author: BELL, J.

text:
    Walter VELEZ, Petitioner, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent.
    No. SC04-1944.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.
    Paul Morris, Miami, FL, and Robert A. Rosenblatt, Pinecrest, FL, for Petitioner.
    Roberto Elpidio Fiallo and Robert Knabe, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   BELL, J.

This case concerns the breadth of the class of persons that have standing to contest probable cause at a postseizure, adversarial probable cause hearing under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. We review Velez v. Miami-Dade County Police Department, 881 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in City of Fort Lauderdale v. Baruch, 718 So.2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and Jean-Louis v. Forfeiture of $203,595.00 in U.S. Currency, 767 So.2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

In addition to certifying conflict, the Third District specified the conflict issue as follows:

DOES A PERSON IN MERE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF SEIZURE HAVE STANDING AT AN ADVERSARIAL PRELIMINARY HEARING TO CHALLENGE THE SEIZURE WITHOUT SHOWING A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY?

Velez, 881 So.2d at 1192. The Third District answers this question in the negative. The Fourth District answers it in the affirmative.

We approve the decisions of the Fourth District in Baruch and Jean-Louis. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Forfeiture Act gives a person in possession of the property at the time of seizure standing to participate in the adversarial preliminary hearing without showing a proprietary interest in the property. In light of this resolution, we quash the decision of the Third District in Velez and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A Miami-Dade police officer stopped Velez for a traffic infraction. The officer asked Velez about a suitcase in plain view on the rear seat of the vehicle. Velez said the suitcase contained only clothing and gave consent for a search. The suitcase yielded $489,880 in currency, mostly in $20 bills secured in bundles. Velez told the officer that the money did not belong to him but had been given to him by a person he did not know. Fifteen days after the seizure, Velez requested an adversarial preliminary hearing under section 932.703(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). Velez did not attend the scheduled hearing. Velez’s counsel asserted that because the officer’s sworn complaint reflected that the money was in Velez’s possession at the time of the seizure, he was a “person entitled to notice” under section 932.701(2)(e) and therefore had standing to contest the seizure at an adversarial preliminary hearing under section 932.703(2)(a). The trial court disagreed, denied Velez standing to participate in the hearing pursuant to Vasquez v. State, 777 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), and concluded that probable cause existed to seize the currency based on the allegations in the sworn complaint.

The Third District affirmed, relying on its holding in Vasquez that “a claimant to seized currency must come forward with sworn proof of a possessory and/or ownership interest in the same to acquire standing to contest the forfeiture proceeding.” Velez, 881 So.2d at 1192 (quoting Vasquez, 111 So.2d at 1202). However, the Third District recognized that its holding directly conflicted with the Fourth District’s holdings in Baruch, 718 So.2d at 846 (holding that “[a] ‘person entitled to notice’ need not demonstrate a proprietary interest in the property at issue”), and Jean-Louis, 767 So.2d at 598 (holding that “appellants have standing in the adversarial preliminary hearing, as at the very least, they were in possession of the money at the time of its seizure”). We granted review based on certified conflict of decisions.

THE FORFEITURE ACT

Forfeiture proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process. The first stage is an adversarial preliminary hearing in which the seizing agency is required to establish probable cause that the property subject to forfeiture was used in violation of the Forfeiture Act. § 932.701(2)(f), Fla. Stat. The Forfeiture Act provides that when personal property is seized, any “person entitled to notice” should receive notice of the right to a preliminary hearing within five days after the seizure and may make a request within fifteen days after receiving notice that the hearing be held. § 932.703(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The Act defines “person entitled to notice” as “any owner, entity, bona fide lienholder, or person in possession of the property subject to forfeiture when seized, who is known to the seizing agency after a diligent search and inquiry.” § 932.701(2)(e), Fla. Stat. The second stage is a forfeiture proceeding “in which the court or jury determines whether the subject property shall be forfeited.” § 932.701(2)(g), Fla. Stat. At the forfeiture proceeding, the court “shall” order the seized property forfeited to the seizing agency “[u]pon clear and convincing evidence that the contraband article was being used in violation” of the Forfeiture Act. § 932.704(8), Fla. Stat. (2002). The person contesting the forfeiture in the second stage is identified in section 932.704 as a “claimant.” The class of persons who are claimants is narrower than those entitled to notice of the adversarial preliminary hearing. A claimant is defined in section 932.701(2)(h) as “any party who has proprietary interest in property subject to forfeiture and has standing to challenge such forfeiture, including owners, registered owners, bona fide lienholders, and titleholders.”

ANALYSIS

Our resolution of the conflict question requires the interpretation of the term “person entitled to notice” as that term relates to other pertinent provisions of the Forfeiture Act. The standard of appellate review on such issues is de novo. B.Y. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004). As explained below, our interpretation of the Forfeiture Act is that the Legislature intended to include those merely in possession of the property at the time of seizure within the class of persons entitled to contest the seizure at the adversarial preliminary hearing. Consequently, we resolve the certified conflict by holding that a person in possession of the property subject to forfeiture at the time of the seizure has the right to participate in the adversarial preliminary hearing on probable cause.

“As this Court has often repeated, ‘[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So.2d 954, 960 (Fla.2005) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). Further, we are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its .express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” McLaughlin v. State 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). A related principle is that when a court interprets a statute, it “must give full effect to all statutory provisions.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). Courts should “avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla.1996) (quoting Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 456).

The Forfeiture Act includes a “person in possession of the property ... when seized” within the class of persons entitled to be notified of the right to request a postseizure, adversarial probable cause hearing. Specifically, the Forfeiture Act first defines a “person entitled to notice” as “any owner, entity, bona fide lienholder, or person in possession of the property subject to forfeiture when seized, who is known to the seizing agency after a diligent search and inquiry.” § 932.701(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). It then provides that a “person entitled to notice” must be notified that there is a right to an adversarial preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists for the seizure and is authorized to request such a hearing. § 932.703(2)(a), Fla. Stat. This combination of a requirement of notification of the right to the adversarial preliminary hearing and the right to request the hearing indicates that the Legislature intended that the “person entitled to notice” have an opportunity to participate in that hearing.

