text:
    In re Lawrence H. MARTIN, Jr.
    No. 2006-B-2948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 2007.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_J^This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Lawrence H. Martin, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently ineligible to practice.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In 2002, Victor Baldovino hired respondent to represent him in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. He paid respondent $600 plus court costs. Respondent filed the bankruptcy petition, but the trustee objected. Respondent failed to inform Mr. Baldovino of the objection and the requirement that he pay pursuant to the bankruptcy plan. The court denied the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan on July 23, 2002. Mr. Baldovino believed respondent would amend the plan. However, the amendment was not filed. Therefore, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss, which was set for hearing on August 20, 2002. Respondent failed to inform Mr. Baldovino of the hearing. He also failed to object to the motion. Consequently, Mr. Baldovi-no’s case was dismissed. During this time period, Mr. Baldovino attempted to contact respondent but was unsuccessful.

| ^Subsequently, Mr. Baldovino hired other counsel to represent him. His new counsel filed another bankruptcy petition, and his bankruptcy plan was eventually approved.

On August 12, 2003, Mr. Baldovino forwarded a certified letter to respondent, which included an itemization of costs totaling $3,400, which he incurred due to respondent’s negligence. On November 3, 2003, respondent forwarded Mr. Baldovino a $1,000 check and indicated he would make two more monthly payments to pay the balance. However, he failed to make the rest of the payments.

In December 2003, the ODC forwarded respondent notice of Mr. Baldovino’s complaint against him via certified mail. Respondent failed to respond to the notice or a follow-up letter also sent via certified mail. The ODC’s further efforts to contact respondent were unsuccessful.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After investigation of Mr. Baldovino’s complaint, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(f)(6) (failure to account for or refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent was served with the formal charges via certified mail delivered on March 24, 2005. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court | aRule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

1) Mr. Baldovino hired respondent to file a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition in January 2002 and paid him a $600 fee plus costs;
2) Respondent filed the bankruptcy petition, and the bankruptcy trustee filed an objection to same;
3) Respondent did not advise Mr. Bal-dovino of the objection or the fact that he had to remit payments pursuant to the bankruptcy plan;
4) The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan in July 2002;
5) Respondent did not file an amended plan as Mr. Baldovino believed he would;
6) The trustee filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy, and same was set for hearing on August 20, 2002;
7) Respondent did not file an opposition to the motion, and the bankruptcy case was dismissed;
8) Respondent consistently failed to respond to Mr. Baldovino’s numerous attempts to contact him;
|49) Mr. Baldovino was required to retain new counsel, incurring additional expenses;
10) On December 19, 2002, Mr. Baldovi-no’s new counsel filed another Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, and the plan was subsequently approved;
11) Respondent sent a letter to Mr. Bal-dovino’s new counsel proposing to pay $3,400 in three monthly installments to reimburse Mr. Baldovino for his additional expenses; however, respondent defaulted on the proposed payment plan; and
12) Respondent failed to cooperate in any way with the ODC.

Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee also determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of Mr. Baldovino’s complaint. Respondent’s conduct caused substantial harm to Mr. Bal-dovino in that he incurred additional expenses and time delays in his bankruptcy matter. Relying upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is a period of suspension.

In aggravation, the committee found the following to be present: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of |slaw (admitted 1981), indifference to making restitution, and ineligibility to practice law. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

Considering the prior jurisprudence of this court involving misconduct similar to that at issue in the instant case, the com■mittee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board determined that respondent violated Rules 1.3,1.4,1.16(d), and 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board determined there is no basis for a finding that respondent failed to refund an unearned fee in light of Mr. Baldovino’s admission in his sworn statement that respondent refunded $800 to him.

The board further determined that respondent violated duties owed to his client and as a professional. Respondent acted knowingly and caused actual harm to his client. He also caused harm to the disciplinary system by delaying the resolution of the complaint. Pursuant to the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the baseline sanction is a period of suspension.

The board found the aggravating factors of prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, indifference |fito making restitution, and ineligibility to practice law. The board found no mitigating factors.

Considering the facts of this case, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

|7The deemed admitted facts in this matter indicate that respondent neglected Mr. Baldovino’s bankruptcy matter, failed to communicate with him, failed to protect his interests upon termination of the representation, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. In acting as he did, respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), and 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found professional misconduct, the sole issue presented for our determination is the appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent violated duties owed to his client and as a professional. He acted knowingly, and his misconduct caused harm to his client. The ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions establish a period of suspension as the baseline sanction for this type of misconduct.

The record supports the following aggravating factors: prior disciplinary offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. There are no mitigating factors.

Like the committee and the board, we agree that respondent’s conduct resulted in considerable harm, both in delay and additional expense, to Mr. Baldovino. Although respondent filed the initial bankruptcy petition for Mr. Baldovino, he took |Rno further action in the case, which was ultimately dismissed by the court. Mr. Baldovino was forced to retain new counsel and spend more than $3,000 in expenses to complete what appears to be a relatively uncomplicated bankruptcy.

Additionally, respondent has been rather cavalier with regard to his professional obligations. As previously noted, respondent has been ineligible to practice law based on non-payment of bar dues since 2004 and ineligible to practice law based on failure to comply with his continuing legal education requirements since 2006. Respondent’s inattention to his professional responsibilities reinforces the conclusion that he has little concern for the duties he owes to his clients and the legal profession.

