text:
    Jon L. MATHASON, Appellant, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellee.
    No. 4D02-3936.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Marjorie Gadarian Graham of Marjorie Gadarian Graham, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens and Jason Guarí of Ricci Leopold Farmer & McAfee, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Martin E. Leach of Feiler, Leach & McCarron, P.L., Coral Gables and John E. Phelan of John E. Phelan, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

Appellant, insured under a group health policy issued by appellee American National Life Insurance Company of Texas (“AN-TEX”), challenges a trial court order denying attorney’s fees in his successful suit against ANTEX for insurance coverage. The trial court determined that because the group health policy was delivered out of state, attorney’s fees were not recoverable. We agree and affirm.

The appellant purchased group health insurance through ANTEX. The group policy was delivered to National Business Association, Incorporated Trust, located in Mississippi. Appellant received a certificate of insurance attached to which were several amendatory endorsements required by Florida law. See § 627.6515, Fla. Stat. (1999). These were delivered to him in Florida. After ANTEX denied coverage for medical expenses and appellant successfully sued ANTEX for insurance coverage, he moved for attorney’s fees under section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides for payment of attorney’s fees to the insured when the insured obtains a favorable judgment against its insurer. ANTEX objected, claiming that it was not obligated to pay attorney’s fees. It relied on section 627.401(2), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that no provision of this part of this chapter applies to “[p]olicies or contracts not issued for delivery in this state nor delivered in this state, except as otherwise provided in this code.” Section 627.402 provides the following definitions:

(1) “Policy” means a written contract of insurance or written agreement for or effecting insurance, or the certificate thereof, by whatever name called, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements, and papers which are a part thereof.
(2) The word “certificate” as used in this section does not include certificates as to group life or health insurance or as to group annuities issued to individual insureds.

§ 627.402(1) & (2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Therefore, because only the certificate was delivered in this state, the master policy was an out-of-state policy and not subject to section 627.428.

Appellant argued that because the amendatory endorsement was delivered in this state, the entire policy should be considered as being delivered in Florida, making it subject to section 627.428. While there is no case law on point, we conclude that the endorsement attached to the certificate was part of the certificate, putting the appellant on notice of a few specific policy provisions and was not the equivalent of delivery of the full policy in Florida. In a similar situation, in Albury v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 409 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the court held that an insured was not entitled to fees under section 627.428 where a certificate and policy booklet explaining coverage were delivered to the insured in Florida but the master policy was delivered in Missouri.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., and ARAMONY, SUSAN, Associate Judge, concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    James A. GRACE, Appellant, v. Ken JENNE, as Sheriff of Broward County, Appellee.
    No. 4D03-520.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.

      James A. Grace, Fort Lauderdale, pro se.
    Robert D. Yates of Buschel, Carter, Schwartzreich & Yates, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

After the sheriff denied appellant’s request for public records, appellant filed this action under section 119.11, Florida Statutes (2001), asking the trial court to determine whether the sheriff properly refused to produce the records. We reverse the order dismissing appellant’s complaint. Although the sheriff may ultimately not be able to retrieve these records, because of their age or another reason, the order in this case, entered- without an evidentiary hearing, was premature. Reversed.

POLEN, KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Gentil CHERRY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D03-549.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Valerie Jonas, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Roberta G. Mandel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the order revoking the defendant’s community control finding that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the violation was willful and substantial. See Boatwright v. State, 847 So.2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Thomas v. State, 760 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Jones v. State, 730 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Reversed.


text:
    Natholee WILLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D03-25.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Frank A. Kreidler, Lake Worth, for appellant.

      Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

After the appellant made a threatening comment to a witness during the lunch break from a trial, the court commenced a contempt proceeding, took testimony, and held appellant in contempt of court without complying with any of the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840, regarding indirect criminal contempt. Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of this rule is error. See Baker v. Green, 732 So.2d 6, 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We therefore reverse the order of contempt.

STONE, WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


author: TAYLOR, J.

text:
    Wesley FORD and Regina Ford, Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Gilton Siqueira, Appellees.
    No. 4D02-2058.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Richard G. Bartmon of Law Offices of Bartmon & Bartmon, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellants.
    Thomas Neale of Neale, Deamedia & Snowden, Fort Lauderdale, and Nancy W. Gregoire of Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Florida Department of Transportation.
   TAYLOR, J.

We reverse the final summary judgment entered in favor of the Department of Transportation (“Department”), because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the Department’s employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the state vehicle he was operating allegedly struck appellant Wesley Ford.

“The general rule in Florida is that an employee who deviates from his employment to engage in a personal errand is not within the scope of his employment if an accident occurs before he returns to the course he was pursuing in the interest of his employer.” Drinnenberg v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 481 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)(emphasis added).

In this case, the record shows that the employee deviated from the scope of his employment to travel to a park for his son’s soccer game. However, a question of fact remains as to whether, at the time of the accident, the employee had reentered the scope of his employment while on his way to park the state vehicle in the assigned parking lot for the night. This question is one for the jury. See Woods v. City of Miami, 646 So.2d 836, 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(‘Whether an employee’s act was committed within the scope of his employment or in furtherance of the employer’s interest generally presents a question for the jury when there are varying inferences and conclusions to be drawn.”).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

FARMER, C.J., and GUNTHER, J., concur.


text:
    Murray BREITBERG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D01-2464.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Joseph R. Chloupek, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marrett W. Hanna, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Murray Breitberg was charged with five counts of capital sexual battery, and one count of indecent assault. He was found guilty as charged on all six counts after a jury trial. We find Breitberg’s first two issues on appeal unpersuasive and therefore affirm his conviction. However, as both parties concede, Breitberg’s fifteen-year sentence on Count VI, indecent assault, was an improper departure sentence without written reason. “The facts supporting the departure must be ... explained in writing by the trial judge.” State v. Baksh, 758 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); See § 921.0016(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). Since it appears unclear from the record whether the trial court was aware of the imposition of a departure sentence, we reverse and remand with instructions for reconsideration of whether the departure sentence is appropriate, and if so, to enter written reasons consistent with a departure sentence.

STONE, POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


author: SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

text:
    Nadrian BUTTS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D03-722.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Thomas C. Mielke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
   SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

This appeal from the denial of a 3.850 motion challenges the imposition of a twenty year habitual offender sentence for a drug offense, notwithstanding the trial judge’s pretrial offer of twenty months imprisonment if the defendant pled guilty to this and an additional charge. Under the circumstances, in which an obvious presumption of vindictiveness has not been dissipated in any way, resentencing before another circuit judge is required. Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla.2003); Blanco v. State, 849 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Smith v. State, 842 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Nowells v. State, 840 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Compare Snow v. Crosby, 851 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

Sentence vacated, remanded for resen-tencing.


author: WELLS, J.

text:
    Osiel GUERRERO, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Unicity Imports Corporation, Appellee.
    No. 3D02-2325.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.

      Osiel Guerrero, in proper person.
    John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for appellee Commission.
    Before COPE, FLETCHER and WELLS, JJ.
   WELLS, J.

Osiel Guerrero appeals from an order of the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) dismissing as untimely, his appeal from an administrative decision denying unemployment compensation benefits. We reverse.

