text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles KRAMER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-1179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Kramer, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 74334; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KH-373.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application for post-conviction relief filed on or about January 4, 2004. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary HAISH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-1187.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Haish, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 269-824.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application for post-conviction relief filed on or about September 1, 2003. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Stewart, Jeffrey; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 281-875.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the motion to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s motion to vacate guilty plea filed on or about November 4, 2002. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the motion is attached.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jewel SPOTVILLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Spotville, Jewel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 233-945.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s writ application filed via certified mail on November 15, 2001. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas Louis PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-3478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Phillips, Thomas Louis;' — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 245-434.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s application for post-conviction relief filed via certified mail on April 9, 2002 and July 12, 2002. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Percy L. TATE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-0906.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Tate, Percy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 255-943.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application for post-conviction relief filed on or about November 2003. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph LAWSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-1411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Lawson, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 271-110.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the district court with instructions to the district court to act on relator’s writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed via certified mail on December 4, 2003. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glenn K. CONSTANTINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-KH-1412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Constantine, Glenn K; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 262-845.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s application for post conviction relief filed on or about December 15, 2003. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    In re Frederick LEWIS, Jr.
    No. 2003-B-3314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Frederick Lewis, Jr., applying for rehearing of this Court’s order dated May 7, 2004; Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 01-DB-097.

Application for rehearing not considered. This Court’s judgment in In re Leivis, 03-3314 (La.5/7/04), 872 So.2d 1061, is final and definitive. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E); La.Code Civ. P. art. 2167.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald FRANKLIN.
    No. 2003-KK-3072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Franklin, Gerald; Defendant; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s order dated April 23, 2004; Parish of Tangipa-hoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 99353; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 1633.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Charles Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Jacqueline CARR.
    No. 2004-OB-1075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Carr, Jacqueline; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s decision dated May 21, 2004.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Arthur BELL and Brennon Bell v. Karl M. KREIDER, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-0613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Bell, Arthur et al.; Bell, Bren-non; — Plaintiffis); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 23, 2004; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 594-370; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-C-1492.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    Jodonna HARDY, et al. v. WESTPORT INSURANCE CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2004-C-0677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Hardy, Jodonna et al.; Hardy, Bessie Mae Carter; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 30, 2004; from Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court, Div. B, No. 74,291-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-790.

Not considered. See Rule 9, Section 6.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren JORDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Warren Jordan applying for reconsideration to this court’s action dated April 80, 2004, from Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Division A, No. 99-3680; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-343.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lonzette K. GADDIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Gaddis, Lonzette; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated May 14, 2004; Parish of Cad-do, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 209,037; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,661.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Latron A. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Smith, Latron A.; applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated May 21, 2004; Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court, Div. B, No. 53505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-KH-01049.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alton Joseph BATISTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1657.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Batiste, Alton Joseph; applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated May 21, 2004; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. B, No. None; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 1235.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stephanie King LETULIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1688.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Letulier, Stephanie King; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 14, 2004; Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96-170,586; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01334.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald R. STOVALL (Pro se) v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1861.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Stovall, Donald R.; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated May 21, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 0, No. 416-696; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0590.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Tina M. TABB, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2004-C-1153.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Tabb, Tina M. et ah; Tabb, Howard; Tabb, Sandra; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 96328; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 0946.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frank ROBERTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1919.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Roberts, Frank; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 01-3516; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-665.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur Ray ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1920.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Robinson, Arthur R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 184,910; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37651-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Spencer GILMORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Gilmore, Spencer;- — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 366-409; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0898.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dana M. COTLONE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1923.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Cotlone, Dana M.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 21485-95; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00965.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lee A. PIPKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1926.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Pipkins, Lee A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 11082-91; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01209.

Denied. See, e.g., Deloch v. Whitley, 96-1901, p. 1 (La.11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349; see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 352-55 (6th Cir.1998).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kekouya JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Jackson, Kekouya; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-CR5-75460; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003-KW-0617.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norris NASH, II v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1932.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Nash, Norris II; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 95-3330; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01058.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dallas ERWIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1951.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Erwin, Dallas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 5-96-160; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2524.

Denied. Repetitive and not cognizable. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy ANDREWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1952.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Andrews, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 381-449; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0784.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph WALKER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1953.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Walker, Joseph Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 98-1844, 98-445; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-00637-KH.

Denied. Moot. Court of Appeal has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ella W. SWINEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Swiney, Ella W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 89,455; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37154-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles LAROSE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re LaRose, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 305-972; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Albert TOLLIVER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-A958.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Tolliver, Albert;' — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 361-225; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0842.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas L. FURGERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Furgerson, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 201,032; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37755-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James CUMMINGS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Cummings, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 28-009-10-11.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1969.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Bell, Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 318-358; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0840.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael HENDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Henderson, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-1865; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KH 03-00530, 00-1797-KH, 01-1255.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Feranzo MCBOUNDS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1971.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re McBounds, Feranzo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 107,461; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37435-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hansel CHAIRS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1972.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Chairs, Hansel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 396-767; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0584.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leandres BROOKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1973.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Brooks, Leandres; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 171,400; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37794-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph Gene GREEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Green, Joseph Gene; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 239,298; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01170.

