author: WEIMER, Justice.

text:
    William MARKS v. NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT.
    No. 2006-C-0575.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 2006.

      Penya M. Moses-Fields, City Attorney, Joseph V. DiRosa, Jr., Chief Deputy City Attorney, James B. Mullaly, Heather M. Valliant, Assistant City Attorneys, for Applicant.
    Eric J. Hessler, for Respondent.
    Claude A. Schlesinger, New Orleans, Chester Theodore, III, for amicus curiae, Louisiana State Fraternal Order of Police.

      Gilbert R. Burras, for amicus curiae, Civil Service Commission for the City of New Orleans.
   WEIMER, Justice.

_J_iA police officer accused of misconduct was terminated by the police department beyond the sixty-day statutory period for conducting an investigation. The Civil Service Commission upheld the discipline imposed. However, the court of appeal reversed (which had the effect of dismissing the investigation and reinstating the officer), finding the police department circumvented the statutory “minimum standards” by not acting within the sixty-day period.

Before the court for consideration is the language of LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B) which specifies minimum standards to be applied during investigations of law enforcement officers. Although the statute provides, in part, investigations shall be concluded within sixty days, the statute does not contain a penalty provision. For reasons that follow, we hold where no prejudice is shown due to the delay and because the legislature has not established a penalty of dismissal statutorily, the court should not do so jurisprudentially. It is not the function of the judicial branch in a civilian legal system to legislate by inserting penalty provisions into statutes where the legislature has not done so. Because the statute does not include a penalty and no |2prejudice has been demonstrated, summary dismissal of the charges is not statutorily mandated if the investigation is not concluded within sixty days. The decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this matter is remanded for consideration of plaintiffs additional assignments of error which were pretermitted by the appellate decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sergeant William Marks, a New Orleans police officer with permanent status, was disciplined for an incident which occurred on November 1 and 2, 2002. The record reflects that Marks left New Orleans in an unmarked police vehicle assigned to another officer under his command. He took the vehicle out of state without permission and traveled to Wisconsin to pick up his girlfriend. Upon arrival, he picked up his girlfriend and her friend. On the return trip, he was stopped for speeding by an Illinois State Police Officer. A traffic citation was issued. Following this incident, the New Orleans Police Department accused Marks of several violations, including failure to adhere to the law, untruthfulness, lack of professionalism, abuse of position, transporting citizens, immoral conduct, failure to perform duties, and abuse of power for not reporting the incident to the police department and for asking the Illinois trooper not to report the incident.

An investigation commenced on November 12, 2002. On January 13, 2003, just beyond the sixty days provided by LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B)(7)the investigating laofficer sought an extension of time from his supervisor to complete the investigation. That extension was denied. No request for an extension was made to the Civil Service Commission as outlined by the statute. The case was referred to the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans on March 19, 2003, for consideration of criminal charges, but the matter was “refused” by the District Attorney; the New Orleans Police Department received notification of that decision on July 3, 2003. On August 12, 2003, the complete report was turned in to the Chief of Police.

During the investigation, Marks was reassigned from his former duties and was not allowed to work details or any overtime. The administrative reassignment lasted almost a year — from November 2002 until his termination on October 2, 2003.

By letter dated October 2, 2003, Marks was notified of the disciplinary action. He was suspended for a total of seventy-five days for failure to adhere to the law, untruthfulness, lack of professionalism, abuse of position, transporting citizens, immoral conduct, and failure to perform duties. He was also terminated for an abuse of power for not reporting the incident to the New Orleans Police Department and for asking the state trooper not to report the incident. The letter signed by Edwin P. Compass, III, Superintendent of Police, also notified Marks of his right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission for the City of New Orleans within thirty days from the date of the letter.

| ¿Marks appealed and the matter was assigned for hearing. Following the hearing conducted on December 3 and 4, 2003, the Hearing Examiner recommended the suspension be upheld, but found the termination unjustified. Procedurally, the matter was then presented to three civil service commission members for review. The commission members reviewed the Hearing Examiner’s report, a copy of the transcript, and the documentary evidence.

On appeal to the Commission, Marks argued the investigation was not completed within sixty days as required by LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B)(7). The Commission reopened the hearing and directed the Hearing Examiner to take evidence and make a report on the effect on this case of the police department’s non-compliance with the statutory sixty-day period. Following the hearing, the Hearing Examiner concluded that there was no evidence to establish that Marks had been prejudiced in preparing or presenting a defense to the charges filed against him because of the delay in the investigation and violation of the sixty-day rule. The Hearing Examiner found the rule to be directory rather than mandatory. The Civil Service Commission agreed with the Hearing Examiner’s conclusion and ruled that failure to conduct the disciplinary investigation within sixty days was not fatal to the disciplinary action because Marks was not prejudiced by the delay. The Commission concluded that “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances in this matter, we find the appointing authority has proven its case against appellant on all charges and that his conduct reflects very badly on the integrity and efficiency of the New Orleans Police Department.” The Civil Service Commission denied the appeal, upholding the suspension and the termination.

Marks then appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission to the court of appeal. Finding the appointing authority circumvented the “minimum standards” |Bby not complying with the sixty-day period prescribed by the legislature, the court of appeal reversed the judgment of the Civil Service Commission. Marks v. New Orleans Police Department, 05-0307, (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/8/06), 925 So.2d 622. The New Orleans Police Department filed a writ application with this court which was granted. Marks v. New Orleans Police Department, 06-0575 (La.5/26/06), 930 So.2d 6.

The appellate court noted it had interpreted the language of this statute in Davis v. New Orleans Police Department, 04-1023 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 899 So.2d 37, writ denied, 05-0941 (La.5/20/05), 902 So.2d 1057. In Davis, the court held the New Orleans Police Department’s violation of the sixty-day time limit for investigations was grounds for reversing the disciplinary action resulting from the investigation. In this case, the police department argued the court should reconsider its holding in Davis that strictly construes the sixty-day time limit because the decision is contrary to the decision of this court in Bannister v. Department of Streets, 95-0404 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 641.

The court of appeal found the facts of this case and that of the Davis case were distinguishable from the facts presented in Bannister. Most notably, the court stated the rule in Bannister was a civil service rule promulgated by the Civil Service Commission that related “solely to the Commission’s own actions.” Davis, 04-1023 at 5, 899 So.2d at 40.

| ¡^Although the court of appeal recognized that “the charges against Marks [were] serious in nature,” the court considered itself bound by the language of the statute as enacted by the legislature. The decision of the Civil Service Commission was reversed by the court of appeal.

Contentions of the New Orleans Police Department

The New Orleans Police Department argues that violation of the sixty-day rule does not deprive an employee of a vested property interest in his employment. The Department further argues it is important to determine whether the employee has been prejudiced by the delay and whether the general public’s interest outweighs the individual employee’s interest. Failure to adhere to the sixty-day rule caused no prejudice and was not a violation of any constitutionally protected due process right. Marks was notified of the discipline against him and given an opportunity to present his case on the merits. He failed to show he was prejudiced by the extended investigation. In this case, after a further hearing, the Civil Service Commission specifically and properly found Marks was not prejudiced by the delay and recognized that failure to conduct the disciplinary investigation within sixty days was not fatal to the disciplinary action.

The Department argues the decision by the court of appeal finding the sixty-day rule mandatory thwarts the fundamental purpose of the civil service system which is to provide a system for the State and its municipalities to insure efficiency in ^governmental operations by providing security of employment. Such a system enables the State or municipality to take advantage and reap the benefits of experience gained by employees of long service. New Orleans Firefighters Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans, 422 So.2d 402, 410 (La.1982); see also Vidrine v. State Parks and Recreation Commission, 169 So.2d 641, 645 (La. App. 1 Cir.1964), application denied, 247 La. 348, 170 So.2d 867 (1965).

