text:
    CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Gary GASPARD, Joan Gaspard, and Joseph Gaspard, Appellees.
    No. 1D07-728.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 26, 2007.
    G. Alan Howard and Robert M. Dees of Milam Howard Nicandri Dees & Gillam, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Danny L. Kepner and Susan A. Woolf of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

REVERSED and REMANDED. See Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 967 So.2d 815 (Fla.2007).

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Levi Jermaine GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-3383.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Archie F. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   THOMAS, J.

Appellant, a convicted sex offender, challenges his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of section 943.0435(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). Because competent, substantial evidence does not support his conviction for failing to register within 48 hours as required by section 943.0435(4)(a), we reverse.

Section 943.0435(4)(a) requires a sex offender to report to the Department of Motor Vehicles, in person, within 48 hours after a permanent or temporary address change to renew his driver’s license or identification card. During a bench trial, the court found that Appellant was evicted from his residence on Monday, August 22, 2005; thus, he was required to report his new address no later than Wednesday, August 24, 2005.

Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s factual finding that he could have registered his new address in person on August 23, 2005. He argues only that he established at trial that he could not have registered on August 24, because no driver’s license offices were open and roads were closed due to Hurricane Katrina’s impending landfall. As the factfinder, the court accepted Appellant’s testimony as true. The State did not proffer any contrary evidence establishing that Appellant could have registered between August 24 and August 30, when he actually registered at a driver’s license office. Thus, we hold that there is no competent evidence in this case that Appellant violated section 943.0435(4)(a).

As noted, section 943.0435(4)(a) requires a sex offender to report in person to a driver’s license office within 48 hours. We construe this statute to require that a sex offender must report to the office within two business days after the offender changes his permanent or temporary address. Were we to construe this statute otherwise, the State could prove a violation of section 943.0435(4)(a) by showing that an offender had changed his address on Friday after 5:00 p.m., but failed to register in person at a driver’s license office until Monday at 8:00 a.m., despite evidence that no driver’s license office was open for business during the intervening weekend. Under the rule of lenity, Florida’s criminal laws “shall be strictly construed [and] when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, [they] shall be construed most favorably to the accused.” § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statutory rule of lenity requires our construction of section 943.0435(4)(a), as this section requires a sex offender to physically report to a driver’s license office.

Here, due to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, and based on Appellant’s testimony and proffered evidence, the trial court found as fact that Appellant registered on the second business day during which a driver’s license office was open and available to Appellant.

Because competent, substantial record evidence does not support a guilty verdict for failing to register as a sex offender within a 48-hour period, as required by 943.0435(4)(a), we reverse and remand Appellant’s conviction and sentence with directions to discharge him. See Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1197, n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc) (holding that unlike the de novo standard of review applicable to review of the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, a guilty verdict is reviewed on appeal to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the verdict) (citing White v. State, 446 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1984)).

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to discharge Appellant.

WOLF and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Marshall J. MATTHEWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-644.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ailene S. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119 (Fla.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 1411, 149 L.Ed.2d 352 (2001).


text:
    LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. WORLDWIDE FLIGHT SERVICES, INC., Appellee.
    No. 5D06-4252.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
    W. Todd Boyd, James K. Parker and Joseph A. Garcia, of Boyd, Mustelier, Smith & Parker, P.L., Miami, for Appellant.
    Jonathan C. Hollingshead and Jamie Billotte Moses, of Fisher, Rushmer, Wer-renrath, Dickson, Talley & Dunlap, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Seneca Ins. Co. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1145830 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004), affirmed by, 133 Fed.Appx. 770 (2d Cir. May 27, 2005).

ORFINGER, MONACO and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert L. HAGINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-3550.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 27, 2007.
    Robert L. Hagins, Raiford, Pro Se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED without prejudice to file a legally sufficient claim. See Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 2007 WL 3196507 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2007).


text:
    Tira TATUM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-5244.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 28, 2007.
    Tira Tatum, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

BARFIELD, WOLF, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sodoc ESSER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-6368.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 28, 2007.
    Michael Ufferman of the Michael Uffer-man Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Peart v. State, 756 So.2d 42, 47 (Fla.2000); Jones v. State, 804 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

ALLEN, DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Charles KAPLAN, Esq., Appellee.
    No. 4D06-4423.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 2007.
    Willie Johnson, Indiantown, pro se.
    No appearance for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the appeal from a denial of petition for mandamus without prejudice to appellant filing another petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, asking the clerk of the circuit court to provide him with a free copy of the transcript of his trial.

POLEN, KLEIN and MAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    James ROSE, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES and FWCIGA/Unisource, Appellees.
    No. 1D06-6043.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 29, 2007.
    Jay M. Levy of Jay M. Levy, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
    Damian H. Albert of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, LLP, Ft. Lauder-dale, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flamily v. City of Orlando, 924 So.2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), rev. granted 944 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC06-847; restyled Sanders v. City of Orlando on August 20, 2007).

ALLEN, DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ., concur.


author: ORFINGER, J.

text:
    Robert A. LEWANDOWSKI, Appellant, v. Jean Kimberly LANGSTON, f/k/a Jean Lewandowski, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3301.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.

      James R. Dressier, Cocoa Beach, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   ORFINGER, J.

Robert A. Lewandowski, the former husband, timely appeals an order denying his post-dissolution petition to change primary residential custody of the parties’ child from the former wife, Jean Lewan-dowski n/k/a Jean Langston, to him. The former husband maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that there had been no substantial change of circumstances. We agree and reverse.

In October 2000, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”). The MSA designated the former wife as the primary residential parent of the child, provided that the parents shared parental responsibility of the child, and granted the former husband liberal visitation during holidays and summer. In September 2005, the former husband filed a petition requesting primary custody of the child, alleging that the child could be exposed to future sexual child abuse due to the former wife’s marriage to Robert Langston, a registered sex offender.

The facts found by the trial court are unchallenged on appeal. We discuss them in detail, as they are important to our analysis. The parties’ only child, a boy, is now nine years old. During the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, the former husband agreed that the child could relocate to Alabama with the former wife. Despite the distance between the former husband’s residence in Florida and the former wife’s home in Alabama, the former husband maintained a very close relationship with the child. The former husband has visited the child five or six times in Alabama, and the child has visited him numerous times in Florida, including every Christmas, spring break, Labor Day, Thanksgiving holiday and summer. The former husband has a very close relationship with his immediate family who all live in Brevard County, Florida, and the child enjoys a good relationship with that family-

In December 2005, the former husband married his current wife, and they reside in the former marital residence, a three-bedroom, two-bath home. The child has his own room at the former husband’s home. The former husband’s new wife has a good relationship with the child and has taken him on various outings since she started dating the former husband in April 2000. She testified that she would welcome him into the home on a full-time basis.

