text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph Wayne PINION.
    No. 06-K-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 26, 2007.
    Louisiana Appellate Project, Frank Sloan, for applicant.
    Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Scott M. Perrilloux, District Attorney, Ann Morgan Trahan Griggs, Patrick Walsh Dunn, Donald J. Wall, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

_jjThe state charged defendant by grand jury indictment with second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. In March 2005, a Tangipahoa Parish jury found defendant- guilty as charged. The trial-court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, State v. Pinion, 05-1954 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/9/06), 931 So.2d 565 (unpub’d), and denied defendant’s request for rehearing on August 22, 2006. Among other arguments, the court of appeal rejected defendant’s claim that the failure of the court reporter to record adequately the bench conferences in which the state and defense made challenges for cause and exercised their peremptory challenges, during a voir dire examination which otherwise appeared adequately recorded and transcribed for the appeal, deprived him of his constitutional .right to meaningful appellate review. The court of appeal agreed with defendant that “the 12transcript containing the bench conferences at issue makes it impossible to determine which jurors were challenged for cause and which jurors were peremptorily excused.” Pinion, 05-1954 at 5. In addition, the court of appeal noted that while the minute entries regarding jury selection identified by name all of the prospective jurors called for examination and recorded which jurors had been selected on the panel, the minutes failed to record which side excused the remaining jurors. Nevertheless, the court found that while defendant “elaim[ed] to be in the position of not being able to show any prejudice because of the inadequate transcript ... at no time in open court was any objection made to the general composition of the jury.” Id. at 6. The court of appeal thus concluded that defendant had “fail[ed] to make the required showing of prejudice based on the missing portions of the transcript.” Id. We granted defendant’s application to consider the decision below and now reverse because it is possible to reconstruct portions of what transpired during the bench conferences and to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty that defendant’s appeal was in fact prejudiced by the inadequate record.

Jury selection in the present case required three panels of 14 prospective jurors each. As the court of appeal found, the questioning of all three panels by the state, defense, and trial court, appears to have been completely recorded and transcribed. However, state and defense exercised their cause and peremptory challenges out of earshot of the prospective jurors during bench conferences that the parties clearly assumed the court reporter would record and transcribe for the record in the event of an appeal. The procedure conformed to La.C.Cr.P. art. 795(B)(2), which provides that “[p]eremptory challenges' of jurors shall be made and communicated to the court in a side bar conference of the judge [and] the ^attorneys conducting the examination and selection of jurors.... The conference shall be conducted in a manner that only the court [and] the attorneys ... are aware of the challenges made until the court announces the challenges without reference to any party or attorney in the case.” (emphasis added).

However, evidently because of unforeseen technical difficulties, the recording made of the bench conferences became increasingly garbled as the court worked through the panels of prospective jurors. As a result, many of the challenges made by counsel for the state and defense, but not all, became lost in a haze of “inaudible” responses. Nevertheless, a comparison of the list provided in the court minutes of jurors called for examination and selected to serve on the panel with the extant intelligible portions of the bench conferences indicates that jury selection appears to have gone generally as follows.

From the first panel of 14 jurors, culled down to 13 jurors after the court excused one (Epperson) during the questioning, seven jurors were provisionally selected by the state (McVay, Bowman, Brumfield, Flattmann, May, Dangerfield, Carroñe), and six jurors were excused either by the state peremptorily or by the court for cause (Seal, Fallon, Robertson, Flynn, and McKnight). The transcript of this bench conference inexplicably omits any mention of defense counsel. However, because Bowman and Brumfield did not serve on the jury panel, we presume that defense counsel then struck those jurors, leaving a balance of five jurors selected.

