source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Michelle D. McKEE.
    No. 2007-B-1381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 1, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 14, 2008.
   PER CURIAM.

I,This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michelle D. McKee, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent, consisting of a total of nine counts of misconduct. The charges were considered by separate hearing committees, then consolidated by order of the disciplinary board. The board then filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing both sets of formal charges.

05-DB-002

Count I — The Haydelr-Harris Matter

In November 2001, respondent settled a personal injury claim for Sheryll Harris and withheld the sum of $2,165.40 to pay Dr. Michael Haydel, Ms. Harris’ medical provider. However, Dr. Haydel did not receive payment from respondent for his services until July 2003, several months after the ODC received complaints from both Dr. Haydel and Ms. Harris. In August 2003, respondent gave a sworn statement |2to the ODC in which she admitted that she had converted the funds withheld from Ms. Harris’ settlement which were intended for Dr. Haydel.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II — The Bankruptcy Matters

In November 2003, the United States Trustee filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC, alleging that she failed to act with proper diligence in the representation of her clients during bankruptcy proceedings, failed to properly disclose attorney’s fees paid by her clients, and provided the court with false and misleading information. In addition, after her own personal bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed with prejudice, respondent filed a second petition for bankruptcy in violation of the court’s order prohibiting her from doing so for a period of time.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), and 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal).

Count III — The Espinosa Matter

In December 2002, respondent entered into an agreement with Celso and Yolanda Espinosa to purchase their home in New Orleans. The act of sale was set for 13January 31, 2003, at which time respondent was required to pay the Espinosas $72,718.98 in certified funds. At the closing, respondent did not have certified funds but wrote a personal check in that amount. In an attempt to prove that the check was good, respondent produced documentation purporting to show that she had obtained a $529,000 default judgment on behalf of a client in a personal injury case. However, respondent failed to disclose to the Espinosas that the default judgment had been set aside on September 24, 2002 because the defendant in the case was in bankruptcy.

Based upon the documentation provided by respondent, and her representation that her fee due from the personal injury case was more than sufficient to pay the $72,718.98 she needed to complete the sale, Mr. and Mrs. Espinosa granted respondent an extension until February 5, 2003 to produce the required certified funds. This date passed and no payment was made. The Espinosas then requested that respondent, who had already moved into the home, vacate the premises. Respondent refused to do so, forcing Mr. and Mrs. Espinosa to retain counsel to institute an eviction proceeding. Respondent was ultimately physically evicted from the property on March 17, 2003.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 8.4(c).

Count IV— The Uni-Copy Matter

In February 2004, respondent purchased a copy machine for her law office from Uni-Copy Technologies, Inc. At this time, respondent no longer maintained an operating account, so she paid for her purchase with three post-dated checks drawn Ron her client trust account, each in the amount of $363.33. The checks were subsequently returned for insufficient funds.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15, 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c).

Count V — The Steward Matter

In August 2002, Helen Steward retained respondent to file a petition for bankruptcy on her behalf. Ms. Steward paid respondent $683 towards a $700 fee to handle the matter, however, respondent failed to file the bankruptcy pleadings. She also failed to communicate with Ms. Steward and moved her law office without leaving a forwarding address.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 and 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client).

Count VI — The Bradford Matter

In August 2002, Betty Bradford retained respondent to file a petition for bankruptcy on her behalf. Ms. Bradford paid respondent $1,300. Respondent filed the bankruptcy pleadings but thereafter she failed to communicate with Ms. Bradford regarding the matter. In January 2004, Ms. Bradford’s bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on motion of the Chapter 13 trustee because respondent failed to appear for hearings in the matter.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

Is 06-DB-001

Count I — The Durel Matter

In November 2003, respondent settled Mary Durel’s personal injury claim for the sum of $2,000. Respondent retrieved the settlement check from opposing counsel on December 17, 2003, the same day that Mrs. Durel died. Respondent then endorsed Mrs. Durel’s signature on the check and negotiated it. She also failed to return the settlement documentation to opposing counsel. When questioned about the matter, respondent admitted that she had settled her client’s claim without authority, endorsed the settlement check without authority, and converted the funds.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.4, 1.15, 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).

Count II — The Grady Matter

In 2002, Betty Grady retained respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter. At respondent’s suggestion, Ms. Grady obtained loans on her case totaling approximately $4,500; respondent then persuaded Ms. Grady to give her one-half of the loan proceeds for her personal use. Respondent has not repaid this sum. After a lengthy period of no communication and no information about the progress of her case, Ms. Grady discharged respondent in writing. She also made repeated requests to respondent for her file so that she could secure the services of a new attorney. However, respondent failed to comply with Ms. Grady’s requests.

| ¡¡The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), and 8.4(a).

Count III — The Misuraca Matter

In May 2003, respondent hired Guy Mi-suraca to perform a home inspection. The $225 check respondent issued to Mr. Misu-raca was returned for insufficient funds. Respondent promised to issue a new check and to reimburse the bank service charges, but she failed to do so.

The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS:

Respondent was personally served with both sets of formal charges. She filed answers to the formal charges as well as memoranda in which she largely admitted the alleged misconduct. The matters then proceeded to formal hearings.

Hearing Committee Reports 05-DB-002

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found that all facts were proven by the ODC, and were not refuted |7by respondent. The committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges (with the exception of the Rule 8.4(a) violation charged in Count IV, the Uni-Copy matter, which the committee’s report did not address).

In determining the appropriate sanction, the committee considered in mitigation respondent’s testimony that she was going through a divorce and suffering from depression at the time of the violations, her payment of restitution to Dr. Haydel (Count I), her cooperation with the ODC in its investigation, and her remorse. The committee also noted that most of the violations were related to respondent’s lack of training, experience, and failure to have a mentor assist her in learning the practice of law.

Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years.

The ODC filed an objection to the leniency of the sanction recommended by the hearing committee.

06-DB-001

After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee found that all facts were proven by the ODC, and were not refuted by respondent. The committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges (with the exception of the Rule |s8.4(c) violation charged in Count III, the Misuraca matter, which the committee’s report did not address).

The committee found that respondent intentionally violated duties owed to her clients and to the public, causing actual harm. The committee determined that the following aggravating factors are present: dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The sole mitigating factor acknowledged by the committee was “Respondent’s remorse in causing harm to her clients.”