The former wife and her family also enjoy a close relationship with the child. The child has lived with the former wife all of his life. However, from the time of the divorce, the former husband has always had a “better” residence than the former wife. Since relocating to Alabama in 1999, the former wife has lived in six different residences, mostly double-wide mobile homes, and the child has attended three different schools. Notwithstanding, the child has had his own room in each of these residences, and is presently on the honor roll.

The former wife testified that when she first moved to Blountsville, Alabama, she resided with her parents in a double-wide mobile home. After her parents built a new home, she and the child remained in the mobile home, which was moved to another location on the property. Because the former wife was not satisfied with the Blountsville school, she enrolled the child in a daycare facility, and later kindergarten, in Cleveland, Alabama, approximately seven miles away. The child remained in the Cleveland school until the former wife remarried in January 2004 and moved to Hartsford, Alabama. The former wife promptly enrolled the child in school in Hartsford. However, the former wife’s marriage only lasted two months. The former wife then returned to Blountsville and put the child back in his Cleveland school. Upon the former wife’s return to Blountsville, she resided with her parents for six to eight months. She then moved to a two-bedroom historic farmhouse in Blountsville.

In January 2005, the former wife began attending community college, pursuing an Associates of Arts degree in computer programming. While attending community college, the former wife met and married Mr. Langston, a sex offender registered in the State of Alabama. When the former wife met Mr. Langston, he was working as a police officer in Hanceville, Alabama. Mr. Langston was then hired as a police officer in Blountsville. However, Mr. Langston resigned after it was discovered that he was a registered sex offender. Mr. Langston was later charged with violating the Alabama sex offender’s community notification statutes by being employed within 2,000 feet of a child care facility. In May 2006, he pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended, and placed on supervised probation for three years.

At the time the former wife married Mr. Langston in July 2005, she knew of his sex offender status, and had investigated the circumstances of his conviction. Mr. Langston had been convicted of a misdemeanor charge of inappropriate touching of a minor. The victim was his twelve-year-old daughter and his parental rights with her have been terminated. Still, the trial court found that the former wife minimized the severity of the circumstances of Mr. Langston’s conviction, explaining that Mr. Langston’s charge was reduced to a misdemeanor and involved “inappropriate touching,” which cannot be defended against. She does not believe that Mr. Langston has done anything wrong, explaining that he was going through a divorce involving a custody dispute when he was charged. She testified that she has no concerns about him being around the parties’ minor child.

At the time of the former wife’s remarriage, the child was visiting the former husband in Florida. When the child returned to Alabama, he lived with the former wife and Mr. Langston in Winfield, Alabama, and was enrolled in the second grade in the Winfield school system. The former wife notified the former husband of her remarriage and advised him that Mr. Langston had been “accused” of inappropriately touching his twelve-year-old daughter. However, she did not tell the former husband that Mr. Langston was a registered sex offender. In August 2005, the former husband accessed the Alabama Department of Public Safety’s website, and learned that Mr. Langston was a registered sex offender. The former husband then contacted the Alabama Department of Child Welfare. The Department investigated, but took no action. The former husband also hired a private investigator to investigate the former wife and Mr. Langston, but the investigation turned up nothing more of consequence.

In September 2005, the former husband filed his petition for a change of custody. The former husband testified that he was concerned for the child’s safety. However, he acknowledged that there was no evidence that the child has been sexually abused while in the former wife’s care.

Alabama law prohibits Mr. Langston from residing in the same home as the minor child. Until the former husband filed his petition, the former wife said she was unaware of the law. Once the petition was filed, the former wife and the child moved to a separate residence. The former wife first moved into a one-bedroom apartment in Winfield, Alabama; however, she later secured a two-bedroom apartment in the same building. In May 2006, she moved into a two-bedroom two-bathroom double-wide mobile home approximately two-tenths of a mile from where Mr. Langston lives. Mr. Langston’s parents own both residences. Although Mr. Langston “lives” at a separate residence, during the day he interacts with the former wife and child as a family. They go to church, hiking, and other outings as a family until the evening, when Mr. Langston leaves and sleeps in his own residence. The former wife said she has no intention of divorcing Mr. Langston, but testified that if she had to choose between Mr. Langston and her son, she would choose her son.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the former husband’s motion to modify custody, the trial court announced a temporary order, which provided that the former wife could not reside in the same household with Mr. Langston and that Mr. Langston could not be in the child’s presence without constant adult supervision. The trial court explained this meant that when the child, the former wife, and Mr. Langston were in the same residence, the adult supervision had to be present on a room-to-room basis. The trial court later entered a final order, denying the former husband’s petition for a change of custody. In its order, the trial court acknowledged that the circumstances were not “ideal,” but determined that the former husband had failed to present any evidence that the child was in an unsafe environment. In making this determination, the court found that there was no evidence that the child had been sexually abused while in the former wife’s care, or exposed in any direct manner to any unsafe conditions, and noted that during the pendency of the proceedings, the Alabama Child Welfare Agency and the former husband’s private investigator had both investigated the former wife and Mr. Langston but found nothing. Still, the court ordered that the former wife could not allow the child to reside in the same household with Mr. Langston and that Mr. Langston could not be in the child’s presence without constant, direct supervision.

When a party seeks modification of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage to change the custody of a child, that party bears the burden of establishing the existence of a substantial and material change in circumstances since entry of the final judgment, and that the change in custody will be in the best interests of the child. E.g., Wade v. Hirschman, 908 So.2d 928, 933-34 (Fla.2005). This Court’s standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id. at 935. To determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we look to the record for competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Id.; accord Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

On these unchallenged facts, the evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the former wife’s actions, which exposed the child to a registered sex offender on a regular basis, constituted a material change of circumstances affecting the physical and emotional health, safety, and well-being of the child. See Albert T. v. Wanda H., No. 07126 (N.Y.App.Div., Sept. 28, 2007); K.E.W. v. T.W.E., No. 2060187, — So.2d-, 2007 WL 2069512 (Ala.Civ. App. July 20, 2007); Roe v. Roe, 33 A.D.3d 1152, 823 N.Y.S.2d 262 (NY.App.Div. 2006); Mock v. Mock, 673 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D.2004); D.N. v. J.H., 782 So.2d 323 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). See generally In re R.A.J., 671 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa Ct.App. 2003); In Re Marriage of Faulhaber, No. 2001-P-0110, 2002 WL 1401066 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2002). It seems inconsistent to find no change in circumstances, while at the same time ordering Mr. Langston out of the house and requiring constant supervision when the child is present.

The next question is whether a change in custody will materially promote the best interests of the child. Wade, 903 So.2d at 934. This question involves the same broad “best interest” inquiry as an initial custody determination. Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 954 So.2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Because the trial court found no material change in circumstances, the court reached no conclusions on what would be in the child’s best interests.

The order denying the former husband’s petition for a change in primary physical custody is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

GRIFFIN and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      . The former husband admitted that he allowed the child a sip of beer in order to satisfy his curiosity about it. He also admitted that he was convicted of reckless driving in 1999. (He was originally charged with DUI). The child was not with him at the time.

