text:
    In re Jeffery Anthony FAVORS.
    No. 2006-B-1339.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Jeffery Anthony Favors, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed four sets of formal charges against respondent. The first set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 02-DB-008, was filed on January 24, 2002 and consists of sixteen counts of misconduct. The second set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 02-DB-133, was filed on December 23, 2002 and consists of five counts of misconduct. The third set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 03-DB-038, was filed on July 2, 2003 and consists of two counts of misconduct. The fourth set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 03-DB-050, was filed on August 14, 2003 and consists of two counts of misconduct.

The first set of formal charges was considered by a hearing committee separately from the other three sets of charges. On September 17, 2003, the following three sets of formal charges were consolidated by order of the disciplinary board for consideration by one hearing committee. Thereafter, on August 15, 2005, the four matters were consolidated by order of the board. On June 2, 2006, the board filed in lathis court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing all four sets of formal charges.

02-DB-008

Counts I & II — The Riley Matter

In November 1999, Belinda Riley hired respondent to handle her personal injury matter. The matter settled for $3,558.25 on July 25, 2000. Thereafter, Ms. Riley’s endorsement was forged on the settlement check and deposited. Respondent failed to inform Ms. Riley of the settlement, which she learned of from the insurance company. Respondent also did not contact her about disbursal of the settlement funds until October 2000. At an October 24, 2000 meeting, Ms. Riley signed the release and received a $1,200 check from respondent as her portion of the settlement. However, respondent did not provide her with a disbursement sheet to account for the rest of the funds.

In April 2001, respondent received a copy of Ms. Riley’s complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. He failed to appear on the designated date but appeared the next day to give his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(b)(c) (fee arrangements), 1.15(b) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.1(b) (failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, | ¡¡trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts III & IV — The Brewer Matter

In April 2000, Sir Finis Brewer retained respondent to handle his bankruptcy, paying him $385. Respondent filed the initial bankruptcy documents. However, he failed to meet with Mr. Brewer to prepare the schedules and plan despite numerous attempts by his client to contact him. Mr. Brewer’s bankruptcy was eventually dismissed due to respondent’s failure to timely file the schedules or plan. The bankruptcy court also ordered respondent to pay $1,000 in sanctions. Additionally, respondent filed an application to pay the bankruptcy filing fees in installments without his client’s consent and only paid $5.00 towards the filing fee despite receiving $385 from Mr. Brewer. Respondent’s failure to pay the rest of the filing fee resulted in an order to show cause why the bankruptcy should not be dismissed.

In March 2001, respondent received a copy of Mr. Brewer’s complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. He failed to appear on the designated date but appeared the next day to give his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.2(a) (scope of representation), 1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

4Counts v. & VI—The Morris Matter

In November 2000, Ernest Morris, Jr. retained respondent to handle his bankruptcy, paying him $700. Respondent filed the initial bankruptcy documents. However, he failed to attend two creditors’ meetings and failed to file any schedules. In January 2001, Mr. Morris discharged respondent and requested a full refund. In March 2001, the bankruptcy court ordered respondent to refund $500 to Mr. Morris and pay $400 in sanctions for his failure to attend the creditors’ meetings. Thereafter, respondent refunded $500 to Mr. Morris.

In February 2001, respondent received a copy of Mr. Morris’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he faded to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. He failed to appear on the designated date but appeared the next day to give his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts VII & VIII — The Barnes Matter

In June 2000, Ronald Barnes retained respondent to handle his bankruptcy. Mr. Barnes paid respondent $485, $185 of which was for filing fees. Despite attempts by Mr. Barnes to contact respondent, he failed to communicate with his client. He also filed three different bankruptcy petitions for Mr. Barnes, all of which were dismissed due to respondent’s errors. Two of the petitions were filed without Mr. Barnes’ knowledge or consent and included his forged signature. Furthermore, respondent filed an application to pay the filing fees in installments despite the fact 15that Mr. Barnes paid him the fees up front. Respondent also admitted that he was not capable of properly handling bankruptcies.

In February 2001, respondent received a copy of Mr. Barnes’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. He failed to appear on the designated date but appeared the next day to give his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.3 (failure to properly supervise non-lawyer assistants), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts IX & X — The Jones Matter

In December 2000, Deborah Jones retained respondent to handle her father’s succession. On December 14, 2000, Ms. Jones paid respondent $540 towards costs and attorney’s fees and gave him several original documents. Ms. Jones’ numerous attempts to contact respondent between January 2001 and March 2001 were unsuccessful. Thereafter, Ms. Jones learned that respondent’s business phone had been disconnected and his law firm had moved to another location. Ms. Jones eventually contacted respondent, who had relocated to Georgia. Respondent agreed to complete the succession from Georgia but thereafter failed to do so. In July 2001, respondent refunded Ms. Jones’ entire payment and provided her with her original documents and succession documents he had prepared on her behalf. The succession documents were not competently prepared.

In June 2001, respondent received a copy of Ms. Jones’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a lfisubpoena to obtain his sworn statement. He failed to appear on the designated date but appeared the next day to give his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts XI & XII — The Katz Matter

Respondent sent ten personal injury clients to Dr. Steven Katz for chiropractic services. Respondent agreed to pay Dr. Katz’ bills upon settlement of his clients’ cases. Respondent failed to communicate the status of the cases to Dr. Katz or respond to his requests for information. Furthermore, two cases settled, and respondent failed to pay Dr. Katz’ bills from the settlements. Dr. Katz’ bills in the two settled cases totaled $3,099.

In July 2001, respondent received a copy of Dr. Katz’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. In lieu of providing a sworn statement, the ODC allowed respondent to provide his response in writing. Thereafter, the ODC requested further information from respondent, who failed to respond.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.4, 1.15(a)(b), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts XIII & XIV — The Lightell Matter

In October 2000, Nolan and Leatia Ligh-tell hired respondent to handle their bankruptcy, paying him $700. Respondent filed the bankruptcy petition but failed to file a proper mailing matrix, resulting in the dismissal of the bankruptcy. Despite the |7LighteIls’ numerous attempts to contact respondent, he failed to communicate with his clients. Eventually, the Lightells learned that respondent’s law firm had closed.

