author: PARIENTE, J. BELL, J.,

text:
    Ernest TILLMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC02-717.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 6, 2006.

      James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Wesley Heidt and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PARIENTE, J.

The decision under review, Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), expressly and directly conflicts with Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), on the issue of whether section 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which prohibits the use of force to resist an arrest notwithstanding the illegality of the officer’s actions, extends to other types of police-citizen encounters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We conclude that the statute, by its plain terms, applies only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties” or “in the lawful execution of any legal duty.” In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to reach the jury on this element, which is not defined in either statute, trial courts should rely on the statutory and decisional law governing the particular duty in which the officer is engaged. In accord with these determinations, we approve the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Taylor and quash the Fifth District’s decision in Tillman.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Fifth District has summarized the pertinent facts in this case:

[On November 7, 1997,] Deputy Parks Duncan, Jr., was patrolling the Deerfield Subdivision when he observed 20 to 30 people standing in front of five to six houses.... Among the group of mostly Hispanic people were five black males standing in the street being loud and boisterous. Duncan approached them and asked them to return to the party. As they left, one of the black males uttered loud obscenities and threatened Officer Duncan.
Due to this threat, Duncan called for back-up. After back-up arrived, Duncan and eight to ten other officers entered the screened pool enclosure at the rear of the house where the party was occurring. At that point, Duncan ... entered to “see if I could determine who made this threat to me.” ...
Deputy Timothy Henriquez testified that he responded to [the] call for backup. Duncan advised him that he had been threatened by two individuáis he recognized as possible bank robbers- or robbery suspects. Henriquez and other backup officers followed Duncan to the pool enclosure where Henriquez saw the two gentlemen run into the pool enclosure. Duncan pointed out Tillman and Henriquez stopped Tillman inside the pool enclosure. Tillman was wearing a “very heavy jacket” which seemed odd to Henriquez because it was not cold. Henriquez asked Tillman if he could pat him down and Tillman refused, but Hen-riquez patted him down' anyway. Henri-quez was concerned about finding weapons on Tillman because he understood that Tillman had threatened Duncan and that Duncan recognized Tillman as having “been accused, or charged at one time or another with armed robbery with weapons.” Henriquez did not find any weapons on Tillman.
... Henriquez asked Tillman to sit down but Tillman refused ... and started to walk away. Henriquez grabbed Tillman’s right shoulder, at which point Tillman suddenly spun around and put Henriquez in a headlock. Henriquez attempted to remove himself from Tillman’s headlock by dropping to the ground. Just then, other deputies jumped on top of Tillman and Henri-quez. Tillman did not release his hold on Henriquez until he was pepper sprayed.

Tillman, 807 So.2d at 107-08..

The jury found Tillman guilty of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07(2)(d) and resisting an officer with violence pursuant to section 843.01. Tillman argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts because the State failed to present prima facie evidence that the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of his duty — a necessary element of both offenses. Tillman, 807 So.2d at 108.

The Fifth District affirmed Tillman’s convictions and sentences. The district court acknowledged that the statutes governing the crimes charged require the State to prove that the officer was lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of the alleged battery or violent resistance. Id. However, the district court cited a line of district court cases that have interpreted section 843.01 in pari materia with section 776.051(1) to hold that the use of force in resisting an arrest by a person reasonably known to be a law enforcement officer is unlawful regardless of whether the arrest is technically illegal. Id. (citing State v. Barnard, 405 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)). The Fifth District explained that it had extended this rule to the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer defined by section 784.07 and had applied it to encounters that fall short of a full-blown arrest, including illegal stops, detentions, and contacts. Id. at 109. Building on this line of precedent, the district court held that while the State must prove that the law enforcement officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, the technical illegality of the officer’s actions does not preclude a conviction of resisting with violence or battery on a law enforcement officer. Id. at 110.

The Fifth District expressly declined in this case to follow Taylor. Id. at 109. In Taylor, the First District held section 776.051(1) inapplicable in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting with violence based on a defendant’s violent reaction to an officer who entered the defendant’s home in response to a noise complaint and attempted to lead him outside. 740 So.2d at 89-91. The First District reversed the convictions because the officer had acted unlawfully in entering the defendant’s home without probable cause, permission, or exigent circumstances. Id. at 90-91. The Fifth District in this case distinguished Taylor on the ground that the officer in Tillman entered the home of another person, not the home of the defendant. The Fifth District also concluded that the patdown and detention of Tillman were less intrusive than an arrest, “so Tillman was not justified in using force to resist.” Tillman, 807 So.2d at 109.

We granted review to resolve the conflict between Taylor and Tillman on the scope of section 776.051(1).

ANALYSIS

I. Statutory Provisions and Standard of Review

The issues in this case require us to construe sections 776.051(1), 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 776.051(1) provides:

A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.

Section 784.07 enhances the penalties for crimes against law enforcement officers and other enumerated classes of public servants by reclassifying the crimes of assault and battery committed against these persons. The reclassification from misdemeanor to felony or from a lower degree of felony to a higher degree increases the authorized sentences for the crimes. Section 784.07 provides in pertinent part:

(2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer ..., a traffic infraction enforcement officer ..., a parking enforcement specialist ..., or a security officer employed by the board of trustees of a community college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
(d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree.

(Emphasis supplied.) Section 843.01 defines the crime of resisting an officer with violence as follows:

Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree....

(Emphasis supplied.) The crime has sometimes been described inaccurately as “resisting arrest with violence.” See, e.g., State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1996). However, neither the title of the statute, “Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person,” nor its explicit terms limit it to arrest scenarios. Cf. N.H. v. State, 890 So.2d 514, 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that title of section 843.02, which defines crime of resisting without violence, is “ ‘resisting [an] officer,’ not ‘resisting arrest’ ”). The facts of this case and Taylor demonstrate that section 843.01 encompasses resistance to actions by law enforcement officers other than arrests.

Because the issues we decide are exclusively matters of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Clines v. State, 912 So.2d 550, 555 (Fla.2005). In construing statutes, we first consider the plain meaning of the language used. Id.; State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla.2003). When the language is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, that meaning controls unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent. State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004).

II. Construction of Section 776.051(1)

Section 776.051(1) forecloses the defense of justifiable use of force by a defendant who resists an arrest by a law enforcement officer, regardless of the legality of the arrest. The plain meaning of the language used in this provision limits its application to arrest scenarios. This construction comports with another rule of construction governing laws that alter the common law. Enacted in 1974, section 776.051(1) abrogates the common-law right to resist an illegal arrest with force. State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641, 642 n. 2 (Fla. 1976); Morley v. State, 362 So.2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325, 1325-26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, and should not be interpreted to displace the common law further than is necessary. See Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So.2d 577, 581 (Fla.1996); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 354 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977); Guerrier v. State, 811 So.2d 852, 854 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Thus, to effectuate its plain meaning and displace the common law' no more than necessary, section 776.051(1) is implicated only when a defendant acts violently against an officer in resisting an arrest.

We reject the Fifth District’s use of the interpretive maxim in pari materia to engraft the prohibition into sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 when an actual arrest is not involved. As the Fifth District recognized in reasoning that a patdown and detention are less intrusive than an arrest, policy reasons may support extending the prohibition in section 776.051(1) beyond police-citizen encounters involving an arrest. Tillman, 807 So.2d at 109. However, “it is not this Court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or policy of a particular statute.” State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); see also State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993) (“It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.”). Further, given the heightened potential for violent resistance by one being placed under arrest, we cannot say that a literal interpretation of the statute “would produce an ‘unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.’ ” Perkins v. State, 682 So.2d 1083, 1085 (Fla.1996) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984)).

In addition, contrary to the Fifth District’s determination, section 776.051(1) requires an actual arrest and not merely probable cause for an arrest. See Tillman, 807 So.2d at 110 (concluding that “once Tillman placed [the officer] in a headlock,” the officer had probable cause to arrest him, rendering Tillman’s subsequent actions sufficient to convict for battery on a law enforcement officer). Section 776.051(1) does not address the use of force to resist an officer when there are grounds for an arrest but no actual arrest is taking place. The notice provided by this provision does not inform persons that it applies once they could be arrested. See generally State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991) (recognizing that publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions).

