author: L GREMILLION, JUDGE. | THIBODEAUX, C.J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kiley M. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-1773.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 2, 2004.

      Douglas L. Hebert, Jr., District Attorney — 33rd JDC, Oberlin, LA, for Plain-tiffiAppellee, State of Louisiana.
    Mary Constance Hanes, Louisiana Appellate Project New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Kiley M. Williams.
    Kiley M. Williams, Basile Detention Center, Basile, LA.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, GLENN B. GREMILLION and JOHN B. SCOFIELD, Judges.

       Honorable John B. Scofield participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

   L GREMILLION, JUDGE.

In this case, the defendant, Kiley M. Williams, was convicted of attempted distribution of cocaine and sentenced to serve twelve years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand with instructions for the trial court to correct the court minutes.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In this assignment of error, Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence presented to support his conviction. He contends the videotapes do not conclusively show a drug transaction occurred and, considering the unusual circumstances involved, a rational trier of fact would be driven to have reasonable doubt.

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La. 1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

12Pefendant refers to the following quote from State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988) (footnotes omitted), in support of his argument:

After reviewing Jackson and the foregoing authorities, we conclude that a reviewing court may not disregard its duty under due process of law as interpreted by Jackson v. Virginia simply because the record contains testimony which tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. If the court finds that no rational trier of fact viewing all of the evidence from a rational pro-prosecution standpoint could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction cannot stand constitutionally. The actual trier of fact’s rational credibility calls, evidence weighing and inference drawing are preserved through the requirement that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered as if by a rational fact finder in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and by the admonition that the sufficiency inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. As Professor Wright observes, the important points are that “the court is not to substitute its judgment of what the verdict should be for that of the jury, but that at the same time the jury cannot be permitted to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable doubt.” 2 C. Wright, supra, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal § 467, at 660-661 & n. 23.

In this case, Defendant was charged with distribution of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). At trial, in order to prove the offense, the State called several witnesses which included Officer Scotty Laborde of the Oakdale Police Department, who testified that Ms. Tiwanna Gallington was the paid confidential informant in this case. Gallington testified that prior to September of 2002 she had used marijuana and cocaine. During that year, she agreed to start working with the Allen Parish Sheriffs Office making controlled buys of drugs. Gallington testified that she witnessed a drug raid of her children’s babysitter’s house. When she approached the scene to find out what was going on, Officer Perkins asked her if she wanted to make some money. At first, she stated she did not know, but later she 13changed her mind and she contacted the officer. Officer Laborde testified he contacted Gallington on May 2, 2002, regarding a controlled buy and the two met with Officer Ben Perkins around 3:00 p.m. When they met, Officer Laborde searched Gall-ington and her vehicle. Officer Perkins installed video and audio equipment in the vehicle and they issued money to her to purchase the drugs. She was also provided four plastic vials to serve as containers for any drugs she purchased. According to Officer Laborde, a couple of individuals were being targeted that day, including Defendant.

Officer Laborde testified that once Gall-ington departed, they maintained audio contact with her and she was provided a cell phone for him to contact her and also for her safety. She was not to use the cell phone to arrange drug buys because it was Officer Laborde’s personal phone and he did not want his number to show up on the dealer’s caller ID. If she wanted to call to arrange a transaction, she had to secure another telephone. Gallington testified that she called Defendant from her home telephone.

We note that Gallington did not remain in the car after being searched initially. She left the car for approximately three to five minutes to use the telephone to call Defendant and was not searched again before leaving to buy drugs. During |4this time, the audio recording equipment did not work. In Officer Laborde’s opinion, this occurred because the microphone, which was on Gallington’s body, was too far from the repeater for it to pick up. When Gallington returned to the car, she had a cordless telephone. Officer Laborde acknowledged that it is important to search the confidential informant (C.I.) and the vehicle before the “buy” to avoid the C.I. setting someone up. He also acknowledged that it would be easier for someone to hide drugs on themselves if they went outside the view of the cameras in the car.

Gallington testified that after she contacted Defendant, she returned to the ear, drove around the corner, and met him. She said she told Defendant on the phone that she was looking for “sixty dollars’ worth.” The transaction was described by Gallington as follows:

And driver door to driver door he handed me the drugs and I gave him the money and then I told him, “hey it’s not right,” I don’t know the exact words but said, “well give me the little one back,” and he took the little one and he gave me a bigger one and I say, “well I gave you sixty dollars,” and he gave me a ten back.

During the transaction, the officers did not maintain visual contact with Galling-ton’s vehicle because they had audio contact and they wanted to avoid being seen by suspected drug dealers. After the drug transaction was completed, Gallington drove to the prearranged location and Officer Laborde retrieved the evidence from the glove compartment. He then searched her and the vehicle and found no other drugs. Officer Laborde testified he was able to verify the information provided him by Gallington by watching the videotape of the transaction and the evidence he collected from the glove compartment. She denied planting the drugs in the vehicle and she testified she knew she was being observed the entire time.

IsOfficer Laborde was questioned about Gallington’s motivation for participating in the controlled buy. According to Officer Laborde, she was paid twenty-five dollars a “buy.” He acknowledged that confidential informants may be in jeopardy in participating in controlled buys, but he testified he was not aware of any promises being made to Gallington by the Sheriffs Department for her participation. Officer Perkins testified that the only incentive he was aware of was that Gallington needed money because she indicated to him that she was raising children without child support. Gallington testified that drug dealers can be violent people, depending on what the circumstances. She testified she felt that at the time of the transaction she was not in danger; however, after they found out what she did, she would be. Further, she denied that there was any incentive other than the twenty-five dollars for her participation.

