author: ANSTEAD, J.

text:
    ST. VINCENT’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellant, v. MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC06-1047.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 6, 2007.

      Major B. Harding and Stephen C. Emmanuel of Ausley and McMullen, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant.
    Stephen A. Ecenia and Richard M. Ellis of Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and Hoffman, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees.
   ANSTEAD, J.

We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal declaring a state statute invalid. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, Inc. v. Memorial Healthcare Group, Inc., 928 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The issue before this Court is whether section 408.036(3)(i), Florida Statutes (2004), is unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for the enactment of special laws. We affirm the holding of the district court, approving the trial court’s judgment that this statute is an unconstitutional special law because there is no reasonable possibility that any other hospital in Florida, except St. Vincent’s, could meet the requirements of the certificate-of-need (CON) exemption provided by the statute before it expires on January 1, 2008.

I. FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts and procedural history of this case are summarized in the First District’s opinion:

In late 2001, St. Luke’s Hospital sought permission from the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) to replace its existing hospital with a new facility to be built on the grounds of the current Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville. St. Luke’s had an open-heart surgery program at its existing location. Unlike most hospitals in the state, St. Luke’s also utilized a “closed-staff’ personnel model, meaning that its medical personnel were salaried staff. Based upon evidence presented below, St. Luke’s is one of only two hospitals in the state with both an open-heart surgery program and a closed-staff personnel system.
Concurrent with St. Luke’s request, St. Vincent’s Medical Center sought permission from the Agency to establish a new hospital with an open-heart surgery program in the facility to be vacated by St. Luke’s. State law required new hospitals to submit a Certificate of Need (“CON”) with the Agency in order to establish an open-heart surgery program.
During the 2003 regular session, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law, chapter 2003-274, Laws of Florida. The law appears as section 408.036(3)(Z), Florida Statutes (2004), part of the Health Facility and Services Development Act. The new statute created an exemption from the CON requirement for any adult open-heart surgery program meeting the statute’s criteria. These criteria are paramount to our analysis:
(il) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter to the contrary:
1. For an adult open-heart-surgery program to be located in a new hospital provided the new hospital is being established in the location of an existing hospital with an adult open-heart-surgery program, the existing hospital and the existing adult open-heart-surgery program are being relocated to a replacement hospital, and the replacement hospital will utilize a closed-staff model. A hospital is exempt from the certifícate-of-need review for the establishment of an open-heart-surgery program if the application for exemption submitted under this paragraph complies with the following criteria:
a. The applicant must certify that it will meet and continuously maintain the minimum Florida Administrative Code and any future licensure requirements governing adult open-heart programs adopted by the agency, including the most current guidelines of the American College of Cardiology and American Heart Association Guidelines for Adult Open Heart Programs.
b. The applicant must certify that it will maintain sufficient appropriate equipment and health personnel to ensure quality and safety.
c. The applicant must certify that it will maintain appropriate times of operation and protocols to ensure availability and appropriate referrals in the event of emergencies.
d. The applicant is a neivly licensed hospital in a physical location previously oivned and licensed to a hospital performing more than 800 open-heart procedures each year, including heart transplants.
e. The applicant must certify that it can perform more than 300 diagnostic cardiac catheterization procedures per year, combined inpatient and outpatient, by the end of the third year of its operation.
f. The applicant’s payor mix at a minimum reflects the community average for Medicaid, charity care, and self-pay patients or the applicant must certify that it will provide a minimum of 5 percent of Medicaid, charity care, and self-pay to open-heart-surgery patients.
g. If the applicant fails to meet the established criteria for open-heart programs or fails to reach 300 surgeries per year by the end of its third year of operation, it must show cause why its exemption should not be revoked.
h.In order to ensure continuity of available services, the applicant of the newly licensed hospital may apply for this certificate of need before taking possession of the physical facilities. The effective date of the certificate of need will be concurrent with the effective date of the newly issued hospital license.
2. By December 31, 2004, and annually thereafter, the agency shall submit a report to the Legislature providing information concerning the number of requests for exemption received under this paragraph and the number of exemptions granted or denied.
8. This paragraph is repealed effective January 1, 2008.
§ 408.036(3)(i), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).
On November 7, 2003, Appellees filed a complaint against the Agency in circuit court. In essence, Appellees alleged that St. Vincent’s Medical Center is the only hospital in the state that can take advantage of this law. The complaint argued the law was a special law in violation of the Florida Constitution and the law violated equal protection by treating one hospital differently from all others in the state. St. Vincent’s Medical Center intervened in the action. The Agency has not appeared in this appeal.
At a summary judgment hearing, the trial judge ruled that factual determinations should be made on whether the law could apply to a hospital other than St. Vincent’s. Accordingly, the judge set the case for a non-jury trial. St. Vincent’s did, however, receive summary judgment on the equal protection claim.
Both sides presented expert testimony on the contested issue. Dr. Ronald Luke, Appellant’s expert in health care planning and health care economics, testified that, within the realm of possibility, “many possible combinations of actors, hospitals, physician groups and health plans” in Florida might qualify for an exemption before the statute sunsets on January 1, 2008. Countering Dr. Luke’s testimony, Dr. Todd Sagin, an expert in medical staff issues and hospital relations, and Patty Greenberg, an expert in health planning, testified for the Appellees. Dr. Sagin and Ms. Greenberg testified that no other hospitals could reasonably qualify for the exemption in the time frame allowed by the statute, July 2003 through January 1, 2008.
On March 9, 2005, the trial judge rendered the final declaratory judgment. Concluding that only St. Vincent’s could take advantage of the statute, the judge explained:
After considering all of the evidence and the arguments of counsel, it is concluded that the Exemption Provision is a special law passed in the guise of a general law, and is therefore unconstitutional because it was not adopted in accordance with the requirements of Article III, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution. The Exemption Provision is nothing more than a description of the situation involving St. Vincent’s and St. Luke’s. The Court concludes that the constitutional requirements governing special laws cannot be avoided by merely utilizing generic language in a complicated classification scheme that is intended to address a special circumstance. The trial judge found no other constitutional infirmities and stated that if the Legislature had simply adhered to the notice requirements of article III, section 10, the statute would have passed constitutional muster.

St. Vincent’s, 928 So.2d at 431-33.

First District Review

On review, the First District affirmed the trial court’s decision holding that section 408.036(3)(1) is an unconstitutional special law. Id. at 431. The First District first found the trial court’s findings to be supported by competent, substantial evidence, noting that the trial judge considered both current and prospective applicability of the statute, heard “extensive, conflicting expert testimony,” and found the appellees’ testimony to be more credible. Id. at 434-35. The First District further held that the trial court correctly applied the law when it concluded that there was no “reasonable possibility” that the exemption could apply to any other party before it expired. Id. at 435. The First District relied upon its earlier opinion in Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n., Inc., 912 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), aff'd, Nos. SC05-2130 & SC05-2131, 967 So.2d 802, 2007 WL 2492308 (Fla. Sept. 6, 2007), emphasizing that, based upon Gulfstream Park, “the proper standard [in determining whether a law is an unconstitutional special law] is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the class will include others.” St. Vincent’s, 928 So.2d at 434 (quoting Gulfstream Park, 912 So.2d at 622) (emphasis supplied). St. Vincent’s Medical Center now appeals the First District’s decision that section 408.036(3)(1) is unconstitutional.

