text:
    Tony JONES, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-1573.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 28, 2006.
    Tony Jones, pro se, Appellant.
    Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of the petition challenging the revocation of his conditional release, but we must reverse the circuit court’s order imposing a lien on appellant’s prison account based on the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla-2003). Under Schmidt, the circuit court erred when it ordered appellant to pay filing fees and imposed a lien on his prison account. See Cason v. Crosby, 892 So.2d 536, 537-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

AFFIRMED as to the challenge to the order by which the circuit court denied mandamus, but REVERSED as to the challenge to the lien order, and that order is hereby QUASHED.

ERVIN, ALLEN, and WOLF, JJ., Concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FULMER, Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dwayne Ricardo WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D05-3851.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.

      James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anne Sheer Weiner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   FULMER, Chief Judge.

Dwayne Ricardo Wilson appeals his judgment and sentence for second-degree murder. We affirm the denial of Wilson’s motion for judgment of acquittal without comment. However, because the jury instruction on self-defense constituted fundamental error under established case law, as the State concedes, we reverse.

Wilson was charged with one count of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of Michael Harris. At trial, Wilson’s sole defense, raised during his own testimony, was that he stabbed Harris in self-defense after Harris allegedly came after him holding what Wilson said looked like a knife. As part of the jury instruction on self-defense, the trial court gave an instruction on the forcible felony exception to self-defense. The court read, in pertinent part: “[T]he use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm is not justifiable if you find ... Dwayne Ricardo Wilson was attempting to commit or committing Murder in the second-degree, Manslaughter, or Aggravated Battery-” See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f).

“It is well established that this standard instruction is not appropriate unless the defendant is charged with an independent forcible felony, in addition to the offense for which he claims self-defense.” Smith v. State, 933 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Martinez v. State, 933 So.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing cases from each district that hold the giving of this instruction is error)). As explained in Giles v. State, 831 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the instruction is “circular and confusing to the jury” because it improperly instructs the jury that the very act that the defendant seeks to justify as an act of self-defense prevents that same act from being an act of self-defense.

Wilson’s counsel did not object to this instruction. This court has, however, consistently held that this instruction “essentially negates the defense and constitutes fundamental error when a defendant committed a single act and claimed self-defense.” Velazquez v. State, 884 So.2d 377, 377-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (attempted second-degree murder) (citing Zuniga v. State, 869 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (aggravated battery with a deadly weapon); Baker v. State, 877 So.2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (aggravated battery with a deadly weapon)); see also Grier v. State, 928 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (second-degree murder).

In line with our precedent, we conclude that although Wilson did not raise this issue at trial, the erroneous instruction was fundamental error. Self-defense was the only defense Wilson asserted at trial, and there was evidence to support that defense. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Due to our reversal, we need not reach two additional issues raised by Wilson concerning a motion for mistrial and alleged improper argument by the State during closing argument.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.


author: MONACO, J.

text:
    Sherri RENFRO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3333.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    Sherri Renfro, Quincy, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   MONACO, J.

Sherri Renfro appeals the denial of her second rule 3.800(a) motion seeking additional jail time credit. Because the trial court mistakenly denied the motion on the theory that it was successive, and because the trial court has, therefore, not yet reviewed the motion on the merits, we reverse.

Ms. Renfro, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, filed a rule 3.800(a) motion in 2005, seeking jail time credit for time she spent in the Lake County jail prior to her Lake County conviction. The trial court granted the motion, recalculated her jail credit, and awarded an additional 29 days of credit toward the service of her sentence.

In 2006, Ms. Renfro filed a second rule 3.800(a) motion, this time seeking an additional 70 days of jail credit for time she served in the Marion County jail. The trial court denied the motion apparently laboring under the misapprehension that it had denied Ms. Renfro’s first motion, and that Ms. Renfro did not take an appeal from that order.

The State argues that Ms. Renfro is barred from filing a second motion by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, even if the second motion raises an issue different than that raised in an earlier motion. The Florida Supreme Court has specifically held, however, that rule 3.800 allows a court to correct an illegal sentence “at any time,” and that “rule 3.800 expressly rejects application of res judicata principles to such motions.” See State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla.2003); see also Pleasure v. State, 931 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Ms. Renfro has raised a different claim in her second motion from that argued in her first motion. As the trial court has not addressed this claim on the merits, we reverse and remand to allow the trial court to reconsider the second claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Albert James HENLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D05-2753.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.

      Albert James Henley, Chipley, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Albert James Henley appeals the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, which asserted eight claims. We affirm the summary denial with respect to all claims except one. In his second claim, Henley alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or call several witnesses whose testimony would have been favorable to the defense. The trial court properly concluded that this claim warranted an evidentia-ry hearing, and appointed postconviction counsel for the purpose of aiding Henley at his hearing on this claim. Although the trial court’s order of denial as to this claim indicates that the claim was being denied following an evidentiary hearing, the State concedes that no hearing was actually held.

Therefore, we reverse the order of denial with respect to Henley’s second claim, and remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the issues raised in that claim only. In all other respects, the summary denial is affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.

THOMPSON, SAWAYA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles E. LONGLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-2748.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    Charles E. Longley, Arcadia, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Charles E. Longley was convicted of robbery with a firearm and sentenced as an habitual violent felony offender. He is appearing in this Court for the tenth time on his 1991 case. This time, he is appealing the denial of his latest rule 3.800(a) motion, which raises three successive and time-barred attacks upon his habitualization. This Court issued a show cause order pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla.1999).

First, Longley’s response, which he has made before, is that the alleged “blatant, fundamental errors that have endured for years” appear “clearly on the face of the record.” Simply asserting that any perceived error amounts to “fundamental error” does not make it so. Longley is merely successively complaining about defects in the habitualization process. See Brown v. State, 813 So.2d 132, 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (stating claim of defective habitualization process is subject to procedural bar against successive claims); Hope v. State, 766 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reiterating that “mere allegation[s] of a defective habitualization process [do] not constitute a claim of an ‘illegal’ sentence”).

