text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward M. SCALLION.
    No. 2007-KK-1860.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Scallion, Edward M.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. C-10142, C-10142-1, C-10142-2; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 07-00784.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Brad A. ADAMS (W-3 and W-4) S.T. Alcus, III (W-17), Danny Allday (W-10), American International Travel, Inc., Norman Augusta (N-16), A. Baumer (W-7), Richard H. Barker, IV (W-16), Otto Candies, Jr., (N-14), Fairview Realty, L.L.C., et al. v. The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT.
    No. 2007-C-1905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Adams, Brad A. (W-3 and W-4) et al.; Augusta, Norman (N-16); Candies, Otto Jr. (N-14); Alcus, S.T. Ill (W-17); International Travel Inc.; Allday, Danny (W-10); Baumer, A. (W-7); Fairview Realty L.L.C. et al; Barker, Richard H. IV (W — 16);—Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2000-19878; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-1159.

Denied.


text:
    Jimmie SHARPLIN v. HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL.
    No. 2007-CC-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Sharplin, Jimmie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. 05, No. 04-08600; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 1318.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Reginald ALLEN, et al. v. DIRECT GENERAL INSURANCE AGENCY OF LOUISIANA, INC. and Andre Allen.
    No. 2007-CC-1957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Direct General Insurance Agency of Louisiana Inc. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs First City Court, No. 2003-55088; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0786.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Burton Joseph SONNIER, Jr., et al. v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1971.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Markel International Insurance Co. LTD; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2006-2804; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00846.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Christian D. CHESSON v. Sarah Rebecca CHESSON.
    No. 2007-CC-1991.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Chesson, Sarah Rebecca; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2003-002782; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00975.

Denied.


text:
    MARTINEZ-FOWLER, L.L.C. v. Orlin ROGERS d/b/a Hammond Ready Mix, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-1994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Rogers, Orlin d/b/a; Hammond Ready Mix, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2001-002872; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1106.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry WEEKS.
    No. 2007-KK-1995.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Weeks, Henry; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 04-6135; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-K-620.

Denied.


text:
    Leslie A. LEONARD v. Emile Joseph RICHARD, Jr.
    No. 2007-C-1997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Leonard, Leslie A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Family Court East Baton Rouge Parish, No. 123,646; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 2305.

Denied.


text:
    Diana M. GENCK, et al. v. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-1999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Craver, Randall D. M.D.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2001-16250; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0767.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Andrew MARQUINEZ v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Fleet Tire Service Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 04-13488; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1078.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Robert A. GRACE and Janet F. Grace, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child, Elizabeth Leigh Grace v. Luis CRESPO and Kimberly Crespo, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child, Sherrand E. Crespo, Allstate Insurance Company, and Sentry Select Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Grace, Robert A. et al.; Grace, Janet F.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 534,553; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CA 0397.

Denied.


text:
    Deborah LIUZZA and Paul Liuzza v. MARSHALLS BRAND NAMES FOR LESS, LA., INC., Lauricella Associates, Inc.
    No. 2007-CC-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Lauricella Associates Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 599-539; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 07-C-644, 07-C-665, 07-C-642, 07-C-643.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Deborah LIUZZA and Paul Liuzza v. MARSHALLS BRAND NAMES FOR LESS, LA., INC., Lauricella Associates, Inc., DEF Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-CC-2014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 599-539; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 07-C-665, 07-C-643, 07-C-642, 07-C-644.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge v. TERRACE LAND COMPANY, INC./TERRACE LAND COMPANY, LLC.
    No. 2007-C-2016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Baton Rouge City of; East Baton Rouge Parish of; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 505-345; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 2107.

Denied.


text:
    Alexandre GUMBS v. Edward GRAY, Cembell Industries, Inc., Gray Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Cembell Industries Inc.; Gray, Edward et ah; Gray Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2000-15636; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0009.