Based on these findings, the committee recommended that respondent be disbarred.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation, urging that permanent disbarment is appropriate.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board agreed that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in both sets of formal charges. The board noted that respondent converted funds in four of the nine counts charged against her, and that she still owes restitution in three of those matters. Particularly troubling to the board was respondent’s conversion of settlement funds of her deceased client Mrs. Durel, and respondent’s continued neglect of her obligation to make restitution to the heirs.

|9In its determination of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the board considered respondent’s indifference to making restitution, and the existence of personal and emotional problems. The board recommended permanent disbarment for respondent’s repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1816 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

We find that the record in this matter supports the factual findings of the hearing committee and disciplinary board. Respondent violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in her various representations, failing to communicate with her clients, failing in her | ^obligations upon termination of representation, commingling and converting client funds, engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, lacking candor toward the tribunal, failing to obey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and committing a criminal act reflecting adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed, and caused harm to clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession.

In determining the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each ease and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The aggravating factors present are a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, vulnerability of the victims, and indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, we note that respondent has no prior disciplinary record and that she has expressed remorse for her misconduct. Although respondent made restitution to two of the four third parties she harmed, her acts of restitution were far from timely to qualify as a mitigating factor. One restitution was paid two years after settlement funds were received. The other restitution was paid three years after the initial writing of the worthless check, and only after action was taken by the District Attorney’s office and there had been a hearing in the disciplinary proceeding.

The record overwhelmingly supports a finding of professional misconduct that is of the most serious nature. Respondent has engaged in a chronic pattern of Inconverting funds for her personal use, writing worthless checks, and accepting legal representations when she had no apparent intention of rendering services or communicating with her clients in the future. Respondent failed to follow court rules, and attempted to circumvent court rules. She has refused to refund unearned legal fees, and failed to make restitution to clients and to all third parties she has harmed. Respondent’s intentional actions often resulted in severe, if not irreparable harm to her clients. We agree with the board that the most troubling example of harm is in the Durel matter, in which respondent converted settlement funds of a deceased client. Respondent has not made an accounting or paid restitution to the Durel heirs for the funds she converted, simply stating that she used the money to pay personal doctor bills. Restitution is also owed to Unieopy, Ms. Steward^ Ms. Bradford, and to Ms. Grady.' , .

Therefore, the (Question' for the court’s consideration is whether respondent’s conduct is so egregious that she should be prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law. In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might warrant permanent disbarment. While these guidelines are not intended to bind this court in its decision-making process, they present useful information concerning the types of conduct we might consider worthy of permanent disbarment. See In re: Yaeger, 05-0035 (La.3/18/05), 897 So.2d 571.

Applying the guidelines to this case, we find that respondent’s misconduct falls squarely within the scope of Guideline 1, which involves repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm. The nature of the misconduct, coupled with respondent’s demonstrated indifference for the welfare of her clients, convincingly establishes that she does not possess the moral | igfitness to practice law, and that she poses a threat of danger to the public in the event she is permitted to resume practicing law. Respondent has disregarded and ignored her obligation to uphold the high standards of honesty and righteousness that she assumed when she took the oath as a member of the bar of this state. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So.2d 391, 392 (1967). She has used her law license not to foster the high standards of the profession, but to exploit her clients for her own benefit.

Under the circumstances of this case, the imposition of any sanction less than permanent disbarment would require us to ignore the seriousness of respondent’s conduct, and the grave harm she has done to her victims and to the public’s confidence in the legal profession. We will therefore accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will further require that respondent make an accounting and appropriate restitution to her clients and third parties.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Michelle D. McKee, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24750, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. Respondent is ordered to provide complete accountings and full restitution to all persons subject of the formal charges. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, |1swith legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The ODC's investigation revealed that respondent collected attorney's fees from her clients, then filed bankruptcy pleadings seeking permission to pay filing fees in installments, falsely representing that she had not received any attorney’s fees. Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, counsel for a debtor may not accept attorney’s fees prior to the payment in full of the filing fees.

      . Due to respondent's actions, the Espinosas had to make repairs to their property, pay additional payments on their mortgage and for insurance premiums, and incurred several thousand dollars in legal fees for the eviction. The Espinosas eventually sold their home for $3,000 less than the amount respondent had agreed to pay.

      . Hearing testimony revealed that Ms. Durel passed away at 7:00 a.m., and the settlement check and papers were retrieved from opposing counsel's office sometime after 8:00 a.m. Opposing counsel testified he would ordinarily use the mail, but respondent "seemed to be in a little bit of a hurry,” so he agreed to leave the settlement documents at his reception desk.

      . After significant delay, Ms. Grady eventually received a portion of her file by fax from respondent.

      . As of the date of the filing of the formal charges, Mr. Misuraca had not received payment for his services. In April 2006, respondent paid $244.65 in restitution to Mr. Misuraca through the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office.

      . The hearing committee noted that there was no evidence respondent received treatment for depression, but they found her testimony credible. By letter to the ODC after the formal hearing, respondent claimed to have been counseled at a pastoral counseling center, but was unable to obtain any records.

      . Respondent testified that she worked as a legal secretary while attempting to pass the bar, and later opened her own practice. The committee stated "it does not appear that respondent ever had any type of guidance to assist her with the intricacies and rigors of a general civil practice.”

      . The committee also found in aggravation that respondent has a prior disciplinary record; however, it appears the committee was referring to the recommendation of discipline filed in the first set of formal charges.

      . The board noted that respondent has made restitution for "some" of the payments she owes; however, as noted by the ODC, this restitution was not made willingly, but rather was forced by the disciplinary proceedings and the threat of charges by the District Attorney's Office.

      .The board noted that respondent produced no medical records of her mental condition, but demonstrated the existence of depression, marriage difficulties, and financial troubles during the periods of misconduct.


author: CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Walter BAILEY. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0594.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 1, 2008.
   In re Bailey, Walter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 02-2801; to the Court of Appeal, Fifthe Circuit, No. 07-KH-9.

Writ denied.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice, concurs and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

concurring.

This court wrote Relator to find out if he had received the requested transcripts. In response, Relator submitted the docket master from his case and his correspondence with the court reporter. According to Relator, he was never sent the transcripts from March 5 and 6, 2003, although he acknowledges he received the other transcripts he requested, including the transcript from his trial. While Relator maintains that he was arraigned on a simple battery charge on March 5, 2003, and was sentenced on the charge of simple possession on March 6, 2003, the docket master he provides clearly shows otherwise. On March 5, 2003, the docket master notations indicate “case administrative; bail order,” and on March 6th, the docket master indicates that the state filed an answer to the defense motion for discovery, particulars and inspection regarding the multiple offender bill of information. Thus, even were this court to grant Relator relief, it appears that nothing occurred on the record on these dates for a court reporter to transcribe. Accordingly, I concur in the court’s denial of the writ application as moot.


text:
    In re Derek John HONORE.
    No. 2003-B-0980.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 28, 2008.
   I,ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

On December 3, 2003, we suspended respondent, Derek John Honoré, for two years, deferred in its entirety, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation, for his violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In re: Honore, 03-0980 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 161 (“Honore /”). Our judgment specified five conditions of probation, including the following requirement:

In addition to his ordinary mandatory continuing legal education requirements, respondent shall earn an additional ten hours of continuing legal education for each year during his probationary period, in the areas of law office management, ethics or professionalism.

