author: SALCINES, Judge.

text:
    Thomas Theodore WATROUS, Appellant, v. Nancy J. WATROUS, Appellee.
    No. 2D05-4745.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.

      Gerald W. Pierce of Gerald W. Pierce, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
    Alan J. Rubinstein of Law Offices of Rubinstein & Holz, P.A., Fort Myers, and Cynthia L. Greene of Law Offices of Greene Smith McMillan, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
   SALCINES, Judge.

Thomas Theodore Watrous, the Former Husband, appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage to Nancy J. Watrous, the Former Wife. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

In this appeal the Former Husband argues that the trial court committed reversible error by utilizing portions of a proposed final judgment submitted by the Former Wife. He also challenges the manner in which the trial court secured the alimony payments. We affirm in all respects without discussion except for the portion of the final judgment that requires the Former Husband to secure the award of alimony with an annuity payable to the Former Wife that would survive his death and terminate only on the remarriage or death of the Former Wife.

The evidence presented to the trial court in this case demonstrates that the Former Wife will be left in dire economic straits if the Former Husband predeceases her. It also demonstrates that the Former Husband had a history of failing to satisfy his financial obligations in general and, in particular, with regard to the Former Wife. The Former Wife not only sustained her burden of demonstrating circumstances sufficient to warrant an order requiring the Former Husband to provide some measure of security for his alimony obligation but also established appropriate circumstances demonstrating a need for some measure of security for the protection of her financial well-being in the event the Former Husband should predecease her. See Richardson v. Richardson, 722 So.2d 280, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.1989) (holding life insurance could be ordered as part of equitable distribution and support scheme to “either satisfy arrearages or to otherwise protect the receiving spouse in appropriate circumstances”); Sasnett v. Sasnett, 679 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (recognizing “[t]he husband’s sudden demise would seriously jeopardize the wife’s well being, both financially and health-wise,” this court determined “[t]he present circumstances clearly demonstrate the ‘appropriate circumstances’ to require some form of security to secure the alimony award”). The trial court accomplished this task by requiring the Former Husband to obtain an annuity payable to the Former Wife that would survive his death and terminate only on the remarriage or death of the Former Wife. However, there is a complete dearth of evidence demonstrating whether such an annuity was commercially available for these purposes and, if so, whether it was available to the Former Husband. Furthermore, the trial court failed to address the financial impact on the Former Husband created by the annuity requirement.

Because the record before us does not contain any evidence concerning the annuity, we reverse the portion of the final judgment that requires the Former Husband to secure the alimony award with an annuity and remand for further proceedings to determine the propriety of using the annuity, or if that proves to be unsuitable, some other method of securing the Former Husband’s alimony obligation and protecting the Former Wife’s financial well-being. In all other respects we affirm.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

KELLY and WALLACE, JJ„ concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: NORTHCUTT, Chief Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Shane P. CZETLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D07-16.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.
   NORTHCUTT, Chief Judge.

Shane P. Czetli appeals the summary dismissal of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand for consideration on the merits.

The postconviction court dismissed Czet-li’s instant motion as successive under rule 3.850(f), relying on a prior rule 3.850 motion that Czetli filed on October 24, 2004. In that prior motion, Czetli attacked the constitutionality of his sexual predator designation. However, until this court issued its 2005 opinion in King v. State, 911 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), a defendant could not challenge a sexual predator designation in a postconviction motion because “designation as a sexual predator [was] neither a sentence nor a punishment, and [] the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure do not, in general, apply to this statutory provision.” Angell v. State, 712 So.2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Jackson v. State, 801 So.2d 212, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that a claim attacking a sexual predator designation may not be raised under rule 3.850 or rule 3.800(a)). In King, we held that a sexual predator designation “may be challenged like a sentencing issue by postconviction motions pursuant to rule 3.800(a) and 3.850.” 911 So.2d at 234 (emphasis added).

The postconviction court incorrectly reasoned that because Czetli couched his claim in his first rule 3.850 motion in terms of constitutionality it was cognizable pursuant to rule 3.850(a)(1). However, rule 3.850(a)(1) provides that one may attack a judgment or sentence on constitutional grounds. At the time Czetli filed his first motion, this court considered a sexual predator designation a civil matter and not a judgment, sentence, or any creature of criminal law. See Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (noting that “the legislative intent behind the statute is civil, rather than criminal”); see also Coblentz v. State, 775 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming the postcon-viction court’s denial of defendant’s rule 3.850 motion attacking his sexual predator designation without prejudice to the defendant seeking relief through a civil remedy). Therefore, Czetli’s first rule 3.850 motion raised a claim that was not cognizable in any postconviction motion at that time but, subsequent to this court’s opinion in King, has been treated as a sentencing issue.

Consequently, the postconviction court should not have considered the prior motion as filed under rule 3.850 to determine that the instant motion was successive. See Ramirez v. State, 822 So.2d 593, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that “[defendant’s] second motion was not a successive postconviction motion since [his] original [rule 3.850] motion only raised claims that his sentence was illegal”); see also Davis v. State, 953 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Ramirez and holding that the defendant’s instant rule 3.850 motion was not successive because this court treated his prior rule 3.850 motion attacking his sentences as a rule 3.800(a) motion on appeal).

Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s dismissal of Czetli’s motion. On remand, the postconviction court shall treat the motion as non-successive and proceed accordingly.

Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    David L. TAYLOR, Jr., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on behalf of Tamika C. ROBERTS, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-4111.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.

      Stephen H. Butter, Aventura, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

The father appeals an order holding him in contempt for failure to pay child support. He argues that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate the order, which adopted findings and recommendations of the child support hearing officer, without first listening to the electronic recording of the entire proceedings before the hearing officer. As Taylor did not provide a transcript of proceedings in accordance with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.491(h) and challenges only the recommendations and not the findings of fact, we affirm.