      . We assume that the trial judge concluded the former husband’s residence was “better” in that it was more spacious and comfortable.


text:
    Lavonne BRIGHT, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-0779.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.

      Marie A. Mattox of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Brian C. Keri, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We find the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 does not preempt the award of attorney’s fees to a defendant pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2006), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. See Marcy v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 921 So.2d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). AFFIRMED.

BARFIELD, WOLF, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ricky ROULHAC, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-4522.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Ricky Roulhac, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General; Heather Flanagan Ross and Thomas Wi-nokur, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the order denying petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief in Washington County Circuit Court case number 67-03-269CF, rendered on or about February 13, 2007, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate herein, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as a notice of appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gary M. DIRK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3770.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ailene S. Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

This court has previously held that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) do not apply retroactively in those cases in which the convictions became final prior to the Apprendi decision, even though resentencing occurred post-Apprendi See Rouse v. State, 965 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Langford v. State, 929 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). As we did in Langford, we certify conflict with Isaac v. State, 911 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

SAWAYA, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


author: PLEUS, J.

text:
    Eric D. BARTLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3891.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Marvin F. Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lori N. Hagan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.
   PLEUS, J.

The defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is affirmed. However, we remand for a corrected sentence. The trial court erroneously believed the three-year mandatory minimum sentence contained in section 775.087(2)(a)1.r., Florida Statutes, for actual possession applied here. In Johnson v. State, 855 So.2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), this Court held that for purposes of sentencing enhancement, actual possession means that the defendant carried the firearm on his person. Because there was no evidence that the defendant had the firearm on his person, there existed no factual basis for application of the three-year mandatory minimum. See State v. Mulus, 970 So.2d 349, 2007 WL 2376669 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug.22, 2007).

Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed but the cause is remanded for resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Freddie James SIPLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-1843.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.

      James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David S. Morgan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the modification of his probationary sentence, which occurred fourteen months after the probationary sentence was imposed. The court modified Appellant’s probation to include electronic monitoring, a mandatory condition of probation. Because the modification did not occur within sixty days after Appellant’s sentencing,' the modification was erroneous. Fields v. State, 968 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Kiriazes v. State, 798 So.2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Accordingly, we reverse with the direction that the added condition of probation be stricken.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

THOMPSON, TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kmata UKAJ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-2443.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Kmata Ukaj, Ocala, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the denial of her motion to reduce sentence, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). The lower court erroneously denied the motion as untimely, even though it had been timely filed within sixty days after the mandate issued in the direct appeal. Although appeals from orders such as this are generally not cognizable, because the lower court was of the mistaken impression that the motion was untimely, we treat the appeal as a petition for certio-rari, grant the petition and quash the order under review. Diaz v. State, 931 So.2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Byrd v. State, 920 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). On remand, the trial court is directed to address the motion on the merits.

ORDER QUASHED; CASE REMANDED.

PLEUS, MONACO and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Henry FILLYAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-2528.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.

      Henry Fillyaw, Miami, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Briggs v. State, 682 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (applying Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla.1988), and affirming sentence that exceeded terms of plea agreement imposed after defendant failed to appear for sentencing), review denied, 691 So.2d 1079 (Fla.1997)).

GRIFFIN, THOMPSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Wayne A. PULA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-2739.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Wayne A. Pula, Carrabelle, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
   PER CURIAM.

Pula appeals the denial of his most recent motion for post-conviction relief. Finding no merit in his argument, we affirm. In so doing, we take the additional step of barring Pula from filing any further pro se pleadings in this case.

Pula was tried and convicted of second degree murder eighteen years ago. His conviction was affirmed in Pula v. State, 578 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Since then Pula has filed multiple pro se motions for post-conviction relief, all of which have been denied by the trial court and this court. As a result, this court issued a show cause order pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999). Pula’s response was meritless.

AFFIRMED; Future Pro Se Filings PROHIBITED.

PALMER, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kenneth L. GRIMSLEY, Petitioner, v. CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT, MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-2760.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Kenneth L. Grimsley, Lowell, pro se.
    No Appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Kenneth L. Grimsley, seeks a writ of mandamus, claiming that Respondent, the Clerk of Circuit Court, Marion County, Florida, has failed to consider his public records request. We grant the petition, and direct Respondent to treat the public records request as a request for judicial branch records pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420, and immediately respond to said request.

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA, MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Siddiq B.A. ASAD, Appellant, v. James R. McDONOUGH, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-3356.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Appellant Siddiq B.A. Asad, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Carrie McNair, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Norman v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 957 So.2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)(“[A] proper motion is required in the lower court before we will consider an argument regarding whether a lien on a prisoner trust account was erroneously imposed.”); Kemp v. McDonough, 955 So.2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)(“It is well settled that an error cannot be complained of in the appellate court if it is not squarely presented to the lower tribunal.”).

BROWNING, C.J., KAHN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jorge MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-2871.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    Jorge Martinez, Jasper, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of an order of the circuit court denying his motion to compel the production of documents requested pursuant to chapter 119, Florida Statutes. Petitioner asserts that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in failing to have a hearing as is required by section 119.11(1), Florida Statutes (2006), before issuing an order denying his public records request. We agree and quash the order under review. Woodfaulk v. State, 935 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

ORDER QUASHED.

PALMER, C.J., ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    James E. CROW, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-2782.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Nov. 30, 2007.
    James E. Crow, Jr., Bonifay, Pro Se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Adaway v. State, 902 So.2d 746 (Fla.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 942, 126 S.Ct. 436, 163 L.Ed.2d 331 (2005) (holding that sentence of life imprisonment without parole does not violate either Eighth Amendment to United States Constitution or article I, section 17 of Florida Constitution).

THOMPSON, ORFINGER and MONACO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lewis M. MOTON, Jr., Appellant, v. James R. McDONOUGH, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-1103.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 4, 2007.
    Lewis M. Moton, Jr., pro se, Appellant.
    Kathleen Von Hoene, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Alexandria E. Walters, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Hampton v. McDonough, 967 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Senda KEFI, Appellant, v. Kevin L. JACKSON, et al., Appellee.
    No. 5D06-1134.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 4, 2007.
    Senda Kefi, Montreal, Quebec, pro se.
    W. Andrew Rariden and Elizabeth C. Wheeler, of Elizabeth C. Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Fla. R.App. Proc. 9.315(a).

PALMER, C.J., MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles S. MARKHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-2706.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 4, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

GRIFFIN, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Shawn Patrick McCOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-410.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 4, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lori N. Hagan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Sanford v. State, 872 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).


author: WEBSTER, J.

text:
    CLAY COUNTY, Florida, Petitioner, v. KENDALE LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent.
    No. 1D07-2435.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.