In August 2001, respondent received a copy of the Lightells’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. Respondent failed to appear on the designated date.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts XV & XVI — The Pearl Matter

In March 1999, Michael and Karen Pearl retained respondent to handle Michael’s worker’s compensation matter. In January 2001, the matter settled for $55,000. Michael received $18,000 as his portion of the settlement. Respondent withheld $26,000 to send as a reinstatement payment to the Pearls’ mortgage company, Midland Mortgage. However, respondent failed to remit the $26,000 to Midland Mortgage. Despite the Pearls’ numerous attempts to contact respondent, he failed to communicate with them. Furthermore, respondent was arrested for the theft of the $26,000, which matter is being screened by the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office.

In August 2001, respondent received a copy of the Pearls’ complaint filed against him with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. By letter dated November 11, 2002, respondent indicated he would not be appearing on the designated date.

| sThe ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges, essentially denying the allegations of misconduct.

Formal Hearing

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on July 24, 2002. The ODC introduced documentary evidence and called the following witnesses to testify before the committee: Deborah Jones, Karen Pearl, Michael Pearl, Nolan Lightell, Cheryl Sides (claims adjuster in the Riley matter), Sir Finis Brewer, Ernest Morris, Jr., Ronald Barnes, Hollis Shepherd (respondent’s previous law partner), Theresa Mason-Brown (administrator for Dr. Katz), and Holly Friedman (investigator for the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office). Respondent did not appear at the hearing.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

The Riley matter — In November 1999, Ms. Riley hired respondent to handle her personal injury case, which settled on June 25, 2000 for $8,558.25. Respondent did not notify Ms. Riley of the settlement and forged her endorsement on the check. Ms. Riley learned of the settlement after contacting the insurance company’s claims adjuster. Ms. Riley did not hear from respondent until she met with him on October 24, 2000, when she signed a release and received a $1,200 cheek as her portion of the | nsettlement proceeds. Ms. Riley never received a disbursement sheet. Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Riley’s complaint filed with the ODC. He also failed to appear on the designated date to give a sworn statement to the ODC; however, he appeared on June 15, 2001 to provide the sworn statement.

The Brewer matter- — Mr. Brewer paid respondent $385 in filing costs and attorney’s fees to handle his bankruptcy. Respondent failed to timely file the bankruptcy schedules or plan, resulting in Mr. Brewer’s bankruptcy being dismissed and his property being foreclosed upon. Respondent also only paid $5.00 towards the filing fee. Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Brewer’s complaint filed with the ODC. He also failed to appear on the designated date to give a sworn statement to the ODC; however, he appeared on June 15, 2001 to provide the sworn statement.

The Morris matter — Mr. Morris paid respondent $700 to handle his bankruptcy. Respondent failed to appear at any of the court hearings and creditors meetings. Respondent also failed to file the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. Morris eventually terminated respondent’s services and hired another attorney at additional costs. Respondent was sanctioned by the bankruptcy court and ordered to refund Mr. Morris’ money. Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Morris’ complaint filed with the ODC. He also failed to appear on the designated date to give a sworn statement to the ODC; however, he appeared on June 15, 2001 to provide the sworn statement.

The Barnes matter — Mr. Barnes paid respondent $485 to handle his bankruptcy. Respondent filed at least three bankruptcy petitions in Mr. Barnes’ name, two of which were without Mr. Barnes’ consent or signature. All three bankruptcies were dismissed due to respondent’s errors. Respondent also failed to pay the filing fee. He subsequently admitted that he was not capable of properly handling bankruptcy matters. Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Barnes’ complaint |infiled with the ODC. He also failed to appear on the designated date to give a sworn statement to the ODC; however, he appeared on June 15, 2001 to provide the sworn statement.

The Jones matter — In December 2000, Ms. Jones paid respondent $540 to handle her father’s succession. Thereafter, respondent never contacted Ms. Jones and abandoned his law practice. After Ms. Jones filed a complaint against him with the ODC, respondent refunded her money and provided her with inaccurate and incompetently prepared pleadings, which resulted in her having to hire another attorney to handle the succession. Respondent failed to respond to Ms. Jones’ complaint filed with the ODC. He also failed to appear on the designated date to give a sworn statement to the ODC; however, he appeared on June 15, 2001 to provide the sworn statement.

The Katz matter — Respondent referred a number of his clients to Dr. Steven Katz for treatment. Respondent failed to pay Dr. Katz after his clients’ cases settled. Respondent has admitted having knowledge of Dr. Katz’ interest in these cases; nonetheless, no payments have been made to Dr. Katz on the settled cases. Respondent failed to respond to Dr. Katz’ complaint filed with the ODC. Therefore, he was subpoenaed to provide a sworn statement. The ODC allowed him to respond in writing instead. However, respondent failed to respond to the ODC’s subsequent requests for information.

The Lightell matter — Nolan and Leatia Lightell paid respondent $700 in filing costs and attorney’s fees to handle their bankruptcy. Thereafter, respondent never communicated with the Lightells and failed to file the bankruptcy. The Lightells were forced to hire another attorney to handle the bankruptcy, and respondent has not refunded any of their money. Respondent failed to respond to the Lightells’ | ¶ complaint filed with the ODC. He also failed to appear to give a sworn statement to the ODC.

The Pearl matter — Michael and Karen Pearl hired respondent to handle two workers’ compensation cases and a bankruptcy matter, which was to be filed because the Pearls were behind on their home mortgage. In January 2001, Mr. Pearl’s case settled for $55,000. Respondent gave Mr. Pearl a check for $18,000 and advised him he would use $26,000 to pay their home mortgage current. In February 2001, the Pearls received a foreclosure notice and learned that respondent had not made the $26,000 payment on their mortgage. Respondent stole the $26,000 and is presently under investigation by the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. As a result of respondent’s actions, the Pearls’ home was foreclosed upon. They became homeless and had to move in with their respective parents, splitting up the family living situation. Respondent failed to respond to the Pearls’ complaint filed with the ODC. He also informed the ODC that he would not give a sworn statement, despite being subpoenaed to do so.

Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. Respondent’s neglect caused serious harm to his clients, especially the Pearls, who lost their home, became homeless, and had their family split as a result of his misconduct. Respondent stole $26,000 from Mr. Pearl’s workers’ compensation settlement. Respondent also took $700 from the Lightells and did no work on their legal matter. Respondent further failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations of these complaints. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

|T Jn aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and indifference to making restitution. As a mitigating factor, the committee recognized that respondent has no prior disciplinary record, but noted that respondent was admitted to the practice of law in April 1999 and his pattern of misconduct began as early as October 2000.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

02-DB-1S3

Count I — The Knight Matter

In December 1999, Burnetta Williams Knight hired respondent to handle several legal matters concerning the succession of her brother, Tommie James Williams. Ms. Knight paid respondent $1,033.50. Thereafter, respondent neglected the legal matters, failed to communicate with Ms. Knight, and relocated to Georgia without notifying her. Respondent also failed to safeguard and return Ms. Knight’s original documents and failed to refund the unearned fee Ms. Knight paid.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(b), 1.5(a)(b), 1.5(f)(6) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.15(a), 1.16(d) (obligations liSupon termination of the representation), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts II & III — The Mizett Matter

In 2001, William Mizett, Jr. hired" respondent to handle his workers’ compensation claim. Thereafter, respondent neglected the matter and failed to communicate with Mr. Mizett, despite numerous attempts by Mr. Mizett to contact him. Respondent’s phone was also disconnected. Furthermore, Mr. Mizett provided respondent with his original documents regarding the matter, which respondent failed to return, preventing Mr. Mizett from hiring new counsel.

In April 2002, respondent failed to claim the certified mail notifying him of Mr. Mizett’s complaint filed against him with the ODC. In May 2002, respondent finally received a copy of the complaint. However, he failed to respond, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena, to be served via certified mail, to obtain his sworn statement. Respondent failed to claim the certified mail.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(b), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Counts TV & V — The Bell Matter

In January 2000, Calvin Bell hired respondent to handle a workers’ compensation claim and a fraud claim. Respondent neglected the matter and incompetently handled court appearances on behalf of his client. Respondent also failed to communicate with Mr. Bell for more than a year and failed to attend scheduled meetings. Furthermore, respondent relocated to Georgia and failed to |uproperly withdraw from the representation of Mr. Bell. Finally, Mr. Bell learned from another attorney that respondent had deceived him as to the status of his legal matters.

In July 2002, respondent received a copy of Mr. Bell’s complaint filed with the ODC. However, he failed to respond, despite numerous requests by the ODC to do so.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.3, 1.4(a)(b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

0S-DB-0S8

Counts I & II — The Lott/Seago Matter

In November 2000, Kenneth Lott hired respondent to represent him in a personal injury matter. In February 2002, after respondent relocated to Georgia, the matter settled for $10,000. The settlement check was made payable to respondent, Mr. Lott, and Majestic Finance, Inc. (“Majestic”), one of Mr. Lott’s creditors. While Mr. Lott gave respondent permission to endorse his name on the check, respondent did not have Majestic’s permission to do so. Nonetheless, respondent deposited the check into his personal checking account. He did not pay any of Mr. Lott’s bills, and he also failed to put funds into the registry of the court after he filed a concursus proceeding and failed to appear for a hearing on the matter. Respondent paid Mr. Lott $500 as his portion of the settlement proceeds but failed to pay Majestic. He also failed to account for the $9,433.50 in fees and expenses he kept for himself.

|1KThe ODC attempted to serve respondent, via certified mail, with notice of Majestic’s complaint. However, respondent failed to claim the mail. As such, he never provided the ODC with a response to the complaint.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.15, 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

08-DB-050

Counts I & II — The Ryles Matter

In January 2000, James Thomas Ryles hired respondent to handle a personal injury matter and a workers’ compensation matter. Thereafter, respondent neglected the matters and failed to communicate with Mr. Ryles. Respondent eventually abandoned his practice and relocated to Georgia. Mr. Ryles learned from the workers’ compensation court that respondent would no longer be representing him in the workers’ compensation matter. Mr. Ryles currently does not know the status of his personal injury matter.

The ODC attempted to serve respondent, via certified mail, with notice of Mr. Ryles’ complaint. However, respondent failed to claim the mail. As such, he never provided the ODC with a response to the complaint. He also failed to claim certified mail notifying him of the ODC’s subpoena to take his sworn statement.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

02-DB-188, 03-DB-088 & 03-DB-050

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the three sets of formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed ^admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After considering the ODC’s submission, the hearing committee found the following:

The Knight matter — Respondent neglected Ms. Knight’s legal matters, failed to communicate with her, failed to return her original documents, and failed to refund the unearned fee she paid him. Respondent further relocated to Georgia without notifying Ms. Knight. In acting as he did, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The Mizett matter — After being hired by Mr. Mizett, respondent failed to communicate with him despite numerous attempts by Mr. Mizett to contact respondent. Eventually, Mr. Mizett learned that respondent’s phone had been disconnected. Respondent neglected Mr. Mizett’s legal matter and failed to return Mr. Mizett’s original documents. Respondent also failed to respond to the ODC’s numerous requests to respond to Mr. Mizett’s complaint. In acting as he did, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The Bell matter — Respondent neglected Mr. Bell’s legal matters by fading to be prompt and prepared for court appearances. He failed to communicate with his client and failed to attend scheduled meetings. He also relocated to Georgia and 117failed to notify Mr. Bell that he would no longer be representing him. When he did speak to Mr. Bell, respondent falsely informed him that his lawsuits were filed and up to date. Respondent also failed to respond to Mr. Bell’s complaint filed with the ODC. In acting as he did, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The Lott/Seago matter — When Mr. Lott’s legal matter settled, respondent deposited the settlement funds into his own personal account, thereby converting client funds. Respondent also failed to pay Mr. Seago, a third party lien holder. Respondent invoked a concursus proceeding but failed to deposit the settlement funds into the registry of the court and failed to appear for a hearing. Respondent paid Mr. Lott $500 but failed to adequately account for the remaining $9,500 of the settlement. Respondent also failed to respond to Mr. Seago’s complaint filed with the ODC or appear for a sworn statement. In acting as he did, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The Ryles matter — Respondent neglected Mr. Ryles’ legal matters and failed to communicate with Mr. Ryles. Furthermore, respondent abandoned his practice without informing his client. Respondent also failed to respond to Mr. Ryles’ complaint filed with the ODC or appear for a sworn statement. In acting as he did, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and as a professional. His misconduct harmed his clients by delaying their legal matters, thus causing them frustration, and by depriving them of their funds. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lavryer Sanctions, the committee determined that disbarment is the baseline sanction.

|1sAs aggravating factors, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

Considering the above findings and this court’s prior jurisprudence, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred. The committee also recommended that respondent provide complete account-ings and make full restitution to his victims. Finally, the committee recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation 02-DB-008, 02-DB-133, 03-DB-038 & 03-DB-050

After reviewing this consolidated matter, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committees’ findings of fact are not manifestly erroneous and/or are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board further determined that the rule violations found by the committees are proper.

