author: I,PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Louis Jeffries LAQUE, III.
    No. 2003-B-3539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2004.
   ■ ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

I,PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from three separate sets of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Louis Jef-fries Laque, III, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently ineligible to practice.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

00-DB-005

Count I — The Thomas Matter

In January 1998, Nolan and Juanita Thomas retained respondent to represent them in a dispute with a Metairie car dealership. On January 28, 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas paid respondent $255 in connection with the representation. Around the same time, the Thomases stopped paying their monthly note on the vehicle subject of the dispute. As a result, the finance company filed a petition seeking a writ of sequestration to seize the vehicle to satisfy the Thomases’ outstanding debt. When Mr. and Mrs. Thomas were served with the petition in April 1998, they immediately went to respondent’s office seeking advice. They spoke with respondent’s paralegal, | ¿who advised that no court date was scheduled in the sequestration proceeding and that she would research the matter.

On May 5, 1998, respondent contacted Mrs. Thomas and advised that his initial fee would not cover Ms handling of the sequestration proceeding. He told her that it was imperative that she seek counsel to avoid the seizure of the vehicle, and requested that she schedule an appointment to discuss the matter. When Mrs. Thomas did not schedule the appointment, respondent presumed he was not handling the sequestration proceeding. He did not send her a letter confirming his position. Ultimately, the Thomases did not appear at a scheduled court hearing and a default judgment was rendered against them for the value of the vehicle, $26,685.16, together with interest and attorney’s fees. Upon receiving notice of the judgment, the Thomases again returned to respondent’s office and were advised by the paralegal that respondent would file a motion to set aside the judgment. No action was ever taken on behalf of the clients. The Thom-ases and the finance company made numerous attempts to contact respondent, to no avail. Respondent failed to refund the unearned fee.

In August 1998, the Thomases filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Thomas matter violated Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.16 (termination of the representation), 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

1 zCount II — The Doublet Matter

In July 1997, Telesia Doublet retained respondent to represent her in a federal criminal proceeding. Ms. Doublet paid respondent $8,000 in connection with the representation. Respondent promised to enter into plea negotiations on Ms. Doublet’s behalf, but he failed to communicate with his client and failed to appear for scheduled appointments and meetings. As a result, Ms. Doublet hired new counsel, Robert Jenkins, who contacted the federal prosecutor and was advised that the plea offer had been withdrawn based on respondent’s failure to respond in the matter. Subsequently, Ms. Doublet and Mr. Jenkins made numerous attempts to contact respondent to request that he withdraw, to no avail. Respondent finally withdrew when the presiding judge contacted respondent to advise he was holding up the case. Notwithstanding, respondent failed to account for any earned portion and to refund the unearned portion of the legal fee Ms. Doublet paid. In August 1998, Ms. Doublet filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Doublet matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count III — The Domangue Matter

In February 1998, Cary Lee Domangue paid respondent $800 to handle a child custody and support matter. For several months, Ms. Domangue made numerous attempts to speak to respondent by telephone, to no avail. Ms. Domangue finally reached respondent in mid-July 1998, approximately five months after the representation commenced, at which time respondent informed his client that he had not yet looked at her file. On several occasions, Ms. Domangue traveled from her home, which was located forty-five miles from respondent’s office, to meet with him pin person. However, respondent failed to appear each time. Finally, in November 1998, Ms. Domangue sent respondent a letter by certified mail terminating his representation and requesting that he refund her legal fee and return her file. Respondent failed to comply with Ms. Domangue’s request.

In November 1998, Ms. Domangue filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on February 25, 1999 with his entire file in the Domangue matter. Respondent appeared in response to the ODC’s subpoena and gave a sworn statement in which he promised to refund the $800 fee Ms. Domangue paid. Respondent failed to refund the fee.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Domangue matter violated Rules 1.3,1.4, 1:5,1.16, 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to- expedite litigation), 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count IV — The Naquin Matter

In December 1996, Linton J. Naquin, Sr. retained respondent to institute an inverse condemnation or expropriation proceeding against the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and' failed to take any action in the matter on his behalf.

In September 1998, Mr. Naquin filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent’s reply to the complaint was inadequate, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear on February '25, 1999 with his entire file in the Naquin matter. Respondent appeared' and gave a sworn statement, but he did not produce his file. The matter was then continued to March 17, 1999. On that date, [¡¡respondent informed the ODC that he was ill with the flu, and he indicated that he would voluntarily appear on April 8, 1999. On that date, respondent informed the ODC that he was having' car trouble, and he requested that the matter be continued to April 19, 1999. Respondent failed, to appear on that date.

■ The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Naquin matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count V — The Hidalgo Matter

In December 1998, Jose Hidalgo paid respondent $300 to represent him in a domestic proceeding. Respondent promised to obtain a continuance of a court hearing scheduled in the matter, but Mr. Hidalgo could not reach respondent to ascertain whether the continuance was granted. When Mr. Hidalgo went to court on the hearing date, respondent was not present and Mr. Hidalgo learned from the trial judge that respondent’s motion for a continuance had been denied. The hearing proceeded and Mr. Hidalgo was forced to represent himself.

Following the hearing, Mr. Hidalgo went to respondent’s office and waited for several hours, but no one appeared. Mr. Hidalgo then returned home and found a telephone message from a member of respondent’s office staff stating that a continuance had been granted by the trial court and that Mr. Hidalgo would be informed of the new court date. Mr. Hidal-go made numerous attempts to contact respondent to discuss the matter, to no avail.

On January 28, 1999, Mr. Hidalgo filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On the same date, respondent refunded the sum of $300 to Mr. Hidalgo. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of Mr. Hidalgo’s complaint.

|fiThe ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Hidalgo matter violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.3, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count VI — The Harrell Matter

In June 1997, Monty Harrell retained respondent to represent him in a property damage matter. Respondent filed suit on behalf of his client in July 1997, but unbeknownst to Mr. Harrell, failed to request service of the petition on the defendant. In August 1997, Mr. Harrell retained respondent to represent him in a succession proceeding. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in the matter on his behalf.

In March 1999, Mr. Harrell filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Harrell matter violated Rules 1.1,1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count VII — The Strauss Matter

On January 28,1999, Harold W. Strauss, III retained respondent to represent him in a domestic proceeding. Mr. Strauss paid respondent a $300 retainer fee in connection with the representation, and he advised respondent’ that a hearing was scheduled in the matter on March 19,1999. Respondent failed to communicate with his client in advance of the court date, and he failed to appear at the hearing, which proceeded in his absence. Following the hearing, Mr. Strauss made numerous attempts to contact respondent to discuss the matter, to no avail. Respondent also failed to refund the unearned fee.

|7On March 23, 1999, Mr. Strauss filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Strauss matter violated Rules

1.1,1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count VIII — The Nolan Matter

In April 1998, Ann Nolan retained respondent to defend her in a lawsuit filed against her by the hospital where she was formerly employed. Ms. Nolan paid respondent a $1,000 retainer fee in connection with this representation. At the same time, Ms. Nolan requested that respondent file suit against the hospital for wrongful termination. Respondent accepted this representation on a one-third contingent fee basis, and he filed Ms. Nolan’s suit in October 1998. Thereafter, respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in either legal matter on her behalf. Respondent also failed to refund the unearned fee.

