source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BOLIN, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Daniel W. WRIGHT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Robert L. CHILDREE, in his official capacity as comptroller of the State of Alabama. Robert L. Childree, in his official capacity as comptroller of the State of Alabama v. Daniel W. Wright, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated.
    1050164 and 1050208.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Dec. 22, 2006.
    As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 18, 2007.

      George C. Douglas, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant/cross-appellee Daniel W. Wright, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Kevin C. Newsom, deputy atty. gen., for appel-lee/cross-appellant Robert L. Childree, in his official capacity as comptroller of the State of Alabama.
    Mark John Christensen, Andalusia, for amicus curiae Covington County Bar Association, in support of the appellant/cross-appellee.
    J. Anthony McLain, gen. counsel, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama State Bar, in support of the appellant/cross-ap-pellee.
    Stephen R. Glassroth of The Glassroth Law Firm, P.C., Montgomery; and Joseph P. Van Heest of Law Offices of Joseph P. Van Heest, L.L.C., Montgomery, for amici curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, in support of the appellant/cross-appellee.

       Although Justice Woodall was not present at oral argument, he has viewed the videotape of that oral argument.

   BOLIN, Justice.

These consolidated appeals concern payment by the State of office-overhead expenses to lawyers who accept appointments to represent indigent clients before the courts of this state.

Facts and Procedural History

Daniel W. Wright is a lawyer practicing in Alabama who accepts indigent defendants as clients pursuant to § 15-12-21, Ala.Code 1975. Before February 1, 2005, Wright and all other attorneys representing such indigent clients were paid an hourly rate, under Ala.Code 1975, § 15-12-21, and were reimbursed for office-overhead expenses at a rate to be preap-proved by the trial court.

On February 1, 2005, the attorney general issued Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2005-063, concluding that the comptroller did not have to pay overhead under § 15 — 12—21(d), Ala.Code 1975, because such expenses were not “expenses reasonably incurred” in defense of one’s client as that term is used in § 15-12-21 (d). Thus, the comptroller began withholding payment of office-overhead expenses on February 1, 2005.

Wright sued Robert L. Childree, the comptroller for the State of Alabama, for withholding office-overhead payments, alleging, among other things, breach of contract. Wright sought a judgment declaring that the comptroller’s denial of payment was improper, and he sought in-junctive relief requiring the comptroller to resume paying office-overhead expenses and to reimburse attorneys for back payments. Wright also sought certification of a class consisting of all Alabama lawyers who were appointed to represent any indigent defendant in Alabama as of February 1, 2005, and who had been improperly denied payment of office-overhead expenses for indigent-defense work after February 1, 2005, but excluding lawyers who are “contract counsel” under Ala.Code 1975, § 15-12-26, or public defenders under § 15-12-41. Wright also sought costs and expenses together with a reasonable attorney fee. Wright alleged that the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel now barred the comptroller from avoiding payment of office-overhead expenses based on the comptroller’s failure to appeal from the Covington Circuit Court’s order in Christensen v. Childree, No. CV-2002-50. In Christensen v. Childree, the Covington Circuit Court held that office-overhead expenses are encompassed in the term “expenses reasonably incurred” as that phrase is used in § 15 — 12—21(d). After the comptroller submitted his answer, Wright submitted a “Motion for Judgment on' the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues Reserved.” In this motion, Wright clarified what he called liability as, “that the [comptroller] must resume overhead payments on indigent defense cases.” In this motion, Wright also requested “that the Court reserve class issues pending admissions by Mr. Childree of the necessary class certification prerequisites.”

Wright apparently sent the circuit court a proposed order, which is not included in the record before this Court, requesting the payment of interest on the withheld payments. Evidently, in this proposed order, Wright included the payment of interest on any amounts he was due, because in his response to the proposed order the comptroller argues against paying interest. The record before this Court indicates that Wright did not request interest, nor did he mention interest until he filed his proposed order.

On September 28, 2005, the trial court entered its order, directing the comptroller to “resume statewide payments of overhead hours on all indigent defense fee declarations which are otherwise properly completed, approved by a judge, and submitted to him for payment” and “to pay all overhead payments withheld from any lawyer in reliance on Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2005-063 (February 1, 2005) to all such lawyers statewide.” The trial court stated in its order that the parties agreed that the comptroller would abide on a statewide basis by the court’s resolution of the dispute, and that, therefore, their agreement pretermitted any need to address class certification. The trial court “decline[d] to address the other issues raised by [Wright] and decline[d] to award attorney fees” and did not specifically address interest in its order. The court certified the judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

After filing an unsuccessful motion to alter or amend the order, Wright filed his notice of appeal on October 28, 2005. In the notice of appeal, Wright alleged that the trial court did not grant complete relief because the court refused to award interest on the office-overhead-expense payments previously withheld, to award attorney fees, to direct the comptroller to provide the information necessary for class certification, and to allow Wright additional time to submit a fee application.

On November 8, 2005, the comptroller filed his cross-appeal, alleging that, based on Ala.Code 1975, § 15-12-21, and the 2005 attorney general’s opinion, the trial court’s decision was incorrect.

History of the Payment of Office-Overhead Expenses

Originally, the statute in question, § 15-12 — 21(d), Ala.Code 1975, set out hourly rates and limits on total fees for attorneys representing indigent defendants and also established that “[cjounsel shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any expenses reasonably incurred in such defense to be approved in advance by the trial court.”

In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in May v. State, 672 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), held that “office overhead expenses are by law encompassed in the term ‘expenses reasonably incurred’ as that term is used in § 15-12-21(d).” This Court quashed as improvidently granted the petition for a writ of certio-rari filed in May v. State, 672 So.2d 1310 (Ala.1995). The Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Barksdale, 680 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), cited the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in May for the proposition that “office overhead fell into the category of expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of a defendant.”

On April 19, 1996, the then attorney general issued identical opinions in responses to inquiries from the comptroller and the finance director, who asked whether the trial court was required to approve office-overhead expenses in advance of the actual occurrence of those expenses. The attorney general concluded that office-overhead expenses claimed under § 15-12-21 (d) must be approved by the trial court in advance of being incurred before the comptroller may reimburse such expenses. In other words, the comptroller may not reimburse appointed counsel for office-overhead expenses incurred before the date the trial court approved the expenses. (Op. Att’y Gen., No. 1996-191, and No. 1996-192.)

