text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2032.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04414; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00121.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2033.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04048; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00068.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04110; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00120.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04050; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00067.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04416; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00122.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04054; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00052.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.;' — -Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04417; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00155.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04076; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00123.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04081; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00116.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2041.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04082; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00117.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2042.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-03955; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00149.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05 — 04087; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00118.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05 — 03954; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00094.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05 — 03953; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00114.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04089; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00119.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04077; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00115.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05064; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00106.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2049.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04554; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00111.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05040; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00093.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2051.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04,'No. 05-05010; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00086.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2052.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-4483; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00160.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2053.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-4533; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00125.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5008; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00084.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2055.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5016; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00090.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-4473; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00156.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2057.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04465; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00098.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04879; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00113.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04480; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00159.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2060.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04877; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00112.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2061.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04419; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00102.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05074; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00096.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2063.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05014; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00087.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05599; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00055.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-04535; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00126.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5505; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00072.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2067.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5600; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00056.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2068.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5373; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00152.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2069.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5803; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00057.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2070.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation; LWCC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District No. 4, No. 05-5387; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00153.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05596; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00054.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-5507; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00071.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-005595; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00053.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2074.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05388; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00154.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re LWCC; Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-5591; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00061.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05508; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00070.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05180; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00158.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2078.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05368; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00150.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2079.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05371; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00151.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05590; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00062.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05587; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00069.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2082.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.;. — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05528; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00064.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2083.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05530; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00082.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05178; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00127.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05527; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00092.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05173; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00103.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2087.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05077; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00097.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05524; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00091.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2089.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05174; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00105.

Denied.


text:
    LAFAYETTE SURGICAL CENTER HOSPITAL v. LWCC.
    No. 2006-CC-2090.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 04, No. 05-05066; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 06-00110.

Denied.


text:
    Steven G. FRANTZ v. The PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re P & O Ports Gulfport Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2004-13017; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0904.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Kimberly BAILEY, et al. v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re New Orleans, City of; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 97-21759; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0886.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Cecil W. ETHERIDGE, Sr., et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re New Orleans City of et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2003-132; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0938.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Shedrick J. ALLEN v. Ronald JONES, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Allen, Shedrick J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 04-17907; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-1077.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Rita HOLZENTHAL, et al. v. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2006-CC-2409.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re First Specialty Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2001-16969; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0967.

Denied.


text:
    Suresh Belame NANJAGOWDA, M.D. v. UNIVERSITY HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, L.C., et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Tulane University Hospital & Clinic: University Healthcare System L.C. d/b/a; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 03-18779; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-1103.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Lillian RUSSELL, et al. v. NEW PRIME INC., et al.
    No. 2006-OC-2411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re RLI Insurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 206,617; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-956.

Denied.


text:
    Lavenia J. MARTIN v. Jamestetta Ann SAUNDERS, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Johnson, James Ellis; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 00-18318; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-1009.

Denied.


text:
    James E. MCCRORY v. CAN DO, INC., et al.
    No. 2006-OC-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re McCrory, James E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 10-16413; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-982.

Denied.


text:
    Jeffery L. WITHERS v. Cheryl Beth WITHERS (Watson).
    No. 2006-CC-2349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Withers, Jeffrey L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98-487; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-072-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Theresa D. HARRIGAN v. AMERICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2006-CC-2354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Arnica Mutual Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 601-507; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-C-580.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    John C. COOKSEY v. Ron W. STEWART.
    No. 2006-C-2348.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Cooksey, John C. Dr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 05-1106; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,-336-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Willis J. SAWYER v. Doris Jones SAWYER.
    No. 2006-C-2345.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Sawyer, Doris Jones; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 64,403; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1189.

Denied.


text:
    Irene STEWART v. BILL HOOD FORD, L.L.C.
    No. 2006-C-2200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Bill Hood Ford L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 103575; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0349.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Albert P. FIRMIN.
    No. 2006-C-2197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louden, Henrynne; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2003-2530; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-1218.

Denied.


text:
    Vinod Kumar DAHIYA v. TALMIDGE INTERNATIONAL, LTD., et al.
    No. 2006-C-1913.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Dahiya, Vinod Kumar; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, Plaquemines Div. B, No. 48-857; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-0514.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Paula Barrere BORDELON v. Travis BORDELON.
    No. 2006-CJ-2414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Bordelon, Paul Barrere; Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated October 13, 2006; Parish of Avoyelles, 12th JDC, Div. B, No. 2006-8868-B.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    In re Robert E. PATRICK.
    No. 2006-OB-2785.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Patrick, Robert E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Appeal of Hearing Committee’s Decision.

Denied.


text:
    J.L. FRANKLIN v. SECRETARY OF STATE, State of Louisiana, al ater.
    No. 2006-OC-2538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Franklin, J.L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 25, 2006; Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Division B, No. 2006-004815; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-1332.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re Honorable H. Lynn JONES, Clerk of Court for the 14th Judicial District Court, Calcasieu Parish.
    No. 2006-CC-0564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Cutrer, Lilynn Annette Hon.;— Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2006-128; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-00201.

Not considered. Application does not involve a case or controversy.


text:
    Mickey O’CONNOR v. WESTBANK INNS, a Louisiana Partnership, John F. Stumpf, Jr., Lincoln T. Case and Harry C. Stumpf.
    No. 2005-CC-1134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Westbank Inns et al.; Stumpf, Harry C.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 599-376; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-C-242.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    CERTIFIED CAPITAL CORPORATION v. BOBCO, INC., Henry G. Kern and John H. Onstott.
    No. 2006-C-2321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Onstott, John H.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 449,534; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0474.

Denied.


text:
    Jonathan M. WYATT v. HARAHAN MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD.
    No. 2006-C-2322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Wyatt Jonathan M.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 614-264; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-CA-81.

Denied.


text:
    LACOUR’S DRAPERY COMPANY, INC. d/b/a Lacour’s Carpet World v. BRUNT CONSTRUCTION, INC.
    No. 2006-C-2324.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 512399; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1352.

Denied.


text:
    Benjamin JONES & Jacqueline Jones v. Paul JEFFERSON, Werner Transportation, Inc. & Pennsylvania Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-2341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Jones, Benjamin et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 549-779; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-CA-25.

Denied.


text:
    Sharon CULLOP-WITHERSPOON v. Twinkles C. JACK and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-2342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Cullop-Witherspoon Sharon;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 488,964; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1700.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL OF Santiago DAVIS (Deceased) and Marcie Davis v. LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER-SHREVEPORT.
    No. 2006-C-2343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center-Shreveport; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 492,418; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,273-CA.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Milton WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, et al.
    No. 2006-0C-2428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Wilson, Milton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 452,143; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1070.

