text:
    Ryan CHAMBERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-2273.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 3, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Mclntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   Corrected Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Ryan Chambers raises three issues, on appeal, only one of which results in a reversal of his conviction and sentence. Chambers contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded statement and confession which he alleges was unconstitutional because it was involuntary and coerced.

Chambers was charged with six counts stemming from an incident on December 29, 2003: burglary (dwelling/battery) (Count I); attempted robbery (deadly weapon) (Count II, Pauline Crooks, and Count III, Nicki Crooks); aggravated battery (deadly weapon) (Count IV, Pauline Crooks, and Count V, Nicki Crooks); and aggravated assault (deadly weapon) (Count VI, Nicki Crooks).

These charges were the result of the police interrogation of Chambers, which was recorded and during which Chambers confessed. After the detectives obtained biographical information, Chambers was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. Chambers was questioned about three separate crimes during the interrogation, including the incident involved in this case. Regarding this incident, the detective asserted that a neighbor witnessed the incident and that Nicki Crooks identified Chambers as the perpetrator, so that he would be going away for thirty years for home invasion robbery with a firearm. The detectives also told Chambers that judges were not lenient toward people that did not come clean, especially when the victims could be put on the stand to testify about their fears at the time of the incident. The detectives explained to Chambers that if he told them who else was involved with the incident, they would put in a good word with the prosecutor. The detectives further suggested to Chambers that if he did not tell the truth about the other perpetrators and he knew they had guns and they went out and killed someone, he could be charged with murder. Shortly following this suggestion that he could be charged with murder, Chambers confessed to his involvement in the incident in question. Subsequently, the detectives again explained that they could put a good word in with the prosecutor and the trial judge, but that they had no say in what happened to Chambers and it was up to the judge to determine his sentence.

After he was charged, Chambers filed a motion to suppress. Chambers contended that his statement to law enforcement and confession were not voluntary so that they should be suppressed. Chambers specified certain incidences within his recorded statement that constituted coercion, including the suggestion that he could face a murder charge if he did not tell the truth. Judge Alemán denied Chambers’s motion to suppress, and the case proceeded to jury trial before Judge Weinstein.

The jury found Chambers guilty of the lesser included offense of burglary of a dwelling as to Count I and the lesser included offense of attempted robbery with a weapon as to Count II and Count III, but acquitted Chambers of Count TV, Count V, and Count VI. Chambers was then adjudicated guilty and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for each of the three convictions, all to run concurrently.

‘The standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress evidence requires that this Court defer to the trial court’s factual findings but review legal conclusions de novo.” Pantin v. State, 872 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citations omitted).

The following principles apply to the review of motions to.suppress statements and confessions:

For a confession to be admissible, it must be made voluntarily. Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla.1980). It may not be obtained by threats, promises, or the exertion of any improper influence. Id. “The constitution does not bar the use ... of any statements that could be construed as a threat or promise, but only those which constitute outrageous behavior and which in fact induce a confession.” Nelson v. State, 688 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Thus, there must be a causal nexus between the improper conduct or questioning and the confession. Id. A confession is not involuntary if officers merely inform a suspect of realistic penalties and encourage or request that person to tell the truth. Id. This is equally true if officers tell the suspect that things would be easier on that person if he or she told the truth. Id. at 973; Frazier v. State, 107 So.2d 16, 22 (Fla.1958). An officer’s promise to inform prosecutors or the trial court of a suspect’s cooperation does not make a confession involuntary. Maqueira v. State, 588 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla.1991); see also Nelson, 688 So.2d at 973. On the other hand, promises not to prosecute may render a confession invalid. See Interest of K.H., 418 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(finding confession involuntary where officer promised juvenile he would not be charged, promise was withdrawn, and juvenile, who was “none too bright,” assumed confession would revive initial promise).

Edwards v. State, 793 So.2d 1044, 1047-1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Although Chambers contends that he was coerced during the interrogation in several different fashions, we conclude that only one alleged incident amounts to coercion. Chambers challenges law enforcement’s suggestion that he could face murder charges unless he told the truth as an impermissible promise not to prosecute in exchange for the truth. Two decisions cited by Chambers and rendered by this Court support his contention.

First, in Edwards v. State, 793 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this Court held a confession involuntary where it ensued from an investigator’s threat to hit a suspect with every charge he could if the suspect did not tell the truth, and wrote:

Certainly, a threat to charge a suspect with more, and more serious, crimes unless he or she confesses is coercive. Further, it is essentially a promise not to prosecute to the fullest extent allowed by law if that person confesses. Hence, the investigators’ threats amounted to an exertion of improper and undue influence, rendering the affected portion of Edwards’ statement involuntary.

Id. at 1048. Likewise, in Samuel v. State, 898 So.2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), this court held a confession involuntary where it ensued from an officer’s threat to charge the suspect with fifteen robberies, where there was evidence of at most nine and probable cause for only one, if he did not tell the truth, writing that “Fowler’s promise not to prosecute the other fictional crimes” was coercive and rendered the confession involuntary. Id. at 237.

Based on Edwards and Samuel, we reach the inescapable conclusion that Chambers’s confession which almost immediately ensued from what was essentially a promise not to charge him with a “fictional” murder if he told the truth rendered his recorded statement and confession unconstitutional as coerced and involuntary. Therefore, Judge Alemán erred by denying his motion to suppress. Consequently, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial (on Counts I, II, and III) at which Chambers’s recorded statement and confession shall be excluded from evidence. We affirm in all other respects without further comment.

Reversed and Remanded.

GUNTHER, FARMER and MAY, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Hailey GRAZIANO, Appellee.
    No. 4D07-177.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 3, 2007.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sue-Ellen Kenny, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert D. Devin, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Wells, No. 4D06-3425, 965 So.2d 834, 2007 WL 2609461 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept.12, 2007) (holding Florida Statutes section 316.191 (2005) facially unconstitutional).

