue in that case was whether the members of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Montgomery were necessary parties to the appeal; the court concluded that the parties directly affected by the newly enacted zoning ordinance were before the court, and that the members of the Board, who had performed legislative functions, were not necessary parties. Ball v. Jones, supra.

Ball v. Jones, dealt with the legislative powers of a governmental board and decided that the members of the board, while carrying out their legislative duties, were not necessary parties to an appeal related to the board's own actions. There are no Alabama cases that directly address whether an entity such as the Board, which acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, has standing to appeal or to defend a judgment reached after the circuit court’s review of its decision. Therefore, we have considered the rationales from cases from other jurisdictions.

Courts in some other jurisdictions have concluded that an administrative or quasi-judicial entity that serves the public interest may obtain status as a party in order to protect the public interest. See Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A.2d 6 (1940) (if the subject matter of the appeal affects the general public interest, an entity such as a zoning board may be a party to an appeal involving its own decision); Public Employees Relations Comm’n v. City of Orlando, 452 So.2d 517 (Fla.1984) (holding that an agency governed by the Florida Administrative Procedure Act had standing as an appellee in a proceeding to review the agency’s decision because the agency could serve to protect the public interest); Board of County Comm’rs of Johnson County v. City of Lenexa, 230 Kan. 632, 640 P.2d 1212 (1982) (holding that the board of county commissioners could be an appellee in an appeal from its decision in order to ensure the protection of the public interest); Boyd & Usher Transp. v. Southern Tank Lines, Inc., 320 S.W.2d 120 (Ky.1959) (because the Department of Motor Transportation served to protect the public interest, it was a necessary appellee in an appeal from a court order vacating the Department’s decision); In re County Comm’rs of Aroostook County, 244 A.2d 75, 78 (Me.1968) (the board of county commissioners returns to the “status of administrators of the affairs of the County” when there is an appeal from a court’s review of the board’s action, and, therefore, the board may represent the county in that appeal).

In Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Maryland v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 60 Md.App. 133, 481 A.2d 513 (1984), the Board of County Commissioners rezoned certain of Holtz’s property subject to certain conditions, and Holtz appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the rezoning, but struck the conditions the Board of County Commissioners had attached to the rezoning plan. The Board of County Commissioners appealed that judgment. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals determined that because the Board of County Commissioners was a “body politic” with broad powers to represent the county’s interests, it had standing to appeal the circuit court’s judgment. In so holding, however, the court distinguished the Board of County Commissioners from entities such as administrative zoning boards “whose jurisdiction and concern is carefully circumscribed.” Board of County Comm’rs of Washington County, Maryland v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 60 Md. App. at 144, 481 A.2d at 519. In making that distinction and stating in dictum that entities with such limited or circumscribed jurisdiction would not be a necessary party to an appeal of a court’s review of its own decision, the court cited with approval several cases that had concluded that entities with limited or circumscribed jurisdiction lacked standing to appeal under facts similar to those at issue in the matter currently before this court:

“As most recently enunciated by the Court of Appeals in M[arylan]d Board v. Armacost, [286 Md. 353, 354-55, 407 A.2d 1148 (1979) ] the rule is this:
“ ‘Generally, an administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity cannot appeal when one of its decisions is reversed by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the authority to appeal to a higher court is provided by law. ...’
“As made clear in [Zoning Appeals Board v.] McKinney [, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938),] and subsequently in Knox v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 88, 23 A.2d 15 (1941), and Adler v. M. & C.C. of Baltimore, 242 Md. 329, 219 A.2d 22 (1966), the disqualification, or lack of standing, arises ultimately from the proposition that the agency is not a party to the administrative proceeding before it That is why it has no cognizable interest in the outcome of the proceeding; that is why it is not regarded as a proper party in the circuit court, even as a respondent/appellee; and that is why it has no authority to appeal from a judgment of the circuit court that reverses or modifies its administrative decision.”

Board of County Comm’rs of Washington County, Maryland v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 60 Md.App. at 141, 481 A.2d at 517 (emphasis added).

In this case, the Civil Service Act limits the ambit of the personnel department, and, therefore, the Board, to governing, supervising, and controlling only members of the City’s classified-service system. § 4. The personnel department administers and regulates the classified-employee system, and the Board governs or supervises the administration of the personnel department. The Board does not represent the general interests of the City or the public. See Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. at 23, 15 A.2d at 10 (“If the subject matter of ... an appeal does not give rise to issues affecting the public generally, the board need take no active part in the litigation but may leave it to be prosecuted by the parties directly interested.”). We conclude that the Civil Service Act limits or circumscribes the functions and jurisdiction of the Board and that the Board does not represent the general public interest. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Board, in order to protect a general public interest, is necessarily entitled to be a party to an appeal of a dispute it had itself considered and decided.