In New Orleans Firefighters Association, this court recognized that civil service was designed to abrogate the “spoils system” whereby public employees were selected for employment and promotion, not on the basis of merit or qualifications for the position, but as rewards for faithful political activity and service. New Orleans Firefighters Association, 422 So.2d at 410. Thus, the Department argues the civil service protections afforded to classified employees also serve to protect the public interest. As this court recognized in Bannister, the appointing authority is charged with the responsibility of taking disciplinary action against an employee for impairing the efficiency of public sendee. To concentrate solely on the possible prejudice to the employee for any delayed decision ignores the rights and duties of the appointing authority to protect the public. Bannister 95-0404 at 7, 666 So .2d at 646. The Department argues weighing the possible prejudice to the employee with the rights and duties of the appointing authority is particularly important with regard to the police department because the public expects the police to act as guardians of its safety. See Stevens v. Department of Police, 2000-1682, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/9/01), 789 So.2d 622, 627.

The Department also urges egregious behavior could stall an investigation, and one who commits serious misconduct could avoid discipline and remain on the force. laCiting Bannister, the Department argues that applying the sixty-day rule as mandatory “would allow [mere] technicalities to defeat actual justice.” The Department also argues that the absence of a statutory penalty “generally indicates a discretionary intent by the drafters.” Bannister, 95-0404 at 6, 666 So.2d at 646. The department notes the drafters did not provide a penalty for violating the sixty-day rule.

Contentions of William Marks

In response, Marks argues the court of appeal correctly determined that the language of LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B)(7) and the obvious intent of the statute mandate that any disciplinary action which results from the violation of such basic rights be overturned. The appellate court found the rule at issue in Bannister was found to be directory because its purpose was the “protection of the government by guiding its officials rather than granting rights to affected private citizens.” Bannister, 95-0404 at 5, 666 So.2d at 646. Marks argues the legislative history establishes that the sixty-day rule is mandatory and not directory. The purpose of the statute is the protection of the rights of police officers. The enacting clause sets forth the legislative intent to establish rights of law enforcement officers by providing procedures and standards to apply during the investigation. The statute establishes “minimum standards” that “shall apply” to the investigation. Additionally, the statute expressly provides a procedure to use if more time is needed for the investigation. Marks further argues the statute provides rights to both the accused officer and the appointing authority | swhen an officer is accused of administrative wrongdoing. The words of the statute are clear and unambiguous — using the word “shall” — and no further interpretation of the legislative will is required.

In brief to this court, Marks argues:

The New Orleans Police Department is tasked with the [difficult and demanding] responsibility of enforcing the laws and protecting and serving the citizens ... of this city. The efficiency and credibility of the department is certainly placed in jeopardy when, because of their refusal to conform with the requirements of law, ... offenders are allowed to go unpunished.
Public policy demands that the police department do everything in it’s [sic] power to insure that officers who violate the administrative rules of the police department are held accountable. Public policy also demands that the police department act within the confines of the law of this state, not only when investigating citizens, but also as it applies when investigating police officers.
The image of the police department is no less diminished when it violates the rights of the citizens on the street as it is when it violates the rights of a police officer. The credibility and image of the New Orleans Police Department could only be enhanced by conducting itself in a manner which conforms with the laws and protects the rights of all who are investigated or accused.
The public benefits from the mandatory application [of] La. R.S. 40:2531 when it is a properly utilized, in that it can be assured that those officers who are accused of administrative wrongdoing are investigated as quickly as possible, and if the investigation reveals wrongdoing, that the offending police officer is disciplined as soon as possible.

Thus, Marks argues both the public and the police department benefit from the efficient investigation and timely discipline of offending officers. Failure of the department to follow the mandates of LSA-R.S. 40:2531 without explanation only serves to undermine confidence of the public in its police department. When the public makes a complaint of wrongdoing against an officer and the department makes |inno real effort to investigate or pursue the allegations, the delay causes a chilling effect on the potential for others to come forward in similar circumstances.

Marks further contends no explanation was given for failing to complete the investigation timely. Likewise, no extension of the investigative period was requested. Rights of the accused officer matter most when the accused officer is innocent of the allegations or falsely accused. For the department to allow a hardworking officer to suffer under such circumstances for an undetermined period of time while ignoring the rights afforded to him is' unconscionable and undermines the working conditions of other hardworking officers who witness such abuses.

DISCUSSION

While the arguments of the parties focus primarily on whether the statute requires a mandatory or directory interpretation, we find the fact that the legislature did not include a penalty in the statute for non-compliance with the sixty-day period to be more significant. Certainly, the statute does not provide, nor suggest, that the remedy for non-compliance with the sixty-day period is dismissal of the disciplinary action.

Generally, statutes using mandatory language prescribe the result to follow (a penalty) if the required action is not taken. If the terms of the statute are limited to what is required to be done, ie., procedural rules, then the statute is considered directory even though mandatory language is employed. Bannister, 95-0404 at 5, 666 So.2d at 646; Sanders v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 388 |nSo.2d 768, 770 (La.1980). Provisions designed to secure order, system, and dispatch by guiding the discharge of duties are usually construed as directory even if worded in the imperative. Id., 388 So.2d at 770.

In a recent decision interpreting the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA), LSA-R.S. 9:3141, et seq., this court held the NHWA provides the exclusive remedies, warranties, and peremptive periods between the. builder and owner relative to new home construction. In that case the builder failed to give the owners notice of the NHWA’s requirements and the homeowners were attempting to recover damages outside the provisions of the NHWA. The statute did not provide a penalty for failure of the builder to provide the homeowners with notice. Although the statute is written with mandatory language requiring the builder to provide notice to the homeowner, the statute does not provide a penalty for the builder’s failure to do so. This court refused to provide a penalty, holding “it is not the function of the judicial branch' in a civilian legal system to legislate by inserting penalty provisions into statutes where the legislature has chosen not to do so.” Carter v. Duke, 05-3090, p. 10 (La.1/19/06), 921 So.2d 963, 970.

Marks contends that the statutory provision provides the officer with certain rights, including the right that the investigation be completed within sixty days. 112While this contention is correct, the statute does not establish a penalty for non-compliance and in the absence of prejudice, we cannot supply a penalty. As such, imposing the penalty of dismissal, as the court of appeal did in this matter, is not statutorily authorized.

When LSA-R.S. 40:2531 was enacted, the legislature did not provide a penalty for failure of the investigating authority to complete the investigation within the allotted sixty-day time frame. During Marks’ appeal, the Civil Service Commission properly remanded this matter to the Hearing Examiner to determine whether the police department’s failure to complete the investigation within the sixty days allotted had a prejudicial effect on Marks. Following a hearing, it was determined that Marks had not been prejudiced in preparing or presenting a defense to the charges filed against him. Taking these facts into consideration, the Commission concluded the department had proven its case against Marks.

We find the failure to comply with the statutory sixty-day time period does not require summary dismissal of a disciplinary action. We do find evidence of failure to comply with the sixty-day period is relevant as to whether the appellant is prejudiced by that failure. A failure to comply with the sixty-day time period may impact whether discipline should be imposed or the type of discipline imposed if prejudice to the officer is demonstrated due to the delay. The Civil Service Commission properly remanded this matter to the Hearing Examiner to determine whether the failure to comply with the sixty-day period prejudiced Marks. It was determined he was not prejudiced.

| ^Although Marks complains in brief that he was reassigned for almost a year and was unable to work overtime or paid details during that time, nothing prevented him from seeking remedial action when the appointing authority did not complete the investigation timely. Civil Service Rules grant the Commission authority to remedy an unauthorized loss by the employee by awarding back pay, reinstating benefits, and modifying disciplinary action in order to rectify any prejudice suffered by the employee from a delayed ruling in the employee’s favor. See La. Const, art. X, § 12; Rules of the Civil Service Commission, City of New Orleans, Rule II, § 4.16; Bannister, 95-0404 at 7, 666 So.2d at 646-647.