In July 1999, Ms. Nolan filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Nolan matter violated Rules 1.1,1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count IX — The Washington Matter

Sometime in 1998, after allegedly contracting food poisoning at a fast food restaurant, Cynthia Washington retained respondent to represent her in connection with the matter. Respondent apparently filed a claim with the restaurant’s insurer on behalf | Rof Ms. Washington, but no settlement was made because the claim was prescribed. Respondent failed to communicate with his client in the course of handling the matter and failed to take any further action on her behalf.

In August 1999, Ms. Washington filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Washington matter violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count X — The Tassin Matter

In September 1997, Raymond Tassin retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter. Respondent timely filed suit on Mr. Tassin’s behalf, but thereafter he failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any steps in the prosecution of the lawsuit. In September 1999, Mr. Tassin’s case was dismissed because respondent failed to appear on the day of trial.

In October 1999, Mr. Tassin filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Tassin matter violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

On January 13, 2000, the ODC filed ten counts of formal charges against respondent in 00-DB-005. The formal charges were served upon respondent personally. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § |911(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Following its review of the matter, the hearing committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with one year deferred. Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation in 00-DB-005.

On September 21, 2001, the disciplinary board recommended to this court that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with one year deferred. This recommendation was lodged in the court’s docket number Ol-B-2641. Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, but on our own motion, we ordered briefing on the issue of an appropriate sanction. Upon reviewing the ODC’s brief, we learned that a second set of formal charges was then pending against respondent. Accordingly, on March 13, 2002, we remanded the Ol-B-2641 matter to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the second set of formal charges, and ordered the issuance of a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both matters. In re: Laque, 01-2641 (La.3/13/02), 812 So.2d 622.

01-DB-010

Count I — The Johnson Matter

In October 1996, respondent was retained to handle a Social Security matter for Kenneth Edward Johnson. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in the matter on his behalf.

hnln April 2000, Mr. Johnson filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Johnson matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count II — The Blanchard Matter

In November 1998, Patricia Blanchard retained respondent to handle a personal injury case for her minor daughter, Yvonne Blanchard. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in the matter on her behalf.

In May 2000, Ms. Blanchard filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Blanchard matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count III — The Valure Matter

In 1998, David Joseph Valure retained respondent to handle a domestic matter. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in the matter on his behalf.

In May 2000, Mr. Valure filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Valure matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

| yjCount IV~The Cook Matter

Nathaniel Cook paid respondent $1,500 to represent him in a pending criminal case. Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to take any action in the matter on his behalf.

In June 2000, Mr. Cook filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Cook matter violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count V — The Dodson Matter

In May 1997, John Roger Dodson retained respondent to handle a child custody matter. Respondent failed to take any action on behalf of his client.

In July 2000, Mr. Dodson filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Dodson matter violated Rules 1.4,8.1(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count VI

On October 11, 2000, respondent gave a sworn statement in connection with the ODC’s investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. Dodson. At that time, respondent was asked to update his primary registration statement address and was informed that as of August 14, 2000, he had been certified ineligible to practice law for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement. As of 112the date of the filing of the formal charges in this matter, respondent still had not updated his registration statement address and was still ineligible to practice law.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(b) (failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement) and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

On January 25, 2001, the ODC filed six counts of formal charges against respondent in 01-DB-010. The formal charges were served upon respondent personally. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Following its review of the matter, the hearing committee recommended that respondent be disbarred. Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation in 01-DB-010.

02-DB-006

On January 17, 2002, the ODC filed a third set of formal charges against respondent in 02-DB-006. The third set of formal charges encompasses one count of misconduct and stems from a complaint filed against respondent by Linda Stanfill.

On September 20, 1996, Mindy Stanfill was injured in an automobile accident in the parking lot of the high school that she attended. In November 1996, Mindy’s parents retained respondent to handle the personal injury case. Respondent did not keep the family informed of the status and progress of the matter, and did not regularly h ¡¡make himself available to meet with his clients. Respondent also did not return telephone calls concerning the case. When Mrs. Stanfill was finally able to reach respondent, he told her that suit had been filed, when in fact no suit was ever filed.

In March 2001, Mrs. Stanfill filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on July 6, 2001 with his entire file in the Stanfill matter. Respondent appeared in response to the subpoena and gave a sworn statement to the ODC, in which he explained that he did not neglect the Stanfill case, nor did he fail to communicate with his clients. Respondent also denied that he told Mrs. Stanfill that suit had been filed in connection with Mindy’s claim. Respondent testified that he referred Mindy for extensive medical treatment after he was retained in November 1996. On July 26, 1997, respondent wrote a letter to the tortfeasor’s insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, offering to settle the case for $78,500. Respondent heard nothing from Allstate in response to the settlement demand, but he testified that during the first week of August 1997, Mrs. Stanfill left a message on his telephone answering machine terminating his representation. Respondent testified that after he received the message he wrote a note to his secretary asking her to call Mrs. Stanfill to confirm his disengagement. Respondent assumed the call was made, but could not be sure, and admitted that in any event, “what happened after that I don’t know because I lack that meticulous fashion in this case.” Respondent also admitted that he did not inform his clients in writing that Mindy’s personal injury claim would | uprescribe on September 20, 1997, and that the Stanfills should seek new counsel to protect her interests. To the extent that any mishandling of Mindy’s file occurred, respondent attributed it to his bleeding ulcers, a condition which ultimately resulted in emergency surgery in October 1998.

In response to the testimony given by respondent, Mrs. Stanfill denied that she ever terminated respondent’s representation. She explained that she called respondent numerous times asking him to contact her, but that she did not discharge him. When Mrs. Stanfill realized that the. one-year anniversary of her daughter’s accident was approaching, her husband checked with respondent to see if a suit had been filed. Respondent assured Mr. Stanfill that he should not worry because “it will be taken care of.” Mrs. Stanfill did not give the matter further thought until she received a telephone call from an attorney representing one of her daughter’s medical providers, inquiring whether the case had settled because some of the medical bills remained unpaid. After Mrs. Stanfill related the problems she had in communicating with respondent, the attorney offered to “check with the Hahnville Courthouse” to see if the suit was ever actually filed. A few days later, the attorney called to inform Mrs. Stanfill that there was no record of a lawsuit in Mindy’s case.

The ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent in 02-DB-006, alleging that his conduct in the Stanfill matter violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The formal charges were served upon respondent personally on February 28, 2002. On September 4, 2002, respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct.

11sThe 02-DB-006 matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on November 22, 2002. Respondent appeared and testified on his own behalf. The ODC called Mr. and Mrs. Stanfill, as well as their daughter Mindy, to testify in person before the committee.

After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found the formal charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day and that he be required to attend Ethics School. Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation in 02-DB-006.