Denied. See, e.g., State v. Deloche, 96-1901, p. 1 (La.11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349; see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 352-55 (6th Cir.1998).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hardy ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-1998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Anderson, Hardy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 185-756; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37024-KH.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony MEALEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Mealey, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 6-00-462, 02-01-125; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 2925.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clinton C. HOWARD, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Howard, Clinton C. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 301-012; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-1984.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Hamilton, Rodney; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 75-351; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-767.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alphonse PORTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Porter, Alphonse; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 377-705; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0885.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua ASHLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2158.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Ashley, Joshua; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96K3051-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01097.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelly D. ADAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Adams, Kelly D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 54,169; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH-02-01242.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vernon ORANGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Orange, Vernon; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 254614; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0711.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher PERCY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Percy, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-6381; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KH-508.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin OLIVER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Oliver, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 423-360; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-2280.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry WILLIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Willis, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 6790-82; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-01145.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy BURTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Burton, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13851-00; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-183.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery A. STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Stewart, Jeffery A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 252,390; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH02-01128.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Isreal DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Davis, Isreal; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 244,921; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 1216.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James BYRD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Byrd, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 80,997; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,- No. KH 03-00098. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; Sate ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Quitman NELSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Nelson, Quitman; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 46,891; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-1526.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis FRAZIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-2284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Frazier, Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2638-93; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 03-00302.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Debra BENNETT v. Johnnie JONES.
    No. 2003-KP-2758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Bennett, Debra; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 13879; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0567.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lakeith DEBROW.
    No. 2003-KP-2789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Debrow, Lakeith; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 186019; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38091-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Salvador PEREZ.
    No. 2003-KP-2814.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Perez, Salvador; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 385-086; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0611.

Denied.


text:
    TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. RELIABLE HOME HEALTH CARE, INC.
    No. 2003-C-2876.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Reliable Home Health Care, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist-8, No. 97-06343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1762.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard BOZEMAN.
    No. 2004-K-0497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 02-5267; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-897.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Solomon MOORE.
    No. 2004-KO-0507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Moore, Solomon; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 02F0432; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37,-935-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Phillip GIVENS.
    No. 2004-KO-0550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Givens, John Phillip; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 156,556; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KA 0495.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nathaniel THORNTON.
    No. 2004-K-0556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Thornton, Nathaniel; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 421-885; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-KA-0907, 2003-K-0699.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Sullivan AMOS, IV.
    No. 2004-K-0570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Amos, John Sullivan IV; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 312,283; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA2024R.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Rodney GILBERT.
    No. 2004-K-0571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Gilbert, James Rodney; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 55881; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 03-1121.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cesar ROCA, Sr. a/k/a Cesar Balari.
    No. 2004-KO-0583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Roca, Cesar Sr. a/k/a; Balari, Cesar; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-1422; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-1076.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dellandra Brett TODD.
    No. 2004-J-0588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Todd, Dellandra Brett; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR2002-4819; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 03-1230.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin ANDERSON.
    No. 2004-K-0596.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Anderson, Melvin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 423-723 C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-2482.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Albert WOODHEAD.
    No. 2004-KO-0598.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Woodhead, Albert; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No.- 00-3422; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 03-KA-1036.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Panos TSOLAINOS.
    No. 2004-K-0616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Tsolainos, Panos; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 290874; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KA 1664.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John D. WEBB.
    No. 2004-K-0628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Webb, John D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 10446; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KA 1066.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Justin KING.
    No. 2004-KK-0998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E.1 Baton Rouge,' 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-03-481; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 0035.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Justin KING.
    No. 2004-KK-1111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re King, Justin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-03-481; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 254.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ;


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward N. AVANT.
    No. 2004-KK-1121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Avant, Edward N.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-03-481; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 254.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Dr. Francisco Manuel GONZALEZ.
    No. 2004-CC-1122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Gonzalez, Francisco Manuel Jr.;— Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2002-18717; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2003-CA-823, 2003-C-0537.

Denied.


text:
    Willie J. YOUNG, Sr., et al. v. Patricia SANDERS.
    No. 2004-C-1137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Sanders, Patricia; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 36015; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,412-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Jeannie GIBBS v. MAGNOLIA LIVING CENTER, INC.
    No. 2004-CC-1148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Magnolia Living Center Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 35,910-B; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38,184-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Lillian E. Landaiche ROY, et al. v. Sheriff Bill BELT, et al.
    No. 2004-C-1149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Belt, Bill Sheriff et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-6398; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1022.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Brenda WHITE v. PHOENIX PHARMACY.
    No. 2004-C-1150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Phoenix Pharmacy;- — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #2, No. 02-01954; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 03-1624.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Palitria BERNIARD v. Noel BERNIARD.
    No. 2004-CP-1157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Berniard, Noel; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 549-043; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KH-433.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    Merriel R. CUMMINGS v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.
    No. 2004-CC-1159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Cummings, Merriel R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 210,159; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 04-00241.

Denied.


text:
    TOWN OF HAYNESVILLE v. Marilyn BUSH. Town of Haynesville v. Smith, Pugh & Company, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Smith, Pugh & Co. et al.; Rabi-nowitz, Mike; Security Insurance Co. of Hartford; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Claiborne, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 35,741; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 38844-CW, 38845-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Onyx P. GARNER, Jr., M.D. v. MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, Tenet Louisiana Healthcare System, Mercy Campus and the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2004-C-1166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Garner, Onyx P. Jr. M.D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2000-7546; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-2015.