Our opinion specifically provided that any violation of these conditions by respondent, or the commission of any misconduct during the period of probation, “may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.”

Following the appointment of a probation monitor and the filing of a probation plan approved by the disciplinary board, respondent’s probation commenced on May 11, 2004. Eighteen months later, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) notified the court of its independent determination that respondent failed to earn the additional ten hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) for each year of his probation which was imposed as a condition of probation in Honoré I. Specifically, for the first year of his probation, calendar year 2004, respondent obtained only six | ^additional hours of CLE in the areas of ethics or professionalism; for the second year, calendar year 2005, respondent earned no CLE hours.

Based on this information, we issued a rule to show cause to respondent directing him to explain whether he complied with his probation requirements under Honoré I. Respondent filed a brief indicating that he earned 14.3 hours of CLE in the fields of ethics and professionalism in 2006, and argued that when these hours were added to the hours he earned in 2004, he was in compliance with the conditions of probation. However, respondent’s MCLE transcript indicated that nearly all of his 2006 hours were earned through “on-line” CLE courses.

After considering respondent’s brief, we issued an order on November 15, 2006 (“Honoré II ”) extending respondent’s probation through calendar year 2007, and directing him to obtain eleven hours of CLE in the areas of law office management, ethics, or professionalism (in addition to his ordinary CLE requirements) on or before December 31, 2007.

On January 17, 2008, the ODC notified the court that respondent failed to comply with the additional CLE requirements of his probation imposed in Honoré II. Specifically, the ODC noted that for the 2007 calendar year, respondent failed to earn any additional hours of continuing legal education in the areas of law office management, ethics, or professionalism.

In his response to the ODC’s pleading, respondent pointed out that he had completed one hour of CLE in professionalism in December 2006, but he admitted |sthat he had not yet completed any of the remaining hours in fulfillment of the court’s order in Honoré II. Respondent requested that we extend his probation through June 30, 2008 in order to permit him to complete the necessary CLE.

DISCUSSION

In Honoré I, we found respondent engaged in fairly serious professional misconduct arising from his neglect of client matters. While we found the baseline sanction for this misconduct was a period of suspension, we placed great emphasis on our finding that respondent’s actions were a product of his inexperience. Accordingly, we concluded that a fully deferred two-year suspension, coupled with a highly-structured probationary period, would give respondent an opportunity to correct his past deficiencies while protecting the public.

A key component of respondent s probationary period was the requirement that he earn additional hours of CLE in ethics, professionalism and law office management. At no time during the initial two-year probationary period did respondent fully comply with this requirement. Based on these facts, it was clear respondent was in violation of the terms of probation by 2006. However, mindful of the disruption caused during part of the probationary period by Hurricane Katrina, we elected to give respondent a second chance in Hon-oré II by extending his probation for an additional year, and specifically directing him to earn eleven additional hours of CLE by December 31, 2007. As of that date, respondent earned only one hour of additional CLE, leaving a deficiency of ten hours.

Based on the undisputed facts before us, we conclude that respondent has not made a good faith effort to comply with the conditions of his probation despite being given ample opportunity to do so. Accordingly, ex proprio motu, we will revoke | respondent’s probation and make the previously deferred two-year suspension exec-utory.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, respondent’s probation is revoked, and the two-year suspension imposed in In re: Honore, 03-0980 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 161 is hereby made executory.

JOHNSON, J., dissents.

WEIMER, J., dissents in part, I would not impose the full two-year suspension at this time.

      . By emergency order dated September 26, 2005, this court provided that because of the effects of Hurricane Katrina, attorneys would not be required to complete the annual minimum CLE requirements of 12.5 hours. However, nothing in this order waived additional CLE requirements imposed as a condition of probation. Additionally, the record reflects respondent made no effort to obtain any CLE hours in 2005 during the eight months preceding Hurricane Katrina.

      . 13.3 hours of the 14.3 hours he completed were earned through on-line courses. Supreme Court Rule XXX, Rule 3(d) provides that credit for attendance at on-line and other similar self-study courses "shall be limited to four (4) hours annually.”


text:
    In re Judge Allen A. KRAKE.
    No. 2006-O-1658.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 26, 2008.
   JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

bln 2006, Judge Allen A. Krake of the 35th Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant, State of Louisiana, was the subject of a judicial discipline matter involving his public and persistent abuse of alcohol. On October 27, 2006, we suspended Judge Krake from judicial office for the remainder of his term, which expires on December 31, 2008, with all but six months of that suspension deferred. We also placed Judge Krake on probation for the remainder of his term of office with specified conditions to which he and the Special Counsel had stipulated, including the requirement that he contract with, and be monitored and supervised by, the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”). Our opinion instructed that if Judge Krake failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his LAP contract, “including, but not limited to, any positive urine alcohol and drug screens and his failure to attend the required number of AA or Lawyer meetings,” LAP shall immediately report such failure to the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) and the Special Counsel. Our opinion concluded:

If [LAP] submits a report to the Judiciary Commission and its Office of Special Counsel that Judge Krake has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [LAP] including, but not limited to, any positive urine alcohol and drug screens, or his failure to attend the required number of AA or Lawyer meetings, the Judiciary Commission shall, without further notice or further hearings, immediately notify the Louisiana Supreme | aCourt that Judge Krake has breached the terms and conditions of his probation. If the Judiciary Commission notifies the Louisiana Supreme Court that Judge Krake has breached the terms and conditions of his probation, the Louisiana Supreme Court shall order that the remaining period of his deferred suspension shall be made executory.

In re: Krake, 06-1658 (La.10/27/06), 942 So.2d 18 (“Krake I”).

On January 31, 2007, the Commission filed a pleading notifying the court of Judge Krake’s failure to comply with the requirements of his LAP contract. In particular, at that time Judge Krake had failed to submit his sobriety report for the month of December 2006; failed to provide documentation of his attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings during December 2006; and failed to pay his $50 monthly monitoring fee. After considering this information, as well as Judge Krake’s response thereto, we chose to take no action at that time with regard to Judge Krake’s probation.

On January 7, 2008, the Commission filed a pleading notifying the court that Judge Krake had once again failed to comply with his LAP contract. Specifically, Judge Krake failed to submit his attendance sheets and letter of recovery for the month of December 2007; missed an appointment for drug screening; and failed to meet with his LAP monitor. In response, Judge Krake asserted that he was not in compliance with his LAP contract because he was “extremely ill” during the last two weeks of December 2007. This court in turn requested and received records from Judge Krake documenting his medical treatment in January 2008 for an abdominal condition.

