text:
    Willie Frank DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D07-1208.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 22, 2007.
    Willie Frank Davis, Miami, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and August Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Willie Frank Davis appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Davis was sentenced in 1985 for offenses committed on June 4, 1984. Davis was sentenced under the 1984 guidelines. Davis, however, committed his offenses before the effective date of the 1984 guidelines. See Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982 (Fla.1989) (holding that guidelines did not become effective until adopted by the legislature on July 1, 1984 and those who committed their offenses before the effective date must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines). Thus, if Davis did not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines, his life sentences under those guidelines, which are not parole eligible, are illegal. Davis contends that the record will conclusively show that he did not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines.

The trial court failed to address numerous cases, many of which were specifically cited by Davis in his motion, which hold that this error constitutes an illegal sentence that may be corrected in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Owen v. State, 864 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Smith v. State, 946 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (finding sentence illegal and, even though claim had been previously raised and rejected, application of a procedural bar

would result in a manifest injustice (as defendant would be entitled to parole if a pre-guidelines sentence was imposed)); Wright v. State, 941 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing and remanding in the same situation for attachment of records showing defendant agreed to be sentenced under the guidelines or for resentencing); Sheely v. State, 820 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing the denial of a 3.800(a) motion in the same situation and holding: “A sentence that is entered pursuant to guidelines which have not been constitutionally enacted is an illegal sentence and is subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a)”).

We reverse and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again denies the motion, it must attach record evidence which conclusively shows that Davis affirmatively elected to be sentenced under the guidelines. If Davis did not elect to be sentenced under the guidelines, then he must be resentenced pursuant to Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982 (Fla.1989). We affirm the trial court’s denial of Davis’s claim of scoresheet error.

FARMER, KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MONACO, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    UNIVERSAL CITY DEVELOPMENT etc., et al., Petitioner, v. Mary Ann WILLIAMS, etc., Respondent.
    No. 5D07-832.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 24, 2007.

      Lamar D. Oxford and James A. Wilkinson, of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Carlos Diez-Arguelles, of Martinez, Manglari, Diez-Arguelles & Tejedor, Orlando, for Respondent.
   MONACO, J.

We have certiorari jurisdiction to review this “cat out of the bag” discovery matter. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(2); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91 (Fla.1995); Wooten, Honeywell & Kest, P.A. v. Posner, 556 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Because the discovery order issued by the trial court is overbroad, we grant the writ.

The petitioners, Universal City Development Partners, Ltd., doing business as Universal Studios, and Universal Studios (collectively, “Universal”), own and operate an amusement theme park that featured a ride known as Back To The Future. The respondent, Mary Ann Williams, rode on the attraction, and alleges that during the ride her head “was going wobbly.” She asserts that she felt nauseated, felt funny, and knew that something was not right. Later, the health services personnel at Universal reported that they had seen Ms. Williams and listed her chief complaint as “syncope right sided paralysis.” The report says also that she described a “sudden course, aphasia but conscious,” although no trauma was noted. Apparently, Ms. Williams collapsed after the ride and suffered right side paralysis and aphasia. She was thereafter hospitalized. She was subsequently released from hospitalization with a diagnosis of right side hemiparesis, dysphasia, gait instability, impaired self-care skills and aphasia.

Eventually, Ms. Williams brought suit against Universal seeking damages on a negligence theory. Her complaint alleges that Universal breached the duty of care by (a) operating a ride that had many jerking movements; (b) failing to provide a safe ride; and (c) failing to warn of “hidden dangers.” Universal denied liability.

During the course of discovery Ms. Williams sought the names, addresses and all other information in the possession of Universal of all persons who claimed an injury as a result of riding on the attraction from its inception to the date of the inteiTogatory. Additionally, Ms. Williams sought all medical reports of all persons injured on the ride from inception to the date of the request to produce. Universal objected for the usual reasons, including overbreadth, undue burden and invasion of the privacy rights of the other patrons. Universal did admit that it kept records of such information, however, and did eventually provide some of the information regarding claimed injuries for the three years between the inception of the attraetion and the date of the alleged injury to Ms. Williams.

Eventually the trial court entered an order overruling the objections and requiring Universal to provide the names and addresses of all persons who during a period of seven years, three years prior to the incident to four years after the incident, reported that they suffered from either heart attack, headache, stroke, neck pain, passing out, fainting or dizziness after riding on the Back To The Future attraction. Universal argues that the discovery order is overbroad on a number of levels and seeks a writ of certiorari.

Certiorari is available when a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law and causes material injury throughout the remainder of the case, leaving no adequate remedy on appeal. See Tanchel v. Shoemaker, 928 So.2d 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). It is the appropriate remedy when an overly broad discovery order is issued by the trial court. See Wooten, Honeywell & Rest. We conclude that certiorari relief is warranted in the present case most particularly because once the information concerning persons who previously rode on the attraction is divulged, it cannot later be withdrawn.

First, Universal urges that the time period for the incidents is not sufficiently limited. This argument, we believe, has merit. While we have no difficulty in concluding that the trial court was within its discretion in ordering discovery for the three years prior to the incident, we see no basis for requiring Universal to produce information on events happening subsequent to the incident.

This court has frequently noted that incidents subsequent to an occurrence in question are immaterial in establishing whether a defendant was on notice of the possibility that a claim might arise. See, e.g., Tanchel; Caterpillar Indus., Inc. v. Keskes, 639 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, Universal is charged in the complaint essentially with failing to provide a safe ride and failing to warn of hidden dangers. Boiled down, Ms. Williams wants to use the discovery information in question to demonstrate that Universal had notice of the health risks of its ride. As nothing that happened after the incident would have any bearing on whether Universal had notice of any dangerous propensities of the ride prior to the time that Ms. Williams rode on it, there is virtually no relevant information, or information that could lead to admissible evidence that could emerge from the inquiry. Accordingly, we quash that part of the discovery order requiring discovery of claims information subsequent to the date of the injury alleged in the complaint.

Next, Universal complains that the discovery order is overbroad because it requires it to disclose the names and addresses of those complaining of a stroke, fainting, dizziness, headaches, neck pains or a heart attack after riding on the amusement. Universal says that people suffering from heart attacks and neck pains should not be included in the discovery. There is some merit to this argument.

Florida has long held that before prior accidents or incidents are either discoverable or admissible, the plaintiff must establish that the accidents or incidents are “substantially similar” to the injury in question. See Caterpillar Indus., 639 So.2d at 1130. The leading case on this issue appears to be Perret v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 299 So.2d 590 (Fla.1974). There, the Florida Supreme Court said that:

Subject to the general requirement of similarity of conditions, reasonable proximity in time, and avoidance of confusion of issues, the courts have generally recognized that ... evidence of prior similar injuries resulting from the same appliance as the injury in suit, is admissible for the purpose of showing the existence of dangerous or defective premises or appliances.

Id. at 592. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Without such a limitation we would be sanctioning the conduct of a fishing expedition. See Caterpillar Indus.

Here, neck pains are at least remotely related to the injuries alleged to have been suffered by Ms. Williams. Nothing at this point, however, suggests that the injuries of Ms. Williams are substantially similar to those of persons suffering a heart attack after the ride. If some nexus between heart attacks and the injuries of the respondent are later established, then perhaps this demand might be revisited. At present, however, heart attacks fail the substantially similar test. Accordingly, we quash that part of the order requiring Universal to produce information concerning persons having a heart attack after riding the amusement.

Finally, Universal asserts that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering it to produce the names and addresses of persons who complained of the listed medical issues without protection for the right of privacy of such persons. Once again, we find merit in this position.

