text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anderson S. JACKSON, III.
    No. 2006-K-0442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Jackson, Anderson S. Ill; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 00-F1195; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,376-KA.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herbert Lee DIGGS.
    No. 2006-KO-0446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Diggs, Herbert Lee; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 430,181; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 0099.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry MAGEE.
    No. 2006-KO-0461.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re MaGee, Jerry; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 02-0306; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth 'Circuit, No. 05-KA-171.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Barron Tommez BAILEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KO-0462.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Bailey, Barron Tommez; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 68646; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,-098.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry MAGEE.
    No. 2006-KO-0464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Magee, Jerry; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 02-0306; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-171.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darwin GAUTHIER.
    No. 2006-KO-0465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Gauthier, Darwin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 1949-03; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 04-1608.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marvin JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KO-0466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Jones, Marvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 14,043; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 0020.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Giles J. DUPLECHIN.
    No. 2006-K-0475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Duplechin, Giles; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-4514; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-726.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Don Patrick JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Jones, Don Patrick; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 397664; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 2643.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Taylor, Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 96-0724; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-961.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tony F. CLARKE, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Clarke, Tony F. Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 300686; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005-KW-1611.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell WALKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Walker, Darrell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 03-1806, 03-1423; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-864.

Denied.


text:
    Charles CARTER v. Burl CAIN, et al.
    No. 2006-CI-0569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 524,318; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005-CW-1243.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard S. BREWSTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Brewster, Richard S.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 81-4405; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-963.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0581.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Anderson, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 423-723; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1331.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles A. TREECE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Treece, Charles A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 372-070.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Peter ADAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Adams, Peter; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 429-661; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1407.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael L. GIFFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Gifford, Michael L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 101930; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1184.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph JEROME, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Jerome, Joseph Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 01-1909; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-949.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone HYPOLITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0618.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Hypolite, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-898; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 04-1658.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terence GILLIAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0624.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Gilliam, Terence; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 203,147; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40256-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus MOORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0626.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Moore, Marcus; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 01-98-173; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 1756.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Zannie NEAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0639.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Neal, Zannie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 98-3238; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-950.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Benjamin HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Harris, Benjamin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-1742-A.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eric Thomas HAWKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Hawkins, Eric Thomas; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 01-CR-932,934; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 1926.

Denied. State v. McKinney, 406 So.2d 160, 161 (La.1981).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilfred GUY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Guy, Wilfred; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs,

Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 306-419; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1433.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 333-367; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1057.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry LANEHEART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Laneheart, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 389-162.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnny R. SUMMAGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Summage, Johnny R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 94,510-A.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy BIENIEMY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Bieniemy, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 356-036; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1058.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    In the Matter of the MASHBURN MARITAL TRUST.
    No. 2006-C-1034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Penton, Helen Mashburn; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2001-003363; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 1678.

Denied.


text:
    BANK ONE, NA v. Floyd DUNN, Jr. d/b/a Dunn Electric.
    No. 2006-C-1121.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Dunn, Floyd Jr. d/b/a; Dunn Electric; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 476,365; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,718-CA.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    Michael HAYDEL, Individually and o/b/o Jeremy Haydel v. STATE FARM INSURANCE CO., Evanston Insurance Co., the Sanctuary Homeowners Association, Inc. and ABC Insurance Co.
    No. 2006-C-1307.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Haydel, Michael et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2003-14087; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA1400.

Denied.


text:
    Rhonda A. LUQUETTE v. Clayborn SELF d/b/a Blockbuster.
    No. 2006-C-1311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Blockbuster Video; Self, Clayborn d/b/a et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District #4, No. 05-02913; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1367.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Scott BENNETT v. DAIGRE'S AUTOMOTIVE, INC.
    No. 2006-C-1323.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Daigre’s Automotive Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 02, No. 02-01205; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-63.

Denied.


text:
    Travis COOPER, et al. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CC-1325.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Cooper, Travis et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Catahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 18,754 A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-00039.

Denied.


text:
    Aldon J. BAUDOIN, II v. Kyle DECKER, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-1330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Baudoin, Aldon J. II; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2004-2048; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-00562.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Annie R.H. RAPP, et al. v. IBERIA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.
    No. 2006-C-1331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Crown Roofing Services, Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 101,-490-D, 101,420-D, 101,787-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). CA 05-833, CA 05-834, CA 05-835.

Denied.


text:
    Quyen NGUYEN, et al. v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON, et al.
    No. 2006-C-1332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Underwriters at Lloyd’s London et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 81114-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1407.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Todd Allen DEAN and Cheryl Dean v. GRIFFIN CRANE & STEEL, INC., Fire & Casualty Company of Connecticut, Ernest Williams, Jr., Coregis Insurance Company, ABC Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Fire and Casualty Co. of Connecticut; Griffin Crane & Steel Service Inc. et al.; Williams, Earnest Jr.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2002-15954; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1226.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James ROSS.
    No. 2006-KK-1336.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Ross, James G.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 2047-06, 1316-02; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2504.

Denied., However, as this Court observed in State v. Thomas, 06-0619, p. 6 (La.7/11/06), 933 So.2d 788, 792, “[tjime is clearly now of the essence, for no matter how responsibility is apportioned, continued delays in the present case risk the loss of witnesses and the fading of memories to an extent that may also place at risk trial as a reliable vehicle for determining whether respondents committed the crime charged against them.”


text:
    Tasso TAYLOR, III and Elizabeth Thompson Taylor v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC. and Dean Morris, L.L.P.
    No. 2006-CC-1337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Dean Morris L.L.P.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2004-11433; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1081.

Denied.


text:
    Carl WALTHER, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and Department of State Civil Service.
    No. 2006-C-1338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Bandaries, Madro; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 468,223; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0739.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason E. SCOTT.
    No. 2006-KK-1344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Scott, Jason E.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 100,031; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41374-KW.

Denied.


text:
    Patricia K. MCNEELY v. SAFE HAVEN ENTERPRISES, INC.
    No. 2006-OC-1352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Safe Haven Enterprises Inc.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. C-736-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1609.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Timothy COMBETTA v. Ron ORDOYNE, Jr., Encompass Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Combetta, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 95,199; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 2347.

Denied.


text:
    Charles E. PLUMMER and Mae Etta Plummer Lewis v. Ora Lee Plummer BROWN, Ruth Plummer Hubbard, Joyce Marie Plummer, Joseph Plummer, Irma Jean Plummer and Samuel Paul Plummer.
    No. 2006-C-1354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Lewis, Mae Etta Plummer;— Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Nineteenth Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 308,103; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1059.

Denied.


text:
    Jeff GOODWIN v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
    No. 2006-CC-1355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Transportation & Devel. Dept, of; Louisiana State of et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Catahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 22,996-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-00202.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Carla Sue YOUNG v. JACK IN THE BOX, INC.
    No. 2006-C-1357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Jack in the Box Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 3, No. 03-08650; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1573.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Chris AUTHEMENT v. HARBOR CONSTRUCTION.
    No. 2006-CC-1359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Zurich American Ins. Co.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2002-17899; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0217.

Denied.


text:
    Charles CARTER v. Burl CAIN, Warden et al.
    No. 2006-CI-1378.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 528,-663; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 0211.

Denied.


text:
    Shanda REDMON v. Sondra CHEEK.
    No. 2006-C-1387.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Redmon, Shanda; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2002-12298; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1117.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Ray ARDOIN v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Janet K. Istre.
    No. 2006-C-1390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Ardoin, Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98,164; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1390.