The Department of Revenue, on behalf of the mother of Taylor’s child, moved for contempt for Taylor’s failure to pay child support. The matter was referred to a child support hearing officer who conducted an evidentiary hearing. After the conclusion of the hearing, the department submitted a proposed order to the hearing officer containing findings of fact and holding Taylor in civil contempt, providing a purge amount and incarceration if he failed to pay. Taylor’s counsel objected only as to the recommendation of incarceration for failure to pay the purge amount in the proposed order. He based his objection on the hearing officer’s failure to orally announce incarceration at the evidentiary hearing.

When the hearing officer filed her recommended order, it contained a provision for incarceration for failure to pay the purge amount. The trial court subsequently ratified and adopted the recommended order. Taylor timely filed a motion to vacate alleging again that the hearing officer had never orally pronounced the requirement of incarceration. He did not provide a transcript of the proceedings and maintained that the trial court was required to listen to the entire proceedings before ruling on his motion to vacate. The trial court denied the motion to vacate because no transcript was provided. Taylor appeals claiming that the court erred in denying the motion to vacate without listening to the entire proceedings before the hearing officer.

Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.491, which governs child support enforcement, sets forth the procedure for seeking review of an order through a motion to vacate:

(h) Record. For the purpose of hearing on a motion to vacate, a record, substantially in conformity with this rule, shall be provided to the court by the party seeking review.
(1) The record shall consist of the court file, including the transcript of the proceedings before the hearing officer, if filed, and all depositions and evidence presented to the hearing officer.
(2) The transcript of all relevant proceedings shall be delivered to the judge and provided to opposing counsel not less than 48 hours before the hearing on the motion to vacate. If less than a full transcript of the proceedings taken before the hearing officer is ordered prepared by the moving party, that party shall promptly file a notice setting forth the portions of the transcript that have been ordered. The responding party shall be permitted to designate any additional portions of the transcript necessary to the adjudication of the issues raised in the motion to vacate or cross-motion to vacate.
(8) The cost of the original and all copies of the transcript of the proceedings shall be borne initially by the party seeking review, subject to appropriate assessment of suit monies. Should any portion of the transcript be required as a result of a designation filed by the responding party, the party making the designation shall bear the initial cost of the additional transcript.

Taylor did not provide a transcript of proceedings. Instead he claims that the trial court was required to listen to the entire proceedings, completely ignoring his obligation to provide a transcript under the provisions of the rule.

Taylor relies substantially on Gregory v. Rice, 727 So.2d 251 (Fla.1999), in which the court addressed the method of judicial review a trial court should apply to recommended orders by child support enforcement hearing officers. It determined that a trial court must determine whether (1) the officer’s findings of fact support the recommendations; and (2) whether the recommendations are justified under the law. If a motion to vacate is filed, the court in dicta said: “Moreover, if a party moves to vacate the order as provided by the rule, the trial judge must review the entire record of the proceedings, including listening to the electronic recording of the proceedings if warranted.” Id. at 255. We say this is dicta because it does not appear that a motion to vacate was filed in Gregory. Furthermore, in Gregory a transcript of proceedings was provided, although it was incomplete. The court never said that listening to the entire electronic recording of the hearings before the child support enforcement officer constituted a record in substantial conformity to rule 12.491.

We do not interpret Gregory as doing away with rule 12.491(h) and the obligation to provide transcripts of the proceedings for the trial court to review. Requiring the trial court to listen to the entire proceedings every time a party files a motion to vacate an order accepting a hearing officer’s recommended order would be exceptionally time consuming and essentially negate the beneficial use of hearing officers to determine findings of fact. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to vacate for failure to provide a transcript.

Furthermore, there was no need for the trial court to listen to the proceedings to determine whether the hearing officer orally recommended incarceration if Taylor did not pay the purge amount. First, we know of no rule or case law which requires a hearing officer to orally pronounce its findings of facts and recommendations. A civil contempt proceeding is not a criminal sentencing process in which the criminal rules require oral pronouncement of the sentence. Secondly, under Gregory the trial court must determine whether the recommendations are justified under law based upon the hearing officer’s findings of fact. Since Taylor has not challenged the findings of fact, the trial court’s review of the recommendations is only to apply the law to the facts to determine whether the recommendations are justified. This the trial court did.

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court.

POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


author: HOROWITZ, ALFRED J., Associate Judge.

text:
    Jordan FIELDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Jones, Appellant, v. H. Spencer KIRTON; Scott Corey Kirton and Dudley R. Kirton d/b/a Thunder Cross Motor Sports Park; Kirton Brothers Lawn Service, Inc.; and Dean Dyess, Appellees.
    No. 4D06-1486.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.
    Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Laurence C. Huttman of Rubin & Rubin, Stuart, for appellant.

      William J. Wallace of William J. Wallace, P.A., Okeechobee, for Appellees-Dud-ley R. Kirton and Scott Corey Kirton d/b/a Thunder Cross Motor Sports Park.
    Alan C. Espy of Alan C. Espy, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellees-H. Spencer Kirton and Kirton Brothers Lawn Service, Inc.
    R. Steven Ruta and Richard Lee Barrett of Barrett, Chapman & Ruta, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee-Dean Dyess.
    Lindsey C. Brock, III of Rumrell Costa-bel Warrington & Brock LLP, Jacksonville, and Matthew W. Monroe and Jill Anne Hillman of Monroe & Zinder, P.C., Los Angeles, CA, for Amicus Curiae-National Association of Underwater Instructors.
    Timothy J. Owens of Christensen & Christensen, Columbus, OH, for Amicus Curiae-American Motorcyclist Association.
   HOROWITZ, ALFRED J., Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of all the defendants. The trial court determined there was no genuine issue of any material fact with respect to Appellant’s wrongful death claim. The trial court specifically relied on the enforceability of a pre-injury release/waiver signed by the natural guardian on behalf of the deceased minor child. The standard of review of this matter is de novo. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001). We reverse.