Under all these circumstances, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Lawrence H. Martin, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 8992, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

JOHNSON, J., would suspend one year and one day.

      . Respondent has been ineligible to practice law since September 7, 2004 for failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. Respondent has also been ineligible to practice law since July 27, 2006 for failing to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements.

      . In May 1997, respondent was admonished for violating Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. JOHNSON, Justice, CALOGERO, Chief Justice, TRAYLOR, J., WEIMER, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    W.R.M. v. H.C.V and M.J.V.
    No. 2006-CA-0702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 2007.
    James O. Middleton, II, for Appellant.
    Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Steven W. Hale & Associates, Steven W. Hale, Lake Charles, Carla F. Chrisco, Terrell D. Fowler, Lake Charles, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

JjOn July 7, 2003, W.R.M. filed a “Petition to Establish Filiation” against H.C.V. and M.J.V., alleging that he is the biological father of A.M.V as a result of an adulterous affair between H.C.V. and W.R.M. In response, H.C.V. and M.J.V. filed exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription. While these exceptions were pending, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 530 of 2004, which enacted La. Civ.Code art. 191. H.C.V. and M.J.V. filed supplemental exceptions based on the application of La. Civ.Code art. 191, arguing that W.R.M. failed to comply with the two-year peremptive period set forth in the article and thus he had no right or cause of action to continue his avowal action.

The district court granted the exceptions of no right of action, no cause of action, and prescription. W.R.M. appealed the judgment to the court of appeal. The court of appeal reversed the district court, thereby declaring the retroactive application of La. Civ.Code art. 191 to be unconstitutional.

H.C.V. and M.J.V. appealed that judgment to this court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(d). We render the following decree.

DECREE

The judgment of the court of appeal is vacated and set aside. W.R.M.’s petition to establish filiation is dismissed with prejudice.

JOHNSON, J., CALOGERO, C.J., and TRAYLOR and WEIMER, JJ„ additionally concur and assign reasons.

KIMBALL, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by CALOGERO, C.J.

JOHNSON, Justice,

concurring.

hi concur with the per curiam opinion vacating and setting aside the judgment of the court of appeal, and dismissing W.R.M.’s Petition to Establish Filiation, with prejudice. In my view, the trial court correctly granted the exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action and prescription. The retroactive application of LSA-C.C. art. 191 was not uneonstitu-tional in this case because W.R.M. did not have a vested right to bring an avowal action, as he did not file his avowal action within a reasonable time, nor did he have an actual relationship with A.M.V. Thus, W.R.M.’s claim is perempted by LSA-C.C. art. 191. In addition, I believe that W.R.M.’s avowal action was prescribed even before LSA-C.C. art. 191 was enacted, because it was not filed within a “reasonable time” as required by Louisiana’s jurisprudence prior to the enactment of LSA-C.C. art 191.

Procedural History

This action began on July 7, 2003, when W.R.M. filed a “Petition to Establish Filiation” against H.C.V. and M.J.V., alleging that he is the biological father ofj^A.M.V. The petition requested that A.M.V. be subjected to DNA testing to determine his biological parentage, and sought a judgment declaring W.R.M. to be the father of the child.

In response, H.C.V. and M.J.V. filed exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription. While these exceptions were pending, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 530 of 2004, which enacted LSA-C.C. art. 191. This article provided that an action to establish paternity of a child who is presumed to be the child of another man must be instituted within two years of the child’s birth. The article was effective on June 25, 2004, but deemed to apply retroactively to all pending cases. H.C.V. and M.J.V. filed supplemental exceptions based on the application of LSA-C.C. art. 191. W.R.M. then filed a supplemental and amending petition, pleading the unconstitutionality of Act 530. W.R.M. argued that the retroactive application of C.C. art. 191 would deprive him of a vested right to pursue his avowal action. H.C.V. and M.J.V. opposed the plea of unconstitutionality.

After a hearing, the trial court denied W.R.M.’s plea of unconstitutionality and proceeded to grant H.C.V. and MJ.V.’s exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription. W.R.M. appealed the trial court’s decision to overrule his challenge to the constitutionality of LSA-C.C. art. 191 and the court’s decision to grant H.C.V. and M.J.V.’s exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription.

The court of appeal reversed and remanded the matter, thereby declaring the retroactive application of LSA-C.C. art. 191 to be unconstitutional. The court of appeal found that, prior to the passage of LSA-C.C. art. 191, plaintiff had a vested | sright to bring an avowal action. Thus, the court of appeal concluded that at the time W.R.M. filed his suit, he had a vested right to sue to avow paternity, and retroactive application of LSA-C.C. art 191 was an unconstitutional abridgment of his right to due process. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment which granted the exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and prescription. I believe that the court erred in its decision and reasoning.

The Avowal Action

Louisiana Law provides a presumption of paternity to the husband of the mother when a child is born during the marriage. LSA-C.C. art. 185. While Louisiana’s Civil Code previously provided that this presumption could be rebutted by the husband pursuant to LSA-C.C. arts. 187, there was no statutory means provided for a purported biological father to recognize his illegitimate child prior to the enactment of LSAC.C. art. 191 in 2004.

