text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John A. THOMAS, Jr.
    No. 2005-KO-2047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Thomas, John A.; — Defendant;Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 220,793; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,648-KA.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Todd DAGGS.
    No. 2007-KK-0251.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Daggs, Todd; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05-5227; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-K-810.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry ADDISON.
    No. 2006-KO-1087.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Addison, Larry; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated November 9, 2006; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. M, No. 03-682; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05 KA 378.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Montreal JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1560.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Jackson, Montreal; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11-98-474; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0035.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Williams, Shawn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 362715; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0216.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Bell, Ronald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 268-096; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-0632.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jaime MADURO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Maduro, Jamie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 12-00-264; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0291.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Williams, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 417-851; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-KA-0260.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A), La. C.Cr.P. art. 926(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. David BRYARS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1585.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Bryars, David W.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2-99-594; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2706.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth D. REED, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Reed, Kenneth D. Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 255748, 254410; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-01628.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory NUNNERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Nunnery, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 444-906; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-0354.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney GRADNEY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Gradney, Rodney Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 01-99-0170; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0208.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony DARENSBOURG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Darensbourg, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-2973; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-276.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lonnie MOSLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Mosley, Lonnie;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 448-358; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-0282.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael WATKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1551.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Watkins, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish'of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 335-572; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-0343.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alfred MCGLORY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1552.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re McGlory, Alfred; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 95,446-B, 95,-447-B, 95,448-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00835.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrance BENOIT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Benoit, Terrance; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-CR-1005; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00163.

Denied. State v. McKinney, 406 So.2d 160, 161 (La.1981).


text:
    STATE ex rel. McKennedy ARMSTEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Armstead, McKennedy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 110355; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00189.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1555.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Miller, Jeffery; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 212,336; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No(s). 41375-KH, 40508-KH.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Williams, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 393-909; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-0228.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Russell Dewitt MATTHEWS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1557.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Matthews, Russell Dewitt a/k/a; Matthews, Dewitt R.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 161,484; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KA 1203.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wesley GUILLARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1558.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Guillard, Wesley; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96-5735; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-338.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward KENNERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Kennerson, Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 85,302, 85,116, 85,076, 85,116, 85,117, 85,303, 84984, 85,-114; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KH 05-00861, KH 05-01624.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John A. THOMAS, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Thomas, John A. Jr.,;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 220,793; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,-648-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-0582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Norwood, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s action dated June 17, 2005, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 279 — 452.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn DRAKE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0351.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Shawn Drake; -Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforde this Court’s order dated September 15, 2006, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Div. H, No. 9-02-168; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 1186.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cameron EMANUEL-DUNN.
    No. 2006-KP-1646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Emanuel-Dunn, Cameron; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 5-01-188; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 0272.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sidney B. ANDERSON.
    No. 2006-KP-1690.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Anderson, Sidney B.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 66821; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 05-01538.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR the CLAIM OF ROBERT LETSCH.
    No. 2007-CC-0250.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Letsch, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 543017; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 2106.

Denied.


text:
    Jennifer Devall COPELAND v. Alvin C. COPELAND.
    No. 2007-CC-0177.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Times Picayune, L.L.C.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2006-10752; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 1941.

Granted.


text:
    Melody SHAKESNYDER v. Onyx GARNER, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-0442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Shakesnyder, Melody; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2000-6628; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-0016.

Granted. The case is remanded to the court of appeal, which is instructed to allow relator to supplement her application with the appropriate documentation and to consider the application, as supplemented, on the merits.

KIMBALL, J., would deny.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny.


text:
    Alison TERREBONNE v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2007-C-0195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Chabert Insurance Agency; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 95281; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 2126.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    Richard BLEVINS v. HAMILTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Southwest Medical Center-Lafayette.
    No. 2007-CC-0127.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Blevins, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2006-0249; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 06-01270.

Granted.


text:
    Lance Hanssen AYERS v. Ethel Simms JULIEN and Benedict J. Willard, et al.
    No. 2007-CP-0259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Ayers, Lance H.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 03-4447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 06-C-384, 03-K-774.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(a).


text:
    Lance Hansen AYERS v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL CLINIC, et al.
    No. 2007-CP-0260.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Ayers, Lance Hansen; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2003-7447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-0384.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(a).


text:
    Jerrod A. WILSON v. Russell BORDELON, et al.
    No. 2007-CP-0252.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Wilson, Jerrod A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 17,558; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 0209R.

Denied; however, relator may timely refile his application in this Court raising his constitutional claims in the event his petition in the district court is deemed abandoned and dismissed pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1186(B)(2)(c).

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    David GILTON v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF PAROLE.
    No. 2006-KP-1702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Louisiana Board of Parole; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 522,486; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1332.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Vilma RAGER v. Bartley Paul BOURGEOIS, Global Motorsports, Canal Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2007-C-0189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Canal Indemnity Company; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 519,540; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0322.

Denied.


text:
    Anthony “Ricky” DEVILLIER, et al. v. ALPINE EXPLORATION COMPANIES, INC., et al.
    No. 2007-C-0191.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Evanston Insurance Co.; — Third Party; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 05-C-0896-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-0770.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Brian K. ABELS v. UNGARINO AND ECKERT, LLC.
    No. 2007-C-0192.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Ungarino and Eckert, LLC; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 106154; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0366.

Denied.


text:
    Jimmy SPRUELL v. Thomas DUDLEY.
    No. 2007-C-0196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Dudley, Thomas; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 35,322; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0015.

Denied.


text:
    Marcus L. SMITH v. THURMAN OILS, INC.
    No. 2007-C-0207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Smith, Marcus L.;- — -Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 81,675; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0743.

Denied.


text:
    THINKSTREAM, INC. v. TEMPLAR, INC.
    No. 2007-C-0208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Thinkstream, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 521,438; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CA 1968.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.


text:
    Ellis A. WHITE, Jr. v. Mayson FOSTER and the City of Hammond.
    No. 2007-C-0209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re White, Ellis A. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2003-004429; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0320.