The Third District construes the Forfeiture Act as granting standing at the preliminary hearing only to one who can demonstrate an interest sufficient to satisfy the court of the party’s standing as a “claimant.” This limitation on standing at this preliminary proceeding is contrary to the plain meaning of section 932.701(2)(e) and would effectively negate the language therein that brings a “person in possession of property subject to forfeiture when seized” within the definition of a “person entitled to notice.” To give effect to the plain meaning of section 932.701(2)(e) and to avoid rendering part of that provision ineffectual, a person in possession of the property at the time of seizure must be granted standing at the adversarial preliminary hearing.

This reading of the Act to include persons in mere possession of the seized property as being entitled to standing at the adversarial preliminary hearing is consistent with amendments to the Act made to conform it with an earlier due process decision from this Court. In 1991, this Court held that due process requires that all “potential” claimants of seized property receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in an adversarial proceeding. See Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So.2d 957, 966 (Fla.1991). During the next legislative session after this decision, the Forfeiture Act was amended to create both the adversarial preliminary hearing and a category of “person entitled to notice” who must be notified of the right to the hearing. See ch. 92-54, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. As amended, the Forfeiture Act extends to potential claimants, including those who were in possession of property when it was seized, the notice required by the decision in Real Property. On this point, the Fourth District has noted:

It is in the interest of a seizing agency to aggressively notice all potential claimants, to cast a wide net for “persons entitled to notice” under the statute, since a later finding of a lack of diligence would vitiate the entire forfeiture proceeding. Any interpretation of the statute which permitted a seizing agency to tiptoe around the notice requirement would eviscerate the statutory intent to provide a speedy preliminary hearing and would run afoul of the procedural due process requirement of Article I, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution.

Baruch, 718 So.2d at 846.

Further, in using the term “adversarial,” the statute contemplates that the preliminary hearing would involve opposing parties. If persons who were merely in possession of the property when it was seized are “entitled to notice” but uniformly denied standing at the preliminary hearing, the resulting hearing might be less than adversarial. Indeed, this hearing would in many cases effectively be an ex parte proceeding, satisfying one of the due process requirements, notice, but not the other, the opportunity to be heard.

The distinction between a “person entitled to notice” and one who is a “claimant” is inherent in, if not essential to, the two-stage process of the Forfeiture Act. In the first stage, the adversarial preliminary hearing, the seizing agency bears the burden of establishing “probable cause that the property subject to forfeiture was used in violation of the [Forfeiture Act].” § 932.701(2)(f), Fla. Stat. Permitting, the broadest class of persons with a potential interest in the seized property to participate at this initial hearing is appropriate because only the issue of probable cause for the seizure is addressed. No interest in the property is actually forfeited to the seizing agency at this stage. The second stage, the forfeiture proceeding, actually “determines whether the subject property shall be forfeited.” § 932.701(2)(g), Fla. Stat. At this second stage, the decision is made as to whether the proprietary interest of a claimant — an owner, registered owner, bona fide lienholder, or titleholder — -will be extinguished in favor of the seizing agency. To establish status as a “claimant” with standing to contest forfeiture in this second stage, a person must demonstrate that he or she has “a proprietary interest in property subject to forfeiture.” § 932.701(2)(h), Fla. Stat. Thus, the different criteria for persons entitled to notice and claimants correspond to the different determinations to be made in adversarial preliminary hearings and forfeiture hearings.

Moreover, “because forfeiture actions are considered harsh extractions, this Court has long followed a policy of strictly construing forfeiture statutes.” DeGregorio v. Balkwill, 853 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla.2003); see also Real Property, 588 So.2d at 961. Any ambiguity in a forfeiture statute must be construed against forfeiture. DeGregorio, 853 So.2d at 373. Requiring a “person entitled to notice” to also demonstrate his status as a claimant in order to participate in the adversarial preliminary hearing is contrary to this principle of strict construction.

Accordingly, we conclude that under the Forfeiture Act a person in possession of the property subject to forfeiture at the time of the seizure has standing at an adversarial preliminary hearing to challenge probable cause for the seizure and is not required to also show a proprietary-interest in the property.

CONCLUSION

We quash the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Velez holding that a person in possession of property at the time of seizure must show a proprietary interest in the property in order to .gain standing to challenge the seizure in an adversarial preliminary hearing. Based on this holding, we remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We approve the decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Baruch and Jean-Louis.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

      . Hereinafter "Forfeiture Act.” The Forfeiture Act spans sections 932.701-.707, Florida Statutes (2002).

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

      . Black’s Law Dictionary 58 (8th ed. 2004), defines an adversary proceeding as "[a] hearing involving a dispute between opposing parties.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. CANTERO, J., PARIENTE, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Steve PAUL, Respondent.
    No. SC05656.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.

      Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Jeanine M. Germa-nowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender and Ellen A. Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in Paul v. State, 912 So.2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), which certified conflict with the decision in Hunsicker v. State, 881 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), review denied, 894 So.2d 970 (Fla.2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

FACTS

Steve Paul was charged with committing six acts of lewd and lascivious offenses against a thirteen-year-old victim and was found guilty of four of the counts. Specifically, the jury found that Paul (1) intentionally touched the victim’s genital area or the clothing covering it, contrary to section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes (1999); (2) intentionally touched the victim in a lewd or lascivious manner by kissing the victim’s neck, contrary to section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes (1999); (3) intentionally touched the victim in a lewd or lascivious manner by rubbing his penis on the victim’s stomach area, contrary to section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes (1999); and (4) intentionally exposed his genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner in the presence of the victim, contrary to section 800.04(7), Florida Statutes (1999). Paul appealed his convictions to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, contending that multiple convictions arising out of the same series of events violate state and federal double jeopardy protections.

Taking the evidence most favorable to the State, the district court succinctly summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

Paul came to the apartment of the thirteen-year-old male victim, where the victim’s parents were asleep in their bedroom. They first went into the living room of the apartment. There, Paul kissed the victim on the neck and rubbed the outside of the victim’s pants over his penis. Seeing that an adjoining bedroom was empty, Paul asked the victim if they could go into that room. They walked into the bedroom and shut the door. There, Paul proceeded to place his hand on the victim’s penis underneath his clothing. The victim then removed his shorts, touched Paul’s penis, and Paul rubbed his exposed penis over the victim’s leg and stomach and ejaculated. At that point, the victim’s sister and her boyfriend arrived.