LDISCUSSION

In Krake I, we found that public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary was compromised by Judge Krake’s persistent and public abuse of alcohol, especially his being severely hung over or appearing to be hung over while on the bench or in chambers. Nevertheless, we accepted the stipulated conditions of probation because we believed those stringent conditions would adequately protect the public and preserve its respect for the judiciary.

A key component of Judge Krake’s probation was the requirement that he comply with his LAP contract. However, he has failed to do so on two occasions during his probationary period. Most recently, Judge Krake has asked us to excuse his failure in this regard because he was ill. However, considering the medical records submitted by Judge Krake, we find that his medical condition did not prevent him from complying with the requirements of his LAP contract.

In summary, based on the undisputed facts of this matter, we must conclude that Judge Krake is not in compliance with the conditions of his probation. Accordingly, ex proprio motu, we will revoke Judge Krake’s probation and make the remaining period of his deferred suspension executo-ry.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, Judge Krake’s probation is revoked, and the suspension imposed in In re: Krake, 06-1658 (La.10/27/06), 942 So.2d 18, is hereby made executory. Judge Krake shall be suspended from judicial office without salary through the remainder of his term, which expires on December 31, 2008. Any application for rehearing in this matter shall be filed in this court no later than 4:00 p.m. on Monday, March 3, 2008.

WEIMER, J., would order a hearing before considering making the suspension executory.

      . Judge Krake argued that his noncompliance with his LAP contract was not the result of his use of alcohol but rather existed because he was "impoverished.” In particular, Judge Krake contended he did not file his sobriety report in December 2006 because he could not afford to pay the $50 monitoring fee. Judge Krake subsequently made arrangements to receive a waiver of the fee.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Eddie Wayne VIREE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 7, 2008.
   In re Viree, Eddie W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 226,959; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00305.

NOTICE OF RECUSAL

In accordance with LSA-C.C.P. art. 152(D), I provide this notice of recusal. I am recusing myself pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 151(B)(4) and LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 671A(5) because I adjudicated the defendant’s conviction appeal.

KNOLL, J., recused.

/s/ Jeannette T. KNOLL Justice Jeannette Theriot Knoll


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tommy BORDELON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1120.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 7, 2008.
   In re: Bordelon, Tommy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 117,139; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01473.

NOTICE OF RECUSAL

In accordance with LSA-C.C.P. art. 152(D), I provide this notice of recusal. I am recusing myself pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 151(B)(4) and LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 671(A)(2) because I am related to a prosecutor in this case.

/a/ Jeannette T. Knoll Justice Jeannette Theriot Knoll

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David Earl JOHNSON.
    No. 2007-KO-1945.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2005.
   In re Johnson, David Earl; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 219,715; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,323-KA.

Denied.


text:
    In re Branden J. VILLAVASO.
    No. 2008-OB-0243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 1, 2008.
   In re Villavaso, Branden J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Granted. Petitioner is allowed to take the Louisiana State Bar Examination in February 2008, subject to the condition that should he satisfactorily pass the examination, he may not be admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana until a final, satisfactory report of investigation has been received from the National Conference of Bar Examiners.

KIMBALL, J., would deny.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny.

KNOLL, J., would deny.


text:
    In re Monica L. MCCLURE.
    No. 2008-OB-0264.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 7, 2008.
   In re McClure, Monica L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Granted. Petitioner is allowed to take the Louisiana State bar Examination in February 2008. Upon satisfactorily passing the examination, petitioner may apply to this Court for the appointment of a commissioner in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XVII, Section 9, to take evidence and report to this Court as to whether petitioner has the appropriate character and fitness to be admitted to the bar and allowed to practice law in the State of Louisiana.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny the application.


text:
    Antoine P. TURNER v. Antoinette A. TURNER.
    No. 2008-CC-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 12, 2008.
   In re Turner, Antoinette A.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 06-10919; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-0152.

Writ denied. Stay denied.


text:
    CREATIVE RISK CONTROLS, INC., et al. v. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS CONSULTING SERVICES, LLC, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2008.
   In re Creative Risk Controls Inc. et al.; Powell, Bennett E.; Powell Insurance Agency Inc.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2005-1694; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1337.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy CLARK.
    No. 2008-KK-0195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2008.
   In re Clark, Roy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-07-0242; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 2032.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vincent MARINELLO.
    No. 2008-KK-0258.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2008.
   In re Marinello, Vincent; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-6329; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-K-4.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Johnson, Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated December 7, 2007; Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 306172; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0063.

Reconsideration denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Freddie R. LEWIS.
    No. 2007-KH-1296.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Lewis, Freddie R.;Defendant(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated August 15, 2007; Parish of Bossier, 26th District Court Div. D Nos. 140815, 140816, 140817; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, 42337-KM, KH 06-42164, KH 06-42062.

Reconsideration denied. Moot.


text:
    Mack CLINTON and Rose Clinton v. REIGEL BY-PRODUCTS, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-C-2239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Clinton, Mack et al.; Clinton, Rose; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 494,491; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,497-CA.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    Susan Radlein Wife of/ and Robert RADLEIN v. HOLIDAY INNS, INC., Felcor Lodging Company, L.L.C., Felcor Lodging Trust, Inc., Felcor Lodging Limited Partnership, Bristol Lodging Tenant Co., Bristol Hotel Asset Co., Bristol Hotels & Resorts, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., et al.
    No. 2007-C-2444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Radlein, Susan et al.; Radlein, Robert; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2000-6516; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0322.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Courtney S. JONES.
    No. 2008-KK-0082.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Jones, Courtney S.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 128630; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 07-01190.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilton CARABY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0968.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Caraby, Wilton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 450-882; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1376.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonathan W. PERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0975.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Perry, Jonathan W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 06-CR-614; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 07-00109.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald FONTENOT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Fontenot, Ronald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 66,514-FA; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 06-01661.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dominic W. COX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Cox, Dominic W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 87,513; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 07-00341.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry BANNISTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Bannister, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 93-5104; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-KH-221.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas LEBEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0989.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re LeBeau, Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-WCR-419-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0233.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John P. RODDY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0990.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Roddy, John P.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 97-F1621; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42438-KH.