The material facts are not in dispute. Pursuant to a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, Bobby Jones was the primary residential parent for his fourteen year old son, Christopher. On May 10, 2003, the father took Christopher to Appellees’ Thunder Cross Motor Sports Park to ride his all terrain vehicle (ATV). To gain entry to the facility and be allowed to participate in riding the ATV, Bobby Jones, as Christopher’s natural guardian, signed a release and waiver of liability, assumption of risk, and indemnity agreement. While attempting a particular jump, Christopher lost control of his ATV, causing himself to be ejected. Tragically, he hit the ground with the ATV landing on top of him. He got up, walked a short distance, then collapsed and died. Christopher’s mother, Bette Jones, was unaware that the father was permitting their son to engage in this activity. She was also unaware that approximately one month prior to the accident causing Christopher’s death, he had attempted the same jump, resulting in a fractured rib and mild concussion.

The analysis regarding the authority of a parent/natural guardian to sign a binding pre-injury release/waiver of a future tort claim on behalf of a minor child must necessarily begin with a review of the supreme court case of Global Travel Marketing, Inc. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392 (Fla.2005) (Global Travel II). In that decision, the supreme court carefully examined this court’s opinion in the Global Travel case reported at 870 So.2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (Global Travel I). Reviewing the supreme court’s opinion, it is clear the ruling did not address the issue of a contractual waiver of a tort claim brought on behalf of a minor by a natural guardian. See Global Travel II, 908 So.2d at 392. The supreme court specifically rejected making any distinction between commercial activities and activity which may be school-based or school-sponsored. Global Travel II, 908 So.2d at 405.

Generally, parents may make decisions affecting their children without governmental interference unless significant harm to the child is threatened by or resulting from these decisions. Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510, 514 (Fla.1998). This right is encompassed within the broad scope of the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of privacy in Article I, Section 23. Thus, courts have consistently held that a waiver executed by a parent on behalf of a minor is supported by public policy when it relates to obtaining medical care', insurance, or participation in school or community sponsored activities. In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 403 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1173 (S.D.Fla.2005) (refusing to enforce a waiver executed by a parent on behalf of a minor relying on the commercial nature of the activity, citing Global Travel II, 908 So.2d at 392); Gonzalez v. City of Coral Gables, 871 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (distinguishing between commercial and school related waivers); Variety Children’s Hospital, Inc. v. Vigliotti, 385 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (dealing with hospital’s enforcement of a quasi-contract against a mother for medical treatment given to her minor child).

Defendants’ position is largely based on the inherent authority of a parent to make decisions about their children’s welfare without interference by third parties, including government. State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1110 (Fla.2004); Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Petersen, 920 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The issue does not involve restricting or precluding parents from deciding what activities may be appropriate for their minor children’s participation. Instead, this court’s analysis is predicated upon the effect of the release insulating the provider of the activity from liability for negligence inflicted upon the minor. The release causes a forfeiture of the minor’s property right to seek legal redress either through his parent or the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

The decision to absolve the provider of an activity from liability for any form of negligence (regardless of the inherent risk or danger in the activity) goes beyond the scope of determining which activity a person feels is appropriate for their child. The decision to allow a minor to participate in an activity is properly left to the parents or natural guardian. For instance, the decision to allow one’s child to engage in scuba diving or sky diving involves the acceptance of certain risks inherent in the activity. This does not contemplate that a dive instructor will permit or encourage diving at depths beyond safe recreational limits, or that the pilot of the plane on a sky diving venture is intoxicated or otherwise impaired, both situations which could cause injury to the minor. The effect of the parent’s decision in signing a pre-injury release impacts the minor’s estate and the property rights personal to the minor. These rights cannot be waived by the parent absent a basis in common law or statute.

There is no basis in common law for a parent to enter into a compromise or settlement of a child’s claim, or to waive substantive rights of the child without court approval. 59 Am.JuR.2d Parent and Child § 40, 183; Romish v. Albo, 291 So.2d 24, 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Section 744.301, Florida Statutes, provides a statutory scheme wherein natural guardians are granted limited rights to settle claims on behalf of minors. That statute provides that parents are authorized to settle any claims or causes of action for damages on behalf of their minor child without the necessity of court approval when the amount does not exceed $15,000. § 744.301(2), Fla. Stat. Any settlement greater that $15,000 but less than $25,000 may involve a guardian ad litem, if the court chooses to appoint one, while a settlement in excess of $25,000 requires a court-appointed guardian as well as a specific determination by the court that the settlement is in the best interest of the minor. Id. There is no comparable statutory scheme governing the issue of pre-injury releases signed by a parent on behalf of a minor child.

If the legislature wished to grant a parent the authority to bind a minor’s estate by signing a pre-injury release, they could have said so. The legislature has decided when the state, as parens patriae, should intervene on behalf of a minor. There is a significant statutory framework in place relating to dependency and juvenile delinquency, which evidences the legislature’s exercise of the parens patriae authority. That statutory scheme does not authorize one parent to release property rights of the child except as specified. It is not the function of the courts to usurp the constitutional role of the legislature and judicially legislate that which necessarily must originate, if it is to be law, with the legislature.

It is clear the waiver signed by Bobby Jones on behalf of his minor son constituted the forfeiture of a property right that uniquely inures to the minor son’s estate. For these reasons, Florida law does not support judicial enforcement of a pre-inju-ry release executed by a parent on behalf of a minor. The final summary judgment entered below is reversed.

We note the implicit conflict between this decision and Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc., 717 So.2d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). There, the mother signed a similar pre-injury release so that her minor son could ride a pocket bike, and subsequently brought an action against the premises owner/proprietor when the boy was injured due to negligence. The Fifth District held the release was sufficient to bar the boy’s claim. Although that case traveled to the appellate court with a different procedural posture, the Lantz court held the release to be enforceable. We certify conflict with Lantz.

Accordingly, we also certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance.

WHETHER A PARENT MAY BIND A MINOR’S ESTATE BY THE PRE-IN-JURY EXECUTION OF A RELEASE.

GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.

      . The instant opinion does not address the impact to the minor's mother, Bette Jones. One effect of this release/waiver was to forfeit her rights in any wrongful death action. That issue is not before this court.

      . The court decided only the narrow issue regarding the enforceability of an arbitration clause incorporated into a commercial travel contract which was entered into by a natural guardian on behalf of a minor. The court found the arbitration clause was not a waiver of a legal claim or right, but rather a selection of an alternative forum for dispute resolution. See Global Travel II, 908 So.2d at 404.