The sixty-day period provided in the statute aspires to serve the interests of the accused officer, the police department, and the public. An officer wrongfully accused should be exonerated promptly. A police officer who engages in inappropriate conduct is an aberration and should be disciplined promptly. The statute provides a time frame within which to complete the investigation, but does not provide a penalty for failure to do so. As in Carter, supra, we defer to the legislature and decline to impose the Draconian penalty of summary dismissal of the disciplinary action where no penalty is provided in the statute and no prejudice is demonstrated due to the delay.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the appellate court is reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of appellant’s other assignments of error.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B)(7) provides:
      B. Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation, the following minimum standards shall apply:
      (7) Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, each investigation of a law enforcement officer which is conducted under the provisions of this Chapter shall be eom-pleted within sixty days. However, in each municipality which is subject to a Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service law, the municipal police department may petition the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board for an extension of the time within which to complete the investigation. The board shall set the matter for hearing and shall provide notice of the hearing to the officer who is under investigation. The officer who is under investigation shall have the right to attend the hearing and to present evidence and arguments against the extension. If the board finds that the municipal police department has shown good cause for the granting of an extension of time within which to complete the investigation, the board shall grant an extension of up to sixty days. Nothing contained in this Paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the law enforcement officer under investigation and the appointing authority from entering into a written agreement extending the investigation for up to an additional sixty days. Further, nothing in this Paragraph shall limit any investigation of alleged criminal activity.

      . Davis is no longer sound authority given our ruling in this matter.

      . In Bannister, this court held that a civil service rule, although couched in mandatory terms requiring the Commission to render its decision within ninety days of receiving the hearing officer’s report, was merely directory in nature. This court noted the rule related solely to the Commission's own actions and did not set forth the result to follow a failure to comply. This court also noted that neither party had been properly forewarned or given an opportunity to avoid the unknown consequences which might follow from the Commission's failure to act. Bannister, 95-0404 at 6 and 7, 666 So.2d at 646.

      . We note that the court of appeal has recently affirmed a decision by the Civil Service Commission in the matter of Dunn v. New Orleans Police Department, 06-0044, (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/9/06), 938 So.2d 217, in which the Civil Service Commission reversed the disciplinary action taken against an officer for failure of the department to complete its investigation within the time allotted by LSA-R.S. 40:2531. The Civil Service Commission cited and followed the decision in Davis, supra.

      Acknowledging its decision in Davis, the court of appeal indicated the New Orleans Police Department must look to the legislature to change the statute if a different result is to be reached in future cases. Dunn, 06-0044 at 2, 938 So.2dat218.
      The New Orleans Police Department has applied to this court for writ of certiorari.

      . As amicus, the Civil Service Commission, although not a party, argued that if the sixty-day rule is mandatory as opposed to directory, and can result in discipline being avoided for failure to timely conclude the investigation, then the legislature exceeded its authority and the statute would, thus, be unconstitutional. The issue of the constitutionality of the statute was not raised below. Therefore, that issue is not properly before this court. Vallo v. Gayle Oil Company, Inc., 94-1238, p. 8 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 864-865.

      . In an amicus brief to this court the Civil Service Commission argues the statute does not create or extinguish rights. It merely establishes deadlines. The Commission further argues that a statute imposing procedural deadlines should be given mandatory or directory meaning depending on an analysis of its purpose. See Bannister, 95-0404 at 5, 666 So.2d at 646. Laws directed to government officials are considered differently from those granting rights to private citizens. The Commission argues the statute should be given directory effect. As indicated in footnote s# the Commission also made a constitutional argument,

      . Amicus Fraternal Order of Police suggests that the due process clause is implicated by the failure to complete the investigation timely. The essential requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to respond before one is deprived of a vested right. See Cleveland. Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891, 901 (La.1985). In this matter, Marks was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to being ■ subjected to discipline on the issue of the delay in completing the investigation. As indicated, the Civil Service Commission reopened Mark's hearing for the Hearing Examiner to take evidence and report on the effect upon his case of non-compliance with the sixty-day rule by the police department. After a hearing, no prejudice was found. Marks had sufficient opportunity to initially present his case on the merits and then another opportunity to show prejudice by the extended investigation when the hearing was reopened. Based on these hearings, the due process clause was not violated.
      Nevertheless, our ruling should not be construed as sanctioning delays, especially since the statute provides for a procedure to seek an extension for conducting an investigation. A delay beyond the statutorily established sixty-day period which unfairly prejudices the officer may well implicate the due process clause. As stated in Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-0589, p. 13 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32, 43:
      Due process is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. As a generalization, it can be said due process embodies the differing rules of fair play which through the years have become associated with differing types of proceedings. [Citations omitted.] '

      . We note for the sake of completeness that the last sentence of LSA-R.S. 40:2531(B)(7), which provision is quoted in full at footnote 1, provides: "Further, nothing in this Paragraph shall limit any investigation of alleged criminal activity.”
      This sentence was not addressed in the context of these proceedings, and we express no opinion as to its applicability.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: TRAYLOR, Justice. CALOGERO, Chief Justice, JOHNSON, Justice

license: Public Domain

text:
    HOLLY & SMITH ARCHITECTS, INC. v. ST. HELENA CONGREGATE FACILITY, INC. and St. Helena Parish Hospital.
    No. 2006-C-0582.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 2006.

      Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Armond, McCowan & Jarman, Maxwell G. Kees, Sr., Charles L. Patin, Jr., Baton Rouge, Scott M. Perrilloux, District Attorney, Clifton Thomas Speed, Assistant District Attorney, Sullivan, Stolier & Resor, Jack M. Stolier, New Orleans, Matthew K. Brown, for Applicant.
    Macaluso & Jordan, Ronald S. Macaluso, for Respondent.
    Paul A. Holmes, John A. Gallaher, Baton Rouge, for Amicus Curiae, Louisiana Municipal Association.
    Patrick S. Ottinger, Lafayette, for Ami-cus Curiae, Lafayette City-Parish Police Jury.
    John F. Weeks, New Orleans, for Ami-cus Curiae, Louisiana Sheriffs Association.
    Roland J. Dartez, Dannie P. Garrett, III, Baton Rouge, for Amicus Curiae, Louisiana Police Jury Association.
    Allen L. Smith, Jr., Lake Charles, for Amicus Curiae, Calcasieu Parish Police Jury.
    Gwendolyn K. Brown, Larry D. Book, Baton Rouge, for Amicus Curiae, City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of Baton Rouge.
    Tina V. Grant, for Amicus Curiae, State of Louisiana.
   TRAYLOR, Justice.

| ,We granted certiorari in this case in order to determine whether a judicial mortgage is effective as to third parties when that judicial mortgage purportedly encumbers the property of a political subdivision of the State. Plaintiff secured three separate judgments against Defendant, and further, Plaintiff filed these judgments in the mortgage records for the applicable parish. Defendant is a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana, and as such, Defendant argues that these recorded judgments should be erased from the mortgage records. Defendant maintains that a judicial mortgage cannot be effective against the State and/or its political subdivisions because certain constitutional and statutory provisions set forth the method by which these judgments must be paid. Plaintiff, however, suggests that these constitutional and statutory provisions do not proscribe the recordation of judgments against the State and/or its political subdivisions. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is trying to circumvent the constitutional and statutory mandates by securing judicial mortgages affecting potential third party purchasers, thereby prompting the estate and/or political subdivisions to pay the judgments in an effort to keep the property unencumbered. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court only as to its result.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. (“Holly & Smith”) obtained three judgments against Defendants St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc. and St. Helena Parish Hospital Service District No. 1 (“St. Helena Hospital”), and each of these judgments was recorded in the mortgage records for St. Helena Parish. Holly & Smith filed a motion to examine judgment debtor on June 10, 2004; however, on August 3, 2004, St. Helena Hospital filed a petition for writ of mandamus in hopes of securing an order directing the St. Helena Parish Clerk of Court to erase said judgments from the mortgage records. Further, St. Helena Hospital sought a declaration that the recorded judgments did not create liens and/or encumbrances against its property. Also on August 3, 2004, St. Helena Hospital fled a motion to quash or for protective order (with respect to Holly & Smith’s intention to conduct a judgment debtor examination). Holly & Smith filed its petition for writ of mandamus on August 16, 2004, as Holly & Smith sought to have St. Helena Hospital immediately pay the three prior-recorded judgments. On August 18, 2004, Holly & Smith moved to have the above-mentioned actions consolidated. A hearing was conducted regarding these matters on September 3, 2004.