      Frances J. Moss, Mark H. Scruby and Rebecca L. Clayton, Green Cove Springs, for Petitioner.
    E. Lanny Russell and E. Owen McCul-ler, Jr., of Smith Hulsey & Busey, Jacksonville, for Respondent.
   WEBSTER, J.

By a petition for writ of certiorari, Clay County seeks review of a final order entered by the trial court. That order granted a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Kendale Land Development challenging an adverse decision by an administrative hearing officer of an appeal taken by Ken-dale from a determination by the County that a Concurrency Reservation Certificate (CRC) issued to Kendale by the County had expired. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law, we grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings applying the correct law.

I.

The essential facts were stipulated to by the parties in both the administrative hearing and the trial court. Kendale is an experienced land developer. In 2004, it began planning a project to develop 124 single-family home lots in the County. On June 16, 2004, the County issued a CRC for the proposed subdivision. At that time, a CRC was defined in the County’s Concurrency Management System ordinance as “the official document issued by the County upon finding that an application for the certificate in reference to a specific final development order or final development permit for a particular development will not result in the reduction of the adopted level of service standards for impacted potable water, sanitary sewer, parks and recreation, drainage, solid waste, transportation (roads) and mass transit facilities and services, as set forth in the [County’s Comprehensive] Plan.” In essence, a CRC carved out, or “reserved,” approval for the development of certain areas of the County, in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. The ordinance further provided that an agreement to pay a “fair share” of the cost of road improvements might “serve as the functional equivalent of a CRC” when a project was unable to meet the transportation concurrency requirements.

Another portion of the Concurrency Management System ordinance provided that “[a] CRC shall expire when any of the following conditions are met: ... [f]or a single family development, the applicant fails to obtain approval of all preliminary plats within six (6) months of CRC issuance or fails to obtain approval of all final plats and final acceptance of all roads and drainage by the Board of County Commissioners within twenty-four (24) months of CRC issuance.” Consistent with this clear language regarding expiration, the CRC issued to Kendale included the following:

A new CRC will be required in order to proceed with any portion of the project that does not obtain the following approvals) by the stated deadline(s):
Obtain approval of all preliminary plats by December 16, 2004.
Obtain approval of all final plats and acceptance of all roads and drainage by the Board of County Commissioners by June 16, 2006.

Notwithstanding the language in the County’s ordinance and the CRC, Ken-dale’s principals concluded that they had an option to choose either of the deadlines, rather than being obliged to comply with both. Accordingly, they decided that they would meet only the June 16, 2006, deadline.

Kendale did not obtain approval of all preliminary plats by December 16, 2004. On January 18, 2005, a Kendale employee sent an e-mail to the County’s Chief Planner. To the extent pertinent, the e-mail read: “We are finally going to be able to move forward on th[e] project. Is there anything we need to do on our concurrency since we should still be able to meet the final plat and acceptance deadline of 6/16/06?” A short time later, the Chief Planner responded, “Concurrency is okay. Regarding the site plan, unless it’s a substantial change just submit for site plan approval.”

In March 2005, Kendale acquired the property for the project. During the next three months, Kendale employed entities to perform surveying, plat and engineering services.

On September 28, 2005, Kendale’s employee sent another e-mail to the County’s Chief Planner. It read: “Th[e] project was to come before the DRC on 9/27/05. Could you tell me what, if anything, we need to do to keep our concurrency valid as we move forward through engineering?” The Chief Planner forwarded the e-mail to an assistant planner, who responded: “The concurrency expires on June 16, 2006 for the final plats and acceptance of all r[oa]ds and drainage. Are all preliminary plats done?” Kendale’s employee replied: “We are just starting the preliminary plats at this time since we just received approval of our site plan last night.” The assistant planner responded with the following: “Attached is the only certificaté I see for this project and if you have not got your preliminary plats, then your concurrency has expired as of December 16, 2004.” Ken-dale’s employee then responded: “I think I’m confused about your process.... I’m used to renewing the concurrency every 90 days (Duval), so I wanted to make sure-we were on track with you.”

No Kendale representative subsequently took any action to determine the status of concurrency on the project. However, on January 9, 2006, Kendale wrote the County’s Chief Planner requesting an extension of the CRC for six months beyond the June 16, 2006, deadline. The Chief Planner responded by e-mail on January 17. In that e-mail, the Chief Planner explained that, when she had told Kendale’s employee on January 18, 2005, that “[cjoncurren-cy [wa]s okay,” she had done so on the assumption that final plat acceptance was the only condition that had not already been met. However, because Kendale had not met the December 16, 2004, deadline for approval of all preliminary plats, the CRC had already expired when she had sent the earlier e-mail. The Chief Planner “apologize[d] for the confusion,” but said that Kendale would have to reapply. Ken-dale did reapply a short time later, but its application was denied because of a lack of available concurrency. However, the County told Kendale that it could proceed with the project if Kendale paid a “fair share” assessment of $625,203 by May 26, 2006. Instead of paying the “fair share” assessment, Kendale filed a notice seeking an administrative appeal, contending that the County was estopped from denying the continued validity of the CRC or, alternatively, from requiring the payment of a “fair share” assessment to obtain a new CRC.

By the time of the administrative hearing, Kendale was arguing that (1) the CRC did not expire, for various reasons; (2) the County was estopped to deny the continued validity of the CRC, principally because of the January 18⅝ 2005, e-mail from the County’s Chief Planner in which she had said that “[concurrency'[wa]s okay”; (3) if the CRC did expire, the amount of the “fair share” assessment required to obtain a new CRC ought to be that which would have been required on the date of the Chief Planner’s January 2005 misstatement, or only $190,414, rather than the $625,203 insisted on by the County; and (4) the County erroneously denied its renewed application. In a detailed and thoughtful order, the hearing officer rejected all of Kendale’s arguments. Regarding the estoppel argument, the hearing officer noted that the Chief Planner’s e-mail was not sent until after the CRC had expired. He found, further, that the CRC was permitted to expire solely as the result of negligence on the part of Ken-dale’s principals and employees.

Kendale then sought review in the trial court, filing its petition for a writ of certio-rari. In its petition, Kendale alleged that the hearing officer’s decision had constituted a departure from the essential re■quirements of law because it erroneously (1) concluded that the portion of the Concurrency Management System ordinance addressing expiration of CRCs was clear and unambiguous; (2) “failed to properly apply the elements of equitable estoppel to the facts”; and (3) concluded that the hearing officer lacked the “authority ... to grant, as a remedy, the fair share amount as of the date of the January 2005 misstatement, $190,414.” The trial court ultimately concluded that the hearing officer’s decision was contrary to the essential requirements of law because, even though the CRC had in fact expired, the hearing officer had erroneously concluded that Kendale had failed to establish a case for equitable estoppel. The trial court also concluded that, because the hearing officer had the authority to affirm the County’s determination but require as a condition of affirmance that the County permit Ken-dale to pay a “fair share” assessment of $190,414, it, too, possessed that authority. Accordingly, the trial court “affirm[ed] the County’s denial of concurrency upon the condition that Kendale be allowed to pay a fair share in the amount of $190,414.... ” The County now seeks from us a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court’s ruling.