Second, Longley contends that the issues have never been addressed on their “merits.” He seems to think that any procedural bar (based on being successive, time barred, etc.) just doesn’t count. It does count, and a claim that the procedural requirements of the habitual offender statute were not followed is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) proceeding. See Clayton v. State, 904 So.2d 660, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Payton v. State, 810 So.2d 539, 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). It is far too late for Longley to file a rule 3.850 motion, to say nothing of the fact that it would be his fourth rule 3.850 motion if he did so.

Third, we hold that Longley is barred from further pro se filings in this Court involving his 1991 case because his pleadings have become an abuse of process. See Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996, § 924.051, Fla. Stat. (2006) (acknowledging limitations on collateral review to be strictly enforced); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants); Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough”). We affirm, and in order to conserve judicial resources we prohibit Longley from filing with this Court any further pro se pleadings concerning Ninth Judicial Circuit Court case number 1991-CF-11788. The Clerk of this Court is directed not to accept any further pro se filings concerning this case from Charles E. Longley, and any more pleadings regarding this case will be summarily rejected by the Clerk, unless they are filed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Clerk is further directed to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for consideration of disciplinary procedures. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); see, e.g., Simpkins v. State, 909 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

AFFIRMED; Future Pro Se Filings Prohibited; Certified Opinion Forwarded to Department of Corrections.

GRIFFIN, ORFINGER, and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    David MOORE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D05-4351.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    David Moore, pro se, Petitioner.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Sherri Tolar Rollison, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. David Moore is hereby afforded a belated appeal of an order denying motion to correct illegal sentence in case number 99-2085G in the circuit court for Bay County. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion will be provided to the clerk of the circuit court, with directions that it be treated as a notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

BENTON, VAN NORTWICK, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel M. LOEFFLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D05-5676.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Judith Ellis, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

      Daniel Loeffler, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   FULMER, Chief Judge.

Daniel Loeffler challenges his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, twenty-eight grams or more, and possession of cocaine with intent to sell, resulting in ten-year sentences concurrent for each count. His counsel has filed an Anders brief, and Loeffler has filed a pro se brief raising three issues. We affirm the convictions and sentences because, after independent review of the record, we agree with counsel’s assessment that there are no issues of arguable merit for the appeal. We write to address one point raised in the pro se brief.

Loeffler raises an issue based upon a filing by defense counsel on October 10, 2005, wherein counsel moved to withdraw based on conflict. Loeffler asserts that fundamental error occurred below because the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion.

The record reflects that counsel’s motion was filed after a bench warrant had been issued for Loeffler’s arrest. The circuit court minutes indicate that Loeffler failed to appear for a hearing on October 3, 2005, and that a warrant was issued. Counsel filed his motion to withdraw on October 10, 2005, and Loeffler was arrested and brought to first appearance on October 12, 2005. Counsel later represented Loeffler at his sentencing hearing and the motion to withdraw was not discussed.

We reject Loeffler’s assertion that these facts alone support a conclusion that fundamental error occurred below. Because more factual development is needed before this court can conclude that any error occurred, any potential issue arising from these facts cannot be resolved on direct appeal. We therefore affirm without prejudice to Loeffler’s right to raise his issue by appropriate motion in the trial court. See Whitaker v. State, 433 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

DAVIS and CANADY, JJ., Concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).


text:
    Yoslen BARRIOS, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY and Gallagher Bassett Ins. Co., Appellees.
    No. 1D05-4867.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    Richard E. Zaldivar and Albert Marro-quin of Richard E. Zaldivar, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
    Christopher M. McShane and Edward D. Schuster of Massey, Coican & Schuster, L.L.C., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Yoslen Barrios, the claimant below, appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims denying her amended verified petition for attorney’s fees. We affirm the order below except to the extent that it rules on the entitlement to attorney’s fees for the issue relating to the claimant’s request for psychiatric care and treatment. The judge of compensation claims reserved ruling on this issue because it was premature, and the judge of compensation claims never heard evidence on this issue. Thus, as to this issue only, the order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

ALLEN, BENTON, and HAWKES, JJ„ concur.


author: PER CURIAM. WOLF, J.,

text:
    BECKMAN COULTER, INC., Appellant, v. James R. MITCHELL, Trustee of the Cardbeck Miami Trust and Department of Revenue, Appellees.
    No. 1D06-0402.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
    Steven L. Brannock and Maegen P. Luka of Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa, and Jerome W. Hoffman and Mark E. Holcomb of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and J. Clifton Cox, Assistant Attorney General, Revenue Litigation Section, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Dillard & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 893 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

HAWKES and THOMAS, JJ., concur; WOLF, J., concurs with opinion.

WOLF, J.,

concurring.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was mistaken in stating that the challenge to the original tax assessment was not raised by the original petition. This issue, however, is irrelevant as to appellant’s right to intervene in light of this court’s ruling in Dillard & Associates Consulting Engineers v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 893 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Appellant will have an opportunity to raise the issue of its responsibility for the tax under the indemnity agreement in circuit court. If the Department of Revenue decided to directly assess appellant for the tax pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes, appellant will be a party to that proceeding. Thus, our decision in Dillard is controlling, and we must affirm. If Dillard were ■ not binding precedent, I would reverse the decision of the ALJ and hold that appellant’s substantial interests are affected by this proceeding.


author: WALLACE, Judge.

text:
    Cuauhthemoz M. GAMEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-2879.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
   WALLACE, Judge.

Cuauhthemoz M. Gamez appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse the postconviction court’s order that summarily denied Mr. Gamez’s claim that his 28.5-year sentence for attempted robbery with a firearm is illegal, and we remand for further proceedings.

On October 7, 1991, Mr. Gamez pleaded no contest to attempted first-degree murder (count one) and attempted robbery with a firearm (count two). The trial court sentenced him to 22 years’ prison to be followed by 5 years’ probation on count one and to 3 years’ prison to be followed by 10 years’ probation on count two. After he was released from prison, Mr. Ga-mez began serving the probationary portions of his sentences. On June 28, 2005, Mr. Gamez admitted to violating the conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to 28.5 years’ prison on counts one and two. The trial court designated the sentences to run concurrently.