II. GOVERNING LAW and ANALYSIS

The question presented involves both factual and legal issues. As the district court correctly noted, appellate courts review a trial court’s factual findings to determine the existence of supporting competent, substantial evidence, while the legal question of whether a law is a special or general law is a legal question subject to de novo review. See St. Vincent’s, 928 So.2d at 434 (“Under the familiar maxim, we review findings of fact under the competent substantial evidence standard, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.”); Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Fla.2003) (“We have held that whether a law is a special or general law is a pure legal question subject to de novo review.”).

Importantly, when a court has declared a state statute unconstitutional, the reviewing court must begin the process with a presumption that the statute is valid. Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Chib, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla.1983).

Article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides as follows:

No special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law. Such notice shall not be necessary when the law, except the provision for referendum, is conditioned to become effective only upon approval by vote of the electors of the area affected.

Art. Ill, § 10, Fla. Const. The Florida Constitution defines “special law” as “a special or local law.” Art. X, § 12(g), Fla. Const. Furthermore, this Court has previously defined “special law” and “general law” as:

[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.
A general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality.

State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 120 Fla. 555, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla.1934) (citations omitted).

As with the circuit court and the district court, our legal analysis begins with the language challenged in the statute itself, section 408.036(3)(£), Florida Statutes (2004):

(3) EXEMPTIONS. — Upon request, the following projects are subject to exemption from the provisions of subsection (1):
(1) Not withstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary:
1.For an adult open-heart-surgery program to be located in a new hospital provided the new hospital is being established in the location of an existing hospital with an adult open-heart-surgery program, the existing hospital and the existing adult open-heart-surgery program are being relocated to a replacement hospital, and the replacement hospital will utilize a closed-staff model. A hospital is exempt from the certificate-of-need review for the establishment of an open-heart-surgery program if the application for exemption submitted under this paragraph complies with the following criteria:
a. The' applicant must certify that it will meet and continuously maintain the minimum Florida Administrative Code and any future licensure requirements governing adult open-heart programs adopted by the agency, including the most current guidelines of the American College of Cardiology and American Heart Association Guidelines for Adult Open Heart Programs.
b. The applicant must certify that it will maintain sufficient appropriate equipment and health personnel to ensure quality and safety.
c. The applicant must certify that it will maintain appropriate times of operation and protocols to ensure availability and appropriate referrals in the event of emergencies.
d. The applicant is a newly licensed hospital in a physical location previously owned and licensed to a hospital performing more than 300 open-heart procedures each year, including heart transplants.
e. The applicant must certify that it can perform more than 300 diagnostic cardiac catheterization procedures per year, combined inpatient and outpatient, by the end of the third year of its operation.
f. The applicant’s payor mix at a minimum reflects the community average for Medicaid, charity care, and self-pay patients or the applicant must certify that it will provide a minimum of 5 percent of Medicaid, charity care, and self-pay to open-heart-surgery patients.
g. If the applicant fails to meet the established criteria for open-heart programs or fails to reach 300 surgeries per year by the end of its third year of operation, it must show cause why its exemption should not be revoked.
h. In order to ensure continuity of available services, the applicant of the newly licensed hospital may apply for this certificate of need before taking possession of the physical facilities. The effective date of the certificate of need will be concurrent with the effective date of the newly issued hospital license.
2. By December 31, 2004, and annually thereafter, the agency shall submit a report to the Legislature providing information concerning the number of requests for exemption received under this paragraph and the number of exemptions granted or denied.
3. This paragraph is repealed effective January 1, 2008.

§ 408.036(3)(Z), Fla. Stat. (2004).

After an evidentiary hearing, wherein the trial judge heard two days’ worth of testimony from a total of five expert witnesses, the trial judge concluded that St. Vincent’s is the only hospital in the state that meets all of the criteria necessary to merit an exemption under the provisions of the statute. Generally, while St. Vincent’s presented evidence that closing a medical staff could technically be done over a short period of time, that any number of organizations in the state could replicate the St. Luke’s/St. Vincent’s transaction, and that the sunset date in the statute still allows enough time for other parties to take advantage of the exemption, Memorial’s experts presented testimony that the relationship between St. Luke’s and St. Vincent’s was highly unusual, if not unprecedented. These witnesses further testified that the decision and procedure to close a medical staff was not only complicated and onerous, but that the entire process contemplated by the statute takes so long to accomplish that other parties could not realistically utilize the exemption before the sunset date; and, finally, that there were no hospitals or medical organizations in the state currently contemplating any type of relocation that would come remotely within the realm of the exemption. We agree with the First District below that the trial court’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Based on a review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s findings of fact in this instance.

Turning to the legal conclusion based upon these facts, the First District held that the trial judge properly found that there was no reasonable possibility that the statute could prospectively apply to parties other than St. Vincent’s. St. Vincent’s, 928 So.2d at 435. Reviewing this conclusion de novo pursuant to Schrader, we also find no error in the district court’s legal analysis or conclusion.

St. Vincent’s does not dispute that the statute’s provisions appear tailored to fit its plans to establish a new hospital. Rather, St. Vincent’s challenges the district court’s invocation of a “reasonable possibility” standard rather than a mere possibility standard in any assessment of whether others may qualify under the statute’s exemption. However, as we recently held in Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Nos. SC05-2130 & SC05-2131, 967 So.2d 802, 2007 WL 2492308 (Fla. Sept. 6, 2007), “a review of our case law and the underlying purpose behind the constitutional restrictions contained in article III, section 10, supports the reasonableness standard used by the First District and its application to this case.” Op. at 809. In Gulfstream Park, we confronted a statute that prohibited a racetrack from selling broadcasts within its market area if it is within twenty-five miles of at least two other racetracks. Id. at 804. While the parties agreed that, at the time of the statute’s enactment, it applied only to one particular part of the state, they differed as to whether the statute was open to application to other areas of the state in the future. Id. at 808. As we held in that case,

In essence, we must choose between a wholly speculative evaluation of the possibility of the future application of a statute as advanced by the appellants and the practical reasonableness standard articulated by the district court. While our own case law has been largely silent on this issue, an examination of the analysis applied in each case implicitly suggests that we ourselves were applying a reasonableness and realistic possibility standard in assessing a statute’s potential future operation. Nowhere in any of our decisions have we indicated that a wholly speculative or unreasonable potential would satisfy the constitutional mandate of article III, section 10.

Id. at 809. Accordingly-, we agreed with the First District’s conclusion in that case, finding that there was no reasonable possibility that the statute would ever apply to other parts of the state. Id. at 809,

While the courts should never second-guess the Legislature about the policy decisions contained within a challenged statute, we are nevertheless obligated to give meaningful effect to the notice procedures for special laws mandated by Florida’s Constitution. Consistent with this obligation we have emphasized in Gulfstream Park that whether a law has general application turns on a determination of whether its application to others is reasonable or practical, not theoretical or speculative. The question of general application is not to be guided by irrational speculation that anything is possible. Id. at 809 (“[A]ny determination of possible future applications of a statute must be done by a realistic and reasonable assessment. Otherwise, such an assessment would essentially be standardless, a situation we do not believe to be consistent with judicial review and enforcement of article III, section 10.”).

