author: PER CURIAM. WELLS, J.,

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO the ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: INDEPENDENT NONPARTISAN COMMISSION TO APPORTION LEGISLATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHICH REPLACES APPORTIONMENT BY LEGISLATURE.
    Nos. SC05-1754, SC05-1895.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 23, 2006.

      Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Joslyn Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Mark Herron and Robert John Telfer, III of Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Committee for Fair Elections, Sponsor.
    Miguel De Grandy and Stephen M. Cody of Miguel De Grandy, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, on behalf of Mario Diaz-Balart, Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; Barry Richard and Glenn T. Burhans, Jr. of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of Charlie Clary, Alfred Lawson, Jr. and Jim Sebesta; and J. Dudley Goodlette of Goodlette, Coleman and Johnson, P.A., Naples, FL, and George N. Meros, Jr. and Allen C. Winsor of GrayRo-binson, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of Allan G. Bense, for Opponents.
   PER CURIAM.

The Attorney General has requested this Court to review a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See art. TV, § 10, art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the proposed amendment does not meet the requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes and should not be included on the ballot for the 2006 general election.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A political committee called Committee for Fair Elections sponsored three initiative petitions to amend the Florida Constitution pursuant to the initiative petition process contained in article XI, section 3 of the Constitution. One of the petitions, entitled “Independent Nonpartisan Commission To Apportion Legislative and Congressional Districts Which Replaces Apportionment By the Legislature” (hereinafter Independent Commission Initiative) seeks to replace the current constitutional provision by which the Florida Legislature apportions the State into senatorial and representative districts with a constitutional provision creating an Apportionment and Districting Commission to accomplish that task. The other two initiative petitions sponsored by the Committee for Fair Elections aré not before this Court for an advisory opinion.

The full text of the proposed amendment provides:

Full Text
Delete current Article III, Section 16, and insert the following:
Section 16. Apportionment and Dis-tricting Commission. — .
(a) APPORTIONMENT AND DIS-TRICTING COMMISSION. In the year following each decennial census or when required by the United States or by court order, a commission shall divide the state into not less than 30 or more than 40 consecutively numbered single-member senatorial districts of convenient contiguous territory, not less than 80 or more than 120 consecutively numbered single-member representative districts of convenient contiguous territory as provided by this constitution or by general law and shall divide the state to create as many congressional districts as there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state. Districts shall be established in accordance with the constitution of this state and of the United States and shall be as nearly equal in population as practicable.
(1) On or before June 1 in the year following each decennial census, or within 15 days after legislative apportionment or congressional districting is required by law or by court order, 15 commissioners shall be certified by the respective appointing authorities to the custodian of records. The president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives each shall select and certify three commissioners. Members of minority parties in the senate shall elect one from their number who shall select and certify three commissioners. Members of minority parties in the house of representatives shall elect one from their number who shall select and certify three commissioners. On or before June 1 of the same year, the chief justice of the supreme court shall select three members of the commission, each of whom shall be a registered voter who for the previous two years was not registered as an elector of either of the two largest political parties in the senate and the house of representatives. The chief justice shall select commissioners from recommendations made by the chief judge of each district court of appeal. Each chief judge shall recommend three individuals who otherwise meet the requirements of this section and who reside in that district. From the individuals recommended by chief judges of the district courts of appeal, the chief justice shall select and certify three commissioners. No two commissioners selected by the chief justice shall reside in the same appellate district.
(2)a. No commissioner shall have served during the four years prior to his or her certification as an elected state official, member of congress, party officer or employee, paid registered lobbyist, legislative or congressional employee, and no commissioner shall be a relative, as defined by law, or an employee of any of the above.
b. As a condition of appointment, each commissioner shall take an oath affirming that the commissioner will not receive compensation as a paid registered lobbyist, or seek elected office in any legislative or congressional district for a period of four years after concluding service as a commissioner.
(3) The commission shall elect one of its members to serve as chair and shall establish its own rules and procedures. All commission actions shall require 10 affirmative votes. Meetings and records of the commission shall be open to the public and public notice of all meetings shall be given.
(4) Within 180 days after the commission is certified to the custodian of records, the commission shall file with the custodian of records its final report, including all required plans.
(5) After the supreme court determines that the required plans are valid, the commission shall be dissolved.
(b)FAILURE OF COMMISSION TO APPORTION; JUDICIAL APPORTIONMENT. If the commission does not timely file its final report including all required plans with the custodian of records, the commission shall be dissolved, and the attorney general shall, within five days, petition the supreme court of the state to make such apportionment. No later than the sixtieth day after the filing of such petition, the supreme court shall file with the custodian of records an order making such apportionment.
(c) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF APPORTIONMENT. Within 15 days after the final report of the commission is filed with the custodian of records, the attorney general shall petition the supreme court to review and determine the validity of the apportionment. The supreme court, in accordance with its rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their views and, within 30 days from filing the petition, shall enter its judgment.
(d) EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN APPORTIONMENT. A judgment of the supreme court determining the apportionment to be valid or ordering judicial apportionment shall be binding upon all citizens of the state. Should the supreme court determine that the apportionment made by the commission is invalid, the commission, within 20 days after the ruling, shall adopt and file with the custodian of records an amended plan that conforms to the judgment of the supreme court. Within five days after the filing of an amended plan, the attorney general shall petition the supreme court of the state to determine the validity of the amended plan, or if the commission has failed to file an amended plan, report that fact to the court.
(e) JUDICIAL APPORTIONMENT. Should the commission fail to file an amended plan or should the supreme court determine the amended plan is invalid, the commission shall be dissolved, and the supreme court shall, not later than 60 days after receiving the petition of the attorney general, file with the custodian of records an order making such apportionment.

