author: JOHNSON, Justice. CALOGERO, Chief Justice, KNOLL, Justice, WEIMER, J.,

text:
    Calvin RABALAIS and Merion Rabalais v. Lloyd A. NASH, Jr., et al.
    No. 2006-C-0999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 9, 2007.

      Coughig Partners, Scott E. Mercer, James D. Prescott, III, Simoneaux, Carle-ton, Dunlap & Olinde, Henry D. H. Olinde, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Applicant.
    Brian Caubarreaux and Associates, Brian M. Caubarreaux, Marksville, Derrick G. Earles, for Respondent.
   JOHNSON, Justice.

_[iThis is a personal injury case involving an emergency vehicle that was returning to the scene of a fire. As a result of his injuries, Calvin and Merion Rabalais sued Lloyd A. Nash, the City of Marksville through the Marksville Fire Department, and the fire department’s insurance carrier, American Alternative Insurance Corporation. The trial jury found Mr. Rabalais to be 100% at fault for the accident. Mr. Rabalis filed a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or Motion for New trial. The trial court subsequently denied this combined motion. Ra-balais appealed this ruling. The court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part the jury’s finding. Rabalais v. Nash, Jr., et al, 05-0937(La.App.3Cir.3/29/06), 926 So.2d 683.

Defendants filed this writ of certiorari, which we granted, to determine the applicability of the Louisiana Emergency Vehicle Statute, LSA-R.S. 32:24(B). Rabalais v. Nash, Jr., et al, 06-0999(La.6/30/06) 933 So.2d 130. Under the | ^circumstances, we find that LSA-R.S. 32:24, is applicable and that Nash’s actions are covered by the statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2002, the Marksville Fire Department responded to a fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant, which is located on the west side of Highway One, or Tunica Drive, in Marksville, Louisiana. The fire was one of the largest in the history of Avoyelles Parish and because of the size and intensity, the fire department requested the assistance of seven neighboring fire departments from Mansura, Hesser, Bunk-ie, Fifth Ward, Moreuville, Brouilette and Pineville. There were reports that the smoke from the fire could be observed in Morganza, Louisiana, which is approximately 40 to 45 miles away, and that the smoke could be seen as far away as the LSU Campus in Alexandria, Louisiana. Because of this huge fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant, the traffic on Highway One, north bound, was mostly stopped or moving bumper to bumper.

Mr. Rabalais was attempting to make a left hand turn onto Highway One, which is at this point, a two lane north-south highway, with a turning lane in between the two lanes of traffic. Mr. Rabalais was leaving the parking lot of Glenn’s Auto Repair Shop, which is located on the west side of Highway One, approximately one half-mile north of the Jen-Re Plastics Plant. Mr. Rabalais testified that he intended to travel north to Wal-Mart, which required crossing the southbound lane of traffic, the turning lane, and then turning left into the northbound lane of Highway One.

Mr. Earl Guillory, a motorist in the southbound lane of traffic, one of the named defendants herein, testified that he was stopped just before the driveway to Glenn’s Auto Repair Shop, creating a gap in the line of stopped cars for Mr. Rabalais to pass through. According to Guillory, Mr. Rabalais was stopped at the end of the |adriveway, then he “shot right out in front of me” and “all I seen was a truck, zoom.”

Because the traffic was so congested on the southbound lane of Highway One directly in front of the auto repair shop, Mr. Rabalais’ vision of traffic in the turning lane was obscured by the line of stopped vehicles. According to Mr. Rabalais, Mr. Guillory signaled to him that it was okay to pull out of the driveway. Mr. Rabalais testified that at the time his vehicle was entering the turning lane he looked to his right in anticipation of his lefthand turn into the northbound lane of Highway One. He admitted that he never looked to his left to see whether any ears were coming from the left before he entered the turning lane.

Just as Mr. Rabalais was attempting to make his lefthand turn, defendant Nash, a Captain with the Marksville Fire Department, was traveling south in the center turning lane of Highway One, returning to the Jen-Re Plastics Plant fire in a Marks-ville Fire Department pick-up truck. The pickup truck driven by Nash was painted red, marked with the fire department name and insignia, and had a bank of emergency lights on top of the cab. Nash testified that he had activated the truck’s emergency lights and sirens. Gretchen Laborde and Lee Bordelon, two motorists stopped on Highway One, both testified to Nash’s use of emergency lights and sirens. Firefighter Mark Bordelon was driving a fire engine pumper truck and was following behind Nash. Mr. Rabalais traveled directly into Nash’s path in the center turning lane, where the vehicles collided. Mr. Rabalais was rendered unconscious and sustained serious injuries as a result of this collision.

The court of appeal affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the ruling of the trial court. The court of appeal reasoned that there were no facts or evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that the applicability of the Louisiana Emergency Vehicle Statute, LSA-R.S. 32:24, was appropriate. The court of appeal found Lmanifest error, and after de novo review, reversed the decision of the trial court and allocated 50% fault to Nash and the Marksville Fire Department and 50% fault to Mr. Rabalais. Further, the court of appeal awarded the following damages: Mr. Rabalais $62,500.00 in general damages and $17,667.53 in past medical expenses, and to Mrs. Merion Rabalais $12,500.00 for loss of consortium.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

It is well-settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 601 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). To reverse a fact-finder’s determination, the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987). Where the jury’s findings are reasonable, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse. Even where the court of appeal is convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently to reach a different result, reversal of the trial court is improper unless the trial court’s ruling is manifestly erroneous, or clearly wrong. Blair, supra.

The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact-finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. See Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Cosse v. Allen-Bradley Co., 601 So.2d 1349, 1351 (La.1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La.1990). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, supra.

Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences | sare more reasonable than the fact-finder’s, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell, supra; Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness’s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit the witness’s story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, supra.

In Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522(La.l/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, this Court addressed the standard of care set forth in subsection D of Louisiana’s emergency vehicle statute stating that:

LSA-R.S.32:24(D) sets out two standards of care for an emergency vehicle driver depending on the circumstances of the case. If, and only if, an emergency vehicle driver’s actions fit into subsections A, B and C of LSA-R.S.32:24, will an emergency vehicle driver be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C of LSA-R.S. 32:24, such driver’s actions will be gauged by a standard of “due care.”

The failure of “due care” is synonymous with ordinary negligence. “Reckless disregard,” however, connotes conduct more severe than negligent behavior. “Reckless disregard” is, in effect, “gross negligence.” Louisiana courts have frequently addressed the concept of gross negligence. Gross negligence has been defined as the “want of even slight care and diligence” and the “want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise.” Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Department Ambulance Service, 93-3099, 93-3110 and 93-3112(La. 7/5/94),639 So.2d 216; State v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917 (La.1942). Gross negligence has also been termed the “entire absence of care” and[f,the “utter disregard of the of prudence, amounting to complete neglect of the rights of others.” Hendry Corp. v. Aircraft Rescue Vessels, 113 F.Supp. 198 (E.D.La.1953) (applying Louisiana law). Additionally, gross negligence has been described as an “extreme departure from ordinary care or the want of even scant care.” W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 34, at 211 (5th ed. 1984); 65 CJ.S. Negligence, § 8(4)(a), at 539-40 (1966 & Supp. 1993). “There is often no clear distinction between such [willful, wanton, or reckless] conduct and ‘gross’ negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning.” Falkowski v. Maurus, 637 So.2d 522 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1176 (La.1993) (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 214). Gross negligence, therefore, has a well-defined legal meaning distinctly separate, and different, from ordinary negligence. “Reckless disregard” or “gross negligence” is the standard to be applied if the emergency vehicle driver’s actions fit LSA-R.S. 32:24(A) through LSA-R.S. 32:249(c). Otherwise, the standard is ordinary negligence. Lenard, supra.

