author: 11 KIMBALL, Justice. | TTRAYLOR, J., h KNOLL, J., | VICTORY J., hWEIMER, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas BOBO.
    No. 2003-KK-2362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 30, 2004.
    Rehearing Denied June 4, 2004.

      Dwight M. Doskey, for Applicant.
    Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, George D. Ross, Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent.
   11 KIMBALL, Justice.

In this extradition case, we are called on to determine whether a defendant’s incarceration in another state interrupts the two-year prescriptive period provided by La.C.Cr.P. art. 578(2) for prosecution of felony charges in this state. Specifically, we must decide whether the State’s failure to bring the defendant to trial within two years from the date of his indictment, when the defendant was incarcerated in Texas at the time of his Louisiana indictment and after the proper execution of extradition papers by Texas authorities, was because his “presence could not be obtained by legal process” or “due to events beyond its control,” as provided for by La.C.Cr.P. art. 579. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the State has not met its burden of proving that an interruption of the applicable prescriptive period occurred.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 1998, the grand jury in Ouachita Parish indicted the defendant, Thomas Bobo, on four counts of distribution of heroin, one count of attempted distribution of heroin, and one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin. According to the affidavit in support of a warrant issued for Bobo’s arrest on October 12, 1998, the charges stemmed from sales of heroin allegedly made by Bobo from his home in Stafford, Texas, in September and October 1998, by mail to a cooperating individual in Ouachita Parish. Bobo’s arrest in Texas followed, and in June 1999 he began | ¡¡serving a sentence in the Texas penitentiary at Huntsville after conviction for possession of heroin arising out of the same series of transactions involved in the Oua-chita Parish prosecution.

In early April 2000, approximately 16 months after Bobo’s indictment in Ouachi-ta Parish, but still within the two-year time limit for trial, the District Attorney’s Office in Ouachita Parish formally requested Governor Mike Foster to issue a demand for Bobo’s extradition from Texas. The demand and supporting documents were prepared by the Louisiana Governor’s Office on May 5, 2000, and were sent to Texas at the end of the month. Among the documents was an agreement for re-extradition of Bobo at the request of the executive authority of Texas in the event that Texas acceded to the demand for Bobo’s extradition. On June 8, 2000, then-Governor George W. Bush signed a warrant for Bobo’s arrest and extradition to Louisiana. On June 14, 2000, the Extradition Coordinator for the Texas Governor’s Office informed the prison authorities at Huntsville, where Bobo remained confined, that the extradition warrant had issued and they were to execute it immediately. The letter explicitly instructed Huntsville to advise the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office “[w]hen all statutory requirements have been complied with and the defendant is ready to return to the demanding state ...” On June 26, 2000, Huntsville informed the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office by letter that it would be “notified prior to the release of this subject so that you may have an officer here to take him/ her into custody.” The letter, on a pre-printed form, provided information with regard to Bobo’s full term date and parole eligibility status, but made no mention of the extradition proceedings underway at the direction of the Texas Governor’s Office.

|3On July 28, 2000, having refused to waive extradition proceedings, Bobo appeared in the district court of Walker County, Texas to challenge the authority of Louisiana over him. During those proceedings, Bobo’s counsel conceded that the necessary paperwork for extradition appeared in order, but argued that his conviction in Texas for a crime arising out of the same series of transactions involved in Ouachita Parish prosecution collaterally estopped Louisiana from taking Bobo into custody. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Bobo’s argument and ordered him remanded to Louisiana. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985) (dual sovereignty doctrine permits successive prosecution of defendant by two states for the same conduct). On October 12, 2000, that judgment was affirmed. Ex Parte Bobo, 14-00-010003 (Tex.App. 14th Cir.10/12/02). However, Bobo was not returned to Louisiana until November 4, 2002, after he had completed his sentence in Texas at the end of October of that year and he waived extradition to Louisiana.

On December 2, 2000, four years to the date on which he was indicted, and following his arraignment on the pending indictment, Bobo filed a motion to quash, in which he asserted that the prosecution against him had prescribed. On March 13, 2002, at the hearing conducted on the motion, the trial court took no testimony, but filed various documents relating to the prescription issue into the record. On May 5, 2003, the trial court issued a written judgment denying Bobo’s motion on grounds that the State’s initial effort to extradite him from Texas was sufficient to interrupt prescription until October 2002, because “[i]t was reasonable for this State, in reliance upon the assertion that it would be notified when the State of Texas was ready to release Defendant, to then wait until such notification was received ... [T]he limitation period began to run anew when the Ouachita Parish Sheriff was notified |4by Texas authorities that Defendant would be released from custody of the State of Texas, thereby removing the cause of the interruption.” Thus, the trial court agreed with the position of the State taken throughout these proceedings that having initiated an extradition demand through the Louisiana Governor’s Office to the executive authority of Texas, it had no affirmative duty to inform itself of the outcome of those proceedings or to take any further action until Huntsville provided actual notice that Bobo was set for release from the penitentiary after serving his sentence there.

Following the ruling of the trial court, Bobo timely filed an application for supervisory writs to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, which, relying on State v. Beverly, 448 So.2d 792 (La.App. 2 Cir.1984), declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. State v. Bobo, 37,880, 37,881 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/13/03), — So.2d

On application of the defendant, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of the lower courts’ decisions that the State had exercised due diligence in attempting to try the accused timely. State v. Bobo, 03-2362 (La.10/17/03), 855 So.2d 745..

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The rule, repeatedly upheld by this court, is that once a defendant in a felony case in Louisiana shows that his trial was not commenced within two years after the date of the institution of the prosecution, the State “bears the heavy burden of showing that it is excused from trying the accused on a charge later than the period mandated by [La.C.Cr.P. art.] 578.” State v. Groth, 483 So.2d 596, 599 (La.1986); State v. Amarena, 426 So.2d 613, 617 (La.1983); State v. Devito, 391 So.2d 813, 816 (La.1980) (on reh’g). This heavy burden “requires the State to exercise due diligence in discovering the whereabouts of the defendant as well as taking appropriate steps to secure his presence for trial once it has found him.” State v. Chadbourne, 98-1998, p. 1 (La.1/8/99), 728 So.2d 832. The State may discharge this burden by demonstrating that a ground for interruption exists under La.C.Cr.P. art. 579, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be interrupted if:
(1) The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, apprehension, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode within the state; or
(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state;
B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall commence to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer exists.

Under Article 579, then, because the Oua-chita Parish grand jury indicted Bobo on December 2, 1998, the State had two years from that date to bring Bobo to trial, unless prescription was interrupted under Subsection (A)(1) or (2).