The Independent Commission Initiative petition was filed with the Florida Secretary of State as required by Florida law. Pursuant to section 15.21, Florida Statutes (2005), the Secretary of State submitted the amendment to the Florida Attorney General and certified that the petition had obtained the signatures of voters as required by article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. In accordance with the provisions of article IV, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, and section 16.061, Florida Statutes (2005), the Attorney General petitioned this Court for an advisory opinion as to whether the text of the proposed amendment complies with the constitutional requirements of article XI, section 3, and whether the proposed ballot title and summary comply with the statutory requirements of section 101.161(1). The Attorney General also petitioned this Court for an advisory opinion as to whether the financial impact statement complies with the statutory requirements of section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes (2005).

In response to the Attorney General’s request, we issued an order allowing interested parties to file briefs and heard oral arguments on the validity of the initiative petition. The Committee for Fair Elections filed briefs in support of the proposed amendment. Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives Alan Bense, Florida Senate members Charley Clary, Alfred Lawson, and Jim Sebesta, and Florida Congressional Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen filed briefs in opposition to the proposed amendment.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution gives Florida citizens the power to propose a revision or amendment to the Constitution through the initiative process. Article IV, section 10 requires the Attorney General to request an opinion of this Court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated pursuant to this initiative process. In turn, article V, section 3(b)(10), requires this Court to render that advisory opinion. However, the Court’s inquiry in such cases is limited to two issues: (1) whether the amendment violates the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and (2) whether the ballot title and summary violate the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005). See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amendment to Bar Gov’t From Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 890-91 (Fla.2000).

In addressing these two issues, this Court’s inquiry is governed by several general principles. First, we will not address the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendment. 778 So.2d at 891. Second, “[t]he Court must act with extreme care, caution, and restraint before it removes a constitutional amendment from the vote of the people.” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982). Specifically, where citizen initiatives are concerned, the “Court has no authority to inject itself in the process, unless the laws governing the process have been ‘clearly and conclusively’ violated.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d 491, 498-99 (Fla.2002); see also Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d at 891 (“In order for the Court to invalidate a proposed amendment, the record must show that the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective.... ”).

Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides in relevant part:

The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision or amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.

Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const, (emphasis added). Thus, the single-subject requirement is a constitutional requirement for citizen initiative petitions. As this Court has explained, the single-subject limitation exists because the citizen initiative process does not afford the same opportunity for public hearing and debate that accompanies the other constitutional proposal and drafting processes (i.e., constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature, by a constitutional revision commission, or by a constitutional convention). Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1998).

The single-subject provision “is a rule of restraint designed to insulate Florida’s organic law from precipitous and cataclysmic change.” In re Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Fla.1994); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla.1994). The single-subject rule prevents an amendment from (1) engaging in “logrolling” or (2) “substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple branches of state government.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla.2000).

Logrolling

Logrolling is a “practice whereby an amendment is proposed which contains unrelated provisions, some of which electors might wish to support, in order to get an otherwise disfavored provision passed.” Id. (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla.1994)). In addressing the issue of logrolling, this Court determines whether the amendment manifests a “logical and natural oneness of purpose.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla.'s Amendment to Reduce Class Size, 816 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla.2002) (quoting Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984)). A proposed amendment meets this test when it “may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme. Unity of object and plan is the universal test.” Fine, 448 So.2d at 990 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 154 Fla. 881, 19 So.2d 318, 320 (1944)).

In Save Our Everglades, this Court concluded that an initiative that created a trust to be funded by the sugar industry to restore the Everglades constituted logrolling because it encompassed the two objectives of restoring the Everglades, which was “politically fashionable,” and compelling the sugar industry to fund the restoration, which was “more problematic.” 636 So.2d at 1341. The Court explained that “[m]any voters sympathetic to restoring the Everglades might be antithetical to forcing the sugar industry to pay for the cleanup by itself, and yet those voters would be compelled to choose all or nothing.” Id. Similarly, the Court concluded that the ballot initiative at issue in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563 (Fla.1998), constituted logrolling because it combined two distinct subjects by banning limitations on health care provider choices imposed by law and by prohibiting private parties from entering into contracts that would limit health care provider choice. The amendment at issue in that case would have forced a voter who might favor or oppose one aspect of the ballot initiative to vote on the health care provider issue in an “all or nothing” manner. Id. at 566.

The sponsor asserts that the Independent Commission Initiative does not constitute logrolling because it creates a fifteen-member independent commission to replace the Legislature in the process of apportioning legislative and congressional districts in the year following each decennial census. The sponsor contends that all of the provisions of the proposed amendment are directly related to that single subject in that the provisions explain the composition of the redistricting commission, the requirements for serving as a commissioner, and the judicial mechanism for reviewing reapportionment plans. The opponents contend that the proposed amendment engages in logrolling because it (1) creates the new redistricting commission while also establishing new standards for districts by requiring them to be single-member districts and to be of convenient contiguous territory; (2) it alters the way state legislative and congressional districts are created; and (3) it adds a new qualification for legislators by requiring commission members to take an oath that they will not seek office as a state legislator or member of Congress for four years after serving on the redistricting commission.