Denied as moot.


text:
    PRAESES CORPORATION v. DIMENSION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.
    No. 2006-CC-2429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Dimension Development Company Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cad-do, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 474390-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41742-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Newell H. ANDRY, et al. and Other Consolidated Cases v. MURPHY OIL U.S.A., INC., et al.
    No. 2006-C-2256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Entergy Louisiana Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 80-774, 77-132, 79-581, 79-729, 87-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2005-CA-133, 2005-CA-0126, 2005-CA-127, 2005-CA-128, 2005-CA-129, 2005-CA-130, 2005-CA-131, 2005-CA-132.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Newell H. ANDRY, et al. v. MURPHY OIL U.S.A., INC., et al.
    No. 2006-C-2278.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 80-774, 77-139, 77-542, 79-644, 77-132, 79-581, 79-729, 87-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2005-CA-133, 2005-CA-0126, 2005-CA-127, 2005-CA-128, 2005-CA-129, 2005-CA-130, 2005-CA-131, 2005-CA-132.

Denied.


text:
    Milton WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Britt, Jeff (Former Tensas Parish Sheriff); — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 452,143; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1070.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    LOUISIANA CRAWFISH PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION-WEST, et al. v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2006-C-2301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Crawfish Producers Assoc. — West et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 04-68,091; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1156.

Denied.


text:
    Janice FLUITT v. CHRISTUS HEALTH CENTRAL LOUISIANA d/b/a St. Frances Cabrini Hospital.
    No. 2006-C-2302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Christus Health Central Louisiana d/b/a; St. Frances Cabrini Hospital; — Defendants); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. # 02, No. 03-04778; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-0945.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Shane H. COLLINS, Sam H. Collins, and Barbara K. Collins v. MIKE’S TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Star Insurance Company, Dwight L. Daigle, and Nutmeg Insurance Company Richard Andrew Jackson v. Mike’s Trucking Company, Inc., Star Insurance Company, Dwight L. Daigle, and Nutmeg Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1914.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Star Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, Nos. 473,861, 479,658; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2005 CA 0238, 2005 CA 0239.

Denied.


text:
    RESIDENTS OF SHENANDOAH ESTATES SUBDIVISION v. GREEN TRAILS, L.L.C., Shenandoah Golf Club, L.L.C., East Baton Rouge Parish Planning Commission, East Baton Rouge Parish Department of Public Works, & Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 2006-C-2098.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Residents of Shenandoah Estates Subdivision; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 529,827; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005-CA-1331.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.


text:
    Audrey D. BRIGNAC v. CITY OF MONROE, Louisiana Civic Center, the City of Monroe, TIG Insurance Company, the Louisiana Travel Promotion Association and Trinity Universal Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-2154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re TIG Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-5187; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,207-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Robert Andrew BOURGEOIS; Dominick Epifano Danna, Gerald Ray Kelley, Sr.; and Phil Carl Robichaux, et al. v. A.P. GREEN INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2006-C-2159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Robichaux, Phil C.; Bourgeois, Robert A., et al.; Danna, Dominick Epifa-no; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. Y, No. 488-642; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-CA-87.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Audrey D. BRIGNAC v. CITY OF MONROE, Louisiana Civic Center, the City of Monroe, TIG Insurance Company, the Louisiana Travel Promotion Association and Trinity Universal Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-2165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Monroe City of; Monroe Civic Center; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-5187; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,207-CA.

Denied.


text:
    ANESTHESIA CONSULTANTS OF THE SOUTH, L.L.C. v. SLIDELL SPECIALTY HOSPITAL, L.P. d/b/a Southern Surgical Hospital, Slidell Medical Management, L.L.C., Irvin Gregory, Bay Ingram, Charles Philip Neely, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Gosey, James M.D.; Butler, James M.D.; Slidell Medical Management L.L.C.; Ingram, Bay; Slidell Specialty Hospital L.P. d/b/a Southern Surgical Hospital, et al.; Thomas, Michael M.D.; Fong, Brian M.D.; Hontas, Mark M.D.; Lavin, Tom M.D.; Warden, Clark M.D.; Southern Specialty Hospital; Gregory, Irvin; Neely, Charles Philip; Finger, Simon M.D.; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 05-13241; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0758.

Denied.


text:
    Marie FUSELIER and George Fuselier v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development and St. John the Baptist Parish.
    No. 2006-C-2355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Fuselier, George; Fuselier, Marie et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 50801; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-CA-118.

Denied.


text:
    ANGELO IAFRATE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. Billy HERRING Billy Herring v. J.I.C.
    No. 2006-C-2365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Angelo Iafrate Construction Co.;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. # 05, Nos. 03-05936, 03-07450,; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2005 CA 1462, 2005 CA 1461.

Denied.


text:
    Nancy Wife of/and John SALTZMAN v. LOUISIANA SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, Brian Ghere, Christopher Algero, John Doe, Jack Doe, and Causeway Animal Hospital, Inc.
    No. 2006-CC-2366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Ghere, Brian; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2006-01890; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0996.

Denied.


text:
    Walter BORG, M.D. v. Douglas W. COOK, M.D., Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center, Inc., Denean James, BCSAC, John Colaluca, D.O., Jay Weiss, M.D. and Tony Young, Ph.D.
    No. 2006-CC-2378.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Borg, Walter M.D.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. M108-2005; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41739-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Cornelius COLEMAN, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Louisiana, State of; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 200,481; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-01074.

Denied.


text:
    Charles E. BLANK, Jolene L. Gomez, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Son, L.D.G., Irma Jo Loubiere, Riley Spurlock, Johnnie Mae Spurlock, Paul D. Kleinpeter, Eva G. Kleinpeter, Joe L. Farley, Linda F. Farley, and Ms. Lee B. Allemond v. SID RICHARDSON CARBON AND GASOLINE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-2389.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Gomez, Jolene L.; Blank, Charles E.; Spurlock, Riley; Kleinpeter, Paul D.; Farley, Joe L.; Allemond, Lee B.; Loubi-ere, Irma Jo; Spurlock, Johnnie Mae; Kleinpeter, Eva G.; Farley, Linda F.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 25,219; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 0356.

Denied.


text:
    Neil C. ABRAMSON v. Neil R. JURKOVIC and United Services Automobile Association.
    No. 2006-C-2393.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Abramson, Neil C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 99-16860; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-0814.