Denied.


text:
    June COCKERHAM, et al. v. LASALLE NURSING HOME INC., et al.
    No. 2006-C-1391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re LaSalle Nursing Home Inc. et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of LaSalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 30,942; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-10.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Thomas E. SUND v. ST. HELENA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2006-C-1392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re St. Helena Parish School Bd.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 18,984; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 2473.

Denied.


text:
    Raymond Julius WILDE, Jr. and Lynn Marie Bercegeay Wilde, Each Individually and as Members of Community of Acquets and Gains Existing Between Them v. Thomas R. HARRELL, Acme Truck Line, Inc., Zurich American Insurance Company and Progressive Security Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Department of Public Safety, Louisiana; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 27732; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-CA-644.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Randy O. HAYNES v. FALCON INLAND, INC.
    No. 2006-C-1409.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Haynes, Randy O.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 122262; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0274.

Denied.


text:
    RUBICON, INC. v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Louisiana, and State of Louisiana, Through its Attorney General, Richard P. Ieyoub.
    No. 2006-C-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Rubicon Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 74,112; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 0220.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    William Chad STELLY v. Scott W. MCQUAIG, McQuaig & Associates, APLC and McQuaig & Stelly, APLC.
    No. 2006-CC-1435.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re McQuaig, Scott W.; McQuaig & Stelly, APLC; McQuaig & Associates, APLC; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 620-825; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-C-421.

Denied.


text:
    Donna WILSON v. OCHSNER FOUNDATION HOSPITAL.
    No. 2006-C-1446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Wilson, Donna; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 565-081; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-CA-953.

Denied


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Connie C. GORE.
    No. 2006-C-1448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Tanner, Robert; Hampton, Ron; Roth, Marty; Mid-South Estate Planning L.L.C.; Ramirez, Dixie; Leblanc, Adrian; Simon, Jennifer; — Other(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 84th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 100 570; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2005-CA-0806, 2005-CA-0549.

Denied.


text:
    Horace J. CORTEZ, et al. v. Peter TERRITO, et al.
    No. 2006-CC-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Territo, Peter et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial

Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 01-13889; to the Court Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2006-C-0245, 2006-C-0352

Deneid.


text:
    Ernest J. THIBODAUX and Hazel Pitre Hunter v. Joshua A. TILTON and Tilda Tinsley Tilton.
    No. 2006-CC-1451.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Tilton, Tilda Tinsley Estate of; Tilton, Joshua A. Estate of; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 827756; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 0528.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Martinell JACKSON and Ida Williams v. Jerry J. COCKERHAM, Lou Gioe Trucking d/b/a Chalmette Truck Corporation and U.S. Capital Insurance Company.
    No. 2006-C-1479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 22, 2006.
   In re Regional Transit Authority; Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 97-1410; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-0320.

Denied.


author: SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Victor SCHNYDER.
    No. 06-KA-29.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    June 28, 2006.

      John M. Crum, Jr., District Attorney, Rodney A. Brignac, Assistant District Attorney, Edgard, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellee, The State of Louisiana.
    Katherine M. Franks, Slidell, Louisiana, for DefendanVAppellant, Victor Schnyder.
    Panel composed of Judges THOMAS F. DALEY, MARION F. EDWARDS, and SUSAN M. CHEHARDY.
   SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, Judge.

I Jn this criminal matter defendant, Victor Schnyder, appeals his conviction on a charge of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2, as well as his adjudication as a multiple offender and enhanced sentence.

Defendant was charged with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling by the St. John the Baptist District Attorney’s Office. After a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty as charged. Subsequently, the State filed a bill of information charging defendant with being a second felony offender. The defendant was found to be a second felony offender and was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. After a defense |smotion for re-consideration of sentence was denied by the trial court, defendant filed a motion for appeal, which was granted. FACTS

On July 8, 2004, the Laplace home of David and Tracy Simko was burglarized. The Simkos discovered that their glass patio door had been broken and the door to the outside yard was open. The garage door was “broken down and kicked in.” Items missing included Mr. Simko’s air gun set, a red and black Craftsman tool bag, several sockets and screwdrivers, and a socket wrench. The theft was reported to police.

Several of the items stolen from the Simko home were pawned at B.J.’s Pawn Shop later that day. Albert Davis, III, manager of B.J.’s Pawn Shop testified that a daily report is made of items pawned. That record shows that on July 8, 2004, defendant pawned some sockets, a ratchet, a pneumatic air tool set and a wrench. The sockets were in a black and red Craftsman tool bag. After comparing the report to the list of items reported stolen from the Simkos, Detective Sergeant Fel-don Carney of the St. John Parish Sheriffs Office testified that he contacted Mr. Sim-ko. Mr. Simko went to the shop and made a positive identification of the items pawned by defendant as the same items stolen from his home.

When interviewed police officers, defendant initially denied knowing anything about the tools including where, they were located. However, after seeing the pawn shop records defendant confessed that he broke into the Simko’s home. At trial defendant’s testimony differed from the statement given police at the time of the investigation. At trial, defendant testified that he lives two houses away from the Simkos and he was in his front yard when a man he had never seen before | ¿offered to sell the tools to him. Defendant testified that he bought the tools from the man and then pawned them.

LAW

Defendant presents five assignments of error for our review. Two of those assignments relate to the sufficiency of evidence presented by the State to prove the charge against defendant.

When issues are raised on appeal as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Taylor, 04-346 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 887 So.2d 589, 592. Wfiien the entirety of the evidence, including evidence that was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any issues regarding other trial errors become moot. Id. Accordingly, we will consider the two assignments of error that relate to the sufficiency of evidence first.

In brief to this court, the defendant claims that it was reversible error to admit his statement to police into evidence at trial because the corpus delicti was never established. The defendant claims that his statement appears so unreliable that it should be considered insufficient to corroborate details of the offense, to establish identity, or to form the basis for the conviction, Therefore, the conviction is illegal as it was based upon an uncorroborated and unreliable statement. In addition, the defendant argues that the State failed to establish the element of unauthorized entry beyond a reasonable doubt, a necessary element of both the corpus delicti and the offense.

The State counters defendant’s assertions by arguing that there is direct and circumstantial evidence of an unauthorized entry. The State claims that the victims’ report of the incident to the police, .the victims’ testimony regarding broken glass and a broken door used to gain entry, and the removal of the victims’ | flproperty from the home all prove that there was an unauthorized entry and corroborate the defendant’s statement.

The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, La. R.S. 15:438 requires that the elements of the offense be proven so that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. State v. Tran, 97-640 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/98), 709 So.2d 311, 316. This is not a separate test from the reasonable doubt standard in Jackson v. Virginia, but rather provides a basis for a determination 'of the existence of reasonable doubt. All of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to satisfy a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The credibility of witnesses presenting conflicting testimony on factual matters is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. The trier of fact can accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Baker, 01-1397 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/30/02), 816 So.2d 363, 365. It is not the function of the appellate court to second-guess the credibility of witnesses as determined by the trier of fact or to reweigh the evidence absent impingement on the fundamental due process of law. Id. Under the Jackson standard, a review of a criminal conviction record for sufficiency of evidence does not require the court to ask whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a. reasonable doubt. State v. Barnes, 98-932 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/10/99), 729 So.2d 44, 46, writ denied, 99-1018 (La.9/17/99), 747 So.2d 1099. Rather, the reviewing court is required to 1 (¡consider the whole record and determine whether any rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

“Simple burglary of an inhabited home is the unauthorized entry of any inhabited dwelling, house, apartment or other structure used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person or persons with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein.” La. R.S. 14:62.2. In order to convict an accused of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, the State must prove; (1) there was an unauthorized entry, (2) the structure was inhabited at the time of entry, and (3) the defendant had the specific intent to commit a felony or theft inside the structure. State v. Barroso, 99-1297 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/17/00), 762 So.2d 206, 213, writ denied, 00-1744 (La.6/29/01), 794 So.2d 821. In order to satisfy the unauthorized entry element, the State must prove that the defendant did not have permission to enter the premises. Tran, 709 So.2d at 316-317. Broken glass on the inside of a residence creates an inference that it was broken in order to facilitate entry, and provides circumstantial evidence indicative of unauthorized entry. Id.