THE APPLICABILITY OF LSA-R. S. 32:24

LSA-R.S. 32:24. Emergency vehicles; exceptions provides:

A. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.
B. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter;
(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation;
(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property;
|7(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
C. The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.
D. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Defendants contend that the court of appeal erred in its interpretation of LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(4), in that the statute allows emergency vehicles to disregard the regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions. Defendants contend there are no limitations or restrictions in the statute which would prevent defendant Nash’s movement herein. They further aver that the court of appeal erred in limiting the statute to a situation where the emergency vehicle driver is driving the wrong way, down a one-way street. Defendants contend that the court of appeal’s decision limits the protection afforded to emergency vehicle drivers and the actions they may take to respond to an emergency. Further, Defendants argue that in limiting the protection afforded to emergency vehicle drivers, the decision of the court of appeal exposes emergency service providers, both public and private, to a greater likelihood of civil liability. Defendants argue that subsection (B)(4), allows emergency vehicle drivers to move around stopped traffic by using the shoulders, turning lanes, or other means to reach the scene of an emergency, as long as the driver is making use of audible or visible signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach.

Plaintiffs contend that LSA-R.S.32:24(A)(1) is not applicable to the facts of this case, because “defendant Nash was not driving a fire truck and he was driving | sin a center turning lane not designated for travel.” In fact, the lane was marked as a “no passing” lane. They also argue that the fire was no longer an emergency. Plaintiffs contend that Nash’s emergency lights and sirens were not sufficient to warn motorists of his impending approach, and he failed to exercise the proper standard . of care. Rabalais contends that as a motorist, he had the right to assume that Nash and others would follow the traffic laws and regulations. Plaintiffs argue that the statute must be strictly construed, pursuant to the principal of stricti juris..

Subsection A(l) of LSA-R.S.32:24, sets forth the circumstances in which the driver of an emergency vehicle is granted particular driving privileges. Those circumstances are when the driver is:

(1) responding to an emergency call; (2) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law; or (3) when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm.

Plaintiffs contend first that the statute is not applicable because the fire was no longer an emergency and Nash was not responding to, but instead returning from a fire. The record reflects that when the fire was initially discovered, the entire Marksville Fire Department rushed to the Jen-Re Plastics Plant. After arriving and fighting the fire for sometime, the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Fire Department determined that the fire was out of control and that they needed additional assistance and equipment to fight the fire.

Ned Bordelon, the Retired Chief of the Marksville Fire Department testified via deposition, that due to the dangerous nature of this plastics fire, assistance was requested from the Baton Rouge-Hazardous Materials (“HazMat”) team which arrived on the scene of the fire and assisted the other fire departments in extinguishing the fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant. When they arrived, they contacted the HazMat team at the Exxon Plant in Baton Rouge and requested foam | ¡¡to help extinguish this chemical fire. The foam arrived in Marksville, approximately two hours after it was requested by the HazMat team.

Ned Boredelon testified that Chris Bor-delon, Assistant Chief of the Marksville Fire Department ordered Nash and firefighter Mark Bordelon to return to the fire station in Marksville to pick up the Pumper No. 1 Fire Truck. He testified that he needed the second fire truck brought to the scene in case it was needed to help fight the fire at Jen-Re Plastics Plant.

On cross-examination, Assistant Chief Christopher Bordelon, testified he considered the fire an emergency and that it was a life or death situation for the firemen who battled the fire. Although the record is not clear as to exactly how long the fire was in progress when this collision occurred, what is clear from the photographs in evidence, is that smoke was still billowing approximately thirty (30)feet in the air at the time of this accident. Therefore, based on the uncontroverted testimony of the fire officials, we conclude that Nash was responding to an emergency when he traveled from the fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant to retrieve additional equipment to take to the fire scene.

Next, we address the issue of whether the pick-up truck driven by Nash was an emergency vehicle. We are guided by a review of the jurisprudence, where non-traditional vehicles have been held to be emergency vehicles. In Metoyer v. Benjamin, 00-1728(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01), 784 So.2d 823, the appellate court held a wrecker, with its emergency lights flashing while responding to a traffic accident, is considered an emergency vehicle, and may not be held liable for an accident in which it is involved without finding that it exhibited a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

In Prather v. Gauthreaux, 297 So.2d 439 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1974), the |inappellate court held that the driver of wrecker with 4-way flasher and emergency beacon, who had been dispatched to the scene of an automobile accident and who had been instructed to get there as soon as possible was entitled to the benefit of LSA-32:24.

In both Metoyer and Prather, the courts held that wreckers were emergency vehicles. Considering non-traditional vehicles such as wreckers have been held to be emergency vehicle for the purposes of invoking the immunity provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:24, we must conclude that an official truck of the Marksville Fire Department qualifies as an emergency vehicle. Therefore, we conclude the fire pick-up truck qualifies as a emergency vehicle.

Subsection B of LSA-R.S.32:24, lists the privileges granted to an emergency vehicle driver. These privileges allow the driver to:

(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of Chapter 32 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation
(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property; and
(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions. [Emphasis ours.]

Subsection B(4) covers two types of maneuvers, those governing the direction of movement in specified directions, and those governing turning in specified directions. The court of appeal concluded that LSA-R.S.32:24(B)(4)only applied if the driver was (a) driving down the wrong way down a one way street, or (b) involved in a turn. The court of appeal concluded that since Nash’s driving in the center turning lane was not specifically listed in LSA-32:24(B)(4), the statute was not applicable.

The court of appeal stated:
... [W]e find that Captain Nash’s actions are not covered by LSA-R.S. In32:24. He was not parking or standing, nor was he proceeding past a red or stop signal at the time of the accident. He did not exceed the speed limit. He did not drive the wrong way down a one way street, nor did his actions involve turning. At the time of the collision, Captain Nash was driving down the center turn lane of a state highway, an exception not enumerated in LSA-R.S. 32:24. Because it must be strictly construed, the list of exceptions granted to drivers of authorized emergency automobiles is exclusive, not illustrative. See Pellegrini v. Crellin, 95-2654 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 463, writ denied, 96-1592 (La.6/27/97), 696 So.2d 991. No where in the statute does it provide that the driver of an emergency vehicle may violate highway regulations and drive in the center turn lane. Therefore, Captain Nash’s actions were not granted exception under LSA-R.S. 32:24, and the statute is inapplicable in this case. [Emphasis ours].

The initial point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the law itself. Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Insurance Company, et al, 02-1138 (La.5/20/03) 851 So.2d 959; Ginn v. Woman’s Hospital Foundation, Inc., 02-1913, p. 9(La.4/9/03),842 So.2d 338, 344; Rougeau v. Hyundai Motor America, 01-1182, p. 5(La.l/15/02),805 So.2d 147, 151. Special rules for interpreting a statute (such as LSA-R.S. 32:24) have been enacted by the legislative branch and are found in LSA-R.S. 1:1 et seq.

LSA-R.S. 1:3 provides, in pertinent part that, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language.” LSA-R.S. 1:4 provided that “[w]hen the wording of a Section of a statute is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” The legislative branch also has provided general rules for interpreting laws in LSA-C.C. art. 9 et seq. See, in particular, LSA-C.C. arts. 9 and 11. We are bound by the language of a relevant law. Allen v. State, through the Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 02-1072, p. 12 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 381.