Denied.


text:
    Gary D. MCGEHEE, Christopher Michael McGehee & Sheldon Duane McGehee v. Kevin Clark BENTON, Dr. Tracy Benton, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company & Geico Casualty Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2020.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Geico Casualty Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 520,062; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 2335.

Denied.


text:
    Ray FRISBY v. Gustav MUGNIER.
    No. 2007-C-2021.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Mugnier, Gustav; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2004-12720; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 2288.

Denied.


text:
    Donnie DOUSAY v. DOUSAY FLOOR COVERING Lynn Dousay d/b/a Dousay Floor v. Donnie Dousay.
    No. 2007-C-2023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Dousay, Donnie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 2, Nos. 05-03348, 05-01271,; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 07-195, 07-196.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Leroy ELLIS, Leroy Ellis Jr., and Beau Michael Ellis, Individually and on Behalf of Decedent Brandon Ellis v. THIBODAUX’S VENTURES, LLC d/b/a Magnolia Beach Truck Plaza and Brandon Matherne.
    No. 2007-C-2024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Ellis, Leroy; Ellis, Beau Michael et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 103,806; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 2398.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Terry and Jo Ann FALCON, Individually, and as Husband and Wife and Joyce Falcon v. CLARENDON INSURANCE COMPANY, Steve Kent Trucking, Inc., Martin R. Leger, Jr., Danny Childers, Oil Mop, L.L.C., Master Vac Hydro Services, L.L.C., Master Vac Industrial Services, L.L.C. and State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.
    No. 2007-C-2036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Falcon, Terry et al.; Falcon, Joyce; Falcon, Jo Ann; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 28,065; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2006 CA 2418, 2007 CA 0152.

Denied.


text:
    Evans P. THIBODAUX, Jr., Gene L. Thibodaux, Patricia T. Naquin, and Felicia T. Bader v. LEONARD J. CHABERT MEDICAL CENTER, Formerly South La. Medical Center, Jeffery J. Joseph, M.D., John A. Dean, M.D., John Dampeer, M.D., Thomas W. Downes, M.D., Jose’ Mena, M.D., and Chris P. Patronella, M.D.
    No. 2007-C-2039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center et ah; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ter-rebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 106961; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0599-R.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thatcher MCELVEEN, et al.
    No. 2007-KK-2206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 7, 2007.
   In re McElveen, Thatcher; McElveen, Terry; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 434-604; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-1422.

Denied.


author: CHARLES R. JONES, Judge.

text:
    Gregory PRINCE and Cynthia Prince v. Frank M. BUCK, Jr., Robert L. Manard, David W. Groner, Frank E. Barber, Continental Casualty Company and Clarendon National Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-CA-1603.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 16, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied June 20, 2007.

      Robert H. Matthews, Pauline M. Warri-ner, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Gregory Prince.
    Richard T. Simmons, Jr., Darren A. Pa-tin, Hailey McNamara Hall Larmann & Papale, L.L.OP., Metairie, LA, for Frank M. Buck, Jr.
    William E. Wright, Jr., Charlotte C. Meade, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Continental Casualty Company.
    (Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, and Judge DAVID S. GORBATY).
   CHARLES R. JONES, Judge.

11 Cynthia Prince, wife ofiand Gregory Prince (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Princes”), seek review of a district court judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of Frank Buck and dismissing the Princes’ case. We affirm.

On December 12, 1997, Mr. Prince retained attorney Robert Manard to handle a workers’ compensation claim against his employer. Mr. Manard and Mr. Buck, who was an associate attorney at Mr. Ma-nard’s law firm, filed suit on Mr. Prince’s behalf on March 31, 1998, in the 16th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Mary.

As a result of an alleged rift between Mr. Manard and Mr. Buck, Mr. Buck withdrew as counsel of record on March 7, 2002. He also filed a petition for intervention in Mr. Prince’s case. Thereafter, Mr. Prince filed a motion for sanctions against Mr. Buck asserting that he abandoned Mr. Prince’s case, that his withdrawal would cause a hardship upon him, and harm his case at trial. Mr. | ¡¡Prince also filed a motion to continue the trial that was scheduled for September 23, 2002.

