author: BENTON, J.

text:
    S.D.S. AUTOS, INC., a Florida Corporation, d/b/a Lexus of Jacksonville, Appellant, v. Francis A. CHRZANOWSKI, Kimberly M. Chrzanowski, Alfred G. Jonas, Harold Gregory Forrest and Rita B. Forrest, both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees, Brumos Motor Cars, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. Carolyn C. Montgomery, Cleophus M. Howell, Alfred G. Jonas and Heidi H. Jonas, both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees.
    Nos. 1D06-4293, 1D06-4294.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 26, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.

      Christopher J. Greene and Gregory Williamson of Brant, Abraham, Reiter, McCormick & Greene, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    J. Michael Lindell and Roger K. Gan-nam of Lindell, Farson & Pincket, P.A., Jacksonville, and Bryan S. Gowdy and John S. Mills of Mills & Creed, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
   BENTON, J.

Appellants Brumos Motor Cars, Inc., a Mercedes dealership (Brumos), and S.D.S. Autos, Inc., a Lexus dealership (S.D.S.), seek relief from non-final orders denying their motions to dismiss amended class action complaints filed under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA or the Act), section 501.201 et seq., Florida Statutes (2005). The trial court construed their motions to dismiss as in part motions to compel arbitration. To the extent Brumos and S.D.S. sought dismissal on the ground that automobile lessees were contractually obligated to pursue their claims (on an individual basis) in arbitration, we have jurisdiction to review the orders. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv)(2007) (allowing appeals of non-final orders that determine “the entitlement of a party to arbitration”).

i.

Appellees’ amended class action complaints allege that Brumos and S.D.S. charged each named plaintiff $879.70 (the fee) as either an “administrative and documentary fee” or as “administrative and state fees” in connection with each vehicle the appellees acquired. The complaints allege that Brumos and S.D.S. violated FDUTPA by failing to disclose the true nature of the fee as required by sections 501.976(11) and 501.976(18), Florida Statutes (2005), and seek, among other things, injunctive relief and money damages under FDUTPA. The appellees also sought certification of a class consisting of all those who paid the fee “in connection with the purchase or lease of a motor vehicle.”

Brumos and S.D.S. moved to dismiss the amended complaints in part on the ground that putative class members who had leased vehicles from them had signed leases containing arbitration provisions. Brumos and S.D.S. argued the lessees could proceed no further in court, once Brumos and S.D.S. demanded arbitration. While the motions to dismiss were pending, the appellees moved for leave to file their second amended class action complaints, adding as named plaintiffs two couples who had leased vehicles from Bru-mos and S.D.S. under agreements containing arbitration provisions. In July of 2006, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, and timely appeals ensued. The trial court certified a class only after it denied the motions to dismiss, and after the present appeals had been taken. In the orders under review, the trial court ruled the arbitration provisions of various leases unenforceable, on grounds they were unconscionable, contrary to Florida’s public policy, and unsupported by mutual assent and consideration.

II.

We address the validity of only two arbitration provisions, the arbitration provisions in the leases which the plaintiffs named in the second amended complaint signed. Both these leases (the Lexus 2 and Brumos 2 agreements) provide for binding arbitration of all disputes concerning the lease or any related transaction, at the election of either party to the agreement. Both arbitration provisions also contain express class action waivers. The Lexus 2 agreement provides that “[a] claim can only be arbitrated on an individual basis and not as a class action.” This agreement further provides that “[tjhere shall be no right to arbitrate a claim as a representative of others or in a private attorney general capacity and there shall be no joinder or consolidation of parties, except for parties to the same contract.” The Brumos 2 agreement provides that leasing customers “give up any right [they] may have to bring a class-action lawsuit or class arbitration, or to participate in either as a claimant, and ... agree to give up any right [they] may have to consolidate [their] arbitration with the arbitration of others.” We conclude that, under our precedent, the class action waivers in the two leases we have to consider violate public policy by hampering important remedial purposes of FDUTPA, because they are designed to prevent individuals with small claims arising out of a motor vehicle dealer’s alleged violation of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), from seeking remedies as a class. On that ground, we affirm the orders below (to the extent they deny Brumos and S.D.S. arbitration of claims arising out of the Lexus 2 and Brumos 2 agreements).

III.

The validity of an arbitration provision is a purely legal question a reviewing court considers de novo. See Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So.2d 278, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So.2d 1212, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); see also Stewart Agency, Inc. v. Robinson, 855 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, applies here because the lease agreements “evidenc[e] a transaction involving commerce” within the meaning of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Both agreements expressly provide, moreover, that the FAA applies. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995) (construing the words “involving commerce” to include any contract “affecting commerce” and to signal Congress’ “intent to exercise [its] commerce power to the full”); E. Funding, L.L.C. v. Roman, 882 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). See also United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir.2003) (observing that “[t]he automobile, if anything, is the paradigm of modern interstate commercial activity”); id. (“[C]ars are themselves instrumentalities of commerce, which Congress may protect.”) (quoting United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir.1995)). No party objects to application of the federal act here, nor do we find any requirement in the Florida Arbitration Code, §§ 682.01-682.22, Florida Statutes (2005), that the FAA does not also impose in these circumstances.

Pursuant to the FAA, any “written [arbitration] provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The Supreme Court has held that section two of the FAA “is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)); see also Regency Group, Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So.2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (noting that “[p]ublie policy ... favors arbitration because it is efficient and avoids the time delay and expense associated with litigation” and that “doubts about the scope of [an arbitration] agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration”). Except for reasons requiring “the revocation of any contract,” the States cannot require litigants who have agreed to arbitrate to resort to a judicial forum, without contravening the “clear federal policy,” Perry, 482 U.S. at 491, 107 S.Ct. 2520, that arbitration agreements be “rigorously enforced.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-91, 107 S.Ct. 2520 (holding California statute requiring that wage collection proceedings take place in court, notwithstanding a private agreement to arbitrate, was preempted by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause).

IV.

State law may, however, invalidate an arbitration provision without contravening the FAA “provided the law at issue governs contracts generally and not arbitration agreements specifically.” Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996)). Although the FAA preempts any state law that singles out arbitration provisions for special scrutiny, defenses to contract enforcement generally applicable under state law, “including voidness for violation of the law or public policy, unconscionability, or lack of consideration,” may render contractual provisions on any subject (including those purporting to prohibit class consideration of claims) invalid without offending the FAA. See Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392, 397-98 (Fla.2005).

The FAA requires arbitration of a statutory cause of action only so long as arbitration does not impair a statute’s remedial function or render it ineffective as a deterrent. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”); see also Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“The arbi-trability of a statutory claim rests on the assumption that the arbitration agreement permits relief equivalent to that which is available in the courts.”); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So.2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Although parties may agree to arbitrate statutory claims, even ones involving important social policies, arbitration must provide the prospective litigant with an effective way to vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”).

We have held that an arbitration agreement that “defeat[s] the remedial purpose of the statute upon which an action is based,” Powertel, 743 So.2d at 576, or “deprive[s] the plaintiff of the ability to obtain meaningful relief for alleged statutory violations,” Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So.2d 574, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), is unenforceable for public policy reasons. See, e.g., Alterra, 953 So.2d at 578 (holding arbitration agreement void for public policy reasons because it defeated the remedial purpose of the Nursing Home Residents Act by expressly limiting liability); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So.2d 296, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (same); Am. Online, Inc. v. Pasieka, 870 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause because “the purpose and effectiveness of the FDUTPA would be seriously undermined if the claims here were required to be brought in Virginia”). We now hold that a contractual provision precluding class relief for small but numerous claims against motor vehicle dealers under section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), impermis-sibly frustrates the remedial purposes of FDUTPA.

V.

Although prevailing parties in FDUTPA actions may recover attorney’s fees and costs, an individual asserting a successful FDUTPA claim arising out of a motor vehicle dealer’s violation of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), may recover only such attorney’s fees as are reasonable in light of the amount of the individual’s actual damages. See § 501.976, Fla. Stat. (2005) (“In any civil litigation resulting from a violation of this section, when evaluating the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees to a private person, the trial court shall consider the amount of actual damages in relation to the time spent.”).

Yet FDUTPA’s attorney’s fee provisions are intended to ensure the efficacy of the Act’s private enforcement scheme, not to doom it to failure. See LaFerney v. Scott Smith Oldsmobile, Inc., 410 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“If, because of the small sums involved, consumers cannot recover in full their attorney fees, they will quickly determine it is too costly and too great a hassle to file suit, and individual enforcement of [FDUTPA] will fail.”); Marshall v. W & L Enters. Corp., 360 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (noting importance of attorney’s fees provision in ensuring that FDUTPA’s “obvious purpose of ... mak[ing] consumers whole for losses caused by fraudulent consumer practices” is served), disapproved on other grounds in Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 758 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla.2000); see also Fonte v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So.2d 1019, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (invaliding arbitration clause provision precluding attorney’s fees award on ground that bar on award “defeats a remedial purpose of FDUTPA”). Where, as in the present case, the amount of an individual consumer’s actual damages is small and attorney’s fees are limited as a result, FDUTPA’s private enforcement scheme cannot effectively deter violations of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), if consumers are prevented from seeking relief as a class. The class action device was designed to provide a procedure for vindicating just these types of claims. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (“[T]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997)).