This Court, in Ex parte Smith, 698 So.2d 219, 224-25 (Ala.1997), discussed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decisions in May and Barksdale. Explicitly adopting the holding of May, this Court stated, “[w]e agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in May that § 15-12-21 authorizes payment to a court-appointed attorney for overhead expenses reasonably incurred in defense of an indigent defendant.” 698 So.2d at 224.

In 1999, the legislature enacted Act No. 99-427, which amended § 15-12-21(d). In that amendment, the legislature increased the hourly rates for attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants. In addition, the legislature changed the sentence that provided that counsel be reimbursed for “expenses reasonably incurred in such defense” to read that counsel would be reimbursed for “expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of his or her client.” (Emphasis added.)

The attorney general issued an opinion in 2001, addressing the issue of office-overhead expenses. Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2002-022 (Oct. 15, 2001). He stated that based on May, Barksdale, and the language of § 15-12-21 (even after the 1999 amendment), an attorney who represents indigent defendants could be reimbursed for office-overhead expenses, even if the attorney worked out of his or her home.

On March 15, 2002, this Court issued an opinion on application for rehearing in Lyons v. Norris, 829 So.2d 748 (Ala.2002). In Lyons, the finance director and the comptroller denied reimbursement for office-overhead expenses of several attorneys who had represented indigent criminal defendants. Those attorneys filed a declaratory-judgment action and a petition for a writ of mandamus in Montgomery County. One attorney also sued the comptroller, alleging negligence and wantonness, while another attorney sought certification of a class action. The trial court consolidated these related cases. Following a hearing, the trial court denied class certification. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus instructing the State officials to approve all attorney-fee declarations that include orders approving office-overhead expenses filed prior to or contemporaneously with the attorney-fee declarations. The State officials appealed. The dispute in Lyons turned on the meaning attributed to the phrase “approved in advance by the trial court” in § 15-12-21 (d). In a footnote, the main opinion addressed office-overhead expenses:

“In June 1999, the Alabama Legislature passed the ‘Investment in Justice Act of 1999.’ Act No. 99-427, 1999 Ala. Acts. In pertinent part, Act No. 99-427 substantively amended § 15-12-21 to increase attorney fees for appointed work at the trial level. Under the Act, the rate of compensation for attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants was increased to $40 per hour for out-of-court time and $60 per hour for in-court time. The fee limits, which have been increased substantially, are now based on the severity of the crime, and there is no limit on the total fee that can be paid to an attorney representing a defendant charged with a capital offense or with an offense that carries a possible sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Section 15-12-21, as amended, also specifies that ‘the court for good cause shown may approve an attorney’s fee in excess of the maximum amount allowed.’ Section 15-12-21 now provides that to be reimbursable, any expenses incurred must be incurred, specifically, ‘in the defense of his or her client.’ Here, the attorneys seek reimbursement for office-overhead expenses, including but not limited to: professional license fees; malpractice, casualty, health, general-liability, and workers’ compensation insurance; office salaries; ad valorem taxes; office supplies; postage and express-delivery charges; depreciation for office equipment and furniture; local and long-distance telephone charges; ‘CLE expenses, including travel and lodging for out-of-town seminars (incurred one or more times per year)’; utilities; various bank fees and interest on business loans; and other professional fees. Although whether these fees are actually incurred ‘in the defense of [an attorney’s] client’ is highly questionable, that issue is not presently before this Court. Neither does this Court have before it the question of the applicability of Act No. 99-427 to office-overhead expenses. However, the change in language in Act No. 99-427 from ‘any expenses reasonably incurred in such defense’ to ‘any expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of his or her client,’ prohibits reimbursement of office-overhead expenses based on calculations of the pro rata cost of an attorney’s criminal practice compared to his overall practice. At the same time, it precludes advance calculations of office-overhead expenses for a specific criminal defendant. The increase in fees, together with the ability of the courts to approve fees in excess of the mandated maximum ‘for good cause shown,’ further indicates the Legislature’s intent to eliminate reimbursement for ‘office-overhead expenses’ under Act No. 99-427.”

829 So.2d at 751 n. 1. Justices Brown and Stuart concurred in the main opinion, which was authored by Chief Justice Moore. Justice Harwood concurred specially, writing that the office-overhead-expenses discussion in footnote 1 of the main opinion was not necessary and that the issue of office-overhead expenses was not properly before the Court. He was joined in that opinion by Justices Houston, Lyons, and Woodall. Justice Johnstone concurred in part and dissented in part, dissenting as to that part of the main opinion regarding the preapproval of expenses, and concurring in overruling the application for rehearing because the applicant was not properly before the Court. Justice See joined the concurring portion of Justice Johnstone’s special writing.

As the trial court states in its order in this case, the decision in Lyons triggered two reactions. The first was Christensen v. Childree, CV-2002-50, an action in Cov-ington County against the comptroller. At oral argument, Wright’s counsel stated that the comptroller briefly stopped paying office-overhead expenses in 2002 pursuant to an executive order and that that was the basis for the Covington County action. The Covington Circuit Court held that office-overhead expenses were to continue under § 15-12-21, even though the statute had been amended. The comptroller did not appeal that decision, and he continues to pay office-overhead expenses in Coving-ton County, even though he ceased paying office-overhead expenses in the rest of the state for a second time on February 1, 2005. The second reaction of the decision in Lyons was Act No. 2002-129, Ala. Acts 2002, a joint resolution by the legislature. This joint resolution provided:

“That it was and continues to be the intent of this Legislature pursuant to the enactment of Act 99-427, H. 58 of the 1999 Regular Session, the Investment In Justice Act of 1999, that overhead expenses shall be paid in addition to in-court and out-of court fees to attorneys appointed to represent indigent persons.”

In 2005, the comptroller requested an opinion from the attorney general asking whether an attorney representing an indigent defendant may claim both office-overhead expenses at a rate approved in advance by the trial court and expenses under the Uniform Guidelines for Attorney Fee Declarations. On February 1, 2005, the attorney general issued an opinion concluding, “Act 99^127 amended section 15-12-21 (d) of the Code of Alabama to eliminate overhead as an expense for which an appointed attorney can be reimbursed. An attorney can only be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses that are approved by the trial court in advance of being incurred.” Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2005-068 (February 1, 2005). The attorney general based his opinion on the language in the main opinion in Lyons and argued that Act No. 2002-129, the legislative joint resolution, was not controlling. The attorney general’s opinion did not mention the earlier attorney general’s opinions from 1996 or 2001, nor did it mention Christensen v. Childree.