On January 13, 2002, Guerrero filed a claim for unemployment benefits alleging that he had been terminated for absenteeism when he returned from an authorized leave. A telephonic hearing subsequently was noticed and held before a UAC hearing referee. Guerrero failed to attend that hearing, and on February 5 his claim for benefits was denied on a finding that he had been terminated for absenteeism. The referee’s decision denying benefits expressly stated that Guerrero had 20 days to appeal the referee’s decision. That order, like the notice of the hearing before the referee, was mailed to the address provided by Guerrero on his benefits claim form and which he has continued to use throughout these proceedings and those below.

Within 20 days of the February 5 order (on February 19), Guerrero submitted a letter to the UAC explaining that his absence from work had been authorized by his employer. The UAC treated this letter as a timely appeal from the referee’s February 5 order and set a hearing before an appeals referee. Notice of this hearing was sent to the same address provided and used by Guerrero. When Guerrero failed to attend this hearing, his appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution.

The dismissal order clearly informed Guerrero that he had 20 days in which either to file a request to reopen the case upon a showing of good cause for failure to attend the hearing before the appeals referee, or to appeal the decision to the UAC. Guerrero did neither within the 20 day time frame allotted. Instead, on June 7, Guerrero filed a request for employment appeals commission review in which he stated that he had “never [been] contacted to appear” at the initial hearing before the referee, and that he had not timely appealed because he “was never contacted.” Additionally, Guerrero stated that this was his third correspondence with the UAC in an attempt to appeal “his case.” He also attached a letter stating:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
IN THE FOLLOWING LETTER THAT I AM SENDING TO YOU BECAUSE AS OF 1-13-02 I HAVE A CLAIM WITH THE UNEMPLOYMENT TO RECEIVE BENEFITS SINCE I HAVE BEEN UNEMPLOYED. THE LAST TIME I HEARD WAS THAT MY EMPLOYER DID NOT WANT TO PAY THE BENEFITS. I HAVE SINCE SENT OUT 2 PRIOR LETTERS OF APPEAL, AND UNTIL THIS MOMENT I HAVE NOT HEARD A RESPONSE FROM YOU. I HAVE TRIED TO COMMUNICATE MY SITUATION WITH YOU AND I HAVE FAIL [SIC] IN MY MISSION. IN THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY I AM SENDING TO YOU ABOUT THIS SITUTION THAT HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED AND WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO ANALYZE MY CASE BECAUSE I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY CHECKS. I HAVE BEEN MANY MONTHS WITHOUT WORK [SIC] I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO LOOK FOR WORK BUT I HAVE NOT FOUND ANY. I WAS FIRED FOR NO GOOD REASON [SIC] I WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO INVESTIGATE MY CASE. I HAVE 3 CHILDREN [SIC] A WIFE AND A HOME TO TAKE CARE OF [SIC] I JUST WANT THE FUNDS THAT I DESERVE.

Based on this notice and letter, the UAC notified Guerrero that it was going to review the appeal to determine whether it was timely filed. Guerrero was advised by separate notice, sent to the original address provided and which appeared on Guerrero's June 7 request for appeal and letter, that although his appeal was untimely, that he had ten days to “show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed” by providing “information relevant to ... the reason for the apparent late appeal.” No such information was forthcoming from Guerrero, and, on July 29, 2002, UAC dismissed his appeal and notified him, again at the same address, that the decision of the UAC could be appealed to this court within 30 days. Guerrero has timely appealed from that decision.

Guerrero argues here that he was never accorded an opportunity to defend his claim for benefits and that he never received a response to his claim for benefits. We therefore reject the UAC’s argument that Guerrero has never claimed lack of notice of the referee’s hearing and decision. While somewhat in-artfully stated, that is precisely what he argues here.

Under section 443.151(4)(b)3 of the Florida Statutes, an aggrieved party has twenty days after mailing or delivery of a referee’s decision to initiate an appeal with the UAC. Failure to perfect an appeal within twenty days subjects a claim to dismissal under Florida Administrative Code Rule 60BB-7.006. There are no good cause exceptions to this dismissal rule. See Espinosa v. Cableoptics, Inc., 807 So.2d 195, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Creech v. Orlando Leasing Sys., 765 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Linderman v. K.B. Beach Suites, Ltd. PTR, 751 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Delgado v. Concentrated Chem. Co., 644 So.2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Florida State University v. Jenkins, 323 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Where, however, a party claims that a referee’s decision was either untimely mailed or not received, appellate courts have held, on due process grounds, that the claimant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness issue. Applegate v. National Health Care Affiliates, Inc., 667 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(re-ma.nding on due process grounds for an evidentiary hearing on whether a decision was timely mailed and received); Landrum v. James Rummer Timber Harvesting, Inc., 645 So.2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)(remanding on due process grounds for an evidentiary hearing on whether claimant timely received a referee’s decision); Robinson v. Morrison, Inc., 501 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(remanding for a hearing to determine whether claimant received notice of a decision).

Guerrero claims that he never received notice of the initial referee’s hearing or the referee’s decision. In order to ensure that Guerrero received procedural due process, we remand for an evidentiary hearing. If it is determined that Guerrero did not receive notice of the decision, he should be afforded the opportunity to appeal and if he received no notice of the hearing before the referee, to present his case.

Reversed and remanded.

      . The UAC should note that Guerrero requires a translator and that one should be provided for the evidentiary hearing. The UAC is also urged to provide sufficient notice, at least two weeks, of the evidentiary hearing.


text:
    T.Y., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D02-3368.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Billie Jan Goldstein, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Marni A. Bryson, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill.2d 158, 11 Ill.Dec. 262, 368 N.E.2d 870 (1977), cited in B.S. v. State, 548 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); cf. B.S., 548 So.2d at 838.


text:
    Bennie Lee PEARSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 02-1762.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
    Bennie Lee Pearson, in proper person.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

      Before GERSTEN, GODERICH, and GREEN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Spaziano, 692 So.2d 174 (Fla.1997).


author: PER CURIAM. TORPY, J.,

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Dewann L. BROWN, Appellee.
    No. 5D02-1610.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Allison Havens, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See State v. McCloud, 721 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

THOMPSON and PALMER, JJ., concur.

TORPY, J., concurs specially with opinion.

TORPY, J.,

concurring specially.

I concur in the result, but not based upon the authority cited by the majority. Appellant originally pled guilty to grand theft of a motor vehicle, a felony of the third degree, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement under which the state nolle prossed two other counts. His criminal punishment code scoresheet reflected total sentence points of 30.2, which equated to a non-state prison sanction. The trial court imposed a county jail sentence, for which Appellant was credited for time served, followed by probation. Appellant apparently was not a model probationer. The sentence that is the subject of this appeal was imposed after Appellant’s third probation violation. On resentencing, Appellant’s total sentence points, as reflected on the criminal punishment code worksheet equaled 48.2, requiring that a 15.15 month prison sentence be imposed unless grounds for departure existed. Instead of imposing a prison sentence, however, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 90 days in the county jail and terminated his probation. The trial judge gave as his written reason for departure that Appellant was sentenced as a “youthful offender.” Indeed, Appellant was 20 years old at the time the motor vehicle theft occurred.