Courts have not invalidated every arbitration provision precluding consumers from seeking class-wide vindication of every statutory claim. But our own precedent requires nothing less in the case of numerous, small claims brought against motor vehicle dealers under section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005). See Am. Online, 870 So.2d at 171-72; Powertel, 743 So.2d at 576-77. The Legislature enacted FDUTPA “to protect not only the rights of litigants, but also the rights of the consuming public at large.” Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So.2d 971, 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (observing that the Act authorizes declaratory and injunctive relief “even if those remedies might not benefit the individual consumers who filed the suit”).

In America Online, we held unenforceable a forum selection clause which would have required suit under FDUTPA to be brought in Virginia, where class action relief was unavailable. 870 So.2d at 171-72. Noting that “FDUTPA does not exist solely for the benefit of the individual parties, and is instead designed to afford a broader protection to the citizens of Florida,” we held that “the purpose and effectiveness of the FDUTPA would be seriously undermined if the claims ... were required to be brought in Virginia.” Id. In reaching its decision, the America Online court distinguished SAI Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc., 858 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), which gave effect to a forum selection clause requiring suit in another state where consumers raised claims under FDUTPA, on grounds that “SAI did not involve a class action, or the unavailability of the Florida remedy in another state.” Am. Online, 870 So.2d at 171.

In finding the arbitration provision in Powertel substantively unconscionable, we relied in part on the fact that the “[t]he arbitration clause ... effectively removes Powertel’s exposure to any remedy that could be pursued on behalf of a class of consumers” and noted that the benefit of class relief preclusion inured asymmetrically to Powertel, not to its customers. Id. at 576. The Powertel court explained that

[c]lass litigation provides the most economically feasible remedy for the kind of claim that has been asserted here. The potential claims are too small to litigate individually, but collectively they might amount to a large sum of money. The prospect of class litigation ordinarily has some deterrent effect on a manufacturer or service provider, but that is absent here. By requiring arbitration of all claims, Powertel has precluded the possibility that a group of its customers might join together to seek relief that would be impractical for any of them to obtain alone.

Id. The fee at issue in these cases has also given rise to small claims that are impractical for consumers to litigate or arbitrate on an individual basis but which allegedly involve “a large sum of money” when considered collectively.

VI.

Disallowing class relief effectively prevents consumers with small, individual claims based upon motor vehicle dealers’ violations of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), from vindicating their statutory rights under FDUTPA. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir.2006) (finding that “bar on class arbitration threatens the premise that arbitration can be a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights”) (internal quotations omitted); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash.2d 843, 161 P.3d 1000, 1005 (2007) (noting that “when consumer claims are small but numerous, a class-based remedy is the only effective method to vindicate the public’s rights”).

Precluding class representation for holders of small claims whose attorney’s fees are limited by the amount of their individual damages dramatically undermines FDUTPA’s private enforcement mechanisms. Cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54 (finding class waiver inapplicable to claims under the federal and state antitrust statutes notwithstanding fact that neither statute expressly confers any right to seek class relief). See also Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wash.2d 826, 161 P.3d 1016, 1023 (2007) (finding public policy embodied in Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA) “violated when a citizen’s ability to assert a private right of action is significantly impaired by a forum selection clause that precludes class actions in circumstances where it is otherwise economically unfeasible for individual consumers to bring their small-value claims” even though the CPA contained no class action antiwaiver provision). But see Fonte, 903 So.2d at 1024-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding arbitration clause’s preclusion of class relief in a case where section 501.976 had no application does not defeat FDUT-PA’s remedial purposes, in part because “neither the text nor our review of the legislative history of FDUTPA suggests that the legislature intended to confer a non-waivable right to class representation”); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir.2000) (“[Because we can discern no congressional intent to preclude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in either statute’s text, legislative history, or purpose, we hold that such clauses are effective even though they may render class actions to pursue statutory claims under the TILA [Truth in Lending Act] or the EFTA [Electronic Funds Transfer Act] unavailable.”).

VII.

FDUTPA provides for public and private enforcement alike. See generally Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 (holding that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute that provides for both private and administrative enforcement actions, Congress envisions a role for both types of enforcement” and that “[weakening one of those enforcement mechanisms seems inconsistent with the Congressional scheme”); but see Johnson, 225 F.3d at 375 (asserting that administrative enforcement mechanisms under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., “bolstered” the conclusion that an arbitration provision preventing consumers from pursuing class relief was not incompatible with TILA).

FDUTPA permits the Office of the State Attorney or the Department of Legal Affairs to investigate claims of deceptive practices and to seek on behalf of consumers, among other things, actual damages and injunctive relief to prohibit such practices. See §§ 501.207 and 501.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). In addition, the Department of Legal Affairs has the authority to issue a cease and desist order to prevent future violations of the act. See § 501.208, Fla. Stat. (2005). These procedures concededly contemplate relief for more than one individual consumer at a time. See Fonte, 903 So.2d at 1025 (enforcing arbitration clause’s bar on class representation in non-section 501.976 context in part because public enforcement authority FDUTPA provides “presents an added deterrent ef-feet to violators if private enforcement actions should fail to fulfill that role” and “gives another possible avenue of recovery for consumers”).

But public enforcement resources are necessarily limited. Reflecting this reality — and against the backdrop of class action availability — the Act created a private cause of action for consumers aggrieved by FDUTPA violations. See § 501.211(1),(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Given the restrictions on individual attorney’s fee awards under section 501.976, to preclude class treatment of consumers’ claims would distort the statutory scheme, undermine FDUTPA’s private enforcement mechanisms and often make relief the statute contemplates unavailable, as a practical matter. In enacting FDUTPA, the Legislature was necessarily aware of class actions’ role in deterring future FDUTPA violations by effectively redressing past violations, see Am. Online, Inc., 870 So.2d at 171-72; Davis, 776 So.2d at 975, a role that has special importance when section 501.976’s restrictions on attorney’s fees apply. We hold that, regardless of forum, FDUTPA plaintiffs may not be precluded from seeking class relief under section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005).

VIII.

In doing so, we join numerous other courts in declining to enforce bans on class relief in consumer contracts that give rise to claims under consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 912 A.2d 88, 101 (2006) (“The public interest at stake in [the plaintiffs] ability and the ability of her fellow consumers effectively to pursue their statutory rights under this State’s consumer protection laws overrides the defendants’ right to seek enforcement of the class-arbitration bar in their agreement.”); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 150, 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1180 (2004) (finding arbitration provision precluding consumer’s ability to seek class relief or act as private attorney general unenforceable as contrary to public policy underlying Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 885-86 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (finding arbitration provision’s preclusion of class relief impermissible under Pennsylvania law and approving trial court holding that “[i]t is only the class action vehicle which makes small consumer litigation possible” and “[s]hould the law require consumers to litigate or arbitrate individually, defendant corporations are effectively immunized from redress of grievances”); Scott, 161 P.3d at 1006 (“[W]e conclude the class action waiver clause before us is an unconscionable violation of [Washington’s] policy to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition ... because it drastically forestalls attempts to vindicate consumer rights.”); Coady v. Cross County Bank, 299 Wis.2d 420, 729 N.W.2d 732, 746-47 (2007) (holding arbitration clause prohibiting plaintiffs alleging violations of Wisconsin Consumer Act from proceeding on class-wide or representative basis unconscionable).

IX.

In sum, we conclude that the contractual provisions at issue here which purport to prohibit consumers from pursuing class relief for small but numerous claims against motor vehicle dealers based upon alleged violations of section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), are irreconcilably at odds with the remedial purposes of FDUTPA, contrary to the public policy of this state, and unenforceable for that reason.

Affirmed.

BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur.

      . Two orders were entered in separate cases involving substantially identical operative facts. Each order was appealed and the appeals have been consolidated. To the extent either order denied a motion to dismiss on grounds that have nothing to do with arbitration, we lack jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C) (2007). An order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable as such until after final judgment, even when the motion to dismiss is appealed in conjunction with an appealable non-final order. Chicago Title Ins. Agency v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 560 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citations omitted). Accord Roofcraft Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas, 677 So.2d 39, 39-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); King v. Odle, 665 So.2d 378, 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 644 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Polo v. Polo, 643 So.2d 55, 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); George J. Karr, D.D.S. v. Sellers, 620 So.2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So.2d 344, 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Kadivar, 482 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Capitol Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 478 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Perimeter Invs., Inc. v. Amerifirst Dev. Co., 423 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

      . Those who suffer loss as a result of a violation of the Act may recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs. See § 501.211(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). In awarding attorney’s fees to FDUTPA plaintiffs who prevail under Section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), courts must take into account "the amount of actual damages in relation to the time spent.” § 501.976, Fla. Stat. (2005).

