author: pWEIMER, Justice. 11 CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    Louise ALLEN, v. The STATE of Louisiana through the ERNEST N. MORIAL—NEW ORLEANS EXHIBITION HALL AUTHORITY and Scottsdale Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-C-1072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 2003.

      John G. Alíelo, Baton Rouge, Holly A. Graphia, Kelly Y. Scott, Crawford & Lewis for Applicant.
    George H. Jones, New Orleans, for Respondent.
    Stevan C. Dittman, New Orleans, Alonzo T. Stanga, III, Metairie, for Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (Amicus Curiae)
   pWEIMER, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeal with respect to whether the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense, embodied in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 and 23:1061, contains a temporal requirement. More specifically, we granted writs to determine whether a defendant who seeks to invoke the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense must enter into a contract with a third party for the performance of specified work before entering into a subcontract for the performance of all or part of that work in order to avail itself of the statutory employer defense. Finding no basis for the imposition of a temporal requirement in either the language or the purpose of LSA-R.S. 23:1032 and 23:1061, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority (hereinafter “Convention Center”) and its liability insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company. In so doing, we expressly | ^overrule the decisions of the courts of appeal that have jurisprudentially imposed a temporal requirement upon the “two contract” theory of defense.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1983, Convention Center, through its managing body, New Orleans Public Facility Management, entered into a long-term contract with Aramark to provide catering services for conventions and other special events that Convention Center would routinely be sponsoring. This 1983 contract was later superceded in 1989 by a substantially similar contract between the parties. Approximately five years later, ACE Hardware Corporation (“ACE”) contracted with Convention Center to provide a venue for its 1994 Annual Fall National Show. During the ACE convention, Louise Allen, an employee of Aramark, was allegedly injured on the premises of Convention Center while in the course and scope of her employment with Aramark. Allen filed suit for damages against Convention Center and its insurer, alleging that an unevenness between the floor of the building and the door of an elevator caused her to trip and fall. Allen has since recovered workers’ compensation benefits from her direct employer, Aramark.

In response to Allen’s petition, Convention Center and its insurer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting tort immunity under the statutory employer doctrine. According to Convention Center, because it was Allen’s statutory employer launder the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense, Allen’s exclusive remedy lies in receiving worker’s compensation benefits.

At the hearing on Convention Center’s motion for summary judgment in the district court, Allen’s attorney appeared in court, but expressed no opposition to the court’s granting Convention Center’s motion. The district court judge entered judgment accordingly, dismissing Allen’s suit against Convention Center and its insurer with prejudice. Allen timely filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied without a hearing.

Allen subsequently appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, alleging that Convention Center is barred from asserting the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense because it cannot satisfy the temporal requirements imposed upon LSA-R.S. 23:1032 and 23:1061 by the case law interpreting those statutes. More specifically, Allen argued that because Convention Center entered the principal contract with ACE after entering the Aramark “sub-contract” to provide catering services for the event, Convention Center is not Allen’s statutory employer. Convention Center, on the other hand, argued that the temporal requirement of the |/‘two contract” theory is neither statutorily nor jurisprudentially mandated; all that is required to satisfy the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense is a showing that the defendant entered a contract with a third party; that pursuant to that contract, work must be performed; and that in order for defendant to fulfill its contractual obligation to perform the work, defendant entered into a subcontract for all or part of the work to be performed.

The court of appeal, in a four-to-one decision, reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the attendant dismissal of Allen’s case. Allen v. State, through the Ernest N. Mortal—New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 00-1552 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/20/02), 814 So.2d 644. In so doing, the court of appeal followed its own precedent holding that the temporal requirement must be satisfied before a defendant is entitled to tort immunity under the “two contract” theory of defense. See, Taylor v. Broadmoor Corp., 623 So.2d 674, 676 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), Crochet v. Westminster City Center Properties, 572 So.2d 720, 723 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). Because the 1989 “sub-contract” with Ara-mark to provide catering services preceded the principal contract with ACE for its 1994 convention, the court of appeal held that Convention Center could not avail itself of the “two contract” theory of defense. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal expressly rejected the contrary holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Louviere v. Woodson Construction Company, 95-1075 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/28/96), 679 So.2d 1013, writ denied, 96-2387 (La.12/6/96), 684 So.2d 929, which ruled that the temporal requirement was not a necessary prerequisite for invoking the “two contract” theory of defense, but was instead a jurisprudentially imposed requirement that had been erroneously adopted by the courts of appeal based on dicta in this court’s opinion in Berry v. Holston Well Services, 488 So.2d 934 (La.1986).

|BWe granted certiorari in this case to resolve the apparent split in the courts of appeal and to determine whether LSA-R.S. 23:1032 and 23:1061, in fact, impose a mandatory temporal requirement on the assertion of the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense. Allen, 02-1072 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 341. Stated in its simplest terms, the issue we granted writs to resolve is whether, under the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense, the defendant must enter into a principal contract with a third party for the performance of specified work before entering into a subcontract for the performance of all or part of that work in order to avail itself of the statutory employer defense.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). A court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The summary judgment procedure is favored under our law. Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Workers’ compensation legislation was enacted in the early decades of the twentieth century, not to abrogate existing tort remedies that afforded protection to workers, but to provide social insurance to compensate victims of industrial accidents because it was widely believed that the limited rights of recovery under tort law were | ^inadequate to protect these individuals. Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 92-2048 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341, 345, citing Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.1979). The legislation reflects a compromise between the competing interests of employers and employees: the employer gives up the defense it would otherwise enjoy in cases where it is not at fault, while the employee surrenders his or her right to full damages, accepting instead a more modest claim for essentials, payable regardless of fault and with a minimum of delay. Id.

The legislatures that adopted the early workers’ compensation acts feared that employers would attempt to circumvent the absolute liability those statutes imposed by interjecting between themselves and their workers intermediary entities which would fail to meet workers’ compensation obligations. Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Employer’s Tort Immunity: A Case Study in Posh-Modern Immunity, 57 La.L.Rev. 467, 488 (1997). To assure a compensation remedy to injured workers, these legislatures provided that some principals were by statute deemed, for purposes of liability for workers’ compensation benefits, the employers of employees of other entities. Id. The legislative approaches to what is commonly referred to as the “statutory employer” doctrine varied.

Louisiana adopted a broad version of the statutory employer doctrine. The Louisiana Act expressly extends the employer’s compensation obligation and its corresponding tort immunity to “principals.” Thus, LSA-R.S. 23:1061, which 17establishes the workers’ compensation responsibility of a principal under the statutory employer doctrine, provides in pertinent part:

When any person, in this Section referred to as the “principal”, undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person, in this Section referred to as the “contractor,” for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee had been immediately employed by him. [Emphasis added.][]

The corollary provision, LSA-R.S. 23:1032, proclaims that the rights and remedies granted to an employee or his dependent under the Act shall be “exclusive of all claims, including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal.” (Emphasis added.) “Principal” is defined as “any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.” Id.