Article 1, section 28 of the Florida Constitution, entitled Right of Privacy, was intended to “protect the right to determine whether or not sensitive information about oneself will be disclosed to others.” See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So.2d 538, 536 (Fla.1987). The information involved includes medical information. Id. In Rasmussen the Florida Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of privacy requires the trial court to balance the competing interests that would be implicated by either granting discovery or denying it.

Here, there does not appear to have been any balancing of the interests. The order provides no protection to the persons whose medical information is to be disclosed. At the very least, the medical information to be disclosed by Universal should have any identifying information deleted from it. See, e.g., Haywood v. Samai, 624 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Ventimiglia v. Moffitt, 502 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). For the most part, if notice of the danger of the ride is to be discovered by this information, then having the names, addresses and social security numbers of the previously injured patrons are unnecessary. That is to say, knowing the identification of a few people who got stiff necks on the ride will generally be unhelpful. The fact that they got stiff necks may, however, have some importance in establishing the elements of the pleaded tort.

Moreover, there may be some individuals disclosed for whom further identifying information may, in balance, be appropriate. These individual cases should be weighed separately by the trial court, and if further disclosure is found to be proper, then certainly the delivery of that information may be ordered, provided the trial court takes such steps as good judgment and the balancing of interests would require to honor the right of privacy of those persons provided by our Florida Constitution. Cf., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). Accordingly, we also quash that part of the order compelling the disclosure of the names, addresses and other identifying information of the persons known to Universal who have asserted one of the listed injuries as a result of the ride.

WRIT GRANTED.

THOMPSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      . The ride closed on March 30, 2007.

      . DorlancL’ Illustrated Medical Dictionary (23rd Ed.), defines "syncope” as "a temporary suspension of consciousness due to cerebral anemia.”

      . Dorland’ Illustrated Medical Dictionary (23rd Ed.), defines "aphasia” as "defect or loss of the power of expression by speech, writing or signs, or of comprehending spoken or written language, due to injury or disease of the brain centers.”

      . Dorland’ Illustrated Medical Dictionary (23rd Ed.), defines "hemiparesis” as "muscular weakness affecting one side."

      . Dorland' Illustrated Medical Dictionary (23rd Ed.), defines "dysphasia” as “impairment of speech, consisting in lack of coordination and failure to arrange words in their proper order.”


author: GRIFFIN, J.

text:
    William M. HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-2331.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   GRIFFIN, J.

William M. Hicks appeals an order of revocation of probation. We affirm the order except as to the finding of a violation of condition 2, which has not been proved, and which, accordingly, is stricken. See Blackwelder v. State, 902 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

AFFIRMED as modified.

ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Teresa Lynn WILLS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-1088.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
    Teresa L. Wills, Ocala, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   MONACO, J.

The petitioner, Teresa Lynn Wills, seeks certiorari review of an order of the trial court denying her motion pursuant to rule 3.800(c), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, on jurisdictional grounds. Essentially, Ms. Wills timely filed her rule 3.800(c) motion, but the sixty-day time limit contained within the rule elapsed before the trial court could address its merits. The State properly concedes that the trial court should have sua sponte enlarged the time within which to have a hearing on the motion in accordance with Abreu v. State, 660 So.2d 703 (Fla.1995), and Timmer v. State, 840 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Accordingly, we grant certiorari, quash the trial court’s order denying relief, and remand this matter for the trial court to consider the motion on the merits.

WRIT GRANTED.

SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Steven KILLMEYER, Appellant, v. Amy KILLMEYER, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-1560.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
    Steven N. Killmeyer, pro se.
    Amy Killmeyer-Gildner, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979).

KAHN, BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Preston Walter BOERNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-1820.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 27, 2007.
    Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellant’s supplemental response to order to show cause, dated June 12, 2007, the Court concludes that the motion to withdraw plea of nolo contendere or vacate judgment and sentence, which failed to cite that it was being filed in accordance with any rule and which was filed more than 30 days after the rendition of the appellant’s judgment and sentence, was untimely pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l). The Court sua sponte concludes that the trial court order which denied the motion is void because the trial court had no authority to consider the merits of the motion. See Lepper v. State, 826 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243 (Fla.1997), which states that if a court’s lack of jurisdiction becomes apparent at any stage of the proceedings, the court should enter an appropriate order to remedy the defect). It follows that the untimely filed motion to withdraw plea thus failed to delay rendition of the judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), and consequently the notice of appeal of the judgment and sentence was also untimely pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(3). See McGee v. State, 947 So.2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Accordingly, the appeals of the motion to withdraw plea and the judgment and sentence are dismissed. See Lepper, 826 So.2d at 364. Furthermore, the appellant’s motion for extension of time for filing appellant’s initial brief, filed on July 9, 2007, is denied as moot.

DISMISSED.

ALLEN, WOLF, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

      . Notably, the motion was unsworn and therefore could not be treated as a rule 3.850 motion. See Lepper.


text:
    Mutt J. DANIEL and Robyn M. Daniel, his wife, Appellants, v. Douglas P. WOODCOCK and Corinne D. Woodcock, his wife, Appellees.
    No. 1D07-2514.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 27, 2007.
    Clyde W. Davis, Fernandina Beach, for Appellants.

      No appearance for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of the appellants’ response, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED as premature. See Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243 (Fla.1997) (quashing decision of the appellate court because it lacked jurisdiction even though the stipulated final judgment had incorporated a settlement agreement, which expressly provided for jurisdiction in the appellate court); Lovett v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 187 So.2d 96, 99 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1966) (stating appellate court jurisdiction “cannot be conferred by stipulation or endowed by action of the court”); Irvine v. T. Southwood 1295, Inc., 948 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Crapo, 918 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding pending claims are interrelated and the order is not immediately appealable partial final judgment even if different legal theories or additional facts are involved in the separate counts).

ALLEN, WOLF, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Curtis GRAHAM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-2593.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 27, 2007.
    Bill White, Public Defender, Fourth Judicial Circuit, and Kelly H. Papa, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Thomas Winokur and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the April 5, 2007, judgment and sentence in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2006-CF-16155-AXXX-MA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED.

DAVIS, POLSTON, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nicanor ANDRADE, Petitioner, v. Holly BENSON as the Secretary of Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-2643.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 27, 2007.

      Paul M. Eakin and Teresa H. Ellis of Eakin & Sneed, Atlantic Beach, for Petitioner.
    Ned Luczynski, General Counsel, and Jennifer A. Tschetter, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied on the merits. Petitioner’s request for an award of attorney’s fee is denied.

DAVIS, POLSTON, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    William M. AMICO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEE LEASING SOLUTIONS and Insurance Company of the Americas, Respondents.
    No. 1D07-4084.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 28, 2007.
    Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Croes v. University Community Hosp., 886 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

BROWNING, C.J., PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


author: SALCINES, Judge.

text:
    Michael HARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-5338.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 29, 2007.
   SALCINES, Judge.

Michael Harrell appeals the postconviction court’s order summarily denying his motion to compel his former appointed counsel to turn over numerous documents, free of charge. We affirm the postconviction court’s order without prejudice to Harrell’s right to file a proper petition for writ of mandamus clearly identifying the documents that Harrell claims he is legally entitled to obtain.

In February 2006, Harrell pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced to prison. Three months later, Harrell mailed his counsel a letter requesting numerous documents relating to his case. In his letter, Harrell threatened that if counsel did not comply with his request, he would file a complaint with the Florida Bar and a petition for writ of mandamus with the circuit court. After the Office of the Public Defender responded to Harrell’s letter and indicated that the requested documents were “available through the Clerk of Court upon payment of appropriate fees,” Harrell filed his present motion to compel, but he did not file a petition for writ of mandamus.