Accordingly, we agree with the First District in Taylor and hold that section 776.051(1) is limited by its plain terms to situations involving an actual arrest.

III. Defining Lawful Execution of a Legal Duty

Because the prohibition in section 776.051(1) applies only to the use of force to resist arrest, the provision has no application to prosecutions for crimes against law enforcement officers under other circumstances. The Legislature has not expressly precluded the defense of justifiable use of force against an officer in situations other than arrest. For this reason, and because the Legislature has placed the element of lawful execution of a legal duty in both sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, proof that the officer was acting lawfully is necessary in a prosecution for crimes committed under either statute that occur outside an arrest scenario.

In Taylor, the First District reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence on the lawful execution element by applying Fourth Amendment law governing warrantless entry by police into a home. 740 So.2d at 90. This approach is consistent with precedent reviewing convictions of resisting arrest without violence under section 843.02, which has a “lawful execution” element identical to that in section 843.01. See N.H., 890 So.2d at 516 (determining the officers were in lawful execution of duties in making investigative stop based on “reasonable suspicion that criminal activity .was afoot”); Espiet v. State, 797 So.2d 598, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (concluding that officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of duties when he entered defendant’s house to make misdemeanor arrest); M.J.R. v. State, 715 So.2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (concluding that because no exigent circumstances existed and defendant could have been arrested only for misdemeanors, officers had no authority to demand entry into residence); K.A.C. v. State, 707 So.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (concluding that officers had “well-founded suspicion” to detain juvenile for truancy).

Gauging the “lawful execution” element by the law governing the duty undertaken is also consistent with precedent holding that the element should not be defined in a manner that takes the issue from the jury. In State v. Anderson, 639 So.2d 609, 610-11 (Fla.1994), this Court approved a jury instruction stating that “effecting a lawful arrest constitutes lawful execution of a legal duty.” In other cases, district courts have reversed convictions because of erroneous jury instructions that referred to the specific defendant in a manner that removed from the jury the issue of the lawfulness of the officer’s actions. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 907 So.2d 582, 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (error to instruct jury that “detaining the defendant constitutes lawful execution of a legal duty”); Royster v. State, 643 So.2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (error to instruct jury that “arresting and taking custody of the defendant does constitute the lawful execution of a legal duty or the execution of a legal process”); Starks v. State, 627 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (instruction that “the attempt to stop Mr. Starks constitutes a lawful execution of a legal duty” incorrect).

We decline to adopt less precise standards that would inevitably bring subjectivity and hence greater uncertainty into the process for determining when an officer is acting in the lawful performance of legal duties. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s refusal to adopt a subjective “reasonable officer” test in determining the constitutional validity of traffic stops. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808, 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (adhering to probable cause test for traffic stops and rejecting test of whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given); see also Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997) (applying Whren under article I, section 12, Florida Constitution). We similarly decline to adopt a more amorphous, hence more subjective, “reasonable officer” test for determining whether an officer is acting in the lawful execution of legal duties as required to establish the crimes defined in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01. Cf. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (characterizing “reasonable officer” test as an attempt “to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means”). Therefore, in construing the lawful execution element of sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, courts must apply the legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs. These standards effectuate the Legislature’s intent in making lawful execution of a legal duty an element of these crimes.

THIS CASE

Tillman asserts that the officer was not lawfully executing a legal duty when he entered the pool enclosure, frisked Tillman for weapons, and prevented Tillman from leaving the officer’s presence. Legal standards applicable to the element of lawful execution govern each of these actions.

Absent consent, a search warrant, or an arrest warrant, a police officer may enter a private home only when there are exigent circumstances for the entry. Taylor, 740 So.2d at 90 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). See also Brigham City v. Stuart, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (discussing exigency exception). The zone of protection under the Fourth Amendment extends to the curtilage of a home, which includes a fenced or enclosed area encompassing the dwelling. See State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303, 306 (Fla.1982) (noting that courts will not allow a warrantless search or seizure in a constitutionally protected area such as one’s back yard).

In Payton, the United States Supreme Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. This Court recently noted:

The circumstances in which the Supreme .Court has applied the exigent circumstances exception are “few in number and carefully delineated.” They include pursuing a fleeing felon, preventing the destruction of evidence, searching incident to a lawful arrest, and fighting fires. Outside of those established categories, the Supreme Court “has often heard, and steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches of the home.”

Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 279 (Fla. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)).

Contrary to the Fifth District’s determination, Tillman’s status as a guest does not preclude application of the law governing warrantless entry into a home in determining whether the officer was lawfully executing a legal duty. The “lawful execution” element does not carry with it the standing requirements that have developed in Fourth Amendment precedent. Even if Tillman’s status as a guest would deprive him of standing to seek suppression of evidence that might have been seized from the home, that status is irrelevant to the determination whether the State established that the officer was in the lawful execution of his duties when the struggle with Tillman occurred.

Assuming arguendo that the officer was in the lawful execution of a legal duty when he entered the pool enclosure, a court determining the lawfulness of the officer’s actions would next determine whether there was reasonable suspicion to detain Tillman and frisk him for weapons. Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2005), which governs detentions, provides:

Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county,, the officer may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding the person’s presence abroad which led the officer to believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.

This standard is consonant with the holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which requires “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” For reasonable suspicion justifying a detention to exist, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An officer making an investigatory stop “must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Terry further provides that an officer may frisk a detained person for weapons if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and poses a threat to the officer or others. 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also J.L. v. State, 727 So.2d 204, 206 (Fla.1998) (“The circumstances may ... require a frisk of the person to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and poses a threat to the officer or others.”), ajfd, 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).

In this case, the officer twice exerted control over Tillman indicative of a Fourth Amendment seizure: first when the officer performed a weapons search against Tillman’s wishes and again when the officer prevented Tillman from leaving his presence. The detention of Tillman constituted lawful execution of a legal duty only if the facts known to the officer created a reasonable suspicion either that Tillman was involved in criminal activity or that he was armed and dangerous.

The Fifth District, which concluded that “the technical illegality” of an officer’s actions does not defeat a prosecution for battery on an officer and resisting with violence, did not apply the standards we adopt today when it assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to support Tillman’s convictions. See Tillman, 807 So.2d at 108-09. Our holding that section 776.051(1) applies only in an arrest scenario requires that the State establish the element of lawful execution of a legal duty under the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION

Without question, the statutory enhancement of the assault and battery offenses against law enforcement officers in section 784.07, and the “resisting” offenses contained in sections 843.01 and 843.02, Florida Statutes, reflect a strong public interest in the protection of law enforcement officers. However, in making “lawful performance” and “lawful execution” of duties an element of both sections 784.07 and 843.01, the Legislature has specified that this enhanced punishment applies only when officers operate within the limits of the law contained in constitutional and statutory provisions as well as pertinent precedent. In this case, those limits are found in Fourth Amendment precedent such as Payton and Terry as well as section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes.

For the reasons explained herein, we approve the holding in Taylor that the prohibition on the use of force to resist an arrest in section 776.051(1) does not extend beyond arrest scenarios. We quash the Fifth District’s decision to the contrary in this case and remand for reconsideration of the denial of Tillman’s motion for judgment of acquittal in accord with the standards set out in this opinion.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

• BELL, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

BELL, J.,

specially concurring.

I join the majority because I cannot say that it is unreasonable to interpret the “lawful, execution of a legal duty” element in sections 784;07(2) and 843.01 according to its plain meaning, especially in the absence of any contrary legislative intent expressly stated in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). However, I write separately to note my concern that this interpretation may narrow the intended scope of protection for public officials further than actually intended and, thereby, undermine the very purpose of these statutes.