It has long been recognized that these provisions present alternative bases for imposing the workers’ compensation obligation on entities that are not direct employers. See, 14 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law TREATISE: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND Practice § 364 at 173 (2002) (“[T]here are alternative bases for the compensation obligation in La. R.S. 23:1061, so as to make the availability of the compensation remedy broad enough to cover two different methods of doing business.”). A “principal” (or statutory |semployer) for purposes of the Act is any person who undertakes to carry out any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation by means of a contract with another (the “trade, business or occupation” defense); or, any person who has contracted to perform work and sub-lets any portion to another (the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense). Wex S. Malone, Principal’s Liability for Workmen’s Compensation to Employees of Contractor, 10 La. L.Rev. 25, 27 (1949). As to the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense, it is irrelevant whether the subcontractor’s work is part of the work ordinarily performed by the principal. In fact, the law presumes the contract to be within the trade, business or occupation of the principal. See, Berry, 488 So.2d at 936 n. 3 (and cases cited therein). The “two contract” defense applies when: (1) the principal enters into a contract with a third party; (2) pursuant to that contract, work must be performed; and (3) in order for the principal to fulfill its contractual obligation to perform the work, the principal enters into a subcontract for all or part of the work performed. Id.; Beddingfield v. Standard Construction Company, 560 So.2d 490, 491-492 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990); Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Schwegmann Westside Expressway, Inc., 516 So.2d 412, 413 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987).

In the present case, plaintiff urges, and the court of appeal held, that there is an additional requirement imposed upon the “two contract” defense. According to plaintiff, the phrase “had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person,” found in §§ 1061 and 1032, imposes a temporal requirement upon the defense which mandates that a principal asserting the “two contract” theory must contract to do work before entering into a subcontract with a separate entity to perform all or part of that work.

|9The temporal requirement urged by the plaintiff and recognized by the court of appeal in this case first appeared in the jurisprudence in the case of Davis v. Material Delivery Service, Inc., 506 So.2d 1243 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987). In Davis, the court of appeal relied on a footnote in this court’s decision in Berry, supra, to find that the contracts at issue in that case did not fit within the “two contract” scenario described in Berry. In Berry, we stated in footnote:

The discussion throughout the remainder of this opinion does not deal with what may be called the “two-contract” statutory employer defense. La. R.S. 23:1032,1061. In that situation, an owner contracts with a general contractor to do a job. The general contractor in turn contracts with a subcontractor for the “sub” to do the whole or a part of the total job contracted by the “general.” ... See Lewis, [v. Exxon Corporation, 441 So.2d 192 (La.1983) ] ... (in dicta); Borne v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 482 So.2d 40 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986); Thornton v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 479 So.2d 7 (La.App. 5th Cir.1985); Brown v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 461 So.2d 443 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984), writ denied in part, 462 So.2d 1235 (La.1985); McCorkle v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 457 So.2d 682 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984); Jurls v. Lama Drilling Co., Inc., 457 So.2d 135 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied 460 So.2d 1045 (La.1984); Certain v. Equitable Equipment Co., 453 So.2d 292 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 459 So.2d 535 (La.1984); Richard v. Weill Construction Co., Inc., 446 So.2d 943 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied 449 So.2d 1356 (La.1984).

Berry, 488 So.2d at 936 n. 3. The Davis court drew upon this footnote, and the fact that the seven cases cited all “involved a particular general contract and a subsequent subcontract to do a part of the work included in the general contract,” Davis, 506 So.2d at 1248, to conclude that a temporal requirement is imposed upon the defense, i.e., the principal must first contract to do work and then contract for the “sub” to do all or part of the work before the defense can be invoked.

Case law subsequent to Davis simply adopted its holding without further analysis or inquiry, resulting in a body of jurisprudence incorporating the temporal requirement as a mandatory component of the “two contract” theory of defense based ImSoiely on dicta from this court’s opinion in Berry. See, e.g., Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corp. v. Genie Industries, 00-2034 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/7/01), 801 So.2d 1161; Black v. McDermott International, Inc., 96-2062 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/2/97), 692 So.2d 724, writ denied, 97-1026 (La.5/30/97) 694 So.2d 252; Peterson v. BE & K, Inc. of Alabama, 94-0005 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 617, writs denied, 95-0831, 95-0818 (La.5/12/95), 654 So.2d 350; Taylor v. Broadmoor Corporation, 623 So.2d 674 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993); Croy v. Bollinger Machine Shop & Shipyard, 578 So.2d 945 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 586 So.2d 532 (La.1991); Crochet v. Westminster City Center Properties, 572 So.2d 720 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990); Short v. Mobil Oil Corp., 544 So.2d 572 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989).

The only decision to depart from this line of case law is that of the third circuit in Louviere, supra. In Louviere, the third circuit traced the temporal requirement of the “two contract” theory to its jurisprudential origins and then declined to follow that jurisprudence, recognizing that in civilian jurisdictions such as Louisiana, the sources of law are legislation and custom, and that legislation is superior to any other source of law. Louviere, 679 So.2d at 1016-1017. In concluding that the language l^of § 1061 does not contain a temporal requirement, the third circuit relied heavily upon the statutory exegesis of Professor H. Alston Johnson, III, in the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise on workers’ compensation. Johnson writes:

Reference to Section 1061 of the Act does not show great support for this theory [the temporal requirement]. While the section does speak in the past tense with respect to the “first” contract (“which he had contracted to perform”), it does not necessarily speak of a subsequent second contract (“and contracts with any person”). While the second phrase could mean that he contracts in the future after the first contract, it could just as well mean that he has a standing agreement with another person to provide labor, for example, on the jobs that he contracts to do for other people. In sum, the statutory exegesis does not appear to require a “temporal sequence” to the two contract theory.

Louviere, 679 So.2d at 1016, quoting 14 Malone & Johnson, § 364, at 192-93 (1994). Drawing upon this reasoning, the court of appeal in Louviere concluded that there is no support in the language of the statute for the imposition of a temporal requirement and refused to jurispruden-tially impose one.

We agree with the premise of the Louvi-ere court that the starting point for the interpretation of the requirements of section 1061 is the statute itself and not the dicta drawn from our footnote in Berry. In addition, we note that the Louisiana Civil Code lists the following rules for the interpretation of laws:

When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. [LSA-C.C. art. 9.]
When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. [LSA-C.C. art. 10.]
|1gThe words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. [LSA-C.C. art. 11.]
When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. [LSA-C.C. art. 12.]

See also, LSA-R.S. 1:4 which states:

When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

Without question, we are bound by the language of the relevant statutes.. However, where there are two interpretations of a statute, we must apply the interpretation which best conforms to the purpose of the law. LSA-C.C. art. 10. See also, Smith v. State, Department of Public Safety, 366 So.2d 1318, 1320 (La.1978); Edwards v. Daigle, 201 La. 622, 634, 10 So.2d 209, 212 (1942).

Applying the prescribed rules for the interpretation of laws, we conclude that the provisions of sections 1061 and 1032 impose no temporal requirement on the “two contract” defense. While it is true, as plaintiff points out, that the relevant section speaks in the past tense with respect to the “first” contract (“which he had contracted to perform”) and then shifts to the present tense (“and contracts with any person”), it does not necessarily follow that this coupling of past and present tenses imposes a specific time sequence on the contracts. Indeed, had such a time sequence been intended, it can be presumed that the legislature would have so stated by inserting appropriate language (“which he had contracted to perform and [then] contracts with any person”) to make clear its intent. In this instance, the coupling of past and present tenses more likely was intended to segregate the two contracts involved rather than to dictate the sequence in which they occur. Therefore, we agree with Professor Johnson that an equally plausible reading of the phrase “and contracts |13with any person” includes the situation where a principal has a standing agreement with another person to provide labor or services on jobs that he contracts to do for other people, and the phrase does not require a temporal sequence to the contracts.