Although the postconviction court correctly denied the motion to compel, it should have treated the motion as a petition for writ of mandamus and determined whether it was facially sufficient or if more particularity was required. “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy since it is used to compel an official to perform lawful duties. A court-appointed lawyer is an ‘official.’ ” See Potts v. State, 869 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Pearce v. Sheffey, 647 So.2d 333, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)).

In his motion, Harrell cited Thompson v. Unterberger, 577 So.2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and argued that because he is indigent he is entitled to any transcripts or depositions that were prepared at public expense without charge for copying. He attached a copy of the letter he previously mailed to his counsel requesting numerous other documents. The postconviction court, relying on Potts, 869 So.2d 1223, summarily denied Harrell’s motion to compel, correctly concluding that he did not request any specific personal property or specific transcripts. Additionally, the postconviction court noted that the majority of the documents requested typically reside in the court file and can be obtained from the clerk of court.

We note that Harrell, if indigent, may be entitled to transcripts that were prepared at public expense on his behalf and any personal property he provided to counsel, without charge for copying. See id. at 1225. However, Harrell apparently requested other items that counsel cannot be required to provide without adequate compensation. See id. (citing Thompson, 577 So.2d at 686; Sanford v. Black, 782 So.2d 548, 549 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). Accordingly, we affirm without prejudice to Harrell’s filing of a proper petition for writ of mandamus, specifically identifying the items that he claims he is legally entitled to receive.

Affirmed.

STRINGER and LaROSE, JJ„ Concur.

      . "A party petitioning for a writ of mandamus must establish a clear legal right to performance of the act requested, an indisputable legal duty, and no adequate remedy at law.” Radford v. Brock, 914 So.2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Smith v. State, 696 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). "When a trial court receives a petition for a writ of mandamus, its initial task is assessing the petition to determine whether it is facially sufficient. If it is not facially sufficient, the court may dismiss the petition.” Id. at 1067-68 (quoting Davis v. State, 861 So.2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citations omitted)). "If the petition is facially sufficient, the court must issue an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be issued.” Id. at 1068 (citing Moore v. Ake, 693 So.2d 697, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Conner v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 541 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)).


text:
    NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY OF the SOUTH, Appellant, v. LANDSCAPE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., Ottoniel Deleon and Wenceslao Lopez-Martinez, Appellees.
    No. 4D06-2922.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 29, 2007.

      Carlos D. Cabrera and Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
    Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Jose G. Rodriguez of Jose G. Rodriguez, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee Wen-ceslao Lopez-Martinez.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, the National Indemnity Company of the South (National), appeals from a Final Declaratory Judgment in Favor of the Defendants, Landscape Management Company, Inc. (Landscape) and Ottoniel Deleon (Deleon). The trial court construed the subject National insurance policy in favor of coverage for Landscape and Deleon for personal injury claims brought by Wenceslao Lopez-Martinez (Lopez-Martinez). We affirm the trial court’s final judgment because we conclude that the exclusion provision in the insurance policy is ambiguous and must be construed against National and in favor of Landscape and Deleon.

This action arises out of an injury to Landscape employee Lopez-Martinez, which occurred through the operation of a vehicle owned by Landscape. As a result of the injury, Lopez-Martinez filed a personal injury lawsuit against Deleon, a permanent employee of Landscape who was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident, and Landscape, the employer and owner of the vehicle. National, the insurer of Landscape, filed this action to determine whether the insurance policy provided coverage for Lopez-Martinez’s injuries.

It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Lopez-Martinez was hired by Landscape to fill a seasonal need for workers during the summer growing season. Mr. Torres, the supervising authority for Landscape, asked his permanent employees to help find seasonal labor, and Lopez-Martinez’s brother-in-law, who was a permanent employee of Landscape, referred Lopez-Martinez to Mr. Torres as a result of that inquiry. After a brief interview, Lopez-Martinez was hired with the explicit understanding that the employment would end in the fall. It is also undisputed that on the day of the accident, Landscape was insured under a Commercial General Liability insurance policy issued by National and that all of the terms of the policy had been complied with by the insured. The sole issue at trial was whether the Employee Exclusion provision in the policy excluded coverage for the injuries to Lopez-Martinez.

The “Exclusions” section of the policy provides as follows:

B. Exclusions
4. Employee Indemnification and Employer’s Liability
“Bodily injury” to:
a. An “employee” of the “insured” arising out of and in the course of:
(1) Employment by the “insured”; or
(2) Performing the duties related to the conduct of the “insured’s” business ...

This exclusion is limited in its application by the definition of “employee” contained in the policy. Section V, paragraph F provides that “employee” includes a “leased worker”, but “employee” does not include a “temporary worker”. Furthermore, the terms “leased worker” and “temporary worker” are defined in the policy as:

“Leased worker” means a person leased to you by a labor leasing firm under an agreement between you and the labor leasing firm, to perform duties related to the conduct of your business. “Leased worker” does not include a “temporary worker”.
“Temporary worker” means a person who is furnished, to you to substitute for a permanent “employee” on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions,

(emphasis added). The words “furnished to” are not defined in the policy. Furthermore, the policy does not specify by whom the temporary worker must be furnished to qualify as a “temporary worker” under the policy.

When read as a whole, the exclusion provision provides that if Lopez-Martinez is a “temporary worker,” then he is not an “employee” for purposes of the employee exclusion and, therefore, the National policy provides coverage to Landscape. Because it is undisputed that Lopez-Martinez was hired to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions, the only issue is whether Lopez-Martinez was “furnished to” Landscape within the meaning of the policy. National argued that in order for Lopez-Martinez to be “furnished to” Landscape, it was necessary that a third party, such as a temporary labor leasing company or other business, be involved in the transaction. However, the trial court rejected this argument, finding that the exclusion language did not, by its plain language, require the use of a temporary employment agency or other business in order for a “temporary worker” to be “furnished,” and that to impose such a requirement would amount to rewriting the terms of the policy. The trial court also found that even if the phrase “furnished to you” might be construed as requiring the involvement of a third party in the transaction, the exclusion was ambiguous, and Florida law requires that ambiguous coverage provisions be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. The trial court, construing the policy in favor of coverage for Landscape and Deleon, entered judgment against National.

National appealed, arguing that the temporary worker definition contained in the policy at issue is not ambiguous and that the application of its plain meaning to the undisputed facts of this case clearly established that Lopez-Martinez was not a “temporary worker”. National argues that this is so because Lopez-Martinez was not “furnished to” Landscape by a third-party, such as a temporary labor leasing company or other business, but was interviewed directly by Landscape to obtain employment. The appellees, however, contend that the policy language is ambiguous, and ambiguous coverage provisions are to be construed strictly against the insurer.

The trial court’s interpretation of a contract is a matter of law that is subject to de novo review. Gossett & Gossett, P.A. v. Mervolion, 941 So.2d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). If the policy language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy as bargained for by the parties. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29, 33 (Fla.2000). However, if the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and another limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous. Id. at 34. Ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy. Id. Likewise, ambiguous insurance policy exclusions are construed against the drafter and in favor of the insured. Id. In fact, exclusionary clauses are construed even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses. Id. The insurance company is held responsible for clearly setting forth what damages are excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy. Fayad v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 899 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla.2005).