We agree with the opponents that the proposed amendment does indeed encompass two separate subjects. Not only would the proposed amendment create a new redistricting commission, but it would also change the standards applicable to the districts that are created by the commission. Paragraph (a) of the proposed amendment would require the commission to divide the state into “single-member ... districts of convenient contiguous territory.” The current constitutional provision provides that the districts may be “of either contiguous, overlapping, or identical territory.” Art. Ill, § 16(a), Fla. Const. This “identical territory” provision permits the creation of multi-member districts. See In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session, 263 So.2d 797, 806-07 (Fla.1972) (rejecting challenges to multi-member districts in the legislative apportionment plan and citing the proceedings of the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission in 1966 which defeated a proposed amendment to change this language in article III, section 16 and thereby require single-member districts).

The other provisions of the proposed amendment exhibit “a natural relation and connection as component parts or aspects of’ the new method proposed for apportionment. These provisions explain the composition of the commission, specify the apportionment process, and provide for judicial apportionment if the commission fails to complete its duty. However, the creation of new standards to be used in apportioning the districts is not a component part of this apportionment plan and results in logrolling. A voter who advocates apportionment by a redistricting commission may not necessarily agree with the change in the standards for drawing the legislative and congressional districts. Conversely, a voter who approves the change in district standards may not want to change from the legislative apportionment process currently in place. Thus, a voter would be forced to vote in the “all or nothing” fashion that the single subject requirement safeguards against. Thus, we conclude that the proposed amendment does not comply with this constitutional requirement.

Altering or Performing the Functions of Multiple Branches of Government

In assessing the second aspect of the single-subject requirement, the Court “must consider whether the proposal affects separate functions of government and how the proposal affects other provisions of the constitution.” In re Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen.—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018, 1020 (Fla.1994). However, the fact that an amendment affects multiple functions of government does not automatically invalidate a citizen’s initiative. See High Speed Monorail, 769 So.2d at 367. As this Court has explained:

We recognize that the petition, if passed, could affect multiple areas of government. In fact, we find it difficult to conceive of a constitutional amendment that would not affect other aspects of government to some extent. However, this Court has held that a proposed amendment can meet the single-subject requirement even though it affects multiple branches of government.

Limited Casinos, 644 So.2d at 74. “A proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail; rather, it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the single-subject test.” Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d at 1353-54.

The opponents contend that the proposed amendment affects multiple branches of government because (1) the Legislature will be completely removed from both congressional redistricting and legislative reapportionment; (2) the Governor will no longer have approval or veto power over congressional redistricting; and (3) the judiciary will be given legislative power through the Chief Justice’s authority to appoint commissioners. There is no question that the amendment will substantially change the responsibilities and power of the Legislature in regard to congressional redistrieting and legislative reapportionment. However, the removal of the Governor’s approval or veto power over congressional redistricting is not a substantial impact on the executive branch. If we were to conclude otherwise, then the initiative process could never be used to change any aspect of the Legislature’s power to enact legislation because the Governor’s veto power would necessarily be involved. This would severely hamper the electorate’s ability to use the initiative process to amend or revise the Florida Constitution. Finally, the effect on the judiciary of nominating and appointing three members to the commission is neither cataclysmic nor precipitous. As this Court noted in Limited Casinos, it is “difficult to conceive of a constitutional amendment which would not affect other aspects of government to some extent.” 644 So.2d at 74. A proposal may affect multiple branches of government, as does the instant proposal, so long as it does not substantially alter or perform the functions of these branches. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Fla.1996). Thus, we find no violation of this aspect of the single-subject requirement.

Ballot Title and Summary

When a constitutional amendment is submitted for vote by the electorate, a title and summary of the amendment must appear on the ballot. Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which sets forth the statutory requirements for the title and summary, is a “codification of the accuracy requirement implicit in article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amendment of Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 902 So.2d 763, 770 (Fla.2005). This accuracy requirement in article XI, section 5, functions as a kind of “truth in packaging” law for the ballot. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 13 (Fla.2000). As explained by this Court,

The citizen initiative constitutional amendment process relies on an accurate, objective ballot summary for its legitimacy. Voters deciding whether to approve a proposed amendment to our constitution never see the actual text of the proposed amendment. They vote based only on the ballot title and the summary. Therefore, an accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed amendment is the sine qua non of the citizen-driven process of amending our constitution.

Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d 646, 653-54 (Fla.2004) (citation omitted).

Section 101.161(1) provides in relevant part:

Whenever a constitutional amendment ... is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment ... shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot.... [T]he substance of the amendment ... shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure .... The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.

(Emphasis added.) This Court has stated “that the ballot [must] be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot.” Askew v. Fire stone, 421 So.2d 151, 155 (Fla.1982) (emphasis removed) (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla.1954)). While the ballot title and summary must state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure, they need not explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment. Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So.2d 1204, 1206 (Fla.1986). The ballot must, however, give the voter fair notice of the decision he or she must make. Askew, 421 So.2d at 155. The purpose of section 101.161 is to ensure that voters are advised of the amendment’s true meaning. In assessing the ballot title and summary, this Court should ask two questions, first, whether the ballot title and summary “fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment,” and second, “whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d at 651 (quoting Right to Treatment & Rehab., 818 So.2d at 497, and Right to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d at 566).