The State contends that Bobo was a “de facto fugitive” for the purposes of La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(1). The burden of proving that the defendant’s purpose in remaining outside of the State was to avoid detection, apprehension or prosecution, and thereby interrupted the two year prescription under La.C.Cr.P. art. 578, rests with the State. Amarena, 426 So.2d at 617 (citing State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 956, 959 (La.1981)). This burden is a heavy one in which the record must “clearly establish | fithat the purpose of the defendant’s absence was to avoid detection, apprehension or prosecution.” Id. (citing State v. Williams, 414 So.2d 767, 768-69 (La.1982)).

The record in this case establishes that Bobo was outside the State when the Ouachita Parish grand jurors indicted him because he resided in Texas, not because he had sought refuge from detection and prosecution for his alleged crimes in Louisiana. Further, the record contains no evidence contradicting Bobo’s statement in the Walker County District Court July 28, 2000 extradition hearing that he “never set foot” in Louisiana. Thus, it seems the State has failed to carry its heavy burden to show that Bobo was a fugitive for purposes of interrupting the time limits on trial in Louisiana because “[t]o make a person a fugitive from justice it must appear that he was within the State when the crime charged is alleged to have been committed.” State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 468, 24 So.2d 819, 822 (1946).

Nevertheless, even assuming that merely by residing at his usual place of abode in Texas, Bobo, because he was “outside the state” when indicted, was a fugitive for purposes of La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(1), it is undisputed that a time came when the State learned of his whereabouts and had within its power the ability to obtain the custody of him. Once the State located Bobo in custody in Texas, it had the affirmative duty to take steps to secure his presence in Louisiana for trial. See Amarena, 426 So.2d at 618 (“Any interruption of the period of limitation which existed under La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(1) ceased when the State learned of the incarceration, location and availability of the defendant, and the two year prescriptive period began to run anew from that time.”); Devito, 391 So.2d at 816 (“After receiving notice of the defendant’s whereabouts [in jail], the State was no longer unable to act in apprehending the defendant or unable to obtain his presence for trial by legal process ... it necessarily follows that any interruption of the period of limitation which existed under Article 579(1) or (2) ceased when the State regained its capacity to act.”).

In fact, the State, fully aware of Bobo’s whereabouts, initiated extradition proceedings through the Louisiana Governor’s Office on May 5, 2000. The State contends that because Bobo was incarcerated in Texas, under La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(2), it satisfied its burden of due diligence in attempting to try the accused timely by initiating extradition proceedings and that it therefore had the right to rely on the form letter from the Huntsville prison authorities that it would be informed of Bobo’s release on his Texas sentence.

By its plain terms, Article 579(A)(2) provides a cause of interruption only when the State cannot secure the person by legal process or by other cause beyond its control. The State’s argument that Bobo’s incarceration in Texas impeded its ability to try him timely here seemingly seeks to reprise this court’s holding in State v. Dupree, 256 La. 146, 235 So.2d 408 (1970), overruled, Devito, 391 So.2d at 816. Du-pree held that interruption of time limits on trial, which began when the defendant escaped to Mississippi, did not end with his incarceration in that state for another offense and continued until his release from jail on that sentence. However, as the ^holdings in Amarena, and Devito show, this Court no longer subscribes to its decision in Dupree.

In this case, the prosecuting authority in Ouachita Parish knew or should have known that Texas and Louisiana participate in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act under which the governor of a participating state, in his or her discretion, may either surrender the accused to the demanding state, or hold the accused until tried and charged, or convicted and punished in the asylum state. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 272, providing:

If a criminal prosecution against the demanded person is pending under the laws of this state, or if he has been convicted in a court of this state but not completely satisfied his sentence, the governor may, in his discretion, surrender him on demand of the executive authority of the other state. The surrender must be pursuant to a re-extradition agreement ...

Cf. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Art. 51.13, § 19, providing:

If a criminal prosecution instituted against such person under the laws of this State and is still pending, the Governor, in his discretion, either may surrender him on demand of the Executive Authority of another State or hold him until he has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this State.

Here, Governor Foster complied with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act by appending the requisite re-extradition agreement to the State’s extradition demand and, to protect its own interests, the State could not reasonably rely on the form letter sent by the prison authorities at Huntsville as the response of the governing executive authority in Texas to Louisiana’s formal demand through its chief executive for the surrender of Bobo. In other words, the State had a duty under Article 579 not only to initiate extradition proceedings in the present case, but also to inform itself of the outcome of the proceedings in the event, as happened, that Texas made the demanded person available to the custody of Louisiana officials. Although Bobo refused to waive extradition after Texas Governor Bush signed the extradition order, by October 1912, 2000, when the Texas appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering his surrender to Louisiana officials, he was no longer beyond the legal processes of the State. Thus, prescription once more began to run against the State on October 12, 2000 when the Texas appellate court affirmed the decision of the district court under the extant extradition warrant issued by the Texas Governor’s Office. This prescriptive period was not thereafter interrupted for more than two years and the arraignment of defendant on December 2, 2002 clearly falls beyond this prescriptive period.

It appears from the record that a breakdown in communication occurred between the Texas and Louisiana authorities when the officials at Huntsville failed to follow the express instructions of the Extradition coordinator in the Governor’s Office and did not notify the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office that extradition proceedings had been completed and that Bobo was available for transport to Louisiana although he was still serving his sentence in Texas. Nevertheless, the fact remains that by failing to make any inquiries regarding the extradition proceedings, the State neglected to take reasonable steps to apprise itself that any cause of interruption as a matter of Article 579(A)(1) or (2) had ceased to exist as of October 12, 2000, and that the two-year period for bringing Bobo to trial in Louisiana for his alleged crimes had begun to run anew from that date. The State’s attempt to rely on the form letter sent by the officials at Hunstville, which makes no reference to the extradition proceedings, as an interruption of prescription under Article 579(A)(1) or (2) is unavailing when in the face of a properly executed warrant of extradition signed by the Texas Governor, a final judgment by the Texas courts on the issue, and this court’s overruling of Dupree and its progeny. Furthermore, problems encountered by the State in extradition or those caused by its own mismanagement cannot be | incharged to the defendant. Devito, 391 So.2d at 816. As a consequence, the State allowed its prosecution to prescribe while Bobo finished serving his sentence in Texas.

Additionally, this matter is distinguishable from the case in Beverly upon which the State and the lower courts rely. In Beverly, it appeared that the California authorities had declined to extradite defendant until the completion of his sentence. 448 So.2d at 793. In this case, when Governor Bush signed the extradition warrant, Texas made Bobo available to Louisiana although he had not yet finished serving his sentence in the penitentiary at Huntsville.

Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Bobo’s motion to quash the present prosecution filed approximately two months after the period of limitation expired. Although Bobo has shown no prejudice' as the result of his continued incarceration on his underlying sentence in Texas for two years after the appellate courts of that state sanctioned his surrender to Louisiana, statutory periods of limitation on the luprosecution of cases offer the primary means of enforcing the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial “beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.” United States v. Manon, 404 U.S. 307, 322, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).