Based on National’s contention that the policy requires that the temporary worker be supplied by a third party, such as a temporary labor leasing company or other business, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the phrase “furnished to you” is ambiguous. This language is capable of different meanings, one of which affords liability coverage. For example, because the language of the policy does not explicitly require that the temporary worker be furnished to Landscape by a third party, such as a temporary worker leasing company or other business, a reasonable interpretation is that the worker could be furnished to Landscape by any person or company, including another employee of the employer, as was the case here. Because the policy is silent as to who must furnish the person to Landscape for the person to qualify as a temporary worker, and there are several reasonable interpretations as to who that might be, the policy is ambiguous. That being the case, the ambiguity must be construed against the insurer, and Lopez-Martinez qualifies as a “temporary worker”. Consequently, the exclusion does not apply, and coverage must be provided.

In sum, National failed to explicitly require in its policy that a third party, such as a temporary labor leasing company or other business, furnish the person to Landscape in order for a person to qualify as a “temporary worker” under the insurance policy. Because it is the insurer’s responsibility to clearly set forth what damages are excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy and ambiguous provisions are construed even more strictly against the insurer, we conclude that the trial court did not err in construing the policy in favor of coverage for Landscape and Deleon. The Final Declaratory Judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GUNTHER, HAZOURI, JJ., and METZGER, ELIZABETH A., Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Yolanda MARCELLUS, Appellant, v. Marilyn CRONAN, Appellee.
    No. 4B06-4826.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 29, 2007.

      Michael J. Long of Metnick, Levy & Long, P.A., Delray Beach, for appellant.
    Donna M. Krusbe of Billing, Cochran, Heath, Lyles, Mauro & Anderson, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant Marcellus timely appeals a final judgment entered after a jury verdict rendered in favor of Cronan in an automobile negligence action.

Marcellus filed a complaint against Cro-nan, asserting Cronan was negligent for rear-ending a vehicle in which Marcellus was a passenger. At trial, counsel for Marcellus requested that the jury instruction pertaining to the presumption of negligence in rear-end automobile accidents be given to the jury. The trial court declined to give such instruction, finding that sufficient testimony had been presented to the jury indicating that the vehicle in which Marcellus was a passenger may have been improperly parked or stopped on the shoulder of a roadway at the time of the accident, versus properly positioned waiting for traffic to move forward.

‘“A rebuttable presumption of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle’ ” when a rear-end collision occurs. Ortlieb v. Butts, 849 So.2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting Yellow Cab Co. of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Betsey, 696 So.2d 769, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). However, the presumption of negligence may be rebutted, if the defendant driver presents “ ‘evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed.’ ” Id. (quoting Yellow Cab, 696 So.2d at 771 and citing Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26, 29 (Fla.1965)). If a defendant presents evidence at trial that fairly and reasonably rebuts the presumption of negligence, the issue of the defendant’s negligence must then be presented to the jury for determination without the aid of the presumption. Id. (citing Baughman v. Vann, 390 So.2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)).

Despite Marcellus’s argument that the automobile accident at issue was the result of a rear-end collision, the trial court found Cronan had presented sufficient evidence to the jury that fairly and reasonably tended to show that Cronan was not negligent, thereby, rebutting the presumption of negligence that would arise in a standard, rear-end collision case. We agree. As such, under the facts of this case, we find that the trial judge properly denied Marcellus’s request to give the instruction pertaining to the presumption of negligence in rear-end collision accidents.

Affirmed.

GUNTHER, HAZOURI, JJ„ and METZGER, ELIZABETH A., Associate Judge, concur.


author: LaROSE, Judge.

text:
    Robert STRICKROTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-2768.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 31, 2007.

      Peter M. Collins, Sarasota, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   LaROSE, Judge.

Robert Strickroth appeals his conviction for cocaine possession; he pleaded no contest, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). The trial court sentenced Mr. Strickroth to eighteen months of probation. Because the police lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Strickroth, we reverse.

Facts

Following the receipt of anonymous complaints over several weeks about illegal drug transactions, Sarasota Police Officer Shanafelt and several other officers set up surveillance of an apartment complex. The surveillance was an impromptu endeavor of these patrol officers. Officer Shanafelt had been a police officer for eight years. He had no formal narcotics training but had made approximately seventy-five drug arrests. Officer Shanafelt had arrested someone near the apartment complex two weeks earlier for possession of cocaine.

During his surveillance, Officer Shanaf-elt, from a distance, saw two men “counting things out in their hands.” He did not see what they were holding. Nevertheless, he interpreted this as “indicative of somebody selling rock cocaine.” From about fifty feet away, Officer Shanafelt observed what he believed were three drug transactions. The first involved an encounter between the two men and a man on a bicycle. The bicyclist left the area without incident. The second involved a pedestrian who exchanged something with the two men, then left the area. Although he did not see what was exchanged, Officer Shanafelt called a nearby patrol unit and instructed them to stop and investigate the pedestrian whom he described. Cocaine was found on the pedestrian, who described the seller to the patrol officer. Our record is silent as to whether Officer Shanafelt knew these facts when he observed the third transaction.

In the third transaction, Officer Shanaf-elt saw one of the two men he was watching — whom we now know matched the description given by the pedestrian in the second encounter — approach a white van with a stripe and exchange something with the driver. Again, Officer Shanafelt did not see what changed hands. He was confident, however, that he had seen a drug transaction. He, again, called a nearby patrol unit and directed them to stop the van.

Officer Worthington, who responded to the call, stopped the van and ordered the driver, Mr. Strickroth, to exit the vehicle. No one else was in the van. Officer Wor-thington’s practice was to assume that everyone she stopped was armed. Accordingly, she immediately handcuffed Mr. Strickroth. As it turned out, Mr. Strick-roth was not armed and Officer Worthing-ton had no objective information suggesting that he was armed or dangerous. Two other officers arrived promptly at the scene. They put Mr. Strickroth in their police car and searched him. They found cocaine in his pocket.

In denying Mr. Strickroth’s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that the police had probable cause to believe that he possessed cocaine. The trial court specifically found that Mr. Strickroth was arrested when Officer Worthington ordered him out of the van and handcuffed him.

Analysis

Florida law recognizes three levels of police-citizen encounters: (1) a consensual encounter involving minimal police contact in which the citizen is free to leave; (2) an investigatory stop requiring “a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity”; and (8) an arrest supported by “probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed.” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). The parties do not dispute that Officer Worthington had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Mr. Strickroth. See id. at 187.

But, the trial court concluded that Mr. Strickroth was under arrest the moment Officer Worthington ordered him out of the van and immediately handcuffed him. The record supports this factual determination, and we see no legal basis to disturb the trial court’s ruling on this point. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 (Fla.2001). Thus, we must consider whether Officer Worthington had probable cause to arrest Mr. Strickroth. We recognize that Officer Worthington acted on instructions from Officer Shanafelt. Consequently, our examination necessarily focuses on whether Officer Shanafelt had probable cause that could be imputed to Officer Worthington.

“[Reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State v. Hendrex, 865 So.2d 531, 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Probable cause to arrest, however, demands a heightened level of certainty about the suspect’s involvement in a crime. Revels v. State, 666 So.2d 213, 215-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Factors supporting a finding of probable cause include (1) evidence of the officers’ training and experience in drug investigations; (2) well-planned and well-controlled surveillance procedures; (3) actual proof of the area’s history of drug activity; (4) detailed proof of prior drug sales immediately preceding the arrest; (5) prior knowledge of a suspect’s involvement in drug activity; and (6) a detailed written arrest report that confirms factual details that establish probable cause. Id. at 216-17. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Officer Shanafelt and, by extension, Officer Worthington, lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Strickroth.

