author: WALLACE, Judge.

text:
    Curtis Harold KNARICH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D04-4141.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 9, 2005.

      James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   WALLACE, Judge.

In this guidelines sentencing case, Curtis Harold Knarich challenges the fifteen-year upward departure sentence imposed on him after his conviction for handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen years, a violation of section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes (1997). The trial court imposed the upward departure sentence on account of Knarich’s prior military convictions for offenses that could not be scored as prior record under the sentencing guidelines because there was no analogous or parallel Florida crime when Knarich committed the military offenses. Knarich argues that his prior military convictions were not a valid legal ground for the upward departure sentence. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the departure sentence, and we remand this case to the trial court for Knarich to be resentenced within the guidelines.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Knarich has twenty-five convictions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice that predate his conviction for the current offense. This circumstance has led to complications in sentencing Knarich for the crime that he committed more than eight years ago. After a jury trial, Kna-rich was convicted of handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen years, in violation of section 800.04(1), a second-degree felony. According to the information, the offense occurred between July 5 and August 11, 1997. Because Knarich’s offense was committed before October 1, 1998, the Criminal Punishment Code is inapplicable. Therefore, Knarich must be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines.

Initially, the trial court sentenced Kna-rich to forty years in prison. The last fifteen years of the sentence were to be suspended, and Knarich was to be placed on fifteen years of sex offender probation. This court reversed the original sentence after concluding that the trial court had improperly scored Knarieh’s prior military convictions. Knarich v. State, 766 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Knarich I). We held that the trial court had erred by scoring Knarich’s military convictions as prior record without comparing the elements of the military offenses to the specific elements of a comparable offense. Id. at 405.

On remand for resentencing, the trial court imposed a thirty-five-year prison sentence. The last ten years of the sentence were to be suspended, and Knarich was to be placed on ten years of sex offender probation. This court reversed the sentence imposed on remand and again remanded for resentencing. Knarich v. State, 866 So.2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (Knarich II). We held that the trial court had erred by comparing Knarich’s military offenses committed from 1982 to 1984 to offenses that were prohibited under Florida law when Knarich committed his 1997 Florida offense. Id. at 170. This court directed the trial court on remand to re-sentence Knarich after comparing the military offenses “to offenses that were contained in the Florida Statutes that were in effect at the time the military offenses were committed.” Id.

On the second remand for resentencing, the State conceded that Knarich’s prior military offenses could not be scored as prior record under the guidelines because there was no Florida offense analogous to the military convictions when those offenses occurred. Without scoring Kna-rich’s military convictions as prior record, the guidelines range for Knarich’s current offense was for a prison term ranging from four years and three months to seven years. However, the State urged the trial court to impose an upward departure sentence based on the nonscoreable military convictions. The trial court agreed, and it resentenced Knarich to the current fifteen-year sentence. In an order providing its reason for imposing the upward departure sentence, the trial court said “that the Defendant [Knarich] had prior unscoreable adult offenses of a similar nature to the offense committed herein.” Knarich has appealed the upward departure sentence.

THE ISSUE

Knarich raises two points on appeal. We need address only Knarich’s argument that his prior nonscoreable military convictions did not constitute a valid legal ground for a departure sentence. This is a question of law that we review de novo. See Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla.1999); Daniels v. State, 884 So.2d 220, 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.703(d)(15) defines “prior record” for the purpose of determining the defendant’s sentence points to be assessed on account of his or her prior criminal convictions. In pertinent part, the rule provides:

“Prior record” refers to any conviction for an offense committed by the offender prior to the commission of the primary offense, excluding any additional offenses pending before the court for sentencing. Prior record shall include convictions for offenses committed by the offender as an adult or as a juvenile [and] convictions by ... military ... courts-Military ... convictions are scored at the severity level at which the analogous or parallel Florida crime is located.
(A) Convictions for offenses committed more than 10 years prior to the date of the commission of the primary offense are not scored as prior record if the offender has not been convicted of any other crime for a period of 10 consecutive years from the most recent date of release from confinement, supervision, or other sanction, whichever is later, to the date of the commission of the primary offense.
(B) Juvenile dispositions of offenses committed by the offender within 3 years prior to the date of the commission of the primary offense are scored as prior record if the offense would have been a crime if committed by an adult....
(D) Any uncertainty in the scoring of the offender’s prior record shall be resolved in favor of the offender[.]

In accordance with the rule, military convictions are to be scored “at the severity level at which the analogous or parallel Florida crime is located.” Id. In determining whether a conviction from another jurisdiction is analogous to a Florida crime for the purpose of calculating sentencing points, the elements of the crime committed in the foreign jurisdiction, and not the underlying facts, must be considered. Dautel v. State, 658 So.2d 88, 91 (Fla.1995); Knarich II, 866 So.2d at 168. If Florida has no statute containing elements of the offense analogous to the statute from another jurisdiction under which the defendant was convicted, no points may be scored for that conviction as prior record. See Mohammed v. State, 561 So.2d 384, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA1990).

On the second remand of Knarich’s case for resentencing in the trial court, the State conceded that Knarich’s prior military convictions could not be scored as prior record because there was no analogous or parallel statute in effect when Knarich committed his military offenses. The trial court agreed that the military offenses were not scoreable as prior record but relied on them as its sole basis for imposing an upward departure sentence. Thus the issue presented is whether Kna-rich’s nonscoreable military convictions constitute a valid legal ground for an upward departure sentence.

NONSCOREABLE OFFENSES AND UPWARD DEPARTURES

The sentencing guidelines do not answer the issue posed by the unusual facts in Knarich’s case. Section 921.0016(2), Florida Statutes (1997), does provide that a departure sentence is discouraged unless there are circumstances or factors which reasonably justify the departure. Section 921.0016(3) sets forth a list of aggravating circumstances under which a departure from the guidelines is reasonably justified. The statutory list of aggravating circumstances does not include prior convictions from other jurisdictions for which there was no analogous or parallel Florida crime when the foreign offense was committed. However, the list contained in the statute is illustrative rather than exclusive. Id.; see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.703(d)(30). In support of the sentence imposed by the trial court, the State relies on three circumstances in which nonscoreable offenses can be used as a basis for an upward departure sentence. We turn now to an examination of these three instances of departures based on nonscoreable offenses.

Nonscoreable Capital Convictions

The first of these circumstances involves nonscoreable capital convictions. Our supreme court has previously held that a trial court may depart from the sentencing guidelines based on a contemporaneous unscored capital conviction. See Bunney v. State, 603 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Fla.1992); Livingston v. State, 565 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Fla.1988); Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081, 1087 (Fla.1987). A rule authorizing a departure based on a contemporaneous unscored capital felony was added to the guidelines in 1993 with the addition of the following language to rule 3.701(d)(12): “Where the offender is being sentenced for a capital felony and other noncapital felonies that arose out of the same criminal episode or transaction, the sentencing court may impose any sentence authorized by law for the noncapital felonies.” Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 613 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Fla.1993).

■ Our supreme court’s decision in Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla.1987), suggests that a prior nonscoreable capital conviction will also support a departure sentence. Under the 1995 amendments to the guidelines, a prior nonscoreable capital felony triples the points the defendant receives for the primary offense and any additional offense. Ch. 95-184, § 6, Laws of Fla., codified as § 921.0014(1)(a); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.703(d)(13).

Remote Convictions

Convictions that are not scored under the guidelines because they are too remote in time from the primary offense constitute a second circumstance in which nonscoreable convictions may serve as a basis for departure. In accordance with rule 3.703(d)(15)(B), juvenile offenses committed within three years prior to the commission of the primary offense are scored as prior record if the offense would have been a crime if committed by an adult. Thus juvenile offenses more than three years old- — -with certain exceptions not material here — are not scoreable as prior record. But such remote nonscorea-ble juvenile offenses constitute an aggravating circumstance under which a departure is reasonably justified. § 921.0016(3)(s). Any departure based on nonscoreable juvenile offenses is subject to the limitation established in Puffinberger v. State, 581 So.2d 897, 899-900 (Fla.1991), that the resulting departure sentence can be “no greater than that which the defendant would have received if the record had been scored.”

