author: hPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Glynn W. REYNOLDS.
    No. 2002-B-1716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from six counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Glynn W. Reynolds, a currently disbarred attorney.

FORMAL CHARGES

Count I — The Eason Matter

In April 1986, Ama Eason paid respondent $150 to handle a stock transfer. Respondent failed to complete the representation and failed to communicate with his client concerning the matter. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

In May 1997, Mrs. Eason filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On June 2, 1997, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at his primary registration statement address. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

\9Count II — The Fontenot Matter

In January 1997, Larry Fontenot paid respondent $600 to handle a child custody matter. Respondent failed to complete the representation and failed to communicate with his client concerning the matter. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

In May 1997, Mr. Fontenot filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On June 18, 1997, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at his primary registration statement address. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

Count III — The Jones Matter

In February 1996, Carol Jones retained respondent to handle a Social Security disability and/or workers’ compensation matter. Respondent failed to complete the representation, failed to communicate with his client, and refused to return Ms. Jones’ file to her.

In July 1997, Ms. Jones filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On September 4, 1997, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at his primary registration statement address. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

Count IV — The Criminal Convictions

On February 23,1999, respondent pleaded guilty in the Ninth Judicial District Court to one count of theft of currency in excess of $500, a violation of La. R.S. | s14:67. The charge stemmed from respondent’s handling of a succession matter. See State v. Reynolds, 99-1847 (La.App. 3rd Cir.6/7/00), 772 So.2d 128. In addition, respondent pleaded guilty to other unrelated charges, including forgery, unauthorized use of a movable, and issuing worthless checks. According to the transcript of the plea colloquy, the forgery charge stemmed from respondent’s forgery of a credit card application in the name of Janice S. Reynolds; the unauthorized use of a movable charge stemmed from respondent’s misuse of Alexandria city telephone services; and the worthless check charge stemmed from respondent’s issuance of a series of checks which were returned to the respective payees marked “insufficient funds” or “account closed” (totaling between $100 and $500 in the aggregate).

Count V — The Berry Matter

In June 1994, Joe Berry retained respondent to handle a personal injury matter arising out of an accident which occurred in Texas. Respondent associated a Texas lawyer, Mr. Smith Day, but thereafter did little work in the case. On February 16, 1996, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months, with fifteen months deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. In re: Reynolds, 95-3059 (La.2/16/96), 667 So.2d 1042, 687 So.2d 372. In June 1996, respondent and Mr. Day timely filed suit on Mr. Berry’s behalf. Berry v. Schrock, No. 15,778 on the docket of the District Court of Tyler County, Texas. On May 1, 1997, this court revoked respondent’s probation and made the deferred portion of the 1996 suspension executory because respondent failed to comply with the terms of probation. In re: Reynolds, 95-3059 (La.5/1/97), 692 So.2d 1057, reh’g denied June 13,1997. Respondent did not inform his client of his Rsuspension from the practice of law. On May 22, 1997, the Texas court allowed Mr. Day to withdraw as counsel; although respondent was aware of this fact, he did not associate another Texas lawyer to handle the case. Moreover, respondent attended a deposition with his client after he was suspended.

Trial in the matter was set for February 5, 1998, but respondent did not appear on that date. On April 27, 1998, the Texas court dismissed Mr. Berry’s case for lack of prosecution. Mr. Berry subsequently retained new counsel, and the court reinstated the case upon plaintiffs payment of $2,500 in attorney’s fees to the defendant.

Count VI — The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matter

On February 3, 1997, respondent filed suit against Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company on behalf of his brother, Dr. Wallace Reynolds, and two nephews. Reynolds v. Champion, No. 186,939 on the docket of the Ninth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Rapides. On May 1, 1997, this court revoked the probation imposed upon respondent in connection with his 1996 suspension and required him to serve the portion of the suspension which had been deferred. Nevertheless, respondent continued to handle the Reynolds case and held himself out as an attorney to the insurance company’s adjustor and its counsel.

In April 1999, counsel for Mutual Service filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On April 12, 1999, and again on October 25, 1999, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at multiple addresses. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On April 20, 2000, the ODC filed six counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of ^Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5© (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation). In addition, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(a) by failing to notify the appropriate parties of his suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, no formal hearing was held, and the matter was submitted to the hearing committee solely on the ODC’s documentary evidence. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3).

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter, the hearing committee recommended that respondent be disbarred. The committee particularly noted the gravity of respondent’s offenses and the relevant (though unspecified) aggravating factors present.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation, seeking the imposition of permanent disbarment.

| bDisciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter; the disciplinary board agreed that the formal charges were generally proven by clear and convincing evidence. The board found that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. The board noted that although the severity of the harm is unknown, Mrs. Eason, Mr. Fontenot, and Ms. Jones were all harmed by the substantial delays in their cases. It found Mrs. Eason reported that she was unable to sell her stock when its value increased to an all-time high because respondent failed to have the stock certificate transferred from her deceased husband’s name into her name, observed that Mr. Fontenot’s child custody matter was delayed by months and noted that neither Mrs. Eason nor Mr. Fontenot received an accounting or a refund of their money from respondent. It found Ms. Jones’ disability matter was delayed by one to two years, although it conceded that it was unknown whether any of her rights were lost because of the delay. It found Mr. Berry’s case, which involves a personal injury claim for permanent injury and which is estimated to be worth approximately $850,000, was actually dismissed by the Texas court due to respondent’s failure to appear for trial. The board found the public has been harmed and the reputation of the profession has been damaged by respondent’s conviction of forgery of a credit card application, unauthorized use of a movable, and issuing worthless checks. Finally, it recognized that respondent’s actions wasted the time of |7the ODC and the Texas court, and has damaged the legal system. The board concluded this misconduct is serious and that the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

As aggravating factors, the board recognized prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1968). The board found no mitigating factors are present.

The board noted that at the time its recommendation was drafted, this court had not yet imposed the sanction of permanent disbarment. However, upon considering the criteria set forth in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, the board concluded that the criteria for permanent disbarment are met in this case. Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard 1 Sis applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports a finding of professional misconduct that is unquestionably serious in nature. Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law after being disciplined by this court, and in fact, did so on more than one occasion and in more than one client matter. Furthermore, respondent has engaged in serious criminal conduct which resulted in his pleading guilty to charges of felony theft, forgery, unauthorized use of a movable, and issuing worthless checks. No less serious is the fact that respondent also neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to refund unearned legal fees, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s neglect of his clients’ legal matters and failure to account for his fees caused actual harm to them. Additionally, his criminal convictions and his unauthorized practice of law call his moral fitness into question. There are no mitigating factors; however, numerous aggravating factors are present. Under these circumstances, we conclude disbarment is the proper sanction.

|aThe disciplinary board recommended that we consider imposing the sanction of permanent disbarment, as set forth in the amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 and § 24. We agree that respondent’s conduct fits several of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, including Guideline 8 (“following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law ... during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred”) and Guideline 9 (“instances of serious attorney misconduct ... preceded by suspension or disbarment for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct...)