Other jurisdictions have determined that an entity such as a personnel board that acts in a quasi-judicial capacity may not be considered a party to an appeal regarding any matter in which the entity has acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. See Inhabitants of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 560 (Me.1980) (“Absent a positive legislative grant of authority to the board to defend its decisions,” the board is not a proper appellee to an appeal from its own decision.); Montoya v. Department of Fin. & Admin., 98 N.M. 408, 649 P.2d 476 (N.M.Ct.App.1982) (holding that the state personnel board was not an indispensable party to a review of the board’s decision because the board had acted in a quasi-judicial capacity); Nolan v. Snohomish County, 59 Wash.App. 876, 802 P.2d 792 (1990) (the city council was not an indispensable party to an appeal involving the review of the council’s decision in a land-use matter); Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. Dist. of Gillette v. State Bd. of Equalization for Wyoming, 992 P.2d 563 (Wyo.1999) (the board of equalization could not be a party to an appeal in which it had exercised its quasi-judicial functions).

In Antelope Valley Improvement & Service District of Gillette (hereinafter “Antelope Valley I ”), Antelope Valley appealed to the board of equalization from the department of revenue’s denial of its application for a sales-and-use ■ tax exemption. The board dismissed the appeal as untimely, and Antelope Valley appealed to the district court, which affirmed the dismissal. Antelope Valley then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, raising a number of issues. That court concluded that the board had properly found the appeal to be untimely filed. In so holding, however, the court concluded that the board did not have standing to file an appellee’s brief in that court. The court stated:

“ ‘Generally a court or board exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, not being a party to its proceedings, and not having any legal interest in maintaining its determination, can neither appeal from a judgment or order of a court reversing the proceedings nor be heard on the appeal.’ 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 175 (1993).”

Antelope Valley I, 992 P.2d at 567.

In Antelope Valley I, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that the original action had been Antelope Valley’s appeal of the decision of the department of revenue, and it concluded that the board was not a party to that original action. The court then determined that Antelope Valley’s appeal from the board’s decision was a continuation of the proceedings that had been conducted before the board. Antelope Valley I, 992 P.2d at 568. The court concluded that because the board was not a proper party to the original action, it was not a party to the appeals in the action; therefore, the court struck and refused to consider the brief the board had submitted in Antelope Valley’s appeal to that court.

After the release of the opinion in Antelope Valley I, the board petitioned the Supreme Court of Wyoming for a clarification of its holding in Antelope Valley I. The court issued an opinion clarifying its original opinion by distinguishing between the effects of the board’s administrative and adjudicatory functions. Antelope Valley Improvement & Serv. Dist. of Gillette v. State Bd. of Equalization for Wyoming, 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo.2000) (hereinafter “Antelope Valley II ”). The court characterized the board’s administrative functions as “regulatory” and its duties as an appellate body as “adjudicatory.” Antelope Valley II, 4 P.3d at 878 n. 1. The court concluded that when the board acted in a regulatory capacity, it would be a proper party respondent to an appeal of its decision. However, where the board acted in an adjudicatory manner by hearing appeals or taking action that made it “resemble[ ] a ‘lower tribunal,’ ” the board could not inject itself as a party into the proceeding. Antelope Valley II, supra.

Similarly, in Montoya v. Department of Finance & Administration, supra, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, distinguishing between the administrative and quasi-judicial functions of a personnel board, determined that the personnel board in that case was acting in a quasi-judicial, rather than an administrative, capacity. The court held that the personnel board was not an indispensable party to an appeal to the circuit court of its own decision entered in a quasi-judicial matter. In so holding, the court rejected an argument that the personnel board was acting to protect the public interest. The court stated:

“Section 10-9-18(G), [N.M.S.A.1978 (Repl.1980) ], authorizes ‘any party aggrieved by the decision of the board’ to appeal the decision to the district court. In hearing administrative appeals by employees from agency action as distinguished from its function in adopting rules and creating policy, the State Personnel Board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity rather than a policy-making function. In the exercise of this latter role, the board is not an indispensable party.”