Paul, 912 So.2d at 10. The Fourth District first held that the above incident was not a single criminal episode but actually consisted of two distinct acts. As the court noted, “where a defendant is charged with lewd and lascivious battery, the different acts of touching are to be viewed with reference to the spatial and temporal aspects of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the defendant had time to pause, reflect, and form a new criminal intent between occurrences.” Id. In applying this test to the defendant, the court found that two sexual offenses occurred: one in the living room and one in the bedroom. As the court elaborated, “at the point in time at which Paul asked the victim if they could move from the living room into the empty bedroom, Paul had the time to pause and reflect on what he was doing.... This is demonstrated by the fact that Paul deliberately moved the victim from the more public living room into the more private bedroom where they were less likely to be discovered.” Id. at 11.

The Fourth District then addressed whether double jeopardy was violated when the defendant was convicted of two counts for each of these two separate criminal episodes. The State contended that double jeopardy protections were not violated because the Legislature had recently amended section 800.04 to create separate offenses for each of the acts committed. Paul, 912 So.2d at 11. The district court rejected this argument, holding that based on its reading of the statutory scheme of section 800.04, there was no legislative authorization for “separate convictions and' sentences for each of the cumulative acts occurring in the course of one continuous and almost simultaneous act of lewd and lascivious activity on a minor, particularly where each lesser act leads up to the most serious of the charges.” Id. Instead, the court deemed “the acts leading up to, or occurring as part of, the most serious, in each room, to be permissive lesser offenses.” Id. However, the court noted that the Fifth District Court of Appeal took a contrary view regarding the recent amendments to section 800.04 when that court held that the amendment to the statute intended to authorize separate convictions and punishments for each subsection of section 800.04:

The language and structure of the amended statute does focus on individual acts and creates separate criminal offenses in each subsection that designates a specific degree of the crime and the punishment to be imposed for each. We conclude that the. legislative intent is clear that separate punishments be imposed for each criminal offense created by the statute. Therefore, with respect to Hunsicker’s convictions for the separate crimes of lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, and lewd or lascivious exhibition, there is no double jeopardy violation.

Id. at 11-12 (quoting Hunsicker, 881 So.2d at 1171).

ANALYSIS

Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a legal determination, and thus our standard of review is de novo. State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941, 945 (Fla.2005). The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy consists of three separate constitutional protections: “It protects against á second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnotes omitted), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); see also State v. Wilson, 680 So.2d 411, 413 (Fla.1996). As this Court has set forth:

The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature “intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.” M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996); see State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997) (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues.... ”). Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, courts employ the Blockburger[ ] test, as codified in section 775.021, Florida Statutes (1997), to determine whether separate offenses exist.

Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 19-20 (Fla.2001) (footnote omitted); see also Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla.1996) (“[Alb-sent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Block-burger ‘same-elements’ test pursuant to section 775.021(4) ... is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.”) (footnote omitted).

In reviewing section 800.04, we do not find a clear statement of legislative intent, and thus we must employ the Blockburger test as codified in section 775.021, Florida Statutes (2005), to determine whether separate offenses exist. Section 775.021(4) provides:

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The first portion of this test, section 775.021(4)(a), sets forth the Blockburger “same elements test,” which prohibits courts from imposing multiple convictions for an act or acts which occur in one criminal episode if each offense does not contain at least one element distinct from the other offenses. Section 775.021(4)(b) sets forth the exceptions to the Blockburger “same elements” test, providing three additional situations where dual convictions are barred. See Florida, 894 So.2d at 945 n. 2.

Because the Blockburger test applies to crimes occurring in only “one criminal transaction or episode,” the first step is to review whether there was one criminal episode or multiple episodes. “In or-der to determine whether offenses occurred during a single criminal episode, courts look to whether there are multiple victims, whether the offenses occurred in multiple locations, and whether there has been a ‘temporal break’ between offenses.” Murray v. State, 890 So.2d 451, 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Staley v. State, 829 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002)); see also Russo v. State, 804 So.2d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same); Cabrera v. State, 884 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that in order for crimes to be considered to have occurred in more than one criminal episode, there must be a sufficient temporal break between the two acts in order to allow the offender to reflect and form a new criminal intent for each offense). In this case, we agree with the district court that based on the circumstances presented, more than one criminal episode occurred — one in the living room when Paul first entered and the next after Paul invited the boy back to a more private room. Accordingly, the court may impose separate convictions and sentences for each criminal episode. The trial court, however, imposed two separate convictions for each criminal episode. The Fourth District reversed these dual convictions based on double jeopardy grounds, and the State contests this decision. To review this matter, we must apply the Blockbur-ger test to each criminal episode to determine whether multiple punishments are authorized.

The first criminal episode occurred in the living room when Paul first entered the home. Specifically at issue are two counts: (1) count I — lewd and lascivious molestation by touching the victim’s genital area or the clothing covering it in violation of section 800.04(5)(a); and (2) count V — lewd and lascivious conduct by kissing the victim’s neck in violation of section 800.04(6)(a). In order for multiple convictions to be permitted under these two counts pursuant to section 775.021(4)(a), i.e., the “same elements” test, each offense is considered separate “if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.” § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, we must review the necessary elements of each violation under the statute itself. In comparing the elements of sections 800.04(5)(a) and 800.04(6)(a), we hold the same elements test will not permit multiple convictions. Specifically, section 800.04(6)(a)(1) defines “lewd or lascivious conduct” as any intentional touching of “a person under 16 years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner,” while section 800.04(5)(a) defines “lewd or lascivious molestation” as the intentional touching “in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a person less than 16 years of age, or forces or entices a person under 16 years of age to so touch the perpetrator.” § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1999). In other words, any violation of subsection (5)(a), which prohibits the lewd touching of particular body parts of a person under sixteen years- of age, will also violate subsection (6)(a), which simply prohibits any lewd touching of a person under sixteen years of age. . Thus, one cannot say “each offense has an element that the other does not.” While subsection (5)(a) has an element that subsection (6)(a) does not, the converse is not true — -that (6)(a)(1) has an element (5)(a) does not. Therefore, dual convictions and punishments are not permitted for these violations.