CONCLUSION

Section 408.036(3)0) provides a CON exemption for certain hospitals seeking to establish an open-heart surgery program. Both the trial court and the district court concluded that there is no reasonable possibility that any hospitals other than St. Vincent’s could take advantage of the exemption before it sunsets on January 1, 2008. We find no error in the findings of the trial court and the legal analysis of the district court concluding that section 408.036(3)(¿) is an unconstitutional special law enacted in the guise of a general law. Accordingly, we affirm the First District’s decision below.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . We find appellees’ claim that the statute violates equal protection because it contains an unconstitutional classification scheme to be procedurally barred as they did not file a cross-appeal to this Court on this issue. Regardless, we agree with the First District that there is no merit in this claim. See St. Vincent's, 928 So.2d at 435.

      . Section 11.02, Florida Statutes (2004), provides the notice requirements for special laws:
      The notice required to obtain special or local legislation or any relief act specified in s. 11.065 shall be by publishing the identical notice in each county involved in some newspaper as defined in chapter 50 published in or circulated throughout die county or counties where the matter or thing to be affected by such legislation shall be situated one time at least 30 days before introduction of the proposed law into the Legislature or, there being no newspaper circulated throughout or published in the county, by posting for at least 30 days at not less than three public places in the county or each of the counties, one of which places shall be at the courthouse in the county or counties where the matter or thing to be affected by such legislation shall be situated. Notice of special or local legislation shall state the substance of the contemplated law, as required by s. 10, Art. Ill of the State Constitution.
      § 11.02, Fla. Stat. (2004).

      . While evidence was presented that the Cleveland Clinic-Westin in South Florida is a closed-staff hospital with an open-heart surgery program, the trial judge found that it does not perform the 300 procedures annually required by the statute.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANSTEAD, J. LEWIS, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, etc., Appellant, v. GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee. Hartman-Tyner, Inc., et al., Appellants, v. Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., Appellee.
    Nos. SC05-2130, SC05-2131.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 6, 2007.

      Major B. Harding and Stephen C. Emmanuel of Ausley and McMullen, Tallahassee, FL, and Joseph M. Helton, Jr. and S. Thomas Peavey Hoffer, Assistant General Counsels, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants State of Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Par-Mutuel Wagering.
    Harold F.X. Purnell and Gary R. Rutledge of Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and Hoffman, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants Hartman-Tyner, Inc., West Flagler Associates, Ltd., The Aragon Group, Inc., Summersport Enterprises, LLLP, and Florida Gaming Centers, Inc.
    Cynthia S. Tunnicliff and Peter M. Dunbar of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell and Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, FL for Ap-pellee.
    Bruce David Green, on behalf of Florida Horseman’s Benevolent and Protective Association, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, FL, as Amicus Curiae.
   ANSTEAD, J.

We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal declaring invalid a state statute. State Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 912 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The issue before this Court is whether section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), is unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for the enactment of special laws. We affirm and approve the holding of the district court that this statute is an unconstitutional special law because there was no reasonable possibility that the classification used in the statute would ever apply to another area of the state after the statute was amended in 1996.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2002, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (“the Department”) filed an administrative complaint against Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc. (“Gulfstream”), alleging that it had engaged in an unauthorized exchange of intertrack wagering signals. Gulfstream had been conducting horse races at its racetrack in Hallandale and selling the live broadcasts of the races to Pompano Park Racing, a harness racing track in Pompano Beach. The Department contended that Gulfstream was in violation of section 550.615(6), which prohibits Gulfstream from selling its broadcasts within its market area, because it holds a thoroughbred racing permit and is within twenty-five miles of at least two other horse race permitholders.

Gulfstream filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court, challenging the provisions of section 550.615(6) on a number of constitutional grounds. Among the grounds was a claim that the statute was a special law and that it was not enacted according to the state constitutional requirements that apply to special laws. After taking evidence to determine the parties and areas of the state affected by the statute, the trial court concluded that section 550.615(6) was unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law:

The plaintiff presented testimony sufficient to establish, and I now find, that there was at the time of enactment, during the entire time since enactment and is now precisely one “area of the state where there are three or more horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other.” The only area of the state where there are or were three horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other is the area of Dade and Broward Counties that includes Gulf-stream, Calder, Pompano Park and Hialeah Park.
Section 550.615(6) was enacted in 96-364, Laws of Florida. There is no suggestion within the enacting legislation of any purpose of the 25 mile intertrack border other than the obvious one — to carve . out the Dade-Broward market area as it existed when the statute was enacted.
Although certainly not dispositive, this conclusion is consistent with the parties’ description of the negotiated legislative process that preceded enactment of the statute. Neither party offered any legislative history to explain some public purpose served by limiting the inter-track wager authorization within the 25 mile border. The most plausible explanation in the testimony was that there was no public policy that led to the 25 mile intertrack border. The restrictions against intertrack wagering at Gulf-stream were simply what Gulfstream was required to give up for various other benefits. This sort of local interest horsetrading is specifically prohibited by Article III Section 10.
The preponderance of the evidence and Florida’s legislative scheme supports the conclusion that the classification created by section 550.615(6) was constitutionally closed at the time of its enactment and remains so. The legislature imposed the statutory geographic restrictions on permitholders. Moreover, the legislature decreed that additional permits may only become “effectual” upon affirmative vote of the county electorate. Thus, for the intertrack wagering restriction to expand the legislature must repeal the geographic permit limitations, an entity must apply for a permit and meet all of the rather daunting requirements, and the electorate of the county must approve the permit. It is unsurprising under these circumstances that section 505.615(6) has since its enactment, applied to precisely one 25 mile area of the state.
The classification was closed at the time of enactment and remains closed. To conclude otherwise would be to reduce Article III Section 10 to mere semantics. Section 550.615(6) applies only and can apply only to the Dade-Bro-ward market area and so constitutes a special law in violation of Article III, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution.
The Department and intervenors vigorously argue the high standard that must be satisfied by a party seeking to overturn a statute. The only doubt injected in this matter comes from the statute’s use of the word “any.” It implies that there might be more than one. But the pari-mutuel statutes themselves, together with conditions as they exist now and as they existed at the time of enactment leads to the conclusion that the classification, “three or more horse-race permitholders within 25 miles of each other,” was and is closed in the constitutional sense.

On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision that section 550.615(6) violates article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, which states, “No special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law ... [unless the law] is conditioned to become effective on the vote of the electors of the area affected.” Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 618.