Based on these determinations, the board found that respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and as a professional. Respondent acted intentionally and caused substantial harm to his clients, the most egregious being the harm caused to the Pearls.

|1flThe board found the following aggravating factors present: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the board recognized that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

Further relying on Guideline 1 (repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm) of the permanent disbarment guidelines and this court’s prior jurisprudence, the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. The board also recommended that respondent provide ac-countings and make restitution to his victims where appropriate. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has Rnbeen proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The testimony, evidence, and deemed admitted facts support the hearing committees’ and disciplinary board’s findings in these consolidated matters. Respondent failed to provide competent representation to his clients, neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to refund approximately $2,600 in unearned fees, converted approximately $41,000 of client and third-party funds to his own use, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, abandoned his law practice when he relocated to Georgia without notice to his clients, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in numerous investigations.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

| ai The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is clearly disbarment. Therefore, the only issue presented for our consideration is whether respondent’s misconduct is so egregious as to warrant permanent disbarment.

Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E depicts conduct that may warrant permanent disbarment. We agree with the disciplinary board that Guideline 1 (repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm) is applicable in this matter. Respondent intentionally converted funds belonging to Ms. Riley, Dr. Katz, the Pearls, Mr. Lott, and Mr. Seago. Restitution has not been made to these clients and third parties, and the Pearls in particular were significantly harmed by respondent’s conversion.

The intentional conversion of client funds, coupled with the numerous other acts of misconduct, indicates that respondent lacks the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. Furthermore, the solitary mitigating factor present in this case — the absence of a prior disciplinary record — is significantly outweighed by the applicable aggravating factors.

Prior jurisprudence reveals that similar cases have resulted in permanent disbarment. Accordingly, respondent must be permanently disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of | ¡¡¡¡Jeffery Anthony Favors, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26029, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent provide accountings and make restitution to his victims. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The hearing was held on January 10, 2003. Judgment was rendered in favor of Majestic and against respondent in the amount of $3,058.90 plus $500 in attorney's fees.

      . The board cited In re: Deshotels, 03-2060 (La. 12/12/03), 863 So.2d 507 (permanent disbarment for seventeen counts of misconduct involving failing to communicate with clients, neglecting legal matters, allowing matters to prescribe, disobeying court orders, failing to return clients’ files, failing to protect clients’ files, converting client funds, failing to provide accountings, failing to refund unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in numerous investigations), and In re: Morphis, 01-2803 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 934 (permanent disbarment for commingling and converting client funds, engaging in fraud and deceit, and settling cases without his clients’ knowledge or consent).

      . Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 1999, and thus it may be technically true that he lacks experience in the practice of law. However, we will give this fact no weight in mitigation in light of respondent's knowing and intentional actions, the pattern of misconduct, and the numerous offenses present, all of which suggest that his inexperience in the practice of law had little or nothing to do with his misconduct.

      . See In re: Tousant, 03-0062 (La. 6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1048, In re: Deshotels, 03-2060 (La. 12/12/03), 863 So.2d 507, and/w re: Martin, 04-0444 (La.9/3/04), 883 So.2d 392.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Sonja JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    Nos. 2005-C-2021, 2005-C-2026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 2006.
   PER CURIAM.

|, Writ granted in No. 05-C-2026. Plaintiff in this case filed suit against the State of Louisiana and E.A. Conway Medical Center (“Conway”) for damages after a scheduled surgery to remove a uterine fibroid for purposes of increasing her fertility resulted in a total abdominal hysterectomy. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs medical malpractice claim. As to plaintiffs informed consent claim, the trial court found that plaintiff consented to a total abdominal hysterectomy and also dismissed that claim. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs medical malpractice claim. However, the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the lack of informed consent claim. The court of appeal awarded plaintiff $25,000 in damages, finding that surgically induced menopause is a material risk of the removal of a patient’s ovaries that should have been disclosed to plaintiff. We grant this writ to determine whether plaintiff consented to the performed procedure and its material risks.

La. R.S. 40:1299.40 provides the proper method of obtaining and proving 12informed consent of a patient. This court has found a doctor’s duty is to disclose to a patient those risks that are “material.” Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, on reh’g, 553 So.2d 398, 411 (La.1989). The determination of materiality is a two step process. The first step is to determine the nature and existence of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence. The second step is for the trier of fact to determine whether the probability of that type harm is a risk to which a reasonable person in the patient’s position probably would attach significance. Thibodeaux v. Jurgelsky, 04-2004 (La.3/11/05), 898 So.2d 299, 314. However, a plaintiff can only recover damages for a doctor’s failure to disclose a material risk if causation is proven. Causation is established only if adequate disclosure reasonably would be expected to have caused a reasonable person to decline treatment because of the disclosure. Id at 315.

In the instant case, the record includes a fully executed consent form signed by plaintiff. The purpose of the scheduled procedure was to remove a uterine fibroid and clear the plaintiffs fallopian tubes. However, the consent form specifically states that 13“If indicated will remove my uterus, tubes and/or ovaries.” The listed risks associated with the surgery are: bleeding requiring transfusion, infection, infertility, and ectopic pregnancy. When obtaining informed consent, technical language will not ordinarily suffice to disclose a risk to a layperson. A doctor is required to disclose material risks in such terms that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would understand, unless the doctor knows or should have known something peculiar to the patient or her circumstances prevented her from understanding. Hondroulis, 553 So.2d at 421. The consent form in this case provided language a reasonable person in plaintiffs position should understand. Further, plaintiff has not proven the doctors at Conway should have known of any peculiarities to prevent plaintiff from understanding the provided language. Consequently, we find no error in the lower courts’ determination that plaintiff consented to the total abdominal hysterectomy that was ultimately performed.