DISCIPLINARY BOARD RECOMMENDATION

On January 29, 2003, the three sets of formal charges pending against respondent were consolidated by order of the chair of the adjudicative committee of the disciplinary board. On December 29, 2003, the disciplinary board filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing the consolidated matters.

The disciplinary board concurred in the hearing committees’ factual findings and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged by the ODC in the three sets of formal charges.

Respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and as a professional. Respondent’s actions were negligent arid knowing toward his clients and were knowing and intentional toward the disciplinary system. Clients were injured by the delays in resolving their legal matters; loss of legal remedies, and having to obtain new counsel. The legal system was injured by the use of limited resources in an effort 11fito afford respondent an opportunity to participate and his failure to, do so. Currently, respondent is ineligible to practice law as of August 14, 2000 for failing to comply with his professional obligations.

The board found the record supports the following aggravating factors: a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct. In mitigation, the board recognized respondent’s personal problems, his inexperience in the practice of law (admitted October 1996), and remorse.

Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the prior jurisprudence, the board suggested the appropriate baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct in these three matters is disbarment or a lengthy suspension from the practice of law. The board noted the seriousness of respondent’s actions, in that on numerous occasions he has neglected to adequately communicate with his clients and to diligently pursue their legal matters, and has failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaints filed against him. Nevertheless, in light of the mitigating factors present, the board concluded that respondent’s misconduct is adequately addressed by a short period of suspension.

Based on this reasoning, the disciplinary board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, with eighteen months deferred, followed by a period of probation. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

|17Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation, but once again, on our own motion, we ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue of an appropriate sanction. Both respondent and the ODC filed briefs in response to the order.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record supports the findings of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board that respondent has violated the professional rules as charged. The sixteen complaints filed against respondent by his clients allege strikingly similar facts. In each instance, respondent accepted the representation and performed minimal legal work, if any, before completely abandoning the legal matter and his client. With the exception of one case, respondent failed to account for the legal fee he was paid or to refund the unearned portion. Respondent intentionally avoided any contact with his clients by refusing to return telephone calls, reply to correspondence, or make himself available for in-person appointments; rather, he used his office staff to communicate [18with the clients on the few occasions where there was any communication. Ultimately, respondent closed his office down without notice to his clients. In almost all of the cases, respondent’s clients suffered actual injury. They were denied their funds and their legal matters were abandoned, resulting in a loss of their legal rights or the needless delay of their cases. Further, many were prejudiced by respondent’s failure to appear at scheduled proceedings. The ODC was then forced to utilize its limited resources to investigate these numerous complaints with little or no cooperation from respondent. In our view, respondent has demonstrated in a convincing fashion that he has no regard for the welfare of his clients or for his professional obligations.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We have imposed a wide range of sanctions in cases involving varying degrees of incompetence, neglect, failure to communicate, failure to return unearned fees, and failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. However, in cases that involve a substantial number of clients, the sanctions imposed have fallen on the high end of the range. See, e.g., In re: Wharton, 03-1816 (La.10/17/03), 872 So.2d 459 (three-year suspension; seven clients); In re: Watley, 03-0233 (La.9/5/03), 854 So.2d 315 (disbarment; six clients); In re: Phillips, 03-1354 (La.6/20/03), 849 So.2d 506 (disbarment; three sets of formal charges involving a total of 24 counts of misconduct); In re: Turissini, 03-0549 (La.6/6/03), 849 So.2d 491 (three-year suspension; six clients); In re: Poirrier, 01-1116, 01-1118 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 94 (disbarment; six clients). The prior jurisprudence therefore establishes a baseline sanction of disbarment for respondent’s mishandling of the cases of sixteen clients.

As aggravating factors, we recognize respondent’s pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, we acknowledge respondent’s testimony that he experienced health and other personal problems in 1998 and 1999. However, we cannot give significant weight to this mitigating factor, as respondent’s misconduct occurred both prior to and long after the time period in question.

Accordingly, under the circumstances presented in this case, we find no basis to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment, much less to the eighteen-month period of actual suspension that has been proposed. In light of the seriousness of respondent’s conduct and the sheer number of clients who have suffered actual harm as a result, we must reject the disciplinary board’s recommendation and impose disbarment.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that Louis Jeffries Laque, III, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24513, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys | anand his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. Respondent is ordered to furnish complete accountings and full restitution of all unearned legal fees to his clients subject of the formal charges. Respondent shall also repay to the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Protection Fund any amounts paid to claimants on his behalf. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent has been ineligible to practice law since August 14, 2000 for failing to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and since September 1, 2000 for failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.

      . In August 1999, Ms. Domangue filed a claim for relief with the Louisiana State Bar Association's Client Protection Fund. The status of that claim is not dear from the record.

      . In October 2000, Ms. Nolan filed a claim for relief with the Louisiana State Bar Association's Client Protection Fund. The status of that claim is not clear from the record.

      . Interestingly, the ODC subpoenaed Allstate's claims file in connection with its investigation of Mrs. Stanfill's complaint against respondent. The file contains three letters— one from respondent informing the adjuster of his representation and two from the adjuster to respondent requesting information — but does not contain the settlement demand that respondent testified he made by letter dated July 26, 1997. Indeed, it appears that the last activity in Allstate's file occurred on May 5, 1997, when the adjuster telephoned respondent for information about the status of Mindy's medical treatment.

      . Respondent was never able to produce the note. During his sworn statement, respondent claimed he had forgotten it at home; during the formal hearing, respondent claimed the note had been misplaced.

      . In addition to the medical problems stemming from respondent's ulcers, his first born child died in January 1998, his niece was raped in early 1999, and his father died in November 1999.

      . Allstate paid the Stanfills for the property damage to their vehicle, but they received no compensation for Mindy's personal injuries.

      . This was usually to the detriment of the clients, who in many cases received incorrect information from respondent’s staff.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: hPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bernice Wadsworth HINES and Wendi Wadsworth v. Charles GARRETT, OneBeacon Ins. Co, and American Central Insurance Co.
    No. 2004-C-0806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2004.
   hPER CURIAM.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Summary judgment is warranted only if “there is no genuine issue as to material fact and [ ] the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor.

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 966(C)(2) provides:

(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s 12burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, motion, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

In this case, the defendant has moved for summary judgment; however, except for the first sentence of Art. 966(C)(2), that the burden of proof remains with the mover, this article otherwise does not apply to the defendant’s motion. Since it was his cattle that were stuck on this stock law highway, the defendant admits that pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 3:2803 he would have the burden of proving at trial that he was not negligent in allowing his cattle to be on the highway at that time. Thus, citing Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Kimball, 340 So.2d 651 (La. App. 2 Cir.1976), the defendant concedes that he must show that he took all reasonably prudent precautions to enclose his livestock and that he must also explain the presence of his livestock on the highway by showing how the animal escaped, in order to overcome the presumption of negligence and to prove freedom from fault in the slightest degree. Accordingly, Art. 966(C)(2)’s language regarding the burden of proof when the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial is not applicable here, since the defendant is the moving party and he has conceded that, as in an affirmative defense, he will have the burden at trial of overcoming the presumption of negligence against |3him. See Jones v. Vela’s Garage & Rental, Inc., 97-2486 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/98), 717 So.2d 246, writ denied, 98-1760 (La.10/9/98), 726 So.2d 35.