Denied.


text:
    Godiva Hawkins ROBERTSON, et al. v. Eric HESSLER, et al.
    No. 2004-CC-1168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Robertson, Godiva Hawkins et al.; Hawkins, Steven Sr.; Jackson, Joell;— Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2000-04393; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-1060.

Denied.


text:
    Eric P. MADISON v. Kimberly Elaine LACOSTE.
    No. 2004-C-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re Madison, Eric P.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 36,894; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CU 2852.

Denied.


text:
    In re J.B.G. Applying for Intrafamily Adoption.
    No. 2004-CJ-1557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2004.
   In re T.W.E.; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Juvenile Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 8540; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 C J 0968.

Denied.


author: | THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

text:
    Donald E. O’BRIEN, et al. v. Dr. Akbar RIZVI, et al.
    No. 2004-86.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 9, 2004.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 2004.

      Elizabeth Erny Foote, Percy, Smith & Foote, LLP, Alexandria, LA, for: Defendants/Appellants — St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Dr. Arthur Carl Plautz, Jr., and CHG Companies, Inc. d/b/a CompHealth.
    Edward P. Sutherland, Baton Rouge, LA, for: Plaintiffs/Appellees — Donald E. O’Brien and Carol O’Brien.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, C.J., GLENN B. GREMILLION, and JOHN B. SCOFIELD , Judges.

       Honorable John B. Scofield participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

   | THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this medical malpractice case, the defendants, Dr. Arthur Carl Plautz, Jr., St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St.Paul), and CHG Companies, Inc., d/b/a CompHealth, appeal the judgment of the trial court denying their exception of prematurity. The trial court ruled that the defendants were not covered under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court concluded that the claims of Donald E. O’Brien and his wife, Carol O’Brien, were not made in the policy period of the insurance contract and the requisite surcharge payable to the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund had been refunded at the time the claims were made. Thus, CompHealth and Dr. Plautz were not qualified health care providers. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have to go through a medical review panel before bringing suit. We disagree with the trial court and reverse its judgment.

I.

ISSUE

The sole issue before this court is whether the defendants were qualified healthcare providers under the MMA, thereby requiring this case to be reviewed by a medical review panel before continuing in state court.

II.

FACTS

CompHealth is a staffing company which places physicians in hospital and clinic positions for short-term assignments across the United States. CompHealth placed Dr. Plautz at Veteran’s Administration Hospital (VAH) in Alexandria, Louisiana. CompHealth sought qualification with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF) by purchasing a claims-made professional liability [^insurance policy through St. Paul and submitting a certificate of insurance to the PCF. The claims-made policy covered claims that were made from February 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002. CompHealth also submitted a check dated February 23, 2001 in the amount of $7,529.00 for a surcharge to the PCF. On March 8, 2001, the PCF issued CompHealth a certificate of enrollment for the period of February 23, 2001 to February 1, 2002.

In February 2002, CompHealth submitted a revised certificate of insurance to the PCF for the period of February 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002, reflecting the actual days worked by CompHealth’s physicians in Louisiana. It submitted an additional surcharge due of $8, 575.00. At the same time, CompHealth purchased an extended reporting endorsement or “tail coverage” to extend coverage for claims made beyond the original one-year period and submitted an additional surcharge on the tail coverage in the amount of $28,756.00.

In March 2002, the PCF informed Com-pHealth that its physicians who were assigned to governmental agencies or who were not licensed in Louisiana could not participate in the PCF. In April 2002, CompHealth requested a refund for surcharges in the amount of $19,850.00 paid to the PCF for physicians who did not qualify. CompHealth received part of the refund on May 9, 2002, and the remainder on September 30, 2002.

The plaintiffs filed suit in state court on December 18, 2002, against Dr. Akbar Riz-vi and Dr. Plautz alleging malpractice arising out of medical treatment received by Mr. O’Brien at VAH from April 18, 2001 through January 16, 2002. The plaintiffs did not request a medical review panel before filing suit after they were informed by the PCF that Dr. Rizvi and Dr. Plautz were not qualified under the fund. On March 20, 2003, the plaintiffs amfended the state court suit to add two additional |,^defendants, CompHealth, as the employer of Dr. Plautz, and St. Paul, as the liability insurer of CompHealth and/or Dr. Plautz.

The defendants filed a dilatory exception of prematurity. The district court denied the exception of prematurity in a judgment dated October 29, 2003, ruling that the defendants were not qualified under the MMA, La.R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not have to go through a medical review panel before bringing their suit in state court. Thereafter, this appeal was filed.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of a question of law is simply a decision as to whether the [trial] court’s decision is legally correct or incorrect.” Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Jessen, 98-1685, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99), 732 So.2d 699, 702. “If the trial court’s decision was based on its erroneous application of law, rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.” Id. (citing Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067 (La.1983)). When an appellate court finds that a reversible error of law was made in the trial court, it must review the facts de novo and render a judgment on the merits. Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002 (La.1993).