It is clear that the purpose behind sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 is to protect public officials by imposing heightened penalties on civilians who physically retaliate against them as they carry out their public duties. Cf. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (finding that the goal of granting “law enforcement officers the- greatest possible protection ... undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of section[ ] 784.07(3)”). Other state courts have recognized that similar statutes in their respective states serve this purpose. See, e.g., State v. Kerrigan, 123 Idaho 508, 849 P.2d 969, 972 (Ct.App.1993) (finding that section 18-915, Idaho Code, “is designed to protect those who are charged with preserving the public welfare from those who impair it”). And we have recognized that it is appropriate for the Legislature to provide this protection. See Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269, 271-72 (Fla.1978) (upholding section 784.07, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), against an equal-protection challenge, in part because the Legislature’s decision to grant greater protection to public officials performing indispensable public services “fosters the public safety and welfare”).

While the effect of our interpretation of this element is uncertain, I am concerned that this decision may be applied in a manner that requires the State to prove that every aspect of a law enforcement officer’s conduct fully complied with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which seems far too strict. Such an interpretation might render law enforcement officers more vulnerable to retaliation than the Legislature intended.

A review of other states’ laws indicates that similar statutes exist in nearly every other state, but only a few of these statutes use the narrow phrase “lawful performance.” Most of these statutes use a broader phrase to define the scope of the enhanced protection for law enforcement officers. They require that the official be “engaged in the execution of any official duties,” acting “within the scope of his authority,” acting “in an official capacity,” or acting “in the performance of his duties.” See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-1204(A)(5) (2006) (“A person commits aggravated assault ... [i]f the person commits the assault knowing or having reason to know that the victim is a peace officer ... while engaged in the execution of any official duties.”); Ind.Code § 35-42-2-l(a)(l)(2006) (enhancing penalty if the offense “is committed against a law enforcement officer ... while the officer is engaged in the execution of his official duty”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4(1) (2005) (imposing a Class A misdemeanor against a person who “assaults a peace officer' with knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer”); Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2) (2005) (making it a Class H felony to “intentionally cause[] bodily harm to a law enforcement officer ... acting in an official capacity and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a law enforcement officer”); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2702(a)(3) (2005) (“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he ... attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers, agents or other persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of duty.”).

Many of these states do not require a showing that the officer’s action was technically lawful in order to submit the case to the jury. See State v. Yoshida, 195 Ariz. 183, 986 P.2d 216, 218 (Ct.App.1998) (“[W]e have no difficulty in concluding that the term ‘official duties,’ as it appears in [Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated] section 13-1204, encompasses all aspects of a peace officer’s good faith performance of his or her job-related duties, even if the officer’s actions are later found to' be constitutionally unreasonable.”); Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (finding officers’ entry into the defendant’s home did not comply with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but, nonetheless, finding the evidence supported the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of battery of a law enforcement officer, a crime requiring the State show the officers were “engaged in the execution of [their] official duty”); State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991) (finding the requirement in section 76-5-102.4, Utah Code Annotated, that the officer be “acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer,” did “not require the State prove that the precise act the officer is performing is not legally challengeable,” but rather that the officer was “acting within the ‘scope of authority of a peace officer.’ ”); Commonwealth v. Biagini, 540 Pa. 22, 655 A.2d 492, 498-99 (1995) (affirming a conviction for aggravated assault, in part because the illegality of the arrest did not prevent the State from establishing that the officers were acting “in the performance of duty,” as required by the statute defining aggravated assault); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 65 Pa. D & C.4th 463, 474-76 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (applying Biagini, 655 A.2d 492,. when the defendant forcefully resisted a warrantless entry).

This Court’s interpretation of the statutory language is a fair one. But, given the above, whether the plain meaning of the term “lawful performance” conforms to legislative intent or narrows the scope of protection too far is an important question the Legislature should examine in light of this decision.

WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

      . Although the 1997 versions of these statutes apply to this case, the provisions have not materially changed in the interim. We therefore cite to the current versions of these statutes.

      . Section 784.07(2) requires that the officer be "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.” Section 843.01 requires that the officer be "in the lawful execution of any legal duty.”- These elements are functionally identical. For convenience, we refer to them in the singular as "lawful execution.”

      . In reviewing Tillman’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal, the district court, as required, construed the facts in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 107, 807 So.2d 106. In his defense, Tillman had testified that he did not threaten the officer, hear anyone else do so, or give permission for the patdown. He also claimed that he was cooperating with the officers until Henriquez pushed him, causing Tillman to stumble, lose his balance, and fall to the ground on top of Henriquez. Id. at 108, 807 So.2d 106.

      . In arrest situations, Florida courts have consistently read section 776.051(1) in pari materia with the offenses described in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01 and, in so doing, have not required the State to prove that the arrest was lawful. See, e.g., Espinosa, 686 So.2d at 1347 and n. 4 (declining to revisit well-settled” law in applying section 776.051 to crime of resisting an officer with violence); see also Delaney v. State, 489 So.2d 891, 892-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. Johnson, 382 So.2d 866, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Because the issue is not before us, we decline to address the effect of section 776.051 on the “lawful execution” element in arrest situations.

      . The First District stated in dicta that "[t]he comparison between a detention and an arrest may be similar enough in this context,” suggesting that it would extend the prohibition in section 776.051(1) to the use of force to resist illegal detentions. Taylor, 740 So.2d at 91. This determination is for the Legislature.

      . Although not presented as an issue for our review, the trial court denied a defense request for a jury instruction based on Payton on the element of lawful execution of a legal duty.

      . See State v. Washington, 884 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that party guest lacked standing to contest warrantless search of home); but see 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(b), at 156 (4th ed.2004) (suggesting that "if the police, without required notice or without probable cause or without a required search warrant, burst into B's home and disrupt a dinner party at which A is present as a guest, then certainly A should be deemed to have standing to object — just as passengers in a car may object to its illegal stopping").

      . The nonconsensual weapons search demonstrates that Tillman was detained for Fourth Amendment purposes. Cf. Smith v. State, 592 So.2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“The lawfulness of a pat down search for weapons presupposes that a stop is valid and that the officer then forms the necessary suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous.”).

      . It appears that most states have statutes heightening the penally for persons who commit an assault or battery on a government official. These statutes take many forms. Many of them impose a separate offense if the assault or battery is committed against certain government officials. See, e.g., Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-167c (2005 & Supp.2006); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 707-712.5 (1993 & Supp. 2005); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3411 (1995 & Supp.2005); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:37.2 (1997 & Supp.2006); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 752-A (2006); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.081 (Supp.2005); Mont.Code Ann. § 45-5-210 (2005); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-929 (Supp.2005); Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.208 (2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-5-204 (2005). Others make it a factor in determining either the class of felony, the degree of assault or battery, or whether the defendant can be charged with aggravated assault. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1204 (2001 & Supp.2005); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-202 (West 2006); Minn.Stat. § 609.2231 (2006); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (2000 & Supp.2005); N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 14-34.2 (2005); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.2005); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 612 (2001 & Supp. 2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-2 (1993 & Supp.2006); Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1 (2004 & Supp.2006); Iowa Code § 708.3A (Supp.2005); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 508.025 (1999 & Supp.2005); Minn.Stat. § 609.2231 (2006); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 200.471 (2000 & Supp.2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1 (2005 & Supp. 2006); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.13 (West 1997 & Supp.2006); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 2702 (2000 & Supp.2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-1.05 (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (Supp.2005); Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-57 (West 2001 & Supp.2005); Wis. Stat. § 940.20 (2003-04 & Supp.2005). Finally other states make this factor determinative in the penalty that must be imposed. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.135 (2004); Cal.Penal Code § 241 (1999 & Supp.2006); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-5-21 (2003 & Supp.2005); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-915 (2005); Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 265 § 13D (2000); Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203 (2002 & Supp.2006); N.D. CentCode § 12.1-17-01 (1997 & Supp'. 2005); N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 651:6 (1996 & Supp.2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 649 (2002 & Supp.2005-2006); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-5 (2002 & Supp.2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1028 (1998 & Supp.2005); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.36.031 (2004 & Supp.2005); W. Va. Code § 61-2-10b (2002).