As a result of this absence of statutory authority, Louisiana courts established the avowal action. This judicially recognized cause of action enabled biological fathers to establish their paternity of their illegitimate children. T.D. v. M.M.M., 1998-0167 (La.3/2/99), 730 So.2d 873 [citing Peyton v. Peyton, 92-107 (La.App. 3rd Cir.2/3/93), 614 So.2d 185; Geen v. Geen, 95-984 (La.App. 3rd Cir.12/27/95), 666 So.2d 1192, 1195, writ den. 96-0201 (La.3/22/96); 669 So.2d 1224; Putnam v. Mayeaux, 93-1251 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1223; Chandler v. Grass, 600 So.2d 852 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992) ].

Thus, a biological father could assert an avowal action despite the |4presumption of LSA-C.C. art. 184 that the mother’s husband is the father of all children born or conceived during the marriage. This created the potential of “dual paternity,” whereby the mother’s husband is the child’s legal father, but the biological father may also assert some parental rights.

In T.D. v. M.M.M., supra, this Court explained the rationale behind the “dual paternity” doctrine by noting policy factors which favored allowing a biological father to avow his child where such action will result in dual paternity. First, the Court observed that a biological father is susceptible to suit for child support. Secondly, a child may seek to filiate to his biological father in order to receive wrongful death benefits or inheritance rights. Thus, this Court reasoned that “[i]t seems only fair, in light of the obligations to which a biological father is susceptible and the multitude of benefits available to the biological child due to the biological line, that the biological father should be afforded at least an opportunity to prove his worthiness to participate in the child’s life.” T.D., 730 So.2d at 876. However, this Court also recognized that an avowal action must be asserted in a timely manner, and that a biological father who cannot meet the best interest of the child standard, retains his obligation of support, but cannot claim the privilege of parental rights. Id.

When W.R.M.’s “Petition to Establish Filation” was filed, there was no statutory time limitation for filing an avowal action. An action for avowal was a judicially-recognized action only, which was required to be filed within a reasonable period of time. On June 25, 2004, while W.R.M.’s action was pending before the trial court, 2004 La. Acts 530, which enacted LSA-C.C. art. 191, became effective. This article generally provided for a two-year | ¿peremptive period for bringing an avowal action.

On June 29, 2005, while W.R.M.’s appeal was pending in the Third Circuit, 2005 La. Acts. No. 192, which enacted LSA-C.C. art. 198, became effective. | (¡This article reduced the peremptive time period for bringing an avowal action from two years to one year.

On March 1, 2006, well after the effective date of Act 192, the court of appeal rendered its decision in this case, and concluded that “retroactive application of LSA-C.C. art. 191 is an unconstitutional abridgement of a right to due process.”

In my view, the legislature clearly established its intent that Article 191 should be applied both prospectively and retroactively. Thus, LSA-C.C. art. 191 applies to W.R.M/s avowal action unless retroactive application would violate the constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual or vested rights.

Due Process

This Court in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2000-1528 (La.4/3/01), 783 So.2d 1251 held that when a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. Under Louisiana law, a cause of action accrues when a party has the right to sue. Id. at 1259.

A “vested right” is “that case when the right to enjoyment, present or ^prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit .... does not constitute a vested right.” Sawicki v. K/S Stavanger Prince, 2001-0528 (La.12/7/01), 802 So.2d 598, 604 (Emphasis added).

In this matter, I am of the opinion that W.R.M. did not have a vested right to pursue his avowal action. While I acknowledge that prior to the enactment of LSA-C.C. art. 191 there was no set prescriptive period for bringing an avowal action, the right to pursue such an action was not absolute. The jurisprudence provided that an avowal action had to be brought “promptly” or within a “reasonable time,” and other issues such as the actual relationship with the child and the child’s best interests must be considered.

|sThe United States Supreme Court has considered the rights of biological fathers in several cases. I derive from this jurisprudence that a biological father’s factual relationship with his child is of far greater significance than his biological relationship.

Thus, based on the above jurisprudence, it is my belief that W.R.M. did not have a complete and unconditional right to pursue his avowal action. I am of the opinion that the right of avowal is not absolute, and that it is the actual relationship with the child, and the timing of the action that are determinative. Because W.R.M. had no vested right to pursue his avowal action, I believe that the trial court correctly applied LSAC.G. art. 191 .retroactively to W.R.M.’s claim. Thus, W.R.M.’s avowal action is perempted based on the two-year time period imposed by that article. I further believe that W.R.M.’s avowal action is prescribed even if Article 191 is not retroactively applied.

Exception of Prescription

I agree with the trial court’s determination that W.R.M. did not file his action within a reasonable time. The record reflects that W.R.M. was aware of the possibility that he was A.M.V.’s father from the moment that H.C.V. told him that she was pregnant, because of their ongoing sexual relationship. While there has been no determinative DNA testing, it is clear from the evidence and testimony | inthat W.R.M. suspected from the beginning that A.M.V. was his biological son. In addition, the record is replete with evidence that H.C.V. suspected that W.R.M. might be the biological father. Despite these suspicions, W.R.M. did nothing to hold A.M.V. out as his son until late 2002, nor did he pursue an avowal action prior to 2003, when A.M.V. was almost nine years old. It is clear from the record that W.R.M. did not enjoy an actual father-son relationship, or a substantial relationship of any quality, with A.M.V. While W.R.M. did see A.M.V. during the course of his affair with H.C.V., after reviewing the evidence, I am convinced that these “visits” were primarily attributable to the convenience of H.C.V. and W.R.M. so that they could create opportunities to pursue their sexual relationship, rather than for the purpose of W.R.M. and A.M.V. fostering a father-son relationship.