Denied.


text:
    Billie Lorain BARKER, James Barry Touchstone, Leta Faye Floyd, and Kathleen Sloan v. SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP.; TriState Schindler Elevator Company; Hollywood Casino Shreveport; Shreveport Paddlewheels, L.L.C.; H.C.S., I, Inc.; H.C.S., II, Inc.; Broadmoor/Roy Anderson Corp., a Joint Venture; Broadmoor L.L.C.; and Roy Anderson Corp.
    No. 2006-CC-2416.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Schindler Elevator Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 468,287; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41729-CW.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.


author: EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge. McKAY, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ryan LEWIS.
    No. 2005-KA-0973.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 24, 2006.
    Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney, Tiffany A. Peters, Assistant District Attorney, Gregory M. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Robert Glass, Glass & Reed, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS Jr., Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD).
   EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

hThe State appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial. After review of the record in light of the applicable law and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On May 16, 2002, Derrick Thornton and Derrick Whatley, both students at Joseph S. Clark High School (“Clark High School”), left school in the middle of the day. The two teenage boys, wearing the gray pants and white shirt uniform of Clark High School, rode the Broad Street bus to Gentilly Boulevard near Lotus Street and then walked southbound on Lotus Street towards Thornton’s residence at 2728 Wisteria Street. At the corner of Lotus and Wisteria Street, Thornton and Whatley encountered two other boys wearing similar uniforms. Thornton and What-ley recognized one of the boys (Ronaldo Smith) as a classmate at Clark High School, but Smith’s companion was unknown to them. After conversing for a few minutes, the four boys walked down Wisteria Street together until they reached the | ¡¿Thornton residence. While the four boys stood talking on the Thornton porch, a fifth boy — also in their school uniform — -joined them. Thornton briefly went inside and returned to the group on the porch with a glass of juice and, after a few more minutes of conversation, Ronal-do’s unknown companion produced a handgun, pointed it at Whatley, and told him not to move. Thornton jumped off the porch and the unknown boy pointed the gun at him and shot him in the neck. Thornton fell to the ground, Whatley went to his aid, and the three other boys ran in the direction of Lotus Street. Whatley and Thornton went inside Thornton’s residence and called for help. A New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) unit arrived at approximately 12:45 p.m. and, shortly thereafter, an EMS unit took Thornton to the Medical Center of Louisiana (a/k/a “Charity”) for treatment and a police detective took Whatley to Clark High School to review a computer program containing the identification photographs of the student body. Whatley identified the photograph of Ryan Lewis as the unknown male and Jarren Green as the fifth person to join the group on the porch. Subsequently, Ryan Lewis was arrested later that evening.

Several weeks later, on May 23, 2002, a private investigator visited the home of Barbara Mackie, Lewis’s gym teacher at Clark High School. Ms. Mackie recalled Lewis attending her third period class (11:45 a.m. until 1:15 p.m.) on the day of the incident and, for verification, referred to her records, including the class ^attendance forms (“Form 44”), which she filled out each day in the third period class at approximately 12 p.m. The Form 44 for May 6, 2002, documented Lewis’s presence in class on that day.

On August 15, 2002, Lewis was charged by bill of indictment with attempted first-degree murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charge at his arraignment on August 22, 2002. In preparation for trial, Lewis’s defense counsel issued three subpoenas to the custodian of school records at Clark High School, seeking the contemporaneous attendance record (Form 44) to demonstrate that Lewis was in class at the time of the incident. Prior to Lewis’s trial in October 2004, Clark High School had returned to its permanent site at 1301 N. Derbigny from its temporary (2001-2002) location on S. Rocheblave Street, but the school records custodian was unable to locate and produce the pertinent Form 44. The long-sought Form 44 was only discovered (in a storage area of Clark High School) after Lewis was convicted and, based upon its post-conviction discovery, the defense filed a motion for a new trial. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the defendant’s motion.

Discussion

In determining whether to grant a defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial judge should consider four factors: (1) whether the new evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) whether the failure to discover the evidence was due to the defendant’s lack of diligence; (3) whether the evidence is material to the issues at trial; and (4) whether the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature that it will probably produce a different verdict in the event of retrial. See La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 851(3). The trial judge has “much discretion” in ruling on a 1 ¿motion for a new trial and, upon review, this court may only set aside the judgment upon a finding that the trial judge exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner. State v. Hammons, 597 So.2d 990, 994 (La.1992).

In this case, the defendant’s alibi — that he was in class at the time of the incident — was confirmed by his teacher who contemporaneously documented each student’s class attendance on an attendance card (“the Form 44”). It undisputed that immediately after the incident, the teacher had the Form 44 in her possession that verified the defendant was in class at the time of the incident and that, as required, she turned the forms into the school office at the end of the term. Defense counsel, aware of the document’s existence, properly attempted to procure it from the school records custodian, issuing three documentary subpoenas, but due to the records custodian’s inability to find the requested document the pertinent Form 44 was not available at the time of trial. Although the teacher testified at trial, confirming that the defendant was in class at the time of the incident, her testimony was unsupported by the contemporaneous document that recorded his attendance. The teacher’s testimony was further undermined by the trial testimony of the school records custodian pertaining to the computer printout which indicated that the defendant was in class the day after the incident, when he was in jail.

The school records for the pertinent time period, including the Form 44 at issue, were discovered in a storage area of the school only after the defendant was convicted of attempted murder. Based on the discovery of the long-sought document, the defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial on behalf of the defendant. At the motion hearing, the records custodian testified that, after reviewing the newly found school records for the period at issue, he questioned |swhether the computer records which he had produced prior to trial (and which subsequently undermined the teacher’s testimony at trial) accurately reflected the school attendance records.

The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion, apparently concluding that the defendant’s inability, despite repeated requests by subpoena, to obtain the contemporaneously maintained attendance records supporting his alibi was prejudicial and that subsequent availability of the document makes a material difference to the defendant’s case and his defense. In appealing the trial judge’s decision, the State argues, in effect, that evidence was not newly discovered because defense counsel knew of its existence prior to trial and merely issued subpoenas to the records custodian for the document rather than having his investigator attempt to seize it from the teacher at her home three months prior to his client’s indictment. The State also contended in oral argument that the trial judge’s decision should be overturned in the interest of judicial efficiency because affirming the decision will result in a retrial of the case. Neither of these arguments is persuasive and, in light of the serious crime at issue, the judicial efficiency argument is particularly egregious. Under the applicable standard of review, we must defer to the trial judge’s reasonable judgment in granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial. A thorough review of the record reveals nothing which suggests the trial judge’s decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. Thus, although a de novo review of the matter may have yielded a different outcome, under the applicable standard of review we cannot find that the trial court abused his vast discretion in granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

McKAY, J., dissents with reasons.

McKAY, J.,

Dissenting with Reasons.

hi respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter.

In the instant matter the State argues that Form 44 was not “newly discovered” or that the production of Form 444 would have changed the verdict had it been submitted at trial.

It is important to distinguish between new evidence and evidence that simply had not been collected prior to trial. The form was available prior to trial and in the possession of a defense witness. Obviously, the defense investigator realized the importance of the form when he instructed Ms. Mackie to hold on to it. However, the defense did not request a copy of the form at that time, even though the witness told the investigator that the form would be turned into the office at the end of the school year. In fact, the defense did not attempt to subpoena the attendance records until May 2004, almost two years after they were submitted to the school. Form 44 was not newly discovered evidence as defendant was clearly aware of its existence long before trial and it was discoverable before trial. Following trial, the form was located approximately one month after the first post-trial subpoena was issued. Defense counsel had sufficient time prior to trial to procure the form. The defendant has failed to show that the form was any more available or capable of being located after trial, than it was before trial.

12Furthermore, assuming the form was unavailable for purposes of La.C.Cr.P. art. 851, it does not constitute evidence, which if introduced at trial, would probably have changed the verdict. In evaluating whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial, the test to be employed is not simply whether another jury might bring in a different verdict, but whether the new evidence is so material that is probably would produce a verdict different from that rendered at trial. State v. Metoyer, 97-2266 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/7/98), 720 So.2d 148.