Defendant argues that there were unusual circumstances which support this assignment of error including the fact that Gallington stopped at her house after the officers searched her and before she made the drug buy. This, he argues, provided her the opportunity to obtain drugs and plant them in her vehicle. Further, he points out the fact that the audio recording failed while Gallington was in her house. Finally, Defendant argues the fact detectives were targeting him, and that Galling-ton could have lied about the drug transaction to keep her job as a paid informant.

We note that there were rational explanations given for Gallington stopping at her house and for the audio recording failing while she was in her house. The jury heard the evidence and had the opportunity to view the witnesses during their testimony. Additionally, the jury viewed a videotape which showed Galling-ton | fiand Defendant involved in a transaction during which they each reached out of their car window and Defendant gave Gall-ington something small enough to fit in her hand. After hearing the testimony presented at trial and viewing this tape, the jury chose to convict Defendant, although not of the charged crime. We find that after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of distribution of cocaine proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, because the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for the charged offense, it also supports the jury’s verdict on the lesser and included offense of attempted distribution of cocaine. See State v. Harris, 02-1589 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 709. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ADMISSION OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE: FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for mistrial after Gallington testified that she bought drugs from Defendant on other occasions. During Gallington’s direct examination, she testified that during the transaction, when Defendant gave her the drugs, she said, “hey it’s not right.” When the prosecutor asked why she said that, Gallington responded, “Because any other time I deal with him he knows that don’t give me little stuff.” After the direct examination and cross-examination were completed, during which several bench conferences were held, certain evidence was argued about and admitted, at least two breaks and more than one hour transpired, and evidence was proffered by Defendant, he moved for a mistrial on the grounds of other crimes evidence. The trial court denied the motion, noting Gallington is not a police officer and the prosecutor did not _[¿iave any forewarning that she was going to make this statement.

The State noted at trial, and now argues, that the objection was untimely as it was not made within a reasonable time following the statement by Gallington. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 841 states in pertinent part, “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” Defendant cites State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682 (La.1977) to say that the error must be brought to the judge’s attention within a reasonable time. In Lee, the defendant was being retried after the supreme court reversed his conviction. At the second trial, during questioning of one of the witnesses, the prosecutor referred to the date of the first trial and mentioned there was a conviction. No objection was made by defense counsel at this point. During the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor again referred to the first trial and the fact there was a conviction. Shortly after these references, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. On appeal, the state argued defense counsel’s objection was untimely. The supreme court stated the issue to be decided was whether the belated motion for mistrial, made after repetition of an unobjected-to error, could be considered in the absence of an objection to the first improper reference. The court stated:

Article 841 is not an inflexible rule imposed on criminal litigants without rationale or justification. It is necessary adjunct to our role as an appellate court which is intended to promote judicial efficiency and to insure fair play. See State v. Smith, 339 So.2d 829 (La. 1977[1976]); State v. Ervin, 340 So.2d 1379 (La.1977[1976]); State v. Marcell, 320 So.2d 195 (La.1975). For example, its operation prevents a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then, upon conviction, resorting on appeal to errors that could have been corrected at trial, had he but brought the errors to the judge’s attention. State v. Smith, supra; State v. Knight, 323 So.2d 765 (La.1975); State v. Marcell, supra.

IsWhat our rules require is that counsel bring an error to the attention of the trial judge within a reasonable time after the error occurs so that he can cure the error or declare a mistrial. C.Cr.P. arts. 770, 771, 841. Generally, a contemporaneous objection must be made immediately. In certain instances, however, objections which come shortly thereafter will be considered timely, see State v. Foss, 310 So.2d 573 (La.1975), and there are even instances in which no objections are required because they would.be a vain and useless act, see State v. Ervin, supra. Particularly may there be such exceptions to the general rule during closing argument for reasons expressed in the following law review comment:

“one must recognize that the closing argument of the prosecutor may be so permeated with improprieties that constant objections may alienate the jurors or underscore the remark rather than erase it from their minds. Therefore, an objection at the end of the summation should be considered timely, and in some cases should be allowed outside the presence of the jury.” (citations omitted) 34 L.L.Rev. 746, 759 (1974).
Moreover, we recognize that a prosecutor’s prejudicial comments in closing argument may be considered by a federal court to violate federal due process guarantees even in the absence of a defense challenge or objection at trial. United States v. Briggs, supra, 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.1972); United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.1970); United, States v. Sawyer, 347 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.1965).
The only effect we can see in counsel’s failure to promptly request relief was that the trial was unnecessarily continued beyond a point when it should have been aborted. We do not find that sufficient reason to bar defendant from making a later motion when the error was blatantly repeated. Therefore we hold that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant defendant a requested mistrial when the prosecution during rebuttal argument stated and stressed that defendant Lee had been convicted of this very murder on an earlier trial of the case.

Id. at 684-85.

In the other case cited by Defendant, State v. Mullins, 537 So.2d 386 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988), the defense made an objection at the close of the state’s closing argument. For the reasons discussed in Lee, the court found the error was preserved for appeal.

|flThe year after Lee was decided, the supreme court dealt with this issue in State v. Sepulvado, 359 So.2d 137 (La. 1978). In Sepulvado, the defendant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the state to question the victim about acts of sexual intercourse with the defendant other than the one at issue. During trial, the victim testified regarding two instances of sexual intercourse with the defendant. The prosecutor then asked her if she subsequently had sexual relations with the defendant. At that point, defense counsel objected. The supreme court held the objection came too late and the issue could not be raised on appeal.