However, our review of the record reveals that much of the instant misconduct occurred in the same general time frame as the misconduct forming the basis for respondent’s earlier disbarment. In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), we observed that when the underlying conduct occurs within the same period as the misconduct forming the basis for a previous disbarment, the discipline imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court ^^simultaneously. Applying this procedure in Chatelain, we declined to extend the minimum period for readmission. Instead, we adjudged the respondent guilty of additional violations warranting disbarment which were added to his record for consideration in the event he applied for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. See also In re: Gros, 98-0772 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 799; In re: Parker, 00-3532 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 794; In re: Patrick, 01-1419 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 804.

In determining an appropriate sanction in the instant case, we believe the approach of Chatelain is instructive. Accordingly, our determination of a sanction will be based upon the appropriate sanction we would have imposed if these charges had been before the court at the same time as the charges in respondent’s previous disciplinary proceedings.

Had the instant charges been filed simultaneously with those charges forming the basis of respondent’s earlier disbarment, they would have only reinforced our view that respondent lacks the moral fitness to practice law and must be disbarred, both as a sanction for his misconduct and to protect the public. Therefore, as in Chatelain, we will adjudge respondent guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and which will be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. We further emphasize that although respondent may have a procedural right to apply for readmission, this court retains absolute discretion to grant or deny such an application. In light of respondent’s lengthy history of egregious misconduct, this court will carefully scrutinize any application for readmission with a critical eye.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that Glynn W. Reynolds be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and which will be added to Inhis record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

TRAYLOR, J., would permanently disbar.

      . Respondent was disbarred by this court in 1999 for various knowing and intentional misconduct, including conversion of client funds, neglect of legal matters, and receiving unauthorized fees in Social Security disability claims. In re: Reynolds, 99-0824 (La.7/2/99), 737 So.2d 1272.

      . We note that respondent was charged in his prior disbarment with the substantive misconduct which precipitated the theft charge. See Count I of the formal charges filed in In re: Reynolds, 99-0824 (La.7/2/99), 737 So.2d 1272.

      . The board did not find that respondent failed to appear in response to a subpoena in connection with Counts I and II, citing a lack of evidence that respondent was served with the subpoena. In addition, the board declined to find that respondent failed to return Ms. Jones' file, as charged in Count III, citing a lack of evidence that the client made such a request.

      . It appears from the record that Mr. Beriy, having become dissatisfied with respondent’s failure to communicate with him or to move the case along, happened to engage another attorney who discovered that the case had recently been dismissed. This attorney was able to have the case reinstated, but Mr. Berry had to pay the defendant $2,500 in attorney’s fees for his failure to appear on the original trial date.

      . In addition to the 1996 suspension, 1997 probation revocation, and 1999 disbarment earlier discussed, respondent has been admonished by the disciplinary board on four occasions: 94-ADB-124 (failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation), 92-ADB-030 (collecting an improper fee in a workers' compensation case), 91-ADB-020 (failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation), and 90-ADB-618 (failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation).

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      (1) Disbarment by the court. In any order or judgment of the court in which a lawyer is disbarred, the court retains the discretion to permanently disbar the lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer who has served a suspension period of more than one year, exclusive of any waivers or periods of deferral, shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the court. No lawyer may petition for reinstatement until six months before the period of suspension has expired. No lawyer may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A lawyer who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the time of the effective date of the interim suspension. The court retains the discretion, in accordance with Section 10A of this rule, to permanently disbar a lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: | .PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Adam Samuel COHEN.
    No. 2002-B-2616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

| .PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Adam Samuel Cohen, an attorney formerly licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently disbarred.

UNDERLYING FACTS

On January 5, 1998, Larry Jones paid respondent $850 to represent him in a criminal matter. State v. Jones, No. 97-7138 on the docket of the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. At the time respondent accepted these funds, he was ineligible to practice law; however, he failed to advise his client or the court of this fact. As a result of respondent’s misrepresentation of his status, the presiding judge was forced to declare a mistrial in Mr. Jones’ case after a jury had already been selected. Respondent nevertheless failed to refund the fee Mr. Jones paid. The ODC further alleges that respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed against him by Mr. Jones.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in | ¡representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After its investigation, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, and the matter was submitted to the hearing committee solely on the ODC’s documentary evidence. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the record, the hearing committee concluded that. respondent’s conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges. The committee recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary record and pattern of ^misconduct as aggravating factors, and found no mitigating factors are present. The committee recommended respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board generally agreed with the hearing committee’s factual findings and its application of the Rules of Professional Conduct; however, the board concluded the ODC failed to prove that respondent did not cooperate in the disciplinary investigation.

The board found that respondent violated duties owed to his client by representing Mr. Jones when he knew he was ineligible to do so, by failing to use reasonable diligence in pursuing Mr. Jones’ case, and by failing to refund the legal fee Mr. Jones paid. Respondent caused actual harm to Mr. Jones by causing a mistrial in the criminal case and by failing to return the $350 fee. The board also found respondent breached his duty to the profession and the legal system by engaging in the practice of law when he was ineligible to practice, by causing a mistrial in the criminal case, and by wasting the trial court’s and district attorney’s time. Because respondent knew or should have known that he was ineligible to practice law when |4he accepted a legal fee from Mr. Jones, the board found his conduct was knowing, if not intentional.

Based upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the presence of several aggravating factors, including respondent’s prior discipline in Cohen I, a dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1991), as well as the absence of any mitigating factors, the board found that disbarment is clearly the appropriate sanction in this case. However, observing that,the misconduct at issue here occurred in January 1998, during the same time frame as the misconduct for which respondent was disbarred in Cohen II, the board adopted the approach of Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), and recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment, and that these violations be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has | sbeen proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Based on our independent review, we conclude the findings of the hearing committee are supported by the record. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that respondent engaged in the practice of law while he was ineligible to do so under the rules of this court. Given that respondent had been ineligible for nearly eighteen months at the time he accepted a legal fee from Mr. Jones, we fail to see how this conduct was anything other than knowing and intentional.

Having found professional violations, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for this misconduct. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; In re: Lain, 00-0148 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 1152; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 400 So.2d 1355 (La.1981). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The misconduct at issue in this proceeding occurred in January 1998, in the same time frame as the misconduct for which respondent was disbarred in Cohen II. In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), we observed | (¡that when a second attorney disciplinary proceeding involves conduct which occurred during the same time period as the first proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously. In that case, involving an attorney who was already disbarred, we declined to disbar the respondent again or to extend the minimum period for applying for readmission. Rather, we adjudged the attorney guilty of additional misconduct which could be considered in the event the attorney sought readmission. See also In re: Richard, 01-3409 (La.9/13/02), 826 So.2d 542; In re: Patrick, 01-1419 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 804; In re: Parker, 00-3532 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 794; In re: Gros, 98-0772 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 799.

In imposing a sanction in the instant case, we believe the approach of Chatelain is instructive. Accordingly, our determination of a sanction will be based upon the appropriate sanction we would have imposed if the charge at issue here had been before the court at the same time as the charges in respondent’s previous disciplinary proceeding.