In State v. East, 99-1379, (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/25/00), 768 So.2d 173, the court opined that cumulative evidence as to an issue fairly disclosed and decided at the trial is usually not of the nature that would probably produce an acquittal for the purpose of determining whether defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.

At trial, Ms. Mackie testified that she recalled Lewis being in class at the time of the shooting. She further testified that she referred to Form 44 to corroborate her statement. Thus, the jury was informed that Form 44 indicated Lewis was in class. Form 44 is cumulative evidence. The defendant has failed to show that the evidence was so material that its introduction ought to have produced a different result.

Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s motion for new trial.

      . At the time of the incident, Thornton (d.o.b. 10/21/84) and Whatley (d.o.b. 10/25/85) were 17 and 16, respectively.

      . For the 2001-2002 school year Clark High School was temporarily located at 2600 S. Rocheblave Street in New Orleans, approximately 6 miles from Thornton's residence on Wisteria Street.

      .Although, the initial police report indicates that Thornton and Whatley knew the boy as “Renaldo” subsequent fingerprint identification, as well as photographic identification by Thornton and Whatley, indicate that his name was Ronaldo Smith.

      . The initial police report of the incident clearly indicates that at the time of the incident the identity of the shooter was unknown to Thornton and Whatley.

      . At the time of the incident, Smith (d.o.b. 12/18/84) was 17.

      . The statement given by Whatley to NOPD Detective Carlton Lawless indicates that the police received the call reporting the shooting at approximately 12:37 p.m.

      .According to the medical records, Thornton was prescribed pain medication and discharged from Charity the following day.

      . Thornton subsequently was shown three line-ups of six school identification card photographs and identified Ronaldo Smith as "Renaldo”, Ryan Lewis as the unknown male, and Vashawn Tate as the fifth person on the porch.

      . Ronaldo Smith and Vashawn Tate were also charged but their cases were subsequently severed from Lewis’s case.


author: WHIPPLE, J.

text:
    Desiree BENNETT v. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Turner United Partnership and United Companies Realty and Development Company, Inc.
    No. 2005 CA 1957.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 15, 2006.

      Frank R. Whitely, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Appellees, Intervenor and Defendant in Reconvention, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance and Third-Party Defendant, Arkansas Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
    Amos H. Davis, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, Turner United Partnership, United Companies Realty and Development Companies, Inc., et al.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE and McDonald, jj.
   WHIPPLE, J.

12Turner United Partnership, United Companies Realty and Development Companies, Inc., and Trinity Universal Insurance Company, appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing their reconven-tional and third-party demands and ordering that Trinity Universal Insurance Company reimburse St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company the amount of its lien for workers’ compensation benefits and medical benefits paid to plaintiff. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 11, 1997, plaintiff, Desiree Bennett, an employee of Arkansas Blue Cross-Blue Shield (“Blue Cross-Blue Shield”), was injured when she tripped in a hole while walking to the outdoor, designated smoking area for United Plaza Building Number Nine, where her employer, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, was a tenant and maintained an office. At the time of the accident, appellants, Turner United Partnership and United Companies Realty and Development Company, Inc., owned the property, commonly known as “United Plaza Building Number Nine” and, pursuant to a written lease entered into between the parties, leased office space to Blue Cross-Blue Shield.

On August 18, 1998, plaintiff filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants Turner United Partnership (“Turner”), United Companies Realty and Development Company, Inc. (“United”), and their liability insurer, Trinity Universal Insurance Company (“Trinity”), (or collectively, “defendants”). On October 2, 1998, United, Turner, and Trinity filed an answer, generally denying any liability for plaintiffs injuries. On |-November 3, 1998, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (“St.Paul”), in its capacity as Blue Cross-Blue Shield’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, filed a petition of intervention, asserting its statutory right to be paid by preference out of any judgment or sums paid to plaintiff and seeking reimbursement from the defendants for workers’ compensation benefits and medical payments made by St. Paul to plaintiff as a result of this accident.

On August 1, 2001, defendants filed a reconventional demand against St. Paul and a third-party demand against Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Defendants claimed that by failing to obtain a subrogation waiver from St. Paul, Blue Cross-Blue Shield had violated Section 8.18 of the Lease Agreement whereby Blue Cross-Blue Shield purportedly agreed to waive subrogation against United, Turner, and Trinity and to “cause [Blue Cross-Blue Shield’s] insurance carriers to waive same.” United, Turner, and Trinity further claimed that, pursuant to the indemnity provision set forth in Section 5.04 of the Lease Agreement, Blue Cross-Blue Shield had agreed to defend, hold harmless, indemnify and/or reimburse United, Turner, and Trinity for any losses resulting from Blue Cross-Blue Shield’s failure to perform and discharge its covenants and obligations under the Lease Agreement, including the claims asserted by plaintiff. Thus, defendants | contended, Blue Cross-Blue Shield was responsible for the losses incurred by defendants due to Blue Cross-Blue Shield’s alleged “active breach” of its contractual obligations to defendants under the lease.

Plaintiff ultimately settled her tort claims in the main demand against the defendants. As a result of that settlement, on November 27, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion and order for partial dismissal, dismissing her claims against defendants with prejudice, but reserving all rights of plaintiff and Trinity against Blue Cross-Blue Shield and St. Paul. Thus, the trial involved only these remaining claims, i.e., defendants’ reconventional and third-party claims against Blue Cross-Blue Shield and intervenor, St. Paul. At trial, defendants introduced a copy of the Receipt and Release Agreement | .^executed on August 10, 2001, evidencing the terms of the settlement between plaintiff and defendants.

On May 4, 2005, the trial court issued written reasons for judgment, dismissing the defendants’ reconventional and third-party demands and granting St. Paul’s petition for intervention. The trial court further ordered that United and Trinity reimburse St. Paul the full amount claimed as its lien, $74,515.30, for workers’ compensation payments made to plaintiff, with interest from the date of demand, and all costs of court. In its written reasons, the trial court stated that it adopted and incorporated as its reasons “the post-trial brief’ submitted by St. Paul and Blue Cross-Blue Shield. A written judgment in conformity with the court’s ruling was signed on May 27, 2005. The instant appeal by defendants followed.

On appeal, defendants assign the following as error:

1. [The trial court] erred in considering any parole [sic] evidence or argument regarding the drafting and negotiating of the lease or the parties’ intent where the provisions in question were clear and explicit and did not lead to any absurd circumstances; and
2. [The trial court] erred in failing to uphold the clear and explicit language of Section 8.18 of the lease between Turner United and Blue Cross which required Blue Cross to waive any subrogation rights and cause its insurers to do the same; and
3. [The trial court] erred in failing to uphold the clear and explicit language of Section 5.04 of the lease which obligated Blue Cross to fully defend and indemnify Turner United for any losses resulting from Blue Cross’s | ^breach of its obligation under the lease to obtain subrogation waivers from its insurers.