Denied. Relator must first seek police reports from their custodian, the Monroe Police Department, R.S. 44:31, and if not satisfied must subsequently seek mandamus relief in the district court. R.S. 44:35. Relator is not entitled to the other documents he seeks. See State ex rel. Simmons v. State, 93-0275 (La.12/16/94), 647 So.2d 1094; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keyoinata M. MARTIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Martin, Keyoinata M.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 03-0885; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-KH-217.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Walter PETERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Peterson, Walter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-CR-1098; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0323.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roger Daniel BRYAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1008.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Bryan, Roger Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 24618.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond KRAFT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Kraft, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 36,5303; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2522.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Zebedee LOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Lott, Zebedee; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 316820; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 1732.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1035.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Williams, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 396-938; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-0276.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin HARVEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Harvey, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 368-550; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0268.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Juan J. DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Davis, Juan J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 454-487; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0460.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jacques GABLE.
    No. 2007-K-1914.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Gable, Jacques; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 462-234; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-0401.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Henry James HARPER, Jr.
    No. 2007-K-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Harper, Henry James Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 452,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 0299.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher KIRKLAND.
    No. 2007-KO-1928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In Re Kirkland, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 246,381; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,397-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Phillip BROWN.
    No. 2007-KO-1939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Brown, Phillip; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 225,722; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,054-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony Ray BARRETT.
    No. 2007-KO-1942.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Barrett, Anthony Ray; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 246,317; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,303-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Lawson WILHITE, Sr., Individually and o/b/o Geraldine Wilhite, (Deceased); Lawson Wilhite, Jr., Hazel Wilhite Moore; Nellie Wilhite Brown; Savanna Wilhite Walker; Diane Wilhite Turner; Larry Wilhite; Mary Wilhite Moffett; and the Estate of Connie Wilhite and B.J.W. (Minor Child of Connie Wilhite) v. David THOMPSON, M.D.; Dan Lefleur, M.D.; Medical Protective Company; Kwabena Owasu, M.D., Emcare, Inc.; and Lexington Insurance.
    No. 2007-C-2025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Moffett, Mary Wilhite; Wilhite, Lawson Jr.; Brown, Nellie Wilhite; Turner, Diane Wilhite; Wilhite, Connie Estate of; Wilhite, Lawson Sr. et al.; Moore, Hazel Wilhite; Walker, Savanna Wilhite; Wilhite, Larry; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of West Carroll, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 27,159; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,395-CA.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J„ would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory R. ADRAGNA.
    No. 2007-K-2029.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Adragna, Gregory R.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 398256; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 0400.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael L. TRIPLET.
    No. 2007-K-2030.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Triplet, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 38648; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,357-KA.

Denied.


text:
    ESTATE OF Derrick FRANCIS, et al. v. CITY OF RAYNE, et al.
    No. 2007-C-2119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Rayne City of et al.; Boulet, Daniel; Foreman, Mario; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 81532-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-359.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnell MILTON and Gilbert Bartholomew, III.
    No. 2007-KK-2204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Bartholomew, Gilbert III; Milton, Johnell; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 06-0518, 06-0544; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-K-672.

Denied.


text:
    REGIONAL UROLOGY, L.L.C., et al. v. David T. PRICE, M.D. and David T. Price, M.D., A Professional Medical Corporation.
    No. 2007-C-2251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Price, David T. M.D.; Price, David T. M.D. A Professional Medical Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 512,639; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,789-CA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Christie and August M. BERTONIERE v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital, Stewart A. Nutting, M.D., James D. Conway, M.D., S. Bleich, M.D., and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Bertoniere, Christie; Bertoniere, August M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 503-610; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-CA-301.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Dawn Marie GIECK v. TENET HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Tenet Healthcare Corporation;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 06-10447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1313.

Denied.


text:
    Francis Patrick QUINN v. Julie Unangst QUINN.
    No. 2007-CC-2303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Quinn, Julie Unangst; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 637-411; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-C-802.

Denied.


text:
    Mark N. MATTHEWS v. The MILITARY DEPARTMENT FOR the STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-CC-2316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Matthews, Mark N.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 475,707; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 1337.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Scott ROUSSELLE v. STATE of Louisiana, District Attorney John Rowley.
    No. 2007-CP-2376.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Rousselle, Scott; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 106-363; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1236.

Denied.


text:
    Goldie JACK v. PRAIRIE CAJUN SEAFOOD WHOLESALE.
    No. 2007-C-2388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Jack, Goldie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District # 4, No. 04-4435; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-0102.

Denied.


text:
    Jon K. ROBERTS v. D & J CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Gray Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2404.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Roberts, Jon K.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers Comp. Dist. IE, No. 0504401; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,510-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    Marco BURGOS and Pilar Diaz v. STAR AUTO SERVICE, INC., Joseph B. Margavio, II, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Star Auto Service, Inc. et al.; Margavio, Joseph B. II; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 600-513; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-CA-229.

Denied.


text:
    Robert BAUER, et al. v. DEAN MORRIS, L.L.P. Mary & Larry Patterson, et al. v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., et al.
    No. 2007-C-2414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, Nos. 2005-2174, 2005-2173; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2007-CA-0635, 2007-CA-0636.

Denied.


text:
    Douglas BROUSSARD v. Jacob CHANDLER and Great Southern Coins, L.L.C.
    No. 2007-C-2421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Broussard, Douglas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2005-13899; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1958.

Denied.


text:
    Jeremy WALTRIP, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Protection Services Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2006-2289; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-01116.

Denied.


text:
    Wendell J. CALLAHAN, Jr. and Jerome M. Cousan v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., Employees A, B, and C of Circuit City Stores, Inc., and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-2424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Callahan, Wendell J. Jr.; Cousan, Jerome M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2004-12002; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1663.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    James NOONAN v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2007-C-2431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 8, No. 02-05797; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-1121.

Denied.


text:
    Ovie REEVES, Jr. v. F. MILLER & SONS, INC.
    No. 2007-C-2435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Reeves, Ovie Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2004-1900-G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 07-339, 07-201.

Denied.


text:
    Cloradean Prejean GRANGER v. Wallace Anthony GRANGER.
    No. 2007-C-2436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Granger, Wallace Anthony; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 94-C-1479-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-1615.

Denied.


text:
    FAMILY WORSHIP CENTER CHURCH, INC., on its Own Behalf and Derivatively on Behalf of Health Science Park, L.L.C. v. Gary N. SOLOMON, Stephen H. Jones, Terry D. Jones and Health Science Park, L.L.C.
    No. 2007-C-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Family Worship Center Church, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 537,353; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1261.

Denied.


text:
    ARC INDUSTRIES, L.L.C. v. William H. NUNGESSER.
    No. 2007-CC-2438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Nungesser, William H.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2006-3028-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-1353.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.


text:
    Shyra ALLEN v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE And All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2007-C-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Allen, Shyra; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, No. 7089; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-1647.

Denied.


text:
    Willie LEE v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE And All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2007-C-2440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Lee, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, No. 7099; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-0171.

Denied.


text:
    NEW INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, Orleans Levee District and R P Beckendorf & Associates d/b/a ISU Coast Insurance Agency.
    No. 2007-C-2442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re R P Beckendorf & Associates d/b/a ISU Costal Insurance Agency; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2006-08203; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0943.