A similar conclusion was reached by the supreme court that same year in State v. Brown, 354 So.2d 516 (La.1978). In Brown, during the cross-examination of witness Simmons, the prosecutor arguably made a reference to the witness’ post-arrest silence. However, the supreme court found the objection to the question was not timely because it was not made until the prosecutor concluded two pages of cross-examination concerning the subject. Thus, the defense was not allowed to raise the error on appeal.

Considering the foregoing cases, as well as the cogent facts of this case (the statement made by Gallington is separated by a substantial amount of testimony, two courtroom breaks, much more than an hour, and thirty-five pages of transcript from the objection to motion for mistrial), we find that the objection was not timely made and, therefore, Defendant has not preserved this issue for appeal. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

However, Defendant further contends he was entitled to a discretionary mistrial pursuant to La. Code Crim.P. art. 771(2). He contends that admonition was |innot sufficient to overcome the prejudice he suffered. Alternatively, he contends that the trial court should have at least admonished the jury to disregard the remark.

Louisiana Code of Criminhl Procedure Article 771 states in pertinent part:

In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the state, the court shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a remark or comment made during the trial, or in argument within the hearing of the jury, when the remark is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a nature that it might create prejudice against the defendant, or the state, in the mind of the jury:
(2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or person other than the judge, district attorney, or a court official, regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the scope of Article 770.
In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial.

In the present case, the challenged testimony was given in response to a question posed to Gallington by the prosecutor.

The jurisprudence interpreting La. C.Cr.P. art. 771 has held that an impermissible reference to another crime deliberately elicited of a witness by the prosecutor would be imputable to the state and would mandate a mistrial. State v. Madison, 345 So.2d 485, 494 (La.1977); State v. Overton, 337 So.2d 1201, 1205 (La.1976). However, unsolicited and unresponsive testimony is not chargeable against the state to provide a ground for mandatory reversal of a conviction. State v. Fowlkes, 352 So.2d 208, 212 (La.1977). We are unable to clearly and unequivocally conclude that the reference was not responsive to the prosecutor’s broad, vague question to Officer McCoy. However, we cannot find, nor does defendant claim, that the reference to other crimes was deliberately obtained by design of the prosecutor to prejudice the rights of defendant. Consequently, La.C.Cr.P. art. 771 does not mandate a mistrial.

State v. Jack, 554 So.2d 1292, 1296 (La. App. 1 Cir.1989), writ denied, 560 So.2d 20 (La.1990).

It appears that the reference to the prior drug deals was not solicited or deliberately obtained by the prosecutor to prejudice the rights of Defendant. Thus, we submit the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial. Additionally, Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury to disregard the remark is without merit, as the Defense did not request admonition. See State v. Texada, 99-1009 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/00), 756 So.2d 463, writ denied, 00-2751 (La.6/29/01), 794 So.2d 824; State v. Fowlkes, 352 So.2d 208 (La. 1977); and Jack, 554 So.2d 1292. Further, to have given an admonition at the time it was requested by Defendant would have served little or no purpose to benefit him and would have served to call attention to the issue of other crimes evidence that went unchallenged for a long period of time. For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error has no merit.

EVIDENCE OF MOTIVATION TO TESTIFY

Defendant contends the trial court erred in not allowing into evidence testimony regarding Gallington’s motivation for being a confidential informant and also a witness in the case. During her testimony, Defendant orally requested permission to cross-examine Gallington regarding prior criminal activities, specifically, an incident in which she hit a man by the name of Leon Posey with a hammer. Defendant wished to question her “on any of those prior criminal activities that may have been an incentive for her or an interest for her to testify.” In response to Defendant’s request, the trial court issued the following ruling:

The Court is not going to allow you to talk about the — what you believe is the case with the facts of Leon Posey matter which may orj^may not have occurred. The officers have testified that they have made no other deals with her or given her no other consideration other than the twenty-five dollars. And the twenty-five dollars was per buy not for making the case. Per buy. What you’re talking about is her reason for working for the police. I don’t know that that shows any particular bias against Kiley Williams or any other person other than making a buy against Leon Posey there she may have some kind of bias if he turned her in for any kind of offense. The Court will allow you to ask if there was any other consideration other than the twenty-five dollars and if she answers yes you can ask what that was. However, to go into something that is ordinarily impermissible without having the means to complete an impeachment and it’s my understanding that you do not have the means at this time to complete the impeachment.

The evidence at issue was proffered by Defendant at the close of Gallington’s direct testimony. The proffered evidence concerned two incidents in which Galling-ton was involved. In the first proffer, Gallington testified that in 2002, she hit a man named Leon Posey in the head with a hammer. Gallington’s explanation for her actions was as follows:

Okay, on that particular day me and the children were sitting in the house watching WWF Wrestling. He walks into my house telling me he has the right to see his children. I said, “no you do not. You knock on my door before you enter.” I was called a B-I-T-C-H and [he] told me I couldn’t tell him when he could and could not see my kids and he hit me. I hit him back, he punched me in my head so in turn I got him in a headlock, drug him in the kitchen and hit him in the head with a hammer and after I hit him I went to Oakdale Police Department and talked to Officer Lati-da Reeves and the other female officer and I told them what I did. I took the hammer and told them exactly what I did and they told me that he was an unauthorized entry and I had the right to defend my house. Therefore, he did not go to the police and turn — and tell— and I guess because he knew he was in the wrong and they would have put charge on him. That’s exactly what happened.