The ballot title and summary of the proposed amendment provide:

Title
INDEPENDENT NONPARTISAN COMMISSION TO APPORTION LEGISLATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHICH REPLACES APPORTIONMENT BY LEGISLATURE
Summary
Creates fifteen member commission replacing legislature to apportion single-member legislative and congressional districts in the year following each decennial census. Establishes non-partisan method of appointment to commission. Disqualifies certain persons for membership to avoid partiality. Limits commission members from seeking office under plan for four years after service on commission. Requires ten votes for commission action. Requires Florida Supreme Court to apportion districts if commission fails to file a valid plan.

The opponents argue that the ballot title is misleading in its use of the terms “independent” and “nonpartisan” to describe the commission. The opponents also assert that these terms amount to improper editorializing. This Court has emphasized that the “ballot summary should tell the voter the legal effect of the amendment, and no more.” Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d at 653 (quoting Evans v. Firestone, 457 So.2d 1351, 1355 (Fla.1984)). However, we have approved ballot summaries containing public policy statements that were also included in the proposed amendment. See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Limiting Cruel & Inhumane Confinement of Pigs During Pregnancy, 815 So.2d 597, 597 (Fla.2002) (approving ballot summary that provided that “[i]nhumane treatment of animals is a concern of Florida citizens”); High Speed Monorail, 769 So.2d at 368 (approving ballot summary stating that the amendment’s purpose was to “reduce traffic and increase travel alternatives”).

The sponsor asserts that the terms are neither misleading nor editorializing, but an accurate statement of the nature of the redistricting commission. The sponsor contends that both the commission and its method of creation fall within the definition of nonpartisan because the commission members will not be influenced by or associated with one political party, will not be subject to oversight or control by the Legislature, legislative leadership or any political party, and will not be required to seek election or reelection to the commission.

While the commission itself may operate in an independent, nonpartisan fashion, the method of selecting the commission members is decidedly partisan. We find the ballot summary to be misleading in this regard. The ballot summary provides that the amendment “[e]stablishes [a] non-partisan method of appointment to [the] commission.” However, twelve of the fifteen commission members would be appointed by partisans because the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the President of the Florida Senate, and a minority leader from each house would each appoint three commissioners. In fact, the proposed amendment only requires that the three members selected by the Chief Justice of this Court be nonpartisan. These three commissioners appointed by the Chief Justice each must be “a registered voter who for the previous two years was not registered as an elector of either of the two largest political parties in the senate and the house of representatives.” Thus, the ballot summary is misleading as to the method by which the commissioners would be chosen.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the proposed amendment does not comply with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and that the ballot summary is misleading and does not comply with section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005). Accordingly, we strike the proposal from the ballot. Because the proposed amendment will not be placed on the ballot, it is unnecessary to address the Financial Impact Statement.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents.

WELLS, J.,

concurring specially.

I concur in the majority opinion.

I write to state my view that joining congressional districting and legislative districting in the same initiative does not meet the single-subject requirement.

CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . Article XI, section 3 gives Florida citizens the power to revise or amend the Florida Constitution through the citizen initiative process.

      . Section 101.161, Florida Statutes (2005), governs the placement of constitutional initiatives and referenda on the ballot.

      . See art. Ill, § 16, Fla. Const.

      . The Secretary of State determined that a petition to establish additional standards for legislative and congressional districts exceeded the statutory word limitation set forth in section 101.161. Thus, that petition was never submitted to the Attorney General as specified in section 15.21, Florida Statutes (2005). The sponsors voluntarily dismissed this Court’s advisory review of a second petition, setting forth an implementation schedule for redistricting in 2007 should the voters approve the Independent Commission Initiative.

      . Section 100.371(3), Florida Statutes (2005), requires the sponsor of an initiative amendment to register as a political committee and submit the text of the proposed amendment to the Secretary of State for approval of the form. Section 101.161(2), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that the substance and ballot title of a proposed initiative amendment must be prepared by the sponsor and approved by the Secretary of State.

      . Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that the petition containing the proposed revision or amendment must be
      signed by a number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of such districts respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen.

      .Section 100.371(6) requires the Financial Impact Estimating Conference to complete an analysis and financial impact statement of the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative. If the initiative is approved for placement on the ballot, this financial impact statement is placed on the ballot.

      . The opponents of the proposed amendment have asked this Court to address the propriety of the form of the signature petitions, which were combined into a unified petition subsequent to the approval of the text by the Secretary of State. We decline to do so as this issue can be more appropriately addressed in the circuit court. Cf. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So.2d 1124, 1131-32 (Fla.1996) (addressing challenge to unified petition form that was initiated by opponents in declaratory judgment action in circuit court).

      . Article XI, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution provides:
      A proposed amendment or revision of this constitution, or any part of it, by initiative shall be submitted to the electors at the general election provided the initiative petition is filed with the custodian of state records no later than February 1 of the year in which the general election is held.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LEWIS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE FLORIDA MARRIAGE PROTECTION AMENDMENT.
    Nos. SC05-1563, SC05-1831.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 23, 2006.

      Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Mathew D. Staver and Anita L. Staver of Liberty Counsel, Maitland, FL, Erik W. Stanley, Rena M. Lindevaldsen and Mary E. McAlister of Liberty Counsel, Lynch-burg, VA, for Florida4Marriage.org, Sponsors.
    Leslie Cooper, New York, NY, Randall C. Marshall, Miami, FL, Rebecca Harrison Steele, Tampa, FL, and Karen Marie Doering, St. Petersburg, FL, on behalf of Richard Nolan and Robert Pingpank, Robert Sullivan and Jon Durre, Dee Graham and Signa Quandt, Richard Rogers and Bill Mullins, Teresa Ardines and Melissa Bruck, Juan Talavera and Jeffrey Ronci, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees — AFL-CIO, the ACLU of Florida, and Equality Florida, for Opponents.
   LEWIS, J.