From the second panel of 14 prospective jurors, four jurors were selected (Peltier, Kramer, Compton and Turner), four were excused peremptorily by the state (Hunt, Foster, Tuminello, Vinet), two were excused by the court for cause (Brown and Dodd), and the remaining four jurors were evidently excused | ¿peremptorily by the defense (Fields, Soniat, Fox, Dumington). Thus, through the first and second panels of prospective jurors, defense counsel appears to have used six of his allotted 12 peremptory- challenges. La.C.Cr.P. -art. 799. In the last panel, by far the most troublesome of the three, it appears that five jurors were provisionally selected (Ro-bique, Bender, Perkins, Bankston and Ce-falu). Bankston then became the twelfth person on the jury after the court excused juror May (selected from the first panel) at the close of voir dire examination and Ce-falu then served as the alternate juror.- It appears that the defense exercised six peremptory challenges, at least one of them after the court denied a cause challenge, and that the state exercised one peremptory challenge. As to the | ¡^remaining veni-repersons, Corbin and Ules, it is' impossible to determine’which side removed them from the panel. In fact, as the following excerpt indicates, the recording process had almost completely failed by the time of the third bench conference:

THE COURT: Josephine Raborn?
BY MR. THIEL: Challenge.
THE COURT: Do what?
BY MR. THIEL: Challenge.
THE COURT: Okay Johnny Varnado? BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: No you don’t have to. Hector Smedley?
BY MS. PARKER: (Inaudible).
By MR. THIEL: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: Hmm?
BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible)
THE COURT: Okay, (Inaudible) saying he works for Amtrak.
BY MS. PARKER: (Inaudible)
THE COÚRT: (Inaudible).
BY MR. THIEL: Inaudible.

16Later in the bench conference, the transcript accounts for prospective juror Smedly, whom the defense backstruck from the panel. However, the parties exercised their challenges in the order in which the jurors were called, and there is no accounting for prospective juror Linda Corbin, who was called after juror Smed-ley but before juror Shawn Bordok, whom the state excused, or for juror Katherine liles, the twelfth juror on the panel, who also simply disappeared in the transcribed selection process. The court of appeal thus overstated the case somewhat when it observed that it was impossible to determine which jurors had been struck peremptorily and which had been excused for cause.

Enough of the selection process survived the technical recording difficulties to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty that defense counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges by the end of the third panel and thereby positioned defendant to raise on appeal in the event of conviction the trial court’s denial of his cause challenges to jurors he then struck peremptorily without a showing of actual prejudice beyond the loss of one or more peremptory challenges. State v. Ross, 628 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993)(“Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied and all of defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted.... A trial court’s erroneous ruling which deprives a defendant of a peremptory challenge substantially violates that defendant’s rights.”); cf. State v. Connolly, 96-1680, p. 10 (La.7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 818 (failure to remove juror with a remaining peremptory challenge waives appellate review of trial court’s denial of a cause challenge to the jury); State v. Mitchell, 94-2078, p. 4 (La.5/21/96), 674 So.2d 250, 254 (the Court need not reach the question of whether there was an erroneous denial of a cause challenge when the defendant struck the juror and had |7peremptory challenges remaining at the close of jury selection); State v. Fallon, 290 So.2d 273, 282 (La.1974)(same).

In this respect, review of the record indicates that the trial court denied at least two defense cause challenges (Fox in the second panel and Zeringue in the third panel) and may have denied others. For example, Katherine liles, who had two sisters employed by the District Attorney’s Office in Tangipahoa Parish, appeared a likely target of a defense cause challenge in the third panel, although she insisted the relationships would not affect her impartiality. Given the present state of the record, particularly with regard to the obscure third bench conference, a reasonable possibility exists that counsel made still other cause challenges before excusing the jurors peremptorily and that these cause challenges became fatally obscured in the wayward recording of the bench conferences.