      . The appellees later amended their requests for class certification to limit the class to all persons who were charged the fee in purchasing or leasing automobiles from Brumos and S.D.S. on or after August 18, 2001.

      . All plaintiffs named at that time had purchased rather than leased vehicles from the appellants. The appellants do not allege that the contracts of any customers purchasing vehicles from the appellants contain arbitration clauses.

      . In effect, at the hearing on the motions to dismiss, the parties stipulated that the arbitration question was ripe for decision, whatever the sequence in which the trial court ruled on pending motions. The trial court granted the appellees' motions for leave to amend, moreover, before the appellants filed the notices of appeal seeking review of the denial of the motions to dismiss refusing to order arbitration.

      . We denied the appellants' motion to stay proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of their appeal of the non-final orders denying their motions to dismiss. Later Bru-mos and S.D.S. appealed the orders granting class certification separately. Those appeals have been consolidated with one another, see case numbers 1D06-5662 and 1D06-5664, but not with the present appeals.

      . Until the trial court certified the class, just those persons actually named in the complaints were parties, and only their leases were pertinent, although the record contains other leases. See Policastro v. Stelk, 780 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (noting that “[a] civil action does not become a 'class action' simply because the complaint bears the legend 'class action complaint' ”).

      .The Lexus 2 agreement provides that “if the provision prohibiting classwide arbitration is deemed invalid, then this entire Arbitration Provision shall be null and void.” The Bru-mos 2 agreement provides, in contrast, for the severability of any provision of the arbitration clause found unenforceable or invalid, and directs that the remaining provisions be "given full effect as if the severed provision had not been included.” On appeal for the first time, the appellants argue that, even if the class action waivers were properly invalidated, the trial court erred by invalidating the entire Brumos 2 arbitration clause, rather than compelling arbitration pursuant to the remaining provisions of the clause. But Bru-mos never made this argument below. The argument is unavailable to it on appeal, because Brumos failed to raise it in the trial court. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982) ("[I]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”).

      . We do not reach the trial court's alternative reasons for invalidating the arbitration provisions.

      . The Lexus 2 agreement provides that "[t]his Arbitration Provision is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the FAA.” The Brumos 2 agreement provides that "[t]his Lease evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce” and that ”[a]ny arbitration under this Lease shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1, et seq.).”

      . Section 501.2105, Florida Statutes (2005), provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any civil litigation resulting from an act or practice involving a violation of this part, ... the prevailing party ... may receive his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from the nonprevailing party.” § 501.2105(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

      . See Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877-78 (11th Cir.2005) (holding arbitration provisions precluding class action relief enforceable in putative class action alleging violations of state usury statutes and the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir.2000) (holding class relief under the Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act precluded by provisions of arbitration clause); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1261 (Del.Super.Ct.2001) (finding bar on class action claims in arbitration agreement enforceable because "[t]he surrender of that class action right was clearly articulated in the arbitration amendment”); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 199-200 (Tex.App.2003) (holding arbitration clause "prohibiting class treatment of small-damage consumer claims” not substantively unconscionable but acknowledging that "there may be circumstances in which a prohibition on class treatment may rise to the level of fundamental unfairness”).

      . The trial court in Powertel, 743 So.2d at 576-77, a consumer class action against a cellular telephone provider, seeking damages for, among other things, Powertel's alleged violation of FDUTPA, id. at 572, denied Pow-ertel’s motion to compel arbitration. We affirmed on two alternative grounds: (1) the arbitration provision was unconscionable; and (2) the clause could not be applied retroactively to a customer's pending lawsuit. Id. at 577.

      . The Powertel court did not invalidate the arbitration clause solely because the clause defeated the remedial purpose of FDUTPA, but relied in part on the clause’s preclusion of class remedies in finding the contract substantively unconscionable. See Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570, 576-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In the present case, however, where attorney's fees are limited by section 501.976, Florida Statutes (2005), we conclude that the arbitration provisions' preclusion of class relief violates the public policy of the state. See Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So.2d 296, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (noting distinction between finding a contractual provision unenforceable on the ground of its unconscionability and invalidating a provision because it defeats the remedial purpose of a statute).

      .In finding these two arbitration clauses’ preclusion of class relief unenforceable, we do not suggest that no FDUTPA claim is arbitra-ble. To the contrary, Florida courts have repeatedly held some FDUTPA claims subject to arbitration. See Five Points Health Care, Ltd. v. Alberts, 867 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Murphy v. Courtesy Ford, L.L.C., 944 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Petsch, 872 So.2d 259, 261-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Stewart Agency, Inc. v. Robinson, 855 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Aztec Med. Servs., Inc. v. Burger, 792 So.2d 617, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Value Car Sales, Inc. v. Bouton, 608 So.2d 860, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We have held that FDUTPA claims may be subject to arbitration, while acknowledging that such claims do not "exist solely for the benefit of the parties to the contract.” Alberts, 867 So.2d at 522 (quoting Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (finding agreement to arbitrate age discrimination claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) enforceable notwithstanding fact that "the ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further important social policies”).

      . See also Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.2007) (concluding arbitration clause precluding class relief substantively unconscionable and determining that "the enforceability of a particular class action waiver in an arbitration agreement must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances”); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir.2007) (holding class arbitration waiver unconscionable under California law); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that "the provisions of the arbitration agreements barring ... class arbitration are invalid because they prevent the vindication of statutory rights under state and federal law”); Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir.2003) (finding class action ban in consumer contract substantively unconscionable); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So.2d 529 (Ala.2002) (finding arbitration clause precluding class relief unconscionable); Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal.4th 148, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2005) (holding waiver of class arbitration “in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages” unconscionable and therefore unenforceable); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill.2d 1, 306 Ill.Dec. 157, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274-75 (2006) (holding class action waiver in arbitration clause substantively unconscionable as applied to consumers alleging violations of Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, but noting that enforceability of waiver must be determined on case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 211 W.Va. 549, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279-80 (2002) (finding class action waiver in arbitration clause in contract of adhesion unconscionable, stating, "if an arbitral forum substantially denies ... rights and remedies ... provided by laws designed to protect ... the public, the FAA does not ... require that those rights be surrendered”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lester WOODARD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-6261.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 16, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.
    Lester Woodard, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4)(B).

BROWNING, C.J., BARFIELD and DAVIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Geoffrey L. OLIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-6263.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 16, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.

      Geoffrey L. Olin, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4)(B).

BROWNING, C.J., BARFIELD and DAVIS, JJ., concur.


text:
    AMS STAFF LEASING, INC./Andrews Roofing, LLC/Aspen Administrators/Providence Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Jesus Infante ARREOLA, Appellee.
    Nos. 1D06-5727, 1D07-1202.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 31, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 18, 2008.
    Richard S. Powers, of William E. Gregory & Associates, P.A., Miami, for Appellants.
    Glen D. Wieland, Orlando; Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the appellants challenge two orders of the JCC; one awarded the claimant TPD benefits, and the other directed the E/C to authorize claimant’s continuing medical care with an orthopedic physician in Mexico. We affirm the orders, but comment only on the order directing the E/C to authorize treatment with an orthopedic surgeon in Mexico.

I. Background

The claimant is a 34 year old undocumented alien who had illegally entered the United States from Mexico. In January of 2005, while working in Florida, the claimant was involved in a compensable accident which is the subject of these appeals. On that date, claimant was unloading trash from the back of a truck when a vehicle came from behind and hit him in the right leg. The claimant had a long, protracted hospitalization. The claimant also had twelve surgeries in Florida in order to heal the severe fracture.

Eventually, in August of 2005, claimant came under the care of Dr. Donald Maul-din, an authorized orthopedist in Dallas, Texas. Dr. Mauldin recommended that the claimant have additional surgery. However, the claimant never received the recommended surgery, as he had returned to Mexico to live with his family in November of 2005.

On February 1, 2006, counsel for claimant sent a letter to counsel for the E/C requesting authorization of one of three orthopedic doctors in claimant’s hometown in Mexico. Counsel for claimant also provided claimant’s address in Mexico. The E/C has not offered claimant any medical care in Mexico and refused to authorize any physician in Mexico to treat the claimant.

On March 30, 2006, the claimant went to a hospital in his home town of Jalisco, Mexico and was assigned to Dr. Ruben Granados-Romero (“Dr. Granados”), an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Granados’s diagnosis was similar to Dr. Mauldin’s, and he opined that the chances of claimant returning to work were poor.