The reading urged by plaintiffs, adhering strictly to the “niceties of grammar,” and construing the use of past and present tense forms of the word “contract,” would, in this instance, produce an unreasonable result. See, e.g., Smith, 366 So.2d at 1320. In this regard, no reason has been advanced, nor can we fathom one, to support a finding that a principal who has a longstanding agreement with a supplier to provide labor and/or services in connection with jobs for which the principal contracts should be treated differently, for purposes of the compensation obligation, than one who enters separate contracts with the supplier after first contracting with a third party to perform certain work. There is no conceivable reason of policy to justify restricting the operation of the section to the latter situation and treating differently principals engaged in the exact same conduct except for the timing of their contracts.

The insertion of a temporal requirement does not further the public policy considerations that are the foundation of the workers’ compensation legislation of this state. The insertion of a temporal requirement interjects an arbitrary requirement that severely impairs the stability of long-term service contracts such as the one at hand, certainly not an outcome that benefits workers involved in such contracts.

Moreover, we must give consideration to the definition of “principal” provided in LSA-R.S. 23:1032(2):

[T]he word “principal” shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof. [Emphasis added.]

|14 Regardless of the timing of the contracts between the principal contractor and the employer, if the injured employee is engaged in the principal’s work “at the time of the injury,” under the clear definition of “principal” the triggering event is “at the time of injury,” not the timing of the contracts.

As LSA-R.S. 23:1061 and 23:1062 have two plausible interpretations, LSA-C.C. art. 10 instructs us to interpret these statutes to have a meaning which best conforms to the purpose of the law. As noted above, workers’ compensation laws were enacted “to provide social insurance to compensate victims of industrial accidents because it was widely believed that the limited rights of recovery available under the general tort law was inadequate to protect them.” Roberts, 634 So.2d at 345. As this court recognized in Berry, the purpose behind the statutory employer doctrine was “to prevent principals from evading their compensation responsibilities by interposing a ‘straw man’ between them and those ‘employees’ who are doing the whole or part or their trade.” Berry, 488 So.2d at 936. A worker should be protected as to the compensation obligation owed to him, and the principal should not be allowed to insulate itself through a contracting scheme. When LSA-R.S. 23:1061 and 23:1032 are interpreted as not having a temporal requirement, the purpose underlying the workers’ compensation act remains unscathed. The worker remains protected with a claim for medicals, rehabilitation, and compensation, regardless of fault. In return, the employer is forced to fulfill the compensation obligation owed to his employee and cannot use an elaborate contractual scheme to evade this responsibility.

We are mindful of our obligation, in construing the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, that “every presumption should be on the side of preserving the general tort or delictual rights of an injured worker against the actual wrongdoer, in |1Rthe absence of explicit statutory-language limiting or excluding such rights,” Roberts, 684 So.2d at 346. However, this presumption should not be applied to frustrate the basic purpose of the workers’ compensation act — to provide workers’ compensation benefits to injured workers and thereby avoid the pitfalls and defenses of the tort system. Nor should the presumption be applied when no conceivable reason of policy for the temporal requirement exists.

CONCLUSION

We reject the holding of the court of appeal to the effect that LSA-R.S. 23:1032 and 23:1061 establish a temporal requirement for asserting the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense. Pursuant to the statutes, in order to raise the “two contract” defense, a defendant must establish only that: (1) it entered into a contract with a third party; (2) pursuant to that contract, work must be performed; and (3) in order for the defendant to fulfill its contractual obligation to perform the work, the defendant entered into a subcontract for all or part of the work performed.

Upon review of the contracts between ACE and the Convention Center and between the Convention Center and Ar-amark, it is clear that the articulated requirements for asserting the “two contract” defense have been satisfied in this case. Finding no basis for the imposition of an added temporal requirement in either the language or the purpose of LSA-R.S. 23:1032 and 23:1061, we therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Convention Center and its insurer, being satisfied that defendant has met its burden of proving that it was the statutory employer of plaintiff and is therefore entitled to tort immunity under the “two contract” theory of the statutory employer defense.

LfiDECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants is reinstated.

CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

11 CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

dissents and assigns the following reasons:

I believe that the temporal requirement is a necessary component of the statutory employer “two-contract” theory of defense. This result is compelled, not by this court’s dicta in Berry v. Holston Well Services, although that footnote supports imposition of a temporal requirement, but by the plain language of the relevant statutes and established rules of interpretation in workers’ compensation cases. The majority opinion gives proper deference to the rules of statutory construction set forth in the Civil Code. The majority and I differ, however, as to the legally proper outcome commanded by application of these rules.

Civil Code article 9 provides that “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” The relevant statutes clearly and unambiguously set forth a temporal requirement in connection with the “two-contract” theory of defense. The general meaning of the phrase “had contracted to perform” denotes that the agreement took place in the past, while the phrase “and contracts with any person” connotes the present tense. See La. Rev. Stats. 23:1082, 1061. In the normal grammatical context, when one places a past-tense phrase sequentially before a present-tense phrase, it is contemplated that the one action precedes the other. While it is also plausible, as the |gmajority holds, that this coupling of past and present tenses was intended merely to segregate the two contracts, we are bound to construe these statutes “on the side of preserving the general tort or delictual rights of an injured worker against the actual wrongdoer, in the absence of explicit statutory language limiting or excluding such rights.” Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 92-2048, p. 8 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341, 346.

Finding a temporal requirement implicit in the plain language of §§ 1032 and 1061 does not lead to the absurd consequences suggested by the majority when one examines the “two-contract”defense in the overall context of the statutory employer scheme. First of all, the benevolent policy of ensuring that injured workers receive compensation benefits is not implicated in the statutory employer situation. Plaintiff has already received benefit payments from her direct employer, Aramark, and this is generally what happens, considering that the Act requires employers to secure compensation to their employees. “It is one of the anomalies of workers’ compensation law that an entire group of persons or entities who may never actually pay compensation to a claimant, or even be asked to do so, nonetheless enjoy complete immune from suit in tort by such a claimant.” Malone & Johnson, 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice, § 364, at 160 (4th ed.1994).

Importantly, contrary to the majority’s assertion, finding a temporal requirement implicit in the “two-contract” theory does not penalize a principal who chooses to conduct its business through a long-standing agreement rather than a series of contracts. This type of principal, may be able to establish statutory employer immunity under a separate theory set forth in R.S. 23:1032: the trade, business, or occupation defense. The legislature chose to make the statutory employer concept |s“broad enough to cover two different methods of doing business.” Malone & Johnson, supra § 364, at 173. The “two-contract” theory is traditionally implicated where a general contractor, with a contract to perform a job for an owner, contracts thereafter with a subcontractor for the “sub” to do all or a part of the job contracted by the “general.” Berry v. Holston Well Servs., 488 So.2d 934, 939 (La.1986). The trade, business, or occupation defense, on the other hand, was designed to prevent principals from escaping their workers’ compensation responsibilities by inserting “straw men” between them and those “employees” who were performing the whole or part of the principal’s trade, business, or occupation. Berry, 488 So.2d at 936. The legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” in §§ 1032 and 1061 shows the separateness of the two defenses: when the principal “undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade business or occupation or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person .... ”

It is worth noting that the legislature has twice amended the trade, business, or occupation theory of defense since its inception to statutorily overrule decisions of this court. On the other hand, the “two-contract” theory has remained virtually unchanged since its 1914 enactment, despite the numerous appellate court cases limiting the availability of the defense through the imposition of the temporal requirement. In the absence of legislative guidance to the contrary, we are bound to construe the relevant statutes as written and according to the history and purpose of tort and workers’ compensation laws. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion, and would find that the court of appeal was correct in reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Convention Center.