Under the Louisiana corpus de-licti rule, an accused party cannot be legally convicted on his own uncorroborated confession without proof that a crime has been committed by someone, i.e. without proof of the corpus delicti. State v. Cruz, 455 So.2d 1351 (La.1984). An untrustworthy confession alone should not support a conviction. State v. Martin, 93-0285 (La.10/17/94), 645 So.2d 190, 195-196. The conviction cannot be based on the defendant’s extrajudicial confession, unless corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti Taylor, 887 So.2d at 592-594. Corroboration is an effective test of the trustworthiness of a person’s inculpa-tory statements. Martin, 645 So.2d at 195-196. The purpose of the corroboration rule is to test the reliability of a confession, in order to prevent an erroneous conviction based solely on an untrue confession. The Louisiana corpus \ ndelicti rule only requires corroboration of the reliability of an inculpatory statement. The rule does not require that independent evidence corroborate every element of the crime admitted in the.accused’s statement, where its general reliability has been corroborated. Therefore, the corroborating evidence need only tend to show the major or essential harm involved in the offense charged, and not all of the elements technically distinguished. In order to establish guilt, the State must show that the injury specified in the crime occurred, and that the injury was caused by someone’s criminal activity. Id.

The corpus delicti must be proven by evidence that the jury may reasonably accept as establishing that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Taylor, 887 So.2d at 592-594. The issue is whether there is any evidence at all, independent of the confession, which establishes the fact that a crime was committed, not whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. Id.

The defendant argues that the State failed to establish the element of unauthorized entry beyond a reasonable doubt, a necessary element of both the corpus de-licti and the offense. He claims that neither David nor Tracy Simko testified that the entrance to their house was unauthorized. He suggests that a broken window and a house in a disturbed condition is not sufficient evidence to prove an unauthorized entry with the intent to commit a theft, and that there was no physical evidence showing that he was seen in or near the Simko home. Defendant also states that his behavior when approached by Detective Carney was not indicative of guilt since he did not run away. He asserts that at most he is guilty of receiving stolen goods, an offense with which he was not charged.

In addition, the defendant argues that his statement appears so unreliable that it should be considered insufficient to establish that he entered the Simko home Rand took the tools. He claims that Detective Carney asked questions that provided all of the information in his statement. We are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments:

The State proved the element of unauthorized entry through the testimony of the Simkos. The Simkos testified that they realized that their home was broken into when they found the glass in their patio door was broken. When Tracy Sim-ko found that the door to their yard was broken open, she called the police. David Simko testified that his garage door was broken by someone who “kicked” it in. In addition, the jury could have found that a report to police that someone had broken into the home showed that the Simkos had not authorized the entry.

Finally, the defendant claims that his statement was unreliable, and therefore insufficient to corroborate details of the offense,, to establish identity, or to form the basis for the conviction. Again, we disagree.

The general reliability of the defendant’s statement was established by corroborating evidence. The defendant, in his statement, said that he kicked in the door to gain entry to the Simko house. David Simko testified that he realized that his house was broken into by someone, who kicked in the garage door. The defendant admitted that he broke ■ into the Simko house on the morning of July 8, and took some tools. He removed the plastic liner from the air tool set before taking it. David Simko testified that on the day of the burglary he realized that he new air gun set was missing when he saw the plastic liner on the floor. Later, he realized that other tools were missing. The defendant admitted that he pawned the tools at B.J.’s Pawn Shop on the same day. Mr. Davis testified that the defendant pawned some tools at 1:53 p.m. on July 8. Detective Carney examined the air gun set at the pawnshop. He thought it looked new. David Simko described his stolen Lair gun set as new when Detective Carney contacted him. David Simko later identified his stolen tools at the pawnshop.

Given the evidence presented at trial, we find that the State corroborated the general reliability of the defendant’s inculpatory statement by proving the corpus delicti with independent evidence. The State proved that an unauthorized entry of the inhabited dwelling occurred, caused by someone’s criminal activity.

Finding-no merit in the two assignments of error relating to the sufficiency of evidence, we now consider the remaining assignments.

The defendant argues that there is no affirmative proof in the record that he was advised of his rights to a hearing and not to incriminate himself, or. that he voluntarily stipulated that he was a second felony offender. He claims that failure to advise him and show he voluntarily stipulated to multiple offender status constitutes reversible error requiring that the stipulation and the sentence imposed in the habitual offender proceeding be set aside.

The State argues that it is implicit that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights in his discussion of the multiple bill with his attorney. The State contends that the defendant’s stipulation infers that he had a right to a hearing and the attendant constitutional rights.

The defense attorney stipulated that the defendant was a second felony offender at arraignment on his multiple bill. However, the record does not reflect that the trial court advised the defendant of his right to a formal hearing, to have the State prove its case under the multiple offender statute, or of his right to remain silent. Nor does the record reflect that prior to entering into a stipulation to second offender status the defendant affirmatively waived his right to remain silent with |1flregard to the multiple offender bill of information, or to a formal hearing in which the State would have to prove its case by competent evidence under the multiple offender statute.

The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the constitutional right to remain silent is applicable in multiple offender status proceedings conducted pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983). As explained by the Johnson court;

.the defendant, if he chooses, has the right to remain silent. Once the defendant chooses to remain silent the state must then by competent evidence prove the elements of R.S. 15:529.1 before the defendant can be sentenced as an habitual offender. Before the defendant chooses to acknowledge or confess in open court that he has been previously convicted of a felony, the statute requires that he first be cautioned by the trial court as to his rights. R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides that defendant be advised by the court of his right to a “formal hearing” and to have the state prove its case. State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983). Further, this section implicitly provides that the defendant should be advised, by the court, of his statutory right to remain silent.

Johnson 432 So.2d at 817

Therefore, a trial court must advise a defendant of his rights to remain silent, to a formal hearing, and to have the State prove its case under the multiple offender statute. State v. Jones, 00-1259 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/13/00), 777 So.2d 563, 568-569. Generally, a trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent is considered harmless error when the defendant’s multiple offender status is established by competent evidence offered by the State at a hearing rather than by admission of the defendant. State v. Knight, 01-881 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/13/02), 811 So.2d 947, 949. However, there is reversible error when the defendant stipulates to the multiple bill without having been informed of his right to a hearing or his right to remain silent, by either the court or his attorney. Id.

| n While the defendant may have stipulated to the multiple offender bill of information, the record does not indicate that the trial court advised the defendant of his rights pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D). At the multiple bill hearing, the trial judge did not address the defendant, at any time during the proceeding. Defense counsel informed the trial court that he had discussed the matter with the defendant, and he was prepared to stipulate. The trial judge accepted the defendant’s stipulation to the multiple bill. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge informed the defendant that the sentencing range for a conviction under La. R.S. 14:62.2 was for not less than one year nor more than twelve years. After the State reminded the trial judge of the defendant’s stipulation to the multiple bill, the trial judge again stated the sentencing range for a conviction under La. R.S. 14:62.2, and then informed the defendant that because it was a multiple bill the sentencing range was increased to not less than six years nor more than twenty-four years. Since, the defendant stipulated to the multiple bill, the State did not establish proof of the prior conviction by competent evidence, and defendant was not informed of his rights pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(D), we find reversible error.