STONE, STEVENSON and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Edward B. DOMM, IV.
    No. 2007-B-0348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2007.
   I,ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Edward B. Domm, IV, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1993. In 1997, he was admonished by the disciplinary board for neglecting a legal matter, failing to account for an advance deposit for fees and costs, practicing law while ineligible to do so, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In 1998, respondent was admonished for revealing confidential client information to a third party without the client’s consent.

In 2004, this court considered a proceeding involving two sets of formal charges against respondent for misconduct that occurred between 1996 and 2002. These charges alleged that respondent failed to comply with the minimum requirements of continuing legal education, practiced law while ineligible to do so, neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to fulfill his obligations upon the termination of the representation, mishandled third-party funds, failed to account for or refund unearned fees, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the | ^administration of justice, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. After considering the record, we disbarred respondent. In re: Domm, 04-1194 (La.10/8/04), 883 So.2d 966 (“Domm I”).

Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent. The first set of formal charges, consisting of one count and bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 05-DB-051, was filed on May 16, 2005. The second set of formal charges, filed on October 5, 2005 in the disciplinary board’s docket number 05-DB-077, likewise consists of one count. The two sets of formal charges were consolidated by order of the hearing committee chair dated January 24, 2006.

05-DB-051

In 1999, Tina M. Waller retained respondent to handle a dispute with an insurance company over annuity payments. Ms. Waller provided respondent with all of the information concerning her annuity. However, respondent failed to complete the representation, failed to respond to Ms. Waller’s repeated requests for information, and failed to return the file. Without her file, Ms. Waller experienced difficulty in retaining new counsel to handle the annuity matter.

In October 2002, Ms. Waller filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent by certified mail on November 22, 2002. Respondent did not claim the certified mail, and accordingly, on January 13, 2003, the ODC’s investigator personally served respondent with a lacopy of the complaint. Respondent failed to reply to Ms. Waller’s complaint, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena compelling him to appear on March 11, 2003 and answer the complaint under oath. Respondent failed to appear on that date. The ODC then issued a second subpoena for respondent’s sworn statement on August 13, 2003. Once again, respondent failed to appear.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

05-DB-077

In 2001, respondent represented a client in a child custody matter. Respondent befriended the client and her nine-year old stepdaughter, K.H., who often stayed overnight at respondent’s home to play with his young daughter. In February 2002, the Livingston Parish Sheriffs Office received a complaint that respondent had molested K.H. in December 2001. On February 4, 2002, K.H. gave a videotaped statement to a counselor from Child Protective Services in which she stated that she sat on respondent’s lap while watching a video at his home one night and that he then touched her vagina on the outside of her clothes. Respondent voluntarily gave a statement to the police and denied these allegations; however, based upon KH.’s |4statement, a warrant was issued for his arrest on one count of molestation of a juvenile.

The criminal charges against respondent were subsequently forwarded to the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office for prosecution. In May 2004, K.H.’s stepmother decided that K.H. would not testify against respondent. As a result, the case against respondent was dismissed.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Both sets of formal charges were served upon respondent personally. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After consideration of the ODC’s submission in response to the deemed admitted order, the hearing committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. Respondent abandoned Ms. Waller’s legal matter and essentially refused to provide her with the documentation to pursue her claim with new counsel. He molested a minor child, causing her serious | fiharm. Respondent also harmed the disciplinary system by failing to cooperate with the ODC in a disciplinary investigation. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct ranges from a period of suspension to disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee recognized the following factors: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. The committee found no mitigating circumstances are present.

The committee then turned to an analysis of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Appendix E to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. The committee found Guidelines 4 (sexual misconduct which results in a felony criminal conviction, such as rape or child molestation) and 9 (instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime, when the misconduct or conviction is preceded by suspension or disbarment for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct or conviction of a serious crime) to be applicable in this matter. The committee reasoned:

Under the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 19(B), the term “serious crime” means a “felony or any other crime, the necessary element of which as determined by the statute defining such crime, reflects upon the attorney’s moral fitness to practice law.” The molestation of a 9-year-old girl by a 37-year-old male is such a serious crime. However, the minor child’s guardian made a decision not to prosecute -the alleged criminal violation. So, unlike where a criminal conviction is obtained, there is no determination that respondent violated a statute that would provide conclusive proof of respondent’s guilt under Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 19(E). However, there is more than ample evidence in the record, evidence that was not denied by respondent and is now deemed admitted, to support a finding that respondent knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct involving | ¿moral depravity with a minor child. The molestation of the 9-year-old girl proves by [clear] and convincing evidence the lack of moral fitness of the respondent to practice law....

Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board found that the deemed admitted facts support the conclusion that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in both sets of formal charges. The disciplinary system suffered harm and expense when respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Respondent violated his duty to Ms. Waller by failing to diligently pursue her claim, to communicate with her, and to return her file. The failure to return Ms. Waller’s file delayed her ability to obtain other counsel, which delayed her receipt of the annuity payments allegedly due to her. In 05-DB-077, respondent violated his duty of trust to his client by betraying the trust she placed in him when she allowed her minor stepdaughter to stay the night at his home. The harm to the minor victim was serious and immeasurable. Respondent’s actions as a whole, especially the publicity of his arrest for child molestation, have brought harm to the profession. Given his prior disciplinary record, respondent’s actions were knowing, if not intentional. The failure to cooperate with the ODC was intentional conduct.

|7In aggravation, the board recognized the following factors: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. The board found no mitigating circumstances are present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board noted that while respondent’s conduct in the second set of formal charges does not technically fall within the parameters of Guideline 4 of the permanent disbarment guidelines, Guideline 4 is nonetheless applicable as respondent’s conduct “can be placed within the scope of this guideline.” The guidelines are merely illustrative and it is within the court’s discretion to permanently disbar respondent even though he was not convicted of child molestation. In a bar admissions case, In re: Hinson-Lyles, 02-2578 (La.12/3/03), 864 So.2d 108, the applicant was a former high school teacher who had been convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile for carrying on a sexual affair with one of her fourteen-year old male students. The court did not allow the applicant to be admitted to the bar because of her felony conviction. Like the teacher in Hinsorir-Lyles, respondent occupied a position of trust, as he was the only adult present when the minor victim spent the night at his home. Respondent violated that trust and the trust of the victim’s stepmother by allegedly molesting the nine-year old girl.