CONCLUSION

Thus, the State’s failure to bring Bobo to trial within two years from the date of his indictment was not because his presence could not be obtained by legal process nor due to events beyond its control. Accordingly, we hold that the State has not met its burden of proving that an interruption of the prescriptive period contained in La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 has occurred.

DECREE

For the foregoing'reasons, the judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed, the motion to quash is ordered granted, and defendant is discharged from custody on the present charges.

REVERSED.

TRAYIOR, J., dissents and assigns, reasons.

KNOLL, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Justice Traylor.

VICTORY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., additionally concurs with reasons.

| TTRAYLOR, J.,

dissenting.

I disagree with the majority. In my opinion, the State reasonably relied on the June 2000 letter from the Huntsville penitentiary, which advised the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office that it would be “notified prior to the release of this subject so that you may have an officer here to take him/her into custody.” Accordingly, I would find that the June 2000 letter interrupted the two-year prescriptive period because the State reasonably believed that the defendant’s “presence at trial [could] not be obtained by legal process,” as provided for by La.C.Cr.P.art. 579(A)(2).

h KNOLL, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons assigned by Justice Traylor.

| VICTORY J.,

dissenting.

As the majority recognizes, “the officials at Huntsville failed to follow express instructions of the Extradition coordinator in the Governor’s Office and did not notify the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office that extradition proceedings had been completed and that Bobo was available for transport to Louisiana although he was still serving his sentence in Texas.” (opinion, p. 1058) The June 26, 2000 letter from Huntsville to the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office clearly led Ouachita officials to believe they would be notified when the defendant was available for return to Louisiana.

Further, although Texas later followed through with extradition proceedings, Oua-chita officials were not notified by Texas. Under these circumstances, the state met its burden under La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(2).

hWEIMER, J.,

additionally concurring.

With all due respect to the dissenting justices, I cannot allow to go unchallenged the statement that the State was somehow reasonably misled. The form letter issued by Texas prison authorities could not reasonably cause the State to believe that the State of Texas had declined to extradite defendant until the completion of his sentence. This form letter does not lift the State’s “heavy burden” of showing that it is excused from trying the accused within the two year period mandated by law.

The form letter on which the dissenting justices rely is a pre-printed letter which simply acknowledges the awareness of the Texas prison authorities that defendant is wanted in Louisiana and that the Ouachita Sheriffs Office will be notified prior to his release. Absolutely no mention is made of the extradition proceedings. This “acknowledgment” letter, which lists defendant’s name, identifying number, and full-term imprisonment date, in no way indicates that the State could not take defendant into custody at an earlier date. As such, the letter states the obvious: the sheriffs office can take him into custody when the defendant completes his sentence. Nothing in the letter indicates he cannot be taken into custody at an earlier date. Additionally, the letter is addressed to the sheriffs office, not to the district attorney.

Considering the formal request for extradition signed by the governor of Louisiana, the properly executed warrant of extradition signed by the Texas governor, and the final judgment of a Texas court ordering extradition of the defendant, it cannot treasonably be argued that the “form” letter issued from the Texas authorities to the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office misled Louisiana authorities into believing that the State of Texas had declined to extradite defendant until the. completion of his sentence. The State, having initiated the extradition process, had a duty to follow the process to its conclusion. Nothing in the record indicates the State of Louisiana was prevented from determining the extradition proceeding had concluded with a court order of extradition.

The dissenting justices’ view that the form letter, which makes no mention of the extradition process, conferred some reasonable basis for the State’s complete abdication of its responsibility to follow up on action the State initiated is not supported by the record in this case.

      . Louisiana and Texas are two of 46 states that participate in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 provides:
      Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be commenced:
      (1) In capital cases after three years from the date of institution of the prosecution;
      (2) In other felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution; and
      (3)In misdemeanor cases after one year from the date of institution of the prosecution.
      The offense charged shall determine the applicable limitation.

      . The rationale of the Stanton case is favorably cited in the Official Revision Comment to La.C.Cr.P. art. 575, which incorporates the identical ground for interrupting the time limits on instituting prosecution for a criminal offense after its commission:
      A similar provision has been apart of every Louisiana statute of limitations since 1805 ... Every provision has employed both the "abscond” concept and the “fleeing from justice” concept. The word "abscond” includes the idea of concealment without flight; on the other hand, "fleeing from justice” requires there be movement out of the jurisdiction ...

      [T]o establish that a person is a fugitive it must first be shown that he was within the jurisdiction at the time the offense occurred and thereafter moved out [citing Stanton ]. However, mere absence is not enough. The status of being a fugitive also requires an intent to avoid prosecution and punishment for a particular offense. If the intent is bona fide and for legitimate purposes, the person is not a fugitive.

      . Mississippi is one of only 4 states that does not participate in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

      . In Beverly, a case also arising out of the Ouachita Parish's prosecutor's office, the second circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant’s motion to quash based on the State's failure to bring him to trial within two years of the institution of the prosecution against him for simply burglary of an inhabited dwelling because California declined to extradite him. 448 So.2d at 793-94. However, Beverly sought and obtained federal habeas corpus relief on his conviction and sentence on the grounds that the second circuit’s decision rested on a faulty factual premise and, as subsequent testimony in the federal proceedings made clear, California in fact had not refused Louisiana's initial extradition demand. Beverly v. Butler, 87-11345-M (W.D.La.1990),-F.Supp.2d-.
      The State argues here that federal relief in Beverly ultimately rested on a finding that the State did not timely file its extradition request with California. However, it appears that the prescription issue arose in large part because "[n]o one in the State of California ever notified any of the Louisiana authorities as to whether Beverly's extradition was approved or rejected, and [the Ouachita Parish District Attorney's Office] never made any effort of any kind to follow up with California authori-lies to determine the status of the extradition.” Beverly, 87-11345-M at p. 5, - F.Supp.2d at-•.
      This court expresses no opinion as to the merits of either the second circuit’s decision in Beverly or the result of the federal habeas proceedings in Beverly v. Butler. In the present case, however, no ambiguity exists as to Texas' response to Louisiana’s demand for Bobo's extradition. While it appears from this case, and from Beverly, that failures occurred in the State's internal operating procedures for monitoring its extradition requests to their conclusion, "[t]he court system cannot excuse itself from affording an accused a trial within the delay required by law simply by relying on internal operating procedures which result in non-compliance with the statutory mandate.” Devito, 391 So.2d at 816.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JjPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Frederick LEWIS, Jr.
    No. 2003-B-3314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from six counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Frederick Lewis, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

FORMAL CHARGES

On May 5, 1999, the ODC filed four counts of formal charges against respondent arising from complaints filed by Diana Geil and Deborah and Russell Jackson. On April 9, 2001, the ODC amended the charges to include two additional counts of. misconduct arising from complaints filed by Enola Bradford and Angela Taylor. The underlying facts are as follows:

Counts I and II — The Geil Matter

In September 1996, Diana Geil retained respondent to pursue a collection matter on her behalf. Ms. Geil allegedly informed respondent that time was of the essence and asked that suit be filed against the debtor as soon as possible because he was a flight risk. In October 1996, Ms. Geil paid respondent $275 to cover the costs of filing suit, but respondent failed to adhere to his client’s request to file suit immediately. In addition, respondent failed to respond to Ms. Geil’s efforts to |gretrieve her original documents. Ms. Geil ultimately retained other counsel who filed suit on her behalf in February 1997. However, during the period that respondent was handling the file, the debtor allegedly moved from the Shreveport area, making it difficult to effect service of the lawsuit.