      . See, e.g., Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corp. v. Genie Industries, 00-2034 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/07/01), 801 So.2d 1161; Black v. McDermott International, Inc., 96-2062 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/2/97), 692 So.2d 724, writ denied, 97-1026 (La.5/30/97), 694 So.2d 252; Peterson v. BE & K, Inc. of Alabama, 94-0005 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 617, writs denied, 95-0831, 654 So.2d 350, 95-0818 (La.5/12/95), 654 So.2d 350; Taylor v. Broadmoor Corporation, 623 So.2d 674 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993); Croy v. Bollinger Machine Shop & Shipyard, 578 So.2d 945 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 532 (La.1991); Crochet v. Westminster City Center Properties, 572 So.2d 720 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990); Short v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 544 So.2d 572 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989); Davis v. Material Delivery Service, Inc., 506 So.2d 1243 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987).

      . Convention Center contended in the court of appeal, and now contends in this court, that pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art.2085, Allen is barred from appealing because she acquiesced in the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the accompanying dismissal of her action. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2085 provides that an appeal cannot be taken by a party who "voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in a judgment rendered against him.” The court of appeal found that Allen did not clearly demonstrate an intention to abandon her right to appeal, citing Schneider v. Mayo, 94-527 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/97), 647 So.2d 606, writ denied, 95-0027 (La.2/17/95, 650 So.2d 254). 650 So.2d 254, and Brewster v. Santos, 94-1148 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 486. Because appeals are favored in law, this court has articulated a high standard for finding that a party has acquiesced in a judgment for purposes of LSA-C.C.P. art.2085. See e.g., Succession of Franz, 238 La. 608, 612, 116 So.2d 267, 268, ("[Bjefore we can say that an appellant has lost his right of appeal, there must be an unconditional, absolute, and voluntary acquiescence in the judgment by the appellant, who must have intended to abandon his right.”). In this case, the fact that Allen’s attorney voiced no objection to the district court's grant of summary judgment could signify that he saw the judgment as inevitable and was planning to move for an immediate appeal. The fact that the attorney subsequently filed a timely motion for new trial supports the inference that he did not wish to stand idly by and allow the court to dismiss his client's case with prejudice. We therefore find no error in the court of appeal's resolution of this issue.

      . Due in large part to the "unholy trinity" of judicially-created employer defenses (assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule), less than 25 percent of injured workers recovered compensation for work-related accidents. Roberts, 634 So.2d at 345.

      . The principal’s responsibility for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits has been a part of our workers' compensation law since its inception in 1914. La. Acts.1914, No. 20, § 6(1), 6(2). In 1950, this court held that the language and purpose of LSA-R.S. 23:1032, when considered with § 1061, established the corresponding tort immunity for principals, Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So.2d 852 (1950), but this immunity was not codified until the statute was amended in 1976. La. Acts 1976, No. 147, § 1.

      . The quoted provisions are those that were in effect at the time of the alleged injury and encompass the law that applies. See, Bruno v. Harbert International, Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 360 (La.1992). The statute was amended in 1997. La Acts 1997, No. 315, § 1.

      . The Berry footnote acknowledges that the "two contract” theory was not at issue; therefore, our comments regarding this defense are clearly dicta.

      . Prior to Louviere, the third circuit had adopted the view of the courts cited above, that the temporal requirement was necessary to the two contract defense. See, Burleigh v. South La. Contractors, 525 So.2d 87, 91 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988) ("A principal must first contract to do work and then contract for another to do all or part of that work.”).

      . The court of appeal quoted from the reasoning of Judge H. Ward Fontenot of the 38th Judicial District Court who said:
      [RJecognizing that there are two methods by which a principal may become a statutory employee and that is the Berry test or the two contract method; and relying upon the statute, there is no temporal requirement in the statute. It would really be a strain ... to say that one [contract] has to come before the other. That’s a judge made requirement. I admit that there are some appellate] panels who have inserted this requirement, but under our civilian method of statutory construction, I see no such requirement.

      .The quoted paragraph was deleted from the latest edition of the Civil Law Treatise, published in 2002. Nevertheless, in that edition, the author reiterates, albeit in a more abbreviated fashion, that the group of cases that "purport to find a temporal requirement in the two-contract basis for tort immunity” rest on "dubious statutory foundation.” 14 Malone & Johnson, § 364 at 173-74 (2002).

      . For a rejoinder to Professor Johnson’s comments, see Judge Cooks’ dissent in Louvi-ere.

      . The comments to § 1061 indicate that the 1989 amendments were intended to modify Berry, and the 1997 amendments were intended to overrule Berry and Kirkland v. Riverwood International, Inc., 95-1830 (La.9/13/96), 681 So.2d 329. Both amendments increase the availability of the statutory employer defense while correlatively broadening compensation liability.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    David M. JARROTT, M.D. v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.
    No. 2003-CC-1056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 2003.
   In re Jarrott, David M. M.D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2002-8797; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-1987.

Denied.


text:
    James H. “Jim” BROWN, as Commissioner of Insurance From the State of Louisiana v. ANA INSURANCE GROUP, a Louisiana Partnership.
    No. 2003-CC-1122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 23, 2003.
   In re Brown, James H. “Jim”; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 388,758; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CW 0578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky J. LANGLEY.
    No. 2003-KK-1125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2003.
   In re Langley, Ricky J.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 10258-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 03-00-163.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky J. LANGLEY.
    No. 2003-KK-1126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 24, 2003.
   In re Langléy, Ricky J.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 10258-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 03-00-459.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chance CEASER.
    No. 2002-K-3021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-K-1523A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-374.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey MILLER.
    No. 2003-KK-0206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Miller, Corey; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-3952; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-K-1013.

Granted.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    The SULTANA CORPORATION d/b/a Hannon Jewelers v. JEWELERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2003-C-0360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Sultana Corporation d/b/a; Han-non Jewelers; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 458,956; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2059.

Granted.


text:
    TRISTAR CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2003-C-0460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Tristar Construction Co. Inc.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 95-8151; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-2282.

Granted. The lower courts are reversed and the motion for summary judgment is denied as there are genuine issues of material fact.


text:
    Wade CLARK, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-CC-0591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Department of Revenue Secretary of; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 483,150; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1936.

Grant and remand to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and full opinion.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathaniel MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Mitchell, Nathaniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 67,603; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37337-KH.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, for enforcement of its order in State v. Mitchell, 37,337 (La.App.2d Cir.2/10/03), if it has not done so already.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rey HUERTA.
    No. 2003-KH-1035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Huerta, Rey; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, Nos. 03-01-2, 12-00-76.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy LAVERGNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Lavergne, Randy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 12-97-230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 00 KW 085.

Granted for the sole, purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James H. BROADWAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Broadway, James H. Plaintiff(s);— Applying for Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated January 31, 2003; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. “C” No. 401-194 Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit No. 2001-K-1958.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith D. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2001-KH-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Keith D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s order dated June 22, 2001, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 314,007.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    Carrie Whitaker CARONNA, et al. v. Barry J. CURRY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Caronna, Carrie Whitaker Admin-istratrix of Estate et al.; Caronna, Jonathon Thomas; Caronna, Candy Jo; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 25,859; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-709.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    Samuel HERON v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD.
    No. 2003-CC-1090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Dixie Machine Welding and Metal Works Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 02-10182; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0492.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(a).

WEIMER, J., dissents and would consider the merits.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald James THOMAS.
    No. 2002-KO-1251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Thomas, Ronald James; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 00-K2003; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CR01-1129.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Richard P. SPOT.
    No. 2002-KO-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Spot, Richard P.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 410-075; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-2083.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Colbert FRANKLIN.
    No. 2002-KO-1308.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Franklin, Colbert; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-0611; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2000-KA-2097.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael CELESTINE.
    No. 2002-KO-1309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Celestine, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 398-285; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2000-KA-2713.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence Herman REED.
    No. 2002-KO-1313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Reed, Lawrence Herman; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 255,822; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 00-1537.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnny Ray LOUNA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Luna, Johnny, R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 95-5491; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02 KH 352.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Micha RIDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Rider, Micha; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 97-146,451, 97-146,440, 97-146,457; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2726.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darren Michael HOUSTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Houston, Darren Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 43,193; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36152-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric DUNN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Dunn, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 391-375; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0318.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew MCGRAW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1371.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re McGraw, Andrew; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 53,783; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36242-KH.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Jackson, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-94-962; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2386.

Denied. See, e.g., State v. Deloche, 96-1901, p. 1 (La.11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349; See also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 352-55 (6th Cir.1998).

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric KEGLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Kegler, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2-97-339; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2346.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carl Wayne DUHON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Duhon, Carl, Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 80 264.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie A. BOUDREAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Boudreaux, Willie, A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 77-2546.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Albert HILLS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Hills, Albert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 385 408; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 500.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George E. DUGARS Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Dugars, George, E. Jr; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 392-445; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 333.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Quinton James RHINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Rhine, Quinton, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-150,967; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2387.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freddie CLEMENTS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
    Reconsideration Denied June 6, 2003.
   In re Clements, Freddie, Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 390-985; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 417.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert D. GALBRETH, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Galbreth, Robert, E. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 103-640; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36192 KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nivaldo BUENO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Bueno, Nivaldo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 292-247; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002 K 319.

Denied.


text:
    RIVER CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK (The Cadle Company) v. VIDEO ASSOCIATES, INC., Robert F. Killingsworth, Jr., John H. Skaggs and Wayne M. Bettoney.
    No. 2002-C-2966.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Cadle Co.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 336,487; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2453.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Edward PARKER.
    No. 2002-K-3023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Parker, Charles Edward; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 318268; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0613.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald WORACHEK.
    No. 2002-K-3024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Worachek, Gerald; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 11-00-76; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0811.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Patrick A. CONNER.
    No. 2002-K-3064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Conner, Patrick A.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-5804; to the Court of Appeal,. Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-363.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy WALKER.
    No. 2002-K-3066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Walker, Roy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 98-3860; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-495.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carkennis LEE.
    No. 2002-K-3098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Lee, Carkennis; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 66,219; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,-538-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jake Michael ORTEGO.
    No. 2002-K-3134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Ortego, Jake Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07-99-348; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0571.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mervyn WILLIAMS.
    No. 2002-K-3182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Williams, Mervyn; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 95-6533; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-645.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joe GUERRA, aka Jojo Guera.
    No. 2003-K-0072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Guerra, Joe a/k/a; Guerra, Jojo;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 202,366; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,347-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Danny Scott CLARK.
    No. 2003-K-0089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Clark, Danny Scott; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00-4681; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-591.

Denied.


text:
    Vickie HERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Jude E. Bailey and Arthur Bailey v. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2003-C-0261.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Hernandez, Vickie et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 87-024, 84-673; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-CA-0162, 2002-CA-0163.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Vickie HERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Jude E. Bailey and Arthur Bailey v. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2003-C-0307.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Louisiana State of through; Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 84-673, 87-024; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2002-CA-0162, 2002-CA-0163.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Stephen Dexter HAWKLAND, Individually and on Behalf of his Minor Son Christopher Hawkland and Laree Inez Hawkland v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Agricultural and Mechanical College.
    No. 2003-C-0336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Hawkland, Stephen Dexter et al.; Hawkland, Christopher; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 421,204; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0047.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Robert M. CARBO and Linda S. Carbo v. CITY OF SLIDELL, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Carbo, Robert M. et al.; Carbo, Linda S.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-11402; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 0170.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    TOWN OF WALKER v. Mary STAFFORD, Betty Marsh, and Lance Milton.
    No. 2003-C-0441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Stafford, Mary et al.; Marsh, Betty; Milton, Lance; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 89673; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-CA-2188.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SECOND CIRCUITS CORPORATION v. DEL CORPORATION.
    No. 2003-C-0461.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Del Corporation; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2000-6517; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-659.

Denied.


text:
    Olla THOMAS, et al. v. SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION d/b/a Lake Charles Memorial Hospital.
    No. 2003-C-0476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Thomas, Olla; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 96-4500; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0645.

Denied.


text:
    CANAL 66 PARTNERSHIP v. Gus A. REYNOIR as Succession Representative of the Succession of Fred M. Reynoir.
    No. 2003-C-0478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Canal 66 Partnership; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2000-14075; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0355.

Denied.


text:
    Ron KELLER and Dolores Keller Madere, Individually and on Behalf of Their Mother, Isma W. Keller v. Shaunda JONES, M.D.
    No. 2003-CC-0479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Agee, Clarence; Agee, Lorraine; Agee, Jessie; Ockman, Anabelle; Clement, Tanya; Tassin, Kathy; Tassin, George; Townson, Mary; Guidry, Susan; Desselle, Nancy; Marse, Allen; Marse, Kenneth;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 548-322; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1214.

Denied.


text:
    Delbert W. BUSH, et ux. v. Dr. Celeste Aida LUJAN-BAEZ.
    No. 2003-CC-0480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Lujan-Baez, Celeste Aida Dr.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 60,270; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01374.

Denied.


text:
    Theresa B. MONISTERE, et al. v. Tod C. ENGELHARDT, M.D. and Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Board.
    No. 2003-CC-0483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Bd.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 566-092, 574-040; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1134.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth L. SMITH and Julia Ann Smith v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC. and Entergy Corporation.
    No. 2003-C-0490.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Smith, Kenneth L. et al.; Smith, Julia Ann; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 48,043; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-989.

Denied.


text:
    Monica Ann LAFAUCI v. Randall J. JENKINS and Illinois National Insurance Company, an Affiliate of the American International Group.
    No. 2003-C-0498.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Lafauci, Monica Ann; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 476-633; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-CA 2960.

Denied.


text:
    Marianne S. JAMES, et al. v. John N. KENT, D.D.S., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University; Agricultural and Mechanical College, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 02-7234; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-1786.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ricky DAVIS v. 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
    No. 2003-CP-0511.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Davis, Ricky;' — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 460,409; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2683.

Denied.


text:
    Troy LANGLINAIS, Individually and as Tutor of the Minors, Troy O’Neil Langlinais and Terry Langlinais v. The CITY OF WESTWEGO and Eric Lirette.
    No. 2003-CC-0512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Langlinais, Troy et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 546-878; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1217.

Denied.


text:
    John B. DINGLER, et ux. v. ZURICH COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0514.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Barras, John A. d/b/a; Cajun Wood Products; Assurance Company of America; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2000-5089; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-674.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Donald SULLIVAN, Jr. v. Mark FRANICEVICH and Joshua, Inc., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Essex Insurance Company;- — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 46-248; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-1375.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Joseph Lee DELCO, Jr. v. Eugene STAFFORD, Tycoon Trucking, Inc. and Clarendon National.
    No. 2003-CC-0523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Delco, Joseph Lee Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 124,442; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2099.

Denied.


text:
    TOWN OF WALKER v. Mary STAFFORD, Betty Marsh and Lance Elliot Milton.
    No. 2003-C-0524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Town of Walker; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 89,673; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2188.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SPORT TECH, INC. v. SFI MANUFACTURING, INC., Outland Sports, Inc. and Robert D. Berkley.
    No. 2003-C-0526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Sport Tech Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98,646; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,413-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Donald WILLIAMS v. Harry F. CONNICK.
    No. 2003-CP-0528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Williams, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2002-00983; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2498.

Denied.


text:
    Vincent J. BRUNO, Ronald J. Cannatella, et al. v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Bruno, Vincent; Cannatella, Ronald J., et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 77-14673; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1175.

Denied.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge Through the Greater Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport District v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and J. Caldarera & Co., Inc.
    No. 2003-CC-0531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re J. Caldarera & Co. Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 493,788; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 2105.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph A. MAZOUE v. AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., (Formerly Avondale Shipyards, Inc.) and It’s Excuective Officers, Edward Hartzman, John Chantrey, Edward Blanchard, Henry Zach Carter, Peter Territo, James O’Donnell, Branton Insulations, Eagle, Inc., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Leahy, William Edward III; Sal-vaggio, Pamela Carol Leahy, Individually and as Administratrix of the Succession of Joseph A. Mazoue; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 96-19918; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1569.

Denied.


text:
    Clyde ABERCROMBIE v. Randy OPOTOWSKY.
    No. 2003-C-0545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Confidential Party; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 99-15640; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1427.

Denied.


text:
    Steve WASHINGTON v. Bobby Joe PICOU, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0552.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Washington, Steve; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 92-5080-F; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01369.

Denied.


text:
    Reagan Rene BURGESS and Paul E. Burgess v. Ryan J. DAIGLE, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Daigle, Ryan J. et al.; Tri-State Delta Chemicals Inc. d/b/a; UAP Delta;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64007; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01434.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Cynthia A. CARR v. DELTA HOMES, INC.
    No. 2003-CC-0559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Delta Homes Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2001-002096; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01346.

Denied.


text:
    Michael Ray BASSETT, et al. v. TOYS “R” US DELAWARE, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Toys “R” Us Delaware Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 427,772; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,434-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    In re GRAMERCY PLANT EXPLOSION AT KAISER.
    No. 2003-CC-0561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Bell, Carl et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 25,975; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1232.

Denied.


text:
    Victor PALMISANO, Husband of/and Terri Palmisano v. LEGION INDEMNITY, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, and Mark T. Hatcher.
    No. 2003-CC-0564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Palmisano, Victor et al.; Palmisa-no, Terri; Shelter Mutual Insurance Company; Hatcher, Mark; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-13627; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1733.

Denied.


text:
    COLEMAN AMERICAN MOVING SERVICES, INC. and Eagle Leasing, Inc. v. Brooks HUBBARD, Toni Batiste, Octavia Phelp, Harrison Winfield, Vernon Johnson, Kelvin Smith, Channon Herron, Tangela Lokey, Individually, as the Legal Representative of Nathaniel Lokey’s Children, and the Legal Representative of the Estate of Nathaniel Lokey, Tchequila Smith, Terry Smith, Marlon Warren, Lavan McCowan, Amos Jenkins, Budget Truck Rental, Inc. and/or Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., Brian Simmons, Jason Diamond, Hank Rader, Kelvin Henderson, U-Haul Co. of Louisiana, Kent Williams, and Catina Williams.
    No. 2003-CC-0567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Acadian Auto Rental; Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 547-264; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-28.

Denied. Adequate remedy on appeal.


text:
    Hyman PIERCE v. PAW PAW’S CAMPER CITY, INC.
    No. 2003-CC-0568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Paw Paw’s Camper City Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 16762; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1561.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Carolyn Eagan ZAMJAHN v. Charles J. ZAMJAHN.
    No. 2003-C-0574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Zamjahn, Carolyn Eagan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 569-731; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-871.

Denied.


text:
    Mary D. DOIRON, Christine M. Timpa, & Stella M. Miceli v. EDWARD D. JONES & CO.
    No. 2003-CC-0576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Edward D. Jones & Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 476,476; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1483.

Denied.


text:
    Ginger MCCRAW v. DIME MORTGAGE COMPANY.
    No. 2003-C-0577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re McCraw, Ginger; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District le, Nos. 00-02297, 00-6057; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 36,604-WCA, 36,605-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    Jeanne Noel POCHE and Francis J. Poche v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Jan Corpora and United Services Automobile Association.
    No. 2003-CC-0581.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re United Services Automobile Association; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 494-053; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1138.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Fay Guillot, Wife of/and Ron GUILLOT v. EAST JEFFERSON GENERAL HOSPITAL, Jane Doe and Mary Doe.
    No. 2003-C-0584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Guillot, Fay et al.; Guillot, Ron;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 520-609; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-1074.

Denied.


text:
    Felix PRICE v. CLERK OF COURT, 19th JDC.
    No. 2003-CP-0588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Price, Felix; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 407,412; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1912.

Denied.


text:
    WAL-MART STORES, INC. and Sam’s East, Inc. v. Edward A. FITCH, Administrator, Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission, in His Capacity as Administrator of Sales and Use Taxes for the City of Shreveport, the City of Vivian, the Caddo Parish School Board, and the Law Enforcement Disstrict of the Parish of Caddo.
    No. 2003-C-0593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc. et al.; Sam’s East Inc.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 453,686; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,762-CA.

Denied.


text:
    NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION RESOURCE, INC. and Jim Morris.
    No. 2003-CC-0597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Morris, Jim; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 556-310; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1218.

Denied.


text:
    Henrik A. LARSEN v. Anna Meria POLK.
    No. 2003-C-0877.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 25, 2003.
   In re Polk, Anna Meria; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 525-820; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-1104.

Denied.


author: | THIBODEAUX, Judge.

text:
    McNICHOLS COMPANY v. John P. UNDERWOOD.
    No. 01-1323.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 6, 2002.
    J. Wendell Clark, Eric R. Miller, Adams & Reese, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant John P. Underwood.
    C. John Naquin, Jr., Naquin & Ward, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee McNichols Company.
    Court composed of HENRY L. YELVERTON, ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX and OSWALD A. DECUIR, Judges.
   | THIBODEAUX, Judge.

Defendant, John P. Underwood, appeals from a judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of plaintiff, McNichols Company, granting its exception of res judicata and granting McNichols’ petition to make two Florida judgments executory in Louisiana. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

FACTS

In 1997, Underwood became a Louisiana salesperson for McNichols, a Florida-based company that sells products in Louisiana. In connection with his employment with McNichols, Underwood signed an employment contract entitled “Non-Competition and Non-Piracy Agreement (non-competition contract).” The non-competition contract was signed in Texas and Underwood continued to live and work in Louisiana. In January of 2000, Underwood informed McNichols that he was going to resign his position and begin working for another company, FLOWCOR Products, as a salesperson in Louisiana.

McNichols instituted suit in Florida, seeking to enforce the non-competition contract it entered into with Underwood pursuant to the law of Florida. Underwood failed to file an answer to McNichols’ Florida lawsuit; instead, Underwood filed a petition in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, seeking a declaration that the non-competition contract he signed was unenforceable and an injunction against McNichols’ enforcement of the contract. However, on April 80, 2000, prior to Underwood’s case being heard in the 19th JDC, McNichols obtained a default judgment in its Florida case against Underwood. The ^Florida judgment enjoined Underwood from working in any capacity for any company engaged in a business similar to that of McNichols’ business. Later, in October of 2000, the Florida court awarded McNi-chols attorney fees and costs against Underwood.

Meanwhile, McNichols filed an exception of no cause of action in Underwood’s 19th JDC case. The exception was granted after the April 2000 Florida judgment was rendered. The 19th JDC dismissed Underwood’s case. The 19th JDC trial judge found that the Florida court had jurisdiction to render its judgment and that it was entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. McNichols next filed an action in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, seeking to make the Florida injunction and money judgments executory in Louisiana. In response, Underwood filed an answer and alternative motions to vacate and/or stay the enforcement of the Florida judgment. As he did in the 19th JDC case, Underwood challenged the validity of the Florida judgments against him. In response to Underwood’s answer challenging the validity of the Florida judgment, McNichols filed an exception of res judicata, based on the decision rendered earlier by the 19th JDC.

The court in the 15th JDC granted McNichols’ exception of res judicata and denied Underwood’s motions to vacate and/or stay the enforcement of the Florida judgment. The trial court in the 15th JDC also granted McNichols’ petition to make the two Florida judgments executory in Louisiana. This appeal by Underwood followed.

Jail.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Essential to this case is an analysis of La.R.S. 13:4231. It provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

For purposes of res judicata, comment (d) of La.R.S. 13:4231 provides that a final judgment is “a judgment that disposes of the merits in whole or in part. The use of the phrase ‘final judgment’ also means that the preclusive effect of a judgment attaches once the final judgment has been signed by the trial court and would bar any action filed thereafter unless the judgment is reversed on appeal.” (Emphasis added). Furthermore, La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841 also states that “[a] judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.” We note that the comments to La.R.S. 13:4231 does not limit the definition of final judgment |4to a judgment where appeal delays have run. It clearly states that a judgment is final between the parties once it is signed by the trial court.

Tate v. Prewitt, 33,895, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/00); 769 So.2d 800, 803, writ denied, 00-3203 (La.1/26/01); 781 So.2d 1265, offers an historical background of res judi-cata in Louisiana as follows:

Louisiana’s original doctrine of res ju-dicata was based on a presumption of correctness rather than an extinguishment of a cause of action. A decided case precluded a second suit only if it involved the same parties, the same cause and the same object of demand as the prior suit. Terrebonne Fuel and Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Company, 95-0654 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624. However, under La.R.S. 13:4231, as amended in 1991, a second action would be barred because it arises out of the occurrence which was the subject matter of the prior litigation. The central inquiry is not whether the second action is based on the same cause of action, but whether the second action asserts a cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject matter of the first action.

It is clear that a second action was instituted in the 15th JDC based on the non-competition contract Underwood signed with McNiehols. It is equally clear that in response to McNiehols’ action to have the Florida judgment against Underwood made executory in Louisiana in the 15th JDC, Underwood asserted the same arguments he asserted in the declaratory action he filed earlier in the 19th JDC, based upon the same non-competition contract. The trial court in the 19th JDC had already signed a judgment with respect to Underwood’s declaratory action in favor of McNiehols.

In support of his position, Underwood relies upon Avenue Plaza, LLC v. Falgoust, 96-0173, p. 4 (La.7/2/96); 676 So.2d 1077, 1079 and, in part, quotes from that case as follows:

_J_gR.es judicata bars relitigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence of a previous suit. It promotes judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube v. Placid Refining, 95-0654, 95-0671, pp. 11-12 (La.1/16/96); 666 So.2d 624, 631. A judgment determining the merits of a case is a final judgment. La.C.C.P. art. 1841. See also, Tolis v. Board of Sup’rs of Louisiana State University, 95-1529 (La. 10/16/95); 660 So.2d 1206. A valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review. LSA R.S. 13:4231.

Underwood especially relies upon the following language from Avenue Plaza:

A final judgment from which there can be no appeal acquires the authority of the thing adjudged. La.C.C. art. 3506(31). Once a final judgment acquires the authority of a thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction to change the judgment, regardless of the magnitude of the final judgment’s error.

Id. at p. 5,1079.

We find that Underwood’s reliance on Avenue Plaza is misplaced in that it more appropriately supports the 15th JDC’s decision to grant McNiehols’ exception of res judicata. It appears from the quoted language that the court makes a distinction between a final judgment and a final judgment that becomes “a thing adjudged.” There must first be a final judgment before it becomes “a thing adjudged.” For purposes of res judicata, the statute and Avenue Plaza make clear that it is necessary that there only be a final judgment in order for res judicata to apply, and that the final judgment need not acquire the authority of a thing adjudged. We interpret the rule in Avenue Plaza with respect to res judicata and a final judgment being “conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review” as meaning that a case on appeal has already been litigated at the trial court level and is not a second suit but the same suit; thus, res judicata would not apply between the same parties, but is applicable should one of the parties file a second suit at the trial court level to \Rbe litigated based on the same transaction or occurrence of the first suit filed at the trial court level. In other words, McNichols could not file an exception of res judicata against Underwood in the 19th JDC action pending on appeal because, as between the parties, res judi-cata is inapplicable. However, in a second suit filed at the trial court level, it was proper for McNichols to raise the exception of res judicata when Underwood attempted to defend against the 15th JDC action by asserting the same arguments in his defense as he asserted in the 19th JDC action. Therefore, we find that the trial court was correct in granting McNichols’ exception of res judicata. Because we find that the 15th JDC did not err in granting McNichols’ exception of res judicata, it is unnecessary for this court to address Underwood’s remaining assignments of error.

All costs are assessed against John P. Underwood.

AFFIRMED.


author: |, PICKETT, J.

text:
    Juana Alicia BARE v. James KING & Sheila King.
    No. 02-1225.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 5, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied April 30, 2003.