Mr. Gamez’s 28.5-year prison sentence for attempted robbery with a firearm (count two) is illegal because the offense of attempted robbery with a firearm is a second-degree felony punishable by a maximum of 15 years in prison. See §§ 812.13(2)(a), 777.04(4)0»), and 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989); see also Hamilton v. State, 890 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Bailey v. State, 877 So.2d 836 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). In its order denying Mr. Gamez’s motion, the postconviction court relied on the judgment entered on June 28, 2005. This judgment described the offense for which Mr. Gamez was convicted on count two as armed robbery, a violation of section 812.13(2)(a), a first-degree felony. However, the judgment is incorrect in this respect. Mr. Gamez originally pleaded no contest to attempted robbery with a firearm, a violation of sections 812.13(2)(a) and 777.04(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), a second-degree felony. For this reason, the June 28, 2005, judgment should be corrected to reflect the crime for which Mr. Gamez was actually convicted on count two.

On this appeal, the State commendably concedes error and agrees that Mr. Gamez is entitled to be resentenced on count two. However, because the 28.5-year prison sentence was the result of a negotiated plea agreement with the State, Mr. Gamez may be resentenced within the 15-year statutory maximum only if the State agrees. See Lang v. State, 931 So.2d 922, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). If the State does not agree to such a sentence, then Mr. Gamez must be allowed to withdraw his admission to the violation of probation. See id.

Finally, the judgments entered on October 7, 1991, and June 28, 2005, contain errors. On remand, the postconviction court shall correct the October 7,1991, and the June 28, 2005, judgments to reflect that the conviction on count one was for attempted first-degree murder, a violation of sections 782.04(1) and 777.04(4)(a), a first-degree felony, and that the conviction on count two was for attempted robbery with a firearm, a violation of sections 812.13(2)(a) and 777.04(4)(b), a second-degree felony.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

SALCINES and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.


author: VILLANTI, Judge.

text:
    Vetrony LIVINGSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-2137.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

Vetrony Livingston appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand with instructions.

Livingston claims that he does not qualify as a prison releasee reoffender because he did not commit his new offense within three years of being released from a state correctional facility. See § 775.082(9)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (2001). However, Livingston’s motion is facially insuffi-dent because it did not affirmatively allege that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a); see also Tyson v. State, 852 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

It appears that the postconviction court relied on exhibits prepared by the Department of Corrections after Livingston was sentenced as a basis for summarily denying the motion on its merits. It is unclear whether the exhibits were part of the trial court record in the proceeding in which the challenged sentence was imposed. Nevertheless, because Livingston’s motion is facially insufficient, the postconviction court should have dismissed the motion, rather than deny it on its merits. Therefore, we reverse the order denying the rule 3.800(a) motion and remand for entry of an order of dismissal, which shall be without prejudice to any right Livingston may have to file a facially sufficient motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a) or a timely and facially sufficient motion pursuant to rule 3.850.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

SALCINES and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.


author: KELLY, Judge.

text:
    John Clark DANIELS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-1236.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2006.
   KELLY, Judge.

John Clark Daniels appeals the summary denial of his motion to define and clarify sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand with instructions.

Daniels alleges that he is entitled to 347 days’ jail credit in circuit court cases 01-04946-CFAWS, 02-02300-CFAWS, 02-03807-CFAWS, and 02-03748-CFAWS, thereby making the sentences coterminous. The postconviction court denied the motion on the merits. We reverse the postconviction court’s order because Daniels’ motion is facially insufficient. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a); see also Stathas v. State, 852 So.2d 881, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to jail time credit was facially insufficient where petitioner failed to allege that court records demonstrated his entitlement to additional jail credit).

Even if Daniels’ motion was facially sufficient, the postconviction court failed to attach any record documents to support its findings. “The burden is on the postcon-viction court to attach portions of the record refuting the rule 3.800(a) claim.” Spears v. State, 920 So.2d 187, 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Therefore, we reverse the order denying the rule 3.800(a) motion and remand for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice to any right Daniels may have to file a facially sufficient rule 3.800(a) motion or a timely facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion. Such motion shall not be considered successive.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

SALCINES and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Melvin MALONE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D04-262.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 3, 2007.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Todd G. Scher, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before GREEN and SHEPHERD, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See § 934.03(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2002); Commerford v. State, 728 So.2d 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Barr v. State, 659 So.2d 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), review denied, 667 So.2d 774 (Fla.1996); Franco v. State, 376 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert, denied, 386 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1980).


author: HAZOURI, J.

text:
    Edward S. LIPTON, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-175.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Jan. 3, 2007.

      Andrew T. Lavin of Navon & Lavin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    John H. Pelzer of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Morris G. Miller and Amy S. Rubin of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   HAZOURI, J.

Edward S. Lipton entered into an equity line of credit contract with First Union National Bank under which he could borrow up to $3,000,000. Less than a month after the closing, the Bank discovered that Lipton and his businesses had been involved in litigation with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and, just prior to the closing, a Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief was entered into by Lipton and his two businesses with the FTC. This judgment, which had not been revealed to the Bank by Lipton, resulted in the Bank’s freezing the loan based upon a provision of the loan agreement which permits the Bank to prohibit additional advances if it “reasonably believe[s] [Lipton] will be unable to fulfill the repayment obligations under this Agreement due to a material change in [Lipton’s] financial circumstances.”

Upon being notified of the Bank’s action, Lipton spoke with a Bank employee, Eddie Jackson, who testified that Lipton told him to close the equity line. Lipton testified that when he told Jackson to “close the line,” he was speaking facetiously and did not offer to terminate the equity line. The Bank closed the equity line and sent Lipton a letter confirming their conversation and Lipton’s instructions to close the equity line of credit.

As a result, Lipton filed a complaint against the Bank alleging it 'breached the contract by refusing to perform its obligations under it. The Bank asserted numerous affirmative defenses including misrepresentation by Lipton in obtaining the loan which permitted the Bank to suspend the loan and also estoppel due to Lipton’s termination of the loan.