In February 1997, Ms. Geil filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on June 20, 1997 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent filed a response to the complaint on June 19, 1997 but failed to appear for the scheduled deposition.

Counts III and IV— The Jackson Matter

In August 1994, Deborah and Russell Jackson retained respondent to represent them in a personal injury matter. In April 1996, respondent succeeded in obtaining a judgment on behalf of his clients and subsequently disbursed the monies to his clients. Respondent failed, however, to deposit client and third-party funds in a properly labeled trust account. He commingled and converted third-party funds, and failed to inform third parties that he had received their funds.

In May 1997, the Jacksons filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on July 16, 1997 and answer the complaint under oath. The ODC granted respondent’s request that the deposition be rescheduled for July 28, 1997. Respondent failed to appear on that date but he finally [.■¡submitted to a deposition on October 24, 1997, during which he agreed to provide his trust account records to the ODC. Respondent failed to produce his records and the ODC issued additional requests in November 1997 and January 1998. Shortly thereafter, the ODC issued a subpoena for respondent to appear at another deposition but the Caddo Parish sheriff was unable to serve respondent. Finally, respondent was personally served in March 1999 to appear before the ODC. At respondent’s request, the ODC agreed to postpone the deposition until April. Subsequently, respondent failed to appear and failed to produce his trust account records.

Count V — The Bradford Matter

Enola Bradford retained respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter. Respondent settled Ms. Bradford’s case and deposited the settlement funds into his operating account, rather than a properly labeled trust account. Respondent then forwarded Ms. Bradford a check for $1,038, representing her portion of the settlement. This check was returned for insufficient funds.

Count VI — The Taylor Matter

In February 1999, Angela Taylor paid respondent $1,115 to represent her in a divorce and custody matter. Respondent thereafter filed the petition for divorce and obtained an order awarding his client temporary sole custody of the children, child support and an income assignment. In August 1999, respondent was certified ineligible to practice law for failure to comply with his professional obligations. Respondent did not communicate to his client that he could no longer represent her 1¿and he apparently abandoned her case. Ms. Taylor was required to retain another attorney to respond to a rule for child custody that her husband filed.

Ms. Taylor filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In its formal charges, the ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent answered the original formal charges and denied any misconduct. Respondent did not file an answer to the amended formal charges.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits. Considering the evidence presented, the hearing committee found:

|i;l. As to Counts I and II, respondent failed to promptly file the petition as requested by Ms. Geil and failed to communicate with her despite her numerous attempts to reach him, including visits to his office. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rule 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) when he failed to appear for a June 20, 1997 deposition scheduled in the Geil matter. The record reflects that respondent wrote a letter, which the ODC received on June 19, 1997, requesting that the deposition be rescheduled due to his inability to obtain transportation to Baton Rouge.
2. As to Counts III and IV, there is clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rule 1.15 when he failed to properly handle and safeguard funds he owed to third-party medical providers out of the Jackson personal injury matter. Although respondent withheld the funds, he failed to deposit the funds in a properly labeled trust account and failed to pay the medical providers. There is also clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 8.1 and 8.4(g) in failing to cooperate with the ODC’s investigative efforts. Respondent failed to appear at scheduled depositions and failed to provide documents and records that the ODC requested.
3. With respect to Count V, there is clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rule 1.15 when he failed to deposit the settlement check from the Bradford matter into a proper trust account and when he wrote his client a settlement check for which there were insufficient funds. As of the date of the committee’s report, respondent had yet to pay Ms. Bradford her share of the settlement, $1,033.
4. Regarding Count VI, the evidence indicates clearly and convincingly that respondent violated Rule 1.4 by failing to communicate with his client. | ^Respondent also clearly violated Rule 1.16 when he failed to withdraw from representing Ms. Taylor after he became ineligible to practice law and failed to surrender the client’s file to her. Further, respondent violated Rules 8.1 and 8.4 when he failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation.

Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee concluded that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

The committee found the following aggravating factors in this case: prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with orders of the disciplinary agency, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1985), and indifference to making restitution. The committee considered the following factors in mitigation: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems, remorse, and remoteness of the prior offenses. The committee also commented that based on its review of respondent’s testimony and other evidence, they are of the belief that while respondent committed the violations knowingly, he did not commit them intentionally.

17Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and be required to make full restitution to his clients and third-party medical providers.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact are supported by the evidence. With regard to the charge of failure to cooperate in Count VI, the board supplemented the findings as follows:

By letter dated November 3, 1999, the ODC initially requested that respondent file a response to Ms. Taylor’s complaint. The ODC sent another request to respondent on November 18, 1999. Because of respondent’s inaction, the ODC issued a subpoena requesting his appearance on February 8, 2000. On February 3, 2000, respondent informed the ODC that he was unable to appear on February 8, 2000. Then, on February 7, 2000, respondent sent the ODC a copy of his response to the complaint, which, he allegedly drafted on December 3, 1999. Respondent’s failure to promptly respond and cooperate caused at least a three-month delay in the investigation.

Based on the factual findings of the committee, as supplemented above, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as follows:

Counts I and II — The board found respondent failed to act diligently and failed to communicate with his client in the Geil collection matter, in violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.4. The board also agreed with the committee’s finding that the ODC failed to Dprove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(a)(g).

Counts III and IV — The board found respondent failed to pay third-party medical providers despite withholding the funds to do so, in violation of Rule 1.15(b). In addition, the board found that respondent violated Rules 8.4(a) and (b) because by converting funds due to third parties, he committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) when he represented to the Jacksons that he intended to pay their medical expenses from the settlement, but failed to do so. The board agreed with the committee’s finding that respondent’s failure to appear at depositions and failure to provide documents violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Also, when respondent ignored the subpoenas issued by the ODC, he “knowingly disobeyed the rules of the tribunal” and violated Rule 3.4(c). By violating the foregoing rules, respondent violated Rule 8.4(a). The board declined to find a violation of Rule 8.4(d).