In the second proffer, Gallington testified she was indicted for cutting Kevin Melbert. This incident occurred on September 6 or 7, 2002, four months after the transaction at issue in this case. Galling-ton testified that she had not been told by the Sheriffs Department or the District Attorney’s Office that her cooperation in | iscases such as the present might be taken into consideration. During her cross-examination, Defendant asked her, “isn’t it true that as an incentive — an additional incentive — other than twenty-five dollars to work for the police that you were to get yourself out of some trouble that you got into?” to which she replied, “No.”

In response to Defendant’s argument on appeal that this testimony should have been admitted at trial, the State points out that the officers and Gallington all testified that her consideration for participating in the controlled buy and for testifying at trial was the pay. The State additionally notes the incidents were not connected in any way to Defendant and that to allow the expansion of La.Code Evid. art. 404 to this degree is not supported by the jurisprudence.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 607(D) allows the credibility of a witness to be attacked by extrinsic evidence to show the witness’ bias, interest or corruption. Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed error when it refused to allow Defendant to question Gallington about the foregoing incidents. However, the error in this instance is subject to a harmless error analysis.

In State v. Williams, 02-1406 (La.4/9/03), 844 So.2d 832, witness Delwin Ancar’s house trailer was invaded by the defendant and two others searching for drugs and money. During Ancar’s direct testimony at Williams’ trial, he testified that three months prior to trial, he pled guilty to possession of cocaine and he was placed on probation. On cross-examination, counsel asked Anear whether he was originally charged with two counts of distribution of cocaine, seeking to establish that one charge was dismissed and the other reduced as a result of the plea bargain. The State objected to any questions regarding the plea bargain and the trial court initially [14overruled the objection. The trial court then heard the testimony of Anear and the Assistant District Attorney who had handled Ancar’s case. Each of them provided reasons why the plea bargain was entered, and both denied that it had any connection to the Williams case. After hearing these two testimonies, the trial court decided to sustain the state’s objection.

The appellate court found the plea agreement bore no relation to the present case, but the supreme court disagreed:

Although the trial court was sensitive to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination, the court ultimately made the wrong decision when it restricted counsel’s questioning of Anear and thereby impaired relator’s ability “to expose to the jury the facts from which [it] ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To the extent that exposure of a witness’s motivation “is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination,” State v. Nash, 475 So.2d 752, 755 (La. 1985), this Court has held on numerous occasions that a witness’s “hope or knowledge that he will receive leniency from the state is highly relevant to establish his bias or interest.” State v. Brady, 381 So.2d 819, 822 (collecting cases); see also State v. Bowie, 00-3344, p. 9 (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 377, 385 (“A defendant’s right to demonstrate facts and circumstances which might influence the witness’s perceptions or color his testimony, thereby lessening the weight the fact-finder might accord his testimony, is guaranteed in both state and federal criminal proceedings and is an important function of the right to confront and cross-examine.”) (citations omitted). A witness’s bias or interest may arise from arrests or pending criminal charges, or the prospect of prosecution, even when he has made no agreements with the state regarding his conduct. Brady, 381 So.2d at 822; see also Nash, 475 So.2d at 755-56. Moreover, even after pending charges have been resolved, bias may arise from a witness’s “vulnerable status as a probationer.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
We need not decide whether, as relator argues, the trial court usurped the jury’s role as the fact-finder by denying jurors the opportunity to infer from the timing and nature of the plea bargain a connection between the narcotics prosecution and the present case. |1REven assuming that Anear had no motive to protect a guilty plea premised on a specific condition (express or implied) that he would testify against relator and his co-defendants, the witness may have subjectively believed that continued cooperation with the state was necessary to protect his probationary status and to forestall any chance of going to jail. It was the fear of incarceration, Anear made clear in his testimony outside the jury’s presence, that led him to accept the plea bargain although he continued to profess his innocence. At the time he entered his guilty plea, Anear had been subpoenaed for a pre-trial hearing conducted in the present case only one week later. As relator’s counsel characterized Anear’s situation, “So one week you were being prosecuted and the next week you’re the witness.... ” Jurors knew from Ancar’s direct testimony that he had pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and had received probation. However, without the full context of the proceedings set out before them, including the terms of the plea bargain, jurors lacked any basis for assessing how intertwined the two cases may have been in Ancar’s mind, how closely associated the plea bargain in one case was to his appearance as a victim/witness in the other, and how much pressure Anear may have felt to cooperate in the prosecution of relator and his co-defendants, not only to protect his probationary status but also to distance himself from the darker implications arising out of the loss of thousands of dollars in cash from his trailer and testimony of family members that the perpetrators were looking for money and drugs only a month after he had been implicated in the cocaine sales to undercover agents.
The trial court therefore erred in precluding defense counsel from delving into the details of Ancar’s prior cocaine conviction to expose for the jury’s consideration the sources of possible bias or partiality of the witness. While confrontation errors are subject to harmless-error analysis, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), we cannot say in the present case that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).

Id. at 835-36.