The court of appeal found surgically induced menopause, a result of the removal of the ovaries, is a material risk that should have been disclosed to plaintiff before surgery. In the instant case, we need not address and we do not determine whether surgically induced menopause is a material risk that should have been disclosed to plaintiff. Instead, we find, even if we were to assume that surgically induced menopause is a material risk, a reasonable person in plaintiffs position would not have declined treatment had that disclosure been made. It is unreasonable to conclude a patient who accepts the risk of the removal of her uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries, as well as the risk of infertility, would not accept treatment if informed surgically induced menopause would result. Therefore, plaintiff cannot recover damages for a lack of informed consent claim.

For the reasons given, we find plaintiff consented to the performed procedure Hand the court of appeal erred in awarding damages for her lack of informed consent claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed insofar as it awarded damages for plaintiffs lack of informed consent claim.

The writ requested in No. 05-C-2021 is denied.

REVERSED IN PART.

      . The applicable provisions of La. R.S. 40:1299.40 provide:
      A.(1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written consent to medical treatment means a handwritten consent to any medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures which: sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, of disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures; acknowledges that such disclosure of information has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a satisfactory manner; and is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if the patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to consent by a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf of such patient in such circumstances. Such consent shall be presumed to be valid and effective, in the absence of proof that execution of the consent was induced by misrepresentation of material facts.
      (2) In addition to the information required to be disclosed in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection, where the medical treatment involves the surgical implantation of “Norplant'' contraceptive devices, the explanation to the patient shall include the known and significant or other material risks, the known adverse results, and alternative methods of contraception.
      B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this Section, no evidence shall be admissible to modify or limit the authorization for performance of the procedure or procedures set forth in such written consent.
      C. Where consent to medical treatment from a patient, or from a person authorized by law to consent to medical treatment for such patient, is secured other than in accordance with Subsection A above, the explanation to the patient or to the person consenting for such patient shall include the matters set forth in Paragraph (1) of Subsection A above, and an opportunity shall be afforded for asking questions concerning the procedures to be performed which shall be answered in a satisfactory manner. Such consent shall be valid and effective and is subject to proof according to the rules of evidence in ordinary cases.


author: PER CURIAM. CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alan B. JAMES.
    No. 2005-KP-2512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   PER CURIAM.

h Granted. The court of appeal’s order for an evidentiary hearing on one of three claims asserted by respondent is vacated and the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing respondentypetitioner’s application for post-conviction relief of all claims asserted is reinstated.

Though this Court recognizes that an attorney’s interference with a defendant’s desire to testify may violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, we also require that the claimant “allege specific facts, including an affidavit from counsel” and point to record evidence to support his claim. State v. Hampton, 00-0522, p. 14-15 (La.3/22/02), 818 So.2d 720, 729-30. We derived these criteria from the decision in Passos-Paternina v. United States, 12 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 (D.P.R.1998), which emphasized that “mere conclusory allegations are insufficient” to rebut a presumption arising from a defendant’s silence at trial that he waived his right to testify. The petitioner must therefore “allege specific facts from which a court could reasonably find” that counsel either informed his client that he was legally forbidden to testify or in some way compelled him to remain silent, and he must also “demonstrate from the record that those specific factual ^allegations would be credible.” Passos-Patemia, 12 F.Supp.2d at 239 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 475-76 (7th Cir.l991)(allegation in petition that inmate told his attorney that he wished to testify and his attorney told him he could not testify insufficient to require a hearing on the claim: “Some greater particularity is necessary ... [and] some substantiation is necessary, such as an affidavit from the lawyer who allegedly forbade his client to testify ... to give the claim sufficient credibility to warrant a further investment of judicial resources in determining the truth of the claim.”)

The criteria adopted in Hampton and derived from Passos-Patemina are therefore guidelines not only for prevailing on the merits of the claim but also for making the claim with sufficient particularity to withstand summary denial on the pleadings without further evidentiary proceedings. In the present case, respondant alleged in his application for post-conviction relief that (1) he and his attorneys had agreed well before trial that he would testify; (2) that counsel then “unequivocally erred in usurping his decision-making power” by preventing him from taking the stand; and (3) that the trial court failed to conduct any inquiry as to whether he had been informed of his right to testify and whether he chose to testify or not. However, because in almost all cases a trial court may presume from a defendant’s silence that he waived his right to testify, Passos-Paternia, 12 F.Supp.2d 238-39, respondent’s claim rests on the first two allegations. The trial court denied the claim under the general provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 926(B)(3) because respondent had failed to “specify!] with reasonable particularity the factual basis for such relief.” Given the criteria adopted in Hampton from federal jurisprudence on point, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in that ruling.

CALOGERO, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., to grant and docket.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

| because the pro se respondent is unrepresented and the court’s present action grant’s the State’s writ application with reasons, which the respondent will see for the first time upon receipt of this ruling, I additionally concur to point out what the respondent no doubt already knows: Under the rules of this court, namely La. Sup.Ct. Rule IX, the respondent may indeed seek a rehearing and file a brief or reasons in support of his application for rehearing.


text:
    Kendrith NICHOLS and Onnie Nichols v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO.
    No. 2006-C-1017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

REHEARING GRANTED; CASE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT. On original hearing this Court affirmed that portion of the appellate court’s opinion which set aside the $95,000.00 judgment the trial court granted in favor of Kendrith Nichols and Onnie Nichols. However, we reversed that portion of the judgment that remanded the case to the trial court for the taking of additional evidence. Upon further consideration of this matter, we grant rehearing, vacate our judgment of July 10, 2006, and deny the writ application of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Accordingly, we reinstate the appellate court decision styled Kendrith Nichols and Onnie Nichols v. State Farm, Fire & Cas. Co., 05-1349 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/06), 926 So.2d 165, and remand this matter to the trial court in accordance with the appellate court decision.

