text:
    In re William B. LYNCH.
    No. 2002-B-2275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from one count of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, William B. Lynch, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently on interim suspension.

UNDERLYING FACTS

This- matter stems from a child pornography ring that operated in the Kaplan, Louisiana area. In 1996, federal law enforcement authorities learned that Glenn Patrick Mire and Barbara Richardson brought female minors to the home of Wilfred Bell, knowing that the children would be molested by Mr. Bell and photographed while engaging in sexually explicit acts. Respondent later discussed with Mr. Mire ways of preventing the authorities from discovering the incriminating photographs. Among other things, on August 12, 1996, respondent went to the home where the photographs had been produced and convinced the owner of the home to remove all the furniture in the areas where the photographs had been taken, in order that authorities would not be able to learn the location where the child pornography had been produced. The next day, respondent met with some of the females who had been photographed and assured them that if they cooperated with him, he would post their bail in the event they were arrested in connection with the investigation. After the | ¡Jemales were interviewed by law enforcement agents, respondent met with the females to determine what questions had been asked of them by the agents, the answers they gave to the agents, and the direction of the investigation. In the course of these meetings, respondent learned that Newton Suire would possibly be called to testify before the federal grand jury investigating the Kaplan child pornography ring. On September 10, 1996, respondent counseled Mr. Suire to commit perjury before the grand jury by testifying falsely under oath when asked about any matters relating to child prostitution or child pornography. In October 1996, respondent attempted to persuade a government witness to give a television interview in which she would lie about the actions of law enforcement agents. Finally, respondent met with a prior participant in the conspiracy and encouraged that person to obstruct justice by not cooperating with federal authorities.

On October 9, 1996, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Louisiana returned a seven-count indictment against respondent and the others involved in the pornography ring. As to respondent, the indictment alleged that he suborned perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622 and conspired to obstruct justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, both felonies under federal law. On October 30, 1997, a jury found respondent guilty as charged. On September 10, 1998, the district court sentenced respondent to serve forty-eight months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. As a special condition of supervision, respondent was ordered to have “no contact with any female minors under age 18 years, either directly or indirectly except his own children.” On December 8, 2000, respondent’s conviction |3and sentence were affirmed in an unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Lynch, 98-30016 (5th Cir.2000).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

On November 4, 1998, this court placed respondent on interim suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime and ordered that disciplinary proceedings be instituted. In re: Lynch, 98-2448 (La.11/4/98), 721 So.2d 845. On November 12,1998, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent arising out of his conviction. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise respond to the formal charges. Accordingly, the charges were deemed admitted. No formal hearing was held, and the matter was submitted to the hearing committee solely on documentary evidence. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3).

In its submission, the ODC pointed out that respondent has been convicted of a serious crime warranting discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the baseline sanction for which is disbarment. The ODC suggested several aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s prior disciplinary record, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1959). In light of all these factors, and particularly considering the nature of the acts by respondent which precipitated his conviction, the ODC argued that permanent disbarment is warranted.

Respondent submitted no evidence for the hearing committee’s consideration.

\ ¿Hearing Committee Recommendation

After considering the ODC’s submission, the hearing committee agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. The committee concluded respondent’s conduct was intentional, and that actual harm resulted from his interference with an ongoing federal investigation into child prostitution and child pornography. The committee concurred in the aggravating factors cited by the ODC, and agreed that no mitigating factors are present. Finding respondent’s conduct fits the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, the committee recommended he be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record, the disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous, and that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. Relying on the same reasoning as set forth by the committee, a majority of the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the sole |Bissue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline and, if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La.4/12/02), 815 So.2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed depends on the seriousness of the offense and the extent of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550 So.2d 188 (La.1989).

The disciplinary board has recommended to us that respondent’s conduct is so egregious as to warrant permanent disbarment. The sanction of permanent disbarment is set forth in the 2001 amendment to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 and § 24. In our commentary accompanying the amendment, we stated, in pertinent part:

In the public interest, the Court has amended Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX to codify Permanent Disbarment as an available sanction for attorney misconduct. While the Court has always had the discretion to deny an application for readmission after the requisite five (5)-year waiting period after disbarment, an attorney who is permanently disbarred under these circumstances will be prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar. These amendments reflect the judgment of the Court that in some instances lawyer misconduct may be so egregious as to warrant a sanction of permanent disbarment based on the facts of an | ^individual case and in consideration of the guidelines in Appendix E to the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

In Appendix E, we set forth several guidelines illustrating the type of cases which might warrant permanent disbarment. We explained that these guidelines were not intended to bind this court in its decisionmaking, but to provide “useful information to the public and to lawyers concerning the types of conduct the Court might consider to be worthy of permanent disbarment.”

Guideline 2 of Appendix E provides that an attorney’s “[ijntentional corruption of the judicial process, including but not limited to bribery, perjury, and subornation of perjury” is a ground for permanent disbarment. Clearly, respondent’s conviction of suborning perjury and of conspiring to obstruct justice in connection with a child pornography investigation falls squarely within this guideline.

As recently noted in In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934, we do not lightly impose the sanction of permanent disbarment. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that we would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sanction here. Respondent engaged in conduct that was actively intended to frustrate the administration of justice. This court cannot and will not tolerate such conduct by an attorney, upon whom high standards of honesty and righteousness are erected. See Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391, 392 (1967). Respondent’s actions convincingly demonstrate he does not possess the requisite moral fitness to practice law in this state. He must be permanently disbarred.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and impose permanent disbarment.

IvDECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of William B. Lynch be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The children, Mr. Mire, and Ms. Richardson were all paid by Mr. Bell.

      . Mr. Suire was, in fact, called to testify before the grand jury, and he did, in fact, commit perjury by denying that he knew any of the prostitutes mentioned in the grand jury, by denying that he had sex with any females under the age of 25 in the last year, and by denying that he had met with and discussed child prostitution or child pornography with respondent.