In State v. Vale, 95-1230 (La.1/26/96), 666 So.2d 1070, three defendants were charged together with possession of heroin with the intent to distribute as a result of a transaction that occurred in June of 1990. In January of 1991, the state dismissed the charge against defendant Bergeron in exchange for his testimony against the other two defendants. In November of 1992, Bergeron was arrested for 1^violating La. R.S. 14:95.1. He was charged with the offense and the charge was still pending at the time of the trial. Approximately two weeks after his arrest for violating La.R.S. 14:95.1, and one day before trial, Bergeron told the state for the first time that defendant Vale had sold him heroin in a Wal-Mart parking lot several weeks prior to the June 1990 incident. In his July 1991 statement to police that was part of his agreement with the state, which resulted in dismissal of his charge, Bergeron had stated he did not know whether defendant Vale was distributing drugs. The state notified the court of its intent to introduce the evidence regarding the prior sale. At the hearing on the matter, Bergeron stated he had forgotten about the purchase from Vale until he was urged by the prose-cutrix to remember everything he could in preparation for the upcoming trial. At trial, when the defense attempted to cross-examine Bergeron about his pending charge as an explanation for his recovered memory of the prior sale, the state objected. The court ruled, “that in the absence of evidence of an explicit deal concerning the firearms offense, Bergeron’s subjective expectations concerning that charge were irrelevant for purposes of cross-examination into his bias and interest in testifying for the state.” Id. at 1072. The supreme court stated:

This court granted certiorari because the trial court’s ruling, affirmed by the court of appeal, conflicted with numerous decisions by this court that to the extent exposure of a witness’s motivation is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, a witness’s “hope or knowledge that he will receive leniency from the state is highly relevant to establish his bias or interest.” State v. Brady, 381 So.2d 819, 822 (La.1980) (collecting cases); see also State v. Nash, 475 So.2d 752, 755-56 (La.1985). A witness’s bias or interest may arise from arrests or pending criminal charges, or the prospect of prosecution, even when he has made no agreements with the state regarding his conduct. Id.
|17The state now concedes the error of the trial court in sustaining its objection and of the appellate court in accepting its argument on the exclusion of the relevant evidence of bias or interest. The state, however, argues that the error was harmless.

Id.

The supreme court subsequently reversed the court of appeal and remanded the case for the court to conduct a harmless error analysis. We note that the fifth circuit found that the error was harmless on remand, State v. Vale, 93-895 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/14/96), 683 So.2d 917, but the supreme court found that it was not upon further review. State v. Vale, 96-2953 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 876.

In State v. Boswell, 96-801 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/97), 689 So.2d 627, the witness, a confidential informant involved in the drug transactions at issue in the case, testified that prior to the transactions, she went to police seeking help with pending arrests. In exchange for her participation and information in narcotics cases, the pending charges were to be dropped. On cross-examination, the defendant attempted to ask the witness whether she had been arrested on drug charges within two to three weeks prior to trial. The state’s objection made at this point was sustained. On appeal, the state conceded that the trial court erred in sustaining the objection, citing Vale as support. This court agreed with the state’s position and conducted a harmless error analysis.

The present case is factually similar to Vale and Boswell regarding Galling-ton’s charge which arose after the transaction, but prior to trial. As for the first incident involving Posey, Gallington testified the time of the occurrence was in 2002, but an exact date was not given. However, the record leads us to believe that it occurred about the time she began working for the District Attorney’s Office. Thus, | ¶ ¿whether this incident occurred before or after Gallington’s participation in the controlled buy is not clear. She testified that she was told by officers at the Oakdale Police Department that her actions were justified. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to determine whether the prospect of prosecution may have been a motivating factor for Gallington’s participation with authorities. However, the foregoing cases allow great latitude in cross-examination on a witness’ motivation for cooperation with the state. In the second instance, clearly, the charges pending against her for the incident involving Kevin Melbert may have had a bearing on the quality of her testimony.

In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court stated that the test for harmless error “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” In Boswell, we set forth the factors to be considered in assessing whether the error was harmless:

Confrontation errors are subject to a Chapman harmless error analysis. De laware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The correct inquiry is whether the reviewing court, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, is nonetheless convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. Factors to be considered by the reviewing court include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438.

Boswell, 689 So.2d at 630, quoting State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1332 (La.1990).

_J_12In the present case, Gallington’s testimony was important to the State’s case. However, her testimony was corroborated on material points by the testimony of the officers, as well as the video recording of her transaction with Defendant. The existence of this video recording enhanced the strength of the State’s case, which was significant. Additionally, we note that Defendant was allowed to fully cross-examine Gallington on other topics, including her personal drug use, the fact she had considered herself a drug dealer at one point, and her prior conviction in Texas for possession of cocaine and methamphetamine. Under these circumstances and considering these factors, we find that the error that occurred was harmless and that this assignment of error is likewise harmless.

ERROR PATENT

We review all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. After reviewing the record, we find that the sentencing minutes require correction. The minutes state the sentence is twelve years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, however, the transcript does not mention that the sentence was to be served without benefit of parole. Accordingly, we remand the case and order the trial court to correct the sentencing minutes to reflect the sentence imposed.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the sentencing minutes to reflect that Defendant’s sentence was not imposed without benefit of parole.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THIBODEAUX, C.J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

| THIBODEAUX, C.J.,

dissenting.