On March 21, 2006, the claimant filed a Petition for Benefits for injuries sustained in the compensable accident, seeking the following benefits: (1) authorization for continued medical care with an orthopedic surgeon in Mexico and (2) costs and attorney’s fees. The E/C defended on a number of grounds, including that there were no known orthopedic doctors in Mexico who qualified as a “physician,” as that term is used in the workers’ compensation statutes.

After a hearing on the matter, the JCC entered an order directing the E/C to provide written authorization to Dr. Granados to provide the claimant with ongoing care that is reasonable, and medically necessary and related to the industrial accident. The JCC also ordered the E/C to pay for such care.

On August 21, 2006, the claimant filed another Petition for Benefits as a result of injuries sustained in the compensable accident. In the August Petition, the claimant sought Temporary Partial Disability Benefits. A hearing was held on the August Petition, after which the JCC awarded the claimant the requested benefits. The appeals of the orders below have been consolidated on this appeal for purposes of briefing and disposition.

II. Analysis

The appellants claim that the definition of “physician” under Chapter 458 does not include doctors living outside the United States who do not meet the same national requirements and qualifications to practice in the USA. According to section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), an employer must provide medical care “only when such care is given based on a referral by a physician as defined in this chapter.” (Emphasis added). “Physician” is defined in section 440.13(l)(q), as follows:

[A] physician licensed under chapter 458, an osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, a chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460, a podia-tric physician licensed under chapter 461, an optometrist licensed under chapter 463, or a dentist licensed under chapter 466, each of whom must be certified by the agency as a health care provider.

§ 440.13(l)(q), Fla. Stat. (2005). The appellants contend that Dr. Granados is not a physician because he is not licensed under chapter 458, or under the laws of any other state in the United States.

Whether the Florida workers’ compensation statutes contemplate treatment by a physician not licensed in any state in the United States appears to be an issue of first impression. We begin by noting that Florida’s workers’ compensation law contemplates coverage for those who are not citizens. In Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), this court held that illegal aliens are entitled to Florida workers’ compensation coverage. See also Safeharbor Employer Servs., Inc. v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (defining employee as “any person who receives remuneration from an employer ... whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but is not limited to, aliens and minors”). To construe section 440.13(2)(a) in a manner that would limit authorized treatment for a claimant injured in the State of Florida to a physician licensed in the State of Florida, or anywhere else in the United States, would preclude workers injured in this state (including illegal aliens) who return to their home country from receiving authorized remedial care for clearly compensable injuries. See § 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (noting that an employer “shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require”).

Additionally, according to Florida Administrative Rule 59A-29.002(3)(d), the requirement for certification does not apply to health care providers of medical services outside the State of Florida. That rule provides that health care providers rendering services outside the state of Florida are not required to be certified in order to provide services pursuant to section 440.13, Florida Statutes. Thus, the rule specifically contemplates that physicians not licensed under Florida law may render services pursuant to chapter 440.

Finally, Florida law indicates that an injured worker is not prohibited from moving from his pre-injury Florida residence and receiving treatment outside Florida. In Department of Transportation v. Montero, 568 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), a claimant suffered from physical and psychiatric injuries due to an accident on the job. At some point, the claimant expressed a desire to return to his family home in Costa Rica. Id. at 66. The treating psychiatrist suggested that such a move might help the claimant’s chances of recovery. Id. After moving to Costa Rica, a JCC found that the claimant had attained MMI as to his physical condition, but not his psychiatric condition. Id. Eventually, the claimant obtained work in Costa Rica with a family friend, but his wages were less than his pre-injury earnings. Id. As a result, he sought temporary partial wage loss benefits. Id. At the hearing, the E/C attempted to introduce evidence as to the prevailing rate of pay, standard of living, and social services available in the United States and Costa Rica. Id. The Montero court held that the trial court properly declined to allow the evidence. The Court stated, “[a]n injured worker is not confined to living in the pre-injury location, and absent an improper motivation a departure therefrom does not preclude compensation benefits.” Id. The court reversed the JCC’s denial of benefits (on the basis that the claimant voluntarily moved) because the claimant’s move to Costa Rica was not shown to have involved any improper motivation. Id.; see also Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Jackson, 461 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (finding that claimant’s move from Florida to North Carolina not motivated by desire to avoid work, and does not show voluntary limitation of income precluding award of wage loss benefits, where claimant’s fiancé had experienced life-threatening accident in North Carolina). In this case, the JCC properly found that the claimant’s motive, to be with his family, was not improper. Cf. Hurley v. Stuart Fine Foods, 687 So.2d 310, 311 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (suggesting move for financial reasons is not an improper motivation where there was no evidence that claimant’s move was motivated by desire to avoid work); Stewart v. CRS Rinker Materials Corp., 855 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (noting that relocation to Pensacola due to marital problems and desire to be with family was not “improper motivation” which would preclude award of TPD benefits).

The appellants rely on case law holding that “[o]ut-of-state remedial treatment may be compensable where local treatment or evaluation would be unavailable or less beneficial to claimant and where equal treatment is unavailable in Florida.” See Decker v. City of West Palm Beach, 379 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see also United Records & Tapes v. Dealt, 378 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Layne-Western Co. v. Cox, 497 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, those cases are distinguishable. Decker is distinguishable because that case dealt with an E/C’s responsibility to pay relocation expenses, which is not at issue in this case. Deoil and Cox are distinguishable because those cases dealt with situations where the claimants were living in Florida but seeking out-of-state treatment or evaluation. In this case, the claimant was no longer living in Florida; he had already moved to Mexico and was residing there at the time he requested the necessary medical treatment. This distinction is important in light of the case law holding that a claimant is not confined to living in his pre-injury Florida residence.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that a foreign physician may render compensable services to workers’ compensation claimants injured in Florida. Thus, the trial court did not err in directing the E/C to authorize continued treatment for claimant by a Mexican physician.

AFFIRMED.

WEBSTER, PADOVANO, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

      . The claimant does not have the necessary legal documents to return to the United States.

      . A case dealing with a similar issue is State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 69 Cal.App.3d 884, 138 Cal.Rptr. 509 (1977). In that case, a workers' compensation applicant had been injured while working in California and had subsequently moved back to Mexico, where he sought treatment with a Mexican physician. Id. at 886, 138 Cal.Rptr. 509. The Workers Compensation Appeals Board ordered the State Compensation Insurance Fund to reimburse the applicant for the treatment he received from the Mexican doctor. Id. The Fund argued that the Mexican physician was not a "physician” as defined in California law because he was not licensed to practice in California. Id. at 887, 138 Cal.Rptr. 509. The court held that, under California law, the definition of physician did not exclude a physician licensed to practice in another country. Id. at 893, 138 Cal.Rptr. 509. Thus, the court affirmed the order of the Board awarding reimbursement for the cost of the self-procured medical treatment the applicant received from the Mexican physician.

      . We do not comment on whether an unauthorized worker could be precluded from receiving benefits under the "fraud defense.” See generally James F. Kidd & Rick Blystone, Not So Fast! A Closer Look at § 440.105(4)(B)(9) Reveals Unauthorized Workers Should be Precluded From Workers’ Compensation Benefits, Under These Circumstances, 81 Fla. B.J. 65 (Oct. 2007) (asserting that an undocumented worker commits fraud for which he or she could be denied workers’ compensation benefits by providing false evidence of identity to his or her employer in an effort to obtain employment, or by providing false statements as evidence of identity to a health care provider subsequent to his or her industrial accident).

      . In Florida, an out-of-state physician may also render services as an independent medical examiner. See Griffin v. J.B. Hunt Transp., 795 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that physician licensed in Georgia, rather than Florida, could perform IME).


text:
    Carl Eugene WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-0282.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 5, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 18, 2008.
    Carl Eugene Williams, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

POLSTON, HAWKES, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


author: ALLEN, J.

text:
    Sylvester L. BROWN, Appellant, v. Walter A. McNEIL, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-1511.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 6, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.

      Sylvester L. Brown, pro se, Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Susan A. Maher, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ALLEN, J.

The appellant is a prison inmate challenging an order entered on his request for a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, whereby the appellant sought to establish that the copy charge in Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-601.901(2) is unlawful and unconstitutional. The appellant contended that this rule, as well as section 945.10(3), Florida Statutes, is arbitrary and capricious and violates his right to due process. Among other contentions, the appellant also asserted that the statute is unduly vague, and that there is no rational basis for the rule. In addition, he referred to the right of access to the courts, while maintaining that he needs copies of medical records so he can pursue a medical malpractice action. The appellant indicated that he is indigent, and argued that the Department of Corrections should not be allowed to impose the copy charge in rule 33-601.901(2).