Furthermore, the board pointed out that respondent has not denied the allegations of child molestation and allowed the facts surrounding the allegations to be deemed admitted. There also is ample evidence in the record supporting the child molestation allegations. The only reason why respondent was not brought to trial was because the guardian of the victim chose not to proceed with the prosecution. As the |scourt decided in Hinsorir-Lyles, respondent has demonstrated that he lacks the moral character to be a member of the bar.

As to Guideline 9, the board rejected the committee’s application of that guideline to this case. The board reasoned that the committee correctly classified the instant misconduct as “serious attorney misconduct”; however, the misconduct occurred between 2001-2003, prior to respondent’s 2004 disbarment in Domrn, I, and thus the serious attorney misconduct was not “preceded by suspension or disbarment for prior instances of serious attorney misconduct.”

Based on this reasoning, the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred and be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow | ¡¡from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The deemed admitted facts in this matter, combined with the other evidence in the record, supports the hearing committee’s factual finding that respondent “knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct involving moral depravity with a minor child.” Additionally, the record supports the committee’s conclusion that respondent neglected his client’s annuity matter, failed to communicate with his client, failed to return her file, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Accordingly, we find respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Having found professional misconduct, the sole remaining issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. In imposing a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

We find that respondent acted knowingly, if not intentionally, and violated a duty owed to his client and to the legal profession. Respondent caused actual harm to his client and to his juvenile victim.

|inThe following aggravating factors are present in this matter: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. We are unable to discern any mitigating factors from the record.

Considering the egregious nature of respondent’s misconduct in this matter together with his prior disciplinary record, we conclude respondent lacks the moral fitness to practice law in this state. Under these circumstances, the only appropriate sanction in this case is permanent disbarment. Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Edward B. Domm, IV, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22039, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance |nwith Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Because of the sensitive nature of the allegations in this matter, we have not identified the client or her stepdaughter by name.

      . A Baton Rouge television station aired a news report on February 5, 2002 concerning respondent’s arrest.

      . We recognize that Guideline 4 of the permanent disbarment guidelines refers to "sexual misconduct which results in a felony criminal conviction.” However, our jurisprudence clearly establishes that the guidelines are illustrative in nature and are not intended to bind this court in its decision making process. In re: Edwards, 04-0290 (La.7/2/04), 879 So.2d 718; In re: Kirchberg, 03-0957 (La.9/26/03), 856 So.2d 1162. Thus, even though respondent was never convicted in a felony criminal context, we may still find his conduct, which has been proven by clear and convincing evidence in this disciplinary proceeding, is of sufficient gravity to warrant permanent disbarment.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Desmond Joseph SENEGAL.
    No. 2006-K-1351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 28, 2007.
   PER CURIAM.

The decision in State v. Senegal, 05-1633 (La.App. 3rd Cir.5/24/06), 931 So.2d 450, is reversed, and this case is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of defendant’s remaining assignments of error pre-termitted on original appeal. Defendant’s failure to file a motion to quash based on the allegation of his prior conviction for distribution of a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance in the bill of information charging him with possession of cocaine, second or subsequent offense, waived the error on appeal. See State v. Ruiz, 06-1755 (La.4/11/07), 955 So.2d 81.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dustin PLEASANT.
    No. 2007-KK-1978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 9, 2007.
   In re Pleasant, Dustin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 468-207; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-1234.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gilbert FRANKLIN.
    No. 2007-KH-0056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Franklin, Gilbert;- — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 11-05-271.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony CROWDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Crowder, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 471-138.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Isiah LANG III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1859.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Lang, Isiah, III; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 05-07-0663.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    In re Appeal of DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-157.
    No. 2007-OB-1435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Ferguson, Eric; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-157.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 07-PDB-006.
    No. 2007-OB-1502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Scott, Warren et ux. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 07 PDB 006.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Samuel Lee HAMILTON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Hamilton, Samuel Lee Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 9-88-0898; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1999.

Not considered. Not timely filed.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Leola LARD (Nee Peoples) v. David POLAND d/b/a Landstar, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-1558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Landstar Inc.; Poland, David d/b/ a; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bien-ville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 6-400; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,284-CA.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Sup.Ct. Rule X, Section 5(d).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie BURKHALTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Burkhalter, Eddie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9048.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mitchell COOK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Cook, Mitchell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 362896; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1984.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Claude WOODS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Woods, Claude;' — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 75-2-61.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas Louis PHILLIPS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Phillips, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-WCR-431.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrel HOLLIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0030.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Hollis, Darrel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 95-4926; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1447.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Maurice HARBOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0031.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Harbor, Maurice; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-7555; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-887.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alexander SHEPARD, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0033.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Shepard, Alexander Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-1236; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-885.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Billy R. FRAZIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Frazier, Billy R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 70,467; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41821-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry B. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Jones, Jerry B.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 379810; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1643.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy J. MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Miller, Troy J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 298-017; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1231.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin VICTORIAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Victorian, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory arid/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 61,171, 50,698, 56,555, 54,124; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2051.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brian YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Young, Brian; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 03-5199; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 2006-KH895.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy KNIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Knight, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 1-94-316; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1680.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Walter Adam KOTT, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Kott, Walter Adam Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 379-354; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 0973.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Washington, William; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04 CR8 90976; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 0634.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bennett PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Pierre, Bennett; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 280406; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1967.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0135.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Williams, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 362-846; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1481.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy BURSE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Burse, Jimmy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 99-3274; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-933.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie H. BEALE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Beale, Willie H.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 106652; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2126.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lee MATTHEWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Matthews, Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 80-3496.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher COSSE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Cosse, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 390-711; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1543.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher D. LEBRETON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Lebreton, Christopher D.;-Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Crimtnal District Court Div. C, No. 418-884; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1416.