The trial court’s refusal to allow Ms. Gallington to be questioned regarding the incidents with Leon Posey and Kevin Mel-bert is not harmless error. The credibility of Ms. Gallington, I believe, was the overriding factor in the jury’s decision to convict the Defendant of the lesser included offense of attempted distribution of cocaine. The majority observes that the Defendant’s testimony was corroborated by the existence of a video recording of Ms. Gallington’s transaction with the Defendant. This video recording “enhanced the strength of the State’s case.” The majority goes on to say that the State’s case was “significant.” We must recall that the Defendant was charged initially with distribution of cocaine, yet the jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of attempted distribution of cocaine. If the State’s case was as “significant” as the majority observes, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the Defendant would have been convicted of the initial charge of distribution of cocaine. Despite the existence of a video recording, the Defendant was not convicted as charged. The video showed nothing more than small objects being passed between the Defendant and Ms. Gallington. Yet, in spite of the 1 ¡¡video, the jury voted 10-2 to convict on a lesser charge; two of the jurors voted to acquit completely. The video, thus, had little impact. The conviction by and large rested on the testimony of the confidential informant. Consequently, the fact that Ms. Gallington may have received leniency was highly relevant to establish her bias or interest. The Defendant in this case had a constitutionally protected right of cross examination of Ms. Gallington. The trial court’s refusal to allow such cross examination was not harmless error, particularly in view of the verdict rendered. See State v. Williams, 02-1406 (La.4/9/03), 844 So.2d 832.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the conviction of the Defendant and remand to the trial court for a new trial.

      . Officer Perkins was asked about his reason for working with Gallington. Specifically, he was asked, "Officer Perkins what considerations were made by you or somebody from the Sheriff’s Office that you're aware of as an incentive to Tiwanna to work with you?” He replied:
      She had information that would help with further investigations or ongoing investigations that we had. It was merely by accident that I ran into her. We was searching a house in Oakdale and she came as you know when you searching a house in Oakdale it draws a crowd. We just started talking and one thing led to another and she ended up calling me a couple of days later and we met and we started making cases.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JJ’ETERS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. ADOPTIONS WORLDWIDE, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-1674.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 2, 2004.
    Anthony C. Caruso, Karen Yarbrough, State of Louisiana, Department of Social Seiwices, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant: State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services.
    Yul D. Lorio, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendants/Appellees: Adoptions Worldwide, Inc., Blaine Doucet, Angela B. Dou-cet.
    Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN, and JOHN B. SCOFIELD, Judges.

       John B. Scofield participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as judge pro tempore.

   JJ’ETERS, J.

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Social Services, appeals a judgment of the trial court granting an exception of no cause of action and dismissing its petition for injunctive relief and assessment of fines against Adoptions Worldwide, Inc. and Blaine and Angela B. Doucet in their capacity as directors of the corporation. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

On September 9, 2002, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Social Services (Department), filed a petition for injunctive relief against Adoptions Worldwide, Inc. and Blaine and Angela B. Dou-cet in their capacity as directors of the corporation. In its petition, the Department asserted that the defendants had operated an adoption agency since November 2, 2000, without being properly licensed pursuant to state law. The petition sought not only to enjoin the defendants from operating “a child placing agency” but also to enjoin them from advertising the corporation as “a child placing agency.” Additionally, the Department sought the assessment of statutory fines and attorney fees against the defendants.

The defendants initially responded to this petition on January 24, 2003, by filing a dilatory exception of nonconformity of the petition with the requirements of La. Code Civ.P. art. 891, a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and peremptory exceptions of no right and no cause of action. The trial court held a hearing on these exceptions on March 19, 2003. Neither the Department nor the defendants presented any evidence at this hearing. Upon completion of the argument, [2the trial court denied the dilatory exception and granted the peremptory exception of no cause of action. It made no ruling on the remaining two exceptions. On April 3, 2003, the trial court signed a judgment stating only that “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter be dismissed, with prejudice, at the costs of the State of Louisiana.” The Department timely requested a new trial, which the trial court denied. It then filed this appeal, asserting five assignments of error.

OPINION

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 931 provides in part: “No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” In Industrial Cos. v. Durbin, 02-0665, pp. 6-7 (La.1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207, 1213, the supreme court explained:

The peremptory exception of no cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the particular plaintiff is afforded a remedy in law based on the facts alleged in the pleading. The exception is triable on the face of the petition and, for the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, the appellate court ... should conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the trial court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Simply stated, a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language of the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial.

| ¡¡(Citations omitted.)

The Department asserted in its petition that Adoptions Worldwide, Inc. operated a child-placing agency and advertised itself as such without first obtaining a valid license to do so. The trial court granted the exception of no cause of action, finding that there exists no requirement for a child-placing agency to obtain a license.

Chapter 14 of Title 46 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes is entitled the “Child Care Facility and Child-Placing Agency Licensing Act.” La.R.S. 46:1401. The legislative intent of this Act is set forth in La.R.S. 46:1402 as follows:

It is the intent of the legislature to protect the health, safety, and well-being of the children of the state who are in out-of-home care on a regular or consistent basis. Toward that end, it is the purpose of this Chapter to establish statewide minimum standards for the safety and well-being of children, to insure maintenance of these standards, and to regulate conditions in these facilities through a program of licensing. It shall be the policy of the state to insure protection of all individuals under care in child care facilities and placement agencies and to encourage and assist in the improvement of programs. It is the further intent of the legislature that the freedom of religion of all citizens shall be inviolate. This Chapter shall not give the Department of Health and Hospitals or the Department of Social Services jurisdiction or authority to regulate, control, supervise, or in any way be involved in the form, manner, or content of any curriculum or instruction of a school or facility sponsored by a church or religious organization so long as the civil and human rights of the clients and residents are not violated.

(Emphasis added.)