Respondent’s decision to knowingly and intentionally engage in the practice of law while ineligible to do so is a serious affront to the authority of this court. See In re: Jones, 99-1036 (La.10/19/99), 747 So.2d 1081 (attorney disbarred for practicing law while ineligible). Had the instant charge been filed simultaneously with those charges forming the basis of Cohen II, some of which also involved respondent’s practice of law during a period of ineligibility, it would only have reinforced our view that respondent must be disbarred.

Therefore, as in Chatelain, we will adjudge respondent guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and which will be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. We further emphasize that although respondent may have a procedural right to apply |7for readmission, this court retains absolute discretion to grant or deny such an application. In light of respondent’s prior disciplinary history, this court will carefully scrutinize any application for readmission with a critical eye.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that respondent is adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and which may be considered in the event he applies for readmission from his disbarment in In re: Cohen, 00-1476 (La.9/15/00), 769 So.2d 531, after becoming eligible to do so. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . In re: Cohen, 00-1476 (La.9/15/00), 769 So.2d 531 (Cohen II").

      . In fact, respondent had been ineligible to practice law since August 1996 for failing to comply with mandatory continuing legal education requirements; since October 1996 for failing to pay bar dues; and since January 1, 1998 for failing to pay the disciplinaiy assessment.

      . At the time the committee's recommendation was filed on August 20, 2001, respondent had already been disbarred for nearly a year; nevertheless, the committee was apparently unaware of that fact. The prior discipline referred to by the committee is a three-year suspension from the practice of law, with all but twenty-one months deferred, imposed by this court in 1998. In re: Cohen, 98-0291 (La.3/27/98), 708 So.2d 415 ("Cohen I).

      . The ODC sent the complaint filed against respondent to an address that was not his primary or secondary registration statement address, and to a closed post office box. Both letters were returned unclaimed. The board noted that beyond respondent's failure to respond to the complaint that he never received, there is no evidence that he was served with a subpoena and failed to appear or that he communicated to the ODC a willingness to participate or provide information and then failed to do so. Accordingly, the board declined to find that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, in violation of Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

      . Cohen II involved misconduct arising out of ten complaints and occurring between April 1995 and March 1998. In these matters, respondent repeatedly accepted legal fees from clients but failed to provide any services; in at least five cases, respondent was ineligible to practice law when he accepted the fees. As previously noted, Cohen I resulted in respondent’s suspension; that case involved misconduct occurring in 1994 and 1995.


author: |tPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Charles H. WHITE.
    Nos. 2001-B-1946, 2001-B-1949.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

|tPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from two sets of formal charges involving five counts of misconduct filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Charles H. White, a currently disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

At the outset, we note that respondent has a lengthy prior disciplinary record for conduct unrelated to that at issue in the instant matter. In 1997, respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one year for failing to comply with court orders and failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation. In re: White, 97-1152 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 375 (“White I”). Less than six months after White I, respondent was disbarred from the practice of law for failing to communicate with a client, failing to refund unearned fees, failing to act with competence and diligence, and failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation. In re: White, 97-2731 (La.2/6/98), 706 So.2d 964 (“White II”). In 2001, respondent was again disbarred for failing to disburse and account for client funds, failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In re: White, 00-2732 (La.4/25/01), 791 So.2d 602 (“White III”). It is against this backdrop that we consider the instant disciplinary charges.

UNDERLYING FACTS

DeLarge Matter

In 1996, Bettye A. DeLarge retained respondent to represent her in connection with claims stemming from a vehicular accident. On June 30, 1997, the tortfea-sor’s insurance carrier settled Ms. De-Large’s bodily injury claims for $10,000. Ms. DeLarge gave respondent permission to retain possession of the check pending resolution of a billing dispute with a third-party medical provider. However, contrary to his client’s instructions, and without her knowledge or consent, respondent forged her name on the check and converted the funds to his own use.

Subsequently, Ms. DeLarge made numerous attempts to contact respondent regarding the status of her ease, but was unable to reach him. Respondent eventually provided his client with an accounting. According to this accounting, the medical payments and attorney’s fees exceeded the settlement amount.

During this period of time, respondent was suspended from the practice of law in White I and was disbarred in White II. Nonetheless, respondent continued to represent Ms. DeLarge and pursued a UM claim against her insurance carrier.

On May 5, 1998, Ms. DeLarge’s insurance carrier issued five drafts totaling $2,000 to medical providers, and forwarded them to respondent. Respondent failed to advise his client or her medical providers of the receipt of the funds, and failed to | ¡¡disburse the funds. At all times, Ms. DeLarge and her insurance carrier were unaware of respondent’s suspension and disbarment.

Mitter Matter

On May 4, 1992, respondent settled the personal injury case of his client, Annie Mae Mitter, for the sum of $238,526.73. Respondent’s attorney’s fee was $95,410.69, representing 40% of the settlement. In September 1992, respondent forwarded to his client a settlement statement and check from his client trust account in the amount of $60,124.39, representing his client’s share after deducting his fee and various legal and medical expenses. Ms. Mitter and her new attorney made numerous requests to respondent for a detailed accounting. Respondent failed to comply with these requests.

In September 1996, Ms. Mitter filed suit against respondent, seeking an accounting of the settlement funds. Respondent failed to answer the suit, and the trial court entered a default judgment against him. On January 9, 1997, the court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Mitter in the amount of $85,875.56, plus interest.

Five days later, respondent filed a motion for new trial. In addition, he provided an accounting and disbursed to Ms. Mitter an additional $35,343.90 from the original settlement. Subsequently, the parties agreed to a settlement, whereby respondent agreed to pay the interest accrued on the $35,243.90 improperly withheld from Ms. Mitter and court costs, totaling $13,093.13. However, respondent failed to satisfy his financial obligation under the negotiated settlement.

\ ¿Failure to Cooperate Charges

Ms. DeLarge and Ms. Mitter filed complaints with the ODC. The ODC forwarded these complaints to respondent by certified mail and requested information from him. Respondent failed to comply with these requests.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

After investigation, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent in the De-Large matter. These charges alleged respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (lack of diligence), 1.4 (failure to communicate), 1.15(a) (failure to keep client and third party funds separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(b) (failure to promptly deliver funds or property owed to a client or third party and failure to render a full accounting upon request), 1.15(c) (failure to place property subject to a dispute with another party in trust), 1.16(d) (failure to protect client interests upon termination of representation), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(e) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC).

One month later, the ODC filed a separate set of formal charges involving two counts of misconduct stemming from the Mitter complaint. These charges alleged violations of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 1.16(d), 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), 3.4(a) | ^(unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence), 3.4(c) (failure to comply with tribunal orders), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

Respondent failed to file an answer to the complaints. Accordingly, the matters were submitted to the hearing committees on documentary evidence only.

Recommendations of the Hearing Committees

DeLarge Matter

The hearing committee determined the formal charges were supported by the documentary evidence. The committee found respondent failed to provide an accounting, converted funds to his own use, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation. It further found respondent’s continuing failure to make restitution to his victim and rectify the consequences of his conduct, his total “disappearance” and unauthorized practice of law must be construed as intentional and knowing misconduct.