The Attorney General has requested that we review the text of a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution to determine compliance with article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and to consider whether the proposed ballot title and summary are within the requirements of section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes (2005). In addition, the Attorney General has requested that we review the corresponding Financial Impact Statement to evaluate compliance with section 100.371 of the Florida Statutes (2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. IV, § 10, art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND BALLOT SUMMARY

Florida4Marriage.org, a Florida volunteer organization, has invoked the citizen initiative process of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution in proposing a constitutional amendment directed to defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman while prohibiting any other legal union that is treated as marriage, or the substantial equivalent thereof, from being valid or recognized in Florida. The full text of the proposed amendment states:

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA THAT:
A new section for Article I is hereby created to add the following: Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.

The ballot title for the proposed initiative is:

Florida Marriage Protection Amendment.

The proposed summary to be placed on the ballot for this amendment reads:

This amendment protects marriage as the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife and provides that no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.

The sponsor of the amendment, Flori-da4Marriage.org, has submitted a brief in support of the proposed amendment. The ACLU Foundation and the ACLU Foundation of Florida have each submitted briefs in opposition. Two very limited issues are now before this Court for consideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In our decision in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 778 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000), we reiterated the standard of review applicable to initiative petition cases:

The Court’s inquiry, when determining the validity of initiative petitions, is limited to two legal issues: whether the petition satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, and whether the ballot titles and summaries are printed in clear and unambiguous language pursuant to section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1999).

Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Educ., 778 So.2d at 890. When addressing these two limited issues, our inquiry is governed by several general principles. First, we will not address the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendment. Id. at 891. Second, we have recognized that we “must act with extreme care, caution, and restraint before [we] remove[] a constitutional amendment from the vote of the people.” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982). In elaborating on this latter principle, we have noted that “the Court has no authority to inject itself in the process, unless the laws governing the process have been ‘clearly and conclusively’ violated.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d 491, 498-99 (Fla.2002). It is within the framework of these fundamental principles that we review this proposed amendment and ballot language.

SINGLE SUBJECT REQUIREMENT

Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part:

The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision or amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith.

Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. (emphasis supplied). This constitutional limitation exists, at least in part, because the citizen initiative process does not afford the same opportunity for hearing and public debate that may accompany the other forms of constitutional proposal and drafting processes (i.e., proposal by the Legislature, a constitutional revision commission, and a constitutional convention). See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1998). A proposed amendment must manifest “a logical and natural oneness of purpose” to accomplish the purpose of article XI, section 3. Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984). We have held that this single subject limitation serves two distinct purposes: “(1) it prevents ‘logrolling,’ a practice that combines separate issues into a single proposal to secure passage of an unpopular issue; and (2) it ‘prevents] a single constitutional amendment from substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple aspects of government.’” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re the Med. Liab. Claimant’s Comp. Amendment, 880 So.2d 675, 677 (Fla.2004) (quoting Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Fla. Transp. Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway or Magnetic Levitation Sys., 769 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla.2000)).

Logrolling

In addressing the “logrolling” aspect of the single-subject rule we have stated that “[a] proposed amendment meets this test when it ‘may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme. Unity of object and plan is the universal test.’” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d 646, 649 (Fla.2004) (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 154 Fla. 881, 19 So.2d 318, 320 (1944)). The opponents here contend that the proposed amendment presents a classic example of the prohibited practice of logrolling because this proposal combines separate subjects in a single amendment. Specifically, the opponents assert that the amendment impermissibly requires the voters to accept part of the proposed amendment which polling has shown a majority of voters oppose — prohibiting alternative forms of legal recognition and protection for relationships of same-sex couples. — to obtain a change which a majority has been shown to favor — limiting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples. In response, the sponsor of the proposed amendment contends that the amendment only addresses the singular objective of preserving marriage by clarifying that marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife and that no other legal unions that are treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof will be recognized as marriage in Florida.

We are persuaded by the argument of the sponsor that no constitutional violation exists with the proposed amendment. The particular language challenged by the opponents is found in the second clause of the proposed amendment and reads: “[N]o other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.” The opponents claim that this language is beyond the subject of the definition of marriage by including a bar to legal unions which provide the benefits and obligations of marriage although under a different name and, therefore, this proposed amendment improperly logrolls these legal unions and the definition of marriage into the same amendment. When the phrase challenged by the opponents is read in context and connection with the proposed amendment as a whole, it is clear that it “may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme” — the restriction of the exclusive rights and obligations traditionally associated with marriage to legal unions consisting of one man and one woman as husband and wife. Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d at 649. The proposed amendment does not impermissibly force voters to approve a portion of the proposal which they oppose to obtain a change which they support. Rather, the voter is merely being asked to vote on the singular subject of whether the concept of marriage and the rights and obligations traditionally embodied therein should be limited to the union of one man and one woman. The plain language of the proposed amendment is clear that the legal union of a same-sex couple that is not the “substantial equivalent” of marriage is not within the ambit of this constitutional provision. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed amendment does not violate the single-subject rule by engaging in impermissible logrolling.