After a six-day non-jury trial, the trial court found that Lipton had made a material misrepresentation to the Bank when he did not disclose the FTC litigation prior to the closing. The evidence showed that the FTC litigation severely affected Lipton’s income and “it would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was a serious problem with Mr. Lipton’s ability to possibly pay this loan in the future.” The trial court concluded that the Bank was within its right to suspend or even cancel the loan at that point. The trial court also found that Lipton had cancelled the loan in his conversation with Jackson and the Bank followed up with a letter of confirmation.

On appeal, Lipton asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law by interpreting the loan agreement to allow the Bank to suspend the loan to conduct an investigation. The loan agreement allowed the Bank to suspend the loan if it “reasonably believe[d]” that Lipton would be unable to repay the loan “due to a material change in his financial circumstances.” “The interpretation or construction of a contract that is clear and unambiguous is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo.” Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co. v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So.2d 727, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). With respect to the factual findings, “[a]s an appellate court, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence but, rather, to view the record to determine if it contains competent and substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the trier of fact.” GNB, Inc. v. United Danco Batteries, Inc., 627 So.2d 492, 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). “Upon appellate review, the findings óf the trial court are presumed correct.” Citibank, N.A. v. Julien J. Studley, Inc., 580 So.2d 784, 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

In Habie v. Krischer, 642 So.2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), this court was asked to determine if a statute was unconstitutionally vague in that it uses the phrase, “reasonably believes.” This court held: “Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 140. “Further, as a general rule, the question of ‘reasonable beliefs’ is a factual determination which should be left for the jury.” Id.

The trial court found as the trier of fact that at the time the Bank suspended the line of credit, it had found out about the FTC litigation against Lipton and his businesses from which the majority of his income was derived. At that point, the Bank could reasonably believe that any effect the litigation might have on Lipton’s income would be substantial and materially affect his financial circumstances. There was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings and no error in its conclusion that the Bank had not breached the contract.

Additionally, as a basis for its decision in favor of the Bank, the trial court found that Lipton had terminated the loan agreement. Lipton argues that as a matter of law the terms of the contract required that any termination by him had to be in writing.

In Visible Difference, Inc. v. Velvet Swing, L.L.C., 862 So.2d 753 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court held:

This court has previously recognized that the doctrine of waiver holds that “a party may waive a covenant of a contract for whose benefit it is inserted.” American Ideal Mgmt., Inc. v. Dale Vill, Inc., 567 So.2d 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (citing Gilman v. Butzloff 155 Fla. 888, 22 So.2d 263 (1945)). American Ideal Management clarified that “the application of waiver necessitates the finding that the covenant sought to be waived was inserted in the contract for the benefit of the party seeking the waiver.” Id. at 501. In American Ideal Management, the court reversed the summary judgment order because the issue of whose benefit the provision was included for was a question of fact.

Visible Difference, 862 So.2d at 755. Because the Bank may waive the provision that the termination must be in writing, the trial court could properly find that Lipton’s oral termination was effective.

Affirmed.

GROSS, J., and MAASS, ELIZABETH T., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Kenneth ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3697.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Jan. 5, 2007.
    Kenneth L. Adams, Polk City, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Adams appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion for postconviction relief. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm without comment. However, we caution the defendant that any subsequent attempt to attack his conviction with the same successive claim will result in this court issuing a show cause order pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999).

AFFIRMED.

MONACO, TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


author: MAASS, ELIZABETH T., Associate Judge.

text:
    Nathan ZUVER, Appellant, v. Gerald GOTTNER, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-361.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Jan. 10, 2007.

      Patrice A. Talisman of Hersch & Talisman, P.A., Coconut Grove, and Ratiner & Lagos, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans & Abel, P.A., Hollywood, for ap-pellee.
   MAASS, ELIZABETH T., Associate Judge.

Nathan Zuver, the plaintiff below, appeals a final judgment entered in favor of appellee Gerald Gottner after a jury trial, arguing that the trial court gave an erroneous standard of care instruction. We affirm.

Zuver sued Gottner after a gun accident. Viewed in the light most favorable to Gott-ner, the evidence established that Gottner kept a Glock pistol with a laser sight in his vehicle’s center console. He kept a spare key inside the vehicle’s gas cap. Gottner knew that his seventeen-year-old grandson, David, was aware the key was kept there. David and his seventeen-year-old friend, Billy Mack, used the key to enter the vehicle and take the pistol without permission. Billy was playing with the laser at Zuver’s house when the gun discharged, injuring Zuver.

Zuver sued Gottner, claiming he was “under the duty to exercise the highest degree of care towards” him. He requested that the jury be instructed that Gottner “had a duty to use the highest degree of care for Nathan Zuver’s safety” and that:

The reasonable care required of the owner of-a gun is the highest degree of care. In such a case negligence of a gun owner may consist either in doing something that would not be done or in failing to do something that would be done by very careful persons under the conditions and circumstances then affecting the gun owner.

Instead, consistent with Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.1, the trial court instructed the jury that:

Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is the degree of care which a reasonable careful person would use under like circumstances. Negligence may consist in [sic] either in doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under like circumstances or in failure to do something that a reasonable careful person would do under like circumstances.

Zuver argues that a gun is a dangerous instrumentality and that a person handling a gun must exercise “the highest degree of care,” citing Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So.2d 1200, 1206 (Fla.1997). Kitchen addressed whether the seller of a firearm could be liable to a third party for selling a gun to someone known to be intoxicated who then uses the weapon against the third party. In finding that these facts stated a claim, the Florida Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 390 (1965), which imposes liability for negligent entrustment of a chattel, holding that “the theory of liability advanced by Kitchen falls squarely within traditional and well-established principles of common law negligence in Florida....” Kitchen, 697 So.2d at 1208.

In analyzing whether Kitchen was within the foreseeable zone of risk created by K-Mart’s actions, the court, citing to Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So.2d 605 (1941), and McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla.1992), noted the well-established common law principle that a gun is a dangerous instrumentality and that one who handles a gun, therefore, must exercise the highest degree of care. Zuver seizes on that reference to argue that the court has elevated the duty owed by a gun owner to safeguard his weapon to something higher than a reasonable man standard. Neither Skinner nor McCain requires the imposition of the higher standard of care that Zuver seeks to impose.