As noted earlier, Officer Shanaf-elt had no formal narcotics training and was participating in what can be best described as a spontaneous surveillance. Although Officer Shanafelt had made a drug arrest in the general area two weeks earlier, the surveillance was set up based on anonymous complaints. Our record does not disclose that Officer Shanafelt had any prior knowledge concerning Mr. Strickroth’s drug activity or whether the two men he was watching were known drug dealers. Significantly, we cannot say that Officer Shanafelt, at the time he observed the encounter with Mr. Strick-roth, knew that the pedestrian from the second transaction had been arrested with cocaine obtained from a person whom Officer Shanafelt later saw with Mr. Strick-roth. Particularly important is the fact that Officer Shanafelt did not see cash or drugs change hands in any of the three transactions he observed. In Revels, 666 So.2d 213, we held that the surveilling officers had probable cause to radio a patrol officer to stop and search the defendant. Revels, however, involved experienced narcotics officers who actually saw currency exchanged for a small object. See id. at 214. That the officers saw money exchanged was “critical to our decision.” Id. at 215.

Our decision in Burnette v. State, 658 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), is more to the point. There, the officers saw a “hand-to-hand” transaction, but saw no money or drugs change hands. The sur-veilling officers radioed other officers, who stopped Mr. Burnette’s car and found cocaine. Id. Although the officers had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, we held that they lacked probable cause for an arrest. Id. We come to the same conclusion here.

Based on Officer Shanafelt’s observations and directions, Officer Worthington had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. As the trial court correctly concluded, however, she immediately arrested Mr. Strickroth. Burnette compels us to conclude that the officers arrested Mr. Strickroth without probable cause. See id.; Cocke v. State, 889 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Johnson v. State, 813 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that handcuffing temporary detainee was improper where not reasonably justified by threat to officer’s safety or suspect’s attempt to flee). Consequently, the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. Mr. Strickroth’s conviction cannot stand.

Reversed.

SALCINES and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.

      . "[T]he collective knowledge of police investigating a crime is imputed to each member under a rule of law often called the fellow officer rule’ or 'collective knowledge doctrine.’ ” Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 648, 657 (Fla.1995); see also State v. Marrero, 890 So.2d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). It can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers of whom at least one possesses the required level of suspicion. See State v. Peterson, 739 So.2d 561, 565 (Fla.1999).


author: WALLACE, Judge.

text:
    Antonio BRAVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-1760.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 31, 2007.

      Keith P. Ligori, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard E. MacDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   WALLACE, Judge.

Antonio Bravo appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed on him after he pleaded no contest to trafficking in amphetamine. Mr. Bravo reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s dispositive order denying his motion to suppress contraband that he discarded during a tussle with law enforcement officers. Because Mr. Bravo abandoned the contraband after an arrest based on probable cause, we affirm his judgment and sentence.

I. THE FACTS

The facts in this case are undisputed. On the afternoon of April 12, 2002, Sergeant Charles Michael Baldwin of the Polk County Sheriffs Office executed a warrant for the arrest of John Doe at Mr. Doe’s residence in Polk County. Sergeant Baldwin was accompanied by two agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (the DEA), Armando Guerrero and Terry Corn. The charges against Mr. Doe in the warrant were for the sale of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. Based on events that occurred during his arrest, Mr. Doe was also charged with possession of cannabis and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Shortly after his arrest, Mr. Doe agreed to cooperate with the officers in exchange for their promise to inform the State Attorney about his “substantial assistance.” To that end, Mr. Doe identified Mr. Bravo as his methamphetamine supplier and agreed to arrange a purchase of the drug from Mr. Bravo. Later that afternoon and evening, Mr. Doe made several telephone calls from his residence to Mr. Bravo at Mr. Bravo’s place of employment. The three officers monitored and recorded these calls. During one of the calls, Mr. Doe told Mr. Bravo that he had enough money to purchase “one,” indicating one ounce of methamphetamine. Mr. Bravo responded that he would come to Mr. Doe’s residence when Mr. Bravo completed his duties at work. Notably, Mr. Bravo also told Mr. Doe, “I’ll bring as much as I can.”

On the day Mr. Doe was arrested, the officers had never previously used him as an informant. Nevertheless, one or more of the DEA agents — including Agent Corn — had previously conducted surveillance operations against Mr. Bravo. As a result of this surveillance, the agents had a photograph of Mr. Bravo and had already identified him as the person they suspected was acting as Mr. Doe’s methamphetamine supplier. The agents had also seen Mr. Doe at Mr. Bravo’s place of employment. In addition to making the monitored telephone calls, Mr. Doe told the officers that he generally purchased one-half ounce of methamphetamine from Mr. Bravo. Mr. Doe also told the officers that Mr. Bravo made the deliveries at Mr. Doe’s residence using a red sports utility vehicle. Finally, Mr. Doe supplied the interesting detail that Mr. Bravo wrapped the drugs in black electrical tape — forming a “black ball” — and carried them in his pocket.

At 9 p.m. that evening, Mr. Bravo called Mr. Doe and said that he was in the area and would be arriving shortly. The three officers remained stationed inside Mr. Doe’s house. They were wearing “raid vests” that identified them as law enforcement officers. The officers recognized Mr. Bravo when he arrived at the residence about ten minutes after the last telephone call. He was driving a red sports utility vehicle. Mr. Doe greeted Mr. Bravo on the porch and made small talk while he led Mr. Bravo into the living room.

As soon as Mr. Bravo entered the living room, the officers emerged from hiding and began what Sergeant Baldwin would later describe as “the takedown.” The three officers announced: “Police[!] You’re under arrest[!]” Next, Agents Guerrero and Corn attempted to grab Mr. Bravo’s arms and handcuff him. The force of this encounter spun Mr. Bravo around so that he was facing Sergeant Baldwin. The sergeant watched as Mr. Bravo reached into one of his pockets, removed some items, and threw the items to the living room floor. After these objects landed on the floor, Agents Guerrero and Corn were able to handcuff Mr. Bravo.

Sergeant Baldwin immediately retrieved the items that Mr. Bravo had thrown to the floor. He found a package of cigarettes and what appeared to be a ball of black electrical tape. Inside the electrical tape were two baggies containing methamphetamine. Then the officers searched Mr. Bravo and recovered $1270 in United States currency.

II. THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER

Sergeant Baldwin and Agent Guerrero were the only witnesses who testified at the hearing on Mr. Bravo’s motion to suppress. After the hearing, the trial court entered a lengthy written order with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the initial encounter between Mr. Bravo and the two DEA agents that had prompted him to discard the contraband was not an arrest but rather “a detention, based on reasonable suspicion.” The trial court concluded that “because it was not until after [Mr. Bravo] threw the drugs on the ground that the arrest was achieved, the arrest was supported by probable cause pursuant to the plain view doctrine.” On these grounds, the trial court ruled that “the detention and subsequent arrest were properly supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause, respectively.”