Denied.


text:
    Ernest R. GREMILLION, Jr., et al. v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-0222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Louisiana, State of; Transportation and Development, Department of;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avo-yelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2004-5970; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-493.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., recused.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Cullen C. WASHINGTON v. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-C-0224.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Washington, Cullen C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2005-3674; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-929.

Denied.


text:
    CRESTWOOD RETAIL CENTER, LLC v. INTERNATIONAL TEA HOUSE, LLC.
    No. 2007-CC-0239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Crestwood Retail Center LLC;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2006-12779; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 2204.

Denied.


text:
    RAYMOND COUNTY v. QUALITY ONE BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC.
    No. 2007-CC-0281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re County, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2006-325; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-1429.

Denied.


text:
    Patrick L. LAURENT v. Michelle JOLLY-WRIGHT and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
    No. 2007-C-0283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Laurent, Patrick L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2001-20289; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-CA-1499.

Denied.


text:
    Chaquita DAY v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-0284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Day, Chaquita;- — -Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 03-8419; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-C-1530.

Denied.


text:
    Godfrey J. and Lydia BERGERON v. ARGONAUT GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-C-0418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 23, 2007.
   In re Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company et al.; Billeaudeau, Frank, Bil-leaudeau, Elsa, d/b/a Jazz Seafood <& Steakhouse; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 496,477; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0813.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


author: MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge,

text:
    WOMAN’S HOSPITAL FOUNDATION OF BATON ROUGE v. Billie Carol BOLTON.
    No. 2005 CA 2357.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Dec. 28, 2006.
    Chris J. LeBlanc, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Woman’s Hospital Foundation of Baton Rouge.
    Keith D. Jones, Baton Rouge, for Defendant/Appellant, Billie Carol Bolton.
    (Court composed of Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY and Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, serving as judges ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court).
   MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge,

Ad Hoc.

\,STATEMENT OF THE FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Billie Carol Bolton discovered she had Hepatitis C in late 1999. She contends she contracted the disease from a blood transfusion performed at Woman’s Hospital Foundation of Baton Rouge in 1980.

On June 16,1999, a class action was filed in Civil District Court in Orleans Parish (“CDC”) entitled Hilda N. Garrison, et al. v. Blood Center for Southeast Louisiana, et al., No. 99-9855. That suit was on behalf of all Louisiana residents who received blood transfusions from Louisiana hospitals before July 15, 1982 and contracted Hepatitis C. At some point Ms. Bolton became a plaintiff class representative in that class action lawsuit. Similarly, a number of corporations that own hospitals in this state were added as defendant class representatives, including Woman’s Hospital.

However, a CDC Judgment of July 24, 2000, dismissed Ms. Bolton’s claim because she had not submitted her claim to a medical review panel.

On February 26, 2003, Ms. Bolton requested a medical review panel for her claim against Woman’s Hospital. On June 9, 2003, Woman’s Hospital filed a petition against Ms. Bolton in East Baton Rouge Parish and requested that a suit number be assigned to the medical review panel action to conduct discovery and motion practice.

On March 23, 2004 the CDC dismissed the Hospital because Ms. Bolton was the only named class representative who had asserted a claim against Woman’s Hospital.

Ms. Bolton’s suit in Baton Rouge against Woman’s Hospital was dismissed on a Peremptory Exception of Prescription filed by the Hospital. | sThe Hospital asserted that Ms. Bolton’s claim had prescribed because her diagnosis was in 1999 and she did not file suit until 2003. The Hospital averred that within one year after discovering she had Hepatitis C Ms. Bolton needed to take some action to interrupt prescription, and that her suit in 2003 was too late. See La. R.S.9:5628. The issue we must resolve is whether the above mentioned class action suit interrupted prescription on Ms. Bolton’s claim.

DISCUSSION:

Originally, the Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice Act did not limit liability for blood transfusions, because an action for transfusion of tainted blood fell under the Civil Code or the Louisiana Product’s Liability Act. The Act was amended in 1987 to include claims arising from blood transfusions. See La. R.S. 40:1299.41.

Under La. Civil Code art. 3462, the prescriptive period on a legal claim is interrupted by the filing of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), provides that prescription on a covered malpractice claim is suspended upon the filing of |4a request for a medical review panel. In LeBreton v. Rabilo, 97-2221 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1226, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot benefit from both an interruption of prescription, by prematurely filing a suit C.C. art. 3462, and the suspension of prescription provided for in La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), by later filing a request for a medical review panel.

Nevertheless, plaintiff raises a novel issue. She contends that La. C.C.P. art. 596, dealing with the suspension of prescription upon the filing of a class action lawsuit, can be harmonized with the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act. La. C.C.P. art. 596, states:

Liberative prescription on the claims arising out of the transactions or occurrences described in a petition brought on behalf of a class is suspended on the filing of the petition as to all members of the class as defined or described therein. Prescription which has been suspended as provided herein, begins to run again:
(1) As to any person electing to be excluded from the class, from the submission of that person’s election form;
(2) As to any person excluded from the class pursuant to Article 592, thirty days after mailing or other delivery or publication of a notice to such person that the class has been restricted or otherwise redefined so as to exclude him; or
(3) As to all members, thirty days after mailing or other delivery or publication of a notice to the class that the action has been dismissed, that the demand for class relief has been stricken pursuant to Article 592, or that the court has denied a motion to certify the class or has vacated a previous order certifying the class.

She reasons that although her petition as a class representative was dismissed, she remains a member of the putative class and prescription is |Rstill suspended as to her claim. Reference to the July 24, 2001 judgment of the CDC reveals that it dismisses “all plaintiffs’ claims for damages herein, including claims for the administration, [or] transfusion ... of blood or a blood product on or after September 1,1975....”