KIMBALL, VICTORY and TRAYLOR, JJ., would deny the rehearing.


text:
    Tiffany ADAMS v. Ruary O’CONNELL, M.D.
    No. 2006-CC-1329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   In re O’Connell, Ruary C. M.D.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, Nos. 01-17278; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.2006-C-0139.

Granted. This matter is remanded to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion.


text:
    Pamela WARREN, Theresa Rene Warren and Sarah Warren Jimenez v. LOUISIANA MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Jeffrey A. Lamp, M.D., Robyn B. Germany, M.D., Sandra Moody, NP-C, and Family Health of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2006-CC-1547.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   In re Family Health of Louisiana Inc.; Lamp, Jeffrey A. M.D.; Moody, Sandra NP-C; Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co. et al.; Germany, Robyn B. M.D.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, Nos. 501,839; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 0412.

Granted and remanded to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion.


text:
    Ivory W. JOHNSON v. HARMONY, L.L.C.
    No. 2006-OC-1595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Ivory W. et al.; Osborne, Milton Jr.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 05, No. 03-02773; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, NO.2005-CA-0994.

Granted. Relator’s brief was filed timely because it was mailed to the court of appeal on the first legal day following the expiration of the briefing delay, which occurred on a legal holiday. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 5059; Rule 2-13 of the Uniform Rule of the Courts of Appeal. Accordingly, relator’s appeal is reinstated.


text:
    Jamie MEYERS v. Dr. Jesus GARCIA.
    No. 2006-CC-2229.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   In re Garcia, Jesus Dr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 106012-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-01154.

Granted. The judgment of the trial court granting plaintiffs motion in limine is reversed. The evidence of plaintiffs body piercing is admissible.


text:
    Jamie MEYERS v. Dr. Jesus GARCIA.
    No. 2006-CC-2230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 29, 2006.
   In re Garcia, Jesus Dr.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 106012-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-01155.

Granted. In the absence of a court order compelling discovery, the trial court erred in imposing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 1471; Helm v. Mervyn’s Department Store, 97-0547 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/20/97), 699 So.2d 129. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting plaintiffs motion in limine and striking defendant’s affirmative defenses is reversed. Case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.


author: WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, Judge, Ad Hoc.

text:
    Alvin BURRELL and Sandra Burrell, Husband and Wife v. Robert WILLIAMS, Alan Raduechel and Northland Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-CA-1625.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    June 9, 2006.

      Thomas L. Mahfouz, Morgan City, Counsel for PlaintiffAppellant.
    Morgan J. Wells, Jr., Lee M. Peacocke, Metairie, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Ad Hoc Judges THOMAS F. DALEY, CLARENCE E. McMANUS, and WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD.
   WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, Judge, Ad Hoc.

| ¡.In this personal injury case, plaintiffs, Alvin and Sandra Burrell, appeal .the amount of damages awarded to them by the trial court, arguing that they are insufficient. For the reasons which follow, we amend in part and affirm as amended.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 29, 2002. Alvin Burrell was operating a 1984 Pontiac 6000 in the eastbound left lane of U.S. Highway 90 in St. Mary Parish. Robert Williams was operating a 1993 Peterbilt tractor, owned by Alan Raduechel, in the eastbound right lane of U.S. Highway 90. When Mr. Williams attempted to move into the left lane to pass a vehicle in front of him, he struck Mr. Burrell’s vehicle, forcing it into the median. Mr. Burrell was taken to the emergency room at Franklin Foundation Hospital, where he complained of neck and shoulder pain.

The day after the accident, July 30, 2002, Mr. Burrell saw his family physician, Dr. Bourgeois, who diagnosed him with a cervical strain, low back strain, and a contusion to the ribs. Dr. Bourgeois told him to avoid lifting or straining and not to return to work as a crane operator at that time. He also gave him muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatory medication. Mr. Burrell saw him again | son August 5, 2002, and Dr. Bourgeois recommended that he begin physical therapy. He began attending physical therapy at Superior Rehab on August 12, 2002. At trial, Mr. Burrell’s physical therapist, Jonathan Marino, testified that his low back pain had dramatically decreased by August 21, 2002, and his cervical pain had decreased by this time as well. After numerous therapy sessions, Mr. Marino discharged him on October 10, 2002.

Mr. Burrell continued to see Dr. Bourgeois during the time period that he went to physical therapy. Dr. Bourgeois testified that at his September 10, 2002 visit, Mr. Burrell still had neck pain, but his back was feeling much better. At his October 15, 2002 visit, Mr. Burrell indicated that his neck was still hurting “on and off’ but his back was essentially normal. At the October 23, 2002 visit, Dr. Bourgeois noted that Mr. Burrell still had some tenderness at the base of his neck, but he released him to go back to work on October 28, 2002. After conducting an examination and finding the results to be normal, Dr. Bourgeois discharged Mr. Burrell from his care on January 10, 2003.

Mr. Burrell returned to see Dr. Bourgeois on July 11, 2003, complaining of neck pain and a burning sensation in his shoulders. At trial, Dr. Bourgeois opined that Mr. Burrell’s pain at that time was probably related to the accident, but it was undoubtedly aggravated by some mechanism or maneuver. Mr. Burrell saw Dr. Bourgeois again on August 8, 2003 complaining of neck and back pain. Dr. Bourgeois ordered an MRI and arranged for an orthopedic consult due to the duration of Mr. Burrell’s symptoms. The MRI revealed degenerative disc disease, which Dr. Bourgeois opined was a pre-existing condition that was not caused by the July 29, 2002 accident and that was aggravated by some maneuver in August 2003.