The committee concluded the baseline sanction for this misconduct was disbarment. The committee did not identify any mitigating factors, but recognized numerous aggravating factors to be present, including prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1967). Accordingly, the committee recommended the imposition of disbarment.

| (Mitter Matter

The hearing committee determined the evidence submitted by Ms. Mitter in support of her complaint established a prima facie case that respondent failed to promptly account for her funds, failed to respond to her requests for information, failed to pay the judgment entered against him in her favor, and failed to promptly disburse settlement funds. Based on the evidence, the committee maintained disbarment was appropriate in light of respondent’s conversion of his client’s funds and his failure to make any efforts to repay the funds even after a monetary judgment was rendered against him. Thus, it recommended imposition of disbarment.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board issued a single recommendation encompassing both the DeLarge and Mitter proceedings. The board adopted the findings of the hearing committees in all significant respects.

The board found respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. It stated his continued failure to account to or make restitution to his victims or to rectify the consequences of his offenses was intentional and knowing misconduct, causing his clients (and possibly various medical providers) to be wrongfully deprived of the funds to which they are entitled. The board ^recognized the presence of numerous aggravating factors, including prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with the disciplinary rules, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The board found no mitigating factors are present.

Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and jurisprudence from this court, the board concluded imposition of disbarment to be appropriate under the facts. Recognizing that respondent is currently disbarred, it recommended that the effective date of the disbarment imposed in this case be effective upon the expiration of his prior disbarment imposed in White II The board further recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to his victims.

Although neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, this court, on its own motion, ordered briefing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(a). The court’s September 18, 2002 order directed the parties “to address whether the sanction of permanent disbarment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, Sections 10(a) and 24, as amended August 1, 2001, is appropriate under the facts of this case.”

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has Lbeen proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Based on our independent review, we conclude the findings of the hearing committee, as modified by the disciplinary board, are supported by the record. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that respondent failed to account for and commingled chent funds, did not communicate with his clients, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigations, and ignored the orders of this court prohibiting him from practicing law.

Having found professional violations, we now turn to a determination of an appropriate sanction for this misconduct. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; In re: Lain, 00-0148 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 1152; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 400 So.2d 1355 (La.1981). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

In reviewing the misconduct, we find that it occurred within the same general time frame as the misconduct at issue in White II and White III. In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So.2d 470 (La.1991), we observed that when a second |flattorney disciplinary proceeding involves conduct which occurred during the same time period as the first proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously. In that case, involving an attorney who was already disbarred, we declined to disbar the respondent again or extend the minimum period for readmission. Rather, we adjudged the attorney guilty of additional misconduct which could be considered in the event the attorney sought readmission. See also In re: Patrick, 01-1419 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 804; In re: Parker, 00-3532 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 794; In re: Gros, 98-0772 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 799.

In determining an appropriate sanction in the instant case, we believe the approach of Chatelain is instructive. Accordingly, our determination of a sanction will be based upon the appropriate sanction we would have imposed if these charges had been before the court at the same time as the charges in respondent’s previous disciplinary proceedings.

Disbarment is clearly the appropriate penalty for the violations in this case. Respondent’s conversion of client funds, neglect of client matters, unauthorized practice of law, and failure to cooperate convincingly demonstrate that he has engaged in some of the most serious professional misconduct an attorney can commit. No mitigating factors are present.

Had the instant charges been filed simultaneously with those charges forming the basis of White II and White III, they would have only reinforced our view that respondent lacks the moral fitness to practice law and must be disbarred, both as a sanction for his misconduct and to protect the public. Therefore, as in Chatelain, we will adjudge respondent guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and which will be added to his record for consideration in the event he applies for readmission after becoming eligible to do so. We further emphasize that although | respondent may have a procedural right to apply for readmission, this court retains absolute discretion to grant or deny such an application. In light of respondent’s lengthy history of egregious misconduct, this court will carefully scrutinize any application for readmission with a critical eye.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that respondent is adjudged guilty of additional violations which warrant disbarment and may be considered in the event that he applies for readmission from his disbarment in In re: White, 00-2732 (La.4/25/01), 791 So.2d 602, after becoming eligible to do so. Respondent is further ordered to make full restitution to his clients and all third-party medical providers, if any, that are still owed funds. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

TRAYLOR, J., would permanently disbar.

      . In addition to these major disciplinary infractions, respondent has been the subject of other disciplinary proceedings. In 1989, he was suspended from the practice of law for ninety days. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. White, 538 So.2d 256 (La.1989). He was also admonished in 1995 and 1994 and reprimanded twice in 1985.

      . Although the formal charges state the personal injury case settled for $235,526.73, the record indicates the case settled for $235,574.75, plus $2,951.98 in accrued interest, for a total amount of $238,526.73.

      . For reasons which are not entirely clear, the charges arising from the DeLarge matter and the Mitter matter were not consolidated and were heard by separate hearing committee panels.

      . The hearing committee found that respondent converted the $2,000 in checks forwarded to him by Ms. DeLarge’s insurance carrier for amounts owed to her medical providers. The board recognized that while respondent failed to advise his client and her medical providers of his receipt of the checks, there was insufficient evidence that he converted the funds. Nonetheless, the board made the specific finding of fact that respondent converted the $10,000 check issued in settlement of Ms. DeLarge’s personal injury claim.

      . The board noted in passing that there is no direct evidence whether the medical providers listed on the reconciliation statement provided by respondent to his client relative to the $10,000 payment were ever actually paid. It pointed out the medical providers listed on the statement include those providers allegedly paid by his client, as well as several other providers. Further, the board noted, according to the reconciliation, Ms. DeLarge may not have been ultimately entitled to any funds. However, the board recognized that "given the fact that Ms. DeLarge sought to have some of the medical providers’ payments negotiated downward and the fact that some of the providers may have been paid by [her insurance carrier], she may have been entitled to some funds.” The board found the record to be unclear on this issue.

      .Although the board's recommendation was filed in July 2001, several months after White III was rendered, the board was apparently unaware of that case.


author: [,PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re T. Kenneth ELBERT.
    No. 2001-B-2345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

[,PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from three counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, T. Kenneth Elbert, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I — The Elmore Matter

Respondent represented Dennis Ray El-more in four separate personal injury cases over a period of approximately five years. All of the cases were apparently settled or brought to judgment. During his representation of Mr. Elmore, respondent did not maintain a client trust account and did not segregate Mr. Elmore’s funds from his own. Respondent did not provide an accounting to Mr. Elmore of any amounts due him or paid to others on his behalf. In 1996, Mr. Elmore retained new counsel, Cathryn Cloninger-Kojis, who attempted without success to obtain Mr. El-more’s files from respondent.

pin April 1997, Ms. Cloninger-Kojis filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On April 15, 1997, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at his primary registration statement address. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to compel his response.

Counts II and III — The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matters

On September 5, 1997, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year, with six months deferred, followed by two years of probation subject to conditions. In re: Elbert, 97-1303 (La.9/5/97), 698 So.2d 949. Respondent was not reinstated to practice until August 12, 1998, when he complied with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 23.