      . The supreme court noted "... that some commonplace school or community activities might also involve commercial travel.” Global Travel II, 908 So.2d at 404. The court further determined there could not be reliable standards without making value judgments concerning the propriety of a given activity, decisions which should be properly left for a parent or natural guardian to determine.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Joseph Joshua HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D06-2226, 4D06-2230, 4D06-2231.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the revocation of probation and resulting sentence. However, we remand for entry of a written order of revocation specifying the conditions appellant was found to have violated. See, e.g., Riley v. State, 884 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Although a substitute judge entered an order of revocation and also an order of probation subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, the court was without jurisdiction to do so at the time. See Kosa v. State, 923 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter final restitution order nunc pro tunc to an initial restitution order because once a notice of appeal is filed, exclusive jurisdiction of the matter is before the district court of appeal). We also note that neither order is consistent with the oral pronouncements of the presiding judge at the revocation proceedings.

WARNER, POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    W.S., the Father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 4D07-382.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.

      Domenic Landolina, Stuart, for appellant.
    Anthony C. Musto, Hallandale Beach, for appellee Department of Children and Families.
    Wendie Michelle Cooper, Orlando, for appellee Z.B. and the Guardian ad Litem Program.
   WARNER, J.

The trial court terminated W.S.’s parental rights on the ground that he both failed to substantially comply and materially breached his case plan. The evidence presented showed that he had made almost no effort to abide by any of the elements of his case plan, for which the trial court found no credible excuse. We affirm.

Although the petition for termination alleged that W.S. had failed to substantially complete the case plan, it did not allege that appellant had materially breached his case plan. Nevertheless, that issue was also tried by implied consent as the evidence of compliance with the case plan was the central issue at trial without objection. K.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 940 So.2d 577, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding issue of termination based on section 39.806(l)(c) was tried by implied consent where extensive evidence was introduced during the hearing implicating section 39.806(l)(c), the attorneys discussed this ground in closing, and the mother’s counsel did not object); compare T.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 905 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (issue of termination based on abandonment was not tried by implied consent where the father’s counsel objected to this ground at trial).

The present case is also readily distinguishable from R.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 872 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), relied upon by W.S. There, we found a violation of due process where the trial court terminated parental rights on a ground that was not raised in the petition, was not mentioned in opening statements, and was not tried by implied consent. Id. at 418. Indeed, in R.S., the ground was not even mentioned until the trial court’s ruling. Here, by contrast, it is clear that the issue of whether the father materially breached the case plan was tried by implied consent.

We also reject the contention that failure to cite to the exact statutory reference for a ground for termination alleged in the petition is fatal, so long as the substance of the ground is alleged in the pleading. See § 39.802(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (“A petition for termination of parental rights filed under this chapter must contain facts supporting the following allegations: (a) That at least one of the grounds listed in s. 39.806 has been met.”), (emphasis added). Cf. B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 996 (Fla.1994) (in the criminal context, an erroneous reference to a statute in a charging instrument is not fatal to the conviction if the necessary elements of the offense otherwise are properly alleged). In this case, while the petition did not cite section 39.806(l)(e)l., the DCF alleged that W.S. had failed to substantially comply with the case plan.

Finally, the trial court’s judgment is supported by substantial competent evidence. Although W.S. was in jail for a period of time during the case plan, W.S.’s case worker had contact with W.S. and made referrals for him which he did not follow. W.S. failed to contact the case worker and saw his infant child only once. On these facts, the trial court was free to conclude that W.S.’s incarceration did not prevent him from making some effort to complete his case plan. In T.C. v. Department of Children & Families, 961 So.2d 1060, 2007 WL 2119245 (Fla. 4th DCA July 25, 2007), which we find to be on point, we squarely rejected a mother’s argument that an order of termination was not appropriate because any breach of her case plan was occasioned by her incarceration and the DCF’s failure to provide her services during such time. In T.C., we found that competent substantial evidence supported the termination pursuant to 39.806(l)(e)2., noting that the mother failed to avail herself of the DCF’s referrals and services in the months leading up to her incarceration. Likewise, in this case, W.S. made no effort at all to comply with the case plan during the times when he was not incarcerated. Termination of W.S.’s parental rights was warranted under section 39.806(l)(e).

For these reasons, we affirm the final judgment of termination of W.S.’s parental rights.

GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur.

      . In light of this disposition, we decline to consider whether termination was also warranted under section 39.806(l)(c).


author: KLEIN, J.

text:
    Kristin Ahr KOCH, Petitioner, v. Daniel L. KOCH, Respondent.
    No. 4D07-927.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2007.
    John F. Schütz and Ralph T. White of John F. Schütz, P.L., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    Beth E. Spiegel, North Miami Beach, for respondent.
   KLEIN, J.

In this dissolution proceeding, in which child custody is at issue, the husband sought to obtain the records of the treating psychotherapists and other confidential medical information pertaining to the wife. After the trial court overruled the wife’s objection, she filed this petition for certio-rari, relying on Attorney Ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K., 780 So.2d 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In D.K we held that, in dissolution proceedings, a party does not waive confidentiality of mental health treatment by requesting custody. We explained:

Only in situations where calamitous events such as an attempted suicide occur during a pending custody dispute have courts found that the mental health of the parent is sufficiently at issue to warrant finding no statutory privilege exists. See Miraglia v. Miraglia, 462 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Otherwise, the courts have instructed that the more appropriate method of securing the necessary information regarding the parent’s psychological state to aid in determining the best interest of the child is to require an independent psychological or psychiatric examination of the parent or parents. In this way, the trial court obtains essential information without interfering with the psychotherapist/patient confidentiality privilege. See Leonard v. Leonard, 673 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Schouw v. Schouw, 593 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Id. at 308.

In this case the trial court concluded that the wife had waived any privilege or right of privacy because her counsel acknowledged that she had an alcohol problem in the past, had received treatment, and was currently a recovering alcoholic. The information regarding alcoholism does not rise to the level of an event or condition contemplated by D.K. We accordingly grant the petition and quash the order which denied protection as to depositions and subpoenas for records.