Next, the Court must consider whether multiple convictions and punishments are permitted for the criminal episode which transpired in the bedroom: (1) count TV — lewd and lascivious conduct by rubbing his penis on the victim’s stomach in violation of section 800.04(6)(a); and (2) count VI — lewd and lascivious exhibition by intentionally exposing his penis to the victim in violation of section 800.04(7). Specifically, these convictions occurred for the same act — in rubbing his penis against the victim, Paul automatically had to expose his penis. The relevant portions of .the statute provide:

(6) LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT.—
(a) A person who:
1. Intentionally touches a person under 16 years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner; ... commits lewd or lascivious conduct.
(7) LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS EXHIBITION.—
(a) A person who:
2. Intentionally exposes the genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner; ... in the presence of a victim who is less than 16 years of age, commits lewd or lascivious exhibition.

§ 800.04,. Fla. Stat. (1999). Under the “same elements” test, each of these provisions does require separate elements that the other does not. Under subsection (6)(a), a defendant must simply touch a person under sixteen years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner — the touching does not mean that the offender has to exhibit any genitals in order to commit this violation. Under subsection (7)(a), a defendant violates the statute if he intentionally exposes his genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner — no touching is required at all. Accordingly, while Paul engaged in only one act that violated both subsections at the same time, he can still be convicted of both violations unless the offenses come within one of the exceptions in subsection (4)(b).

As addressed above, section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits multiple convictions and punishments for: “(1) [o]ffenses which require identical elements of proof; (2) [o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute; [and] (3) [o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 775.021(4)(b)(1), which concerns offenses that “require identical elements of proof,” does not apply here. Violating section 800.04(6) requires a touching, and violating section 800.04(7) requires an exhibition of the offender’s genitals. Hence, although both crimes occurred based on the same act, the offenses themselves do not require identical elements of proof.

The next exception is subsection 775.021(4)(b)(2), which prohibits multiple convictions and punishments for “[o]f-fenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.” In Florida, this Court’s most recent case addressing this exception, the Court looked to whether both crimes intend to punish the same primary evil. Specifically, in Florida, the defendant was convicted of both aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and attempted second-degree murder with a firearm after he shot a police officer. Id. at 944. This Court rejected the claim that attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery were degree variants of the crime of injuring someone, holding that attempted murder punishes the potential of the defendant’s act to cause death, whereas aggravated battery punishes the act of injuring another person. Id. at 949 (relying on the analysis set forth in Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 23 (Fla.2001)).

In turning our attention to the case at hand, we note that both lewd or lascivious conduct and lewd or lascivious exhibition stem from the same crime of lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of child. In 1999, the Legislature delineated the crime of lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault upon a child into separate crimes: subsection 800.04(6) prohibits lewd or lascivious conduct upon a child; and subsection 800.04(7) prohibits lewd or lascivious exhibition upon or in the presence of a child. We find that both crimes are not intended to punish the same primary evil but that the different subsections address different evils: one forbids lewd or lascivious exhibition; and the other prohibits lewd or lascivious touching. Thus, the two crimes are not merely degree variants of the same core offense and do not come within the exception to the requirement of separate convictions set out in section 775.021(4)(b)(2).

The last exception to consider is in subsection 775.021(4)(b)(3), which applies to “[o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” § 775.021(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). As this Court recently stressed in Florida, 894 So.2d at 947, “subsection (4)(b)(3) applies only to necessarily lesser included offenses,” which have been defined as “those [offenses] in which the elements of the lesser offense are always subsumed within the greater, without regard to the charging document or evidence at trial.” Id. In this case, lewd or lascivious conduct does not necessarily include lewd or lascivious exhibition. The only reason why the two were charged based on the one act in the bedroom is because Paul conducted the prohibited touching with his genitals, therefore also exposing his genitals in the process of touching the victim. However, if he had simply touched the victim’s stomach in a lewd manner with any other portion of his body, he would have only violated 800.04(6). Because the determination regarding a necessarily lesser included offense is confined to the statutory elements of the crime and does not consider the evidence at trial, double jeopardy is not violated by these two convictions.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we approve in part the decision of the district court, to the extent that it found two criminal episodes occurred and that Paul could not be convicted of both a violation of section 800.04(6)(a)(1), Florida Statutes, and section 800.04(5)(a), Florida Statutes, for the acts which occurred in the living room. However, we quash the district court’s determination that application of section 775.021 prohibits convictions of both section 800.04(6)(a) (lewd and lascivious conduct) and section 800.04(7) (lewd and lascivious exhibition) for the acts that occurred in the bedroom. We further disapprove the decision in Hunsicker to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. The case is hereby-remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., concur.

CANTERO, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

CANTERO, J.,

specially concurring.

I concur in the majority’s result and much of its reasoning. I must admit discomfort, however, with our continued reliance on the “same evil” test articulated in Carawan v. State, 515 -So.2d 161 (Fla.1987), but abrogated the following year by statutory amendment. See ch. 88-131, § 7, Laws of Fla. The statute does not mention any such test. It simply prohibits separate punishments for crimes that “are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute” § 775.021(4)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). I would apply the plain meaning of that language. The Legislature intends to disallow separate punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal transaction only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees. By looking beyond the statute to decipher whether the crimes target the “same evil,” the majority defies legislative intent.

The purpose of double jeopardy protections is not to restrict, but to respect, the Legislature’s authority to decide when multiple sentences may be imposed. As the majority acknowledges, see majority op. at 1171-72, we have consistently held that “[i]n determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions and sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction, the dispositive question is whether the legislature ‘intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.’ ” M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996) (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)). Because legislative intent is not always clear from the statutory language, the United States Supreme Court has designed a test to resolve ambiguities. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under that test, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. The Supreme Court has cautioned that this test is “not a constitutional rule requiring courts to negate clearly expressed legislative intent,” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983), but merely a “rule -of statutory construction” used to ascertain legislative intent when it has not been clearly manifested. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137.