We are constrained to agree with the Hospital’s argument that Ms. Bolton was dismissed from the class action as a class representative and as a member of the class. Thus pursuant to C.C.P. art. 596(3) prescription began to run again on her claim thirty days after notice of the dismissal. We are impelled to this result because LeBreton, supra teaches that the general rule of C.C.P. art. 596 must yield to the specific rule for malpractice cases.

Next, plaintiff argues that to require her to submit her claim to a medical review panel is to require her to do a vain and useless act. She bases this argument on the fact that La. R.S. 40:1299.47(G) provides that the sole function of the medical review panel is to determine whether the defendant acted within the appropriate standard of care. However, plaintiff does not allege defendant breached any standard of care so the medical review panel has nothing to do. This argument, however, ignores the fundamental change that has taken place in this area of the law. In 1981 the legislature enacted C.C. art. 2322.1 which provided that certain uses of human blood by health care providers were exempt from strict liability or all liability without negligence. In 1990 the article was re-written to declare that specific uses of blood by named health care providers was the rendition of a medical service “for all purposes whatsoever,” and not a sale. Simply stated, plaintiff seeks to plead a products liability cause of action in this blood transfusion case. The legislature has abrogated that cause of action | (¡but provided another avenue of redress. It is plaintiffs obligation, though, to timely bring herself within the parameters of that remedy.

In 1999 these provisions were declared to be procedural and applicable to all causes of action regardless of when they may have arisen. Likewise in 1999 the legislature enacted La. R.S. 9:5628.1 relative to the time within which to file action for liability from the use of blood. Subsection (B) thereof provided that it was procedural and had retroactive application. However, for any claim that arose prior to July 1, 1997, the claimant was given until July 1, 2000 to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Ms. Bolton was treated at Woman’s in April of 1980. She learned she had Hepatitis C in October or November 1999 and since she did not use drugs or have tattoos she inferred the only cause was the asserted blood transfusion. She did not file her complaint with the Patients’ Compensation Fund until February 27, 2003, more than twenty-three (23) years from the date of treatment and more than three (3) years from the date of her diagnosis and discovery.

The claims against Woman’s are prescribed on the face of the petition under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, La. R.S. 9:5628 and La. R.S. 9:5628.1. When prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to show that the action is not prescribed. See Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 2003-1030, (La.2/6/04), 865 So.2d 49, 54, and Kirby v. Field, 2004-1898 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 131, writ denied, 2005-2467 (La.3/24/06), 925 So.2d 1230. Ms. Bolton has offered no evidence or credible argument to meet this burden.

| .CONCLUSION

Because we find La. R.S. 9:5628.1 to be applicable and a sufficiently clear statement of the legislative intent, we apply it here and affirm the trial court’s dismissal on the exception of prescription.

AFFIRMED.

      .La. R.S. 9:5628. Actions for medical malpractice
      A. No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, nurse, licensed midwife practitioner, dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital or nursing home duly licensed under the laws of this state, or community blood center or tissue bank as defined in R.S. 40:1299.41(A), whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
      * * *

      . Art. 3466. Effect of interruption
      If prescription is interrupted, the time that has run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the last day of interruption.

      . Art. 3472. Effect of suspension
      The period of suspension is not counted toward accrual of prescription. Prescription commences to run again upon the termination of the period of suspension.


author: PARRO, J.

text:
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE and Parish of East Baton Rouge Through The Greater Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport District v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and J. CALDARERA & CO., INC.
    No. 2006 CA 0522.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Dec. 28, 2006.

      John W. Waters, Jr., Bienvenu, Foster, Ryan & O’Bannon, New Orleans, for Defendant-Appellant J. Caldarera & Co., Inc.
    Davis B. Allgood, Daniel B. Davis, James C. Percy, Ryan E. Johnson, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poltevent, Carrére & Denegre, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, for Defendants-Appellees URS Corporation and Joseph Levraea.
    Before: PARRO, GUIDRY, and McClendon, jj.
   PARRO, J.

2The defendant, J. Caldarera & Co., Inc. (Caldarera), appeals a judgment sustaining an exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing some of its third-party demands against URS Corporation (URS) and Joseph Levraea. After a de novo review of the designation of this partial judgment as final, we conclude that the trial court erred in so designating it. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand to the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of a contract to renovate the Baton Rouge airport. The original contractor defaulted, and on April 19, 1999, the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, through the Greater Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport District (EBR) executed a “Takeover Agreement” with the contractor’s surety, American Home Assurance Company (American Home), to complete the terminal project. On April 30, 1999, American Home hired Caldarera as the general contractor under a “Completion Contract.” However, there were numerous problems and delays with the project, and on March 27, 2002, EBR terminated the “Takeover Agreement.” On the same day, EBR sued American Home for breach of contract and Caldarera for tort damages. American Home, with Caldarera’s consent, removed the suit to federal court, and there both defendants filed third-party demands against URS, the company hired by EBR as program manager in charge of supervising the airport construction work; Calda-rera also filed third-party demands against Levraea, a URS employee who was the on-site program manager for the terminal project. The third-party demands were mailed to URS and Levraea by certified mail, but were not served on them. Eventually, because of the federal court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (19th JDC).

On February 11, 2003, in the 19th JDC, Caldarera asked that the federal court record be made part of the record in this case and filed an amended and restated | ¡¡answer, a reconventional demand against EBR, and a restated third-party demand against URS and Levraea. The restated third-party demand included claims for indemnity and contribution, and also claimed tort damages from June 27, 2001, based on actions taken by URS and Levraea after that date. URS and Levraea filed an answer on March 7, 2003, and on March 24, 2004, they filed a peremptory exception. The exception raised the objection of prescription as to Caldarera’s third-party tort claims concerning conduct occurring before February 11, 2002. URS and Lev-raea contended that the filing of the third-party claims in federal court did not interrupt prescription, since that court was not a court of competent jurisdiction; that they were not served within the prescriptive period; that they did not waive service under FRCP Rule 4(d); that they did not answer the third-party demands in the federal court; and that the re-filing of the claims in the 19th JDC after remand was too late. Caldarera claimed its third-party demands were in the nature of a continuing tort; the actual notice provided by its mailing of the third-party demand to URS and Levraea was sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription; and URS and Levraea had waived service under FRCP Rule 4(d) or by answering the third-party demand in the 19th JDC.