Denied.


text:
    Donna ROYALS v. TOWN OF RICHWOOD.
    No. 2007-C-2447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Richwood Town of; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers Compensation District # OlE, No. 05-03541; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,585-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    FAMILY WORSHIP CENTER CHURCH, INC., on its Own Behalf and Derivatively on Behalf of Health Science Park, L.L.C. v. Gary N. SOLOMON, Stephen H. Jones, Terry D. Jones and Health Science Park, L.L.C.
    No. 2007-C-2448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Solomon, Gary N.; Jones, Stephen H.; Jones, Terry D.; Health Science Park, L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 537,353; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1261.

Denied.


text:
    Tyrone DOYLE and Doris Doyle v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re General Motors Corp. et al.; — • Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 215-916; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-01295.

Denied.


text:
    Walter THEODORE v. JAZZ CASINO COMPANY, L.L.C. d/b/a Harrah’s New Orleans.
    No. 2007-C-2452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Theodore, Walter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 01-16398; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0615.

Denied.


text:
    Levon LEBAN v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2007-C-2458.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Orleans Parish School Board;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2004-2343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0571.

Denied.


text:
    Eddy OLIVER, et al. v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2461.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Louisiana State of; Recovery School District; Elementary & Secondary Education Bd. of; Education Department of; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2005-12244; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1354.

Denied.


text:
    Michael W. TRAHAN v. CITY OF CROWLEY.
    No. 2007-C-2462.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Trahan, Michael W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 02-09331; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-266.

Denied.


text:
    HERFF JONES, INC. and Graduate Supply, Inc. v. Nettie Sue GIROUARD, James Rabb, Warren Rabb and the Grad Shoppe, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-2463.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Graduate Supply Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2006-4331; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-0393

Denied.


text:
    HERFF JONES, INC. and Graduate Supply, Inc. v. Nettie Sue GIROUARD, James Rabb, Warren Rabb and the Grad Shoppe, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-2464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Herff Jones Inc. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2006-4331; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-0393.

Denied.


text:
    Christopher CORMIER v. STATE of La., DEPT. OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES.
    No. 2007-C-2466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Louisiana, State of Through the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 02, No. 05-07727; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-642.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Ms. Brenda FRANKLIN, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Daughter, Shaylon Day v. The TULANE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL AND CLINIC, and Dr. Franklin G. Boineau, III, M.D., Dr. Olugbenga A. Akingbola and the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, d/b/a Tulane University Health Sciences Center, et al.
    No. 2007-C-2468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Franklin, Brenda et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review’ Parish of 0rleans’ Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2005-2307; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-1557.

Denied.


text:
    Irene PREJEAN v. The ORIGINAL KEVIN GUIDRY PRODUCE MARKET, INC.
    No. 2007-C-2470.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re The Original Kevin Guidry Produce Market, Inc.;' — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 20052974; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-138.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    Michael W. TRAHAN v. CITY OF CROWLEY.
    No. 2007-C-2471.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 15, 2008.
   In re Crowley, City of; — -Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 02-093331; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-266.

Denied.


author: THOMAS F. DALEY, Judge.

text:
    SALES 360, L.L.C. v. LOUISIANA MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION and Its Members, Arthur Tait, C. Robert Bohn, Jr., V. Price Leblanc, Jr., Gerald R. Lane, Cloid White, Marshall Hebert, Calvin Braxton, Sr., Ted S. Atterbery, Jr., David M. Mann, Alexis D. Hocevar, Jacob Drago, and Jacqueline L. Edgar c/w Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission v. Sales 360, LLC.
    Nos. 07-CA-432, 07-CA-440.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Dec. 11, 2007.

      Angela W. Adolph, Stephanie B. La-borde, Milling Benson Woodwood L.L.P., and Herschel C. Adcock, Sr., Baton Rouge, LA, and Philippe J. Langlois, Milling Benson Woodward, L.L.P., and P. Lindsey Williams, New Orleans, LA, and Jon C. Adcock, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Sales 360, L.L.C.

      Adrian F. Lapeyronnie, III, Greenberg & Lapeyronnie, LLC Gretna, LA, for Defendants/Appellees.
    Panel composed of Judges EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., THOMAS F. DALEY, and WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD.
   THOMAS F. DALEY, Judge.

|aThe appellant, Sales 360, LLC, has appealed three district court judgments in these consolidated appeals. In appeal No. 07-CA-440, appellant appeals two judgments rendered by Division K of the 24th Judicial District Court, granting the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission’s motion to make a judgment executory and denying appellant’s Motion to Vacate and stay collection proceedings. In appeal No. 07-CA-432, appellant appeals a judgment rendered by Division M of the 24th Judicial District Court granting the Commission’s Exceptions of No Right of Action, No Cause of Action, and Res Judicata. For the reasons that follow we affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS:

Appellant, Sales 360, LLC, is an entity that provides advertising services and sales personnel to automobile dealerships to conduct sales promotions for limited specified time periods. Appellant mailed out flyers advertising sales, special prices, and financing available for car purchases at four motor vehicle 14dealerships on specific dates. In December 2005, the appel-lee, the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, (herein after referred to as the Commission), notified appellant that a hearing would be held regarding appellant’s alleged violation of enumerated sections of the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission law and its Rules and Regulations in its advertising of sales on specific dates for four specific dealerships. This letter informed appellant that as a result of appellant’s alleged violations, the Commission may impose a civil penalty. On May 6, 2006, counsel for appellant forwarded a letter to the Commission stating that appellant would not appear at the hearing because it was appellant’s belief that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over it and the Commission is without authority to levy civil penalties against it.

On May 8, 2006, the Commission held a hearing relative to the conduct of appellant in advertising the sales enumerated in the December 2005 letter. On August 14, 2006, the Commission made the following findings of fact:

Sales 360, LLC engaged in false and misleading advertising by distributing flyers in numbers exceeding 300,000 pieces and containing fifty-seven (57) violations of the advertising laws, rules and regulations of the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission.

The Commission made the following conclusions of law:

Sales 360, LLC violated fifth-seven (57) of the advertising laws, rules and regulations of the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission.

The Commission then ordered a fine and penalty of $285,000.00 assessed against appellant.

On October 16, 2006, the Commission filed a petition to make its judgment exec-utory in Division K of the 24th Judicial District Court. On October 17, 2006, the judge of Division K signed a judgment making the Commission’s August 14, 2006 judgment against appellant executory. On November 16, 2006, appellant filed a Motion to Vacate the October 17, 2006 judgment and Motion for a Stay of | ¡¡proceedings pending consideration of the petition to annul. On January 9, 2007, the judge of Division K signed a judgment denying appellant’s Motion to Vacate and Motion for Stay.