Count V — The board agreed that respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) when he deposited Ms. Bradford’s settlement check into his operating account instead of his trust account, thereby causing the check he issued to Ms. Bradford to be returned for insufficient funds. As of December 4, 2003, respondent still had not paid restitution to Ms. Bradford.

Count VI — The board agreed that respondent violated Rule 1.4 when he failed to inform Ms. Taylor that he was ineligible to practice law. Further, he violated Rule 1.16(d) when he failed to withdraw as counsel for Ms. Taylor after being certified ineligible to practice law. Ms. Taylor was unaware of respondent’s ineligible status and continued her attempts to contact him to handle her pending child custody case. | thereafter, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation, in violation of Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(g).

The board concluded that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients and to the profession. The board further determined that respondent’s conduct caused significant actual harm to his clients and third-party medical providers. In addition, his failure to communicate with clients caused delays in their legal matters. Finally, respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC placed additional burden and expense on the disciplinary system. The baseline sanction for respondent’s conduct ranges from a lengthy suspension to disbarment.

The board concurred in the aggravating and mitigating factors cited by the hearing committee, with the exception of the mitigating factor of remoteness of prior disciplinary offenses. The board noted that respondent’s last admonition was imposed in 1995, and thus concluded that his prior offenses cannot be considered “remote.”

Considering the prior jurisprudence involving misconduct similar to respondent’s, the board found a three-year suspension is appropriate. See In re: Sabludowsky, 00-0891 (La.6/16/00), 761 So.2d 1288 (attorney given a three-year suspension for failure to pay a third-party medical provider from client settlement funds and failure to maintain an adequate balance in his trust account); In re: Graham, 02-2789 (La.1/31/03), 841 So.2d 707 (after considering the [Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v.] Hinrichs [486 So.2d 116 (La.1986) ] test, the court imposed a three-year suspension on an attorney who failed to remit funds to medical providers, converted the funds, and then failed to cooperate with the ODC); In re: Feazel, 01-2309 (La.11/9/01), 800 So.2d 771 (attorney who had a pattern of neglecting clients’ legal matters and failing to cooperate with the ODC received three-year suspension, with one year deferred, subject to supervised probation); and In re: Boudreau, 2000-3158 (La.1/5/01), 776 So.2d 428 (in consent discipline matter, attorney received a three-year suspension for failure to account for or return unearned fees, failure to communicate, neglect of client matters and failure to cooperate with ODC). In view of the mitigating circumstances present in this case, and considering that respondent has declined to accept new clients since these proceedings began in 1999, the board determined it is appropriate to defer one year of the three-year suspension.

Based on this reasoning, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with one year deferred. The board further recommended that respondent be ordered to make restitution to his clients and third-party medical providers and that he attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is Inapplicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports the detailed factual findings of the hearing committee. Respondent has neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, commingled and converted client and third-party funds, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s conduct harmed his clients by delaying resolution of their legal matters and depriving them of their funds. Under similar facts, this court has imposed lengthy suspensions. See, e.g., In re: Powers, 99-2069 (La.9/24/99), 744 So.2d 1275 (three-year suspension imposed on attorney with a prior disciplinary record for similar misconduct who neglected three clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with the clients, failed to account for and return unearned fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC). Aggravating factors are present, such as a pattern of misconduct, respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law, and his prior disciplinary record. However, we also recognize the presence of mitigating factors, including respondent’s personal and emotional problems at the time of the misconduct and his h ¿remorse for his actions. Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for three years, with one year deferred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Frederick Lewis, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 17025, be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of three years. It is further ordered that one year of this suspension shall be deferred. Respondent is ordered to make restitution of all monies owed to clients and third parties and to attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Ms. Geil allegedly made several trips from her home in Texas to seek the return of her file materials and in some instances had to leave notes on respondent's door.

      . Between August 1, 1999 and April 19, 2001, respondent was ineligible to practice law in Louisiana for failing to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement. Between September 3, 1999 and April 19, 2001, respondent was ineligible for failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.

      . Standard 4.12 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Standard 4.42 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Standard 7.2 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

      . Respondent was admonished on five occasions between 1990 and 1995; four of the admonitions were solely for failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigations. Respondent was admonished in 1995 for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with a client, and failing to cooperate with the ODC.


text:
    Joseph GREFER, et al. v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1057.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2004.
   In re Employers Mutual Cas. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 572-152; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 04-C^477, 04-C-466.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen Scott WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-K-3514.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Williams, Allen Scott; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 66997; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 03-387.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny L. JONES.
    No. 2003-K-3542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 401-183; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-0829.

Granted.


text:
    James W. LONG, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2004-C-0485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Louisiana, State of; Transportation and Development Dept, of; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97-805; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,422-CA.

Granted.


text:
    Warren W. HOAG, Jr., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-CD-0857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Louisiana House of Representatives; Louisiana Senate; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 471,708.

Stay ordered. Writ granted.


text:
    Janice Cantrell O’CONNOR and George J. O’Connor, Jr. v. Elmer LITCHFIELD, Sheriff, East Baton Rouge Parish.
    No. 2004-C-0655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Litchfield, Elmer Sheriff et al.; East Baton Rouge Parish; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 448,521; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0397.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of M.A.
    No. 2004-CJ-0819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Fanguy, Hon. Judge Thaddeus;— Other; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated April 7, 2004, Parish of Terrebonne, City Court of Houma, No. J-415-02; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CW 0616.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Lewis, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 8-88-151; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0215.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A); art. 930.4(D).

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MOREHEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1237.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Morehead, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 310142; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2609.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarence SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Smith, Clarence; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 99-5815; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-376.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George MOORE, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Moore, George, III; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 36,451; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37413-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory GUIDRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1279.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Guidry, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 421-849; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0264.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry WEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re West, Terry;' — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 381-449; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0008.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew CELESTINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1304.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Celestine, Andrew; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96-5701; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-68.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen LEGROANE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1306.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re LeGroane, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 396-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-025.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Claude E. WOODS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1319.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Woods, Claude E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 75-2-61.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clint William JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Jones, Clint William; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 199,805; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37498-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond MCGARY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re McGary, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 48,550; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0379.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michelle BENJAMIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1503.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Benjamin, Michelle; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 370-485; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0494.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen ROBERTSON, Jr. v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2003-KP-2747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Robertson, Allen Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 01-91-611.

Granted. Consolidated w/2004-KP-0575.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy Ray WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KP-0575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Williams, Jimmy Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 7-94-871.