In Florida, the Legislature has codified this test as a rule of statutory construction, see § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1999), thereby clarifying its intent and eliminating the need to rely on Blockburger. The statute explains that “[t]he intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity ... to determine legislative intent.” Id. § 775.021(4)(b). Consistent with this objective, a defendant “shall be sentenced separately” for multiple offenses arising from one criminal episode as long as “each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.” Id. § 775.021(4)(a). The statute contains three, and only three, exceptions. The Legislature does not intend to allow separate sentencing for related offenses that (1) “require identical elements of proof,” (2) “are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute,” or (3) “are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” Id. § 775.021(4)(b). I agree with the majority’s straightforward application of the first and third exceptions. My disagreement concerns only the exception for degree variants of an offense (subsection (4)(b)(2)).

Continuing a strange but steady tradition in our caselaw, the majority interprets the degree-variant exception to mean that separate punishments cannot be imposed where “both crimes intend to punish the same primary evil.” Majority op. at 1175. I consider this interpretation strange because, in amending section 775.021 in 1988, the Legislature clearly intended to abrogate our 1987 decision in Carawan, 515 So.2d at 161, which applied that test. Ca-rawan held that “where the accused is charged under two statutory provisions that manifestly address the same evil and no clear evidence of legislative intent exists, the most reasonable conclusion usually is that the legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments.” Id. at 168. We have acknowledged more than once that the Legislature subsequently rejected this holding. See Boler v. State, 678 So.2d 319, 322 (Fla.1996) (explaining that “the 1988 amendment of section 775.021(4) was intended to override our previous decision in Garawan ”); State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla.1989) (deeming it “readily apparent that the legislature does not agree with our interpretation of legislative intent and the rules of construction set forth in Carawan ”). Nevertheless, rather than simply applying the plain language of the statute, we continue to apply the “same evil” test.

The statute itself creates an exception for crimes that “are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.” § 775.021(4)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). By its very language, this exception is intended to apply narrowly. It prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense. See Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153, 156 (Fla.1994) (Grimes, J., dissenting) (highlighting the phrase “as provided by statute” and concluding that the “Court’s obligation is to apply the statute as it is written”). One example is the theft statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of petit theft. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005): Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§ 782.04, 782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. See id. § 806.01. It is in such cases, and only such cases, that the exception was intended to apply. That is why in Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001), after expressing concern that “[e]xtended to its logical extreme, a broad reading of Sir-mons and the [degree-variant] exception would render section 775.021 a nullity,” id. at 23, we noted that “exceptions for homicides ... and theft, where the nature of the crime is often defined by degree of the violation, are consistent with the limited statutory exception.” Id. (emphasis added).

Although the majority’s application of the “same evil” test departs from the plain language of the statutory exception, it does have the support of precedent. After the statutory amendments in 1988, for a while we applied the plain meaning of the exception — for example, classifying grand theft of goods and grand theft of a firearm as degree variants because under statute “[t]he degree of the crime of theft'depends on what was taken.” Johnson v. State, 597 So.2d 798, 799 (Fla.1992). But we soon (and without explanation) reverted to the pre-amendment “same evil” test. In Sir-mons, we classified two crimes as degree variants because they were “based on the same core offense.” 634 So.2d at 154. Three dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Grimes, warned that “[t]he effect of this decision is to slide back into the Carawan analysis which the Legislature rejected in its 1988 amendment to section 775.021.” Id. at 156-57 (Grimes, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). They were right. In Gordon, 780 So.2d at 17, we even revived Carawan’s language, refusing to apply the degree-variant exception because “the separate evils [of the crimes] are sufficiently distinct-that they warrant separate punishment.” Id. at 23. Last year, in State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941 (Fla.2005), following Gordon, we held that two crimes could be punished separately because each had its own “primary evil.” Id. at 949. Today the majority follows Gordon and Florida, holding that the degree-variant exception focuses on “whether both crimes intend to punish the same primary evil.” Majority op. at 1175.

In deference to precedent, I did not object when we applied the “same evil” analysis in Florida. I have come to the conclusion, however, that this analysis departs so dramatically from the plain meaning of the statute — and from the Legislature’s obvious intent to abrogate that test — that we should reevaluate those cases. Not only does the “same evil” test fail to respect the plain language of the statute; and not only does continued application of the test, in light of our admission that the statutory amendments abrogated it, fail to acknowledge the supremacy of legislative intent in double jeopardy analysis; but the test itself is infinitely vague and malleable, and therefore offers much less clarity than straightforward application of the statute.

The statutory exception is easy to apply, requiring courts to determine only whether the criminal code provides for degree variants of a single offense. The same cannot be said for the majority’s “same evil” test, which invites courts to reflect abstractly on the evils targeted by various crimes. How does one even decide which evil is “primary” under the majority’s approach? Consider the crimes in this case: lewd or lascivious conduct and lewd or lascivious exhibition. The majority concludes that the primary evils of those crimes are “exhibition” and “touching.” Majority op. at 1175. But one could just as well conclude that the two crimes are directed toward the same evil of lewd or lascivious conduct toward children. Either position can be rationally defended. Unlike the statutory rule, which is clear and narrow, the “same evil” standard is broad and blurry. As happened in this case, it will continue to spawn litigation and inter-district conflict about whether particular crimes address the same evil. The statutory amendments were intended to remove such ambiguity and establish a bright line. Today we (once again) fail to capitalize on that opportunity.

Were the Legislature in an ironic mood, it could accuse us of committing the same evil today that we committed in Carawan. My preference would be simply to follow the Legislature’s own directive, limiting the degree-variant exception to cases where the Legislature has literally “provided by statute” that multiple crimes are “degrees of the same offense.” The Legislature has not done so with respect to the crimes here — i.e., lewd or lascivious conduct and lewd or lascivious exhibition. See § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1999). I therefore agree with the majority’s conclusion that those crimes cannot be considered degree variants. In reaching that conclusion, I see no need to ponder their primary evils. In all other respects, I concur with the majority.

WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While the [Double Jeopardy] Clause itself simply states that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,” the decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator.

Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981).