The Act, when read in its entirety, clearly contemplates that a child-placing agency must obtain a Class A or Class B license. It defines a child-placing agency as “any institution, society, agency, corporation, facility, person or persons, or any other group engaged in placing children in foster homes or with substitute parents for temporary care or for adoption, but shall not mean a person who may occasionally refer children for temporary care.” La.R.S. 46:1403(A)(2) (emphasis added). It 14further provides that “[a]ll ... child-plae-ing agencies shall be subject to the provisions of [Chapter 14].” La.R.S. 46:1415.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:1406 creates the Louisiana Advisory Committee on Licensing of Child Care Facilities and Child-Placing Agencies (Advisory Committee), which is charged with the tasks of developing “new minimum standards for licensure” and of consulting with and advising the Department “on matters pertaining to the review and revision of rules, regulations, and standards for licensure of Class A facilities and decisions to revoke or refuse to grant or renew a Class A license.” La.R.S. 46:1407. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:1409(B) requires that the Advisory Committee “approve rules and regulations developed by the department to meet” certain minimum “standards for all Class A child care facilities and child 'placement agencies.” (Emphasis added.) Included within those minimum standards are standards to “[prohibit discrimination by ... child placement agencies on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, national origin, handicapping condition, or ancestry.” La.R.S. 46:1409(B)(5).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:1408(A) provides in pertinent part that “[a]pplication for a Class A license shall be made by the child care facility or child placing agency to the department upon forms furnished by the department.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, “[w]hoever operates any ... child-placing agency, as defined in R.S. 46:1403, without a valid license issued by the department shall be fined not less than seventy-five dollars nor more than two hundred fifty dollars for each day of such offense.” La.R.S. 46:1421. The authority for injunctive relief on behalf of the Department is found in La.R.S. 46:1422, which provides in part: “If any Is -.. child-placing agency operates without a valid license issued by the department, the department may file suit ... for injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order, to restrain the institution, society, agency, corporation, person or persons, or any other group operating the facility or agency from continuing the violation.” Additionally, La.R.S. 46:1425 provides:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person other than a child-placing agency possessing a Class A or Class B .license or a Louisiana-based crisis pregnancy center to advertise through print or electronic media that it will adopt children or assist in the adoption of children.
B. If any person advertises in violation of this Section, the attorney general, the Department of Social Services, the appropriate district attorney, or any licensed Class A or Class B child-placing agency or a Louisiana-based crisis pregnancy center may file suit in district court according to the general rules of venue to obtain injunctive relief to restrain the person from continuing the violation.
C. Nothing in this Section shall apply to any individual licensed to practice law in this state while such individual is engaged in the practice of law or to any individual licensed to provide mental health counseling as provided in the Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1120 and preplacement and home studies as provided in the Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1173.
D. Anyone who violates the provisions of this Section shall be liable for all costs of any proceeding brought to enjoin such violation, including reasonable attorney fees, which shall be set by the court.

The issue now before us arises because La.R.S. 46:1404 fails to mention child-placing agencies when discussing licensing requirements. That statute provides only that “[a]ll child care facilities, including facilities owned or operated by any governmental, profit, nonprofit, private, or church agency, shall be licensed. Licenses shall be of two types: Class A and Class B.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court concluded that the failure by the legislature to include child-placing agencies in this statute precluded such an agency from having to obtain a license before entering into business. If we were to read that statute standing alone, we would agree. However, our reading of Chapter 14, including particularly the statement of legislative intent | (¡found in La.R.S. 46:1402, causes us to conclude that child-placing agencies are subject to the same licensing requirements as child care facilities despite the failure to include them in La.R.S. 46:1404.

Thus, in concluding that the Department’s petition does state a cause of action, we reverse the trial court judgment dismissing the Department’s action and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we are limited in our review to testing the legal sufficiency of the Department’s petition and no other issue. Industrial Cos., 837 So.2d 1207. We cannot reach the issue of the effect that Mr. Doucet’s assertion, that he is a practicing attorney, would have on the litigation as no evidence was presented on this issue and that matter is not properly before us.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We assess all costs of this appeal to Adoptions Worldwide, Inc.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The caption of the petition identifies the corporation and the Doucets as defendants. However, the Doucets are named as defendants only in their capacity as directors of the corporation. Additionally, the petition itself names only the corporation as a defendant but consistently refers to the "defendants” throughout the petition, without naming the Doucets.

      . The record is silent concerning the disposition of the other exceptions. However, the trial court minutes of March 19, 2003, erroneously state that the trial court denied the dilatory exception and both peremptory exceptions. The minutes do not mention the declinatory exception.

      .The language of the judgment has some significance because, after the filing of the exceptions and before the hearing on the exceptions, the Department amended its petition to name Blaine and Angela B. Doucet as individual defendants. However, neither Blaine nor Angela Doucet had responded to the amended petition at the time the exceptions were heard. Additionally, the caption of the April 3, 2002 judgment listed as defendants only the corporation and the Doucets in their capacity as directors.

      . We note that La.R.S. 46:1409 was amended by 2003 La. Acts No. 369, § 1, but that amendment does not affect the decision in this case.


author: pEZELL, Judge.

text:
    Ronald L. HANKS v. KINETICS GROUP, INC.
    No. WCW 03-1354.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 2, 2004.

      James Ray Morris, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff/Respondent, Ronald L. Hanks.
    Kirk Lindsay Landry, Aaron James Chaisson, Jr., Keogh, Cox, & Wilson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Applicant, Kinetics Systems Caribe, Inc.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and BILLY HOWARD EZELL, Judges.
   pEZELL, Judge.

This is a workers’ compensation matter. In this case, Kinetics Systems Caribe seeks supervisory writs from a decision of the workers’ compensation judge denying its exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we grant writs and reverse the ruling of the workers’ compensation judge as to the exception of lack of in personam jurisdiction.