The trial court sustained the exception in part. The dispositive language of the judgment stated the following:

[T]he Court being of the opinion that the exception should be granted, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
(1) the peremptory exception be and it is hereby SUSTAINED, except to the extent that it originally sought dismissal of the tort-based damage claims of defendant American Home Assurance Company;
(2) the indemnity and any contribution claims asserted against URS Corporation and Joseph Levraea by J. Caldarera & Company, Inc. in this matter, be and they are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
L(3) the indemnity and contribution claims asserted against URS Corporation and Joseph Levraea by American Home Assurance Company in this matter, be and they are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(4) the tort claims asserted against URS Corporation and Joseph Levraea by J. Caldarera & Company, Inc. in this matter that relate to conduct occurring before February 11, 2002 be and they are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(5) this judgment shall be without prejudice to the rights of URS Corporation and Joseph Levraea to seek dismissal of any other claims of J. Caldarera & Company, Inc. or American Home Assurance Company on any grounds, including prescription;
(6) all costs of the peremptory exception and the related motion to clarify ruling are assessed against J. Calda-rera & Company, Inc. and American Home Assurance Company, in solido; and
(7) the Court further expressly determines, pursuant to La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 1915(B)(1), that no just reason exists for delaying the finality of this judgment and that this judgment should be and hereby is designated as final for purposes of appeal.

The judgment was signed November 18, 2005, and Caldarera appealed the partial dismissal of its third-party claims against URS and Levraea arising out of conduct occurring before February 11, 2002.

FINALITY OF PARTIAL JUDGMENT

At oral argument, this court queried the parties concerning whether it was appropriate to designate this partial judgment as final, in that the judgment did not sustain the exception in its entirety, but only dismissed Caldarera’s third-party tort claims against URS and Levraea related “to conduct occurring before February 11, 2002.” Additionally, only a portion of the judgment was appealed. The concern raised by this court was that this designation of the judgment as final would result in “piecemeal” litigation and multiple appeals that would ultimately delay the resolution of | Rthe lawsuit. Also, because only a final judgment may be appealed, this court must examine the issue of whether this judgment was correctly designated as final in order to determine whether this court has jurisdiction over this matter. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1841 and 2088(A); McGehee v. City/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 00-1058 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/12/01), 809 So.2d 258, 260.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(B) provides as follows:

(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any order or decision which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 02-1351 (La.App. 1st Cir.10/22/03), 867 So.2d 723, writs denied, 04-2313, 04-2324, 04-2327 (La.11/19/04), 888 So.2d 206, 211, and 212, this court addressed a similar situation, wherein the judgment was clearly designated as final and appealable by the trial court, but the reasoning upon which the court based that designation was unstated. The issue in Motorola was whether the trial court’s rationale underlying its determination had to be explained in order to be a proper designation of finality of a partial judgment for purposes of appeal under Louisiana law. Id. at 727. After examining the historical underpinnings of the codal article, this court concluded that although the trial court’s explication of its designation of a judgment as final is the most desirable practice, its failure to provide such reasons was not a jurisdictional defect. Id. at 732. In such a situation, if the reasons are neither apparent nor provided by the trial court, this court would conduct a de novo | (¡review, applying a non-exclusive list of factors adopted from the federal courts in determining whether a partial judgment is final. Id. Those factors include:

(1) The relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims;
(2) The possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court;
(3) The possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time;
(4) The presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; and
(5) Miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.

Id. If, after conducting a de novo review, this court were to conclude that the trial court erred in designating the judgment as final, the appeal would be dismissed. Id. at 733.

This method of resolving such partial judgments under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B) has since been approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court in R.J. Messenger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La.3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, stating:

In order to assist the appellate court in its review of designated final judgments, the trial court should give explicit reasons, either oral or written, for its determination that there is no just reason for delay. However, if the trial court fails to do so, we find the appellate court cannot summarily dismiss the appeal. For purposes of judicial efficiency and economy, we approve the approach taken by the First, Third and Fifth circuits, and hold the proper standard of review for an order designating a judgment as final for appeal purposes when accompanied by explicit reasons is whether the trial court abused its discretion. If no reasons are given but some justification is apparent from the record, the appellate court should make a de novo determination of whether the certification was proper.

Id. at 1122. The supreme court also approved the factors cited above as illustrative and appropriate for the determination of whether a judgment should have been designated as final. Id.; see also, Pelts & Skins, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 05-0952 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/06), 938 So.2d 1047, 1050, writ denied, 06-1821 (La.10/27/06), 939 So.2d 1281.

17Applying those principles to the judgment in this case, we note the following. No reasons were given in this case, although the possible benefit of narrowing some of the issues in this complex lawsuit provides some apparent justification. Therefore, according to the Messenger decision, we must conduct a de novo review of the proceedings, using the cited factors, as those may apply to the matter before us.