Based on the 2005 attorney general opinion, the comptroller ceased payments of office-overhead expenses to lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants under Ala.Code 1975, § 15-12-21.

Analysis

As a threshold matter, we address Wright’s argument that the comptroller’s cross-appeal should be dismissed based on a “concession” made in the trial court by a lawyer for the comptroller to the effect that the State is obligated under § 15-12-21(d) to pay office-overhead expenses. Wright refers to the following emphasized statements by the lawyer representing the comptroller at the trial court’s hearing on Wright’s “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues Reserved”:

“[Attorney]: Your Honor, I think there is — from the standpoint of the comptroller, he requested the AG opinion. The AG’s office delivered the opinion on February 1, and he has relied on that opinion to direct him, to advise him in how he should act in his official capacity.
“/ think that we are here in the proper ivay to be here to contest that, which is a declaratory judgment action, and I don’t have any great words to say other than exactly what Mr. Douglas [Wright’s lawyer] said is that we look to this CouH to provide some direction for the comptroller in light of what previous caselaw has said, the Lyons [v. Norris, 829 So.2d 7Jf8 (Ala.2002)] opinion included, and what the Attorney General’s office — the opinion that they rendered or issued to the comptroller.
“[Attorney]: It has — some of this about the Christensen [v. Childree] case, and I will you — well, I don’t want to say that. The Christensen case was determined in consultation with other assistant — with the Attorney General’s office to be the law there and not be applicable anywhere else in the state.
“This is why — that’s essentially why the comptroller is acting that way or acting that way for fee declarations that come out of that particular circuit.
“THE COURT: There is something disturbing about that. That makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, I mean, basically discriminating against everybody else in every other judicial circuit but Covington County. That is not right.
“[Attorney]: Well, I cannot necessarily disagree with that.
“THE COURT: I know you can’t. What is your take on the resolution from the legislature?
“[Attorney]: My take on that resolution is that it was an attempt to clarify— it was the legislature’s shot at clarifying what was intended in 15-12-21, the amended 15-12-21. It was in response to what was said in a footnote in the Lyons opinion, which that footnote formed the basis, I think, of the Attorney General’s opinion, I think the footnote by [Chief] Justice Moore.
“I also note that in the legislation that did arise — I think it was during the special session when the legislature was trying to amend that code section further, I did note that the language in that resolution was going to be inserted into that order to make it very clear.
“[Attorney]: So, I mean, I don’t — I don’t necessarily have a disagreement with Mr. Douglas on this. I don’t think the comptroller necessarily does. I think the comptroller necessarily does. I think the comptroller just wants to make sure that his position is he was advised on a course of action, and that is what he has been doing. ”

Although the comptroller admits that the lawyer’s arguments could have been more forceful, he contends that his position has been made clear throughout the filings and proceedings in the trial court: 1) that office-overhead expenses are not reimbursable under § 15-12-21 (d) as amended; 2) that the attorney general’s 2005 opinion, upon which the comptroller relies, draws support from Lyons v. Noris, 829 So.2d 748; 3) that the Covington Circuit Court’s decision is Christensen v. Childree is binding only in that judicial circuit; 4) that the doctrine of res judicata and other related doctrines do not preclude the comptroller’s positions; and 5) that Wright is not entitled to attorney fees or prejudgment interest. We agree that based on the foregoing, the comptroller did not concede liability in its argument. Simply because the lawyer for the comptroller chose to acknowledge the confusion regarding the interpretation of § 15 — 12— 21, without a more explicit concession of these arguments his statements do not amount to a waiver of the issues squarely before the trial court.

In the present case, Wright filed a “Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues Reserved.” Wright attached matters outside the pleadings to his complaint. Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a motion for a judgment on the pleadings be treated as one for a summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., whenever matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. Not all matters outside the pleadings, however, convert a motion to a summary-judgment motion. See Donoghue v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 1032 (Ala.2002)(insurance contract attached to a motion to dismiss did not convert that motion into a summary-judgment motion because the complaint specifically referenced the policy, which was the foundation for the underlying claims). However, we need not resolve this issue because our decision in this case depends upon the resolution of a question of law — how § 15-12-21 (d) should be interpreted. This Court accords the trial court’s ruling no presumption of correctness as to a question of law. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 894 So.2d 643 (Ala.2004). We now turn to the main issue — whether § 15 — 12—21(d), as amended in 1999, provides for the payment of office-overhead expenses to lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants. As noted earlier in this opinion, § 15-12-21(d) originally set out hourly rates and limits on total fees for attorneys representing indigent defendants and established that “[cjounsel shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any expenses reasonably incurred in such defense to be approved in advance by the trial court.” In 1999, the legislature amended § 15 — 12—21(d) to increase the hourly rates. In addition, the legislature changed the sentence that provided that counsel be reimbursed for “expenses reasonably incurred in such defense” to provide that counsel be reimbursed for “expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of his or her client.

“It is an ingrained principle of statutory construction that ‘[t]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law and judicial interpretation when it adopts a statute. Ex parte Louisville & N.R.R., 398 So.2d 291, 296 (Ala.1981).’” Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So.2d 71, 83 (Ala.2003)(quoting Carson v. City of Prichard, 709 So.2d 1199, 1206 (Ala.1998)). In adopting statutes and amendments thereto “ ‘ “the Legislature is presumed to have known the fixed judicial construction preexisting statutes had received, and the substantial re-enactment of such statutes is a legislative adoption of that construction.” ’ ” Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So.2d at 88 (quoting Wood-Dickerson Supply Co. v. Cocciola, 153 Ala. 555, 557, 45 So. 192, 192 (1907), quoting in turn Morrison v. Stevenson, 69 Ala. 448, 450 (1881)). “[W]here a statute is reenacted without material change, ‘it must be assumed that the Legislature was familiar with its interpretation by this court and was satisfied therewith.’ ” Jones v. Conradia 673 So.2d 389, 392 (Ala.l995)(quoting Nolen v. Clark, 238 Ala. 320, 321, 191 So. 342, 343 (1939)).