If the party moving for summary judgment will bear the burden of persuasion on the subject issue at trial, that party must support his motion with credible evidence that would entitle him to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed.1983). Such an affirmative showing shifts the burden of production to the party opposing the motion and requires that party either to produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a “genuine issue” for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting additional time for discovery. Id. However, as explained in In re: Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), “[i]f ... there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment....” 723 F.2d at 258.

Defendant, however, maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment because his deposition testimony, taken on two occasions and excerpts of which were submitted in support of his motion, sets forth facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence. He testified (1) that at the time of the accident he had been installing new fencing on his leased property, but that his cattle were being kept in a pasture where the new fence had been completed; (2) that the pasture was located behind the house; (3) that on the morning of the date of the accident, he had conducted a visual inspection of his herd and his fences; (4) that his cattle had never before escaped from the pasture; (5) that he first became aware of the breach in his |4fence when he was alerted about the accident and he went to inspect the fence visually; (6) that he discovered for the first time that a tree, sixty feet tall and twenty inches in circumference had uprooted and fallen on the fence; (7) that the tree had struck another tree and part of the second tree was on the fence as well; (8) that he then cut up the tree and removed all of the debris; (9) that the tree had appeared to be healthy; and (10) that there had been no unusual weather conditions that might have alerted him to the possibility of a tree falling on his fence.

In opposing the motion, the plaintiffs pointed to portions of the defendant’s deposition testimony in which the defendant had contradicted himself with regard to the location of the tree vis-a-vis the house and whether the tree had been inside or outside the fence. Plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s credibility was a genuine issue of material fact. Both lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The court of appeal concluded summary judgment was warranted, finding that the defendant’s explanation of how the cows had escaped through no fault of his own had satisfied his burden of exonerating himself, and rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the discrepancies regarding the location of the alleged fallen tree in the defendant’s deposition testimony created genuine issues of material fact. The court of appeal reasoned that it was “not obviously material whether the tree fell to the northeast or southeast of the farmhouse.” The court of appeal found that the defendant’s explanation correcting his first statement as to the location of the tree did not create a genuine issue of material fact.

The court of appeal also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant’s credibility remained at issue. The court of appeal reasoned that the prospect that a jury might discredit the defendant’s testimony is inadequate to defeat 1 Rhis properly supported motion for summary judgment, citing Babin v. Winn-Dixie, 00-0078 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37. The court of appeal further stated that it was entitled to accept the defendant’s depositions as true, citing Garsee v. Bowie, 37,-444 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/03), 852 So.2d 1156.

We disagree with the reasoning of the court of appeal under the particular circumstances of this case, which presents the somewhat unusual situation wherein the defendant moving for summary judgment presents his own self-serving testimony to overcome a presumption of negligence against him and to relieve himself of liability, but that testimony also contains significant discrepancies which would logically be considered by a fact-finder in determining his credibility and in weighing the evidence. The defendant is defending against the plaintiffs’ claim based on his assertion that an otherwise healthy tree fell on his fence, but the defendant apparently did not retain any evidence of the tree, disposing of it after he learned of the accident, and, when he first testified, the defendant gave a different location for the allegedly fallen tree. The ^diagrams the defendant drew at both depositions are substantially similar with regard to the outline of the property itself, but the locations of the fallen tree vary quite distinctly. In his first deposition, the defendant indicated the tree was south and east of the house, but at the second deposition, conducted after the parties had visited the property, the defendant located the tree north and east of the house, explaining that he had earlier been mistaken. He also had initially stated that the tree was inside the fence, but at the second deposition corrected himself that the tree had been outside the fence. Notably, the location of the fallen tree that the defendant gave in the first deposition was on the highway side of the fenced property, quite near where the plaintiffs struck the defendant’s cows on the highway, but the location of the tree the defendant gave in the second deposition is on the backside of the property away from the highway.

Application of the general rule that a court, ruling on a motion for summary judgment, must accept an affiant’s testimony or affidavit as credible or true is not appropriate in this particular case, where the mover’s testimony absolving himself from liability contains substantive contradictions or discrepancies that would ordinarily tend to call his credibility into doubt if presented to a fact-finder. Contrary to the court of appeal’s conclusion, the defendant’s credibility is material in this case because his defense to the presumption of negligence against him stands or falls on that credibility, since no one else saw the fallen tree or witnessed him inspecting his fences. And, the defendant’s credibility is a genuine issue in light of the significant contradictions in his own deposition testimony with regard to the location of the alleged fallen tree that he had removed soon after the accident.

While the general rule is that courts entertaining a motion for summary judgment are not to decide credibility issues, the defendant’s differing stories as to the location of the tree that allegedly fell and allowed the cattle to escape found in his deposition |7testimony sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant cattle owner’s credibility is indeed a genuine and material issue better suited for resolution by trial. The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiffs here had the opportunity to depose the defendant to test his veracity, and in our view they were able to “shake” his original version of the facts and raise significant issues of credibility. Cf. Corrugated Paper Products, Inc. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d 908, 914 (7th Cir.1989). Accordingly, we find that the plaintiffs have adequately raised a challenge to the defendant’s credibility by pointing out inconsistencies in relevant parts of his testimony, and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of rebutting the presumption of negligence against him.

For these reasons, we conclude the defendant is hot entitled to summary judgment, reverse the rulings of the lower courts, and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.

DECREE

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TRAYLOR, J., dissents, would prefer to deny the writ.

      . The jurisprudence interpreting La.Rev.Stat. 3:2803 is well settled that when an automobile strikes a horse or cow on one of the enumerated "stock law” highways, the burden of proof rests upon the owner of the animal to exculpate himself from "even the slightest degree of negligence.” Schexnider v. Allstate Ins. Co., 304 So.2d 825 (La.App. 3d Cir.1974), writ refused, 307 So.2d 639 (La.1975); Womack v. Rhymes, 300 So.2d 226 (La.App. 2d Cir.1974), writ refused, 303 So.2d 179 (La.1974). Thus, the courts have recognized that a legal presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the animal's owner is created in such cases. E.g., Ourso v. Grimm, 92-1274 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/5/94), 630 So.2d 963, 966, writs denied, 94-0339, 94-0346 (La.3/25/94), 635 So.2d 230-31. To rebut that presumption, the defendant must not only show that he has taken all reasonable and prudent measures and precautions to enclose his livestock, but he must also explain the presence of the animal on the highway by showing when, where, and how the animal escaped from its enclosure, that is, his complete freedom from fault. Id.