With reference to the third-party tort claims against URS and Levraea, both parties agree that the March 27, 2002 decision to terminate the “Takeover Agreement” occurred outside the prescriptive period delineated in the judgment. Therefore, any of Caldarera’s claims against URS and Levraea related to that decision can still be litigated. Moreover, any claims based on their actions leading to the allegedly wrongful disqualification of Cal-darera’s bid to complete Phase Two of the project, which occurred after the termination of that agreement, can also still be litigated. Indeed, Caldarera’s tort claims based on any of URS and/or Levraea’s actions after February 11, 2002, are not prescribed under the terms of this judgment. Caldarera has argued to this court that none of its claims have prescribed, because the actions of URS and Levraea constitute a “continuing tort,” in that there was a continuing duty owed to it by URS and Levraea to properly administer the airport project and a continuing breach of that duty by URS and Levraea. Without expressing any opinion on the validity of this argument, we nevertheless note that the continuing tort theory does assert a significant connection between actions taken before February 11, 2002, and those that occurred later. Even if this court were to conclude that the trial court judgment was correctly designated as final and that the judgment should be affirmed, the evidence at trial might nevertheless include reference to the earlier actions of URS and/or Levraea. Although claims based on these actions would have been adjudicated as prescribed, such evidence could be relevant to establish a pattern of behavior, animus, or continuing breach of duty, all of which have been alleged in the third-party demand. | sTherefore, under this theory of Caldarera’s case, there is a direct relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated tort claims, such that the partial judgment would not necessarily narrow any of the evidence at trial.

We also believe it is possible that, because of the interrelationship between the parties and between the claims based on actions before and after certain key dates, this court might be obliged to consider the same issues a second time. The partial judgment reserved to URS and Levraea its right to seek dismissal of any other claims of Caldarera or American Home on any grounds, including prescription. American Home’s claims against URS track those of Caldarera in many respects. Thus, the exact same issues of prescription and continuing tort might be brought before this court, in the event the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription were again raised by URS concerning American Home’s third-party demands against it.

From the voluminous record in this case, it is obvious that the parties are vigorously litigating every issue, from discovery matters to rulings on exceptions and partial judgments. One earlier appeal to this court was mooted by parallel proceedings, and one other judgment was improperly designated as final. Several matters have been filed as applications for supervisory writs, and later filed as appeals when rulings on motions or exceptions were designated as final partial judgments. While we do not discourage vigorous advocacy, every writ action or appeal delays the ultimate resolution of the case, adds to the parties’ litigation expenses, and causes the expenditure of considerable time and effort by this court and/or the supreme court. With reference to the matter before us, there is a very real possibility that this court might have to |aaddress the same issues in another appeal. For this reason, and because the partial judgment in this case would not necessarily shorten the time of trial or narrow the evidence on the tort claims, we find that allowing an immediate appeal of the relevant portions of this partial judgment would only encourage multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation, causing delay and judicial inefficiency. In considering whether a judgment is properly designated as final pursuant to Article 1915(B), a court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So.2d at 1122. We find no reasons for certifying the relevant portions of this judgment as final and immediately appealable that would outweigh these judicial administrative interests. Because the partial judgment on the third-party tort claims is not a final one, it may be revised at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment adjudicating the remaining issues in the case. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2); see Templet, 951 So.2d 182.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court improperly designated the partial judgment as a final judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B), this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment pertaining to Caldarera’s third-party tort claims against URS and Levraea. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal of that portion of the judgment and remand the ease to the trial court. Assessment of appeal costs shall await final disposition of this matter.

APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED.

      . Other pleadings were also filed in federal court and in the state court, and numerous other parties were named in various capacities, but those claims are not germane to this appeal.

      . American Home had filed a similar motion on November 6, 2002, requesting that all of its pleadings in the federal court, including its third-party demand against URS, be included in the 19th JDC suit record.

      . According to the briefs, the parties had settled claims arising out of actions preceding June 27, 2001.

      . This exception also raised the objection of prescription as to American Home’s tort claims against URS relating to conduct occurring before November 6, 2001. The exception also raised the objection of failure to state a cause of action concerning both defendants’ indemnity and/or contribution claims.

      . The judgment was a clarification of an earlier ruling by the court, which was noted in a minute entry on July 9, 2004, stating that "the Court is of the opinion that the peremptory exception of no cause of action is well founded and hereby sustains it.” Because the court had taken the entire matter under advisement after the hearing, until this clarifying judgment was signed, it was not clear whether or how the court had ruled on the exception raising the objection of prescription as to some of the defendants' claims.

      . The only matter addressed in this appeal is the dismissal of some of Caldarera’s third-party demands against URS and Levraea on the grounds of prescription. The appeal did not assign error to the dismissal of the indemnity and contribution claims asserted against URS and Levraea by American Home and Caldarera. Moreover, before the hearing, URS and Levraea withdrew without prejudice their prescription objection as to American Home. American Home did not join in the appeal of the judgment.

      . Historically, our courts have had a policy against multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation. Templet v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Public Safety & Corr., 05-1903 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/3/06), 951 So.2d 182, 185.

      . Concluding that the trial court's good reasons were apparent from the nature of the case, this court ultimately declined to conduct such a de novo review and maintained the appeal. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 02-1351 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/25/04), 878 So.2d 838, 841, writs denied, 04-2313, 04-2324, 04-2327 (La.11/19/04), 888 So.2d 206, 211, and 212.

      . Neither party has appealed the dismissal with prejudice of the indemnity and contribution claims filed against URS and/or Levraea by Caldarera and American Home. The result of this judgment, as it pertains to those claims, is to completely eliminate those issues from the litigation. Therefore, the trial court correctly designated those portions of the judgment regarding the dismissal of the indemnity and contribution claims as a final partial judgment. And, since neither party timely appealed those portions of the judgment, those dismissals are final and unappealable.

      . We recognize, however, that it appears that fewer of those claims would be subject to the objection of prescription, due to the earlier filing by American Home of its third-party demand in the 19th JDC.

      . At this writing, nine civil writ actions, several motions, and one earlier appeal have been filed with this court. The earlier appeal to this court was voluntarily dismissed, because the same relief had first been sought in a writ application, as it was unclear whether the trial court’s “stay” of the proceedings constituted a de. facto judgment granting in-junctive relief. This court had granted the writ application and reversed the trial court ruling, and the supreme court had denied the application for writs concerning that matter. Therefore, the appeal to this court concerning the same issue was voluntarily dismissed by the appellant as moot. We note also that in one of the writ actions, this court found that the trial court had incorrectly certified a judgment as final, and further declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the issue: See City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, through the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport Dist. v. American Home Assur. Co., 2006-0229 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/13/06) (unpublished writ action).