Denied.


text:
    Willie Lee TART v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2007-KP-0364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Tart, Willie Lee;-Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 49,458.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodney DILLON.
    No. 2007-KP-0376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Dillon, Rodney;-Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 500750; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2465.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin M. DELAUNE.
    No. 2007-KO-0385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Delaune, Kevin M.;-Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 05-462; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KA-682.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Virgil Lorenzo SMITH.
    No. 2007-KO-0389.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Smith, Virgil Lorenzo; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 357134; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 2618.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy L. GOULD.
    No. 2007-KP-0398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Gould, Randy L.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 18844-03; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 06-01515.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ricky Wayne THOMAS.
    No. 2007-KO-0401.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Thomas, Ricky Wayne; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 221,761; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,734-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry DUPREE.
    No. 2007-K-0439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Dupree, Henry; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 00-F0305; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-658-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leroy SEMIEN.
    No. 2007-K-0448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Semien, Leroy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-K-0612-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-841.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Stanford LINDSEY.
    No. 2007-KO-0453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Lindsey, John Stanford; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 383021-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA1102.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley LINDSEY.
    No. 2007-KO-0454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Lindsey, Stanley; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 003-05-0854; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 1268.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nicky Lavelle COLEMAN.
    No. 2007-KO-0459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Coleman, Nicky Lavelle; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 05-F0644; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,764-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Pierre WEATHERSPOON.
    No. 2007-KO-0462.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Weatherspoon, Pierre; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 02-4897; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KA-539.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Deandre JOHNSON.
    No. 2007-K-0467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Johnson, Deandre; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-CR-131089; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-1263.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sidney ANDERSON.
    No. 2007-K-0468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Sidney Anderson; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 458-360; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-KA-1031.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Deandre JOHNSON.
    No. 2007-K-0509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-CR-131089; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-1263.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy KNIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0599.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Knight, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 1-94-316; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2495.

Demed.


text:
    Antoinette HARRIS v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2007-CC-1229.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Orleans Parish School Board et al.; Flint, Eddie; Atlanta International Ins. Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 1985-18424; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0223.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA), LTD. v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA.
    No. 2007-C-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 509,141; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1082.

Denied.


text:
    Jarod MARQUEZ v. JACK USSERY CONSTRUCTION.
    No. 2007-OC-1404.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Jack Ussery Construction; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 6, No. 05-02618; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1852.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Carolyn PATRICK, Individually and on Behalf of Ronnie Joe Patrick v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, City of Monroe, Entergy Louisiana, Inc., Entergy Corporation and George Donald Emfinger.
    No. 2007-C-1452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Patrick, Carolyn et ah; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 02-0411; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-197-CA.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    William Daniel LITTLETON and Carolyn Lahonda Littleton v. Dewayne G. ENTERKIN, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut.
    No. 2007-C-1476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Littleton, William Daniel et al.; Littleton, Carolyn LaHonda; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 03-0947; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-867-CA.

Denied — may reraise on appeal.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    NHU TRAN and Sai Hong Versus Dufrene Boats, Inc. Consolidated with NGA Trinh, Individually and on Behalf of Hao Tran and Lynn Tran v. DUFRENE BOATS, INC.
    No. 2007-CC-1521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Dufrene Boats Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 113230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 0827.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Tom OWENS and James Wall v. SOUTHWEST OUACHITA WATER WORKS, INC., and Willie Smith.
    No. 2007-C-1522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Smith, Willie; Southwest Ouachita Waterworks Inc. et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 06-2991; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-278-CA.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.


text:
    Slim BRUMFIELD v. The PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Neeb Kearney & Company Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 06-11711; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0391.

Denied. Although the court of appeal’s judgment was premised on an incorrect factual finding, it reached the correct result in reversing the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment. There are questions of fact concerning when plaintiffs significant exposure to asbestos occurred. See Austin v. Abney Mills, 01-1598 (La.9/4/02), 824 So.2d 1137.

WEIMER, J., would deny without language.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 632 v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re New Orleans City of; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 1981-11108; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0618.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., recused.


text:
    Linda SHUBERT, Rose McNair, Tome’ Frazier, Derrick Chocklin, and Robert Ybarzabal v. TONTI DEVELOPMENT CORP. d/b/a Tonti Management.
    No. 2007-CC-1532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re APMT Inc.; Five Properties L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 628-035, 632-085; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-C-390.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth FORD, et al. v. RAPIDES HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2007-C-1533.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Ford, Kenneth et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-7454; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-1539-CA.

Denied.


text:
    CASE ATLANTIC COMPANY v. BLOUNT BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Blount Bros. Construction Inc. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 505,692; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,251-CW.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Charlie L. JACKSON v. HOME DEPOT, INC. and/or Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.
    No. 2007-C-1559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Jackson, Charlie L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 481,939; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1438.

Denied.


text:
    Susan and William LAURENDINE, et al. v. The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Board of Commissioners Orleans Levee District et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2005-11660; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0674.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., recused.


text:
    Christy THOMAS on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Brad Thomas v. SIDLENIE, LLC, ABC Insurance Company, Emma McCarthy, XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-1568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Thomas, Christy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 103-306; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0150.

Denied.


text:
    CEI ROOFING, INC. v. SIMON PROPERTY GROUP, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re SPG Prien, LLC; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2005-0277; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00519.

Denied.


text:
    Althea ALVAREZ and Armando Alvarez, Individually on Behalf of His Two Minor Children, Andre Alvarez and Anyssia Alvarez v. Chad T. LEBLANC, Direct General Insurance Company of Louisiana, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and USA Agencies Casualty Insurance Company, Inc.
    No. 2007-CC-1574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Alvarez, Althea et al.; Alvarez, Armando; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 623-845; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-C-415.