Similarly, three of our sister district courts have approved departure sentences based on convictions for adult offenses that were too remote in time to be scoreable as prior record. Knotts v. State, 533 So.2d 826, 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Evrard v. State, 502 So.2d 3, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Mullen v. State, 483 So.2d 754, 756 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), disapproved on other grounds by Hernandez v. State, 575 So.2d 640 (Fla.1991). The Fourth District has held that the limitation on the length of a departure sentence based on nonscoreable prior record imposed by our supreme court in Puffinberger applies as well to a departure based on adult offenses that are not scored because they are too remote in time. Freeman v. State, 663 So.2d 675, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

Nonscoreable “Out-of-Sequence” Convictions

The third circumstance in which a departure sentence is authorized based on prior convictions that are not scored under the guidelines involves the nonscoreable “out-of-sequence” conviction. In Harris v. State, 685 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1996), Harris had committed a robbery and then committed a burglary two days later. He was convicted and sentenced for the burglary first. At Harris’s later sentencing for the robbery, the burglary did not qualify as “prior record” for scoring under the guidelines because the burglary occurred after the robbery. The burglary did not qualify as an “additional offense” either because the sentencing for the burglary was not pending before the court with the robbery. Because the burglary was not scoreable under the guidelines, Harris’s case fell “between the cracks.” Id. at 1285. Noting that the disallowance of any departure would result in “an unearned windfall” to Harris because his cases were tried “out of sequence,” the supreme court held that the nonscoreable burglary could be used as a basis for a departure sentence under these circumstances. Id. Nevertheless, the court also held that the Puffinberger limitation would be applicable to any departure sentence. Therefore, the departure sentence was required to be within the recommended or permitted range that would have been allowable if the burglary had been scored as prior record. Id.

ANALYSIS

As we have seen, there are three circumstances previously recognized as valid legal grounds for departure based on nonscoreable offenses: capital felonies, remote juvenile or adult convictions, and out-of-sequence convictions. Knarich’s prior military convictions do not fall into any of these three categories. The convictions are not nonscoreable because they are too remote but, rather, because there is no analogous or parallel Florida crime to which they can be compared for scoring purposes. Thus, for this court to affirm Knarich’s upward departure sentence, we would necessarily have to recognize a fourth circumstance in which nonscoreable convictions may serve as a valid legal ground for departure.

The State urges us to take this step on the basis that Knarich’s nonscoreable military convictions are an aggravating factor that is not considered in the sentencing guidelines. The State compares the nons-coreable military convictions to capital felonies that are not scored because the guidelines specifically exclude them.

The State’s argument is unpersuasive. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to establish a uniform set of standards to guide trial courts in imposing sentences for conduct that the legislature has determined warrants the sanction of the Florida Criminal Code. See § 921.001(4). The three recognized circumstances in which departures from the guidelines based on nonscoreable convictions are permitted are disparate. However, there is one critical factor that unites them. In each of the three instances in which a departure based on a nonscoreable conviction is authorized, the unscored conviction that forms the basis for departure was for an offense that was defined as a crime under Florida law when that offense was committed. It follows that an upward departure based on such a nonscoreable conviction is consistent with the legislature’s determination concerning the type of conduct that warrants the sanction of the criminal law.

Conversely, it is inconsistent with the legislature’s determination of the conduct that warrants criminalization to impose an upward departure on persons such as Kna-rich based on a conviction for an offense for which there was no analogous or parallel crime in Florida when the offense was committed. We agree that the conduct for which Knarich was convicted in the trial court was reprehensible and deplorable. But in Knarich’s case, the justification for enhanced penalties resulting from nons-coreable convictions for offenses that constituted crimes in Florida when the conduct occurred is missing. Indeed, it would be anomalous to permit a trial court to impose an upward departure sentence based on a conviction for an offense committed in another jurisdiction that did not constitute a crime in Florida when the offense occurred.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Knarich’s upward departure sentence is not based on a valid legal ground and must be reversed. On remand, the trial court shall resentence Knarich within the guidelines. See Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748 (Fla.1987); Patten v. State, 531 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

Sentence reversed; remanded for resen-tencing.

FULMER, C.J., and VILLANTI, J., Concur.

      . The Criminal Punishment Code was established effective October 1, 1998, and applies to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after that date. Ch. 97-194, § 42, Laws of Fla.; see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1997).

      . The window period for challenging a guidelines sentence as invalid due to the amendments made by chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, closed on May 24, 1997. Trapp v. State, 760 So.2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000); see also Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). Knarich's offense was committed after that date. Thus Knarich is subject to sentencing under the 1995 guidelines. See §§ 921.0011-.0016, Fla. Stat. (1997); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.703.

      . The pertinent elements of Knarich’s 1982 to 1984 military offenses involved offenses against a child under the age of sixteen years. By contrast, the comparable lewd and lascivious statute in effect in Florida at the same time, section 800.04, required that the child be under the age of fourteen years. Effective October 1, 1984, ch. 84-86, § 8, Laws of Fla., the age threshold for a victim of this offense was changed from under fourteen years to under sixteen years, id. § 5(1).

      . The trial court's inability to impose a departure sentence on Knarich on account of his prior military offenses does not mean that he will avoid serving a prison term for his conduct. As we have previously noted, the guidelines range for Knarich's 1997 offense is for a prison term ranging from four years and three months to seven years. Knarich has already been incarcerated on account of his offense for a period that substantially exceeds his maximum seven-year sentence under the guidelines.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ALTENBERND, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re GUARDIANSHIP OF Theresa Marie SCHIAVO, Deceased. Department of Children and Family Services, Appellant, v. Michael Schiavo, as Guardian of the person of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Appellee.
    No. 2D05-1455.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 16, 2005.
    William Frederic Jung of Jung & Sisco, Tampa; and Jack Emory Farley and Jeffrey Dana Gillen, Lakeland, for Appellant.
    George J. Felos of Felos & Felos, P.A., Dunedin, for Appellee.
   ALTENBERND, Judge.

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) appeals an emergency order enforcing mandate, which was entered by the probate court on March 23, 2005. This order was entered after Theresa Marie Schiavo’s feeding tube was removed on March 18, 2005, and before her death on March 31, 2005. On March 30, 2005, this court issued a per curiam opinion affirming the order on appeal and indicating that an additional written opinion explaining the court’s ruling would follow. This is that additional written opinion.

On March 23, 2005, the DCF filed a motion to intervene in the Guardianship of Theresa Marie Schiavo. The motion gave notice to the court pursuant to section 415.1055(9), Florida Statutes (2004), that the DCF had received a report alleging that the court-appointed guardian had abused the ward. The motion explained that chapter 415 gives the DCF the power to investigate claims of abuse, neglect, or exploitation of vulnerable adults. The motion further explained that the DCF may arrange for protective services for an abused, vulnerable adult on a nonemergen-cy basis without the consent of the adult by filing a petition with the circuit court. § 415.1051(1). In an emergency, the DCF may enter premises and remove a vulnerable adult to a medical facility for treatment to prevent serious physical injury or death. § 415.1051(2).

The motion alleged that the DCF had received a medical opinion that challenged the diagnosis relied upon by the probate court when it entered its final judgment authorizing the removal of the feeding tube. The DCF also alleged that it had received many reports of abuse on its hotline concerning Theresa Marie Schiavo and that it had an obligation to investigate those claims. The DCF took the position that it could not conduct its investigation if the terms of the final judgment were carried out and Theresa Marie Schiavo died. Essentially, the DCF wished to intervene in the proceeding so that it could take custody of Theresa Marie Schiavo and reinsert the feeding tube without violating the court’s final judgment.

At the time the DCF filed its motion, the removal of Theresa Marie Schiavo’s feeding tube was being challenged by many parties in virtually every available court. In order to accommodate these challenges, the courts dispensed with normal time restrictions and attempted to streamline legal procedures. The probate court was no exception.

The guardian immediately responded to the DCF’s motion by making an emergency oral motion to enforce mandate. A hearing was held on March 23, 2005, with oral notice given to the DCF. All relevant parties participated in that hearing. Following the hearing, the probate court entered an order restraining the DCF “from taking possession of Theresa Marie Schia-vo or removing her from the Hospice Woodside facility, administering nutrition or hydration artificially, or otherwise interfering with this Court’s final judgment.” This is the order that the DCF appealed.

At the broadest level, this appeal concerns the competing powers given to the judiciary in chapter 744, Florida Statutes (2004), and to the DCF in chapter 415. Chapter 744 gives extensive authority to the judiciary to establish guardianships, including guardianships for persons who fall within the definition of “vulnerable adults” under section 415.102(26). See § 744.3031. Chapter 415 gives authority to the DCF to protect vulnerable adults both before a guardianship has been established and thereafter.