The appellant suggests that instead of requiring payment of the charge in rule 33.601.901(2), the Department could place a lien on his inmate trust account. But although such a lien is elsewhere provided for in certain other circumstances, rule 33.601.901(2) does not authorize that procedure and specifically requires payment of the copying cost. And the Department did not preclude the appellant’s access to the records, which have been available for the appellant’s inspection. In Roesch v. State, 633 So.2d 1 (Fla.1994), the supreme court indicated that indigent inmates are not generally entitled to free copies of records held by governmental entities, and that the imposition of a copy charge does not deprive the inmate of a constitutional right. See also Elam, v. State, 689 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The trial court made a similar ruling in the present case, and properly rejected the appellant’s claims for relief from the copy charge in rule 33-601.901(2).

The appealed order is affirmed.

DAVIS, and BENTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    William R. BOSHEARS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.
    No. 1D08-0179.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 7, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.

      William R. Boshears, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

WOLF, BENTON, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Peter G. STACK and Sandra Mann-Stack, Appellants, v. HOMESIDE LENDING, INC., Appellee.
    No. 2D06-4697.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 8, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 19, 2008.
    Peter G. Stack, pro se.
    Sandra Mann-Stack, pro se.
    Forrest G. McSurdy of Stern & McSur-dy, P.A., Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A., Plantation, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Peter Stack and Sandra Mann-Stack appeal the trial court’s fourth amended final judgment ordering foreclosure. Because the attorneys’ fees included in the trial court’s order granting Homeside Lending, Inc.’s fourth motion to amend final judgment are not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and the trial court did not make the required findings, we reverse the order as to the award of attorneys’ fees but affirm in all other respects.

This appeal arises out of a foreclosure action that commenced in 1998. We begin with a much abbreviated summary of the procedural history of this case to shed some light on how this case got to this point.

The trial court entered a final summary judgment of foreclosure on March 15, 1999. At that time, the total cost judgment was $39,886.98, of which $1485 represented attorneys’ fees. Sandra Mann-Stack, in her name only, filed a notice of bankruptcy, staying the foreclosure sale. When the bankruptcy case was dismissed, Homeside moved to reconfirm the final judgment and reset the foreclosure sale. Ms. Mann-Stack appealed. The appeal was dismissed. Ms. Mann-Stack followed with a second bankruptcy petition. That case was dismissed. Homeside then filed an affidavit of attorneys’ fees and costs and moved to amend the judgment. On August 21, 2001, the trial court entered an amended final judgment. With additional interest, escrow, and additional attorneys’ fees, the total judgment was now $60,857.19, of which $7,584.05 represented attorneys’ fees.

In October 2001, the Stacks’ counsel submitted checks to the lender for $60,857.19 plus about $900 in self-calculated interest, but Homeside refused the checks because it claimed additional attorneys’ fees and costs which were not included in the final judgment. Homeside then filed a second motion to amend the final judgment and set foreclosure sale. The trial court granted the motion on April 5, 2002, and the second amended final judgment now reflected a total amount due of $72,118.47, of which $12,287.73 represented attorneys’ fees. Peter Stack filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge. Judge Bruce Boyer granted the motion, and Judge Nelly Khouzam took over the case. Sandra Mann-Stack followed the second amended final order with a notice of suggestion of bankruptcy. This third attempt at filing for bankruptcy was also dismissed. Meanwhile, Peter Stack appealed the second amended final judgment. This court affirmed the second amended final judgment with a written opinion. See Stack v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 846 So.2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Subsequently, Homeside filed a third motion to amend final judgment and set foreclosure sale. On July 30, 2004, the trial court entered a third amended final judgment. That judgment totaled $93,413.55, of which $16,855.55 represented attorneys’ fees. Mr. Stack filed a motion to stay the proceedings, which was denied. The home was sold at a foreclosure sale on September 3, 2004. On September 9, 2004, Ms. Mann-Stack filed her fourth suggestion of bankruptcy. The sale was vacated. Meanwhile, Mr. Stack appealed the third amended final judgment. The third amended final judgment was affirmed without a written opinion by this court on September 7, 2005. Stack v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 915 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (Table). The record does not reveal what happened to Ms. Mann-Stack’s fourth attempt at filing for bankruptcy, but we must assume it was also dismissed because proceedings in the trial court resumed.

On May 5, 2006, Homeside filed its fourth motion to amend final judgment of foreclosure and reset foreclosure sale. Homeside now claimed that the total amount due was $119,812.13. This motion contained two line items not seen in prior motions: (1) “Prior attorney fees and costs” of $27,566.49, and (2) “Bankruptcy Fees” of $4882.95. The trial court denied Homeside’s motion on June 22, 2006, on the basis that the request for fees was time-barred.

At about the same time, Mr. Stack filed a motion to disqualify Judge Khouzam. Although she denied the motion, Judge Khouzam subsequently entered a sua sponte order of recusal. Following Judge Khouzam’s recusal and assignment of the case to another judge, Homeside filed an “Amended Motion to Amend Final Judgment” on June 30, 2006. This amended motion was identical to the previous motion except for a corrected address in the fourth amended affidavit. Following a hearing, the trial court, with a new judge presiding, entered a fourth amended final judgment granting the motion as submitted.

“An award of attorneys’ fees must be supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and contain express findings regarding the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate for the type of litigation involved.” Debra J. Sutton, P.A. v. LeBeau, 912 So.2d 327, 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Tutor Time Merger Corp. v. MeCabe, 763 So.2d 505, 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). In this case, there is no support in the record for the additional attorneys’ fees awarded in the fourth amended final judgment. We also note that both attorneys’ fees and costs are combined in a single entry, whereas prior affidavits and judgments segregated costs from fees. Thus, it is impossible to tell what part of this $27,566.49 represents attorneys’ fees and what part represents costs. Regardless, the increase of approximately $10,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs was not supported by the affidavits submitted to the trial court, and the trial court failed to make the required findings regarding the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate. We also note with concern that despite the fact that the trial court originally denied Homeside’s fourth motion to amend final judgment and reset foreclosure sale, Homeside resubmitted an almost identical motion to a different judge after Judge Khouzam was replaced.

Based on the above, we conclude that the attorneys’ fees awarded in the fourth amended final judgment are not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record and the trial court failed to make the required findings.

Accordingly, we reverse the fourth amended final judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees in excess of the $16,855.55 previously awarded in the third amended final judgment, but we affirm the judgment in all other respects. Should Homeside seek further relief via a suit for a deficiency judgment, no further attorneys’ fees may be claimed except those which may be incurred in obtaining that judgment.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and SALCINES, J., and COBB, WARREN H., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.

      . The attorney stated in correspondence that he represented Sandra Mann-Stack only.


text:
    Cesar RODAS, and The Law Office of William F. Souza/William F. Souza, Esquire, Appellants, v. COMMERCIAL FORMING CORP. and CNA, Appellees.
    No. 1D07-0637.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 11, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 18, 2008.

      William F. Souza of the Law Offices of William Souza, P.A., North Miami Beach, for Appellants.
    Michelle Cabrera-Leon and Peter D. Weinstein of the Law Offices of J. Robert Miertschin, Jr., Plantation, for Appellees.
   BENTON, J.

Some three years after Cesar Rodas initiated workers’ compensation proceedings in Miami, the parties stipulated to a change of venue from the Miami to the Fort Lauderdale district. The main case had already settled, but attorney’s fees remained to be litigated. The judge of compensation claims treated the stipulation as a motion for change of venue and denied it by order entered January 25, 2007, noting that the case had settled on August 17, 2006, after being “litigated in the Miami District since December 11, 2003.” Mr. Rodas appeals the nonfinal order denying a change of venue.

He also seeks review of a related order to show cause, even though (through counsel) he has already complied fully with the show cause order. We do not have jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order to show cause, and so could not address its propriety, even if the question were not moot. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.180(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2007). See also Roofcraft Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas, 677 So.2d 39, 39-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Chicago Title Ins. Agency v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 560 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

We do have jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order that denies a change of venue. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.180(b)(1)(B) (2007). Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Judges of compensation claims are presumably under an obligation to transfer a proceeding from an improper venue to a proper venue. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Q-6.106(4) (2007) (“When a judge assigned to a case determines that the case is proceeding in an incorrect venue, the judge may transfer the case to the proper venue.”). But the parties never alleged, here or below, that venue in the Miami district was improper.

Although parties may stipulate to a change of venue, any such stipulation is ineffective until and unless the judge of compensation claims also orders the change. See § 440.25(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007) (providing that a final hearing on a petition for benefits shall be held, “unless otherwise agreed to between the parties and authorized by the judge of compensation claims[,] in the county where the injury occurred”). The judge of compensation claims did not abuse his discretion in refusing to order a change of venue here. See Tigers v. Castillo, 843 So.2d 1026, 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Carlson-Southeast Corp. v. Geolithic, Inc., 530 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); see also Tindall v. Smith, 601 So.2d 627, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

The order denying a change in venue is affirmed. The appeal from the order to show cause is dismissed.