This proceeding arises out of a work-related injury Ronald Hanks alleges he sustained while employed by Kinetics in Puerto Rico. Hanks was first employed by Kinetics as a welder and detailer in Texas in 1996. He later worked for Kinetics and/or its branches in several places throughout the United States on a contract basis. However, he never performed any work for Kinetics in Louisiana. Before every change of location, a relocation agreement was signed by Hanks setting forth, among other things, his wages and any benefits.

While performing work for Kinetics in North Carolina, Hanks was made aware of a possible job opening in Puerto Rico following the completion of his then current job. After the North Carolina job was completed, Hanks drove the travel trailer he was living in back to his permanent residence in Louisiana, so that he could leave it there while in Puerto Rico. While in Louisiana, he received, via email, a relocation agreement setting forth the rate of pay for his employment in Puerto Rico and benefits, such as trips home. On June 1, 2001, Hanks printed out the relocation agreement, made alterations to it and faxed it back to Kinetics. Subsequently, he was sent to Puerto Rico to begin his new job.

On September 22, 2001, Hanks was replacing mechanical piping on a rack while standing on a ladder. While reaching for a piece of piping, Hanks felt a pop in his back and pain in his right leg. He immediately informed his supervisor. Hanks | ¡^continued his employment with Kinetics, performing light-duty work until March 20, 2002, at which time he was laid off as part of a reduction in force. Hanks then filed this workers’ compensation claim.

Kinetics answered the claim, asserting exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of in personam jurisdiction, and lack of proper service and citation. The workers’ compensation judge granted the exceptions of insufficiency of service and citation and ordered Hanks to attempt proper service. The exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in person-am jurisdiction were denied. From that decision, Kinetics sought supervisory writs.

We will first deal with Kinetics’ claim that the workers’ compensation judge erred in denying its exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree with this assertion.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1035.1 states, in pertinent part:

(1) If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents, would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this Chapter had such injury occurred within this state, such employee, or in the event of his death resulting from such injury, his dependents, shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this Chapter, provided that at the time of such injury
(a) his employment is principally localized in this state, or
(b) he is working under a contract of hire made in this state.

Since it is undisputed that Hanks’ employment was not principally located in Louisiana, our first concern is whether he was working under a contract of hire made in this state. The conclusion reached by the workers’ compensation judge, as a factual determination, may not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of manifest error. Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 97-1225 (La.3/4/98), 708 So.2d 375. In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate court | ¡¡must determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Id.

In denying Kinetics’ exception, the workers’ compensation judge found that pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1035.1, Hanks was working under a contract of hire made in Louisiana. We find no error in this ruling.

A relocation agreement was sent to Hanks before each time he changed locations to work for Kinetics. These agreements set forth the rate of pay he was to receive and the length of the job, as well as any additional benefits, such as transportation to the job, and trips home. Hanks testified that the pay went up on almost every relocation agreement he had signed, depending on where he would be located. The relocation agreement for the Puerto Rico job not only set forth his pay for that particular job, but also established that he would receive trips back to Louisiana as part of his compensation. This contract was sent by Kinetics to Louisiana, where it was altered by Hanks. The altered contract was sent back to and accepted by Kinetics. Based on the facts before us, we find no error in the workers’ compensation judge’s determination that the relocation agreement signed by Hanks was a contract for hire made in Louisiana. Accordingly, we find that the workers’ compensation judge was clearly reasonable in denying Kinetics’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon La. R.S. 23:1035.1.

While we find that the workers’ compensation court did have proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case, we also find that Kinetics has insufficient contacts with Louisiana to force it to defend itself in this state.

While Hanks alleges that there are many divisions or branches of Kinetics Corporations throughout the world, Kinetics Caribe is a nonresident corporation principally located in Puerto Rico. Therefore, to determine if the Louisiana Workers’ | ¿Compensation Court has personal jurisdiction over it, we must apply the Louisiana Long Arm Statute, La. R.S. 13:3201, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident:
(1) Transacting any business in this state.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.
(3) Causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission in this state.
(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.
(5) Having an interest in, using or possessing a real right on immovable property in this state.
B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.

“In accordance with La. R.S. 13:3201(B), we must inquire into whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction complies with constitutional due process.” Hallaron v. Jacob’s Eng’g Group, Inc., 02-903 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/11/03), 839 So.2d 952, 954, writ denied, 03-1844 (La.10/31/03), 857 So.2d 478. “Due process requires that in order to subject a nonresident defendant to a personal judgment, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (citing de Reyes v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd., 90-2214 (La.1991), 586 So.2d 103, and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

Under the minimum contacts/fair-play factors analysis set forth in International | Shoe, we find that the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Kinetics. It is undisputed that Kinetics did not do business in Louisiana, nor did it have offices in this state. It did not contract to supply services or things in this state. The work performed by Hanks was performed in Puerto Rico and the injury occurred there as well. In fact, Hanks had never performed any work for Kinetics in Louisiana. The only contacts Kinetics had with Louisiana whatsoever was the email sent to Hanks at his Louisiana residence. We find that Kinetics did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana. Therefore, to subject them to the personal jurisdiction of a Louisiana court would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

For the reasons set forth, the writ is granted. The workers’ compensation ruling denying the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction is reversed, and judgment is rendered in Kinetics’ favor, granting the exception and, thereby, dismissing Kinetics as a defendant. Costs of this appeal are to be split between the parties.

REVERSED.