In Blair v. Tynes, supra., this Court held that the legislature has given law enforcement officers the exclusive power to regulate traffic and the public has a corresponding obligation to follow traffic regulations. Law enforcement officers are duty bound to exercise this power reasonably to protect life and limb and to refrain from causing injury or harm. When a law enforcement officer becomes aware of a dangerous traffic situation, he has the affirmative duty to see that motorists are not subjected to unreasonable risks of harm. Monceaux v. Jennings Rice Drier, Inc., 590 So.2d 672, 675 (La. App. 3rd. Cir.1991). In Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952 at 10,(La.ll/30/94), 646 So.2d 318, this Court stated that the scope of an officer’s duty is to choose a course of action which is reasonable under the circumstances. In other words, the scope of an officer’s duty to act reasonably under the circumstances does not extend so far as to require that the officer always choose the “best” or even a “better” method or approach.

The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 art. Ill, § 15(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very bill shall contain a brief title indicative of its object.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the title of a law may be examined to determine its purpose. Boutte v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Sev. Dist. No. 1, 99-2402, p. 5 (La.4/11/00), 759 So.2d 45, 49. When we interpret La. R.S. 32:24, we are bound to give effect to all parts of it and cannot give it an interpretation that makes any part of it superfluous 'or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Palmer v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, 02-2043, p. 5 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 363, 367; Hollingsworth v. City of Minden, 01-2658 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 514, 517. The Title of LSA-R.S. 32:24, is “Emergency Vehicles; Exceptions.”

11sAfter reviewing the title and substance of LSA-R.S. 32:24, we conclude that the purpose of this statute is to provide immunity from liability to drivers of emergency vehicles, under specific circumstances. When two or more interpretations may be given a law, the interpretation which is reasonable and practical is preferred to that which makes part of the law ridiculous or meaningless. Louisiana Horsemen’s Association v. Fair Grounds Corporation, First Statewide Racing Company, Inc., d/b/a Evangeline Downs, Louisiana Downs, Inc., Delta Downs Racing Association, Inc., and the Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 021928(La.4/9/03), 845 So.2d 1039; Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 01-0198,(La.6/29/01);792 So.2d 721.

In the instant case, “direction of movement” is not defined by LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(4), and is the point of contention here. Dictionaries are a valuable source for determining the “common and approved usage” of words. Louisiana Horsemen’s Assoc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 02-1928, p. 5,845 So.2d 1039, 1042. In Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, the word “movement” is defined “as the act or process of moving; especially to a change of place or position or posture; a particular instance or manner of moving”. The court of appeal concluded that the statute did not apply to Nash’s driving in the center lane, since “driving in the center turn lane” was not specifically listed in LSA-R.S. 32:24. LSA-R.S.32:24 does not specifically list “driving the wrong way down a one-way street”. Yet, in Carpenter v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 333 So.2d 296 (La.App.lst. Cir.1976), an appellate court held LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(3) and (4) authorize the driver of an emergency vehicle to exceed the speed limits and to disregard regulations governing the direction of traffic flow. The police vehicle was traveling 60 mph, and the wrong way on a major city street.

114The instant case does not involve a one way street nor was Nash speeding. The record reflects that Nash was traveling 45 mph in a 55 mph speed. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Nash’s behavior constituted “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” which would violate the duty imposed' by LSA-R.S. 32:24 on drivers of emergency vehicles. ■ Nor does the record indicate that Nash acted without due regard for the safety of others. Nash’s action in driving the fire pickup truck in the turning lane of Louisiana Highway One was reasonable, particularly since he was entitled to assume that Mr. Rabalais would not move his vehicle until the fire truck had passed. See Smith v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 1024 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992).

When we assign responsibility for this collision, it is clear that Mr. Rabalais’ actions violated the duty imposed on drivers by LSA-R.S. 32:125 to make way for emergency vehicles. Rather than stopping and staying in position until the fire truck had passed, Rabalais’ testimony indicated that he never looked to his left, that he looked only to his right, and then moved forward into the roadway. He was negligent in failing to look left, to see what he should have seen, and hear the approaching fire trucks; negligent in failing to yield the right of way, and failing to stop and remain in position until the authorized emergency vehicle had passed. The phrase “direction of | ^movement” implies any process that involves movement on a particular course or in a particular direction. As such, the phrase “direction of movement” could include both an emergency vehicle traveling down the wrong way of a one-way street, and an emergency vehicle traveling down the center lane of a two-way highway.

Subsection C of LSA-R.S. 32:24 states that “the exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.” Subsection C, then, makes applicable the privileges under subsection B only when the emergency vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach.

Here, the record reflects there were six witnesses to the accident. Gretchen La-borde, Lee Bordelon, Mark Bordelon (firemen), Lloyd Nash (defendant), and" Carl James Ducote, all testified that .the emergency lights on the fire pickup truck were activated. (R. 747, 752, 792-793, 826, 839, and 894). In addition, Earl Guillory (defendant), testified that he heard the sirens from the fire trucks. (R. 900-902).

At trial, Mr. Rabalais attempted to establish that Captain Nash did not in fact activate the fire truck’s sirens and/or flashing lights. The jury evidently believed Nash and the independent witnesses on this point and their finding was reasonable, based on the record before us.

When the driver of an emergency vehicle meets the requirements of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the driver can only be held liable for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others, i.e., gross negligence. Neloms v. Empire & Marine Ins. Co. (La.App.2 Cir.10/16/03), 859 So.2d 225. If the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not meet the requirements of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the driver’s actions will be gauged by an ordinary standard of “due care.” Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175; See also Pope v. Prunty, 37,395 (La.App.2 Cir.8/20/03), 852 So.2d 1213, where the court determined that LSA-R.S. 32:24(C) requires an emergency vehicle driver(ambulance), to use lights and/or sirens “sufficient to warn motorists of their approach.” The trial judge concluded that the use of warning lights alone was insufficient. Since the driver’s actions did not follow LSA-R.S. 32:24; the court measured her actions by an ordinary standard of due care.

Subsection D of LSA-R.S. 32:24, sets out two standards of care for an emergency vehicle driver depending on the circumstances of the case. When an emergency vehicle driver’s actions fit into subsections A, B and C of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the emergency vehicle driver will be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not meet the statutory requirements, the driver’s actions will be gauged by a standard of “due care.”

In Spears v. City of Scott, 05-0230(La. App.3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 983, the appellate court found that the police officer’s actions in approaching and then continuing on through the intersection constituted gross negligence and that the officer’s siren was insufficient to warn motorists of his immediate approach to the intersection. In Spears, the appellate court noted that Subsection (B)(2) of LSA-R.S. 32:24 allows the driver of an emergency vehicle to proceed past a stop signal, but |17onIy after slowing down or stopping “as may be necessary for safe operation.” The trial court found that the driver “came to a rolling stop at the intersection, but that he did not continue to monitor traffic when he entered the intersection, even though he was traveling through the intersection against a red light.”

Spears can be distinguished from the instant case. In Spears the officer failed to maintain a lookout before he proceeded. Therefore, the immunity provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:24 were inapplicable. In the instant case, Mr. Rabalais failed to maintain a lookout as he proceeded into the roadway.

After careful review of the record in its entirety, and applying the appropriate standard for review, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the jury’s conclusion that defendants Nash, the Marksville Fire Department and their insurer, were not liable.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT REINSTATED.

CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

VICTORY, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

Dissenting.

hThe court of appeal properly construed La.Rev.Stat. 32:24 strictly and concluded that the statute did not authorize the defendant, fire truck driver, to travel in the turning lane. The only “privileges” a driver of an emergency vehicle is entitled to exercise are specifically set forth in La. Rev.Stat. 32:24(B) as follows:

(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter;
(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation;
(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property;
(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions.