STONE and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Judge.

text:
    Patrick Lee MANNING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-794.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chandra Waite Dasrat, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.
   SILBERMAN, Judge.

Patrick Lee Manning appeals his sentences for three counts of aggravated assault entered following the trial court’s revocation of his probation. He also challenges the order denying his motion to withdraw plea on the three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated battery. We reverse the sentences for the aggravated assaults because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Manning’s probation when he had already served the statutory maximum for those offenses. We affirm the order denying the motion to withdraw plea without discussion.

The State charged Manning with aggravated battery and three counts of aggravated assault for events that occurred in November 1998. After he entered a guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Manning for all four crimes. Pertinent to this appeal are the sentences on the aggravated assaults, for which the trial court sentenced Manning to. five years in prison, suspended, and placed him on three years’ probation. In August 2000, the trial court revoked Manning’s probation and, as to the aggravated assaults, sentenced him to five years in prison followed by three years’ probation. In November and December 2005, and in January 2006, Manning was charged with violating several conditions of his probation. He admitted to the violations, and on January 10, 2006, the trial court sentenced him to five years in prison for the aggravated assaults.

Manning then filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). He argued that the August 2000 sentences of five years in prison followed by three years’ probation were illegal because they exceeded the statutory maximum penalty for third-degree felonies, and, therefore, that the probationary portion of the sentences should be stricken. He further argued that because he was not legally on probation following the completion of the prison portion of his sentences, the prison sentences imposed in January 2006 for violating probation were illegal.

After the sixty-day time limit expired under rule 3.800(b), the trial court granted relief and vacated the sentences on the aggravated assault charges. However, an order on a rule 3.800(b) motion entered after the sixty-day time limit is a nullity, and the motion is deemed denied. See Whitmore v. State, 910 So.2d 308, 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Alix v. State, 799 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

As to the merits of Manning’s challenge to his current sentence, it is well established that the combined terms of incarceration and probation must not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. See Baker v. State, 652 So.2d 431, 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Gonzales v. State, 816 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). When the trial court imposed the sentence of five years in prison to be followed by three years’ probation in August 2000, it exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a third-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Thus, Manning was illegally on probation and the trial court had no jurisdiction when it revoked his probation in 2006 and resentenced him on the aggravated assault charges. See Tucker v. State, 873 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Therefore, we reverse the three sentences for aggravated assault imposed in January 2006 and remand for the trial court to strike those sentences. Because the present appeal is of the January 2006 sentencing order, that portion of Manning’s argument that seeks to have the probationary periods imposed in August 2000 on the aggravated assault charges stricken is not properly before us. But in light of our disposition here, it appears that the claimed error as to probation, contained in the August 2000 sentence, is now moot.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

STRINGER and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.

      . Our disposition of this case does not affect Manning's sentence for aggravated battery.

      . We note that Manning was not required to file a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion while this appeal was pending to preserve this issue for review.' This court recognized in Tucker v. State, 873 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), that because the defendant had already served the statutory maximum for the offense, she was not legally on probation and the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke her probation and to resentence her. Where a trial court lacks jurisdiction to resentence a defendant, the issue need not be preserved for review. See Aponte v. State, 896 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).


author: WALLACE, Judge.

text:
    Deaunte PHILLIPS, a/k/a Deaunte Antwand Phillips, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-1858.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 15, 2007.

      James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Sean K. Ahmed, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   WALLACE, Judge.

A jury found Deaunte Phillips, also known as Deaunte Antwand Phillips, guilty of several felonies and two misdemeanors. On appeal, Mr. Phillips argues only that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of cannabis with intent to sell, a violation of section 893.13(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2003). Because the State failed to present competent, substantial evidence to exclude Mr. Phillips’ hypothesis that he possessed the marijuana exclusively for personal use, we reverse the judgment and sentence for the possession-with-intent-to-sell charge only.

The Facts and Procedural Background

After a series of events not pertinent to the issue to be discussed, Lakeland police officers arrested Mr. Phillips and took him to the police station. During the booking process, an officer found a plastic bag in the waistband of Mr. Phillips’ trousers. Inside the plastic bag were ten smaller plastic bags containing marijuana. The total weight of the marijuana was 26.6 grams.

The officers had not observed Mr. Phillips selling marijuana. They did not find (a) any money, (b) a “little black book,” (c) empty baggies, or (d) any other items in Mr. Phillips’ possession that would tend to prove that he was selling marijuana. Instead, the State relied on the packaging of the marijuana in small baggies as the basis for its claim that Mr. Phillips was holding the marijuana for sale. Thus the State’s evidence that Mr. Phillips intended to sell the marijuana was entirely circumstantial.

Mr. Phillips moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. He argued that the State had failed to make a prima facie case that he intended to sell the marijuana. Mr. Phillips conceded that the trial court should allow the jury to decide the question of his guilt or innocence on a related charge of possession of cannabis in excess of twenty grams, a violation of section 893.13(6)(a). The same quantity of marijuana formed the basis for each of the two charges. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, and it submitted both charges to the jury. The jury found Mr. Phillips guilty of both offenses as charged. At sentencing, the trial court set aside the jury’s verdict on the simple possession charge based on the State’s concession that Mr. Phillips could not properly be convicted of possession with intent to sell and simple possession of the same quantity of marijuana. The trial court adjudged Mr. Phillips to be guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to sell and sentenced him for that offense.

Discussion

“Where the only proof of an intent to sell is circumstantial, [that proof] may support a conviction only if it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Glenn v. State, 824 So.2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Jackson v. State, 818 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). The type of circumstantial evidence “necessary to prove intent to sell” includes the quantity and value of the contraband (which may be sufficient evidence standing alone if it is substantial), the presence of paraphernalia, and other suspicious circumstances or evidence that “would indicate an intent to sell.” Id.

It is the trial judge’s proper task to review the evidence to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences. That view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state.

State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla.1989).