Montoya v. Department of Fin. & Admin., 98 N.M. at 412, 649 P.2d at 480.

The Civil Service Act provides a method of governing the City’s hiring practices in order to promote the efficiency of the City’s government and to provide job stability and security for members of the classified-service system. The principal change created by the enactment of the Civil Service Act was that new procedures were established for the City’s hiring and firing decisions. City of Dothan v. Lucas, supra. However, even after the enactment of the Civil Service Act,

“[t]he right to hire and fire is still reposed in the responsible officials of the City. The principal change [brought about by the enactment of the Civil Service Act] is that there has been established a new procedure for this to be done for the purpose, as stated in Heck v. Hall, 238 Ala. 274, 190 So. 280 [(1939)], of promoting better government by attracting employees who are better qualified and who are assured of tenure so long as they perform satisfactorily and do not violate the rules, which protects the employee from the political tides that ebb and flow.”

City of Dothan v. Lucas, 47 Ala.App. at 341, 254 So.2d at 346 (emphasis added).

In addition to the foregoing, the record on appeal clearly indicates that, before his employment was terminated, DeVane was an employee of the City — not an employee of the Board. The City, not the Board, was the entity that terminated DeVane’s employment; therefore, the City is the entity with an interest in protecting its termination decision. The Civil Service Act does not require that the Board approve the City’s termination decision in order that the termination be effective. Rather, the Civil Service Act sets forth a procedure whereby a discharged classified-service employee may seek the Board’s review of the termination decision. See Cheek v. Vulcan Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 Ala.App. 192, 290 So.2d 654 (Ala.Civ.App.1973) (a classified-system act similar to Dothan’s Civil Service Act did not require that the personnel board approve the termination of an employee within that system in order that that termination take effect). In hearing such an appeal, the Board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.

DeVane and the City were clearly the only proper parties to DeVane’s appeal to the Board of the City’s termination of his employment; the Board could not be a party to DeVane’s appeal to the Board of the City’s termination of his employment. To allow the Board to become a party in an appeal of its decision to the circuit court would allow the Board to abdicate its function as an impartial quasi-judicial fact-finder in a dispute such as the one at issue in this appeal. If the Board were deemed to be a party in this matter, the Board would function as a litigant, taking an adversarial position to a party that had appeared before it in a quasi-judicial proceeding. In that situation, the Board would be advocating the position of the other party to that same quasi-judicial proceeding. There are no provisions in the Civil Service Act that allow the Board to take an adversarial role against a member of the classified-service system or to advance the position of one of the parties that has appeared before it.

After receiving evidence and hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties that appeared before it, the Board issued a decision regarding the validity of the City’s termination decision. It cannot be said that the Board had any legally protected interest in the outcome of the dispute before it in the quasi-judicial proceeding, that is, in the dispute between the City and DeVane over the propriety of the City’s termination of DeVane’s employment. After considering DeVane’s and the Board’s arguments and the law from this and other jurisdictions, we conclude that the Board, after acting in its quasi-judicial capacity in hearing and deciding DeVane’s appeal, could not interject itself as a party to later proceedings in this same matter; we also conclude that the Board did not have a legal interest in defending or maintaining its decision upholding DeVane’s termination. The Board did not have a “cognizable interest in the outcome of [De-Vane’s termination] proceeding.” Board of County Comm’rs of Washington County, Maryland v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 60 Md.App. at 141, 481 A.2d at 517. It follows, then, that the trial court’s reversal of the Board’s decision did not harm a legally protected right of the Board, and, therefore, that the Board has no standing in this matter. See State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, supra.

“When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdiction. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District, 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex.1996) (‘Standing is a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction’). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) (‘“standing ‘is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines’ ” ’); National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994) (‘Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation.’); Romer v. Board of County Comm’rs of the County of Pueblo, supra, 956 P.2d [566] at 585 [ (Colo.1998) ] (‘standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to every case and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings’) (Martinez, J., dissenting); Cotton v. Steele, 255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693 (1999). But see Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249, 721 A.2d 43 (1998) (standing is not jurisdictional).”

State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1028. Similarly, when a party without standing purports to appeal to an appellate court of this state or to ñle a petition for a writ of certiorari the court must dismiss the appeal or the petition.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

YATES, P.J., and CRAWLEY, J., concur.

PITTMAN and MURDOCK, JJ., dissent.

PITTMAN, Judge,

dissenting.