      . The ODC alleged that respondent's conviction constituted a violation of Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

      . Respondent received four private reprimands between 1975 and 1989.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      (1) Disbarment by the court. In any order or judgment of the court in which a lawyer is disbarred, the court retains the discretion to permanently disbar the lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A) was amended to add the highlighted language:
      A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer who has served a suspension period of more than one year, exclusive of any waivers or periods of deferral, shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the court.... No lawyer may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A lawyer who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the time of the effective date of the interim suspension. The court retains the discretion, in accordance with Section 10A of this rule, to permanently disbar a lawyer and permanently prohibit any such lawyer from being readmitted to the practice of law.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LPER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Michael J. BONNETTE.
    No. 2002-B-2596.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   LPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from nine counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michael J. Bonnette, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana, but currently suspended.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I — The Jones Matter

In December 1996, respondent received $2,000 to file an appeal in a criminal case in which Randall Jones and two others were co-defendants. On December 30, 1996, respondent filed a “Motion for Out of Time Application for Writ of Review, Cer-tiorari and Mandamus,” but he thereafter took no further action on behalf of his clients. Respondent also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

In November 1997, Mr. Jones filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with La client), 1.5(f) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II — The Laffitte Matter

In October 1995, James Wilson Laffitte retained respondent to handle a civil matter on his behalf. Respondent subsequently became incapacitated, but he failed to withdraw from the representation and allowed Mr. Laffitte’s claim to prescribe. Nevertheless, in June 1996, respondent told Mr. Laffitte that he had received a settlement check on his behalf. Respondent failed to keep numerous appointments with Mr. Laffitte until December 9, 1997, when respondent advanced to Mr. Laffitte the sum of $500 by check drawn on his general account.

In December 1997, Mr. Laffitte filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.8(e) (providing financial assistance to a client), 1.16(a)(2) (declining or terminating representation where the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g).

_J¿Count III — The Smith Matter

In May 1996, Sharon Smith retained respondent to pursue a claim for damages stemming from an incident in which she claimed she had been falsely arrested. Respondent neglected the matter, and as a result, the claim prescribed. Respondent nevertheless advised Ms. Smith that the defendants had agreed to an out-of-court settlement. On January 18, 1998, respondent advanced to Ms. Smith the sum of $300 by check drawn on his general account.

In March 1998, Ms. Smith filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.8(e), 1.16(a)(2), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g).

Count TV — The Vercher Matter

In June 1997, Ronnie Vercher retained respondent to file an appeal in a criminal case. Mr. Vercher paid respondent $2,097.05 toward his $3,000 fee, but respondent failed to complete the appeal and failed to communicate with his client. Respondent also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

In June 1998, Mr. Vercher filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f), 1.16(d), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

14Count V — The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matter

On September 4, 1998, respondent was certified ineligible to practice law in Louisiana for non-payment of his 1998-1999 Louisiana State Bar Association membership dues. On September 28, 1998, respondent handled two eases in the Winn-field City Court. In City of Winnfield v. Pepper, docket number 178-98, respondent moved for and was granted a continuance on behalf of the defendant. In City of Winnfield v. Dingler; docket number 117-98, respondent entered a guilty plea to first offense DWI on behalf of the defendant.

By letter dated September 30, 1998, Winnfield City Judge Jacque Derr filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.16(a)(1) (declining or terminating a representation that will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

Count VI — The Howard Matter

In August 1998, James Howard paid respondent $1,250 to handle a child custody matter. Respondent neglected the matter and Mr. Howard terminated the representation six weeks later. However, respondent failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

|Jn September 1998, Mr. Howard filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent faked to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. During a sworn statement given on December 17, 1998, respondent acknowledged that he owed Mr. Howard a refund of $1,250, which he promised to mail that day. Respondent failed to refund the sum he had promised, however.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d), 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4(c), 8.1(c), 8.3(a) (reporting professional misconduct), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g).

Count VII — The Glass Matter

In February 1998, Barbara Glass paid respondent $2,500 to handle a criminal matter on behalf of her stepson. Respondent neglected the matter and performed no services on his client’s behalf. By letter dated July 2, 1998, respondent promised Ms. Glass that he would refund the entire amount she paid no later than July 15, 1998. In late July, Ms. Glass received $1,250 from respondent. When the balance of the fee was not forthcoming, Ms. Glass filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC.

During a sworn statement given on December 17, 1998, respondent advised the ODC that he had recently spoken to Ms. Glass, and he promised that he would promptly pay the $1,250 he owed her. However, respondent had not, in fact, spoken to Ms. Glass, and he has failed to refund the sum he promised.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f), 1.15, 1.16(d), | fi3.3, 8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

Count VIII — The Pittman Matter

In October 1997, Regina Pittman paid respondent $375 to handle an expungement on behalf of her son. Respondent neglected the matter and Ms. Pittman terminated the representation in December 1998. However, respondent failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

In March 1999, Ms. Pittman filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath. During a sworn statement given on July 13, 1999, respondent acknowledged his failure to complete the representation and promised that he would contact Ms. Pittman to resolve the matter. Respondent failed to do so, however.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f), 1.7(b) (conflict of interest), 1.15, 1.16(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).

Count IX — The Leviston Matter

In June 1999, Pattie Leviston filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to answer the complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear and answer the complaint under oath.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct in this matter violates Rule 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

^DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

After investigation, the ODC filed nine counts of formal charges against respondent. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, and the matter was submitted to the hearing committee solely on the ODC’s documentary evidence. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the record, the hearing committee concluded that respondent’s conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.3 and 1.4 (in the Jones, Laffitte, Smith, Vercher, Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters); 1.5(f) (in the Jones, Vercher, Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters); 1.16(a)(2) (in the Laf-fitte matter); 1.16(d) (in the Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters); 3.2 (in the Howard matter); 5.5(a) (in the unauthorized practice of law matter); 8.1(c) (in all counts); 8.4(a) (in all counts); 8.4(c) (in all counts); and 8.4(g) (in all counts).

The committee found that respondent violated duties owed to his clients by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in his various representations, failing to keep his clients reasonably informed about the status of their cases, failing to comply with his clients’ requests for information, failing to provide account-ings for client funds, and failing to refund unearned fees. Respondent also violated a duty to the legal system by appearing in court while ineligible to practice law, and cavalierly ignored his duty to cooperate in the disciplinary investigations of the underlying complaints. The committee concluded respondent’s conduct rises to the level of Isgrossly negligent, if not intentional, misconduct, and that respondent caused actual harm to his clients, particularly those who were wrongfully deprived of funds to which they are entitled and those whose legal rights and remedies have been lost.