On September 3, 2004, the trial court allowed the consolidation of the above-referenced actions. The trial court granted St. Helena Hospital’s motion to quash or for protective order regarding the judgment debtor examination, and the trial court | odenied Holly & Smith’s petition for writ of mandamus. Further, the trial court denied St. Helena Hospital’s petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court stated:

However, what I’m saying is is that I think you’ve got a right to record your judgment. As I appreciate it, the recor-dation of a judgment in the conveyance records constitutes a judicial mortgage or lien — whatever you want to call it. Beyond that, which is the execution part, I don’t think the plaintiff can do. I don’t think he can do that. So if you’re asking me what does that mean, yes, I think it means there is a judicial mortgage on all of the property which cannot be executed upon. What effect does it have when it goes to third parties, as I appreciate that’s the testimony here, I think it probably goes with the property, and it’s something that’s got to be dealt with. And I think that that is the — perhaps one area that the Legislature left open for possible collection or execution of judgments. (Emphasis added).

The trial court signed this judgment on October 29, 2004, and St. Helena Hospital appealed this decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeal.

On February 10, 2006, the First Circuit Court of Appeal majority affirmed the trial court’s decision. In its opinion, the appellate court found:

Article XII, § 10 and LSA-R.S. 13:5109 B provide a method by which judgments rendered against the state or its political subdivisions may be paid. Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Police Jury, 336 So.2d 986, 989 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ refused, 339 So.2d 846 (La.1976). Although the judgment against St. Helena Hospital is not exigible and payable without St. Helena Hospital first appropriating the funds, neither the constitution nor the statutory scheme prohibits the filing in the mortgage records of a judgment against a hospital service district such as St. Helena Hospital. Nor does the constitution or the statutory scheme entitle St. Helena Hospital to a declaration that the judicial mortgages on its property are without effect on third party purchasers. (Emphasis added).

From this decision, Judge Downing dissented and assigned reasons. Judge Downing stated:

“It is an axiom of the law that no one can do indirectly what he cannot do directly.” Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 253 La. 553, 563, 218 So.2d 592, 596 (La.1969). The majority’s ruling allows a plaintiff to indirectly make judgments against |4the State’s political subdivisions exigible and payable without the political subdivision first appropriating the funds. Here, the St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., and St. Helena Parish Hospital are undisputedly political subdivisions of the State. And to accomplish the sale of their immovable property, they will be forced to either pay the judgment liens or accept a price reduced to account for the value of the liens. Either way, while a seizure and sale of public property is not technically ordered here, the political subdivision effectively is required to pay off the liens. As such, the majority authorizes violation of La. Const, art. XII, § 10 C and La. R.S. 13:5109 B(2). This is beyond our authority.

St. Helena Hospital sought supervisory writs with this Court, and its writ application was granted on May 26, 2006.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

St. Helena Hospital avers that La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) provides the exclusive method for the payment of judgments rendered against the State and/or its political subdivisions. La. Const, art. XII, § 10 states:

(A) No Immunity in Contract and Tort. Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property.
(B) Waiver in Other Suits. The legislature may authorize other suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit shall waive immunity from suit and liability.
(C) Limitations; Procedure; Judgments. Notwithstanding Paragraph (A) or (B) or any other provision of this constitution, the legislature by law may limit or provide for the extent of liability of the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision in all cases, including the circumstances giving rise to liability and the lands and amounts of recoverable damages. It shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision and provide for the effect of a judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. The legislature may provide that such limitations, procedures, and effects of judgments shall be applicable to existing as well as future claims. No judgment against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision | against which the judgment is rendered. (Emphasis added).

Further, St. Helena Hospital points out that the above-referenced constitutional provision is reiterated within La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2). La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) provides:

Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency,-or a political subdivision, or any compromise reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political subdivision. (Emphasis added).

St. Helena Hospital asserts that the above-referenced legislation is clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, St. Helena Hospital argues that the lower courts erred in failing to recognize that judicial mortgages cannot be maintained against political subdivisions of the State. St. Helena Hospital suggests that the lower courts erroneously applied the general provisions of La. Civ.Code art. 3307, specifically La. Civ.Code art. 3307(2), while St. Helena Hospital maintains that the lower courts overlooked the specific mandates of La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) and La.Rev. Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2). La. Civ.Code art. 3307 provides:

A mortgage has the following effects:
(1) Upon failure of the obligor to perform the obligation secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee may cause the mortgaged property to be seized and sold in the manner provided-by law and have the proceeds applied toward the satisfaction of the obligation.
(2) The mortgaged property may not be transferred or encumbered to the prejudice of the mortgage.
(3) The mortgagee is preferred to the unsecured creditors of the mortgagor and to others whose rights become effective after the mortgage becomes effective as to them. (Emphasis added).

St. Helena Hospital contends that the specific legislation overrides the more general legislation, and as such, St. Helena Hospital argues that the constitutional and | ^statutory mandates prevent an interpretation of La. Civ.Code art. 3307(2) which would, for all intents and purposes, allow a third party purchaser to pay a judgment rendered against the State and/or its political subdivisions. Consequently, St. Helena Hospital asserts that public policy considerations must be taken into account. St. Helena Hospital argues that the sustenance of judicial mortgages on the property of political subdivisions would have a chilling effect on the sales potential of said governmental property, and thus, St. Helena Hospital suggests that there would be an adverse affect on commerce.

In support of its assertions, St. Helena Hospital refers to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Charbonnet, 00-1548 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/28/01); 802 So.2d 956. In that case, certain money judgments against the Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”) were recorded in the Orleans Parish mortgage office. The legislation pertaining to housing authorities had been amended prior to the recor-dation of these money judgments, and as such, the amended legislation contained no provision that prohibited the filing/recor-dation of money judgments rendered against housing authorities. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant HANO’s petition for writ of mandamus directing that the judgments against HANO “be erased from the mortgage records....” The Fourth Circuit referred to La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) and La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) in its decision, and ultimately, the appellate court concluded:

... [W]e find that the judicial act of recording appellants’ money judgments, which create judicial mortgages over HANO’s property, will 17detrimentally impact the legislature’s attempt toward privatizing public housing. Also worth noting is the fact that appellants’ judgments against HANO are effective even without being recorded in the mortgage office.

Holly & Smith argues that the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Charbonnet is inapplicable to the case at hand. Holly & Smith suggests that the Charbonnet opinion dealt with amended legislation that did not change the prior-existing law regarding the impermissibility of judicial mortgages vís-á-vis housing authorities. Furthermore, Holly & Smith maintains that, in the instant matter, the lower courts did not authorize the method of payment for these recorded judgments, in derogation of constitutional and statutory provisions, but rather, Holly & Smith contends that the lower courts permissibly allowed the mere recordation of these judgments. In other words, Holly & Smith maintains that “re-cordation” does not equal “method of payment.” Holly & Smith points out that La Const, art. XII, § 10(C) and La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) do not specifically prohibit the recordation of judgments against political subdivisions in the mortgage records.

In support of the contention that the recordation of the three judgments against St. Helena Hospital is permissible, Holly & Smith refers to several statutes that specifically prohibit the creation of charges and/or liens on the properties of certain political bodies when judgments are rendered against same. For instance, with respect to the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, La.Rev.Stat. § 33:4720.64(A) provides:

All property of the authority, including funds owned or held by it for the purpose of this Chapter, shall be ex empt from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, and no execution or other judicial process shall [ jssue against the same nor shall judgment ayainst the authority be a charge or lien upon such property; but the provisions of this Section shall not apply to or limit the right of obligees to pursue any remedies for the enforcement of any pledge or lien given pursuant to this Chapter by the authority on its rents, fees, grants, or revenues from community improvement projects; further, the provisions of this Section shall not apply to or limit the right of an obligee to foreclose or otherwise enforce the terms and provisions of any mortgage, note, or other security given by the authority in connection with any immovable property owned by it. (Emphasis added).