Between May 27, 1998 and August 4, 1998, respondent filed pleadings on behalf of the plaintiff in Wheeler v. Wheeler, No. 90,939 on the docket of the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

In an unrelated matter, by letter to the Louisiana Department of Justice dated June 26, 1998, respondent represented that he had been retained to handle an ongoing matter on behalf of Gretchen Durham. In July 1998, Assistant Attorney General Thomas L. Enright, Jr. filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On July 31, 1998, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent at his primary registration statement address. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On June 7, 2000, the ODC filed three counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 5.5(a) (engaging in the 1 ¡¡unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation). In his answer to the formal charges, respondent denied any misconduct with respect to the Elmore matter, and he requested a hearing in mitigation with respect to the two unauthorized practice of law matters.

At the formal hearing conducted by the hearing committee, the ODC introduced documentary evidence in support of the formal charges, including the complaints in each of the matters at issue; the sworn statements of respondent and Mr. Elmore, the client subject of Count I of the formal charges, and various correspondence concerning the Elmore matter; copies of the pleadings filed by respondent in the Wheeler case, subject of Count II of the formal charges; and copies of the letter written by respondent to Mr. Enright, subject of Count III of the formal charges. The ODC also called Mr. Elmore and his present attorney, Ms. Cloninger-Kojis, to testify in person before the committee. Though respondent was properly notified of the hearing, he did not appear, nor was any evidence presented on his behalf.

Review of the Record

Count I — The Elmore Matter

Mr. Elmore, a maintenance worker with a high school education, was employed in the office building where respondent maintained his law practice. Between December 1990 and June 1993, Mr. Elmore was involved in four separate automobile accidents. He asked respondent to handle the cases, and though no formal retainer agreement was executed, respondent agreed that he would “take care of everything.” Unfortunately, it may never be known with certainty how much was recovered on behalf of Mr. Elmore in these cases, because during the representation, Mr. Elmore |4never saw any pleadings or documentation concerning his cases, never saw a file or any correspondence, and never discussed the cases with respondent in any detail whatsoever. In April 1996, respondent gave Mr. Elmore $2,000 in cash and a cashier’s check in the amount of $5,600, which respondent contended represented a complete accounting of all proceeds due Mr. Elmore from the four cases.

Although respondent did not testify at the formal hearing, he did give a sworn statement to the ODC in June 1997, pursuant to subpoena. Respondent conceded that he did not maintain a client trust account or otherwise keep funds belonging to Mr. Elmore segregated from his own. Respondent flatly stated that he was entitled to retain all of the funds he recovered on Mr. Elmore’s behalf as a result of a June 1, 1992 power of attorney which he claimed was granted him by Mr. Elmore. Respondent asserted that this power of attorney entitled him to do whatever he pleased with the money recovered on Mr. Elmore’s behalf. Respondent also produced a document entitled “Recapitulation, Acknowledgment, Receipt and Release,” dated April 25, 1996, which he claimed was signed by Mr. Elmore and which showed how all of Mr. Elmore’s funds were disbursed. According to the “recapitulation,” respondent collected sums totaling $33,243 in the four cases he handled on behalf of |KMr. Elmore. Respondent retained $11,080 in attorney’s fees (33%% of the total) and paid $517.50 in court costs and $6,000 in medical expenses, leaving $15,645.50 due to Mr. Elmore. From this amount, respondent deducted $2,200 pursuant to an “assignment,” $1,800 for “air conditioning,” and $3,807 for cash payments to Mr. Elmore on respondent’s “ledger.” These deductions left $7,838.50 due to Mr. Elmore, of which Mr. Elmore received $7,600 ($2,000 in cash and a $5,600 cashier’s check). No explanation was provided on the “recapitulation” for the difference of $238.50 that was not accounted for.

Mr. Elmore testified that he trusted respondent completely and would endorse cheeks as they were received, but that he was given no money or accounting at that time. Mr. Elmore admitted that he borrowed small sums of money from respondent over the years, which by his own accounting totaled $5,013. After receiving $7,600 from respondent in April 1996, Mr. Elmore sought the advice of Ms. Cloning-er-Kojis, who attempted without success to retrieve Mr. Elmore’s files from respondent. Without these files it has been impossible to reconstruct the settlement history of Mr. Elmore’s cases. Ms. Clo-ninger-Kojis has been able to verify that payments totaling $18,128 were made by State Farm Insurance Company in two of the four Elmore cases. There is no record of any other payments. In addition, Ms. Cloninger-Kojis has been unable to trace the medical payments made on behalf of Mr. Elmore, and |fithere are serious discrepancies concerning the alleged assignment of $2,200, the payment of $1,800 for “air conditioning,” and the $3,807 in alleged cash payments to Mr. Elmore on respondent’s “ledger.” To date, respondent has refused to turn over Mr. Elmore’s files to Ms. Cloninger-Kojis, even as she continues to try to sort out Mr. Elmore’s affairs, and the insurance company records have long since been destroyed. Under the circumstances, Mr. Elmore will likely never know exactly how much was recovered on his behalf from the defendants in his cases.

The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matters

Respondent served the active portion of his 1997 suspension and was eligible to be reinstated to the practice of law on March 19, 1998. However, he did not comply with the reinstatement requirements until August 12, 1998, and accordingly, he remained suspended until that date.

On May 27, 1998, respondent filed a “Rule to Increase Child Support, for Payment of Back Due Costs and Interest Due Defendant’s Attorney from Previous Judgments Rendered by this Court and for Defendants Unpaid Portion of Children’s Medical and Dental Expenses and Child Care” on behalf of Ms. Aarolyn Wheeler in her suit against her former husband. On July 28, 1998, respondent requested that two subpoenas be issued in the Wheeler case. Finally, on August 4, 1998, respondent filed an “Affirmative Answer to Petition for Joint Custody and to Fix Visitation” on behalf of Ms. Wheeler.

In an unrelated matter, respondent wrote a letter to Assistant Attorney General Thomas L. Enright, Jr. on June 26, 1998, regarding Ms. Gretchen Durham. In the letter, respondent represented that his “office is retained by Ms. Durham in this matter” and attempted to resolve a collection problem between the State of Louisiana and Ms. Durham.

| ^Hearing Committee Recommendation

On November 29, 2000, the hearing committee filed its recommendation with the disciplinary board. In connection with the Elmore matter, the committee made the following findings of fact:

1. Mr. Elmore retained respondent as his attorney to represént him on at least four different occasions.
2. Respondent proceeded to secure either a settlement or a judgment on four cases.
3. Respondent did not maintain a trust account on behalf of Mr. Elmore nor did he segregate Mr. Elmore’s funds from his own.
4. Respondent failed to properly account to Mr. Elmore for money due him as a result of these settlements or recoveries.
5. Respondent engaged in fraud and ill practices with regard to Mr. El-more’s funds and converted those funds to his own use.
6. Respondent recovered on Mr. El-more’s behalf at least $18,128 (the amount which has been documented by the insurer involved in two of Mr. Elmore’s cases); however, by his own admission, respondent recovered on Mr. Elmore’s behalf the sum of $33,243.
7. Mr. Elmore received $7,600 from respondent in April 1996.
8. The only documented medical expense is one trip to Baton Rouge General Hospital. Discrepancies exist concerning the other medical expenses, the assignment of $2,200, an $1,800 loan for an air conditioning unit, attorney’s fees, other costs, and expenses. These fees, costs, and expenses are unsubstantiated, other than in respondent’s recapitulation, which Mr. Elmore testified he never received.
9. By Mr. Elmore’s own accounting, represented by a personal ledger kept by him over the years, he was advanced the sum of $5,013 by respondent.
IrIO. Respondent owes Mr. Elmore the sum of approximately $22,163 (less attorney’s fees, medical expenses, and court costs).