In aggravation, the committee recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary record for misconduct similar to that at issue here, his dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1977), and indifference to making restitution. The committee recognized that mitigating factors may exist in the form of respondent’s personal and emotional problems, but ultimately no consideration was given to these circumstances because respondent failed to present any medical or other evidence to the committee to justify doing so. In light of the substantial aggravating factors present, and considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the prior jurisprudence dealing with similar misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board generally agreed with the hearing committee’s factual findings and its application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. After reviewing the record in its entirety, the board determined that respondent neglected his clients’ | alega! matters and failed to communicate with his clients in the Jones, Laffitte, Smith, Vercher, Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters, in violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.4; failed to return unearned fees in the Jones, Vercher, Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters, in violation of Rules 1.5(f)(6) and 1.16(d); failed to withdraw from the representation of his clients during a period when he was ineligible to practice law, in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1); failed to withdraw from the Laffitte matter upon becoming impaired, in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(2); failed to expedite litigation in the Howard matter, in violation of Rule 8.2; knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal in connection with his unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Rule 3.4(c); engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during a period of ineligibility, in violation of Rule 5.5(a); knowingly made a false statement of material fact in the course of the disciplinary investigation in the Glass matter, in violation of Rule 8.1(a); failed to cooperate with the ODC in any of its disciplinary investigations, in violation of Rules 8.1(c) and 8.4(g); violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, in violation of Rule 8.4(a); engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation in connection with his unauthorized practice of law and in the Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters, in violation of Rule 8.4(c); and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in connection with his unauthorized practice of law and in the Jones, Vercher, Glass, and Pittman matters.

The board found that respondent has violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal profession. The board noted that respondent’s conduct was Imknowing, if not intentional, and resulted in actual harm to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. The board agreed with the hearing committee’s assessment of the aggravating factors and finding of an absence of mitigating factors.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board agreed that the baseline for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. Considering the relevant jurisprudence involving an extreme pattern of neglect of client matters, failure to return unearned fees, and failure to cooperate with the ODC, the board found there is no reason to deviate from the baseline sanction in this case.

Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. The board further recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings, with legal interest to commence running thirty days from the date of finality of the court’s judgment until paid.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

lnBased on our independent review, we conclude the findings of the hearing committee, as modified by the disciplinary board, are supported by the record. The undisputed evidence reveals respondent has violated numerous provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we now turn to a determination of an appropriate sanction for this misconduct. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain the appropriate standards of professional conduct, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. In re: Vaughan, 00-1892 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 87; In re: Lain, 00-0148 (La.5/26/00), 760 So.2d 1152; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Levy, 400 So.2d 1355 (La.1981). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re: Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent’s conduct is unquestionably serious in nature. On repeated occasions, he has neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to account for and refund unearned legal fees, and failed to properly terminate the representation of his clients. He also engaged in the practice of law while ineligible to do so, and has made no effort whatsoever to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation of these matters. This pattern of misconduct clearly caused actual harm to respondent’s clients, the public, and the legal profession.

Numerous aggravating factors are present, including respondent’s lengthy disciplinary history. We are unable to discern any mitigating factors from the record.

Disbarment is generally appropriate when the respondent has demonstrated a “a callous disregard for the ethical standards of the legal profession.” Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 291 So.2d 385, 388 (La.1974). Respondent’s actions in the instant matter, combined with his prior disciplinary record, convincingly prove that he has demonstrated a callous disregard for the standards of the legal profession. Accordingly, respondent must be disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Michael J. Bonnette be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . We previously suspended respondent from practice for a period of one year and one day. In re: Bonnette, 01-1401 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 68. Respondent did not seek reinstatement following the suspension, however, and therefore he remains suspended from the practice of law.

      . Respondent represented to the ODC in a sworn statement that he was committed to an in-patient program for the treatment of depression during the period of time in which he represented Mr. Laffitte.

      . Respondent was subsequently reinstated to the practice of law effective October 15, 1998.

      . Respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board in 1999 (99-ADB-005), and as previously noted, was suspended by this court in 2001 for one year and one day.

      . The majority of the board's disagreement with the committee seems to stem from the committee’s finding of rule violations that were not charged by the ODC. For example, the committee found respondent violated Rules 8.4(a), (c), and (g) in connection with each and every count of the formal charges; however, respondent was not charged in each count with violations of those sections.

      .The board concluded the remainder of the formal charges are not supported by the record, and accordingly, recommended the following charges be dismissed: a violation of Rule 1.7(b) charged in the Pittman matter; violations of Rule 1.8(e) charged in the Laf-fitte and Smith matters; violations of Rule 1.15(a), (b), or (c) charged in the Howard, Glass, and Pittman matters; violations of Rule 1.16(a) charged in the Smith and Pittman matters; violations of Rule 3.3 charged in the Howard and Glass matters; a violation of Rule 3.4 charged in the Howard matter; a violation of Rule 8.3(a) charged in the Howard matter; violations of Rule 8.4(b) charged in the Howard and Glass matters; and violations of Rule 8.4(c) charged in the Jones and Vercher matters. The ODC did not file an objection in this court to the board's recommendation, and therefore the dismissal of these charges will not be discussed further.


author: JjPER CURIAM.

text:
    In re Shawn Paul WELCOME.
    No. 02-B-2662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   JjPER CURIAM.

This matter arises from two petitions for consent discipline filed jointly by respondent, Shawn Paul Welcome, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Louisiana but currently on interim suspension, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) prior to the institution of formal charges.

UNDERLYING FACTS

The underlying facts of these matters are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties.

00-BB-112

The Hammons Matter

In March 1999, Rebecca Hammons retained respondent to handle a workers’ compensation matter. Respondent neglected the case and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to return to Ms. Hammons the file relating to the matter.

In February 2000, Ms. Hammons filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on June 14, 2000 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

19The Koshen Matter

In July 1996, Richard Koshen retained respondent to file a civil suit against his former employer. Respondent negotiated a settlement with the defendant and accepted a check in the amount of $221 from him. However, Mr. Koshen had not approved the settlement of the case for that amount. Moreover, respondent did not give the $221 check to Mr. Koshen. He thereafter neglected the case and failed to communicate with his client.

In March 2000, Mr. Koshen filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on June 14, 2000 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

The Tulane Law School Matter

On December 29, 1999, respondent issued a $300 check to Tulane Law School in payment of the registration fee for a continuing legal education program sponsored by the law school. The check was subsequently returned NSF. Although the law school made several attempts to collect the seminar fee from .respondent, he failed to make the check good.