When a vulnerable adult does not consent to protective services by the DCF in a nonemergency situation, the DCF typically files a petition in circuit court to obtain authority to provide those services. § 415.1051(l)(a). If the court authorizes protective services, the DCF must petition the court within sixty days to determine how to best proceed. § 415.1051(l)(e)(l). One of the options available at that time is the creation of a guardianship under chapter 744. § 415.1051(l)(e)(l)(d). The rules are essentially the same in an emergency, except that the DCF can perform the removal of the vulnerable adult and begin providing protective services prior to filing a petition and holding a hearing. § 415.1051(2)(b), (e). The petition must be filed and heard by the circuit court within four business days of the emergency removal. § 415.1051(2)($.

Because the statutes contemplate that an extended term of vulnerability can be addressed by the creation of a guardianship under chapter 744, it might be logical to structure the respective powers of the circuit court and the DCF so that the DCF had no authority to interfere once a chapter 744 guardianship had been established. Certainly, it is probable that the DCF will rarely need to use its powers under chapter 415 concerning a person who is already the ward of a judicially created guardianship under chapter 744.

On the other hand, it is possible for a guardian to abuse or neglect a ward, and chapter 415 is written to give the DCF some power over abusive guardians. “Guardian” is defined in chapter 415 to include a guardian under chapter 744. § 415.102(11). Section 415.1051(4) contains special provisions for protective services when the vulnerable adult has a guardian. This statute expressly gives the DCF power to perform an emergency removal of a ward from the care of a guardian prior to a judicial hearing.

In this case, however, the narrower issue is whether the DCF can use these powers to remove a ward from the control of the guardian in order to restore a feeding tube that had been removed at the express order of the circuit court in a postjudgment order, after the final judgment authorizing removal of the feeding tube has been reviewed and affirmed in all available appellate venues. The primary “abuse” alleged by the DCF was the guardian’s decision to obey the specific directives of the probate court’s order.

We conclude that chapter 415 does not give the DCF power to declare the acts of a guardian that are in strict compliance with an explicit, lawful order of a guardianship court to be actions constituting neglect, abuse, or exploitation. Once the guardian asked the court to authorize removal of the feeding tube in 1998, the State undoubtedly had an interest in the issues that were litigated in this case. The State has participated in such cases in the past. See, e.g., State v. Herbert (In re Guardianship of Browning), 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The executive branch of state government, either through the Attorney General or through the DCF, undoubtedly had standing to intervene in this case years before the probate court entered the order on March 18, 2005, requiring the guardian to remove the feeding tube. It did not, however, have the power to wait on the sidelines until those proceedings were final and the order had been implemented and then challenge the judicial decision as “abuse” under chapter 415. This is particularly true of an order discontinuing a form of medical treatment because section 415.113 expressly provides that nothing in chapter 415 shall be construed to “require any medical care or treatment in contravention of the stated or implied objection of such person.” The entire purpose of the litigation in the probate court had been to determine the treatment that the ward herself would have selected under these circumstances. See Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 780 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

To the extent that the DCF suggested that it needed to take possession of Theresa Marie Schiavo in order to conduct its investigation of the various claims of abuse it had received on its hotline, the DCF never explained why that investigation would necessitate a further delay of the court’s final judgment. The ward, of course, could not communicate or assist the DCF in any investigation, and the DCF did not provide any reasoned explanation of why its investigation required this extraordinary action. The probate court clearly had discretion to conclude that this request was not a sufficient basis for it to rescind its order.

The probate court correctly ruled that the powers given to the DCF in chapter 415 did not permit the DCF to challenge the final order of the probate court in this manner. We trust that the DCF would have obeyed the probate court without a formal restraining order, but in light of all of the circumstances in March 2005, the trial court was well within its power to issue a restraining order to assure continued compliance with its order.

Affirmed.

FULMER, C.J., and WALLACE, J., Concur.

      . The DCF has suggested that this appeal should be dismissed as moot. However, we issued our per curiam decision at a time when this case was not moot and was of great public importance, stating, "Affirmed; an opinion will follow.” We do not believe that the doctrine of mootness allows us to avoid explaining a decision when it is issued in such an expedited fashion. However, even if the doctrine of mootness were to apply, it would not destroy our jurisdiction because there are issues of great public importance raised by this case. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla.1984) (explaining that mootness does not destroy an appellate court's jurisdiction when questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur).

      . Although this order is not a final order as to the DCF, we have jurisdiction of this appeal as a reviewable nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B) or (4).


author: PER CURIAM. DAVIS, Judge,

text:
    T.N., Petitioner, v. Gary PORTESY, Detention Superintendent, Hillsborough Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Respondent.
    No. 2D05-01.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 7, 2005.
    Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and James Anthony Julian, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

T.N., a juvenile, petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from custody after he was detained pursuant to an order of indirect criminal contempt issued on December 15, 2004. On January 5, 2005, after reviewing the petition, this court issued an unpublished order granting the petition for writ of ha-beas corpus and ordering T.N. to be immediately released from his detention. This opinion now follows.

T.N. was originally charged with possession of cannabis in violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2004). On June 30, 2004, without being arraigned on the charges, T.N. and his mother entered into an agreement with the State, by which he agreed to participate in the Juvenile Drug Court Program. This agreement was ratified by the trial court on June 30, 2004.

As part of the agreement, T.N. was subject to mandated drug treatment and testing to ensure that he remained drug free. Additionally, the agreement specified that if T.N. failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, the trial court could find him in contempt and impose one or more of several enumerated sanctions. The list of possible sanctions included placement in a secure facility and placement in a residential treatment program.

On more than one occasion afterwards, T.N. tested positive for marijuana, and after August 16, 2004, he apparently stopped attempting to participate in any drug treatment program.

As a result, the trial court found T.N. to be noncompliant with the agreement and issued an order directing him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for abandoning his drug treatment obligations. Pursuant to this order, the trial court held a hearing, which resulted in the entry of an order holding T.N. in indirect criminal contempt pursuant to section 985.216(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The court sanctioned T.N. by placing him in secure detention for ten days, after which he was to be transported to the ACTS Addiction Receiving Facility to be held there until he could be placed in residential treatment.

In his petition, T.N. claims that the legislative intent of section 985.216 was not to incarcerate juveniles who participate in the juvenile drug court program to avoid being adjudicated delinquent. Accordingly, T.N. argues that when a juvenile fails to uphold the terms of a drug court agreement, the appropriate procedure is not to hold the child in indirect criminal contempt, but rather to dismiss the child from the drug court program and return him or her to court for adjudication based on the original charges.

Although the terms of the agreement were originally part of a contract between T.N. and the State, by ratifying the agreement, the trial court placed T.N. under direct order to comply with the terms of the agreement. T.N.’s failure to do so subjected him to being found in indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s order. Although we do not find the trial court’s finding that T.N. was in indirect criminal contempt of court to be error, we conclude that the sanction that the trial court imposed was in error.

The legislature has specified the possible sanctions that a trial court may impose for indirect criminal contempt. See § 985.216(2)-(3). Because the trial court’s use of the ACTS Addiction Receiving Facility and the residential drug treatment program as sanctions for indirect criminal contempt are not contemplated -within the statute, those sanctions were improperly imposed.

Accordingly, we quash that portion of the trial court’s order that imposed these sanctions. On January 25, 2005, this court granted T.N.’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered his immediate release.

CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., Concur.

DAVIS, J., Concurs with opinion.

DAVIS, Judge,

Concurring.

I fully concur with the majority’s opinion. However, I write to point out the difficult position in which the current status of the law places the trial court when dealing with juvenile drug offenders.

In an attempt to provide education and treatment for certain first-offender juveniles, the legislature authorized the implementation of the pretrial intervention program. Section 985.306 provides that pending charges may be dismissed as to those juveniles who comply with the program. However, the same statute provides that if the court finds that the juvenile did not successfully comply with the program, the court may order the juvenile to continue “in an education, treatment, or urine monitoring program” or the court may order that the prosecution on the pending charges be commenced. § 985.306(l)(c)(l). However, the statute is silent as to whether the treatment options may include the involuntary placement of the child in a residential drug treatment center.

As part of the procedure used to implement this statute, the juvenile court below attempted to address this issue by having T.N. enter into a contract by which he agreed that if he failed to comply with the intervention requirements, he could be placed in such a facility against his will. However, to provide the trial court with the authority to enter such an order, the contract also states that the child agrees that his noncompliance would subject him to prosecution for indirect contempt of court and that upon such a finding, the court could impose the residential treatment as a sanction.