Denied.


text:
    Ernestine LEE v. RYAN’S FAMILY STEAK HOUSE, INC.
    No. 2007-C-1577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Lee, Ernestine; — Plaintiff; Applyr ing for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 515-236; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA1400.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Robert H. HOFFMAN v. CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1579.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford; Beau Chene Homeowners Association Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 15076; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 0473.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, William Clay Ford, Jr., Allan Gilmour, Nick Scheele, Bill Hood Ford, L.L.C., and Hixon Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc. d/b/a Hixson Autoplex and Hixson Autoplex of Alexandria.
    No. 2007-C-1580.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Louisiana State of; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 514,913; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1810.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Jeff SEPULVADO v. TOLEDO NURSING CENTER, INC. and Management Services of Beauregard Parish Inc.
    No. 2007-C-1583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Toledo Nursing Center Inc. et al.; Management Services of Beauregard Parish Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 58,852; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-122.

Denied.


text:
    Virginia R. BURGUIERES, et al. v. The KEMPER AND LEILA WILLIAMS FOUNDATION, etc.
    No. 2007-CC-1584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Kemper & Leila Williams Foundation et al.; Historic New Orleans Collection; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 91-13917; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0675.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terence T. PETIT.
    No. 2007-KK-1805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2007.
   In re Petit, Terence T.; — -Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 463-139; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0723.

Not considered, not timely filed. See La. Supreme Court Rule X, § 5. Stay denied.


text:
    Richard HARDY, Evelyn Valore & Ramona McClaran v. Raymond SIMMONS, Gary Loftin, Ernie Roberson & Jay Dardenne, Secretary of State.
    No. 2007-CC-2007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 16, 2007.
   In re Simmons, Raymond et al.; — -Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 515,135 — C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43023-CW.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See La. R.S.18:1409(G); La.R.S.18:1413; see also Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(c).


author: PETTIGREW, J.

text:
    Herbert STOGNER and Anna Stogner v. Anna M. ALLBRITTON and National Automotive Insurance Company.
    No. 2006 CA 1863.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    June 8, 2007.

      Lindsey J. Leavoy, John T. Joubert, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Herbert Stogner and Anna Stogner.
    Sue Buser, Gonzales, for Defendants-Appellees Anna M. Allbritton and Direct General Insurance Company.
    Before: PETTIGREW, DOWNING, and HUGHES, JJ.
   PETTIGREW, J.

Un this case, plaintiffs, Herbert and Anna Stogner, challenge the trial court’s judgment that dismissed, with prejudice, all claims against defendant, Anna M. All-britton, and her insurer, Direct General Insurance Company of Louisiana (“Direct General”)/ For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 29, 2002, Ms. Stogner was involved in an intersectional collision with Ms. Allbritton in Hammond, Louisiana. Thereafter, on April 11, 2003, the Stogners filed suit against Ms. Allbritton and her liability insurer, National Automotive Insurance Company (“National Automotive”), seeking to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the accident. On August 22, 2003, Lemic Insurance Company (“Lemic”) intervened in the suit as Ms. Stogner’s workers’ compensation insurer, seeking reimbursement for benefits it had paid to Ms. Stogner as a result of the accident in question. The Stogners subsequently filed a supplemental and amending petition on December 18, 2003, adding State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) in its capacity as their uninsured/underinsured carrier.

On February 9, 2004, the trial court signed an order, submitted by the Stog-ners, dismissing, with prejudice, all claims against Ms. Allbritton and National Automotive, without any reservation as to Ms. Allbritton. The only reservation of rights contained in the order was as follows: “with plaintiff reserving all rights to proceed against any party not specifically dis-. missed herein, including her uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.” (Emphasis added.) As of February 9, 2004, the only remaining party to the suit was State Farm.

Thereafter, on March 9, 2005, over one year after Ms. Allbritton was dismissed with prejudice, the Stogners filed a second supplemental and amending petition. In said petition, the Stogners again named Ms. Allbritton as a defendant and added Direct General, in its capacity as Ms. All-britton’s liability insurer, as an entirely new party to the litigation. In response thereto, Ms. Allbritton and Direct General filed exceptions raising the objections of res judicata and no cause of action/right of action as to the claims ^against Ms. All-britton and an exception raising the objection of prescription as to the claims against Ms. Allbritton and Direct General. The trial court heard arguments from the parties on August 22, 2005, and took the matter under advisement.

On January 4, 2006, the trial court issued reasons for judgment, granting the exceptions filed by Ms. Allbritton and Direct General as follows:

The amended suit naming Anna All-britton as a defendant after she was dismissed with prejudice stems from the same material facts as the first petition filed in this matter and is barred by res judicata. The exception of res judicata is granted.
For completion of the record, this court finds that because all claims against Anna Allbritton were dismissed with prejudice on February 9, 2004, plaintiff has no right/no cause of action as to Anna Allbritton.
Further, mover’s exception of' prescription is granted.

A judgment in accordance with the court’s findings was signed on February 1, 2006, dismissing, with prejudice, all claims against Ms. Allbritton and Direct General. The Stogners timely filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court in a judgment dated June 12, 2006. This appeal by the Stogners followed, wherein they assigned the following specifications of error:

I. The Trial Court committed legal and factual error in ruling all claims against • Ms. Allbritton were dismissed with prejudice on February 9, 2004;
II. The Trial Court committed legal error in ruling that plaintiff has no right/no ... cause of action as to Ms. Allbritton;
III. The Trial Court committed legal and factual error in granting the exception of res judicata as to Ms. Allbritton; and
IV. The Trial Court committed legal and factual error in granting the exception of prescription as to Direct General Insurance Company.

| ¿STOGNERS’ INTENT REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST MS. ALLBRITTON

(Assignment of Error Number One)

On appeal, the Stogners assert they never intended to dismiss all their claims against Ms. Allbritton. Moreover, the Stogners note they did not know Direct General insured Ms. Allbritton at the time they executed the February 9, 2004 release of Ms. Allbritton. The Stogners argue they detrimentally relied on information from Ms. Allbritton’s attorney— that Ms. Allbritton did not likely have any additional insurance — when they agreed to the settlement with Ms. Allbritton and National Automotive. Thus, the Stogners maintain, they certainly never intended to release any claims against Direct General.