Although the majority agrees with the court of appeal’s conclusion that the actions of the defendant driver do not fit under subsection 1 through 3 above, it reverses the court of appeal’s finding of liability on the part of the driver by finding that his actions fit under subsection 4, which is highlighted above. In order to do so, the majority focuses on the word “movement” in that subsection and uses a definition from an on-line dictionary to support its conclusion. However, it seems ’ apparent to me, as the court of appeal implied, that the more important word in La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(B)(4) is “direction.” The subsection is clearly designed to allow the driver of an emergency vehicle to exercise the privilege of going the wrong way on a one-way street and/or to turn in a direction the law otherwise prohibits, such as making a left |2turn where such turns are normally prohibited.

The defendant driver was not traveling in the wrong direction when the accident occurred in this case. Rather, he was traveling in a center turn lane, that obviously allows travel for a short distance in either direction, but does not allow a driver to travel for greater distances. The defendant driver was not violating any law regarding movement in a given direction at the time of the accident, and therefore his actions are not protected by La.Rev. Stat, 32:24(B)(4).

Therefore, I would not immunize this driver or exonerate him from liability on the strength of the Emergency Vehicle Statute. As a consequence, I would assign some fault to both the plaintiff and defendant in the case, as did the court of appeal.

KNOLL, Justice,

dissenting.

|TIn the present case, I find the majority, in contravention of well established rules that strictly construe immunity statutes, extends a governmental immunity to include a vehicle whose use was not necessary to the performance of an emergency function at a time when the period of first response had elapsed. For these reasons and those that follow, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

In determining the proper standard of care La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24 imposes on the driver of an emergency vehicle, this Court in Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La.01/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, found that statute contains two alternate standards, depending on the circumstances. If subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24 are met, an emergency vehicle driver will be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C of La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:24, such driver’s actions will be gauged by an ordinary negligence standard. Lenard, 805 So. 2d at 180.

Simply because an individual happens to be an emergency vehicle driver does not automatically relieve him from liability for ordinary negligence. Lenard, 805 So.2d at 181. As provided in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24(A), “The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not |2upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, .... ” (Emphasis added). As a threshold issue, it is well established that the privilege set forth in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24 may be invoked only if the driver of the emergency vehicle is responding to an emergency. Keating v. Holston’s Ambulance Service, Inc., 546 So.2d 919 (La. App. 3 Cir.1989); Prather v. Gautreaux, 297 So.2d 439 (La.App. 3 Cir.1974). One factor in the determination of whether a particular act of an emergency vehicle driver is privileged is whether the dangerous act was necessary to the performance of the emergency function. Bunkie Funeral Home, Inc. v. McNutt, 414 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982).

In the present case, it cannot be denied Captain Lloyd Nash was driving a fire department vehicle and that it was properly using audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of his approach. Nevertheless, my review of the facts convinces me Mr. Nash was not performing an act necessary to the emergency at the time of the accident. The Marksville Fire Department had been fighting the fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant for as long as 90 minutes when Mr. Nash was re-dispatched to the fire station. Seven neighboring volunteer fire departments had also responded to the Jen-Re fire and'as many as forty-five firefighters were fighting the fire when the Fire Chief directed Mr. Nash to leave the scene of the fire to transport another fireman back to the fire station to retrieve another pumper truck and additional equipment. Although the pumper truck contained air packs, foam, and a large water canon, Mr. Nash’s vehicle carried no additional equipment that would have assisted in fighting the fire. Further, no showing was made that it was necessary for Mr. Nash’s vehicle | sto lead the way for the pumper truck' — the pumper truck was clearly marked as a fire department vehicle, had the proper lighting, and its siren was operational. Significantly, Mr. Nash admitted in his deposition, there was no purpose for him to lead the pumper truck back to the scene of the fire; he could easily have followed the pumper truck back.

Although the Jen-Re fire was large and it burned for a long time, Mr. Nash’s return trip to the fire clearly did not involve the urgency that a first response would have entailed. The Fire Chief had already determined the Jen-Re employees were accounted for and they were not endangered by the fire. Additionally, all of the Marksville firemen were on the scene, except for Mr. Nash and Mr. Borde-lon, and the Marksville Fire Department was assisted by a large contingent of firemen from neighboring towns; together they were fighting the fire and protecting neighboring properties. Moreover, Assistant Fire Chief Chris Bordelon stated that at the time of Mr. Nash’s accident the fire was contained to the structure and later that day it was determined to let the fire burn everything down at the Jen-Re site.

Against that backdrop, I simply do not see that Mr. Nash’s vehicle fits the description of an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency that would be entitled to the privileges set forth in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24. It is evident from the language employed in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24 that the Legislature was keenly aware of the danger posed to the public as an emergency vehicle responds to an emergency call. As illustrated in the present case, bumper-to-bumper traffic impeded the southbound lane needed to return to the Jen-Re plant, forcing Mr. Nash to utilize the turning lane, a non-traditional thoroughfare, as a means to reach the fire. I ¿Likewise, the bumper-to-bumper traffic impeded the view Mr. Rabalais had as he attempted to turn into the northbound lane of travel. When confronted with those facts, the investigating state trooper, Phillip Tagliarino, stated he would not have driven in the turn lane at a speed of 45 m.p.h. The trooper further stated that when other people are already at the scene of an emergency, the need to hurry your response is no longer needed.

Although I disagree with the appellate court’s analysis of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24, I nonetheless find the appellate court’s reliance on ordinary negligence appropriate under the facts of this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the appellate court decision for other reasons.

WEIMER, J.,

additionally concurring.

hi write only to further address whether the facts support the application of LSA-R.S. 32:24 because Captain Nash was “responding to an emergency call” or was “responding to, but not ... returning from, a fire alarm.”

Clearly, Captain Nash was not returning from a fire alarm. Obviously, this portion of the statute addresses the situation which occurs after the fire fighting task is complete and the firefighters are returning to the fire station. There is generally no need for haste in returning to the station and the protections afforded by the statute do not apply.

In this matter, the facts adequately support a finding that Captain Nash was “responding to an emergency call” or he was in the process of “responding to ... a fire alarm.” When he was dispatched to the station to retrieve equipment and while he was returning to the fire scene, the fire was still ablaze and the emergency had not abated. Haste was imperative. Even if it can be suggested Captain Nash was not | ^responding to an emergency call (a suggestion with which I disagree), he remained in the process of responding to a fire alarm at the time of the accident at issue.

Assistant Chief Bordelon ordered Captain Nash and firefighter Bordelon to return to the fire station to retrieve another fire truck, Pumper No. 1. The firefighters needed the additional equipment on Pumper No. 1, including air packs, foam, and a large water cannon. The pumper was capable of spraying 1000 to 2000 gallons of water per minute. It also had the capability to draft water from a nearby pond to fight the fire. Additionally, the pumper was needed at the scene in the event that another fire erupted elsewhere.

Assistant Chief Bordelon advised Captain Nash and firefighter Bordelon to retrieve the pumper and return “as soon as possible.” With a fire of this magnitude, Assistant Chief Bordelon indicated that every man counted and even one man could make a difference. The fire burned out of control and remained an emergency to the firefighters whose lives were at stake as they battled the enormous blaze. The plaintiffs own expert admitted this fire created an emergency and acknowledged he would defer to the firefighters concerning their decision as to the appropriate response to the fire.

Captain Nash was not a mere courier. He was the third ranking officer in the department and had 14 years experience. His job at the scene was to assist the fire chief in coordinating the actions of the firefighters. The record adequately establishes Captain Nash was “responding to an emergency call” or “responding to ... a fire alarm” as contemplated by LSA-R.S. 32:24. At the time of the accident, the fire was still being fought. Firefighters remained at risk as long as they battled the blaze. It was not until later that day that a decision was made to allow the fire to burn itself out.