Further, regarding New Community Development Corporations, La.Rev.Stat. § 33:7621(A) provides:

All property of a corporation, including funds owned or held by it for the purposes of this chapter, shall be exempt from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, and no execution or other judicial process shall issue against the same nor shall judgment against the corporation be a charge or lien upon such property; but the provisions of this section shall not apply to or limit the right of obligees or guarantors to pursue any remedies for the enforcement of any pledge or lien given pursuant to this chapter by a corporation on its real or personal property, rents, fees, grants or revenues for a new community development project. (Emphasis added).

Holly & Smith avers that the statutes pertaining to hospital service districts, i.e., La.Rev.Stat. §§ 33:7701-7708, contain no provisions that explicitly prohibit the creation of judicial mortgages upon the property of said hospital service districts; therefore, Holly & Smith suggests that the recordation of judgments rendered against hospital service districts is permissible. Holly & Smith points out that the Legislature has enacted statutes pertaining to other political bodies, ie., New Orleans Redevelopment Authority and New Community Development Corporations, in order to explicitly prohibit the creation of judicial mortgages on their respective properties, and as such, the Legislature could, if it chose to do so, explicitly prohibit the creation of judicial mortgages on the properties of hospital service districts. With no such explicit prohibition, Holly & Smith maintains that the recordation of judgments | nagainst St. Helena Hospital is permissible.

Additionally, Holly & Smith maintains that St. Helena Hospital waived any right it might have had to prevent the creation of judicial mortgages on its property, as well as waiving any right to prevent the recordation of judgments rendered against it, when it signed the architectural contract with Holly & Smith. According to Holly & Smith, the architectural contract contained no language that limited Holly & Smith’s ability to secure judicial mortgages on the property of St. Helena Hospital. Moreover, Holly & Smith argues that St. Helena Hospital should be equitably es-topped from having the recorded judgments erased from the mortgage records.

It is not necessary for us to delve into the details of the architectural contract between St. Helena Hospital and Holly & Smith, nor is it necessary for us to address Holly & Smith’s assertion of “equitable estoppel.” In order to resolve the question of whether judicial mortgages can be established on the property of the State and/or its political subdivisions, we need to look at our primary source of law — the legislation. When we are called upon to review legislative provisions, this Court follows certain guidelines, as we did in Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227 (La.1/19/05); 893 So.2d 809. In Louisiana Municipal Association, this Court recognized:

Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by this court under the de novo standard of review. After our review, we “render judgment on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below. This court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the laws of this state.”
“Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, the interpretation of a law involves primarily the search for the legislature’s intent.” The interpretation of a statute starts with the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
hnThe laws of statutory construction require that laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. The legislature is presumed to have acted with deliberation and to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter. “Under our longstanding rules of statutory construction, where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter.” A statute must be “applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed fair purpose and intention the Legislature had in enacting it.” In addition, “courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute and cannot give a statute an interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided.”

The language incorporated within La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) and La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) is both clear and unambiguous. La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) provides, in pertinent part:

No judgment against the state, a state agencg, or a political subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision against which the judgment is rendered. (Emphasis added).

La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) provides:

Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, or any compromise reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political subdivision. (Emphasis added).

From the plain language of the constitutional and statutory provisions, there are no prohibitions against recording in the mortgage records those judgments rendered against political subdivisions; however, the constitutional and statutory provisions are very clear with respect to the method by which judgments against the State and/or its political subdivisions are paid.

Because the recordation of judgments against the State and/or its political h subdivisions is not constitutionally or statutorily prohibited, the question then becomes — are judicial mortgages created when these judgments against the State and/or its political subdivisions are filed in the applicable mortgage records? To determine whether judicial mortgages are created in the aforementioned scenario, we must once again look to our primary source of law. La. Civ.Code art. 3278 provides:

Mortgage is a nonpossessory right created over property to secure the performance of an obligation. (Emphasis added).

Further, La. Civ.Code art. 3281 provides:

Mortgage may be established only as authorized by legislation. (Emphasis added).

Thus, the establishment of judicial mortgages is stricti juris, and accordingly, we must strictly adhere to the definition of “judicial mortgage” provided by La. Civ. Code arts. 3299 and 3300.

La. Civ.Code art. 3299 states:

A judicial mortgage secures a judgment for the payment of money. A legal mortgage secures an obligation specified by the law that provides for the mortgage. (Emphasis added).

Meanwhile, La. Civ.Code art. 3300 provides:

A judicial mortgage is created by filing a judgment with the recorder of mortgages.

Thus, La. Civ.Code art. 3300 provides for the creation of the judicial mortgage, while La. Civ.Code art. 3299 defines the judicial mortgage. Because “[a] judicial mortgage secures a judgment for the payment of money,” it stands to reason that a judicial mortgage would not exist if the recorded judgment could not secure payment of same. WebsteR’s ThiRD New International DiCtionary states that the verb 11 ¡/‘secure” means “to put beyond hazard of losing or of not receiving: guarantee.” Because La. Const, art. XII, § 10(C) and La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5109(B)(2) are very clear regarding the method of payment for judgments rendered against the State and its political subdivisions, it is evident that the recordation of judgments against the State and/or its political subdivisions cannot secure the payment of same. While the recordation of a judgment is permissible, its recordation does not create a security device. Accordingly, we hold that the recordation of judgments rendered against the State and/or its political subdivisions does not create judicial mortgages on the property of the State and/or its political subdivisions.

CONCLUSION

Although St. Helena Hospital has requested that the three judgments rendered against it, and recorded in the St. Helena Parish mortgage records, be erased from said mortgage records, we find the erasure of their inscription from the mortgage records is unnecessary. The judgments may be recorded, and may remain in the mortgage records, although these recorded judgments do not serve to secure the payment of same. While we find that the lower courts erred in their respective determinations that these recorded judgments were, in fact, judicial mortgages, the lower courts arrived at the correct result in this case. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed as to its result only.

AFFIRMED AS TO RESULT ONLY.

CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

KNOLL, J., dissents for reasons assigned by CALOGERO, C.J.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

l,The majority in this case tell us that the erasure of inscription from the mortgage records is unnecessary, then finds that the judgments do not serve to secure payment of the debt evidenced by the judgment. Further, the majority finds that the lower courts in these cases erred in determining that the inscriptions (i.e., the recorded judgments) were in fact judicial mortgages, but nevertheless concludes that the courts below arrived at the “correct result in this case.” If the lower courts did err, presumably because the majority here is finding that the recorded judgment cannot constitute judicial mortgages because the plaintiffs cannot by law secure the performance of the obligations, that is, the payment of debt, and if inscription on the mortgage records is unnecessary, any purpose served by allowing the recordation of judgments in the mortgage records will be greatly outweighed by the confusion that results because title examiners may see the inscription as a bar to clear title. Thus, I would order cancellation of the recordation of these three judgments from the mortgage records.

JOHNSON, Justice

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

hTo avoid confusion, I would order cancellation of the recordation of these three judgments from the mortgage records of St. Helena Parish.

Since we have determined that the recordation cannot create a judicial mortgage against the State or any of its political subdivision, in my mind, the re-cordation itself is impermissible.

      . In this litigation, it is not disputed that Defendants are political subdivisions of the State of Louisiana. See generally La.Rev.Stat. § 46:1051.

      . The three recorded judgments were rendered on January 9, 1998, March 11, 2002, and May 16, 2002, respectively.

      . Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 05-0175, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06); 928 So.2d 615, 618.

      . Id. at 618.

        .Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582 (La.5/26/06); 930 So.2d 6.