II.

We begin with an exposition of the law regarding the scope of review in certiorari proceedings of quasi-judicial local agency action which, although it is well settled, nevertheless seems routinely to be misapplied. Circuit court review of such action, known as “first-tier” review, is limited to determinations whether (1) procedural due process was accorded in the administrative proceeding; (2) the essential requirements of law were observed in the administrative proceeding; and (3) the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. Broward County v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838, 843 (Fla.2001) (quoting from City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982)). Our scope of review, known as “second-tier” review, is even more limited. We determine only “whether the trial court (1) afforded due process and (2) observed the essential requirements of law.” Randall v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 791 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 703 So.2d 1202, 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (criminal division en banc), approved, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998)), approved sub nom. R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1281 (Fla.2004). A ruling constitutes a departure from “the essential requirements of law” when it amounts to “a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983). When considering such a petition for writ of certiorari, a court has only two options — it may either deny the petition or grant it, and quash the order at which the petition is directed. G.B.V. Int’l, 787 So.2d at 843-44 (citing cases). The court may not enter any judgment on the merits of the underlying controversy, or direct the lower tribunal to enter any particular order. Id. Assessing the trial court’s order according to these well-established rules, we conclude that order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, and that we are, therefore, obliged to quash it.

III.

As we have noted, one “clearly established principle of law” is that, on first-tier certiorari review, a circuit court is limited to determining whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. Whether the record also contains competent substantial evidence that would support some other result is irrelevant. E.g., Dusseau v. Metro. Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 794 So.2d 1270, 1275 (Fla.2001) (quoting from Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Fla.2000)); G.B.V. Int’l, 787 So.2d at 845; Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla.1989). Here, rather than merely determining whether the hearing officer’s findings that Kendale did not reasonably rely on the January 2005 misstatement by the Chief Planner or any other act or omission of the County and his decision that Kendale had failed to prove entitlement to the defense of equitable es-toppel were supported by competent substantial evidence, the trial court conducted an independent review of the record, concluding that competent substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the County was equitably estopped to deny Kendale a CRC. This constituted “a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice” and, therefore, a departure from the essential requirements of law. G.B.V. Int’l, 787 So.2d at 845; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Fla.2000).

We have also noted that another “clearly established principle of law” is that, when considering a petition for writ of certiorari, a court has only two options — it may either deny the petition or grant it, and quash the order at which the petition is directed. G.B.V. Int’l, 787 So.2d at 843-44 (citing cases). The court may not enter any judgment on the merits of the underlying controversy, or direct the lower tribunal to enter any particular order. Id. Here, the trial court entered judgment on the merits, fashioning what it believed to be an equitable remedy. This, too, constituted “a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice” and, therefore, a departure from the essential requirements of law. G.B.V. Int’l, 787 So.2d at 845; Fla. Power & Light Co., 761 So.2d at 1093.

IV.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it granted Kendale’s petition for writ of cer-tiorari. As we have explained, the relief we may grant is limited to quashing the trial court’s order, which we now do. We also remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings applying the correct law.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO-RARI GRANTED.

PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    F.B., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-4837.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

F.B. appeals the trial court’s finding of guilt for felony battery and argues that the State failed to prove the elements of the crime. We affirm because the error was not preserved.

In a juvenile proceeding, a motion for judgment of dismissal at the conclusion of the State’s case is necessary to preserve the issue for review. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.525(h); J.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 825 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). F.B.’s counsel moved for judgment of dismissal at the close of the State’s case, but not on grounds that the State failed to prove the elements of the crime.

Accordingly, we must affirm.

CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ., and DAKAN, STEPHEN L„ Associate Senior Judge, Concur.


text:
    Q.M., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-2705.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The condition of probation requiring the child to attend family counseling if recommended by the Department of Juvenile Justice is stricken on the ground that it is an improper delegation of judicial authority. See Huffman v. State, 472 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); In Interest of T.L.D., 586 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). In all other respects, the order withholding adjudication of delinquency is affirmed.

Affirmed as modified.

WEBSTER, PADOVANO, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Edd COX, Jr., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-3341.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Edd Cox, Jr., pro se, Petitioner.
    Gypsy Bailey, Staff Counsel/Director of Courts, Tallahassee; Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Alexandria Walters, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus denied. See Sapp v. State, 917 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

BROWNING, C.J., KAHN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sharronda JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-4485.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tom Wm. Odom, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher Zibura, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The revocation of appellant’s probation and the sentences imposed are affirmed. However, we reverse and remand for the trial court to enter a written order revoking probation and specifying the conditions of probation that appellant violated. See Ballate v. State, 962 So.2d 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

WARNER, FARMER and GROSS, JJ., concur.


text:
    David McCARTHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-5078.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Robinson v. State, 373 So.2d 898 (Fla.1979).

SHAHOOD, C.J., WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert Wayne MURRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D07-78.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and John M. Conway, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s convictions, finding record evidence contradicting defendant’s claim of self defense. As to the sentence, relying on Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), rev. granted, 956 So.2d 458 (Fla.2007), we hold that the Department of Corrections record establishing the predicate offense for prison releasee reoffender sentencing was not inadmissible hearsay or in violation of the Confrontation Clause. As in Yisrael, we certify conflict with Gray v. State, 910 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

WARNER and FARMER JJ., and CONNER, BURTON C., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Ricky BURTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D07-243.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Margaret Good-Earnest and Michael Anti-nori, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and August A. Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The order revoking defendant’s probation is affirmed. The charges of violation were initially filed before the probationary term had expired. See § 948.06(1)(d) (filing of warrant alleging violation of probation tolls term of probation until disposition of VOP charges).

WARNER and FARMER JJ., and CONNER, BURTON C., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Kim Marie ADAMS, Appellant, v. William Scott COOK, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-1015.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
    Lisa R. Patten and Lorraine M. Durham, of Patten Law Firm, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Gregory K. - Mausser, Sanford, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Kim Marie Adams [“Wife”] appeals the trial court’s Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, raising three issues concerning equitable distribution of marital assets and debt. Two of these have merit.

First, it was error to award all business profits to her husband, William Cook [“Husband”]. Wife appears to concede that the parties’ business, a public adjusting firm, should be valued based on receivables. She claims entitlement to half of the $67,383.87 in receipts actually received by Husband after the petition for dissolution was filed. In the final judgment, the trial court declined to order equitable distribution, finding that the money that the business received on account of cases that were in progress at the time the petition was filed was “consumed by the parties, used to pay off loans, or otherwise divided by the parties.”