In its opinion, the First District did its own constitutional analysis as to whether the classification created in section 550.615(6) was limited to one geographic area or remained open:

When Gulfstream Park opened for business, the restrictions on the minimum distance between pari-mutuel wagering facilities were much more lenient, and that is why it was possible for Gulf-stream to be one of three horse racing tracks within a twenty-five mile radius of each other. However, these conditions do not exist at present, because the other sections of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act now prohibit the issuance of permits for horse racing tracks this close together. Section 550.054(2) states in part, “[A]n application may not be considered, nor may a permit be issued by the division or be voted upon in any county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dograces at a location within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility....” § 550.054(2), Fla. Stat. (2004).
If a horse racing permit cannot be issued at a location within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility, then it is safe to say that there will not be a new area in Florida that would have three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other. Because new horse racing tracks would have to be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) will not be replicated.
Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility. However, the prohibition in section 550.615(6) against inter-track wagering in areas where there are three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other was enacted subsequently in 1996. The timing of these two laws leads us to conclude that the purpose of the twenty-five-mile limit in section 550.615(6) was merely to describe the area where Gulf-stream is located. It was, even at that time, the only area that could fit the description.
The evidence presented in this case plainly shows that there is no reasonable possibility that section 550.615(6) will be applied in another area of the state. Someone would have to obtain a thoroughbred permit in Key West, which would then be subject to the prohibition against intertrack wagering in the statute only if two other stand-alone quarter horse permits were issued in Key West, and then only if all three horse racing tracks were located within twenty-five miles of each other. Alternatively, the Department would have to issue a standalone quarter horse permit in a twenty-five mile area that includes an existing thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other horse racing permit holder.
These hypotheticals do not show that section 550.615(6) has any real potential to apply to others. They are highly contrived situations that demonstrate no more than a technical possibility. The evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that quarter horse racing is a thing of the past. Apparently, quarter horse races are so unprofitable that they are no longer held anywhere in the state, not even by those who hold multiple horse racing permits and can afford to pay the fixed expenses of operating their race tracks with the revenues earned from other kinds of horse races.

Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 621-23. The Department and Hartman-Tyner, Inc, et. al. (“Intervenors”) now appeal the First District’s conclusion that section 550.615(6) is unconstitutional.

ANALYSIS

The question of whether a law is a special or general law is a legal question subject to de novo review. Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Fla.2003). When a court has declared a state statute unconstitutional, the reviewing court must begin the process with a presumption that the statute is valid. Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla.1983).

The Florida Constitution defines “special law” as “a special or local law.” Art. X, § 12(g), Fla. Const. Furthermore, this Court has defined “special law” and “general law” as:

[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.
A general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or instrumentality.

State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 120 Fla. 555, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla.1934) (citations omitted). We have applied these definitions to a wide variety of statutes that were enacted by the Legislature as general laws, but were challenged as special laws. We discuss only a few to illustrate the application of the constitutional restrictions on the passage of special or local laws.

In City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143 (Fla.2002), this Court addressed a statute which authorized only certain municipalities — those with populations of more than 300,000 on April 1, 1999 — to impose a parking tax. Id. at 146. We concluded that the statute was a special law because its express terms concerning population on a date certain limited its application and excluded any other municipalities from joining the class in the future. Id. at 151. This was a straightforward case because it could easily be determined, based upon available population statistics, that the class was closed and there was no possibility of the statute ever applying to another municipality.

On the other hand, in City of Coral Gables v. Grandon, 157 Fla. 71, 25 So.2d 1 (1946), this Court held that a statute relating to the creation of a water management district in any county having a population greater than 260,000 was not a special law. Id. at 2-3. This statute was a general law because there were other Florida counties that were rapidly approaching the limit set by the statute. Id. at 2. Thus, it was reasonably possible that the statute would apply in another area of the state.

In Department of Business Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So.2d 1155 (Fla.1989), we addressed a statute that authorized the receipt and display of simulcast thoroughbred horse racing, and pari-mutu-el wagering thereon, at licensed facilities. Id. at 1157. The statute provided criteria for establishing a class of counties in which a facility could be licensed, including requiring the existence of two unused quarter horse racing permits before January 1, 1987. Id. All parties in that case agreed that Marion County was the sole county that would ever fall within the statutorily designated class of counties eligible for licensure of a facility. Id. Therefore, we held that the statute was an unconstitutional special law, despite the Legislature’s treatment of the law as a general law, because it applied only to one county and there was no possibility that it would ever apply to any other county. Id. at 1158. We explained that “a statutory classification scheme incapable of generic application to members of a class, and fixed so as to preclude additional parties from satisfying the requirements for inclusion within the statutory classification at some future point in time, indicates an arbitrary classification scheme in the context of parimutuel legislation.” Id. at 1158 n. 4 (citing Sanford-Orlando, 434 So.2d at 882; Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Fla. State Racing Comm’n, 165 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla.1964)).

In Sanford-Orlando, we confronted a statute that permitted harness racing tracks to be converted to dog racing tracks. 434 So.2d at 880. At the time the legislation was passed, it only applied to one track. Id. at 882. However, we stated that “[n]either does it matter that, once the law was passed, Seminole was the only track to benefit from it. The controlling-point is that even though this class did in fact apply to only one track, it is open and has the potential of applying to other tracks.” Id. We concluded that because the statute could be applied to future tracks, it was a constitutional general law, and we emphasized that “[t]he fact that matters is that the classification is potentially open to other tracks.” Id.

Finally, in Biscayne Kennel Club, this Court addressed a statute that allowed a racing permitholder having daily revenues below a certain amount to conduct harness racing in any county that had previously approved pari-mutuel wagering. 165 So.2d at 763-64. However, at the time of its enactment, the statute applied in only one county. Id. at 764. Nevertheless, this Court held that the class remained open because “a number of Florida counties may by future referendum acquire racing establishments, and some may reasonably be expected to come within the class covered.” Id.

THIS APPEAL

Apparent from an analysis of our prior cases on special laws is that while we must give great deference to actions of the Legislature, we must also recognize that under the provisions of article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, the Legislature is constitutionally barred from passing general laws that impact only specific parties or areas of the state unless constitutional requirements are met. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a statute that appears to apply to one situation or area at the time of enactment may still be considered a general law if it could be applied to other situations or areas in the future.

The parties herein are in agreement that the statute when enacted and at the time of the trial court proceedings only applied to a limited area of the state and limited entities located therein. They differ only as to whether the class of operations covered by the statute remains open, and the standard for determining the statute’s potential for future application. Appellants assert that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in considering whether the statute could apply to other entities or other areas of the state by adding a “reasonableness” condition to the evaluation of that possibility:

The Department and the intervenors argue that it is still possible to have an area in Florida where there would be three horse race permit holders within a twenty-five mile radius of one another. They point out that the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act contains a special provision exempting quarter horse permit holders from the one-hundred mile limit that applies to other horse race permit holders. See § 550.334(4), Fla. Stat. It is at least conceivable, they argue, that someone could obtain a permit to hold quarter horse races near enough to a thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other horse racing permit holder to trigger the prohibition against inter-track wagering.
This brings us to the most difficult part of the case. We acknowledge that the class is not closed for the purpose of this analysis merely because it is unlikely that it will include anyone else. However, we could not say that the class is open merely because there is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone else. That approach would undermine the constitutional requirements for the adoption of special laws. We conclude from the applicable precedents that the proper standard is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the class will include others.

Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 622 (emphasis supplied). We conclude that a review of our case law and the underlying purpose behind the constitutional restrictions contained in article III, section 10, supports the reasonableness standard used by the First District and its application to this case.

In essence, we must choose between a wholly speculative evaluation of the possibility of the future application of a statute as advanced by the appellants and the practical reasonableness standard articulated by the district court. While our own case law has been largely silent on this issue, an examination of the analysis applied in each case implicitly suggests that we ourselves were applying a reasonableness and realistic possibility standard in assessing a statute’s potential future operation. Nowhere in any of our decisions have we indicated that a wholly speculative or unreasonable potential would satisfy the constitutional mandate of article III, section 10.