On appeal, the state suggests that the trial judge’s ground for departure was section 921.0026(2)(k), Florida Statutes, (2002), which permits departure when a defendant is “too young to appreciate the consequences of the offense.” The briefs make much of the issue of whether Appellant was indeed too young to appreciate the consequences of his actions. As a result, the majority bases its decision to affirm the trial court on State v. McCloud, 721 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), which involved the use of section 921.0026(2)(k) as a departure ground. In my view, the trial judge clearly did not use this ground as a basis for departure, notwithstanding the positions taken by the attorneys in their briefs.

The sentencing scoresheet signed by the trial judge states very clearly that departure is based on “youthful offender,” which is a separate mitigating circumstance set forth in section 921.0026(Z), Florida Statutes, (2002). The “youthful offender” designation clearly applies to Appellant because he was less than 21 years of age at the time the crime was committed. § 958.04(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). Under these circumstances, the trial court could have departed at the time Appellant originally pled to the crime of grand theft motor vehicle. Because the court could have originally imposed a youthful offender sentence, it was authorized to impose a youthful offender sentence upon the violation of probation. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat., (2002); See Mearns v. State, 779 So.2d 282 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) (after revoking defendant’s probation, trial court is free to impose any sentence it might have originally imposed before placing him on probation). The court’s stated ground for departure, therefore, was appropriate.

      . The trial judge could have reached the same sentencing result without having to depart if he had chosen to modify the probation, add the county jail time as a probation condition and then terminate the probation after the jail time was completed. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat., (2002).


author: SHARP, W., J.

text:
    FLORIDA HOSPITAL WATERMAN, Petitioner, v. Theresa STOLL and Ronald Stoll, Respondents.
    No. 5D02-1053.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2003.

      Larry D. Hall and Brian D. Equi of Hill, Adams, Hall & Schieffelin, P.A., Winter Park, for Petitioner.
    Brent C. Miller and Thomas D. Hippel-heuser of the Law Office of Brent C. Miller, P.A., Leesburg, for Respondents.
   ON PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, CLARIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

SHARP, W., J.

We deny the motions for rehearing, clarification, and certification filed by petitioner Florida Hospital Waterman. Nevertheless, we withdraw our November 8, 2002 opinion and substitute the following opinion, which more fully explains our reasons for denying Florida Hospital Waterman’s request for certiorari review.

In this medical malpractice case, petitioner Florida Hospital Waterman, the defendant below, seeks a writ of certiorari from this court to overturn the trial court’s order which in essence rejected its claim that the statute of limitations had expired before the respondent Theresa Stoll, the plaintiff below, provided a verified written medical expert opinion as mandated by the pre-suit screening statute. We conclude the Hospital failed to timely raise this issue and thus waived the statute of limitations defense.

The chronology of this case, as established by the record, is essential to our analysis. Theresa Stoll was a patient at the Hospital, which is located in Lake County, Florida, from March 6 through March 10, 1998. On March 9, 1998, fluid from an IV line infiltrated her arm beyond the blood vessels and allegedly caused her personal injuries. Stoll contacted an attorney who had her request a copy of her medical records from the Hospital on April 17,1998.

In August 1999, Stoll’s attorney sent a letter to the Hospital stating he was willing to resolve the matter without litigation for 2.5 million dollars. The Hospital responded by stating it intended to avail itself of the protections afforded under the Medical Malpractice Reform Act and specifically the 90-day presuit discovery period.

On June 2, 2000, Stoll’s attorney sent the Hospital a notice of intent to sue for medical malpractice:

Please be advised that Theresa Stoll intends to commence litigation against you for injuries sustained in relation to her March 1998 treatment at your facility. Ms.Stoll was treated for gastrointestinal bleeding first in your emergency room and later as an admitted patient. A part of her treatment consisted of blood transfusions and IV therapy. During the course of the transfusions and TV therapy fluid infiltrated into her arm on a massive scale causing injury to the muscles, nerves, veins, arteries and other aspects of her right arm.
Your staff failed to properly monitor the blood transfusion and IV treatments and further failed to detect and take corrective actions when the infiltration was discovered. All of these acts are below the applicable standard of medical care.
As a result of your staffs failure to properly treat my client she has sustained permanent injury to her right arm. Ms. Stoll has suffered a throm-bosed cephalic vein and has developed related problems from this including but not limited to Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy, thrombophlebitis of the cephalic vein, post phelbitic syndrome and pain in her arm, neck, back and shoulders. In addition, Ms. Stoll has suffered loss of income and earning ability, and has and will incurred (sic) medical expenses for treatment of the injury caused by your staff.
I am enclosing the affidavits of Dr. Gabor Kovacs and Patricia Beare, R.N., Ph.D. as corroborative opinions.

The corroborating opinion from Dr. Ko-vacs, a physician in New Jersey, was in the form of a letter to Stoll’s attorney. The letter was notarized by a New Jersey notary public but was not stated as sworn to by Dr. Kovacs, nor did he attempt to verify his opinion. In this letter, Dr. Kovacs concluded: “the failure to closely monitor and to immediately discontinue the intravenous catheter at the time when it infiltrated fails to meet the accepted standard of medical care. As a result of this failure the patient has suffered thrombophlebitis of her cephalic vein along with edema and post phlebitic syndrome of her right upper extremity.”

The other corroborating opinion was from Patricia Beare, a registered nurse and nursing professor from Louisiana. Dr. Beare concluded: “it is my opinion that as a direct result of the substandard care described above, Stoll experienced a substantial amount of blood and/or fluid loss into the right arm resulting in pain, weakness, and injury to the veins of the right arm.” Her opinion did not have a completed notary certificate establishing an oath was administered; nor did she verify her opinion in any manner.

On June 19, 2000, the Hospital acknowledged receipt of the notice of intent to sue. The Hospital noted Stoll’s claim involved damages that allegedly occurred in March of 1998, which was then beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence claims, and requested documentation that the statute of limitations had not run. The Hospital also asked for informal discovery as provided in section 766.106, including tax returns filed by Stoll since 1993.

Stoll’s attorney informed the Hospital he filed a petition for extension pursuant to chapter 766 and this claim was well -within the statute of limitations. He provided some of the medical information requested but felt Stoll’s tax returns were not relevant since she was not working prior to her hospitalization, in March of 1998.

On August 27, 2000, the Hospital requested Stoll’s chiropractic records and documentation of Stoll’s educational and employment history to support her claims for loss of income and earning ability. The Hospital also noted it had written off $14,627.89 in hospital and outside provider charges and bills as a goodwill gesture. Stoll’s attorney replied he had given the ■Hospital all of Stoll’s chiropractic records and that Stoll had been looking for work in the food service field.

On August 30, 2000, the Hospital sent Stoll’s attorney a letter stating that, after investigation, it rejected Stoll’s claim: “We have also had the case reviewed by an appropriate medical expert; and it is our finding that Florida Hospital Waterman and its nursing personnel provided appropriate care and treatment to Theresa Stoll, including their monitoring of her IV sites and response to the infiltration (which is a known risk of IV therapy) ...” The Hospital attached an affidavit from a registered nurse to support its rejection of Stoll’s claim.

On September 5, 2000, Stoll and her husband filed this medical malpractice action against the Hospital in Orange County. The complaint alleged in part:

11.Defendant, Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc., is vicariously liable for the acts/omissions of its staff and employees and agents, actual, apparent, ostensible, or otherwise, whom discovery reveals may have been negligent in the care and treatment of Theresa Stoll.
12. Defendant, Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. is directly liable for inadequate staffing and/or negligent hiring which may be uncovered as the case progresses.
13. Defendant, Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. is further directly liable for any non-conformities with Florida Statute § 766.110 including, but not limited to: Assuring the competence of its medical staff and personnel; selecting and retaining competent medical staff and personnel; diligently supervising its medical staff and personnel; adopting adequate written procedures for the selection of medical staff and personnel; performing periodic reviews of the medical care rendered by each member of its medical staff; and selecting and retaining competent doctors, although those doctors may be independent practitioners.
14. At some point in time between the initial admission to Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. and March 9, 2000(sic) fluid infiltrated into arm beyond the blood vessels and began to cause injury to Theresa Stoll.
15. Upon initial discovery of infiltration of the fluids Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc.’s staff and employees failed to diagnose and properly treat the infiltration causing further injury.

On or about October 4, 2000, the Hospital moved to dismiss and/or strike the complaint. First, the Hospital alleged Stoll’s attorney failed to provide information to support his client’s claims for loss of income and earning ability despite its repeated requests for such information. The Hospital asserted it was effectively denied the ability to evaluate the merits of the claim and the complaint should be dismissed for the unreasonable failure of Stoll’s attorney to cooperate during the pre-suit investigation.

Next, in the event the complaint was not dismissed, the Hospital requested all allegations of negligence “unrelated to issues involving detection and corrective actions regarding IV infiltration” be stricken from the complaint. The Hospital claimed Stoll’s counsel failed to put it on notice of other allegedly negligent acts during the pre-suit investigation as required by section 766.106(2). According to the Hospital, no mention was made in Stoll’s notice of intent of the claim for negligent staffing, hiring, credentialing and/or negligent supervision as alleged in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the complaint. Finally, the Hospital moved to strike Stoll’s request for attorney’s fees for failure to allege a statutory or contractual right to such fees.

Nowhere in this motion did the Hospital allege the corroborating opinions from Dr. Kovacs and Dr. Beare were insufficient or defective or that they failed to comply with the pre-suit requirements.

At the same time, the Hospital also moved to dismiss for improper venue or to transfer the case to the appropriate venue (Lake County). About a month later, on November 3, 2000, the trial court granted this motion and transferred the ease to Lake County.

At a hearing on June 25, 2001 concerning the merits of its motion to dismiss, the Hospital, apparently for the first time, orally attacked the plaintiffs’ June 2, 2000 notice of intent to sue on the basis that the corroborating medical opinions were insufficient. The Hospital argued the letter from Dr. Kovacs was not verified and the opinion from Dr. Beare was not notarized.

The Hospital then argued the grounds discussed above which it raised in its motion to dismiss/strike. The Hospital also argued the causes of action were “mixed up with one another” and the complaint should be repled.

In response, Stoll’s attorney argued Dr. Kovacs’ letter was properly notarized pursuant to New Jersey law and was “impliedly” verified because it was signed in the presence of the notary. However, he agreed with the Hospital the complaint should be amended to separate the causes of action. He also agreed to drop the claim for attorney’s fees.

The court indicated it would permit Stoll to amend the complaint and to obtain a properly verified statement from Dr. Ko-vacs. The Hospital pointed out there may be a problem with the verification since the alleged medical malpractice took place in March of 1998, more than three years ago. Since the trial court found the supporting documents were not verified, the Hospital asked the court to dismiss the complaint “perhaps without prejudice.” The Hospital’s motion to dismiss was granted without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Stoll’s attorney obtained an affidavit from Dr. Kovacs on July 27, 2001 and filed it with the court on August 3, 2001. Stoll’s attorney also filed a first amended complaint and a second amended complaint. The Hospital again moved to dismiss or strike Stoll's complaints. The trial court granted some relief to the Hospital but did not dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The Hospital now seeks certio-rari review arguing the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in failing to dismiss Stoll’s complaint as barred by the statute of limitations for medical negligence because the two medical opinions required by the statute were not properly verified.

Chapter 766 sets out a complex presuit investigation procedure that both the claimant and defendant must follow before a medical negligence claim may be filed in court. Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278 (Fla.1996). Prior to issuing a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice lawsuit, the claimant must conduct an investigation to ascertain there are reasonable grounds to believe that any named defendant in the litigation was negligent and that such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. §§ 766.104(1), 766.203(2). After completing the presuit investigation and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, the claimant must notify each prospective defendant of his or her intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. Section 766.203(2) requires the claim be corroborated by at least one “verified written medical expert opinion” which must be furnished by the claimant.

Compliance with the presuit requirements is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice action. However, failure to comply does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Hospital Corporation of America v. Lindberg, 571 So.2d 446 (Fla.1990). The failure to comply with the presuit requirements is not fatal to a plaintiffs claim so long as compliance is accomplished within the statute of limitations period. Kukral.

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. However, chapter 766 provides numerous extensions. See § 766.104(2); § 766.106(3)(a); § 766.106(4). The Hospital calculates the statute of limitations expired in this case on December 13, 2000, shortly after it was transferred to Lake County and well before Stolls’ attorney obtained the affidavit from Dr. Kovacs on July 27, 2001.

Although compliance with the pre-suit requirements is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice action, the failure to comply may be excused upon a showing of estoppel or waiver. Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So.2d 223 (Fla.1991). In that case, the Ingersolls filed a dental malpractice suit against Howard Hoffman. The following day, they amended the complaint to join as a defendant Howard’s brother, Warren Hoffman, and ultimately dismissed Howard from the suit. On the day of trial, Warren filed a motion to dismiss, alleging he had not been served with a notice of intent to initiate litigation for malpractice.

Apparently the only notice of intent had been sent to Howard. The trial court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds for failure to provide the notice of intent. The district court of appeal affirmed and certified the question whether the failure to comply with the presuit requirements deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, or whether the lack of such notice may be excused by a showing of estoppel or waiver.

The Florida Supreme Court held the failure to follow the presuit requirements is not jurisdictional. The court also held Hoffman waived the Ingersolls’ failure to comply by failing to timely raise the issue:

The amended complaint contained a specific allegation that the Ingersolls had complied with all conditions precedent to the filing of the suit.In his answer, Warren Hoffman made only a general denial of the allegation of compliance with all conditions precedent. The answer contained no reference to the Ingersolls’ failure to comply with section 768.57 [renumbered as § 766.106]....
We do not suggest that under appropriate circumstances a defendant could not amend the answer so as to specifically deny the performance of a condition precedent. The test as to whether an amendment to a pleading should be allowed is whether the amendment will prejudice the other side.... Had Hoffman timely raised the defense of failure to follow the requirements of section 768.57, the Ingersolls could have attempted to comply with the statute within the period of the statute of limitations. An amendment to Hoffman’s pleadings after the statute of limitations had run would have unfairly prejudiced the Ingersolls.

589 So.2d at 224-225.

Here the Hospital’s October 4, 2000 motion to dismiss or strike the Stolls’ complaint raised only the following grounds: the failure of Stoll’s attorney to provide information regarding his client’s claim for economic damages; the lack of notice of the claim for negligent hiring and staffing; and the lack of a basis to support a claim for attorney’s fees. The motion did not allege the corroborating opinions from Dr. Kovacs or Dr. Beare were defective. Nor did the Hospital allege Stoll failed to comply with the statutory requirement to provide a “verified” medical expert opinion. Had the Hospital raised these concerns in its motion, the Stolls could have complied before the statute of limitations expired, that is, by December 13, 2000.

Because the Hospital did not raise any issue concerning the adequacy of the corroborating opinions until the June 21, 2001 hearing, which was more than six months after filing its motion to dismiss, and also after the expiration of the limitations period, we conclude the Hospital, like Hoffman, waived compliance in this case by failing to timely raise the issue in its motion to dismiss and/or strike. Ingersoll.

We distinguish this case from Royle v. Florida Hospital-East Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 689 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1997), because Royle did not involve the issue of waiver. In that case, the defendant healthcare providers objected to the lack of a verified medical expert opinion at their first opportunity. After the plaintiff filed her medical negligence complaint, one defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and the other defendant moved for summary judgment. Both defendants contended the relief requested was warranted because the plaintiff failed to provide corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence litigation by the submission of a verified written medical expert opinion.

The opinion in Royle does not state exactly when the statute of limitations had expired — only that it had expired by the time the trial court ruled on those motions. In this case, the Hospital failed to raise the verification issue in its October 2000 motion to dismiss/strike (when the statute of limitations had not yet expired) and raised the issue only orally at the June 2001 hearing (after the statute of limitations had expired). To allow the Hospital to “amend” its motion to dismiss by including this new ground for relief after the statute of limitations had expired, would have unfairly prejudiced the Stolls. Ingersoll.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED.

GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.

      . § 766.106, Fla. Stat.

      . The Hospital also claimed Stoll’s brief response that she was looking for work in the food service area was inadequate and not in good-faith.

      . The statutes requiring that claimants provide a verified written medical expert opinion in a medical malpractice action do not mention notarization, the requirement being "verification.” Royle v. Florida Hospital-East Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 689 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1997); Mieles v. South Miami Hosp., 659 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Section 92.525 provides that verification may be accomplished by either an oath taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths, such as a notary, or by the signing of the written declaration prescribed in subsection two. As noted above, neither Dr. Kovacs' letter nor Dr. Beare's opinion had a completed notary certificate establishing that an oath had been administered, nor did they contain words of verification pursuant to section 95.525(2), Florida Statutes.

      . Certiorari is appropriate to review an order denying a motion to dismiss which claims the presuit requirements of chapter 766 have not been met. Central Florida Regional Hospital v. Hill, 721 So.2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So.2d 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).


author: PER CURIAM. GRIFFIN, J.,

text:
    Jerome MORANCY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D03-2614.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
    Jerome Morancy, Orlando, Pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Jackson v. State, 847 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). We disagree with Green v. State, 839 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and certify conflict.

SHARP, W., and TORPY, JJ., concur.

GRIFFIN, J., concurring specially, with opinion.

GRIFFIN, J.,

concurring specially.

Actually, I do not disagree with Green. My own view, like that of Judge Sawaya, is that Hersey v. State, 831 So.2d 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), was wrongly decided, but since it is the law of this district, we must follow it. Pena v. State, 853 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Fillyaw v. State, 853 So.2d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    GLA AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a Florida corporation and Athena Condominium Association, Inc., a Florida not-for-profit company, Appellants, v. The CITY OF BOCA RATON, Appellee.
    No. 4D02-1051.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 8, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 2003.

      Robert A. Sweetapple and Alex Varkas of Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, Boca Raton, for appellant.
    Jamie Alan Cole and Matthew H. Man-del of Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza & Guedes, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Diana Grub Frieser, Boca Raton, for appellee The City of Boca Raton.
    Teri L. Donaldson, Betsy Hewitt and Charles T. Collette, Tallahassee, for Ami-cus Curiae Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

WARNER, J.

We deny the motions for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place.

GLA and Associates, Inc. (“GLA”), a residential developer of condominiums, challenges the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the City of Boca Raton (“the City”) and holding constitutional a city ordinance that requires a city permit for activities conducted seaward of the established coastal construction control line. The court held that GLA was collaterally estopped because GLA’s predecessor in title previously litigated the same issue, and the court found in favor of the City. It also determined that the city ordinance is not preempted by Chapter 161 of the Florida Statutes, and that the ordinance is not unconstitutional for lacking adequate criteria to be considered upon an application for a variance. We agree and affirm.

GLA is the developer of a residential condominium on beachfront property owned by Athena Condominium Association, Inc. in Boca Raton. In January of 1999, GLA applied to the Department of Environmental Protection of the State of Florida (“DEP”) for a permit to rehabilitate a beach dune, to conduct general landscaping activities, and to build a concrete walkway and wooden dune walkover structure, all seaward of the state coastal control line (“CCL”). The “rehabilitation” of the dune sought to lower the dune along GLA’s property by three feet. After review, the DEP approved the permit, finding “no significant adverse impacts to the beach/dune areas or to adjacent properties.” A condition of the permit required GLA to “obtain any applicable license or permits which may be required by federal, state, county, or municipal law.” (Emphasis added).

Without obtaining a permit from the city, GLA commenced its activities on the dune, including the removal of exotic vegetation. As it began to contour the dune to the lower permitted elevations, the City cited GLA for violating specific provisions of the City’s ordinances. City ordinance section 28-1556(3) provides in pertinent part: “[N]o person shall construct any structure whatsoever seaward of the county coastal construction control line as established by the department of natural resources ... [or] make any excavation, remove any beach materials or otherwise alter existing ground elevations seaward thereof.” The ordinance defines “excavation” as the “removal of soil, sand or vegetation by the process of digging, scooping or hollowing out.” Boca Raton, Fla., Code of Ordinances § 28-1556(2X1999). In addition, a “structure” includes “anything constructed or erected, the use of which requires a fixed location on the ground.” Id. A dune walkover would qualify as a structure.

To comply with the City’s ordinances, GLA submitted an application for approval of its dune rehabilitation work, without waiving its right to challenge the ordinance. Although the City’s staff approved the native species landscaping plan, the City Council eventually denied approval because of the reduction of the dune elevation. Based upon the City’s denial of approval, the DEP revoked GLA’s state permit.

GLA filed suit claiming the City ordinance was preempted by state law, specifically the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (“the Act”), Chapter 161, Florida Statutes. The Act provides that once the CCL is established, as it was in this case, “no person ... shall ... make any excavation, remove any beach material, or otherwise alter existing ground elevations” except in compliance with the statute. § 161.053(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). For any such work on a dune, a permit issued by the DEP is required. See § 161.053(5). GLA maintained that the City’s ordinance, which requires a permit to perform exea-vation, is impliedly preempted by the Act, which provides in part, “Any ... coastal municipality may establish coastal construction zoning and building codes in lieu of the provisions of this section, provided such zones and codes are approved by the department as being adequate to preserve and protect the beaches and coastal barrier dunes adjacent to such beaches....” § 161.058(4). That section also permits local administration of established CCLs “where desired by local interests and where such local interests have, in the judgment of the department, sufficient funds and personnel to adequately administer the program.” Id. (emphasis added). GLA argued that because the DEP never approved the City’s ordinance or “certified” the City’s competence to permit coastal work, only the state provisions should apply. GLA also alleged that although the ordinance provided for the ability to obtain variances from its terms, it included no standards to guide the City in granting variances to the setback.

In answering GLA’s complaint, the City contended both that its ordinance was not preempted and that GLA’s suit was barred by collateral estoppel. GLA’s predecessor in title, Booties, Inc. (“Booties”), brought an action against the City in.1996 seeking a declaratory judgment that Chapter 161 preempted the City from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Ordinance section 28-1556 over the permitting of structures seaward of the state’s CCL. In the earlier litigation, Booties’ application for the construction of a swimming pool seaward of the CCL was denied by the City. In that case, the court ruled that the ordinance did not violate the requirements of state law, nor did state law preempt the city from regulating construction seaward of the CCL because a conflict did not exist between the ordinance and state law.

The trial court entered summary final judgment against GLA after determining GLA was collaterally estopped from litigating the preemption and inconsistency arguments already decided in the Booties litigation. The court further determined that Chapter 161 did not preempt the City from regulating seaward of the CCL because the Act and the ordinance are not inconsistent. Finally, it found that Chapter 28 of the City Code provided sufficient criteria for the consideration of variance applications requested under section 28-1556 to pass constitutional muster. From this judgment, GLA appeals.

We first agree that the Booties litigation collaterally estopped GLA from raising its preemption and inconsistency claims. In its reply brief, GLA concedes that the Booties litigation “was exactly the same except that Booties was predicated on a different permit and was never appealed.” These distinctions are meaningless where GLA admits that both cases tested the facial validity of the ordinance. With no real explanation, GLA simply suggests that this court need only give the prior litigation “appropriate regard” as opposed to preclusive effect.

The doctrine of collateral estop-pel,

[PJrevents identical parties from relit-igating the same issues that have already been decided. The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1995) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977)). Here, Booties, GLA’s immediate predecessor in title raised the same claims regarding the City’s authority to regulate activities seaward of the dune. Although Booties sought to build a swimming pool and GLA sought to excavate the dune, each raised facial challenges to the ordinance itself. As GLA neither contests its privity with Booties nor contests the fact that identical issues were raised and decided in each suit, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies and precludes the relitigation of the issues raised in this suit.

Even if collateral estoppel does not apply, the Act does not preempt the city ordinance. GLA may argue only that the Act impliedly preempts the City ordinance, because there is no express preemption in the statutory language. “Implied preemption should be found to exist only in cases where the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted by the Legislature.” Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 1075 (Fla.1984); Hillsborough County v. Fla. Rest. Ass’n, 603 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). Additionally, “[t]he scope of the preemption should also be limited to the specific area where the Legislature has expressed their will to be the sole regulator.” Id. (citing St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, 583 So.2d 635 (Fla.1991)) (determining “the existence of one funding mechanism by the Legislature does not preclude the county from adopting additional funding mechanisms”); Santa Rosa County v. Gulf Power Co., 635 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (concluding “the existence of a pervasive scheme of regulation by the Legislature over an electric utility does not preclude the county from adopting a franchise fee for the use of county right-of-way”).

GLA contends that such preemption is shown by section 161.053(4), which allows local regulation “in lieu of’ the statute’s provisions only where such local regulation has been approved by the DEP and where the local government has sufficient funds and expertise to preserve the dune and beaches. However, GLA overlooks section 161.053(5)(b) which provides for exceptions by which the DEP may permit structures seaward of the CCL. It states:

If in the immediate contiguous or adjacent area a number of existing structures have established a reasonably continuous and uniform construction line closer to the line of mean high water than the foregoing ... a proposed structure may, at the discretion of the department, be permitted along such line.... However, the department shall not contravene setback requirements or zoning or building codes established by a county or municipality which are equal to, or more strict than, those requirements provided herein.

(Emphasis added). As the DEP states in its amicus brief in support of the position that the City’s ordinance is not preempted by the statute, “the Department has always interpreted the provisions of Chapter 161 in this manner, i.e., as allowing local setback ordinances such as Boca Raton’s. Indeed, state law expressly requires deference to such local setback requirements. See § 161.053(5)(b).” We give considerable deference to the DEP’s position, as it is the agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing these regulations. See Fla. Interexchange Carriers Ass’n v. Clark, 678 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla.1996); 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. State Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 824 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Here, the City’s ordinance is more strict in that it prohibits excavation of the dune where the state would apparently permit it. Therefore, the statute neither preempts the ordinance nor is in conflict with it.

Appellant cites to Town of Palm Beach v. State Department of Natural Resources, 577 So.2d 1388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and Pace v. Board of Adjustment, Town of Jupiter Island, 492 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), as support for its position. Both cases are distinguishable. In Town of Palm Beach, the municipality was challenging the DEP’s determination that it had no jurisdiction regarding the maintenance of vegetation seaward of the dune. We held that under the regulations, the DEP had authority to regulate such activity where it materially affected the dune. See 577 So.2d at 1386. The issue of whether municipal ordinances were preempted by the existence of such authority was not an issue in the case. In Pace we held that the “pervasive” authority of the state over the beaches and dune system as expressed in Chapter 161 did not prevent the municipality from regulating landward of the CCL. See 492 So.2d at 415. In fact, we noted that the statute contained a provision allowing local zoning codes involving setbacks from the shoreline which were more strict than the state regulations. See id. As that is the case here, Pace does not support GLA’s position.

Finally, GLA contends that the ordinance does not contain any ascertainable standards or criteria to be followed in consideration of the variance applications. Ordinance 28-1556(4), which creates a procedure for obtaining a variance from the terms of the ordinance, does not contain the criteria to be followed when making a determination on an application for variance. Instead, these criteria are contained in City Code section 28-130(2). That section provides that the City may “grant variances from the requirements of this chapter” and includes the criteria to consider when deciding to grant variances from the zoning code. (Emphasis added). As the trial court found, because 28-1556 is part of the same chapter, the criteria included in 28-130 apply to variances sought under 28-1556(4).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final summary judgment of the trial court.

FARMER, C.J., and STONE, J., concur.


text:
    Ernest O. DOWNIE, Appellant, v. DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSES OF The STATE OF FLORIDA, and Fred O. Dickinson, Executive Director Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles and Sandra Lambert, Director Div. Driver Licenses and Rafael Madrigal Chief, Bureau of Administrative Reviews, Division of Driver Licenses and Jack L. Blackman, Field Hearing Officer, Division of Driver Licenses, Appellees.
    No. 4D02-4877.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 8, 2003.
    Ryan S. Grazi, Peter T. Gianino, and Joseph L. Gufford, III of Law Offices of Grazi & Gianino, Stuart, for appellant.

      Heather Rose Cramer, Lake Worth, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court order on summary judgment, pursuant to stipulation, on the authority of Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So.2d 782 (Fla.2003), and remand for further proceedings.

STONE, KLEIN, and MAY, JJ„ concur.


author: CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    Kirk W. LOURIM v. CENTRAL GULF LINES, INC., et al.
    Nos. 2003-CC-1510, 2003-CC-1566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 2, 2003.
   In re Central Gulf Lines Inc. et al; LMS Shipmanagement Inc.;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, Nos. 01-14014; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 03-C-0334, 2003-C-03555.

In re Assuranceforeningen Gard; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, Nos. 01-14014; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0355.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs with reasons.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

concurs in the denial of the writ applications and assigns reasons.

Although the defendants did not seek to have the district court’s partial summary judgment designated as immediately ap-pealable pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1915(B), they will have an adequate opportunity to appeal the partial summary judgment after the case is finally decided in the district court. See La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1915(B)(2).


text:
    In re Curtis J. CONEY, Jr.
    No. 2003-B-2477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 10, 2003.
   ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Curtis J. Coney, Jr., and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Curtis J. Coney, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 4270, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19, pending further orders of this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _ day of September, 2003.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Abraham MANHEIM. Liquidation of Manheim Antique Galleries an in Commendam Partnership.
    No. 2003-OC-1785.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 18, 2003.
   In re Cohen, Gayle Manheim; Weitz, Edward L.; Lipschutz, Sandra Weitz;— Other(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, Nos. 95-2276, 96-13670; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-CA-0282, 2002-CA-0283.

Granted. In the context of reviewing the October 31, 2002 judgment, the court of appeal will be called upon to consider the trial court’s finding that the April 18, 2001 judgment is final. Under these circumstances, the court of appeal was premature in acting on the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal granting the motion to dismiss is vacated and the court of appeal is ordered to refer the motion to the merits.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    B.J. PIPPEN, Jr. and Rhonda Pippen on Behalf of Morgan Pippen, Deceased v. MOREHOUSE GENERAL HOSPITAL and Dr. Mamdouh Mickail.
    No. 2003-CC-2358.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2003.
   In re Pippen, Rhonda; Pippen, B.J. Jr. et al.; — Plaintiffis); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of More-house, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-205; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38059-CW.

Writ granted. This case presents a very close issue on an evidentiary matter which is best left to the trial court’s great discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this matter is reversed, and the ruling of the trial court allowing into evidence testimony and/or records relating to defendant’s substance abuse treatment, with the appropriate limiting instructions as to its purpose, is reinstated.

VICTORY, J., would deny the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Judy L. TOLBERT.
    No. 2003-KK-2695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 26, 2003.
   In re Tolbert, Jody L.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 425-988; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-1695.

Denied.


text:
    UNITED COMPANIES LENDING CORPORATION v. The HUMBOLT CORPORATION and Patrick F. McGrew.
    No. 2003-OC-2702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 30, 2003.
   In re The Humbolt Corporation et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 462,968; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 2499.

Writ denied; stay denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Sullivan AMOS, IV.
    No. 2002-K-1547.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Amos, John Sullivan IV; — Defendant; Applying for Rehearing, of this Courts’ Action dated June 18, 2003; Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 312,283; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2024.

Rehearing denied.

CALOGERO, C. J., would grant the rehearing.


text:
    The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, INC. v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, and All other Persons, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Taxpayers Property Owners of the City of New Orleans; Non Resident Property Owners of the City of New Orleans et al.; Citizens of the City of New Orleans;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2003-3309; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0826.

Denied.


text:
    The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, INC. v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, and All Other Persons, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Taxpayers Property Owner of the City of New Orleans; Non Resident Property Owners of the City of New Orleans et al.; Citizens of the City of New Orleans;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2003-4001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0827.

Denied.


text:
    The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, INC. v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, and All Other Persons, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Taxpayers Property Owners of the City of New Orleans; Non Resident Property Owners of the City of New Orleans et al.; Citizens of the City of New Orleans;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2003-3309; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0826.

Denied.


text:
    The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, INC. v. ALL TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CITIZENS OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation Therein, and All Other Persons, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Taxpayers Property Owners of the City of New Orleans; Non Resident Property Owners of the City of New Orleans et al.; Citizens of the City of New Orleans;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2003-4001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0827.

Denied.


text:
    Steve MARSHALL and Lisa Marshall v. CAPITAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION and Nathaniel Causey Jr.
    No. 2003-C-2601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Capital Trans. Corp.; Causey, Nathaniel Jr.; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 477,794; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1018.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant for reasons assigned by Ciaccio in his dissent.


text:
    Josephine Musso MURDEN, et al. v. ACANDS, INC. et al.
    No. 2003-CC-2716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 2003.
   In re Maryland Casualty Company;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 99-12527; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1702.

Denied.


text:
    Brian CAMPBELL, et al. v. TORK, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-1341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Peake Motors Company, Inc.; Mid-Continent Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 489-773; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1247.

Granted.


text:
    James HOWARD v. WEST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2003-C-1426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Howard, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 28,377; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0803.

Granted.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darnell LEWIS.
    No. 2002-KK-1550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 430-648; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1069.

Granted. The decisions of the lower courts are hereby reversed. See State v. Byron C. Love, 02-3347 (La.5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198.

WEIMER, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David LEFEVRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lefevre, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-4225; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 02/ KA/0592, 00/KA/1142, 01/KA/1003.

Granted in part; otherwise denied. The proviso added by the court of appeal to the defendant’s sentence on count 2 for aggravated burglary, that the 30 year term will run without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is deleted. See La.R.S. 14:60. In all other respects, the court of appeal’s decision is affirmed and relator’s present application is denied.


text:
    Karen J. RICHARD, Individually and on Behalf of her Minor Child, Emily Richard v. Michael A. HALL, Screening Systems International, Louisiana Division, Inc., Allstate Insurance Company and Empire Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-1488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Richard, Karen J. Individually and on Behalf of her minor child; Richard, Emily; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 474r-953; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0366.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David LEFEVRE.
    No. 2002-KO-3231.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lefevre, David a/k/a; Lefevre, David; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-4425; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-592.

Granted in part; otherwise denied. The proviso added by the court of appeal to the defendant’s sentence on count 2 for aggravated burglary, that the 30-year term will run without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is deleted. See La.R.S. 14:60.

KNOLL, J., would deny.


text:
    In re Appeal of DISCIPLINARY BOARD DECISION NO. 2003-ADMIN-272.
    No. 2003-OB-1293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Hemmans, Charles A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 2003-ADMIN-272.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2002-ADMIN-717.
    No. 2003-OB-2431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Simon, J. Minos; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 02-ADMIN-717.

Denied.


text:
    Alton SENEGAL and Lena Broussard v. Steven T. CASTILLE and St. Christopher Childcare & Preschool Center.
    No. 2003-C-1593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 8, 2003.
   In re Senegal, Alton et al.; Broussard, Lena; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2001-4526-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1190.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    CLAIBORNE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. v. Ralph SLAUGHTER, Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-C-1609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Claiborne Electric Cooperative, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 389,828; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 1357.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bryant C. LARCE.
    No. 2002-K-0335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Larce, Bryant C.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 416-324; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1992.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Thomas, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 371-173; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 01 K 2270.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Walter JOHNSON.
    No. 2002-KO-1948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Walter; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 411-378; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2350.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Malachi CONNOLLY, III.
    No. 2002-KP-2171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Connolly, John Malachi III; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 92-134938.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne RODRIGUES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2185.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Rodrigues, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 94-2590; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02 KH 641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis A. GAAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Gaal, Dennis A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-4482; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-376.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stewart PRICE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Price, Stewart; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 386-504; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 331.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert E. LOVE Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Love, Jr., Robert E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 34,012.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raynard WEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re West, Raynard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 4-98-235, 4-98-236; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1219.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin MINGO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Mingo, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 8256; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0186.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Berwick REDMOND v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Berwick Redmond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 348-054; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1014.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael FAIRLEY.
    No. 2002-KO-2376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Fairley, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 421-858; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0378.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald SIMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Sims, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 98-849; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-772.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Albert VIERLING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2408.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Vierling, Albert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 79-269; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-879.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George MICK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Mick, George; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 492,677; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0674.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alonzo JASON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Jason, Alonzo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 391-437; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1289.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarion BAY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Bay, Jr., Clarion; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 34,592; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00351.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael TILLIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Tillie, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 389-852; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0998.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2427.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Ronald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 348-104; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1256.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William J. MCINTYRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re McIntyre, William; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 297857; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0446.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric P. WOLFE a/k/a Steven Burbank v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 2002-KH-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Wolfe, Eric P. a/k/a; Burbank, Steven; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 400-603; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1245.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alonzo JASON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Jason, Alonzo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 391-437; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1289.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frank RADECKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-CI-2525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Radecker, Frank; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 471,531; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2173.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Artmore WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Wilson, Artmore; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 279779; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW1443.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marshall T. BACHELOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Bachelor, Marshall T.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 8750811; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,-478-KA.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael LOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lott, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. S, Nos. 97-0229, 91-5977; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-109.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Smith, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 350-833; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1260.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ray RATTLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Rattler, Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 304-693; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1484.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2546.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 8-93-883; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 0408.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roxanne C. WESTMORELAND v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2552.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Westmoreland, Roxanne C.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. OX-1299; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-845.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jemetric DEBROW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Debrow, Jemetric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 186019; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36680-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory S. BRADLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Bradly, Gregory S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 420-824; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1662.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Telly GUILLORY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Guillory, Telly; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St.' Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 93K1226; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00143.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ron Kirk THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Thompson, Ron Kirk; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 47662, 47663, 47664; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36639-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Herbert WOMACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Womack, Herbert;-Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 248-192.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald Ray JAMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re James, Donald Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 390-919; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1581.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcella LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lewis, Marcella; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 33005; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36722-KH.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alan B. AILLET.
    No. 2002-K-2586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Aillet, Alan B.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 01-2925; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1675.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., to grant and remand.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cathy JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Cathy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 94-5733; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-875.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher WATSON.
    No. 2002-KK-2896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 378-073; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0939.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dana MILES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-3140.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Miles, Dana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 4-97-133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1417.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reynard STEWART.
    No. 2002-K-3141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Stewart, Reynard; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 429-410; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1742.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Danny LEE.
    No. 2002-KP-3166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lee, Danny; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 94-140,004, 99-151,291; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1906.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Rickey ROBICHAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-3192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Robichaux, Rickey; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 304,551; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2047.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Levon TAYLOR.
    No. 2002-KO-3232.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Taylor, Michael Levon; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 327664; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0140.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael MILLER.
    No. 2002-KO-3233.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Miller, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 332641; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0752.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph CARTER.
    No. 2003-KO-0001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Carter, Joseph; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-00-737; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0681.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earl Blake YOUNG.
    No. 2003-KO-0003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Young, Earl Blake; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 67,612, 62,199; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0979.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David L. WILSON.
    No. 2003-KO-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Wilson, David L.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 03-00-682; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0757.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-KO-0036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Williams, Louis; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 386-515; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1815.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Damian WOODS.
    No. 2003-KO-0055.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Woods, Damian; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 404-217; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1995.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ty COLLINS.
    No. 2003-KO-0059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Collins, Ty; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-0431; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-546.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dennis John ROY.
    No. 2003-KO-0088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Roy, Dennis John; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 02-00-264; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0147.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Philip FOSTER.
    No. 2003-K-0775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 1-01-635; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 1259.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph J. SANDOVAL.
    No. 2003-K-0853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Sandoval, Joseph J.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 00-3293; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-230.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmy LAM.
    No. 2003-K-0945.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lam, Jimmy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 207-052; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,862-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin Lamont JONES.
    No. 2003-K-0956.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Kevin Lamont Jones; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 215,105; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,553-KA.

Denied.


text:
    NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA v. Burt HARRINGTON, et al. Mary Electa LeBlanc v. Chrysler Corporation, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Harrington, Burt et al.; Progressive Security Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 97-5278, 97-5366; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 02-832, 02-833.

Denied.


text:
    NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA v. Burt HARRINGTON, et al. Mary Electa LeBlanc v. Chrysler Corporation, et al.
    No. 2003-C-1403.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Daimler-Chrysler Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 97-5278, 97-5366; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 02-832, 02-833.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas L. GARDNER.
    No. 2003-KK-1490.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Gardner, Thomas L.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 67,663; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1506.

Denied.


text:
    Louann A. MUNDEN, Individually and as Executrix of the Succession of Donn Wiederhold, and as Natural Tutrix of the Estate of the Minor Child, Mason Andrew Munden v. The STATE of Louisiana, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, Medical Review Panel, Mark C. Drennan, Commissioner of Administration, State of Louisiana and the State of Louisiana, Through the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University on Behalf of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans—University Campus.
    No. 2003-C-1532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Louisiana State of, et al; Division of Administration; Medical Review Panel; Drennan, Mark C. Commissioner of Administration; Louisiana State University Board of Supv. of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College; Medical Center of Louisiana at N.O. University Campus; LSU Health Care Services Division; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 482,342; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2326.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Roger BOBBITT.
    No. 2003-KK-1534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Bobbitt, James Roger; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 113,681, 113,682; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37570-KW, 37571-KW.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Juana Alicia BARE v. James KING & Sheila King.
    No. 2003-C-1535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re King, James; King, Sheila; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 38,286; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1225.

Denied.


text:
    Rhonda N. RYLAND v. ST. MARY’S RESIDENTIAL TRAINING SCHOOL.
    No. 2003-C-1536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re St. Mary’s Residential Training School; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, Dist.-2, No. 00-09802; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0027.

Denied.


text:
    Tanya HANKS, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Nicholas Hanks v. COLUMBIA WOMEN’S & CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, Francis J. Cardinale, M.D., and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-CC-1537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Hanks, Tanya et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2000-3918; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1433.

Denied.


text:
    Sam NELKEN, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Thru the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2003-C-1538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Louisiana State of; Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,662; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-0036.

Denied.


text:
    Wade T. VERGES v. Donna Swisshelm VERGES.
    No. 2003-CC-1551.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 3, 2003.
   In re Lea, Paul M. D.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 94-11670; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-2716.

Denied.