DISCUSSION

The lease contract is the law between the parties in defining their respective legal rights and obligations. Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 95-3058, p. 8 (La.12/13/96), 702 So.2d 648, 666. Each provision in an agreement must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the agreement as a whole. LSA-C.C. art. 2050; K & M Enterprises of Slaughter, Inc. v. Pennington, 99-0930, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir.5/12/00), 764 So.2d 1089, 1091, writ denied, 2000-1537 (6/30/00), 766 So.2d 548.

We are obligated to give legal effect to contracts according to the true intent of the parties. LSA-C.C. art. 2045. The true intent of the parties to a contract is to be determined by the words of the contract when they are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences. LSA-C.C. art. 2046; Fleniken v. Entergy Corporation, 99-3023, 99-3024, p. 14 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/16/01), 790 So.2d 64, 73, units denied, 2001-1269, 2001-1295 (La.6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1250, 1252. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. LSA-C.C. 2046; Amoco Production Company v. Fina Oil & Chemical Company, 95-1185, p. 11 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/23/96), 670 So.2d 502, 511, writ denied, 96-1024 (La.5/31/96), 673 So.2d 1037.

In such cases, the meaning and intent of the parties to the written contract must be sought within the four corners of the instrument and cannot be explained or contradicted by parol evidence. LSA-C.C. art. 1848; Amoco, 95-1185 at 12, 670 So.2d at 511. Contracts, subject to interpretation from the instrument’s four corners without the necessity of extrinsic |7evidence, are to be interpreted as a matter of law. Fleniken, 99-3023, 99-3024 at 14, 790 So.2d at 73. The use of extrinsic evidence is proper only where a contract is ambiguous after an examination of the four corners of the agreement. Fleniken, 99-3023, 99-3024 at 14, 790 So.2d at 73.

Defendants aver on appeal that they are entitled to indemnification under the terms of the lease and that they are entitled to damages, representing their “losses” incurred as a result of Blue Cross-Blue Shield’s “negligence in failing to obtain a waiver from St. Paul” and breach of the contract of lease. We find no merit to these claims.

In rendering its judgment, the trial court apparently found that the pertinent portion of Section 5.04 of the Lease Agreement, which would seemingly have obligated Blue Cross-Blue Shield to be hable for any injuries caused by any defects in United’s premises, was not made part of the lease. Specifically, as Blue Cross-Blue Shield contended, and the trial court apparently agreed, because this portion of the Lease Agreement was stricken through, Blue Cross-Blue Shield had no contractual or other obligation upon which liability could be imposed for plaintiffs injuries caused by defects in the property. Therefore, any obligation to waive subro-gation and “cause Tenant’s insurance carriers to waive same” under “any insurance policy” as contemplated by Section 8.18, did not apply to plaintiffs liability claims related to or based upon defects in the defendants’ premises.

Moreover, as the trial court apparently recognized, because defendants’ settlement with plaintiff was entered into without the written consent of St. Paul, in direct violation of LSA-R.S. 23:1102 C(l), defendants were statutorily required to reimburse St. Paul for the total amount of lsworkers’ compensation and medical benefits paid to satisfy the intervenor’s statutory privilege.

Defendants argue at length that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to the parties contractually agreeing that Blue Cross-Blue Shield, as lessee, would assume responsibility for the defendants’ premises, agree to indemnify defendants, agree to obtain liability insurance on the premises, and agree to obtain subrogation waivers from such insurers, vis-a-vis any and all claims for injuries, whether resulting from the defendants’ negligence or any defects in the premises. However, even assuming arguendo that no impediment existed to prevent the parties from so contracting, a plain reading of the lease, in its entirety, and giving meaning to all of its provisions, reflects that the parties did not do so. Pretermitting the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence regarding the negotiations and intent of the parties in con-fecting the lease, the lease agreement shows that the trial court’s ruling was correct.

As noted above, Section 5.04 of the Lease Agreement obligated Blue Cross-Blue Shield to indemnify defendants solely for claims based on the negligence or fault of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, resulting from any omission, negligence or misconduct on the part of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, its agents, employees, etc. or for any claims arising from its use or “thing done or occurring” on the premises or resulting from any failure of Blue Cross-Blue Shield to perform its obligations under the lease. However, the remaining portion of Section 5.04, through which the lease would assign liability to a lessee for any claims arising from use of the premises, including those due to the defendants’ own negligence or any condition, design or defect in the building, mechanical systems, “or elsewhere in the ... Premises ... or property adjacent thereto,” was specifically rejected and stricken from the 1 alease confected by the parties. Defendants cite no other provision in the lease upon which such liability was accepted by Blue Cross-Blue Shield or upon which defendants’ theory of liability could be contractually imposed.

Instead, as noted by Blue Cross-Blue Shield, at best, Blue Cross-Blue Shield was only obligated to reimburse or indemnify for any damage or injury done to the building and premises caused by its agents, employees, etc. and was only required to maintain public liability insurance coverage to ensure coverage for any such liability claim.

As set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102 C(l):

When a suit has been filed against a third party defendant in which the employer or his insurer has intervened, if the third party defendant or his insurer fails to obtain written approval of |inthe compromise from the employer or his insurer at the time of or prior to such compromise and the employee fails to pay to the employer or his insurer the total amount of compensation benefits and medical benefits out of the funds received as a result of the compromise, the third party defendant or his insurer shall be required to reimburse the employer or his insurer to the extent of the total amount of compensation benefits and medical benefits previously paid to or on behalf of the employee to the extent said amounts have not been previously paid to the employer or his insurer by the employee pursuant to the provisions of Subsection B of this Section. Notwithstanding such payment, all rights of the employer or his insurer to assert the defense provided herein against the employee’s claim for future compensation or medical benefits shall be reserved.

If a third-party defendant or his insurer fails to obtain written approval of a settlement or compromise, a claim for reimbursement is properly pursued against the third-party defendant or his insurer under LSA-R.S. 23:1102 C(l). See Prevost v. Jobbers Oil Transport Company, 95-0224 (La.App. 1st Cir.10/6/95), 665 So.2d 400, 406, writ denied, 96-0440 (La.4/8/96), 671 So.2d 336. The evidence introduced at trial shows that defendants failed to obtain written approval for the compromise from the intervenor, St. Paul. As such, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the defendants’ breach of LSA-R.S. 23:1102 C(l) required them to reimburse St. Paul for its workers’ compensation lien and dismissed defendants’ third-party demands as meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the May 27, 2005 judgment of lnthe trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendants/appellants, United, Turner, and Trinity.

AFFIRMED.

      . The “Lease Agreement” was entered into by the parties in September of 1990 and contained an initial three-year term. The parties entered into subsequent agreements extending and renewing the lease for additional three-year terms in 1993, 1996, and 1998.

      . Section 8.18 of the Lease Agreement provides as follows:
      Waiver of Subrogation. Tenant waives any right of subrogation against Landlord and its officers, directors, employees and representatives under any insurance policy and shall cause Tenant's insurance carriers to waive same and so notify Landlord.