Prematurity

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 926 provides for the dilatory exception of prematurity. “[The exception of prematurity] is the proper procedural mechanism for a qualified health care provider to invoke when a medical malpractice plaintiff has failed to submit the claim for decision by a medical review panel before |4filing suit against the provider.” Sprad-lin v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. Found., 98-1977, p. 4 (La.2/29/00), 758 So.2d 116, 119. “If an action against a health care provider covered by the Act has been commenced in a court of law and the complaint was not first presented to a medical review panel, an exception of prematurity must be maintained, and the plaintiffs suit must be dismissed.” Bennett v. Krupkin, 00-23, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02), 814 So.2d 681, 685, unit denied, 02-1208 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 338. Therefore, this court must determine whether Dr. Plautz and/or Com-pHealth were covered by the MMA as qualified health care providers.

Waiver of Exception of Prematurity

The plaintiffs argue that the defendants waived the exception of prematurity because they made a general appearance before the exception was filed. We decline to address plaintiffs’ argument raised in their brief wherein they contend that the trial court erred in not addressing the claim of waiver of exception of prematurity. Because the plaintiffs did not formally answer the appeal, as required by La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133, they are not entitled to the relief requested.

Medical Malpractice Act

The purpose of the MMA is set forth in Bennett, 814 So.2d at 685-86:

The Medical Malpractice Act confers upon qualified health care providers two principal advantages in actions against them for malpractice. First, the liability of a qualified health care provider for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of any one patient may not exceed $100,000, and the total amount recoverable from all defendants and the PCF for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of any one patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits, may not exceed $500,000, plus interest and costs. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.42(B). Second, as stated above, no action for malpractice against a qualified health care provider or his insurer may be commenced in a court of law before the complaint has been presented to a medical review panel [5and the panel has rendered its expert opinion on the merits of the complaint, unless the parties agree to waive this requirement. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(A); Dunn [v. Bryant], 96-1765 [, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/19/97), 701 So.2d 696, 699],
Health care providers may take advantage of these benefits only if they qualify under the Act by meeting certain statutory requirements as set forth in LSA-R.S. 40:1299.42(A). These benefits are bestowed on health care providers as long as they remain qualified under the Act. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.45(A). The burden is on a defendant to prove prematurity and initial immunity from suit as a qualified health care provider under the Medical Malpractice Act. Dunn, 96-1765 at p. 6, 701 So.2d at 699.

Qualifícation under MMA

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42 sets forth the requirements for a health care provider seeking to qualify under the MMA as follows:

A. To be qualified under the provisions of this Part, a health care provider shall:
(1) Cause to be filed with the board proof of financial responsibility as provided by Subsection E of this Section.
(2) Pay the surcharge assessed by this Part on all health care providers according to R.S. 40:1299.44.
(3) For self-insureds, qualification shall be effective upon acceptance of proof of financial responsibility by and payment of the surcharge to the board. Qualification shall be effective for all others at the time the malpractice insurer accepts payment of the surcharge.

Subsection E of this section provides, in part, that:

(1) Financial responsibility of a health care provider under this Section may be established only by filing with the board proof that the health care provider is insured by a policy of malpractice liability insurance in the amount of at least one hundred thousand dollars per claim with qualification under this Section taking effect and following the same form as the policy of malpractice liability insurance of the health care provider!.]

[ ¿Thus, to qualify under La.R.S. 40:1299.42, a health care provider must file, the type of proof of financial responsibility described in Subsection E and pay the annual PCF surcharge.

Proof of Financial Responsibility

The first prong of the statute required CompHealth to file proof of financial'responsibility by obtaining a malpractice liability policy. CompHealth purchased a policy of professional liability insurance through St. Paul on a claims-made basis, effective February 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002, with limits of $100,000.00 per claim. “[A] ‘claims made’ insurance policy is one in which coverage attaches only if the negligent harm is discovered and reported within the policy period.” Robicheaux v. Adly, 00-1207, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1048, 1052. However, if tail coverage is purchased on a claims-made insurance policy, coverage is provided for claims which arise during the policy period, but were not reported until after the expiration date of the policy. Id. at 1053. On February 27, 2002, CompHealth purchased tail coverage through St. Paul for the period of February 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002. CompHealth submitted a certificate of insurance dated February 1, 2002 and the necessary surcharge on the tail coverage in the amount of $28,756.00 to the PCF. Although the claim in this case was not filed until December 18, 2002, this tail policy provided coverage for malpractice occurring between February 1, 2001 and February 1, 2002, regardless of when the claim was made. Therefore, we conclude that CompHealth and Dr. Plautz satisfied the first prong of La.R.S. 40:1299.42 by purchasing tail coverage which covered the claim filed on December 18, 2002.

| ^Payment of Surcharge

CompHealth paid a surcharge on the original policy on February 23, 2001. It also paid a revised surcharge for the original policy and a surcharge on the tail coverage on February 27, 2002. However, CompHealth requested a partial refund of the surcharge paid to the PCF, in the amount of $19,850.00, when it was informed by the PCF that its physicians working in government facilities or who did not have licenses to practice in Louisiana did not qualify for PCF coverage. CompHealth received part of the refund on May 9, 2002, and the remainder on September 30, 2002. The plaintiffs claim that CompHealth and Dr. Plautz were not qualified under the MMA because the second prong of the statute was not met, ie., that CompHealth had not paid a surcharge to cover the period during which they filed their claim because the surcharge was refunded at the time the claim was filed.