      . One of the states that uses this phrase has arguably defined it as we have now defined the phrase in sections 784.07(2) and 843.01, Florida Statutes. See Mickelson v. State, 886 P.2d 247, 249-51 (Wyo.1994) (finding that police officers were not " ‘engaged in the lawful performance’ of their official duties” because neither search and seizure laws nor the state’s liquor laws supported the warrant-less entry into the defendant’s bar).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANSTEAD, J. PARIENTE, J., CANTERO, J., BELL, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    V.K.E., etc., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC05-1176.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 6, 2006.

      James S. Purdy, Public Defender and Marvin F. Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Kristen L. Davenport and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   ANSTEAD, J.

In this case, we consider whether the Legislature intended for certain criminal statutory fees and surcharges to apply to juveniles in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In the decision below, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, noting that it was bound by its prior decision in S.S.M. v. State, 898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), upheld the imposition of such surcharges in juvenile delinquency proceedings. V.K.E. v. State, 902 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The court certified the issue to us as one of great public importance: “Does a trial judge have the power and authority to impose on juveniles in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 93[8].085?” Id. at 344. We have discretionary jurisdiction and granted review. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer “no” to the certified question and approve of the views and analysis set out in the concurring opinion of Judge Sharp. We therefore quash the district court’s decision in V.K.E.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner V.K.E., an eleventh grade high school student and a juvenile, was involved in an altercation with another student and entered a plea of nolo contendere to a delinquency petition asserting the commission of a simple battery under the provisions of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2001), a misdemeanor. The trial court withheld adjudication of delinquency, placed V.K.E. on probation, and ordered her, among other things, to pay $852.66 in restitution, $140 in attorneys fees, and two surcharges- — $201 in domestic .violence costs and $151 to the rape crisis fund— within sixty days. V.K.E. appealed the imposition of the surcharges. The district court affirmed, relying on its prior decision in S.S.M., and certified the question quoted above. V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 344.

ANALYSIS

We find the analysis set out in Judge Sharp’s separate opinion below provides a reliable guide to legislative intent and the correct answer to the certified question. We further conclude that the overriding indications of legislative intent discussed by Judge Sharp should control the outcome here: first, the Legislature has created a juvenile justice system as a totally separate and distinct rehabilitative alternative to the punitive criminal justice system, and not as a subset of that system with all of its attendant punitive measures and costs; second, the Legislature has expressly provided in certain instances for the taxation of criminal justice costs and surcharges against delinquents but has not done so here; and third, the Legislature has actually spoken on the issue before us by expressly providing that court fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed in juvénile proceedings. Moreover, we conclude that a contrary holding would open the door to the assessment in juvenile proceedings of the unrelated costs, fees, and surcharges provided for in the adult criminal system without a clear legislative mandate to do so. This in turn would impair the ability of the juvenile system to focus on and serve its legislatively mandated rehabilitative function.

Because Judge Sharp has fully and cogently articulated these principles of legislative, intent, we adopt her analysis as our own and set it out in full:

I am bound by this court’s opinion in S.S.M. v. State, 898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), but were that not the case I would have resolved this issue differently. In this special concurring opinion, I write to explain my reasons for disagreeing with S.S.M.
In S.S.M., a child was assessed a $201.00 surcharge pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes. She pled guilty to two counts of battery, first degree misdemeanors. In this case, V.K.E. pled guilty to a charge of simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was surcharged $201.00 pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes and $151.00 pursuant to section 938.085, Florida Statutes.
Sections 938.08 and 938.085 are part of the “general” adult criminal statutes contained in Chapter 938. They belong to Part II of that Chapter entitled “Mandatory Costs in Specific Types of Cases.” That Part imposes various charges, sometimes described as “costs” or “surcharges” on persons who have violated specific criminal statutes. Funds raised from these surcharges or costs are designated to go to various state and local programs; i.e., the Emergency Medical Services Trust Fund; the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Trust Fund; the Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation Trust Fund; and the County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund; and the Department of Children and Family Services Child Advocacy Trust Fund for the Florida Network of Children’s Advocacy Centers, Inc.
In the case of section 938.08, $85.00 of the surcharge goes to the Domestic Violence Trust Fund, $1.00 to the Clerk of the Court as a service charge, and the balance to the county to defray costs of incarcerating persons sentenced under section 741.238 (minimum term of imprisonment for domestic violence). In the case of section 938.085, the surcharge goes to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund, and $1.00 to the Clerk of Court as a service charge.
In both this case and S.S.M., the juveniles against whom the surcharges were assessed are young females. Neither case involved domestic violence or rape. Incongruously, they appear to be persons in the “victim” category for the general benefit of whom these surcharges are being imposed.
In addition to Part II, Chapter 938 contains Part I, Mandatory Costs in All Cases. For a violation of a state criminal statute or municipal or county ordinance (to benefit the Additional Cost Clearing Trust Fund), section 938.01 imposes a $3.00 court cost and section 938.03 imposes $50.00 as an additional cost for the violation of any criminal law, for the benefit of the Crimes Compensation [T]rust Fund. However, this statute specifically was revisited by the Legislature and made expressly applicable to delinquency proceedings. It reads:
Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state, or the violation of any municipal or county ordinance .... (emphasis added)
Part I also contains two other sections requiring the imposition of court costs. For the violation of any criminal offense, section 938.05 imposes from $50.00 to $200.00, for the benefit of the Fine and Forfeiture Fund, and section 938.06 imposes, as a court cost, a $20.00 surcharge on any fine, for the benefit of the Crime Stoppers Trust Fund.
In addition, Part IV provides for discretionary assessment of costs in specific types of cases to benefit alcohol and drug abuse programs, the Operating Trust Fund of the Department of Law Enforcement, and costs of prosecution upon conviction including investigative costs and attorneys fees for public defenders. Chapter 939 also contains additional cost assessment statutes, applicable if a person violates any kind of criminal statute or ordinance of this state. The “court costs” of $65.00 must be used to fund innovations to supplement state funding for the elements of the state courts system, to assist counties to provide legal aid programs, to fund public law libraries, and to support teen court programs, juvenile assessment centers, and other juvenile alternative programs.
The rationale used in S.S.M., to justify imposition of the surcharge pursuant to section 938.05, was that the statute assesses this surcharge for a violation of section 784.03 (battery statute), and section 985.03(58) defines “violation of law” or a “delinquent act” as a “violation of any law of this state.” [n.l]
[n.1] Section 985.03(58) provides:
Violation of law’ or ‘delinquent act’ means a violation of any law of this state, the United States, or any other state which is a misdemeanor or a felony or a violation of a county or municipal ordinance which would be punishable by incarceration if the violation were committed by an adult.
This definition comes from Chapter 985, the Chapter which deals with juvenile delinquency. In my view, it has no relevancy to Chapter 938. Indeed, the statute expressly provides that the Chapter 985 definitions apply only “when used in this Chapter;” i.e., Chapter 985.
Section 985.228(6), Florida Statutes, provides further:
An' adjudication of delinquency by a court with respect to any child who has committed a delinquent act or violation of law shall not be deemed a conviction; nor shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to be a criminal by reason of that adjudication; nor shall that adjudication operate to impose upon the child any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by or resulting from conviction to disqualify or prejudice the child in any civil service application or appointment, with the exception of use of records of proceedings under this part as provided in s. 985.05(a).
Section 985.233(5)(b) also provides the court must impose either an adult sanction or a juvenile sanction, but not a combination.
If, however, the rationale of S.S.M. is accepted, there is no logical limit to assessing juveniles being prosecuted under Chapter 985, with not only the surcharges under sections 938.08 and 938.085, but all, if not many, of the surcharges or court costs set forth in Chapter 938, outlined above, because all of those statutes impose “court costs” or surcharges for funding state and local law enforcement programs based on the fact that a person has violated a state criminal law or municipal ordinance or criminal traffic offense. If sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments provided for in Chapter 938, for the adult penal system, are logically applicable to juveniles.
I do not think that this is what the Legislature intended. The statutory scheme sets up a separate procedure and system for handling juveniles who violate the state/county/city criminal laws, different and apart from the adult system. The stated public policy underlying Chapter 985 is to protect children involved in the juvenile justice system, and to insure their care, safety, treatment, education and rehabilitation, [n.2]
[n.2] For example, section 985.02(1) provides:
985.02. Legislative intent for the juvenile justice system.
(1). General protections for children. It is a purpose of the Legislature that the children of this state be provided with the following protections:
(a) Protection from abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
(b) A permanent and stable home.
(c) A safe and nurturing environment which will preserve a sense of personal dignity and integrity.
(d) Adequate nutrition, shelter, and clothing.
(e) Effective treatment to address physical, social, and emotional needs, regardless of geographical location.
(f) Equal opportunity and access to quality and effective education, which will meet the individual needs of each child, and to recreation and other community resources to develop individual abilities.
(g) Access to preventive services.
(h) An independent, trained advocate when intervention is necessary, and a skilled guardian or caretaker in a safe environment when alternative placement is necessary.
(i) Gender-specific programming and gender-specific program models and services that comprehensively address the needs of a targeted gender group.
It should not follow, without a solid basis, that adult criminal sanctions be imposed on juvenile offenders.
Chapter 985 disfavors detention and limits harsher sanctions if other alternatives are available. Yet, sections 988.08 and 938.085 make the payment of substantial funds by the juvenile a condition of not being placed in detention. Most children are not wage earners nor are they expected to be. If a child needs large sums of money to avoid detention, the burden will fall on the child’s parents or guardians.
Although parents and guardians have been tasked with payment of costs or expenses for delinquent children, as well as payment of restitution in certain situations under chapter 985, those instances have been specifically provided for and defined by the Legislature, in Chapter 985. See § 985.231(9), Fla. Stat. They are quite different than the scheme devised in Chapter 938. For example, sections 985.215 and 985.231(10) allow the court to impose a fee of $5.00 per day payable to the Department of Juvenile Justice to offset the cost of care, support, and maintenance of the child against the parents or guardians, unless they are indigent. Section 985.231 requires the court to devise a penalty component such as restitution in money or kind for an adjudicated delinquent child. Restitution • ordered may not exceed an amount the child and the parent or guardian reasonably can be expected to make or pay. And, parents or guardians who are not indigent can be ordered to pay for attorney’s costs, as provided for in section 938.29. See § 985.203, Fla. Stat.
•In the past, this court has adhered to the theory that unless the Legislature expressly makes a cost or surcharge imposed by Chapter 38[sic] applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, such costs or surcharges are not applicable to juveniles. See P.P. v. State, 671 So.2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). That case held that additional “costs” of $50.00 for the benefit of the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund should be assessed against all persons, including delinquents, based on the express language used in the statute, section 960.20(1) [renumbered 938.03], which made it clear the Legislature intended them to be assessed in juvenile cases.[n.3]
[n.3] As noted above, that statute provides:
Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state, or the violation of any municipal or county ordinance which adopts by reference any misdemeanor under state laws, shall pay as an additional cost in the case, in addition and prior to any other cost required to be imposed by law, the sum of $50.00 ... (emphasis added)
Both P.P. and J.A. v. State, 633 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), noted that section 985.221, a statute passed prior to section 938.03, provides that in proceedings under Chapter 985, “court fees shall not' be charged against nor witness fees allowed to, any party to a delinquency petition or any parent or legal guardian.” However, the courts held that the older statute had been partially overturned by section 938.03 because of the express language used in the newer statute.
One could make a semantical argument that court “fees” are not “court costs” or “surcharges” and thus section 985.221 never prohibited the imposition of surcharges or court costs under Chapter 938. None of these terms is defined in Chapter 985 and Chapter 938 uses the terms interchangeably. In my view, that leads to the same logical dilemma left by S.S.M. Are all or most of the costs and surcharges, including those specified in 938.08 and 938.085, provided for in Chapter 938 applicable in juvenile delinquency cases simply because they involve violations of state, county, or municipal law?
Because the two penal systems for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by such different philosophies and goals, I believe the better answer is that unless the Legislature expressly makes an adult sanction, cost or surcharge expressly applicable to the juvenile system, it should not be applicable. Sections 938.08 and 938.085 make no reference to delinquency proceedings. Thus I would have concluded that the trial court erred in this juvenile case, in imposing the surcharges against V.K.E., pursuant to sections 938.05 and 938.085.