In Hexcel Decatur, Inc. v. Vickers, 908 So.2d 237 (Ala.2005), the employee sued his employer, alleging that he was terminated in violation of § 25-5-11.1, Ala.Code 1975, in retaliation for making a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The employer argued that the plain meaning of § 25-5-11.1 requires the commencement of a civil action as a prerequisite to a retaliatory-discharge claim. The employer asked this Court to revisit its earlier decision in McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So.2d 1299 (Ala.1991), interpreting § 25-5-1,1.1. McClain was released in 1991, and the legislature enacted major revisions to the workers’ compensation law in 1992. The legislature also made further changes to the workers’ compensation law in 1993, 1995, and 1996. However, the legislature did not amend § 25-5-11.1 to correct the interpretation given that section in McClain. This Court held:

“Overruling McClain in the face of this legislative history would violate the rule that ‘[t]he Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is presumed to have knowledge of existing law and of the judicial construction of existing statutes.’ Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So.2d 801, 814 (Ala.2003). See also Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831, 835 n. 9 (Ala.2002)(Tn 1968, this Court adopted the Belli v. Driskill, 282 Ala. 640, 213 So.2d 806 (1968)] test. The Legislature has had more than 30 years .to overrule or modify that decision; it has chosen not to do so. Moreover, in those 30 years, the Legislature has amended the Workers’ Compensation Act. “ ‘[WJhen the legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately adopted the statute with knowledge of this court’s interpretation thereof.’ ” ’ (quoting Jones v. Conradi, 673 So.2d 389, 392 (Ala.1995), quoting in turn Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 495-96, 213 So.2d 225, 227-28 (1968))); Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 41-42 (Ala.2002)(‘Presumably, when the Legislature reenacts or amends a statute without altering language that has been judicially interpreted, it adopts a particular judicial construction.’). Had the Legislature disagreed with the interpretation of § 25-5-11.1 given by this Court in McClain, it could have easily amended § 25-5-11.1 in 1992, 1993, 1995, or 1996 when it changed, added, or repealed no less than 90 other sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Legislature has acquiesced in the holding of McClain, and to overrule that case now would be to disregard the doctrine of stare decisis.”

908 So.2d at 240-41.

In 1999, when the legislature amended § 15-12-21 (d), it was aware of the decisions of the appellate courts in May v. State, 672 So.2d 1307, Barksdale v. State, 680 So.2d 1029, and Ex parte Smith, 698 So.2d 219. In 1993, the Court of Criminal Appeals in May and Barksdale held that office-overhead expenses are “expenses reasonably incurred” as that phrase is used in § 15 — 12—21(d). In 1997, this Court discussed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decisions in May and Barksdale and explicitly adopted the holding that § 15-12-21 authorizes the payment to a court-appointed attorney for office-overhead expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of an indigent defendant. Had the legislature intended to make such a broad sweeping change in contradiction to the earlier caselaw, it could have easily done so. The subtle change in the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21 (d) did not change the operative phrase “expenses reasonably incurred” addressed in May and Barksdale, but only the prepositional phrase following those words, and did not rise to the level of making a broad sweeping change that contradicted existing caselaw.

We recognize that a fundamental principle of statutory construction is that it is presumed that the legislature did not do a futile thing in enacting a statute. Ex parte Watley, 708 So.2d 890 (Ala.1997). This rule operates to aid in determining the intent of the legislature. Smitherman v. Marshall County Comm’n, 746 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1999). However, the rule “has no place here, where the legislature has merely recodified a provision that has an established construction.” Jones v. Conradi, 673 So.2d at 394 n. 14.

' [9,10] As stated earlier, the trial court made note of the legislature’s 2002 joint resolution expressing its intent that Act No. 99^127 not affect the payment of office-overhead expenses. Although we agree with the comptroller that this joint resolution is not binding law, we do note that it was adopted by the same quadren-nially elected legislative body that enacted Act No. 99-427. This Court has clearly stated, however, that “[a] resolution is not a law but merely the form in which the legislature expresses an opinion. The Legislature has no power to make laws by-resolution.” Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So.2d 41, 43 (Ala.1982). Therefore, even though Act No. 2002-129 set out the legislature’s intent postenactment, it is not- controlling in deciding the issue before us.

The comptroller argues that the 1999 amendment clarified an ambiguity regarding the payment of office-overhead expenses. (State comptroller’s brief at 22-24.) However, given the judicial interpretation of § 15-12-21 before the 1999 amendment to the effect that office-overhead expenses were embraced in that section, there was no ambiguity in the phrase “expenses reasonably incurred” regarding the prior payment of office-overhead expenses. Therefore, there was at that time no ambiguity, but assuming that there was ambiguity, the legislature could have plainly stated that office-overhead expenses were nonreimbursable. Rather, it was the subtle change in the 1999 amendment to § 15 — 12—21(d) adding the language “in the defense of his or her client” that obviously created confusion, because after the amendment, there were opposing attorney general opinions in 2001 and 2005, a footnote in an opinion by this Court in 2002 stating in dicta that office-overhead expenses were not payable, and a circuit court case upholding the payment of office-overhead expenses in 2002. Accordingly, the comptroller’s argument that the 1999 amendment to § 15 — 12—21(d) resolved an ambiguity regarding the payment of office-overhead expenses and made it clear that office-overhead expenses were not reimbursable is not well taken.

Although there is no meaningful difference in the phrases “in such defense” and “in the defense of his or her client,” it is important that we recognize that it was a footnote in an opinion of this Court that has brought us here today. Indeed, the comptroller paid office-overhead expenses from 1999 to 2002. In 2001, the then attorney general issued an opinion addressing office-overhead expenses and concluded that based on the language of § 15-12-21(d), even after the 1999 amendment, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant could be reimbursed for office-overhead expenses even if the attorney worked out of his or her home.