In this case, three police officers testified that the marijuana found on Mr. Phillips was packaged in a way that was consistent with packaging marijuana for sale. Sergeant Mumbauer testified that on the night they arrested Mr. Phillips, the officers did not find — either on Mr. Phillips’ person or in his vehicle — any money, a “little black book,” empty baggies, or any other items indicative of drug sales. Sergeant Sealey testified that marijuana found in ten individual baggies “is consistent with sales of marijuana.” He stated, “An amount of marijuana in one plastic baggie ... could be construed as personal use.” However, on cross-examination, Sergeant Sealey testified as follows:

Q. Detective Sealey, the fact that it’s packaged in 10 individual bags doesn’t mean that the person is selling it, does it?
A. It’s consistent with sales.
Q. Okay. It’s consistent with somebody that’s going to smoke 10 baggies of pot too, isn’t it?
A. Unusual.
Q. Unusual?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Well, if your dealer is standing on the corner and you go up and say I want $50 worth of marijuana and he’s got it packaged separately, isn’t that how you’re going to get it? I mean, have you ever seen anybody get a bag and dump the little bags in on the street corner and then hand it to the person?
A. Have I seen it, yes.
Q. So that’s the only way you’ve ever seen in your 16 years is a user buys drugs is one big baggie?
A. You can buy it in any way you want.
Q. Okay. So—
A. Depending on how you’re going to spend. You can [b]uy a brick.
Q. So it’s consistent with a user also?
A. It could be.
Q. Okay. So it’s consistent with selling, consistent with the buying?
A. Anyone involved in it, yes, ma’am.

Mr. Phillips did not cross-examine the other two police officers concerning the fact that the marijuana packaging could be consistent with personal use. No officer testified that the quantity of marijuana found— 26.6 grams — was inconsistent with personal use.

Mr. Phillips asserts that this case is similar to Gamble v. State, 644 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). In Gamble, police officers found “a baggie containing 40 ... pieces of cocaine” in the back seat of a patrol car after the defendant had been in the car. Id. at 1377. The officers also found $600 on the defendant. Id. The defendant denied any knowledge of the cocaine and claimed that he had won the money from" gambling. Id. At trial, an officer testified that the amount of cocaine found “was inconsistent with personal use.” Id. On cross-examination, however, the officer conceded that the “5.3 grams of cocaine could be within the realm of possibility for personal consumption, but he doubted it.” Id. The Fifth District reversed the sentence that the trial court had imposed for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. Id. at 1378. The district court reasoned that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the possession-with-intent-to-sell charge because there was no evidence that the cocaine had been packaged in a way “to suggest that it was for sale ... and not for personal consumption.” Id. Further, the Fifth District determined that the officer’s testimony supported the defendant’s view of the facts because the officer admitted that the quantity of cocaine could have been for personal consumption. Id.

Here, the State argues that it met its burden to introduce competent evidence that was inconsistent with Mr. Phillips’ theory of the case. According to the State, the officers’ testimony concerning the marijuana packaging was sufficient to rebut Mr. Phillips’ hypothesis that he possessed the marijuana exclusively for his personal use. The State relies on Bruce v. State, 616 So.2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). In Bruce, the defendant was found in possession of thirteen individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine. Id. at 504. The Third District upheld the defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to sell on the ground that the individually wrapped pieces of cocaine, “coupled with expert evidence of an experienced narcotics officer that the quantity involved indicated that the crack was for sale, was more than sufficient to justify the jury’s conclusion that [the defendant] indeed held the cocaine for distribution.” Id. (emphasis added).

We conclude that the State did not meet its burden to introduce evidence that would exclude Mr. Phillips’ hypothesis that he held the marijuana exclusively for his personal use. The only evidence on which the State relied to support the charge of possession with intent to sell was the officers’ testimony that the packaging was consistent with the sale of marijuana. One of the officers agreed that the marijuana could have been for personal use. The State presented no evidence that the quantity of marijuana found on Mr. Phillips was inconsistent with personal use. See Jackson v. State, 818 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (finding that although cocaine pieces were individually packaged, the quantity “was not so large as to imply an intent to sell without other evidence”). Further, the State had no other evidence that Mr. Phillips intended to sell the marijuana. See Barnes v. State, 838 So.2d 641, 641-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (affirming a conviction of possession of ten baggies of marijuana with the intent to sell when the defendant was also in possession of a large amount of money, reasoning, “the separate packaging of the drugs, coupled with the fact that the drugs and cash (a substantial sum) were kept together, supports the inference that Appellant intended to sell the drugs”). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the State’s evidence was insufficient to exclude Mr. Phillips’ theory that he possessed the marijuana for personal consumption. See Fowler v. State, 492 So.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (declaring that the circumstantial evidence relied on by the State to prove the defendant’s guilt must lead to only one inference that is “clearly inconsistent with the defendant’s hypothesis of innocence”).

Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Phillips’ judgment and sentence for possession of cannabis with intent to sell. On remand, the trial court shall adjudge Mr. Phillips to be guilty of the necessarily lesser included offense of possession of not more than twenty grams of cannabis, section 893.13(6)(b), and sentence him for that offense. See § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (2003); Grant v. State, 864 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Absent a valid waiver, Mr. Phillips must be present for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments and sentences imposed on Mr. Phillips.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

DAVIS, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.


text:
    Kemar WOLLISTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-4528.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Mclntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   KLEIN, J.

Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and argues that his Miranda rights were violated when he was questioned by the police in his home. Although there was a Miranda violation, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, Officer Stewart testified that he and others were dispatched to an address after the police had received information that a woman had been battered there. Appellant and another man opened the door and let the officers in. Officer Forteza then told appellant that a female had called the police claiming she had been battered. Appellant responded that he had broken up with his girlfriend and she had come to pick up her things. When Officer Forteza asked if they could search the premises to determine if the victim was there, both men consented.