In May 2000, Ms. Gilda Cross of Tulane Law School filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to reply to the complaint. The ODC thereafter served respondent with a subpoena compelling him to appear on June 14, 2000 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear.

|s02-DB-003

The Dupre Matter

In February 2000, Marshall Dupre retained respondent to handle a child support and child custody matter. Mr. Dupre paid respondent $3,505.66, of which $1,500 represented respondent’s fee and $250 represented filing fees; the remaining sum, $1,755.66, was to be paid toward Mr. Dupre’s child support obligation. Respondent neglected the case and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee. Furthermore, respondent did not promptly remit Mr. Dupre’s child support payment.

The Gregoire Matter

In January 1999, Leo John Gregoire, Jr. retained respondent to handle his divorce. Although respondent filed the petition for divorce, he thereafter neglected the case and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee Mr. Gregoire paid and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

The Davis Matter

In February 2000, David Scott Davis paid respondent $1,700 to handle a criminal matter. Respondent neglected the case and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee Mr. Davis paid.

The Ely Matter

Lucille Ely retained respondent to write her will. After Mrs. Ely died, her heirs tried to contact respondent to obtain the papers he had prepared so that the will could |4be probated. However, respondent failed to communicate with the heirs and failed to forward to them the papers he possessed.

The Wilkerson Matter

In June 1999, Louis Wilkerson paid respondent $950 to handle a divorce and partition of community property. Although respondent initially completed some work on Mr. Wilkerson’s behalf, he thereafter neglected the matter. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

The Thormas Matter

In November 2000, Ronnie Thormas retained respondent to handle three unrelated legal matters. Mr. Thormas paid respondent $2,500, along with $200 in filing fees. Although respondent completed one of the matters he had been retained to handle, he neglected the other two matters and failed to communicate with his client. He also failed to account for any earned portion of the legal fee and failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Petitions for Consent Discipline

The ODC conducted an investigation into the complaints filed against respondent. On September 7, 2000, prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC filed a joint petition for consent discipline in OO-DB-112. In the petition, respondent admitted that his conduct in the Hammons, Koshen, and Tulane Law School matters constituted a violation of Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to |Kcommunicate with a client), 1.16(d) (termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties agreed that the mitigating factors present are absence of a prior disciplinary record, inexperience in the practice of law (admitted 1996), and remorse; the aggravating factors present include a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the orders of the disciplinary agency. For his misconduct, the parties proposed that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions.

After the filing of the joint petition for consent discipline, the ODC received additional complaints against respondent. This prompted the parties to file a second petition for consent discipline, encompassing the new complaints. On December 28, 2001, respondent and the ODC filed a joint petition for consent discipline in 02-DB-003. In the petition, respondent admitted that his conduct in the Dupre, Gregoire, Davis, Ely, Wilkerson, and Thormas matters constituted a violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, |fi1.5(f) (payment of fees in advance of services), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The parties agreed that the mitigating factors present are absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal and emotional problems, timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law, physical or mental disability or impairment, and remorse; the aggravating factors present include a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. For respondent’s misconduct, the parties sought the imposition of an eighteen-month suspension, to run concurrently with the suspension proposed in 00-DB-112. The parties also agreed that respondent’s suspension shall be followed by a two-year period of supervised probation subject to the same conditions as set forth in OO-DB-112.

On January 25, 2002, the two petitions for consent discipline were consolidated in the disciplinary board. Shortly thereafter, the ODC and respondent filed a joint motion for interim suspension, which this court granted on February 20, 2002. In re: Welcome, 02-0289 (La.2/20/02), 811 So.2d 874.

ItDisciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board reviewed the petitions for consent discipline separately. In connection with OO-DB-112, the board determined that respondent’s misconduct was knowing and intentional and violated duties owed to his clients, the disciplinary system, and the profession. As to the Hammons and Koshen matters, the board found that respondent knowingly failed to perform services for a client, knowingly dealt improperly with client property, and engaged in a pattern of neglect, causing actual injury to Ms. Hammons and Mr. Koshen. As to the Tulane Law School matter, the board found respondent initially failed to honor the check he had written for the CLE seminar fee, despite several attempts at collection by the law school; this conduct harmed Tulane by depriving it of monies rightfully owed it for an extended period of time. The board concluded this conduct was both knowing and intentional, as was respondent’s failure to respond to the complaints filed against him by his clients and the law school, and his failure to appear for a sworn statement pursuant to subpoena. Respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC caused harm to the legal profession by unjustly delaying the resolution of the complaints.

Based upon its review of the record, the board agreed with the parties’ assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors present. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the prior jurisprudence of this court dealing with misconduct similar to respondent’s, the board concluded that a suspension is the baseline sanction in this case. Under the circumstances, the board agreed a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law, followed by a two-year period of probation with conditions, is appropriate for respondent’s misconduct in OO-DB-112.

In connection with 02-DB-008, the board determined that respondent’s misconduct was knowing and negligent and violated duties owed to his clients. |s Be-spondent neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, and failed to promptly return their property and unearned legal fees. Although the record does not provide specific information as to any injury suffered by the six clients at issue, at a minimum, it was established that these clients’ legal matters were unduly delayed and that they were deprived of funds or other property to which they were entitled for an extended period of time.

With respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors, the board agreed with the parties that a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses should be considered in aggravation. However, the board found one of the mitigating factors cited by the parties, namely physical or mental disability or impairment, is not supported by the record. First, no evidence of a physical disability was presented by the parties. Furthermore, only limited evidence was presented to establish that respondent suffered from depression and substance abuse during the relevant time period. Notwithstanding this evidence, the parties presented nothing to establish a direct causation between the mental disability and chemical dependency and the misconduct at issue. Based on this reasoning, the board did not consider this factor in mitigation.

After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the prior jurisprudence of this court dealing with misconduct similar to respondent’s, the board concluded that a suspension is the baseline sanction in this case. Under the circumstances, the board agreed an eighteen-month suspension from the practice of law, followed by a two-year period of probation with conditions, is appropriate for respondent’s misconduct in 02-DB-003.