      . Section 5.04 of the Lease Agreement provides as follows:
      Indemnity; Liability. Tenant shall defend and fully indemnify and hold harmless Landlord and its officers, directors, employees, agents and representatives from any and all liability for injury, loss, accident or damage to any person(s) or property(ies), and from any claims, actions, proceedings and expenses and costs in connection therewith (including without limitation reasonable counsel fees), (i) arising in whole or in part from (a) the omission, fault, willful act, negligence or other misconduct of Tenant, its contractors, agents, employees, invitees, and visitors or (b) from any use made or thing done or occurring on the Leased Premises, or (ii) resulting in whole or in part from the failure of Tenant, its agents or employees, to perform and discharge its covenants and obligations under this Lease. Tenant is or wilbbeeome-familiar with the Leased -Premises, acknowledges that the same are received by Tenant in a- good state of repair, accepted by Tenant in-the condition in which they are now or shah-be when ready — for occupancy, — and that Landlord and its officer-sr-partners, employees, agents and representatives shall not be liable to Tenant-or Tenant’s coatractors — agents, em ployees, invitee-s-or visitors for an}' damage to person(s) -or— property(ies) — due to any condition, design, or defect in the Building or its mechanical systems-or-elsewhere in the-Leased Premises or the Building or the property adjacent thereto which-may-now exist or hereafter occur. — Landlord-and-its officers,--directors, employees; agents, and representatives-shall be defended and in damnified and-held harmless and exonerat ed by-Tenant from any-liability caused by or arising in whole or in part from-Landlord's negligence or-that of its-officers, directors, employees, agents, and- representatives to the full extent permitted by law. — Tenant accepts the Leased Premises as-suitable for the purpose for which-the same are leased and- ■ assumes all rislcs-of damage- to -person(s)-or property(ies)-and agrees that no ■representatives except such as are — contained — herein have been made — to- Tenant respecting the — condition—of -the — Leased P-remises.

      .The parties stipulated that the incident involving plaintiff occurred while she was an employee of Blue Cross-Blue Shield, acting in the course and scope of her employment, and that she was on the leased premises when she was injured.

      . We note that Blue Cross-Blue Shield and St. Paul filed a "Post Hearing Memorandum” and a "Supplemental Post Hearing Memorandum.” Because it is not clear from the trial court’s written reasons for judgment which post-trial memorandum it adopted, for purposes qf our review, we assume that the court's reasoning was in accord with the statements set forth in both post-trial memo-randa.

      . Section 5.01 of the lease agreement provides:
      Maintenance, Repairs and Re-entry. Tenant shall, at Tenant’s sole cost and expense, repair or replace any damage or injury done to the Building, or any part thereof, or any property of Landlord adjacent thereto, caused by Tenant or Tenant's contractors, agents, employees, invitees or visitors. If Tenant fails to make such repairs or replacements promptly, or within fifteen (15) days after such occurrence, Landlord may at its option, make such repairs or replacements, and Tenant shall repay the cost thereof to Landlord on demand. Tenant shall keep the interior of the Leased Premises in good order and repair at its own expense; and agrees to surrender the Leased Premises at the expiration of this Lease or at such other time as it may vacate the Leased Premises in as good condition as when received, excepting depreciation caused by ordinary wear and tear. Tenant will not commit or allow any waste or damage to be committed on any portion of the Leased Premises.

      . Section 5.05 of the lease agreement provides:
      Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall, at all times during the Leased Term and all extensions thereof, carry Owner's, Landlord’s and Tenant’s public liability insurance coverage on the Leased Premises with an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Louisiana, with limits of not less than $300.00 per occurrence for injury or death and limits of not less than $100,000 for injuries to property, and with deductibles acceptable to Landlord. The ■ insurance-policy effecting such coverage shall name the — Landlord as--a named insured, and Tenant shall furnish to Landlord a copy of said insurance policy, or certificate of insurance, duly certified by the insurer, which policy shall contain a clause requiring insurer to give Landlord no less than ten (10) days prior notice of cancellation of the policy.

      . Additionally, defendants acknowledge in their brief that regardless of whether Blue Cross-Blue Shield actually waived subrogation or is deemed to have contractually waived subrogation, absent a specific waiver by St. Paul, the carrier remains entitled to reimbursement for compensation benefits paid. LSA-R.S. 23:1101 and 23:1103; Sandbom v. BASF Wyandotte, Corporation, 95-0335 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/30/96), 674 So.2d 349, 362.


author: GAIDRY, J.

text:
    CITY OF COVINGTON v. Louis WALKER.
    No. 2005 CA 1734.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 15, 2006.

      Christopher R. Philipp, Lafayette, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant City of Coving-ton.
    Ford T. Hardy, Jr., New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Louis Walker.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   GAIDRY, J.

|2In this workers’ compensation case, the employer appeals a workers’ compensation judge’s finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Louis Walker, sustained a work-related back injury in February 1993 while employed by the City of Covington (“the City”). The City paid Walker’s medical expenses associated with the injury, including a June 1993 back surgery, plus indemnity benefits until Walker was able to return to work in October 1993. Walker worked for the City until March 1995, when he resigned for health reasons. After Walker’s resignation, the City began paying him Supplemental Earnings Benefits (“SEB”).

In July 2003, the City filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation, asserting that:

The employer has paid the employee more than 520 weeks of disability benefits and therefore the employee is not entitled to any additional disability benefits; alternatively, the employee is disabled from working because of an unrelated heart condition; alternatively, the employer is entitled to a credit for the employee’s receipt of Social Security disability benefits.

The matter proceeded to trial, after which the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) found that Walker was totally and permanently disabled and thus entitled to receive weekly disability benefits in the amount of $184.99 from the date of judgment and continuing. The City appealed devolutively from this ruling, assigning the following errors:

1. The OWC committed manifest error in finding that Walker was totally and permanently disabled.
|s2. The OWC committed legal error in determining that Walker was totally and permanently disabled because he could not be retrained.
3. The OWC committed legal error in finding that Walker was totally and permanently disabled, even though he had previously returned to work at his former employment, but was subsequently disabled by an unrelated medical problem.

Walker answered the appeal, seeking to have this court render judgment ruling that his right to have his medical expenses paid by the City is not prescribed.

DISCUSSION

The issue presented at the trial of this matter was whether Walker was totally and permanently disabled in accordance with La. R.S. 23:1221(2). Prior to adjudicating this issue, the OWC was required to make a determination as to whether there is a reasonable probability that with appropriate training or education Walker might be rehabilitated to the extent that he can achieve suitable gainful employment, and whether it is in his best interests to undertake same. La. R.S. 23:1226(D).