      . In fact, we are compelled to observe that this record could serve as the definition of piecemeal litigation.


author: McDonald, j. PARRO, J.,

text:
    Raymon Lee HARTZO and Debra Elaine Hartzo v. AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2005 CA 1493.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Dec. 28, 2006.
    Writ Denied March 16, 2007.

      Darren Giles, Bossier City, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Raymon Lee Hartzo and Debra Elaine Hartzo.
    Roger D. Marlow, Stephen A. Mogab-gab, Covington, Counsel for Defendant/Ap-pellee American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    Donald R. Smith, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Allstate Insurance Company.
    Before: Chief Judge CARTER, PARRO, McDonald, HUGHES, and WELCH, JJ.

      . In their briefs to the court, all parties refer to Nicole as the "owner” of the Ford Taurus. In affidavits, both Marilyn Larmon and her daughter, Amy Letard (Goldsby), stated that the Taurus had been donated to Nicole. However, Frank Larmon, the father of Charles and Nicole and husband of Marilyn, stated in his deposition that the Taurus had been given to Nicole, but no paper work had been completed. We will refer to Nicole as the owner since she was considered by the named insured, Amy Letard, as the owner, and apparently had the authority to grant permission to operate the vehicle.

   McDonald, j.

I pThe issue presented in this appeal is whether insurance policies issued by American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Louisiana (ANPAC-LA), provided coverage for the loss sustained by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in this matter, Raymon and Debra Hartzo, filed suit against American National Property & Casualty Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for damages sustained when their daughter, Chandra Hartzo, was killed in an automobile accident. ANPAC issued automobile liability policies to Charles Larmon for his 1993 Mercury Sable, and to Amy Le-tard, as the named insured on the policy covering the 1996 Ford Taurus, which Charles was driving at the time of the fatal accident.

ANPAC-LA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that neither of the policies issued by it provided coverage because Charles did not have express or implied permission to drive the Ford Taurus at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion, ANPAC was dismissed from the suit with prejudice, and the judgment was certified as a final judgment in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1915. Both the plaintiffs and Allstate appealed the judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 15, 2004, a 1996 Ford Taurus driven by Charles Larmon collided with a 2000 Toyota Tacoma operated by Laura Chustz. Chandra Hartzo was a passenger in the Chustz vehicle. The |sFord Taurus was owned by Nicole Larmon, Charles’s sister, and, as noted, was insured by an automobile liability policy issued by ANPAC-LA identifying the named insured as Amy K. Letard (Goldsby), who was Charles and Nicole’s stepsister.

Three separate policies of insurance are involved in this litigation. ANPAC-LA issued policy number 17-V-J97-555-4 to Charles Larmon on his personal vehicle, a 1993 Mercury Sable. ANPAC-LA also issued the policy of insurance on the vehicle that Charles was driving at the time of the accident, the Ford Taurus. Although this policy, number 17-V-J97-226-1, was issued to Amy, the record reflects that the Ford Taurus was actually titled in Marilyn Larmon’s name. The third policy was issued by American National General Insurance Company (ANGIC) to Neida Larmon, Charles and Nicole’s mother, insuring Nei-da’s personal vehicle.

ANPAC-LA filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that neither of the policies of insurance issued by ANPAC-LA provided coverage because Charles did not have permission from either the named insured or the owner of the Ford Taurus to operate that vehicle. In support of its contention that Charles did not have express or implied permission to operate the Ford Taurus, therefore there was no insurance coverage, ANPAC-LA submitted the depositions of his parents, Frank Larmon and Neida Larmon, and Nicole Larmon, and the affidavits of Amy Letard (Goldsby), Marilyn Larmon, Amy’s mother and Charles’ stepjmother,4 and Kirby McKenzie, an underwriting manager employed by American National Property and Casualty Company whose duties include supervision of underwriting functions for ANPAC-LA. The Hartzos filed an opposition to the motion, relying on the same evidence.

Both ANPAC insurance policies contained the same language and policy definitions, and, at issue here, is the following:

(I) “You” and “your” mean the Policyholder named in the Declarations and spouse, if living in the same household.
(5) “Insured” or “Insured person” means the person, persons, or organization defined as an insured person in or with reference to a specific coverage.
(6) “Non-owned car” means a car, utility vehicle, or utility trailer not owned by, in whole or in part, or furnished or available for the regular use of either you, your spouse, or a relative. It does not include a temporary substitute car.
(10) “Relative” means a person living with you and related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, including your ward or foster child, provided neither the relative nor the relative’s spouse owns, in whole or in part, a car.
(II) “Temporary substitute car” means a car or utility trailer not owned by you or a relative being temporarily used with the owner’s permission as a substitute for your insured car because of its withdrawal from normal use due to its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction.
(14) “Your insured car” means:
(a) the car described in the Declarations for which a premium is shown;
(b) a temporary substitute car;

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS USED IN PART I ONLY

As used in this Part, “insured person” means:

(1) with respect to your insured car:
(a) you or a relative;
(b) a person using your insured car if its use is with your express or implied permission; and
(2) with respect to a non-owned car:
(a) you or a relative, provided the use is with the express or implied permission of the owner;
|sNo person shall be considered an insured person if that person uses your insured car without your express or implied permission.

(Emphasis in the original.)