      . In Babin, we found that the defendant Winn-Dixie had pointed out an absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action under La.Rev.Stat. 9:2800.6, because the plaintiff would be unable to satisfy his burden of proving the constructive notice requirement of the statute by showing that the toothpick boxes had been on the floor for some period of time prior to his alleged fall. In support, the defendant had produced the affidavit of its employee, who stated she had inspected the aisle ten minutes prior to plaintiff's fall and did not observe any toothpick boxes on the floor. At that point, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. We concluded that the plaintiff was unable to produce any factual support for his contention that the toothpick boxes were on the floor for some period of time before his fall. We rejected the reasoning of the appellate court, which had speculated that the plaintiff could show there was a possibility the boxes had been on the floor for some period of time, and that Winn-Dix-ie's employee was negligent in failing to observe them. However, we reasoned, such speculation falls far short of the factual support required to establish that plaintiff will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, because the plaintiff must make a positive showing of the existence of the condition prior to the fall.

      . The Garsee court held that, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must assume that all of the affiants are credible. 37,444 atp. 7, 852 So.2d at 1159. Earlier, the court of appeal had cited Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, for this same proposition. In Independent Fire, which considered the admissibility of affidavits by expert witnesses submitted to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, this court held that, rather than automatically exclude expert opinion evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Daubert-Foret standards should be considered by the trial judge in deciding whether to admit expert opinion evidence.


text:
    In re: John E. WAGAR, Jr.
    No. 2004-OB-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2004.
   ORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) is conducting an investigation into allegations that respondent mishandled client and third-party funds and failed to supervise his non-lawyer staff. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Voluntary Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by John E. Wagar, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 22661, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of John E. Wagar, Jr. for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended March 24, 2004.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John E. Wagar, Jr. shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

/s/ Catherine D. Kimball Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Linda Marie MEYER.
    No. 2004-B-1585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from a joint motion to revoke probation filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) and respondent, Linda Marie Meyer, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Respondent was the subject of prior disciplinary proceedings in In re: Meyer, 03-1960 (La.9/26/03), 856 So.2d 1158 (“Meyer I”), which involved her failure to adequately protect the interests of third parties in settlement funds she received and her failure to timely return client property at the conclusion of the representation. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent submitted a petition for consent discipline proposing that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. The ODC concurred in the petition, and the disciplinary board recommended the proposed discipline be accepted. On September 26, 2003, this court accepted the petition for consent discipline and imposed a suspension of one year and one day. The suspension was deferred in its entirety subject to respondent’s completion of a two-year period of probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline.

| JOINT MOTION TO REVOKE PROBATION

The ODC is currently investigating two complaints against respondent involving misconduct similar to that which resulted in the consent discipline, i.e., failure to act with diligence, improper and inadequate bookkeeping and trust account record keeping, and instances where the balance of respondent’s trust account dropped below the amount held on behalf of her clients. In both cases, respondent’s misconduct commenced while the consent discipline in Meyer I was pending.

On June 24, 2004, respondent and the ODC filed a joint motion to revoke respondent’s probation. Respondent and the ODC have stipulated that the misconduct as set forth above “appears to be similar to the misconduct which resulted in Ms. Meyer’s being placed on probation, except that the new misconduct involves the additional element of negligent conversion of client’s funds. This misconduct violates the terms of her probation.” Moreover, the parties have stipulated that respondent has not “adequately addressed the underlying problems, including both record keeping/financial records deficiencies. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for her to continue on probation.”

The ODC contends that a revocation of probation and imposition of the one year and one day suspension is appropriate under these circumstances. The ODC suggests that given the proximity of the misconduct to the prior violations, no additional proceeding (over and above the revocation of probation and the imposition of the previously deferred suspension) is necessary. The ODC further suggests, and respondent acknowledges, that the resolution of the underlying problems can be adequately addressed if and when respondent applies for and is granted reinstatement following her suspension, at which time “appropriate supervision and other conditions may be required to address the underlying problems.”

| aAccordingly, the parties jointly move the court to revoke respondent’s probation and order that the previously deferred one year and one day suspension be made immediately executory.

DISCUSSION

The information submitted in the joint motion supports the conclusion that respondent failed to comply with the conditions of her probation in Meyer I and has committed additional violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to revoke respondent’s probation and make the previously deferred one year and one day suspension executory.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, respondent’s probation is revoked and the previously deferred one year and one day suspension imposed in In re: Meyer, 03-1960 (La.9/26/03), 856 So.2d 1158, is hereby made executory. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent, Linda Marie Meyer, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19060, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    In re Yvonne L. HUGHES.
    No. 2004-B-1620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Yvonne L. Hughes, Louisiana Bar Roll number 7089, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

/s/ Jeffrey P. Victory Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: JjPER CURIAM. h KNOLL, Justice,

text:
    In re Matthew L. PEPPER.
    No. 2003-B-2779.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.

      Charles B. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Bernadine Johnson, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Counsel for Applicant.
    Matthew L. Pepper, Counsel for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Matthew L. Pepper, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

INTRODUCTION

.Two sets of formal charges were filed against respondent by the ODC. The first, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 99-DB-106, was filed on October 14, 1999 and encompasses two counts of misconduct involving one client matter. The second set of formal charges, 02-DB-044, was filed on May 11, 2002 and encompasses three counts of misconduct. The two sets of formal charges were considered by separate hearing committees, then consolidated pursuant to an order of the disciplinary board dated October 31, 2002. On September 17, 2003, the disciplinary board ordered that respondent .be publicly reprimanded for his misconduct in the consolidated matters. Pursuant to the ODC’s request for review of the board’s ruling, the disciplinary board lodged the record in this court on October 6, 2003.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

99-DB-106

Counts I and II — The Le Matter

In March 1998, Truc Le paid respondent $600 to handle a collection matter. Respondent failed to keep his client advised as to the status of the' matter, and though he performed some work on Mr. Le’s behalf, he failed to complete the representation. He also failed to account for the legal fee paid to him and failed to release Mr. Le’s file upon request. Finally, respondent relocated his office to Mississippi without notice to his client or the Louisiana State Bar Association, and he failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. Le.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation). The ODC also alleged that respondent failed to correct his primary registration statement address, in violation of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 8(C), and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, which constitutes a ground for discipline under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 9(a).

Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct in connection with his handling of the Le matter. The matter then proceeded to a formal I.shearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on July 25, 2000.

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings and legal conclusions:

In November 1996, Mr. Le’s minor son broke his arm while playing team soccer at a school playground in New Orleans, and he received medical treatment for his injuries at Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital. Mr. Le sought payment of his son’s medical expenses by the City of New Orleans, but that claim was ultimately denied. Thereafter, the hospital filed suit against Mr. Le for the unpaid medical bill. At the end of March 1998, Mr. Le paid respondent $600, expecting that respondent would assist him in defending the collection suit. Respondent contacted the hospital’s attorney and obtained an extension of time within which to answer the petition. Respondent subsequently filed an answer and a third-party demand against the Orleans Parish School Board and the New Orleans Recreation Department. In June 1998, the hospital obtained a judgment against Mr. Le for the amount of the unpaid medical bill, and a judgment debtor rule was set for September 1998. Respondent attended the rule with Mr. Le and was successful in working out payment terms with the hospital, allowing Mr. Le an additional twelve months to pay off the hospital’s judgment. The status of the third-party demand filed by respondent is unclear from the record.