In Bennett, 814 So.2d at 686-87, the court, in interpreting La.R.S. 40:1299.42(E)(1), determined that “once a health care provider has qualified under the [MMA], the health care provider’s qualification under the Act is concurrent with the coverage under the underlying insurance policy, ie., qualification takes effect and follows the same form as the policy of insurance.” We agree with the first circuit.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(A)(3) states that qualification, other than for self-insureds, is effective at the time the malpractice insurer accepts payment of the surcharge. In this case, St. Paul accepted payment of the surcharge on the original policy in February 2001, and accepted the surcharge on the tail coverage on February 27, 2002. Thus, CompHealth and Dr. Plautz were qualified as of February 2001. The underlying insurance policy was extended by tail coverage for an unlimited amount of time. Thus, qualification continued as long as the underlying tail coverage continued, which was for an unlimited time encompassing the time |swhen this claim was filed. Moreover, in Abate v. Healthcare International, Inc., 560 So.2d 812, 813 (La.1990), the supreme court held that the MMA “does not provide coverage to health care providers who fail to [initially] qualify pri- or to the commission of the tortious conduct[.]” In this case, it is undisputed that Dr. Plautz and CompHealth were qualified under the MMA prior to the alleged malpractice and at the time of the alleged tortious acts of malpractice. The fact that the PCF retroactively disqualified Com-pHealth and Dr. Plautz after it issued a certificate of enrollment and after Com-pHealth paid the surcharge does not affect CompHealth’s and Dr. Plautz’s qualification.

We find no merit in the plaintiffs’ argument that CompHealth had not paid a surcharge. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court committed legal error when it determined that CompHealth and Dr. Plautz were not covered under the MMA because the surcharge was refunded.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Donald E. O’Brien and Carol O’Brien.

REVERSED.


author: J^DREW, J.

text:
    William E. CROWE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOMESPLUS MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC.; Jeff Foote, Individually; and Shane Scott Upshaw, Individually, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 38,382-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    June 21, 2004.
    Watson, McMillin & Harrison, L.L.P. by David Carlton McMillin, Monroe, for Defendant-Appellant, Homesplus Manufactured Housing, Ine./Defendants-Appellees, Jeff Foote and Shane Scott Upshaw.
    Michael S. Coyle, Ruston, for Plaintiff-Appellee, William E. Crowe.
    Before WILLIAMS, PEATROSS and DREW, JJ.
   J^DREW, J.

The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that an oral contract of employment existed between William E. Crowe, plaintiff, and HomesPlus Manufactured Housing Inc., defendant. HomesPlus contended that the trial court was clearly wrong in finding the evidence was sufficient to prove the parties entered into an oral employment contract. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court in favor of Crowe is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Crowe was a co-owner with William J. Meyer of Bud’s Mobile Homes d/b/a Lincoln Home Center, a business which sold and serviced mobile homes in Ruston. Jeff Foote and Shane Scott Upshaw, officers of HomesPlus, contacted Crowe in March 1999 because they wished to purchase Bud’s and the property on which the business was located.

Via stipulation, the parties placed into evidence the July 1999 letter of intent signed by Meyer, Crowe, and Foote for HomesPlus; an unsigned employment contract; the October 13 memo to a law partner from defendant’s primary counsel, Tod Cagle; the October 14, 1999, memo from his law partner to Cagle; the settlement statement; and the HomesPlus Ruston sales figures for 2000. HomesPlus placed into evidence without objection: (1) the act of sale of the business and moveable property; (2) the deed executed by the parties to the immovable property; (3) Crowe’s pay stub from HomesPlus; (4) an initial offer from Upshaw dated May 21, 1999; and (5) a counterproposal from Crowe dated June 11,1999.

From the judgment in favor of Crowe, HomesPlus appealed.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The trial court observed that:

• For 16 years Crowe co-owned Bud’s located on the 1-20 service road in Ruston.
• Foote and Upshaw approached Crowe and his co-owner in March 1999 and the parties negotiated for the sale of the business and immovable property.
• Crowe’s contention was that, as partial consideration for the sale, Crowe would be employed as General Manager of HomesPlus for a period not less than one year at a salary of $4,000 per month plus 40% of the gross profits in excess of $120,000.
• In November 1999, in two acts of sale, Crowe and his partner sold the business and the immovable property to HomesPlus.
• No written employment contract was executed, but Crowe began working for HomesPlus at the agreed salary and capacity on November 23, 1999.
• On December 7, 1999, HomesPlus terminated Crowe, who alleged he was wrongfully terminated and had a one-year employment contract. Homes-Plus maintained that Crowe was an “at will” employee who was fired for failure to perform employment duties.
• Crowe sued HomesPlus, Upshaw, and Foote; by stipulation, the individual defendants were dismissed from the action.

The trial court cited La. C.C. art. 1846, which provides, in pertinent part:

If the price or value is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.

In addition to Crowe’s testimony, the trial court found the following was corroborating evidence:

• All testified that it was Foote and Upshaw’s idea to hire Crowe; Foote and Upshaw considered Crowe’s employment essential to the business.
|s« The letter of intent among the parties corroborated Crowe’s assertions concerning the terms of the employment agreement, stating that if no employment contract was reached, the sale terminated and the buyers could have their $50,000 deposit refunded.
• Neither Upshaw nor Foote asked for a return of the deposit.
• Other documents reflected the parties’ attempts to complete an employment contract.