This is where the problem arises. In addition to establishing the intervention program and allowing the court to order “treatment” for noncompliance, the legislature also has limited the sanctions available to the trial court for use in punishing indirect criminal contempt. § 985.216. As the majority opinion notes, the use of a residential treatment center is not included as a possible sanction. We applaud the juvenile court for its attempt to implement the intervention program. We understand that for such a program to work, there must be some means of enforcement. However, the child’s consent does not give the trial court the option of imposing sanctions not authorized by the legislature.

If the legislature intends for the court to have the authority to involuntarily order a noncompliant child into a residential treatment program prior to the adjudication of delinquency, the statute establishing the intervention program should so specify. If it is contemplated that such an order is an appropriate sanction for a finding of indirect criminal contempt, that provision should so state. However, until either of these statutes is amended, the trial court is left with a statutorily-created intervention plan that leaves unanswered multiple questions as to how to handle a noncompli-ant participant.

      . This program is outlined in section 985.306, Florida Statutes (2004), as a program that allows a juvenile to receive substance abuse education and treatment prior to adjudication.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    Michael J. BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. Mary Pulliam BUCHANAN, Appellee.
    No. 2D04-5016.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 7, 2005.
    Robert L. Valentine, Lakeland, for Appellant.
    Douglas H. Smith of The Smith Law Group, P.A., Lake Alfred, for Appellee.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

In this postdissolution proceeding, Michael J. Buchanan (the Former Husband) appeals a civil contempt order. Because the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of the Former Husband’s present ability to pay the $10,000 purge amount, we reverse.

The trial court found the Former Husband in contempt for failure to pay previously ordered attorney’s fees of $10,000 to the attorney for Mary Pulliam Buchanan (the Former Wife). In the contempt order, the trial court further found that the Former Husband had the present ability to pay $10,000, sentenced him to 179 days in jail, and allowed him to purge the contempt and be released from jail with the payment of $10,000.

In order to impose incarceration for civil contempt, the trial court must find “that the contemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt.” Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985). Thus, the contemnor must have “the present ability to pay from some available asset[.]” Id. Here, the trial court found that the Former Husband had various assets totaling $14,000 and the present ability to pay $10,000 from those assets. The record does not support this finding.

Most significant is the trial court’s finding that the Former Husband had $9200 available to him in corporate stock. No one at the contempt hearing testified to the value of the Former Husband’s corporate stock; rather, the trial court relied on the Former Husband’s corporate tax return to support its finding. A review of the tax return, however, reflects that it lists “[tjotal liabilities and shareholders’ equity” of $9200. The tax return lists the stock value at only $1000.

Thus, the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Former Husband had the present ability to pay $10,000. Accordingly, we reverse the contempt order.

Reversed.

CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., concur.


author: WHATLEY, Judge.

text:
    Harold ERICKSEN, Appellant, v. FASTENING SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee.
    No. 2D04-3833.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 19, 2005.
    Tommy Meyer of Law Office of Tommy Meyer, Sarasota, for Appellant.
    John S. Koda of Boone, Boone, Boone, Koda & Frook, P.A., Venice, for Appellee.
   WHATLEY, Judge.

In this appeal, Harold Ericksen argues that there are several deficiencies in the order awarding him attorney’s fees that was entered after Fastening Systems, Inc., voluntarily dismissed its action against him. We find merit only in his argument that the trial court erred in failing to award both prejudgment and post-judgment interest on the fee award. See Quality Engineered, Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc., 670 So.2d 929, 930-31 (Fla.1996) (holding that prejudgment interest on award of attorney’s fees accrues from date entitlement is determined and agreeing with decisions that “approve including prejudgment amounts in a merged total, with postjudgment interest then accruing on the merged total.”); Stoler v. Stoler, 679 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (affirming finding that interest on attorney’s fees and costs accrues from date of entitlement and that postjudgment interest may accrue on prejudgment amount, citing Higley South). See also § 55.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing that interest accrues on judgment until it is paid).

Accordingly, we affirm the order awarding attorney’s fees but remand to the trial court for entry of an award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest calculated at the statutory rate.

Affirmed but remanded.

SALCINES and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.


author: SALCINES, Judge.

text:
    Thomas BROPHY, Jr., Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. and Suncoast Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 2D04-1466.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 21, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 11, 2006.
    Alex D. Weisberg, Theodore F. Greene III, and Scott Cohen of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Sunrise, for Appellant.

      John G. Glenn and Brooks C. Rathet of Anderson St. Denis & Glenn, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
   SALCINES, Judge.

Thomas Brophy, Jr., appeals from a final order dismissing with prejudice his amended complaint against DaimlerChrys-ler Corporation (“DaimlerChrysler”) and Suncoast Chrysler-Plymouth-Jeep, Inc. (“Suncoast”). We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

In his amended complaint, Mr. Brophy alleged three claims, each arising under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (“Magnuson-Moss Act” or “the Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12. His first and second claims were against DaimlerChrysler under the Act for breach of DaimlerChrys-ler’s written warranty and breach of an implied warranty. His third claim was against Suncoast under the Act for breach of an implied warranty only.

Mr. Brophy alleged that he entered into a transaction to lease a 2001 Chrysler Sebring. Wells Fargo Auto Finance (“the lessor”) purchased the Sebring from Sun-coast, a DaimlerChrysler authorized dealership, and then immediately leased the vehicle to Mr. Brophy. He alleged that the manufacturer issued a written warranty to the lessor which, in turn, was assigned to him. The crux of Mr. Brophy’s complaint was that the vehicle was covered by DaimlerChrysler’s written warranty and that, during the coverage period, the vehicle had numerous defects which remained unrepaired despite repeated efforts by DaimlerChrysler authorized dealerships to make the repairs.

DaimlerChrysler and Suncoast filed a motion to dismiss in which they maintained, in pertinent part, that the complaint failed to allege a cause of action against either of them — there was no independent state law basis for bringing an action under the Magnuson-Moss Act because the vehicle was leased and there was no privity of contract between Daimler-Chrysler and Mr. Brophy.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and rendered a final order dismissing with prejudice each of the three claims set forth in Mr. Brophy’s amended complaint. Mr. Brophy appeals from the dismissal order and urges this court to adopt case law from other states which would allow him to maintain his claims against DaimlerChrysler and Suncoast under the Magnuson-Moss Act. We need not look beyond the case law of this state, however, to decide this case.

Recognizing that the intended purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Act is to “increase the enforceability of warranties” and protect “the ultimate user of the product,” this court has recently aligned itself with a number of courts which have held that the Magnuson-Moss Act may be applied to a lease and that the Act does not require a sale to an ultimate consumer. O’Connor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 905 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In O’Connor, this court reversed a final summary judgment entered in favor of the automobile manufacturer in a lawsuit brought by a lessee for breach of the manufacturer’s written warranty pursuant to the Act. The manufacturer, BMW, asserted that the lessee, O’Connor, did not meet the Act’s definition of “consumer.” In O’Connor, this court concluded that the lessee satisfied two alternative categories of consumer, either of which would allow her to pursue a claim for breach of a written warranty against the manufacturer pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Id. at 240. The lessee in O’Connor was a “category two” consumer because her vehicle was transferred to her during the duration of the written warranty, a warranty which satisfied the Act’s definition of “written warranty” because it was made “in connection with the sale” of the vehicle from the dealer to the leasing company. Id. In O’Connor, the lessee also qualified as a “category three” consumer not only because she was entitled to enforce the manufacturer’s warranty by the terms of the warranty itself but also because she was entitled to enforce the manufacturer’s warranty under applicable state law, i.e., chapter 681, Florida Statutes (2001) (Florida’s “Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act”). O’Connor, 905 So.2d at 240.

Shortly after the decision in O’Connor, this court considered a case much like the present case involving the dismissal of claims which had been brought pursuant to the Act by the lessee of a vehicle against the vehicle’s manufacturer based not only upon an alleged breach of the manufacturer’s written warranty but also upon an alleged breach of an implied warranty. See Cerasani v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 916 So.2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In Cerasani, we reversed the dismissal of the claim for breach of the written warranty under the Act but affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty under the Act. Id. at 847. In affirming the dismissal of the claim for implied warranty, we held that “the Act does not supersede state law privity requirements for implied warranty claims, and pursuant to Florida law, ‘a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses for breach of implied warranty in the absence of privity.’ ” Id. (quoting Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 904 So.2d 450, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). Thus, where the lessee had failed to allege that there was privity of contract between herself and the vehicle’s manufacturer, her claim for breach of implied warranty was properly dismissed. Cerasani, 916 So.2d at 847.