Under the Court’s decision today, one who exposes and then uses his penis to commit a sexual touching of a victim in a single episode may be convicted of two crimes under section 800.04, Florida Statutes. As I stated when last we sailed the double jeopardy seas, “[s]omething is wrong with this picture — and with the underlying analysis.” State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941, 950 (Fla.2005) (Pariente, C.J., dissenting). In his specially concurring opinion in this case, Justice Cantero agrees with the majority’s destination, but questions its route. He would limit the application of section 775.021(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2005), which precludes separate convictions of “[ojffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute” for a defendant’s act or acts in a single episode, to statutory offenses in which the Legislature has made a degree relationship explicit. His approach comes closer to the statutory languáge than the majority’s “primary evil” construction of this exception. However, it yields the same illogical results — multiple convictions for what is at heart a single crime. Therefore, I cannot sign on for the voyage. Instead, we should return to the “core offense” analysis employed by the Court in construing section 775.021(4)(b)(2) in Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994).

In Florida, the Court affirmed convictions of aggravated battery and attempted second-degree murder for the act of firing a single gunshot that struck and injured the victim. Applying the “primary evil” test from Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001), to section 775.021(4)(b)(2), the majority concluded that the crime of attempted murder punishes the potential to cause death, whereas the crime of aggravated battery punishes an actual, noncon-sensual touching or striking. Florida, 894 So.2d at 949.

Justice Cantero concurred in the majority opinion in Florida, but now questions its “primary evil” test under section 775.021(4)(b)(2). I have been in his shoes. In my dissenting opinion in Florida, I acknowledged that my views had changed since I concurred in approving multiple convictions under the “primary evil” analysis in Gordon. 894 So.2d at 951 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting). I noted that Gordon departed from our precedent applying section 775.021(4)(b)(2), which provides an exception for degrees of the same offense as provided by statute to the Legislature’s intent to authorize convictions and sentences for each offense committed in a criminal episode. Tracing a line of decisions that started with Sirmons but was effectively abandoned in Gordon, I noted that courts had derived “core offenses” from a number of crimes currently codified in the criminal laws, not merely those initially identified in Justice -Kogan’s concurring opinion in Sirmons. Florida, 894 So.2d at 950-51. I determined that

where the two convictions are for offenses that are merely aggravated forms of the same underlying offense, only a single conviction is, proper under section 775.021(4)(b)(2). Both the rule and the exceptions can retain a reasonable field of operation without arbitrarily limiting core offenses to a narrow few.
Therefore, I conclude that Gordon’s focus on whether convictions punish the same “primary evil,” 780 So.2d at 23, rather than on whether they constitute “degree variants of the core offense,” Sirmons, 634 So.2d at 154, was improper.

Id. at 951 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting).

Justice Cantero views the “same evil” and “core offense” tests as two sides of the same coin, but I consider them distinct. As I stated in Florida, I would discard the former in favor of the latter. See 894 So.2d at 952. Lewd exposure and lewd touching are separate evils within the meaning of Florida and Gordon, which found battery and attempted murder to be separate evils, but they derive from the same core offense of lewd or lascivious conduct involving children. The core offense in section 800.04 is set forth in the title of the statute, “Lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age.” The core offense is also evident in the 1983 version of the statute, before the first of several substantive revisions:

Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree. ...

§ 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1983). The current version of the statute has subsections that distinguish battery, molestation, conduct, and exhibition, and vary the penalty based on the ages of the perpetrator and victim, but the nature of the conduct making up this crime is essentially the same. Paul’s convictions of lewd or lascivious molestation, conduct (two counts), and exhibition are thus merely degree variants of this core crime.

Relying on the Legislature’s limitation of the exception in section 775.021(4)(b)(2) to “[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute ” (emphasis supplied), Justice Cantero would confine the analysis to statutory offenses— both those in which the degree relationship is obvious, such as theft, homicide, and arson, and those in which “[ojther statutory designations ... evince a relationship of degree.” Specially concurring op. at 1178 & note 5. However, this interpretation yields illogical results: separate convictions for lewd exhibition of the defendant’s penis followed by a lewd touching with the penis, as in this case, and for aggravated battery and attempted murder based on a single episode of stabbing, shooting, or beating, as in Florida. Justice Cantero’s approach would also allow separate convictions for murder and aggravated battery arising from a single lethal attack, eon-trary to the current law of the state. See Campbell-Eley v. State, 718 So.2d 327, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that conviction for second-degree murder and aggravated battery on pregnant woman based on infliction of multiple stab wounds in single homicidal assault violated double jeopardy); Laines v. State, 662 So.2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (concluding that killing of victim with “a series of rapid-fire violent acts” in a single transaction violated only the second-degree murder statute and not also the aggravated battery statute), receded from on other grounds by Grene v. State, 702 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); cf. Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 198 (Fla.2005) (concluding that in light of fact that defendant delivered single stabbing blow that resulted in infant’s death, aggravated child abuse based on aggravated battery merged into infant’s homicide and could not be used as aggravating factor in death case), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2294, 164 L.Ed.2d 820 (2006).

Courts are obligated to apply statutory language that is clear and unambiguous according to its plain meaning. Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.2005). The divergent judicial interpretations given section 775.021(4)(b)(2) by the Court in cases such as Sirmons and Gordon, and now by Justice Cantero in this case, reflect an innate ambiguity in the statutory language. I cannot resolve this ambiguity in section 775.021(4)(b)(2) in favor of a construction that would authorize convictions for either murder or attempted murder and an aggravated battery inherent in the murder or attempted murder. Nor can I construe this provision to permit the equally illogical result of separate convictions for a progression of lewd or lascivious acts in a single episode that violate separate subsections of section 800.04. Therefore, I would return to the Simons line of precedent and an interpretation of section 775.021(4)(b)(2) that exempts from the presumption of multiple convictions those statutory offenses that , are degree variants of a common core offense.

■ The Second and Fourth Districts have reached similar conclusions, albeit without engaging in “core offense” analysis. Reviewing its precedent, the Fourth District

recognized that where a defendant is charged with lewd and lascivious battery, the different acts of touching are to be viewed with reference to the spatial and temporal aspects of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the defendant had time to pause, reflect, and form a new criminal intent between occurrences. In each case, the sex acts in question occurred in a single episode and a single location, with one act immediately following the other, with no temporal breaks, and without the requisite time for the defendant to pause and reflect in order to form a second criminal intent.