On the day of the accident, and for several months prior, Charles and Nicole resided with their mother. On that day, Charles’s car was in the shop, so when he and Nicole went out to eat, Nicole drove them in her car. After dinner, Charles and Nicole went to a friend’s house; Charles drove at Nicole’s request because she had too much to drink. Upon leaving there, Nicole drove Charles to another friend’s house, then went home, and shortly thereafter, to bed. She heard Charles return home, but did not speak to him. The keys to Nicole’s car were in her purse on the kitchen table. Without asking Nicole, Charles left the house in Nicole’s car and was involved in the accident. The deposition testimony of Nicole was that Charles could not use her car without permission, which she had sometimes given in the past, and sometimes withheld.

At the summary judgment hearing, AN-PAC-LA argued that there were no material facts in dispute, and the facts established that Charles did not have either express or implied permission to drive the Ford Taurus. Therefore, in accordance with the terms of the automobile liability insurance policy, there was no insurance coverage. Plaintiffs argued that the policies at issue were ambiguous as to whether Charles was a relative shown as an insured driver on the declarations page of the policy, and there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Charles had implied permission from Nicole to drive the car. In oral reasons for judgment, the trial judge noted “[tjhis is a complicated case... and it’s a hard one to decide.” After listening to argument and examining all the evidence, the judge found that there was |fino insurance coverage under either of the ANPAC-LA policies and granted the motion for summary judgment.

This appeal was timely filed by both the plaintiffs and Allstate, which would be liable to the Hartzos under the uninsured motorist provision of their automobile liability policy if no insurance coverage was provided by the ANPAC-LA policies.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellants assert that Louisiana cases deciding whether permission was given to trigger insurance protection under the omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy favor finding permission to protect innocent victims. This court is asked to review the law and the facts and find that Charles had the implied permission of Nicole to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident. Alternatively, this court is asked to determine that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of ANPAC because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

ANPAC-LA sets forth the undisputed facts, and argues that the insurance policies at issue here are not ambiguous; under these facts, the policies do not provide coverage. ANPAC-LA cites the supreme court’s language in Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 759, 763, stating “Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers, like other individuals, are entitled to limit their liability and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually assume.” Further, it contends that their policies provide coverage in compliance with La. R.S. 32:900(B)(2). We |7recognize that insurers are legally allowed to limit their contractual liability. Indeed, were insurers not able to enforce reasonable conditions upon their liability, in accordance with actuarial standards and projections, their industry would be hindered in its ability to serve the important function it does in our society. However, these limits must be “reasonable,” and not against public policy. We are unable to agree with ANPAC-LA’s argument that the facts in this case, as adduced from the depositions submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment, establish that ANPAC-LA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The issue of “permission” has repeatedly entangled our courts, with the supreme court frequently being called upon to untie the knots.

In the seminal case of Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938), this [supreme] court addressed what constitutes permission in an omnibus clause and adopted the “initial permission” rule. Under this rule, once consent, express or implied, is granted by the insured to use the vehicle, any subsequent changes in the character or scope of the use do not require additional specific consent of the insured. Norton v. Lewis, 623 So.2d 874, 875 (La.1993). Thereafter, “coverage will be precluded only where the deviation from the use consented to amounts to theft or other conduct displaying an utter disregard for the return or safekeeping of the vehicle.” Id. There are at least three justifications for this rule: (1) “it effectively furthers the state’s policy of compensating and protecting innocent accident victim[s] from financial disaster[,]” (2) the rule “serves to discourage collusion between lender and lendee in order to escape liability!!]” and (3) the rule “greatly reducefs] a most costly type of litigation.” Id.

Manzella v. Doe, 94-2854 (La.12/8/95), 664 So.2d 398, 402.

The “initial permission rule” can only assist us in deciding this case, however, if we find that when Nicole allowed Charles to drive her car after dinner, it constituted an initial express permission from which his use later that night was a subsequent change. The facts do not support this analysis. Having found no express permission, we must determine whether Charles’s |suse of the car at the time of the accident was with Nicole’s “implied permission.”

The parties have cited numerous cases to assist us in this endeavor. After extensive review of the jurisprudence, we agree with the concurrence of former Justice Watson in Perkins v. McDow, 615 So.2d 312, 317 (La.1993), that “these cases serve to point out the mischief caused by the permissive user provisions of automobile liability policies.” Similarly, we agree that the solution would be to hold that the permissive use clause is contrary to public policy, especially in cases involving family members living in the same household. Louisiana statutory law requires that all vehicles have liability coverage and the denial of coverage on the basis of familial prohibitions, reconstructed post-accident, fosters litigation and does not serve the state’s policy of compensating and protecting innocent accident victims.

Our review of the jurisprudence on the issue of “implied permission” also convinces us that the determination is extremely fact-sensitive and involves a balancing of legal and public policy issues that will rarely be appropriate in a motion for summary judgment. Implied permission, as opposed to express permission, must be inferred from the totality of facts and the relationships involved. On the record before us, we do not find that ANPAC-LA has established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the portion of the judgment dismissing AN-PAC Louisiana Insurance Company with prejudice is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed against AN-PAC Louisiana Insurance Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PARRO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

PARRO, J.,

dissenting.

Li respectfully disagree with the majority opinion for the following reasons.

On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden of proof is on the moving party. However, on issues for which the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party’s burden of proof on the motion is satisfied by pointing out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the nonmov-ing party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that it will be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial; failure to do so shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Clark v. Favalora, 98-1802 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/24/99), 745 So.2d 666, 673. In considering whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts cannot consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh the evidence. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751.

A plaintiff who seeks to establish coverage under the omnibus clause of an automobile liability insurance policy must prove that the vehicle was being used with the express or implied permission of the named insured. Perkins v. McDow, 615 So.2d 312, 315 (La.1993); see LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2). The fact of permission must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence without the aid of any presumptions. See 2Manzella v. Doe, 94-2854 (La.12/8/95), 664 So.2d 398, 402; Norton v. Lewis, 623 So.2d 874, 876 (La.1993). Thus, once ANPAC-LA pointed out to the court that there was an absence of factual support to show that Charles’s use of Nicole’s vehicle was with the express or implied permission of Nicole, the plaintiffs were required to produce factual support sufficient to establish that they would be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial as to this issue.

Nicole testified by deposition that she usually did not let Charles drive her vehicle; however, after eating and consuming alcoholic beverages at a restaurant on the night in question, Nicole allowed Charles to drive them in her vehicle to their next destination, a friend’s house where her boyfriend’s band was practicing. After staying there long enough for her to be able to drive, Nicole drove Charles to the house of another friend. After dropping him off, she proceeded to her mother’s home where she and Charles had been living. She got home around 11:00 p.m. and parked her vehicle in the driveway by a garage in the backyard. Nicole went to bed at approximately 12:00 or 12:30 a.m. Prior to that time, Nicole, who had been in her room, heard Charles when he entered the house. Nicole testified that Charles was due at work that morning and was scheduled to be picked up by a car-pool buddy around 7:30 or 8:00 a.m. Nonetheless, Charles took the keys to Nicole’s vehicle from her purse that was on the kitchen table without asking and left in her vehicle. When she got up to smoke a cigarette between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m., Nicole noticed that her vehicle and Charles were both gone.

It is undisputed that Charles did not have Nicole’s express permission to use her vehicle at the time of the accident. Charles’s earlier use of Nicole’s vehicle from the restaurant to the house where band practice was being held was obviously with Nicole’s express permission, but that express permission did not continue once Nicole resumed control of driving the vehicle. Thus, the majority correctly concluded that the initial | ¡¡express permission could no longer constitute the consent needed to -withstand a subsequent change in the character or scope of the use as discussed in Manzella, 664 So.2d at 402. Accordingly, for there to be coverage under the ANPAC-LA policies, Charles would have had to have been operating the vehicle at the time in question with Nicole’s implied permission.

Generally, implied permission arises from a course of conduct by the named insured involving acquiescence in, or lack of objection to, the use of the vehicle. Francois v. Ybarzabal, 483 So.2d 602, 605 (La.1986). A personal relationship, together with other factors, may prove the required implied permission. Turner v. Alexander, 29,148 (La.App. 2nd Cir.2/26/97), 690 So.2d 756, 758.

Nicole had permitted Charles to drive her vehicle on only two or three occasions within the couple of months since they had returned to live at their mother’s home. Nicole stated that her brother had driven her vehicle on prior occasions when his car was being repaired. However, Nicole explained in her deposition that Charles understood that he was not allowed to use her vehicle without first obtaining her permission. She testified, “I was very strict with letting him use the car.” Charles understood that he was not to use her vehicle under “any circumstances.” When Charles asked for permission to use her vehicle, Nicole would not normally grant him permission. Many times, she opted to drive him where he wanted to go rather than allowing him to use her vehicle. Charles had never before taken the keys for Nicole’s vehicle from her purse. These facts are not contradicted.

In this case, we are not faced with conflicting versions of the facts. The evidence offered in connection with ANPAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment, although establishing a personal relationship between Nicole and Charles, clearly does not establish a course of conduct by Nicole involving acquiescence in, or lack of objection to, the use of the vehicle. Allstate Insurance Company noted that without the testimony of Charles, the purpose for which Charles took Nicole’s vehicle, or if he [4sought to get Nicole’s permission, will never be known. It further urged that it is improper to allow ANPAC-LA to benefit from Allstate’s inability to obtain evidence that would contradict that of Nicole. Although Charles’s death made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof in this case, the parties opposing the motion for summary judgment had the opportunity to offer evidence to establish a course of conduct between Nicole and Charles that gave rise to implied permission. Nonetheless, no evidence was offered to contradict Nicole’s testimony to the effect that rarely, if ever, did she allow Charles to use her vehicle and that Charles understood that he was not to use Nicole’s vehicle without first obtaining her permission. Thus, the fact that Nicole never formally revoked her permission for Charles to drive her car on the night in question, other than by resuming driving control, is irrelevant under the facts of this case. Furthermore, the fact that the determination as to implied permission is extremely fact-sensitive and involves a balancing of legal and public policy issues alone is insufficient to preclude this issue from being resolved in the context of a motion for summary judgment.

For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s granting of ANPAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment, because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of proof with factual support sufficient to establish that they would be able to show at trial that Charles’s use of the vehicle at the time of the accident was with Nicole’s implied permission. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

      . Plaintiffs named as a defendant American National Property and Casualty; ANPAC-LA answered stating that it was erroneously named. The record reflects that American Property and Casualty Company, which uses the acronym ANPAC, is the parent company of ANPAC-LA, which issued the insurance policy covering the Ford Taurus, as well as a policy of insurance to Charles Larmon on his personal vehicle.

      .Allstate Insurance Company issued the automobile liability policy covering the plaintiffs’ vehicle, and this policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

      . Charles Larmon was also lulled in the accident.

      .Summary judgment was also urged in the same motion on behalf of American National General Insurance Company, which insured a vehicle owned by Neida Larmon.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:900(B)(2), referred to as the omnibus clause, requires that motor vehicle liability policies "[s]hall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle....”

      . Charles’s vehicle was in the shop for repairs, and Nicole had driven them to the restaurant in her vehicle.

      . According to their mother, Charles was sitting in a chair and watching television at approximately 1:30 a.m. when she advised him that he should go to bed. She explained that Charles responded that he was going to watch some television and then go to bed because he needed to get up for 7:00 a.m. for work.

      . Thus, the facts of this case differ from those of Prudhomme v. Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 95-1502 (La.App. 3rd Cir.4/3/96), 671 So.2d 1116, 1120, cited by Allstate Insurance Company.

      . Furthermore, the parties had the opportunity to fully cross-examine Nicole during her deposition, and her deposition testimony was unwavering and consistent.

      . Charles’s mother testified in her deposition that she also would not permit Charles to drive her vehicle. One of her reasons for this policy was based on the fact that Charles had wrecked one of her cars in the past.