The OWC found Walker to be a very credible, albeit very inarticulate, witness. Walker was sixty years old at the time of trial, had a fourth grade education, and had a long history of previous employment as a laborer. Walker testified that his daily activities consist of visiting with friends and Lwatching television and that he cannot perform any of his previous jobs. The state-appointed independent medical examiner, Dr. Jorge Isaza, considered Walker to be at maximum medical improvement, unable to return to his previous occupation, and lacking the skills necessary for light duty. Dr. Isaza con-eluded that Walker was completely disabled. The City offered Walker vocational rehabilitation in 1993 and 1994, prior to his return to work; but after his resignation in 1995, no vocational rehabilitation was offered. The OWC found that there is no reasonable possibility of Walker being retrained for any suitable employment. The OWC found Walker to be highly uneducated and difficult to understand, and combining that with his physical condition and the fact that he had been out of the workforce for ten years at the time of trial, found it doubtful that Walker could be competitive in the job market. Based upon this, the OWC believed that vocational rehabilitation would not be in either party’s best interests.

Great weight must be given to the court’s factual findings regarding whether a workers’ compensation claimant has met his burden of proving disability, and that factual finding will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Bazar v. Hull, 95-1427 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/96), 669 So.2d 603. Where there is clear and convincing evidence before the workers’ compensation judge that furnishes a reasonable factual basis for a finding, the workers’ compensation judge’s finding of facts will not be overturned on appeal. Bazar, 95-1427 at p. 2, 669 So.2d at 604. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.

[¡/The evidence in the record amply supports the OWC’s findings that: (1) there is no reasonable probability that, with appropriate training or education, Walker might be rehabilitated to the extent he can achieve suitable gainful employment and that it is not in his best interests to undertake such training or education; (2) Walker was totally and permanently disabled under La. R.S. 23:1221(2); and (3) Walker was totally and permanently disabled due to his work-related back injury. While there was some conflict in the evidence, and we might have decided the case differently as trier of fact, we find no manifest error in the OWC’s findings.

Regarding Walker’s answer to the City’s appeal requesting that we rule that his right to have his medical expenses paid by the City is not prescribed, there was no argument in brief concerning this issue, which also was not mentioned at trial, and therefore we will not consider it. La. URCA Rule 2-12.4.

CONCLUSION

The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to be borne by appellant, the City of Covington.

AFFIRMED.

      . The parties disagree as to whether Walker's resignation was due to a heart condition or his prior back injury. The medical records in evidence show that he was being treated for both at the time of his resignation.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(2)(c) states that compensation for permanent total disability:
      shall be awarded only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence, unaided by any presumption of disability, that the employee is physically unable to engage in any employment or self-employment, regardless of the nature or character of the employment or self-employment, including, but not limited to, any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered employment, or employment while working in any pain, notwithstanding the location or availability of any such employment or self-employment.

      . Also in evidence were the records of Dr. Stuart Phillips, an orthopaedic surgeon who evaluated Walker a number of times between March 1995 and June 2001, and Dr. Paul M. Doty, Walker's treating orthopedic surgeon. Both doctors considered Walker disabled from working due to his back injury.


text:
    John J. ALMON, Jr. v. Kathye Maria Caporale ALMON.
    No. 2005 CA 1848.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 15, 2006.

      Mark Alan Jolissaint, Slidell, Counsel for PlaintiffiAppellant, John J. Almon, Jr.
    Jane L. Trióla, Pearl River, Mary Clemenence Devereaux, Covington, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Kathye Maria Caporale Almon.
    Before: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE and McDonald, jj.
   WHIPPLE, J.

I sThis matter is before us on appeal by John Almon from a judgment of the trial court dismissing his rule to terminate permanent spousal support with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By judgment dated April 15, 2004, Mr. Almon was ordered to pay Mrs. Kathye Almon permanent spousal support in the amount of $600.00 per month. On January 31, 2005, Mr. Almon filed a rule to terminate permanent spousal support alleging that Mrs. Almon had cohabited with another person in the manner of married persons thereby extinguishing her entitlement to permanent spousal support, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 115. Mr. Almon alternatively requested that his monthly spousal support award be reduced because he had been laid off from his employment and was therefore unemployed.

On May 3, 2005, a hearing was held before the trial court. At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Almon conceded that although Mr. Almon was unemployed, there had been no change in financial circumstances at that time that would warrant a reduction in his spousal support obligation. He then dismissed the portion of the rule requesting a reduction on the basis of Mr. Almon’s unemployment. However, the trial proceeded on the issue of termination of Mr. Almon’s permanent spousal support obligation due to Mrs. Almon’s alleged cohabitation. After hearing testimony, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the rule with prejudice finding that the circumstances presented were not sufficient to establish that Mrs. Almon “cohabited with another person in the manner of married persons,” as required by LSA-C.C. art. 115. A written judgment was signed May 18, 2005.

laMr. Almon appeals, contending that the trial court erred in its factual findings and in failing to conclude that Mrs. Almon had “cohabited” with another person “in the manner of married persons” sufficient to warrant the termination of Mr. Almon’s spousal support obligation.

DISCUSSION

The appellate court’s review of factual findings is governed by the manifest error-clearly wrong standard. The two-part test for the appellate review of a factual finding is: 1) whether there is a reasonable factual basis in the record for the finding of the trial court; and 2) whether the record further establishes that the finding is not manifestly erroneous. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). Thus, if there is no reasonable factual basis in the record for the trial court’s finding, no additional inquiry is necessary to conclude there was manifest error. However, if a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a trial court’s factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the trial court’s finding was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). The manifest error standard of review obligates an appellate court to give great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. We will not reverse factual determinations, absent a finding of manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989).

Louisiana Civil Code article 115, which governs the extinguishment of spousal support obligations provides, as follows: “The obligation of spousal support is extinguished upon the remarriage of the obli-gee, the death of either party, or a judicial determination that the obligee has cohabited with another person of either sex in the manner of married persons.”

| ¿Article 115 was last amended by Acts 1997, No. 1078, § 1, effective January 1, 1998. As discussed in Arnold v. Arnold, 2002-0819 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/2/03), 843 So.2d 1167,1171, prior to the application of 1997 La. Acts No. 1078, article 112(A)(4) provided that “[p]ermanent periodic alimony ... terminates if the spouse to whom it has been awarded remarries or enters into open concubinage.” However, the phrase “open concubinage” is no longer used in the Louisiana Civil Code to identify a manner of extinguishment of the spousal support obligation. Instead, with regard to the modification or extinguishment of a spousal support obligation, LSA-C.C. art. 115 requires “a judicial determination that the obligee has cohabited with another person of either sex in the manner of married persons.”

According to Revision Comment (e), the new language used in article 115, ie., “cohabited with another person ... in the manner of married persons!,] means to live together in a sexual relationship of some permanence ... It does not mean just acts of sexual intercourse.” The phrase further “obviates the difficulties of proving absence of concealment” inherent in the term “open concubinage.” See LSA-C.C. art. 115, Revision Comment (e); see also Arnold, 843 So.2d at 1171.