In sum, the board found the proposed discipline in both matters appropriately addresses respondent’s misconduct. Accordingly, the board recommended the joint petitions for consent discipline be accepted. The board further recommended that the 19discipline imposed in 00.-DB-112 and 02-DB-003 run concurrently, retroactive to the date of respondent’s interim suspension.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The rule violations in this case, as admitted by respondent, principally involve failure to account for and refund unearned fees, failure to communicate with clients, neglect of client matters, and failure to cooperate with the ODC. The sole issue presented for the court’s consideration is whether the eighteen-month suspension proposed by respondent and the ODC is an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

In fashioning an appropriate sanction, we are mindful that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary proceedings is not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct to safeguard the public, to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the standards of the profession. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Guidry, 571 So.2d 161 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

In prior cases involving similar misconduct, this court has imposed sanctions ranging from disbarment to fully deferred suspensions. After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find the scale is tilted in this case toward the lower end of the range. Of particular note is the fact that all of respondent’s misconduct occurred within the same time frame — late 1999 and 2000 — during a period in which respondent Imsuffered personal and emotional problems. Given the mitigating factors present in this case, in particular the absence of a prior disciplinary record and respondent’s inexperience in the practice of law, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, and timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct, coupled with the relatively minor aggravating factors present, we conclude an eighteen-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

Based on these factors, we find the proposed consent discipline is adequate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we will accept the joint petition for consent discipline and suspend respondent from the practice of law for eighteen months, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary board, and considering the record filed herein, it is ordered that Shawn Paul Welcome be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months, retroactive to his February 20, 2002 interim suspension. All costs and expenses in these matters are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

TRAYLOR, J., would reject the consent discipline.

      .The parties proposed the following conditions:
      1. Respondent shall establish and maintain an effective calendaring system and method to communicate with clients and shall obtain the assistance of the LSBA’s Loss Prevention Counsel and Practice Assistance Counsel in the creation of a proper law office management program;
      2. Respondent shall enroll in and attend one full day of Ethics School administered by the LSBA’s Practice Assistance and Improvement Committee;
      3. Respondent shall maintain current in the law during his period of actual suspension by satisfying all annual MCLE . requirements in a timely fashion, and shall pay all bar dues and disciplinary assessments;
      4. Respondent shall respond to all reasonable requests of his probation monitor; and
      5. Respondent shall refund any funds due to his clients.

      . Respondent had a substance abuse problem during the relevant time period, and suffered from depression and anxiety. The parties represent that he has "sought professional help for his emotional and personal problems in order to rectify his situation.”

      . After the complaints were filed, respondent made restitution to Mr. Dupre, Mr. Gregoire, Mr. Davis, and to Mrs. Ely’s family; he returned Mrs. Ely’s papers to her family; and he remitted the child support payment on Mr. Dupre’s behalf. Furthermore, in connection with 00-DB-112, respondent has returned $221.64 to Mr. Koshen and paid $330 to Tulane Law School for the CLE seminar.

      . The parties proposed concurrent discipline because the misconduct in 02-DB-003 is similar to and occurred in the same time frame as the misconduct addressed in the petition filed in 00-DB-112.

      . The joint petition for consent discipline also provides for a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. However, such issues, along with any other relevant factors, may be addressed if and when respondent applies for reinstatement. See In re: Harris, 99-1828 (La.9/17/99), 745 So.2d 1172.


author: |,PER CURIAM.

text:
    Chiwana J. JONES, Wife of and Henry Jones, et al., v. Nick CONGEMI, Both Individually and as the Chief of Police, et al., Wilmareen James, Wife of/and Wilson James, v. Nick Congemi, Individually and as the Chief of Police, et al.
    No. 2002-C-2979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 24, 2003.
   |,PER CURIAM.

In application no. 02-CC-0105, defendants, Nick Congemi, et al., applied to this court, seeking review of a ruling of the district court denying its motion for summary judgment and the court of appeal’s denial of its application for supervisory relief. On April 12, 2002, this court remanded the case to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion. Jones v. Congemi, 02-0105 (La.4/12/02), 812 So.2d 659. On March 16, 2000, the court of appeal rendered an opinion, stating that it initially declined to reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and deferred to the trial court’s finding that there were material issues of facts as to the circumstances surrounding the accident. The court of appeal then stated,

The Supreme Court, without stating reasons, has rejected that position. Given this directive from the Supreme Court and recognizing the superior authority of that court, we now adopt the position set forth by | ?Judge Rothschild in his original dissent.

The court of appeal then noted Judge Rothschild’s dissent and reversed for the reasons contained therein.

Plaintiff now seeks review of that judgment, contending the court of appeal failed to comply with the mandate of this court to render an opinion after briefing and argument by the parties. We agree.

In remanding cases to the appellate courts for briefing, argument and opinion, this court selects cases in which more detailed consideration of the law and facts pursuant to the court of appeal’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted. The court’s intent in remanding these cases is not to require the court of appeal to reach a certain result in its opinion. Rather, the court of appeal is free to reach any result which it believes is required under the law, in light of the briefing and/or argument by the parties, supporting its conclusions by means of a full opinion.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is vacated as to the issue of the summary judgment pertaining to the defendants’ liability. The matter is remanded to the court of appeal for further proceedings consistent with this court’s order of April 12, 2002.

      . Consolidated with this application was application 02-C-2778, filed by Scottsdale Insurance Company. On this date, we denied that application and thus consider the court of appeal opinion regarding that issue to be final and conclusive. Therefore, the remand applies only to application 02-C-2979, which pertains solely to the summary judgment on the issue of liability of the defendants.


text:
    Gordon RAMSEY v. Jesse C. BROWN.
    No. 2003-CD-0748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 18, 2003.
   In re Brown, Jesse C.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, First Justice Of The Peace Court, No. 222-2003; 2nd Parish Court Div. A, No. 1000-529.

Petition transferred to Court of Appeal for expeditious consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of K.U.P.
    No. 2003-CJ-0615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2003.
   In re J.P.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Juvenile Court Parish of Jefferson, No. 2002 CC 43; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1279.

Denied.


text:
    Michael D. DAVIS v. YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 19, 2003.
   In re Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. et al.; Skeeter Products, Inc.;'— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, . Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 203,712; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 03-00326.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    ANR PIPELINE COMPANY v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION, Malcolm B. Price, Jr., Chairman of the Louisiana Tax Commission, Kenneth P. Naquin, Jr., Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission and Russel R. Gaspard, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission. And Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2002-C-1479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Tax Commission et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 468417, 480159, 480160, 480161, 480163, 480873, 485716; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2001 CA 2594, 2001 CA 2595, 2001 CA 2596, 2001 CA 2597, 2001 CA 2598, 2001 CA 2599, 2001 CA 2600.

Granted.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy SIMS.
    No. 2002-K-2208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 423-804; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0479.