In Skinner, the nineteen-year-old plaintiff was operating the spring target ejector in the “high house” at a skeet shooting range. 5 So.2d at 606. The high house was equipped with an aperture through which the plaintiff ejected the target once the gunmen yelled “pull.” Id. The plaintiff had time to move his head and shoulders below the aperture for protection when the target was released. Id. at 607. He was seriously wounded when the defendant fired without giving the command “pull.” Id. at 606. While the court noted that some jurisdictions classify firearms as dangerous instrumentalities, the use of which is subject to the highest degree of care, the case centered on whether it was error to fail to instruct the jury consistent with concepts of negligence. Id. at 608. The court concluded that it was. Id.

In McCain, a mechanical trencher operator was injured when the trencher struck an underground electrical cable. 593 So.2d at 501. The defendant’s employee previously had marked the areas where the trencher could safely be used, and there was evidence the operator was in a “safe” area when the cable was struck. Id. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding that the injury was not foreseeable, noting that foreseeability is relevant in two ways: to determine whether a duty is owed, a question of law, and to determine whether violation of the duty proximately caused the injury, a question of fact. Id. at 502. The court noted that whether a duty is owed is dependent on whether a defendant’s conduct foreseeably creates a “zone of risk.” Id. The court held that a duty was created under the fact pattern presented, but that whether the employee’s conduct foresee-ably and substantially led to the plaintiffs injury was properly a question for the jury. Id. at 504.

Kitchen, Skinner, and McCain addressed only whether a duty was owed, not the degree of duty owed. They recognized the general, common sense proposition that as the risk becomes greater, the care expected becomes greater because the zone of risk is greater: a reasonable man is more careful with a machete than a butter knife because he is more likely to cause injury to more people if the machete is mishandled.

An instruction that Gottner was required to use “the highest degree of care” would have removed from the jury’s determination how much care a reasonable man should use in safeguarding his weapon. That determination was properly left to the jury. Zuver’s counsel was entitled to, and did, argue that Gottner’s actions fell below the reasonable man standard of care, when considered in light of the risk posed by a mishandled gun. Zuver was not entitled to an instruction that Gottner owed a duty of care beyond that of a reasonable gun owner under similar circumstances. See Edgar v. Brandvold, 9 Wash.App. 899, 515 P.2d 991 (1973).

Affirmed.

GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Justice of the Peace Justin L. CONNER.
    No. 2005-O-1648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 13, 2006.
   ORDER

Considering the Motion for Dissolution of Interim Disqualification filed by Justice of the Peace Justin L. Conner, District 1, Concordia Parish, State of Louisiana, and the concurrence thereto filed by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion be and hereby is granted on the ground that the criminal charges against Justice of the Peace Conner have been dismissed. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 27(e), this court’s order of July 7, 2005 interimly disqualifying Justice of the Peace Conner from exercising judicial functions be and hereby is dissolved.

This order shall be effective immediately-


author: PER CURIAM. JOHNSON, J. KNOLL, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.A.
    No. 2006-CJ-2380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   PER CURIAM.

| tWrit granted in 06-CJ-2380. We granted certiorari to consider the legal issue of whether the juvenile court exceeded- its statutory authority when it ordered a child adjudicated in need of care in the custody of the Department of Social Services(“The Department”), Office of Community Services(“OCS”), be placed in a family setting and prohibited placement of the child in a group home setting.

On August 24, 2006, the juvenile court held a review hearing pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 692 to review the case plan prepared by OCS for the child in need of care, R.A., who was living in a foster home, an emergency placement. OCS asserted R.A. needed to be placed in a group home because of his behavioral problems and presented to the court the only home that would accept R.A. at the time was Hope Haven. Based on the evidence presented that R.A. was improving significantly with his placement in the foster home, the juvenile court judge rejected the plan to place R.A. in Hope Haven and specifically ordered R.A. be placed in a family setting if his current foster home placement could not be made a permanent one. The judgment at issue stated, “The court ordered the Office of Community Services to place [R.A.] in a family setting if his current placement changes. Further, the court disapproves any group home placement, specifically: Hope Haven.”

In application to this court, OCS asserts the juvenile court exceeded its ^statutory authority in ordering R.A. be placed in a family setting and prohibiting placement in a group home. We agree.

Article 672(A) of the Louisiana Children’s Code provides the Department with sole authority over the specific placements of children assigned to its custody. Once a child enters the Department’s custody, the Department must develop a case plan detailing its efforts toward achieving a permanent placement for the child. La. Ch.C. art. 673. The case plan “shall be designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available, and in close proximity to the parents’ homes, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child. The health and safety of the child shall be the paramount concern in the development of the case plan.” La. Ch.C. art. 675(A). These statutes, however, must be read in conjunction with the other statutes that govern child in need of care proceedings. Article 692 provides for periodic review hearings by the court. At the conclusion of the case review hearing, the court may “[a]pprove the plan as consistent with the health and safety of the child and order compliance by all parties,” La. Ch.C. art. 700(A)(1), or “[f]ind that the case plan is not appropriate, in whole or in part, based on the evidence presented at the contradictory hearing and order the department to revise the case plan accordingly.” La. Ch.C. art. 700(B). In approving or rejecting the case plan, the court cannot revise the plan itself or order specific placements of children placed in the Department’s custody. State ex rel. L.C.B., 01-2441, p. 10 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 159, 164-65. Thus, while the juvenile court retains the ultimate authority over a child’s placement, the Department has the sole authority to determine the specific placements of children in its custody. Id. at pp. 9-10, 805 So.2d at 164.

In the instant case, the juvenile court did more than merely reject and order revision of the Department’s plan. The court therefore exceeded its statutory ^authority when it prohibited placement in a group home and ordered placement specifically in a family setting. The Department has the sole authority to determine the particular placement setting for the child. The court may only accept or reject and order revision of the case plan; it may not order specific placements. Accordingly, to the extent the judgment impinges on the authority given OCS to select a specific placement for R.A., the judgment is vacated. The writ is otherwise denied.

JUDGMENT VACATED IN PART.

JOHNSON, J., would deny with reasons.

VICTORY, J., would deny.

KNOLL, J., dissents with reasons.