^Firefighters must be afforded sufficient discretion to determine what is an emergency as they risk their lives in an effort to save lives and protect property. The statute at issue was written to limit the circumstances that will result in the imposition of liability on emergency responders. We should not construe what is an emergency or what is a response to a fire alarm so as to render the statute ineffective to achieve the purpose for which it was enacted.

Firefighters are entrusted to serve as special guardians of the public’s safety. Their uncontradicted testimony regarding what is considered an emergency or whether they are responding to a fire alarm must be afforded proper deference and should not be second guessed unless unsupported by the facts.

      . Mr. Rabalais filed a supplemental petition for damages, adding Mr. Earl Guillory, his employer, Avoyelles Glass of Bunkie, Inc., and its insurer State Farm Insurance Company. Prior to the trial, on joint motion of Mr. Rabalais and defendants, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, Avoyelles Glass of Bunkie, Inc., and Mr. Guillory, were dismissed as defendants, leaving Lloyd Nash, the City of Markville Fire Department and American Alternative Insurance Company as defendants.

      . The court's reliance on Pellegrini v. Crellin, as authority, is misplaced since Pellegrini, involved the Direct Action Statute, LSA-R.S.22:655(B), and involved the issue of whether an injured third party may recover from the insured tortfeasor’s automobile insurer. The trial court held that an injured third party did not have a direct cause of action. The Fourth Circuit, held that a third party could not bring a bad faith cause of action for the insurer’s failure to settle a claim.

      . The degree of care required of the driver of other vehicles, upon the approach of an emergency vehicle, is provided for by LSA-R.S. 32:125 which states:
      A. Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of audible and visual signals, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible signal only, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection, and shall stop and
      remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.
      B. This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.'

      . The statute specifically provides that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.

      . In Istre, et al. v. Daniel Meche, 05-0303,(La. App. 3 Cir. 11/02/05), 916 So.2d 307, the appellate court held that police officer acted reasonably in joining high-speed pursuit as it moved from rural into city area. But see, Youngblood et al. v. Lee, et al., 40-0314(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/02/05), 914 So.2d 1186, where the court held that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the police officer acted with reckless disregard for the safety of the public and was liable for the accident.

      . In my view, the presence of these factors distinguish the pumper truck from Mr. Nash's vehicle. The evidence preponderates that there was an identifiable need to resupply the firemen on the scene with air tanks, foam would later be needed to douse the fire, and the water canon served a usefulness in fighting the fire. These indicia convince me that the pumper truck, had it been involved in the accident, would have met the requisites in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:24 needed to call the higher standard of negligence into play.

      . The record does not establish the length of time the fire burned. Mr. Nash stated he was told the fire burned for 10 to 12 hours.

      . LSA-R.S. 32:24 provides, in pertinent part: A. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Janie W. KEHR.
    No. 2007-B-0071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_JjThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Janie W. Kehr, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently inactive.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In May 2003, Tonja Lee Horton hired respondent to handle a child custody matter. Ms. Horton paid respondent $2,000 and provided her with all of the information she requested. Thereafter, respondent neglected the matter and failed to communicate with her client despite Ms. Horton’s numerous attempts to contact her.

Ms. Horton filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC forwarded a copy of the complaint to respondent. Respondent requested additional time to file a response. Several months later, she sent a letter to the ODC in which she stated that she had entered inactive status and requested the ODC close all remaining files open in her name. The ODC advised respondent that she was still required to answer Ms. Horton’s complaint, despite her inactive status. Respondent failed to reply.

| ¡¿DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging her conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a) (failure to communicate with a client), and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Respondent was served with the formal charges’ via certified mail. Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee found the following: Ms. Horton retained respondent to assist her in a domestic matter. However, after receiving $2,000 from Ms. Horton, respondent failed to move the matter forward and failed to keep her client informed. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation and failed to respond to Ms. Horton’s complaint even after asking for additional time to do so.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), and 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee found that respondent violated duties owed to her client and to the legal profession. She acted negligently and caused actual harm in the amount of thousands |aof dollars to Ms. Horton. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is suspension.

The committee also found the following aggravating factors present: prior disciplinary offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and indifference to making restitution. The committee found no mitigating factors.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The committee also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the record. The board also determined that the committee properly found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

Based on these findings, the board determined that respondent violated duties owed to her client and to the legal profession. Contrary to the committee’s finding, the board determined that respondent’s conduct was knowing. However, it agreed with the committee’s finding that the amount of injury caused by respondent to Ms. Horton is significant because respondent has failed to refund the $2,000 fee or Rprovide Ms. Horton with an accounting. The board also agreed with the aggravating factors found by the committee and determined that there are no mitigating factors present. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and this court’s prior jurisprudence, the board determined that the baseline sanction is a suspension for one year and one day. Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day and render an accounting and make the appropriate restitution to Ms. Horton. Furthermore, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed-admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions |fithat flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The déemed-admitted facts in this matter indicate that respondent accepted a $2,000 fee to handle a legal matter then neglected the matter and failed to communicate with her client. She also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Based on these deemed-admitted facts as well as the other evidence in the record, we conclude the ODC has proven in a clear and convincing manner that respondent has violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), and 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found professional misconduct, the sole remaining issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. In imposing a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The primary divergence between the hearing committee and disciplinary board was over whether respondent’s conduct was negligent or knowing. Based on the evidence contained in the record, we are unable to determine whether respondent’s neglect of Ms. Horton’s case was the product of negligence or was an intentional act. Regardless of respondent’s state of mind, however, we find her conduct caused significant and actual harm to Ms. Horton by delaying resolution of her case and depriving her of funds.

| (¡Several aggravating factors are present in this case, the most significant of which is respondent’s prior discipline in 2003 for similar misconduct. We are unable to discern any mitigating factors from the record.

In determining an appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct, we take guid-anee from In re: Thornton, 04-0488 (La.7/2/04), 876 So.2d 781. In that case, we suspended an attorney for a period of one year and one day for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with a client, and failing to cooperate with the ODC. Notably, as in the instant case, the attorney had a prior admonition for similar misconduct, and no mitigating factors were present.

Considering the record as a whole, we conclude a similar sanction is appropriate in the instant case. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, which will necessitate a formal application for reinstatement. We will also order respondent to render an accounting and make restitution to her client.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Janie W. Kehr, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25432, be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of one year and one day. It is further ordered that respondent render an accounting and make restitution to her client. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent requested that her status be changed to inactive as of 11/26/03

      . Respondent received an admonition in July 2003 for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with a client, and including inappropriate language in her employment contract in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), and 1.5 (fee arrangements) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee noted that these violations are essentially the same violations as those in the instant matter.


author: TRAYLOR, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William RILEY.
    No. 2007-KK-282.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 28, 2007.
   TRAYLOR, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part from the granting of the writ.

Iil agree with the majority that the finding of direct contempt under La.C.Cr.P. art. 21 should be affirmed. Under the circumstances presented here, the defendant engaged in contumacious, insolent, or disorderly behavior toward the judge which tended to interrupt or interfere with the business of the court or to impair its dignity or respect for its authority. La. C.Cr.P. art. 21(5).

However, I dissent from the majority’s finding that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is excessive and that the matter be remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. The penalty for a direct contempt of court is set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 25 as “a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 25(B). The defendant in this matter was sentenced to a six-month sentence.