      . The legislation in effect prior to the amendment did specifically prohibit judicial mortgages on HANO property.

      . Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Charbonnet, 00-1548 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/28/01); 802 So.2d 956, 959.

      . Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Charbonnet, 00-1548 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/28/01); 802 So.2d 956, 959.

      . See La.Rev.Stat. § 33:4720.55.

      . See La.Rev.Stat. § 33:7604.

      . Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227, pp. 35-36 (La.1/19/05); 893 So.2d 809, 836-837 (citations omitted)(footnote omitted).

      . Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2053 (4th ed. 1976)(emphasis added).

      . Payment is made "only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political subdivision.’’ La.Rev.Stat.
      § 13:5109(B)(2)(emphasis added).


author: KIMBALL, Justice. JOHNSON, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tron HUGHES.
    No. 2005-K-0992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 2006.

      Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney, Zata W. Ard, Assistant.District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Sherry Watters, New Orleans, for Respondent.
   KIMBALL, Justice.

It Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Shannon Williams. After a trial by jury, he was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced. The court of appeal reversed defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding the evidence insufficient to prove defendant’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After consideration of the record, we disagree and find the evidence presented was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator. The testimony of defendant’s accomplices, though at times inconsistent and self-serving, was sufficiently corroborated to support defendant’s conviction for manslaughter. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal, reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the court of appeal for it to consider defendant’s remaining assignment of error.

| ¡.Facts and Procedural History

On August 17, 2002, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Shannon Williams was shot twice in the head in the kitchen of his residence on Emory Road. The New Orleans Police Department dispatched officers to the scene in response to reports of shots fired on Emory Road. Officer Yancy Dixon and Officer Harry Brown were the first to arrive on the scene. Officer Dixon looked through the glass in the front door and saw two spent bullet casings, then entered the residence. Once inside, the officers found Williams, unresponsive and lying on his side in the kitchen, bleeding from the head. Two shoe boxes, one containing a digital scale, and a Crown Royal bag, were on the kitchen table.

Detective Bernard Crowden led the investigation into Williams’s homicide. The detective first interviewed Mervyn Duck-worth, Williams’s employer. In a taped statement, Duckworth stated that he dropped Williams off at his house around 7:30 in the evening. When they arrived, Ryan Smith and two other men were waiting for Williams in a burgundy-colored car and one person was waiting in a white car. Smith, who was the driver, and the man seated in the front passenger seat of Smith’s car went into the house with Williams. According to Duckworth, Smith’s passenger was carrying a shoe box. Duckworth then heard two gunshots and saw Smith immediately run out of the house. After viewing a photographic lineup, Duckworth identified Smith as the man he saw running out of the house.

Detective Crowden also interviewed Smith. Smith told the detective that his nephew, Clarence Emilien, and Emilien’s friend wanted to buy a car from Williams. Smith drove Emilien to Williams’s house to buy the car. Emilien’s friend followed in another car. Williams was not at home when they arrived, and Emilien’s friend got in the front passenger seat of Smith’s car with a shoe box. When Williams arrived, 13Smith followed Williams and Emi-lien’s friend into the house. Once inside, Emilien’s friend removed a gun from the shoe box and shot Williams. Both he and Emilien’s friend ran out of the house. Emilien’s friend jumped into a white car containing Emilien and another man. The white car drove away quickly and Smith ran back into Williams’s house to retrieve his car keys before driving home and calling the police. Smith described Emilien’s friend as a little shorter than himself, with short, uncombed hair that looked “nappy like you just been rubbing your hand in your hair or something like that.”

Based on Smith’s account, Detective Crowden attempted to contact Emilien. Subsequently, Emilien arrived at the police station with his mother. In a taped statement, he named defendant, a childhood acquaintance, as the third person on the scene. He also identified defendant from a photographic lineup. Emilien stated they went to Williams’s house to buy drugs. Emilien stated Smith drove to Williams’s house, defendant rode in the front passenger seat, and he rode in the back seat. Emilien stated he ran when he heard the shots. Emilien was later arrested as a principal to first degree murder.

Shortly after Emilien’s arrest, Smith was arrested as an accessory after the fact to the murder. Smith later identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the person who shot Williams.

Several days later, on August 27, 2002, Detective Crowden arrested defendant at the Greyhound Amtrak Station after defendant approached him while he was working a paid detail at the security desk in full uniform and asked where he could catch a taxi. Upon searching defendant, Detective Crowden recovered a Houston-New Orleans bus ticket purchased by Donny Minor, dated August 26, 2002, and $585.00 in cash. , Defendant told the detective that he was returning home from Texas pbecause his mother called to tell him that he was on the news. He further stated that his cousin purchased the bus ticket for him, and that he planned to turn himself in to the police after talking to his lawyer.

Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for one count of first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30. Both Emilien and Smith entered into plea agreements with the State in exchange for their testimony against defendant. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the court of appeal, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter, and the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive. Finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction and sentence, and ordered defendant discharged from custody. State v. Hughes, 04-1797 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/05), 900 So.2d 168. Specifically, the court of appeal found that no rational trier of fact, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that the identity of the perpetrator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeal determined that the only evidence connecting defendant to the crime came from the testimony of Emilien and Smith. It pointed out, however, the self-serving nature of their testimony and that the initial statements of Emilien and Smith were different in some respects from their testimony. It also noted that Emilien acknowledged he owned the same type of gun used in the murder and lied about its whereabouts at the time of the murder. The court of appeal also relied on the fact that no physical evidence | ^connected defendant to the crime scene. Finally, it pointed out that the physical description given by Duckworth, the only eyewitness unrelated to Emilien and Smith, was inaccurate.

One judge dissented from the court of appeal’s opinion. The dissenting judge stated that Emilien’s testimony was not wholly uncorroborated, and that his complicity in the events leading up to the murder was not disputed. The dissenting judge concluded that Emilien’s testimony was not so contradicted by other evidence or uncorroborated that a rational juror could not have relied upon it to find defendant guilty.

Upon the State’s application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s decision. State v. Hughes, 05-0992 (La.1/9/06), 918 So.2d 1019. In its brief, the State contends the court of appeal erred in finding insufficient evidence to convict defendant of manslaughter when the evidence included virtually uncontested observations of defendant by two witnesses.

Discussion

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard ‘ enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d .560 (1979).... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentifi-cation. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La.4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988). It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Bright, 98-0398, p. 22 (La.4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.

Moreover, in Louisiana, an accomplice is qualified to testify against a co-perpetrator even if the State offers him inducements to testify. Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658. The inducements would merely affect the witness’s credibility. Id. at p. 12, 796 So.2d at 658. Additionally, a conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice, although the jury should be instructed to treat the testimony with great caution. State v. Tate, 01-1658, pp. 4-5 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 928. When the accomplice’s testimony is materially corroborated by other evidence, such language is not required. Id.; State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 13 (La.4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 761. An accomplice’s testimony is materially corroborated “if there is evidence that confirms material points in an accomplice’s tale, and confirms the defendant’s identity and some relationship to the situation.” Castleberry, 98-1388 at p. 13, 758 So.2d at 761 (quoting State v. Schaffner, 398 So.2d 1032, 1035 (La.1981)).

In this case, the sole issue is defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Thus, we must determine whether the State negated any reasonable probability of misidentification. At trial, the State used the testimony of three witnesses to prove defendant’s identity as the shooter: (1) Ryan Smith, who was deceased at the time of trial, but who positively identified defendant as the shooter; (2) Clarence Emilien, Smith’s nephew, who confirmed defendant entered Williams’s house with Williams 17and Smith before the gunshots rang out; and (3) Mervyn Duckworth, Williams’s employer, who identified Smith as one of the two men he saw entering Williams’s home and who later saw Smith running from the house without a weapon in his hands immediately after the shots were fired. The defense challenged the credibility of these witnesses, making particular issue of Emi-lien’s bargained-for testimony, and relied on defendant’s cousin for an alibi defense.

Because Ryan Smith was deceased at the time of trial, his previous sworn testimony given at a motion hearing was read to the jury. Smith identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the shooter. He also described defendant as having uncombed, nappy hair and wearing a white t-shirt and jeans. Detective Crowden also testified that Smith positively and immediately identified defendant as the person who went into Williams’s residence with him and shot Williams in the head.

Mervyn Duckworth, who was Williams’s employer, testified at trial that he had previously met Smith at Williams’s house. He stated that on the day of the murder, he and Williams had run errands, that Williams had used his truck for various errands, and that Williams had asked for a ride home. When they got to Williams’s home, Smith’s car was already parked in the driveway, so Duckworth parked behind Smith’s car. Williams got out, and Smith and his front seat passenger exited the car. A third person remained in the backseat of the car. Duckworth described the front seat passenger as thinner and smaller than Smith. Duckworth testified that shortly after the men walked toward the house, he heard a gunshot. At the same time he heard the 1 Rsecond shot, he saw Smith running from the house waving his empty hands above his head. Duck-worth did not see any weapon in Smith’s hands. He testified that when the first shot was fired, the passenger who had remained in the car seemed surprised because he quicMy turned his head. After hearing the shots and observing Smith running out of the house, Duckworth drove away. Duckworth subsequently identified Smith from a photographic lineup. He described the front seat passenger that accompanied Smith into Williams’s house as wearing a white t-shirt and perhaps black pants.

Clarence Emilien testified at trial that he had entered into a Memo of Understanding with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to accessory to first degree murder and would be sentenced from zero to five years in exchange for his truthful testimony in defendant’s case. Emilien admitted to defense counsel that he had already pled guilty to accessory to first degree murder and to possession of cocaine, and had already been sentenced to probation.

Emilien testified that he and defendant had been friends since they were in kindergarten. On the day of the shooting, he and defendant were at a back-to-school party together. Prior to the shooting, Emilien and defendant had gone to Williams’s house around 5:00 p.m. for defendant to buy a kilo of cocaine from Williams for $20,000.00. Emilien testified that Williams did not want to do business with defendant at that time because defendant had a gun, a .357 revolver. When Williams refused to make the sale, Emilien and defendant left. Later, Williams called and told them he would make the sale if defendant was unarmed and Ryan Smith, Emilien’s uncle, accompanied them back to his house. Emilien testified that Smith agreed, and they left Smith’s workplace in Smith’s car, with Emilien riding in the back seat and defendant riding in the front passenger seat. Williams was not home when they |flarrived at his house, but he got there as a passenger in Duckworth’s vehicle about five minutes later. Williams exited Duckworth’s vehicle, and defendant and Smith got out of the car. Defendant was carrying a Crown Royal bag and a Nike shoe box. Emilien testified he remained in the car looking for a scale and Duckworth remained in his vehicle. When he heard gunfire, Emilien looked up and saw Smith running with nothing in his hands. Duckworth left and Emilien got out of the car and ran to his aunt’s house. Later, Emilien identified defendant in a photographic lineup and made an in-court identification of defendant.

Emilien testified that he owned a Taurus 40-caliber weapon, but that he was not in possession of the gun at the time of trial. He stated that the gun was taken by police officers when he was pulled over for a traffic violation in a separate incident. He stated he did not know where the gun was located. Both Detective Bickham and Officer Prepetit testified that Emilien’s 40-caliber gun had not been seized in conjunction with the traffic stop, and Sergeant Meisch further testified that property room records did not show a seizure of Emilien’s gun.

For the defense, Torrey Lewis, defendant’s cousin, testified that on August 17, 2002, defendant visited his snowball stand at St. Bernard and Robertson several times throughout the day and then returned between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. to help him clean up after closing that evening.

After hearing this, and other, testimony, the jury rejected defendant’s alibi defense and returned the responsive verdict of manslaughter against defendant. After considering the record in this case, we find the State negated any reasonable probability of misidentification such that a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty of manslaughter. We do not find the jury’s credibility calls regarding defendant’s identification irrational.

[inThe testimony of Duckworth, Smith, and Emilien was not clearly unworthy of belief. Duckworth, the only neutral eye-witness, testified that he observed three men in a car outside Williams’s house. He observed two men exit while one remained in the back seat. This account coincides with Emilien’s testimony that he remained in the back seat of the vehicle. Consistent with Emilien’s testimony, Duckworth indicated that the man with Smith carried a shoe box into the house. Duckworth further testified that he had previously met Smith at Williams’s home and identified Smith as one of the two men he saw entering the victim’s home. He later saw Smith run from the house without a weapon in his hands. This, too, is consistent with Emilien’s testimony. In fact, Duck-worth testified that Smith was already outside of the house when the second gunshot was fired. Furthermore, it appears the court of appeal’s reliance on Duckworth’s testimony concerning the physical description of the man who went inside the house with Smith is misplaced. Although Duck-worth testified that the man with Smith had a similar build, Duckworth emphasized that the other man was smaller. In addition to Duckworth’s testimony ruling out Smith as the shooter, his physical description of the man who remained in the back seat matched Emilien’s build, thereby suggesting that defendant was the man who went into the house with Smith and the victim.

As for Emilien’s credibility, while he apparently lied about the confiscation of his gun, he readily implicated himself in the plan to purchase drugs from Williams. Moreover, the jury was well aware that the state bargained for Emilien’s testimony. Thus, despite the suspicion raised by accomplice testimony, “in this case it does not appear that Emilien’s testimony was so contradicted by other evidence or uncorroborated that a rational jury could not have relied upon it to find that defendant was guilty.” Hughes, 04-1797 at p. 4, 900 So.2d at 178 (McKay, J., dissenting). In Given this corroborative testimony from Duckworth, Emilien’s testimony placing defendant at the scene, and Smith’s positive identification of defendant as the shooter, we find the court of appeal erred in finding the state’s evidence of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator insufficient.

Defendant complains of the trial court’s failure to provide the jury with a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony. As an initial matter, the record reveals that defendant never requested such an instruction be given. Additionally, the testimonies provided by Duckworth, Emilien, and Smith each corroborated the version provided by the others. Furthermore, the trial judge instructed the jury “to scrutinize carefully the testimony and the circumstances under which the witness has testified,” including “any reason he may have for testifying in favor of or against the State, or the defendant, and the extent to which the testimony is supported or contradicted by other evidence.” In addition, defendant’s trial counsel summarized the instruction on witness credibility during his closing argument. Given the independent corroborating testimony in the case, the trial court’s instruction provided sufficient guidance to the jury for its evaluation of the accomplices’ testimony.

The jury had full disclosure of all of the circumstances militating against a reliable identification and still found the witnesses’ testimony sufficient to exclude any reasonable probability of misidentification. The jury was fully informed of inconsistencies between the witness’ trial testimony and their previous statements. Defense counsel fully discussed Emilien’s bargain with the State. Here, a rational trier-of-fact could have believed the State’s witnesses and rejected the alibi testimony from defendant’s cousin as self-serving. For all that appears, the jury accepted the State’s suggestion in its closing argument that “the drug deal got so heated, they got so mad at each other for playing each other that maybe it’s a manslaughter.” That | ^jurors returned a verdict on a lesser included responsive offense as an alternative to conviction on the charged offense or an outright acquittal is no grounds for viewing the result as irrational or as mandating reversal based on insufficiency of evidence.

Decree

For all the above reasons, we find the court of appeal erred in determining that no rational trier of fact could have found the identity of the perpetrator proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for it to consider defendant’s remaining assignment of error.

REVERSED. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED. REMANDED TO COURT OF APPEAL FOR CONSIDERATION OF REMAINING ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, J.,

dissenting.

_JjI respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence supports defendant’s conviction for manslaughter.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)_ [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984).

In the case sub judice, the victim, Shannon Williams, was shot twice in the head in an aborted drug transaction on August 17, 2002. Mervyn Duckworth drove Williams to his residence that evening. He later testified that he saw Williams enter his residence with two or three men who were waiting for Williams. Duckworth was able to identify only Ryan Smith. The first calls to the 911 operator were from Ryan | aSmith, who admitted when interviewed that he was at the crime scene with his nephew, Clarence Emilien, and his nephew’s friend to buy a car from the victim.

The testimony tying Tron Hughes to the crime, came from Clarence Emilien. (According to Emilien, Duckworth was the victim’s cocaine supplier.) Emilien was initially arrested and charged with first degree murder and with possession of cocaine. Both Smith and Emilien entered into plea agreements with the State in exchange for their testimony against the defendant. In exchange for a guilty plea to accessory after the fact and simple possession of cocaine, Emilien was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years, suspended, with three years active probation. Smith died before the case came to trial, and his pre-trial testimony was read to the jury.

There was no physical evidence, at all, to tie the defendant to the crime scene. The bullet casings and other physical evidence at the crime scene had no fingerprints or DNA implicating Hughes. Duckworth could not identify Hughes as the third man at the crime scene with Smith and Emilien. So, what we are left with, is the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the uncle and nephew, Smith and Emilien. When we view this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational fact finder could find that every essential element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeal.

      . Smith died before the trial. His pretrial motion hearing testimony was read to the jury and the tape of his 911 calls was played for the jury.

      . Emilien pled guilty to accessory to first degree murder, as well as to a charge for possession of cocaine arising out of a separate incident, and received a probated sentence on both charges.

      . Specifically, on cross-examination, Duck-worth explained that the front seat passenger was "almost Ryan Smith’s size, like, an averaged type person. But a little younger or smaller, a little skinnier, or smaller."


text:
    SOUTHEAST WIRELESS NETWORK, INC., Slaydon Investment, Inc., and Celia Katz, Individually and in Her Capacity As Independent Executrix for the Succession of Samuel B. Katz v. U.S. TELEMETRY CORPORATION, U.S. Telemetry Network, Inc., K. Steven Roberts, Thomas L. Siebert, Donald M. Clarke, S. Andrew Banks, Charles M. Bruce and James K. Gable.
    No. 2006-C-1736.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 2006.
   In re Gable, James K.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 505,430; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005-CA-1536.

Granted.


author: CALOGERO, C.J., KIMBALL, J.,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LAMBERT.
    No. 2006-KK-2788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 28, 2006.
   In re Lambert, Eddie; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 455-807; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1460.

Stay denied; Writ denied.

CALOGERO, C.J.,

would grant only as to the evidentiary ruling and otherwise would deny.

KIMBALL, J.,

would grant only as to the evidentiary ruling and otherwise would deny.


text:
    B.W.S., Jr., T.A.S. as Administrators of the Estate of M.T.S. v. LIVINGSTON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Randy Pope Superintendent of Livingston Parish School Board, Cecil Picard, Louisiana Department of Education State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
    No. 2006-OC-2758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 2006.
   In re Livingston Parish School Board et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 06-112,288; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 2177.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thatcher MCELVEEN.
    No. 2006-KK-2381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 5, 2006.
   In re McElveen, Thatcher; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 434-604; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1024.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thatcher MCELVEEN.
    No. 2006-KK-2382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 5, 2006.
   In re McElveen, Thatcher; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 434-834; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1025.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

KIMBALL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    A.C. COPELAND v. Luan HUNTER.
    No. 2006-CC-2798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 5, 2006.
   In re Copeland, A.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 547-189; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-C-639.

Stay Withdrawn.

Writ denied.


text:
    A.C. COPELAND v. Luan HUNTER.
    No. 2006-CC-2709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 5, 2006.
   In re Times Picayune L.L.C.; — Other; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 547-189; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-C-639.

Granted. Pretermitting the merits, we find the court of appeal erred in discussing the portion of the trial court’s ruling refusing to unseal its reasons for judgment, as relator did not assign this portion of the trial court’s ruling as error in its application to the court of appeal nor did it brief the issue. Accordingly, the portion of the court of appeal’s judgment discussing the sealing of the trial court’s reasons for judgment is vacated and set aside.


text:
    June THOMPSON v. John THOMPSON.
    No. 2006-CJ-2789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2006.
   In re Thompson, John; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 158,667; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 2150.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher Michael O’BRIEN.
    No. 2006-KP-0997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re O’Brien, Christopher Michael;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 276,286; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 06-00304.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy SARRIO.
    No. 2006-KP-1012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Sarrio, Roy; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96-3301; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-127.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert WILLIAMS.
    No. 2006-K-1356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Williams, Robert; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 411-522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-0176.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael D. OWENS.
    No. 2006-KO-1377.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Owens, Michael D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 217,719; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,685-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis Dan HARGROVE, III.
    No. 2006-KO-1380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Hargrove, Louis Dan III; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 68930; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,427-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony G. BAILEY.
    No. 2006-KO-1421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Bailey, Anthony G.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 022064; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 1521.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan TAYLOR.
    No. 2006-KO-1422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Taylor, Jonathan; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 01-04-0546; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 1532.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James O. FLETCHER.
    No. 2006-KO-1424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Fletcher, James O.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 125998-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 05-1410.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sylvester MEAD.
    No. 2006-KO-1426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Mead, Sylvester; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 211,460; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,406-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert HUDSON.
    No. 2006-KK-2392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Hudson, Robert; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Catahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 00-1144; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 06-00742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ellis PRICE.
    No. 2006-KK-2418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Price, Ellis; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 454-590; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1088.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian WILSON.
    No. 2006-KD-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 455-561.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mosa ALGAHIM.
    No. 2006-KK-2605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 09-05-447; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1987.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew GATTO.
    No. 2006-KK-2689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 387798; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1711.

Denied.


text:
    Abdul H. MU’MIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CI-1186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Mu’Min, Abdul H.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 510,007.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for its consideration.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norris VESSELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2712.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Vessell, Norris; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 452-749; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-K-1281.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Manuel PLAISANCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1962.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Plaisance, Manuel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 93-1563; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-486.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Manuel PLAISANCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1801.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Plaisance, Manuel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 93-1563; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-416.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin HUGHES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1205.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Hughes, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 95-2275; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-122.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alton CHEATAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Cheatam, Alton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 276,099; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-00215.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joel Nathaniel JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Jones, Joel Nathaniel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR419-93; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-01093.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnie DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Davis, Ronnie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-2188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-41.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr. D.C. 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark PITTMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Pittman, Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-2221; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-207.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Neal DIVINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Divine, Neal; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 96-4105; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 06-KH-145, 06-KH-144.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Neal DIVINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1223.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Divine, Neal; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 96-4105; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No(s). 06-KH-145, 06-KH-144.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alexander HYMES, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Hymes, Alexander Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-5096; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-150.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Manuel PLAISANCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1238.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Plaisance, Manuel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 93-1563; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-84.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent L. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Johnson, Vincent L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. V, No. 11 — 83— 424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2608.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emmett SPOONER, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Spooner, Emmett Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 11-98-332; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KW 1630.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charlie GILLIAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Gilliam, Charlie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 396-627; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-1506.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694 cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. John J. KENDALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Kendall, John J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 352580; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2536.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Julius FEET v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Feet, Julius; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 139-055; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2225.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald STELLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Stelly, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 56,763; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 2511.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dewayne DOBBINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-2711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Dobbins, Dewayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 456-982.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the filing to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark BALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Mark Ball; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 6, 2006; Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Div. D, No. Q3-5008; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-890.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Brown, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 13, 2006; Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 37815; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 05-00908.

Reconsideration Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Quntos WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-0918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Wilson, Quntos; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 27, 2006; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 179,482; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41017-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Benny Joe YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Young, Benny Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 227,092; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40973-KH.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a Brady violation claim filed on or about October 27, 2005. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the claim. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frank WALGAMOTTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-KH-1460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 8, 2006.
   In re Walgamotte, Frank; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 29,285.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion to vacate and correct an illegal sentence filed prior to May, 2006. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.