Mr. Prince then retained attorneys David Groner and Frank Barber to serve as additional counsel with Mr. Manard. These three attorneys settled his case for $150,000.00 during an in-court pre-trial settlement proceeding. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Mr. Prince released all of the underlying defendants, dismissed his lawsuit, and his motion to continue was rendered moot. Mr. Prince recited his understanding of the terms of the settlement on the record. A reservation of rights in favor of Mr. Prince was not included in the settlement.

In the same proceeding, Mr. Manard brought to the district court’s attention that there were two matters that were unresolved: 1.) Mr. Buck’s intervention, and 2.) Mr. Prince’s motion for sanctions. These issues were subsequently settled pursuant to a stipulated judgment that was entered into on February 7, 2003.

On or about July 30, 2003, the Princes’ subsequently sued Mr. Manard, Mr. Buck, Mr. Groner, Mr. Barber, Continental Casualty Company and Clarendon National Insurance Company for legal malpractice in the Parish of Orleans. Mr. Groner and Mr. Barber were later dismissed from this case via summary judgment. Thereafter, Mr. Buck and his personal liability insurer, Continental Casualty Company (hereinafter referred to as “CNA”), filed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal from the instant case. The district court granted the motions on March 18, 2005. The Princes’ filed a motion for new trial and exceptions of prematurity, no cause of action, prescription and preemption. However, the ^district court denied the motion and exceptions. The Princes’ filed the instant appeal.

The Princes allege that the district court erred in granting Mr. Buck’s and CNA’s motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the Princes contend that the district court erred in finding that there was no indication of negligence and/or wrongdoing by Mr. Buck because these issues by agreement were not before the district court. They further contend that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Buck and CNA are immune from claims for legal malpractice involving his representation of Mr. Prince because Mr. Prince settled his claims following Mr. Buck’s withdrawal as counsel.

The standard of review of a summary judgment is de novo. Suskind v. Shervin-Gulf Tranon, 03-0037, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/16/03), 846 So.2d 93, 96. Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).

The reviewing court asks the same questions as does the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover-appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 26 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966(C)(2) provides:

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof |4at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claims, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

To prove a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove: (1) there was an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney was negligent, and (3) that negligence caused plaintiff some loss. Couture v. Guillory, 97-2796, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 713 So.2d 528, 530 (quoting Scott v. Thomas, 543 So.2d 494 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989)). However, if a plaintiff is able to prove the first two elements of the legal malpractice test, the burden then shifts to the defendant attorney to establish that the client could not have succeeded on the original claim. Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So.2d 1109, 1110 (La. 1982).

As we further explained in Broadscape.com, Inc. v. Walker, 03-904, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/25/2004), 866 So.2d 1085, 1089:

Jenkins does not dispose of the plaintiffs burden in providing all three prongs required in a legal malpractice suit. The court reasoned:
when the plaintiff proves that negligence on the part of his former attorney has caused the loss of the opportunity to assert a claim and thus established the inference of causation of damages resulting from the loss [sic] opportunity for recovery, an appellate court must determine whether the negligent attorney met his burden of producing sufficient proof to overcome plaintiffs and cause the loss of the opportunity to assert a claim and thus establishes the inference of causation of damages resulting from the loss opportunity for recovery, an appellate court must determine whether the negligent attorney met his burden of producing sufficient proof to overcome plaintiffs prima facie case.

|RIn their first assignment of error, the Princes assert that the district court erred in finding that there was no indication of negligence and/or wrongdoing by Mr. Buck because those issues were not before the trial court.

Mr. Buck challenged all three (3) elements of the legal malpractice standard in his motion for summary judgment. Yet, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district court limited its review to the third element of the legal malpractice test per the agreement of the parties.