In response, appellees, Direct General and Ms. Allbritton, argue that the Stog-ners’ claim that there was no intent to release the claims against Ms. Allbritton is disingenuous. Noting the clear language of the order of dismissal, appellees contend there can be no dispute as to the Stogners’ intent with regard to the dismissal of Ms. Allbritton. Concerning the detrimental reliance argument, appellees assert that the Stogners were aware Ms. Allbritton’s attorney had not been able to confirm that she had no other insurance and that the Stogners’ attorney knew that Ms. Allbrit-ton was not cooperating with her attorney and had not responded to inquiries regarding other insurance. Further the appel-lees maintain the Stogners “simply failed to take the steps necessary to determine whether [Ms. Allbritton] had additional insurance prior to reaching .the settlement.”

The February 9, 2004 dismissal, which was submitted by counsel for the Stogners, contains the following language:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Anna Stogner’s claims against Anna M. All-britton and National Automotive Insurance Company, be dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs, with plaintiff reserving all rights to proceed against any party not specifically dismissed herein, including her uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

The Stogners’ attorney indicated that she relied on correspondence from Ms. Allbritton’s attorney indicating that it was not likely that Ms. Allbritton had any other |Rapplicable coverage. However, the Stogners’ attorney acknowledged that she also knew that Ms. Allbritton was no longer cooperating with her attorney. Nonetheless, the Stogners and their attorney proceeded with the settlement and dismissal of Ms. Allbritton, even before deposing her on October 15, 2004, when they learned that she was insured by Direct General.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and applicable law and agree with appel-lees’ arguments that the Stogners intended to dismiss all claims against Ms. Allbrit-ton. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the Stogners’ claims against Ms. All-britton were dismissed with prejudice on February 9, 2004. This assignment of error is without merit.

RES JUDICATA AS TO MS. ALL-BRITTON NO RIGHT/NO CAUSE OF ACTION

(Assignments of Error Number Two and Three)

In assignment of error number two, the Stogners argue the trial court erred in ruling they have no right of action or cause of action against Ms. Allbritton. In assignment of error number three, the Stogners assert the exception raising the objection of res judicata was granted in error as the parties are not the same. In response to these arguments, appellees contend that the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against Ms. Allbritton had “the force of law and the effect of a final judgment on the merits” and, thus, the “trial court was correct in its ruling that res judicata bars further pursuit by the [Stogners] of any relief as to [Ms. Allbrit-ton].” Appellees further maintain that the Stogners “had no right of action to pursue a second claim for the same damages against [Ms. Allbritton] after she was dismissed with prejudice at the [Stogners’] request” and that the Stogners “could not again state a cause of action as to her for which relief could be granted.” We agree.

IfiThe res judicata statute, La. R.S. 13:4231, provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgmént arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive," in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

Pursuant to this statute, then, a second action is precluded when all of the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2004-882, p. 36 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 746, 771.

A dismissal with prejudice has the effect of a final judgment of absolute dismissal after trial and constitutes a bar to another suit on the same cause of action. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1673. Moreover, a final judgment acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is sought within the time fixed by law or if the judgment is confirmed on further review. Tolis v. Board of Sup’rs of Louisiana State University, 95-1529, p. 2 (La.10/16/95), 660 So.2d 1206.

As previously indicated, it is clear from the record that the February 9, 2004 dismissal of Ms. Allbritton was with prejudice. Thus, it was a final judgment that constituted a bar to another suit on the same cause of action. The Stogners failed to seek timely review of the February 9, 2004 judgment of dismissal, but then tried to revive their claims against Ms. Allbrit-ton in an amended petition filed on March 9, 2005. As argued by appellees in brief to this court, “[tjhe suggestion that they be permitted to |7do so now comes too late.” Accordingly, the trial court was correct" in its finding that “[t]he amended suit naming Anna Allbritton as a defendant after she was dismissed with prejudice stems from the same material facts as the first petition filed in this matter and is barred by res judicata.” Thus, these assignments of error are without merit.

PRESCRIPTION AS TO DIRECT GENERAL

In their final assignment of error, the Stogners contend the trial court committed legal and factual error in granting the exception raising the objection of prescription as to Direct General. The Stog-ners maintain that their claim against Direct General is not prescribed because: “Ms. Allbritton (the tortfeasor) and State Farm (the UM insurer) are solidary obli-gors; Mr. and Mrs. Stogner filed their pleadings timely against one or the other of the solidary obligors; and the timely filed pleadings interrupted prescription against movers.” Although we disagree with the Stogners’ argument regarding the prescription issue, we nonetheless conclude the trial court was in error in finding that the Stogners’ claims against Direct General were prescribed.

Prescription is interrupted by the filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. La. Civ.Code art. 3462. The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors. La. Civ.Code arts. 1799 and 3503. It is well settled that a liability insurer and its insured are solidary obligors such that interruption of prescription against one would be effective against the other. See La. R.S. 22:655(B)(1). Thus, in. the instant case, timely suit against Ms. Allbritton would serve to interrupt prescription for suit against Direct General. Appellees argue on appeal, however, that because the Stogners voluntarily dismissed Ms. Allbrit-ton, with prejudice, on February 9, 2004, prescription as to Direct General began to run anew from that date. See La. Civ. Code art. 3466. Therefore, appellees contend all claims as to Direct General prescribed on February 9, 2005, before the Stogners’ second supplemental and amending petition was filed. While appellees’ argument in this regard would normally be correct, they have failed to consider what effect the petition of intervention filed in |sthe instant suit by Lemic, Ms. Stogner’s workers’ compensation insurer, might have on the interruption of prescription.

In Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 440 So.2d 93, 95 (La.1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

The filing by one party of a suit to recover his damages usually does not affect the running of prescription against other parties who sustained separate damages in the same accident. However, a timely petition by an employer’s workmen’s compensation insurer, seeking recovery of compensation benefits paid to .an injured employee against a tortfeasor who caused the injury to the employee, interrupts prescription .... The reason is that there is only one principal cause of action, and the compensation insurer is asserting part of the employee’s cause of action, because the insurer has paid part of the employee’s damages and is entitled to recover to the extent of those payments as partial subrogee.

Accordingly, when several parties share a single cause of action (as through partial subrogation), suit by one interrupts prescription as to all. Louviere, 440 So.2d at 96. Moreover, once the employer’s compensation insurer files suit to recover compensation benefits paid to an injured employee and thereby interrupts prescription on the employee’s claim arising from the same cause .of action, prescription is continuously interrupted during the pendency of the insurer’s suit. Id. at 98.

In the instant case, Lemic timely intervened in this suit against Ms. Allbritton and National Automotive on August 22, 2003, to recover compensation benefits paid to Ms. Stogner as a result of the damages she sustained in the accident in question. Lemic’s petition of intervention was not dismissed until March 29, 2005. Thus, prescription as to Ms. Allbritton (and any obligor solidarity liable with Ms. Allbritton) was continuously interrupted during that time. Accordingly, when the Stogners filed their second supplemental and amending petition on March 9, 2005, naming Direct General as a defendant, prescription was interrupted as to Direct General. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is reversed insofar as it granted the exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissed, with prejudice, the Stogners’ suit against Direct General.

[^CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment that granted the exception raising the objection of prescription as to Dix-ect General and dismissed, with prejudice, the Stogners’ suit against Direct General. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. We remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs associated with this appeal are divided equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

      . We note that the Stogners actually appealed from the trial court's denial of their motion for new trial, which is not an appealable judgment absent a showing of irreparable harm. Pittman v. Pittman, 2001-2528, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d 369, 372, writ denied, 2003-1365 (La.9/19/03), 853 So.2d 642. However, the supreme court has directed us to consider an appeal of the denial of a motion for new trial as an appeal of the judgment on the merits as well, .when it is clear from the appellant’s brief that he intended to appeal the merits of the case. Shultz v. Shultz, 2002-2534, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/03), 867 So.2d 745, 746-747. It is obvious from the Stogners’ brief that they intended to appeal the judgment oh the merits. Thus, we will treat the appeal accordingly.

      . We note that the February 9, 2004 dismissal specifically reserves to Ms. Stogner all rights to proceed against any party not specifically dismissed including her uninsured motorist carrier, State Farm. The trial court did not decide whether the language of the release and the February 9, 2004 dismissal was broad enough to include any unknown insurers of Ms. Allbritton. In fact, the issue as to whether Direct General was covered by said language was not decided by the trial court below. ■


author: MAX N. TOBIAS,' Jr., Ad Hoc, Judge.

text:
    Louis J. RUFFINO and Christopher B. Ruffino v. TANGIPAHOA PARISH COUNCIL, Parish President Gordon Burgess and Councilman Buddy Ridgel.
    No. 2006 CA 2073.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    June 8, 2007.

      Scott M. Perrilloux, District Attorney, Clifton T. Speed, Assistant District Attorney, Greensburg, for Defendant-Appellee-End Appellant Tangipahoa Parish Council.
    Glen R. Galbraith, Seale & Ross, P.L.C., Hammond, for Defendants-lst Appellants-Appellees Gordon Burgess and Buddy Rid-gel.
    Before: JONES, MURRAY, and TOBIAS, JJ.

      . The Honorable Charles R. Jones, Judge, the Honorable Patricia Rivet Murray, Judge, and the Honorable Max N. Tobias, Jr., Judge, all members of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, are serving as judges ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   MAX N. TOBIAS,' Jr., Ad Hoc, Judge.

I,We are asked to review the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the Tangipahoa Parish Council, the parish president, and a councilman both of which enjoined them from discussing in their public capacity the contract between a private landowner and the United States government.

Christopher B. Ruffino owned fifteen acres of land in Tangipahoa Parish outside of Hammond, Louisiana. The property, known as “Louisville Estates,” was a permitted 68-unit mobile home park, and the Ruffinos entered into a lease agreement with the United States government to house those displaced by Hurricane Katrina in trailers provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for eighteen months, beginning on 2 December 2005. The Tangipahoa Parish Council noted the agreement, and the minutes of the council meeting held on 27 December 2005 reflect that Councilman Howard “Buddy” Ridgel (“Ridgel”) discussed the proposed trailer park to be placed at Iverstine Lane under “councilmen’s privileges.”

On 29 December 2005, the Ruffinos filed a petition for a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and for issuance of writ quo warran-to against the Tangipahoa Parish Council Government (“Parish of Tangipahoa”), Parish President Gordon Burgess (“Burgess”), and Parish Councilman Ridgel (collectively “appellants”). On that same day, a judge of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court issued..a temporary restraining order without bond as required by La. C.C.P. art. 3610 in favor of the Ruffinos. The court ordered:

that Tangipahoa Parish Counsel (sic), President Gordon Burgess and Councilman Buddy Ridgel are hereby restrained and enjoined from conducting any hearings, proceeding and/or Councilmen’s Privileges or otherwise discussing the private property located at Iver-stine Lane in Tangipahoa, Louisiana or interfering with, causing delays of, and/or obstructing the contracted lease entitled U.S. Government Lease for Real Property of the 15 acres of property located at Iverstine Lane known as “Louis Ruffino #2” or as “Louisville Estates.”

| aThe judgment granted the temporary restraining order and provided that the restraining order would automatically be renewed every ten days until a hearing could be held.

Ridgel and Burgess sought to remove the case to federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana remanded the case to state court.