Paul v. State, 912 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citations omitted). The Second District, reversing two of three convictions under section 800.04 for handling and fondling that preceded intercourse on each of four occasions, concluded that “[t]he constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits multiple convictions for lewd and lascivious acts that are not sufficiently discrete to be deemed separate offenses.” Gisi v. State, 909 So.2d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

In this case, Paul committed “one continuous and almost simultaneous act of lewd and lascivious activity on a minor.” Paul, 912 So.2d at 11. I agree with the majority that Paul’s conduct in the living room, in which he touched the victim’s genital area outside his clothing and kissed his neck, constituted one offense of “lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age” under the “separate elements” test in section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). I also agree that Paul’s acts in the bedroom of exposing his penis and rubbing his penis on the victim’s stomach violated sections 800.04(6)(a) and 800.04(7), which have different elements, necessitating analysis under the three exceptions in section 775.021(4)(b) to the legislative preference for separate convictions. I dissent in part because the majority, employing the flawed “primary evil” analysis of Florida and Gordon rather than the “core offense” analysis of the Sirmons line of cases, does not recognize that these violations constitute only one additional offense under section 775.021(4)(b)(2). For the reasons explained in this opinion and my dissent in Florida, I would reverse one of the two convictions for the second of the two episodes.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

      . The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const, amend. V. Likewise, article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution provides a similar protection: "No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.

      . See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

      . Of course, if two convictions occurred based on two distinct criminal acts, double jeopardy is not a concern. See Hayes v. State, 803 So.2d 695, 700 (Fla.2001) ("[T]he prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple convictions and punishments where a defendant commits two or more distinct criminal acts.”).

      . Both section 800.04(6)(a) and section 800.04(5)(a) include specific alternative conduct. Specifically, section 800.04(6)(a) also addresses the crime of soliciting a person under age sixteen years of age to commit a lewd act, while section 800.04(5)(a) includes forcing or enticing a person under sixteen years of age to touch the perpetrator. As this Court held in Gibbs v. State, 698 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.1997), when courts are reviewing whether double jeopardy is violated based on an alternative conduct statute, the court must break the conduct elements into the specific alternative conduct which is in the other statute being compared and cannot consider the entire range of conduct proscribed by the statute, which in this case would include both offensive touching and offensive solicitation. Such a situation must be differentiated from a case in which the defendant is charged with both solicitation and touching. Thus, "if prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Id. at 1210.

      . I do not mean to imply that the Legislature must use the magic word "degree” in defining the crime in order for the degree-variant exception to apply. Other statutory designations could also evince a relationship of degree, such as when a crime has an ordinary form and an aggravated form.

      . In her partial dissent, Chief Justice Pariente argues that we could have and should have prevented the "core offense” analysis from sliding back into the "same evil” analysis. While acknowledging that my textual interpretation of the degree-variant exception "comes closer to the statutory language than the majority's ‘primary evil’ construction,” she contends that a "core offense” analysis would be even better because it would prevent "illogical results — multiple convictions for what is at heart a single crime.” Concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 1180. As I explained earlier, however, the Legislature has full authority to decide whether to allow multiple sentences for a single criminal transaction. Our most reliable guide to legislative intent is the statutory language. Because the "core offense” analysis has no firmer a statutory foundation than the majority’s "primary evil” analysis, I reject them both.

      . Significant revisions to section 800.04 took place in 1984, 1990, and 1999. See ch. 99-201, § 6, Laws of Fla.; ch. 90-120, § 1, Laws of Fla.; ch. 84-86, § 5, Laws of Fla.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    YOUR DRUGGIST, INC., Petitioner, v. Robert POWERS, etc., Respondent. B.A.L. Pharmacy, etc., Petitioner, v. Robert Powers, etc., Respondent.
    Nos. SC05-1191, SC05-1192.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.

      Scott A. Cole and Maria Trejos Klep-pinger of Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A., Miami, FL, and Mark L. Pomeranz of Pomeranz and Associates, P.A., North Miami, FL; and Jonathan M. Matzner and Jay B. Green of Green, Ackerman and Frost, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, for Petitioners.
    Peter Herman and Stephanie D. Alexander of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondents.
    Hala Sandridge of Fowler, White, Boggs and Banker, P.A., Tampa, FL on behalf of Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance; Katherine E. Giddings, Joseph W. Hatchett, Martin R. Dix, and James E. Joanos of Akerman Senterfitt, Tallahassee, FL on behalf of The Florida Retail Federation and The National Association of Chain Drug Stores; and Kelley B. Gelb of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone, Buser, Sla-ma, Hancock, Liberman and McKee, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL on behalf of The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, for Amici Curiae.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review Powers v. Thobhani, 903 So.2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision which the district court of appeal certified to be in direct conflict with decisions of two other district courts pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. Upon further consideration, we have determined that there is no actual conflict and that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction of this cause. Accordingly, this review proceeding is hereby dismissed.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, C.J., recused.


text:
    CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON, Petitioner, v. T. Alec RIGBY, Respondent.
    No. SC05-1725.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.
    Eric Saida of Duane Morris, LLP, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Joseph M. Matthews of Colson Hicks Eidson, Coral Gables, FL, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

We originally accepted jurisdiction to review Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 907 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Upon further consideration, we have determined that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. Accordingly, this review proceeding is hereby dismissed.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leticia CALLARD, et al., Appellants, v. Braulio L. BAEZ, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC06-331.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.
    Leticia and Jorge L. Callard, pro se, Miami, FL, for Appellant.
    Samantha M. Cibula and David E. Smith, Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, and David M. Lee, Florida Power and Light Law Department, Juno Beach, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We have on appeal a decision of the Florida Public Service Commission. We find that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because it concerns a dispute over charges for electricity supplied to an individual residence. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. We thus transfer this appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. See § 350.128(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., dissents.


text:
    George MAY, Petitioner, v. Patrick C. BARTHET, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC04-2270.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 22, 2006.

      George May, pro se, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Petitioner.
    John R. Hart and Michael K. Winston of Carlton Fields, P.A., on behalf of Mandalay Resorts Group, Inc., West Palm Beach, FL; Patrick C. Barthet and Paul D. Breit-ner of the Barthet Firm, Miami, FL, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

On November 18, 2004, petitioner George May filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in May v. Barthet, 886 So.2d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), which has been treated as a notice to invoke this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction. Since his initial filing in this case, May also has filed a “Petition for Extra Ordinary Writ Awarding Treble the Amount of All Contract’s that Are Pending in All Cases in All State of Florida Courts in Damages for George May, and His Joint Venture Partners and Against all Defendant’s Including Case Number Case No: CA 04 8739 AN, Which is Part of this Case Herein” and a “Notice of the Automatic Payment of all Attorney Fee’s, Costs by the State of Florida, Required by Florida Statutes § 73.092.” Additionally, since March 2004, May has initiated eleven other proceedings in this Court. The Court has never granted May the relief he has requested in any of these various proceedings. See May v. Bender Farms, Inc., 904 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2005) (mandamus petition denied); May v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 907 So.2d 518 (Fla.2005) (mandamus petition denied); May v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt, 906 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2005) (mandamus petition denied); May v. Patrissy, 902 So.2d 790 (Fla.2005) (petition for review denied); May v. Turner Groves Ltd. P’ship, 906 So.2d 1059 (Fla.2005) (mandamus petition denied); May v. Martino, 903 So.2d 189 (Fla.2005) (petition for review dismissed); May v. 711 Group, L.C., 900 So.2d 553 (Fla.2005) (mandamus petition denied); May v. Curtis, 891 So.2d 551 (Fla.2004) (petition for review dismissed); May v. Lumpkin, 890 So.2d 1115 (Fla.2004) (petition for review dismissed); May v. Allapattah Props. P’ship, 888 So.2d 622 (Fla.2004) (petition for review denied); May v. Int’l Game Tech., Inc., 873 So.2d 1223 (Fla.2004) (petition for review dismissed). Most if not all of these petitions were devoid of merit, as is the instant petition.

Moreover, the Court notes that other state and federal courts have imposed sanctions on May for initiating multiple frivolous pro se proceedings. See May v. Hatter, No. 00-4115-CIV-MOORE, 2001 WL 579782 (S.D.Fla. May 15, 2001), at *1, *4-*5 (noting the need to impose a more restrictive sanction due to May’s violations of the court’s prior order and barring May from initiating future actions in the court without first obtaining leave therefrom); In re May, No. 00-2266-CIV-JORDAN, 2000 WL 1276943, at *4 (S.D.Fla. Aug.31, 2000) (ordering that May is “enjoined from filing any more frivolous, baseless, or repetitive lawsuits in this or any federal district court” and that he post a $1500 contempt bond before filing any other lawsuits in the court); May v. Barthet, No. 4D04-2800 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec.3, 2004) (barring May from filing any further appeals or petitions in the court unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar); May v. Allapattah Properties P’ship, No. 04-675 CA (Fla. 19th Cir.Ct. Jan. 24, 2005) (barring May from filing any further pleadings in the court unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar); May v. Bar-thet, No. 502004 CA004938 XXXXMB (Fla. 15th Cir.Ct. July 15, 2004) (barring May from commencing any further pro se actions in the court without first obtaining leave therefrom); May v. Glassman, No. 98-005841 AB (Fla. 15th Cir.Ct. Dec. 18, 1998) (barring May from filing any further pleadings in the court unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar or without first obtaining written approval from the court).

Due to his numerous meritless petitions filed in this Court, May was ordered, on April 25, 2006, to show cause why this Court should not find that he has abused the legal system and impose upon him a sanction for such abuse, including but not limited to directing the Clerk of this Court to reject for filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions, letters, documents, or other filings submitted to this Court by him unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar.

May has not responded to this Court’s order to show cause and therefore has failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant. See, e.g., Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); In re Sin-dram, 498 U.S. 177, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989); Sibley v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S268, — So.2d -, 2006 WL 1096636 (Fla. Apr. 27, 2006); Armstead v. State, 817 So.2d 841 (Fla.2002); Peterson v. State, 817 So.2d 838 (Fla.2002); Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So.2d 398 (Fla.2001); Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1998); Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1995). One justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to timely review of their legitimate filings. See Martin, 506 U.S. at 3, 113 S.Ct. 397 (imposing sanction where petitioner’s filings for certiorari review had a deleterious effect on the Court’s fair allocation of judicial resources); see also Peterson, 817 So.2d at 840 (“This Court has a responsibility to ensure every citizen’s right of access to the courts.... A limitation on [the petitioner’s] ability to file would further the constitutional right to access for other litigants because it would permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims filed by others.”). As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184, 109 S.Ct. 993.

Upon a thorough review of May’s filings in this Court, we conclude that May has abused the processes of the Court and has hindered the ability of this Court to properly resolve those matters that are properly before the Court. We conclude that on this record, sanctions are merited. Accordingly, in order to preserve the right of access for all litigants and promote the interests of justice, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to reject for filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents or other filings submitted by George May unless signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Under the sanction herein imposed, May is not wholesale being denied access to the courts. He may petition the Court through the assistance of counsel whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith. However, May’s frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come to an end. Further, if George May submits a filing in violation of this order, he may be subjected to further contempt proceedings or other appropriate sanctions.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, C.J., recused.

      . The Fourth District considered a challenge to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's application of the Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2003), to the petitioner. The Fourth District found that May was previously barred from filing pro se matters in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit without obtaining that court’s authorization or the signature of an attorney. However, the clerk of the circuit court had accidentally accepted and filed a complaint submitted by May. In response, the defendants filed a notice pursuant to the Vexatious Litigant Law that creates a procedure for correcting such errors. The trial court ultimately dismissed the complaint after May failed to appear at a hearing on the notice. The Fourth District affirmed the decision of the trial court. Further, finding that May had caused the court to expend an unreasonable amount of judicial resources on his frivolous claims, the Fourth District ordered May to show cause why he should not be barred from further pro se appeals in the Fourth District without the signature of an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. May, 886 So.2d at 324-26.

      . By separate orders issued simultaneously with this opinion, we have dismissed May’s petition for review and. disposed of May's other filings in this case.