On appeal, Wife makes essentially two arguments: that the trial court reversibly erred because it failed to “quantify the value of the business and the amount of debt allegedly incurred by the parties for living expenses and used to offset the value of the business;” and because there was no competent substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that “the value was offset by alleged loan payments, the parties consumed the profits in the prior year, or that the business was equitably divided between the parties prior to trial.” We agree with both contentions.

On the date that the petition was filed, the parties had a number of marital assets and liabilities to be distributed between them, including real property, bank accounts, and the business. The partial mediation agreement, which the parties entered into in June of 2004, divided the Wingfoot property, specified IRA accounts, and all financial accounts, except the Everbank account. Additionally, the mediation agreement noted that in settling on the amount to be distributed to Wife with respect to the financial accounts, “[t]he Home Depot, Lowes and the taxes on the Triangle building” were taken into account and resolved. Further, the trial court’s final judgment expressly stated that “the parties had resolved all issues” prior to trial, except for the valuation and equitable distribution of the business, the valuation and equitable distribution of the Rouse Road property, the student loans, Wife’s claim for a bicycle, and claims for attorney’s fees and costs.

There is no record evidence of joint expenses after the filing nor evidence that Husband and Wife jointly consumed the value of the business that existed on the date of the filing. See § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2003). Further, no testimony was presented to establish that payments from the claims, which were in progress at the time the petition was filed, were used to pay off loans. Husband suggested in his closing that the payments from the claims were used in part to pay off debts that the parties jointly incurred at Lowes and Home Depot. However, those debts were equitably divided in connection with financial accounts under the mediation agreement. Finally, there is no evidence that the business was “otherwise divided” by the parties prior to trial. Indeed, the Final Judgment made it clear that equitable distribution of the business had not occurred at the time of trial. The trial court erred in failing to equitably distribute to Wife her share of this asset.

The trial court also erred by not following section 61.075(5), Florida Statutes, when considering Wife’s claim that her student loans were a marital debt. In August of 2002, Wife began law school, and Husband supported her in this decision. During the course of the marriage, Wife incurred three semesters worth of student loans totaling $27,750. The loan she took out each semester exceeded her tuition for the semester and the surplus funds available from the loans were deposited into Husband and Wife’s joint bank accounts. About $3,000 per semester, or a total of $9,000, was deposited into the couple’s joint bank accounts. The couple used the extra loan money that was deposited into their joint bank accounts for living expenses.

The trial court concluded that the student loans were not marital debt and, as a result, Husband was not responsible for any portion of it. The trial court reasoned that Wife’s law degree was solely for her benefit and, thus, the debt incurred in obtaining it was solely hers. Husband properly concedes on appeal that the student loan debt should have been listed as a marital debt. However, he asserts that “[wjhile technically a debt incurred during the course of a marriage by one party is marital debt for purposes of equitable distribution, finding the party who has not received the benefit of the education, and will obtain no benefit from that education, liable for the debt in creating that education is inequitable.”

Wife correctly points out that the trial court did not find, and there is no basis in the evidence from which one could conclude, that it would be inequitable to allocate the student loan debt between the parties. Indeed, the trial court never reached the issue of equitable distribution, because the court failed to recognize the student. loans as marital debt. Second, whether one party obtained the benefit of the marital debt does not determine the equitable distribution of the debt under section 61.075(1). On these two issues, we reverse and remand for equitable distribution.

Wife’s third complaint on appeal, that the trial court erred in valuing the marital home, has no merit. On that issue, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

GRIFFIN, THOMPSON, JJ., and SIMMONS, C., Associate Judge, concur.

      . Wife graduated from Barry University School of Law in May of 2005, passed the bar exam, and was authorized to be sworn in at the time the trial began.


text:
    CITY OF PALM BAY and City of Palm Bay Code, etc., Petitioner, v. PALM BAY GREENS, LLC, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-1910.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.

      John K. Shubin, Juan J. Farach and Lucinda A. Hofmann, of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, for Petitioner.
    James P. Beadle, of Spira, Beadle & McGarrell, P.A., Palm Bay, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petitioners, City of Palm Bay [“City”] and City of Palm Bay Code Enforcement Board [“Board”] seek prohibition review of an appellate order of the circuit court denying the City and Board’s motion to dismiss a petition for writ of certiorari in which the respondent, Palm Bay Greens, LLC [“Landowner”], seeks review of a decision of the Board finding the Landowner in violation of certain City code provisions. The prohibition petition asserts that the circuit court appeal was untimely filed. We agree.

On July 12, 2006, the Board found the Landowner in violation of various provisions of the City code relating to maintenance of the property and ordered the Landowner to bring the property into compliance by August 11, 2006, (exterior maintenance and trash and debris removal) and September 10, 2006 (remaining violations). On July 19, 2006, the Landowner filed a motion for rehearing or, in the alternative, motion for clarification of this order. At its August 9, 2006, meeting, the Board voted to deny the Landowner’s motion for rehearing. No written denial order was entered. However, at the landowner’s request, the Board sent a letter to the Landowner on September 18, 2006, setting forth that the Board does not routinely enter written orders on such matters but confirming that the minutes of the Board’s August 9, 2006, meeting reflect that the Board denied the rehearing motion.

On October 18, 2006, the Landowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court seeking review of the Board’s order of violation, citing to the denial of its motion for rehearing and the Board’s letter advising the Landowner of the denial of rehearing. The City moved to dismiss the Landowner’s certiorari petition, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s July 12, 2006, order because the Landowner’s motion for rehearing was not authorized and, therefore, did not toll the time to seek certiorari review. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h). The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and decided that the rendition date of the Board’s original order was tolled until the date the Board sent the Landowner the letter informing the Landowner that the motion for rehearing was denied. On February 7, 2007, the circuit court entered an order denying the City’s motion to dismiss.

The City thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, citing Spradlin v. Town of North Redington Beach, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 215 (6th Jud. Cir. Pinellas Co. Nov. 16, 2006), in which the circuit court in its appellate capacity concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order of a Code Enforcement Special Master where the Special Master considered an unauthorized motion for rehearing. The court in Spradlin relied on Rivers v. State, Department of Revenue, 508 So.2d 860, 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), for the proposition that there is no statute, rule or code provision authorizing a motion for rehearing directed to a final agency action. The circuit court in Sprad-lin noted that no statute, rule or code provision tolled the time for rendition of the original order, and the fact that the Special Master exercised its inherent authority to reduce the fine did not change the unauthorized motion for rehearing into an authorized motion that would extend the time to seek an appeal. After conducting a hearing, the circuit court denied the City’s motion for reconsideration.

Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution authorizes circuit court appellate jurisdiction for “direct review of administrative action prescribed by general law.” Section 162.11, Florida Statutes, specifically authorizes appeals of final administrative orders of enforcement boards to the circuit court. To determine whether the circuit court is properly exercising appellate jurisdiction, the issue is whether the Board’s order was subject to a motion for rehearing and, if so, whether the Landowner’s motion for rehearing tolled the time in which to file an appeal. See Miami-Dade County v. Peart, 843 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (under Rule 9.110 failure to file notice of appeal within 30-day period constitutes “irremediable jurisdictional defect”). If the Landowner’s motion for rehearing was authorized, the Landowner’s certiorari petition was timely filed based on the date the Landowner was notified of the denial of the rehearing motion. If the motion for rehearing was not authorized, the certiorari petition was untimely.

The Landowner acknowledges that there is no specific rule or statutory authority for the rehearing or reconsideration of a local administrative agency decision, but urges that the local agency, here the Board, had the inherent power and authority to rehear and reconsider a previously entered order. The Landowner relies on Mills v. Laris Painting Co., 125 So.2d 745 (Fla.1960), for the proposition that administrative agencies have the inherent or implied power to rehear or reopen a cause where the proceeding is essentially a judicial one.

The City argues that while the Board had the inherent authority to rehear or reconsider its decision, it had to exercise that authority before the period in which to seek an appeal expired. When the Board declined to alter its decision by denying the rehearing motion on August 9, 2006, the Landowner had three days left in which to commence an appeal.

In Rutledge v. County of Hillsborough, 2005 WL 2416976 (Fla. 13th Cir.Ct. Sept. 2, 2005), cited by the Landowner, the circuit court in its appellate capacity rejected an appellee’s argument that a notice of appeal filed after the denial of a motion for rehearing of a Code Enforcement Board order was untimely. In Rutledge, the County Code Enforcement Board on January 22, 2004, entered an order imposing a fíne for code violations. The order gave the landowners until March 16, 2004, to correct the violations. Subsequently, the Board filed a lien and imposed fines retroactive to March 16, 2004. The Board then entered an order on August 2, 2004, imposing a $13,300 fine and lien on the landowners’ property. The landowners filed a request for a reduction in the fines. The Board treated this request as a motion for rehearing and denied the request on September 22, 2004. The landowners then filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court on October 22, 2004. On appeal, the County argued, inter alia, that the notice of appeal was untimely as to the original January 22, 2004, order. The circuit court determined that the January 22, 2004, order was not a final agency action and that the action was not final until the August 2, 2004, order was entered. Without discussion, the circuit court held that the finality of the August 2, 2004, order was tolled by the filing of the landowners’ “motion for rehearing.” Therefore, the circuit court held that the notice of appeal was timely.

We think Spradlin is correct. A motion can suspend rendition of an order only if the motion is authorized under the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Forrest, 682 So.2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). A motion for rehearing does not suspend rendition of an administrative order because rehearing is not authorized in administrative proceedings. See Systems Mgmt. Assoc., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of H.R.S., 391 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (appeal of order of Division of Administrative Hearings hearing officer dismissed as untimely because motion for reconsideration directed to administrative hearing was unauthorized and did not toll rendition of original order); Taylor v. Dep’t of Prof. Reg. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 520 So.2d 557, 560 (Fla.1988) (administrative agency exercising its quasi-judicial power has inherent authority to change or modify final order within reasonable time but only for the purpose of correcting clerical errors or inadvertent mistake, and does not allow tolling of time as motion for rehearing); Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice, § 2.4 (2005).

The Landowner’s argument that the Board’s inherent authority to reconsider the original order authorized the motion for rehearing is unpersuasive. A lower “tribunal’s” inherent authority to reconsider an order does not transform a motion for rehearing into the kind of motion that suspends rendition. Only an “authorized and timely” motion for rehearing can toll the period for filing a notice of appeal. While a lower tribunal may have the power to reconsider an order, the filing of an unauthorized rehearing motion will not toll the time for filing an appeal. See Goodwin v. State, 826 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

The City is entitled to prohibition relief. We herewith issue the writ.

WRIT GRANTED.

PALMER, C.J., GRIFFIN and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a lower tribunal from improperly exercising jurisdiction. See Rice v. Freeman, 939 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Prohibition review of circuit court appellate jurisdiction to review untimely appeal of county court order); Miami-Dade County v. Peart, 843 So.2d 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (Prohibition granted prohibiting circuit court appellate division from considering untimely appeal from decision of administrative hearing officer); Goodwin v. State, 826 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (Prohibition granted directing circuit court to dismiss untimely appeal). See also Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 605 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1992) (Prohibition power exercised by supreme court to prevent DCA from considering untimely appeal).

      . The circuit court also decided that certiorari was not the appropriate remedy and that the Landowner's petition should be treated as a direct appeal. See Sarasota Co. v. Bow Point on Gulf Condo. Developers, LLC, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D2551, - So.2d -, 2007 WL 3120415 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 26, 2007).


text:
    Donald F. ESLINGER, Sheriff, etc., Appellant, v. Arnaldo MARTINEZ, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-659.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
    David Lane, Sanford, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PLEUS, J.

In this forfeiture action, Seminole County Sheriff Donald Eslinger appeals an order finding that Arnaldo Martinez was entitled to the return of $29,844.35 out of $56,144.35 seized. Eslinger argues that circumstantial evidence established probable cause to believe that the entire $56,144.35 was contraband. Based upon the low standard required at the adversarial preliminary hearing, we agree and reverse.

Eslinger filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of $56,144.35. The complaint alleged that in January 2006, the sheriffs office conducted a wiretap investigation regarding a drug trafficking organization in Longwood . and Altamonte Springs. Agents intercepted calls between Orestes Sutherland, Pablo Lewis and Arnaldo Martinez. Lewis and Martinez were directing Sutherland to deposit money into several bank accounts. Agents also learned that Lewis and Martinez supplied cannabis to Sutherland. On August 31, 2006, agents seized $56,144.35 from six bank accounts registered to Martinez.

Martinez requested an adversarial preliminary hearing to determine probable cause. At that hearing, Agent Daniel Moran testified that investigation revealed that Sutherland was a supplier of cannabis and Martinez was “higher up on the food chain.” Agents had court-ordered intercepts for the phones of Martinez and Sutherland. They intercepted and taped several calls between Martinez and Sutherland. In those conversations, Martinez directed Sutherland to deposit money in two accounts ending in 3857 and 6670. In one conversation, Martinez asked Sutherland to deposit $9,000 into one of his bank accounts ending in 3857. Agents later seized money in those two accounts.

They also seized a third Martinez account which contained a fixed-term CD. The money in the CD had been transferred from account number 6670, into which Sutherland had previously deposited money at Martinez’ direction. Moran stated that it was common practice for drug dealers to deposit cash in increments under $10,000 into bank accounts and later transfer that money into CDs. This system was used to avoid reporting requirements, avoid detection by law enforcement and make the money appear to be clean when the CDs matured.