Altering or Performing the Functions of Multiple Branches of Government

The analysis to be applied when determining whether a proposed amendment alters or performs the functions of multiple branches of government is a functional rather than a locational analysis. See Fine, 448 So.2d at 990. Further clarifying this analysis, it must be noted that “[a] proposal that affects several branches of government will not automatically fail; rather, it is when a proposal substantially alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates the single-subject test.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So.2d at 1353-54. This portion of the single-subject rule operates to prevent “precipitous and cataclysmic change in state government.” Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d at 495. Although neither opponent of this proposed amendment has advanced an argument that it violates this portion of the single-subject analysis, we must complete our constitutional responsibility. We conclude that this proposed amendment would not operate to substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple branches of government.

Initially, a comparison of the proposed amendment with current law in section 741.212 of the Florida Statutes (2005), demonstrates that the amendment essentially tracks the language of the current statutory provision. Section 741.212, in pertinent part, reads:

(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, ... or relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction, ... are not recognized for any purpose in this state.
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any state, territory, possession, or tribe of the United States or of any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location respecting either a marriage or relationship not recognized under subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.
(3)For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the term “spouse” applies only to a member of such a union.

§ 741.212, Fla. Stat. (2005). The proposed amendment is essentially inserting this statutory scheme into the constitution with language substantially similar to the statutory provision itself. Therefore, it cannot be said that the proposed amendment would substantially alter the function of any branch of government as the State is currently applying section 741.212. Although the proposed amendment may perform a function of the Legislature by implementing a public policy decision of statewide significance, it most certainly would not act to perform the functions of any other branch of government and, therefore, would not impermissibly alter or perform the function of multiple branches of government.

The foregoing analysis causes us to conclude that the proposed amendment satisfies the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.

REVIEW OF BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY

Section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes (2005), provides the requirements for the ballot title and summary of proposed constitutional amendments. The statutory provision requires, in pertinent part:

Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot.... Except for amendments and ballot language proposed by joint resolution, the substance of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure .... The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.

§ 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

This Court has explained this statutory provision, noting:

“[Sjection 101.161 requires that the ballot title and summary for a proposed constitutional amendment state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure.” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 154-55 (Fla.1982). This is so that the voter will have notice of the issue contained in the amendment, will not be misled as to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot. Id. at 155. However, “[i]t is not necessary to explain every ramification of a proposed amendment, only the chief purpose.” Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So.2d 1204, 1206 (Fla.1986).

In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen.—Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d 1336, 1341 (Fla.1994). The proper analysis to assess whether a proposed amendment’s ballot title and summary meet this requirement focuses on two questions: (1) whether the ballot title and summary, in clear and unambiguous language, fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment; and (2) whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public. See Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d at 651-52 (citing Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So.2d at 498-99; Advisory Opinion to Attorney Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla.1998)).

The opponents of this proposed amendment assert that reference to “no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof’ in the summary fails to satisfy the “clear and unambiguous” requirement because no definition is given as to what constitutes the “substantial equivalent” of marriage. The opponents rely upon the decisions of this Court in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re People’s Property Rights Amendments, 699 So.2d 1304 (Fla.1997), and Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 778 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000), as support for the position. However, we conclude that these cases relied upon by the opponents are clearly distinguishable and are not controlling.

In Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, we addressed a proposed amendment that purported to bar differential treatment based on race, color, ethnicity, and national origin in the areas of public education, employment, and contracting. See id. at 889. In our analysis, we recognized that the terminology employed in the ballot title and summary was different from that appearing in the actual text of the proposed amendment. See id. at 897. We noted that the ballot title and summary referred to “people,” whereas the text of the proposed amendment referred to “persons.” See id. at 896. We held that “the divergent terminology ereate[d] a discrepancy as to whether the proposed amendments’ proscriptions applied] to corporations” due to the differing legal definitions of the respective terms. Id. at 897. In addition, the ballot summaries did not define the terms “otherwise lawful classification,” or “bona fide qualifications based on sex.” See id. at 898-99. As a result, we held that the lack of a fundamental definition for these multiple legal phrases would not adequately inform voters of the legal significance and the full effect of the proposed amendment. See id. at 899. Given our determination that the proposed amendment failed to adequately define terms and utilized inconsistent terminology, we concluded that the proposed amendment should not be placed on the ballot. See id. at 899-900.

The ballot language we consider here presents a different scenario from that addressed in Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education. Initially, the ballot title and summary being reviewed today do not impermissibly employ terminology divergent from that contained in the text of the actual proposed amendment. A comparison of the language of this ballot title and summary with the actual proposed amendment reveals that the language submitted for placement on the ballot contains language that is essentially identical to that found in the text of the actual amendment. Moreover, the terminology challenged by the opponents — “marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof’ — is not within the field of undefined legal phrases with which the Court was concerned in Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education. The terminology here, “substantial equivalent,” is a phrase which is used both in the proposed amendment and the summary, that is frequently used and understood by the common voter, and which does not require special training in the legal profession to comprehend its meaning. The plain meaning of these words, according to dictionary definition, is clear that the chief purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that unions between same-sex couples that are treated virtually identically to marriage will not be recognized in Florida. See Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1174, 393 (10th ed. 1998) (“Substantial ...: la: consisting of or relating to substance”; “Equivalent ... 3: corresponding or virtually identical”). Based on these clear distinctions, we conclude that our decision in Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education is inapplicable to this proposed amendment and, therefore, does not support the proposition that it cannot be placed on the ballot.

Our decision in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights is also inapposite. In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights, the Attorney General requested that we review three proposed amendments to ensure compliance with applicable law. See 699 So.2d at 1306. After reviewing all three proposed amendments, we determined that none satisfied the requirements of section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes, and concluded that all three should not appear on the ballot. See id. at 1312. In so holding, we noted that the divergence in terminology between the ballot title and summary in one of the amendments would be confusing to the voter. See id. at 1308. Additionally, we were concerned that the legal phrases “common law nuisance,” “loss in fair market value,” and “exemption” were not defined, and that this lack of definition created uncertainty as to the actual effect of the proposed amendments. Id. at 1309, 1312. Moreover, we noted that the language of one of the amendments submitted for review was misleading because its definition of a new tax as “increases in tax rates ... d[id] not distinguish between an increase in ... money paid ... or the actual [tax] rate.” Id. at 1311.

The ballot title and summary before us today do not suffer from the same deficiencies as those we reviewed in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights, and, therefore, our holding therein does not control the outcome of this action. Unlike the ballot summaries in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights, there is no divergence in terminology either between the ballot title and summary, or between the ballot summary and the language of the actual amendment. In addition, the type of undefined legal terminology with which we were concerned in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights is simply not present in this ballot title and summary. The factors presented in this proposed amendment are distinguishable from those which were before the Court in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Property Rights and Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, and, therefore, those decisions are not controlling in the present case.

The ballot title and summary here are more analogous to those we approved in our decision in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re the Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, 880 So.2d 675 (Fla.2004). In Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, we reviewed the propriety of a ballot title and summary for a proposed amendment that purported to limit contingency fees available in medical malpractice actions. See id. at 676. In holding that the proposed amendment satisfied the applicable requirements of the law, we noted that there was no divergence in terminology between the summary and amendment, and that, similar to the summary and amendment here, the summary “c[ame] very close to reiterating the briefly worded amendment.” Id. at 679. Further, in Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, we held that the lack of a definition of the term “medical liability” in the phrase “claim for medical liability” was not fatal because the “issue as to the precise meaning of this term [wa]s better left to subsequent litigation, should the amendment pass.” Id. Finally, the language of the ballot title and summary here adequately inform the voter of the proposed amendment’s chief purpose — -limiting marriage to the legal union of only one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ballot title and summary for this proposed amendment fulfill the requirement of informing the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment in a clear and unambiguous manner.

In addition to the above analysis, we have also cautioned that a ballot title and summary should be reviewed to ensure that they “tell the voter the legal effect of the amendment, and no more.” Evans v. Firestone, 457 So.2d 1351, 1355 (Fla.1984). Political rhetoric in a ballot title and summary that invites an emotional response from voters as opposed to providing only a synopsis of a proposed amendment is improper. See Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d at 653-54; Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d at 1341-42. The opponents of the proposed amendment assert that use of the terms “protect” and “protection” in the ballot title and summary constitutes political rhetoric and, therefore, misleads the voter by inviting an emotional response in violation of these principles. However, contrary to this assertion, a review of the relevant case law demonstrates that the instant ballot title and summary do not constitute impermissible political or emotional rhetoric.

The opponents direct attention to our decision in Save Our Everglades, 636 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1994), as support for the contention that the current ballot title and summary constitute political rhetoric. In Save Our Everglades, we concluded that the ballot title and summary at issue did not satisfy the requirements of section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes. See id. at 1341-42. In reaching this conclusion, we held that the ballot title, “Save Our Everglades,” misled the voter because 'it implied that “the Everglades is lost, or in danger of being lost, to the citizens of our State, and needs to be ‘saved’ ” while “nothing in the text of the proposed amendment hints at this peril.” Id. at 1341. We noted that the text of the actual amendment stated that the purpose of the amendment was to “restore” the Everglades and did not include the term “save.” See id. Therefore, we determined that the emotional language included in the ballot title could mislead voters as to the contents and purpose of the amendment. See id. In addition, we held the summary to be misleading because it created the impression that entities other than the sugarcane industry would be sharing the cleanup expense while the amendment’s text did not support that conclusion. See id.

Decisions from this Court subsequent to Save Our Everglades demonstrate that our holding there has no application in the present matter. In Advisory Opinion to Attorney General re Protect People From the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke by Prohibiting Workplace Smoking, 814 So.2d 415 (Fla.2002), we reviewed the following ballot title and summary:

Ballot - title: Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second Hand Tobacco Smoke by Prohibiting Workplace Smoking.
Ballot summary: To protect people from the health hazards of second-hand tobacco smoke, this amendment prohibits tobacco smoking in enclosed indoor workplaces. Allows exceptions for private residences except when they are being used to provide commercial child care, adult care or health care. AJso allows exceptions for retail tobacco shops, designated smoking guest rooms at hotels, and other public lodging establishments, and standalone bars. Provides definitions, and requires the legislature to promptly implement this amendment.

Id. at 416. In rejecting the assertion that the ballot title and summary there' contained terms constituting impermissible political rhetoric, we noted that the title and summary did “not rise to a comparable level of political and emotional language and subjective evaluation as the language we rejected in Save Our Everglades.” Workplace Smoking, 814 So.2d at 420. In so holding, we reasoned that the proposal' did not utilize emotional terms such as “save” in the ballot title and summary while employing more docile terminology such as “restore” in'the amendment text. See id. at 421. We specifically addressed use of the term “protect” in the ballot title and summary, and rejected the challenger’s analogy to the use of the term “save” that was rejected in Save Our Everglades, noting that the “use of the term ‘protect’ d[id] not constitute impermissible political rhetoric or the adjudication of a fact.” Workplace Smoking, 814 So.2d at 421. We recognized that we had approved prior ballot titles and summaries containing the term “protect,” and stated that we were “unable to discern the logic as to how the application of essentially the same term” could be acceptable in one case and unacceptable in -another. Id.; see also Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So.2d 667 (Fla.2004) (holding that the use of the term “protection” in the ballot title did not constitute impermissible political or emotional rhetoric).

Our analysis in the Workplace Smoking and Medical Malpractice decisions is directly applicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term “protect” is “to maintain the status or integrity of.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment — preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they “clearly and conclusively defective.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (holding that language in a citizen initiative must be clearly and conclusively defective to justify removal of the measure from the ballot).

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT

Article XI, section five of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part:

(c) The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.

Art. XI, § 5(c), Fla. Const. Pursuant to this constitutional section, the Legislature has enacted section 100.371(6), which provides in relevant part:

(6)(a) ... [T]he Financial Impact Estimating Conference shall complete an analysis and financial impact statement to be placed on the ballot of the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues or costs to state or local governments resulting from the proposed initiative ....
3.... Any financial impact statement that a court finds not to be in accordance with this section shall be remanded solely to the Financial Impact Estimating Conference for redrafting. The Financial. Impact Estimating Conference shall redraft the financial impact statement within 15 days.
4. If the members of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference are unable to agree on the statement required by this subsection, or if the Supreme Court has rejected the initial submission ... and no redraft has been approved by the Supreme Court by 5 p.m. on the 75th day before the election, the following statement shall appear on the ballot pursuant to s. 101.161(1): “The financial impact of this measure, if any, cannot be reasonably determined at this time.”

§ 100.371(6)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).

The financial impact statement (“FIS”) submitted for the “Florida Marriage Protection Amendment” reads as follows:

The direct financial impact this amendment will have on state and local government revenues and expenditures cannot be determined, but is expected to be minor.

We conclude that the language of the proposed FIS does not violate the applicable statutory and constitutional requirements and, therefore, approve its placement on the ballot. Although the FIS does not state with particularity any increase or decrease in revenues or costs to state or local government that the proposed amendment might have, it does make it clear that the financial impact “cannot be determined, but is expected to be minor.”

Subsection (6)(b)(4) of section 100.371 of the Florida Statutes states that if a FIS cannot be agreed upon by the Financial Impact Estimating Conference (“FIEC”), or if this Court has rejected an FIS and no redraft has been submitted, then the following language is to be place on the ballot: “The financial impact of this measure, if any, cannot be determined at this time.” § 100.371(6)(b)(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The FIS here essentially tracks this statutory language by informing the voter that the financial impact of this proposed amendment cannot be determined. The FIS then goes further by informing the voter that although the impact cannot be determined, any impact that may occur is expected to be minor. The language of the proposed FIS does not attempt to editorialize or sway the voter by the inclusion of emotional or political rhetoric. Rather, the FIS informs the voter in plain language that the FIEC was unable to determine the financial impact — one result that is contemplated by the statutory scheme regulating this required statement in Florida. Moreover, a review of the financial information statement accompanying the FIS, which is available to voters at each polling location, at the main office of the supervisor of elections, and on the internet, see § 100.371(6)(d)(4)-(5), Fla. Stat. (2005), reveals that the FIEC clearly complied with section 100.371 of the Florida Statutes in completing its analysis of the financial impact of the proposed amendment. The fact that the FIEC is unable to discern the actual financial impact does not render a proposed FIS in violation of applicable law when those laws in fact contemplate such a scenario. See § 100.371(6)(b)(4), Fla. Stat. (2005).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the initiative petition and proposed ballot title and summary for the “Florida Marriage Protection Amendment” meet the legal requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and section 101.161(1) of the Florida Statutes (2005). We therefore approve the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. In addition, we hold that the proposed FIS comports with applicable law and, therefore, approve the FIS as submitted for placement on the ballot. We note, however, that no other issues are being addressed here and this opinion should not be construed as expressing either favor for or opposition to the proposed amendment.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Wilmann RENAUD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC05-1005.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 23, 2006.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Margaret Good-Earnest and Jeffrey Go-lant, Assistant Public Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Melanie Dale Surber and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Renaud v. State, 901 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal certifying conflict with the decisions in Fitzpatrick v. State, 863 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), and Berthiaume v. State, 864 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, we have now determined that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. A requirement for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is “that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to ... relief.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a). This rule does not contemplate the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. In the instant matter there was no increase in a sentence entered subsequent to the date the oral sentence was imposed and the date the defendant had begun serving the sentence which would implicate a facial double jeopardy violation or illegal sentence apparent on the face of the record. The oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order were imposed at the same hearing. Therefore, Renaud’s claim is not cognizable under a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence on the face of the record. When the alleged illegality of the sentence is not apparent on the face of the record, a rule 3.850 motion is the only available remedy. Unlike the present case, in both Fitzpatrick and Berthiaume the courts considered facial double jeopardy and illegal sentence implications under the facts presented.

Renaud failed to present this substantive issue in his initial rule 3.850 motion. Therefore, the Fourth District was correct in dismissing Renaud’s claim as a successive rule 3.850 motion which is procedurally barred. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed due to no actual conflict.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents.