author: SMITH, Chief Justice,

text:
    Jack HAYES and George S. Whitten, Sr. v. LEFLORE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
    No. 2004-CT-00759-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 17, 2006.

      George S. Whitten, Jr., attorney for appellants.
    Willie James Perkins, Sr., Greenwood, attorney for appellee.
   SMITH, Chief Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On November 14, 1995, an order was entered into the minute books of the Leflore County Board of Supervisors (“Board”). This order reflected that all five members of the Board agreed to authorize the exchange of lands between Le-flore County (“County”) and two companies, Gold Kist and Scott Petroleum. The order also included incentives from the County, including the construction of a rail spur track, easements, and an ad valorem tax exemption. Phil Wolfe, a member of the Board, claimed the Board neither considered, discussed, nor approved the 1995 order. On April 17, 1998, he filed a petition for injunctive relief in the Leflore County Chancery Court against the Board and County under the Open Meetings Act, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 25-41-1, et seq. (Rev.2003) (“Open Meetings Suit”). Wolfe requested the chancellor purge the order from the minute books and enjoin the enforcement of the order, or in the alternative, remove his name from the recorded vote. Gold Kist filed an answer and cross petition in June 1998, as did Scott Petroleum.

¶ 3. While Wolfe’s case was pending, Southern States Cooperative (“Southern”) purchased the land obtained by Gold Kist in the 1995 order. Because Wolfe’s suit was a cloud on Southern’s title to the land, Southern filed suit in late 2002 to quiet and confirm title, naming Wolfe as a defendant (“Quiet Title Suit”). On March 7, 2003, in an agreed order entered in Southern’s suit, Wolfe agreed to dismiss any claims pending in his Open Meetings Suit against the Board and County. In exchange, Wolfe would be released from Southern’s Quiet Title Suit.

¶ 4. After learning that Wolfe was dismissing his suit, Harold Emerson, Jack Hayes, and George S. Whitten, Sr. (collectively “Hayes”), filed a motion on March 21, 2003, to intervene in Wolfe’s Open Meetings Suit under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). Like Wolfe, Hayes alleged the 1995 order was not an action taken by the Board. Hayes requested an injunction commanding the Board to purge the 1995 order from its minutes or a decree that would strike the 1995 order from the Board’s minutes.

¶ 5. On May 5, 2003, the chancellor entered an order dismissing Wolfe’s Open Meetings Suit with prejudice. When Hayes challenged the dismissal in a motion for relief, the chancellor pointed to the March 7, 2003, order in Southern’s Quiet Title Suit wherein Wolfe had agreed to dismiss his Open Meetings Suit. The chancellor ruled that Hayes had no basis for a Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene because Wolfe already had agreed to dismiss his Open Meetings Suit on March 7, 2003.

¶ 6. Hayes appealed, and in a 7-0 vote, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding Hayes’s motion to intervene was timely and that Hayes should have been allowed to intervene. Hayes, 2005 WL 1870252, at *3, 935 So.2d at 1029. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fact that although Wolfe signed March 2003 order in the Quiet Title Suit, there was no record of dismissal filed in the Open Meetings Suit until May 2003. Id. Leflore County filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, which we granted. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Hayes filed his motion to intervene before the Open Meetings Suit was dismissed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate and affirm the chancellor’s decision to dismiss Hayes’s petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. “[A] trial court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to intervene.” City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 826 (Miss.1999) (citing Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So.2d 97, 101 (Miss.1996); Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377, 381 n. 1 (Miss.1987)). “The standard of review of a chancellor’s denial of a motion to intervene is abuse of discretion.” Cohen v. Cohen, 748 So.2d 91, 93 (Miss.1999) (citing Perry County v. Ferguson, 618 So.2d 1270, 1271-72 (Miss.1993)).

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. One of many issues on appeal is whether Wolfe’s Open Meetings Suit closed so as to prevent Hayes from intervening under Rule 24(a)(2). Stated differently, the preliminary issue is whether the chancellor’s March 7, 2003, order, which was entered in the Quiet Title Suit, was sufficient to dispose of the Open Meetings Suit. The County asserts, and the chancellor agreed, that Hayes has no basis for a Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene because Wolfe already had agreed to dismiss his suit on March 7, 2003, in an agreed order in Southern’s Quiet Title Suit. Hayes disagrees, asserting several theories which this Court will address in turn.

¶ 9. Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), a dismissal may be accomplished by notice, stipulation, or court order. However, Hayes argues that the agreed order entered in the Quiet Title Suit was not effective to dismiss the Open Meetings Suit. Hayes argues Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 58 and 79(a) exclude the chancellor’s reasoning to deny Hayes’s motion to intervene; namely, that an agreed order (containing an agreement to dismiss a separate suit) which is entered on the docket in one suit does not operate to dismiss the separate suit.

¶ 10. Rule 58 requires “[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document which bears the title of ‘Judgment.’ ” Rule 58 also states “[a] judgment shall be effective only when entered as provided in M.R.C.P. 79(a).” Rule 79(a) requires the court clerk to maintain a general docket: “The clerk shall keep a book known as the “general docket” of such form and style as is required by law and shall enter therein each civil action to which these rules are made applicable.”

¶ 11. Although Hayes cites to Rules 58 and 79(a) in support of his argument, we disagree with Hayes’s contention that a notice of dismissal, stipulation of dismissal, or order of dismissal must be entered on the docket so as to effect a dismissal for purposes of a Rule 24(a)(2) intervention. The comment to Rule 58 states, “[t]he purpose of Rule 58 is simply to provide a precise post-trial dato from which periods of time may be computed.... The times for taking post-trial action are computed from the date judgment is entered .... ” (emphasis added). While Rule 58 is important for establishing a date for computing post-trial motions and appeals, we do not interpret the rule to be the only means by which to effect a dismissal, especially where the parties have stipulated to dismiss a separate case, even though the stipulation is located in an order entered in a separate suit. Based on the facts of this case, we focus on the agreement between the parties as formalized in the March 7, 2003, order in the Quiet Title Suit, as opposed to whether a motion had been filed or an order entered in the Open Meetings Case. We find the March 7, 2003, order in the Quiet Title Suit, wherein Wolfe agreed to dismiss his suit against the Board, sufficiently disposed of the Open Meetings Suit for purposes of a Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene. The matter being litigated was resolved, which left nothing into which Hayes could intervene.

¶ 12. Next, Hayes cites Elliott v. Harrigill, 241 Miss. 877, 133 So.2d 612, 614 (1961), where this Court held where two or more cases are consolidated, the consolidation does not make parties to one case parties to the other and separate decrees should be entered, unless the nature of the matters be such that it is clearly proper to include both in one decree. In Elliott, a holder of a note sued the note’s endorsers, and also filed a separate suit against the maker. Id. at 613. However, while the suits were later consolidated, a single decree was entered. Id.

¶ 13. Hayes also cites the comment to Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a) for the proposition that “equity cases preserve identity of the causes, pleadings are carried on as if no consolidation had arisen, and separate decrees are issued.” (citing V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, § 506 (2d ed.1950)). Hayes concludes that since this is the rule for most consolidated cases, it was far greater error for the chancellor to treat the March 2003 order in the Quiet Title Suit as controlling in the Open Meetings Suit, since those two eases were not consolidated.

¶ 14. However, Hayes fails to recognize the exception provided in Elliott, that separate decrees are required in consolidated cases “unless the nature of the matters be such that it is clearly proper to include them in one decree.” Id. at 614. Moreover, nothing in either Elliott or the comment to Rule 42 suggests the chancellor was forbidden from entering an order in the Quiet Title Suit to dispose of litigation involved in the Open Meetings Suit.

¶ 15. Hayes also argues the Open Meetings Suit had not concluded, based on several events that unfolded after the March 7, 2003, order. These include Wolfe’s May 12, 2003, motion to dismiss himself as a party in the Open Meetings Suit (as required by the March 7, 2003, order in the Quiet Title Suit); an order of dismissal of Scott Petroleum signed by the chancellor in April 2003; and an order of dismissal presented by the board attorney and signed by the chancellor in May 2003 in the Open Meetings Suit. Again, in addition to the rationale set forth above, we find the subsequent motions filed in the Open Meetings Suit as required by the March 7, 2003, order, were simply formalities to a forgone conclusion.

¶ 16. Hayes argues that based on Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (superseded by statute as recognized in Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir.2005) in the context of employment discrimination), that while an agreed order among parties to a lawsuit resolves the issues among them, it does not conclude the rights of strangers to the proceeding. As such, Hayes asserts he should be allowed to intervene.

¶ 17. In Wilks, a group of white firefighters filed suit claiming they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified black firefighters. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 760, 109 S.Ct. 2180. The white firefighters argued the City of Birmingham and the county’s personnel board were making promotion decisions based on race in reliance on certain consent decrees. Id. The consent decrees were the result of a former suit initiated by black firefighters against the City of Birmingham. Id. at 759, 109 S.Ct. 2180. After trial, the district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, holding the plaintiffs were precluded from challenging the employment decisions made pursuant to the consent decrees, even though the plaintiffs had not been parties to the proceedings in which the consent decrees had been entered. Id. at 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the plaintiffs “ ‘were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees, ... their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded.’ ” (quoting In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987)).

¶ 18. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the defendants argued the plaintiffs were aware that the original suit (from which the consent decree was entered) might affect them, and because they chose not to intervene, the plaintiffs should not be permitted to later litigate the racial discrimination issue in a new action. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762, 109 S.Ct. 2180. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating “[a] judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.”

¶ 19. The Wilks decision has no bearing on this case. In Wilks, the issue was not whether the plaintiffs could intervene in a proceeding already before the court, but instead whether a plaintiff was bound by a decision in a prior proceeding where the plaintiff chose not to intervene. Here, the issue is whether Hayes may intervene in a proceeding that is no longer ongoing. Again, Hayes seeks an injunction commanding the Board to purge the 1995 order from its minutes or a decree that would strike the 1995 order from the Board’s minutes. While we find the Wilks case has no bearing on Hayes’ right to intervene, the decision here does not “conclude the rights” of Hayes to seek the same or similar relief. Stated differently, we are not precluding Hayes from filing his own suit seeking an injunction or a decree to purge or strike the 1995 order.

¶20. Finally, Hayes alternatively argues that even if the March 7, 2003, order in the Quiet Title Suit served to close the Open Meetings Act, intervention is still permissible after final judgment pursuant to Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377 (Miss.1987) and Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(i).

¶ 21. In Pittman, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Pittman, 501 So.2d at 380. Approximately 140 days after the entry of judgment, the liability insurer for the defendant’s putative employer filed a motion to intervene and have the default judgment vacated. Id. at 381. The trial court denied the liability insurer’s motion. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed, finding the liability insurer’s intervention was proper under the four requisites listed in Rule 24(a)(2). Id. at 386.

¶ 22. However, Pittman is distinguishable from this case. In Pittman, the liability insurer’s purpose in seeking intervention was to file a motion under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), which may be filed at any time within six months after entry of a judgment. Id. at 382. Moreover, the defendant had similarly filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Id. This Court stated:

Any delay other parties may have experienced from allowing [the liability insurer] to intervene was going to be experienced anyway as a result of the [defendant’s] motion. [The liability insurer’s] motion for leave to intervene did not introduce into the case any new claim or require any new litigation beyond that already before the court by virtue of [defendant’s] motion filed the previous day.

Id.

¶ 23. Hayes also argues M.R.A.P. 4(i) authorizes post-judgment intervention. The rule states:

If the board of supervisors of any county ... sued in official capacity, fails to file a notice of appeal under Rule 4(a) within 20 days after the date of entry of an adverse judgment or order, or within 7 days after filing of a notice by another party pursuant to Rule 4(c), any taxpayer of the county ... shall have the right at the taxpayer’s own expense to employ private counsel to prosecute the appeal in compliance with these rules.

M.R.A.P. 4(i). However, Hayes fails to realize that a fundamental element of the rule requires an “adverse judgment or order.” Again, Wolfe dismissed his suit against the Board; as logic would dictate, no judgment in favor of or against the Board was possible.

CONCLUSION

¶ 24. Based on our analysis, we find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by denying Hayes’s motion to intervene. As the chancellor explained in his order denying Hayes’ motion to intervene, the Open Meetings Suit was completely disposed of pursuant to the March 7, 2003 order whereby Wolfe agreed to dismiss his suit. For all intents and purposes, the action in which Hayes wanted to intervene no longer existed at the time he filed his petition for intervention. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the chancellor’s order denying Hayes’s motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).

¶ 25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEFLORE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ„ CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The facts are taken from those provided by the Mississippi Court of Appeals in Hayes v. Leflore County Bd. of Supervisors, 2005 WL 1870252, at *1, 935 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Miss.Ct.App. Aug.9, 2005) (hereinafter “Hayes

      . Although Wolfe’s first application for in-junctive relief is not included in the record, it appears Scott Petroleum was listed as a defendant in the Open Meeting Suit, as Scott filed an answer along with a cross complaint requesting the court to compel the Board to fulfill all legal obligations as listed in the 1995 order.

      . Hayes argues that because Scott Petroleum had filed a cross claim as part of its answer, Wolfe’s Open Meetings Suit remained "open” because as a plaintiff, Scott Petroleum did not dismiss its claim until after Hayes filed his motion to intervene. Hayes cites the chancellor's order denying Hayes' intervention, where the chancellor stated Wolfe "was the only Plaintiff in this matter.” We disagree with Scott's assertion. Even though Scott Petroleum may have been a plaintiff for purposes of its cross claim, Scott Petroleum's interest was for the Board to fulfill its interests, namely the obligations listed in the 1995 order, not the interests which Hayes sought: an injunction commanding the Board to purge the 1995 order from its minutes or a decree that would strike the 1995 order from the Board’s minutes.

      . However, as that issue is not before us, we will not discuss the merits of such a claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ISHEE, J,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Cheryl ROBLEY, Ph.D., Appellant v. BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF MISSISSIPPI, Appellee.
    No. 2003-CA-02209-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 21, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 2005.
    Paul J. Delcambre, Gulfport, attorney for appellant.

      James Altus McCullough, Cheri D. Green, Whitney Morgan Stone, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
    Before KING, C.J., IRVING and ISHEE, JJ.
   ISHEE, J,

for the Court.

¶ 1. The Appellant, Dr. Cheryl Robley, filed suit against Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mississippi (“Blue Cross”) claiming damages for failure by Blue Cross to maintain their duty of confidentiality of medical information in their possession relating to Dr. Robley. The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted a directed verdict in favor of Blue Cross pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing the complaint filed by Robley. From this decision Dr. Robley timely appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2. Dr. Robley was a successful clinical psychologist in Tennessee for several years prior to moving to Mississippi. During the 1980’s, Dr. Robley began to suffer severe status migraine headaches. Despite consulting numerous physicians and trying numerous treatment regimens, the headaches were persistent and disabling, and Robley was forced to close her practice. Since October 8, 1997, she has been under the primary care of a doctor in New Orleans. Frequently, Dr. Robley has been prescribed narcotic medications for the treatment of the pain associated with her headaches.

¶ 3. Blue Cross is the provider of group health and medical insurance benefits to the employees of William Carey College. Dr. Robley’s husband, Franklin T. Johnson, was employed at the Gulf Coast campus of William Carey College. Through the policy issued to the employees of the college, Mr. Johnson was able to insure his wife, son, and his daughter, Kelly Johnson. Periodically, medical records relating to Dr. Robley’s treatment for migraine headaches, including medication records, hospital records, pharmacy records and physician’s records, were submitted to Blue Cross with claims for payment of medical expenses and prescription drug charges incurred in the course of her treatment. Blue Cross also obtained information by correspondence and telephone from Dr. Robley’s various other health care providers. Some of the records obtained by Blue Cross referred to Dr. Robley’s use of narcotic medications.

¶4. Sandra McFarland, R.N., worked for Blue Cross as a ease manager. McFarland was assigned all persons covered by the William Carey group plan. As such, McFarland managed any claims filed by Dr. Robley or her daughter Kelly. In February of 1997, Kelly was hospitalized several times at Gulf Coast Community Hospital and its affiliated Wound Care Center in Biloxi. Kelly was being treated for several severe deep abscesses. On March 14, 1997, Kelly was being treated by Dr. Dennis Smith, a general surgeon, who was incising and draining one or more large abscesses which had become infected. Because of Dr. Robley’s history of debilitating migraine headaches and Mr. Johnson’s concern that he could not properly care for Kelly’s wounds, the staff at the Wound Care Center sought approval from Blue Cross for in home visits by a home health care nurse who would dress the wounds.

¶ 5. Paula Mason, a registered nurse employed by the Wound Care Center, was the employee who called Blue Cross seeking approval. The disputed conversation between Blue Cross employee McFarland and nurse Paula Mason, and the incident’s subsequent effects on Dr. Robley, became the subject of this controversy. Mason testified at trial that McFarland was familiar with the family, but reticent to agree to provide in home care, and that McFarland had called Dr. Robley “a drug seeker.” McFarland and Blue Cross deny ever using that term. Mason then relayed McFarland’s alleged comment to Dr. Rob-ley and her family. Dr. Robley alleges that hearing the comment caused her to enter a psychotic state, which aggravated her pre-existing migraines and left her bedridden for several days. Dr. Robley further alleges that since the incident she has frequently become enraged, violent, and suffers bouts of crying over minor incidents that previously would not have affected her.

¶ 6. On January 29, 1999, Dr. Robley filed suit against Blue Cross in the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Harrison County. The complaint sought to recover damages for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and for breach of contract for the release of confidential medical information. Blue Cross filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint on March 17, 1999, stating that Blue Cross acted reasonably in good faith with respect to their contractual obligations under the subject policy. Blue Cross filed an amended answer on November 19, 2001, adding the statute of limitations and failure to join a necessary party and/or indispensable parties as affirmative defenses.

¶ 7. After the completion of discovery, Blue Cross filed a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was granted. On October 11, 2002, Blue Cross filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all remaining claims. That motion was overruled by order of the trial court on June 8, 2003. The case proceeded to trial before jury on August 19, 2003. After the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence, Blue Cross presented a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the motion, holding that there was insufficient evidence of a breach of confidentiality and insufficient evidence to support an award of damages for breach of confidentiality. The trial court entered its final judgment in favor of Blue Cross on September 8, 2003. Aggrieved by this decision, Dr. Robley asserts the following errors on appeal: (1) whether a sufficient jury question was presented as to whether Blue Cross breached its fiduciary duty of confidentiality to allow Dr. Robley to survive Rule 50 judgment, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to present an issue to the jury that Dr. Robley suffered from injuries that were causally related to the release of the confidential information by Blue Cross.

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

I. Whether a sufficient jury question was presented as to whether Blue Cross breached its fiduciary duty of confidentiality to allow Robley to survive Rule 50 judgment.

¶ 8. Motions for review of motions for a directed verdict are reviewed de novo. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1054(¶ 7) (Miss.2003) (citing Pace v. Financial Sec. Life of Mississippi, 608 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Miss.1992)). This Court must decide whether the facts presented by both parties with any reasonable inferences to be considered in the light most favorable to Dr. Robley, and disregarding any evidence of Blue Cross in conflict therewith, point so overwhelmingly in favor of Blue Cross that reasonable jurors could not have returned a verdict for Dr. Robley. Drennan v. The Kroger Co., 672 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Miss.1996) (quoting Litton Systems, Inc. v. Enochs, 449 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Miss.1984)).

¶ 9. Dr. Robley argues on appeal that the trial court erred in interpreting the Blue Cross subscriber’s agreement to allow Blue Cross to disclose confidential information to third parties at Blue Cross’s sole discretion. Dr. Robley asserts that the trial court also erred when it opined that because Ms. Mason was calling Blue Cross to discuss treatment for Dr. Rob-ley’s daughter, the disclosure of Dr. Rob-ley’s medical information was authorized by the familial nature of their relationship under paragraph N.l of the subscriber’s contract.

¶ 10. Dr. Robley’s argument is two-fold. First, Dr. Robley asserts that Blue Cross had contractually created fiduciary duty of non-disclosure. Second, Dr. Robley argues that the subscriber’s agreement did not authorize disclosure of Dr. Robley’s medical information. We shall discuss these issues separately, first turning toward whether Blue Cross owed Dr. Robley any fiduciary duty. In determining whether a fiduciary duty existed, we must examine the language of the subscriber’s agreement. Article XVII, paragraph N.l states in its entirety that:

Each Member receiving care under the Benefit Plan authorized and directs any Provider to furnish to Company, at any time upon its request, all information, records, copies of records or testimony relating to attendance, diagnosis, examination, or treatment. Such an authorization and compliance therewith by each Provider affected will be a condition precedent to rights to Benefits to each Member hereunder, and no Benefits will be provided in any case where such authorization is not given full effect. Company will utilize the information described in this paragraph for internal administration of the benefit Plan, medical analysis, coordination of benefit provisions with other plans, subrogation of claims, or in the reviewing of a disputed claim. Additionally, Company will hold such information, records, or copies of records, as confidential except where in its discretion the same should be disclosed.

Blue Cross argues that the language of paragraph N.l allows it the discretion to use medical information for internal utilization review, and that in doing so it is granted the right to disclose the information to outside medical providers if necessary for them to complete their review. Blue Cross exerts that its duties were not fiduciary in nature, but were merely contractual. In short, Blue Cross argues that the disclosure of Dr. Robley’s personal medical information was permissible under the terms of the contract, even when the disclosure was made pursuant to a discussion regarding the care of a third party, in this instance Dr. Robley’s daughter.

¶ 11. We begin by recognizing that the general rule regarding first-party insurance contracts is that such contracts are an arm’s length transaction between two parties which does not create fiduciary obligation. Estate of Jackson v. Mississippi Life Ins. Co., 755 So.2d 15, 24(¶ 36) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Dr. Robley asserts that the terms of the subscribers agreement expressly create a duty of confidentiality that became fiduciary in nature through the contract. Dr. Robley relies upon Lowery v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., for the proposition that the term “fiduciary relationship” is broad enough to include a confidential relationship, and that such a confidential relationship may be established through the terms of an insurance contract. Lowery v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., 592 So.2d 79, 83-85 (Miss.1991). While Dr. Robley admits that the facts of Lowery indicate that the contract in question was a credit life insurance policy, she argues that the proposition should apply to all contracts.

¶ 12. We find that the provisions of the subscriber’s agreement created a fiduciary relationship between Blue Cross and Dr. Robley that required Blue Cross to evince a high degree of care as to the dissemination of Dr. Robley’s medical information. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has long recognized that “[a] release of this information to the wrong person or wrong organization could cause embarrassment to the patient, and could possibly be the subject of a lawsuit for damages.” Young v. Madison General Hospital, 337 So.2d 931, 934 (Miss.1976).

¶ 13. We next turn to the issue of whether the subscriber’s agreement allowed the disclosure of Dr. Robley’s medical information under the factual circumstances created by her daughter’s illness. Blue Cross asserts that the subscriber’s agreement allowed them to disclose Dr. Robleys’s medical information according to its own absolute discretion. Furthermore, the trial court held that the release of Dr. Robley’s information in the context of daughter Kelly’s illness could not be deemed a release to a third party. We can find no basis for the trial court’s holding based upon the plain language of the agreement. We note that there is scant support from the agreement to conclusively hold that the disclosure was specifically barred as well. We conclude that the issue of the propriety of the disclosure was simply not suitable for directed verdict. The testimony at trial was mixed in this regard, and taking all evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Robley, we must hold that the trial court erred by granting Blue Cross’s motion for directed verdict. The issue of whether Mrs. McFarland, as an employee of Blue Cross, breached the duty of confidentiality requires a weighing of the testimony presented at trial, a task which falls within the province of the jury. We hereby reverse the judgment of the trial court.

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to present to the jury that Dr. Robley suffered from injuries that were causally related to the release of the confidential information by Blue Cross.

¶ 14. Dr. Robley argues on appeal that if it is found that Blue Cross did indeed breach its fiduciary duty of confidentiality, then Dr. Robley may pursue damages for intentional emotional distress. In turn, Blue Cross asserts that no fiduciary duty was owed, and as such no claim for emotional distress may be made by Dr. Robley as such a claim is not allowed under contract. As discussed supra, we hold that Blue Cross did owe such a fiduciary duty to Dr. Robley. Again, we reiterate that a jury could have found that the duty was breached, thus rendering directed verdict improper. However, assuming arguendo that no fiduciary duty was owed to Dr. Robley by Blue Cross, a plaintiff may assert a claim for mental anguish and emotional distress under a breach of contract claim. University of Southern Mississippi v. Williams, 891 So.2d 160, 172(¶ 30) (Miss.2004). Blue Cross further argues that any of Dr. Robley’s alleged injuries were not the reasonably foreseeable result of any breach of duty that may have occurred. Blue Cross’s contention as to the foreseeability of Dr. Robley’s injuries is untenable. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the disclosure of sensitive medical information about a person, even if true, constitutes an actual wrong and that it is not unreasonable to foresee that a person would be injured by the release of such information. Young, 337 So.2d at 933-34. Taken in the light most favorable to Dr. Robley, sufficient proof of her alleged injuries was presented at trial to present a jury question. We hold that sufficient evidence existed at trial of a causal connection between the release of Dr. Robley’s confidential information and her alleged injuries to allow her cause to survive Blue Cross’s motion for directed verdict. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court as to this issue.

¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.

KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, CHANDLER, AND BARNES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: LEE, P.J.,

text:
    Jack HAYES and George S. Whitten, Sr., Appellants v. LEFLORE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Appellee.
    No. 2004-CA-00759-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Aug. 9, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 2005.

      George S. Whitten, Jr., attorney for appellants.
    Willie James Perkins, Greenwood, attorney for appellee.
   LEE, P.J.,

for the Court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

¶ 1. On November 14, 1995, an order was entered into the minute books of the Leflore County Board of Supervisors (LCBS). This order reflected that all five members of the Board agreed to authorize the exchange of lands between Leflore County and two agricultural businesses, Gold Kist and Scott Petroleum. The Board conveyed ten acres of public property to the two businesses and accepted in return two-and-one-half acres of private land owned by the same two businesses. The companies were also given other incentives from the county, including the construction of a railroad spur track, the grant of easements accessing property and water wells and an ad valorem tax exemption.

112. On July 3, 1998, Phil Wolfe, one of the supervisors, filed a second amended application for injunctive relief against Le-flore County and the LCBS, claiming that the order in question had never been presented to the Board, nor voted on by the Board. Wolfe filed this action under the Open Meetings Act, which requires public bodies to keep minutes that accurately reflect final actions taken at each meeting. See Miss.Code Ann. § 25-41-11 (Rev. 2003). Wolfe requested that the chancellor purge the order from the minute books and enjoin the enforcement of the order or, in the alternative, remove Wolfe’s name from the recorded vote.

¶ 3. Gold Kist filed an answer and cross petition on June 10, 1998, in response to Wolfe’s first application for injunctive relief. Scott Petroleum filed an answer on June 12, 1998. The Leflore County Chancery Court entered an agreed order to stay the proceedings on July 30, 1998, in order for the parties to resolve the controversy. Gold Kist subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on September 12, 2001, and, on January 8, 2002, the trial court dismissed Gold Kist. Scott Petroleum was dismissed on April 19, 2003.

¶4. At some time during the proceedings, Southern States Cooperative (Southern) purchased the ten acre parcel of land at issue. In late 2002, Southern filed suit against Wolfe, inter alia, to quiet and confirm its title to the land. One of the clouds on the title was Wolfe’s open meetings suit. On March 7, 2003, an agreed order was signed wherein Wolfe agreed to dismiss any claims pending in the open meetings case as well as any claims affecting the property which was subject to Southern’s quiet title suit.

¶5. On March 21, 2003, Harold Emerson, Jack Hayes, and George Whitten, all citizens of Leflore County, filed a motion to intervene, requesting the same relief as Wolfe requested in his second amended motion for injunctive relief. Southern filed a response on April 14, 2003, and Hayes and Whitten (hereinafter Hayes) filed a motion to strike Southern’s response on April 22, 2003. The Board filed its response to the motion to intervene on April 25, 2003.

¶ 6. On May 5, 2003, the chancellor entered an order dismissing Wolfe’s claims with prejudice. Hayes then filed a motion for relief, challenging the May 5 dismissal order. On June 16, 2003, the chancellor noted the March 7, 2003, agreed order in the quiet title case wherein Wolfe dismissed his claims in the open meetings ease and concluded that Hayes had no basis for the motion to intervene. The chancellor denied Hayes’s motion to intervene and also found that the “Motion for Relief from an Order or Alternatively Motion to Alter a Judgment is a moot issue since applicants for intervention are not parties and have no standing to seek this relief....” Hayes moved the chancellor to reconsider and, on March 12, 2004, the chancellor denied the motion. Hayes now appeals to this Court asserting many issues, all of which can be condensed into one: whether the chancellor erred in denying Hayes’s motion to intervene.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. Trial courts have considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to intervene. Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So.2d 97, 101 (Miss.1996). Consequently, we review rulings on motions to intervene using an abuse of discretion standard of review. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377, 383 (Miss.1987).

DISCUSSION

I. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN DENYING HAYES’S MOTION TO INTERVENE?

¶ 8. Hayes’s main argument is that the chancellor erred in denying their motion to intervene. Hayes filed a motion to intervene pursuant to M.R.C.P. 24(a), which states as follows:

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

¶ 9. The comments to Rule 24 state that the application must be timely; however, there is no set definition of what constitutes “timely,” only that the court be provided an opportunity to “take some account of the practical situation and the effect on those already parties and on the economical disposition of judicial business by allowing intervention.” In order to reverse the chancellor’s decision, we must determine whether Hayes’s motion to intervene was timely; whether Hayes has an interest in the subject matter of the action; whether Hayes is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; and whether Hayes’s interest is already adequately represented. See Pittman, 501 So.2d at 381. Furthermore, the court in Pittman accepted the Fifth Circuit’s approach to timeliness, identifying four additional factors to consider. The factors are as follows:

(1) the length of time during which the would be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as a result of the would be intervenor’s failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the ease; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the would be intervenor may suffer if his petition for leave to intervene is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely.

Pittman, 501 So.2d at 382. See Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir.1977).

In Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.1980), the Fifth Circuit allowed intervention where the intervenor filed a motion to intervene seventeen days after he “knew that his interests were no longer adequately represented.” Id. at 1325.

¶ 10. In regards to whether Hayes’s motion to intervene was timely, we find that it was timely. Although Wolfe signed the agreed order on March 7, 2003, there was no record of dismissal filed until May 5, 2003, when the chancellor ordered all claims of Wolfe pending against the Board dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, Hayes apparently learned of Wolfe’s intention to settle the case sometime in February 2003, realized that his interest would no longer be adequately represented and subsequently filed the motion to intervene. Hayes’s motion to intervene was filed on March 21, 2003, well before Wolfe’s open meeting action was dismissed. We also note that we can find no prejudice to the existing parties as the open meetings suit had been stayed in 1998 for a number of years and the quiet title suit was not initiated until late 2002.

¶ 11. According to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 25-41-15 (Rev.2003), of the Open Meetings Act, “[t]he chancery courts of this state shall have the authority to enforce the provisions of this chapter u-pon application of any citizen of the state. ...” (emphasis added). In other words, any member of the public has the right to enforce the Open Meetings Act. Wolfe, Feb. 1, 2001, A.G. Op. # 2001-0019. This Court is not reading Section 25-41-15 to create an unconditional statutory right to intervene, which other statutes have done. See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11 — 33— 101, 31-5-1, 53-3-19, and 71-3-71. However, Hayes, as a taxpayer of Leflore County, clearly had an interest in the action and his interest was protected by Section 25-41-15. After learning that Wolfe was going to give up his claim, but before the claim was dismissed by court order, Hayes made efforts to secure his interest in the action.

¶ 12. We also cannot find that Hayes’s interest was adequately represented when Wolfe agreed to dismiss the open meetings suit in return for the quiet title suit against him to be dismissed. Wolfe clearly did so for his own personal benefit and not to protect the interests of the public.

¶ 13. The court in Pittman stated that “there is much to be said for an overall attitude which gives the benefit of the doubt to the one seeking intervention, particularly where intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is claimed.” Pittman, 501 So.2d at 385. We agree, finding that the chancellor’s denial of Hayes’s motion to intervene was in error. We reverse the chancellor’s denial and allow intervention by Hayes.

¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LE-FLORE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED AND RENDERED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

KING, C.J., BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Wolfe’s first application for injunctive relief was not included in the record, but appears to have been filed sometime in April 1998.

      . Harold Emerson passed away on April 21, 2003.


author: IRVING, J.,

text:
    Modena BUCKLEY and Keith Buckley, Appellants v. William GARNER, Appellee.
    No. 2004-CA-00158-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Aug. 23, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied May 30, 2006.

      Pat Donald, attorney for appellant.
    P. Shawn Harris, Forest, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, P.J., IRVING and CHANDLER, JJ.
   IRVING, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. William Garner filed a petition against Modena Buckley and Keith Buckley in the Scott County Chancery Court. In the petition, he alleged that he and Modena had previously entered into a lease agreement which granted him an option to purchase a certain tract of land but that Modena subsequently sold the land to her son, Keith. Garner sought specific performance of the option agreement. After a hearing on the matter, the chancellor found that Garner’s option to purchase the land superceded Keith’s warranty deed and granted Garner’s request for specific performance. Aggrieved, Modena and Keith now appeal the chancellor’s decision.

¶ 2. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find no reversible error; therefore, we affirm the chancellor’s ruling.

FACTS

¶ 3. On May 20, 1998, Modena and Garner entered into an agreement wherein Modena agreed to lease Garner approximately twenty-seven acres of land for five years with an option to purchase for $45,000 at the end of the five-year period. The agreement, which was never recorded in the chancery clerk’s office, provided in pertinent part:

I Modena Buckley agrees [sic] to lease to William C. Garner 27.15 acres of land, known as the Joel Buckley place located approximately 4 miles south of Morton on Springfield Road for five years, with option to buy for $45,000 are [sic] lease again at the end of the five years.
William C. Garner agrees to keep place bush hogged and cleaned up with the option to demolish or repair the house located on the place.
William C. Garner agrees to leave the barn and contents as is for the next five years.
The contents of the house, I give to Juanita Garner.

¶ 4. Thereafter on October 9, 1999, Modena executed a warranty deed conveying the same twenty-seven acres of land to Keith, and the deed was promptly recorded in the clerk’s office. Three years later when Garner contacted Modena, expressing a desire to exercise the option contained in their prior lease agreement, he was informed that the property had been conveyed to Keith. Garner then contacted Keith about the property, and Keith informed him that he had no desire to sell.

¶ 5. In response, Garner filed an action against Modena and Keith seeking specific performance of the option. Keith countered that he had provided sufficient consideration for the property, and was unaware of Garner’s existing option. After a hearing, the chancellor found that Keith was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and ordered Modena to convey the property to Garner within thirty days upon receipt of Garner’s tender of the $45,000 purchase price.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

Standard of Review

¶ 6. “[We] will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor unless such findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.” Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams, 864 So.2d 926, 930(¶ 9) (Miss.2003) (citing In re Conservatorship of Bardwell, 849 So.2d 1240, 1245(¶ 16) (Miss.2003)). “If there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s findings of fact, those findings must be affirmed.” Id. “However, this court reviews questions of law de novo.” Estate of Dykes, 864 So.2d at 930(¶ 9) (citing Morgan v. West, 812 So.2d 987, 990(¶ 7) (Miss.2002)).

Bona Fide Purchaser Status

¶ 7. On appeal, Keith primarily argues that he tendered valuable consideration in exchange for the warranty deed from Modena and was without notice of Garner’s existing option. Keith contends that as a result, he became a bona fide purchaser for value, and as such, Garner's option is unenforceable against him.

¶ 8. In order to defeat the option, Keith must prove that he was a bona fide purchaser, that is, a purchaser for a valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of Garner’s unrecorded option. See Mills v. Damson Oil Corporation, 686 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Woodruff v. Bates, 210 Miss. 894, 50 So.2d 559 (1951)). “A valuable consideration is paid by one who, at the time of his purchase, advances a new consideration, surrenders some security, or does some other act which, if his purchase were set aside, would leave him in a worse position than that which he occupied before the purchase.” Mills, 686 F.2d at 1100 (citing Boon v. Barnes, 23 Miss. 136, 139 (1851)).

¶ 9. We first review the evidence on whether Keith possessed actual or constructive notice of the option. During the hearing, Keith testified that he first became aware of the option in December 2002 when Modena forwarded him a letter from Garner’s attorney seeking to enforce the agreement. Similarly, Garner even conceded that there was no direct evidence that Keith possessed knowledge of the option.

¶ 10. The chancellor concluded that the evidence presented during the hearing failed to establish that Keith had knowledge of the option prior to Modena’s conveyance of the property to him. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find no evidence that contradicts the chancellor’s finding that Keith had actual knowledge of the option. However, even if Keith did not have actual knowledge of the option, he could still be denied the status of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice because he would be chargeable with inquiry notice if he knew that Garner was in possession of the property under the lease. Palmer v. Fair Co., 140 Miss. 294, 105 So. 513 (1925); cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 365, 29 So.2d 100 (1947). One chargeable with inquiry notice is “ ‘chargeable with notice, equivalent in law to knowledge, of all those further relevant facts which such inquiry, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have disclosed.’ ” Credit Lyonnais New York v. Koval, 745 So.2d 837, 842(¶27) (Miss.1999) (quoting Crawford v. Brown, 215 Mis. 489, 503, 61 So.2d 344, 350 (1952)).

¶ 11. The chancellor did not address the question of whether Keith was placed on inquiry notice as a result of Keith’s knowledge that Garner was using the land in question, and we decline to address it here because it is a question of fact to be resolved at the trial level. However, no matter the answer to the question, Keith cannot prevail as a bona fide purchaser, because, as we discuss later in this opinion, he gave no consideration for the transfer of the land to him.

¶ 12. We next review the evidence on the issue of consideration for the warranty deed from Modena to Keith. The deed from Modena to Keith specifically acknowledges a consideration of ten dollars and “other good and valuable consideration.” Keith contends that as a result, the burden of proof shifted to Garner to prove that Keith was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. That may be true, but even so, there was ample evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that Keith tendered no consideration for the deed.

¶ 13. During the hearing, Keith testified that he could not recall giving Modena $10 in exchange for the property. Modena testified that Keith promised to pay her moving and living expenses in exchange for deeding the property to him. Modena further testified that while she had future intentions of moving to Texas, she had no intentions of moving on the day that she deeded the property to Keith. When asked whether she thought Keith would have still helped her move to Texas even if she had not owned any property, Modena responded that she did.

¶ 14. The record reflects that Keith subsequently fulfilled his promise to Mode-na by moving her to Texas and paying her living expenses. Keith, however, testified that he would have moved Modena and paid her expenses notwithstanding her conveyance of the property to him. During Garner’s case-in-chief, Keith specifically testified as follows:

Q. (By Mr. Harris) At the time you were deeded this property in 1999, your mother had not made the decision, well, I’m going to move out there with Keith on any particular date, had she?
A. I don’t know what decision she had made.
Q. You and she had not discussed her moving out there with you on any particular date?
A. Oh, yes, we had discussed it.
Q. What had you discussed?
A. Do what?
Q. What had you discussed?
A. What had I discussed?
Q. Yes, sir, with her about a particular date.
A. We didn’t discuss — well, we discussed when she was ready that it was available.
Q. But you hadn’t discussed any particular date, that she would move out here on such and such date?
A. Oh, no.
Q. So, when you were deeded the property, you didn’t know if that would happen in two days or two years or three years into the future, did you?
A. That is correct.
Q. If your mother had not owned any property in Scott County or Hinds County and she was going to move out there and live with you, would you still be willing to pay for her moving expenses?
A. Sure.
Q. And her living expenses like you have?
A. Yes.

¶ 15. After thoroughly considering the evidence, the chancellor found that because Keith would have paid Modena’s moving expenses and would have taken care of her anyway, Keith did not change his position or give up anything in exchange for the property. The chancellor concluded that as a result, Keith’s promise to Modena was insufficient consideration to support a valid warranty deed and to protect him as a bonafide purchaser for value.

¶ 16. We agree with the chancellor’s findings. The record clearly reflects that Keith did not suffer a detriment as a result of his promise to Modena. Keith specifically testified that he would have moved Modena and paid her expenses notwithstanding her transfer of the property to him. As a result, we find that Keith’s promise was gratuitous in nature and was, therefore, insufficient to protect him as a bonafide purchaser for value. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in concluding that Garner’s option superceded Keith’s warranty deed and in ordering specific performance of the option.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, CHANDLER, BARNES, AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . Modena, who was eighty-one years old at the time of the hearing, testified that the document was prepared by Juanita Garner, the appellee's mother. Modena also testified that she signed the document without first reading it.

      . The chancellor found that Gamer's agreement to take care of the property and keep it clean constituted sufficient consideration for the option.

      . Garner argued that due to Keith and Mode-na’s mother/son relationship, a presumption existed that Modena had communicated the existence of the option to Keith. The chancellor, however, concluded that no such presumption existed.

      . The record reflects that when Modena finally moved to Texas in August 2000, she lived with Keith and his wife for a year and a half before moving into an assisted living facility for senior citizens. Keith, however, continued to pay her living expenses.


author: BARNES, J.,

text:
    AMITE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Amite County School Board, Appellants v. Charles W. FLOYD a/k/a Charlie Floyd, Appellee. Amite County School District and Amite County School Board, Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. Charles W. Floyd a/k/a Charlie Floyd, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Nos. 2003-CC-02705-COA, 2003-CC-02703-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Nov. 15, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied April 18, 2006.

      James A. Keith, Jackson, attorney for appellants.
    Gregg L. Spyridon, Michael W. Rutledge, Biloxi, attorneys for appellee.
   BARNES, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. In this consolidated appeal, the Am-ite County School Board and the Amite County School District appeal the judgment of the Amite County Chancery Court overturning the board’s decision to discharge Charles Floyd from his employment as principal of Amite County High School, and the chancellor’s award of attorneys’ fees to Floyd. Floyd argues on cross-appeal that the chancellor erred in denying his request for an injunction against the school board, and by denying his motion to amend his complaint. Finding that the board’s decision to terminate Floyd was supported by substantial, credible evidence, we reverse and render the chancery court’s ruling and reinstate the decision of the Amite County School Board. Additionally, finding that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Floyd $19,411 in attorneys’ fees, we reverse and remand. We find no error on cross-appeal, and thus affirm.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. After becoming aware of a number of problems in the administration of Amite County High School, Amite County School District Superintendent Mary Russ began an investigation. When her requests for information were met with resistance from Principal Charles Floyd and his staff, Russ asked the Amite County School Board for authorization to suspend Floyd so that she could proceed with her inquiry. On October 10, 2002, the board voted to suspend Floyd pending the investigation; however, acting on erroneous legal advice, the board voted that Floyd be suspended without pay. During the following month, Russ completed her investigation and ultimately dismissed Floyd by letter dated November 15, 2002. The letter identified the following reasons for Floyd’s termination: (1) improperly charging students a $75 fee for tobacco violations and suspending students until the fees were paid; (2) signing off on student records that contained numerous inaccuracies and white-outs; (3) removing a physical science course from the curriculum without authorization; (4) holding track and field events on school property for private groups without fully explaining the details of the events to the school board; (5) failing to fulfill the duties of a full-time principal by spending an inordinate amount of time on unrelated activities; and (6) failing to complete student schedules for the 2002-2003 school year in a timely manner.

¶ 3. Following his termination, Floyd requested a due process hearing before the school board. However, four days prior to the scheduled hearing, Floyd filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Amite County (former cause No. 2002-264, on appeal No. 2003-CC-02703-COA) seeking to enjoin the school board from proceeding with the hearing and asking to be reinstated to his position as principal. Specifically, Floyd’s petition alleged that the board could not be fair and impartial in hearing his case, and that he had been denied due process under both the Mississippi and United States constitutions because the board had suspended him without pay. In January 2003, the chancery court refused to issue an injunction, stating in its opinion that the school board could provide Floyd a fair and impartial hearing. However, the court found that Floyd’s due process rights had been violated by the suspension without pay. Though the chancellor denied Floyd’s request for an injunction, the court awarded him attorneys’ fees in the amount of $19,411. Floyd subsequently filed a motion to amend his cause of action to include a claim of damages arising from the due process violation, but the chancellor denied the motion. The school board timely appealed to this Court on the chancellor’s award of attorneys’ fees, and Floyd timely cross-appealed asserting that the chancellor erred in denying his motion to amend and in refusing his request for an injunction.

¶ 4. After the chancery court issued its ruling, the board-appointed hearing officer conducted a hearing over four days in March and April of 2003 regarding Floyd’s dismissal. Though a number of witnesses testified on his behalf, Floyd did not testify at the hearing. In June 2003, the hearing officer presented the school board with the hearing transcripts, exhibits, and a 122-page summary of the evidence adduced at the hearing. After reviewing these materials, the school board voted unanimously in July 2003 to uphold Floyd’s termination and issued a written decision with specific findings of fact supporting the dismissal. Aggrieved, Floyd sought review of the decision in the Amite County Chancery Court (former cause No.2003-156, on appeal No. 2003-CC-02705-COA), as provided by section 37-9-113 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.2001). On October 21, 2003, the chancery court issued an opinion overturning the school board’s decision and reinstating Floyd to his position as principal of Amite County High School. The school board and school district filed a timely appeal to this Court, and we consolidated the appeal, case No. 2003-CC-02705-COA, with the appeals in the injunction case, No. 2003-CC-02703-COA.

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED BY DECIDING THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT ONE OR MORE OF THE REASONS UNDERLYING THE BOARD’S DISMISSAL ACTION AND BY DECIDING THAT THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFER TO THE SCHOOL BOARD’S FINDINGS OF FACT BY IMPROPERLY RE-WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE, IMPROPERLY ASSESSING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, AND IMPROPERLY CONSIDERING MATTERS NOT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THE BOARD.

¶ 5. Section 37-9-59 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.2001) provides that “For incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral conduct, intemperance, brutal treatment of a pupil or other good cause the superintendent of schools may dismiss or suspend any licensed employee in any school district.” Employees so dismissed are entitled by law to a public hearing upon the charges. Id.; see also Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-111 (Rev.2001) (setting forth hearing procedures). In such a hearing, the superintendent has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that there are adequate grounds for dismissal. Harris v. Canton Separate Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 655 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1995). Section 37-9-113 of the Mississippi Code allows an employee aggrieved by a school board’s decision to seek judicial review in the chancery court of the judicial district in which the school district is located. However, this statute severely limits the chancery court’s scope of review in such an instance. It provides, in relevant part:

The scope of review of the chancery court in such cases shall be limited to a review of the record made before the school board or hearing officer to determine if the action of the school board is unlawful for the reason that it was: (a) Not supported by any substantial evidence; (b) Arbitrary or capricious; or (c) In violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee.

Miss.Code Ann. § 37-9-113(3) (Rev.2001). On appeal, this Court applies the same standard of review. Harris, 655 So.2d at 901.

¶ 6. As an initial matter, we find that the chancellor improperly looked beyond the record before the school board in making his ruling. Section 37-9-113(3) limits the chancery court to a “review of the record made before the school board or hearing officer” in determining whether the board’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. In this case, however, the chancellor’s decision was driven in part by matters outside the record. In his opinion, the chancellor referred to Floyd’s prior injunction action, stating, “It can’t escape notice that the Board itself suspended Coach Floyd without pay without any basis and contrary to statute.... This prior failure by the Board and Mary Russ can’t be completely ignored in this Court’s decision.” The chancellor attempted to justify his reliance on matters outside the record by suggesting that James Keith, the school board’s attorney, incorporated the record of the injunction proceedings into the record before the school board. At Floyd’s termination hearing, Keith said, “Okay. And we won’t go into all those details in this hearing. I think that’s already a matter of record, and if we need to refer back to it we certainly can do that.” However, as the need never arose to refer to the record of the injunction proceedings, the attorneys never actually made an effort to incorporate the injunction record into the record before the school board. Thus, the chancellor acted against the mandate of section 37-9-113(3), and was in error in looking beyond the record before the school board.

¶ 7. Referring to the strict standard of review set forth in section 37-9-113, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that if there is substantial, credible evidence supporting a school board’s findings of fact, a reviewing court may not disturb those findings on appeal. Harris, 655 So.2d at 902 (citing Noxubee County Bd. of Educ. v. Givens, 481 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss.1985)). “Substantial evidence” has been defined as “evidence which ... afford[s] a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. It is something more than a ‘mere scintilla’ of evidence, and does not rise to the level of ‘a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). In contrast, “An act is arbitrary when it is not done according to reason or judgment, but depending on the will alone. ‘Capricious’ [is] defined as any act done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.” Burks v. Amite County Sch. Dist., 708 So.2d 1366, 1370 (¶ 14) (Miss.1998) (internal citations omitted). Logic dictates that a board decision based on substantial evidence is, by definition, not arbitrary or capricious. In reviewing a school board’s termination decision, the court’s task is to determine whether substantial evidence exists supporting that decision; if it does, the court has no authority to reverse. Merchant v. Bd. of Trustees, 492 So.2d 959, 962 (Miss.1986).

¶ 8. The chancellor below found that the school board had failed to demonstrate by substantial, credible evidence that Floyd’s termination was justified. In so doing, we find that the chancellor improperly substituted his own judgment for that of the board. Rather than limiting his inquiry to the determination of whether substantial evidence existed supporting the board’s decision, the chancellor exceeded his authority by re-weighing the evidence and the credibility of the hearing witnesses, and by looking beyond the record before the school board. After reviewing the record, it is clear to this Court that the board’s decision to discharge Floyd was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we must reverse and render the ruling of the chancery court, and reinstate the decision of the Amite County School Board discharging Floyd from his employment as principal of Amite County High School. We will now address the reasons enumerated by the school board for Floyd’s termination.

a. Tobacco violations

¶ 9. At the hearing, Amite County School District Superintendent Mary Russ testified that the issue of tobacco violations came to her attention in the fall of 2002, when parents began calling her office complaining ábout their children being fined $75 for smoking-related offenses. During her investigation, Russ discovered several receipts for fines levied upon students who had been caught smoking, and uncovered disciplinary reports revealing that some students had not been allowed to return to school until the fines were paid. Russ testified that when she questioned Floyd about the fines, he stated that the former superintendent, Bobby Whittington, had approved them. However, while the school district’s policy manual (“handbook”) outlined a range of different disciplinary measures to be imposed upon a student in possession of tobacco, a fine was not listed as an authorized punishment. In fact, the only fines approved in the handbook were those for overdue books. Russ testified that she checked with other principals in the school district, and that none of the other administrators understood there to be a policy allowing such fines. Russ stated that once she requested that Floyd stop this practice, she received no more complaints.

¶ 10. Furthermore, Russ testified that she had been unable to obtain an accounting of the tobacco fines collected by the school. Russ stated that she questioned the school’s business manager, who claimed that he had never received any of the fines and thus had no record of the money being deposited in the school’s accounts. Further, school disciplinarian Charles Jackson testified at the hearing that he never received the money, and that instead the fines were supposed to have been collected by the school secretary. Floyd offered no evidence showing what happened to this money.

¶ 11. The chancellor held that on this ground, the board had not presented substantial, credible evidence supporting Floyd’s dismissal. The chancellor stated that “The fact is that multiple school personnel testified that [former Superintendent Bobby] Whittington initiated the [tobacco] policy. It is also undisputed that Coach Floyd immediately abandoned the fine policy once he was so ordered by [Superintendent] Russ.” The chancellor further stated that there was no specific evidence showing that the fine monies had been mishandled in any way.

¶ 12. The chancellor’s opinion mirrors Floyd’s argument in that it suggests that the tobacco fines were part of established school policy. However, it is clear that they were not. Authorization for these fines appears nowhere in the school district’s handbook, and as a result, the imposition of the fines was a clear violation of district policy. Published school district policy authorized Floyd to administer one of a number of punishments, including in- and out-of-school suspension, for tobacco violations; it did not give him the power to charge a fine. Furthermore, exacerbating the problem, Floyd could not account for the.monies collected by the school. While it is true that there was no evidence adduced at the hearing suggesting a criminal mishandling of the funds, Floyd could not provide any evidence explaining where the collected fines went.

¶ IS. The present case is strikingly similar to Merchant v. Board of Trustees, 492 So.2d 959, 962 (Miss.1986), in which a high school football coach was discharged for the unauthorized sale of t-shirts and soft drinks, and for his failure to account for the monies collected from the sales. The Mississippi Supreme Court held in that case that these violations of school district policy justified Merchant’s discharge. In the present ease, the school board put forth substantial, credible evidence showing that Floyd violated published school district policy in levying the tobacco fines, and that he could not account for the monies collected pursuant to the fines. The chancellor’s ruling must be reversed.

b. Inaccuracies in student records

¶ 14. The school board’s written decision stated that there was substantial evidence that Floyd improperly signed a number of students’ permanent records, thus certifying students for graduation, when the records should not have been certified in many instances. Additionally, other errors appeared on student records that showed the records were not being kept in accordance with Mississippi State Department of Education (SDE) regulations.

¶ 15. Mary Ann Moore, a long-time SDE employee whose duties included reviewing student records and developing training programs regarding proper maintenance of student records, testified at Floyd’s hearing that a student’s permanent record contains a “graduation facts” box that must be signed by the principal of a school before that student can graduate. This box summarizes certain information such as a student’s grade-point average, class rank, and the number of high school units completed. Moore stated that the principal’s signature in this box certifies that the information contained in a student’s record is true and accurate. She testified that while a principal typically delegates record-keeping to a staff member, the principal cannot delegate the responsibility for ensuring that the information contained in the record is true and correct.

¶ 16. The school board introduced forty-five transcripts of Amite County High School students; none of the transcripts had been kept in accordance with SDE regulations, according to Moore. The reasons for noncompliance recur and vary from record to record. A sampling of the infirmities in the student records follows:

Many records contained unexplained handwritten grade changes, and many reflected that students had been given either too little or too much credit for the courses taken;
Changes were made to the record of Student 4 through the use of correction fluid, along with various other unexplained grade changes;
Student 7⅛ “graduation facts” box contained no class rank and no summary of high school units;
Student 9’s record reflected that he had taken only two units of science, when three were required in order to graduate.

¶ 17. Moore testified that it is a serious omission for a student to graduate without taking a required course. However, the student records submitted by the school board made it clear that Floyd certified for graduation no fewer than eleven students, who, because they had not taken certain required classes, should not have been eligible to graduate. Moore admitted that “to be fair,” officials could investigate the records and the circumstances to determine whether a student took the required courses for graduation, but that this information was not apparent on the face of the records. Moore stated that in reviewing student records she often finds errors, but “not a pervasive pattern this massive with this type of error,” especially in regard to students failing to meet graduation requirements. Lastly, Superintendent Mary Russ testified that Deputy State Superintendent John Jordan had referred to the Amite County High School record-keeping as the worst he had seen in the State of Mississippi.

¶ 18. In his ruling, the chancellor acknowledged that the evidence “clearly established] that there have been some problems with the details and methods of handling the cumulative records of students” during Floyd’s tenure. However, he found that the board’s decision to terminate Floyd on this ground was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported by substantial, credible evidence. The chancellor stated that the evidence was insufficient to show that Floyd “did something wrong,” especially since “it was clear that the entire District has very lenient or lax policies regarding the maintaining of cumulative student records.” However, testimony produced at the hearing showed that Floyd essentially “rubber-stamped” students’ records, certifying them for graduation without taking the time to verify the accuracy or the completeness of the records. The school board did not find that Floyd acted improperly by “doing something wrong” such as falsifying records. Instead, it found that Floyd had neglected his duty as principal by certifying students to graduate when they had not met the requirements for graduation, and found that Floyd had made no efforts to correct these problems.

¶ 19. It is apparent from the chancellor’s opinion that he exceeded his authority by re-weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. As stated above, if there is substantial, credible evidence supporting a school board’s findings of fact, a reviewing court may not disturb those findings on appeal. Harris, 655 So.2d at 901. A reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to the determination of whether substantial evidence supports the school board’s decision. Where there is conflicting testimony presented to the school board at a termination hearing, the school board alone, not the reviewing court, is authorized to determine the credibility of the evidence and witnesses before it. Id. at 902. The reviewing court is by no means entitled to decide the case as if it had been the trier of fact of the issues in dispute. Byrd v. Greene County Sch. Dist., 633 So.2d 1018, 1022 (Miss.1994).

¶ 20. In the present case, the chancellor improperly re-weighed the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses as if he had been the trier of fact. This is simply not the chancellor’s province in such a case. In finding that no substantial, credible evidence supported the board’s termination of Floyd, the chancellor opined that “the entire process initiated by Mary Russ is without credibility.” He chancellor determined that Russ’s “ ‘story’ makes no sense whatsoever,” and that “the incredible story” that gave rise to Floyd’s discharge “taint[ed]” the school board’s case. Furthermore, the court stated that “The Board’s decision does not reflect that the Board took into consideration the knowledge and credibility of the witnesses who testified.” The chancellor proceeded to substitute his own judgment for that of the board. As it was the board’s place to make determinations as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence before it, the chancellor overreached his authority in deciding this case.

¶ 21. As the reviewing court, our task is merely to determine whether substantial, credible evidence supported the school board’s decision. A wealth of evidence was offered by the school board showing the deplorable condition of the records at the Amite County High School; the board was clearly within its rights to discharge a principal under whose watch these conditions flourished. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the chancellor’s ruling.

c. Failure to complete student schedules in a timely manner

¶ 22. In January 2002, Floyd hired Ruth Lee Griffin as the guidance counselor for Amite County High School. In her new position, one of the key tasks with which Griffin was charged was the development of master schedules for the high school. However, Griffin told Floyd that as she had formerly been a special education teacher, she had no experience or training with respect to creating master schedules. Griffin testified that the master schedule for the 2002-03 year was supposed to be completed by the spring of 2002; however, Floyd told her to wait. As a result, Griffin did not begin work on the 2002-03 master schedule until June of 2002. Superintendent Mary Russ testified that Floyd repeatedly assured her that the schedule would be completed by the beginning of the 2002-03 school year, and that he would help Griffin prepare the schedule. Despite Floyd’s guarantee, he provided only minimal assistance to Griffin, and the schedule was not completed at the beginning of the school year. Jerry Pad-gett, a science teacher at Amite County High School, testified that the beginning of the 2002-03 school year was “chaotic,” and that there were “numerous errors, delays and changes of schedules” that lasted six to eight weeks into the new school year. Again, Floyd offered no testimony regarding his failure to ensure the timely completion of the 2002-03 master schedule.

¶ 23. In finding that the school board had put forth no substantial evidence supporting Floyd’s discharge on this ground, the chancellor referred to Padgett’s testimony in which he claimed that for the eight years he had been in the school district there had never been a schedule completed before August. While this testimony illustrates that scheduling problems were common at Amite County High School, it does not excuse Floyd’s failure in the present case. In Holliday v. West Point Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 401 So.2d 1296 (Miss.1981), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a principal’s inept handling of a school schedule constituted incompetence under section 37-9-59 justifying the principal’s discharge. Similarly, we find that substantial, credible evidence showed that Floyd failed to ensure an orderly beginning to the school year by failing to have the master schedule completed. We must reverse the chancellor’s ruling.

d. Other grounds for termination

¶ 24. It is clear from the above discussion that the school board was justified in discharging Floyd for a number of reasons. The remaining grounds put forth by the school board present much closer questions, however. As we have already found sufficient grounds supporting Floyd’s termination, we need not rule further. Regardless, we will discuss the remaining issues briefly.

¶ 25. The school board claims as one of its grounds for Floyd’s termination that Floyd improperly removed a physical science class from the school’s curriculum without authorization. The school board offered testimony that Floyd had replaced a physical science class with an upper-level chemistry course upon the request of Jerry Padgett, after approximately twenty students had registered for the physical science class. According to Superintendent Mary Russ, only the SDE has the authority to remove courses from a school’s curriculum if students have registered for the course. However, the board offered no evidence to corroborate Russ’s assertion that Floyd’s actions were improper. The chancellor held that in the absence of evidence that Floyd’s actions actually violated SDE or school district policy, this ground was insufficient to justify Floyd’s termination. We agree with the chancellor on this point, and had this been the only ground upon which the school board’s decision relied, we would affirm the chancellor’s ruling.

¶ 26. The remaining grounds set forth by the school board as justifying Floyd’s discharge are (1) that Floyd held track and field events on school property for private groups without fully explaining to the school board the details of those events, and (2) Floyd’s failure to fulfill his duties as full-time principal by spending an inordinate amount of time on activities unrelated to his contractual responsibilities. At a school board meeting on May 9, 2002, Superintendent Russ granted Floyd permission to use Amite County High School’s track to host a private track meet during the summer of 2002. However, Russ testified that Floyd did not inform her of the extent to which he would be spending time preparing for the event. Russ testified that when she called the high school that summer to reach Floyd, she was told that Floyd was unavailable because he was busy performing tasks related to the track meet. Russ testified that because of the inordinate amount of time spent preparing for the track event, Floyd failed to perform his duties as a full-time principal.