The parties testified that disagreements over various “perks” requested by Crowe resulted in the failure to sign the employment contract. The trial court observed that the basic terms of Crowe’s employment were never at issue and noted that no one told Crowe his employment was dependent on a written contract.

The trial court concluded that Crowe had met his burden of proving that he had an oral contract of employment for a term of one year at $4,000 per month and that HomesPlus terminated Crowe without cause. Therefore, HomesPlus was responsible for Crowe’s damages of $48,000 less salary already paid.

TESTIMONY

By Bill Crowe

In addition to recounting his background and 24 years’ employment in the mobile home industry, Crowe testified that:

• He belonged to and held offices in various state and national manufactured housing associations.
• He was being inducted into the Louisiana Manufactured Housing Association’s Hall of Fame.
• He had been appointed by the governor to the Louisiana Manufactured Housing Commission.
14* Foote and Upshaw approached him at a mobile home show in March 1999 about buying the business and the land on which it was located; they also stated they wanted Crowe to work for HomesPlus for a minimum of one year due to his reputation and good will in the community.
• Negotiations began in April 1999, primarily by phone and fax.
• If ■ HomesPlus bought the business, Foote and Upshaw specified that they would hire Crowe.
• The agreed prices were $175,000 for the land and $100,000 for the business.
• Part of the consideration for the sale was HomesPlus’s agreement to employ Crowe as general manager of the Lincoln Parish business for not less than one year at $4,000 per month plus 40% of the gross profits (less any salaries) exceeding $120,000.
• Neither Foote nor Upshaw ever requested the $50,000 deposit be returned or stated to him that the sale closing would not occur.
• The letter of intent did not require that Crowe’s employment contract had to be written.
• Crowe was satisfied with the agreed compensation package and went to work on November 23, 1999; he was paid per the agreement until his termination on December 7,1999.
• Crowe received no employment or policy/procedure manual.
• At termination, Crowe was informed HomesPlus had a good young salesman who wanted a promotion; the Lincoln Parish location was the only place the defendant could make the other employee a manager.
• During negotiations, Foote and Up-shaw told Crowe that HomesPlus would not purchase the business if Crowe did not agree to be employed.
• A week or two before the November 22, 1999, closing, Crowe had a meeting in West Monroe with Foote and Up-shaw at which they reached an oral contract of employment with the terms noted above as to compensation and the term of employment.
• Two or three days before closing, Foote called to tie up “loose ends” concerning Crowe’s cell phone, expenses for association meeting, and |fia credit card, matters which Crowe considered minor, since the parties had an agreement about his employment.
• Sometime prior to the West Monroe meeting, Crowe received a draft of an employment contract containing the agreed compensation terms; the employment contract was never executed. Crowe believed he had a oral contract for one year’s employment.
• Foote, Upshaw, and their attorney, Tod Cagle, never told Crowe he did not have an oral employment contract, nor did they send him a letter or document so stating. They also never told Crowe he was an at-will employee.
• Prior to the closing on the land, Cagle indicated to Crowe that there were minor issues to be worked out in the written employment contract which would not be signed at the closing. Cagle did not tell Crowe he had no employment contract until the written employment contract was signed.
• Crowe was not represented by an attorney during the negotiations and closing.
• Meyer, Crowe’s partner, signed the Letter of Intent on July 3, 1999; Crowe, on July 5; and Foote, on July 6. A great deal of negotiation occurred between July and the November 22, 1999, closing.
• There was “no animosity or anything” and “we pretty well came to an agreement that I would be employed for a year.” Crowe was initially offered six months’ employment and rejected it.
• Crowe understood there would be a written employment contract with HomesPlus; Crowe did not feel the contract needed to be signed after Foote and Upshaw gave their word about his employment compensation and term; Crowe’s intent along with Foote and Upshaw was that there was going to be a written contract of the agreement. Crowe understood the
written contract would memorialize the agreement already reached.
• Crowe acknowledged that the payments in the sale differed from the terms in the July 1999 Letter of Intent.
• A week or two before closing, Cagle phoned to state the employment contract would not be signed at closing, but did not inform Crowe there would be no employment contract.
• Crowe emphatically denied Foote called before closing to state there would be no employment contract, although Crowe could come to work as general manager.
k* A few days before closing Foote called and asked if Crowe would mind waiting until after closing because “there are a few of these minor details that we need to get ironed out and get in writing before we do the employment contract.” Because Crowe was convinced he had a year’s contract with HomesPlus, Crowe agreed.