JOHNSON, J.

would deny the writ application for the following reasons:

hThe Department of Social Services’ (“the Department”) position is that pursuant to LSA-Ch.C. art. 672(A) it has sole authority over children committed to its custody. The Department has asked this Court to reaffirm the limits on the court’s authority to determine placement of a juvenile. I agree with the Juvenile Court that the Department has violated federal and state statutory mandates to achieve placement of juveniles in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting. The court was not satisfied that the Department had made any reasonable effort to comply with the court’s order. The Department’s search for a foster family was limited to East Baton Rouge Parish. The search for a grouphome placement was statewide. (Hope- Haven is in Jefferson Parish).

LSA-Ch. C. art. 675 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The case plan shall be designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available, and in close proximity to the parents’ homes, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child. The health and safety of the child shall be the paramount concern in the development of the case plan.

It is uncontroverted that at the August 24, 2006 case review hearing, R.A. was living in the Costello foster home and was adjusting well to this temporary placement. He was enrolled in high school and following the house rules. Despite a history of difficult placements in various group home settings, this evidence shows that R.A. was able to make a successful adjustment to a foster home. His behavior had | {.improved dramatically. Counsel for R.A.’s biological mother suggests: “At the August 24, 2006 court hearing, while R.A. was waiting in the hallway for his case to be heard, he was informed that he was being moved to Hope Haven Center in Marrero, Louisiana.” He was in fact moved on August 31, 2006, despite the court’s ruling.

Every child deserves a home. Louisiana seems to be one of the few places where case workers are still determined to institutionalize them. The Department has concluded that R.A. needs constant supervision and will only consider group placement for him. The Department has challenged the Juvenile Court’s authority to determine the most appropriate placement, and which setting is in the best interest of the child. The Office of Community Services (“OCS”) made no attempts to place R.A. in a “family setting.” The Court specifically disapproved any group home placement, “specifically, Hope Haven.” Hope Haven is a secure locked, therapeutic facility, the most restrictive placement available through the Department.

I fail to see the need for this supervisory writ, which was filed by the Department on September 29, 2006. The Department had defied the court’s order on placement and was only concerned at that point, I suppose, with being found in contempt of court.

Do we still need Juvenile Judges to determine the best placement for children in need of care? In my opinion, the Department has usurped the court’s role which is to determine what is in the best interest of the child.

The good news is that R.A., at age 16, will soon leave state supervision. The tragedy is that the state has failed to provide him with a foster home, when we could have done so. I agree with R.A.’s CASA volunteer “the system has failed him as he has been labeled ‘group home material’.”

KNOLL, J.,

dissenting.

_[¿With all due respect, in my view the majority errs in finding the juvenile court’s ruling “that the least restrictive placement for R.A. is a family setting” and specifically disapproving the plan to facilitate a group home placement, revised the Department’s case plan in violation of La. Ch.Code art. 672A. I further find that granting this writ with a per curiam without a full record before us impedes our ability to thoroughly explore the “case plan” of the child. In my view, there is a distinction between what constitutes a case plan and balancing the statutory requirement of placement of the child in the “least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting”, in the best interest of the child, coupled with the juvenile court’s role to protect the child’s right to thrive and survive.

At any point in a child in need of care proceeding that a child enters the custody of a child care agency, such as the Department, the custodian shall develop a case plan detailing the custodian’s efforts toward achieving a permanent placement for the child. See La. Ch.Code arts. 671, 673. The Children’s Code further provides, in pertinent part:

A. The case plan shall be designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive, most family-like, and most appropriate setting available, and in close proximity to the parents’ homes, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child. The health and safety of the child shall be the paramount concern in the development of the case plan.
B. The case plan shall include at least the following:
(1) A description of the type of home or institution in which the child is |¡>placed, including a discussion of the child’s health and safety, the appropriateness of the placement, and the reasons why the placement, if a substantial distance from the home of the parents or in a different state, is in the best interest of the child.
(2) A plan for assuring that the child receives safe and proper care, and that services are provided to the ... child, ... in order to ... facilitate the safe return of the child to his own home or other permanent placement of the child, or both, and address the needs of the child while in foster care, including ... a discussion of the appropriateness of the services that have been provided to the child under the plan. When appropriate for a child sixteen or older, the plan shall include a written description of the programs and services which will help the child prepare for the transition from foster care to independent living.
La. Ch.Code art. 675 (emphasis added).
In developing a case plan, the health and safety of the child shall be the paramount concern. See La. Ch.Code arts. 673 and 675A. The Code further provides that the case plan shall be designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive, most family-like and most appropriate setting available consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child. See La.

Ch.Code art. 675A. Case review hearings are required to be held at least once every six months until the child is permanently placed. See La. Ch.Code art. 692B. At the conclusion of the case review hearing the court may either approve the plan as consistent with the health and safety of the child or find that the case plan is not appropriate and order the Department to revise the case plan accordingly. See La. Ch.Code art. 700A(2).

The health, safety and best interest of the child shall be the paramount concern in all child in need of care proceedings. See La. Ch.Code art. 601. This lodestone of the juvenile justice system is meaningless without an opportunity for judicial review. State ex rel. L.S., 01-2215, p. 13 (La. App 4 Cir. 3/20/02), 814 So.2d 601, 608, writ denied, 02-0957 (La.4/17/02), 813 So.2d 414. The juvenile court, in its case review hearing, found the Department’s case plan for R.A. was not appropriate and ordered the Department to effectuate the least restrictive and most family-like | «setting for R.A.