|4On June 18, 2003, Mr. Burrell and his wife, Sandra Burrell, filed a petition for damages against Mr. Williams, as driver of the tractor, Mr. Raduechel, as Mr. Williams’ employer and owner of the tractor, and Northland Insurance Company, as the liability insurer of Mr. Raduechel for the use and operation of the tractor. Trial of this matter was held on August 18, 2004, and the trial judge took the matter under advisement. On October 18, 2004, the trial judge issued Reasons for Judgment, and on October 25, 2004, he issued First Amended Reasons for Judgment. The trial judge found that Mr. Williams was solely at fault for the accident, and plaintiffs were awarded $4,500 for Mr. Burrell’s past medical expenses, $10,000 for general damages, $6,500 for lost wages, and $1,500 for Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium, for a total award of $22,500. A judgment setting forth this award was signed on November 12, 2004. It is from this judgment that plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred in awarding only $21,000 for Mr. Burrell’s damages and lost wages and only $1,500 for Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium damages. They assert that the trial judge should have awarded $7,486.24 in medical expenses, instead of $4,500, and $14,567.07 in lost wages, instead of $6,500. They further argue that the general damages award for Mr. Burrell’s pain and suffering should have been $50,000, instead of $10,000, and that Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium award should have been $5,000, instead of $1,500.

| BGeneral Damages

Plaintiffs were awarded $10,000 in general damages for Mr. Burrell’s pain and suffering resulting from the July 29, 2002 accident. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Burrell was treated for neck and back pain for 13 months and that $10,000 is insufficient for injuries of this duration. Defendants respond that Mr. Burrell’s injuries were basically resolved within two months of the accident and that the occasional pain he experienced with strenuous activity was consistent with his pre-existing degenerative conditions. Defendants contend that the $10,000 general damage award for Mr. Burrell’s pain and suffering was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.

In his amended reasons for judgment, the trial judge indicated that Mr. Burrell experienced physical pain and suffering from August 8, 2002 to January 10, 2008, which was approximately five months, and returned to the doctor in August 2003. He stated that he believed $10,000 was sufficient for pain and suffering of this duration.

General damages are those which are inherently speculative in nature and cannot be fixed with mathematical certainty, including pain and suffering. Wainwright v. Fontenot 0CM92 (La.10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70, 74. A trial judge’s assessment of the appropriate amount of damages is a determination of fact that is entitled to great deference on review. Id. The primary factors to be considered in assessing quantum for a general damage award are the severity and duration of the injured party’s pain and suffering. Fleniken v. Entergy Corp., 00-1824 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 780 So.2d 1175, 1194, units denied, 01-1268, 01-1305, 01-1317 (La.6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1250-1254. Absent a determination that the trial judge abused his discretion in the award of general damages, a reviewing court should not disturb a trial judge’s award. Wright v. General Aviation Co., 04-772 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/30/04), 889 So.2d 1115, 1119.

|RThe trial judge’s finding that Mr. Bur-rell experienced pain and suffering for approximately five months is reasonable. Dr. Bourgeois indicated that Mr. Burrell’s physical examination was normal in January 10, 2003, so he discharged him from treatment. It was not until six months later, July 2003, that Mr. Burrell returned to Dr. Bourgeois with complaints of neck or back pain. Based on Dr. Bourgeois and Mr. Marino’s records and the entire record before us, we find that the trial judge’s determination that Mr. Burrell’s injuries from this accident resolved within five months was not clearly wrong.

In Marie v. John Deere Ins. Co., 96-1288 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1327, Jennifer Marie suffered neck and back pain as a result of an accident, in which the pickup truck she was driving was struck by an 18-wheeler. She began treatment with a chiropractor/physical therapist approximately three weeks after the accident. The majority of her treatment occurred during the first 4-5 months after the accident, but continued on and off until ten months after the accident. This Court affirmed the trial court’s award of $8,500 to plaintiff for her general damages.

In Stokes v. Stewart, 99-0878 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/00), 774 So.2d 1215, plaintiff suffered a back sprain after the dump truck he was driving was struck by defendant’s vehicle. The medical testimony indicated that his back sprain resolved approximately five months post-accident, but plaintiff stated at trial that he continued to have pain with strenuous activity. The trial court awarded plaintiff $10,000 in general damages, and the award was affirmed by this Court.

In order to overturn a general damages award on appeal, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion in assessing the general damages that should be awarded for the plaintiffs particular injuries under the particular circumstances of the case. Yaun v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260, 1261 (La.1998), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 7L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). Considering the record before us, along with the applicable jurisprudence, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding $10,000 in general damages for Mr. Burrell’s pain and suffering. Accordingly, this ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

Medical Expenses

Plaintiffs were awarded $4,500 for Mr. Burrell’s past medical expenses. They argue that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding this amount, because the evidence reveals that his medical expenses arising from this accident totaled $7,486.24. Defendants respond that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to award the full amount of Mr. Burrell’s medical expenses, because he was released to return to work on October 28, 2002 and any medical expenses incurred after that date were not caused by the accident.

Special damages, such as past medical expenses incurred as a result of an accident, have a ready market value and are susceptible of being established with reasonable mathematical certainty. Wain-might v. Fontenot, supra. To recover past medical expenses, a plaintiff must show, through medical testimony, both the existence of the injury and a causal connection between the injuries and the incident or accident of which plaintiff complains. Wright v. General Aviation Co., supra at 1120. When a plaintiff claims to have incurred medical expenses and those claims are supported by medical bills, these expenses should be awarded, unless there is contradictory evidence or reasonable suspicion that the bills are unrelated to the accident. Brandao v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35,368 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 1039, 1047, unit denied, 02-493 (La.4/26/02), 814 So.2d 558.

Defendants argue that a $4,500 award represents plaintiffs medical expenses from the date of the accident through October 28, 2002 and that the trial judge was under no legal obligation to award any medical expenses incurred after |sthat time. In his amended reasons for judgment, the trial judge found that Mr. Bur-rell incurred “medical expenses totaling approximately four thousand five hundred ($4,500) dollars.” (Emphasis added.) However, as stated above, special damages, such as medical expenses can be established with reasonable mathematical certainty, so an “approximate” award for medical expenses is generally not proper. Even if the trial judge had awarded the exact amount of medical expenses from the date of the accident through October 28, 2002, the record shows that such an award would still be insufficient.

At trial, Dr. Bourgeois testified that he released Mr. Burrell to return to work on October 28, 2002, but he did not find that Mr. Burrell had fully recovered at that time. Rather, at his October 23, 2002 visit, Dr. Bourgeois noted that Mr. Burrell still had some tenderness at the base of his neck, and he did not discharge him from his care until January 10, 2003. Further, in the trial judge’s reasons for judgment, he found that Mr. Burrell suffered injuries to his cervical and lower back and that he “experienced physical pain and suffering from personal injuries from August 08, 2002 to January 10, 2002[sic] (Approximately 5 months.)” Thus, the trial judge’s award of medical expenses was not based on a finding that the injuries caused by the accident had resolved by October 28, 2002. Rather, he specifically found that the pain and suffering caused by the accident lasted through January 10, 2003.