I am mindful of the fact that A.M.V. is apparently unaware of the possibility of W.R.M.’s paternity. Considering that A.M.V. is twelve years old at this point in time, and considering that he is living with both H.C.V. and M.J.V., who he believes are his parents, it would not be in the best interests of A.M.V. to allow W.R.M. to pursue an avowal action. I agree with the reasoning set forth in Revision Comment (e) to Article 198: “Requiring that the biological father institute the avowal action quickly is intended to protect the child from the upheaval of such litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and presumed father or may have become attached over many years to the man presumed to be his father.” Allowing W.R.M. to pursue an avowal action at this point in time would be harmful to the innocent child, A.M.V.

\ ^Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action

In addition, I believe that the trial court properly granted the exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the legal sufficiency of the petition. Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La.1989). The function of an exception of no right of action is to question whether a particular litigant who has set forth a cause of action is the proper party to judicially enforce the cause of action asserted. Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary, 2005-2364 (La.10/15/06), 939 So.2d 1206.

The two-year time period set forth in Article 191 (and the one-year time period set forth in Article 198) are peremptive in nature. Our Civil Code defines peremption as “a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period.” LSA-C.C. art. 3458. Peremption, unlike prescription, destroys the right. Because I believe that the trial court properly applied Article 191 retroactively, W.R.M.’s cause of action ceased to exist two years after A.M.V.’s birth, and he no longer had a right to assert such an action. Thus, the Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action were correctly granted.

For these reasons, I concur with the per curiam opinion.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

additionally concurring.

L In T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167 (La.3/2/99), 730 So.2d 873, a majority of this court recognized that the alleged biological father has standing to bring an avowal action and found, under the facts of that case, that the doctrine of laches did not bar the alleged biological father from bringing such an action six and one-half years after the birth of the child. Thus, under T.D. v. M.M.M., the right of the alleged biological father to bring an avowal action prior to Act 530 of 2004 was required to be exercised within a reasonable period of time lest the doctrine of laches bar the filing of his action.

I dissented in T.D. v. M.M.M. because I believed the alleged biological father had no standing to bring an avowal action, as no statutory or codal authority then granted him standing to rebut the presumption of paternity set forth in La. Civ.Code art. 184 (now La. Civ.Code art. 185, enacted by Acts 2005, No. 192, eff. June 29, 2005). 98-0167, 730 So.2d at 879, Calogero, C.J., dissenting. In my view, the Civil Code then granted only the child the right to seek dual paternity. Id.

Nonetheless, applying the court’s holding in T.D. v. M.M.M. to the facts of the instant case — and I see no reason not to do so, I find that any right to bring an avowal action W.R.M. may have possessed prior to the enactment of La. Civ.Code art. 191 by Act 530 of 2004 (now La. Civ.Code art. 198, enacted by Acts 2005, No. 192, eff. June 29, 2005), had prescribed, or was barred by the doctrine of laches as employed |gin T.D. v. M.M.M., when he filed his petition in July 2003 nearly nine years after the birth of the child in September 1994. Thus, the trial court correctly maintained the defendants’ exception of prescription. Accordingly, it was unnecessary in my view for the court of appeal to reach the issue of whether the retroactive application of Act 530 of 2004 divested W.R.M. of a substantive property right and deprived him of the due process of law.

TRAYLOR, J.,

concurring.

hi concur in the result for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer. I write additionally to state that although the Court determined, in T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167, (La.3/2/99); 730 So.2d 873, an opinion which I authored, that the doctrine of lach-es was applicable in paternity cases in “rare and extraordinary circumstances,” I have reassessed that reasoning and now believe that the ten-year prescriptive period contained in C.C. art. 3499 creates a more appropriate and ascertainable period of time.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring.

hi concur in the result.

A biological father’s cause of action to avow his child has its basis in constitutional rights. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ... ‘basic civil rights of man.’ ”) As such, an avowal action is based on rights which flow from the Constitution.

Consequently, it is unnecessary for the legislature to establish an avowal action. Louisiana courts have recognized a right which already exists. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167, p. 3 (La.3/2/99), 730 So.2d 873, 875, citing Peyton v. Peyton, 92-107 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/93), 614 So.2d 185; Geen v. Geen, 95-984 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/27/95), 666 So.2d 1192, writ denied, 96-0201 (La.3/22/96), 669 So.2d 1224; Putnam v. Mayeaux, 93-1251 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1223; Chandler v. Grass, 600 So.2d 852 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). In the absence of legislation prohibiting the avowal action or limiting the action, this court is well within its ^authority to recognize the existence of the avowal action. Constitutional rights can exist as substantive rights although not legislatively recognized.

In T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167, 730 So.2d 873, the court, believing that no prescriptive period existed, resorted to the application of the doctrine of laches. I believe the court fell into error in the establishment of a reasonable period of time for bringing the avowal action. Instead of resorting to laches to create a reasonable period of time for bringing an avowal action, the court should have consulted the Louisiana Civil Code which prescribes a 10-year period of time. LSA-C.C. art. 3499. See also, Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, 04-2482 (La.4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260, in which this court repudiated the doctrine of laches.