A sentence which falls within the statutory limits may be excessive under certain circumstances. To constitute an excessive sentence, this Court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and therefore, is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A trial judge has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set 1 .¿sentences aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 2001-2754 p. 6 (La.1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4. In sentence review, the only relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Id. Considering the actions of the defendant, in full view of the judge, the attorneys, spectators and other defendants in the courtroom, I do not find that the trial court abused his broad discretion in imposing this sentence. I would, instead, deny the defendant’s writ.

Moreover, the trial court has already indicated what sentence it feels the defendant’s actions merit. If the majority finds that the sentence imposed was excessive, it should impose a new sentence and not require the trial court to undo what it has already done in a considered manner.


text:
    In re Hersy JONES, Jr.
    No. 2006-B-2702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 30, 2007.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|! This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Hersy Jones, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed two sets of formal charges against respondent, consisting of a total of four counts of misconduct. The two sets of formal charges were considered by separate hearing committees before being consolidated by order of the disciplinary board on January 31, 2006.

01p-DB-06Jp

The Burke Matter

In April 1997, Maxine Burke, acting as the curatrix on behalf of her mother, Mit-tie Fields, hired respondent to handled a dispute with her former accounting firm, Wilson and Bratlie, over billing invoices in connection with the operation of her mother’s restaurant, Silver Moon Barbeque. She and respondent signed a written legal services agreement whereby she agreed to pay respondent a $1,000 fee in order |2for him to review and audit the invoices. In addition, respondent would receive 25% of any reduction in the billing invoices and prior payments he was able to obtain. Ms. Burke paid the $1,000 fee the same day.

Soon thereafter, respondent contacted Wilson and Bratlie via letter. Wilson and Bratlie sent respondent some records at the end of April 1997. Respondent reviewed the records but never recovered any money on Ms. Burke’s behalf. He also never provided her with a report of his findings.

In September 1997, Ms. Burke, discharged respondent. In June 1998, she requested that he return her file. In September 1998, she requested that he refund the $1,000 fee because she claimed he did no work on the matter. Respondent failed to return her file and failed to refund any unearned fee.

The Wafer/Smith Matter

In October 1998, two sisters, Avery Wafer and Celester Smith, hired respondent to handle a property boundary dispute with their cousin. Respondent and his clients signed a retainer agreement that provided for an initial fee of $1,500, plus an additional $1,000 if litigation was necessary. Furthermore, the agreement indicated any additional work beyond the $2,500 amount would be billed , at the rate of $125 per hour.

Respondent traveled with his clients to view the property, reviewed the documents they provided, and spoke with a surveyor. Thereafter, he determined litigation would be necessary to resolve the matter and requested the additional $1,000 to proceed. His clients declined to pay the additional $1,000, advising |arespondent they wanted to see the results of his work so far before paying him additional money. Rather than doing so, respondent informed his clients he was withdrawing from the representation and would refund any unearned fee.

Although he returned his clients’ file to them, respondent did not refund any of the fee and did not provide his clients with an accounting. He also failed to adequately communicate with his clients during the representation.

Formal Charges

In the Burke matter, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (failure to refund an unearned fee), and 1.16 (failure to account for a fee and return a client’s file) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In the Wafer/Smith matter, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges, essentially denying the allegations of misconduct. He also asserted two affirmative defenses-the defense of abandonment based on the ODC’s untimely filing of formal charges and the defense of abuse of right because the complaints were based on the bad faith motives of a disgruntled former employee.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

|4The charges in 04-DB-064 proceeded to a hearing committee. After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee filed its report.

In the Burke matter, the committee determined respondent acted diligently, and some or all of the fee was earned. However, it found respondent failed to communicate to Ms. Burke her rights as to a fee dispute and failed to return her file. The committee further noted respondent failed to advise Ms. Burke of her rights even after the ODC explained the rule to him.

In the Wafer/Smith matter, the committee agreed that some portion of respondent’s fee was earned. In particular, it found respondent performed at least seven to nine hours of work (nine hours worked at $125 per hour would result in a $1,125 fee). It also determined there is no evidence that respondent lacked diligence. However, the committee found he failed to communicate by failing to return phone calls, failed to deposit into his trust account the portion of the fee that may have reasonably been in dispute, failed to communicate the right to arbitration of the fee dispute, and failed to account for the earned portion of the fee.

Based on these factual findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the Burke matter and Rules 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16(d) with respect to the Wafer/Smith matter.

The committee found that respondent initially acted negligently but his conduct eventually became knowing. As aggravating factors, it recognized a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1995), and | ^indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the committee found absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and delay in disciplinary proceedings.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended for two years, fully deferred, and be placed on probation, during which time he should complete five extra hours of continuing legal education in ethics and should submit the fee disputes to arbitration, if his victims so desire.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

05-DB-065

The Lensey Matter

In August 2001, Tisha Lensey, a former Shreveport police officer, hired respondent to represent her against the City of Shreveport. In particular, Ms. Lensey wanted respondent to file a wrongful termination action in state court and a civil rights action in federal court. Respondent and Ms. Lensey signed a contingency fee agreement with regard to the federal court action and signed an hourly fee agreement with regard to the state court action.

The hourly fee agreement signed in connection with the state court action provided for a $2,000 advance deposit against future hourly billing at $150 per hour, with the client’s approval required for expenses beyond the initial $2,000. Ms. Lensey paid respondent $750 towards the $2,000 deposit. Additionally, she performed clerical work for respondent, who deducted $100 to $150 from her bijweekly6 paychecks to be applied to the advance deposit. Respondent did not deposit any of the advance fees into his client trust account, nor did he account for or keep records of Ms. Lensey’s payments. He also failed to keep track of the hours he worked on the state court matter.

The state court action resulted in Ms. Lensey’s reinstatement as a police officer and receipt of back pay and interest totaling $73,602.48. Of this amount, $64,496.24 was paid directly to Ms. Lensey. The remaining $9,106.24 was paid in the form of check made payable to both respondent and Ms. Lensey.

At this point, a dispute arose between respondent and Ms. Lensey over whether respondent was entitled to a contingency fee in the state court action. As a result, Ms. Lensey refused to endorse the check. Respondent then endorsed Ms. Lensey’s signature on the check and deposited the check into his operating accounting instead of his client trust account, despite the existence of the fee dispute. He also failed to account for or refund any of the funds to Ms. Lensey.

Count II — The Frazier Matter

In April 2001, Emmanuel Frazier was shot and killed by the police while allegedly fleeing arrest. A few days later, respondent approached Emmanuel’s parents, David and Lucy Frazier, at a Shreveport funeral home where they were making funeral arrangements for their son and asked them to meet with him regarding their son’s killing. The Fraziers did not know respondent, had no prior professional 17or personal relationship with him, nor had they previously contacted him seeking legal assistance. Nonetheless, they met with him and signed a general power of attorney, which allowed respondent to investigate Emmanuel’s death.

Respondent also learned that Emmanuel was survived by an infant daughter. Upon learning the identity of the child’s mother, Lakendra Williams, respondent signed her to a contingency fee agreement to represent her in a wrongful death claim.

In April 2002, respondent filed a lawsuit in federal court on behalf of Ms. Williams and the Fraziers based on a wrongful death claim. Because Emmanuel had a daughter, his parents did not have a viable wrongful death claim. In November 2002, the Fraziers’ claims were dismissed.

In April 2004, the Fraziers filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. They alleged that respondent failed to communicate with them and failed to return their file.

Formal Charges

In the Lensey matter, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rules 1.5 (fee arrangements) and 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third parties) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In the Frazier matter, the ODC alleged that respondent violated Rules 1.4, 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 7.3(a) (solicitation), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges, essentially denying the allegations of misconduct.