It was absurd for Mr. Buck to agree to limit his motion for summary judgment to the issue of damages when he was not conceding that the Princes’ could succeed in carrying their burden of proof on the first two factors. Additionally, the district court should not have not have addressed the issue of damages without first making a determination as to whether an attorney/client relationship existed between the parties and whether Mr. Buck was indeed negligent. Failing to discuss these elements hindered the district court’s ability to fully understand and discuss the Princes’ alleged damages against their attorney. We note that the record reflects that the district court struggled in making a determination as to damages ' without considering the other prongs of the legal malpractice standard.

Nevertheless, based on a review of the record, we find that the district court did not err in holding that there was no proof of negligence and/or wrongdoing by Mr. Buck. This assignment of error is without merit.

In their second assignment of error, the Princes' assert that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Buck and CNA are immune from legal malpractice claims because Mr. Prince settled his claims following Mr. Buck’s withdrawal as counsel. Mr. Buck, however, contends that the Princes cannot prove damages because a prejbdal6 settlement was entered into by Mr. Prince under oath and in open court. We agree.

In Couture v. Guillory, 97-2796 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 713 So.2d 528, this Court previously addressed the issue of whether a client can recover damages against his/her attorney for legal malpractice where said client has settled his/her underlying claims. We summarized the facts of Couture in Spellman v. Bizal, 99-0723, (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/1/00), 755 So.2d 1013:

In Couture, the plaintiff, Patty Couture (Couture), had an underlying suit against his employer, the St. Bernard Parish School Board (School Board). Couture retained attorneys Vivian Guil-lory and Clark Roy (Guillory and Roy) to represent him in seeking judicial review of his dismissal by the School Board. On the date that the matter was originally set for trial, the parties reached a partial compromise and settlement, whereby Couture agreed to dismiss several of his claims against the School Board in exchange for monetary compensation. In this agreement, unlike the plaintiff in our case who released all of his rights/claims against the St. Bernard Parish Sheriffs Department in the underlying personal injury suit by virtue of his execution of a Receipt and Release, Couture agreed to preserve two of his rights. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment reversing the action of the School Board and reinstating Couture to his former position. The School Board appealed, and this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and reinstated the disciplinary action taken by the School Board in dismissing Couture from his employment. Couture’s attorneys did not take a writ from this decision to the Supreme Court, and as a result, the Fourth Circuit’s decision is now final.
Couture subsequently retained new counsel and filed a malpractice claim against Guillory and Clark for their alleged negligence' in failing to seek writs from the Fourth Circuit’s decision. In response, Guillory and Clark each filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that as a matter of law, Couture was not entitled to recover from them damages for claims which he had previously discharged by compromise agreement executed in the underlying suit. Guillory and Clark further argued that because Couture, in this compromise 17agreement, dismissed his claim for loss of wages, loss of benefits, mental anguish and other general damages allegedly sustained as result of his discharge, those damages would not have been available to him even if Couture would have been successful in a writ to the Supreme Court. The trial court granted Clark and Guillory’s Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
This Court affirmed, holding that the only claims for damages that could be asserted by the client against the attorneys were those claims that were not discharged by the client prior to trial against his former employer. In our reasoning, we noted that Couture can have no greater rights against his attorneys for the negligent handling of a claim than were available to him in the underlying claim against the School Board. Couture, supra at 532. We further stated as follows:
By the express terms of the Restricted Release and Reservation of Rights executed by plaintiff prior to the trial against the School Board, plaintiff discharged all of his claims for damages against the School Board, except his claim for reinstatement and his claim to seek judicial reversal of his dismissal. The words of the agreement are clear and unambiguous and this agreement has a force equal to the authority of the things adjudged. La. Civil Code art. 3078 (Emphasis ours). To the extent that plaintiff asserts claims for damages against his former attorneys in this malpractice action which were clearly discharged in the underlying suit against the School Board, we find that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing these claims. (Emphasis ours).

Spellman v. Bizal, 99-0723, pp. 10-11, 755 So.2d at 1019.