In concluding that the Dothan Personnel Board (“the Board”) does not have standing to appeal the circuit court’s decision, the majority holds that because the local act establishing the Board does not expressly grant the Board a right of appeal it cannot otherwise possess standing to appeal an adverse ruling of the circuit court to this court. While I agree that there is a fundamental difference between being an interested party and having standing to appeal, I conclude that the Board meets both criteria.

The real-party-in-interest principle identifies a person who has a “ ‘significant interest in the particular action.’ ” Dennis v. Magic City Dodge, Inc., 524 So.2d 616, 618 (Ala.1988)(quoting Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1542 (1971)). One has standing, however, “ ‘if his stake in the resolution of that complaint assumes the proportions necessary to ensure that he will vigorously present his case.’ ” Smith v. Potts, 293 Ala. 419, 422, 304 So.2d 578, 580 (1974)(quoting Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal.3d 150, 159, 101 Cal.Rptr. 880, 886, 496 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1972)). I believe that once a party who appeared before the Board in its quasi-judicial capacity appeals the Board’s decision to the circuit court, the Board’s stake in the resolution of that proceeding gives the Board standing. I would liken it to the Board’s stepping into the shoes of any municipal agency that previously appeared before the Board to respond to an employee’s complaint. Thus, when an employee appeals the Board’s decision to the circuit court, it seems obvious that the Board will “vigorously present” its case, that is, defend its own decision, before the circuit court. Naturally it follows that the Board has the right to appeal an adverse decision of the circuit court to this court, pursuant to § 12-3-10, Ala.Code 1975. See also Auburn Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 848 So.2d 269 (Ala.Civ.App.2002)(discussing standing generally as well as standing under an agency’s own rules and regulations).

This appeal is analogous to an appeal taken by a zoning board, when a circuit court reverses the decision of that board. See Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Birmingham v. Davis, 699 So.2d 1264 (Ala.Civ.App.1997); Board of Zoning Adjustment of Mobile v. Dauphin Upham Joint Venture, 688 So.2d 823 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). While I recognize that the enabling legislation for zoning and planning boards, codified at Section 11-52-1 et seq., is worded differently than the Civil Service Act, Act No. 92^142, Ala. Acts 1992, both zoning boards and personnel boards are created by legislative action and both function as quasi-judicial bodies. See Ball v. Jones, 272 Ala. 305, 132 So.2d 120 (1961); Swann v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 459 So.2d 896 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). Therefore, the distinction the majority draws — differentiating quasi-judicial bodies from quasi-administrative bodies — -appears to be a distinction without a substantive difference.

By definition, a Class 5 municipality has a population of not less than 25,000 and not more than 49,999 inhabitants according to the 1970 federal decennial census. § 11-40-12, Ala.Code 1975. By taking judicial notice that the population of the City of Dothan in 1970 was 36,733, I conclude that it is authorized to adopt the mayor/commission/city manager form of government codified at § 11-44E-1 et seq. Once Do-than adopted this form of government all applicable Code provisions apply including § 11-44E-45, which prohibits the City from participating in personnel decisions.

The Board was specifically created by legislative act to handle municipal employment matters for the municipality. Such legislation has been held “to limit political control and arbitrary discretion in public employment,” Hall v. City of Tuscaloosa, 421 So.2d 1244, 1249 (Ala.1982), thereby making municipal employment and retention more reliable and stable. Our Legislature’s intent to prevent the City from participating in administering personnel matters is codified at Section 11-44E-45, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, the Board acts primarily as an administrative agency handling all personnel functions for the City. While the Board does not generally represent the interests of the City, it certainly has a vested interest in seeing that its decisions regarding personnel matters are followed. Therefore, I conclude that an adverse decision by a circuit court necessarily confers standing for the Board to appeal a court’s decision ordering it to do or not to do something contrary to its stated position.

Furthermore, if the Board was not a proper party, then the employee’s appeal to the circuit court, naming both the Board and the City, was improper, as the City is prohibited by statute from taking part in the appointment or removal of civil service employees. Thus, if neither the City nor the Board has standing to bring an appeal of an adverse ruling by the circuit court, access to the appellate courts is completely denied. This is constitutionally unsound. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (standing exists to allow those not a party to original complaint, but affected by its outcome, to have access to the courts in order to preserve their rights).

Based on the above reasoning, and because I would address the merits of the appeal, I respectfully dissent.