We hold that Mr. Brophy’s amended complaint was sufficient to withstand DaimlerChrysler’s motion to dismiss his claim for breach of the manufacturer’s written warranty. The facts alleged in the amended complaint were sufficient to qualify Mr. Brophy as a category two consumer under the Act; the allegations indicated that the vehicle was transferred to Mr. Brophy during the duration of Daimler-Chrysler’s written warranty. See Cerasani, 916 So.2d 843. Also, based on the allegations set forth in the amended complaint, the “written warranty” fell within the purview of the Act because it was made “in connection with the sale” of the vehicle from the dealership to the lessor. See O’Connor, 905 So.2d at 240. Moreover, Mr. Brophy alleged that the lessor assigned the warranty to him. See Mesa, 904 So.2d at 457 (holding that “a vehicle involved in a prior sale that is subsequently leased with a manufacturer’s warranty satisfies the [Act’s] requirement that the warranty be made ‘in connection with the sale,’ and a lessee who is assigned such a warranty may enforce it”).

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of count one of the amended complaint which was brought by Mr. Brophy against DaimlerChrysler for breach of the manufacturer’s written warranty pursuant to the Act. However, as in Cerasani, 916 So.2d 843, we affirm the dismissal of the remaining counts for implied warranty because Mr. Brophy’s amended complaint did not allege the requisite privity of contract.

As this court did in O’Connor, 905 So.2d at 241, and Cerasani 916 So.2d 843, we certify conflict with the First District’s decision in Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So.2d 147, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), to the extent that Sellers concluded that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to lease transactions.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; conflict certified.

FULMER, C.J., and DAVIS, J„ Concur.

      . In their motion to dismiss, the defendants additionally asserted that the claims against both of them had to be dismissed because the "retail installment contract” required all disputes to be resolved by arbitration (the referenced retail installment contract was not attached to the motion contained in the appellate record). They further asserted that the claim against Suncoast had to be dismissed because Suncoast had disclaimed all warranties in the lease agreement. In this appeal, neither DaimlerChrysler nor Sun-coast argue that those grounds would support a dismissal. Further, Mr. Brophy has not challenged the dismissal of the claim against Suncoast on any ground specifically related only to Suncoast.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Paul S. JOHNSON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D05-3047.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 21, 2005.
   PER CURIAM.

Paul S. Johnson, Jr., appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence. As no one has been able to provide this court with a copy of Johnson’s motion, we vacate the amended order denying Johnson’s motion to correct illegal sentence that was signed by the postcon-viction court on June 13, 2005. Johnson may refile his motion, previously filed on March 1, 2005, in the circuit court within thirty days from the date of the mandate issued in this proceeding. Alternatively, Johnson may restate the claim raised in his previously filed motion in a new motion to be filed with the court within thirty days from the date of the mandate issued in this proceeding. Any such submission filed in the circuit court should be considered as if filed as of March 1, 2005, the date of Johnson’s originally filed motion for post-conviction relief, and should not be deemed successive to the claims in the original motion because the order denying the original motion has been vacated.

NORTHCUTT, DAVIS, and LaROSE, JJ., concur.


text:
    GROUP W., INC., and Jerry Wilson, Appellants, v. WILLIAM H. MORRIS COMPANY, through its Division Omnicron International, a Florida Corporation, William H. Morris and William J. Morrison, as Trustees of the Marilyn L. Morris Revocable Trust as created under an agreement dated March 26, 1993, as Amended on March 20, 2001, and as Trustees of the Marilyn L. Morris Family Trust dated December 10, 2001, Appellees.
    No. 2D05-2291.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 28, 2005.

      Randall 0. Reder of Randall 0. Reder, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.
    Hala Sandridge and John D. Emmanuel of Fowler White Boggs Banker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

Group W., Inc., and Jerry Wilson appeal a nonfinal order denying their Proceedings Supplementary Motion to File Third Party Complaint and Petition for Writ of Attachment (the Proceedings Supplementary Motion). We affirm.

In 1998, Group W. and Wilson obtained a second amended judgment against the William H. Morris Company, William H. Morris, and others. This judgment (the California judgment) was entered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Later, Group W. and Mr. Wilson attempted to domesticate the California judgment pursuant to sections 55.501-55.509, Florida Statutes (2003), the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In January 2004, Mr. Morris filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, seeking a declaration that enforcement of the California judgment was barred by the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). Group W. and Mr. Wilson answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint.

In April 2004, the trial court entered a Partial Summary Judgment, concluding that Group W. and Mr. Wilson “are precluded by the statute of limitations from taking any actions to collect on the underlying judgment other than seeking to enforce the judgment as a recorded instrument possibly creating a lien on real property in Pasco County, Florida.” The court reserved jurisdiction to determine whether Group W. and Mr. Wilson have a valid and enforceable lien on real property in Pasco County. The counterclaim and third-party complaint also remained pending. No appeal was taken from the Partial Summary Judgment.

In March 2005, Mr. Wilson filed his Proceedings Supplementary Motion, asserting that the California judgment had been domesticated in Florida and requesting leave to file a third-party complaint and petition for writ of attachment against the William H. Morris Company and Mr. Morris. The trial court denied Mr. Wilson’s motion, making specific reference to the earlier Partial Summary Judgment.

In this appeal, Group W. and Mr. Wilson argue that the trial court’s Partial Summary Judgment, concerning the statute of limitations, was wrong and that, as a result, the trial court should have granted the Proceedings Supplementary Motion. The appellees, including William H. Morris Company and Mr. Morris, argue that Group W. and Mr. Wilson did not timely appeal the Partial Summary Judgment and cannot now challenge the correctness of that order.

“[Pjartial final judgments are renewable either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal from the final judgment in the entire case.” Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(k); see also Bay & Gulf Laundry Equip. Co. v. Chateau Tower, Inc., 484 So.2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Group W. and Mr. Wilson did not appeal the Partial Summary Judgment as a partial final judgment as contemplated by rule 9.110(k). Further, the entire case has not yet been resolved by final judgment in that Group W. and Mr. Wilson’s counterclaim and third-party complaint have not yet been resolved and the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine whether Group W. and Mr. Wilson have an enforceable judgment lien on real property in Pasco County. Moreover, the order denying the Proceedings Supplementary Motion does not dispose of the entire case. Thus, there is no basis for Group W. and Mr. Wilson to obtain review of the Partial Summary Judgment in this appeal.

Because Group W. and Mr. Wilson have not presented any cognizable argument to demonstrate error with respect to the order denying the Proceedings Supplementary Motion, we affirm. Our decision does not preclude Group W. and Mr. Wilson from pursuing any appellate remedies that they may have in relation to the Partial Summary Judgment once a final judgment is entered disposing of the pending case.

Affirmed.

DAVIS and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.


text:
    Carol M. ROSENBLOOM, Appellant, v. Michael ROSENBLOOM, Appellee.
    No. 4D04-3239.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 2, 2005.
    Greg A. Lewen of Miller, Schwartz & Miller, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
    Terry Ellen Fixel and Tracy B. New-mark of Fixel & La Rocco & Newmark, Hollywood, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Burton v. Burton, 851 So.2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

KLEIN, SHAHOOD and GERBER, JONATHAN D., Associate Judge, concur.


author: NORTHCUTT, Judge. DAVIS, Judge,

text:
    In re Petition of Jane DOE for a Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice of Termination of Pregnancy. Jane Doe, Appellant.
    No. 2D05-5321.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Nov. 10, 2005.

      Randall C. Marshall, of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami; Rebecca Harrison Steele, of ACLU Foundation of Florida Inc., Tampa; and Penny Kfare Jacobs, Orlando, for Appellant.
   BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

By the opinion attached, the Second District Court of Appeal has reversed the order entered by The Honorable Ellen Masters, Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida, in Case Number 53-2005DP-183892XX, dismissing a petition for a judicial waiver of parental notice of termination of pregnancy.

The minor may consent to the performance or inducement of a termination of pregnancy without notice to a parent or guardian.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

A minor employing the pseudonym Jane Doe challenges a final order dismissing her petition for judicial waiver of the statutory requirement that her physician notify her parent or guardian prior to terminating her pregnancy. We reverse.

The proceeding below arose pursuant to section 390.01114, Florida Statutes (2005). That law requires a physician to notify a minor’s parent or legal guardian at least 48 hours before performing an abortion on that minor. § 390.01114(3)(a). The statute excuses the notice requirement under five circumstances, one of them being that the minor has successfully petitioned a circuit court to waive it. § 390.01114(3)(b)(5). This type of provision, commonly referred to as a judicial bypass, has been deemed necessary to the constitutionality of statutes restricting the abortion rights of minors. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (construing a statute requiring parental consent to a minor’s abortion); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 117 S.Ct. 1169, 137 L.Ed.2d 464 (1997) (construing parental notice statute under Bellotti standards); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-11, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir.1991) (upholding Georgia parental notification statute as satisfying Bellotti criteria).