Similarly, Mr. Prince discharged his claim for damages when his receipt and release agreement was executed. Mr. Prince did not reserve any rights against Mr. Buck as part of his release with the defendants in the underlying claim. Therefore, following our rationale in Couture, even if the Princes were able to prove Mr. Bucks negligence at the trial of this matter, they would be limited to recovering damages for only those claims that they did not discharge in the compromise agreement with Mr. Princes employer.

fiMrs. Princes claims for mental anguish and loss of consortium, services and society would be the only claims that were not settled because she was not a party to the settlement. Yet, claims for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium are specifically excluded from the scope of compensation under workers compensation jurisprudence. La. R.S. 23:1032; See also Cox v. Glazer Steel Corp., 592 So.2d 425, 426 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1991). Moreover, Mrs. Prince did not have an attorney — client relationship with any of the attorneys involved in the underlying workers’ compensation case; consequently, she does not have standing to bring a legal malpractice claim against anyone.

We find that this assignment of error is without merit because Mr. Prince cannot recover twice for the same damages, and Mrs. Prince cannot succeed in a legal malpractice claim against Mr. Buck.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


author: MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge. ARMSTRONG, C.J.,

text:
    Elisabeth Lassiter BAINS v. The YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS, Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CA-1423.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Oct. 3, 2007.

      Robert L. Marrero, Robert L. Marrero, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Edward F. Harold, Raul V. Esquivel III, Fisher & Phillips L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for DefendanVAppellee.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME).
   MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

| ^STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff in this matter, Elizabeth Lassi-ter Bains, seeks reversal of the trial court’s decision granting the defendant’s exception of no cause or right of action. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Early in Ms. Bains’ career, she was employed as a fundraiser for a non-profit organization, and earned a reputation for good work. For family reasons, she had to leave that employment. In May 2005, TLC Linen Services employed Ms. Bains at a salary of $40,000 per annum. In May 2005, the plaintiff began discussing potential employment opportunities with the defendant organization. Her affidavit and petition stated that on May 20, 2005, the, CEO of the YMCA, Darrell Johnston (hereinafter “CEO”), offered her the position of Director of Development in charge of fundraising activities. This was a salaried position paying $65,000 per annum with a possible bonus.

Between May 20 and June 8 the plaintiff and the CEO were in contact numerous times. On no less than three occasions, the CEO reiterated that she was 12offered the job. Moreover, on May 24, 2006, the CEO sent the following email to the plaintiff:

Elisabeth,

We are set for a noon lunch on Thursday, June 2nd, with some of the Development Committee of the Board of Directors. Please plan to arrive at our 2525 Canal Street office (next door to the United Way) at 11:00 a.m. that day to meet with some of the staff. Unless you change your mind after meeting everyone, I would like you to start on June 6. I will get out an offer letter in the morning.

Subsequent to receiving this email, plaintiff resigned her job at TLC Linen Services.

As per the email correspondence, Ms. Bains presented herself at defendant’s office for the meeting. At the meeting, the CEO informed Ms. Bains that the YMCA’s budget numbers “weren’t so hot” and that she might have to start the job at the end of June instead of on June 6. Nevertheless, the meeting went so well that while there one of the Committee members even asked the plaintiff if she could start work that afternoon. At the conclusion of the meeting the CEO told the plaintiff that he would be in touch with her by June 8, 2005.

However, by June 8 the plaintiff had not heard from the CEO. On June 9, 2005, the CEO then informed her that there was a pronounced budget shortfall which prohibited the organization from immediately filling the Development Director vacancy. He notified her that the position would not likely be filled until the fall of 2005, but he could not guarantee that he could hire her at that time.

Following this conversation and the realization that the YMCA was unable to employ her plaintiff sought other employment but was unable to obtain a job for seven months. On August 25, 2005 she filed a petition alleging she relied to her ^detriment on the CEO’s promise of a job offer and has lost wages or other compensation as a result of this reliance. The plaintiff filed this suit under La. C.C. art. 1967, claiming she is entitled to compensation for her detrimental reliance upon the CEO’s conduct, promises, and representations. The defendant subsequently filed an Exception for No Cause or Right of Action. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendant, granting the exception. Following that judgment by the trial court the plaintiff filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An exception of no cause of action is a peremptory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 927. Because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law and the district court’s decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition, appellate review of the district court’s ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. Scheffler v. Adams Reese, L.L.P., p. 5, 06-1774, (La.2/22/07) 950 So.2d 641, 647.