      . A Class 5 municipality is one that, at the time of the 1970 decennial census, had a population of not less than 25,000 and not more than 49,999. § ll-40-12(a), Ala.Code 1975.

      . Under the Civil Service Act, an "appointing authority” is defined as "a department head.” § 2.

      . See Hurley v. Marshall County Commission, 614 So.2d 427, 432 (Ala.1993) (noting that the purpose of civil-service laws is to promote the efficiency of local governments by providing their employees “stability, continuity, and security in their jobs”); Hall v. City of Tuscaloosa, 421 So.2d 1244, 1249 (Ala.1982) (the purpose of civil-service legislation is "to achieve the goals of stability, continuity, and security in the various job classifications within a municipality”).

      . Section 33 of the Civil Service Act provides a method for "[a]ny person or city official directly interested” to appeal a decision of the Board to the circuit court. It neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits the Board from appealing an adverse ruling of the circuit court.


text:
    Ex parte CITY OF DOTHAN PERSONNEL BOARD. (In re City of Dothan Personnel Board v. Stanley E. DeVane).
    1020884.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 18, 2003.
    D. Kevan Kelly, asst, city atty., Dothan, for petitioner.
    Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.
   HOUSTON, Justice.

The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied.

In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion. Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So.2d 155 (1973).

WRIT DENIED.

MOORE, C.J., and LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and WOODALL, JJ„ concur.


author: McMILLAN, Judge.

text:
    Angela Moore MacEWAN v. STATE.
    CR-99-0463.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    May 26, 2000.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 18, 2000.

      Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for appellant.
    William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Cedric B. Colvin, asst. atty. gen., for appel-lee.
   McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Angela Moore MacEwan, appeals from the summary denial of her Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for post-conviction relief. Her underlying conviction was for capital murder, specifically the murder of a child under the age of 14, see § 13A-5^0(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See MacEwan v. State, 701 So.2d 66 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her Rule 32 petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. In her petition, the appellant argues that her attorney, who represented her both at trial and on appeal, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellant contends that counsel failed to assert on her behalf the affirmative defense that she was suffering from a mental disease or defect, even though, she says, counsel was aware of her mental health background. In support of her argument, she claims that counsel failed to submit any expert testimony or medical evidence regarding her mental health.

The record reveals that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing because it had before it an affidavit of the appellant’s attorney, stating that he had adequately investigated the appellant’s insanity defense, but had decided to not pursue that defense for strategic reasons. See Rule 32.9, Ala.R.Crim.P. Additionally, the record indicates that the trial judge who ruled on the Rule 32 petition also presided over the appellant’s trial and was therefore in the best position to rule on the allegations contained in the petition. See Makres v. State, 739 So.2d 1141 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). (If the trial judge has personal knowledge of facts underlying any allegations in the Rule 32 petition, the judge may deny those claims without further proceedings, so long as the specific reasons for the denial are stated in a written order.) Moreover, the record indicates that the trial court, in dismissing the petition, specifically found that the appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof regarding her ineffective-assistance claim. See King v. State, 729 So.2d 366 (Ala.Cr.App.1998) (in a Rule 32 proceeding, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle him to relief). The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing the appellant’s petition.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

LONG, P.J., and COBB, BASCHAB, and FRY, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Ex parte Angela Moore MacEWAN. (Re Angela Moore MacEwan v. State).
    1992219.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 11, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied March 8, 2002.
    Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for petitioner.
    William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Cedric B. Colvin, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
   On Application for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

The opinion of July 20, 2001, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.

Angela Moore MacEwan was convicted by a jury of capital murder for killing a child under the age of 14 years, see § 13A-5 — 40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. MaeE-wan appealed her conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which unanimously affirmed in MacEwan v. State, 701 So.2d 66 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); this Court denied MacEwan’s petition for the writ of certio-rari.