The footnote in the opinion in Lyons and the 2005 attorney general opinion, which relied heavily on Lyons, stand alone in concluding that the 1999 amendment to § 15—12—21(d) abolished the payment of office-overhead expenses. That conclusion cannot be inferred, as the State contends, from the “dramatic” increase in the hourly rates effected by the 1999 amendment and the change in the phrase from “such defense” to the more specific phrase “in defense of his or her client.” The raise in the hourly rates in the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21 (d), without the payment of office-overhead expenses, is less than the pre-1999 hourly rates plus office-overhead expenses. Furthermore, the relevant language upon which the payment of office-overhead expenses was originally based in May was the phrase “expenses reasonably incurred.” The legislature did not amend that phrase in 1999, thus reflecting the legislature’s intent that lawyers appointed to represent indigent clients were still entitled to the payment of office-overhead expenses, the intent reflected by the nonbinding joint resolution of the legislature.

The parties raise the issue whether the Covington Circuit Court’s decision in Christensen v. Childree is binding on the comptroller. In light of our resolution regarding the interpretation of § 15-12-21(d), as amended, it is not necessary to address this issue.

As noted previously, this appeal and cross-appeal arise out of the trial court’s order entered in response to Wright’s “Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues Reserved.” The trial court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. As a practical matter, what the trial court did was to rule on Wright’s claim that § 15—12—21(d), as amended, required the comptroller to pay office-overhead expenses to lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants. In affirming that order today, we do not reach the other issues Wright asks us to address on appeal; those issues remain pending before the trial court.

Conclusion

Section 15-12-21 (d), as . amended in 1999, provides for the payment of office-overhead expenses to lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants in Alabama. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.

      . Although the indigent defendants in the cases to which this opinion is directed are criminal defendants, we note that in civil proceedings that provide for the appointment of counsel' — for example, whether as an attorney or a guardian ad litem, as in a civil-commitment case (§ 22-52-14, Ala.Code 1975), or as an attorney in a case involving a waiver of parental consent to an abortion (§ 26-21-4, Ala.Code 1975) — the statutes governing such civil proceedings provide that attorneys appointed in those proceedings shall also be compensated under § 15-12-21, Ala.Code 1975.

      . Wright attached several documents to his complaint, including the Talladega Circuit Court’s standing order pre-approving an hourly rate for office-overhead expenses, Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2005-063, and the Covington Circuit Court’s order in Christensen v. Childree, no. CV-2002-50.

      . Wright’s notice of appeal acknowledges that he did not request interest in the original complaint but states that he did request interest in motions filed in the trial court.

      . The original opinion, issued on November 30, 2001, was withdrawn when the March 15, 2002, opinion was issued.


author: LYONS, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Timothy Lamar TRAWICK. (In re Timothy Lamar Trawick v. State of Alabama).
    1051563.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 2, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied May 18, 2007.
    Timothy Lamar Trawick, pro se.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Kevin C. Newsom, deputy atty. gen., and Stephanie N. Morman and Jean A. Therkelsen, asst, attys. gen., for respondent.
   LYONS, Justice.

Timothy Lamar Trawick petitions for certiorari review of the affirmance by the Court of Criminal Appeals of the trial court’s dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition. Trawick alleged in his Rule 32 petition that his sentence had been illegally enhanced under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala.Code 1975 (“the HFOA”). We affirm.

Trawick was convicted in 1986 of two counts of rape in the first degree and two counts of sodomy in the first degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the HFOA based on three prior felony convictions in 1976 for the sale of controlled substances. In July 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmed Traw-ick’s convictions and sentences, Trawick v. State, 512 So.2d 818 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), and issued a certificate of judgment. In October 1987, April 1988, and March 2001, Trawick filed petitions for postconviction relief under Rule 32, Aa. R.Crim. P. Ml three petitions were denied by the trial court; those denials that Trawick appealed were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In November 2001, Trawick filed a fourth Rule 32 petition, alleging, among other things, that his enhanced sentence under the HFOA was illegal because, he argued, prior drug-related felonies could not be used to enhance the sentence for a non-drug-related offense. The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed its judgment in an unpublished memorandum on the basis that the claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(4), 32.2(b), and 32.2(c), Ma. R.Crim. P. Trawick v. State (No. CR-05-1095, June 23, 2006), — So.2d-(Ma.Crim. App.2006) (table). Trawick petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari on the grounds that the denial of his fourth Rule 32 petition conflicted with prior caselaw and that the Rule 32 petition presented an issue of first impression.

Before we consider the merits of Traw-iek’s position, we must first determine whether the Court of Criminals correctly held that the issue raised in the Rule 32 petition was precluded. If so, our inquiry need go no further. The State’s brief in this proceeding, which Trawick has not contradicted, states that Trawick raised this same issue — that under the HFOA a felony conviction for a drug-related offense could not be used to enhance a sentence for a non-drug-related offense — in his Rule 32 petition filed in March 2001 (“the third petition”). In its brief the State contends that in the third petition, “Trawick argued that his 1986 convictions of sodomy and rape were due to be set aside on grounds of a defective indictment and excessive sentence.” The trial court denied Traw-ick’s third petition, in part, on the basis that “prior felony drug offenses may be used to enhance a sentence under the [HFOA] following a conviction for a felony that was not drug related. Justo v. State, 568 So.2d 312 ([AIa.Crim.App.] 1990); Powell v. State, 624 So.2d 220 ([Ala.Crim.App.] 1993).” When the trial court dismissed the third petition, Trawick appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. Traw-ick did not file an application for rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals; thus, he did not file a petition for certiorari review with this Court in response to the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the dismissal of his third petition.

Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., generally precludes a trial court from granting relief in response to a successive Rule 32 petition. Rule 32.2(b) defines a “successive petition” as follows: “If a petitioner has previously filed a petition that challenges any judgment, all subsequent petitions by that petitioner challenging any judgment arising out of the same trial or guilty-plea proceeding shall be treated as successive petitions under this rule.” Rule 32.2(b) creates a two-pronged approach to addressing successive petitions. The first inquiry, under Rule 32.2(b), is whether the grounds raised in the successive petition are duplicative, that is, have the same grounds been raised in a prior petition. Under Rule 32.2(b), “[t]he Court shall not grant relief on a successive petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the petitioner.”