DISCUSSION

At the outset it is only appropriate to note that while plaintiff focuses on the theory of detrimental reliance, a theory with roots in equity at common law, the civil law offers an alternative analysis that focuses on the concept of unilateral declaration of the will as well as offer and acceptance.

Moreover, in Lieux v. Mitchell, 06-0382, p. 15 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 307, 317 our brethren recently stated:

|4Louisiana is a fact-pleading jurisprudence [sic]. Mehta v. Baton Rouge Oil Company, Inc., 99-1773, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir.9/22/00), 768 So.2d 243, 246. Since “theory of the case” pleading has been abandoned, the courts of this state require only that a pleading set forth the facts upon which relief may be granted. See La. C.C.P. art. 891; Spencer-Wallington, Inc. v. Service Merchandise, Inc., 562 So.2d 1060, 1064 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ de nied, 567 So.2d 109 (La.1990). Recovery may be granted to a party under any legal theory justified by the facts pled. See La. C.C.P. art. 862; Mehta, 99-1773 at p. 5, 768 So.2d at 246; Spencer-Wallington, Inc., 562 So.2d at 1064. However, the petition must set forth facts upon which such recovery can be based. Sledge v. Continental Casualty Co., 25, 770, p. 20 (La. App. 2nd Cir.6/24/94), 639 So.2d 805, 819.

Lieux, at 15.

Thus, even though plaintiff specifically pleads detrimental reliance as her theory of recovery, we may analyze the facts pled under other legal theories to see if she is entitled to recovery.

In 1985, the Louisiana Civil Code recognized detrimental reliance as a basis of obligations. However, the civil code contains other devices for the enforcement of promises in cases of reliance, the issue which lies at the heart of this case. The Roman maxim venire contra factum pro-prium non valet, which means “no one can contradict his own act” or “no one is allowed to go against the consequences of his own act” was founded on the notion that “it is not licit to enforce a right in contradiction to one’s previous conduct, when that conduct, interpreted in good faith, would justify the conclusion that the right does not exist or will not be enforced.” This civilian maxim is similar to that of equitable estoppel and has been applied in Louisiana jurisprudence. The civilian doctrine of culpa in \Rcontrahendo, which means “fault in contracting,” performs a function similar to that of promissory estoppel and has also been applied in Louisiana jurisprudence.

Moreover, Louisiana’s Civil Code Art. 1757, entitled “Sources of obligations,” states:

Obligations arise from contracts and other declarations of will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in instances such as wrongful acts, the management of affairs of another, unjust enrichment and other acts or facts. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, unlike the common law analysis of a contract using consideration which requires something in exchange, the civil law concept of “cause” can obligate a person by his act of the will. The difference has been analogized to a civilian contract-consent approach compared to a common law contract-bargain approach. Consideration is an objective element required to form a contract, whereas cause is a more subjective element that goes to the intentions of the parties. Therefore, in Louisiana law, a person can be obligated by both a gratuitous or onerous contract.

In sum, using a traditional civilian analysis, the relevant query to determine whether liability attaches is whether abandonment of negotiations was accompanied by fault. In this case, if the CEO engaged in wrongful conduct by revoking his offer to employ Ms. Bains that was accepted, then a remedy or reparations would be appropriate. This analysis is yet another appropriate formulation of the problem presented in this case, even though the legislature has created more specific articles that apply.

| (¡Plaintiff expressly pleads La. C.C. art.1967, entitled “Cause defined; detrimental reliance,” which states:

Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.