[ ^Hearing Committee Recommendation

The charges proceeded to a formal hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing committee issued its report.

In the Lensey matter, the committee determined the evidence established that the state court matter was to be handled on an hourly basis and that the contingency fee agreement applied to the federal court matter only. The committee further found respondent attempted to assert a contingency fee over funds received in the state court matter even though he was not entitled to such a fee in that matter.

The committee found that the initial $750 payment made by Ms. Lensey was not earned at the time Ms. Lensey paid respondent and therefore should have been deposited by respondent into his client trust account. It found all other payments by Ms. Lensey may have been earned when paid. The committee also observed that given the amount of hours respondent worked on the case, he actually earned more than Ms. Lensey paid. However, it recognized he did not obtain written consent to work additional hours as required by the contract.

With regard to the $9,106.24 check made payable to respondent and Ms. Lensey, the committee found respondent acted improperly when he deposited the check into his operating account because he was aware Ms. Lensey disputed the fee. Additionally, the committee found respondent was not entitled to the entire amount based upon the terms of the contract with Ms. Lensey.

Based on these findings, the committee concluded respondent violated Rules 1.5 and 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In the Frazier matter, the committee accepted the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Frazier, Emmanuel’s sister, and her husband, all of whom testified that they did not know respondent prior to Emmanuel’s death. Furthermore, the committee made a |flfactual finding that found none of the family members had any contact with respondent prior to respondent’s appearance at the funeral home. Thus, the committee concluded respondent solicited the representation of the Fraziers at Emmanuel’s wake in violation of Rule 7.3.

In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The sole mitigating factor identified by the committee was respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended for two years and attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

Following the hearing committees’ reports, the charges were consolidated for review by the disciplinary board. After reviewing the record, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committees’ factual findings were not manifestly erroneous.

Based on these facts, the board found that respondent violated |inRules 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in the Burke matter. It found he failed to keep Ms. Burke apprised of the status of his review of the billing records, failed to provide an accounting, and failed to return her file at the termination of the representation. In the Wafer/Smith matter, the board found that respondent violated Rules 1.4, 1.5, and 1.16 by failing to return his clients’ telephone calls, failing to place the disputed fee amount in his client trust account and seek a resolution of the dispute, and failing to account for funds at the termination of the representation. The board found that respondent violated Rules 1.5 and 1.15 in the Lensey matter when he failed to deposit the initial $750 fee payment into his client trust account, failed to deposit the $9,106.24 settlement check into his client trust account, converted the $9,106.24 to his own use, and failed to account for or refund any portion of the amount he converted. Finally, in the Frazier matter, the board found that respondent violated Rule 7.3 by soliciting the Fraziers during Emmanuel’s funeral. The board further determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients and to the legal profession.

Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and jurisprudence from this court, the board determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the board found an absence of a prior disciplinary record and full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.

Considering these factors, the board found no reason to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment.- Accordingly, the board recommended that 1 -, respondent be disbarred, be required to make restitution to his victims, and be assessed all costs of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed a timely objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. However, respondent filed a motion to file an out-of-time objection. Although we denied this motion, we allowed respondent and the ODC to file briefs without oral argument. Both respondent and the ODC filed briefs.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact' and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Par-due, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude the evidence produced by the ODC establishes in a clear and convincing matter that respondent failed to communicate with his clients, failed to deposit advance fees into his client |1g,trust account, failed to provide accountings, failed to refund unearned fees, failed to place disputed funds in his client trust account, failed to return a client’s file upon termination of the representation, converted client funds to his own use, and solicited a representation. These facts establish violations of Rules I.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 7.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a deter-minátion of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Taken as a whole, respondent’s conduct demonstrates a disregard for the welfare of his clients. Without diminishing the seriousness of his misconduct in the Burke and Wafer/Smith matters, we find respondent’s most egregious actions occurred in the Lensey and Frazier matters.

In the Lensey matter, respondent knowingly and intentionally converted more than $9,000 of Ms. Lensey’s funds by placing these funds into his operating account. Even accepting respondent’s contention that there was some confusion as to whether the representation was on an hourly basis or contingent basis, the record establishes that respondent knew Ms. Lensey disputed the fee. Therefore, respondent had a clear duty to place the disputed funds in his trust account pursuant to Rule 1.5. His failure |,1sto do so amounts to a conversion of client funds. When respondent’s conversion is combined with his other fraudulent acts, such as falsely endorsing Ms. Lensey’s name to the check, the baseline sanction is disbarment. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986).

Likewise, we consider respondent’s actions in the Frazier matter to be serious in nature. The hearing committee made a finding of fact, which we determine is supported by the record, that respondent had no prior contact with the Frazier family prior to appearing at the funeral home. Thus, respondent’s actions amount to solicitation. In In re Broome, 01-2260 (La.2/26/02), 815 So.2d 1, we explained that violation of the prohibition against solicitation is very serious professional infraction:

Our jurisprudence has consistently found solicitation to be a very serious professional violation. In re: D’Amico, 94-3005 (La.2/28/96), 688[668] So.2d 730 (“direct solicitation of professional employment from a prospective client in violation of Rule 7.3 is a very serious disciplinary violation that undermines the reputation of lawyers generally and the public’s attitude toward the profession”); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. St. Romain, 560 So.2d 820 (La.1990) (“[solicitation is abhorrent to the legal profession and places lawyers in disrepute with the public”). Rules against solicitation are prophylactic measures which are intended to prevent harm before it occurs. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447[, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444] (1978).

Considering respondent’s misconduct as a whole, we conclude the appropriate baseline sanction is disbarment. Numerous aggravating factors are present, namely |ua dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, we find an absence of a prior disciplinary record and full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.

Under these circumstances, we see no basis to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment. Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and disbar respondent. We will further order that respondent shall provide ac-countings to his victims and make the appropriate restitution.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the briefs and the record, it is ordered that Hersy Jones, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 23664, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

Respondent is ordered to furnish complete accountings and full restitution of all unearned legal fees to his clients subject of the formal charges. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Originally, 04-DB-064 consisted of three counts of misconduct. However, the ODC withdrew Count II during the formal hearing in that matter. Accordingly, no further reference is made to Count II.

      . The agreement indicated that respondent was acting as the attorney for Mittie Fields (Ms. Burke’s mother) d/b/a Silver Moon Barbeque and Silver Moon Barbeque, Inc.

      . Despite discharging respondent with respect to the auditing matter, Ms. Burke hired respondent to represent her in other matters.

      . Respondent claimed the ODC completed its investigation in December 1999 but did not file formal charges until May 2004. In the interim, he heard nothing from the ODC. The ODC disputes this contention, stating that consent discipline was discussed, respondent rejected same, and he wished to proceed to a formal hearing.

      .Respondent testified at the formal hearing that he employed Martha Alston, a disbarred attorney, as his assistant. See In re: Min-nieweather, 94-1782 (La.12/9/94), 647 So.2d 1092, for the details of Ms. Alston’s (a/k/a Martha Minnieweather) disbarment. After he fired her, a number of his clients, including Ms. Burke and Ms. Wafer, began filing complaints against him, which he believed were filed at Ms. Alston’s urging.

      . Although respondent was not admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana until 1995, he indicated he was admitted to the practice of law in New York in 1987.

      . The federal court litigation proceeded to trial, but the jury found against Ms. Lensey. As a result, respondent recovered no fee in this matter.