III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

We employ a mixed standard of review in considering the trial court’s ruling on Mr. Bravo’s motion to suppress. The trial court’s determination of historical facts enjoys a presumption of correctness and is subject to reversal only if not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. However, the trial court’s determinations on mixed questions of law and fact and its legal conclusions are subject to de novo review. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001); E.B. v. State, 866 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

IV. MR. BRAVO’S ARGUMENTS

On appeal, Mr. Bravo appears to concede that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would have justified his temporary detention. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (identifying three levels of police-citizen encounters, including (1) a consensual encounter, (2) a temporary detention or investigatory stop, and (3) an arrest). But Mr. Bravo contends that the trial court erred in finding that the officers had conducted only a temporary detention before he discarded the contraband. Mr. Bravo argues that the officers simply arrested him — without probable cause. If Mr. Bravo was illegally arrested, it follows that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. A suspect who abandons or discards property as a result of an illegal stop or arrest does so involuntarily, and the abandoned or discarded property must be suppressed. See State v. Anderson, 591 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla.1992); Baggett v. State, 849 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

V. FRAMING THE ISSUES

Based on Mr. Bravo’s arguments, the initial question we address is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the law enforcement officers temporarily detained Mr. Bravo to further their investigation and arrested him only after he discarded the contraband. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then we must affirm Mr. Bravo’s judgment and sentence. But if the answer to this question is in the negative, then we must address the State’s alternative argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Bravo as soon as he walked into Mr. Doe’s living room. See § 901.15(3), Fla. Stat. (2001); Popple, 626 So.2d at 186 (stating that an arrest “must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed”).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Temporary Detention or Arrest?

The trial court based its legal reasoning largely on this court’s decision in State v. Hendrex, 865 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In Hendrex, the defendant had been arrested after police officers, with guns drawn, ordered him to get out of his car and lie on the ground. Id, at 533. The defendant “removed a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance from his ... pocket and placed it on the ground ... as he lay down.” Id. The Hendrex court determined that the initial stop was “an investigatory stop and not an arrest” and that the defendant’s voluntary production of the contraband provided the probable cause to convert the stop into an arrest. Id. at 534. Here, the trial court determined that the officers’ initial encounter with Mr. Bravo was similar to the stop under review in Hendrex and that Mr. Bravo’s jettison of the black ball provided the necessary probable cause to justify his arrest.

We disagree. Sergeant Baldwin testified that when Mr. Bravo entered Mr. Doe’s residence, “[tjhere was no real time lapse” and that the events happened “very quick[ly].” The sergeant explained that Mr. Doe led Mr. Bravo into the living room where Agent Guerrero and Agent Corn “attempt[ed] to detain him.” Sergeant Baldwin said that Mr. Bravo “turned facing me upon being taken down” and pulled the black ball containing the contraband from his pocket before the agents were able to secure his hands. Agent Guerrero testified that he did not see Mr. Bravo throw anything on the floor while the agents were restraining him. He described his encounter with Mr. Bravo, stating, “I approached him and attempted to grab his arm and place handcuffs on him.” The agent said that his mask interfered •with his ability to see everything that happened. He continued, “[W]hen I made contact with him, there was a little slight scuffle trying to get the handcuffs on him, and my mask was, you know, was thrown around my face a bit until we were able to handcuff him.”

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Baldwin described the incident in Mr. Doe’s living room as a “take-down.” The sergeant testified that the officers believed that they had probable cause to arrest Mr. Bravo before he entered the residence. Before Mr. Bravo had even walked into the house, the officers’ plan was to arrest him and search him. Neither Sergeant Baldwin nor Agent Corn testified that they intended to advance their investigation by speaking with Mr. Bravo before proceeding further. What is more, neither of the officers ever suggested during the hearing that they believed that they needed to search Mr. Bravo because they were concerned for their safety. Furthermore, the officers’ testimony did not indicate that their plans changed once Sergeant Baldwin saw Mr. Bravo discard the black ball. Rather, Sergeant Baldwin testified that the officers intended to arrest and search Mr. Bravo “based on the totality of the circumstances of ... the phone calls, ... the time frame of his arrival, the description of his vehicle upon arrival, the identification of him upon arrival, and the fact that he entered into the residence.” Without question, the scope of the search that the officers had in mind exceeded the limited pat-down search for weapons that would have been permissible during a temporary detention of Mr. Bravo. See Frazier v. State, 789 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (recognizing that a pat-down search may be executed if, “during a lawful investigatory stop, [the] officer has probable cause to believe that a subject is armed” and noting that once the officer determines that there are no weapons present, the search should end).

To resolve the question of whether the officers temporarily detained Mr. Bravo or arrested him, we consider the elements of an arrest. An arrest includes the following four elements:

(1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2)[a]n actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3)[a] communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4)[a]n understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.

Melton v. State, 75 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1954) (citations omitted). Reviewing the facts of this case in light of these four elements, we note the following. First, the officers’ admitted intention was to arrest Mr. Bravo. Second, Mr. Bravo was seized when the two DEA agents grabbed his arms and began to place handcuffs on him. Third, as soon as Mr. Bravo had entered Mr. Doe’s living room, the officers announced their status as law enforcement officials and informed Mr. Bravo that he was under arrest. Fourth, Mr. Bravo clearly understood that the officers’ intention was to arrest him. Thus all of the elements of an arrest are present here. See State v. Gonzalez, 870 So.2d 200, 201-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a suspect had been placed under arrest when he was rushed by law enforcement officers, ordered out of his car at gunpoint, thrown to the ground, and handcuffed while lying face down on a parking lot).

For these reasons, we conclude that the officers arrested Mr. Bravo as soon as he entered Mr. Doe’s living room. The trial court incorrectly determined that the officers’ initial stop of Mr. Bravo was an investigatory stop that became an arrest only after Mr. Bravo discarded the black ball.

B. Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause?

Having determined that the officers’ arrest of Mr. Bravo was immediate rather than deferred until after he had discarded the contraband, we must now reach the question of whether they had probable cause to make the arrest or if the officers acted based on a mere suspicion. In addressing this question, we “consider the ‘totality of [the] circumstances’ that led to the discovery of [the] evidence.” Hendrex, 865 So.2d at 533 (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1128 (Fla.1995)). Sergeant Baldwin testified that either Agent Corn or another DEA agent had already conducted surveillance operations on Mr. Bravo. Further, the sergeant testified, “I heard on the other end of the phone Mr. Bravo telling Mr. [Doe] that he would be there when he got off work, and he would bring as much as he could when he got off work.” (Emphasis added.) Sergeant Baldwin- also testified that the final telephone conversation between Mr. Doe and Mr. Bravo was a call from Mr. Bravo to Mr. Doe that occurred approximately ten minutes before Mr. Bravo arrived at Mr. Doe’s residence. During that call, Mr. Bravo said that he would be arriving at Mr. Doe’s residence “very soon.” Mr. Bravo did not present any evidence to contradict the sergeant’s testimony on these points. Instead, he merely noted that the officers could not be certain of the identity of the person with whom Mr. Doe was speaking on the telephone.

Mr. Bravo correctly observes that most of the officers’ information was obtained from Mr. Doe, who did not have a record as a reliable, confidential informant. However, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that Mr. Doe was a reliable, albeit unproven, informant for many of the same reasons that we found the informant in Hendrex to be reliable: Mr. Doe demonstrated his ability to influence and predict Mr. Bravo’s behavior, and Mr. Doe’s statements were against his own penal interest and reflected his desire to “curry favor with the authorities.” See Hendrex, 865 So.2d at 535. Mr. Doe was unlikely to get his “substantial assistance” letter from the officers if he misled them. Furthermore, the detailed information that Mr. Doe gave the officers indicated that he had first-hand knowledge of Mr. Bravo’s drug-selling activities — a fact that the officers already suspected from their observations of Mr. Doe at Mr. Bravo’s place of employment. See State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1128 (Fla.1995) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (noting that an informant’s basis of knowledge continues to be a “ ‘relevant consideration [ ]’ in an overall totality of circumstances analysis”).