Accordingly, the defendant’s adjudication as a multiple offender and his enhanced sentence are hereby vacated. However, a defendant can be re-tried on a multiple offender bill, since double jeopardy does not attach to multiple offender hearings. Jones, 777 So.2d at 568-569.

The final two assignments regard questions of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to timely move for reconsideration of sentence and whether the enhanced sentence is excessive. Because we find reversible error in the adjudication of defendant as a multiple offender, these assignments are moot.

|1?For the foregoing reasons, the conviction on the charge of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2 is affirmed. The adjudication of defendant as a multiple offender is reversed. The multiple offender status and the enhanced sentence are hereby vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; MULTIPLE OFFENDER STATUS AND SENTENCE VACATED; MATTER REMANDED.

      . We note that the appeal appears to be untimely on its face. However, in view of Executive Order KBB 2005-32, 48 and 67, issued by Governor Kathleen Blanco suspending prescriptive periods, this court will consider the appeal as timely.


author: TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

text:
    William C. OVERTON, Jr. v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, (a/k/a Shell Offshore, Inc.), Floyd Landry, and Dennis A. Pilney.
    No. 2005-CA-1001.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    July 19, 2006.

      James L. Arruebarrena, James L. Ar-ruebarrena, LLC, New Orleans, LA, and Fred L. Herman, Law offices of Fred L. Herman, New Orleans, LA, for William C. Overton.
    Kathleen F. Hobson, New Orleans, LA, and Marie Breaux, New Orleans, LA, for Shell Oil Company.

      (Court composed of Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge LEON A. CANNIZZARO, JR.).
   TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

| ¶ This appeal arises under the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute regarding Shell Oil Company’s termination of William Overton, who claimed his termination was retaliation based on his status as a whistleblower. The trial court held that William Overton was a whistleblower and awarded him damages of $609,586.20. The damage award included trebling all damages as well as interest and prejudgment interest. Shell Oil Company appeals asserting the trial court erred by finding William Overton was a whistleblower in good faith and by trebling damages outside the scope of Louisiana’s whistleblower statute. We find the trial court did not err in determining William Overton was a good faith whistleblower and affirm the damage awards. We reverse the granting of prejudgment interest on the trebled portion of damages and the trebling of prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

William Overton (“Mr. Overton”) began working on offshore oil platforms for Shell Oil Company (“Shell”) in 1984. Mr. Over-ton possessed a good personnel record and no disciplinary actions with Shell until 1997.

| ¿Eugene Island 189B

In 1997, Mr. Overton worked on the Eugene Island 189B (“EI189B”) production platform, with Dennis Pilney (“Mr. Pilney”) as his foreman and Floyd Landry (“Mr. Landry”) as Superintendent, and was in charge of adjusting the pressure on the pilots on the platform. Jacket 20, one of the pilots, was not functioning properly and Mr. Overton adjusted the pressure to around 800 pounds per square inch (“psi”) and completed documents for the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) report. Following the completion of his hitch, the time spent offshore on the pil rig, Mr. Overton left for vacation. Upon his return to EI189B, Mr. Overton discovered that MMS boarded the platform to perform an inspection. MMS found federal infractions during the annual inspection. The MMS report for Jacket 20 indicated that it was in perfect working order. However, the pressure settings were incorrect at a setting of 1,200 psi. During the course of Shell’s investigation, it discovered that a contract worker falsified the MMS report after Mr. Overton left EI189B. Crew members witnessed this contract worker discard Mr. Overton’s report into the trash. The contract worker admitted to falsifying the MMS report, but blamed the incorrect pressure settings on Mr. Over-ton. Mr. Overton denied that he had adjusted Jacket 20 illegally to dangerous pressure settings as he had not had access to Jacket 20 since his departure weeks before. However, his.report was discarded by the contract worker. This resulted in Mr. Overton receiving a one week suspension without pay for a safety violation.

Original Federal Complaint

On May 6, 1998, Mr. Overton filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (“EDLA”), ' 98-1361, against Shell ^regarding its violations of environmental laws and regulations during the 1997 EI189B incident. Specifically, Mr. Over-ton alleged the contract worker falsified the MMS report, that the Shell manager had knowledge of the falsification and did not report it to the Department of the Interior or MMS, and that other Shell employees covered up the falsification. Shell received service of this complaint. The EDLA dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Bay Marchand 26

In 1998, Shell transferred Mr. Overton to Bay Marchand 26 (“BM26”) under the supervision of Earl Calíais (“Mr. Calíais”). In October 1998, while on BM26, Mr. Overton used a substance called torque-seal to make sure that no one changed his settings on safety valves. Mr. Calíais was unhappy about the use of torque-seal and counseled Mr. Overton not to use it again. Due to his use of torque-seal, Mr. Overton received a Performance Evaluation of “Does Not Consistently ' Meet Expectations,” his lowest evaluation since he began working for Shell.

Original State Petition

On June 9, 1999, Mr. Overton filed a petition in Civil District Court against Shell, Mr. Pilney, and Mr. Landry, which contained similar allegations to the federal complaint from 1998. Mr. Overton alleged that Shell covered up the MMS report falsification in violation of Federal laws. Mr. Overton also alleged Shell continued to retaliate against him, causing stress, damage to his reputation, and a transfer requiring him to drive over four hours from his home. The EDLA denied Shell’s request for removal.

[Main Pass 310

In July 1999, Shell transferred Mr. Overton to Main Pass 310 (“MP310”) and Main Pass 252 (“MP252”). Chuck Holcomb (“Mr. Holcomb”) was Mr. Overton’s Field Supervisor and Christine Sistrunk (“Ms. Sistrunk”) was Mr. Holcomb’s Area Team Leader. On July 7, 1999, Mr. Over-ton arrived on MP310 and met with Mr. Holcomb who instructed him to meet with Sostane Tauriac (“Mr. Tauriac”) for further instructions. Mr. Tauriac instructed Mr. Overton to keep a bucket full of soap that was injected into a water line from a WEMCO unit on the platform. The soap acted as a surfactant, which increases the weight of the oil being discharged from the WEMCO and causes it to sink from the surface of the water. This removes the oil sheen from the water’s surface. Mr. Over-ton was unsure if this was legal and advised Mr. Tauriac to shut down the WEM-CO pending further advice. Mr. Tauriac instructed Mr. Overton that his only job was to make sure the bucket remained full of soap.

The same day, Mr. Overton called David Tregre (“Mr. Tregre”), a Department of Interior investigator, to report the possible safety violation. Mr. Tregre instructed Mr. Overton to continue injecting the soap and to take notes on everything. Later that day, Mr. Tauriac instructed Mr. Over-ton to disconnect the soap line. Mr. Tauri-ac informed Mr. Holcomb of the soap discharge, which he claimed was due to the lack of another chemical clarifier. Mr. Tauriac then filed a 201 form.