WEBSTER and POLSTON, JJ„ concur.


text:
    Robert BRUMM, et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF BISCAYNE PARK, Florida, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D07-1265.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 20, 2008.
    Shubin & Bass, John K. Shubin, Miami, Lucinda A. Hofmann, and Elaine D. Walter, for appellants.
    Norman C. Powell and Regine Mones-time, Miami, for appellees.
    Before GERSTEN, C.J., and CORTIÑAS, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2005); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Ltd. Casinos, 644 So.2d 71, 75 (Fla.1994).


text:
    Thomas WALKER, Appellant, v. In re ESTATE OF Clyde WALKER, Appellee.
    No. 3D07-1889.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 20, 2008.
    Grumer and Macaluso, and Keith T. Grumer and Maidenly Macaluso, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Weiner, Cummings, & Vittoria, and Bias I. Cueto and Paul M. Cummings, Miami, for appellee.
    Before GERSTEN, C.J., and RAMIREZ, and CORTIÑAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Diaz v. Ashworth, 963 So.2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).


author: PALMER, C.J.

text:
    M.B.T., Mother of S.T., S.W., and S.T., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-703.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 25, 2008.
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski, of Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Anthony C. Musto, Hallandale Beach, for Appellee.
   OPINION ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

PALMER, C.J.

Following the issuance of this court’s decision, appellant, M.B.T., filed a motion for clarification. Having carefully considered the arguments raised in said motion, we grant the motion, withdraw the per curiam affirmed disposition dated January 24, 2008, and substitute the following opinion.

M.B.T. appeals the final order entered by the trial court terminating her parental rights to her three children. We conclude from our review of the record that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) sustained the burden of proof necessary for the termination of M.B.T.’s parental rights.

The evidence presented during the termination hearing was sufficient to prove that, during the two-year time period that the mother’s children were in shelter care, the mother failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the terms of her case plan, failed to regularly visit or contact her children, failed to contact her case worker, and was incarcerated on four separate occasions based on four separate offenses.

As the Fourth District explained in C.M. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 854 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003):

Because stability for children is so important to both their physical and mental well-being, the Legislature requires that no child remain in foster care longer than one year so that permanent placement may be achieved as soon as possible. See § 39.001(l)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002). At all stages of the proceedings, courts are compelled to expedite proceedings to prevent children from languishing in the foster care system. This includes appeals. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.146(g). Achieving permanent stability in the child’s life is the paramount concern of the judicial process.

The mother argues that the termination order should be reversed because DCF failed to prove that termination of her parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the children. We disagree.

Section 39.810 of the Florida Statutes (2005), sets forth the various considerations involved when determining what the manifest best interests of children are in dependency matters. In its final order, the trial court properly demonstrated its application of the provisions of the statute to the facts presented, noting that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the children because placement with a relative was not available and the mother is devoid of any ability or disposition to provide the children with food, clothing, medical care or to meet their physical, mental and emotional needs. The court further found that it was unlikely that the children would remain in foster care for a long time because they were all young in age. Additionally, the record demonstrates that the Guardian Ad Litem recommended that it was in the children’s best interests for the court to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See In re K.W., 891 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(holding that evidence supported finding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the manifest best interests of the child where mother was provided with a case plan and ample time, but failed to comply with her case plan).

AFFIRMED.

PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur.


author: THOMPSON, E., Senior Judge.

text:
    Robert J. BURNSTINE, Appellant, v. Desiree TOWNLEY, Appellee.
    No. 5D06-4412.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.

      Barry Rigby, Orlando, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   THOMPSON, E., Senior Judge.

Robert Burnstine challenges the calculation of his income for child support in the trial court’s final judgment of paternity that adopted the general magistrate’s report and recommendation. Although Burnstine objected to the general magistrate’s report and recommendation, the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. We reverse to allow an eviden-tiary hearing and direct the trial court to make specific findings in recalculating Burnstine’s gross income.

The fluctuations and uncertainty inherent in entrepreneurial income make it difficult to calculate. At the evidentiary hearing before the general magistrate, Burnstine explained that he owned a business that sells promotional advertising using cold air balloons of the type frequently used by automobile dealerships. He is the sole shareholder, officer, and director. Besides himself, it employs two full-time employees and one part-time employee. Burnstine has a bachelor’s degree in information systems, business, and English and has been self-employed since college. He had a furniture store for five years, but it closed in December 2003 due to depleted funds after an attempt to open another store with his brother, who died unexpectedly. He had no income from 2004 until June 2005 and lived off his savings. His sole asset was the equity in his house, which he sold in June 2005 to obtain a mortgage on a new house and to buy the balloon business for $675,000. After he sold the house he had about $20,000 to live on. In 2006 he took about $10,500 out of the business as income and used savings for the rest of his personal expenses.

Burnstine operates the business out of his house. About 1000 square feet of his 2700 square-foot house are dedicated to the business. The business pays the monthly interest of $2800 on the house mortgage, but not the principal. He reports that it does not pay other personal expenses for him. He has not shown income on his tax returns for three years. His new business has seasonal fluctuations; the fourth quarter is usually negative.

Burnstine listed $7900 in expenses on his financial affidavit. He listed $4200 for two mortgage payments; the business pays the mortgage interest. He personally pays for his car insurance, gasoline, and medical insurance. He provided the company’s first-year financial statements for the nine-month period ending 30 September 2006. The statements listed gross receipts of $552,956.87 and mortgage interest expenses of $33,227.48. He also produced a residential loan application used to obtain the home mortgages; it listed base employment income of $7692 per month. The financial statement and loan application were admitted without objection.

Desiree Townley testified that she earned $42,000 from regular employment. She was familiar with the death of Burnst-ine’s brother, the closure of his furniture business, and periods during which he was unemployed. The record includes evidence of his checks that showed regular monthly payments in 2003 of $812.50 and, in 2004, $680. Since April 2006, he has paid her $600 per month, and she acknowledged that he paid her $3000 in February 2006 to catch up on child support. She did not keep records of his support payments; her testimony was from memory. Burnst-ine testified that he had paid her at least $600 a month in child support during his teenaged son’s entire life except for the period from January 2005 until June 2006 after he sold the furniture business. Between January 2005 and March 2006, he paid her $89 or $98 per month. Burnstine contributed to the tuition and expenses for their son’s private middle school.

The general magistrate filed a report and recommendation that determined in pertinent part that Burnstine’s net monthly income was $15,448.56, which represented the monthly average of the business’s net income of $139,034.22 from its nine-month financial statement. Therefore, it awarded Townley monthly child support of $1300.68. It rejected any need to make written findings to support the income it attributed to Burnstine because, citing Bromson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 710 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and Silberman v. Silberman, 670 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), it was not imputing income to Burnstine because he was not unemployed or underemployed.

Burnstine filed timely exceptions to the general magistrate’s report, and requested an evidentiary hearing. He complained that the report did not reflect whether the child support award would be applied retroactively because the evidence demonstrated long periods of unemployment. Further, he rejected the general magistrate’s characterization that he claimed he had no income; his business and personal income are blended, and the problem was what level of income would be attributed to him personally. His financial affidavit reflected living expenses of $7905.66 per month, which he paid with his savings; thus, he contended his income was less than the expenses figure and far less than the magistrate’s determination of $15,448.25. He also criticized the magistrate’s use of a high monthly income of $14,166 in 2002 from his established furniture business in order to justify the current income figure it reached as an amount that Burnstine “is capable of producing.”

The court denied Burnstine’s exceptions and entered a final judgment that ratified, approved, and incorporated the general magistrate’s report and recommendations. Burnstine filed a timely motion for rehearing and clarification, arguing that the general magistrate’s calculation of his income did not account for business expenses and improperly relied on high past earnings that were not probative of his current income. This appeal ensued.

Our review of the trial court’s adoption and ratification of a general magistrate’s report and recommendation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Collado v. Pavlow, 951 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490(f) provides that if exceptions are filed, they shall be heard on reasonable notice by either party or the court. A litigant who requests a hearing on exceptions, but is not afforded one, is deprived of due process. Id. Burnstine requested an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with his filing of exceptions to the general magistrate’s report. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied his exceptions without first conducting a hearing. Yoxsimer v. Yoxsimer, 918 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Burnstine contends that the magistrate’s determination of his income was not supported by competent substantial evidence. The general magistrate’s report and recommendation relied on the corporation’s nine-month financial statement of net income as the best evidence of Burnst-ine’s income. The magistrate simply divided the net income of $139,034.32 by nine months to arrive at his monthly net income of $15,448.25.