Although the officers did not observe Mr. Bravo committing any crime before they arrested him, they did verify the details that Mr. Doe had provided about the color and model of Mr. Bravo’s vehicle and the typical transaction wherein he would deliver the methamphetamine at Mr. Doe’s residence. The officers had also identified Mr. Bravo from their prior surveillance operations. Most important, the officers had heard the person on the telephone that Mr. Doe identified as Mr. Bravo stating that he would bring as much as he could. The officers reasonably believed that this statement was a promise to deliver a quantity of methamphetamine. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe that Mr. Bravo was engaged in committing a felony when he entered Mr. Doe’s residence. Here, because the officers verified the details “except for the final one of the commission of the crime,” the arrest was valid. State v. Flowers, 566 So.2d 50, 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Butler, 655 So.2d at 1129-31 (approving Flowers, 566 So.2d at 51, and State v. Brown, 556 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)).

VII. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the trial court properly denied Mr. Bravo’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Bravo’s judgment and sentence.

Affirmed.

FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

      . The name "John Doe” is a pseudonym.

      . We commend the trial court for its thorough and thoughtful order disposing of Mr. Bravo’s motion to suppress. The trial court’s order has facilitated this court’s review of this case.

      . Mr. Bravo does not contend that the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a temporary detention.

      . We may consider the State’s alternative argument under the rule of appellate efficiency commonly referred to as the "tipsy coachman” rule. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906-07 (Fla.2002); Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644-45 (Fla.1999).

      . The officer's characterization of the incident after the fact is not controlling. However, this court understands that the term "take-down” — when used in this context — denotes an arrest. See Johnson v. State, 581 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). In sports, the term "takedown” refers to "[a] move or maneuver in wrestling or the martial arts in which a standing opponent is forced to the floor.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1764 (4th ed.2000). Law enforcement officers often employ such a move or maneuver when making an arrest. It is for this reason that we suppose that the word "takedown” has become a slang expression for the arrest of a suspect by a police officer. See takedown-Wiktionary, http://en. wiktionary.org/wiki/takedown (last visited Aug. 10, 2007).

      . In fact, Mr. Bravo was unarmed.


text:
    In re Vicki Kemp CRUSE.
    No. 07-B-1716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2007.
   ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Vicki Kemp Cruse, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Vicki Kemp Cruse, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19531, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.3, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceedings in 07-B-1529 be dismissed as moot.

/s/ Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re J. Maurice THOMAS.
    No. 2007-B-0994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 23, 2007.
   ORDER

Considering the record of these matters,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, J. Maurice Thomas, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27307, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter bearing this court’s docket number 07-B-0994 be remanded to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the proceedings numbered 07-DB-029 as well as any pending investigative matters. After appropriate consideration of the consolidated matters, the board is directed to issue a single recommendation of discipline to this court encompassing all disciplinary matters involving respondent.

/s/ Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Rick Allan MAYER.
    No. 07-OB-1292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 28, 2007.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Resignation from the Practice of Law Filed by Rick Allen Meyer,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Rick Allan Mayer, Louisiana Bar Roll number 15013, seeking to voluntarily resign from the practice of law in the State of Louisiana pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVIII, § 5, be and is hereby granted.

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Melvin BURMASTER v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH GOVERNMENT.
    No. 2007-CA-1311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 31, 2007.
   PER CURIAM.

hThe State of Louisiana invokes the appellate jurisdiction of this court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), on the ground that the district court declared Act No. 545 of the 2006 Regular Session to be unconstitutional.

Pretermitting the merits, we find the appeal is not properly before this court. Article V, § 5(D) vests appellate jurisdiction in this court in cases in which “a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional_” A review of the district court’s judgment indicates the court merely denied defendant’s exception of no cause of action. Nothing in the judgment declares a law or ordinance unconstitutional.

Although the district court’s oral reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of Act 545, it is well-settled law that the trial court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 1918; see also Carmena v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office, 06-2680 (La.2/2/07), 947 So.2d 715; Haynes v. United Parcel Service, 05-2378 (La.7/6/06), 933 So.2d 765; Spiers v. Roye, 04-2189 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/10/06), 927 So.2d 1158; Davis v. Hoffman, 00-2326 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/24/01), 800 So.2d 1028; LaRocca v. Bailey, 01-0618 (La.App. 3rd Cir.11/7/01), 799 So.2d 1263; City of Kaplan v. Mayard, 616 So.2d 826 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1993); Marino v. Marino, 576 So.2d 1196 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991).

Because there is no declaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, there is no basis for the exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

      . Act 545 enacted La. R.S. 9:2800(H)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
      (H)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, except for gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon liability imposed under Civil Code Articles 2317 and 2317.1 against a public entity for any damages arising from hurricanes Katrina or Rita, including aftereffects of either hurricanes and post-hurricane restoration, repair, cleaning and construction.

      The provisions of this Subsection shall be given retroactive application to August 26, 2005.


text:
    In re Clark C. ROY.
    No. 2007-OB-0929.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 31, 2007.
   hON APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT

PER CURIAM.

In 2004, petitioner, Clark C. Roy, was suspended from the practice of law for three years, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension, pursuant to a petition for consent discipline. In re: Roy, 04-0635 (La.4/30/04), 872 So.2d 464. The disciplinary proceeding stemmed from several complaints against petitioner, generally alleging that he neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, misled his clients concerning the status of their legal matters, and failed to refund unearned fees. This misconduct was directly attributable to petitioner’s alcoholism.

Following his suspension, petitioner successfully completed an inpatient substance abuse treatment program and made substantial progress in maintaining his sobriety. Thereafter, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement, asserting that he has complied with the reinstatement criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) took no position concerning petitioner’s reinstatement. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule XIX, § 24(F) and (G), the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

After considering the evidence presented, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be conditionally reinstated to the practice of law. The disciplinary board agreed that petitioner has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement by clear |?and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the board recommended to this court that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law, subject to certain conditions regarding his recovery agreement with the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”). Neither petitioner nor the ODC objected to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and reinstate petitioner to the practice of law, subject to the condition that he must extend his LAP contract for a period of five years and fully comply with the terms and conditions thereof. The ODC shall monitor respondent’s compliance with his recovery agreement and notify this court of any violation, which may be grounds for immediately transferring respondent to disability inactive status, or placing him on interim suspension, as appropriate.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Clark C. Roy, Louisiana Bar Roll number 8220, be immediately reinstated to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth herein. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.

       Knoll, J., recused.

      . Petitioner’s current LAP contract expires on September 20, 2007. The five-year extension which is a condition of petitioner's reinstatement will subject him to monitoring by LAP through 2012.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Warren A. WALLACE.
    No. 2006-KH-2555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 31, 2007.
   PER CURIAM.

Writ granted. Relator’s sentence is amended to delete the term “without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence” from his sentence. The trial court exceeded its authority when it imposed a 12-year sentence for aggravated incest, pursuant to a plea agreement, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The court-accepted plea agreement between relator and the state did not include any provision that the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence and the penalty provisions of R.S. 14:78.1(D) do not provide for such a term. As such, the trial court erred by imposing this illegal condition as part of the sentence. Cf. State v. Terrebonne, 01-2632, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/02), 822 So.2d 149, 151 (remand for resentencing required for defendant who pled guilty, pursuant to plea agreement, to offense of aggravated incest, when trial court’s imposition of sentence for such offense was more onerous than that called for by the terms of court-accepted plea agreement, as trial court ordered that sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and plea agreement did not contain such a condition).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cecil C. JONES.
    No. 06-KO-3025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 31, 2007.
   PER CURIAM.