Moreover, in Biscayne Kennel Club, we ourselves utilized a reasonableness standard when we concluded that “a number of Florida counties may by future referendum acquire racing establishments, and some may reasonably be expected to come within the class covered.” 165 So.2d at 764 (emphasis supplied). We conclude now that we made explicit in that opinion what was implicit in our prior decisions, namely that any determination of possible future applications of a statute must be done by a realistic and reasonable assessment. Otherwise, such an assessment would essentially be standardless, a situation we do not believe to be consistent with judicial review and enforcement of article III, section 10.

Further, we also agree with the observations of both the trial court and the district court on this issue. The trial court explained its determination that the class upon which the statute operated was realistically closed and that “[t]o conclude otherwise would be to reduce article III section 10 to mere semantics.” The district court further explained that “we could not say that the class is open merely because there is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone else. That approach would undermine the constitutional requirements for the adoption of special laws.” Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 622.

CONCLUSION

Section 550.615(6) prohibits thoroughbred permitholders from engaging in in-tertrack wagering in “any area of the state where there are three or more horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other.” Both the trial court and the district court concluded that at the time the statute was amended in 1996, these conditions existed only in the area where Gulfstream was located, and there was no reasonable possibility that they would ever exist in another part of the state. We concur in the findings of the trial court and the conclusion of the district court. As a result, we conclude that section 550.615(6) is an unconstitutional special law enacted in the guise of a general law. Accordingly, we affirm the First District’s decision below.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs.

LEWIS, C.J.,

specially concurring.

I agree with the majority analysis that section 550.615(6) of the Florida Statutes is an unconstitutional special law. I write separately because the majority fails to mention, recognize or discuss the impact of the nonseverability clause found in section 550.71 of the Florida Statutes on the present dispute. Section 550.71, entitled “Operation of ch. 96-364,” was originally enacted as part of chapter 96-364, Laws of Florida, and provides:

If the provisions of any section of this act are held to be invalid or inoperative for any reason, the remaining provisions of this act shall be deemed to be void and of no effect, it being the legislative intent that this act as a whole would not have been adopted had any provision of the act not been included.

§ 550.71, Fla. Stat. (2006). Section 550.71 is an example of a pure-form nonseverability clause. Unlike severability clauses, which are commonly included in legislation and direct that the invalidation of any part of a statute does not affect the validity of the remaining statutory provisions, a non-severability clause, such as the clause found in section 550.71, expresses legislative intent that if any provision of a statutory enactment is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of the act will also be voided.

Although the impact of a nonseverability clause has never been directly addressed by Florida courts, this Court has addressed the operation of severability clauses on several occasions. See, e.g., Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 628 (Fla.2000); Moreau v. Lewis, 648 So.2d 124, 127 (Fla.1995); St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 588 So.2d 635, 640 (Fla.1991). This Court has held that although severability clauses are highly persuasive, such clauses are not binding on courts. See St. Johns County, 583 So.2d at 640. The decision whether to sever an unconstitutional provision from the remainder of a statute is guided by four factors which consider whether:

(1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.

Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 137 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla.1962).

However, these factors are poorly suited to any analysis of severability in instances where the statute contains an unambiguous statement of legislative intent of non-severability — that the invalidity of one provision of a statute should void the remaining provisions. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court decision in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981), in which the Court, although ultimately remanding the determination to the Alaska state courts, noted with regard to a nonseverability clause that it “need not speculate as to the intent of the Alaska Legislature; the legislation expressly provides that the invalidation of any portion of the statute renders the whole invalid.” Id. at 65, 102 S.Ct. 2309. In those rare situations where the Legislature has chosen to include a clear directive that the invalidation of one provision of a statute shall result in the invalidation of the statute as a whole, there can be no doubt that the Legislature would not have passed any of the provisions without passing all of the provisions. In my view, section 550.71 is an unambiguous statement of legislative intent, and, therefore, the invalidation of section 550.615(6) operates to void the remaining provisions of chapter law 96-364.

While chapter law 96-364 is a lengthy and involved legislative act which effected substantial changes in the laws regulating the Florida pari-mutuel industry, the majority of the provisions contained in that act have been subsequently amended. Those amended provisions are no longer provisions of the chapter law. Therefore, it appears that the only provisions which would now be impacted by the operation of section 550.71 are sections 550.6335 with regard to permissible surcharges on inter-track wagering and 550.70 with regard to jai alai facilities. See §§ 550.6335, 550.70, Fla. Stat. (2006). Regardless of the impact of the operation of section 550.71, the majority should address this issue.

Today, the Court ignores the proverbial elephant in the corner, even though this Court requested and received supplemental briefing specifically on the impact of the nonseverability clause after oral argument.

BELL, J., concurs.

      . We decline to address the issue of whether Gulfstream was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the constitutionality of section 550.615(6).

      . The Department and Intervenors concede that these procedures were not followed. They contend that the Legislature was not required to give notice or allow for a local election because the statute was properly enacted as a general law.


text:
    Juan E. CEBALLO, et al., Petitioners, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
    No. SC06-1088.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 20, 2007.

      Lauri Waldman Ross of Lauri Waldman Ross, P.A., Miami, FL, and Keith A. Truppman of Mintz and Truppman, P.A., North Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
    James M. Fishman of James M. Fish-man, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.
    Louis K. Rosenbloum of Louis K. Ro-senbloum, P.A., Pensacola, FL, on behalf of the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers
    Elizabeth K. Russo of Russo Appellate Finn, P.A., Miami, FL, on behalf of State Farm Florida Insurance Company, as Am-ici Curiae.
   ANSTEAD, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Ceballo, 934 So.2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth District in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Ass’n, 877 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The Third District in Ceballo held that entitlement to a recovery under a supplemental ordinance and law provision of a homeowner’s policy was not affected by Florida’s Valued Policy Law (VPL), and such coverage required the insured to demonstrate an actual loss before payment was required. Ceballo, 934 So.2d at 538. For the reasons stated below, we approve the decision of the Third District and hold that the VPL, section 627.702, Florida Statutes (2004), does not override the language of a policy as it relates to supplemental coverage.

ANALYSIS

In the present case, the Ceballos lost their home to a fire- — a covered peril under their homeowner’s insurance policy with Citizens Property Insurance. The home was declared a total loss, and Citizens paid the face value of the policy. That coverage is not at issue herein. However, payment under a supplemental coverage is in dispute.

The relevant section of the Ceballos’ supplemental policy endorsement provides:

11. Ordinance or Law
a. You may use up to twenty-five percent (25%) of the limit of liability that applies to COVERAGE A for the increase [sic] costs you incur due to the enforcement of any ordinance or law which requires or regulates:
(1) The construction, demolition, remodeling, renovation or repair of that part of a covered building or other structure damaged by a PERIL INSURED AGAINST; or
(2) The demolition and reconstruction of the undamaged part of a covered building or other structure, when that building or other structure must be totally demolished because of damage by a PERIL INSURED AGAINST to another part of that covered building or other structure; or
(3) The remodeling removal or replacement of the portion of the undamaged part of a covered building or other structure necessary to complete the remodeling, repair or replacement of that part of the covered building or other structure damaged by a PERIL INSURED AGAINST.