Following Shell’s investigation, conducted by Ms. Sistrunk and Human Resources Representative Shanna Chalk Broussard (“Ms. Broussard”), into the | ^soaping incident, Mr. Tauriac and Mr. Overton received 84 hour suspensions without pay. Both Mr. Tauriac and Mr. Overton had to complete a recommended Corrective Action Plan involving recertification and training at Shell’s training facility in Robert, Louisiana. Mr. Overton’s suspension was based on the fact that he did not report the possible violation to anyone at Shell, which allegedly violated Shell’s Code of Conduct.

Federal Subpoenas Regarding Alleged Violations

On December 22, 1999, Mr. Overton formally announced to Ms. Sistrunk that he was working with the Department of Interior and of his status as a whistleblower. On January 19, 2000, while Mr. Overton was working on MP252, federal agents boarded the platform armed with weapons and issued grand jury subpoenas based upon alleged violations of environmental regulations. Several hours after the agents arrived, Ms. Sistrunk and Mr. Holcomb met with Mr. Overton to discuss his annual Performance Evaluation. Mr. Overton was given a “Marginal” rating on his evaluation. He was also given a Final Written Warning, a Personal Development Plan, and a Corrective Action Plan requiring many hours of training at the Robert training facility. Following the meeting, Ms. Sistrunk and Mr. Holcomb instructed Mr. Overton not to speak to other crew members and ordered him to remain in his room until a specially requested helicopter arrived to take him off the platform.

In March 2000, Mr. Overton had to sign a Return to Work Agreement as a condition of allowing him back offshore. This agreement required a commitment to responsibility and accountability, effective communication skills, and following guidelines and procedures. A violation of any of these tenets could result in Mr. Overton’s termination.

| Shift Change Incident And Termination

On July 20, 2000, Mr. Overton arrived at the heliport some time before 6:00 a.m. for a flight to the platform for his next hitch. When he arrived, someone stated that Mr. Holcomb was looking for Mike Volz (“Mr. Volz”) and David Hanna (“Mr. Hanna”). Mr. Overton went to the parking lot to look for them. Mr. Overton went to check in on the flight manifest and was told he was too late because the helicopter was already fueled. Mr. Overton had to wait until the next flight to go to the platform. Once he arrived, Mr. Holcomb called him into a meeting and Ms. Sistrunk was on the phone. Mr. Overton was accused of being late for the flight because of a new rule that crew members must arrive at the heliport no less than thirty minutes prior to the scheduled flight time. Mr. Overton was unaware of this rule. Pursuant to their discussion, Mr. Overton was placed on suspended status. On July 27, 2000, Shell terminated Mr. Overton for allegedly violating his Return to Work Agreement by allegedly missing the helicopter flight on July 20, 2000.

On October 30, 2000, Mr. Overton filed his First Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages. The petition incorporated further details, as above mentioned, regarding Shell’s alleged retaliatory actions against Mr. Overton. On March 26, 2002, Mr. Overton filed his Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages, which seeks to incorporate the complaint Mr. Overton filed in the EDLA and establish May 5, 1998, as the beginning date of “protected activity” under the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute and further states facts regarding Shell’s alleged retaliation.

| rjTrial

The parties proceeded to a five day bench trial. During the trial, the trial court dismissed Mr. Landry and Mr. Pil-ney from the suit with prejudice. The trial court’s judgment on April 5, 2005, held that Shell’s termination of Mr. Over-ton was retaliation for being a whistleblower and ordered Shell to pay $609,586.20. The trial court allotted the damage award as follows:

Lost wages $ 9,715.07
Lost pension benefits $ 151,868.33
Lost employment benefits $ 16,612.00
Emotional distress $ 25,000.00
Subtotal $ 203,195.40
Trebled x 3
Total $ 609,586.20

The trial court further ordered that Mr. Overton submit a motion to assess attorney’s fees and costs within thirty days. Shell suspensively appeals the April 5, 2005 judgment.

Shell asserts many assignments of error. As to liability, Shell avers that the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Overton was terminated in retaliation for being a whistleblower. Shell also asserts the trial court erred in awarding lost pension benefit damages, lost fringe benefit damages, lost wages, and emotional distress damages. Shell also asserts the trial court erred by trebling interest and prejudgment interest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review the trial court’s findings of fact under a “manifest” error” or “clearly wrong” standard. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). The Louisiana Supreme Court created a two prong test for overturning the factfinder’s decisions, which includes: 1) finding the trial court’s rulings have no reasonable factual basis and 2) the record indicates that the trial court’s findings pare wrong (manifestly erroneous). Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). The appellate court must determine, after reviewing the entire record, if the trial court’s decision was clearly wrong or reasonable. Stobart v. State, Through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). This standard is partly based on the trial court’s ability to better weigh witness credibility. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973). If “two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883.

The trial court’s legal findings are reviewed under the de novo standard. Balseiro v. Castaneda-Zuniga, 04-2038, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/17/05), 916 So.2d 1149, 1153. “A legal error occurs when a trial court applies the incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial.” Banks v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, 01-0859, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/2002), 829 So.2d 511, 514.

LIABILITY

The Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute (“Whistleblower Statute”), La. R.S. 30:2027, protects employees from retaliation for reporting possible environmental regulation violations. The pertinent section of La. R.S. 30:2027 in regards to liability states:

§ 2027. Environmental violations reported by employees; reprisals prohibited
A. No firm, business, private or public corporation, partnership, individual employer, or federal, state, or local governmental agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee, acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into |9any environmental violation by the employer, or another employer with whom there is a business relationship, of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.
B. (2)(a) The term “action is taken” shall include firing, layoff, lockout, loss of promotion, loss of raise, loss of present position, loss of job duties or responsibilities, imposition of onerous duties or responsibilities, or any other action or inaction the court finds was taken as a result of a report of an environmental violation.

The employee claiming protection under the Whistleblower Statute must show that he was acting in good faith. Barron’s Law Dictionary defines good faith as “a total absence of any intention to seek an unfair advantage or to defraud another party; an honest and sincere intention to fulfill one’s obligations.” BaRROn’s Law Dictionary 220 (4th ed.1996). Black’s Law Dictionary states that good faith is an “intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition.” Black’s Law Dictionary 693 (6th ed.1990). “[A]n honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage....” Id. He must also prove a causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory actions. Chiro v. Harmony Corp., 99-0453, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 1198, 1201. However, the protected activity need not be the sole reason behind the employer’s alleged retaliatory conduct. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n. 4 (5th Cir.1996), citing De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 857 n. 12 (5th Cir.1982). The whistleblower must show illicit motivation for the employer’s alleged retaliatory actions. Powers v. Vista Chem. Co., 109 F.3d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir.1997).

The plaintiff in a Louisiana tort action must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La.1993), citing Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971). “A | ^preponderance of the evidence means evidence of greater weight or evidence which is more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.” ODECO Oil & Gas Co. v. Nunez, 532 So.2d 453, 457 (La.App. 1 Cir.1988). “Proof by direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient to constitute a preponderance, when, taking the evidence as a whole, such proof shows that the fact or causation sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Lasha, 625 So.2d at 1005, citing Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151, 155 (1971).

Shell alleges that the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Overton was in good faith, that allegedly violating the Return to Work Agreement constituted a pretextual reason for firing Mr. Overton, and that Shell had illicit motivation to fire Mr. Overton. Therefore, it contends that it should not be liable under the Whistle-blower Statute.