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to medical expenses incurred both before and after January 10, 2003. They argue that Dr. Bourgeois found that the cervical pain Mr. Burrell complained of in July 2003 was probably related to the accident, so the trial judge should have awarded medical expenses incurred in July 2003 and thereafter. However, Dr. Bourgeois released him from care in January 2003, and he testified that Mr. Burrell’s pain in July and August 2003 undoubtedly resulted from some mechanism or maneuver that aggravated his previous injuries.

^^Considering that Mr. Burrell did not seek treatment or complain of neck or back pain for several months after Dr. Bourgeois discharged him, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that his pain and suffering caused by the accident lasted until January 10, 2003, approximately five months. Our review of the record reveals that plaintiffs medical expenses incurred from the date of the accident through January 10, 2003 were $5,881.00, and plaintiff is entitled to recover this amount. Accordingly, we amend the trial judge’s award of medical expenses and increase it to $5,881.00.

Lost wages

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in awarding only $6,500 for Mr. Burrell’s lost wages resulting from the accident, asserting that the evidence supports an award of $14,567.07. Defendants respond that the trial court’s award of $6,500 for lost wages was within his discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Burrell was employed by J. Ray McDermott as a crane operator, earning $16.63 per hour for regular pay, with “time and a half’ for overtime pay. At trial, Mr. Burrell testified that just before the accident, he was working six or seven days a week, 12-14 hours per day, because there was alot of work at that time. He was not able to work from the date of the accident until he was released to work by Dr. Bourgeois on October 28, 2002.

Brad Case, who is also a crane operator for J. Ray McDermott, testified that during the time Mr. Burrell was not working, there was alot of work and the crane operators were working seven days a week, 10-12 hours per day. Based on Mr. Case’s income during the time Mr. Burrell could not work, plaintiffs argue that $14,567.07 in lost wages should have been awarded.

[inThe record shows that in July 2002, Mr. Burrell earned $3,059.93 and that he had not worked more than 10 hours per day on a regular basis. Mr. Case testified that the amount of work he did in July 2002 was consistent with the amount of work he did for the rest of 2002. Defendants argue that Mr. Burrell did not work enough hours in July 2002 to support his claim that he lost over $14,000 in wages during the time that he could not work. They also assert that Mr. Burrell’s income for 2002 was only $8,394.75 less than 2001, so an award of $14,000 in lost wages would be unreasonable. They further argue that Mr. Burrell was paid $2,147.77 from his employer during the time that he was unable to work, so this amount should be deducted from his claim for lost wages.

A plaintiff seeking damages for past lost wages bears the burden of proving lost earnings, as well as the duration of time missed from work due to the accident. Boyette v. United Services Auto. Assn., 00-1918 (La.4/3/01), 783 So.2d 1276, 1279. A trial court has broad discretion in assessing awards for lost wages, but there must be a factual basis in the record for the award. Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-589 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32, 53. Where there is no basis for a precise mathematical calculation of a past lost wage claim, the trial judge can award a reasonable amount of damages without abusing his discretion. Id.

In the present ease, Mr. Burrell was paid an hourly wage and his earnings varied depending on the amount of hours that he worked. It is impossible to determine the exact amount of wages that Mr. Bur-rell would have earned if he had not sustained injuries in this accident. However, considering the documentation regarding Mr. Burrell’s 2001 and 2002 incomes, the number of hours he worked in July 2002, the income he earned in July 2002, and the testimony of Mr. Burrell and his co-worker, Mr. Case, we find that there is a factual basis for the trial judge’s award of $6,500 in lost wages. Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge’s award for lost wages.

| nZ/OSS of Consortium

Plaintiffs argue that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding only $1,500 in damages for Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium caused by the accident. They assert that, due to Mr. Burrell’s injuries, Mrs. Burrell had to perform some of his chores, such as taking out the trash and mowing the lawn, and that Mr. Burrell had sexual problems as well. They contend that $5,000 should have been awarded for Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium. Defendants respond that the $1,500 award was reasonable, because there is little evidence in the record of any loss of consortium damages, and plaintiffs did not specify any significant impact that Mr. Burrell’s injuries had on their marriage. Further, they argue that Mr. Burrell previously sought medical treatment for sexual problems and there is no evidence that any of his sexual problems after the accident were related to the accident.

In general, a claim for loss of consortium involves the elements of loss of love and affection, companionship, material services, financial support, aid and assistance, fidelity, and impairment of sexual relations. O’Connor v. Litchfield, 03-397 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/31/03), 864 So.2d 234, 246. A loss of consortium award is a fact-specific determination to be decided on a case-by-case basis and is disturbed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Snearl v. Mercer, 99-1738 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 780 So.2d 563, 592, writs denied, 01-1319, 01-1320 (La.6/22/01), 794 So.2d 800, 801.

Although Mrs. Burrell may have done some additional chores as a result of Mr. Burrell’s injuries, the evidence reveals that her loss of consortium was not substantial or of lengthy duration. Considering the facts of this particular case, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding only $1,500 for Mrs. Burrell’s loss of consortium. Accordingly, we affirm this award,

h .DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial judge’s awards for general damages, lost wages, and loss of consortium. We amend the trial judge’s award for past medical expenses to increase it to $5,881.00.

AMENDED IN PART, AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

      . He returned to physical therapy on December 2, 2002 and continued through December 11, 2002.

      . At trial, it was stipulated that the proper defendant insurance company was Southern County Mutual Insurance Co., not Northland Insurance Company. The pleadings were amended to name Southern County Mutual Insurance Company as the defendant.

      . We note that plaintiffs stipulated at trial that their claims would not exceed $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Therefore, it is clear that a general damage award of $50,000, along with an award for special damages, would exceed the amount set forth in the stipulation.

      . Mr. Burrell's pharmacy bill for November 22, 2002 was not included in this award, because the record does not show that this bill was related to the accident.