While the parties agree that the Ceballos are entitled to recovery under this supplemental ordinance and law provision of the policy, they disagree on whether the insured must first show proof of an actual loss in order to recover under that provision. The Ceballos contend that because they have met the burden of demonstrating a total loss under the YPL, they should receive the policy limits of the supplemental coverage without establishing that they actually incurred any additional loss or expense. In rejecting this position, the Third District concluded that “[t]he Cebal-los are correct in them assertion that they are entitled to the Additional Coverage, for which they were charged and paid a premium. However, as provided in the policy, they may receive a maximum of 25% of the limit of liability, only if they actually incur the covered expenses.” 934 So.2d at 538 (footnote omitted). The district court certified that its decision as to the supplemental coverage was in conflict with the decision of the Fourth District in Mierziva. Id.

In Mierzwa, the Fourth District first interpreted the plain meaning of the VPL statute to require a homeowner’s insurer to pay the face value of the policy, even when part of the total loss was caused by a non-covered peril, and even though the insured was covered under another policy for that peril. 877 So.2d at 775-76. As noted above, that issue is not before us in this proceeding. As in Ceballo, however, the Fourth District also considered the issue of supplemental coverage under the Mierzwas’ policy. Specifically, as to that coverage, the Fourth District stated, “The owner has established beyond any question its entitlement to the additional 25% in benefits under the ordinance or law coverage.” 877 So.2d at 780. Apparently, because the Fourth District decision contains no discussion of any requirement of the insureds to demonstrate an actual loss, the Third District interpreted this language from Mierzwa as conflicting with its holding that an insured must incur an actual loss in order to recover under a supplemental coverage. The Third District certified conflict with this portion of the decision of the Fourth District. Ceballo, 934 So.2d at 538.

Valued Policy Law

Florida’s VPL was originally enacted in 1899 to promote clarity and predictability for property insurers and insureds alike by predetermining the value of insured real property and having that value set out in the policy of insurance. Ch. 4677, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla. (1899). The principal object and purpose of Florida’s VPL is to fix the measure of damages payable to the insured in case of total loss. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). The parties are in agreement here that the Ceballos have met the requirements under the statute to collect the face amount of the policy; however, they dispute whether the reference to face value in the statute also includes any supplemental coverages, thereby entitling an insured to automatic recovery of the face amount of the supplemental coverage without the need to demonstrate that a specific loss was incurred beyond the loss of the insured’s home.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines coverage as “[ijnclusion of a risk under an insurance policy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 394 (8th ed. 2004). A risk is defined as “[t]he type of loss covered by a policy; a hazard from a specified source.” Id. at 1353. In the instant case, for example, the primary risk insured against is loss and damage to the home. Typically, supplemental or additional coverage, however, is the addition to an insurance policy of a different type of loss beyond the primary risk already covered and for which the policy was designed. Logically, before an insured can add additional coverage to a policy, that policy must contain some base, standard, or initial coverage that may be augmented by additional coverage. Though related, each coverage protects against a separate covered loss or hazard. Similarly, each coverage defines the “amount and extent” of the insurer’s liability for the covered risk. See Black’s Lato Dictionary 365 (6th ed. 1990).

The plain language of Florida’s VPL, section 627.702,' Florida Statutes (2004), requires an insurer to pay that amount listed on the face of the policy in the event of a total loss without the necessity of any additional proof of the actual value of the loss incurred. Further, “face value” means the value which can be ascertained from the language of the instrument without aid from extrinsic facts or evidence. Investors’ Syndicate v. Willcuts, 45 F.2d 900, 902 (D.Minn.1930), rev’d on other grounds, 57 F.2d 811 (8th Cir.1932). Florida’s VPL specifically states that it does not apply to “any coverage or claim in which the dollar amount of coverage available as to the structure involved is not directly stated in the policy as a dollar amount specifically applicable to that particular structure.” § 627.702(5), Fla. Stat. (2004). Since the supplemental coverage provisions in the Ceballos’ policy do not directly state a dollar amount, but instead state only the maximum percentage of the limit of liability, the VPL does not apply to that coverage. Of course, the major purpose of the VPL is to require an actual dollar amount of coverage be designated in the policy as the value of a structure in order to remove any uncertainty as to the amount an insured is entitled to recover for a total loss of the structure. That purpose is generally unrelated to additional or supplemental coverage that may be offered by an insurer to an insured.

We conclude that the primary purpose and essential rationale of the VPL in bringing certainty to the value insured simply does not extend to supplemental coverage that may be provided in the same policy. In other words, the perceived need to bring certainty to claims for a total loss of an insured’s home does not extend to the resolution of claims under supplemental coverage. In this case, for example, the obligation to pay a claim under the supplemental coverage may well vaiy depending on the specific requirements of the ordinances or laws governing the rebuilding or demolition of an insured structure, and those laws may vary from place to place. Some insureds may incur such costs while others may not, and the costs themselves may vary. Under these circumstances, and unlike the issue of establishing an agreed insurable value for a destroyed residence, it would make little sense for mandating the payment of the maximum limits of coverage provided for a supplemental coverage regardless of the actual loss.

Further, supplemental insurance has not been considered by courts as being limited to or dependent upon the face value of the policy. See Bonito v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 64 Conn.App. 487, 780 A.2d 984, 988 (2001) (replacement cost endorsement did not alter the policy limits, but provided additional coverage that could exceed the limit of liability); Marchman v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 232 Ga.App. 481, 500 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1998) (replacement cost rider did not increase the face value of the policy; insured not entitled to $125,000 plus $70,000); Trible v. Tower Ins. Co., 43 Wis.2d 172, 168 N.W.2d 148, 157 (1969) (stating that the VPL “applies only to the described premises and that the value of losses covered by additional insurance must be proven”). Further, “[e]ourts have almost uniformly held that an insurance company’s liability for replacement cost does not arise until the repair or replacement has been completed.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Patrick, 647 So.2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Leo John Jordan, What Price Rebuilding?, Brief, Fall 1990, at 17; Tamco Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 216 F.Supp. 767 (N.D.Ill.1963)).

Instructively, the United States District Court in and for the Northern District of Florida in Langhorne v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 432 F.Supp.2d 1274 (N.D.Fla.2006), has considered the issue before us and explained that “because to date plaintiff has not ‘actually expended’ any amount to repair, rebuild, or replace his dwelling, defendant has no obligation to pay him under the [Extended Replacement Cost Coverage] endorsement” that provided coverage of up to an additional 100% of the face value of the policy. Id. at 1279. Similarly, in the present case, the Third District ruled that Citizens has written the policy to require the insured to incur the loss before receiving additional payments under the supplemental law and ordinance coverage. The district court explained:

The Ceballos are correct in their assertion that they are entitled to the Additional Coverage, for which they were charged and paid a premium. However, as provided in the policy, they may receive a maximum of 25% of the limit of liability, only if they actually incur1 the covered expenses. Florida’s Valued Policy Law does not alter this conclusion. To hold other-wise, and provide for damages in the absence of a loss, would be a windfall to the homeowners. We therefore reverse and remand for the Cebal-los to present proof of incurred expenses consistent with the policy.