V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 344-47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (Sharp, J., concurring specially).

CONCLUSION

In sum, we agree with the reasoning of Judge Sharp and her conclusion that the Legislature has demonstrated its awareness of its broad authority to provide for the taxation of costs, fees, and surcharges in both adult and juvenile delinquency proceedings, but has not provided for the assessment of costs under sections 938.05 and 938.085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the district court, and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., specially concurring with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.

BELL, J., dissents with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J.,

specially concurring.

An eleventh grade female high school student punched another student in the face and broke the student’s nose, then pled no contest to simple battery. The trial court withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed V.K.E. on juvenile probation. She was ordered to pay restitution of $852.66 and two statutory surcharges for domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers. The issue is whether the Legislature intended juveniles to be subject to these surcharges applicable to adult offenders. Because I do not discern a clear expression of. legislative intent for the adult surcharges to apply to juveniles, I agree with the majority that these statutory surcharges are not authorized. The majority has reached the correct result as a matter of statutory interpretation and has acted in accord with the purposes of juvenile sentencing as set forth by the Legislature.

Unlike the $50 in costs for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund authorized by section 938.03(1), Florida Statutes, sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not expressly authorize the $201 and $151 surcharges for domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers in juvenile delinquency cases. The costs in section 938.03(1) apply to “[ajny person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense,” and to “[a]ny person whose adjudication is withheld.” (Emphasis supplied.) In contrast, nothing in sections 938.08 and 938.085 clearly evinces legislative intent to extend the surcharges to juvenile delinquency proceedings, apart from the fact that juveniles as well as adults can “plead[ ] guilty or nolo contendere to, or [be] found guilty of’ one of the enumerated offenses. I cannot presume from the sparse statutory language in these provisions; set against the more complete expression of legislative intent in section 938.03(1), that the Legislature intended to place the burden of funding domestic violence programs and rape crisis -centers on juvenile delinquents, some of whom may have committed offenses unrelated to either domestic violence or rape.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero views the reliance on the difference in statutory language as an incorrect application of the principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Neither the majority here nor Judge Sharp in her concurring opinion below, which the majority adopts, explicitly rely on expressio unius. I believe they are instead applying an in pari materia construction by construing these related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. “The doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222, 1229 (Fla.2005). The use of language explicitly encompassing juvenile delinquents in section 938.03(1) and the absence of similar language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 suggest that the Legislature intended a distinction. Courts frequently look to other provisions to conclude that the Legislature “knows how to” accomplish what it has omitted in the enactment in question. See e.g., Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 916 So.2d 778, 783 (Fla.2005).

At the very least, the difference in the statutory language indicates ambiguity, which under the rules of statutory construction we should resolve by seeking other indications of legislative intent. See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So.2d 1224, 1230 (Fla.2004) (stating that only when statutory language is ambiguous will the Court resort to rules of statutory construction to discern legislative intent). These other -indications appear in statutory provisions articulating the purposes of the juvenile delinquency system and in section 985.221, Florida Statutes, which prohibits court fees in delinquency proceedings.