By Tod Cagle

• Cagle represented HomesPlus, Foote and Upshaw in the purchase of Bud’s from Crowe and his partner.
• Cagle was asked, probably by Foote, to put together an employment contract for Crowe who was to be employed as general manager by Homes-Plus.
• Foote agreed that Crowe would work for HomesPlus for one year. The parties had also agreed that Crowe’s compensation would be $48,000 per year plus 40% of any excess over $120,000.
• Crowe also wanted a cell phone, a credit card and expenses for business meetings, benefits to which Foote and Upshaw did not agree. Foote and Up-shaw wanted a written employment contract.
• He informed Crowe there would be no employment contract executed at the closing, and inquired if Crowe was ready to proceed with the closing. Ca-gle did not know if he informed Crowe there would never be an employment contract. He was concerned that Crowe show up at the closing.
• He did not send Crowe a letter stating there would not be an employment contract and did not inform Crowe his one-year employment at $48,000 was contingent on a written contract of employment.
• A few days before the November 22 closing, Cagle spoke with Crowe to make certain Crowe knew that “we didn’t have an agreement as to the employment contract and to make sure he was gonna show up and consummate the sale.”
• Cagle told Foote to talk with Crowe also.
• Cagle did not believe his clients had an employment contract with Crowe who did not assert he had an oral contract of employment in that phone call with Cagle.
• Cagle informed Crowe that due to the Letter of Intent, Crowe did not have to proceed with the sale. Crowe’s response was that he had ^informed his partner he would be sending him money from the sale and Crowe was ready to proceed.
• The parties varied the date of closing and the payment times from those provided in the Letter of Intent initially signed.
• Instructed by his clients to get a written employment contract, Cagle worked as a negotiator among the parties for the employment contract and was unsuccessful in getting an agreement. Cagle prepared multiple drafts. • Within a week of closing, Cagle knew there was not going to be an employment contract, written or oral, for Crowe as part of the transaction and the purpose of his call to Crowe was to inform him of that fact.

By Jeff Foote

• HomesPlus, Foote, and Upshaw stated in response to interrogatories that:
Mr. Crowe was retained as an employee with HomesPlus únder belief that he would be able to assist Hom-esPlus in retaining good will from the prior business operations and keep the new business operations going in a business like manner.
• There were no written reprimands of Crowe’s job performance for Homes-Plus; Foote could recall no oral reprimands concerning Crowe’s job performance. There was no employment manual.
• Foote could recall no specific reasons for the termination and said, “We just felt like he was unbecoming as-of a manager at that point in time.”
• Although the answer to Crowe’s petition stated that Crowe was fired by reason of failure to properly perform his employment duties, there was no documentation or evidence of that allegation.
• Foote did not think he specifically told Crowe he could be fired at any time, but did tell him there “was gonna be no employment contract.”
• Foote acknowledged that, “Our intent was to have a one year agreement with Mr. Crowe in negotiations and our intent was to pay him four thousand dollars a month. I mean we said it in the letter of intent. It was all there. We wanted Mr. Crowe to come to work for | Sus in the negotiation phase. There was no question — There’s no question about that.”
• They never told Crowe prior to closing that he could be fired at any time.
• On advice of Cagle, Foote called Crowe prior to the sale and said, “Mr. Crowe, if you wanna sell your business there will be no employment contract. You can come to work for us and this is what we’ll pay you but there’s gonna be no terms. If you wanna sell the business, we will proceed. That’s it.”
• Among Crowe’s unacceptable practices were watching TV in the office, having solitaire up' on his computer screen, and smoking in the office.
• Foote never told Crowe his employment was contingent on a written contract.

By Shane Upshaiv

• HomesPlus retained Crowe under the belief that he would be able to assist HomesPlus in retaining good will from the prior business operations and keep the business operations going in a businesslike manner.
• Crowe’s salary was to be $4,000 per month; Crowe went to work and was paid that amount.
• Crowe was terminated for failure to operate in a professional manner including smoking in the office, which he was doing the day he was fired.
• Upshaw did not agree that Crowe was to be employed for one year.
• At closing, HomesPlus was not offering Crowe an employment contract.
• They knew Crowe would not be a long term employee because Crowe stated he had considered retiring and traveling in a motor home and was in poor health.
• They had someone in their Monroe office who had gained sufficient experience during the protracted negotiations that they felt would do a better job than Crowe, so Crowe was terminated. Crowe would not have been terminated had there been a one-year employment contract.
Is» Crowe was mistaken in thinking there was an oral employment contract.
• HomesPlus did not agree to a one year term of employment for Crowe.

On rebuttal, Crowe stated that after the meeting in West Monroe, in his mind, it was all set that the parties had agreed he was to work for one year at $48,000 plus the percentage of the gross profit in excess of $120,000 per year. He reiterated that Cagle stated only that the employment contract would not be signed at closing. Crowe did not consider the absence of an employment contract at closing to be significant because he had an oral employment agreement with Foote and Upshaw. In Foote’s call prior to closing, Foote informed Crowe they could not sign the employment contract at closing because there were kinks to be worked out regarding perks.

DISCUSSION

Under Louisiana law, formation of a valid and enforceable contract requires capacity, consent, a certain object, and a lawful cause. The court must find there was a meeting of the minds of the parties to constitute the requirement of consent. Arias v. Albe, 04-26 (La.App. 5th Cir.5/26/04), 876 So.2d 179.

The existence or nonexistence of a contract is a question of fact. Townsend v. Urie, 2000-0730 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 800 So.2d 11, writ denied, 2001-1678 (La.9/21/01), 797 So.2d 674; Fox v. LAM, 25,616 (La.App.2d Cir.2/23/94), 632 So.2d 877. The determination of the existence of a contract is a finding of fact, not to be disturbed unless clearly wrong. O’Glee v. Whitlow, 32,955 (La.App.2d Cir.4/7/00), 756 So.2d 1288.