Ceballo, 934 So.2d at 538 (footnote omitted). We agree with the Third District’s analysis. The Ceballos were entitled to, and received, the face value of their insurance policy for the loss of their home, but that loss does not affect their obligation to show that they have incurred an additional loss in order to recover under the supplemental coverage. Citizens’ counsel conceded in oral argument that “to incur” means to become liable for the expense, but not necessarily to have actually expended it. We agree. However, we also agree with Citizens that the VPL does not mandate the payment of the policy limits of the additional coverage without proof of loss where the unambiguous language of the policy requires such proof.

Conclusion

We approve the decision of the Third District below, and we disapprove of those portions of the decision in Mierzwa which conflict with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . We have disapproved of that holding in Mierzwa in Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cox, No. SC06-2494, 967 So.2d 815, 821 (Fla. Sept. 20, 2007).


author: WELLS, J.

text:
    FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Eugene A. COX, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC06-2494.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 20, 2007.

      Elliot H. Scherker, Elliot B. Kula, and Daniel M. Samson of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, FL, and Mark J. Upton of Daniell, Upton, Perry and Morris, P.C., Daphne, AL, for Petitioner.
    Louis K. Rosenbloum of Louis K. Ro-senbloum, P.A., Pensacola, FL, and Gregory M. Shoemaker of Schofield, Wade, Roane and Shoemaker, P.A., Pensacola, FL, for Respondents.
    G. Alan Howard and Robert M. Dees of Milam, Howard, Nicandri, Dees, and Gil-lam, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, on behalf of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.
    Elizabeth McArthur, David A. Yon and Travis L. Miller of Radey, Thomas, Yon, and Clark, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of American Insurance Association, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.
    Elizabeth K. Russo of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, FL, on behalf of State Farm Florida Insurance Company.
    Charles F. Beall, Jr. of Moore, Hill and Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, FL, on behalf of Helping Hands Legal Center, As Amid Curiae.
   WELLS, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cox, 943 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

DOES SECTION 627.702(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2004), REFERRED TO AS THE VALUED POLICY LAW, REQUIRE AN INSURANCE CARRIER TO PAY THE FACE AMOUNT OF THE POLICY TO AN OWNER OF A BUILDING DEEMED A TOTAL LOSS WHEN THE BUILDING IS DAMAGED IN PART BY A COVERED PERIL BUT IS SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED BY AN EXCLUDED PERIL?

Fla. Farm Bureau, 943 So.2d at 847. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the First District below.

FACTS

On September 16, 2004, Hurricane Ivan struck the Florida Panhandle. The Coxes’ home was considered a total loss and suffered both wind and flood damage. The Coxes had a homeowners’ policy valued at $65,000 with Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Florida Farm Bureau), which provided protection from losses caused by wind damage but did not include losses based on flood damage. The Coxes made a policy limits demand of $65,000, plus additional coverage for personal property and other additional provisions for a total of $117,000. Florida Farm Bureau inspected the home and asserted that the wind caused $11,583.93 of the damage to the home, the storm caused an additional $3,227.14 worth of damage to other structures, and the Coxes were entitled to $2000 for living expenses. After tendering all amounts it claimed that it owed to the Coxes under the policy, Florida Farm Bureau filed a complaint to seek declaratory relief, asserting that the loss was caused primarily by flooding. The Coxes counterclaimed for breach of contract and a violation of the Valued Policy Law (VPL). The Coxes filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, relying on Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwiting Ass’n, 877 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). After reviewing the facts to which both parties admitted, the trial court granted the Coxes’ motion, finding that “the holding in Mierzrua is controlling and binding” and that under Mierziua’s interpretation of the VPL, the VPL does not require that a covered peril be the peril causing the entire loss so long as a covered peril caused some of the loss. Florida Farm Bureau appealed this decision to the First District Court of Appeal.

On appeal, the First District reviewed the statute and the Mierzwa decision, and in a split decision (with Judge Polston dissenting), adopted Mierzwa’s interpretation of the statute:

The meaning of the VPL is simple and straightforward. There are two essentials in the statute. The first is that the building be “insured by [an] insurer as to a [e.s.] covered peril.” § 627.702(1). The second is that the building be a total loss. If these two facts are true, the VPL mandates that the carrier is liable to the owner for the face amount of the policy, no matter what other facts are involved as to the cost of repairs or replacement. That is to say, if the insurance carrier has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss, that liability is for the face amount of the policy.

Fla. Farm Bureau, 943 So.2d at 827 (quoting Mierzwa, 877 So.2d at 775-76). The ■ court further held that “[n]othing in. the statutory language limits the VPL’s application to cases in which a solitary covered peril is the sole cause of the loss.” Id. at 828. After holding that this is the clear statutory directive, the court undertook a detailed analysis as to why courts are without the power to modify a statute’s express terms. The First District then reviewed recent legislative enactments to the statute, which were not retroactive, the historical purpose of the VPL and prior case law addressing the VPL, and the effect of the insurance contract upon the. statute. The court granted Florida Farm Bureau’s motion for certification of the above issue; rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied. Id. at 847.

ANALYSIS

The VPL has been a part of Florida law since 1899, requiring insurers to set the value of property which was insured if a total loss occurred. Originally, the VPL applied to damages caused only from fire and lightning. In 1982, the Legislature extended the VPL to all covered perils, and this version remained essentially the same until 2005.

The 2004 version of the VPL, which is at issue in this case, provides:

(1) In the event of the total loss of any building, structure, mobile home as defined in s. 320.01(2), or manufactured building as defined in s. 553.36(12), located in this state and insured by any insurer as to a covered peril, in the absence of any change increasing the risk without the insurer’s consent and in the absence of fraudulent or criminal fault on the part of the insured or one acting in her or his behalf, the insurer’s liability, if any, under the policy for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has been charged and paid.

§ 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). A plain reading of the statute in its 2004 form shows that the statute intended only to set the value of the property insured by the policy in order to conclusively establish the property’s value when there is a total loss. Under the VPL, an insurer cannot challenge the value of property after a loss has occurred.

However, the statute’s requirement that the value of the property be the amount set out on the face of the policy is not the issue in this case. Florida Farm Bureau is not asserting that the value of the property it agreed to insure is less than the $65,000 set forth in the parties’ contract. Instead, Florida Farm Bureau asserts that it is not liable for the total loss of the home because the covered peril (wind damage) only caused $11,583.93 of the damage to the home; the remaining loss was caused by flood damage and storm surge, which were explicitly excluded perils. The Coxes, on the other hand, allege that the VPL requires Florida Farm Bureau to pay the full face value of the policy. Based upon the reasoning of Mierzwa, the Coxes argue that if the property is a total loss from a combination of perils which are covered and perils which are not covered under a policy, the VPL requires the insurer to pay the face amount of the policy, regardless of what portion of the total loss was caused by the covered peril. As stated above, a majority of the First District decided that the plain language of the 2004 statute required the construction of the statute in accord with the construction by the Fourth District in its Mierzwa decision.

The First District held that the VPL did more than mandate that the value of property set forth in the insurance policy is uncontestable. The district court construed the VPL to require the insurer to pay the value set forth in the policy even if a peril covered by the policy did not cause the total loss of the property.

Judge Polston dissented, stating:

I agree -with the majority’s statement of its holding that “the VPL forecloses an insurer’s challenge to the measure of damages in the event of a total loss.” Although I agree with the ruling as stated, the majority does not stop there. Instead of treating the VPL as only a valuation statute as plainly stated by the Legislature, the majority opinion aligns this court with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Mierzwa by reading into the statute a requirement for the insurer to pay for damages caused by both excluded and covered perils. “Causation” is not mentioned in the statute. Because it is not mentioned, the statute has no application other than to conclusively establish the property’s value when there is a total loss. Therefore, the unambiguous terms of the policy must be given effect.

Fla. Farm Bureau, 943 So.2d at 837 (Polston, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Polston.

As the First District correctly noted, the statute is to be given its plain meaning. See Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Fla.2006) (“When the language is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, that meaning controls unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent.”). In applying this rule, courts derive legislative intent “from the words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in speculation as to what the judges might think that the legislators intended or should have intended.” V.K.E. v. State, 934 So.2d 1276, 1286 (Fla.2006) (quoting Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779, 782 (Fla.1960)). Accordingly, “the statute’s text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature’s intent.” V.K.E., 934 So.2d at 1286.

Contrary to the conclusion of the district court, we do not find that the plain language of the statute intends that if a covered peril causes part of a total loss, that the insurer is mandated to pay for the total loss. Of particular importance, the VPL does not mention causation. Section 627.702 does not establish any requirement for an insurer to pay for excluded or non-covered perils. We read the plain language of the statute not to reasonably support such an interpretation. The beginning phrase states: “In the event of the total loss ... as to a covered peril.... ” § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). Throughout section 627.702(1), the Legislature repeatedly relies upon the terms of the parties’ insurance contract and discusses only covered perils. Section 627.702(1) explicitly states that “[i]n the event of the total loss of any building ... insured by any insurer as to a covered peril ..., the insurer’s liability, if any, 'under the policy for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for ivhich a premium has been charged and paid.” § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).

Based upon this plain language of the statute, we conclude that the statute intends that an insurer is liable for a loss by a peril covered under the policy for which a premium has been paid. The First District’s majority fails to give effect to this plain statutory language.

Our holding today is consistent with our prior case law addressing the VPL. Shortly after the 1899 adoption of the VPL in Florida, this Court reviewed the statute to determine whether the act was unconstitutional because it impermissibly confined an insurer’s defenses. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62 (1904). As this Court recognized from the beginning, the VPL was intended only to set the valuation of the insured property:

The statute requires the insurer to fix the insurable value of the building, and to specify such value in the policy, and the measure of damages in case of total loss is fixed at the amount mentioned in the policy upon which a premium is paid. The statute does not undertake to deprive the insurer of any proper defense it may have to an action upon the policy, except in respect to the measure of damages and the authority of certain agents. Its principal object and purpose is to fix the measure of damages in case of loss total, or partial; and, to this end, it requires the insurer to ascertain the insurable value at the time of writing the policy, and to write it therein.

Id. at 65.

In support of its decision, the First District’s majority opinion cites to American Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Robinson, 120 Fla. 674, 163 So. 17 (1935). We do not agree that Robinson supports the First District’s decision. In Robinson, we reaffirmed the principle that the VPL prohibits an insurer from challenging whether the value of the insured property is less than the full amount of coverage as stated in the policy based on depreciation in value or any other cause. In Robinson, the plaintiff sued his insurance company for payment on a $3000 fire insurance policy after a fire completely destroyed the insured building. Robinson, 163 So. at 19. The insurer raised numerous defenses as to why it should not be liable for the full amount, including the allegation that either before or after issuance of the policy, the insured dwelling became infected with termites or dry rot. This Court denied this defense, noting that the insurer did not contend fraud or concealment by the insured in respect to .the value of the property. Therefore, the insurer could not avoid the amount set forth in the contract by complaining about a condition which existed at the inception of the contract and which it could have ascertained if the insurer had inspected the property. Id. Next, we rejected the insurer’s claim of “depreciation by reason of ‘termites’ or ‘dry rot,’ “ holding that Florida’s VPL “will not permit a reduction of the amount of insurance specified in the policy by reason of depreciation in value caused by use, decay, accident, casualty, or otherwise, where such change arises from a supervening cause occurring subsequent to the issuance of the policy.” Id. In Robinson, the insurer was attempting to contest the value of the property since there was no issue that a covered peril caused the loss of the property. Here the insurer is not contesting the value of the property — instead, it is contesting whether it is liable for the entire loss when the covered peril alone did not cause a total loss but was only responsible for a relatively small amount of the damage.

The First District’s majority relies on Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), and Netherlands Insurance Co. v. Fowler, 181 So.2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). We do not find that these cases deal with the issue in this case. Rather, in both of the cases, the decisions found coverage because the losses were caused by a covered peril for which a premium was charged and paid.

Finally, the court below relied significantly on the Fourth District’s decision in Mierzwa. We disapprove Mierzwa. In Mierziva, as here, the insured property was damaged by a combination of wind and water in a hurricane. The insurer asserted that it was responsible for the percentage of the total loss attributable to wind. The insurer did not contest the total value of the property. We find that the Fourth District misconstrued the VPL in holding that “if the insurance earner has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss, that liability is for the face amount of the policy.” Mierzwa, 877 So.2d 775-76. As addressed above, we conclude that this holding in Mierziva was not the intended application of the VPL and did not give effect to all provisions of the VPL statute..

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the First District below, and remand the .case for further proceedings. We disapprove the decision in Mierzwa.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . The policy excluded water damage as follows:
      SECTION I — EXCLUSIONS
      1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.

      c. Water Damage, means:
      (1) Flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
      The Coxes did not carry flood insurance as to the property at issue.

      . Specifically, section 2 of chapter 4677 provided as follows:
      In case of the total loss of the property insured the measure of damage shall be the amount upon which the insured paid a premium, and, in case of partial loss, the measure of damage shall be such part of the amount upon which premiums are paid as the damage sustained is part of the insurable value of the building or structure as fixed by the agent of the insurer, and the insurers shall be estopped from denying that the property insured was worth at the time of insuring the amount of the insurable value as fixed by the agent.
      Ch. 4677, § 2, Laws of Fla. (1899).

      . Section 539 of chapter 82-243, Laws of Florida, amended the VPL as follows:
      (1) In the event of total loss by fire or lightning of any building or structure or mobile home as defined in s. 320.01(2) or manufactured building factory-built-, hous-⅛⅜ as defined in s. 553.36 (11) (4) located in this state and insured by any insurer as to a covered peril such perils, in the absence of any change increasing the risk without the insurer's consent and in the absence of fraudulent or criminal fault on the part of the insured or one acting in his behalf, the insurer’s liability, if any, under the policy for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which premium has been charged and paid.
      Ch. 82-243, § 539, Laws of Fla.

      .In 2005, after Mierzwa was released, the Legislature amended the VPL, expressly providing that "when a loss was caused in part by a covered peril and in part by a noncov-ered peril, paragraph (a) does not apply. In such circumstances, the insurer's liability under this section shall be limited to the amount of the loss caused by the covered peril.” § 627.702(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).

      . Contrary to the First District’s interpretation of this case, our decision in Robinson does not determine whether an insurer must pay for excluded perils which allegedly contributed to the loss. In Robinson, the fire, which was a covered peril, clearly caused the total loss.

      . We limit our holding to only those cases in which a covered peril did not cause a total loss or constructive total loss.