Both the majority and the dissent construe the surcharges as a -form of punishment, but disagree on whether punishment of this nature serves the purposes of the juvenile justice system. The majority looks to the system’s rehabilitative purposes, while Justice Cantero focuses on provisions authorizing punishment of juvenile delinquents. > The resolution lies somewhere in the middle. Chapter 985, Florida Statutes, which- governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, does have a punitive component, but one which must be individually tailored to the needs of the child, consistent with a second important purpose of the .juvenile justice system, which is to rehabilitate the child. See J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381, 1386 (Fla.1998) (noting that juvenile offenders are not held to be criminals and are considered rehabili-tatable) (quoting In re C.J.W., 377 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla.1979)).

Section 985.01 provides that the purposes of the chapter are, inter alia:

(c) To ensure the protection of society, by providing for a comprehensive standardized assessment of the child’s needs so that the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment can be administered consistent with the seriousness of the act committed, the community’s long-term need for public safety, the prior record of the child, and the specific rehabilitation needs of the child, while also providing whenever possible restitution to the victim of the offense.
(e)l. To assure that the adjudication and disposition of a child alleged or found to have committed a violation of Florida law be exercised with appropriate discretion and in keeping with the seriousness of the offense and the need for treatment' services, and that all findings made under this chapter be based upon facts presented at a hearing that meets the constitutional standards of fundamental fairness and due process.

This language looks to punishment not as an end in itself, but as a means to protect society. And the sanction imposed should be geared to the “specific rehabilitation needs of the child, while also providing whenever possible restitution to the victim of the offense.” Legislative intent that punishment be individualized is also evident in section 985.228(4), which authorizes as a penalty component of juvenile probation “nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense.” The goals of individualized treatment, rehabilitation, and punishment are entirely unrelated to the funding of domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers, which broadly focus on addressing the prevention of violence and its harmful consequences throughout the state.

The word that appears perhaps most often in the provisions of chapter 985 setting out the chapter’s purposes and the court’s disposition options is “appropriate.” Imposing surcharges that fund domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers is not appropriate punishment, in the sense of proportionate or commensurate with the offense, for a high school student who has committed simple battery in a school fight. It certainly does not directly foster the goal of rehabilitation.

Finally, I agree that section 985.221, which prohibits court fees from being imposed in juvenile delinquency proceedings, supports the majority. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero discerns from precedent and dictionary definitions that a surcharge or cost can be distinguished from a fee. However, the Legislature has not defined the terms so that we can be sure that it intended this distinction to be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221. In the absence of express language authorizing the “surcharge” in section 938.08 and 938.085 in delinquency proceedings, section 985.221 is an additional indication that imposition of the surcharge on juvenile delinquents is contrary to legislative intent.'

It is my hope that when the Legislature acts in the area of juvenile justice, it seeks to further the goals of the juvenile delinquency system that promote rehabilitation and personal responsibility. If the majority has misconstrued legislative intent, the Legislature can clarify its intent regarding imposition of these surcharges on juveniles by amending the statutes. In the interim, I join the majority in concluding that, consistent with the emphasis on individualized treatment in chapter 985, these surcharges were not intended to be imposed on juveniles.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

CANTERO, J.,

dissenting.

I would apply the plain meaning of the statutes and answer “yes” to the certified question. I would therefore approve the district court’s decision in this case, see V.K.E. v. State, 902 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), as well as other courts that have upheld imposition of statutory surcharges in delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., State v. J.C., 916 So.2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); S.L.G. v. State, 912 So.2d 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); S.S.M. v. State, 898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). As these courts consistently have found, the statutes at issue are unambiguous and therefore must be applied as written.

The majority instead concludes that sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Majority op. at 1282. It relies on “the overriding indications of legislative intent discussed by Judge Sharp” in her specially concurring opinion in V.EE. Majority op. at 1278. The legislative intent is far from clear, however, and certainly is insufficient to trump the plain language of the statutes. Therefore, I must dissent.

In the following discussion, I will (A) analyze the plain meaning of the statutes and conclude that they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings; and (B) address the majority’s arguments for a contrary interpretation.

A. The Plain Meaning of the Statutes

The surcharges at issue were mandated under sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), which state in relevant part:

938.08 Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence. — In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision....
938.085 Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers. — In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision.

The issue is whether sections 938.08 and 938.085 apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. This issue is purely one of statutory interpretation. Although legislative intent guides our analysis, see Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004), to determine that intent we look first to the statute’s plain meaning. State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 1996). “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is ‘that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.’ City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla.1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 220 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1969)). “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction.... ” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla.1931)). “[T]he legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in speculation as to what the judges might think that the legislators intended or should have intended.” Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779, 782 (Fla.1960). “[T]he statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (quoting McRainey, 137 So. at 159). Thus, the statute’s text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature’s intent.

Under the plain language of the statutes in question, sections 938.08 and 938.085, they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Section 938.08 states, without exception, that “[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $201.” (Emphasis added.) The statute thus requires the trial court to impose this surcharge on anyone, juvenile or otherwise, who violates section 784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section 938.08). This language is clear, definite, and unambiguous. Juveniles, as well as adults, can violate the law. Because V.K.E. pled nolo contendere to simple battery under section 784.03, under section 938.08 she committed a “violation of ... s. 784.03.”

That the court withheld adjudication of delinquency does not change the analysis. As one court has said, “[i]n a juvenile proceeding, a finding that the child has committed a delinquent act or violation of law occurs when the court withholds adjudication of delinquency and when the court adjudicates [a] child delinquent.” State v. Menuto, 912 So.2d 603, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis added) (citing § 985.228(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)). Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court’s withholding of adjudication in this case, V.K.E. committed a “violation of law.”

Section 938.085 contains similar language. It provides that “[i]n addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads ... nolo contendere to ... a violation of ... s. 784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $151.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, the State originally charged V.K.E. with felony battery under section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2002). However, the State and V.K.E. later agreed to a plea bargain. To avoid a possible conviction of felony battery, she pled nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.03 — simple battery. This plea placed her within the ambit of section 938.085 because she pled “nolo contendere to ... a violation of ... s. 784.03.” The statute requires the trial court to impose this $151 surcharge on anyone who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section 938.08). The statute contains no exceptions for juveniles.

In addition, sections 938.08 and 938.085 explicitly state that “[pjayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation ... or any other court-ordered supervision.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court’s disposition order did impose the surcharges as a condition of probation. The order. includes, among the twenty-three conditions of V.KE.’s probation, payment of the surcharges. The order reflects the language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 that “[pjayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation.”

Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis must end there. The plain meaning of sections 938.08 and 938.085 controls. As a majority of this Court recently noted, “[w]hile this may seem simplistic, it is nevertheless what is required.” Knowles, 898 So.2d at 11-12 (Cantero, J., concurring, with three other justices joining). The majority relies heavily on legislative intent, see majority op. at 1278, yet “the legislature is assumed to have expressed its intent through the words found in a statute.” Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993). When that “language ... is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, I conclude that a trial judge has the authority to impose the surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 938.085 on juveniles in delinquency proceedings.

B. Arguments for Disregarding the Plain Language

In adopting Judge Sharp’s opinion as its own, the majority offers several grounds for disregarding the plain language of the statutes in question: (1) the Legislature created a separate juvenile justice system as a distinct rehabilitative alternative to the criminal justice system; (2) sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specifically include delinquency proceedings; and (3) section 985.221, Florida Statutes (2004), prohibits the imposition of court fees in delinquency cases. I address each argument in turn below, and ultimately conclude that none justifies deviating from the plain language.

1. Juvenile System Separate from Criminal System

The majority endorses Judge Sharp’s argument that the Legislature “set[ ] up a separate procedure and system for handling juveniles ... different and apart from the adult system.” Majority op. at 1280-81 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). In this juvenile system (Chapter 985), Judge Sharp argues, the “stated public policy ... is to protect children ... and to insure their care, safety, treatment, education, and rehabilitation.” Id. However, such “vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are ... inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)).