The detrimental reliance theory is a general part of the Civil Law and springs forth from the idea that in a civil society people should keep their word. In order to invoke the doctrine of detrimental reliance, the claimant must prove three elements: (1) a representation by word or conduct; (2) justifiable/reasonable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one’s detriment because of the reliance. Lakeland Anesthesia v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, 03-1662 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/17/04), 871 So.2d 380, 393.

Defendant cites May v. Harris Management Corp., 04-2657, (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 140, contending it is the only Louisiana case to address this precise issue. In May the plaintiff filed a claim against her potential future employer, Harris Management Corp., asserting that she reasonably relied on its offer of employment to her detriment. She filed the complaint seeking damages for detrimental reliance arising out of the withdrawal for an at-will employment offer. The Court was divided. The author’s view became the majority opinion with the aid of a concurrence. There was a dissent. The appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the defendant employer’s summary judgment.

|7The writer of the opinion, without thoroughly consulting the Civil Code, first used stare decisis, as opposed to jurisprudence constante, to arrive at the conclusion that detrimental reliance claims of employees terminated after such employees worked a short time in at-will employment situations. As the concurring and dissenting writers allude to, this was not the factual scenario presented to that court because plaintiff had not yet been employed. Extrapolating from this finding, the author then leaps outside of Louisiana law and considers cases involving at-will employment offers that were withdrawn before the prospective employee actually begins work. Such a consideration poses a twofold problem: one, most other American jurisdictions do not have a Civil Code; and two, common law jurisdictions allow their judiciary more leeway in estoppel because of the history of courts in equity. Comparing this approach with the civilian approach, Louisiana’s judiciary is tied more closely to following the legislature’s mandate as laid out in the Code. The concurrence agreed with the trial court that Ms. May, the plaintiff, justifiably relied on the promise of the prospective employer, however, she simply did not meet her burden of proof as regards damages. The dissenting opinion found that Ms. May did establish an adequate prima facie case of detriment suffered and that there should be no unwarranted extension of the at-will employment principle to a classic factual scenario of detrimental reliance.

In the instant case, Ms. Bains contends that May is distinguishable on the facts because she can prove detriment, due to her long period of unemployment.

| ¡¿Defendant, as in May, argues that there is a conflict between the codal articles and that the article that should prevail is La. C.C. art. 2747, entitled “Contract of servant terminable at will of parties,” which states:

A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or family, .without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to depart without assigning any cause.

Applying the structural civilian analysis of obligations to the employment at will doctrine/article reveals that it is a conditional obligation of a resolutory nature, i.e., the obligation of the employment may be immediately enforced, but will come to an end when the conditional right of termination occurs. La. C.C. art. 1767. Even though the condition depends solely on the obligor’s will, it does not make the obligation null necessarily, such as in the case of a potestative condition, as long as the right to terminate is exercised in good faith, a term defined by La. C.C. art. 1759, which states:

Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.

Further elucidating the good faith required as regards the condition, La. C.C. art. 1770, entitled, “Condition that depends on the whim or the will of the obligor,” states:

A suspensive condition that depends solely on the whim of the obligor makes the obligation null.
A resolutory condition that depends solely on the will of the obligor must be fulfilled in good faith.
[Emphasis added.]

Comment (f) to this article, art. 1770, is quite enlightening, it states that in order to comply with the requirement of good faith, a party exercising his right to terminate a contract at will should consider not only his own advantage, but also the hardship to which the other party will be subjected because of the termination. For 13example, if termination occurs because of purely personal rather than business reasons, bad faith may exist. Confer, Corenswet v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 594 F.2d 129, (5th Cir.1979); Lee Lumber Company, L.T.D. v. International Paper Company, 321 So.2d 42 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976).

An at will contract has an indefinite duration. La. C.C. art.2024, entitled “Contract terminated by a party’s initiative,” states:

A contract of unspecified duration may be terminated at the will of either party by giving notice, reasonable in time and form, to the other party.