Granted. Consolidated with 2003-KP-2747.


text:
    Ginger BAILEY, et al. v. Dr. Gregory KHOURY, et al. Ginger Bailey, et al. v. Dr. Gregory Khoury, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Khoury, Gregory Dr. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 99-11412; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-C-0049, 2002-C-0236.

Granted. Consolidated with 2004-CC-0647 and 2004-CC-0684.


text:
    Ginger BAILEY, et al. v. Dr. Gregory KHOURY, et al. Ginger Bailey, et al. v. Dr. Gregory Khoury, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Ancira, Robert Dr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Palish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, Nos. 99-4242, 99-11412; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-C-0049, 2002-C-0236.

Granted. Consolidated with 2004-CC-0620 and 2004-CC-0684.


text:
    Ginger BAILEY, et al. v. Dr. Gregory KHOURY, et al. Ginger Bailey, et al. v. Dr. Gregory Khoury, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0684.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Walgreens Louisiana Co. Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, Nos. 99^4242, 99-11412; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-C-0049, 2002-C-0236.

Granted. Consolidated with 2004-CC-0620 and 2004-CC-0647.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Corey DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Davis, Corey; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 97-1445; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00867.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard L. HILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Hilton, Richard L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 96-CR-966060; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0178.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph LEMAR, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Joseph Lemar, Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 4-96-375; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0384.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James MORRISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re James Morrison; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 233-762.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Floyd TYLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1518.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Tyler, Floyd; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 268-294.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Armando BARROSO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Barroso, Amando; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 97-7409; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH^74.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bryan DEMOUCHET v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Demouchet, Bryan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. CR94-1606, CR95-202; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-KH-1195.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chadwick DENNIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Dennis, Chadwick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-6888; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-520.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Adreama DICKERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Dickerson, Adreama; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 416-087; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0542.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lester BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Bell, Lester; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 3-94-1346; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0383.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Danny R. GRAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Gray, Danny R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 284,029; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0685.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freddie NERO Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Nero, Freddie Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 01-73-2695.

Denied. Repetitive La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles CUTLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Cutler, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 14089-93; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-00338.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ervin DORSEY.
    No. 2003-KP-1856.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Dorsey, Ervin; — -Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 267-811.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Phillip ANTHONY v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2003-KP-1865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Anthony, Phillip; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 387-535.

Denied. Relator may seek release of his mental health records pursuant to R.S. 44:7.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Craig Wesley MARKS.
    No. 2004-KK-0007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Marks, Craig W.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2002CR93469; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 03-01249.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William SMITH.
    No. 2004-KO-0050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Smith, William; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-6593; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-866.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keith LEBLANC.
    No. 2004-KO-0054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Leblanc, Keith; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 429-503; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-0276.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter J. EVANS.
    No. 2004-KO-0080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Evans, Walter J.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 01-3192; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-0752.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Luther R. WINDHAM.
    No. 2004-K-0106.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Windham, Luther R.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2002-2533; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 03-945.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard L. HILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Hilton, Richard L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 96CR966060; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 1628.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Isaac B. MANUEL.
    No. 2004-KO-0122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Manuel, Isaac B.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 428-137; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-0928.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tony POLLARD.
    No. 2004-KO-0140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Pollard, Tony; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-K3604; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0941.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie Lee DOUGLAS, II.
    No. 2004-KO-0153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Douglas, Willie L. II; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 207,807; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,721-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William Odell CASH.
    No. 2004-KO-0232.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Cash, William Odell; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR7493-00-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-853.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey D. BOZEMAN.
    No. 2004-KO-0233.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Bozeman, Corey D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 433-183; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-KA-1210.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Denise LEBRUN, Wife of/and Dale J. Lebrun, Nancy Ancar, Wife of/and Terry L. AnCar, Catherine Barr, Wife of/and William L. Barr, David M. Keller, Catherine McMullen Wife of/and Joel T. McMullen and Sandy Peyton, Wife of/and Kevin Peyton v. Robert W. KUSWA and Tomorrow, Inc. d/b/a BK Enterprises.
    No. 2004-C-0283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Kuswa, Robert W.; Tomorrow Inc. d/b/a; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-14246; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0482.

Denied.


text:
    Mary CLULEE, et al. v. BAYOU FLEET, INC.
    No. 2004-CC-0486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Bayou Fleet Inc. et al.; Bayou Fleet Partnership; Durant, Robin; Bat-ture Fleet Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 49,963; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1359.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Wendy LANDERS, et al. v. Dr. Edward STAUDINGER, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Landers, Wendy et al.; West, Ethel; Landers, Richard Estate of;' — ■ Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2002-13390; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-2048.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Charles M. GRESHAM v. PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC. Callon Offshore Production, Inc., and Preston Raigan.
    No. 2004-C-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Landry, Paul T.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 45-725; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1228.

Denied.


text:
    COVINGTON PONTIAC-BUICK-GMC TRUCKS, INC. and Eddie Pablovich v. AAA SEWER & WATER FABRICATION & SERVICE, LLC, David Guidry, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Covington Pontiac-Buick-GMC Trucks Inc. et ah; Pablovich, Eddie;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2001-10357; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2676.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, INC. v. INSURANCE MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATORS OF LOUISIANA, INC.
    No. 2004-CC-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Personnel Management, Inc.; — • Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 112,087; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38591-CW.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE, Parish of East Baton Rouge v. JOHNCA PROPERTIES, L.L.C.
    No. 2004-C-0696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Johnca Properties L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 460,313; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0632.

Denied.


text:
    ACADIA PARISH POLICE JURY, et al. v. TOWN OF DUSON.
    No. 2004-C-0697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Acadia Parish Pol. Jury et al.; Goss, Kenneth Sher.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 75890-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-944.

Denied.


text:
    Pamela Ann RACCA v. ST. MARY SUGAR COOPERATIVE, INC., Sterling Sugars, Inc. Raphael Rodriguez, Jr., Shirley Rodriguez, Ronald James Rodriguez, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development, State of Louisiana Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Parish of St. Mary, Louisiana, Town of Baldwin, Louisiana, Blair J. Hebert, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Racca, Pamela A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Rer view, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 100,935; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1766.

Denied.


text:
    Jadallah HINDI v. The STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Louisiana State of et al.; Louisiana Housing Finance Authority; Risk Management Office of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 99-13311; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1974.

Denied.


text:
    BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING v. Donald Ray YOUNG.
    No. 2004-C-0704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Barber Brothers Contracting Co., Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist.-5, No. 01-02736; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0747.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Pamela and Randy BOUDREAUX v. BRAUN INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., Mary Rose Brown and Jerry Brown, Town of Lutcher, Mayor Troas Poche and Dean Millet, Town of Lutcher, Planning and Zoning Commissioner.
    No. 2004-C-0705.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Boudreaux, Pamela et al.; Bou-dreaux, Randy; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 28589; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-1070.