The majority cannot reconcile this characterization of “public policy” with section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which demonstrates that the purposes of the juvenile justice system go beyond “care, safety, treatment, education, and rehabilitation” to include punishment as well. The statute authorizes a judge to “enter an order stating the facts upon which its finding is based but withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing [the juvenile] in a probation program under the supervision of the department.” Id. (emphasis added). It outlines the court’s authority over juveniles, such as V.K.E., who are not adjudicated delinquent: “The court may, as a condition of the [probation] program, impose as a penalty component restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew ... or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense.” (Emphasis added.) This list is not exhaustive and leaves other sanctions within the court’s discretion.

Moreover, whatever purposes one may infer from Chapter 985, they are “inadequate to overcome the words of its text.” Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220, 122 S.Ct. 708. Section 985.228(4) does not preclude a court from imposing penalties on juveniles. Despite the “public policy underlying Chapter 985,” majority op. at 1281 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)), section 985.228(4) does not preclude a judge from imposing on juveniles the surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085.

Nevertheless, the majority, again quoting Judge Sharp, advances two additional policy arguments against the imposition of the surcharges. First, it claims that the surcharges bear no rational relationship to the delinquent act in this case. Second, it assumes that in future cases they could be counterproductive. Neither of these claims is sufficient to override the plain language of the statutes.

The majority first argues that these surcharges, which fund domestic violence and rape crisis programs, bear no rational relationship to the offense in this case — simple battery. See majority op. at 1278-79 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 345 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). This rationale implies that a surcharge that funds a program, such as one for domestic violence, cannot be imposed unless the offense triggering the surcharge relates to that program. No law supports this view, and such an interpretation would render several parts of sections 938.08 and 938.085 inapplicable even to adult offenses. Cf. Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) (“[C]ourts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.”). Many of the offenses triggering the surcharges, enumerated in sections 938.08 and 938.085, are unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence. See § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault); § 784.021, Fla. Stat. (2005) (aggravated assault); § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery); § 784.041, Fla. Stat. (2005) (felony battery). Several are inconsistent with the concept of domestic violence, see § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault or battery by person who is being detained in a prison, jail, etc.); § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials). Accepting Judge Sharp’s — now the majority’s — view would require us to prohibit the imposition of any surcharges, either upon a juvenile or an adult, when the offense is not directly related to the programs being funded. Yet sections 938.08 and 938.085 require that a court “shall impose” the surcharges at issue when they apply. This obligatory language indicates that the Legislature has deemed the surcharges appropriate even when the offense charged is unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence.

The majority also adopts Judge Sharp’s argument that, “[i]f sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments ... in Chapter 938 ... are logically applicable to juveniles.” Majority op. at 1280 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). The majority also asserts that because most children are not wage earners, it is the parents who will often have to pay these surcharges. This contention resembles a claim that such a result would be unreasonable or ridiculous.

We will deviate from a statute’s plain language when necessary to avoid an absurd result. “[N]o literal interpretation should be given that lends to an. unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.... ” State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, 261 (1928). But this exception to , the plain meaning rule is intended to be narrow. The United States Supreme Court, for example, “rarely invokes such a test to override unambiguous legislation.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). The fact that the surcharges are imposed on juveniles, who often are not wage earners, cannot be considered unreasonable or ridiculous. A court may reasonably contemplate that a juvenile’s parent or guardian can assist her in complying with an order to pay surcharges. Moreover, juveniles such as V.K.E. are not incapable of raising these funds themselves. In this case, the surcharges total $352, less than half of the $852.66 of restitution the court ordered (with which the majority apparently finds no problem). Thus, the imposition of the surcharges cannot be considered unreasonable or absurd.

2. Absence of Express Application to Delinquency Proceedings

The majority next claims that, unlike certain instances where the Legislature has expressly provided for the taxation of costs and surcharges against juveniles, sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specify that they apply to delinquency proceedings. See majority op. at 1278. In particular, the majority relies on Judge Sharp’s discussion of section 938.03, Florida Statutes (2003). See id. at 1279, 1282 (citing V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 345, 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). Section 938.03 states in relevant part:

Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.—
(1) Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state or the violation of any municipal or county ordinance which adopts by reference any misdemeanor under state law, shall pay as an additional cost in the case, in addition and prior to any other cost required to be imposed by law, the sum of $50. Any person whose adjudication is withheld shall also be assessed such cost.

(Emphasis added.) According to the majority, had the Legislature wanted the surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085 to apply to juveniles, it would have explicitly said so. See majority op. at 1278.

This argument alludes to a principle of statutory construction known as “expressio unius est exclusio alterius — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So.2d 1181, 1187 (Fla.2005) (citing Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002 (Fla.2003)). The Second District has concluded that the principle does not apply in this context. See State v. J.C., 916 So.2d 847, 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (rejecting the juveniles’ argument that, because the Legislature did not expressly include juveniles in the surcharge statutes, it meant to exclude them). I agree.

We use principles of statutory construction to interpret statutes only when they are ambiguous. “[T]he rules of statutory construction are the means by which courts seek to determine legislative intent only when that intent is not plain and obvious enough to be conclusive.” Knowles, 898 So.2d at 10 (emphasis added). “If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended.” Zuckerman, 615 So.2d at 663. As I have noted above, the language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 is clear and unambiguous, and its plain meaning controls.

Even if we were free to use the canons of statutory construction, the principle of expressio unius applies to the mention of things within the same statute, and usually within the same sentence. It does not apply where something is mentioned in one statute but not in another. One cannot infer from the Legislature’s explicit application of section 938.03 to juvenile proceedings that the absence of such language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 reflects an intent not to apply those statutes to juvenile proceedings. Section 938.03 applies to certain specified areas: “any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense.” The principle of expressio unius permits the inference that it does not apply to categories not mentioned in that sentence. On the other hand, the language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 does not indicate that the statutes apply only to adults, or only in specified proceedings. Nor does either one specify that, for purposes of the statute, only adults can violate any of the enumerated provisions. Instead, they require, without special language, the imposition. of these surcharges “for a violation of’ or “when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of ... a violation of’ any of the enumerated offenses. See §§ 938.08, 938.085. This broad language contains no references to adults that would permit the inference that juveniles were intended to be excluded.

Justice Pariente argues that the majority and Judge Sharp are not applying the principle of expressio unius, but “are instead applying an ‘in pari materia’ construction by construing these related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Specially concurring op. at 1283. But as I noted above, we use canons of statutory construction only when statutes are ambiguous. See Knowles, 898 So.2d at 10; Zuckerman, 615 So.2d at 663. The language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 is clear. Justice Pariente uses the principle of in pari materia not to resolve an ambiguity, but to create one. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 586, 115, S.Ct. .1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s application of the maxim noscitur a sociis to section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 creates doubt, instead of reducing it, and arguing that the canon applies only in cases of ambiguity). As ■ the argument goes, because section 938.03 refers to juveniles and sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not, it is now unclear (although it was not before) whether these statutes apply to juveniles. Then, by applying an in pari materia construction (or, as the majority does, the principle of expressio un-ms ), this newly created ambiguity is resolved by using the same language that created it. I do not agree that the, canons of construction can be used in the same breath to first create, and then resolve, an ambiguity.

3. Prohibition of Court Fees in Delinquency Cases

Finally, the majority claims that “the Legislature ... expressly provided] that court fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed in juvenile proceedings.” Majority op. at 1278. It endorses Judge Sharp’s, argument that section 985.221, Florida Statutes-. (2004), which prohibits imposition of “court fees” in juvenile delinquency cases, applies to the surcharges as well. Majority op. at 1278, 1282 (citing V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). The statute provides in relevant part:

Court and witness fees. — In any proceeding under this chapter, court fees shall not be charged against, nor witness fees allowed to, any party to a delinquency petition or any parent or legal guardian or custodian or child named in a summons.

(Emphasis added.) The State, however, argues that section 985.221 specifically prohibits only fees, not surcharges. See also S.L.G., 912 So.2d at 614 (concluding that “section 985.221 ... prohibits only the imposition of court fees in juvenile proceedings”).

The question, then, is whether a “surcharge” is a “court fee” or something else. Neither section 985.221 in particular nor chapter 985 in general defines the term “court fees.” Justice Pariente believes that, because the Legislature failed to define these terms, we cannot be sure that their usual meanings and distinctions should be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221. Specially concurring op. at 1285. However, both the United States Supreme .Court and this Court have established that, when the Legislature has not defined a word or term in a statute, we should construe it according to its ordinary and common meaning. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 228, 229, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)); see also Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.2005) (“[O]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.”) (quoting Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001)). The plain and ordinary meaning of words can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla.2003).

A dictionary defines the term “fee” as “a charge fixed by law or by an institution ... for certain privileges or services” and “a charge fixed by law for the services of a public officer.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 833 (3d ed. 1993). The Fifth District has held that, in legal terms, “ ‘[flees’ ... are charges fixed by law for the services of public officers or for the use of some privilege under control of the government.” S.L.G., 912 So.2d at 614 (citing Crawford v. Bradford, 23 Fla. 404, 2 So. 782 (1887); 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 1 (2004)). It distinguishes “fees” from “costs,” which “are statutory allowances recoverable by the prevailing party to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending the proceeding.” Id. (citing Golub v. Golub, 336 So.2d 693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). No other court in Florida has defined the term “court fees.” The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in the context of lawsuits, “ ‘[flees’ are generally those amounts paid to a public official, such as the clerk of the court, by a party for particular charges typically delineated by statute.” United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 508 U.S. 1, 8, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 123 L.Ed.2d 563 (1993) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666 (2d. ed. 1983)). “Most commonly these include such items as docket fees, clerk’s and marshal’s charges, and witness’ fees.” Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra.

Section 985.03(14) defines “court” as “the circuit court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter.” When used with the word “court,” the phrase “court fee” connotes a sum fixed by law that is paid or charged for a court’s services, particularly those of the marshal or clerk of court. On the other hand, the term “surcharge” is defined as “a charge in excess of the usual or normal amount; an additional tax, cost, or impost” and “an additional and usu[ally] excessive charge.” Webster’s at 2299. In addition, a “fee” is distinguishable from a “cost,” which is defined as “the amount or equivalent paid or given or charged or engaged to be paid or given for anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered.” Id. at 515. The plural form “costs” refers to “expenses incurred in litigation ... those payable to the attorney or counsel by his client esp. when fixed by law ... [and] ... those given by the law or the court to the prevailing against the losing party in equity and frequently by statute.” Id.

Based on these definitions, the term “court fees” does not include surcharges. While the term “cost,” which generally connotes an amount paid for something bought or for services rendered, may include “fees,” which connotes a similar amount paid for a service rendered, particularly that of a public officer, a “surcharge” refers to an additional or excessive charge, which may be punitive in nature. Based on the ordinary meanings of the terms “fee” and “surcharge,” I conclude that section 985.221’s prohibition against charging “court fees” does not prohibit the surcharges set forth in sections 938.05 and 938.085. To the contrary, section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which, as I noted earlier, allows a court to impose as a penalty component “restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew ... or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense,” at least implicitly authorizes imposition of surcharges.

Even assuming that section 985.221 conflicts with sections 938.08 and 938.085, the latter statutes govern because they were enacted after section 985.221. “[I]f statutes are inconsistent or conflict, the last expression of legislative intent, in point of time or order, prevails.” S.S.M., 898 So.2d at 85 (citing Askew v. Schuster, 331 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla.1976), and Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So.2d 813, 816-17 (Fla.1962)) (other citation omitted). “The last expression of the Legislature prevails due to the general presumption that later statutes are passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws.” Id. (citing Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla.1978), and J.A. v. State, 633 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Here, sections 938.08 and 938.085 were enacted in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Ch.2001-50, § 5, at 320, Laws of Fla.; ch.2003-114, § 3, at 729, Laws of Fla. Section 985.221 (formerly section 39.073) has been in effect since 1990, ch. 90-208, § 5, at 1150, Laws of Fla., and was last updated in 1997. S.S.M., 898 So.2d at 85. The Legislature presumably was aware of section 985.221 when passing sections 938.08 and 938.085. See id. Therefore, sections 938.08 and 938.085 represent the last expression of legislative intent and should prevail.

C. CONCLUSION

I find that the language of the statutes is clear and unambiguous. I agree with the Fifth District’s analysis in this case. A trial judge has the authority to impose the mandatory surcharges provided in sections 938.08 and 938,085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Accordingly, I would answer the certified question, in the affirmative and approve the Fifth District’s decision.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.

BELL, J.

dissenting.

While I personally prefer the policy-based interpretation advanced by Judge Sharp, and now the majority, I believe the plain language of the statute leads to the conclusion reached by Justice Cantero. Absent an argument that this “plain language” reading of the statute somehow leads to an absurd result contrary to legislative intent, we are limited to that conclusion. This is especially true in a case like this where even the majority acknowledges that we do not really know what the Legislature intended in regard to the question posed. See majority op. at 1278 note 2.

As Justice Cantero explains, the plain language of sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), should lead us to answer “yes” to the certified question. Neither section 938.083 nor section 938.085 exempts juvenile delinquencies from the convictions triggering the mandatory fines imposed in these statutes. The Legislature mandated that section 938.08, Florida Statutes (2005), apply “[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of [the listed statutes]” and that section 938.085, Florida Statutes (2005), apply “in addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication a violation of [the listed statutes.]” (Emphasis added.) While I agree with the majority’s argument that “the two penal systems for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by different philosophies and goals,” I cannot overlook the fact that the Legislature knew these differences when it wrote these statutes, yet chose language encompassing both systems.

Therefore, I join Justice Cantero in his dissent and encourage the Legislature to clarify its intent on this significant issue.

      . To date, the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have certified the same question in a combined eleven cases. We have stayed the remaining cases pending our disposition of this one.

      .A frank response to the question before us may be that we do not really know with certainty the precise answer to the question posed concerning what the Legislature intended because the Legislature has treated the issue of the assessment of costs and surcharges in a wide variety of ways, sometimes expressly providing for assessment in juvenile proceedings and sometimes not. However, because the question must be resolved in order to review the juvenile court’s assessment of costs, we must do our best to provide an answer.

      . The most serious sanctions provided by the Legislature for the violation of the criminal statutes in question are punitive sanctions such as imprisonment in the state prison system, sanctions wholly inapplicable to juvenile proceedings.

      . Of course, if the Legislature had expressly provided for an assessment in juvenile proceedings, as it has done in other instances, we would have no issue to resolve. The plain meaning of such a provision would control.

        . The order states in relevant part:
      [V.K.E.] is hereby placed on PROBATION under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice with the conditions specified in this order.

      It is FURTHER ORDERED that [V.K.E.] shall comply with the following sanctions.

      17. Pay $201.00 Domestic Violence costs within sixty (60) days from the date of this order.
      18. Pay $151.00 to the rape crisis fund within sixty (60) days from the date of this order.
      (Emphasis added.)


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Brent D. KLEIN, et ux., Appellants, v. Joel W. ROBBINS, etc., Appellee.
    No. SC04-974.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 6, 2006.
    Peter J. Leavy and Thomas Roy Spencer of Spencer and Klein, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Appellants.
    Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami-Dade County Attorney and Thomas W. Logue, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, FL, for Ap-pellees.
   PER CURIAM.

We have on appeal Klein v. Robbins, 873 So.2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), in which the Third District Court of Appeal cited as controlling authority its decision in Sunset Harbour North Condominium Ass’n v. Robbins, 837 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (declaring unconstitutional section 192.042, Florida Statutes (1997)), rev’d, 914 So.2d 925 (Fla.2005). At the time the Third District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Klein, Sunset Harbour was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1); see also Smith v. Welton, 729 So.2d 371 (Fla.1999).

On the authority of our decision in Sunset Harbour Condominium Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So.2d 925 (Fla.2005), the decision under review is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Third District Court of Appeal for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision in Sunset Harbour.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.