The committee praised respondent’s creative advocacy on Mr. Le’s behalf in asserting the third-party demand, but found respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Le and to document his efforts so that his client understood the nature and scope of the representation. Furthermore, the committee found respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Le concerning the status of the third-party demand. This conduct by respondent violated Rules 1.4 and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional [4Conduct. However, the committee found no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.5(f), or 1.16(d) in connection with his representation of Mr. Le. The committee also found that respondent failed to supply the bar association with his current address, in violation of Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 8(C) and 9(a), and Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee did not find that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation because the certified mail sent to him was never delivered.

After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is an admonition. In mitigation, the committee recognized the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary' proceedings. The committee recognized the following aggravating factors: prior disciplinary offenses, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1990). The committee found the aggravating factors outweigh those in- mitigation and warrant an upward deviation from the baseline sanction. Accordingly, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with all but one month deferred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

U02-DB-0U

Count I — The Allen Matter

On November 8, 1999, Anita Renee Allen paid respondent $600 to handle a legal matter involving her minor son. Ms. Allen terminated respondent’s representation by letter dated December 8, 1999 and requested a refund of the legal fee she paid. By letter to Ms. Allen dated February 17, 2000, respondent agreed to refund Ms. Allen $600; however, he subsequently failed to do so. Respondent also relocated his office to Mississippi without notice to his client or the bar association, and he failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by Ms. Allen.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct. in the Allen matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure.to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(6) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.15(b) (failure to render an accounting regarding funds or other property that a client or third person is entitled to receive), 1.16(a) (failure, to withdraw from the representation of a client upon being discharged), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II — The Tanner Matter

On February 14, 1997, respondent filed a, RICO suit on behalf of the plaintiffs in C.B. Brooks, et al. v. Russell R. Kelley, et al., No. 1:97-CV-78GR on the docket of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. On February 25, 1998, the district court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants. Thereafter, one of the defendants, the International | nAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (“IAMAW”), filed a post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees and Rule 11 sanctions against respondent. The district court granted the motion, finding that respondent failed to adequately investigate the allegations set forth in the plaintiffs’ complaint, that he demonstrated “a persistent pattern of nonresponsiveness” toward the court and the defendants, and that he unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. By order dated June 29, 1998, the court directed respondent to pay to IAMAW attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,489.00 by no later than July 14, 1998. Respondent has not complied with the district court’s order.

The district court’s judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ suit was subsequently affirmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Thereafter, IAMAW filed another post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions against respondent. By order dated March 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and directed respondent to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,842.50 within thirty days. Respondent has not complied with the Fifth Circuit’s order.

In January 2001, IAMAW’s counsel, Texas attorney Rod Tanner, filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent was served with the complaint by certified mail on February 1, 2001; however, he failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. The subpoena was subsequently returned because of respondent’s absence from both his primary and secondary registration statement addresses. On August 13, 2001, respondent was served with the complaint by 17certified mail delivered to an address in Long Beach, Mississippi. Respondent thereafter submitted a response to the complaint; however, his failure to register a valid registration statement address delayed the investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Tanner matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.2(a) (scope of the representation), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count III — The Schneider Matter

In January 2000, Donald Schneider paid respondent $500 to handle a DWI matter. Respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Schneider, failed to keep him advised as to the status of the case, and failed to enroll as Mr. Schneider’s counsel of record. Respondent also failed to appear in court for Mr. Schneider’s arraignment on April 19, 2000 or for his trial on July 13, 2000. Mr. Schneider terminated respondent’s representation by letter dated September 18, 2000 and requested a refund of the $500 fee. Despite his client’s request, respondent failed to account for any earned portion and to refund the unearned portion of the legal fee Mr. Schneider paid.

In January 2001, Mr. Schneider filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On February 28, 2001, a copy of the complaint was forwarded to respondent |sby certified mail sent to his primary registration statement address. The correspondence was returned marked “unclaimed.” On August 13, 2001, respondent was served with the complaint by certified mail delivered to an address in Long Beach, Mississippi. Respondent thereafter submitted a response to the complaint; however, his failure to register a valid registration statement address delayed the investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the Schneider matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(6) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct in connection with his handling of the Allen, Tanner, and Schneider matters. The matter then proceeded- to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on September 24, 2002.

After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings and legal conclusions:

With respect to Count I, the Allen matter, the committee found a lack of credible evidence to support respondent’s contention that he performed any work on behalf of his client,. and therefore, found he did not earn his $600 fee. . Though respondent testified that he returned Ms. Allen’s money. in the form of a $600 money |florder, respondent could not produce the receipt and Ms. Allen denied ever receiving the money. Therefore, the committee determined that respondent did not refund the fee to Ms. Allen. This conduct by respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5(f)(6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee found the testimony presented at the hearing was inconclusive with respect to whether respondent did or did not cooperate in returning Ms. Allen’s file to her new lawyer, noting that “[i]t may have been that Respondent had no file to return.” Concerning the failure to cooperate charge, the committee found that respondent was dilatory in notifying the bar association of his correct address, but did not find that respondent failed . to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Accordingly, the committee found no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 1.15(b), 1.16(a)(d), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

With respect to Count II, the Tanner matter, the committee noted respondent’s acknowledgment that he has not satisfied the court orders imposing sanctions, but concluded that because the ODC did not present the sworn testimony of Mr. Tanner in connection with this count, the formal charge should be dismissed. Moreover, even considering the documentary evidence introduced by the ODC, the committee concluded that Mr. Tanner’s complaint is “more of a debt-collection effort than an ethical complaint,” and thus the committee found no clear and convincing evidence of a rule violation.

With respect to Count III, the Schneider matter, the committee acknowledged respondent’s testimony that he made one trip from Mississippi to attend court on Mr. Schneider’s behalf, but the date given by Mr. Schneider was incorrect. Nevertheless, lacking court records or other credible evidence that respondent performed any services for Mr. Schneider, the committee found he did not earn his $500 fee. The |incommittee also determined that respondent did not refund the fee to Mr. Schneider. This conduct by respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5(f)(6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Concerning the failure to cooperate charge, the committee found that respondent was dilatory in notifying the bar association of his correct address, but did not find that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Accordingly, the committee found no clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 1.16(d), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

With respect to both Counts I and III, the committee found respondent was negligent and did not act with reasonable diligence in representing his clients, and that he caused them injury or potential injury by delaying the resolution of their cases for a short time. Ms. Allen and Mr. Schneider also paid for services that they did not receive. The committee determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a reprimand.

The sole aggravating factor recognized by the committee was respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law. The committee recognized no mitigating factors.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded, and that he be required to make restitution to Ms. Allen in the amount of $600 and to Mr. Schneider in the amount of $500.

The ODC objected to the hearing committee’s failure to find misconduct as to Count II and to the leniency of the sanction recommended.

J^RULING OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board ordered that respondent receive a public reprimand.

The board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact in 99-DB-106, the Le matter, and in Counts I and II of 02-DB-044, the Allen and Tanner matters, are not manifestly erroneous. With regard to Count III of 02-DB-044, the Schneider matter, the board noted the ODC’s admission during oral argument before the board panel that respondent had performed “some work” for Mr. Schneider in his DWI matter. In view of this admission and the evidence in the record concerning respondent’s trip to Louisiana to attend court for Mr. Schneider, the board concluded that respondent earned the $500 fee Mr. Schneider paid. Accordingly, the board found the hearing committee’s factual findings in Count III are manifestly erroneous.