Denied.


text:
    Mary CLULEE Wife of/and Neal Clulee, Homeplace Batture Leasing, Inc. and N/C Materials, Inc. v. BAYOU FLEET, INC., Bayou Fleet Partnership, Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., Robin Durant, Ronald Adams, J. Mac Morgan, Chris Tregre, Sued in His Official Capacity as President of St. Charles Parish and Randy Lewis, Sued in His Official Capacity as Parish Attorney for St. Charles Parish.
    No. 2004-OC-0706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Bayou Fleet Inc.; Bayou Fleet Partnership Ltd.; Durant, Robin; Batture Fleet Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 49,963.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ollie Mae PECOT v. CALCASIEU-CAMERON HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT d/b/a West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2004-C-0719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Pecot, Ollie Mae;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-6318; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1102.

Denied.


text:
    Keith VAN METER, et al. v. Henry J. MACFARLAND, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re MacFarland, Henry J. et al.; Pi-cou, Robert L. Jr.; Peoples, Phyllis; Me-condangelo, Nancy; Bergeron, Michael; Duhe, Teddy L.; Fakier, Michael; Gary, Dexter; Malbrough, Oneal; Monette, Rene’; Smitko, Jerri; Voisin, Michael; Waggenspack, Guy; Hospital Service District No. 1 Terrebonne Parish; Terre-bonne General Medical Center d/b/a; Terrebonne General Medical Center;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terre-bonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 135,295; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 2396.

Denied.


text:
    Charles S. REILY, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2004-C-0722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Reily, Charles S. et al.;—Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 81-42886; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-580.

Denied.


text:
    Dr. Dion Lynn ARMSTRONG v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.
    No. 2004-C-0723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Armstrong, Dion Lynn Dr.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2003-00532; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1241.

Denied.


text:
    Robert W. KUSWA and Tomorrow, Inc. d/b/a BK Enterprises v. Denise LEBRUN, Wife of/and Dale J. Lebrun, Nancy Ancar, Wife of/and Terry L. Ancar, Catherine Barr, Wife of/and William L. Barr, David M. Keller, Catherine McMullen, Wife of/and Joel T. McMullen, and Sandy Peyton, Wife of and Kevin Peyton.
    No. 2004-C-0725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Kuswa, Robert W. et al.; Tomorrow Inc. d/b/a; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 02-14341; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0613.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel SAFFORD v. BAYOU LAFOURCHE FRESH WATER DISTRICT.
    No. 2004-C-0747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Safford, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 57,706; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0700.

Denied.


text:
    REGENCY MOTORS OF METAIRIE, L.L.C. d/b/a Regency Ford, Troy J. Duhon, Allen Krake, Michael M. Seago and David R. Williams v. HIBERNIA-ROSENTHAL INSURANCE AGENCY, L.L.C. d/b/a Hibernia-Rosenthal Insurance Agency, Inc., Rosenthal Agency, Inc., Hibernia National Bank, Legion Insurance Company, Chubb Insurance Company, Lloyds of London, Inc. and Unionamerica Insurance Company, Ltd.
    No. 2004-C-0753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Regency Motors of Metairie L.L.C. d/b/a; Regency Ford et al.; Duhon, Troy J.; Krake, Allen; Seago, Michael M.; Williams, David R.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 580-804; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-1812. Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jessica SHEPARD and Angela Brown v. Robert YOUNG, Jr. and Cob Enterprises of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2004-C-0754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Shepard, Jessica; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 99-12864; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0429.

Denied.


text:
    Jim S. HALL v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, James A. Williams, Lawrence G. Willie and Janet Willie.
    No. 2004-C-0756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Hall, Jim S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 588-722; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-1333.

Denied.


text:
    BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the LAFOURCHE BASIN LEVEE DISTRICT v. RATHBORNE LAND COMPANY, INC.
    No. 2004-C-0758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Board of Commissioners, La-fourche Basin Levee District; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 40,352; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-CA-1206.

Denied.


text:
    METER READING SPECIALISTS, INC. v. CITY OF DENHAM SPRINGS.
    No. 2004-C-0763.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Meter Reading Specialists Inc.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 91,064; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0703.

Denied.


text:
    James BLACKBURN v. James G. GENGELBACH and Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-C-0766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Blackburn, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 472,804; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0739.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.


text:
    Evelyn STAMPLEY v. ALBERTSON’S INC., ABC Insurance Company and John Doe.
    No. 2004-C-0767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Stampley, Evelyn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 479,319; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0846.

Denied.


text:
    Sonya J. WILLIAMSON and Her Minor Children, Abner Williamson, Dixie Williamson, and Jolie Williamson Through Their Natural Tutor Robert Williamson v. HAYNES BEST WESTERN OF ALEXANDRIA, INC.; American General Fire & Casualty Company; Maryland Casualty Insurance Company; Best Western International, Inc.; and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company; M/M H.L. Haynes, Individually, et al.
    No. 2004-C-0784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Williamson, Sonya J. et al.; Williamson, Abner; Williamson, Dixie; Williamson, Jolie; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 95-16175; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1076.

Denied.


text:
    Ryan BALLARD v. Rhonda LANDRY, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0785.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Travelers Indemnity Company of America; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2001-7829; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-C-0198.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Sheila Cantrell BORDENAVE v. Michael B. BORDENAVE.
    No. 2004-C-0786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Bordenave, Michael B.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 88-22426; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-1534.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason MICIOTTO.
    No. 2004-KK-0788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Miciotto, Jason; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 27052-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 04-00114.

Denied.


text:
    Golzie DANOS and Faye Thibodeaux Danos v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0915.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Danos, Golzie et al.; Danos, Faye Thibodeaux; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2003-15723; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-C-0224.

Denied.


text:
    Harry CHAMBERLAIN v. Robbie Jo STODDARD.
    No. 2004-CJ-0967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 7, 2004.
   In re Chamberlain, Harry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-1812; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 04-00454.

Denied.


author: _JjPICKETT, Judge.

text:
    Justin CONNER v. Gene T. ALLEN.
    No. 04-182.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Feb. 13, 2004.
    Robert E. Clark, Vidalia, LA, for Justin Conner.
    Derrick D. Carson, Ferriday, LA, for Gene T. Allen.
    Court composed of Judges JIMMIE C. PETERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and ARTHUR J. PLANCHARD, Pro Tempore.
   _JjPICKETT, Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant, Justin Conner, appeals from a judgment of the trial court which dismissed his suit challenging the eligibility of defendant-appellee, Gene T. Allen, as a candidate for Mayor of the Town of Ferriday. We affirm.