Mr. Overton’s first act of protected activity was the complaint he filed in the EDLA in May 1998 in which he alleged that Shell did not disclose the falsification of MMS reports to MMS or the Department of Interior. Specifically, Mr. Over-ton alleged that Shell violated the Louisiana Hazardous Waste Control Law, La. R.S. 30:2172, the Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331, and other MMS regulations, as well as other state and federal environmental provisions. Shell received service of this lawsuit and was put on notice that Mr. Overton was involved in protected activity pursuant the Whistleblower Statute.

The case sub judice was filed after Mr. Overton was disciplined for allegedly “dialing out” or illegally increasing the pressure settings on Jacket 20 at EI189B. The resulting one week suspension without pay was Mr. Overton’s first discipline. The contract worker that falsified the MMS report was no longer allowed to work on Shell platforms and was the last person with access to the settings on Jacket 20. |n At trial, Frank Ainsworth, a position operator, and Sherman Marcantel, a worker for Danos and Curóle, testified that they witnessed the contract worker throwing out Mr. Overton’s range chart for Jacket 20. Therefore, there was no proof that Mr. Overton “ramped up” Jacket 20 to 1,200 psi and not to around 800 psi as he indicated. Nonetheless, Mr. Overton was disciplined for the incorrect pressure settings and filed suit. As of that time, Mr. Overton was a whistleblower because he disclosed “an activity, policy, practice of the employer ... that the employee reasonably” believed was “in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.” La. R.S. 30:2027.

Shell transferred Mr. Overton to BM26 in 1999 where he had a “counseling” session because he used torque-seal to ensure that no other crew members changed his valve settings. The incident caused him to receive an evaluation of “Does Not Consistently Meet Expectations.” This was Mr. Overton’s lowest evaluation, so far, in his history of working for Shell.

In July 1999, Mr. Overton arrived for his first day of work on MP 310 and Mr. Tauriac instructed him to keep a bucket of soap full for the WEMCO unit. Mr. Over-ton testified that he thought that using the soap as a surfactant to hide an oil sheen was illegal, but that he was unsure at the time. He told Mr. Tauriac that the WEM-CO should be shut down until the problem could be resolved. Mr. Tauriac disregarded this and further instructed Mr. Overton to fill the bucket with soap. Mr. Overton left the WEMCO and phoned the Department of Interior from his quarters. He spoke with Mr. Tregre, who confirmed the illegality and instructed Mr. Overton to add soap to the bucket and to take notes. As a result, Mr. Overton was suspended for 84 hours and instructed to create a Corrective Action Plan. Mr. Overton testified that he was placed in an awkward position his first day on MP310 |1?and had to follow the orders of Mr. Tauriac. Ms. Sistrunk testified that Mr. Overton was disciplined for violating Shell’s Code of Conduct because he did not report his suspicions about the soap to someone else at Shell. However, Mr. Overton questioned Mr. Tauriac and then reported his suspicions to the Department of Interior. Paul Kelone, an independent witness working for Production Management who was in the process of buying a Shell platform, testified that he witnessed Shell employees soaping WEMCO lines for about six weeks while he was on the platform.

Mr. Overton formally told Ms. Sistrunk that he was a whistleblower on December 22, 1999. Ms. Sistrunk stated in her deposition that she was “personally disappointed.” On January 19, 2000, federal agents boarded the platform to issue grand jury subpoenas regarding complaints made by Mr. Overton. A few hours after the federal agents left, Ms. Sistrunk and Mr. Holcomb called Mr. Overton into a meeting to give him his annual Performance Evaluation. Mr. Overton received a “Marginal” rating, the worst in his career at Shell. This rating also required him to sign a Corrective Action Plan and a Personal Development Plan. Mr. Overton was instructed to go directly to his quarters, not to talk to anyone, and wait for a helicopter to take him off the platform.

Ms. Sistrunk testified at trial that there was no way to prove that the evaluation was filled out prior to the federal agents arrival. Mr. Holcomb also stated in his deposition that there were no written documents to confirm the completion date of Mr. Overton’s evaluation. Mr. Holcomb stated that no documents could confirm that the helicopter was prearranged.

Following Mr. Overton’s training at the Robert training center, Ms. Sistrunk made him sign a Return to Work Agreement. The agreement confirmed Mr. 11sOverton’s commitment to responsibility and accountability, effective communication skills, and following guidelines and procedures. A violation of any of these tenets could result in Mr. Overton’s termination. Before Mr. Overton returned to work, Mr. Holcomb testified that he instructed the crew to watch Mr. Overton.

On July 20, 2000, Mr. Overton was scheduled to begin working offshore again. He arrived at the heliport before the 6:00 a.m. flight. However, he was told that he was too late and would have to take the next flight. This resulted in Mr. Overton missing crew change and being late for his shift. Once he arrived on the platform, he met with Mr. Holcomb and Ms. Sistrunk, via speakerphone, concerning his late arrival. They instructed him that he violated his Return to Work Agreement by arriving late. They also informed Mr. Overton that he violated a Shell policy that required all crew members to arrive at the heliport at least thirty minutes pri- or to departure. Mr. Overton was unaware of this policy. On July 27, 2000, Mr. Overton was terminated for violating his Return to Work Agreement.

Ms. Sistrunk testified that Mr. Overton was terminated because he violated his Return to Work Agreement and not specifically for missing the helicopter flight. However, Mr. Overton violated that agreement by missing the helicopter flight. Mr. Holcomb also stated in his deposition that missing the flight was the only reason Shell terminated Mr. Overton.

The trial court found the heliport incident suspect. First, Shell’s investigation notes document that Mr. Volz, Mr. Hanna, and Brian Macklin were also unaware of Shell’s new thirty minute arrival policy. Mr. Volz and Mr. Hanna also arrived at almost the same time as Mr. Overton, yet they were allowed on the | ^helicopter and escaped discipline for not arriving thirty minutes early. Mr. Holcomb also admitted in his deposition that he may have told the dispatcher that some people were outside, but had not come in yet. He also stated that he assumed that Mr. Volz and Mr. Hanna were in the parking lot because they had never missed a flight. However, Mr. Overton had never missed a flight. Mr. Holcomb also stated that Mr. Hanna told him that he had seen Mr. Overton at the heliport. Ms. Broussard testified that both Mr. Volz and Mr. Hanna stated that they saw Mr. Overton at the heliport.

After reviewing all of the evidence in the record, we cannot find that the trial court manifestly erred, was clearly wrong, or legally wrong when it stated that Shell’s “handling of the July 20, 2000 incident was an arbitrary application of its policies.” Mr. Overton appeared to be acting in good faith because he was acting without malice and without any intentions of obtaining an unfair advantage or of defrauding anyone. Mr. Overton tried to fulfill his job requirements and his obligation to the environment as an offshore employee by complying with environmental regulations. He also stated that he was unsure if soaping the WEMCO line was illegal. Additionally, his original suit filed in 1998, stemmed from his duty to monitor pressure settings on valves and the only evidence to validate his claim that he set the pressure at 800 psi was thrown away by a contract worker. Good faith in regards to the Whistleblower Statute determines Mr. Overton’s status and not Shell’s Code of Conduct.