Granted.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 02-PDB-017.
    No. 2002-OB-2763.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Dennis, Eddie L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of The Disciplinary Board, No. 02-PDB-017.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Joseph R. CASANOVA.
    No. 2002-B-2155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Joseph R. Casanova; — Plaintiff; (s); Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated November 11, 2002; Office of Disciplinary Board, Nos. 98-DB-078, 99-DB-030.

Rehearing denied.

CALOGERO, Chief Judge, KIMBALL, J., and WEIMER, J. would grant rehearing.


text:
    BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2002-C-2633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re City of New Orleans, Board of Assessors, applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 10, 2003; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Division K, No. 99-17471; to the Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0691.

Denied.


text:
    Teresa L. HOLLIER, Individually and on Behalf of Josephine Mitchell v. GUEST HOUSE OF BOSSIER, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-1919.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Guest House/Bossier et al.; Central Management Company Inc.; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 108,562; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36489-CW.

Remand to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of this Court’s opinion in Richard ex rel. Deville v. Louisiana Extended Care Centers, Inc., 02-0978 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 460.


text:
    James PENDER, et al. v. NATCHITOCHES PARISH HOSPITAL.
    No. 2002-C-2105.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Natchitoches Parish Hospital;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 73,366-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 01-1380.

Remanded to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Richard ex rel. Deville v. Louisiana Extended Care Centers, Inc., 02-0978 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 460.


text:
    Mary FERGUSON, Individually and as Provisional Administratrix of the Estate of Alma Gilliam v. HERITAGE MANOR SOUTH, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-2156.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Heritage Manor South et al.; Community Care Center of Shreveport South L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 465,746; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36621-CW.

Remand to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of this Court’s opinion in Richard ex rel. Deville v. Louisiana Extended Care Centers, Inc., 02-0978 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 460.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Throme LACROIX.
    No. 2002-KP-1783.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Lacroix, Throme; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 396-406 “K”; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0732.

Application withdrawn at relator’s request.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Throme LACROIX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2544.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Lacroix, Throme; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 396-406; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0732.

Application withdrawn at relator’s request.


text:
    Kenneth FRASIER v. Richard STALDER, et al.
    No. 2001-CI-2602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Frasier, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 448723; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000-CW-1119.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard D. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Williams, Leonard D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 372-657; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-1800.

Denied. See, e.g., State v. Deloche, 96-1901, p. 1 (La.11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349; see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 352-55 (6th Cir.1998).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-0523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Smith, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 371-004; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-K-2252.

Denied.


text:
    Charles CARTER v. SERGEANT WRIGHT B-TEAM, Lieutenant Lemoine B-Team, Burl Cain, Warden and Richard Stalder, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2002-CI-0832.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
    Reconsideration Denied May 9, 2003.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 466,-342; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 CA 2107.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph D. ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Robertson, Joseph D.; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 384650; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 1061.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph L. MARINO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Marino, Joseph, L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 392-252; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2000 KA 1131.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thaddeus JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Johnson, Thaddeus; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 99-6773; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2001 KA 842.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Billy Mac MCCOY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re McCoy, Billy Mac; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 18,500.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).'


text:
    STATE ex rel. John D. COOK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1061.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Cook, John D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 97-F-1330; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35665-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Freeman PATTERSON v. Richard STALDER, Secretary La. Department of Corrections and the Louisiana Board of Parole, et al.
    No. 2002-CI-1070.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Patterson, Freeman; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, No. 472,050; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 CA 2732.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joe R. ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1082.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Robertson, Joe R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 87-3597; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-83.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ralph SINGLETON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Singleton, Ralph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 281,991; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001-KW-2047.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carlos MCGREW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re McGrew, Carlos; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-6892; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 02-KH-167, 01-KH-829.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan FOX.
    No. 2002-KO-1088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Fox, Jonathan; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 11363, 11364; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KA 1845.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence J. CHAISSON, Sr.
    No. 2002-KO-1088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Chaisson, Lawrence Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 337641; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 0664.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny SYKES.
    No. 2002-KO-1090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Sykes, Johnny; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 299019; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KA 0791.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Talonzo Detroit DEBROW.
    No. 2002-KO-1091.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Debrow, Talonzo Detroit; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 202,660; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,700-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antonio SEWELL.
    No. 2002-KO-1098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Sewell, Antonio; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 199,992; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 35,549-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chester F. ONEZIME.
    No. 2002-KO-1099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Onezime, Chester F.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court'Div. F, No. 00-1030; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 01-KA-1018.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gordon NEWMAN.
    No. 2002-KP-1483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Newman, Gordon; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 380-770; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0666.

Denied.


text:
    Toby ARMENTOR v. ARROW PEST CONTROL.
    No. 2003-C-0139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Armentor, Toby; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation-District 3, No. 98-08199; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0533.

Denied.


text:
    Dr. Frederick RISENER v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. ONE OF THE PARISH OF TERREBONNE.
    No. 2003-C-0142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of Terrebonne; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 91183; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2755.

Denied.


text:
    Lewis FRAZIER, Jr. v. ZAPATA PROTEIN USA, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Frazier, Lewis Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-14309; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0605.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James L. MORRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-KH-0250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Morris, James L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 462820; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002-CW-1710.

Denied.


text:
    John DOE, et al. v. ABC CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Shaw, Charles J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, Nos. 96-11743, 94-8087; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2754.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wendell HARRISON, Sr.
    No. 2003-KH-0473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Harrison, Wendell Sr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 92142; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 02-00992.

Denied.


text:
    Carol PIERCE and Alan G. Pierce v. John P. VALIULIS.
    No. 2003-CC-0515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patients Compensation Fund; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 404-063; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37183-CW, 37182-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Mary Jane WYRICK and Tommy Wyrick v. John P. VALIULIS.
    No. 2003-CC-0517.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patients Compensation Fund; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 403237; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 37182-CW, 37183-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Preston FUSILIER v. FRANK BRISCO’S DIRT SERVICE, INC.
    No. 2003-CC-0565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Frank Brisco’s Dirt Service Inc.; — • Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation #4, No. 02-05272; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 02-01383.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Stacie Cady v. Carl THIBODEAUX.
    No. 2003-C-0118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Louisiana State of; Social Services Dept, of; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 86-2128; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0586.