Two years later, MacEwan filed a Rule 82, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition with the trial court, alleging that she had had ineffective assistance of counsel. (This present review arises out of that Rule 32 petition.) MacEwan argued that her representation at trial was ineffective because her attorneys declined to present an insanity defense on her behalf. MacEwan alleged that she had had a long history of mental-health problems and that her attorneys should have argued that, as the result of a mental defect or disease, she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. After reviewing MacEwan’s petition and the State’s motion to dismiss, the trial court held that MacEwan had not met her burden of proof in alleging her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of dismissal. See MacEwan v. State, 860 So.2d 894 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). This Court granted MacEwan’s petition for certiorari review in order to determine, from the record, whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had a sufficient basis for affirming the trial court’s dismissal of MacEwan’s postconviction motion. After reviewing the entire record, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on MacEwan’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

One of MacEwan’s claims in her Rule 32 petition is that the State did not serve a copy of its motion to dismiss the Rule 32 petition on MacEwan’s Rule 32 counsel. The trial judge considered the State’s motion to dismiss and summarily dismissed the Rule 32 petition without affording Mac-Ewan an evidentiary hearing. MacEwan contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her petition because, she says, her Rule 32 counsel’s correct name and address were “clearly listed on the [Rule 32] petition” at the place where counsel had signed the petition, and counsel could have been served, but was not.

A failure on the part of the State in this case to serve its motion to dismiss on counsel for MacEwan in her Rule 32 proceeding is significant because attached to the motion to dismiss was an affidavit by MacEwan’s trial counsel defending his effectiveness in conducting her defense. The summary dismissal of MacEwan’s petition deprived her of an opportunity to cross-examine her trial counsel regarding the assertions he makes in the affidavit, the substance of which may have prompted the trial judge to dismiss the petition.

We cannot say with full confidence that the State’s failure to serve its motion to dismiss (with the attached affidavit) on MacEwan’s Rule 32 counsel did not prejudice MacEwan, because the trial judge neglected to enter a written order stating his reasons for summarily dismissing the petition. While such a written order is not required in a Rule 32 proceeding, it is sound judicial practice, particularly given the facts presented in this case. See Bowers v. State, 709 So.2d 494, 495 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). Therefore, in order to allow the trial court to properly inquire into the merits of MacEwan’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for that court to remand it for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF JULY 20, 2001, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.

BROWN, J., concurs in the result.

STUART, J., dissents.

      . The trial court additionally found the claim to be time-barred. However, it appears Mac-Ewan’s petition was filed on the last day of the period allowed by Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim.P. This issue was not raised by either party on this certiorari review.


author: McMILLAN, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Angela Moore MacEWAN v. STATE.
    CR-99-0463.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 30, 2002.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 2003.
    Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for appellant.
    William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Cedriek B. Colvin, asst. atty. gen., for ap-pellee.
   After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

McMILLAN, Presiding Judge.

In Ex parte MacEwan, 860 So.2d 896 (Ala.2002), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court and remanded the cause for us to remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding the appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Although the trial court has already held such a hearing and made the findings of fact pursuant thereto, it did so before it had regained jurisdiction over this matter. In the interest of judicial efficiency, we will address this hearing as if it had been timely held.

The trial court’s order follows:

“The Defendant alleges that her attorneys failed to provide effective assistance because they did not present the defense of insanity.
“This court, having tried this case, and having considered the pleadings of the parties, the record of the court, and the evidence presented at the hearing, denies the Defendant’s petition on the following finding of facts.
“1. That George Andrews is an experienced, respected and competent criminal defense attorney.
“2. It is abundantly clear that Mr. Andrews and Mr. Thagard diligently and thoroughly investigated the defendant’s mental condition before, during, and after the death of her child.
“3. This investigation included a psychiatric examination of defendant by Dr. Beidleman, who concluded that defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense.
“4. The defendant testified at the trial and was apparently not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of [t]he offense.
“5. That Mr. Andrews and Mr. Tha-gard, after discussing this issue with the defendant, chose not to present a defense for which they had no evidence.
“6. The primary issue in this case was the defendant’s degree of culpability. In other words, was the killing of her child intentional, reckless, criminally negligent or an accidental act.
“7. Given the facts in this case, this was the only viable or reasonable strategy left to defense counsel, and they pursued it vigorously and competently.
“8. The Court orally charged the jury on the offense of capital murder, reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.

“Based on the above, the Court finds that the Defendant has failed to prove:

“1. That her attorneys were deficient in their performance or
“2. That her attorneys’ performance prejudiced her such that the outcome would have been different but for her attorneys’ performance.”

Based on the trial court’s findings of facts as well as the record, the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, BASCHAB, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.


author: MOORE, Chief Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Angela Moore MacEWAN. (In re Angela Moore MacEwan v. State of Alabama).
    1020709.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 18, 2003.

      Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for petitioner.
    Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.
   MOORE, Chief Justice.

The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied.

In denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be ■understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion. Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So.2d 155 (1973).

WRIT DENIED.

SEE, BROWN, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ„ concur.