Thus, I would apply Article 3499 for determining the appropriate prescriptive period. As such, I believe it is erroneous to state W.R.M.’s avowal action is prescribed. Because the avowal action was filed within 10 years of the birth of the child, the matter was not prescribed when filed. However, LSA-C.C. art. 198 has specifically designated a peremptive period in which an avowal action may be asserted:

A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a child at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is strictly personal.
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or Lwithin ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs.
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one year from the day of the death of the child.
The time periods in this Article are peremptive. [Emphasis supplied.]

Because of the time frames presented by the instant case, it is significant that the legislature specified that this provision is to be applied retroactively. Consequently, it must be determined whether this alleged father had a vested right such that the retroactive application of the provision would be prohibited.

As Justice Knoll noted in her concurrence in T.D. v. 98-0167 at 2-3, 730 So.2d at 878:

[T]he Court concluded that the biological father’s “substantive rights were not violated by application of a ‘best interests of the child’ standard.” [Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).] ... In Quilloin, the best interests of the child trumped the biological father’s interests. Where a marital unit is intact, the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the marital family may also silence a biological father’s competing interest. Id.; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551.

The unwed biological father’s substantive rights were further defined in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The Court explained that something more than genes was necessary for the biological father to preserve his rights. Lehr focused on the biological father’s “grasp[ing the] opportunity and accepting] some measure of responsibility for the child’s future.” Id. at 262, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614. Only then did the Federal Constitution require a State to provide a forum for the unwed father to voice his opinion as to what was in his natural child’s best interest. Id. The Lehr Court was most concerned with whether the State had “adequately protected his opportunity to form such a relationship.” Id. at 264, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614.

In this matter, the trial court analyzed the relationship that existed between W.R.M. and the child in order to deter-mine whether W.R.M.’s argument that I retroactive application of legislation would deprive him of a vested right was meritorious and thus application of the legislative bar was constitutionally prohibited. I do not believe that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its determination that W.R.M. did not adequately establish a relationship with the child such that his rights were vested. The trial court found that W.R.M. established only a “casual acquaintance” with the child and referred to a “lack of relationship” between the child and W.R.M. The trial court also found the child does not know of W.R.M.’s potential paternity, noted the limited interaction between W.R.M. and the child, and observed that inaction by W.R.M almost spanned a decade.

The right of avowal is not absolute; it is the relationship with the child that is determinative, not mere biological connection. Geen, 95-984 at 3, 666 So.2d at 1194; see also, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2344, 105 L.Ed.2d 91(1989), which held that the non-spouse’s claims of parental rights to a child born into a marriage are “not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.”

In sum, because the retroactive application of LSA-C.C. art. 198 does not impact a vested right based on the facts of this case, I would find the matter perempted.

      . The "Petition to' Establish Filiation” was properly considered an "avowal action” by the lower courts.

        . W.R.M v. H.C.V. & M.J.V., 05-425 (La. App.3Cir.3/1/06) 923 So.2d 911.

      .LSA-C.C. art. 185 provides in pertinent part: “The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the marriage.” This presumption was previously codified in LSA-C.C. art. 184. For a detailed history of this presumption see T.D.
        v. M.M.M., 98-0167 at 1-4 (Kimball, Justice dissenting), 730 So.2d at 880-882.

      . LSA-C.C. art. 187 provides in pertinent part: “The husband may disavow paternity of the child by clear and convincing evidence that he is not the father.”

      . Act 530 of 2004 provided, in pertinent part:
      Section 1. Civil Code Article 191 is hereby enacted to read as follows:
      Art. 191. Father’s action to establish paternity; time period.
      A man may establish his paternity of a child presumed to be the child of another man even though the presumption has not been rebutted.
      This action shall be instituted within two years from the date of birth of the child, except as may otherwise be provided by law. Nonetheless, if the mother in bad faith deceives the father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the date the father knew or should have known of his paternity, but no more than ten years from the date of the birth of the child.

        Section 2. R.S. 9:395.1 is hereby enacted to read as follows:
      § 395.1 Exception to time limitation for establishment of paternity
      The two-year peremptive period in Civil Code Article 191 shall not apply to the Department of Social Services providing services in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 666.
      Section 3. The provisions of this Act shall be applied both prospectively and retroactively and shall be applied to all pending claims.
      (Emphasis added).

      . Act 192 of 2005 provided, in pertinent part: Section 1. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Title VII of Book I of the Civil Code, presently comprised of Articles 178 through 211, are hereby amended and reenacted to comprise Chapters 1 and 2 of Title VII of Book I of the Civil Code, consisting of Articles 184 through 198, to read as follows:

      Art. 198. Father’s action to establish paternity; time period
      A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a child at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is strictly personal.
      If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action shall be instituted within two years one year from the day of the birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs.
      In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one year from the day of the death of the child.
      The time periods in this Article are peremp-tive.

      Section 3. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending on its effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after its effective date.
      (Emphasis added)

      . While the court of appeal applied LSA-C.C. art 191, the application of either Article 191 or Article 198 would serve as a time bar to W.R.M.’s action.