The Florida statute provides that the court must grant a judicial bypass petition if it finds (1) by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor “is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy”; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, that there “is evidence of child abuse or sexual abuse of the petitioner by one or both of her parents or her legal guardian”; or (3) by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interest of the petitioner.” § 390.01114(4)(c), (d). If the court does not find that any of these conditions have been met, it must dismiss the petition. Id. The statute further provides that, unless the minor requests an extension, the petition will be deemed granted if the court does not rule on it within 48 hours of its filing. § 390.01114(4)(b).

Doe petitioned the circuit court to waive the notice requirement on October 27, 2005. Employing a form petition devised for the purpose by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.987, she alleged two of the statutory grounds for a judicial bypass: that she is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy and that notifying her parents prior to the procedure would not be in her best interest. The circuit court appointed counsel to assist Doe and, on October 28, held an evidentiary hearing at which Doe was the only witness.

Doe stated that she is 17 years old and that she will turn 18 in about a month. She has graduated from high school with an impressively high grade point average. She now attends a trade school in a nearby city, for which she has incurred student loans that she will have to repay after she completes her program. Doe lives at home with her parents, but she contributes to her living and automobile expenses with income from part-time employment. She testified that, in the past when she was able to work more, she helped to pay some of the family’s general household expenses.

Doe testified that she is pregnant by her steady boyfriend, whom she plans to marry in the next year. She diagnosed her pregnancy after missing her menstrual period and taking a home pregnancy test. At the time of the hearing below she believed she was about six weeks pregnant, but she had no medical confirmation of this or, indeed, of the pregnancy itself. She and her boyfriend had visited a medical clinic to seek a termination of the pregnancy, but the clinic instead referred her to a juvenile justice program to obtain assistance in petitioning for a judicial waiver of the statutory parental notice requirement.

Doe’s desire to terminate her pregnancy is “not at all” motivated by any pressure from her boyfriend, she testified. Rather, she said, at this time in her life she is not prepared for the struggle, financial or otherwise, associated with supporting a child. It would require her to work full-time and therefore to give up her educational endeavor, which in itself would create further difficulties in the future. Doe testified she is aware that an abortion poses medical risks, some of which are long-term and include the possibility that she could not bear children in the future. Acknowledging that her family’s religion is Catholic, she testified that she has considered the religious and future emotional ramifications of her decision.

According to Doe, she has a good relationship with her parents. But she believes that they would adamantly oppose her decision. Beyond that, she testified that the issue might well destroy the relationship and that her parents might ask her to leave their home.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition by an order in the form suggested by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.991. The order stated:

The minor has not proven by sufficient evidence any of the criteria that would permit a judicial waiver of the parental notification requirement of Section 390.01114(3), Florida Statutes, for the following reasons:
The child currently resides with her parents and suspects that she is pregnant pursuant to a home pregnancy test. She has not consulted with a medical professional. She and her boyfriend went to a clinic to terminate her pregnancy and were advised to go to the ... County Justice Center for assistance in filing this proceeding. Further, the child recognizes that she enjoys a good relationship with her parents but is concerned that advising them of her pregnancy would cause the relationship to change. The child has not established that a waiver would be in her best interest.
The provisions set forth in Florida Statute § 390.01114(3)(b) are not applicable. The grounds set forth in § 390.01114(4)(c) have not been established by clear and convincing evidence. The grounds set forth in § 390.01114(4)(d) have not been established by a preponderance of the evidence, and in fact, are not applicable in this cause....

Doe appealed on November 3, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(n). As mandated by this rule.— which provides that the order dismissing the waiver petition will be deemed reversed if we do not decide the appeal within 10 days after its filing — we have expedited our consideration of this matter.

We preface our discussion by noting that this is the first time this court has been called upon to address this parental notification statute. It was enacted by the 2005 legislature, ch. 2005-52, Laws of Fla., and became effective only on June 30, 2005. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 907 So.2d 1161 (Fla.2005). There is scant Florida case law interpreting or applying it. However, Florida’s statute is similar to several that have been adopted in other states, and we have been assisted by judicial interpretations of those laws.

Under the statute, our starting point must be the findings of fact set forth in the circuit court’s order. Section 390.01114(4)(e) requires the court to “issue written and specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision.” (Emphases supplied.) Requiring trial courts to set forth findings to support their rulings serves important purposes. In cases such as this, involving the application of a statute that so directly touches on an individual’s constitutional right, requiring written findings helps to ensure that the decision has been reached strictly according to constitutionally permissible criteria. See In re T.W., 543 So.2d 837, 841 (Fla. 5th DCA) (holding that statute requiring parental consent to a minor’s abortion was unconstitutional in part because its judicial bypass provision lacked procedural safeguards to avoid the “clear danger that trial judges will render a decision on the basis of their own moral, religious or political beliefs”), approved, 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989).

In this case, the findings included in the order are insufficient to serve this critical purpose. Manifestly, nothing in the order’s few recited facts supports a conclusion that Doe is not sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy or that she failed to prove that notifying her parents of her decision would not be in her best interest. The facts contained in the order might well be typical of the great majority of minors who would petition for a waiver under the statute. Certainly, it could be expected that most such petitioners live with their parents; many of them have learned of their pregnancies via commercially available tests administered at home; it may well be that many will have been directed to the courthouse by the very medical personnel they sought to consult. Finally, who can doubt that most minors — indeed, most adults — in Doe’s position would fear that divulging this decision would damage their relationships with their parents? These facts, standing alone, simply bear no logical relationship to the statutory grounds for a judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement. At best, they beg the question whether those grounds exist in this case. More importantly, if those few circumstances are sufficient in themselves to justify withholding a judicial bypass, then virtually no minor could ever obtain one under Florida’s parental notification statute.

For obvious practical and constitutional reasons, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended that result. To the contrary, it identified several areas of inquiry to assist the court’s assessment of the judicial bypass grounds as they relate to the specific petitioner before it. Thus, the statute provides that “the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor, and all other relevant evidence.” § 390.01114(4)(e). The findings contained in the order dismissing Doe’s petition do not specifically or logically relate to any of these factors.

Another important reason that courts may be required to set forth written findings is that they facilitate appellate review. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla.1978) (stating that order granting new trial must contain findings and reasons in order to facilitate intelligent appellate review). Where, as here, orders do not contain sufficient findings of fact as required by law, appellate courts typically deem them incapable of meaningful review and they remand with directions to the issuing courts to make the necessary findings. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Fla.1994) (reversing for a new trial because absent the “specific findings of reliability” mandated in section 90.803(23), an appellate court cannot determine whether the hearsay statements admitted under the statute were in fact reliable). We decline to do so in this case, for two reasons.

First, a remand for the purpose of supplying appropriate findings of fact would violate the legislative intention that judicial bypass petitions progress through the justice system without delay. The legislative concern for speed and efficiency is so important that it is permitted to trump all other considerations contained in the bypass provision. Hence, the statute provides that if the circuit court does not rule on a waiver petition within 48 hours, it is deemed granted. § 390.01114(4)(b); see also In re A.S., 909 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). At the same time, the statute calls for an expedited appeal of an order denying a waiver petition. § 390.01114(4)(f). The legislature requested that the supreme court adopt rules to ensure that judicial bypass proceedings “are handled expeditiously and in a manner consistent with this act.” § 390.01114(5). Accordingly, the supreme court promulgated a rule directing that in an appeal of an order denying a parental notification waiver, the district court of appeal must render its decision within 10 days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(n). Consistent with the legislative scheme, the rule provides that “[i]f no decision is rendered within the foregoing time period, the order shall be deemed reversed, [and] the petition shall be deemed granted.” Id.

Importantly, the rule contains no exceptions. If we fail to rule within 10 days— for any reason — the order is deemed reversed and the petition is deemed granted. To carve an exception for orders that lack the mandatory findings necessary for appellate review would be beyond our constitutionally-assigned purview, would violate the letter of the appellate rule, and would contravene the clearly expressed intention of the legislature. Moreover, we are loath to deviate from a carefully crafted statutory and procedural scheme for resolving issues that are both deeply personal and widely debated. Such a course is fraught with the danger of undermining public and individual confidence in the ability or willingness of our government to devise clear rules for deciding these difficult questions and to adhere to them.