Based on these factual findings, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as follows:

In 99-DB-106, the board concluded that Rules 1.4 and 8.4(a) were violated by respondent’s failure to communicate the goals and limitations of what he could accomplish in the representation of Mr. Le. However, the board found Rules 1.3, 1.5(f), and 1.16(d) have not been violated. Respondent diligently pursued options for Mr. Le, and the committee found no evidence (nor did Mr. Le testify) that respondent did not earn the $600 fee he was paid. Furthermore, the board found Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) have not been violated. The record does not show that respondent failed to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings, that he engaged in conduct involving deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation, or that his conduct interfered with the administration of justice. Finally, the board agreed that Supreme Court Rule hgXIX, §§ 8(C) and 9(a) have been violated by respondent’s failure to keep his primary and secondary registration statement addresses current.

In Count I of 02-DB-044, the board concluded that Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5(f)(6) have been violated by respondent’s failure to use reasonable diligence in the investigation of the Allen case and to adequately communicate his concerns about the case to Ms. Allen. Respondent failed to place the disputed funds ($600) into his- trust account or refund the client the unearned fees. The board found Rules lJL5(b), 1.16(a)(d), 8.1(c), and 8.4(c) have not been violated in the Allen case.

In Count II of 02-DB-044, the board concluded that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and thus dismissed this count. Mr. Tanner’s' Complaint merely involves attorney’s fees owed pursuant to a court order for filing a frivolous lawsuit.

In Count III of 02-DB-044, the board concluded that a violation of the Rules' of Professional Conduct was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, based upon the record and the ODC’s admission that respondent performed some work for Mr. Schneider in his DWI case, thereby earning the $500 fee. The board dismissed this count.

Considering this misconduct, the board found respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients, Mr. Le and Ms. Allen, and to the legal system. The board noted that Mr. Le was not harmed by respondent’s actions, but Ms. Allen has been deprived of the use of $600 for two years. Considering the ABA Standards discussing negligent misconduct, as opposed to those pertaining to knowing or intentional misconduct, the board determined the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a public reprimand.

|13The board found the following aggravating factors are present: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive (in the Allén matter), pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law. ' The board made no findings with respect to mitigating factors, except to note the record supports the mitigating factor of absence of a dishonest or selfish motive in the Le matter.

Under these circumstances, the board ordered that respondent be publicly reprimanded. The board also ordered that respondent refund $600 to Ms. Allen.

Two board members dissented, on the ground that a public reprimand is too lenient for respondent’s misconduct.

The ODC sought review of the board’s ruling in this court. We ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue of whether the record supports the disciplinary board’s report. After reviewing the briefs filed by both parties, we docketed the matter for oral argument.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

We find the record supports the hearing committees’ findings of fact, as modified by the disciplinary board, as well as the board’s application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent failed to adequately communicate with Mr. Le and Ms. Allen, and failed to refund an unearned legal fee to Ms. Allen. Respondent has [ 14also failed to comply with his professional obligation to promptly notify the Louisiana State Bar Association of changes in his primary registration statement address.

Having found professional misconduct, the next issue presented for our consideration in this case is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. In considering that issue, we are mindful that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Guidry, 571 So.2d 161 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The baseline sanction for multiple instances of neglect and failure to communicate can be somewhat difficult to determine, as such misconduct is often combined with more serious professional offenses. However, in general, this court has imposed suspensions of short to moderate duration for such misconduct, sometimes deferring a portion of the suspension. See In re: Fazande, 03-2210 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 174 (collecting authorities).

As aggravating factors, we recognize respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law and the prior admonitions imposed by the board, although we note two of these admonitions are relatively remote in time. In mitigation, we find respondent’s misconduct to be the result of negligence rather than any intentional act calculated to cause harm to his clients.

Iisln light of this latter factor, we conclude it is appropriate to defer a portion of respondent’s suspension. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months, with all but one month deferred. We will also place respondent on probation for a period of one year, subject to the condition that he pay full restitution to Ms. Allen. We caution respondent that his failure to make restitution to Ms. Allen, or any other misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Matthew L. Pepper, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19976, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. All but one month of the suspension shall be deferred, and respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of one year, subject to the condition that he pay restitution to Anita Allen in the amount of $600 plus legal interest. Any violation of the condition of probation, or any other misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension ex-ecutory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

h KNOLL, Justice,

dissenting.

I believe the six-month suspension with all but one month deferred imposed by the majority in the case sub judice is unduly lenient in light of the egregious facts of this case. This court has frequently imposed lengthy suspensions in cases involving multiple instances of neglect of client matters, failure to communicate and failure to refund unearned fees. See, e.g., In re: Wharton, 03-1816 (La.10/17/03), 872 So.2d 459 (three-year suspension); In re: Bankston, 03-1082 (La.10/3/03), 856 So.2d 1187 (two-year suspension); In re: Szuba, 01-1877 (La.10/5/01), 797 So.2d 41 (two-year suspension).

I find it particularly disturbing that respondent has failed to produce any credible evidence that he has refunded the unearned fee in the Allen matter. Although respondent asserted he sent Ms. Allen a money order in the amount of the unearned fee, he produced no documentation in support. The hearing committee made a factual determination that his version of events was not credible. Nonetheless, in oral argument before this court, respondent continued to adhere to this fanciful story, which I find borders on misrepresentation to the court.

Respondent’s misconduct, combined with his prior disciplinary record dating back to 1996, justifies a lengthy suspension from the practice of law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

      . The records of the Louisiana State Bar Association reveal that respondent was admitted to practice in Mississippi in September 1989.

      . In 1996, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in 95-ADB-047 for engaging in an ex parte communication with a judge. In 1999, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in 99-ADB-045 for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with a client, failing to refund unearned fees, failing to withdraw from the representation of a client after being discharged, and failing to expedite litigation. In 2002, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in 02-ÁDB-037 for practicing law when he was ineligible to do so, due to his failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement.

      . Mr. Tanner also filed a complaint against respondent with disciplinary authorities in Mississippi. At the hearing before the hearing committee in the instant matter, respondent admitted that he received a reprimand from the Mississippi bar in connection with Mr. Tanner’s complaint.

      . Because Mr. Schneider was unrepresented by counsel, he was granted a continuance of the trial to enable him to find new counsel, which he did. . ■

      . The board found there is no evidence in the record that respondent’s misconduct was knowing or intentional, and both hearing committees agreed respondent acted negligently.


text:
    In re Keith D. THORNTON.
    No. 2004-B-0488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY "PROCEEDINGS

hPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from two sets of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Keith D. Thornton, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

•The underlying facts of these matters are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties.