Denied.


text:
    Theresa Traylor COLLINS v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Shelter Mutual Insurance Company et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 92-2507; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,528-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John EVANS and Diane Evans v. STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2003-C-0125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Evans, John et al.; Evans, Diane; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 93,762; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,539-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Lewis FRAZIER, Jr. v. ZAPATA PROTEIN USA, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Zapata Protein USA Inc. n/k/a;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-14309; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0605.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Ferrell LAVERGNE, Eagle Pacific Insurance Company. v. QUALITY FABRICATORS OF EUNICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2003-C-0127.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Quality Fabricators of Eunice et al.; Clarendon America Ins. Co.; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-C-2071 D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0548.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Jerrilyn and Jerome CONNER, et al. v. Dr. Howard STELLY and Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund.
    No. 2003-C-0129.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-2434; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-549.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Eddie J. BENOIT, Jr., Eddie J. Benoit, Sr., Margie Benoit, Leighton E. Stamps and Diane C. Stamps v. DAVEYFIRE, INC., ABC Insurance Company and Jefferson Marine Towing v. Events, Inc. d/b/a Classic Fireworks.
    No. 2003-CC-0086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Events Inc. d/b/a; Classic Fireworks; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 546,607; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1094.

Denied.


text:
    CA ONE/PAMPY’S v. Shirley BROWN, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0087.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Brown, Shirley; S.B. Shirlee AMC Co., Inc. d/b/a/; Mrs. Brown’s Kitchen;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2001-6944; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-1408.

Denied.


text:
    Eddie J. BENOIT, Jr., Eddie J. Benoit, Sr., Margie Benoit, Leighton E. Stamps and Diane C. Stamps v. DAVEYFIRE, INC., ABC Insurance Company and Jefferson Marine Towing v. Events, Inc. d/b/a Classic Fireworks.
    No. 2003-CC-0090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Ranger Insurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 546,607; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-C-1058.

Denied.


text:
    639 JULIA STREET PARTNERS v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and The Downtown Development District of New Orleans.
    No. 2003-C-0101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re 639 Julia Street Partners; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 98-7020; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-0777.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward WASHINGTON.
    No. 2003-KK-0109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Washington, Edward; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 5-00-133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 2244.

Denied.


text:
    Michelle Renee BIAS v. Ernest J. VINCENT and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Bias, Michelle Renee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-1277; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-642.

Denied.


text:
    Joy GILCREASE v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
    No. 2003-C-0113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari, and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District lw, No. 01-00079; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,-523-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    Charles JONES, Jr. v. Terry JOHNSON, BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc. and Peterbilt of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2003-C-0117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Jones, Charles Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 466,588; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2415.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Frankie MORRISON, et al. v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Prison Angola, Louisiana. Stacey D. Matthews v. Baron Kaylo, Warden Avoyelles Correctional Center, Cottonport, Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KP-1499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Morrison, Frankie et al.; Morrison, Frankie a/k/a; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 96-1088; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-320.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Roderick WILLIAMS v. The METROPOLITAN COUNCIL OF EAST BATON ROUGE, James Moosey, and American Alternative Insurance Company.
    No. 2002-CC-1673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re American Alternative Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 454,911; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CW 2718.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth SIMMONS.
    No. 2002-KP-1698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Simmons, Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 95-1196; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-402.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Billy Mac MCCOY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1730.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re McCoy, Billy Mac; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 17,376; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 KW 0623.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick WOODBERRY.
    No. 2002-KP-1856.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Woodberry, Derrick; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 371-742; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-K-0994.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kiana CALLOWAY.
    No. 2002-KP-1857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Calloway, Kiana; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 94-4551; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-509.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose GARCIA.
    No. 2002-KP-1858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Garcia, Jose; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 90-81; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-375.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael BIRKLETT.
    No. 2002-KP-1926.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Birklett, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 157,033; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36492-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin Lynn FALLS.
    No. 2002-KP-2093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Falls, Kevin Lynn; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 96-1478; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 02-00206.

Denied. See State ex rel. Rice v. State, 99-0496 (La.11/12/99), 749 So.2d 650.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbur ALEXANDER.
    No. 2002-KP-2096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Alexander, Wilbur; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 96-770; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW-02-00267.

Denied.


text:
    Barbara DUPRE, Wife of, and Ferrel Dupre v. John FLOYD, M.D., Victor Tedesco, M.D., Charles Ledoux, M.D. and Terrebonne General Medical Center.
    No. 2002-CC-2147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Terrebonne General Medical Center; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 132,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CW 2399.

Denied. Moot. See Dupre v. Floyd, 02-0153 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/20/02), - So.2d -, 2002 WL 31895084.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald HAWKINS.
    No. 2002-K-2303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Hawkins, Ronald; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 403-405; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1815.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Desmond M. JACKSON.
    No. 2002-K-2396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Jackson, Desmond M.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2000-193F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,176-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tracy WALKER.
    No. 2002-K-2398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Walker; Tracy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ .of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 91,855; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KA 0150.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kirk A. BAHAM.
    No. 2002-K-2405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Baham, Kirk A.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 419-715; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0201.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence MELANCON.
    No. 2002-K-2407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
    Reconsideration Denied May 2, 2003.
   In re Melancon, Lawrence; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 408-778; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-KA-1656.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael SOPCZAK.
    No. 2002-K-2471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Sopczak, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 98-1012; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KA-235.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Billy M. MCCOY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-2677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re McCoy, Billy M.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 17,677-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 KW 1678.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    Warren GIBSON v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Russell Walker, Jr. and David Phillips.
    No. 2002-C-2843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Phillips, David; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 99-2970; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-1256.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Leon IMPASTATO a/k/a Leon J. Impastato.
    No. 2002-C-2887.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Impastato, Gary M. Sr.; LoNigro, Nancy; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 98-17439; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-1987.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sonia SHOEMAKER.
    No. 2002-KK-3148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 259-752; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 02-K-1744.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John DOE, et al. v. ABC CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2002-CC-3223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Shaw, Charles J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, Nos. 96-11743, 94-8087; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-C-2101.

Denied.


text:
    Coralee MONK, Individually and as Natural Tutrix of the Minors, Jeffrey Wayne Hanks, Ward Hanks, Michael Hanks, Carina Monk and Shawn Monk v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS and Dr. Steven Jurisich.
    No. 2002-CC-3253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Monk, Coralee et al.; Hanks, Jeffrey Wayne; Hanks, Ward; Hanks, Michael; Monk, ■ Carina; Monk, Shawn;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 419,922; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CW 2398R.

Denied.


text:
    J. CALDARERA AND COMPANY, INC. v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge, on Behalf of the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport.
    No. 2003-CC-0014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re J. Caldarera & Co., Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 491,747; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2002 CW 1041, 2002 CA 1270.