In its written reasons for judgment, the juvenile court observed that the evidence presented demonstrated that the least restrictive setting for R.A. is a foster family. The Department, without any supporting facts, concluded that R.A. is in need of constant supervision and indicated its intent to place R.A. in a staff-secure, locked therapeutic residential facility- — -the most restrictive placement available. The Department’s case plan to place R.A. in a restrictive facility was made despite the evidence in the case review report that R.A.’s “emergency” foster family placement has been positive. The Department reported R.A. “is following house rules and is enrolled in High School. He expresses interest in playing football and has gone to football practice.” This same report outlines a history of difficulties R.A. experienced in various group home settings, each lasting approximately one month. The CASA report detailed R.A.’s successful acclimation in the foster home and concluded it is an extremely different environment from the group home setting he is used to and his behavior has improved dramatically. I find it significant the Department’s explanation for its limited efforts in searching for a foster family was that a case manager in another region might be upset if a youth from the Baton Rouge region was using a foster home placement in another region. This explanation does not appear to support a decision made for the best interest of the child, but rather for administrative reasons of the Department. This gives me pause. The Department policy manual itself declares placement of a child in a facility shall only be made when no available relative or foster placements can meet the child’s needs. Thus, the juvenile court did not approve the case plan because the Department did not make reasonable efforts to achieve the least restrictive, most family-like and most appropriate setting as legislatively mandated. An appellate court cannot set aside a Ljuvenile court’s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. State in the Interest of S.M.W., 00-3277, p. 14 (La.2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1223, 1233.

I do not find the juvenile court’s order disapproving of the Department’s case plan and holding the matter open determined a particular placement for R.A., thereby revising the case plan in violation of La. Ch.Code articles 672 A and 700. See State ex rel. L.C.B., 01-2441, p. 10 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 159, 165. In that matter, the juvenile court made a particular placement choice by ordering the child be moved to a certified foster home within five days. Rather, in the matter sub judi-ce, the juvenile court disapproved of the case plan; critical to review of the plan is a determination of the appropriateness of the child’s placement. Although the minutes reflect the juvenile court judge mentioned Hope Haven specifically in her order disapproving the Department’s plan, her -written reasons, read overall, demonstrate her ruling only disapproved the case plan, not a specific placement for R.A. The juvenile court amply supported its determination that the Department violated statutory mandate to achieve placement in the most appropriate and family-like setting in the best interest of the child. To reverse the juvenile court’s decision would allow untrammeled discretion to the state agency where there is a showing of impairment of the child’s best interest. The judicial system is required to protect children’s rights to thrive and survive. State in the Interest of S.M., 98-0922, p. 14 (La.10/20/98), 719 So.2d 445, 452. Although the court may not revise the plan or make particular placements, the court remains the ultimate authority over a child’s placement. L.C.B., 01-2441 at p. 11, 805 So.2d at 165. It is critical that the State meet the best interest of this child, as statutorily mandated. R.A., who has been in custody since February 2003, will turn 17 in January, 2007. For these reasons, I would deny the writ.


text:
    Zandrea JOHNSON v. Bobby SPURLOCK.
    No. 2006-CJ-2885.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 13, 2006.
   In re Rayford, Zandra Johnson; Johnson, Zandra a/k/a; Johnson-Rayford, Zan-dra a/k/a; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 594-535; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-C-912.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George KING.
    No. 2006-KK-2383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 73,169; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 06-00981.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Benson CROON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Croon, Benson; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 10-81-982.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application for post-conviction relief filed on or about January 18, 2005 and answered by the district attorney on March 4, 2005. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas Louis PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Phillips, Thomas Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 245-843.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to vacate and correct an illegal sentence filed on or about April 20, 2006. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven L. KENSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Kensey, Steven L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 80-2, 80-54.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a brief in support of an application for habeas corpus filed on or about March 15, 2006. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Anderson, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 233-762.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the district court with instructions to the district judge to rule on relator’s motion to vacate conviction filed on or about August 16, 2005. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy HOLLINGSWORTH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Hollingsworth, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 0.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s writ of habeas corpus transferred from the 20th Judicial District Court on June 30, 2005. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley COSTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2358.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Coston, Stanley; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 403-628; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1018.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s application for post-conviction relief filed on March 31, 2003. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    Lisa BABIN v. Larry VALLOTTON, Turner Industries, L.L.C., and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CC-0660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Vallotton, Larry et ah; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Louisiana; Turner Industries L.L.C.; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 522,498; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 0004.

Denied.


text:
    Rennice YOUNG v. David GREMILLION and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Gremillion, David et ah; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 616-663; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-CA-802.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Virgil Lorenzo SMITH.
    No. 2006-KH-1171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Smith, Virgil Lorenzo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 357133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 0164.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David FRANKLIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1237.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Franklin, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 5-99-243; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2508.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John R. ALLEMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Alleman, John R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-K-0189; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-01382.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith Lynn DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Davis, Keith Lynn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 286,017; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-288.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Owen Hugh ROBERTSON.
    No. 2006-KO-1449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Robertson, Owen Hugh; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 219,453; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,626-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard R. WASHINGTON.
    No. 2006-K-1483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Washington, Leonard R.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 451-662; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1006.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ward E. JACKSON.
    No. 2006-KO-1511.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Jackson, Ward E.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish 'of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 111502,109458; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 40,950-KA, 40,949-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Daniel DOYLE v. VERNON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2006-CC-2214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Vernon Parish School Board;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. 02, No. 05-06112; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00685.

Denied.


text:
    KITTERLIN CREEK, L.L.C. v. BENNETT AND PETERS, INC. and John L. Sullivan.
    No. 2006-CC-2479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Kitterlin Creek L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2005-0003776; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1100.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David DOBBS.
    No. 2006-KK-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Dobbs, David; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 399465; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW1696.

Denied.


text:
    Theophilus ROSE v. Bernard E. JOHNSON and Celebrity Professional Services, Inc.
    No. 2006-C-2528.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Bernard E. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, -15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2000-1849; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-518.

Denied.


text:
    GEORGIA GULF CORPORATION v. Ralph SLAUGHTER, Secretary, Department of Revenue and Taxation Brett Crawford and the State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Georgia Gulf Corporation.
    No. 2006-C-2547.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Georgia Gulf Corporation; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 399,-376, 467,931; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2005 CA 1917, 2005 CA 1918.

Denied.


text:
    Ruby COX v. SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2006-C-2576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Cox, Kevin, Admin, of Succ. Ruby Cox; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 29,577; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,391-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory RUIZ.
    No. 2006-KO-1755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Ruiz, Gregory; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 02-1010; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 06-30, KH 05-1098, KH 05-1261.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney W. MACON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Macon, Rodney W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 112-549.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed on or about November 5, 2005. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lonnie COOLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Cooley, Lonnie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 27398.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the petition to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s application for post-conviction relief filed via certified mail on or about April 10, 2006. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    In re David C. JARRELL.
    No. 2006-OB-2521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Jarrell, David C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Denial of Admission to the Louisiana Bar Association.