While conducting the search, Officer Stewart saw multiple bags of a powdered substance which appeared to be cocaine and paraphernalia in one of the bedrooms. He had also observed a bowl in the bedroom with a substance in it. The officer then asked appellant what the substance was, and appellant responded that it was cocaine. At that point, which is when appellant argues he should have been given Miranda rights, the officer asked appellant whose bedroom the cocaine was in, and appellant responded that it was his bedroom. Officer Stewart testified that appellant was not free to leave after Officer Stewart first observed cocaine, which was before he asked the appellant what was in the bowl and who used the bedroom.

In Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568 (Fla.1999), the court set forth the four part test for determining if a defendant is in custody: 1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning, 2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation, 3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt, and 4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning. Ramirez further explains that a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if a reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest.

The state argues that, because appellant was in his own home, he was not in custody when he answered the question about who lived in the bedroom. Appellant, however, had already been confronted with the presence of cocaine and had not been informed that he was free to leave. We conclude that he should have been given his Miranda rights before being questioned about control of the bedroom.

Although the state has not argued that the failure to give the Miranda warning was harmless, our independent review for harmlessness, which we are required to do under section 924.33, Florida Statutes, reveals evidence that the bedroom contained two credit cards and a social security card in appellant’s name. In addition, appellant made a full confession at the police station, after having been given Miranda warnings. A second confession can make the failure to give an earlier Miranda warning harmless; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Davis v. State, 859 So.2d 465 (Fla.2003). We conclude that the identification found in the bedroom, and the second confession, which was properly admitted in evidence, make the earlier Miranda violation harmless.

Affirmed.

WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Robert C. ARLEDGE.
    No. 2007-B-1604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 3, 2007.
   ORDER

Considering the Joint Petition for Interim Suspension filed by respondent, Robert C. Arledge, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Robert C. Ar-ledge, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19465, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.3, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

/s/ Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Michelle BOUDREAUX v. Jacques N. LEBLANC.
    No. 2007-CJ-1427.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 10, 2007.
   In re LeBlanc, Jacques N.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 147688; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CU 0325.

Writ denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ application.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ application.


text:
    Michael H. BERCIER, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. Monique Pregeant, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 13, 2007.
   In re Bercier, Monique Pregeant; Bercier, Michael H. et ah; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 10-14858, 10-14760; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00865.

Denied.


text:
    YELLOW ROCK, L.L.C., et al. v. SASOL NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 14, 2007.
   In re Sasol North America Inc. et al.; Fletcher, Thomas J. “Tommy”; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-3530; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00859.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clinton GRIMMETT.
    No. 2007-KH-1345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Grimmett, Clinton; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 21275.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas H. HELVIK.
    No. 2007-KH-1415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Thomas H. Helvik; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 13585-06.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest BILLIZONE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Billizone, Ernest Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 06-6137, 06-6669.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Freddie R. LEWIS.
    No. 2007-KH-1296.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Lewis, Freddie R.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 140815, 140816, 140817; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 42337-KM, KH 06-42164, KH-06-42062.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric BRIDGES.
    No. 2007-KH-1346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Bridges, Eric; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 433,893.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    Charles CARTER v. Burl CAIN, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.
    No. 2006-CI-2013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Charles Carter, applying for Reconsideration to this court’s action dated May 4, 2007 from the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 531054, to the Court of Appeal, first Circuit, No. 2005 CA 2660.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald BRIGGS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Donald Briggs, Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated May 4, 2007; Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court, Division C, No. 19325.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re Paul S. MINOR.
    No. 2007-B-1184.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Minor, Paul S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated June 20, 2007.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnie K. HONGO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1933.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Hongo, Ronnie K.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 57538; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA-05-286.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Linroy DOUGLAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2443.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Douglas, Linroy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 00-7001; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-551.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William Henry Walker BLAKE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Blake, William Henry Walker;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 272,-137, 272,139, 265,583; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00295.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Brown, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 430-823; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1125.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Johnson, Darrell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 398-940; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1166.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La./12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendale TALBERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Talbert, Kendale; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 13376, 13375; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1005.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy QUIROZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Quiroz, Randay; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 378601; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1398.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2494.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Thomas, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 185,645; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41776-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby SAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Sam, Bobby; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 04-96-0424, 1-95-813; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1303.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone FULTZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2496.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Fultz, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 1-04-0106; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1323.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Jones, Curtis; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 373519-D; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1134.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren RANGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Range, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 12-80-1044, 11-81-975; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1391.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joe W. MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2500.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Miller, Joe W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 01-4570; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-650.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Smith, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 11-01-89; to the Court of Appeal,- First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1292.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Duane T. JOSEPH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Joseph, Duane T.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 033253; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1300.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Noe STEPHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Stephan, Noe; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 207,887; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41724-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas BILLARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Billard, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 00-1041; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 06-KH-687, 06-KH-614.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond SHAW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Shaw, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 98-5803; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-673.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James W. GLEASON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Gleason, James W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 54,528; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00697.

Denied.


text:
    John POULLARD v. Richard L. STALDER, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2006-CI-2513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Poullard, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 522,452; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1907.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ashley SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Smith, Ashley; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 372817; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur SPARKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Sparks, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 422-614; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1039.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick HAYNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Haynes, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 366-924; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1176.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norris NASH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Nash, Norris II; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 95-3330; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06 00795.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Poydras, David Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 52685; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00993.