Denied.


text:
    John A. BAHAM and Doris F. Baham v. INTERNATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORPORATION and Turner Industrial Services, Inc.
    No. 2003-C-0020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Baham, John A. et ah; Baham, Doris F.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 471,818; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2001 CA 2128.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Kenneth BRANSCUM v. Terry CATHERINE d/b/a Catherine’s Janitorial Industrial Service, Hermitage Insurance Company, Floor Blazer, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2003-C-0029.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Branscum, Kenneth et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, Nos. 95-1542, 95-12780 “K”, 95-13627 “F”, 95-14997 “D”; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2001-CA-0852.

Denied.


text:
    Jerrilyn and Jerome CONNER, et al. v. Dr. Howard STELLY and Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund.
    No. 2003-C-0039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Conner, Jerrilyn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-2434; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-549.

Denied.


text:
    John M. PITRE and Esther M. Pitre v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-C-0045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Pitre, John M.; Pitre, Esther M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-C-3891-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-535.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin Bryan KING, Sr., Individually and as Natural Tutor of His Minor Children, Kevin Bryan King, Jr., Kathryn Elizabeth King and Ashley Dean King v. Leo Paul STEWART, Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development, Fulton Performance Products, Inc., Vanguard Insurance Company, and ABC Insurance Company and Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2003-C-0048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Fulton Performance Products Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 59,768, 61,809; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2001 CA 1931, 2001 CA 1932.

Denied.


text:
    Shirline L. JOUBERT v. Wayne BROUSSARD, Progressive Insurance Company, and Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana.
    No. 2003-C-0060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 99-3871-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-911.

Denied.


text:
    SIZELER HAMMOND SQUARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. GULF STATES THEATRES, INC., n/k/a Hammond Theatres, Inc. and Hammond Theatres, L.L.C.
    No. 2003-C-0070.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Sizeler Hammond Square Limited Partnership; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 539-564; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-CA-759.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Orson Lee DURHAM.
    No. 2003-KK-0073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Durham, Orson Lee; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 02-F0183; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 37113-KW.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Johnny JONES v. OUACHITA PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2003-C-0082.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Jones, Johnny; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-1329; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 36,552-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Derrin ERNEST v. PETROLEUM SERVICE CORPORATION and Carbis, Inc.
    No. 2003-CC-0084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Ernest, Derrin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 479651; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CW 1794.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Wyatt V. DEJOIE v. SCIENTIFIC SERVICES AND PROTECTIVE PRODUCTS, INC., d/b/a Rodent Guard-Termite and Pest Control
    No. 2003-C-0085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re Scientific Services and Protective Products Inc. d/b/a et al.; Rodent Guard-Termite and Pest Control; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 00-15538; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1308.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ruben CHAVEZ.
    No. 2003-KK-0816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 21, 2003.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 167-00; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2008 KW 0501, 2003 KW 0501.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Gloria SCOTT, et al. v. The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 25, 2003.
   In re Philip Morris USA Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 96-8461; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0551.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Cynthia BOURNE, et al. v. Saul KAHN, D.D.S., et al.
    No. 2003-CC-0812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 26, 2003.
   In re Bourne, Cynthia et al.; Bourne, Neijaneir Marie; Magee, Marlon; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, Nos. 98-9443, 2001-8982; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-C-0521.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason HELOU.
    No. 2002-K-2302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Helou, Jason; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. CR77,314; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-77.

Granted.


text:
    Brett BARNHILL v. A-1 REMODELING, et al.
    No. 2003-OC-0226.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re A-1 Remodeling; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 6s, No. 00-06345; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2002 CA 0357.

Granted. The order of the court of appeal granting claimant’s motion for remand is vacated and set aside. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the motion by a three-judge panel, after providing the parties with an appropriate opportunity to brief the issue. See Gootee Construction, Inc. v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co., 00-2341 (La.11/13/00), 775 So.2d 1044.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry HAMLIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2002-KH-1095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Hamlin, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 270-123.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to vacate his guilty plea and conviction he filed on or about January 21, 2002. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file, and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony DEVEAUX.
    No. 2003-KH-0686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Deveaux, Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 199681.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration under La.C.Cr.P. art. 701(F).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony DEVEAUX.
    No. 2003-KH-0687.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Deveaux, Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 199631.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration under La.C.Cr.P. art. 701(F).


text:
    Tina Louise Church WOODARD, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Children, Phillip Elton Woodard, Jr., Britany Michele Woodard, Jessie Paul Woodard and Jennifer Lynn Woodard v. EAST FELICIANA PARISH POLICE JURY and Titan Indemnity Company.
    No. 2002-OC-3138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re East Feliciana Par. Pol. Jury et al.; Titan Indemnity Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 32,673; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2002 CW 1862, 2002 CA 2020.

Granted in part. The trial court’s ruling denying relators’ motion in limine is reversed. See Palacios v. Louisiana Delta Railroad Inc., 98-2932 (La.7/2/99), 740 So.2d 95. In all other respects, the writ is denied.

KIMBALL, J., would deny the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would deny the writ.

KNOLL, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 99-KH-1007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Davis, Randy; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Motion to Enforce Order of this Court dated June 4, 1999; Parish of Jefferson 24th Judicial District Court Div. “I” Number 95-4667; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number 97-KH-0762.

Motion to Enforce granted. The district court is ordered to comply with this Court’s earlier order, see State ex rel. Davis v. State, 99-1007 (La.6/4/99), 743 So.2d 1246, within thirty days, if it has not done so already. The district court is further ordered to provide this Court with proof of compliance.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leroy JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 1999-KH-1099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Leroy Jones applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s Order dated July 8, 1999; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Division C, No. 276-392.

Motion to Enforce granted. The district court is ordered to comply with this Court’s earlier order, see, State ex rel. Leroy Jones v. State, 99-1099 (La.7/8/99), 747 So.2d 31, within thirty days. The district court is further ordered to provide this court with proof of compliance.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 99-KH-1704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2003.
   In re Edward Jackson; -Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to enforce this Court’s Order dated June 25, 1999; Parish of Jefferson 24th Judicial District Court Div. “I” Nos. 98-708, 92-0433; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit No. 99-KW-0251.

Motion to Enforce granted. The district court is ordered to comply with this Court’s earlier order, see State ex rel. Edward Jackson v. State, 99-1704 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 623, within thirty days, if it has not done so already. The district court is further ordered to provide this Court with proof of compliance.