Citing Bromson, 710 So.2d at 155, and Silberman, 670 So.2d at 1110, the general magistrate excused the requirement of making specific factual findings when the court is not asked to impute income, but instead, to simply make a factual determination of a party’s actual income. The reasoning is that factual findings are required only when the court imputes income to an unemployed or underemployed party. The obligors in Bromson and Silberman were fully employed, and the court merely made a factual determination of income. The Bromson court cautioned, however, that specific factual findings facilitate appellate review, particularly in light of the substantial impact the findings have on the lives of both parents. 710 So.2d at 156. Unlike the obligors in Bromson and Sil-berman, who were attempting to understate or misrepresent income, Burnstine produced professionally prepared financial statements and income tax returns.

To facilitate review in this case, we direct the trial court to make specific factual findings of Burnstine’s income. Burnstine presented three sources of evidence of his income and testified that he had taken $10,500 in income distributions from the corporation that year. The loan application reflected that he had earned a monthly income of $14,166 from the furniture business from 1998 through January 2002, and zero income from two different furniture businesses from February 2002 through November 2004. Florida Family Rule of Procedure 12.285(d)(6) requires the disclosure of a recent loan application as evidence relevant to a request for child support.

Burnstine does not dispute that the corporation’s payments of his mortgage and other expenses are income to him for purposes of calculating child support. § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla. Stat. (2006); Layeni v. Layeni, 843 So.2d 295, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). During the last eight years of Burnstine’s entrepreneurial career, his efforts paid very well for about five years, then the last three years produced zero income. The $15,448 income figure neither represents an established income stream nor does it reflect recent periods when Burnstine’s entrepreneurial efforts were unproductive.

As Judge Klein pointed out in Bromson, 710 So.2d at 155, regarding a child support obligor’s income determination:

Because the number which the trial court ultimately chooses has such a substantial impact on the lives of both parents and children, appellate judges naturally want to satisfy themselves in both underemployment and misrepresentation of income cases that there is evidence to support the numbers. When trial judges explain their reasoning, appellate judges can feel more comfortable about affirming in close cases. Conversely, the lack of an explanation can increase the odds of reversal.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Burnstine had available income of $15,482 per month and remand for the court to provide an evidentiary hearing for his objections to the general magistrate’s report. Upon remand the trial court shall recalculate and make specific factual findings of Burnstine’s gross income. Any retroactive child support would also require specific findings regarding imputed income. The remand will permit Burnstine to provide additional financial statements that will either buttress the court’s earlier determination of income or demonstrate that the figure was inflated.

Burnstine contends that it was an abuse of discretion to disregard evidence of his income from his financial affidavit and loan application. A child support determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to the statutory guidelines and the reasonableness test. Matthews v. Montgomery-Matthews, 913 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The trial court may weigh evidence of Burnstine’s income differently, and even disregard evidence when reasonable to do so. Here, however, the general magistrate and trial court abused their discretion in relying solely on evidence of insufficiently established income not shown to be consistently available to him.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

PALMER, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur.


text:
    Jacob Wesley SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D07-3749.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
   PER CURIAM.

Jacob Wesley Scott appeals the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Mr. Scott filed the motion on July 7, 2007, while the direct appeal of his judgment and sentence in the same case was pending. Thus, the postconviction court improperly denied the motion rather than striking it as unauthorized. See Ladson v. State, 907 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We reverse and remand for the postconviction court to strike the unauthorized motion. Once the mandate issues on his direct appeal, Mr. Scott may file a rule 3.800(a) motion on the same issue should he seek further relief. See id.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FULMER, CASANUEVA, and CANADY, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Carlton J. CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-5868.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2008.
    Carlton J. Clark, pro se, Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant challenges an order denying his facially insufficient motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The order is affirmed without prejudice to the right of the appellant to file a facially sufficient motion for postconvietion relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Burchfield v. State, 907 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

AFFIRMED.

ALLEN, WOLF, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Frederick RAY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-0803.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 2008.
    James Frederick Ray, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

BROWNING, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    C.A.F., a Child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-3982.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 7, 2008.

      Don Waggoner, of Don Waggoner Law, P.A., Kissimmee, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brigid E. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, C.A.F., seeks habeas corpus review of a so-called “release order” of the circuit court imposing “conditions of release” that he contends unlawfully impose significant restraints on his liberty. These conditions include provisions such as a dusk-to-dawn curfew, obedience to all “household rules and requirements” and all school rules, evening study and submission to the court of progress reports from each teacher. We agree that there is no lawful authority for the order to which the juvenile court below has subjected Petitioner child because the child is in no legal status from which the court may “release” the child nor impose conditions on any such “release.”

FACTS OF THE CASE

On June 28, 2007, Petitioner, a child under the age of eighteen, was temporarily detained by deputies of the Osceola County Sheriffs Office for the sale or delivery of cannabis. Rather than arrest Petitioner, the deputies released him to the custody of his father at the scene. The deputies later filed a report with the State Attorney. More than a month later, the State Attorney filed its petition against Petitioner and issued him a notice to appear in court. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.045(a).

In compliance with the notice, on September 26, 2007, Petitioner appeared in court for his arraignment as ordered but without an attorney. No attorney was appointed to represent him at the arraignment. The court ordered Petitioner to be “released” to the custody of his parents with “conditions of release.” The court wrote and signed an additional order containing these various conditions of release.

After obtaining counsel, on November 2, 2007, Petitioner appeared before the court on a Motion to Release Child from PreTrial Discretionary Conditions of Release. The court denied the motion and continued the conditions of release.

ILLEGALITY OF THE ORDER

“[P]retrial detention of juveniles is now governed entirely by statute.” J.J. v. Fryer, 765 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also R.W. v. Woolsey, 678 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“The power to place those charged with ... a delinquent act in detention is entirely statutory in nature.”). Section 985.215, Florida Statutes (2007), deals comprehensively with the subject of how a juvenile who has been arrested or charged with an offense is to be handled, including the various levels of juvenile pre-trial detention and conditions of pre-trial release, and provides only for the use of secure, non-secure, and home detention prior to trial. The juvenile court does not have the statutory authority to detain a child except as provided in Chapter 985. As explained in section 985.02, titled “Legislative intent for the juvenile justice system”:

(4) DETENTION — The legislature finds that there is a need for a secure placement for certain children alleged to have committed a delinquent act.... The Legislature further finds that decisions to detain should be based in part on a prudent assessment of risk and be limited to situations where there is a clear and convincing evidence that a child presents a risk of failing to appear or presents a substantial risk of inflicting bodily harm on others....

(Emphasis added).

Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.005 — .013 governs the procedures for pre-trial detention and release. Any detention outside the statute and rule is illegal, and to the extent the appealed order in this case is a form of “detention,” it is illegal. See A.S. v. Byrd, 777 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In this case, none of the detention procedures was ever followed and no risk assessment was ever done. See § 985.225(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). This level of restriction on an accused juvenile’s freedom of movement and association without complying with the statutory requirements or procedural safeguards is outside of Florida law.

The State’s position is that the conditions imposed on Petitioner do not amount to a “detention.” According to the State, the statutes and procedures governing detention need not be followed because Petitioner was not in any way “detained.” This argument proves too much because if Petitioner has not been detained, there is no status from which he may be “released.” Even if the terms of the “release order” did not rise to the level of “detention,” there is still no authority to impose them.

The State relies on two statutes as authority for the court’s power to impose this “release order” on Petitioner. The first is section 985.0301, which merely establishes that the circuit court has jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency cases; yet even that statute specifies that the court’s control over the child has to accord with the provisions of Chapter 985. § 985.0301(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). The other statute relied on by the State is section 985.02(3)(a), contained in the chapter’s expression of legislative intent. That statute expresses that the State’s policy is to:

Develop and implement effective methods of preventing and reducing acts of delinquency, with a focus on maintaining and strengthening the family as a whole so that children may remain in their homes of communities.

§ 985.02(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The State says that it cannot be contested that the “release order” at issue is designed to reduce delinquent behavior and strengthen his family. Therefore, according to the State, it must be within the power of the court. We agree that every court has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, but that power is subject to valid existing laws and constitutional provisions. See Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla.1978). It is the Legislature that must give the courts authority to enter such orders.

It appears that the purposes of such an order are to control the child’s movements, activities and behavior and to place the child within the contempt powers of the court in a situation where the power of detention is unavailable. However, it is the legislature’s job to “develop” and “implement” effective methods of preventing and reducing delinquency. It is the courts’ job to see that the law is followed.

We have been informed by Petitioner’s counsel that he was to be tried on the delinquency petition on January 22, 2008, and, if the writ was not issued before that date, the pre-trial “release order” issue will have become moot for him. Even though moot as to this juvenile, it appears that the issues raised here are fully capable of repetition and equally likely to evade review; hence, we have elected to decide the issue presented. We conclude that if Petitioner remained under the “release order,” he would be entitled to issu-anee of the writ. However, because of the circumstances, we withhold it.

ISSUANCE OF WRIT WITHHELD.