Although it reached the wrong result in the present case, the court of appeal began with the correct premise. This Court has never articulated a per se rule either requiring the recording of bench conferences or exempting them from the scope of La.C.Cr.P. art. 843, which requires in felony cases the recording not only of the evidentiary portions of trial but also of “the examination of prospective jurors ... and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel.” State v. Hoffman, 98-3118, p. 50 (La.4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 586. The Court has instead conducted a case-specific inquiry to determine whether the failure to record the conferences results in actual prejudice to the defendant’s appeal. As a general rule, the failure of the record to reflect the argument of counsel on objections, even when made in open court, does not affect a defendant’s appeal because it does not hinder adequate review of the trial court’s ruling. State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091, 1104 (La.1983). Thus, the failure to record bench conferences will lsordinarily not affect the direct review process when the record suggests that the unrecorded bench conferences had no discernible impact on the proceedings and did not result in any specific prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., Hoffman, 98-3118 at 50-51, 768 So.2d at 587 (trial court cured any record problems “by summarizing substantive unrecorded conferences for the record”); State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, pp. 28-29 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 773 (three unrecorded bench conferences during direct examination of state witnesses had no discernible impact on the proceedings and the fourth concerned a mistrial motion by defense counsel, the basis of which was “easily ascertainable from the record” without regard to the unrecorded side-bar discussion); State v. Deruise, 98-0541, pp. 9-15 (La.4/3/01), 802 So.2d 1224, 1233-37 (failure to record bench conferences in which the prosecutor and defense counsel made their peremptory and cause challenges did not prejudice the appeal when the jury strike sheet was available for review and detailed the exercise of peremptory challenges by both sides and when the transcript of the voir dire revealed a substantial basis for denying a defense cause to the juror, even assuming that the challenge had been made but not preserved in the record; remaining unrecorded bench conferences involved evidentiary matters that were otherwise addressed in the appeal, or involved matters of no discernible impact for which the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice); State v. Allen, 95-1754, p. 11 (La.9/5/96), 682 So.2d 713, 722 (failure to record arguments at the bench concerning some of the defense peremptory challenges harmless when challenges for cause and arguments on the challenges were fully transcribed in the record and the minutes clearly reflected which jurors had been excused peremptorily and whether the state or defense had exercised the challenge).

|3On the other hand, in State v. Landry, 97-0499 (La.6/29/99), 751 So.2d 214, a combination of loud construction noise at the courthouse and audio recording problems on the part of the court reporter rendered the record grossly incomplete, in several respects, including the failure to record peremptory strikes and challenges for cause made at the bench. Landry, 97-0499 at 1-2, 751 So.2d at 215. This Court reversed the defendant’s capital conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial because the deficiencies deprived the defendant of his constitutional right of appeal and judicial review. Landry, 97-0499 at 4, 751 So.2d at 216. The Court thereby reaffirmed that “it is not the defendant’s obligation .to insure an adequate record .... it is the duty of the court .... to see that the court reporter makes a true, complete and accurate record of the trial.” Landry, 97-0499 at 3, 751 So.2d at 216 (citing American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 2.5 (1972)).

In the present case, the trial court and not defense counsel had the duty to insure that the bench conferences involving jury selection were properly recorded because La.C.Cr.P. art. 795(B)(2) required that counsel for the state and defense exercise their peremptory challenges in side bar conferences out of the hearing of jurors, and further required that the court refrain from attributing the strikes to either side on the record when excusing the jurors. Counsel therefore could reasonably assume that the court had taken adequate steps to preserve the record of the sidebar conferences for appeal just as counsel could reasonably assume that the eviden-tiary portions of trial were also adequately recorded and preserved for review. Counsel could also reasonably assume that the court had discharged its correlative duty of insuring that the minutes of the proceedings would conform to the requirements for the lodging of appeals in criminal cases in the courts of appeal |inand this Court, and thus include a list of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges in addition to a list of jurors selected to try the case. See La.S.Ct. Rule I, § 6(b); Rule 2-1.5(3) and (4), Uniform Rules Courts of Appeal.

Although the court of appeal faulted counsel for not making a general objection on the record to the composition of the jury, an objection that counsel had been forced to accept an obnoxious juror as the result of the trial court’s erroneous ruling on one or more cause challenges has not been an aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence for preserving error in the denial of cause challenges for over 50 years since State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So.2d 221 (1942) was legislatively superceded in the 1966 revisions to the Code of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1279-80. In jury selection, counsel satisfies the requirements of Louisiana’s contemporaneous objection rule by stating his grounds for a cause challenge and then by removing the juror with one of his remaining peremptory challenges when the court declines to excuse the juror for cause. La. C.Cr.P. art. 841 (“It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take ... and the grounds therefor.”).

In this particular instance, by operation of art. 795(B)(2), bench conferences are a material part of the proceedings for purposes of La.C.Cr.P. art. 843 and their omission from the present case, given the reasonable likelihood that counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges, the uncertainty with respect to how many cause challenges the defense made unsuccessfully, and the absence of other contemporaneous records accounting for the selection process, e.g., adequate minutes or jury strike sheets, requires reversal of defendant’s conviction and sentence. State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107 (La.1976) (reversal required in second In degree murder case in which record missing the testimony of four state witnesses and the voir dire of prospective jurors); compare State v. Goodbier, 367 So.2d 356 (La.1979)(absence of voir dire transcript from the record did not compromise defendant’s appeal when affidavit of the court report indicated that counsel failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges).

Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed, defendant’s conviction and sentence and vacated, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

      . As the following excerpt from the second bench conference indicates, it is possible to make an educated guess as to what transpired with respect to some of the prospective jurors despite the frequent “inaudible'' responses recorded by the court reporter:
      THE COURT: Alright Michael Fox.
      BY Ms. PARKER (prosecutrix): Acceptable
      BY MR. THIEL (defense counsel): (Inaudible)
      BY MS. PARKER: Based on what?
      BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible)
      THE COURT: (Inaudible) I’ll let you challenge him. I’ll let you release him of course, but I’m not going to do it for cause.
      BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible).
      BY MS. PARKER: Yeah but I think you rehabilitated him when you (Inaudible).
      THE COURT: And I thought he was rehabilitated.
      BY MS. PARKER: He said he could listen to the doctors and make a decision then.
      THE COURT: Okay he’s out, but that’s (inaudible).
      It reasonably appears from this incomplete transcript that the defense challenged juror Fox for cause, the court denied the challenge, and the defense then excused Mr. Fox, who did not sit on the jury, in the exercise of a peremptory challenge.

      . As with juror Fox in the second panel, the transcript of the third bench conference suggests that prospective juror Mary Ann Ze-ringue, who did not sit on the jury, was excused -by a defense peremptory after the trial court denied a cause challenge:
      THE COURT: Okay Mary Ann Zeringue?
      BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible).
      THE COURT: I’m not going to, I think she cured her.
      BY MR. THIEL: (Inaudible).
      THE COURT: Josephine Raborn?
      BY MR. THIEL: Challenge.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re David M. DICKSON.
    No. 2007-B-0733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 7, 2007.
   hATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office- of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, David Meyer Dickson, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public. In re: Dickson, 05-1498 (La.6/15/05), 903 So.2d 1129.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed three sets of formal charges against respondent, consisting of a total of five counts of misconduct. The charges were considered by separate hearing committees, then consolidated by orders of the disciplinary board. The board then filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing all three sets of formal charges.

02-DB-056

The Crisp Matter

In November 1997, David Crisp retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter arising out of an automobile accident. In April 1998, respondent settled Mr. Crisp’s claim for $15,000. Respondent deposited the settlement check into his operating account because he did not maintain a client trust account. Respondent paid Mr. Crisp his portion of the settlement and withheld the |asum of $8,732 for payment of Mr. Crisp’s medical expenses. Respondent later withdrew these funds from his operating account and placed the cash in a safe or “black box.” Respondent did not pay Mr. Crisp’s medical expenses until 2000, some two years after he received the settlement proceeds.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.15(b) (failure to promptly remit client funds and failure to provide an accounting of client funds), 1.15(c) (failure to keep disputed funds separate from the lawyer’s own' funds), 1.15(d) (failure to maintain a client trust account), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

03-DB-073

Counts 1 & II The Lines Matter

In 2001, Ronald D. Lines hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter. Respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Lines and failed to expedite the criminal case. Respondent also withdrew nearly $40,000 from Mr. Lines’ bank accounts pursuant to a power of attorney; however, respondent did not comply with Mr. Lines’ requests for an accounting of these funds, nor did he comply with Mr. Lines’ instructions as to the disbursement of the funds. Eventually, respondent paid $2,500 to Mr. Lines’ son and $18,630 to the attorney who succeeded him as counsel |?,for Mr. Lines. Respondent converted the remaining funds, $17,809.71, to his own use.

In 2002, Mr. Lines filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 8.4(a), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

05-DB-036

Count I & II-The Salinas Matter

In June 2002, David Salinas paid respondent $8,000 to represent him in a criminal matter pending in St. Tammany Parish. Respondent told Mr. Salinas that if he paid him $18,000, he would pay off a judge and the district attorney to obtain a more lenient sentence of probation, and that Mr. Salinas would be able to return to his home in Texas. Tape and transcript evidence of this verbal exchange is in the record. Mr. Salinas reasonably believed respondent had political connections to arrange such a deal. When Mr. Salinas was unable to pay the full $18,000, respondent advised him to plead guilty and assured him he could arrange a deal of a five-year sentence on the guilty plea. Based on respondent’s representations, Mr. 14Salinas pled guilty. However, rather than the five-year sentence respondent had promised him, Mr. Salinas received a ten-year sentence.

In 2004, Mr. Salinas filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3.5(a) (a lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, or other official by means prohibited by law), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Respondent answered the first and second sets of formal charges and denied any misconduct. Those matters then proceeded to hearings on the merits, which were conducted by separate hearing committees in 2003 and 2004.

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the third set of formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Reports

02-DB-056

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as | Ralleged in the formal charges by knowingly failing to maintain a client trust account and by failing to promptly pay a third-party medical provider. Upon considering the numerous aggravating factors and absence of mitigating factors, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, deferred with conditions.

The ODC objected to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the committee.

0S-DB-07S

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. The committee found that respondent knowingly failed to preserve Mr. Lines’ funds and knowingly failed to provide Mr. Lines with an accounting for all of his funds. He also failed to adequately communicate with his client concerning the status of the criminal case and failed to expedite the litigation, despite Mr. Lines’ specific requests to do so. This misconduct caused Mr. Lines significant injury. Based on these findings, and considering the numerous aggravating factors and absence of mitigating factors, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

05-DB-036

The hearing committee determined that the factual allegations of the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant |fito Rule XIX, § 11(E)(8), and that respondent violated Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) as alleged in the formal charges. The committee found the ODC did not prove a violation of Rule 3.5(a), reasoning that there is nothing in the deemed admitted facts which suggests that respondent actually contacted or even attempted to contact the presiding judge or the district attorney regarding Mr. Salinas’ criminal charges. Nevertheless, it is clear that respondent told his client he could and would bribe public officials. Finding such conduct goes to the very heart of the legitimacy of our legal system, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

02-DB-056, 03-DB-073 & 05-DB-036

The disciplinary board generally accepted the hearing committees’ factual findings, reasoning that the findings are not manifestly erroneous and/or are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board further determined that the rule violations found by the committees are largely correct. The board found that respondent’s conduct was knowing and intentional and that he violated duties owed to his clients and the profession. Respondent exposed his clients and third parties to harm by depriving them of funds rightfully owed to them, and harmed a client and the profession by making misrepresentations which affected the outcome of a proceeding. |7The board also recognized that the disciplinary system has been harmed in that the ODC was forced to expend additional resources to obtain information for its investigation. Taking into account all of respondent’s misconduct, the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

The aggravating factors found by the board include: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, failure to cooperate, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1978), vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. The sole mitigating factor is the remoteness of respondent’s prior disciplinary offense.

Considering the nature of the misconduct, the numerous aggravating factors, and the Rule XIX, Appendix E guidelines, the board found an upward deviation to permanent disbarment is warranted. The board cited Guideline 2 as particularly instructive. Guideline 2 provides that permanent disbarment may be warranted for “intentional corruption of the judicial process, including but not limited to bribery, perjury, and subornation of perjury.” Although the board could find no prior jurisprudence to support permanent disbarment specifically for a violation of Rule 8.4(e), the board found respondent’s misconduct in the Salinas matter was unquestionably best described as “intentional corruption of the judicial process.” Mr. Salinas was clearly misled, and chose to forego trial based on respondent’s representations that he could influence the district attorney and the trial judge presiding over his criminal matter. Such misconduct caused severe damage to the profession in eroding the public’s trust in the bar and the judiciary.

|sBased on this reasoning, the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended that respondent be ordered to provide an accounting and make restitution to Mr. Lines, and that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caul-field, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

We find the record supports the factual findings of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board. We further find that respondent knowingly and intentionally violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to maintain a client trust account, failing to timely pay third-party medical providers, neglecting legal matters, converting client funds, and improperly claiming that he could influence the judiciary.

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a discussion of an appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, | spreserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The record demonstrates that respondent violated duties owed to his clients and to the profession, and caused harm to clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. Considering respondent’s misconduct as a whole, we believe the appropriate baseline sanction is disbarment.

Numerous aggravating factors present, including a prior disciplinary offense, dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules and orders of the disciplinary agency, indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct. The only mitigating factor we can identify is the remoteness of respondent’s previous disciplinary offense.

Under these circumstances, we see no reason to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment. Accordingly, the sole remaining inquiry is whether respondent’s offenses are so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar.

In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might result in permanent disbarment. While these guidelines are not intended to bind this court in its decision-making process, they present useful information concerning the types of conduct we might consider worthy of permanent disbarment. See In re: Yaeger, 05-0035 (La.3/18/05), 897 So.2d 571.

11 (Applying the guidelines to this case, we find respondent’s misconduct in the Salinas matter falls within the spirit of Guideline 2, which applies to conduct involving the intentional corruption of the judicial process. Respondent sought a payment of money from his client, intentionally representing to his client that he had the ability to influence the judiciary. Although there is no evidence respondent actually attempted to improperly influence the judiciary, his actions clearly resulted in a corruption of the overall judicial process for his personal gain. This court will not countenance any actions by an attorney which suggest that the attorney can improperly influence the judiciary.

Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude respondent lacks the fundamental honesty and moral fitness to practice law in this state. We can envision no circumstance in which we would readmit him to the bar. Accordingly, we must permanently disbar him.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of David Meyer Dickson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 13815, be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. Respondent is ordered to furnish complete accountings and full restitution to all persons subject of the formal charges. All costs and expenses in this matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, Inwith legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent obtained a power of attorney from Mr. Lines after suggesting to him that his funds might be seized by federal law enforcement authorities. Respondent withdrew $28,859.71 from Huntington Bank and $10,080 from Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to the power of attorney.

      . Rather, the committee felt such conduct is more properly a violation of Rule 8.4(e), which prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a judge, judicial officer, governmental agency, or official.

      . Notably, the board agreed that respondent’s misconduct in the Salinas matter is more properly considered a violation of Rule 8.4(e), rather than a violation of Rule 3.5(a).

      .In 1983, respondent was privately reprimanded by the Committee on Professional Responsibility for giving advice to a person who was not represented by an attorney and for threatening to present criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.


text:
    In re Derrick EDWARDS.
    No. 2006-OB-2433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2007.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Derrick Edwards, successfully passed the essay portion of the Louisiana Bar Examination. However, the Committee on Bar Admissions (“Committee”) declined to certify him for admission to the Bar based upon character and fitness concerns. On petitioner’s application to this court, we appointed the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to conduct an investigation and appointed a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence. Following the proceedings, the commissioner filed his report with this court, recommending that petitioner be admitted to the practice of law. Neither petitioner nor the Committee objected to that recommendation.

Considering the commissioner’s recommendation and the entire record of this proceeding, it is ordered that the application for admission be and hereby is granted.

ADMISSION GRANTED.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary JUNOT.
    No. 2007-KP-2244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 21, 2007.
   In re Junot, Gary; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 04-6565; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-KH-731.

Stay denied, writ denied.


text:
    Angela MURPHY v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA.
    No. 2007-CC-2126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
   In re Alexandria City of; — -Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation # 2, No. 07-02500; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 07-00973.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Austin BERNARD, III.
    No. 2007-KK-2262.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
   In re Bernard, Austin III; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 502214, 503387; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 2309.

Denied. Issue may be re-raised on appeal.


text:
    EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. Brian WILSON in his Official Capacity as Assessor of East Baton Rouge Parish and Louisiana Tax Commission and Greg Phares in his Official Capacity as Sheriff and Ex Officio Tax Collector of East Baton Rouge Parish and Central Community School Board.
    No. 2007-CC-2253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 2007.
   In re East Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 560,816; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 2313.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. Brian WILSON, in his Official Capacity as Assessor of East Baton Rouge Parish and Louisiana Tax Commission and Greg Phares in his Official Capacity as Sheriff and Ex Officio Tax Collector of East Baton Rouge Parish and Central Community School Board.
    No. 2007-CC-2255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 2007.
   In re Central Community School Board; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 560,816; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 2362.

Stay denied. Writ denied.