On 3 April 2006, the Parish of Tangipa-hoa ' filed its answer to the petition for injunction, and a motion to strike the petition pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971. The trial court set 24 April 2006 as the date for' the hearing on the motion to strike, as well as for the petition for preliminary injunction. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to strike and granted the preliminary injunction in favor of the Ruffinos again without bond as mandated by La. C.C.P. art. 3610. The judgment enjoined the defendants/appellants

while serving in their official capacities from entering into discussions regarding the private contract between Louis J. Ruffino and Christopher B. Ruffino and the United States Government and/or undertake discussion of that contract that may cause injury, delay, damage, obstruction, or in any manner interfere with that contract.

The judgment signed on 11 May 2006 went on to provide that the writ of preliminary injunction did “not enjoin the Parish Council and its President while serving in their official capacity during a Parish Council [sic] from discussing public policy including by not limited to parish issues including traffic, police, public utilities, and road work that may be affected by the private contract.” Further, the judge made a handwritten notation on the judgment that “no party is prohibited in any manner from discussing this matter in a party’s capacity as a private citizen.”

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court explained that mere mention of the contract between the Ruffinos and the United States government would not be prohibited, but that discussion of the contract in a manner that would interfere with the contract or the parties to' the contract was enjoined. It also noted that as private [■¡citizens, the Parish President and the Parish Councilmen have freedom of speech rights that were not enjoined by the trial court.

Two timely appeals were lodged by the defendants; one on behalf of the Parish of Tangipahoa on 18 May 2006 and another on behalf of Ridgel and Burgess on 17 May 2006. Both appeals assign three errors to the trial court, and they both deal with primarily the same issues. First, the appellants assert that the trial court erred in issuing the temporary restraining order insofar as it violated the separation of powers doctrine and Louisiana Constitution Article III, § 8. Second, the trial court erred in issuing a judgment granting a writ of preliminary injunction that operated in the same manner as the temporary restraining order. Finally, the trial court erred in not granting the motion to strike. The record on appeal reflects that the Ruffinos declined to file an appellate brief, notifying the court that the property had been sold and that they no longer had any interest in this matter.

Article III, § 8 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that:

A member of the legislature shall be privileged from arrest, except for felony, during his attendance at sessions and committee meetings of- his house and while going to and from them. No member shall be questioned elsewhere for any speech in either house. (Emphasis added.)

This article has been held to constitute “an absolute bar to interference when members are acting within the legislative sphere.” Parish of Jefferson v. SFS Construction Group, Inc., 01-1118, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/13/02), 812 So.2d 103, 105, citing, Copsey v. Baer, 593 So.2d 685 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991).

The First Circuit Court of Appeal examined the origin of the legislative privilege in Article III, § 8 and concluded that inquiries into the motivation for legislative actions ran afoul of Article III, citing an opinion by the United States Supreme Court, which held in United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 366-67, 100 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980), that “the Clause protects against inquiry into the acts that occur in the regular course of the | legislative process and into the motivation for those acts.” Copsey, supra, 593 So.2d at 687. Because the injunction complained of specifically enjoins discussion in the legislative arena, it is clearly in violation of Article III, § 8. The prohibition extends not only to the Louisiana legislature but also other legislative bodies such as the legislative bodies of parish and city governments. Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it issued both the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Next, we look to whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike filed by the defendants pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971. Article 971 provides that a special motion to strike may be brought against “a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim.” La. C.C.P. art. 971 A(l). The article defines an “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue” as including “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official body authorized by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 971 F(l). Further, the article provides that a litigant prevailing on a special motion to strike is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The record on appeal does not provide or reflect any indication that the Ruffinos could prevail under any theory of law on their petition for injunction. We know of no theory of law that would permit them to prevail on the facts set forth in the record on appeal. Therefore, the motion to strike was properly filed, and the trial court erred as a matter of law by not granting it and vacating the temporary restraining order and ^denying the preliminary injunction. Because the Parish of Tangipahoa should have prevailed on its motion to strike, it is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Because we have concluded that the in-junctive actions of the trial court were erroneous as a matter of law, and insofar as no evidence exists in the record on appeal that the Ruffinos might have prevailed on their petition, we vacate the judgment of the trial court granting the writ of preliminary injunction and reverse the trial court’s. denial of the motion to strike. The petition filed by the Ruffinos stated no legal grounds on which the Ruffi-nos’ might have prevailed, and a motion to strike under Article 971 was proper. Accordingly, we render judgment granting the Parish of Tangipahoa’s motion to strike. In light of the foregoing, the Parish of Tangipahoa is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and we remand the matter to the trial court so that it may determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to be awarded to the Parish of Tangi-pahoa and for further proceedings on the reconventional demand filed by Burgess and Ridgel.

REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; RENDERED IN PART; REMANDED.

      . Although Christopher B. Ruffino and Louis J. Ruffino ture both petitioners in this matter, the petition describes Christopher B. Ruffino as the owner of the property and Louis J Ruffino as the holder of the relevant permits for the trailer park. We refer hereafter to the Ruffinos collectively as "the Ruffinos.”

      . Automatic renewals of temporary restraining orders without specific written order of the court signed every ten days extending the restraining order are prohibited by La. C.C.P. art. 3604.

      . Burgess and Ridgel filed an answer on 21 April 2006 and further lodged a reconventional demand against the Ruffinos for wrongful issuance of the injunction.

      . Although the article specifically applies to a “member of the legislature’’, the privilege has been extended to local legislative bodies and local officials. Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.1991), writ denied, Calhoun v. Odinet, 502 U.S. 1060, 112 S.Ct. 939, 117 L.Ed.2d 110 (1992).

      . Because the rationale for dissolving the temporary restraining order is identical to that for vacating the preliminary injunction, we pretermit a discussion of them as separate assignments of error.

      . Although Ridgel and Burgess addressed the motion to strike in their appellate brief, we note that the motion to strike was only filed on behalf of the Parish of Tangipahoa, although Ridgel and Burgess did submit affidavits to bolster that motion. Therefore, there was only one motion to strike filed on behalf of one defendant, the Parish of Tangipahoa.
      We also note that a party is entitled to recover attorney's fees for the wrongful issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of injunction. La. C.C.P. art. 3608.