      . Ms. Lensey, through counsel, filed a petition for damages against respondent for the return of the $9,106.24. In response, respondent filed an answer and reconventional demand for 40% of the $73,602.48 in back pay and interest. Without notice to Ms. Lensey's attorney, respondent proceeded to take a default judgment against her in the amount of $20,338.49. The default judgment is dated September 26, 2005, which was more than two months after formal charges were filed against him in this matter. At the formal hearing, Ms. Lensey testified that neither she or her attorney were aware of respondent's reconventional demand, nor was she aware of the judgment against her.

      . The board cites In re: Sledge, 03-1148 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 671 (rehearing denied 12/12/03) (disbarment imposed upon an attorney who solicited clients, neglected his law practice, and'failed to supervise his non-lawyer assistants); In re: Graugnard, 03-2899 (La.3/26/04), 869 So.2d 785 (disbarment imposed upon an attorney who converted and otherwise mishandled funds owed to clients and health-care providers, neglected client matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund unearned fees, and lied under oath); and In re: Gines, 03-2827 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 778 (disbarment imposed upon an attorney who neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to account for and refund unearned fees, failed to place disputed funds in trust, failed to safe keep client property, and failed to cooperate with the ODC).

      . After filing his brief, respondent filed a "Motion to Supplement the Record,” in which he sought to -add three exhibits to the record: (1) a letter indicating respondent has entered into fee dispute resolution with the clients who are the subject of the Lensey matter, the Burke matter, and Wafer/Smith matter; (2) documentation that respondent has deposited $9,000 in disputed fees, in the Lensey matter into his trust account; and (3) an affidavit from a member of the Frazier family discussing how respondent came into contact with the family. Respondent also filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief discussing these exhibits. The ODC did not object to admission of the first two exhibits, but objected to the third exhibit. By order dated March 21, 2007, we permitted respondent to file the first two exhibits, but denied ■ the motion to file the third exhibit. Likewise, we permitted filing of the supplemental brief, but-struck any reference to the third exhibit.

      . Respondent places great emphasis on the fact that the committee did not find that he "stole” the money, only that he failed to place it in his trust account. However, for purposes of determining conversion for purposes of lawyer discipline, we do not need to find the lawyer had an intent to commit a theft of the funds. Rather, as we explained in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), the essence of conversion is whether the lawyer exercises dominion or control over the client’s funds in a manner inconsistent with the client’s rights:
      The intent required for a conversion is not necessarily that of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an intent to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights. A mistake of law or fact is no defense. Persons deal with the chattels or exercise acts of ownership over them at their peril, and must take the risk that there is no lawful justification for their acts. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra, § 15 at 92-93; Prosser, supra, at 171.

      . Through his supplemental exhibits, which we have allowed into the record, respondent has provided the court with documentation that he has now deposited $9,000 into his trust account representing the disputed fee in the Lensey matter. Furthermore, respondent provided the court with documentation that he has submitted the Burke, Wafer/Smith, and Lensey matters to the Louisiana State Bar Association's fee arbitration program. While these actions, which occurred long after disciplinary proceedings were instituted, do not influence our decision with regard to the appropriate sanction, they are relevant for purposes of determining the amount of restitution owed by respondent to his clients.


text:
    Joseph SHER v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2007-CC-0531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 13, 2007.
   In re Sher, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 06-9276; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0303.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    Delton Ray COUTEE v. Rayland K. BEURLOT, M.D.
    No. 2006-C-2943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Beurlot, Rayland K. M.D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, City Court of Alexandria, No. 101,341; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 06-569.

Granted.


author: WEIMER, J.,

text:
    Byron BRYANT v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, American Home Assurance Company and Don Johnson.
    No. 2006-CC-1692.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
    CALOGERO, C.J., would grant and docket.
   WEIMER, J.,

would grant and docket. See Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Insurance Co., 06-0363 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 554 (WEIMER, J., dissenting), on reh’g, 06-0363 (La.2/16/07), 950 So.2d at 556 (WEIMER, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).


text:
    Lee Carlton WILLIAMS and Margaret Williams v. LOUISIANA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND OVERSIGHT BOARD.
    No. 2006-CC-2215.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board et al.; State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 38,850; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,593.

Granted. The Judgement of the court of appeal is vacated and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of its ruling in light of Colvin v. Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board, 06-1104 (La.1/17/07), 947 So.2d 15.

CALOGERO, C.J., would deny.


author: CALOGERO, C.J.,

text:
    CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jack STRAIN, Sheriff for St. Tammany Parish.
    No. 2006-CC-2360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   CALOGERO, C.J.,

would deny for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Colvin v. Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board, 06-1104 (La.1/17/07), 947 So.2d 15.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph Elas MYERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Myers, Joseph Elas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 2301-97, 17485-01,13418-06,12957-06.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    Edward BUGGAGE v. VOLKS CONSTRUCTORS.
    No. 2006-C-2757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Buggage, Edward — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 26, 2007; Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. 9, No. 04-00358; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 2002.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    Kim MCLIN and Curtis McLin v. Jeffrey BREAUX, M.D., Michael Leggio, M.D., and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-2822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Breaux, Jeffrey M.D., Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s order dated January 26, 2007; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 504682; to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, No. 2005-CA-1911.

Not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    Ivan HAWTHORNE and Healthworks International, LLC v. Michael R. COUCH.
    No. 2007-C-0173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Healthworks International, LLC; Hawthorne, Ivan; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 38,248-B; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,603-CA.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Dr. Marion A. LANASA.
    No. 2007-C-0182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re LaNasa, Barbara; — -Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 614-622; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-CA-561.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    Gregory Kent MOROUX, et al. v. Andre F. TOCE Daniel Lombas, et al. v. Gregory K. Moroux, et al.
    No. 2007-C-0235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Toce, Andre F. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 99-5383, 00-1207; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). 06-831, 06-832.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    In re George K. WAGUESPACK.
    No. 2007-OB-0200.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re George K. Waguespack, applying for Rehearing of this Court’s Order dated January 31, 2007; Office of Disciplinary Board.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sylvester MEAD.
    No. 2006-KO-1426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Mead, Sylvester; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Action dated December 8, 2006; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court, Div. D, No. 211,460; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,406-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Gary POCHE, et al. v. Eddie J. JORDAN.
    No. 2005-CI-0204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Poche, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s Order dated April 17, 2006; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. I, No. 2003-16900; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-C-1164.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary POCHE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Gary Poche, applying for Motion to Enforce this Court Order dated April 17, 2006; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Division H, No. 313-963, to the Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit, No. 2004-K-1932.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward C. PATTERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Patterson, Edward C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-4388; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-560.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel F. BONIT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KO-1211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Bonit, Daniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 163,058; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 0795.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David W. LOCKE.
    No. 2006-KP-1431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Locke, David W.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 01-CR2-81848.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Washington, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 371-478; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2006-K-0304, 2006-K-0057.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lonzette GADDIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Gaddis, Lonzette; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 209,037; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41295-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael RATCLIFF.
    No. 2006-KP-1499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Ratcliff, Michael; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 330380, 354173, 354174; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0217.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keri Rene THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Thomas, Keri Rene; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 97,441; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00412.

Denied.


text:
    Willie HUMPHREY v. Burl CAIN, Warden, et al.
    No. 2006-CI-1510.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Humphrey, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 491,881; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0798.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Houston COOLEY, II v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Cooley, John Houston II; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 358,320; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 1415.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence ODOM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Odom, Lawrence Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 4-81-512.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anderson HAWKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1514.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Hawkins, Anderson; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 6-92-807; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2652.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dominic L. ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Robinson, Dominic L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 379024; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0185.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael SPRINGER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Springer, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10-96-599; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2441.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1517.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Turner, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 12-93-388; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0084.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl G. SOILEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1518.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 16, 2007.
   In re Soileau, Darryl G.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11,440-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-01530.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.