In rendering its findings, the trial court stated as follows:

Article 115 states cohabitated (sic) in the manner of married persons. I went to Webster’s Dictionary and looked up cohabit and cohabiting. The archaic version is to dwell or abide in company. The second definition says to dwell or live together as husband and wife. In the United States, at the common law, marriage is presumed when a man and woman have cohabitated permanently together being reputed by those who know them to be husband and wife and admitting the relationship. The presumption is removed if the relationship is proved to have been an — of illicit origin.
The evidence shows clearly that Mr. Perine came to the house of Mrs. Almon, her testimony is originally as a friend to help her out with a child who was anorexic and this man would go feed the child. Then she said she felt some obligation to |Bhim, apparently when he needed a place to live, because of what he had done to help her. She freely admitted that he slept in her house, but she says he slept downstairs and kept his clothing in the garage. And she freely admitted that they engaged in sex occasionally.
I’ve already said that my view of marital sex is archaic, and it is. [Counsel for Mr. Almonj’s example of if somebody went on a cruise and had sex, that was not living like married people. What if they went on a cruise every weekend, would that still not be married people or what if you went on a cruise with a different partner every weekend? I mean, I just think that sex in this country has become casual, not to my liking, but apparently it has become casual.
According to Webster and the common law, and I know we’re a civil law jurisdiction, but you have to hold yourself out to be a married person. And I don’t think that happened here. And having basically no case law from Louisiana to go on, I’m going to find that while Mrs. Almon had this man to share her house, not necessarily her bedroom, and occasionally had sex with him, that it did not rise to a manner of married persons, and I’m going to deny the rule to terminate permanent alimony.

On appeal, Mr. Almon argues the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 115. In support, he cites to an isolated statement by the trial court in its oral reasons, “you have to hold yourself out to be a married person,” and argues that the article does not require proof that Mrs. Almon held herself out as being married to the person with whom she is living in order to be deemed to be “living in the manner of a married person.”

After a complete reading of the trial court’s reasons, we find that Mr. Al-mon has taken this statement out of context. A reading of the reasons in their entirety shows that the trial court correctly applied the standard set forth in the article. Moreover, we find the record supports the court’s factual finding “that while Mrs. Almon had this man to share her house, not necessarily her bedroom, and occasionally had sex with him, that it did not rise to a manner of married persons.” Thus, the trial court properly denied the rule to terminate permanent spousal support.

| fiMr. Almon further argues that, according to Arnold and Booth v. Samuels, 97-2395 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/20/98), 712 So.2d 1037, unit denied, 98-1563 (La.9/18/98), 724 So.2d 764, “living together in the manner of married persons simply means to ‘live together in a sexual relationship of some permanence.’ ” While living together in a sexual relationship of some permanence is certainly a factor, the statute does not provide for extinguishment of a spousal obligation, where, as here, the evidence establishes only random acts of sexual intercourse. After thorough review of Arnold and Booth, we find Mr. Almon’s reliance on these cases misplaced, as the instant case is factually distinguishable.

At the hearing, Mrs. Almon testified that Mr. Terry Perine lived in her home for approximately one year, from the latter part of 2003 to December of 2004, and also for a few months prior to 1999 when Mr. Perine was released from a rehab program, because he had nowhere else to stay. Mrs. Almon testified that she allowed him to reside there because she felt obligated to Mr. Perine and felt that she owed him a “big favor” because he had helped Mrs. Almon by coming to feed her daughter, who suffered from anorexia, when Mrs. Almon was working at night. She stated that when circumstances arose that Mr. Perine had nowhere else to stay, she allowed him to live in her home. In return, although Mrs. Almon did not insist that Mr. Perine pay a specific amount as rent, Mr. Perine agreed to help Mrs. Al-mon pay for her monthly medication, pay for groceries, and perform repairs and small jobs around her home. Mrs. Almon testified that on many occasions, Mr. Pe-rine would tell her “This is my last job, then I’m going to leave.” Mrs. Almon stated that initially she would reply that that was fine with her. However, Mrs. Almon further testified that she became dissatisfied with the financial arrangements in return for housing after he 17expressed his desire that she “give him part of the house” in return for the repairs he made. In explaining why he had resided on the premises for the time period at issue, she stated that Mr. Perine would always begin working on a new repair project in the house despite knowing that Mrs. Almon did not want him to continue to five there.

Mrs. Almon testified that during the time in question, Mr. Perine did not share Mrs. Almon’s bedroom. He did not keep his belongings, ie., clothes and toiletries, in her bedroom. Instead, during the time he lived at Mrs. Almon’s home, he slept downstairs and kept his clothing in the garage in a laundry basket. Mrs. Almon testified that she did not want or allow Mr. Perine to share her bedroom, and, in fact, kept an outside lock on her bedroom door to keep Mr. Perine out of her bedroom. Mrs. Almon described one occasion wherein she was forced to file a complaint with the police after Mr. Perine attempted to cut through the lock on her bedroom door. This incident occurred shortly before Mrs. Almon terminated their financial arrangements and asked Mr. Perine to move out of the residence.

Although Mrs. Almon testified that they had engaged in sexual relations on occasion at the commencement of his residency, she never committed to having any type of romantic relationship with him because they were not involved in such a relationship. Mrs. Almon stated that they stopped having, sexual relations early on because there was no affection involved in it. Mrs. Almon further testified that she and Mr. Perine did not “date,” they were not an “item,” and they did not attend parties or social functions together as a “couple.” Mrs. Almon did not consider or introduce Mr. Perine as her “boyfriend,” nor did she consider them a “couple.” Mrs. Almon testified that they never discussed marriage and stated that she had |8not engaged in nor expected to have any long-term or other relationship with Mr. Perine, other than noted above.

A thorough review of the record and testimony contained therein reveals that Mrs. Almon and Mr. Perine did not “live together in a sexual relationship of some permanence” as contemplated by the statute. See LSA-C.C. art. 115, Revision Comment (e). Moreover, although Mrs. Almon testified that she and Mr. Perine had engaged in sexual relations on occasion in the early part of his residing in her home, “cohabited ... in the manner of married persons,” does not mean just acts of sexual intercourse. See LSA-C.C. art. 115, Revision Comment (e); see also Scott v. Scott, 579 So.2d 1094, 1096 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1991). Considering the record in its entirety, the record does not support a finding that Mrs. Almon and Mr. Perine were cohabiting with one another “in the manner of married persons” as required by LSA-C.C. art. 115 to warrant the termination of Mr. Almon’s permanent spousal support obligation.

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s factual findings and determinations herein, which are amply supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court dismissing Mr. Almon’s rule to terminate permanent spousal support 18with prejudice is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Mr. Almon.

AFFIRMED.

      . We note that Kenneth John Landry, a private investigator, was also called to testify at the hearing before the trial court. Landry testified that he was retained by Mr. Almon to conduct surveillance on Mrs. Almon’s home at 219 Grafton Street. Landry testified that from February 12, 2004 to July 22, 2004 his surveillance revealed that a silver Chevrolet pick-up truck registered to Mr. Perine was routinely parked at Mrs. Almon's residence. However, as noted herein, Mrs. Almon does not dispute that Mr. Perine lived at the residence during that time period, albeit under circumstances other than those suggested by Mr. Almon.