This article mandates reasonable notice so as “to avoid unwarranted injury to the interest of the victimized party,” in this case we speak specifically of Ms. Bains loss of employment in reliance on the CEO’s declaration of will. However, Louisiana courts have found that in the at-will employment context, either the employer or employee may terminate at any time.

Wusthoff v. Bally’s Casino Lakeshore Resort, p. 3, 97-1386, (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/25/98), 709 So.2d 913, 914.

Ms. Bains argues that since she was not yet an employee, the employee at will article should not apply to her. Defendant counters that it could have hired her for one minute and then fired her, thereby precluding this argument. Nevertheless, we need not address this issue today, as this is before us on the granting of an exception of no cause of action.

Because La. C.C. art. 2747 does not act as a shield that protects a master from dismissing his servant under any factual scenario, we find that our civil code may offer relief. For example, if plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted in bad faith, there may be a remedy under our civil code. We note that in paragraph 13 of | mplaintiff s petition she pleads facts to the effect that a Member of the YMCA’s Board of Directors, Mr. Allen Favrot, made a statement that directly contradicted the CEO’s representations. Discovery of defendant’s books could reveal bad faith or explain the contradictions, but that is a matter for proof at trial, and a query we need not address at this stage of the proceedings. At the very least, this petition satisfies La. C.C.P. art. 856 and states a cause of action recognized by the law, and that is all that is needed to defeat an exception of no cause of action.

Therefore, because it is possible to reconcile the codal articles that at first blush appear to be in conflict by a thorough analysis of our civil code, and because there are certain scenarios in which the law may offer Ms. Bains relief, we reverse the granting of defendant’s exception of no cause of action and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LOMBARD, J., Concurs for the Reasons Assigned by Judge KIRBY.

ARMSTRONG, C.J., Dissents.

BAGNERIS, J., Dissents for the Reasons Assigned by Chief Judge ARMSTRONG.

ARMSTRONG, C.J.,

Dissents.

hi respectfully dissent.

An exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Inc., 05-0612, 05-719 (La.3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1217. In this case, the allegations of plaintiffs complaint seek recovery solely under a theory of detrimental reliance. Present Louisiana case law finds that it is inherently unreasonable to rely on an offer of at-will employment. May v. Harris Management, 2004-2657 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 140. Therefore, plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which she could recover against the defendant. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BAGNERIS, J., Dissents for the Reasons Assigned by Chief Judge ARMSTRONG.

      . Mattar, Mohamed Yehia, Promissory Estoppel: Common Law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4 Tul. C.L.F. 71 (1988).

      . S. Litvinoff, Obligations, § 88 at 135 (7 La. Civ. Law Treatise 1975).

      . J. Puig Brutau, Estudios de Derecho Comparado, (1951) at 111, quoted in Sanders v. United Distributors, Inc. 405 So.2d 536, 537 n. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981).

      . Davilla v. Jones, 418 So.2d 724 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982); Sanders v. United Distributors, 405 So.2d 536 (La.App. 4 Cir.1981).

      . Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So.2d 444 (La. 1974); Snyder v. Champion Realty Corp., 631 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.1980).

      . La. C.C. art.1910.

      . La. C.C. art. 1909.

      . Mattar, Mohamed Yehia, Promissory Estoppel: Common Law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4 Tul. C.L.F. 71 (1988), See p. 139, Reasonableness of Reliance on a Gratuitous Promise Made Without the Required Formalities.

      . La. C.C. art.2024, comment (e).

      . La. C.C.P. art. 856 reads: In pleading fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be alleged with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be alleged generally.

      . Because Louisiana Civil Procedure has substantially adopted from the Federal Rules of Procedure, it is interesting to note that La. C.C.P. art. 857 dealing with the pleading of suspensive conditions may apply. The reason being that while the Civil Law distinguishes between conditions, i.e., suspensive and reso-lutory, the common law from which the Federal Rules originate, does not make such a distinction. Applied, here art. 857, would simply require a general pleading, but since the petition meets the more specific burden of art. 856, we need not address this speculative query.