On November 16, 2006, appellant filed a Petition to Annul the August 14, 2006 judgment of the Commission and annul the October 17, 2006 judgment of Division K. This petition was filed in Division M of the 24th Judicial District. The individual members of the Commission were named as defendants in this petition. The members and the Commission responded with Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action, and Res Judicata /issue preclusion. On May 15, 2007, the judge of Division M signed a judgment granting all of the members and the Commission’s exceptions and denying appellant relief.

Appellant timely appealed all of the judgments rendered by the district court and raises numerous Assignments of Error on appeal.

WHETHER THE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPELLANT:

Appellant repeatedly argues that the Commission has no constitutional authority over it, contending that the commission’s authority extends only to those persons or entities engaged in the business of or serving as a motor vehicle dealer, broker, franchisor, facilitator, repairer, or manufacturer, converter, distributor or wholesaler of motor vehicles. Appellant contends that as an advertising and consulting firm, it is not subject to the Commission’s regulatory authority.

We disagree. As much as appellant would like to hold itself out as solely an advertising agency and consultant, the facts brought out at the Commission’s hearing, a copy of the transcript of which was admitted into evidence in the district court, make it clear that appellant contracted with dealerships to conduct and/or | Bassist in the sales of automobiles on certain dates. Appellant’s contracts with the dealerships include providing and mailing advertising flyers and providing personnel to assist in the sales.

The Commission’s jurisdiction is set out in LSA-R.S. 32:1251, et seq., and includes the advertising of sales of motor vehicles as provided in LSA-R.S. 32:1251:

The legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sale of motor vehicles in the state of Louisiana vitally affects the general economy of the state, the public interest, and the public welfare, and that in order to promote the public interest, and the public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate and to license those persons enumerated in R.S. 32:1254 and doing business in Louisiana ... in order to prevent false and misleading advertising ...

LSA-R.S. 32:1254(N) provides:

Any person who sells or offers to sell new motor vehicles or specialty vehicles, or leases, rents, or offers to lease or rent new motor vehicles or specialty vehicles, and which is not a licensee of the commission shall, nonetheless, be subject to the provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 32 and the rules and regulations of the commission which pertain to the regulation of advertising.

LSA-R.S. 32:1253(E) provides:

The commission is hereby vested with the powers and duties necessary and proper to enable it to fully and effectively carry out the provisions and objects of this Chapter, and is hereby authorized and empowered to make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations and to adopt and prescribe all forms necessary to accomplish said purpose, and the enumeration of any power or authority herein shall not be construed to deny, impair, disparage, or limit any others necessary to the attainment thereof. A copy of all rules and regulations adopted by the commission shall be published in the Louisiana Register, and same may be amended, modified, or repealed from time to time.

The contract between appellant and the dealerships states that appellant will provide highly skilled automotive sales professionals and will coordinate every aspect of the sales during the sales promotion. In addition to a flat fee, appellant was paid a percentage of the gross sales of the motor vehicles for the sales 17promotion. As can be deemed from a reading of the above statutes and testimony and evidence of the hearing before the Commission, appellant falls within the broad authority of the Commission to regulate sales and advertising of motor vehicles.

Appellant urges this Court to follow the ruling in Dyer v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 1999-2706 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/00), 767 So.2d 749, and find the Commission had no authority over it as a non-licensee. We find the Dyer case distinguishable from the case at bar because the applicable statutes in Dyer used the phrase “currently valid license” leading the court to conclude that the person accused of violating the statute possessed either an expired, suspended, or revoked license at the time of the alleged act. Since there is no such terminology in the statutes relevant to the case at bar, we find Dyer inapplicable.

Thus, we find appellant’s argument that the Commission lacked authority to regulate its activities to be without merit.

Appellant goes on to argue that the Commission has no authority to levy civil penalties against it. We disagree.

LSA-R.S. 32:1252(18) defines a “licensee” as “any person who is required to be licensed by the commission pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter.” By virtue of its actions in participating in the sales of automobiles, appellant was required to be licensed by the Commission. Although it did not obtain a license, because of appellant’s actions, appellant is treated as a licensee pursuant to R.S. 32:1252(18) and is therefore subject to all penalties, including fines as provided in LSA-R.S. 32:1260 as though it were a properly licensee. Thus we find appellant’s argument that the Commission lacked authority to levy a civil penalty against it to be without merit.

| ¿THE COMMISSION’S NOTICE TO APPELLANT AND AMOUNT OF THE PENALTY:

Appellant argues the notice of hearing sent by the Commission regarding the hearing was deficient and claims it was never put on notice of the true nature of the Commission’s intentions. Appellant contends it had no notice that the Commission intended imposing a civil penalty.

Appellant failed to exercise its rights to appeal the findings of the Commission. LSA-R.S. 49:964 provides that a party aggrieved by the finding of an administrative agency may appeal that finding to the district court of the parish in which the agency is located within thirty days after the Commission has mailed written notice of its decision. The record contains a certified letter dated August 14, 2006 addressed to appellant and a return receipt indicating appellant received this letter on August 15, 2006. This letter informs appellant of the findings rendered by the Commission. Appellant acknowledged that it did not seek review of the Commission’s findings. As such, appellant’s review in this Court is limited to whether or not the judgment of the Commission is an absolute nullity.

The relevant provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure state that a judgment may be annulled if it is rendered against a defendant who was not served with process or by a court that does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. La. C.C.P. art. 2002. Having found above that the Commission had jurisdiction over this matter we will examine whether the service by the Commission to appellant was sufficient.

The notice given of a hearing by an administrative agency need only be reasonable and need not meet the exacting requirements for notice in judicial proceedings. Tafaro’s Inv. Co. v. Division of Housing Imp., 261 La. 183, 259 So.2d 57 (1972). Such notice must serve the purpose of informing the parties 19of the purpose and time of the proceedings, the possible consequences or the manner in which interests may be affected, and the method of presenting objections to the administrative action. Id.

The letter sent to appellant by the Commission clearly lists the actions of appellant that the Commission deemed were a violation of its rules, including a listing of the rules violated. Appellant obviously received this letter as evidenced by the letter from appellant’s attorney that appellant would not appear at the hearing. Thus, we find appellant had sufficient notice of the Commission’s hearing of the allegations against it.

THE OCTOBER 17, 2006 JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT:

On October 17, 2006, the trial judge of Division K of the 24th Judicial District Court signed an order making the decision rendered by the Commission executory. We find this to be an error for the following reasons:

According to LSA-R.S. 36:3, the Commission falls under the office of the governor and is to perform and exercise its powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities as provided in R.S. 36:803, which provides in pertinent part:

A(2) In addition, each of those agencies shall continue to impose, collect, and retain license or certification fees as provided by law; issue and renew certificates for qualified applicants, set standards for and approve the preparation, conduct, and administration of its own examinations, and be responsible, as otherwise provided by law, for carrying out the laws relative to its profession or occupation to the extent that such laws provide for rulemaking, certification, licensing, regulations, testing, inspection, enforcement, and adjudication by the agency.