01-DB-092

The Matthews Matter

In April 2000, Natasha Matthews retained respondent to represent her in a paternity and child support matter, and paid the sum of $500 plus court costs. Respondent filed a petition on Ms. Matthews’ behalf and subsequently obtained the appointment of a private process server; however, service was never made on the defendant because Ms. Matthews was unwilling to pay for additional service attempts. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the fee Ms. Matthews paid.

In August 2000, Ms. Matthews filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent answered the complaint in December 2000, following which the ODC requested additional information concerning the matter. Respondent failed to ■reply to the supplemental requests for information.

„li,P3-DB-0Q7

Count I — Failure to Cooperate

In August 2001, Louis LipinsM filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. On September 25, 2001, and again on October 17, 2001, the ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

Count II — The West Matter

Teresa West paid respondent $500 to represent her in a child support matter. Respondent filed a petition on Ms. West’s behalf and obtained a hearing date, but the matter was passed by the court and no hearing was ever held. Respondent has taken no further steps to move Ms. West’s matter forward, has not withdrawn as her counsel, and has not refunded any portion of the fee Ms. West paid.

In November 2001, Ms. West filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear on March 15, 2002 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent did not appear on that date.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On September 6, 2001, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent in 01-DB-092, alleging that his conduct in the Matthews matter violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(e) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), |sand 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On November 16, 2001, upon respondent’s failure to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the hearing committee considered written argument and documentary evidence submitted by the ODC on the issue of sanctions. On December 5, 2002, the hearing committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months for his misconduct in the Matthews matter.

On January 29, 2003, prior to the disciplinary board’s consideration of 01-DB-092, the ODC filed a second set of formal charges against respondent in 03-DB-007. In Count I of the second set of formal charges, the ODC alleged that respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed by Mr. Lipinski, in violation of Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In Count II, the ODC alleged that respondent neglected Ms. West’s legal matter, failed to communicate with his client, and failed to cooperate in the investigation of the complaint filed against him, in violation of Rules 1.3,1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(g).

Respondent answered the formal charges in 03-DB-007 and generally denied any misconduct. He then filed a motion to recall the deemed admitted order entered in 01-DB-092. On May 9, 2003, the disciplinary board granted respondent’s motion and recalled the deemed admitted order. The board also consolidated the two sets of formal charges and remanded the consolidated matters for a hearing before a hearing committee.

\ ¿Hearing Committee Recommendation

Considering the stipulated facts, and the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee determined that respondent neglected Ms. West’s child support matter and failed to keep her reasonably informed about the status of her case. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaints filed by Ms. Matthews, Mr. Lipinski, and Ms. West. However, the committee did not find clear and convincing evidence of any substantive misconduct in connection with the Matthews matter. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

As aggravating factors, the committee recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses and multiple offenses. The committee found no mitigating factors are present.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, followed by a period of supervised probation.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board generally accepted the hearing committee’s factual findings, and agreed that the committee properly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board specifically noted its agreement that the ODC failed to prove any substantive misconduct arising out of the Matthews matter. Ms. Matthews’ case did not move forward because she refused to pay for additional attempts to serve the | ^petition on the defendant. Moreover, respondent was never terminated by Ms. Matthews, and she never requested a refund of the fee from him prior to the filing of her complaint. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Matthews’ whereabouts were unknown. Based on this reasoning, the board determined that respondent did not violate Rules 1.8, 1.4, and 1.16(d) in connection with the Matthews matter.

The board found respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients and to the profession. Respondent’s conduct caused injury to Ms. West because her case was delayed, and his failure to cooperate with the ODC caused unnecessary depletion of the agency’s resources in that additional investigative efforts were necessary.

The board adopted the aggravating factors cited by the hearing committee, and also recognized respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1990). The board found no mitigating factors are present.

Considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and the prior jurisprudence of this court, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, followed by a period of supervised probation. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The joint stipulation of facts submitted by the parties establishes that respondent neglected a legal matter and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to cooperate with the ODC in three separate disciplinary investigations. Therefore, the | fisole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, Ms. West, when he neglected her child custody matter and failed to keep her informed of the status of her case. Respondent’s actions caused Ms. West’s legal matter to be delayed. Moreover, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of three complaints filed against him. The baseline sanction for such misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law. See, e.g., In re: Karam, 03-0755 (La.6/27/03), 852 So.2d 979; In re: Bonnette, 01-1401 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 68; In re: Smith, 00-2627 (La.11/27/00), 775 So.2d 1. In light of the aggravating factors found by the board to be applicable in this case, and considering the absence of any factors in mitigation, we conclude that a one year and one day suspension is necessary to protect the public, the legal system, and the profession.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation of discipline.

JjDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Keith D. Thornton, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20392, be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of one year and one day. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee's consideration.

      . In 2000, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board for failing to cooperate with the ODC in a disciplinary investigation (see 00-ADB-048).

      . The hearing committee and disciplinary board both recommended that respondent’s suspension be followed by a period of supervised probation with conditions. However, such issues, along with any other relevant factors, may be addressed if and when respondent applies for reinstatement. See In re: Welcome, 02-2662 (La.1/24/03), 840 So.2d 519; In re: Harris, 99-1828 (La.9/17/99), 745 So.2d 1172.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re: Randy Scott NUNEZ
    No. 2004-B-1458.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PRODEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected a client’s personal injury matter, resulting in the prescription of the claim, and improperly attempted to settle his malpractice liability with his client. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Randy Scott Nnnez, Louisiana Bar Roll number 21331, be publicly reprimanded.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall- enroll in and attend the next session of Ethics School offered by the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Practice Assistance and Improvement Committee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ninety days of the date of this court’s judgment, respondent shall complete a continuing legal education course in the area of law office management. This course shall be in addition to respondent’s regular mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.


text:
    Claudia Reynolds GENTRY, et al. v. Johnny R. BIDDLE, Jr., M.D.
    No. 2004-CC-1509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2004.
   In re Louisiana Patients Compensation Fund;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2000-2756; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 04-00798. .

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Dewayne BROWN, et al. In re Bridgett Elaine Brown, et al.
    No. 2004-KK-1359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2004.
   In re Brown, Bridgett Elaine; Cortello, Glenn; Brewer, Michael;—Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 272039, 272241, 272187, 270219, 272534, 272533, 272526, 272187, 272058; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 04-00457.

Stay lifted; writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant and remand for evidentiary hearing.

KIMBALL, J., would grant and remand for evidentiary hearing.

WEIMER, J., would grant and remand for evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George Foster WILLIAMS, Jr., et al. In re Bridgett Elaine Brown, et al.
    No. 2004-KK-1360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2004.
   In re Brown, Bridgett Elaine; Cortello, Glenn; Brewer, Michael; Williams, Blane Gerard; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 272195-001, 272136-002, 272060-001, 272027-001, 272225-001, 272210-001, 272387-002, 272483-002; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 04-00456.

Stay lifted. Writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant and remand for evidentiary hearing.

KIMBALL, J., would grant ánd remand for evidentiary hearing.

WEIMER, J., would grant and remand for evidentiary hearing.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy ROSE.
    No. 2004-KK-1374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 16, 2004.
   In re Rose, Randy;—Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 445-176; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-K-0693.

Denied.