      . In Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), the court allowed an avowal action where the alleged biological father had no actual relationship with the child, but where the action was instituted within three months of the child's birth. While the court recognized the right to avowal, it held that the right should not be absolute. The court stated: “The line of cases which have expanded the rights of illegitimate fathers are quite consistent in the holding that it is the actual relationship with the child that is determinative, not the mere biological connection where the biological father has chosen not to timely develop it. Thus a biological father who knows or has reason to know of the existence of his biological child and who fails to assert his rights for a significant period of time cannot later come forward and assert paternity.” Smith, 566 So.2d at 414. (Emphasis added).
      In Putnam v. Mayeaux, 93-1251 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/10/94), 645 So.2d 1223, the court held that an avowal action filed one year and three days following the birth of the child was filed within a reasonable time. The Court cited earlier cases for the proposition that the right to avowal should not be absolute, and that it is the actual relationship with the child that is determinative. The court also quoted approvingly other jurisprudence holding that a biological father who knows, or has reason to know, of the existence of his biological child and who fails to assert his rights for significant period of time, cannot later come forward and assert paternity. (Emphasis added).
      In Geen v. Geen, 95-984 (La.App. 3rd Cir.12/27/95), 666 So.2d 1192, the Court held that biological fathers who meet certain prerequisites have a right of avowal. The court determined that under the particular facts of that case, the biological father's avowal action, filed nineteen months after the child's birth, was filed within a reasonable time. The Court reasoned that a right of avowal is not absolute, and that it is the actual relationship with the child that is determinative, not the mere biological connection. Geen, 666 So.2d at 1194. The Court agreed with earlier jurisprudence which held that a biological father who knows, or has reason to know, of the existence of his biological child, and who fails to assert his rights for a significant period of time, cannot later come forward and assert paternity. Id. (Emphasis added).
      In Bolden v. Rodgers, 99-417 (La.App. 5th Cir.9/28/99), 746 So.2d 88, the Court recognized that the right to avowal is not absolute, and that it is the relationship with the child that is determinative, not the mere biological connection. Thus a biological father who knows, or has reason to know, of the existence of his biological child and who fails to assert his rights for a significant period of time cannot later come forward and assert paternity. (Emphasis added).

        In Parker v. Buteau, 1999-519 (La.App. 3rd Cir.10/13/99), 746 So.2d 127, the court considered the timeliness of an avowal action brought eleven years after the child's birth. The alleged father had argued that he was in a continuous relationship with the mother from the time the child was born, and was promised by the mother that he would be allowed to raise the child. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of an exception of prescription, reasoning that the alleged biological father failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why he waited eleven years to bring the avowal action. The Court noted that although a biological father has a right to bring an avowal action despite the presumption in LSA-C.C. 184, the jurisprudence requires that the action be brought promptly. Parker, 746 So.2d at 129. The Court also recognized that the greater the period of time which elapses from the child's birth to the bringing of the action, the less favorably such an action should be viewed. Id. (Emphasis added).
      In Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989), this Court recognized the importance of the relationship with the child when analyzing a biological father's rights. This Court noted that “[w]hen they have shown an actual relationship with their illegitimate child, biological fathers have received substantial protection and recognition of their due process and substantive rights through the United States Supreme Court.” Smith, 553 So.2d at 851.

      . The Court first considered the Due Process rights of biological fathers in Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), wherein the Court struck down an Illinois statute which established an irrebutta-ble presumption that fathers of illegitimate children were unfit to have custody of those children. Thus, such children were automatically made wards of the state upon the mother's death, and the biological father’s relationship with the child was not considered. Mr. Stanley had lived and cared for his children for their entire lives, but had no opportunity to show his fitness as a parent. The Court noted that "[t]he right to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ’basic civil rights of man,’ ” and, thus, the State could not deprive the unwed biological father of his children without due process. The Court held that parents in Mr. Stanley’s position were constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before custody of the children could be taken away by the state.
      The unwed father's substantive rights were also recognized in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) in which the Court held that the biological father’s "substantive rights were not violated by application of a ‘best interests of the child' standard.” The Quilloin Court upheld a Georgia statute which allowed illegitimate children to be adopted without the consent of the biological father. The father in Quilloin had an opportunity to legitimate his child before the adoption, and object to the adoption, but failed to do so. Thus, the adoption issue was resolved according to the best interest of the child.
      A biological father’s substantive rights were further defined in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The Lehr Court was most concerned with whether the State had "adequately protected his opportunity to form such a relationship.” Id. at 264, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614. The Court explained that "the significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993.
      More recently, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), the Court considered the constitutionality of a California statute which provided that a child bom to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited circumstances. The Court held that the presumption in the statute did not infringe upon the due process rights of another man who wanted to establish his paternity of such a child. In Michael H., the biological father argued that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the parental relationship he had established with the child, and that protection of the mother and husband's marital union was an insufficient state interest to support termination of that relationship. In a plurality opinion, the Court disagreed and held that the biological father failed to meet his burden of proving that his claimed liberty interest was "one so deeply imbedded with society’s traditions as to be a fundamental right.” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. at 2336.

      . W.R.M.’s action would also be perempted pursuant to the one-year period set forth in LSA-C.C. 198.

      . See Justice Johnson’s concurrence for the factual and procedural history. Johnson, J. concurring, pp. 1-3.

      . LSA-C.C. art. 3499 provides:
      Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a liberative prescription of ten years.

      . See 2005 La. Acts No. 192 § 3, which declares that the provisions of this Act “shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending on its effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after its effective date.”

      . Although the trial court ruled W.R.M.'s avowal action was prescribed, the legislature indicated that Article 191 (now Article 198) actually provided for peremption. See LSA-R.S. 9:395.1 ("The two-year peremptive period in Civil Code Article 191 shall not apply to the Department of Social Services providing services in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 666.”) (Emphasis supplied.)


author: GAIDRY, J.

text:
    Wayne TEMPLET v. The STATE OF LOUISIANA Through The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, V.J. Bella and W.R. Whittington.
    No. 2005 CA 1903.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Nov. 3, 2006.

      Mark E. Falcon, Daniel L. Avant, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Wayne Templet.
    Amanda G. Clark, Shelly D. Dick, Jason A. Bonaventure, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants State of Louisiana through Department of Public Safety and Corrections, V.J. Bella, and W.R. Whit-tington.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   GAIDRY, J.

12This appeal challenges a grant of a partial summary judgment deciding some, but not all, of the liability issues presented to the trial court. We conclude that the certification of the judgment as final and appealable pursuant to Article 1915(B) of the Code of Civil Procedure was improper, and we dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2000, Wayne Templet filed this lawsuit against his former employer, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, its appointing authority, W.R. Whittington, and V.J. Bella, the State Fire Marshall. Therein, he averred that he was terminated from his position in the Fire Marshall’s office in violation of his constitutional right of free speech. Templet sought reinstatement to his former position, and to recover lost wages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, credits and emoluments of his position, as well as attorney fees.

Some of the facts forming the basis of this litigation are undisputed. .From late 1996 through October of 1998, Templet authored and disseminated a series of anonymous letters alleging that Bella had taken inappropriate actions in connection with his administration of the Fire Marshall’s office. The typewritten letters were sent to numerous governmental offices and officials, including Colonel Whit-tington. On February 3, 1998, the Office of State Inspector General issued a report, approved by Governor Foster, which made findings of seven specific instances of wrongdoing on the part of Bella. Thereafter, Bella was reprimanded for his inappropriate actions.

On December 29, 1997, Colonel Whit-tington directed an Internal Affairs investigation into the source of the anonymous letters received by his office in envelopes with handwritten addresses. Colonel Whittington directed Bella to order Tem-plet to submit handwriting samples to Internal Affairs. On October 8, 1998, | oTemplet was interviewed by Internal Affairs and provided the requested handwriting samples, but denied having written the anonymous letters. Thereafter, handwriting analysis based on the sample provided by Templet and the handwritten addresses on the envelopes containing the anonymous letters were compared, and an expert concluded the addresses on the envelopes were written by Templet. On January 22, 1999, Templet again was interviewed by Internal Affairs, and he denied having addressed or mailed the anonymous letters.

By letter dated March 15, 1999, Templet was terminated from his position with the Fire Marshall’s Office, effective the following day. In the letter, Colonel Whitting-ton stated that he concluded as a fact from the investigation that Templet did address the envelopes containing the anonymous letters. In the termination letter, Whit-tington stated that Templet’s repeated denials of having addressed the envelopes violated provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethics prohibiting the making of false statements and the willful withholding of information from a report or statement. Templet’s actions, Whittington concluded, violated the Code of Conduct and Ethics requirement that every employee cooperate with an Internal Affairs investigation, and also violated another section of the Code of Ethics prohibiting conduct unbecoming an employee.

In his lawsuit, Templet claimed that the cited reasons for his termination were devised to conceal the true reason for his termination; namely, his exercise of his constitutional right to free speech and comment upon matters of public concern. He alleged that he had a constitutionally protected right to author the letters and to not disclose his authorship to Bella and Whittington. Templet averred that the actions of Bella and Whittington in conducting the investigation into the source of the letters with the intent to punish and identify the author of the letters, in requiring him to submit handwriting samples, and in terminating him from his position, were all actions taken in retaliation of his free speech rights.

| Jn the petition, Templet alleged that Whittington and Bella were liable in their official and individual capacities. He further alleged that their actions were “willful, knowing, intentional and in callous disregard” for his constitutional rights.

In response, Bella and Whittington asserted the defense of qualified immunity. They also averred that any injuries or damages suffered by Templet were caused by his own wrongful acts, reckless misconduct, and/or negligence. Furthermore, they insisted, Templet was fired not for exercising his right of free speech, but for giving false testimony to an Internal Affairs investigator with the State Police in violation of departmental policies.

Thereafter, Templet filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the defendant’s liability for violating his right to engage in anonymous free speech in addressing matters of public concern, a right guaranteed to him by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7, of the Louisiana Constitution. In support of the motion, Templet submitted a statement of uncontested material facts, Whittington’s and Bella’s depositions, eight anonymous letters he authored, the State Inspector General’s Final Report, the termination letter, as well as his own deposition testimony and an affidavit admitting that he is the author of the anonymous letters.

In opposition to the motion, defendants urged that genuine issues of material fact exist, including: whether the letters constitute free speech on matters of public concern, whether the State’s interest in protecting the operations and reputation of one of its. departments outweighs Tem-plet’s right to voice his opinion, and the motivation for Templet’s termination. Defendants insisted that Templet was terminated not for the content of his letters, but because he lied in sworn statements during an Internal Affairs investigation.

|sOn June 27, 2005, the trial court granted Templet’s motion for partial summary judgment in open court. The trial court did not set forth specific findings in granting the motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and subsequently signed a judgment decreeing that the motion for partial summary judgment “is hereby granted.” Thereafter, defendants sought to take a devolutive appeal of the judgment, asserting that the summary judgment on the issue of liability, leaving only the issue of damages, was appealable as a matter of right. Alternatively, defendants requested that the trial court certify the judgment for immediate appeal. Defendants later withdrew the motion for a devolutive appeal and substituted a sus-pensive appeal.

On September 12, 2005, this court observed there had been no designation by the trial court that the judgment was a final judgment after an express determination that there was no just reason for the delay as required by Article 1915(B) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. This court issued a rule to show cause, requiring the parties to demonstrate there had been a designation of the judgment in accordance with Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 2002-1351, p. 16 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/22/03), 867 So.2d 723, 732. Defendants then supplemented the record to include the trial court’s September 29, 2005 certification of the judgment for an immediate appeal. Therein, the trial court found there was no just reason for delaying an appeal for these reasons: (1) the adjudicated issue, liability, and the unadjudicated issue, damages, were easily severed for the purposes of the appeal; (2) factors such as judicial economy, expense of the parties, and undue delay all weighed in favor of immediate appeal; and (3) there was no potential for the appellate court to be obligated to consider the same issue a second time. On November 15, 2005, this court recalled the rule to show cause and maintained the appeal.

| .APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indemnity Corporation, 2002-0716, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/30/03), 867 So.2d 715, 717. A partial summary judgment rendered pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(E) may be immediately appealed during an ongoing litigation only if it has been properly designated as final by the trial court. La.Code. Civ. P. art. 1915(B). Although the trial court designated the partial summary judgment as a final one under Article 1915(B), that designation is not determinative of this court’s jurisdiction. Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 2000-0206, p. 2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. Thus, this court’s jurisdiction to decide this appeal hinges on whether the certification was appropriate. Because the trial court gave explicit reasons in certifying the appeal, we are to review the certification applying the abuse of discretion standard. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664, p. 13 (La.3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.

Historically, our courts have had a policy against multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation. Article 1915 attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. Thus, in considering whether a judgment is properly designated as final pursuant to Article 1915, a court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. R.J. Messinger Inc., 2004-1664 at p. 13, 894 So.2d at 1122. Factors to be considered by a trial court, although not exclusive, when determining whether a partial judgment should be certified as appealable include: 1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; 2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; 3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a |7second time; and 4) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense and the like. Nevertheless, the overriding inquiry for the trial court is whether there is no just reason for the delay. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 2004-1664 at p. 14, 876 So.2d at 1122-23.

Applying these precepts, we find the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the partial judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Article 1915(B). Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment requested judgment on only one liability issue raised in this litigation, that is, whether he was terminated for exercising his right to free speech. However, there are outstanding issues that must be adjudicated by the trial court before liability can be determined. These issues include the merits of Whittington’s and Bella’s qualified immunity defense, whether they can be held liable in their individual capacities, and whether any of the defendants are liable for punitive damages. In short, the merits of these liability issues, which necessarily involve introduction of evidence on the parties’ conduct surrounding the termination, must be resolved before the trial court can proceed to litigate the damage issue. Thus, contrary to the trial court’s reasons for certifying the judgment, this is not a case where the liability issues and the damage issues are easily severed for appeal and trial purposes.

Where a partial summary judgment decides only some aspects of a liability claim, this court has routinely held that the ruling is not one properly certified for an immediate appeal under Article 1915(B). See Young v. City of Plaquemine, 2004-2305 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05), 927 So.2d 408 (holding that a trial court abused its discretion in designating as final a partial summary judgment determining causation in a negligence action; reasoning that allowing an immediate appeal from a judgment finding that a plaintiff has met some, but not all, of the elements of a negligence liability claim only serves to encourage | spiecemeal adjudication and appeals, causing delay and judicial inefficiency); Daigle & Associates, APLC v. Lafayette Insurance Company, 2004-0915 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/05), 916 So.2d 1078 (holding that a partial summary judgment finding coverage under one section of an insurance policy, where coverage also was asserted under other sections of the insurance policy, should not have been certified as final, as the appeal from that judgment would not resolve claims arising from multiple coverage issues based on alternate theories of recovery under different sections of the same policy); Leray v. Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A., 2004-1282 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/10/05), 916 So.2d 260, writ denied, 2005-1837 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 554 (holding the trial court improperly certified a partial summary judgment allowing the fault of non-party tortfeasors to be quantified by a jury, noting that the issues of liability, degree of liability, and damages remained to be adjudicated). Cf. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2003-2209 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/1/05), 904 So.2d 760 (holding that a trial court did not err in certifying a partial summary judgment resolving all liability issues, leaving only the amount of damages properly recoverable for determination by the trial court).

Likewise, we find that under the circumstances of this case, allowing an immediate appeal of a decision deciding one, but not all, of the liability issues raised by this lawsuit only serves to encourage multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation, causing delay and judicial inefficiency. We find there are no compelling reasons for certifying the judgment as final and immediately appealable that would outweigh these judicial administrative interests. Because the partial judgment is not a final one, it may be revised at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment adjudicating the remaining issues in the case. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B)(2).

| (¡CONCLUSION

Because the trial court improperly designated the partial summary judgment rendered herein as a final judgment pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B), we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this ruling. Assessment of appeal costs shall await final disposition of this matter.

APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED.