author: ROBERTS, Justice. Per Curiam. TERRELL, Chief Justice HOBSON, Justice THOMAS, Justice DREW, Justice

text:
    The STATE of Florida ex rel. Virgil D. HAWKINS, Relator, v. BOARD OF CONTROL, a body corporate, et al., Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.
    March 8, 1957.

      Horace E. Hill, Daytona Beach, and Robert L. Carter, New York City, for relator.
    Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Ralph E. Odum, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John J. Blair, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
   ROBERTS, Justice.

This litigation is concerned with the rights of the relator, a Negro, to be admitted to the University of Florida Law School, provided he meets the entrance requirements applicable to all students. The history of the litigation is set forth in State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 20, our latest decision in the controversy, referred to hereafter as the “1955 decision.”

Our 1955 decision was entered in response to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, May 1954, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783, 98 L.Ed. 1112, directing this court to reconsider its decision in State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 162 (the “1952 decision” hereafter), “in the light of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, etc. [347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 833] and conditions that now prevail.” Since this court has held in a long line of decisions that it is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court “construing the meaning and effect of acts of Congress and those provisions of the national Constitution which restrict the powers of the states,” Miami Home Milk Producers Ass’n v. Milk Control Board, 1936, 124 Fla. 797, 169 So. 541, 544, we held in our 1955 decision, under the authority of Brown v. Board of Education, etc., supra, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, that the relator could not be denied admission to the University of Florida Law School solely because of his race. In the exercise of our discretion, however, we decided to withhold the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus in the cause, pending a subsequent determination of law and fact as to the time when the relator should be admitted to that institution; and the Honorable John A. H. Murphree, Resident Circuit Judge of the circuit in which the University is located, was appointed as the commissioner of this court to take testimony on behalf of the relator and the respondents, members of the Board of Control, relating to the factual issue. Our decision in this respect was based on two considerations, one a federal and the other a state ground: (1) the application to the controversy of the formula set out in the so-called “implementation decision,” Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 295, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083; and (2) the exercise of our traditional power as a state court to decline to issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus if to do so would tend to work a serious public mischief. City of Safety Harbor v. State, 1939, 136 Fla. 636, 187 So. 173, State ex rel. Carson v. Bateman, 131 Fla. 625, 180 So. 22; State ex rel. Gibson v. City of Lakeland, 126 Fla. 342, 171 So. 227; State ex rel. Bottome v. City of St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233, 170 So. 730.

The relator then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court to review our 1955 decision on the ground that the decision in the Brown case, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, did not apply to “State junior colleges, colleges, graduate and professional schools.” The court disposed of this petition by a short but not entirely unambiguous opinion, dated March 12, 1956, 350 U.S. 413, 76 S.Ct. 464, 100 L.Ed. 486, reading as follows:

Per Curiam.

“The petition for certiorari is denied.
“On May 24, 1954, we issued a mandate in this case to the Suprema Court of Florida. 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783, 98 L.Ed. 1112. We directed that the case be reconsidered in light of our decision in the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. In doing so, we did not imply that decrees involving graduate study present the problems of public elementary and secondary schools. We had theretofore, in three cases, ordered the admission of Negro applicants to graduate schools without discrimination because of color. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; cf. McLattrin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149. Thus, our second decision in the Brown case, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, which implemented the earlier one, had no application to a case involving a Negro applying for admission to a state law school. Accordingly, the mandate of May 24, 1954, is recalled and is vacated. In lieu thereof, the following order is entered:
“Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded on the authority of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. As this case involves the admission of a Negro to a graduate professional school, there is no reason for delay. He is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149.”

The cause is now before this court on the relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to admit him to the University of Florida Law School, his contention being that the above-quoted opinion entitles him to immediate admission, provided he is otherwise qualified, without regard to the outcome of the factual study which was in progress at the time of the filing of his motion and which has now been concluded.

There can be no doubt that, by revising its May 1954 mandate directed to our 1952 decision in the manner above noted, the Supreme Court of the United States neatly, albeit laconically, cut off the federal prop that supported, in part, our 1955 decision. But it will have been noted that the opinion stated that “[t]he petition for certiorari is denied”, presumably referring to our 1955 decision; and, this being so, our 1955 decision still stands, nonetheless firmly, on the state ground mentioned therein and referred to above.

Indeed, it is unthinkable that the Supreme Court of the United States would attempt to convert into a writ of right that which has for centuries at common law and in this state been considered a discretionary writ; nor can we conceive that that court would hold that the highest court of a sovereign state does not have the right to control the effective date of its own discretionary process. Yet, this would be the effect of the court’s order, under the interpretation contended for by the relator. We will not assume that the court intended such a result.

In what appears to be a progressive disappearance of State sovereignty, it is interesting to read certain decisions (among others) which the United States Supreme Court has handed down in recent months. See: Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 1956, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112, holding that a union shop agreement negotiated between certain railroads and certain organizations of employees of such railroads which had been authorized by an act of the Congress superseded the right-to-work provisions of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska and the state statutes enacted pursuant thereto; Rea v. United States of America, 1956, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed. 233, holding that it was within the power of the federal courts to enjoin an officer of the executive department of the federal government from testifying in a state court in a case involving a violation of a criminal statute of that state; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 1956, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640, outlawing antisedition laws in 42 states, Alaska and Hawaii; Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 1956, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, requiring the states to finance appeals by penniless persons convicted of crimes; Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 1956, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692, limiting the power of states and cities to discharge public employees when they plead the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination in duly authorized inquiries affecting the general welfare; Browder v. Gayle, D.C.M.D.Ala.1956, 142 F.Supp. 707, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 352 U.S. 903, 77 S.Ct. 145, 1 L.Ed.2d 114, holding invalid statutes and ordinances requiring the segregation of the white and colored races in motor buses operating in the City of Montgomery, Alabama.

It is a “consummation devoutly to be wished” that the concept of “states’ rights” will not come to be of interest only to writers and students of history. Such com cept is vital to the preservation of human liberties now. And whatever one’s ideology may be — whether one is a strong defender of state sovereignty or an equally fervent advocate of centralized government — we think the great majority of persons would agree that if the death knell of this fundamental principle of Jeffersonian democracy is to be tolled, the bell should be rung by the people themselves as the Constittition contemplates. President Lincoln’s words of warning are just as true today as they were almost a century ago, when he said in his first inaugural address on March 4, 1861:

“If the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by ‘decisions of the Supreme Court * * * the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”

And we do not feel it is amiss to refer to the following remarks made by George Washington in his “Farewell Address”:

“If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.”

But we repeat that, despite these recent decisions, we cannot attribute to the Supreme Court an intention to abrogate the rule which denies to federal courts the right to regulate or control long-established rules of practice and procedure adopted by state courts for the administration of justice therein. Cf. Naim v. Naim, 1956, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850, in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia declined to remand a cause to a lower court, as directed by mandate of the United States Supreme Court, because to do so “would be contrary to [the] fixed rules of practice and procedure” of the Virginia courts, as well as the statute law of that state. A motion to recall the mandate and to set the case down for oral argument upon the merits, or in the alternative, to recall and amend the mandate was denied by the United States Supreme Court for the reason that the decision above referred to, 90 S.E. 2d 849, “leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal question.” Ham Say Naim v. Naim, 1956, 350 U.S. 985, 76 S.Ct. 472, 100 L.Ed. 852. A fortiori, we cannot assume that the Supreme Court intended to deprive the highest court of an independent sovereign state of one of its traditional powers, that is, the right to exercise a sound judicial discretion as to the date of the issuance of its process in order to prevent a serious public mischief. As recently as June 4, 1956, in United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 76 S.Ct. 794, 799, 100 L.Ed. 1162, the Supreme Court recognized the “dominant interest” of a state in preventing violence. It there said: “The States are the natural guardians of the public against violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that effect.” We are cognizant of our duty to compel relator’s admission to the University of Florida Law School “without delay”, if it is feasible to do so at this time; but we have an equally compelling duty to perform in respect to the public peace and a long-established state judicial procedure by which to perform it. We point out, additionally, that the relator, having a choice between a federal and a state court, selected this court as the forum in which to try his cause; he thereby selected the rules of practice and procedure long established in this jurisdiction. We have no doubt that the Supreme Court intended that we should adhere to such procedure in the instant controversy. The relator’s contention in this respect cannot, therefore, be sustained.

We come now to the question of whether the facts, as developed under the guidance of this court’s commissioner, require the immediate admission of the relator to the University of Florida Law School, provided he meets the entrance requirements. It might be noted that the relator had due notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearings scheduled by the commissioner. He did not appear nor did he present any testimony in support of his right to immediate admission. Moreover, the history of this controversy leads us to believe that the relator does not, in fact, have a genuine interest in obtaining a legal education. He was given an opportunity to secure a legal education outside this state under the Regional Education Plan, but declined; he was given an opportunity to attend the University of Florida Law School, temporarily, if law facilities were not available at the Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University, but declined; he was then given an opportunity to attend the law school at the Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University, but declined. And, as noted, he was given an opportunity to appear before the court’s commissioner and offer evidence in support of his right to immediate admission to the University of Florida Law School, but declined.

It should be noted that the Law School at the University of Florida is an integral part of that institution. A law student is not in a class separate and apart from all other University students — he is a University student just as much as those entering the engineering school or the educational school or the architectural school, and entitled to participate in all campus activities.

Against this background, we have considered the evidence adduced by the respondents which, in the state of the record here, must constitute the basis for the exercise of our discretion in the matter. The factual material on file in this court reflects a prodigious amount of work by the commissioner and the respondents or those acting in their behalf. It is not contended— nor could it be — that there was even a modicum of bias on the part of any person involved in the work of assembling the data here presented nor in the formulation of the questionnaries which were the basic media by which much of the information was obtained. The survey is completely objective and as accurate and comprehensive as the time available for the study would permit. The testimony of the witnesses shows no bias and reflects only a sincere desire to do whatever is best for all concerned.

The survey conducted under the guidance of the court’s commissioner shows, among others, that a substantial number of students and a substantial number of the parents of students state that they expect to take action — which apparently is positive action— to persuade Negro students to leave the University or make it so unpleasant for them that they will move out of a dormitory room or out of a class or out of a cafeteria or otherwise stop using the facilities of the University of Florida, should integration occur. It was also shown that 41 percent of the parents of students now in our white universities would cause them to drop out of those schools or transfer to another school; and that 62 percent of the parents of white 1956 high school graduates would send their children elsewhere than to our white state institutions, if we have enforced integration. There would be loss of revenue to our white institutions from grants, from activities on the part of the alumni of those institutions in support of their financial affairs, and from students moving out of dormitories (many of which are being paid for out of revenue certificates), if we have integration. Those institutions would lose the support of 52 percent of their alumni, if integration occurs, which would seriously impair the financial support to be expected from our state legislature. Integration would unquestionably result in the abandonment of substantially all of the graduate work now being offered at the Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University because it would be an unnecessary duplication of the same courses offered at the University of Florida or at Flordia State University.

Our study of the results of the survey material to the question here, and other material evidence, leads inevitably to the conclusion that violence in university communities and a critical disruption of the university system would occur if Negro students are permitted to enter the state white universities at this time, including the Law School of the University of Florida,, of which it is an integral part. This court has an opportunity to prevent the incidents of violence which are, even now, occurring in various parts of this country as a result of the states’ efforts to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in the Brown case. We quote with approval that part of the language of Mr. Justice HOBSON in his special concurring opinion in which he said “the testimony which was taken at the direction of this court by the Honorable John A. H. Murphree, and which is now before us for consideration, was not in the record when the Supreme Court of the United States said ‘there is no reason for delay’. This testimony, as well as the revealing incidents (of which we may take judicial notice) which have occurred since the repudiation of the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine, convinces me that the immediate admission of relator to the University of Florida College of Law would result in great public mischief.” The homely expression, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” is especially applicable to the situation here — involving, as it does, the public welfare of all our people.

In the exercise of what we sincerely believe to be sound judicial discretion, we have decided that the relator’s motion for a peremptory writ should be denied, but without prejudice to the right of relator to renew his motion when he is prepared to present testimony showing that his admission can be accomplished without doing great public mischief. For the reasons stated, the entry of a final judgment is deferred until further order of the court.

It is so ordered.

THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., . concur.

TERRELL, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur specially.

THOMAS and DREW, JJ., dissent.

TERRELL, Chief Justice

(concurring).

I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice ROBERTS, particularly with that part relating to the power of this and other states to control their process when public mischief is imminent. This doctrine is all the more compelling when long-settled rules relating to the administration of justice and the prevention of violence are brought in question. Historically, individuals, as well as states, have1 interposed action to thwart the inroads of Federal authority .not so much for delay as to preserve what was deemed to be the most precious of American ideals. In a free democracy the decisions of courts, even the Supreme Court of the United States, have never been considered sacrosanct or free from challenge.

In 1798 Jefferson and Madison on behalf of Virginia and Kentucky challenged the constitutional validity of the Federal sedition law. They contended that the law was not only unconstitutional, that it was in violation of the compact with the states and would continue so until effectuated by constitutional amendment. No attempt was made to force obedience on the part of Kentucky and Virginia but in 1801 Jefferson, author of the Kentucky resolution, was elected president of the United States.

In 1832, South Carolina nullified the Federal tariff act passed that year and nothing was done to force obedience but a new tariff act was passed forthwith. In 1838, the State of Georgia was ordered by the Supreme Court of the United States not to remove the Cherokee Indians beyond the state. [Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25.] This was the famous case in which President Andrew Jackson injected himself into the picture and issued his famous pronouncement, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” The order was not obeyed. The State of Wisconsin refused to follow the order of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision [Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691] promulgated prior to the Civil War. Georgia and Virginia have recently but respectfully declined to follow orders of the Supreme Court relying on control of their own process and the fact that there was still a modicum of sovereignty in the states that they had a right to invoke. In none of the foregoing incidents was any attempt made to coerce the states.

Some anthropologists and historians much better informed than I am point out that segregation is as old as the hills. The Egyptians practiced it on the Israelites; the Greeks did likewise for the barbarians; the Romans segregated the Syrians; the Chinese segregated all foreigners; segregation is said to have produced the caste system in India and Hitler practiced it in his Germany, but no one ever discovered that it was in violation of due process until recently and to do so some of the same historians point out that the Supreme Court abandoned the Constitution, precedent and common sense and fortified its decision solely with the writings of Gunner Myrdal, a Scandinavian sociologist. What he knew about constitutional law we are not told nor have we been able to learn.

Such is in part the predicate on which the states are resisting integration. They contend that since the Supreme Court has tortured the Constitution, particularly the welfare clause, the interstate commerce clause, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the provisions relating to separation of state and federal powers, and the powers not specifically granted to the Federal government being reserved to states, they have a right to torture the court’s decision. Whatever substance there may be to this contention, it is certain that forced integration is not the answer to the question. It is a challenge to freedom of action that is contrary to every democratic precept. It is certain that attempts at integration by court order have engendered more strife, tension, hatred and disorder than can be compensated for in generations of attempt on the part of those who are forward looking and want to do so. They have done more to break down progress and destroy good feeling and understanding between the races than anything that has taken place since emancipation. Social progress in any time is not measured by legislative acts and decree; it is measured by qualitative citizenship.

The seventeen states committed to segregation have the material stake in this question. They have spent billions on separate schools, hospitals and other institutions in the attempt to provide “separate but equal” facilities and opportunities for both races in reliance on what they understood to be the law. Violence has arisen everywhere and continues to arise account of attempts to comply with the Federal Courts’ orde.rs and the end is not yet. These “states are the natural guardians of the public against violence”; they know the reasons for it; they are fully aware that such tensions are grounded in the attempt of the Federal Courts at a form of enforced integration that is contrary to every precept that activates the need for law in this country.

Human nature may not be what it should be but such as it is, we are compelled to take it into account. The problem presented is more social than legal. In fact law is not the conclusive answer. Social advancement has never been measured by legal formulas and human nature has not reached the point where human ingenuity will not find a road to bypass laws and regulations which attempt to abrogate long-settled social standards. To be enforced in a democracy law must always follow and never precede a felt necessity for it. This was never better illustrated than by what is now being done to bypass Federal integration orders and what happened to national prohibition in the thirties. Surveys made in Washington City schools where integration has been attempted for at least two years also fortify this premise. If, as pointed out in the opinion of Mr. Justice ROBERTS, the Supreme Court of the United States recognizes that the “dominant interest” of the state is to prevent violence and the record here points the road to violence, that in itself is enough for this court to withhold the issuance of its mandate. The record is best fortified by what is or has been taking place in more than a half dozen states.

Then it has been revealed that these riots and outbreaks were not activated by local people but by interlopers from other places, in other words, social boll wéevils, fruit flies, potato bugs, bean beetles, cane borers and other pests that we institute quarantines or other rigid measures against to get rid of. It takes time to do this and then it must be done by legal processes, otherwise we invoke that which is at least in the nature of the communist manifesto to enforce democratic processes. The problem is a different one in every state and ■in this state the governor and the educational authorities are pursuing legal methods to solve the problem. After all is said the big question is not one of defying constituted authority, it is one of finding a way of solving a serious problem recently thrust upon the states with segregated schools and at the same time preserve their traditions, their moral, social, cultural and educational standards.

For the purpose of fortifying the premises discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is pertinent to point out that the legislature on recommendation of the Fabisin-ski Committee, appointed by the governor, to recommend a method to best handle the segregation question in a legal way, has enacted Chapter 31380, Chapter 31389, Chapter 31390, and Chapter 31391, Acts of 1956, 2d Ex.Sess., F.S.A. §§ 230.231, 14.-021, 14.022, 231.36. The first of this series of acts became effective July 26, 1956, and the other three became effective August 1, 1956. These a’cts, including those they amended, defined a complete scheme to administer the public school system. They were enacted under the police powers to promote the sáfetyj health, order, welfare and education ■ of the people within the State of Florida.

They, also confer additional powers on the governor, in that they authorize him to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations to protect the public against violence and property damages. They recognize that the state has the dominant interest in and is the natural guardian of the public' against violence. It is perfectly evident that these acts had in view recent Federal decisions affecting segregation in that they authorized county boards of public instruction to choose personnel from all available sources, to consolidate school programs at any school center and to dismiss any teacher or teachers not essential to carry on the consolidated school program.

Another purpose of these acts was to ■preserve 'the welfare of all classes and by .a system of uniform tests classify all school •entrants according to intellectual ability and scholastic proficiency to the end that there will be established in each school within the county an environment of equality among those of like qualification and academic attainments. What effect, if any, the system so created will have on the case before us, I do not discuss. The point is that it expresses the public policy of the state as to the question. Those administering our educational program are moving as fast as consistent with wise judgment to set it up and other systems not materially different to protect the public from violence have been approved though they had little, if any, educational aspect. United Auto., Aircraft & A. I. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 76 S.Ct. 794, 100 L.Ed. 1162; Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172.

These acts were passed since we last considered this case, they offer a sound and sensible basis to handle the school problem in Florida which was thrown into confusion overnight by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, which in turn overthrew and kicked out the window the recognized school policy approved by all courts in the country for generations. The change has precipitated school problems peculiar to every state in the country. If Florida is not authorized to meet and solve the problem by which it is confronted in a sane and sensible manner, then all the law I have been taught governing state and Federal power has been pitched down the drain.

For these reasons I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice ROBERTS.

HOBSON, Justice

(concurring specially).

I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority because the testimony which was taken at the direction of this court by the Honorable John A. H. Murphree, and which is now before us for consideration, was not in the record when the Supreme Court of the United States said “there is no reason for delay”. This testimony, as well as the revealing incidents (of which we may take judicial notice) which have occurred since the repudiation of the “separate but equal” doctrine, convinces me that the immediate admission of relator to the University of Florida College of Law would result in great public mischief.

In the interest of both races, that is to say, the common weal, the writ of mandamus should, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, be withheld until the Supreme Court of the United States in this case, after consideration of those matters which it has not heretofore had an opportunity to weigh and evaluate, unequivocally directs that relator be admitted to the College of Law at the University of Florida. In such event the onus will rest, as it should, with the tribunal responsible for the initial departure from a constitutional interpretation which had served us for so many years. And since I am bound by the paramount federal law, if such ruling should be made by a fully informed Supreme Court, I could not fail to comply without stultifying my oath of' office.

THOMAS, Justice

(dissenting).

After a careful examination of the opinion prepared for a majority of the court, I come to the conclusion that I must dissent.

It seems fitting, before recording my reasons for disagreement, to set out a chronology of the important steps in this protracted litigation.

On 30 May 1949 the relator filed in this court a petition for a writ of mandamus to command the respondents, members of the Board of Control and the president and the registrar of the University of Florida, to admit the petitioner, a Negro, to the college of law of the University. Adams, C. J., and Terrell, Sebring, Barns and Hobson, JJ., voted to issue an alternative writ of mandamus while Chapman, J., and the writer dissented on the ground that the petitioner had not first applied to the State Board of Education. The alternative writ, issued 10 June 1949, was in the usual form and commanded the respondents to admit the relator to the college of law or show cause 11 July 1949 why a peremptory writ should not follow.

From the. answers, filed in response to the alternative writ of mandamus, it appeared that at the time of relator’s application the college of law at the University of Florida was the only law school maintained in the state by taxes, and that relator had been informed that because there was no law school then functioning within the State where Negro students could'be enrolled, the Board of Control was prepared to provide him, at a college or university acceptable to him in another state, courses of study as valuable as any offered in an institution of higher learning in Florida. At this time and for many years before the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College staffed exclusively by Negroes and maintained exclusively for members of the Negro race, supported by State-taxation, had been functioning in Tallahassee.

Attention was drawn to the laws of the state restricting courses at the University of Florida to members of the white race, and the respondents asserted that in denying the relator’s application they had not acted arbitrarily but had only obeyed the statute and the Constitution. It was provided in Section 228.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., that “schools for white children and the schools for negro children shalli be conducted separately.” Section 12 of. Art. XII, of the -Constitution, F.S.A., follows: “White and colored children shall! not be taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made for both.”'

To repeat, it was in obedience to the-statutory and constitutional inhibitions that the respondents declined to'admit the relator to the college of law at the University. of Florida, and in order to afford him the training1 he desired they offered to secure him an education of equal quality at an institution outside the state where Negroes were not barred.

.It was further represented that all state institutions of higher learning, including the University of Florida, and Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College — the name was changed to Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University by Chapter 27995, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953, F.S. A. § 241.411 — were managed and controlled by the Board of Control under the supervision of the State Board of Education and that from time to time, as the need arose, courses were added to the curricula of the institutions. Carrying out this policy, according to the answer, the Board of Control had, prior to the demand of relator, included in its budget requests for funds to be used in the establishment of a law school at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College. As a conclusion the respondents stated that if the relator still refused “to accept out-of-state scholarship or-other provision which may he made for his-'instruction in the courses he has re-, quested elsewhere than at a State institution established for white students exclusively, and it should be held that said arrangement is insufficient to satisfy the relator’s lawful demands, the respondent, Board of Control, has made provision for relator’s immediate admission and enrollment” at the law school established at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College. In the event the “necessary facilities, equipment and personnel for said course of- study should not be immediately available” at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College, continued respondents, the respondents had “made provision for [relator’s] instruction * * * at the only other institution of higher learning in the State of Florida offering such course, until such time as adequate and comparable facilities and personnel * * * [could] be obtained and physically set up at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes, in Tallahassee, Florida.”

The relator moved for a peremptory writ notwithstanding the answer.

The members of this court were in unanimous agreement that the entry qf a final order should be withheld, and jurisdiction meanwhile retained, until the court should be satisfied either that the Board of Control had furnished, or failed to furnish, to the relator the opportunity, to pursue his desired course of study, substantially equal to the opportunity given students at other institutions supported by taxation. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, Fla., 47 So.2d 608.

The relator moved again for a peremptory writ, 16 May 1951. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla., 53 So. 2d 116, 119. This writ was denied, 15 June 1951, on the ground that the relator had not shown that he had exhausted all reasonable means of gaining admittance to the University of Florida. The order was entered without prejudice to the right to renew the motion for a peremptory writ when the relator could show that he had “brought himself within the principles enunciated in State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control [Fla., 47 So.2d 608].”

The relator petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to review the last order by certiorari but on 13 November 1951, that court declined because the judgment was not final. State of Florida ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 342 U.S. 877, 72 S.Ct. 166, 96 L.Ed. 659.

On 7 June 1952 the relator presented his third motion for a peremptory writ. In an opinion of this court filed 1 August 1952, it was written that by making this motion the relator was taking the position that he would only enjoy the full political rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution by being admitted to the University of Florida Law School, a school maintained exclusively for white persons, even though a law school, exclusively for Negroes, supported by taxation was available to him. The court held, unanimously, that the motion should be denied and the alternative writ quashed. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla., 60 So.2d 162.

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review this judgment, ordered the judgment vacated and remanded the cause to this court “for consideration in the light of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, etc., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, and conditions that now prevail.” The mandate was dated 24 May 1954. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783, 98 L.Ed. 1112.

It should be remarked here that the case of Brown v. Board of Education, cited in the mandate, was one dealing with elementary schools while the present litigation involved a graduate school, and the direction that this court reconsider its judgment not only in the light of the cited case but also of "conditions that now prevail" was quite confusing, as will be emphasized when we advert to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and allied decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to a later mandate affecting the present litigation. (Italics supplied.)

In response to the mandate, this court entered its order 31 July 1954, directing the relator to amend his petition within 60 days so as to present the issues raised by the original petition “ ‘in the light of the Segregation Cases * * * and conditions that now prevail’ ” and directing respondents within 30 days afterward to amend their return so that this court would be enabled to abide by the mandate.

In obedience to the order both petition and return were amended resulting in presentation of the single question “whether or not the relator [was] entitled to be admitted to the University of Florida Law School upon showing that he [had] met the routine entrance requirements.” State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla., 83 So.2d 20, 22. This opinion was filed 19 October 1955. So the issue was then narrowed to the one whether or not the relator’s petition should be rejected because he was a member of the Negro race.

Meanwhile, between the time the pleadings were amended and the last cited decision was rendered, the Supreme Court of the United States entered its opinion, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 implementing the decision in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180. In the ‘implementation decision’ that court recognized that varied problems would exist locally the solution of which might require time and that school authorities should bear the burden of showing what delay was necessary “in the public interest and * * * consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.” Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756.

So when the opinion of 19 October 1955 was filed by this court it was the majority-view that, inasmuch as the mandate had referred to a case dealing with elementary schools, and the decision in that case had been implemented to permit some delay in meeting and solving problems, and this court had been directed to re-examine the decision in the present case in the light not only of that case but also in the light of “conditions that now prevail,” a commissioner should be appointed to take testimony about local problems, and adjustments that would be necessary under conditions that prevailed, in order to admit the relator, and that upon such testimony the court would decide when a peremptory writ should issue. Four months from the date of the decision, 19 October 1955, was the period fixed for taking the testimony, and before that time expired the period was extended to 31 May 1956.

A petition for certiorari to review the decision of 19 October 1955 was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States and that court, 12 March 1956, while the testimony being taken under the decision of 19 October 1955 was incomplete, entered a decision per curiam. [350 U.S. 413, 76 S.Ct. 464.] Some confusion resulted because the order began with the statement “The petition for certiorari is denied” and the concluding paragraph began with the statement .“The petition for writ of cer-tiorari is granted.” The issuance of the mandate of 24 May 1954 was recited, then the court observed that it directed “the case be reconsidered in light of our decision in the Segregation Cases,” but any reference to consideration of the matter “in the light of * * * conditions that now prevail” was omitted. Then the court explained that in directing this court to reconsider there was no implication that decrees affecting graduate students present the “problems of public elementary and secondary schools.” To stress the point it was announced that in three cases: Sweatt v. Painter 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247, Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149 the court had “ordered the admission of Negro- applicants to graduate schools without discrimination because of color” and it was expressly stated that the ‘implementation decision’ "had no application to a case involving a Negro applying for admission to a state law school (Italics supplied.)

So the mandate of 24 May 1954 was recalled and the case remanded, “on the authority of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 833].” This is the now familiar decision dealing with elementary schools.

The judgment concluded with this significant language: “As this case involves the admission of a Negro to a graduate professional school, there is no reason for delay. He is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates.” State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 76 S.Ct. 464, 100 L.Ed. 486.

Despite the ambiguities which I have pointed out, I think, and I thought as early as 19 October 1955, when the decision of this court directing the taking of testimony was rendered, that the Supreme Court of the United States had, in effect, declared invalid the provision of the Constitution of the State of Florida in conflict with the interpretation that court had given the Constitution of the United States.

From the time of the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256, rendered in 1896, decisions by this court that white and colored students should be segregated but that the opportunities should be equal enabled members of this court to observe their personal oaths to support, protect and defend the Constitution of this state and do so in perfect harmony with rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject. The inhibition in the State Constitution is stated in clear, unambiguous language. Construing it verbatim brought no inconsistency with construction of the Constitution of the United States which contains no express language prohibiting segregation. In the recent decision overturning a precedent of 60 years, nobody seems ever to have bothered to consider the effect upon the oath of members of this court to support an absolute state constitutional inhibition of integration in schools in this state.

At the time of the rendition of the decision of 19 October 1955 I thought, despite the apparent ambiguity in the order on the first petition of certiorari, that no further testimony' with reference" to prevailing conditions had been contemplated. Because of this view and the thought that no testimony was needed to dispose of the case, the issue having been reduced to the one whether a Negro could be barred simply by reason of his race, I thought the decision was wrong, so I dissented. And my conviction was buttressed by the understanding that the respondents had not requested the procedure, anyway.

My conclusion was confirmed by the entry of the second judgment. Even though there was a repeated reference to the Brown case, the language already quoted and then repeated dissipated any impression that there was occasion for further delay.

I cannot agree that when a decision denying a petition for mandamus is, in effect, reversed, the subordinate court retains the power to issue the writ at some later date. It is my view that in such case the discretion, held to have been abused, has been exhausted and the time has arrived to obey the mandate of the higher court.

It seems to me that if this court expects obedience to its mandates, it must be prepared immediately to" obey mandates from a higher court. In this case when the Federal question was presented and determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, the ruling became binding upon this court at once regardless of our lack of sympathy with the holding.

Inasmuch as, to repeat, the Supreme Court of th'e United States has ruled that “there is no reason for delay” and that the relator “is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates” I think this litigation has ended and that the matter is now one purely of administration.

DREW, Justice

(dissenting).

It is a fundamental truth that justice delayed is justice denied. This case has now reached the point where further delay will be tantamount to a denial of a constitutional right of' relator.

, Mr. Justice Sebring pointed out the course in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, Fla. 1955, 83 So.2d 20, 31, with which I must now agree. The Constitution of the United States -of America, Article 'VI/-provides that “ ‘This Constitution * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ ” The oath of office I have taken requires that I “ ‘support, protect and defend’ ” it. The Supreme Court of the .United States has been established by long tradition as the final interpreter of the Constitution of the United States. Such an interpretation has been made in this case.

I cannot conclude that any discretion remains in this Court to lawfully postpone the issuance .of a peremptory writ. That mandamus is a discretionary writ is academic, but that this broad principle is applicable in those cases where an authoritatively declared constitutional right is being denied — I cannot agree. See State ex rel. Beacham v. Wynn, 1946, 158 Fla. 182, 28 So.2d 253, 254 in which this Court said “where the right is .indisputable . there is no room 'for the exercise of discretion other than in keeping with the law.” Also see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 1824, 9 Wheat. 738, 866, 22 U.S. 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204, 234.

Courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. Judicial discretion is a legal discretion. It is a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law. When, as here, that course has been discerned and a determination has been reached that relator is being denied his constitutional right, it is the clear duty of this Court to enforce the right. The power vested in the judiciary should- never be exercised for the sole purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. The power we possess is for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the law. I conceive it to be my plain duty to give effect to the law which has been established by the United States Supreme Court.

I, therefore, respectfully dissent.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, Acting Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Florida, ex rel. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, a corporation, Relators, v. Wilbur C. KING, Alan S. Boyd, and Jerry W. Carter, as members of and constituting Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, and Rockana Carriers, Inc., a corporation, as an interested party, Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B.
    March 6, 1957.
    D. Fred McMullen of Ausley & Ausley, Tallahassee, and Allen & Dell, Tampa, for relators.

      Lewis W. Petteway and Guyte P. Mc-Cord, Jr., Tallahassee, for Florida R. R. and Public Utilities Commission.
    Hill, Hill & Dickenson, Tampa, for Rockana Carriers, Inc., respondents.
   THOMAS, Acting Chief Justice.

This court issued an alternative writ of mandamus, 6 November 1956, commanding the respondents, who are members of Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, to cancel a “letter order” of the commission granting temporary authority to Rockana Carriers, Inc., to engage in certain transportation operations, and to revoke the rule of the commission, numbered 61, or to show cause for their failure to comply with the writ.

This action was an aftermath of the litigation we concluded by our opinion in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. King, Fla., 89 So.2d 246, by which we quashed an order of the commission that a certificate of public convenience and necessity held by L. H. Sims be cancelled and reissued to Rockana Carriers, Inc.

The matter comes to us again on the motions of the commission and Rockana Carriers, Inc., to quash and the answer of the latter.

After the decision in the cited case was announced, Rockana Carriers, Inc., immediately applied for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing the carriage in which it had been engaged under the certificate this court had held invalid, and inasmuch as the service had been furnished for some time under that certificate, the carrier sought and was granted temporary authority to continue against the day when the formal procedure, we held had not earlier been followed, should be conducted to determine whether or not the carrier should be awarded a certificate of public convenience and necessity.

The commission has adopted a rule, Rule 61, that an application for temporary authority to operate will be considered when formal application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity has been made, the written request for interim authority has been filed, immediate and urgent need for the transportation has been shown to exist, and all certificate holders whose rights might be adversely affected have been notified. Such temporary authority extends only to the time the application for a certificate is determined by the commission or by the Supreme Court.

The relators assert that the commission had no power to grant temporary authority to the carrier, and that the rule of the commission on which it was based is illegal and void.

The commission is given extensive supervisory and regulatory power over transportation companies engaged in common carriage by automobile, Sec. 323.07, Florida Statutes 1955, and F.S.A., and in exercising its duties “may * * * prescribe rules and regulations applicable to any and all such auto transportation companies.” Also by Sec. 350.12(2) (m), Florida Statutes 1955, and F.S.A., the commission was empowered to “prescribe all rules and regulations appropriate for the execution of any of the powers conferred upon them by law either in express terms or by implication * * In this section it is further provided:

“ * * * Every rule, regulation, * * * or order heretofore or hereafter made by the commissioners shall be deemed and held to be within their jurisdiction and their powers, and to be reasonable and just and such as ought to have been made in the premises and to have been properly made and arrived at in due form of procedure and such as can and ought to be executed, unless the contrary plainly appears on the face thereof or be made to appear by clear and satisfactory 'evidence, and shall not be set •aside or held invalid unless the contrary so' appears. All presumptions shall be in favor of every action of the commissioners and all doubts as to their jurisdiction and powers shall be resolved in their favor, * *

Relators complain about the grant of the temporary authority without notice to them because of the mandate in Sec. 323.02, Florida Statutes 1955, and F.S.A., that no auto transportation company may operate without having first obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Their principal objection is the failure of notice to them, and this is met by the statement of the commission that notice must be given only to certificate holders- whose rights are adversely affected, while a railroad company is not a “certificate holder.”

The circumstances of this case convince us that it is a fair illustration of the need for the rule about which the relators complain. After a hearing, attendant by representatives of relators who opposed a transfer of the certificate of public convenience and necessity from L. H. Sims to Rockana Carriers, Inc., the commission approved the transfer and the transferee continued service under it until upon certiorari to this court it was held that it had not been properly re-issued because it was in reality a permit grown into a certificate, and because of the rejection of certain testimony the court considered relevant. -

Ten days after its petition for rehearing was denied by this court, the carrier applied for a certificate to furnish the service it had been furnishing under the certificate earlier declared invalid. As has been seen from an analysis of the rule under attack, the filing of the new application was a prerequisite to the granting of .the temporary authority.

Undoubtedly the commission felt that this carrier was to perform a service fully justified under the law when the assignment from L. H. Sims was recognized. The whole matter has now been resubmitted to the commission on its merits. It seems to us sensible to permit continuance of the operation, and preserve the status quo, while a re-examination of the case could be made. The alternative would have been to stop the carrier from operating while the action pended.

Under the certificate first issued to L. H. Sims and later cancelled and re-issued to the carrier, a definite service acceptable to the commission, and, according to the present record, beneficial to a segment of the public, was performed. It was interrupted by our decision which went more to the procedure followed than to the merits of the controversy that developed. The present procedure before the commission is obviously an attempt to correct that which we found defective. Although we see no harm in the decision of the commission permitting the carrier to operate temporarily until the whole matter can be considered and a determination reached whether or not a certificate of convenience and necessity should be, after proper investigation and examination, issued to the carrier, we think the relators have just complaint about the provision in the rule for notice.

We hold that the rule was within the authority of the commission to promulgate. In the vast field of the commission’s operation, it is conceivable that many situations could arise requiring immediate temporary action both to protect industry and to advantage the public.

But we conclude that the part of the rule with reference to notice cannot be sustained. Under the statute, notice of hearing on an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity, must be given “to all transportation companies serving any part of the route proposed to be served by the applicant * * Sec. 323.03(2), Florida Statutes 1955, and F.S.A. By the rule, notice is required to be served “on all existing certificate holders whose rights might be adversely affected * * (Italics supplied.)

The provision in the rule for notice is narrower than the one in the statute and this we cannot approve. The relators were, in our opinion, entitled to reasonable notice of application for temporary authority.

In this very case the same relators were the successful petitioners in the proceeding attacking the reissuance of the certificate to the carrier. They were entitled to notice of the application for a certificate of convenience and necessity which, under the rule, was required to be on file when the carrier sought the temporary authority. We think they were entitled also to be heard on the matter of the interim authority.

The motions to quash the alternative writ are denied.

ROBERTS, THORNAL and O’CON-NELL, JJ., concur.


author: TERRELL, Chief Justice.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. CITY OF MELBOURNE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.
    March 6, 1957.
    Murray W. Overstreet, Kissimmee, for appellant.
    W. J. Vaughn, Melbourne, and Mitchell, Pershing, Shetterly & Mitchell, New York City, for appellee.
   TERRELL, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court of Brevard County validating an-issue of Water and Sewer Revenue Bonds, Series A, of the City of Melbourne, Florida, which will hereinafter be referred to as the “City”. Said bonds were dated November 1, 1956. There is no controversy about the facts out of which the case emerged or the issues presented. It is admitted that the City has outstanding utilities revenue bonds dated November 1, 1952, in the sum of $563,000, which mature serially and are not subject to redemption until November 1, 1962.

It is first contended that the City is without legal authority to issue bonds to refund said outstanding utilities' revenue bonds which are not subject to redemption until November 1, 1962.

It is shown and admitted that said utilities revenue bonds are subject to redemption, in whole or in part, at the option of the City prior to their respective maturities on November 1, 1962, for the principal of the bonds and accrued interest, at the date of redemption, plus a premium of 3% of the principal amount. Resolution 6_44, authorizing the issue of said Water and Sewer Revenue Bonds, Series A, shows that part of the proceeds are to be used for retiring all of the outstanding utilities revenue bonds in the sum of $563,-000. In our view State v. Orlando, Fla., 82 So.2d 874, concludes this question against the contention of appellant. It is pointed out by appellant that the bonds subject to redemption in the last cited case were not due for two or three years while the bonds in question are not subject to redemption for five years, hence the Orlando decision is not decisive of the question raised in this case. We think there is no merit to this contention. Saving to the City was the primary element that actuated the Orlando decision and being so the philosophy of that case would be all the more applicable in the case at bar.

It is next contended that the City of Melbourne was' devoid of lawful authority to construct and extend its water distribution facilities to within the corporate limits of the towns of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach and charge the subscribers within and outside said towns a higher rate for water than it charges those within the corporate limits of the City of Melbourne.

The answer to this question is concluded against the contention of appellant by Section 6, Charter of the City of Melbourne, Section 169.02, Florida Statutes 1955, F.S.A., and Section 159.03, Revenue Bond Act of 1953, F.S.A. See also Section 359, Charter of the City of Melbourne. These provisions specifically authorize the City to construct and operate waterworks within or without the City and Section 40 of the City Charter authorizes the City Council, without limitation, to fix the rates and charges for water and other public utilities wherever located. In his final decree validating the bonds the chancellor found that the proposed additions to the City’s water and sewer facilities were very much needed to preserve the health, convenience and sanitary condition of the City. He further found that the towns of Indi-alantic and Melbourne Beach had no public facilities for supplying water, that the existing private facilities were inadequate for present needs, that the needs of said towns were closely related to the economy of the City ánd that the project of enlarging its water and. sewer facilities had been studied and approved by a competent consulting engineer.

Courts in this country have generally held that when a municipality provides public services beyond its corporate limits the rates charged for them may be fixed by contract, as was done here, in the absence of forbidding statute. Davisworth v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 606, 224 S.W.2d 649; Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402; City of Moultrie v. Burgess, 212 Ga. 22, 90 S.E.2d 1; Guth v. City of Staples, 183 Minn. 552, 237 N.W. 411; City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 299 P.2d 667; Fulghum v. Town of Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 76 S.E.2d 368; City of Montgomery v. Greene, 180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900; City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 246 S.W.2d 622; Botkin v. City of Abilene, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W.2d 732. The last two cases deal with question of fixing utility rates as between residents and non-residents of the city.

The concluding question is whether or not the construction of water distribution facilities within the corporate limits of the towns of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach deny due process and equal protection of the laws to the residents of the City of Melbourne in violation of Sections 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.

At the outset it may be pointed out that the bonds in question are not obligations of the City of Melbourne, neither are they secured by any pledge of the taxing power of the City. They are not secured by lien of any kind on the physical property of the City but are supported entirely by a pledge of a certain portion of the utilities •service tax for distributing water to the inhabitants of the City and the inhabitants of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach who ■subscribe for the water. It is shown that the City is the center of a large and growing metropolitan population, a part of which is the population of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach who pay a charge for water ■commensurate with the cost of delivery to them. The evidence shows that the delivery of water to customers outside the ■City will result in no increase of cost to residents of the City. The water system is •owned by the City and the cost of maintenance is supported solely by pledge of the •utilities service tax. It is not required that such pledge be approved by a vote of the freeholders as required by Section 6, Article IX, Constitution of Florida. State v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 60 So.2d 32; State v. City of North Miami, Fla., 89 So. 2d 8; State v. City of Bartow, Fla., 48 So.2d 747; State v. City of Pensacola, Fla., 40 So.2d 569.

It is accordingly our view that the construction of water distribution facilities within the corporate limits of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach does not deny due process and equal protection to the residents of the City of Melbourne in violation of Sections 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida.

The decree appealed from is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.

• ROBERTS, DREW and THORNAL, JJ., concur.


author: THORNAL, Justice.

text:
    Curtis S. NEWCOMB and wife, Mildred W. Newcomb, Plaintiffs, v. Edward P. ROARTY and wife, Mathelda L. Roarty, Defendants.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.
    March 6, 1957.

      Brannon & Brown, Lake City, for plaintiffs.
    Ferguson & Jopling, Lake City, for defendants.
   THORNAL, Justice.

The Honorable R. H. Rowe, as Circuit Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, has filed in this Court a Certificate under 31 F.S.A.Rule 27 of the Supreme Court Rules certifying for our reply the questions hereafter stated.

The statement of facts indicate that the litigation involves a suit by the plaintiffs to obtain an accounting and other relief from the defendants in connection with alleged fraudulent misrepresentations as to the income of a motor court which defendants had agreed to sell to the plaintiffs.

In the course of the proceeding the plaintiffs sought production of the defendants’ income tax return and state sales tax reports for the years mentioned in the Certified questions which are as follows:

“I. Under [30 F.S.A.] Rule 1.28 Of The 1954 Florida Rules Of Civil Procedure, Would The Plaintiffs, Under The State Of Facts Herein Submitted, Be Entitled To Require The Defendants To Produce The Income Tax Returns For The Years 1952, 1953 And 1954 Showing The Income From The Palmetto Motor Court, Or Would The Same Be Privileged?
“11. Under Rule 1.28 Of The 1954 Florida Rules Of Civil Procedure, Would The Plaintiffs, Under The Statement Of Facts Herein Submitted, Be Entitled To Require The Defendants To Produce The Sales Tax Reports For The Years 1952, 1953 And 1954 Showing The Income From The Palmetto Motor Court, Or Would The Same Be Privileged?”

We have held that the appellate jurisdiction to this Court cannot be invoked and a cause bodily transferred to us except from a determination of an inferior court. Likewise, we have announced the proposition that the Rule providing for certification of questions to this Court by a Circuit Court should be strictly construed and applied. Schwob Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla.1942, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So.2d 782. In the case last cited we also attempted to announce several basic rules governing the certification of questions.

In the more recent case of Gordon v. Norris, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 914, we further attempted to delineate in detail a number of' the controlling conditions precedent to the acceptance of a certificate of a question by us under our present Supreme Court Rule 27.

In Taylor v. Taylor, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 868, we held that a certified question which involves the application of ordinary rules of evidence is not within the contemplation of the applicable rules of this Court.

An examination of the certificate forwarded to us in the instant case reveals that an answer by us would not be disposi-tive of the cause. The parties themselves are not in accord on the proposition that our answer to the particular questions would dispose of the litigation. In the orderly administration of the judicial process we are bound to observe the proper line of demarcation between the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial courts and the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. We should always be cautious to avoid encroachment upon the full and proper exercise of jurisdiction by the trial judges.

It appears to us that any effort on our part to answer the questions above certified would be an inappropriate interference with the power to act and the jurisdiction of the trial judge.

We are, therefore, compelled to deny the certificate.

TERRELL, C. J., and HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


author: DREW, Justice.

text:
    ALAN WRIGHT FUNERAL HOMES, Inc., a Florida corporation, and United States Casualty Company, a corporation, Petitioners, v. Alex SIMPSON and The Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.
    March 6, 1957.

      Smathers, Thompson & Dyer, Miami, for petitioners.
    Nichols, Gaither, Green, Frates & Beckham, M. Dudley Burton, Miami, Rodney Durrance and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents.
   DREW, Justice.

This case requires the application of undisputed concrete facts to the general language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to determine if the particular injury is compensable as “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Section 440.09 (1), Florida Statutes 1955, F.S.A. The test is the relationship of an event to an employment.

The employee of the funeral parlor was struck by an automobile as he was in the process of crossing a street which separated his office-home from the restaurant where h'e proposed to eat. The terms of his employment required him to be on 24 hour call, but did not require his presence at the place of business at all times. The deputy commissioner found "at the time of the accident claimant was not crossing the street in response to a call nor was he under the direction of his employer. His duties for the day had been completed and he was free to go where he pleased as long as he left word at the funeral home of his whereabouts.” (Emphasis added) Nevertheless1 the deputy commissioner held that the injuries sustained in the accident were com-pensable and his .order was affirmed by the full commission. The carrier has petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the latter order.

We have never held, or intimated, that 24 hour call duty afforded a blanket of coverage to an employee without regard to his activity at the time of injury. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, 1940, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495. In that case we held:

“There is no dispute about the essential facts. It is admitted that Moore was an officer and an employee of Lee Motors of Fort Myers, Inc., that said company maintained a twenty-four hours service, and that the deceased was subject to call at any time, that on the evening he was killed he was at his place of business and went in his own car to carry his wife home and was killed while returning to his place of business in the manner stated.
“The cases generally hold that for an injury to arise out of and in the course of one’s employment, there must be some causal connection between the injury and the employment or it must have had its origin in some risk incident to or connected with the employment or that it flowed from it as a natural consequence. Another definition widely approved is that the injury must occur within the period of the employment, at a place where the . employee may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental to it.
“When the accident which resulted in Moore’s death took place, he was on a mission purely personal to himself and wife and had no connection whatever with his employment; it did not flow from nor was it in any way incident to his employment.” 143 Fla. 103, 105, 196 So. 495, 496.

In Hi-Acres, Inc., v. Pierce, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 49 the court made the statement: “There is material difference between being on duty twenty-four hours a day and being subject to call twenty-four hours per day. Even though the employee may have heen subject to call, after hours, to perform some special mission, he is not on duty unless it is shown that he had been called, after hours, to perform some special duty and had responded to such call.”

Claimant relies heavily on the following cases to sustain his award: Blount v. State Road Department, Fla.1956, 87 So.2d 507; Sweat v. Allen, 1941, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348; Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 282; Bowen v. Keen, 1944, 154 Fla. 161, 17 So.2d 706; and Wilson Cypress Co. v. Miller, 1946, 157 Fla. 459, 26 So.2d 441.

In the Blount case, supra, we allowed compensation to a road department worker who was injured in an automobile accident which occurred when he was driving a road department vehicle home from his office. The pivotal point of the case was that the employer furnished the vehicle and required the employee to perform his duties of eliminating dangerous conditions involving the highways whenever he was called, or whenever the situation presented itself in his course of travel on his section of th'e highway system. Because of the close analogy between the duties of Mr. Blount and those of the police officer in Sweat v. Allen, supra, excerpts from the Sweat case were extensively quoted in the Blount case. In Sweat v. Allen a police officer was compensated for injuries resulting from a car striking him as he was enroute to catch a bus on the way to work. There we said, “As shown by the record, the claimant’s employment did require him to be upon the street upon occasion. And while he was not there in response to an order on the morning of his injury, he was within his employment for he was still charged with a duty or task connected therewith.” 145 Fla. 733, 738, 200 So. 348, 350. The turning point in Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, supra, becomes readily apparent by reviewing a portion of the opinion which distinguished a number of cases, including Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, supra. In the Naranja case we observed, inter alia, “None of these cases is applicable here because none involved an injury to a claimant occurring by reason of a special hazard on a route used as means of ingress and egress to the employer’s premises.” 74 So.2d 282, 287. A young boy’s dependants were allowed compensation in Bowen v. Keen, supra, where he was killed by an automobile as he was walking to work because, “the deceased had no fixed or regular hours of work and was really subject to call; that while he usually went to his work about 8 A.M., he was, at the time he was killed, carrying out the orders of his employer, in furtherance of a mission in his employer’s interest, which orders required him to leave his home at a much earlier hour than usual, and that when he was accidentally run over and killed he was actually engaged in his employer’s business.” 154 Fla. 161, 173, 17 So.2d 706, 712. The Wilson Cypress Co. case, supra, involves the “bunk-house rule” which has no application where the injury does not take place on the employer’s premises.

Not one of the distinguishing features of the cases reviewed immediately above appears in the present case. If we were to extend the blanket of coverage to the facts in this case, the outer limits of coverage would resolve into a vague and indistinct line encompassing a veritable sea of uncertainty. We are not authorized— under the plain provisions of the act — to extend it beyond the limits prescribed in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, supra.

Certiorari is granted and the questioned order quashed.

TERRELL, C. J., and ROBERTS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.


author: O’CONNELL, Justice.

text:
    Alvin T. GREEN, Appellant, v. Jack H. PUTNAM et al., Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Division B.
    March 6, 1957.

      Andrew L. Kennedy, Miami, for appellant.
    Byrd V. Duke, Jr., Miami, for appellees.
   O’CONNELL, Justice.

Green, the appellant, was plaintiff in the court below. Putnam, the appellee, was ■one of the defendants. It is unnecessary to mention the other defendants or their interest in the proceedings or in the property involved herein.

It appears from the pleadings in this cause that Green and Putnam in October 1952 entered into a verbal agreement where-under the parties were to construct, for sale, a residence building on a lot owned by Putnam and his wife. Putnam was to furnish not only the lot but also the necessary finances. Green was to supervise and act as working foreman in the construction. The parties were to share equally the profits from the sale of the residence. It was contemplated that a written partnership agreement would be executed and that the parties would build four other houses on lots to be procured by Putnam.

In his amended complaint Green claims that Putnam on about December 8, 1952 repudiated the oral agreement and refused to execute the partnership agreement, and that as a result thereof he, Green, refused to proceed further with the construction of the residence which was not then completed. In his answer Putnam claims that Green breached the agreement by refusing to proceed with the construction.

On December 12, 1952 Green, pursuant to F.S. Chapter 84, F.S.A., filed a claim of lien on the lot in question and thereafter filed this suit in chancery praying in the alternative that he be found to have either a mechanic’s lien or an equitable lien for the reasonable value of his services and monies advanced in the improvement of said lot.

Green further alleged that he had not received any portion of the profits from sale of the building and had not been compensated for his services or for certain monies advanced by him. It appears that the building had been completed and sold by Putnam to one of the defendants not named in this opinion.

The cause came on for final hearing before the chancellor, and after hearing a part of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, Green, the chancellor terminated the trial and entered an order dismissing the cause.

In his order of dismissal the chancellor recited that it appeared from the testimony of the plaintiff, himself, that:

1. the arrangement whereby plaintiff performed the labor on the defendant Putnam’s land was a “profit-sharing joint em terprise”;

2. the business affairs and finances of said enterprise were under the exclusive management and control of the defendant Putnam, the plaintiff being the working foreman engaged solely in the actual construction of the building; and

3. there was no agreement between the parties for the sharing of losses of the transaction.

The chancellor concluded that the relation between the parties appeared to be a profit-sharing joint enterprise, and that such relation was not compatible or consistent with the existence of a mechanic’s lien under the Florida Statute. He refused to receive further evidence, including evidence of the reasonable value of plaintiff’s services, and terminated the trial. His order of dismissal was with prejudice.

It was error for the chancellor to dismiss the bill for at least two reasons.

First, the plaintiff prayed for relief in the alternative. He sought either a mechanic’s lien or an equitable lien. Assuming, but not deciding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a mechanic’s lien for the reasons cited by the chancellor, the plaintiff might well be entitled to an equitable lien. The chancellor did not decide that plaintiff, on the merits and the evidence, was not entitled to an equitable lien. His order of dismissal in effect was a ruling that the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action. We can not agree for we think such a case may well be a classic example where equity may intervene to impress a lien to prevent inequity or unjust enrichment of one party as against another. And we have held that one who has performed services or furnished materials in the improvement of real property is not limited to proceeding under the mechanics’ lien law, but may proceed to establish an equitable lien on the property in question. Palmer v. Edwards, Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 495.

The second reason for finding the order of dismissal to be error appears on the face of the order.

We construe that in the use of the words “profit-sharing joint enterprise” the chancellor meant a joint venture.

In his order he found such a joint venture to exist and based such finding on the testimony of the plaintiff. Yet he states that the testimony on which he based this finding was to the effect that (1) Putnam, the defendant, had exclusive control of the business affairs and finances while plaintiff was only engaged in the construction and (2) that there was no agreement for sharing of losses.

The finding that the relationship between the parties was that of co-adventurers is inconsistent with one party having exclusive management and control of the transaction and with no provision for sharing of losses.

We have held that mutual control' and an intention to share losses as well as profits are essential elements in a joint venture. Willis v. Fowler, 1931, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358, Albert Pack Corporation v. Fickling Properties, 1941, 146 Fla. 362, 200 So. 907.

While a chancery decree or other judicial pronouncement, otherwise correct, will not be reversed solely because the judge deciding the case has undertaken testate in connection with his decree a wrong reason for arriving at the decision he has made, there is an important exception to-this rule as well settled as the rule itself. That exception is where in deciding a cause-it appears that the chancellor misconceived a controlling principle of law applicable to-the controversy. Knight v. City of Miami, 1937, 127 Fla. 585, 173 So. 801. Here it is clear that the chancellor misconceived the law as relating to the essential factors constituting the relationship of co-adventurers- and his order must be reversed.

We are careful to state that this opinion shall in no way be construed to decide that one co-adventurer who furnishes labor, services or materials in the improvement of real estate owned by the other co-adventurer is not entitled to claim and enforce a lien therefor under F.S. Chapter 84, F.S. A., for he may well be entitled to such a lien. We do not decide this question because it is not before us. To decide it now would require that we assume that the chancellor, after a full trial, will find the parties in this cause to have been co-adventurers. This we are not permitted to do.

The order of dismissal is reversed with directions that the chancellor conduct further proceedings in accordance with law.

TERRELL, C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MANATEE, Appellee.
    Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.
    March 6, 1957.
    W. M. Smiley, Bradenton, for appellant.
    Dewey A. Dye, Jr., of Dye & Dye, Bradenton, for appellee.
   THORNAL, Justice.

The State seeks reversal of a decree validating an issue of bonds.

The sole question is whether the proposed bond issue is valid in the absence of the approving vote of the freeholders prescribed by Section 6, Article IX of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

Manatee County owns and operates a hospital. The County proposes to issue bonds in the amount of $250,000 to finance the cost of constructing additions to the hospital. The schedule of maturities suggests that the bonds will be liquidated in about five years. However, the bond resolution provides that principal and interest to become due on the bonds “is payable from and secured by a first charge on and the pledge of the proceeds derived from an ad valorem levy of not to exceed five (5) mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of all property in Manatee County, Florida, excluding all property exempt by law and homesteads, for a period of fifteen consecutive fiscal years, beginning with the fiscal year 1956-57.” The resolution also provides that the County is under no obligation to pay the principal or interest except from the proceeds of said five-mill levy. The proposal to issue the bonds was not submitted to the freeholders. Nonetheless,, the trial judge was obviously of the view that issuance of the bonds absent freeholder approval was authorized by prior decisions of this Court. He thereupon entered a decree validating the bonds. The State appeals and seeks reversal of the decree of validation.

The appellant contends that Section 6, Article IX of the Florida Constitution prohibits the issuance of the bonds without freeholder approval.

The appellee County contends that the operation of the hospital is an essential function of county government and in the light of certain cited opinions of this Court, freeholder approval is unnecessary.

Preliminary to our consideration of the law applicable, we concede that this record thoroughly demonstrates the importance and ■desirability of the proposed improvement. There is testimony to the effect that in the judgment of the County officials there -would be no question but that the freeholders would approve the issue if it were ■submitted to them. It is further explained in the record that the reason for not submitting the proposal to an election was that in the judgment of the County officials such ■an election would postpone the ultimate issuance of the bonds from eighteen months to two years. Why this is so we are not informed.

The position of the County is founded on an interpretation of Section 135.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which authorizes county commissioners to levy a building tax not exceeding five mills per annum for not more than thirty consecutive years, the proceeds of the tax to be used “to erect or repair any courthouse, jail or other county building * * Appellee submits the view that the county hospital falls within the classification of a “county building” and insists that the hospital is such an essential to the existence of county government that the financing of its improvements by the method here presented is constitutionally sound.

Section 6, Article IX of the Florida Constitution provides in part as follows:

“ * * * the Counties, Districts or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same shall-have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law * *

We are not aware of any provision in the Constitution that is any clearer or more concise and to the point, than the one just quoted. It is totally lacking in ambiguities. It simply but positively and-unequivocally requires a freeholders’ election as a condition precedent to the issuance of county, district or municipal bonds. We do have in the books a line of decisions which hold in effect that courthouses and jails are so completely essential to the very existence of county government that the quoted provision of the Constitution could not have been considered as applicable to them when the constitutional amendment was approved. These decisions all turn on the point of basic and fundamental essentiality of the particular improvements involved. They point out, for example, that in the enforcement of the criminal laws a jail to house offenders is absolutely necessary. The law? could not be enforced without one. Those cases likewise point out that in the conduct of county government it is essential to have a building within which to house the offices, equipment and public records. The essentiality of these two types of structures emphasizes the basic reason for classifying them in a category peculiar unto themselves. No other public improvement occupies the same status. Our decisions have justified the conclusion which we have reached with reference to these two types of building on the fact that the rule establishing their essentiality was thoroughly grounded in our law when Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution was amended as above quoted in 1930.

Despite this limited license which has been taken with the organic law by judicial decree, there are, nevertheless, those who are of the view that the constitutional provision does not even permit of this exception. We must confess that there appears to be some considerable merit to that view when we examine the language of the provision involved. It is not necessary, however, to attempt to reconcile potential conflicts in this instance in order to lead us to the conclusion that, despite the need, justification, convenience and undoubted service that ■ the proposed hospital addition would render, it is not essential to the existence of county government. It can be advanced in reply that there are sick people who need medical care, that there is a shortage of available hospital rooms, that the public health justifies the improvement, but it cannot in our judgment be successfully asserted that the county government would cease to exist if the improvement is not provided. That, in the ultimate, is the test of essentiality required to justify the exception which has heretofore been recognized by our decisions.

The appellee relies on our recent opinion in State v. County of Palm Beach, Fla. 1956, 89 So.2d 607. The majority of the Court there concluded that the construction of a county office building served the same functions as the courthouse and a children’s home otherwise described as a building for the detention primarily of juvenile delinquents and minors coming under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court should both be classified as essential to the administration of county government. It was the view of the majority that the two buildings there involved were well within the classification of courthouses and jails as recognized by prior decisions. However the basic division of the thinking of the Court might be noted by reference to the dissenting and special concurring opinions in the case last cited. Regardless of this, State v. County of Palm Beach, supra, certainly cannot be taken as a precedent for the issuance of ad valorem tax bonds to construct any and every type of county building that might be conceived. The decision is well clothed with the established limitations on the type of structure that will be permitted.

So it was in Tapers v. Richard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39, one of the basic decisions on which this general line of cases is bottomed. There a county was permitted to issue certificates to be liquidated out of the proceeds of an ad valorem levy. The certificates were used to finance the building of a county jail.

To demonstrate distinctions which have been made, reference might be had to Yon v. Orange County, Fla.1949, 43 So.2d 177. Prior cases are there analyzed. In the Yon case it was held that a county could not issue certificates supported by a one-mill levy for five years to obtain money to purchase rights-of-way for highway improvements. It may be argued that in view of the tremendous increase in automobile traffic and the economic importance of a county road system to serve communities of the area, the acquisition of rights-of-way in the improvement of a highway system is essential to the continuity of the government itself. This Court, however, reached a conclusion to the contrary.

The strongest case adverse to the position of the appellee is State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, Fla.1952, 60 So. 2d 747. There in an exhaustive opinion prepared for the majority by the late Justice Mathews it was expressly held that a proposal to issue bonds pledging ad valorem taxes to be used for constructing a county hospital building was invalid in the absence of an approving vote of the freeholders. The able author of that opinion thoroughly covered many of the points which we have made above. Likewise, earlier decisions of this Court were thoroughly analyzed, discussed and either agreed to or decided as not controlling. Reference should be made to that opinion not only for its clear-cut delineation between that which is essential and that which is not, but likewise for its lucid analysis of the reasons for the constitutional provision involved and the practical importance of abiding by its requirements.

Once again we state that when the organic law compels us to conclude that a proposal to finance an important and much desired public improvement is in contravention of the requirements of the Constitution, we do so with reluctance and regret. Nonetheless, we did not write the Constitution. We have no power to tamper with it. Whether Section 6, Article IX, Florida Constitution, is wise and salutary is not within the orbit of our consideration. The people placed the provision in the organic law. Until they remove it, we and all other public officials are bound by it. Any other conclusion would reduce' the Constitution to an obsolete shibboleth.

For the reasons above announced, the decree will have to be—

Reversed.

TERRELL, C. J., and HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.