The second prong of Rule 32.2(b) states that “[a] successive petition on different grounds shall be denied” unless one of two exceptions apply. (Emphasis added.) The exception that Trawick attempts to invoke in this case allows the trial court to consider a successive petition when “the petitioner is entitled to relief on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment or to impose sentence.” Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. Trawick’s claim that his sentence is illegal under the HFOA presents a jurisdictional claim. See, e.g., Ex parte Robey, 920 So.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Ala.2004) (holding that because multiple punishments for the same offense constitute a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by law and an illegal sentence affects the trial court’s jurisdiction, “Robey is not barred from asserting in this successive Rule 32 petition the violation of his double-jeopardy rights”); Ex parte Sanders, 792 So.2d 1087, 1091 (Ala.2001) (“ ‘[w]hether a sentence is excessive ... is a jurisdictional issue’ that is not precluded by the limitations period of Rule 32, by the rule against successive petitions, or by Rule 32.2(a)(3)”). However, Traw-ick’s fourth Rule 32 petition asserts a ground Trawick has previously asserted, even if it is a jurisdictional issue. Therefore, the second prong of Rule 32.2(b), which is limited to successive petitions on different grounds, does not apply.

The first prong of Rule 32.2(b) precludes Trawick from reasserting a jurisdictional claim “on the same or similar grounds.” Because Trawick’s jurisdictional claim is duplicative, the issue having already been raised and adjudicated on its merits by the trial court in his third petition, we do not reach the second prong of Rule 32 containing the jurisdictional exception. Compare Grady v. State, 831 So.2d 646, 648-49 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (“[Although this is a successive petition ... jurisdictional claims are not ‘precluded by the limitations period or by the rule against successive petitions.’ ... Moreover, from the record before us, Grady did not claim that his sentence was illegal in his first Rule 32 petition.” (emphasis added)). Although our cases have previously stated that jurisdictional claims cannot be precluded as “successive,” that exception to Rule 32.2(b) applies only to jurisdictional claims not previously raised and adjudicated on the merits.

Because the trial court adjudicated Trawick’s jurisdictional claim on the merits in a prior petition, Trawick is precluded from reasserting that jurisdictional claim in a successive petition. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals properly found that his claim that he had been illegally sentenced under the HFOA was precluded, and that judgment is due to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

SEE, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, and MURDOCK, JJ„ concur.

COBB, C.J., recuses herself.


text:
    Ex parte INTERNATIONAL REFINING & MANUFACTURING CO. d/b/a IRMCO et al. (In re Bell Carr, Jr., et al. v. International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO et al.).
    1051084.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 23, 2007.
    As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 11, 2007.

      Connie Ray Stockham and James M. Smith of Stockham, Carroll & Smith, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRM-CO.
    Sydney F. Frazier, Jr., and Michael E. Turner of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O’Neal, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Nalco Company.
    Leslie A. Caldwell of Lusk, Lusk, Dowdy & Caldwell, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Ameol Corp.
    J. Alex Wyatt and David A. Lee of Parsons, Lee & Juliano, P.C., for petitioner Sunnen Products Co.
    Richard Eldon Davis of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O’Neal, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Castrol Industrial North America, Inc.
    H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Katie Loggins Vreeland, and Edwin B. Nichols of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Allegheny-Ludlum Corporation.
    David B. Hall, Sara M. Turner, and Jason Asbell of Baker, Donelson, Bear-man, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioners AK Steel Corporation, ARMCO Advanced Material Co., ARM-CO-Butler Operations, and The Minster Machine Company.
    Michael C. Quillen of Walston, Wells, Anderson & Birehall, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioners American Metal Fibers, Inc., ALRO Steel Corporation, and Lancaster Fibers, Inc.
    Joe E. Basenberg and James S. Witcher III of Hand Arendall, LLC, Mobile, for petitioners Tennant Company, Premier Cutting Tools, Inc., Pine Bluff Cutting Tools, Inc., and Reiff & Nestor Co.
    Douglas L. McCoy and Leanna Bankes-ter of Hand Arendall, LLC, Mobile, for petitioners Bliss Clearing Niagra, Inc., Pine Bluff Cutting Tools, Inc., Tennant Company, and Reiff & Nestor Co.
    Timothy W. Knight of Kee & Selby, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioners Lincoln Electric Company and L-Tec.
    James E. Fleenor, Jr., of Battle, Flee-nor, Green, Winn, Clemmer, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Buckman Laboratories, Inc.
    Clifton Wayne Jefferis of Forman, Perry, Watkins, Krutz & Tardy, LLP, Jackson, Mississippi, for petitioner Chemco Manufacturing Company, Inc.
    James H. McLemore of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner Contacts, Metals & Welding, Inc.
    Charles Fleming, Jr., of Huie, Fernam-bucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner D.A. Stuart Company.
    Stanley A. Cash of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioners Rochester-Midland, Hollingsworth & Vose Company, and Houghton International, Inc.
    Frank H. Lankford of Huie, Fernam-bucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioners Hollingsworth & Vose Company and Houghton International, Inc.
    F. Grey Redditt, Jr., and Timothy A. Clarke of Vickers, Riis, Murray & Curran, LLC, Mobile, for petitioner Delta Foremost Chemical Corporation.
    Matthew Robinett of Norman, Wood, Kendrick & Turner, Birmingham, for petitioner Inco Alloys International, Inc.
    John Whitaker of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, Birmingham; and John Martin Galese of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Joamca Chemical Products, Inc.
    C. Paul Cavender, Kathryn Morris Willis, and David A. Bragdon of Burr & For-man, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Precision Industrial Automation, Inc.
    William T. Mills II, H.C. Ireland III, and Larry W. Harper of Porterfield, Harper, Mills & Motlow, Birmingham, for petitioner Regal-Beloit Corporation.
    Jere F. White, Jr., Harlan I. Prater IV, Adam K. Peck, John M. Johnson, Andrew S. Nix, Derrick A. Mills, and Philip McCall Bridwell of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, for petitioners Certified Labs, a division of NCH Corporation, Chemsearch Labs, a division of NCH Corporation, GE Betz, Inc., Henkel Corporation, Loctite Corporation, Parker Anchem, and Tremco Incorporated.
    G. Thomas Yearout of Yearout, Spina & Lavelle, Birmingham, for petitioner Research Solvents & Chemicals, Inc.
    John C. Pierce and Michael A. Montgomery of Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller, Katz, Craig, LLP, Mobile, for petitioner S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.