Moran further testified that Martinez had a twenty-year history of drug trafficking. Martinez’ wage, hour and tax records showed no employment or taxes paid in Florida. Based on their observations and intercepted phone calls, agents believed Sutherland was receiving 200-pound shipments of cannabis on consignment, selling it and then depositing money into Martinez’ bank account. Martinez was later stopped on Interstate 10 escorting a vehicle containing 210 pounds of cannabis. Martinez was facing separate criminal charges as a result of this investigation.

Agent Edwin Santos testified that he monitored and translated around 100 phone calls from Spanish to English in this investigation. In those calls, Martinez and Sutherland discussed the sale and distribution of profits from cannabis. In one conversation, Martinez was insistent that Sutherland deposit no more than $9,000.

Megan Greer, records custodian at Bank of America, testified about deposits into three of Martinez’ accounts — 6670, 3857, and 6832. The deposits were all for $9,000 or less and totaled over $200,000. Any deposits of $10,000 or more in one day required a cash transaction report. None of the deposits into Martinez’ accounts generated cash transaction reports. . One of Martinez’ accounts was a $25,000 CD that was established from money transferred from account number 6670.

Orestes Sutherland testified that he delivered cannabis three times for Martinez and deposited money into Martinez’ accounts from the sale of that cannabis. Sutherland identified deposits he made into Martinez’ account from selling cannabis in the following amounts: $5,000, $5,000, $8,800, $4,500 and $4,000. They totaled $26,300. The trial court found probable cause as to the $26,300, but found that Martinez “is entitled to the return of $29,844.35 upon the finality of this order.”

Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) because the lower court ordered that Martinez was entitled to return of some of the money. See also Beary v. Bruce, 804 So.2d 579 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (finding jurisdiction to review appeal from a similar non-final forfeiture order because it required sheriff to return some, but not all, property to claimant).

Eslinger argues that the trial court erred in failing to find probable cause as to the entire amount seized because circumstantial evidence established that all of the money was linked to illegal drug sales and that evidence was unrefut-ed. The de novo standard applies to reviewing a lower court’s probable cause determination in a forfeiture proceeding. City of Coral Springs v. Forfeiture of A 1997 Ford Ranger Pickup Truck VIN#1FTCR10A4VTA62475 FL Tag 3U16BDE, 803 So.2d 847, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA2002).

Section 932.701(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), defines contraband as including:

[CJurreney or other means of exchange that was used, was attempted to be used, or was intended to be used in violation of any provision of chapter 893, if the totality of the facts presented by the state is clearly sufficient to meet the state’s burden of establishing probable cause to believe that a nexus exists between the article seized and the narcotics activity, whether or not the use of the contraband article can be traced to a specific narcotics transaction.

(Emphasis added).

In In re Forfeiture of One Hundred Seventy-One Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($171,900) in U.S. Currency, 711 So.2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court noted that probable cause for forfeiture may be established by circumstantial and hearsay evidence. In a footnote, the court further explained:

The standard of probable cause to support a forfeiture is less rigorous than that required to prove criminal conduct. For forfeiture, the question is not whether, in fact, the currency or property was used in (or the proceeds of) criminal activity. Rather, the question is whether there is sufficient probability to warrant a reasonable belief that that currency was connected to criminal activity. See e.g., [U.S. v.] Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d at [1276] 1282 [ (9th Cir.1983) ]; United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 234 (9th Cir.1978); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

Id. n. 8 (emphasis in original).

In the instant case, Eslinger presented testimony and documentary evidence directly linking $23,600 to illegal drug sales. The question is whether there was probable cause to believe the remaining $29,844.35 was also used in illegal drug sales.

The unrefuted evidence established that Martinez lived in Florida but had no record of working or paying taxes in Florida. Despite a lack of work history, Martinez had several bank accounts into which a total of over $200,000 was deposited in a one-year period. All of this money was deposited in increments of $9,000 or less, which is a common technique used by drug dealers to avoid reporting requirements and detection by law enforcement.

Of the $56,144.35 seized, $26,300 was directly linked to cannabis sales by Sutherland. In addition, a $25,000 CD was established from an account into which Sutherland had deposited drug money. Agent Moran testified that drug dealers commonly moved money around in bank accounts to avoid detection and into CDs to launder it. Eslinger notes that under federal forfeiture law, “when a claimant to a forfeiture action has actual knowledge, at any time prior to the initiation of the forfeiture proceeding, that claimant’s legitimate funds are commingled with drug proceeds, traceable in accord with the forfeiture statute, the legitimate funds are subject to forfeiture.” U.S. v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla., 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991). This rule of law is consistent with section 932.701(2)(a), which expressly states that probable cause may be established “whether or not the use of the contraband article can be traced to a specific narcotics transaction.”

We conclude that while the remaining $29,844.35 was not directly traced to a specific narcotics transaction, there was a “sufficient probability to warrant a reasonable belief’ that this money resulted from illegal drug sales. There was no evidence presented to suggest anything otherwise.

REVERSED.

GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


author: GRIFFIN, J.

text:
    D.D., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-1317.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   GRIFFIN, J.

Appellant, D.D., appeals the disposition order finding her guilty of battery and placing her on probation until her nineteenth birthday. D.D. contends that it is apparent on the face of the record that D.D.’s trial counsel was ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

The crux of D.D.’s appeal goes to the failure of her trial counsel to move for a judgment of dismissal. We find no error and affirm. The trial court correctly ruled that the testimony of the mother, coupled with the admission of D.D., were sufficient to support the battery adjudication. See, e.g., Wingfield v. State, 751 So.2d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Clark v. State, 746 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State v. Roux, 702 So.2d 240 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Malczewski v. State, 444 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Carl Junices BRYAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-6740.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Fuller v. State, 748 So.2d 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

BROWNING, C.J., KAHN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lawrence DIGSBY, Petitioner, v. James R. McDONOUGH, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, and Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Respondents.
    No. 1D07-5804.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
    Lawrence Digsby, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits.

ALLEN, DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jose A. VAZQUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-3170.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 11, 2007.
    Jose A. Vazquez, Jasper, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

See Seward v. State, 937 So.2d 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Smith v. State, 886 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA), cause dismissed, 902 So.2d 792 (2004).

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lee A. TURNER a/k/a Dexter Tookes, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-1173.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 11, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Henry T. Swann, III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Grice v. State, 967 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

PALMER, C.J., GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.


text:
    Julian BURNSIDE, Appellant, v. MEDER SEPTIC TANK CO., INC. and Roger Meder, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-1119.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 11, 2007.
    Thomas E. Mooney and John V. Colvin of Mooney Colvin, P.L., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Katherine E. McKinley of Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Tractor Supply Co. v. Kent, 966 So.2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

ORFINGER, MONACO and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leander BLETCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-3573.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 11, 2007.
    Leander L. Bletcher, Orlando, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Miller v. State, 814 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

PLEUS, ORFINGER and MONACO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael A. HOWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-3695.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 11, 2007.
    Michael A. Howard, Raiford, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See McFarland v. State, 808 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

ORFINGER, MONACO and LAWSON, JJ., concur.