¶27. Other testimony adduced at the hearing suggested, however, that Floyd had been attending to his duties as full-time principal. Charles Jackson testified that Floyd was accessible when he or others needed him, and that he returned calls and was responsive to the needs of the faculty and administration. Furthermore, Jackson testified that he had never known Floyd to sacrifice his duties as principal for any track obligations. Additionally, track coach Kathy Banks testified that Floyd had missed an Amite County High School track meet that summer; he stated that he would not leave the campus because being principal was his primary duty.

¶ 28. Again, whether or not the school board put forth substantial evidence on these grounds is a close question. Again, had these been the only reasons upon which the school board relied in discharging Floyd, we would affirm the chancellor’s ruling.

e. Conclusion

¶ 29. It is settled law that where the record supports one valid reason to discharge a licensed school district employee, the board’s decision will not be disturbed. Spradlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 515 So.2d 893, 899 (Miss.1987). The chancellor found that none of the grounds for Floyd’s termination was supported by substantial, credible evidence; however, it is clear from our review of the record that three of the board’s reasons were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we must reverse the chancellor’s ruling and reinstate the decision of the school board discharging Floyd from his employment as principal of Amite County High School.

III. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN DENYING INJUNC-TIVE RELIEF TO FLOYD ON THE GROUND THAT THE BOARD WAS BIASED.

¶ 30. On December 16, 2002, Floyd petitioned the Amite County chancery court to enjoin the school board from proceeding with his dismissal hearing, alleging that the board was incapable of giving him a fair and impartial hearing. In a letter opinion dated January 23, 2003, the chancellor found that Floyd had failed to demonstrate that the board was biased against him. Floyd contends that the chancellor erred in his finding.

¶ 31. In analyzing claims of bias by employees appealing terminations, this state recognizes a presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of school board members serving as adjudicators in dismissal hearings. Harris, 655 So.2d at 903. In order to rebut this presumption, the dismissed employee must show “that the board members had a personal or financial stake in the decision, or that there was some personal animosity toward him.” Id. Furthermore, a showing that the board was involved in the events preceding the employee’s termination is insufficient to rebut the presumption of honesty and integrity. Byrd, 633 So.2d at 1022.

¶ 32. This Court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings of fact unless we find that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, or made a finding which was clearly erroneous. Bank of Miss. v. Hollingsworth, 609 So.2d 422, 424 (Miss.1992). In the present case, the board members’ testimony makes it clear that they had no personal or financial stake in the decision, and that they had no personal animosity toward Floyd. In finding that the board members were not so biased as to deny Floyd a fair and impartial hearing, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion. We affirm the chancellor’s denial of Floyd’s request for injunctive relief.

IV. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN AWARDING FLOYD ATTORNEYS’ FEES WHEN HE DID NOT OBTAIN THE SUBSTANTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT IN HIS INJUNCTION CASE.

¶ 33. The Amite County School Board contends that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding Floyd a total of $19,411 in attorneys’ fees. In his opinion denying Floyd’s request for a permanent injunction against the school board, the chancellor recognized that the school board had violated Floyd’s due process rights by suspending him without pay and awarded Floyd attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The school board contends that the amount was unreasonable in light of the fact that Floyd obtained none of the equitable relief he sought in his injunction case.

¶ 34. This Court recognizes that the award of attorneys’ fees is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Cruse v. Nunley, 699 So.2d 941, 944 (¶ 11) (Miss.1997). Accordingly, we will reverse such an award only upon finding an abuse of discretion, such as a misapplication of the law, by the trial judge. Id. The most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees is “the degree of success obtained.” Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).

¶ 35. In his petition seeking to enjoin the school board from conducting a hearing in his case, Floyd additionally sought the following relief:

(1) Reinstatement to his position as principal of Amite County High School, with back pay retroactive to October 10, 2002;
(2) A permanent injunction prohibiting the school board from suspending or terminating him on the same or similar grounds in the future;
(3) A declaration that he was entitled to written notice of the specific reasons for his termination, a list of witnesses and a copy of the documentary evidence substantiating the reasons for his termination; and
(4) Reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of the board’s failure to provide him with a fair and impartial hearing.

¶ 36. As discussed above, the chancery court properly denied Floyd’s request to enjoin the school board from proceeding with the dismissal hearing. Additionally, the chancellor refused to reinstate Floyd to his position as principal, or to permanently enjoin the school board from proceeding against him in the future. Furthermore, the chancery court denied Floyd’s request that the school board be required to provide him with documentary evidence supporting the reasons for his dismissal. The chancellor reasoned that, as the case involved a dismissal rather than a non-renewal, the school board was not required to provide Floyd with these documents. Even though Floyd failed to obtain any of his requested relief, the chancellor nonetheless awarded him attorneys’ fees in the sum of $19,411.

¶ 37. Considering the fact that Floyd obtained none of the relief sought in his injunction case, we find that the chancellor’s fee award was highly disproportionate to Floyd’s “degree of success.” In his opinion, however, the chancellor properly recognized that the school board’s suspension of Floyd without pay compelled Floyd to employ an attorney and to seek reinstatement of his pay pending his ultimate dismissal. While the school board, by letter dated November 15, 2002, recognized its mistake in imposing the suspension without pay and reinstated Floyd’s pay up to the date of the dismissal hearing, the record is unclear as to whether Floyd actually received his back pay prior to commencing this action. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the chancellor for a determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees, taking into consideration the degree of success obtained by Floyd in the injunction action and limiting the award of fees to those legal services rendered from the date Floyd was suspended without pay until the date upon which Floyd’s pay was reinstated.

V. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW FLOYD TO AMEND HIS PETITION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.

¶ 38. On March 17, 2003, nearly two months after the chancellor issued his decision on Floyd’s petition for injunctive relief, Floyd moved to amend his petition to include a claim for damages. In a letter opinion dated August 20, 2003, the chancellor denied Floyd’s motion, ruling that the matter had been fully presented, and that the court had no authority to allow Floyd to “retry his case.” Floyd contends that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying his motion to amend.

¶ 39. A trial court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is subject to an abuse of discretion standard; thus, unless we are convinced that the trial court abused its discretion, we have no authority to reverse. Harris v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 873 So.2d 970, 990 (¶ 64) (Miss.2004). This Court will affirm the trial court’s denial of a motion to amend where it appears that the requesting party has not exercised due diligence in filing the application to amend. See Pratt v. City of Greenville, 804 So.2d 972, 976 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001). In Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 617 (Miss.1991), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the plaintiff requested amendment two days prior to an adoption trial. In the present case, the motion to amend was not filed until well after the chancellor had passed judgment in the case. Finding that Floyd did not exercise due diligence in seeking amendment of his petition, we affirm the chancellor’s denial of Floyd’s motion to amend.

¶ 40. IN CAUSE N0.2003-CC-02705-COA, THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF AMITE COUNTY OVERTURNING THE SCHOOL BOARD’S DISCHARGE OF CHARLES FLOYD IS REVERSED AND RENDERED, AND THE DECISION OF THE AMITE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD IS REINSTATED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.

¶ 41. IN CAUSE N0.2003-CC-02703-COA, THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF AMITE COUNTY AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES IS REVERSED AND REMANDED. ON CROSS-APPEAL, THE DENIAL OF CHARLES FLOYD’S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THE DENIAL OF FLOYD’S MOTION TO AMEND ARE AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED EQUALLY TO THE APPELLANT AND THE APPELLEE.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Evidence was produced at the hearing suggesting that some of these students were allowed to "work off" the fines during physical education class in order to avoid suspension.

      . Moore testified that the proper procedure for changing a grade on such a record would be to cross out the incorrect information, write the new information, and initial the change. Moore further stated that the SDE strongly encouraged the use of a narrative explanation for the change.

      . In order to protect the identity of the students, we will refer to students by number rather than by name.

      .Moore testified that SDE regulations strictly prohibit the use of correction fluid on student records because it calls into question the accuracy and integrity of the data. Also troubling was the revelation that the changes to Student 4’s record had been made retroactively, after the student graduated from high school.

      . Corroborating this testimony was a letter dated October 25, 2002, in which Jordan informed Russ that he had requested an audit of the Amite County school system.

      . Section 37-9-109(a) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.2001), regarding non-renewal of employee contracts, requires a school board to supply the aggrieved employee with "[wjritten notice of the specific reasons for nonreemployment, together with a summary of the factual basis therefor, a list of witnesses and a copy of documentary evidence substantiating the reasons intended to be presented at the hearing.” Section 37-9-59, which deals with employee dismissal, does not require the school board to provide such documentation to a dismissed employee.