Our second reason for declining to remand this case is more straightforward: the record before the circuit court is not likely to yield findings sufficient to deny the waiver petition. We have examined the record to determine whether a remand to make adequate findings would serve a practical purpose. In doing so, we are mindful that the traditional appellate presumption of correctness, as well as its attendant deference to determinations of fact made in the lower court, require us to view the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the order under review. We are also aware that these principles are considerably weakened when the evidence is undisputed and when, as here, it is presented to a judge sitting without a jury. See Bradley v. Waldrop, 611 So.2d 31, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see also Holland v. Gross, 89 So.2d 255, 258 (Fla.1956). Moreover, the presumption of correctness never requires an appellate court to disregard record evidence that disproves the lower court’s findings or that reveals its ruling to be an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So.2d 899, 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (reversing order granting a new trial based on the trial court’s determination that it had erroneously given a jury instruction where the order was not supported by written findings and where the record showed that the jury instruction was warranted), review denied, 886 So.2d 227 (Fla.2004).

We reiterate that we are not in a position to make findings of fact based on the written record. But having viewed the record in light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that a remand for findings would not be useful for the purpose of justifying the trial court’s denial of Doe’s petition. As previously described, the record of the hearing below contains evidence on the factors set forth in the statute. All of that evidence is undisputed and it supports granting Doe’s petition. Doe’s age bears positively on the statutorily-mandated inquiry into her emotional development, maturity, and understanding. See In re Doe, No. 03AP-1185, 2003 WL 22871690 (Ohio Ct.App. Dec. 5, 2003) (unpublished opinion). The same is true of her stellar academic performance in high school, of her ongoing quest to prepare herself for a career, and of her financial contributions to her living expenses and those of her family. See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So.2d 722 (Ala.1993), partially overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Anonymous, 664 So.2d 882, 884 (Ala.1995); In re Jane Doe, 134 Ohio App.3d 569, 731 N.E.2d 751, 752-53 (1999); In re Jane Doe, 83 Ohio App.3d 904, 615 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (1992). Doe’s emotional development and maturity are further evidenced by her committed relationship with a young man she intends to marry, by her consultation with him about her condition, by her attempt to address the situation medically, and, indeed, by her determination to do so at this time rather than wait until she turns 18 and needs no judicial bypass to avoid informing her parents. See Ex parte Anonymous, 810 So.2d 786 (Ala.2001); In re Anonymous, 718 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). Her understanding of her circumstances is manifest in her appreciation that there are medical risks associated with the procedure, as well as religious and emotional consequences. Finally, Doe’s assessment of her relationship with her parents and of their likely reaction to her decision is consistent with all the other circumstances of the case; certainly, it is not the sort of unrealistic view that might be expected of someone who does not have the emotional development, maturity, intellect, or understanding contemplated in the statute.

On the first ground alleged in Doe’s waiver petition, it should be kept in mind that she was not required to prove that she has the maturity of an adult. See Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So.2d 722 (Ala.1993); Anonymous, 549 So.2d 1347 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Rather, she was called upon to demonstrate that she is “sufficiently mature” to make the decision whether to terminate her pregnancy — a right that minors possess under the federal and Florida constitutions. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); T.W., 551 So.2d at 1194-95. To be sure, the statute required her to prove this ground by clear and convincing evidence. The supreme court has described this standard as

an intermediate level of proof [that] entails both a qualitative and quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.

In re Davey, 645 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla.1994); see also In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961, 967 (Fla.1995). On the face of it, Doe’s testimony was clear and direct. It was credible in that it was consistent with all the known circumstances, and it was undisputed. Certainly, with one possible exception, it was sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary to establish the maturity basis for a judicial bypass.

The possible exception stems from the record’s inability to portray Doe’s demean- or. Obviously, we did not observe her during her testimony. But when making the required written and specific findings in support of its ruling, the trial court did not mention that it found Doe’s demeanor to be immature, or even suggest that Doe’s demeanor had any bearing on its consideration. And at the hearing itself the court commented that several factors demonstrated that Doe was mature. Cf. Ex parte Anonymous, 810 So.2d 786 (Ala.2001) (noting that the trial court’s order did not mention the minor’s demeanor, but the totality of the judgment showed that the court found the minor to be credible).

In the context of determining whether we should remand for findings at the expense of the strict time deadlines set forth in the statute and appellate rule — assuming, arguendo, that we would even be authorized to do so — our examination of the record strongly suggests that a remand would be fruitless on the maturity issue. Cf. Ex parte Anonymous, 808 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.2001) (remanding to trial court to supplement its order with factual findings required under section 26-21-4, Alabama Code (1975), which, unlike the Florida statute, does not contain a provision that the minor’s petition is automatically granted if the trial or appellate court fails to rule within the stated time periods).

On the second ground raised by Doe’s petition — whether notifying her parents of her decision would not be in her best interest — we also conclude that a remand for additional findings would be futile. It is important to note here that the “best interest” basis for waiving the statute’s notification requirement is not a simple reference to the more general kind of inquiry most often associated with child custody or support determinations. Courts interpreting similar judicial bypass provisions in other states’ parental notification statutes have recognized that the inquiry is more particularized to the question whether it is in the minor’s best interest not to notify her parents that she is exercising her constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. Thus, for example, when discussing best interest in this context, the Texas Supreme Court listed the following factors that should be considered:

(1) the minor’s emotional or physical needs; (2) the possibility of emotional or physical danger to the minor; (3) the stability of the minor’s home and whether notification would cause serious and lasting harm to the family structure; and (4) the relationship between the parent and the minor and the effect of notification on that relationship. An additional factor that courts in other jurisdictions have considered is whether notification may lead the parents to withdraw emotional and financial support from the minor. This list is not exhaustive, and in making the best-interests determination the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.

In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (citations omitted).

Here, Doe gave all indication of possessing an accurate view of her parents’ likely response to her decision. She was nearly an adult herself, had a good relationship with her parents, and lived in their home. Clearly, her vantage point was far superior to the court’s, and from that vantage she feared that notifying her parents would destroy her relationship with them and possibly lead to her ejection from then-home. Of course, at a point in Doe’s life when she remained financially dependent on her parents as she worked toward her own financial independence, destroying that relationship likely would result in the loss of their financial support. Thus, notifying Doe’s parents posed a risk to her current and future ability to be self-supporting that was similar to the very risk she sought to avoid by terminating the pregnancy. Under the criteria outlined by the Texas Supreme Court, these factors would support a finding that notifying Doe’s parents of her decision was not in her 'best interest. And the undisputed testimony in that regard, from the only person at the hearing who was in a position to know, certainly preponderated over the trial court’s speculation that Doe might not be giving her parents enough credit. See City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co., 352 So.2d 149, 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (“A trier of fact simply should not disregard unrebutted, sworn, affirmative relevant testimony absent some reason why it ought not to be relied upon.”).

Again, we do not find these facts from the written record, and we cannot. But, as in the case of the maturity basis for a judicial bypass, our examination of the record on the best interest issue reveals that a remand for findings of fact sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement likely would be for naught.

In sum, the order dismissing Doe’s petition for a judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement does not contain sufficient written and specific findings to support the circuit court’s decision. A remand for the supplementation of those findings would require us to violate the time limitation imposed by rule 9.110(n) as well as the clear legislative intention that these proceedings conclude speedily and efficiently. Moreover, our examination of the record convinces us that there would be little, if anything, to be gained from such an endeavor.

Accordingly, the order is reversed. In accordance with rule 9.110(n), Jane Doe’s petition for a judicial waiver of the parental notification required in section 390.01114 is deemed granted. The clerk shall place a certificate to this effect in the file and provide Doe with a certified copy of it for delivery to her physician. This court’s mandate shall issue simultaneously with this opinion, and no rehearing motion shall be entertained.

FULMER, C.J., Concurs.

DAVIS, J., Dissents with opinion.

DAVIS, Judge,

Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for judicial waiver because the petitioner failed to make the necessary showing that would entitle her to relief.

Proceedings pursuant to section 390.01114, Florida Statutes (2005), are somewhat different from the routine evi-dentiary hearing. The statute provides that the trial court should grant the relief if it finds by “clear and convincing evidence” that the minor is “sufficiently mature” to make the decision to terminate the pregnancy or if the court finds by “a preponderance of the evidence” that notification of the parents “is not in the best interest of the petitioner.” § 390.01114(4)(c), (d). The statute further provides that the petitioner shall be given court-appointed counsel without cost to assist the petitioner at the hearing. § 390.01114(4)(a). Finally, the statute requires that the trial court “shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor, and all other relevant evidence” and shall issue “written and specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision.” § 390.01114(4)(e).

Although the statute does not specifically so state, the implication of the statute is that the burden of making the showing of maturity and/or best interest of the petitioner is on the petitioner. Further, since there is no adversarial party, the witnesses are not subject to cross-examination and there will be few, if any, contested facts for the trial court to resolve. The responsibility assigned to the trial judge, then, is to hear the testimony presented by the petitioner and determine whether the petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that she is of sufficient maturity to make this decision without parental assistance or by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in her best interest not to notify her parents of the decision.

There is an absence of both statutory and case law offering guidance for appellate review of these decisions. Similar statutes in other states specify that appellate review is based on a de novo standard. See In the Matter of B.S., 205 Ariz. 611, 74 P.3d 285 (2003); In re Petition of Anonymous 1, 251 Neb. 424, 558 N.W.2d 784 (1997). The petitioner here argues that this court should apply the “clear error” test to the trial court’s findings of fact and review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. This court has discussed the standard of review for a bypass proceeding in In re E.B.L., 544 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Although that case involved a prior statute, the reasoning is applicable.

We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the trial court makes a discretionary decision under this statute which is governed by the limited standard of review announced in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Thus, we cannot reverse the trial court if reasonable people could differ as to the propriety of the trial court’s decision.

Id. at 335. However, Judge Altenbernd discussed in a footnote the possibility that, due to the potential implication of the minor’s right of privacy, the trial court’s decision may be subject to a more stringent appellate review. Id. at 335 n. 5. Due to the silence of the statute and the lack of definitive case law, it is unclear what standard of review we should apply. However, since the trial court had the1 benefit of personally observing the witness, I conclude that it is appropriate to apply an abuse of discretion standard to the factual findings while reviewing the legal conclusions de novo.

The issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in finding that the petitioner failed to meet the required showing of proof. Since the testimony in such a hearing is not disputed, the trial court’s findings of fact become an issue on review only if the trial court rejects the facts presented by the testimony. If the order indicates that a witness’s demeanor caused the trial court to disbelieve his or her testimony, the appellate court would defer to such a conclusion. However, without the trial court’s notation regarding a witness’s demeanor, the facts recited by the witness would be accepted on appellate review.

Whether the petitioner presented sufficient facts to meet the “clear and convincing” standard required to show maturity is a legal conclusion that is subject to de novo review. Likewise, the determination of whether the petitioner showed by a “preponderance of the evidence” that it is in the petitioner’s best interest not to notify her parents is also a legal conclusion.

Accordingly, I suggest that we should focus our review on what facts were presented and how they measure against the appropriate test. Although neither the statute nor Florida case law offers guidance as to the definition of “maturity” or “best interest,” courts in other states with similar statutes have issued decisions that are helpful.

In attempting to define maturity for the application of the bypass statute in Nebraska, the Supreme Court of Nebraska noted:

Maturity is “difficult to define, let alone determine.... ” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3048 n. 23, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (commonly referenced as Bellotti II). Notwithstanding, determine it we must. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly defined “maturity” in the context of parental notification or consent statutes, it has observed that “minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 443 U.S. at 635, 99 S.Ct. at 3043-44.

In re Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d at 787-88. The federal district court for Utah, in its attempt to define maturity, concluded that “maturity is not solely a matter of social skills, level of intelligence or verbal skills. More importantly, it calls for experience, perspective and judgment.” H-B- v. Wilkinson, 639 F.Supp. 952, 954 (D.Utah 1986). The Wilkinson court went on to suggest that the minor’s prior work experience, experience living away from home, and experience in handling personal finances should be considered.

In considering the minor’s perspective, the Wilkinson court concluded that the trial court should consider the minor’s appreciation and understanding of the seriousness and possible detrimental impact of each available option as well as the minor’s realistic perception and assessment of possible short-term and long-term consequences of each of the options. Finally, in assessing judgment, the court opined, “The exercise of good judgment requires being fully informed so as to be able to weigh alternatives independently and realistically. Among other things, the minor’s conduct is a measure of good judgment.” Id. at 954.

Although the “experience, perspective, and judgment” definition of maturity is not controlling in this court, the discussion is helpful. The trial judge here determined that the petitioner did not provide clear and convincing evidence to show that she had sufficient maturity to make such a decision without notifying her parents. The trial court found that the petitioner is almost eighteen years of age, has worked part-time, has assumed responsibility for a personal monthly bill, and helps pay for another of her personal monthly bills. When she was working full-time, she contributed toward the family’s expenses as well, although there is no indication as to how often this occurred. She concluded, “But whatever I can now, I just give whatever I can.” She is a recent high school graduate with an admirable grade point average and is enrolled in a trade school. She plans to marry the father of the child within a year.

My concern here is that, despite petitioner’s apparent intellectual ability and limited financial responsibility, she failed to demonstrate the maturity required by statute to make such an important decision on her own. If maturity and good judgment are measured by one’s attempt to become fully informed of all of the options available and the possible consequences of those options, the instant record does not demonstrate that this petitioner exhibited such maturity. There was no testimony as to what she had done to inform herself of the options available to her, the nature of the medical procedures that would be performed, or the possible short-term and long-term ramifications of each of the options available. In fact, the testimony was that upon determining by a home test that she was pregnant, the petitioner went to a clinic to terminate the pregnancy. There was no testimony as to any counseling that may have taken place at that time. Rather, the testimony indicates that the clinic sent her to the court to file her petition for the waiver of parental notification and that she was then appointed an attorney. There was no testimony as to what efforts she made to educate herself as to the options available and the ramifications of each. The only testimony on this issue was the petitioner’s affirmative response to her attorney’s inquiry regarding whether she had considered the long-term ramifications of her decision. Likewise, her attorney asked whether she understood the possible medical complications, and she responded, “Uh-huh, I understand that.” There is nothing to show what her understanding of these ramifications and medical complications might include. Furthermore, there is nothing to show that the petitioner was aware of any options other than termination of the pregnancy.

The absence in the record of any testimony as to what the minor understood supports the trial court’s finding regarding maturity. This minor has not shown that she is in fact well informed as to the issues involved in making such a decision and that she is making a mature, rational decision. Her decision to immediately seek termination without seeking any other information or counseling establishes her failure to show by clear and convincing evidence that she possesses sufficient maturity to be entitled to bypass relief.

The record is similar regarding the petitioner’s best interest. The testimony indicated that she has a good relationship with her parents. However, the petitioner testified that she believed her parents would disapprove of her decision and that their disapproval might negatively impact her relationship with them. Yet, she failed to provide any factual basis to show that this is a reasonable conclusion. The question is whether this shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interest of the minor to waive the parental notification. Under the facts of this case, with this minor making this decision as described above, I would conclude that the facts do not show by a preponderance of the evidence that such would be in her best interest.

The fatal flaw found by the majority in the trial court’s order is its failure to make sufficient findings of fact. I disagree with the basic assumption of that opinion. The majority seems to suggest that if there are facts that have not been supplied by the petitioner, i.e., what steps she has taken to educate herself as to the options and ramifications, what information she has considered in making the decision, etc., that the trial court must make findings as to the absence of those facts. I disagree. The trial court recited the facts that were presented by the petitioner and concluded that they did not meet the statutorily required standard for the separate issues. Based on my review of the record, I agree and would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

      . Doe gave the exact date of her birthday. To better ensure her anonymity, see § 390.01116, we are giving only general descriptions of this and other more detailed aspects of her testimony.

      . A virtually identical 1999 predecessor, § 390.01115, Fla. Stat (1999), was stricken by the Florida Supreme Court as violative of the right to privacy set forth in article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla.2003). The 2005 statute was created after Florida’s voters amended the constitution to expressly permit the legislature to enact a parental notification law notwithstanding the Florida constitutional privacy right. Compare Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const. with Art. 10, § 22, Fla. Const.; see also In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 907 So.2d 1161 (Fla.2005).

      . By no means should our comments on the shortcomings of the findings in the order be taken as criticism of the very able circuit judge who entered it. We feel constrained by having to sort out and apply a new and uninterpreted statute in a mere 10 days. But the time permitted us is lengthy compared to the 48 hours allotted to the circuit judge.

      . See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990) (stating that a state may require the minor to prove maturity in a bypass proceeding); see also In the Matter of B.S., 205 Ariz. 611, 74 P.3d 285, 289 (2003) (stating that since the minor controls the presentation of evidence and the trial court will not receive evidence disputing the minor’s maturity or best interest claims, the minor must prove entitlement to the judicial bypass).