Based on these factual findings, the committee concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by holding property belonging to Mr. Elmore in his own account and not placing the funds in a segregated trust account, and by failing to render a full accounting to Mr. Elmore; violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to turn over his files or other documentation regarding Mr. El-more’s settlements and other legal matters; and violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

With respect to the unauthorized practice of law matters, the committee found that respondent violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by representing Ms. Wheeler and Ms. Durham while he was suspended from practice. Finally, the committee concluded that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its disciplinary investigation, and that he appeared to give a sworn statement only when subpoenaed to do so, in violation of Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(g).

The committee determined that the baseline sanction for these serious offenses is disbarment. In aggravation, the committee noted respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, and indifference to making restitution. The committee found there are no mitigating circumstances present. Concluding there is no reason under the facts of this case to deviate from the baseline sanction, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

| gNeither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter, the board generally concurred in the factual findings made by the hearing committee, with the exception of the committee’s finding of the approximate amount of restitution due Mr. Elmore. While the board agreed that restitution is due to Mr. Elmore, it found that there is not sufficient information in the record regarding the amount of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs, if any, owed by Mr. Elmore. The board agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. The board found respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the profession, and that respondent’s misconduct resulted in actual injury to his client, the legal system, and the profession. The board adopted the aggravating factors recognized by the hearing committee, and agreed that there are no mitigating factors present.

In light of these findings and the fact that respondent’s prior discipline has not been effective in deterring him from a continued pattern of misconduct, the board recommended that he be disbarred from the practice of law. The board also recommended that respondent be ordered to provide a complete accounting to Mr. Elmore and pay any restitution due. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Although neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, this court, on its own motion, ordered briefing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(a). The court’s September 18, 2002 order directed the |inparties “to address whether the sanction of permanent disbarment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, Sections 10(a) and 24, as amended August 1, 2001, is appropriate under the facts of this case.”

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Based on our independent review, we conclude the findings of the hearing committee, as modified by the disciplinary board, are supported by the record. It cannot be disputed that respondent has violated numerous provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There are no mitigating factors present; however, numerous aggravating factors exist. Under these circumstances, we conclude the baseline sanction is disbarment. However, given the egregiousness of respondent’s misconduct, we will further consider whether permanent disbarment is warranted. .

InOn August 1, 2001, after a lengthy period of study and public comment, this court adopted amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 and § 24 to provide for the sanction of permanent disbarment. In re: Gros, 98-0772 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 799; In re: Parker, 00-3532 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 794; In re: Patrick, 01-1419 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 804. In our commentary accompanying the amendment, we stated, in pertinent part:

In the public interest, the Court has amended Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX to codify Permanent Disbarment as an available sanction for attorney misconduct. While the Court has always had the discretion to deny an application for readmission after the requisite five (5)-year waiting period after disbarment, an attorney who is permanently disbarred under these circumstances will be prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar. These amendments reflect the judgment of the Court that in some instances lawyer misconduct may be so egregious as to warrant a sanction of permanent disbarment based on the facts of an individual case and in consideration of the guidelines in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

In Appendix E, we set forth several guidelines illustrating the type of cases which might warrant permanent disbarment. We explained that these guidelines were |12not intended to bind this court in its decisionmaking, but to provide “useful information to the public and to lawyers concerning the types of conduct the Court might consider to be worthy of permanent disbarment.” Under Guidelines 1 and 8, respectively, “repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm” and “following notice, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law ... during the period of time in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred” are grounds for permanent disbarment. Clearly, respondent’s conduct in the matters at issue falls squarely within these guidelines.

As recently noted in In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934, we do not lightly impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that we would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sanction here. Respondent’s conduct is unquestionably serious in nature. He engaged in the unauthorized practice of law after being suspended by this court, and in fact, did so on more than one occasion and in more than one client matter. Furthermore, respondent abused the trust of his client, Mr. Elmore, and relied upon a so-called power of attorney as giving him carte blanche to use a client’s funds at his own pleasure and without any accounting to the client whatsoever. By such conduct, respondent has utterly failed in his ethical obligation to preserve and maintain his client’s funds. ■ This court cannot and will not tolerate such conduct by an attorney, upon whom high standards of honesty and righteousness are erected. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391, 392 (1967). Because respondent does not possess the requisite moral fitness to practice law in this state, he must be permanently disbarred.

| ^DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of T. Kenneth Elbert be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. Respondent is ordered to furnish a complete accounting to Dennis Ray Elmore and to make appropriate restitution. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . In 1997, we suspended respondent from practice for one year, with six months deferred, followed by two years of probation subject to conditions. In re: Elbert, 97-1303 (La.9/5/97), 698 So.2d 949. Respondent served the active portion of his suspension and was reinstated to the practice of law on August 12, 1998. Effective July 6, 2001, respondent’s probation was revoked for failure to comply with the conditions of probation, and the deferred portion of the prior suspension was made executory. In re: Elbert, 01-1608 (La.6/22/01), 790 So.2d 624. Although respondent is eligible for reinstatement from this suspension, he has not complied with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 23. Accordingly, he remains suspended from the practice of law.

      . Although Mr. Elmore’s signature appears on the power of attorney, he denied that the contents of the document were ever explained to him. The power of attorney grants to respondent (“in his personal capacity and not as an attorney at law”) authority to
      Sign any and all document, check, release, pleading [sic] or any other document on my behalf. To maintain all monies as he sees fit, until such time that I have accumulated funds sufficient for me to purchase the house located at 6735 Vineyard, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. All proceeds are hereby assigned to T. Kenneth Elbert until he has had an opportunity to recover all sums advanced to me. This document also acknowledges a debt due T. Kenneth Elbert of $1,000.00 in loans in 1991 and $1,200.00 in 1992. Mr. Elmore denies that he asked respondent to keep his money until he could accumulate enough to purchase a house.

      . Although Mr. Elmore's signature appears on the "recapitulation,” he denied ever having seen the document.

      . Interestingly, Mr. Elmore testified that he did not sign a contingency fee agreement with respondent, and that respondent never explained how the legal fees would be paid in the cases, or indeed, even what the legal fees would be.

      . In the sworn statement respondent provided to the ODC, he explained that the difference of $238.50 was not important because he was certain he had advanced more than $3,807 to Mr. Elmore on his "ledger.”

      .None of the medical expenses which respondent claims to have paid (totaling $6,000) can be verified by the alleged medical providers. Mr. Elmore testified that he sought medical treatment on only one occasion, when he visited the emergency room of Baton Rouge General Hospital following his second automobile accident, but his treatment records reveal that a worker’s compensation carrier was billed for those expenses.

      . In addition to the 1997 suspension and revocation of probation matters earlier discussed, respondent was also suspended from the practice of law for one year in 1987, Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Elbert, 512 So.2d 398 (La.1987), and has twice been reprimanded (1985 and 1988) for misconduct substantially similar to that at issue here. Presently, respondent is ineligible to practice law for failure to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment (since September 1, 2000) and for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements (since July 26, 2001).

      . In addition to those noted by the hearing committee, we find the following aggravating factors are present: dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1977).

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      (1) Disbarment by the court. In any order or judgment of the court in which a lawyer is disbarred, the court retains the discretion to permanently disbar the lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer who has served a suspension period of more than ■ one year, exclusive of any waivers or periods of deferral, shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the court.... No lawyer may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A lawyer who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the time of the effective date of the interim suspension. The court retains the discretion, in accordance with Section 10A of this rule, to permanently disbar a lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.


author: LPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Blair David CONDOLL.
    No. 2001-B-3106.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

LPER CURIAM.

This attorney disciplinary proceeding arises from nine counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Blair David Condolí, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Gray Matter

In November 1998, Joan Gray (as guardian of and on behalf of her two minor grandchildren) and Veronica Tillman retained respondent to represent them in a personal injury matter against Ms. Gray’s insurance carrier. After being retained, respondent failed to answer his clients’ requests for information. Without notice to his clients, respondent settled the personal injury claims of the minor children and Ms. Tillman for $7,000. Upon receiving the settlement checks, he endorsed his clients’ names without the proper consent and authority and deposited them into his office account. Respondent failed to disburse any funds to his clients or their medical provider, despite having guaranteed payment for $2,815 in medical services rendered to his clients.

| ¡¡.Upon learning of the settlement from her insurance carrier, Ms. Gray filed a complaint with the ODC. In the course of the investigation, respondent gave a sworn statement conceding he failed to communicate with his clients. He maintained no funds were due his clients after deduction of his legal fee and the medical expenses; however, he admitted that he did not keep financial records at the time and was unable to locate his client file regarding the settlement.

Wilson Matter

In 1996, Saleem Wilson retained respondent to represent him in a property damage matter against his insurance carrier. Without Mr. Wilson’s knowledge or consent, respondent settled the property damage claim for $15,879.44. Respondent forged his client’s name on the settlement draft and converted the funds.

When respondent refused to respond to his client’s requests for information regarding the status of his claim, Mr. Wilson retained counsel, Wayne James, who had employed respondent as a law clerk prior to respondent’s bar admission, to seek recovery of the settlement proceeds. Respondent failed to honor the formal demands for payment. Therefore, Mr. Wilson and Mr. James filed a report with the New Orleans Police Department, which resulted in respondent’s arrest. Following respondent’s criminal conviction stemming from the theft of funds, respondent provided $15,000 in restitution to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson filed a complaint and supporting documentation with the ODC. In the course of the ODC’s investigation, respondent gave a sworn statement in which | she indicated that he failed to disburse the funds to Mr. Wilson because there was a dispute concerning the amount of the legal fees. Respondent maintained he did not know how to place the disputed funds in the registry of the court. He further testified that following his arrest, he closed all of his bank accounts and placed the funds in a safe in his home. He admitted he borrowed against the funds for personal and office expenditures.

Wright Matter

On October 7, 1998, Louis C. Wright paid respondent an initial retainer fee of $350 to institute bankruptcy proceedings on his behalf. Over the course of the next six months, respondent failed to file the appropriate schedules, resulting in the dismissal of the bankruptcy case. On April 14, 1999, Mr. Wright sent correspondence to respondent, advising that respondent’s mishandling and neglect of the legal matter delayed his attempts to correct his credit problems and also hampered efforts to amicably resolve the matter with his mortgage company, likely resulting in the loss of his home. Respondent failed to respond to his client’s request for the refund of the fee.

Mr. Wright filed a complaint and supporting documentation with the ODC. During the ODC’s investigation of the complaint, respondent gave a sworn statement alleging his delay in filing the appropriate schedules stemmed from his client’s failure to give him the necessary information.

Lavelis Fountain Matter

On November 17,1998, Lavelis Fountain retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter on a contingency fee basis. Respondent failed to take any Paction in the matter on behalf of his client. Moreover, he neglected to communicate with Mr. Fountain after January 1999.

Mr. Fountain filed a complaint and supporting documentation with the ODC. Respondent failed to respond to the ODC’s requests for information.

Williams Matter

In 1998, Rodney Williams retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter and a discrimination matter. Without the knowledge or consent of Mr. Williams, respondent settled the personal injury matter for $3,660. Respondent forged Mr. Williams’ signature on the settlement draft and converted the funds. In subsequent conversations with his client, respondent neglected to advise he had settled the case and received the funds. As to the discrimination proceeding, respondent failed to diligently pursue the case on behalf of Mr. Williams, and refused to respond to his client’s requests for information.

Mr. Williams filed a complaint and supporting documentation with the ODC advising of respondent’s misconduct. In a sworn statement, respondent claimed that according to the employment contract, he did not need his client’s permission to settle the personal injury case and cash the settlement draft. Contrary to Mr. Williams’ testimony at the formal hearing, respondent also testified his client was not entitled to any funds from the personal injury case since the employment contract specified the settlement funds would go toward his expenses in the discrimination suit. The ODC requested that respondent provide a copy of the employment contract, as well as an accounting; however, respondent failed to comply with the request.

| zRuth, Fountain Matter

In 1998, Ruth Fountain retained respondent to institute suit against an automobile dealer stemming from her purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle. While respondent filed suit on behalf of his client, he faked to take any further action in the matter. Ms. Fountain made numerous efforts to contact respondent regarding the status of her case,- but was unable to contact him.

On June 25, 1999, Ms. Fountain filed a complaint with the ODC. In a deposition taken during the ODC’s investigation, respondent admitted Ms. Fountain’s case had “slipped through the cracks,” and that he failed to advise his client he had taken no action in the matter. Respondent contended that he was unable to produce her file because he had misplaced it during one of his office relocations.

Landry Matter

In 1997, Rosalind Christina Landry retained respondent to represent her in a medical malpractice suit. After instituting suit, respondent neglected to reply to discovery requests, resulting in the dismissal of one of the defendants.

On July 6, 1999, Ms. Landry filed a complaint with the ODC. Respondent provided an initial sworn statement in the matter, but provided no further information.

Vance Matter

In September 1997, Alice Gail McBride Vance retained respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter. Although respondent took some initial action, he later abandoned Ms. Vance’s case and failed to respond to her requests for information regarding the legal matter and her files in his possession.

On July 12, 1999, Ms. Vance filed a complaint and supporting documentation with the ODC. In a sworn statement, respondent denied that he neglected his client’s | fimatter and failed to communicate with her. Contrary to Ms. Vance’s testimony at the formal hearing, respondent contended his employment was terminated by Ms. Vance prior to completion of her case. However, he conceded he never received anything in writing from her advising of such and that he never formally withdrew from her case. He maintained the delay in resolving her case stemmed from a court clerical error in obtaining a default judgment in his client’s favor. Moreover, respondent stated that he advised Ms. Vance she could pick up her file at any time after she terminated his services.

Lancelin Matter

In May 1998, Trent M. Lancelin retained respondent to represent him in property damage and personal injury matters stemming from a vehicular accident. Over the course of the next year, Mr. Lancelin spoke to respondent on three occasions, and was led to believe respondent was pursuing the case. However, without Mr. Lancelin’s knowledge or consent, respondent had settled the property damage and personal injury claims for $665 and $7,800, respectively, shortly after he was retained. Respondent had endorsed his client’s signature on the settlement drafts and converted the funds to his own use.

On September 15, 1999, Mr. Lancelin filed a complaint with the ODC advising respondent would not respond to his requests for information regarding the status of his case. At the time, Mr. Lancelin was still unaware respondent had settled his case.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

After investigation, the ODC filed formal charges alleging respondent’s actions violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 | ./neglect of a legal matter), 1.2 (failure to abide by scope of representation), 1.3 (incompetence), 1.4 (failure to communicate), 1.5 (failure to execute written contingency contract, failure to refund unearned fees, failure to place disputed fees in trust and failure to maintain client trust account), 1.15 (commingling and conversion of client funds), 1.16 (failure to protect client interests upon termination of representation), 8.1 (knowingly making a false statement of material fact, failure to respond to lawful demand for information from disciplinary authorities and failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation), 8.4 (violating or attempting to violate the professional rules, commission of a criminal act adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation).

Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges. In his answer, he denied any misconduct.

Recommendation of the Hearing Committee

Respondent failed to appear at the formal hearing. The ODC presented the testimony of seventeen witnesses in support of its case.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing committee determined the ODC proved the allegations of professional misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. The hearing committee found respondent knowingly and willfully violated duties to his clients, the judicial system and the profession, resulting in serious actual harm. It determined his clients’ legal matters were delayed, and in some instances dismissed, because of his failure to act. Moreover, the committee pointed out his clients were denied their funds.

Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee concluded the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. |sAs aggravating factors, the committee recognized dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct, and failure to cooperate and obstruction of the disciplinary process. The committee did not cite any mitigating factors. Accordingly, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred.

Recommendation of the Disciplinary Board

The disciplinary board adopted the factual findings of the hearing committee. The board found respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his client, the public and the profession. It noted there was actual injury to respondent’s clients because he deprived them of their settlement funds, failed to refund unearned fees, failed to pay third parties and delayed the administration of his clients’ cases. Additionally, many clients had to engage new counsel at additional expense to have their legal problems resolved. The board found such conduct damages the public’s view of the reputation and integrity of the legal profession.

In addition to the aggravating factors cited by the committee, the board recognized the vulnerability of respondent’s victims as an aggravating factor since most of the clients appeared to be legally unsophisticated and have meager resources. Further, although the board recognized respondent’s inexperience in the practice of law as a mitigating factor, it concluded his knowing and/or intentional actions, the pattern of misconduct and the numerous offenses suggest his inexperience in the practice of law had little or nothing to do with his misconduct. The board recommended respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and ordered to pay full restitution to his victims.

IflAlthough neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, this court, on its own motion, ordered briefing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(a). The court’s September 18, 2002 order directed the parties “to address whether the sanction of permanent disbarment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, Sections 10(a) and 24, as amended August 1, 2001, is appropriate under the facts of this case.”

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisi ana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444, 445 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports a finding of serious professional misconduct. Respondent’s repeated practice of settling client matters on his own volition, forging settlement checks and converting the resulting funds for his own use displays a shocking disregard for his professional obligations. There are no mitigating factors present; however, numerous aggravating factors exist. Under these circumstances, we conclude the baseline sanction is disbarment. However, given the egregiousness |inof respondent’s misconduct, we will further consider whether permanent disbarment is warranted.

On August 1, 2001, after a lengthy period of study and public comment, this court adopted amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 and § 24 to provide for the sanction of permanent disbarment. In re: Gros, 98-0772 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 799; In re: Parker, 00-3532 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 794; In re: Patrick, 01-1419 (La.3/15/02), 815 So.2d 804. In our commentary accompanying the amendment, we stated, in pertinent part:

In the public interest, the Court has amended Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX to codify Permanent Disbarment as an available sanction for attorney misconduct. While the Court has always had the discretion to deny an application for readmission after the requisite five (5)-year waiting period after disbarment, an attorney who is permanently disbarred under these circumstances will be prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar. These amendments reflect the judgment of the Court that in some instances lawyer misconduct may be so egregious as to warrant a sanction of permanent disbarment based on the facts of an individual case and in consideration of the guidelines in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

Inin Appendix E, we set forth several guidelines illustrating the type of cases which might warrant permanent disbarment. We explained that these guidelines were not intended to bind this court in its decisionmaking, but to provide “useful information to the public and to lawyers concerning the types of conduct the Court might consider to be worthy of permanent disbarment.” Under Guideline 1, “repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm” are a ground for permanent disbarment. Clearly, respondent’s conduct in the matters at issue falls squarely within this guideline.

As recently noted in In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934, we do not lightly impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that we would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sanction here. Respondent has utterly failed in his ethical obligation to preserve and maintain his client’s funds. As did the respondent in Morphis, respondent has used his law license not to foster the high standards of the profession, but as a license to steal from the citizens of Louisiana. This court cannot and will not tolerate such conduct by an attorney, upon whom high standards of honesty and righteousness are erected. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391, 392 (1967). Because respondent does not possess the requisite moral fitness to practice law in this state, he must be permanently disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Blair David Condolí be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § | ia24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this'state. Respondent is ordered to make full restitution to his victims. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent was originally charged with a total of fourteen counts of misconduct. The disciplinary board dismissed five counts of the formal charges (counts IX, X, XI, XIII and XIV) based on a finding respondent was not properly served. The ODC did not file an objection in this court to the board’s dismissal of these counts. Accordingly, we will not discuss them further.

      . Respondent provided an accounting alleging he expended 27 hours on behalf of his clients at $150 per hour, totaling $4,050. However, the allocation of time appears to be suspect. For example, respondent billed his clients three hours to request a police report and draft a one-page letter of representation. He billed two hours for reviewing a two-page police report and making a phone call to Ms. Gray. He billed five hours for preparing a letter of representation and arranging for his clients to receive treatment with one medical clinic.

      . Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 1997. Each of the numerous complaints and the formal charges were filed within approximately two years of respondent's bar admission.

      . The board identified respondent's lack of experience as a mitigating factor, but recognized that his misconduct resulted from intentional misconduct, not inexperience. Like the board, we give little, if any, weight to respondent’s inexperience.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      (1) Disbarment by the court. In any order or judgment of the court in which a lawyer is disbarred, the court retains the discretion to permanently disbar the lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer who has served a suspension period of more than one year, exclusive of any waivers or periods of deferral, shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the court.... No lawyer may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A lawyer who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the time of the effective date of the interim suspension. The court retains the discretion, in accordance with Section 10A of this rule, to permanently disbar a lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.