Evidence supported a causal connection between Mr. Overton’s continuous reports of environmental violations and his disciplinary record. Mr. Overton’s evaluations deteriorated with his continued complaints regarding Shell practices, and it eventually led to his termination. The arbitrariness of Shell’s application of |1Bthe new thirty minute heliport rule also demonstrates illicit motivation. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated, in a compensation case, that “[a]n employer cannot simply invent a violation of a safety rule or stretch the facts of a situation out of context so he has an excuse for firing an employee.... ” Ducote v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So.2d 704, 707 (La.1985). As such, we find that the alleged violation of the Return to Work Agreement was a pretextual reason for Shell’s motivation for terminating a repeated whistleblower.

DAMAGES

Having affirmed the trial court’s determination of Shell’s liability under the Whistleblower Statute, we now examine the damage awards. Mr. Overton became a whistleblower in 1998 and the case sub judice commenced in June 1999, prior to the July 9, 1999 amendment of the Whis-tleblower Statute to its present wording used by the trial court. As such, the Whistleblower Statute of June 1999, must be applied to this case. Louisiana Revised Statutes are not applied retroactively unless “expressly so stated.” La. R.S. 1:2. Therefore, we find that the trial court committed error by using the present version of the Whistleblower Statute. The damages section of La. R.S. 30:2027, in June 1999, read as follows:

B. (1) Any employee against whom any action is taken as a result of acting under Subsection A of this Section may commence a civil action in a district court of the employee’s parish of domicile, and shall recover from his employer triple damages resulting from the action taken against him and all costs of preparing, filing, prosecuting, appealing, or otherwise conducting a law suit [sic], including attorney’s fees, if the court finds that Subsection A of this Section has been violated. In addition, the employee shall be entitled to all other civil and criminal remedies available under any other state, federal, or local law.
(2)(a) The term “action is taken” shall include firing, layoff, lockout, loss of promotion, loss of raise, loss of present position, loss of job duties or responsibilities, imposition of onerous duties or responsibilities, or any other action or inaction the court finds was taken as a result of a report of an environmental violation.
| nJb) ‘Damages’ for the purposes of this Section shall include, but not be limited to, lost wages, lost anticipated wage due to wage increase, or loss of anticipated wages which would have resulted from a lost promotion, any property lost as a result of lost wages, lost benefits, and any physical or emotional damages resulting therefrom. (Emphasis added).

The above version of the Whistleblower Statute does not include the three year limitation on trebled damages that the present version includes.

Lost Wages

Shell avers the “District Court’s award of $9,715.07 (trebled to $29,145.21), lacks sufficient record evidence” to support the award. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial court has broad discretion for awarding lost wages as long as a “factual basis” for the award exists. Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-0589, p. 29 (La.2005), 893 So.2d 32, 53. “[T]he amount of lost earnings need not be proved with mathematical certainty, but by such proof as reasonably establishes the claim, and such proof may consist only of the plaintiffs own testimony.” Id. Lost wages should be determined to a reasonable certainty. Id. Courts can determine damage awards even if it “cannot be exactly estimated ... based upon all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1006-07, 245 So.2d 151, 155 (1971).

Holly Sharp (“Accountant Sharp”), CPA, CFP, CFE, Mr. Overton’s forensic accountant, testified that she reviewed Mr. Overton’s Shell earning statements, social security statement, W-2s, income tax returns, and payroll records from Mr. Overton’s subsequent jobs. Accountant Sharp calculated Mr. Overton’s back-pay from July 27, 2000, to be $62,490, with overtime. She included the $5,000 bonus that Mr. Overton did not receive as a result of his “Marginal” rating following the issuance of the grand jury subpoenas. Accountant Sharp calculated actual losses of |17$27,102 for remaining back-pay and $20,076 for front pay from the trial date for twenty-four months.

Dan Cliffe (“Accountant Cliffe”), CPA, Shell’s forensic accountant, testified that Mr. Overton’s loss of back-pay was $6,300 without including overtime. However, Accountant Cliffe reviewed only evidence Shell provided and conducted no independent research for documents concerning Mr. Overton’s earnings. Accountant Cliffe also did not consider overtime. He admitted that Mr. Overton would have made $51,725 without overtime in 2000 if Shell had not terminated his employment.

The trial court’s Reasons for Judgment include no reasoning behind the $9,715.07 award. However, predicated on the fact that Mr. Overton obtained a new job within thirteen days of being terminated from Shell and given the varying calculations between both forensic accountants, one of whom conducted no independent investigations or calculations, we do not find that the trial court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in awarding $9,715.07 in lost wages.

Fringe Benefits

Shell alleges the trial court erred by awarding Mr. Overton $16,612 in fringe benefits. First, Shell asserts the award extends a year and a half past the trial date: $11,917 for pre-trial fringe benefits and $4,695 for post-trial benefits until December 31, 2006. Second, Shell alleges that Accountant Sharp incorrectly calculated Mr. Overton’s benefits because she assumed that he did not pay a portion of the premium even though Shell deducted money from his paycheck to pay a portion of the premium.

Accountant Sharp examined Shell’s benefits book. She testified that Mr. Overton received “a lot of fringe benefits that were not replaced by his new 11semployment.” These extra benefits included health insurance for his wife. Accountant Sharp calculated the amount of money Mr. Overton would have to pay “out of pocket” for the missing fringe benefits and then added calculations for the fringe benefits that were not replaced by his new employers. Her calculation included the loss of disability insurance, dental coverage, and other fringe benefits not covered. Accountant Sharp calculated-$16,612 in total loss of fringe benefits. ' Once Accountant Sharp discovered, while testifying at trial, that Mr. Overton paid part of his fringe.benefit premiums, she stated that her calculations were still correct because Shell provided better benefits than the average or “low ball” figures- she used to calculate health insurance, etc. She also included a credit for the value of benefits Mr. Overton received from his subsequent employers and placed values on “what’s not being replaced.”

Accountant Cliffe testified that Mr. Overton had “similar” benefits at his subsequent jobs. Therefore, he did not calculate a loss of fringe benefits for Mr. Over-ton. Once again, he did not. conduct any outside research from the calculations that Shell provided.

Accountant Sharp admitted at trial that she calculated Mr. Overton’s lost fringe benefits based on the premise that he did not pay partial premiums at Shell. However, she countered her mistake with the fact that Shell provided superior benefits and she used average or “low ball” numbers when she calculated Mr. Overton’s loss. She also deducted money from her calculations for that paid by Mr. Overton’s subsequent employers. Accountant Cliffe did not calculate the loss of any fringe benefits. Given the trial court’s ability to weigh the credibility of witnesses and Accountant Sharp’s explanations, we do not find that the trial court |1sabused its discretion or committed manifest error in awarding $16,612 in lost employment benefits.

Pension

Shell asserts the trial court erred by awarding Mr. Overton $151,868.33 in lost pension benefits. Shell' argues that Mr. Overton had no “evidentiary foundation” and lacked a “proper factual predicate.” Shell also urges that all tort victims are required to mitigate their damages, even though it is an affirmative defense, and that Mr. Overton failed to mitigate pension losses.

“[M]any courts, in a variety of factual settings, have determined that pension benefits constitute deferred compensation for services.” Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Dist., 602 So.2d 704, 708 (La.1992). The Louisiana Supreme Court has also noted that “employees who are illegally discharged are entitled to recover for lost retirement contributions, or corresponding pension benefits.” Id. at 710. Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized the right to pension as a property right in community property. See Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978); T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La.1976).