      Richard E. Smith and Deborah Alley-Smith of Christian & Small, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Dexter Corporation n/k/a Invitrogen, Inc.
    Apsilah Owens Millsaps and W. Ivey Gilmore, Jr., of Owens & Millsaps, LLP, Tuscaloosa, for petitioners Barksdale Warrior Paper Co. and Nonferrous Products, Inc.
    John W. Clark, Jr., and Cynthia N. Williams of Clark, Oncole, Hair & Smith, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner A.M. Castle & Co.
    H.C. Ireland III, Larry W. Harper, F. Brady Rigdon, and Hugh M. Flanagan of Porterfield, Harper, Mills & Motlow, P.A., Birmingham, for petitioner Spartan Chemical Co., Inc.
    Sidney J. Hardy of McCranie, Sistrunk, Anzlemo, Hardy, Maxwell, & McDaniel, Metairie, Louisiana, for petitioner NSU Corp.
    Charles E. Pearson, Tuscaloosa, and H. Gregory Pearson and Charles E. Harrison of Junkin, Pearson, Harrison & Junkin, L.L.C., Fayette, for respondents.
   LYONS, Justice.

International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO and 47 other corporate defendants in the proceeding below (“the petitioners”) petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners’ motions to dismiss the claims against them, or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural Background

On November 13, 2003, Bell Carr, Jr., and approximately 320 other former employees at a manufacturing plant operated by Arvin Industries d/b/a Arvin-Meritor, Inc. (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”), sued Ar-vin-Meritor and six individual defendants, also former employees at the plant, where automotive mufflers were manufactured. The complaint alleged that up until the closing of the plant in May 2002, the plaintiffs suffered harm from “exposure to toxic and dangerous chemicals” that were flushed from the manufacturing machines and eventually circulated into a large pit, which the plaintiffs were responsible for draining and cleaning. In addition to these seven defendants, the original complaint fictitiously named 40 other defendants in the caption and in the body of the complaint.

On May 6, 2005, approximately three years after their last exposure to the chemicals, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, seeking to add 64 new named defendants, including the petitioners, in place of the fictitiously named defendants (hereinafter “the new defendants”), 113 new plaintiffs, as well as additional fictitiously named defendants. The amended complaint reasserted the five claims asserted in the original complaint, but only against the seven original defendants. The first amended complaint also alleged claims of negligence, wantonness, liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, civil conspiracy, and the tort of outrage, but only against the new defendants.

On June 14, 2005, the new defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The district court remanded the five original claims against the seven original defendants to the Fayette Circuit Court because they did not fall within the CAFA. The district court also determined that the claims in the amended complaint against the new defendants did not relate back under Alabama law and did not constitute what it referred to as an “interstate case of national importance.” Accordingly, the new claims asserted and the parties added in the amended complaint fell within the exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA in 28 U.S.C. § 1382(d)(U)(B)(ii)(I), and the district court also remanded the remaining claims to the Fayette Circuit Court.

Upon remand, the new defendants filed motions to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, on the ground that the claims asserted against them in the amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint and are thus barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See § 6-2-38(0, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the motions. The new defendants sought a certification to file a permissive appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., but the trial court denied the request for the certification. The petitioners then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “[Mjandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” Ex parte Horton, 711 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala.1998). “Subject to certain narrow exceptions ..., the denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.” Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 825 So.2d 758, 761 (Ala.2002)(citing Ex parte Jackson, 780 So.2d 681, 684 (Ala.2000)).’
“Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int’l, Ltd., 882 So.2d 819, 821-22 (Ala.2003).”

Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Ala.2005). This Court has recognized an exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by mandamus; that exception applies when the motion the trial court has denied was filed by a newly joined defendant asserting a statute-of-limitations defense based on 'the plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action against the defendant, who, in the original complaint, was fictitiously named. See, e.g., Ex parte Stover, 663 So.2d 948, 951-52 (Ala.1995).

Discussion

The petitioners claim that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of fictitious-party practice found in Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that, therefore, the claims in the amended complaint and the addition of the new defendants do not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint under Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, they argue, those claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The petitioners further contend that the plaintiffs did not act with due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named defendants before they filed their original complaint. We address, first, the threshold issue: whether the original complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action against the fictitiously named defendants to support the relation-back of the new claims in the amended complaint.

Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:

“(h) Fictitious Parties. When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in the party’s pleading, the opposing party may be designated by any name, and when that party’s true name is discovered, the process and all pleadings and proceedings in the action may be amended by substituting the true name.”

Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows a plaintiff to assert claims against a fictitiously named defendant who is subsequently substituted and named, and those claims will ‘“relate back to the date of the original complaint if the original complaint adequately described the fictitiously named defendant and stated a claim against such a defendant.’ ” Ex parte Snow, 764 So.2d 531, 535 (Ala.1999) (quoting Fulmer v. Clark Equip. Co., 654 So.2d 45, 46 (Ala.1995) (emphasis added)). See also Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So.2d 254, 255 (Ala.1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must state a cause of action against the fictitiously named party in the body of the original complaint.”).

The plaintiffs cite Johnson v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 517, 518-19 (Ala.1985), for the proposition that rules of pleading “ ‘are to be construed liberally to effect the purpose of the rules, and, under the rule of liberal construction, every reasonable in-tendment and presumption must be made in favor of the pleader.’ ” Citing Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Waters v. Jolly, 582 So.2d 1048, 1056 (Ala.1991), the plaintiffs further contend that the pleading need only set forth a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, the purpose of which is to give the defendant adequate notice of the claims against it. We agree with the plaintiffs that the purpose of notice pleading is to provide defendants adequate notice of the claims against them. The same notice-pleading rule applies to fictitious-party pleading. See, e.g., Stover, 663 So.2d at 952 (“ ‘Any count in a complaint which would state a cause of action under our liberal notice pleading rules would also state a cause of action against a fictitious party. One need not state with more particularity a cause of action against an unknown party as compared to a named party.’ ”) (quoting Columbia Eng’g Int’l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So.2d 955, 960 (Ala.1983)). The pertinent question, in this case, is whether the plaintiffs’ original complaint would have provided the fictitiously named defendants adequate notice of the claims against them.