      Paul Benoist, Attorney at Law, Vidalia, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee: Juana Alicia Bare.
    J.W. Seibert, III, Vidalia, LA, for Defendant/Appellant: James King & Shelia King.
    Court composed of NED E. DOUCET, JR., Chief Judge, ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.
   |, PICKETT, J.

FACTS

In 1979, W.C. McGehee, owner of the entirety "of Lot 18 in Upper Coosa Subdivision, sold the southern half of Lot 18 to Larry L. Brown, Sr. The act of sale filed in the conveyance records in Concordia Parish included the following relevant clauses:

This sale is made and accepted subject to the following restrictions and conditions applicable to the hereinabove described property, which restrictions-shall be binding on the vendee, his heirs, successors and assigns and any subsequent sale or transfer of the said property shall be subject thereto, although not set forth therein:
(c) No trailer shall ever be erected, moved, or placed on the hereinabove described property by the purchaser, his successors, or assigns.

Juana Alicia Bare is successor-in-title to W.C. McGehee and owns the northern half of Lot 18.

James and Shelia King are successors-in-title to Larry L. Brown and are the owners of the southern half of Lot 18. The Kings purchased the property in April 2001.

A dispute arose between Bare and the Kings when the Kings moved a mobile home onto their lot. Bare filed a Petition for Injunctive Relief on May 22, 2002. The trial court denied her request for a temporary restraining order and set a hearing date on June 10, 2002, to consider whether a preliminary injunction should issue. Prior to the hearing, the Kings executed a bill of sale on the mobile home and an act of immobilization. These were recorded in the conveyance records. At the hearing, by stipulation, the parties converted the hearing to a trial on the merits on the permanent injunction. The matter was tried and taken under advisement.

| ¡>By letter dated July 10, 2002, the trial court notified the parties that he had determined “that the structure placed on the property in question is not a “trailer” and does not violate any restrictive covenant[.]” A judgment denying the permanent injunction was signed on July 24, 2002. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The appellant, Juana Alicia Bare, alleges six assignments of error:

1) The trial court abused its discretion by failing to set the hearing on the preliminary injunction timely, in accordance with the legislature’s command.
2) The trial court committed manifest error by failing to find that the used house trailer or mobile home purchased by the Kings was the type of improvement prohibited by the building and use restrictions that were in place on the King property.
3) The trial court committed manifest error by ignoring and failing to enforce the predial servitude, restrictive covenant, mi generis real right, or stipulation pour autri running in favor of Bare’s property.
4) The trial court committed manifest error by applying an irreparable injury standard to its analysis of the facts of this case.
5) The trial court committed manifest error by allowing testimony and photographic evidence on the issue of Bare’s property.
6) Because the trial court expressly found that the Kings’ structure was not a trailer, it had to classify the structure as something else. Based on the evidence presented at trial, it is apparent that the trial court reached its determination, at least in part, on the act of immobilization. As such, the trial court committed manifest error, because it misapplied the law of immobilization.

DISCUSSION

The first assignment of error concerns the application of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3602, which states:

A preliminary injunction shall not issue unless notice is given to the adverse party and an opportunity had for a hearing.
An application for a preliminary injunction shall be assigned for hearing not less than two nor more than ten days after service of the notice.

lain this case, the petition for injunction relief was filed on May 22, 2002, and the defendants were served on May 23, 2002. The appellant argues that the court’s failure to hold a hearing within ten days of service should result in reversal.

On the day the Petition for Injunctive Relief was filed, the court executed an order which set the hearing on the preliminary injunction for June 10, 2002. Nothing in the record indicates that Bare objected to the setting of the hearing on a date which fell outside the time delays in the statute. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that they would convert the matter to a trial on the permanent injunction. Again, there was no objection regarding any procedural flaw in the setting of the hearing. We find any objection to the court’s violation of Article 3602 regarding the fixing of the hearing date was waived by the party’s failure to timely object. This assignment of error lacks merit.

The second assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in finding the structure placed on the property at issue is not a trailer and did not violate the building and use restrictions encumbering the property.

Regarding the interpretation of restrictions on the use of property, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated as follows in McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154, 158 (1960):

The law favors the free and unrestrained use of immovable property. It follows that any doubt as to the interpretation of a servitude encumbering property must be resolved in favor of the property owner. LSA — Civil Code, Article 753 [Now La.Civ.Code art. 730], The intention of the proprietor to establish a servitude must clearly appear from the title document. Noel Estate v. Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry. Co., 187 La. 717, 175 So. 468 [1937]; Clark v. Reed, [La.App.1960, 122 So.2d 344], The contract, under consideration, explicitly declares that the restriction ‘shall constitute a covenant running with the land and shall be binding upon * * * all subsequent owners * * *.’ The recitals of the contract leave no doubt that a real obligation was created.

|4In the instant case, there also is no doubt, based on the language in the act of sale from W.C. McGehee to Larry L. Brown, that a real obligation was created which is binding on the Kings, Mr. Brown’s successors in title. The issue becomes whether the mobile home, placed on that property by the Kings, is a ‘trailer’ as contemplated by the restrictive covenant and, therefore, prohibited.

We have reviewed the evidence in this matter, including the photographs introduced into evidence and marked as P-13 through P-17. The first two show the structure being wheeled down the highway by a truck. The third and fourth photographs show the truck with half of the structure behind it on the property at issue. The last picture shows one-half of the structure on the property. There is no question the structure placed on the property at issue is in fact a mobile home.

Similar issues have been addressed by this court. In Mouille v. Henry, 321 So.2d 377 (La.App. 3 Cir.1975), a subdivision’s restrictive covenant prohibited living in a “tent, trailer or shack”. This court, relying on a dictionary definition, found that a mobile home is a trailer. It rejected the appellant’s argument that the 1957 restrictions did not contemplate a mobile home or modular home building and affirmed the trial court’s grant of a mandatory injunction.

In City of Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So.2d 691 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ refused, 344 So.2d 670 (La.1977), this court was called on to interpret a city zoning ordinance which defined “trailer, mobile home” as a “vehicle equipped for use as a dwelling and designed to be hauled along a highway.” The defendant in that case had placed a mobile home on a lot in an area not zoned for such structures but had removed the wheels and axles and put the trailer on concrete blocks. This court, citing Smith v. DeVincent, 322 So.2d 257 (La.App. 2 Cir.1975), found the mobile home at issue was a ‘trailer’ and prohibited in that particular area by the zoning ordinance.

We find instructive the provisions of La. R.S. 32:1, which defines certain terms for the Louisiana Highway Regulatory Act, and defines “mobile home” as follows:

(a) a trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed and equipped as a dwelling place, living abode or sleeping place, either permanently or temporarily, and is equipped for use as a conveyance on highways; or, (b) a trailer or semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is designed and constructed for use as a mobile home, as defined in (a), but which is used instead permanently or temporarily for the advertising, sales, display, or promotion of merchandise or services, or for any other commercial purpose except the transportation of property for hire or the transportation of property for distribution by a private carrier.

Considering the statutory definition, and our jurisprudence, we find the mobile home at issue is a ‘trailer’ and is prohibited by the restrictive covenant against the King property. The trial court erred by failing to grant the permanent injunction and the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Considering our discussion above relative to the restrictive covenant contained in the deed and our determination that the mobile home at issue violates that restrictive covenant, thereby entitling the appellant to a permanent injunction the remaining assignments of error are moot. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the Kings.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.