Denied. Time-barred and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Glenn HILL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Hill, Glenn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 502812; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne MCKINNEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re McKinney, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-3828; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-626.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nakie GLADSTONE and Keyon Singleton v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Singleton, Keyon; Gladstone, Nak-ie; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 387-333; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1118.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theo ALLEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Allen, Theo; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 5207 95; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00913. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Erris Paul RIDEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Rideaux, Erris Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 02-481; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00876.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David J. CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Carter, David J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 73-1482; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-750.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joel R. PEDELAHORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Pedelahore, Joel R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 337852; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1524.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone LIVAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Livas, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 341-631; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1115.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Virgil L. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Smith, Virgil L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 334402; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1111.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Spencer GILMORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Gilmore, Spencer;^ — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 366-409; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1266.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Creighton WUNEBURGER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2614.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Wuneburger, Creighton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 95-6486, 92-1052; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-689.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Luis A. CORZO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Corzo, Luis A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 01-2754; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-711.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald Ray LEMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Lemons, Donald Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 00-F1850; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41410-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John HARRISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Harrison, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 409-642; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1047.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon LEBOEUF v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2621.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re LeBoeuf, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 07-04-0491; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 0153.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ryan GREEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2622.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Green, Ryan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 437767-04; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 0940.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harold Joe BLACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2623.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Black, Harold Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 521,-693, 527,740; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2006 CW 1216, 2006-CW-0655.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky CARTHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2626.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Carthan, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR-196-98-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-00786.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MOREHEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Morehead, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 310142; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1211.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marshall T. BATCHELOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Batchelor, Marshall T.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-F087508; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41788-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arien DELCO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Delco, Arien; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 438,144; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 0504.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In' re Washington, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 98-1121; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-715.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Aaron Devon PITTMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Pittman, Aaron Devon; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 92-CR1-52115; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0931.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norvel REYNOLDS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Reynolds, Norvel Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2-97-433; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1552.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary Lynn MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Mitchell, Gary Lynn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 34,445, 34,672, 34,673, 35,994; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41772-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mike READO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2664.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Reado, Mike; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 17533-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01035.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Warren RANGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Range, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 11 — 81— 975, 12-80-1044; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1458.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MOREHEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-3018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Morehead, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 310142; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1367.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tut M. SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Simmons, Tut M.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2006NS00099; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-KH-263.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory MCCRAY.
    No. 2007-KH-1416.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re McCray, Gregory; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 12-06-0297; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0251.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Percy JONES.
    No. 2007-KH-1508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2007.
   In re Jones, Percy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 07-158, 06-5344; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-K-370.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would deny as moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rene COLLINS, et al.
    No. 2007-KK-1651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 20, 2007.
   In re Collins, Rene; Gaines, Danzel; Lopez, Jose; Ruiz, Valdivia; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated August, 14, 2007; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. 4, Nos. 479,783, 479,786, 479,760, 479,-763; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0934.

Reconsideration not considered. See Rule IX, Sec. 6 of the Sup.Ct. Rules. JLW.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the reconsideration for the reasons previously assigned.


text:
    LA FITNESS AND AEROBICS, L.L.C. v. GREAT AMERICAN E & S INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 21, 2007.
   In re Great American E & S Ins. Co., et al.; K & K Insurance Group; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-4389; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00836.

Deny stay; deny writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Salvador MANGANO and Mabel Mangano.
    No. 2007-OK-1717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 23, 2007.
   In re Blanco, Kathleen Babineaux Gov.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-WLFN-12; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 1604.

Writ denied. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new deadline for filing writs related to the initial motion to quash when the state failed to file its writ application or request an extension within the original deadline granted by the trial judge. The “alternative” issues in the second motion were included in the first motion. The writ application in all respects is therefore denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NOS. 04-PDB-079 & 04-PDB-080.
    No. 2006-OB-0926.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Caldwell, Danny Lee, Jr. ¡Plaintiffs) Applying For Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated August 25, 2006; Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board; Office Disciplinary Board Nos. 04-PDB-079, 04-PDB-080.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 03-PDB-085.
    Nos. 2005-OB-1264, 2005-OB-1282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Sullivan, Daniel C.;PIaintiff(s) Applying For Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated August 25, 2006; Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board; Office Disciplinary Board. No. 03-PDB-085.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2005-ADMIN-209.
    No. 2005-OB-1593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Lacombe, Owen; — Plaintiffs) Applying for Reconsideration of an Order of this Court dated August 25, 2006; Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board No. 2005-ADMIN-209.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 05-PDB-148.
    No. 2006-OB-1777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Sanchez, Raphael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Disciplinary Board Decision Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 95-PDB-148.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BD. NO. 06-PDB-044.
    No. 2006-OB-1997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Allen, Derrick Jerome; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board No. 06-PDB-044 Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-044.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-066.
    No. 2006-OB-2459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Smith, James L.; — Other; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-066.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DISCIPL. BOARD NO. 06-PDB-094.
    No. 2006-OB-2537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Foster, Perry; — Other; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-094.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-078.
    No. 2006-OB-2582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Bersuder, Robert J.; — Other; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-078.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-108 AND NOS. 2006-ADM-799 AND 2006-ADMIN-800.
    No. 2006-OB-2796.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Christenson, David A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Bd. No. 06-PDB-108; 2006-AD-MIN-799 & 2006-ADMIN-800 Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-108, 2006-ADMIN-799, 2006-ADMIN-800.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2006-PDB-111.
    No. 2007-OB-0122.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Hunter, Erin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-lll.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-115.
    No. 2007-OB-0123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re LeBlanc, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-115.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-413.
    No. 2007-OB-0413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Franks, Jonette; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-114.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re: APPEAL OF DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-128.
    No. 2007-OB-0486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Attorney General; — Other; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-128.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-135.
    No. 2007-OB-0592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Billiot, Johnny; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-135.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-151 AND 06-PDB-152.
    No. 2007-OB-0671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Taylor, Lilian; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, Nos. 06-PDB-152, 06-PDB-151.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-102.
    No. 2007-OB-0672.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Thompson, Anne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-102.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-126.
    No. 2007-OB-0675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Kang, Chan Won; — -Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-126.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-149.
    No. 2007-OB-1075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In Re Anderson, Austin Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-149.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 06-PDB-163.
    No. 2007-OB-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Washington, Felton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 06-PDB-163.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 05-PDB-158 AND 05-PDB-159.
    No. 2007-OB-1081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Ladner, Clydell; Ladner, Patrick et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, Nos. 05-PDB-158, 05-PDB-159.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 07-PDB-001.
    No. 2007-OB-1145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Vincent, Rodney; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 07-PDB-001.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 07-PDB-010.
    No. 2007-OB-1495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Morris, Daniel Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2006-ADMIN-1219.
    No. 2007-OB-1501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 24, 2007.
   In re Green, Maureen; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 2006 ADMIN 1219.

Denied.