Denied.


text:
    Phillip Albert JOHNSON v. Debra Jean Dickson JOHNSON.
    No. 2006-CP-2455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Phillip Albert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 218,828; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-00793.

Not considered, not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    Lorraine Joyce Benoit COLEMAN, et al. v. Terrence Knight BENOIT.
    No. 2006-CP-2485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Benoit, Terrence Knight; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 104176; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05 00931-CW.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    Gary JACKSON, Alice Jackson, and Joseph E. Jackson v. ESTATE OF Donald Ray GADDIS, Fidelity Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, and the State of Louisiana Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2006-C-2510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Insurance Guarantee Association; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 46,618; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1946.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    Beatrice COLLOR v. OUR LADY OF THE LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Michelle Downs and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-0191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Collor, Beatrice; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 510065; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 2505.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clayton WEAVER.
    No. 2006-KO-0695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Clayton Weaver; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 01-4930; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-169.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Peter J. LEWIS.
    No. 2006-KO-0757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Lewis, Peter J.; — -Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 01-4930; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-170.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Sylvia DAVIS v. LAKELAND MEDICAL CENTER, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2006-CC-0860.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Davis, Sylvia et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, Nos. 95-5009, 95-14897; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-C-1342.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy SPICER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Spicer, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 276533; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2355.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Virgil Lorenzo SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Smith, Virgil Lorenzo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 357133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005-KA-0164.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Patrick JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Jones, Patrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 124,572; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,-652-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roy WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Williams, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 44,261; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-085-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Ray LOVE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Love, Charles Ray Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 260,147; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KH 05-01440, KH 06-00050.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy ROBERTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1174.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Roberts, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. VII, No. 5-01-148; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2476.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert BOLTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1177.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Bolton, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-6389; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-55.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnell DEMPSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Dempsey, Johnell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 428-378; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1152.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry SIMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Simms, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 00-6313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2006-KH-108.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph James THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Thomas, Joseph James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 98K4382D, 99K0247D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KA05-619, KA05-620.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald Bernard BANKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Banks, Gerald Bernard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 83134; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00074.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendrick JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1203.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Kendrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. Ill, No. 07-98-972; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 1832.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dale SCHEXNAIDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Schexnaider, Dale Michael;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 257-601; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-01319.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Mack, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 44,716, 47,099; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40938-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charlie BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Brown, Charlie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 87-3958; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-151.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Barry JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Barry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 04-0163; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-180.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vernon C. SHIELDS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Shields, Vernon C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 329796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2334.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby R. YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Young, Bobby R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 211,534; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40837-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Craig PITRE.
    No. 2006-KO-1438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Pitre, Anthony Craig; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 101384; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 05-1128, 05-405.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie Robert LANE Jr.
    No. 2006-KO-1453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Lane, Eddie Robert Jr.; — -Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 234-796; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,816-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jermaine CARROLL.
    No. 2006-KO-1470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Carroll, Jermaine; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 229,082; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,001-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry J. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2006-KO-1471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Williams, Larry J.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 273,837; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1338.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas Lee HUMPHRIES, Jr.
    No. 2006-KO-1472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Humphries, Thomas Lee Jr.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 226,549; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,810-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl JOHNSON.
    No. 2006-K-1485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Carl; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 110102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 1272.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Toby Shaun BORDELON.
    No. 2006-KO-1549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2006.
   In re Bordelon, Toby Shaun;' — -Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 68773-F; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1507.

Denied.


text:
    Fred L. FINCH, III v. Max CLAY, New Orleans Auto Auction, and American Home Assurance.
    No. 2006-CC-2932.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Clay, Max et al.; New Orleans Auto Auction; American Home Assurance; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2003-12035; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1939.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Fred L. FINCH, III v. Max CLAY, New Orleans Auto Auction, and American Home Assurance.
    No. 2006-C-2933.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Clay, Max et al.; American Home Assurance; New Orleans Auto Auction;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2003-12035; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1940.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dontrell BROWN.
    No. 2006-K-0950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Brown, Dontrell; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-222; to the Court of' Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-KA-1090.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Debra HILL.
    No. 2006-K-1502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Hill, Debra; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 4564827; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1123.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey SMITH.
    No. 2006-K-1619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Smith, Corey; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-214; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1120.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Byron SCOTT.
    No. 2006-K-1620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Scott, Byron; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-353; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1119.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael POLK.
    No. 2006-K-1694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Michael Polk; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-441; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1118.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyronne RATCLIFF.
    No. 2006-KK-1776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Ratcliff, Tyronne; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-216; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1145.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin M. GAUSE.
    No. 2006-KK-1889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Gause, Kevin M.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Second Parish Court Parish of Jefferson, No. S942691; 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 111.111; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-K-399.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thedrow BROWN.
    No. 2006-K-2169.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Brown, Thedrow; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 0, No. 455-429-K; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1146.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jamie METZLER.
    No. 2006-K-2287.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Metzler, Jamie; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 454-772; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1148.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne ANDERSON, Phyllis West, Trina Johnson, Phillip Seifert and Yancy Roberts.
    No. 2006-K-2325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Trina; Roberts, Yancy; West, Phyllis; Seifert, Phillip; Anderson, Wayne et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-080; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-1116.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., Would grant.

JOHNSON, J., Would grant.

WEIMER, J., Would grant.


text:
    M.D., Wife of/ and C.R.W., Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of the Minor Child, K.W. v. STATE of Louisiana, the DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Office of Community Services of the State of Louisiana and Julianne North.
    No. 2006-C-2386.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 21, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana et a!.; Social Services, Department of; Community Services of State of Louisiana, Office of;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 93-11755; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1044.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Kevin M. MCLAUGHLIN v. Donna MCLAUGHLIN.
    No. 2006-CD-2996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 22, 2006.
   In re McLaughlin, Donna; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 114307.

Writ transferred to the First Circuit Court of Appeal for its consideration on an expedited bases.

KIMBALL, J., would deny the writ.