“The ‘plaintiffs interest’ in a pension plan should be determined by considering ... the amount of pension benefits the plaintiff would have received had he not been terminated.... ” Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 620 (5th Cir.1996). Speculative damage awards without a basis of detail or specificity are not permitted. Bieber-Guillory v. Aswell, 98-559, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/98), 723 So.2d 1145, 1151. Although the mitigation is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proof. Taylor v. Tulane Med. Ctr., 98-1967, 98-1969, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/24/99), 751 So.2d 949, 954. Also, the Lnplaintiff must only take “reasonable steps” to mitigate his damages. Aisole v. Dean, 574 So.2d 1248, 1253 (La.1991).

Accountant Sharp reviewed Shell’s pension plan and Mr. Overton’s “Personal data as of August 11, 2000” as provided by Shell. Accountant Sharp used “conservative growth rates,” and used a three percent increase in salary. She also used a statistical “growth life” of sixteen additional years with a retirement age of 65. Using this method, Accountant Sharp calculated that Mr. Overton’s “net present value” of his pension was $151,868. Accountant Cliffe admitted that his calculations were too low because they did not include the possibility of Mr. Overton working for Shell the remainder of his career. He further admitted that, based on the assumption that Shell continues to have a profitable company and the same kind of pension benefits, that Mr. Over-ton’s present value of lost pension benefits was $144,000.

Shell asserts that the trial court did not consider the possibility of Mr. Overton losing his job to downsizing or that the pension plan could change. However, those are not factors considered by forensic accountants when calculating lost pension or retirement benefits. The trial court weighed the testimony of both forensic accountants. Accountant Sharp testified as to her thorough analysis, where as, Accountant Cliffe admitted that he did not calculate the lost pension with the consideration that Mr. Overton could work for Shell the remainder of his career. Based on Accountant Sharp’s use of Shell’s pension plan book, Shell’s personal data on Mr. Overton, and statistic base calculations, we do not find that the award is speculative. Additionally, Mr. Overton could not be expected to refuse every job in his field because it lacked a similar pension plan to Shell’s. Thus, we find the mitigation argument without merit. Therefore, we do | g1not find the trial court committed error or abused its discretion by awarding $151,868.33 in lost pension benefits.

Emotional Distress

The trier of fact is granted broad discretion when awarding general damages. Guillory v. State Farm Ins. Co., 94-1405 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/95), 662 So.2d 104, 116. The reviewing court alters the award only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. Id.

Mr. Overton testified that he felt isolated and that he sought psychiatric treatment several months before and after Shell terminated him. He stated that his psychiatrist, Dr. Spears, prescribed him the medication Serzone for depression. After termination, Mr. Overton testified that he felt withdrawn, isolated himself from his daughter, stopped sleeping normally, and quit his hobbies. He stated that it was one of the hardest times of his life and characterized it as “equivalent to a death.”

Patricia Overton (“Mrs. Overton”) testified that her husband felt like he was being treated differently after he filed the federal and state lawsuits against Shell. She stated that he started losing sleep, starting gaining weight, and stopped hunting, fishing, and hiking. Mrs. Overton also stated that Mr. Overton felt like he was being punished. She further testified that she felt that the stress in the house strained Mr. Overton’s close relationship with their daughter. Mrs. Overton testified that Mr. Overton seemed “pretty depressed.”

Dr. Shwery, Mr. Overton’s expert psychologist, testified that he conducted a “battery of tests” on Mr. Overton, interviewed him and Mrs. Overton, and spoke with Dr. Spears. Dr. Shwery stated that Dr. Spears diagnosed Mr. Overton with a mild form of depression and anxiety. Dr. Spears independently diagnosed Mr. | ¾, Overton with a depressive disorder after conducting the Beck Depression Inventory, the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Incomplete Sentences Blank Test, Shipley Institute of Living Scale, the Behavioral Medicine Diagnostic. Test, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (“MMPI”). He also testified that Mr. Overton had excessive guardedness and suspicion, but that the feelings were “consistent with someone who felt abused and retaliated against at work.” Dr. Shwery confirmed Mrs. Overton’s statements regarding changes in Mr. Overton. Dr. Shwery stated that psychologists administer tests because that is “the training and the province of the psychologist.”

Dr. Shwery hand scored the MMPI he administered. Dr. Shwery stated that Dr. Ginzburg, Shell’s expert witness, “ignored” the data that showed signs of depression on the MMPI test he administered. Lastly, Dr. Shwery stated that the causation of Mr. Overton’s depression was related to his employment at Shell, the environmental issues, and his termination.

Dr. Ginzburg, a certified psychiatrist, stated that more psychologists administer the MMPI in Louisiana than psychiatrists. He gave Mr. Overton the MMPI test, scored it by computer, and interpreted Mr. Overton’s symptoms. He interviewed Mr. Overton, but not his wife or former doctor. Dr. Ginzburg stated that Mr. Overton had symptoms but they were “insufficient to raise to the level of a clinical diagnosis.” However, he found that Mr. Overton’s symptoms of depression were slightly elevated.

Upon a thorough review of the above testimony, we do not find the trial court’s determination that Mr. Overton suffered emotional distress because of his | ^conflicts with Shell was clearly wrong. Therefore, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion is awarding $25,000 for emotional distress.

TREBLED DAMAGES

First, Shell asserts several of the damage awards should not be trebled because they extend past three years. However, Shell misplaces reliance upon the current version of the Whistleblower Statute, which limits trebled damages to three years. As discussed above, the Whistle-blower Statute in June 1999, when Mr. Overton filed the case sub judice, did not include a three year limitation on trebled damages. Therefore, we find this argument is without merit.

INTEREST

“Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.” La. R.S. 13:4203. However, “penalty interest is entirely of the post-judgment variety, and thus is calculated only from the date the penalties are awarded until the date they are paid.” Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 97-0110 (La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 1382, 1389. Pursuant to this jurisprudence, we find the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Overton prejudgment interest on the trebled, penalty portion of the damages. Prejudgment interest should have been granted on the untrebled damage amount of $203,195.40.

TREBLED INTEREST

As stated above, we find that the trial court should not have granted prejudgment interest on the trebled portion of damages. Pursuant to the discussion of granting prejudgment interest on the trebled damage award, we find that the trial court erred by ordering that prejudgment interest be trebled.

124This Court must determine if the trial court erred by trebling post-judgment interest on the trebled damage award. The Whistleblower Statute authorizes the assessment of penalties against violators. “Statutes which authorize the imposition of a penalty are to be strictly construed.” Hornsby v. Bayou Jack Logging, 04-1297, p. 12 (La.5/6/05), 902 So.2d 361, 369. The Whistleblower Statute does not provide for the trebling of interest. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred by ordering that post-judgment interest be trebled.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Shell terminated Mr. Overton because he was a whis-tleblower. We affirm the damages award as to lost wages, pension, fringe benefits, and emotional distress. However, we reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the trebled damage award and reverse the award of trebled prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

      . The MMS is a bureau in the Department of the Interior that manages the nation's natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf. The MMS inspects for violations of environmental regulations.

      .Torque-seal is an orange substance used on platforms to mark the location of safety valve settings. If the setting is adjusted or moved, the orange seal is broken proving that someone changed the valve from the original setting.

      . A WEMCO unit is the final discharge point for the water to be separated from the oil and released into the Gulf of Mexico/ocean.

      . A 201 form alerts the Federal Government that there has been an unauthorized discharge into the ocean from the platform.

      . During trial, the trial court entered into evidence another trial court’s opinion that stated that Dr. Ginzburg was not a credible witness for determining the amount of expert witness fees owed him.