The trial court cited Smith v. Dishman & Bennett Specialty Co., Inc., 35,682 (La. App.2d Cir.1/23/02), 805 So.2d 1220, 1223-1224, a suit to recover additional wages in excess of $500.00:

... [U]nder an oral contract of employment, the basic rule governing proof is the second paragraph of La. C.C. art. 1846, which requires that plaintiff prove his case by one credible witness “and other corroborating circumstances.” The plaintiff may be the one credible witness. “Other corroborating circumstances” need only be general in nature; independent proof of every detail of the agreement is not required....
Moreover, a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. When there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review; the issue for the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was wrong, but whether the fact-finder’s conclusions were reasonable under the evidence. When a factfinder’s determination is based on its discretion to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be wrong.

Simply put, if the trial court’s findings were reasonably based upon the entire record on appeal, this court may not reverse the judgment. Underwood v. Rollins, 35,544 (La.App.2d Cir.2/27/02), 811 So.2d 168, citing O’Glee v. Whitlow, supra.

Crowe relied upon the July 1999 Letter of Intent signed by Crowe’s co-owner, Crowe, and Foote which provided the following for the employment agreement:

4. Employment Agreement: Both Seller and Purchaser acknowledge that they intend to secure Bill Crowe as the manager of the Lincoln Home Center for a minimum period of one year from the date of closing. Should HomesPlus Manufactured Housing, Inc. and Bill Crowe fail to reach an |nagreement regarding his employment, this agreement terminates and Purchaser shall be entitled to a refund of the $50,000.00 deposit and all parties shall be relieved from any and all liabilities therein. In addition, upon completion of the employment by Bill Crowe with purchaser, Bill Crowe agrees to enter into a legally binding non-competition agreement with Purchaser. [a handwritten note at the conclusion of part # 4 states: “For 2 years”]

HomesPlus pointed out and Crowe acknowledged that the actual sales of the business and land did not conform to the July 1999 Letter of Intent because the closing date and payment provisions were different. HomesPlus’s position was that the parties continued negotiations on the employment contract until negotiations were stopped before the sale; therefore, no meeting of the minds ever occurred concerning the employment contract. According to HomesPlus, the trial court was clearly wrong and manifestly erroneous in finding that Crowe proved an employment contract was entered.

HomesPlus urged on appeal that based upon Crowe’s testimony, Crowe only thought he had an oral contract but was mistaken. Relying on the undisputed facts that negotiations about the employment contract were extensive and that everyone contemplated that the employment contract would be reduced to writing, Homes-Plus asserted strongly that its attorney and officers informed Crowe prior to closing that there would be no employment contract.

As previously noted, when testimony conflicts, a trial court’s reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact will not be disturbed on appeal; the issue is not whether the trial court was wrong, but whether the court’s conclusions were reasonable under the | ^evidence. When a factfinder’s determination is based on its discretion to credit the testimony of one or two witnesses, that finding can virtually never be wrong. Here, the trial court accepted as credible Crowe’s version of the transactions.

Clearly, negotiations over the perks were contested and lengthy, and an agreement was never reached on the matters of travel expense, credit cards, and cell phone for Crowe. This court found a valid contract of sale in O’Glee v. Whitlow, supra. The O’Glees and the buyers agreed on the price and basic payment terms for the sale of a restaurant. The buyers took possession, made some payments and later stopped payments contending that the sale was not valid, since the contract was not reduced to writing as contemplated and details remained to be worked out. This court accepted the trial court’s finding that a valid, binding agreement existed and the sale was perfected. Although the present dispute does not concern the sale itself, the analogy is clear. The trial court found Crowe’s employment contract existed even though the contemplated written contract had not been completed and details remained to be resolved.

As specifically pointed out by the trial court, the essential elements of the employment contract (term and compensation) were never at issue. Indeed, both HomesPlus’s attorney and Foote testified that was the agreement. The trial court rejected conflicting testimony and accepted as credible Crowe’s testimony that:

• Prior to the closing, he was informed the employment contract would not be signed at the closing because of the disputed perks. He expected the written contract would later memorialize their agreement.
He was never informed that his contract had to be in writing to be valid.
• He was never told that there would never be an employment contract.
• He was not concerned about the lack of a signed contract because he had the word of Foote and Upshaw at their West Monroe meeting concerning the term and compensation of his employment.

After accepting Crowe as the one credible witness required to prove the existence of the oral contract, the trial court found sufficient corroborating evidence. Relatively early in the negotiations, the parties agreed to the term and compensation for Crowe’s employment. Defendant admitted that Foote and Upshaw considered Crowe’s employment essential to the purchase. Not seeking to back out and have the deposit returned, HomesPlus purchased the business and land. The next day Crowe immediately went to work in the agreed position, general manager, at the previously-agreed salary. The parties conducted themselves as if the employment contract was in effect. Crowe was terminated only fourteen days later without any documentation of alleged misconduct. HomesPlus had simply decided on different staffing for the Ruston business.

CONCLUSION

After listening to the testimony, examining the documents in evidence, and considering post-trial briefs, the trial court issued an extensive and well-reasoned opinion which concluded that Crowe had an oral employment contract with Homes-Plus. Our review of this record revealed that the trial court’s findings were entirely reasonable.

luDECREE

The judgment in favor of plaintiff, William E. Crowe, and against defendant, HomesPlus Manufactured Housing, Inc., in the amount of $48,000.00 less a credit of $2,266.61, along with costs and legal interest from the date of judicial demand, is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against HomesPlus.

AFFIRMED.