On February 6, 2004, plaintiff-appellant filed a “Petition Objecting to Candidacy” which alleged defendant-appellee does not meet the qualifications, as set forth in La.R.S. 33:384, to seek the position of Mayor of the Town of Ferriday. A hearing was held on February 9, 2004. The trial court granted defendant-appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal. On February 10, 2004, judgment was signed dismissing the petition and affirming defendant-appellee’s qualifications as candidate for the office of Mayor of the Town of Ferriday. On February 10, 2004, plaintiff-appellant filed a notice of appeal.

La.R.S. 33:384 provides:
The mayor shall be an elector of the municipality who at the time of qualification as a candidate for the office of mayor shall have been domiciled and actually resided for at least the immediately preceding year in the municipality.

In Russell v. Goldsby, 2000-C-2595 (La.9/22/00); 780 So.2d 1048, the Supreme Court stated:

In an election contest, the person objecting to the candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate is disqualified. La. R.S. 18:492; Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546 (La.1983). The laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally interpreted so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of permitting the candidate to run for public office. Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679 (La.1991).
Turning to the issue of domicile first, we note it is well settled that residence and domicile are not synonymous, and a person can have several residences, but only one domicile. La. Civ.Code art. 38; Messer, 438 So.2d at 547; Autin v. Terrebonne, 612 So.2d 107 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1992). A person’s domicile is his principal^establishment wherein he makes his habitual residence and essentially consists of two elements, namely residence and intent to remain. The question of domicile is one of intention as well as fact, and where it appears domicile has been acquired in another place, the party seeking to show it has been changed must overcome the legal presumption that it has not been changed by positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of a domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place and of abandoning the former domicile. Paitan v. Fields, 95-1936 (La.App. 1st Cir.1995), 669 So.2d 1233. Absent declaration to change domicile, proof of this intention depends upon circumstances; there is a presumption against change of domicile. Messer, 438 So.2d at 547; Herpin v. Boudreaux, 98-306 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/5/98), 709 So.2d 269, writ denied, 98-0578 (La.3/11/98), 712 So.2d 859. Russell v. Goldsby, 780 So.2d 1048 at 1051.

Turning to the testimony offered by the plaintiff-appellant at trial, Golda Ensminger, Registrar of Voters for Concordia Parish, testified defendant-appellee changed his address with the Registrar of Voters Office from 2962 Highway 569, which is outside the city limits of Ferriday, to 609 Alabama Avenue, which is within the city limits of Ferriday, on February 12, 2003. Monelle Moseley, the Assessor for Concor-dia Parish, testified in February 2003, defendant-appellee requested the homestead exemption be removed from 2962 Highway 569. Cotrina Johnson, a billing clerk for the Town of Ferriday, testified the only account for water service for 609 Alabama Avenue is in the name of Concordia Funeral Home. Obie Jo Simmons, the 911 Coordinator, testified each residence or business in the Parish of Concordia should have an address for purposes of the 911 service, but that it is common in the parish to have more than one structure with the same address.

Defendant-appellee testified he, his wife, and his adult son have lived in a two bedroom trailer located behind his business, Concordia Funeral Home, located at 609 Alabama Avenue, since October 2002. Defendant-appellee also testified he has no intention of moving outside the city limits of Ferriday. Defendant-appellee receives mail at both 609 Alabama Avenue and P.O. Box 684. Defendant-appellee still owns the property located on Highway 569, and his wife occasionally visits that property on weekends.

| ¡¡Defendant-appellee testified the trailer located at 609 Alabama Avenue has electricity, water and sewerage. The service for the electricity is independent of the funeral home, but the water and sewerage service is connected to that of the funeral home. There is one phone which rings at the funeral home and the trailer due to the need for being accessible to his clients at all times. The trailer is furnished with living room furniture, a kitchen table and chairs, and two beds. The trailer has a complete kitchen and bath. Defendant-appellee eats and sleeps at the trailer every day. Several photographs, which were taken the morning of the hearing, were introduced into evidence which depicted the trailer set up behind the funeral home and the contents of the trailer.

When a trial court’s findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, great deference must be given to those findings. Blackwell v. Kershenstine, 97-210 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/27/97), 690 So.2d 247, writ denied, 97-0545 (La.3/14/97), 689 So.2d 1390. In Mayes v. State, 96-789 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 497, writ denied, 97-0113 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1376, this court stated a trial court’s grant of a motion for involuntary dismissal should not be reversed in the absence of manifest error.

The trial court acknowledged the testimony regarding the change of address and the change of the homestead exemption made in February, 2003, within the year preceding the notice of candidacy, but the court stated this was simply when defendant-appellee completed the paperwork regarding the change of his address to 609 Alabama Avenue. The trial court stated the record is devoid of any evidence refuting defendant-appellee’s testimony that he has been living at 609 Alabama Avenue since October, 2002, which is more than one year preceding his notice of candidacy.

We' find no manifest error in the trial court’s finding that plaintiff-appellant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant-appellee was not domiciled and did not actually reside in the municipality for at least the immediately preceding year.

In his appellate brief, plaintiff-appellant cites La.R.S. 18:101 B, which provides, in pertinent part:

B. For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and voting, “resident” means a citizen who resides in this Instate and in the parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register and vote, with an intention to reside there indefinitely. If a citizen resides at more than one place in the state with an intention to reside there indefinitely, he may register and vote only at one of the places at which he resides. However, if a person claims a homestead exemption, pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, on one of the residences, he shall register and vote in the precinct in which that residence is located.

As noted above, defendant-appellee removed the homestead exemption from the property at 2962 Highway 569 in February 2003. Pursuant to La.R.S. 18:101 B, defendant-appellee was required to register and vote in the precinct in which the residence on Highway 569 was located until he removed the homestead exemption from that property in February 2003. Therefore, plaintiff-appellant argues defendant-appellee could not meet the qualifications for Mayor of the Town of Ferriday until February 26, 2004, one year following the change removing the homestead exemption from the Highway 569 property.

This court finds La.R.S. 18:101 B does not preclude defendant-appellee from being domiciled and actually residing at 609 Alabama Avenue prior to the change regarding the homestead exemption in February 2003 for the following reasons. La. R.S. 18:101 B pertains to voting, as indicated in the opening phrase of that paragraph, and is separate and apart from La.R.S. 33:384, which pertains to qualifications for mayor. Additionally, La.R.S. 33:384 simply requires the person to be an elector of the municipality, and the one year requirement found in that statute does not apply to the requirement of being an elector. As defendant-appellee changed his address to 609 Alabama Avenue with the Registrar of Voters in February 2003, he was an elector of the municipality at the time he filed his notice of candidacy. Therefore, defendant-appellee, Gene T. Allen, met all of the qualifications for mayor enumerated in La.R.S. 33:384.

For the reasons expressed above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at plaintiff-appellant’s cost.

AFFIRMED.