The Commission’s powers are spelled out in LSA-R.S. 32:1251, et seq. While these statutes allow the Commission to impose civil penalties, the statutes do not provide for the collection of these penalties.

1mA review of statutes granting authority to other administrative agencies indicates that the legislature made specific provisions for the collection of such civil penalties in some areas. For example, LSA-R.S. 18:1511.5 D, which regulates the powers of the ethics board for elected officials, provides that a judgment assessing civil penalties shall become executory when all delays for appeal have expired according to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, and may be enforced as any other money judgment.

Similarly, LSA-R.S. 32:788 D, which spells out the powers of the Louisiana Used Motor Vehicle and Parts Commission provides:

Upon the failure of any person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or trust to timely pay any civil penalty imposed by the commission when due, the commission shall be entitled to recover by suit or otherwise, from such party all costs of collection, including court costs, deposition, and other discovery costs, and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the commission in collecting such civil penalty.

There is no such provision for the collection of civil penalties in the statutes governing and enumerating the powers of the Commission before us. While the Commission urges this Court to use the language in R.S. 32:1260 C providing for the Commission to render a judgment as sufficient to indicate the legislative intent to make the ruling rendered by the Commission against appellant a judgment capable of being made executory by the district court, we are without authority to do so. As the Supreme Court stated in International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So.2d 1039 (La.1988), statutes authorizing the imposition of a penalty are to be strictly construed. The courts should not construe penal statutes as extending powers not authorized by the letter of the law even if such powers would be arguably within its spirit. This rule has been applied in the area of administrative law. See, Benson & Gold Chevrolet, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, 403 So.2d 13 (La.1981).

|nLa. C.C.P. art. 2781 provides that a judgment rendered in a Louisiana court may be made executory in any other Louisiana court of competent jurisdiction. The Commission is not a court but is an administrative agency in the executive branch of state government. See, Bagert v. Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials, 594 So.2d 922 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992). The Commission argues that the decision rendered by the Commission on August 14, 2006 is a judgment that was properly made executory by the district court. However, our review of LSA-R.S. 32:1251, et seq., indicates the only reference to a judgment being rendered by the commission comes m LSA-R.S. 32:1260 C, which provides that the Commission may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party to proceedings held or court reporter fees, commission, attorney fees, the mileage and per diem of the commissioners, and other applicable and reasonable costs.

LSA-R.S. 49:951 defines an “adjudication” as an agency process for the formulation of a decision or order. R.S. 49:951(3) provides, in part:

(3) “Decision” or “order” means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunc-tive, or declaratory in form) of any agency, in any matter other than rulemaking, required by constitution or statute to be determined on the record after notice and opportunity for an agency hearing. ...

Because these statutes must be strictly construed, we find the Commission’s ruling of August 14, 2006 was a decision or order that was rendered after notice and a hearing. This decision or order, although styled as a judgment, is not a judgment that can be made executory pursuant to La. C.C.P. arts. 2781 and 2782. The statutes granting power to the Commission are silent as to how the civil penalties assessed by the Commission in a decision or order are to be collected. Therefore, we find in order to collect the penalties assessed against appellant, the | ^Commission must file suit using ordinary proceedings For this reason, the October 17, 2006 and January 9, 2007 judgments of Division K of the 24th Judicial District Court are set aside.

THE MAY 15, 2007 JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT:

On November 16, 2006, appellant filed a Petition to Annul Judgments and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in Division M of the 24th Judicial District. The Commission and its individual members are named as defendants in this petition. In this petition, appellant seeks to annul the October 17, 2006 judgment of Division K and annul the judgment of the Commission. In response to this petition, the Commission and its members filed Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action, and Res Judicata. On May 15, 2007, the trial judge in Division M rendered judgment granting all of the Commission’s and its members’ exceptions.

Louisiana Code Civil Procedure article 1061(B) requires a “defendant in the principal action” to “assert in a reconventional demand all causes of action that he may have against the plaintiff that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the principal action.” In Walker v. Howell, 04-246 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/04), 896 So.2d 110, the court held that the proper procedural vehicle to enforce the mandates of La. C.C.P. art. 1061 is an Exception of Res Judicata by barring claims that were or could have been litigated in a previous lawsuit.

In its Petition to Annul, the appellant raised the same arguments as to why the judgment of the Commission should be declared null, i.e. the Commission had no jurisdiction over it because it was not a seller of motor vehicles, as it raised in Lathe Motion to Annul filed in Division K. The appellant further argued the trial court judgment of October 17, 2006 making the Commission’s judgment executory should be annulled because it was based on the Commission’s judgment which was without effect since the Commission had no jurisdiction over it. This was the same argument made in the motion filed in Division K.

Accordingly, we find the trial court correctly granted the Commission’s Exception of Res Judicata as to all claims made against the Commission. This finding renders a discussion of the Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action as they pertain to allegations raised against the Commission moot.

The individual members of the Commission also filed Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action. With regard to the Exception of No Right of Action filed by the members, we note that R.S. 32:1253(H) states that “No member of the commission or the executive director, shall be subject to suit or be held liable as an individual in any suit against the commission”. Appellant raises only one allegation against the individual members of the commission, stating in paragraph 26 of the petition, that the Commission, “through its members” violated the due process clause of the Louisiana Constitution by knowingly and intentionally prosecuting a non-licensee. Under Louisiana law individual commissioners cannot be sued individually in any suit against the Commission. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in granting the Exception of No Right of Action with regards to the allegation made in paragraph 26 against the Commission members individually.

The trial court granted the members’ Exception of No Right of Action, but did not make an express ruling on the members’ Exception of No Cause of Action. La. C.C.P. art. 923 provides that the function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiffs action declared barred by effect of law. Hence, upon finding 114the plaintiff has no right of action, the court must dismiss the suit. Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 562 So.2d 888, 892 (La.1990).

CONCLUSION:

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court dated October 17, 2006, making the judgment of the Commission executory is vacated and set aside. The January 9, 2007 judgment of the trial court denying appellant’s Motion to Vacate the October 17, 2006, judgment is also set aside. The May 15, 2007 judgment of the trial court granting the Exceptions of Res Judicata, No Cause of Action, and No Right of Action is affirmed.

This matter is remanded to the district court, Division K, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; MATTER REMANDED.

      . We note, however, that because the appellant did not timely seek judicial review of the ruling of the Commission, its rulings are final.

      . The January 9, 2007 judgment denied appellant’s Motion to Vacate the October 17, 2006 judgment and denied appellant’s Motion for a Stay.