GRIFFIN, PLEUS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.

      . The court issued an order to determine counsel on October 12, 2007, for case management on October 31, 2007, and for trial on November 6, 2007.

      . In full, the September 26, 2007, order states:
      RELEASE ORDER WITH CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
      To: Superintendent of: Upon due consideration, the said child shall be released forthwith to: ParenVGuardian X Child shall have a curfew of 6:00 pm inside the residence, and may not be out of the home before 6:00 am. Exceptions: UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION OF THE PARENT'S ONLY IF OUT OF THE HOME AFTER 6 PM. NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS.
      The child shall comply with the following conditions of release:
      (1) Obey all laws and not possess or carry any weapons.

        (2) Not possess or use any intoxicants or illegal drug or associate with those who do.
      (3) Obey all parental/household rules and requirements
      (4) Cooperate with all law enforcement officers.
      (5) Attend all future court hearings; keep all appointments with your attorney and DJJ.
      (6) Have no contact with co-defendants and/or victim(s) and victim's family.
      (7) Observe a curfew set by parent(s)/custodian, unless otherwise specified by the Court.
      (8) The child shall comply with the following specific conditions:
      Attend school regularly, including ALL classes, with NO unexcused absences, tardiness and referrals; complete all work required.
      Obey ALL SCHOOL RULES and participate in any special programs, tutoring, and meetings with school counselor or principal as directed.
      Study on evenings preceding each school day. Bring progress reports from each teacher to next hearing and submit to Court.
      Work full/part time or if directed submit applications for employment.
      If recommended, submit to drug evaluation/screening and possibly complete rehabilitation program or counseling. Upon demand, submit to Random drug tests. Participate in counseling as directed by DJJ or the Court.
      The child’s parent(s)/guardian shall report any violations in writing to DJJ or the Court.

      . Section 907.041, Florida Statutes, governing pretrial release of criminal defendants does not apply to delinquency cases.

      .The only other authority relied on by the State is a concurring opinion in a completely inapposite case, M.F. v. Department of Juvenile Justice, 782 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), apparently cited to suggest that the circuit court is empowered to enter any order it deems appropriate to a child’s welfare.

      . It appears that these orders were issued from forms previously prepared, suggesting this case is not an isolated event.

      . See K.P. v. State, 952 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); C.M.T. v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 550 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).


author: PER CURIAM. EVANDER, J.,

text:
    X.R., a Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-2462.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 7, 2008.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rose M. Levering, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

X.R., a juvenile, appeals from an order holding him in contempt of court in a delinquency matter. He argues that the juvenile court lacked authority under Florida law to hold him in contempt of court for his failure to comply with a behavior order which was entered in connection with his pre-trial release.

X.R. was charged by delinquency petition with possession of not more than 20 grams of cannabis in violation of sections 893.03 and 893.13, Florida Statutes. X.R. appeared with his grandmother at arraignment. Counsel was appointed, a drug evaluation was ordered and the case was set for docket sounding.

During the hearing, the grandmother stated that X.R. would not voluntarily go for drug evaluation and stated, “I’ve tried everything.” The prosecutor asked if X.R. had been placed on a behavior order stating, “Apparently we have a grandmother, I believe, who needs some help.” In response to an inquiry from the court, the grandmother requested that the court enter a behavior order. The following then transpired:

THE COURT: Okay, there’s one— there’s a copy of one in front of you. What that is, is it requires:
He attend school, no suspensions, tar-dies or absences.
That he live with you, his legal guardian.
That he be respectful to you, no profanity.
That he have no new law violations.
That he attend all court appearances.
That he not associate with any co-defendants, victims, or anyone not approved by you.
And that I do impose a curfew of 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. And if he violates that, do not call the police, you call the number on there which is our juvenile court coordinator, and she’ll address it.
If there’s a violation, we do address those each Wednesday after detentions. I could sentence him for up to five days of secure detention for the first violation. For the second violation, I could sentence him to up to fifteen days in secured detention.
Okay. I’m going to go ahead and enter one of those at this time for [X.R.]. I’ll do it.

Defense counsel objected to entry of the behavior order.

Thereafter, an affidavit for order to show cause for behavior order violation was filed and a show cause order was issued with the hearing set for June 27, 2007. The affidavit alleged that X.R. failed to attend summer school sessions, violated the curfew and was disrespectful to his grandmother.

X.R. failed to appear on June 27, 2007 and the court ordered he be taken into custody. He was, and the show cause hearing was held on the following day, June 28, 2007. The grandmother testified that X.R. failed to attend school all week and never abided by the 7:00 p.m. curfew, instead returning home at 11:30 p.m. or 12:30 a.m. When deputies went to get X.R. after he failed to appear, they were told he was next door and he was found hiding in the bed of a pickup truck. He told deputies he was not X.R. but a neighbor confirmed his identity. X.R. testified and claimed he had completed school and no longer had to attend. He claimed he got home late from work but the grandmother knew nothing about any job. She said he had no job and asked her for money on a daily basis.

We need not address the precise point raised by X.R. because the record supports the sanction of contempt in this case, specifically due to X.R.’s disobedience of the show cause order.

The juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over X.R. who was charged with a delinquent act. See § 985.0301(1), Fla. Stat. (“[t]he circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law”). The court additionally had personal jurisdiction over X.R. and X.R. was not free to simply disobey the court’s order to appear and show cause.

In Robbie v. Robbie, 726 So.2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Fourth District affirmed a contempt order entered due to the husband’s non-payment of temporary alimony. Although the trial court may have entered an erroneous ruling awarding temporary alimony to the wife on remand following appeal of the marital dissolution, it had jurisdiction to do so and thus the husband was not free to ignore the court’s order. The trial court had jurisdiction over the remand proceedings, and no matter how erroneous or unreasonable, the husband was required to obey the temporary alimony order until it was reversed or vacated. See also Kaylor v. Kaylor, 466 So.2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (order must be obeyed until vacated or modified by that court or until reversed on appeal, no matter how unreasonable or erroneous); Rubin v. State, 490 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (reason behind rule requiring obedience to court orders is that need for obedience to court order far outweighs any detriment to individuals who may be temporarily victimized by order, even if erroneous).

Section 985.037(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for punishment of juveniles for contempt, references contempt of a valid court order and the show cause order here was operative unless and until the behavior order was reversed or vacated.

X.R. was required to appear in response to the order to show cause and was free to raise his objections, and to then seek appellate review of any adverse ruling. X.R.’s disobedience of the court’s directive, in and of itself, exposed him to contempt of court sanctions for failure to appear. Accordingly, under the facts presented, contempt was a viable sanction in this case.

AFFIRMED.

PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur.

EVANDER, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.

EVANDER, J.,

concurring specially.

Although I believe that the behavior order was erroneously entered, I agree that the juvenile was not free to disregard the order. So long as the trial court’s order was entered with subject matter jurisdiction, the juvenile was obligated to obey the order, even if erroneous. Robbie v. Robbie, 726 So.2d 817, 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

I write to express my views on the use of pre-trial behavior orders. As observed by Judge Griffin in her concurring' opinion in T.W.L., the Legislature has not authorized the use of pre-trial behavior orders. Like Judge Griffin, I find no merit to the State’s contention that a court has the “inherent authority” to enter these types of orders. See also C.A.F. v. State, No. 5D07-3982, 976 So.2d 629, 2008 WL 611684 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 7, 2008). I do believe, however, that when a trial court is authorized to order pre-trial secure detention, the court may utilize the less restrictive approach of releasing the juvenile conditioned on the juvenile’s compliance with a pre-trial behavior order.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court could not lawfully order secure detention. Accordingly, I believe that the behavior order was erroneously entered.

      . T.W.L. v. State, 950 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Griffin J., concurring).


author: GRIFFIN, J.

text:
    Michael A. HOWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D07-3265.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 7, 2008.

      Michael A. Howard, Raiford, pro se.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   GRIFFIN, J.

Defendant, Michael A. Howard, appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

Although the appealed order denied the motion, the order specified that denial was without prejudice to amend any claims found in the order to be “insufficient.” This court and others have concluded that such an order lacks finality and the courts of appeal lack jurisdiction to review it. Kelly v. State, 969 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Quilling v. State, 968 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Lee v. State, 939 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

We note, for the benefit of the trial courts, that the procedure recently detailed by the Supreme Court in Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007), calls for a legally insufficient motion to be stricken, with leave to amend. The notion of a denial with leave to amend is a concept somewhat foreign to the usual work of the criminal courts and, hence, to their users. Therefore, we explain that, for purposes of jurisdiction, we will treat an order striking a motion with leave to amend and one denying a motion with leave to amend equivalently. If leave to amend has been given by the trial court, a defendant may not appeal until he has obtained a denial of the motion that does not include leave to amend.

DISMISSED.

PALMER, C.J. and TORPY, J., concur.