A complaint stating a claim against a fictitiously named defendant must contain sufficient specificity to put that defendant on notice of the plaintiffs claim if it were to read the complaint. See Phelps v. South Alabama Elec. Coop., 434 So.2d 234, 237 (Ala.1983) (“ ‘There were no allegations in the body of the complaint charging that the “designer, manufacturer, assembler, distributor, or seller” of the hoist was negligent.’ ... Thus, there was virtually no way for the defendant to be put on notice by the original complaint that it might be a party to that suit.”) (holding that the complaint did state a cause of action against the fictitiously named defendant and discussing and distinguishing Walden v. Mineral Equip. Co., 406 So.2d 385, 389 (Ala.1981)). In other words, merely naming the fictitious party in the style and/or body of the complaint is insufficient; the complaint must describe the actions that form the basis of the cause of action against the fictitiously named defendant. See Stover, 663 So.2d at 951-52 (“In order to state a cause of action against a fictitiously named defendant in the body of the original complaint, the complaint must contain a description of wrongdoing on the part of the fictitiously named defendant.”) (quoting Columbia Eng’g Int’l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So.2d at 960). Likewise, in Phelps, the Court distinguished Columbia Engineering, in which the Court held that the complaint did not state a cause of action against one of the fictitiously named defendants. In Phelps, this Court noted, “In Columbia Engineering, supra, the opposite result was reached because there was no allegation of what the engineering company did, but only that the ‘wrongful conduct’ of the defendant resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” 434 So.2d at 237 (emphasis added).

The original complaint stated five separate causes of action: workers’ compensation, co-employee liability, misrepresentation, suppression and concealment, and deceit. Each count specifically named the defendant or defendants against whom that count was directed, but no count even mentioned the fictitiously named defendants. One of the paragraphs describing the fictitiously named defendants states: “References to ‘defendants’ in this complaint will be understood to include fictitious party defendants.” Even though the plaintiffs never alleged any of the counts directly against the fictitiously named defendants, they claim that because the paragraphs describing the fictitiously named defendants incorporated those unknown defendants in all references to “defendants,” each count that seeks relief against “defendants” implicitly incorporates the fictitiously named defendants.

This argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the plaintiffs’ original complaint. Of the five counts in that complaint, only the counts alleging misrepresentation, suppression and concealment, and deceit stated a claim not against a specifically named defendant or defendants, but against the more general “defendants.” The claims seeking workers’ compensation and alleging co-employee liability sought relief against specific defendants. Each of the five counts, however, specifically identified the individual defendants against whom the count was directed. The complaint cannot be read to invoke the fictitiously named defendants every time the word “defendants” was used in describing a count simply because the word “defendants” was used to describe the individual defendants specifically named in each count. That is not to say, however, that the original complaint wholly failed to state a cognizable cause of action against any of the fictitiously named defendants.

The plaintiffs’ original complaint includes the fictitiously named defendants in the caption as well as in the body. Paragraphs 4 and 5 describe the “fictitious party defendants” as “persons, firms, or corporations, whether singular or plural, who or which caused or contributed to cause death to the plaintiffs decedent [] ... or who by their acts, omissions, negligence, or wantonness, jointly, severally, or separately caused or contributed to cause the occurrence complained of herein.” The original complaint asserts factual allegations against the fictitiously named defendants only in two paragraphs. Paragraph 12 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“[T]he pit itself required cleaning at least two (2) times a year during the period of the operation of the plant. This cleaning would be accomplished, on orders of the defendants Norman Bobb, John Gary, Ron Goodwin, Todd Morgan, Nina Butler, and/or Richard Estes, and/or fictitious party defendants 1 through jO, by the pit being drained and then cleaned by hand by employees from various other plant departments.... ”

(Emphasis added.) Likewise, paragraph 14 of the original complaint further describes facts relevant to the cleaning of the pit sufficient to implicate the fictitiously named defendants under the broad construction of the word “defendants.” The original complaint contains no other description of any wrongful acts or omissions by the fictitiously named defendants.

Taken together with the claims of negligence and/or wantonness asserted against the fictitiously named defendants in the first amended complaint, these factual allegations adequately describe acts that form the basis of a cause of action against the fictitiously named defendants — namely, that they ordered the pit to be drained and cleaned by hand — and thus they comply with the notice-pleading requirement in Stover. However, the cause of action described here supports only claims of negligence and/or wantonness in the context of their co-employees’ ordering the plaintiffs to drain and clean the pit by hand. The complaint states no additional facts involving the fictitiously named defendants that would give them adequate notice of other claims of negligence or wantonness stemming from other acts or omissions. From the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of their petition for a writ of mandamus it appears that the 64 new defendants substituted in the amended complaint for the fictitiously named defendants are all corporate defendants. Further, it appears that the five additional claims asserted against the new defendants are all claims arising out of a products-liability cause of action, having nothing to do with co-employees’ ordering the plaintiffs to drain and clean the pit by hand.

Neither the new defendants nor the added causes of action fall within the narrow cause of action asserted in the original complaint against the fictitiously named defendants. Therefore, they do not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. The plaintiffs, however, in their response to the petition, contend that some of their claims nonetheless survive, because, they say, those claims fall within a six-year statute of limitations. See § 6-2-34, Ala.Code 1975. That issue, however, is not before us; our mandamus review extends to reviewing the denial of motions for a dismissal or for a summary judgment that asserted a statute-of-limitations defense only as to fictitious-party practice. See Stover, 663 So.2d at 951-52. The extent to which the amended complaint, filed within six years of the events made the basis of the action but not within two years thereof, states claims not barred by the two-year statute of limitations is a question not before us. However, all claims governed by a statute of limitations that require the application of the doctrine of relation back under fictitious-party practice to survive are due to be dismissed.

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s order denying the motions to dismiss, or for a summary judgment, and we remand the case for further proceedings, including a determination of the extent to which any claims are timely, without the availability of the relation-back doctrine.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, BOLIN, and MURDOCK, JJ., concur.

      . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l l)(B)(ii)(I) states that "the term 'mass action’ shall not include any civil action in which — ... all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State....”

      . Despite our efforts, we can find no reference in the original complaint, other than this one, to an injury resulting in death, although it is altogether possible that one of the approximately 320 plaintiffs named in the original complaint brought a claim for an injury resulting in death.