Granted in part. Defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the denial of diminution of sentence for good behavior under La.R.S. 15:571.3(C). See State v. Narcisse, 97-3161, p. 1 (La.6/26/98), 714 So.2d 698, 699 (Department of Corrections lacks authority to deny diminution of sentence for good behavior on a sentence imposed for a crime enumerated in La. R.S. 15:571.3(0(1), “in a case in which the trial court has not formally adjudicated and sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.”); see La.R.S. 15:571.3(0(2) and (3). In all other respects, the application is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cecil C. JONES.
    No. 2006-K-2905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 31, 2007.
   PER CURIAM.

Granted in part. Defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the denial of diminution of sentence for good behavior under La.R.S. 15:571.3(C). See State v. Narcisse, 97-3161, p. 1 (La.6/26/98), 714 So.2d 698, 699 (Department of Corrections lacks authority to deny diminution of sentence for good behavior on a sentence imposed for a crime enumerated in La. R.S. 15:571.3(0(1), “in a case in which the trial court has not formally adjudicated and sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender under the provisions of La.R.S. 15:529.1.”); see La.R.S. 15:571.3(0(2) and (3). In all other respects, the application is denied.


author: KIMBALL, J.,

text:
    BEUTLER ENGLAND CLINIC (Marie Kershaw) v. MERMENTAU RICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1778.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2007.
   In re Mermentau Rice Inc. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 3, No. 03-01253; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 07-00949.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

KIMBALL, J.,

concurs and assigns reasons. While I question the Hearing Officer’s application of La. R.S. 23:1318 to grant Plaintiffs motion to quash the subpoenas issued in connection with the motion to recuse hearing upon which this writ has been filed, I concur in denial because Defendant did not seek timely review of that ruling in this Court.

JOHNSON, J., concurs for reasons assigned by Justice Kimball.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonas BRUCE.
    No. 2007-OK-1790.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2007.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Stay Proceedings, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 470-817; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KM-112.

Stay denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Don MORELAND.
    No. 2007-KK-1815.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 10, 2007.
   In re Moreland, Don; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 501499; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 1780.

Stay denied; Writ denied.


text:
    Michelle MARSHALL, et al. v. AIR LIQUIDE-BIG THREE, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1832.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2007.
   In re Air Liquide — Big Three, Inc., f/k/a Lincoln Big Three, Inc.; Air Liquide America Corporation; Air Liquide America L.P.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2005-8706; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1184.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Amanda GUTWEILER aka Amanda Hypes.
    No. 2006-K-2596.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 265037; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 06-561.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James DUNN.
    No. 2007-KK-0878.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff: Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 98-36.

Granted.


text:
    CALCASIEU PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. LEWING CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. et al.
    No. 2006-C-1645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Company;— Third Party; Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2002-4241; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-928.

Granted. Case remanded to Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in 06-C-1827, Supreme Services & Specialty Inc. v. Sonny Green, Inc.


text:
    Lt. Rickey JONES v. CITY OF NATCHITOCHES POLICE DEPT., et al.
    No. 2007-C-1139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re City of Natchitoches Police Dept, et al.; Natchitoches City of; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 78,525-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 06-1387.

Writ granted. The judgment of the trial court is reinstated; the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The decision of the Board to terminate employment was made in good faith for legal cause.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant and docket.


text:
    In re CONFIDENTIAL PARTY.
    No. 2007-OB-1692.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Confidential Party; — Plaintiff; Applying for Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status Pursuant to Rule XIX § 22(C) Office of Disciplinary Counsel, No. 05-OB-056.

Petition for transfer to disability inactive status denied. Respondent has not produced any evidence demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration of our prior disposition of this matter.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert WILLIAMS, II.
    No. 2007-KK-799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Williams, Robert II; — Defendants); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated June 1, 2007; Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 16309-04, 16297-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 07-00304.

Reconsideration not considered.


text:
    Leonard DUNBAR v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2007-C-0919.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Leonard Dunbar; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated, June 22, 2007, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, No. 533,169; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit No. 2006 CA 0848.

Reconsideration not considered. See Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Weldon WILLIAMS.
    No. 2003-KP-3077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Williams, Weldon; — Defendant Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated September 3, 2004; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 370-260; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-1740.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry SURRATT and Cynthia Anderson.
    No. 2006-K-2100.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Anderson, Cynthia; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated June 1, 2007; Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 66,513FA; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1406.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-087.
    No. 2006-OB-2456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Batiste, John P.; — Other; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-087.

Denied.


text:
    Sandra BORDELEON, Darren Bordeleon Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child, Darren M. Bordeleon v. STATE of Louisiana, Through DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Louisiana State of et al.; Public Safety and Corrections Dept, of; State Fire Marshal’s Office of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, Nos. 573-892, 592-319; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 07-C-367, 07-C-366.

Writ denied. Stay denied.


text:
    Ted ADDISON v. STATE of Louisiana, Burl Cain Warden.
    No. 2006-KP-2407.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Addison, Ted; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 99-7325; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-625.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rhonda K. OLIVER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Oliver, Rhonda K; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 01-955; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-694.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/32/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ted ADDISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Addison, Ted; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 99-7325; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-625.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael E. SULLIVAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CI-2685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Sullivan, Michael E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 510,563; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 2361.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norris GUIDRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Guidry, Norris; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 60948; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00784.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Noel AUSTIN v. Burl CAIN, Warden Louisiana State Prison.
    No. 2006-KH-2713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Austin, Noel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 03-6329; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-744.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher DAVID v. 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2714.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re David, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 03-5840; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-664.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Xavier S. ARTIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2715.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Artis, Xavier S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 10589-96; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01095.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2716.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Smith, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 339-931; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1162.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Smith, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9-98-249; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0953.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond C. BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Brown, Edmond C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 343-679; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1285.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert LAMBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Lambert, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 403313; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1569.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick NELLON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Nellon, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99-6870; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-710.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jesse FONTENOT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2721.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Fontenot, Jesse; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 90242; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01158.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederick BARROW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Barrow, Frederick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-148,742; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1374.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark J. BLAYLOCK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Haylock, Mark J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-5307; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 06-KH-628, 06-KH-724.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Danny Lee WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Wright, Danny Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court — Div. B, No. 163,589; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-642-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky GRYDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2725.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Gryder, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 69,906; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41865-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Trevor HOLMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Holmes, Trevor; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 954,546; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0379.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Felix A. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Williams, Felix A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 143,151; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41843-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Desmond KIBBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Kibby, Desmond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 7-00-532; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1232.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mitchell P. COOK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2765.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Cook, Mitchell P.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 390434; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1922.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rondy VERNON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Vernon, Rondy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-CR-467763; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1063.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward James ROCHON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Rochon, Edward James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 5596-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-385.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendrick Wayne JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Jones, Kendrick Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 242,141; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-429-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Regina MCSWEEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re McSween, Regina; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-CR-1702; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00889.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Maurice O. BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Brown, Maurice O.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 97-689; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1871.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilbert RIDEAU.
    No. 2006-OK-2805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 15321-01; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1470.

Denied. The matter has been remanded by the court of appeal to the district court for further proceedings.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leroy SHORTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2833.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Shorter, Leroy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 223,297; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01170.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2834.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Brown, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97-0365; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-745.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2848.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Thomas, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 6-98-834; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1616.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Ray JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2849.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2007.
   In re Johnson, Charles Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 02-99-0655; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1789.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).