author: TRAYLOR, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. ALL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE CARRIERS AUTHORIZED AND LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN the STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2006-CD-2030.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 25, 2006.

      Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Tina V. Grant, Megan K. Terrell, Ryan M. Seidemann, Clement D. Story, III, Assistant Attorneys General, for Applicant.
    Adams & Reese, Philip A. Franco, Martin A. Stern, V. Thomas Clark, Jr., Jeffrey E. Richardson, Elizabeth Roussel, Barras-so, Usdin, Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver, H. Minor Pipes, III, Bienvenu, Foster, Ryan & O’Bannon, John W. Waters, Jr., Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse, Robert I. Siegel, Plauche’, Maselli, Landry & Par-kerson, Andrew L. Plauche’, Jr., Lugen-buhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin & Hubbard, Seth A. Schmeekle, Joseph P. Guichet, Ralph S. Hubbard, III, New Orleans, Nielsen Law firm, Gerald J. Nielsen, Metairie, Wendy S. Weingert, Martin, Disiere, Jefferson & Wisdom, Christopher W. Martin, Houston, TX, for Respondent.
    Bradley E. Black, Counsel for William Quigley, Judson Mitchell, Jr., Cheryl P. Buchert, Ramona Fernandez, Amicus Curiae.
   TRAYLOR, Justice.

l1We exercise our supervisory authority in an expedited manner to determine whether Acts 2006, Nos. 739 and 802, which extend the prescriptive period under which certain insurance claims arising from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may be filed and which may alter the insurance contractual provisions regarding the time period in which to bring a claim, are constitutional. After review of the relevant state and federal law, we find that the legislative acts at issue are constitutional.

| .FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf South region of the United States, including large land areas in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. In the southeastern portion of Louisiana, the storm surge swept across the coastal areas, causing extensive damage to property. In the City of New Orleans, where the levees failed, flood waters swamped large portions of the City. The physical devastation to homes and businesses in the aftermath of the storm itself and the subsequent flooding have additionally resulted in the displacement of a large portion of the population of the State who formerly resided in the storm-devastated areas. These former residents of southeastern Louisiana were scattered across all fifty states by Hurricane Katrina and hundreds of thousands are estimated to still be displaced outside of the State. A staggering number of houses and businesses in Louisiana were either destroyed or suffered major damage.

On September 25, 2005, Hurricane Rita hit the southwestern portion of the State of Louisiana. The storm surge associated with Hurricane Rita inundated coastal communities, leveled buildings and breached levees. As with Hurricane Katrina, mass displacement of residents occurred, this time of the citizens formerly residing in the southwestern segment of the state. Many of these citizens continue to be displaced at this time.

In the aftermath of these two storms, Governor Blanco issued several Executive Orders that extended various legal deadlines that were impossible to meet under the twin circumstances of physical devastation of property and displacement of citizens. See Executive Order Nos. KBB 2005-32, KBB 2005-48 and KBB 2005-67. As a |sfurther response to the extraordinary circumstances faced by many Louisiana citizens, the Louisiana Legislature enacted House Bill 1289 and House Bill 1302, now known as Acts 2006, Nos. 739 and 802, which extend the prescriptive period within which citizens may file certain claims under their insurance policies for losses occasioned by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Prior to these amendments, Louisiana law held that no insurance contract issued in Louisiana could limit the right of action against an insurer to a period less than twelve months. See La. R.S. 22:629(A)(3).

Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 739, the Louisiana Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the State of Louisiana on July 10, 2006 in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, ten days after the effective date of the act, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the acts at issue. Made defendant 14in this declaratory judgment action were all property and casualty insurance carriers authorized and licensed to do business in the state. Pursuant to various motions to dismiss, the State has dismissed all claims against the defendant insurers except for three insurance companies which remain in this suit — Allstate Insurance Company, State Farm Insurance Company and USAA Insurance Company.

On July 20, 2006, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) filed a Notice of Removal to Federal Court in the Middle District of Louisiana. On August 17, 2006, the federal court remanded the matter to the state district court, finding that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

On August 17, 2006, the Louisiana Attorney General filed a writ of certiorari with the Louisiana Supreme Court, urging the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and take up the matter before the district court due to the interests of judicial efficiency and in contemplation of the expiration of the former prescriptive period for citizens to file claims against their insurers. This court found that the issues presented were of an extraordinary nature, time-sensitive, and of such significant public interest that the court’s plenary, supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised. See Marionneaux v. Hines, 2005-1191 p. 4-5 (La.5/12/05), 902 So.2d 373, 376-377 (court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction in matter which had not been docketed and |fiset for hearing in the district court due to considerations of statewide effect of issue, time sensitivity of pending legislation, the public interest and judicial efficiency). Pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction, the court issued an order on August 22, 2006, granting the writ of certiorari and remanding the matter to the district court for an expedited hearing. The court additionally ordered that expedited review of the district court’s decision be made available, and set forth an expedited briefing schedule and time period for oral argument. See State of Louisiana v. All Property and Casualty Insurance Carriers Authorized and Licensed to do Business in the State of Louisiana, 2006-2030 (La.8/22/06), 936 So.2d 807.

The state district court held the ordered hearing on August 23, 2006, after which Judge Kay Bates issued a judgment finding the Acts at issue to be constitutional. Specifically, Judge Bates found without merit the defendants’ arguments regarding standing, their asserted violation of the Contracts Clauses of the Louisiana and the United States Constitutions, their asserted violations of procedural due process, and essentially pretermitted their asserted violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

On August 24, 2006, the Louisiana Attorney General sought review with this court, pursuant to the August 22, 2006 order, and oral argument was heard on August 25, 2006.

|fiLAW AND DISCUSSION

The issue presented for our determination is whether the provisions of Acts 2006, Nos. 729 and 802, which extend the prescriptive periods under which certain insurance claims arising from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may be filed and which may alter the contractual provisions of insurance policies regarding the time period in which to bring a claim, are constitutional.

The question whether the Acts at issue are constitutional is a legal question which will be reviewed de novo. Louisiana Municipal Association, et al. v. State of Louisiana and the Firefighters’ Retirement System, 2004-0227 p. 45 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 842-843. This court has repeatedly held that statutes and legislative acts are generally presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging the validity of the statute has the burden of proving it is unconstitutional. Id.; State v. Fleury, 2001-0871 p. 5 (La.10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468, 472; Board of Com’rs of North Lafourche Conservation, Levee and Drainage Dist. v. Board of Com’rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist., 95-1353 p. 3 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 636, 639. Unlike the federal constitution, the Louisiana “constitution’s provisions are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature.” Louisiana Municipal Association, 2004-0227 p. 45, 893 So.2d at 843; Board of Com’rs, 95-1353 p. 3, 666 So.2d at 639. Therefore, “[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must also cite to the specific provision of the constitution which prohibits the legislative action.” Louisiana Municipal Association, 2004-0227 p. 45, 893 So.2d at 843; Fleury, 2001-0871 p. 5, 799 So.2d at 472; Board of Com’rs, 95-1353 p. 4, 666 So.2d at 639. In this declaratory judgment action, the defendants bear the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the legislative acts at issue.

The defendants raise several grounds in the district court to support their contention that Acts 2006, Nos. 739 and 802 are unconstitutional. First, the defendants assert that the Louisiana Attorney General has no standing to bring this declaratory judgment action. Further, the defendants assert that because a portion of Act 802 refers additionally to claims brought pursuant to “flood insurance,” and flood insurance is provided through the federally-administered National Flood Insurance Program, that the state legislative act violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The defendants also assert that the Acts impair their contractual relationship with their policyholders, in violation of the Contract Clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. Finally, the defendants contend that their due process rights have been violated by the expedited nature of these proceedings.

Before proceeding to our analysis of these issues, we must first review the relevant legislative pronouncements.

La. R.S. 22:629(A)(3), prior to its 2006 amendment, provided:

§ 629. Limiting actions; jurisdiction.
A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state or any group health and accident policy insuring a resident of this state, regardless of where made or delivered shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement:
(3) Limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than twelve months next after the inception of the loss when the claim arises under any insurance classified and defined in R.S. 22:6(10), (11^(12), and .(13),c or to a period of less than one year from the time, when the cause of action accrues in connection with all other insurances unless otherwise specifically provided in this Code.

Act 739 (House Bill 1289) of the 2006 Regular Legislative Session, amended La. R.S. 22:629. What had formerly been Subsection (A)(3) was redesignated as subsection (B) to provide as follows:

B. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state, or any group health and accident policy insuring a resident of this state regardless of where made or delivered, shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than twelve months next after the inception of the loss when the claim arises under any insurance classified and defined in R.S. 22:6(10), (11), (12), and (13), or to a period of less than one year from the time when the cause of action accrues in connection with all other insurances unless otherwise specifically provided in this Code.

In addition, Act 739 enacted La. R.S. 22:658.3, which provides

§ 658.3. Filing claims; extension for claims arising from hurricane activity.
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Title to the contrary, any person or entity having a claim for damages pursuant to a homeowners’ insurance policy, personal property insurance policy, tenant homeowners’ insurance policy, condominium owners’ insurance policy, or commercial property insurance policy, and resulting from Hurricane Katrina shall have through September 1, 2007, within which to file a claim with their insurer for damages, unless a greater time period to file such claim is otherwise provided by law or by contract.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Title to the contrary, any person or entity having a claim for damages pursuant to a homeowners’ insurance policy, personal property insurance policy, tenant homeowners’ insurance policy, condominium owners’ insurance policy, or commercial property insurance policy, and resulting from Hurricane Rita shall have through October 1, 2007, within which to file a claim with their insurer for damages, unless a greater time period to file such claim is otherwise provided by law or by contract.

Act 739 was signed by the governor on June 29, 2006, and became effective on that | fldate.

The other legislative act at issue did not amend existing law or enact a new statute. Instead, Section 1 of Act 802 (House Bill 1302) set forth uncodified law, seeking generally to

prevent additional hardship to property owners who have already been overwhelmed and daunted by these hardships and have endured so much grief and suffering and who soon will be forced to decide whether to institute a lawsuit to preserve their cause of action, possibly causing unnecessary litigation or compromising ongoing settlement discussions ....

To effectuate this purpose, Section 2 of Act 802 provides uncodified legislation to establish

an additional, limited exception to the running of prescription and, as such, prevents the running of prescription for one year on any claim seeking to recover for loss or damage to property against an insurer on any homeowners’ insurance policy, including tenant and condominium policies, personal property insurance policy, commercial property insurance policy, or flood insurance policy, on any automobile or fleet policy for loss or damage to an insured’s vehicle caused by flood, wind, or rain, or on any policy for loss or damage to crop or livestock, when such loss or damage was caused by or as a result of Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita, or both. Accordingly, any such claim for damages caused by Hurricane Katrina shall be instituted on or before August 80, 2007, and any suit not instituted within that time and any claims relating thereto shall be forever barred unless a contract or the parties thereto provide for a later date. Any such claim for damages caused by Hurricane Rita shall be instituted on or before September 25, 2007, and any suit not instituted within that time and any claims relating thereto shall be forever barred unless a contract or the parties thereto provide for a later date.

Act 802 was signed by the governor on June 30, 2006, and became effective on that date.

Applicability of the Acts

Under the former law prior to enactment of these Acts, the rights of citizens to |infile insurance claims for damage caused by the hurricanes would expire on the one year anniversaries of the storms, August 29, 2006 and September 25, 2006 for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, respectively. Act 739 and Act 802 became effective when they were signed by the governor, on June 29 and June 30 of 2006, prior to the expiration of the former one-year prescriptive period of La. R.S. 22:629 for these claims.

The language of the 2006 Acts makes plain that the provisions of the 2006 Acts are to apply to claims arising prior to their effective dates, i.e. to claims arising as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Our interpretation of the applicability of this legislative action is guided by La. Civ.Code art. 6, which provides:

In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is legislative expression to the contrary.

We have previously held that Article 6 requires a two-fold inquiry:

First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive.

Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000-1132 p. 7 (La.4/3/01), 785 So.2d 1, 10, citing Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La.1992).

Here, we find that portions of the acts clearly indicate the legislature’s intent that their provisions be applied both retroactively and prospectively for the types of claims described therein. The provisions of newly-enacted R.S. 22:658.3 in Act 739 state in Subsection A that, “[n]otwith-standing any other provision of this Title to the contrary, any person or entity having a claim for damages pursuant to [various types of insurance] and resulting from Hurricane Katrina shall have through September 1, 2007, within which to file a claim with their insurer for damages, unless a greater time period to file such claim is otherwise provided by law or by contract.” (Emphasis added). Similarly, Subsection B of that statute provides that, “[njotwithstanding any other provision of this Title to the contrary, any person or entity having a claim for damages pursuant to [various types of insurance] and resulting from Hurricane Rita shall have through October 1, 2007, within which to file a claim with their insurer for damages, unless a greater time period to file such claim is otherwise provided by law or by contract. ” (Emphasis added). Act 802 likewise announces an additional, limited exception to the running of prescription “when such loss or damage was caused by or as a result of Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita, or both.” See Act 802, Section 2.

Our finding of the legislature’s intent to have the provisions of these Acts apply retroactively and prospectively would normally end our inquiry. However, in this matter we must still classify the legislation. Retroactive application of a new rule of substantive law may raise constitutional implications under the Due Process and Contract Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. Thus, it is necessary for the court to determine whether the Acts constitute substantive legislation. This court has held that “even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give a substantive [i;>law retroactive effect, the law may not be applied retroactively if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights.” Mortal, 2000-1132 p. 10, 785 So.2d at 10; Segura v. Frank, 1993-1271 p. 9 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 721.

Acts 739 and 802 of the 2006 Legislative Session concern the prescriptive period for filing claims against insurers for damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although prescriptive statutes are generally procedural in nature, which would allow retroactive application of these Acts to causes of action that arose prior to their effective dates, the extension of the time period in which to claim damages presented here merits further consideration of the nature of the legislation. Chance v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 93-2582 p. 2 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 177, 178; Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523 (La.1979).

In Chance, this court was faced with legislation which, in effect, revived an already prescribed claim. Here, the legislation at issue has the effect of extending a prescriptive period. Our analysis in Chance, finding the nature of the legislation to be substantive, is compelling:

For while the defendant does not acquire anything during the running of the prescriptive period, once the time period has elapsed, the legislature grants the defendant the right to plead the exception of prescription in order to defeat the plaintiffs claim. La.Code Civ. P. arts. 927 & 934. Because the defendant acquires the right to plead the exception of prescription, a change in that right constitutes a substantive change in the law as applied to the defendant.

Id., 93-2582 p. 2, 635 So.2d at 178.

We hold that the 2006 Acts at issue are substantive in nature. We must next determine whether the Acts impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights such that they must not be applied retroactively. See Segura, 1993-1271 p. 17, 630 So.2d at 726. Since this issue is also one of the grounds of unconstitutionality raised by the defendants, we will now analyze the arguments presented by the defendants before this |1scourt and in the district court.

Contract Clause

The defendants argue that extension of the prescriptive period in which to file damage claims for damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita found in Acts 739 and 802 violates the Contract Clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions by substantially impairing the private contractual relationship between authorized property and casualty insurers and their policyholders.

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the Obligations of Contracts.” United States Constitution Article I, Section 10. Similarly, the Contract Clause of the Louisiana Constitution states that “[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.” La. Const. Art. 1, Section 23. This court has previously described these constitutional provisions as “virtually identical” and “substantially equivalent.” Morial, 2000-1132 p. 12, 785 So.2d at 13; Segura, 1993-1271 p. 20, 630 So.2d at 728.

Although the language of these constitutional clauses appears unambiguously absolute, “the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2721, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978).

It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.

Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 241, 98 S.Ct. at 2721, quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480, 26 S.Ct. 127, 130, 50 L.Ed. 274 (1905). Thus, the prohibition contained in the Contract Clause “must be accommodated to the inherent power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410, 103 S.Ct. 697, 704, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983) (internal citation omitted).

In Board of Comm’rs v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986), this court set forth the appropriate Contract Clause analysis as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Energy Reserves, supra. See Segura, 1993-1271 p. 21, 630 So.2d at 729. The standard to be used by reviewing courts is a four-step analysis, as follows:

first, the court must determine whether the state law would, in fact, impair a contractual relationship; second, if an impairment is found, the court must determine whether the impairment is of constitutional dimension; third, if the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the court must determine whether a significant and legitimate public purpose justifies the regulation; finally, if a significant and legitimate public purpose exists, the court must determine whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation’s adoption.

Segura, 1993-1271 p. 21, 630 So.2d at 729; Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 410-413, 103 S.Ct. at 704-705. We will analyze the effect of the 2006 Acts under this four part test.

1. Impairment of Contractual Relationship

Regarding the first inquiry, we have already determined that application of Act 739 and Act 802 would extend the time period during which policyholders could file damage claims against their insurers for property damage sustained in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The defendant insurers will be prohibited from pleading the exception of prescription for those claims filed within the one-year extension of the prescriptive period authorized by the Acts. Thus, we hold that this extension of the prescriptive period in which to file damage claims would, in fact, constitute an | ^impairment of the contractual relationship between the defendant insurers and their policyholders. See Segura, 1993-1271 p. 21-22, 630 So.2d at 729.

2. Constitutional Dimension of Impairment

We must next determine whether the impairment is one of constitutional dimension. This court has previously held that “this inquiry requires a reviewing court to determine the severity of the impairment.” Segura, 1993-1271 p. 22, 630 So.2d at 729. “Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage, while severe impairment will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation.” Id., 1993-1271 p. 22, 630 So.2d at 729, citing Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 254, 98 S.Ct. at 2727. In order for contractual impairment to be termed “substantial,” the impairment need not rise to the level of total destruction of contractual expectations. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704. In addition, in determining the extent of the impairment, a reviewing court may also consider “whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Id. For, “where a complaining party enters a contractual relationship in a heavily regulated industry, expectations of further regulation of that industry may lessen the severity of a subsequent impairment of that party’s contractual rights and obligations.” Segura, 1993-1271 p. 23, 630 So.2d at 730.

As in Segura, we can measure the severity of the impairment of the defendants’ contracts by determining the extent to which the insurers’ contractual expectations would be frustrated by operation of the 2006 Acts. Id., 1993-1271 p. 23, 630 So.2d at 730. At the time the insurance policies were issued, former R.S. 22:629 provided that claimants had at least one year in which to bring damage claims under the policies. Consistent with the law existing at that time, certain defendant insurers did |1Rnot undertake the obligation to extend a period of time longer than one year to allow policyholders to file claims from the dates of a damage-causing event. Each insurer reasonably expected that damage claims filed after a one year prescriptive period would be unenforceable due to exceptions of prescription. To that extent, the impairments of the defendant insurers’ contractual obligations could be said to be substantial.

On the other hand, this court has previously held that “the Louisiana insurance industry is pervasively regulated.” Habeney v. Bellow, 1994-1600 p. 1 (La.10/28/94), 645 So.2d 624. In fact, the minimum prescriptive period was already set by statute in the former R.S. 22:629. Thus, a change in the prescriptive period was a legal possibility. See Segura, 1993-1271 p. 24, 630 So.2d at 731.

While we find that the contractual obligations of the defendant insurers under the 2006 Acts may be substantially impaired, we also note the fact that state law has traditionally regulated insurance as a matter of public policy, even including the precise procedural mechanism for filing claims at issue herein. On balance, as we found in Segura, the impairments in these cases constitute more than minimal alteration of the insurers’ contractual obligations and are therefore of constitutional dimension. Id., 1933-1271 p. 25, 630 So.2d at 731. However, we also find that the impairments constitute considerably less than total destruction of the insurers’ contractual expectations. Id. Consequently, when we inquire into the public purpose 117underlying the legislation, we will give considerable deference to the legislature’s judgment. Id.

3. Significant and Legitimate Public Purpose

The third inquiry is whether a significant and legitimate public purpose justifies the regulation. As we stated in Segura,

the public purpose requirement is primarily designed to prevent a state from embarking on a policy motivated by a simple desire to escape its financial obligations or to injure others through the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts of the denial of means to enforce them.

Id., 1933-1271 p. 25, 630 So.2d at 731, citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934).

In this case, Act 739 and Act 802 were enacted by the Louisiana Legislature in order to protect the health and general welfare of the citizens of this state affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The best explanation of the public purpose of this legislation is supplied by the legislature itself in Section 1 of Act 802:

The Louisiana Legislature finds that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created a statewide emergency and inflicted immediate undue and unimaginable hardships on hundreds of thousands of Louisiana citizens, including forced evacuation or rescue, difficulty in finding shelter, multiple relocations, and coping with the death or uncertainty of the whereabouts of loved ones. The legislature further notes that subsequent hardships have included delayed reentry into hurricane-affected areas, massive clean-up and debris removal efforts, the attempted salvage of personal effects, the severity of the damage to homes and businesses and difficulty in determining the extent of the damage, the difficulty of obtaining information regarding rebuilding, the loss of personal legal documents including insurance contracts, the complexity of legal issues, discerning the distinctions between flood insurance, hurricane insurance, and homeowner’s insurance and understanding how these types of coverage work together, possible multiple insurance carriers, the limited availability of adjusters and the time constraints on such adjusters in processing the more than one and one-half million claims filed for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita combined, complex negotiations with insurance companies, and decisions as to whether to enter into mediation offered by the Louisiana Department of Insurance. The legislature further recognizes additional and ongoing emotional and psychological hardships, including the difficulties imposed by remaining separated from family members, facing the devastating loss of life and 11Rproperty, being displaced from one’s home, neighborhood, school, church, and community, and post-traumatic stress and depression as evidence by continued mental anguish and related suicides. This uncodified law is enacted to prevent additional hardship to property owners who have .already been overwhelmed and daunted by these hardships and have endured so . much grief and suffering and who soon-will be forced to decide whether to institute a lawsuit to preserve their cause of action, possibly causing unnecessary litigation or compromising ongoing settlement discussions and, as such shall be liberally construed to effect its purposes.

We recognize the inadequacy of words to describe the total devastation of property, community and social structure which are the after-effects of these catastrophic storms. At oral argument, counsel for Allstate agreed with the description that these storms constitute the worst natural disaster to ever have occurred in the United States. Consequently, in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season, we find the legislative extension of the prescriptive period for damage claims is based upon a significant and legitimate public purpose.

A Appropriateness of Adjustment of Contractual Rights and Responsibilities

After finding a significant and legitimate public purpose supporting the legislation, the court must determine whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation’s adoption. “Unless the state itself is a contracting party, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.” Segura, 1933-1271 p. 26, 630 So.2d at 732.

The contractual relationships impaired in these cases are private ones between defendant insurers and their policyholders. We have determined that, while of constitutional dimension, the substantial impairment is of the type that may be anticipated in this highly regulated industry. We note that the legislature’s extension of the prescriptive period for filing claims in these types of insurance cases is limited |19in both time and scope. The prescriptive period is extended for only one additional year and is limited to certain types of claims arising out of damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Consequently, we find that the measures taken by the legislature in the enactment of the 2006 legislation at issue are both appropriate and reasonable in order to protect the rights of the citizens of Louisiana and their general welfare.

In this context, the court must also address an argument raised by the defendant insurers regarding the State’s position as a property owner and property insurance policyholder who may benefit from the extension of time in which to file claims. In addition, the defendant insurers raise the concern that the State, through the state program known as the Louisiana Recovery Authority, will be assigned the remaining rights of policyholders and may benefit from the extension of time in which to pursue these assigned claims.

The Supreme Court has previously considered these arguments, finding that “[w]hen the state is a party to the contract, ‘complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity [of the state legislation] is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.’ ” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 705 n. 14, quoting United States Trust Co. v. Netv Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1519, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). Even under this- stricter standard of review of the public.purpose of the legislation, our conclusion that the measures taken by the Louisiana legislature in Acts 739 and 802 were both appropriate and reasonable | Pnis not shaken. The State was not providing a benefit to a special interest, including the State itself. The fact that the State is also an affected property owner we find incidental , to the scope of the matter at issue. Finally, we note, as was discussed in oral argument, that any recovery by the State through the Louisiana Recovery Authority will not be kept for the State’s use, but will be put back into the program for the benefit of the community through grants.

Accordingly, we conclude under the appropriate Contract Clause analysis, application of Acts 2006, Nos. 739 and 802 would violate neither the federal nor the state constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual obligations.

Standing

The defendants contend in the district court that the Louisiana Attorney General does not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action to test the constitutionality of these legislative acts, arguing that proceedings should be brought contradictorily solely between interested persons. We agree with the district court’s determination of this issue and find the argument meritless. The legislature authorized the Louisiana Attorney General to seek a declaratory judgment within the very legislation at issue. Section 3 of Act 739 provides:

The attorney general is hereby directed to file suit within ten days of the effective date of this Act seeking declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of the provisions of this Act or the constitutionality of Acts 2006, No. [802] that originated as House Bill 1302 or Acts 2006, No. - that originated as Senate Bill No. 740, and such suit shall seek to determine the constitutionality of any or all of these Acts.

Thus, the Louisiana Attorney General was authorized to file this declaratory judgment |⅞1 action, seeking a judicial declaration as to the constitutionality of Acts 739 and 802.

Supremacy Clause

The defendants further contend that the Acts are in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because the extended prescriptive period to file a claim contained in the Acts is an attempt to regulate flood insurance, which is preempted by federal law. Initially, we note that only Act 802 contains a provision regarding “flood insurance policy” as one of the types of insurance for which claims may be instituted within the legislatively extended time period, on or before August 30, 2007 for a claim for damage caused by Hurricane Katrina and on or before September 25, 2007 for a claim for damage caused by Hurricane Rita. There is no allegation of unconstitutionality on Supremacy Clause grounds asserted as to Act 739. Consequently, there is no Supremacy Clause argument which may be asserted as to Act 739.

The United States Constitution provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land_” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The complained-of portion of Section 2 of Act 802 provides as follows:

Recognizing the magnitude of the unprecedented destruction caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the breaches in the levee systems, the widespread and life-altering hardships suffered as a result of the hurricanes and the devastation, and the need for equity and fairness particularly in these trying times, the Louisiana Legislature hereby establishes an additional, limited exception to the running of prescription and, as such, prevents the running of prescription for one year on any claim seeking to recover for loss or damage to property against an insurer on any homeowners’ insurance policy, including tenant and condominium policies, personal property insurance policy, commercial property insurance policy or flood insurance policy, on any automobile or fleet policy for loss or damage to an insured’s vehicle caused by flood, |?,¿wind or rain, or on any policy for loss of damage to crop or livestock, when such loss of damage was caused by or as a result of Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita, or both. (Emphasis added)

The district court found that, since the National Flood Insurance Program deals only with claims arising from flood damage, there was no need to discuss the possibility of any federal preemption because there was no showing at this time that any claim resulting from flood damage would fall outside of the one-year prescriptive period set by Congress.

Our reading of Act 802 leads us to the conclusion that no Supremacy Clause violation has occurred because the Louisiana Legislature in Act 802 made no attempt to ■regulate the federally-regulated National Flood Insurance Program. All parties agree that the National Flood Insurance Program is federally regulated through the National Flood Insurance Act. See Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129. Although the Louisiana Attorney General argues that the portion of Act 802 referring to “flood insurance policies” may be severed out of the legislation, we do not find that action to be necessary here.

The insurance companies and other insurers which form, associate, or otherwise join together in the pool under this part may adjust and pay all claims for proved and approved losses covered by flood insurance in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and, upon the disallowance by any such company or other insurer of any such claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant to accept the amount allowed upon any such claim, the claimant, within one year after the date of mailing of notice of disallow-anee or partial disallowance of the claim, may institute an action on such claim against such company or other insurer in the United States district court for the district in which the insured property ór the major part thereof shall have been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such court to hear and determine such action without regard to the amount in controversy. (Emphasis added).

12SIn construing statutes, “courts must endeavor to give an interpretation that will give them effectiveness and purpose, rather than one which makes them meaningless.” State v. Cunningham, 2004-2200 p. 8-9 (La.6/13/05), 903 So.2d 1110, 1116; State v. Union Tank Car Company, 439 So.2d 377, 382 (La.1983). Thus, “if there are two ways to interpret a statute, courts are to interpret the statute in such a manner to uphold the constitutionality.” Cunningham, 2004-2200 p. 9, 903 So.2d at 1116; State v. Interiano, 2003-1760 p. 4 (La.2/13/04), 868 So.2d 9, 13.

Keeping these rales of construction in mind, we find that the phrase “or flood insurance policy,” can be read to reference other types of flood insurance policies other than the federally-regulated flood insurance program. For any type of flood insurance other than the federally-regulated flood insurance, the Legislature, through Act 802, provides an exception to the running of prescription for these types of insurance which are subject to state regulation. We do not find that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is implicated by Act 802.

Procedural Due Process

In the district court, the defendants objected to these proceedings as being violative of their rights to procedural due process. Specifically, the defendants claim they were rushed in their preparation due to the expedited hearing schedule ordered by this court. The district court found this contention to be meritless, noting that the defendants had ample notice of the proceedings because the Acts themselves put property and casualty insurance carriers on notice of this inevitable proceeding by the Attorney General.

We agree with the district court’s finding. The legislation at issue became effective, at the latest, on June 30, 2006. The declaratory judgment action was perfected on all of the named defendants more than a month ago. All of the parties | ^were on notice of the substance of the issues to be considered. The fact that the defendant insurers attempted to remove the matter to federal court, and the matter was remanded to state court, does not change the fact that all of the parties have had adequate and substantial notice of the legal issues involved in this matter. In addition, the parties were aware of the legislature’s charge to suspend delays and rules to the extent practicable in order to facilitate the expedient resolution of this matter. We find that there has been no violation of the defendants’ due process rights in the presentation and resolution of this matter.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court, finding constitutional 2006 Acts, Nos. 739 and 802. In keeping with the expedited nature of this proceeding, we order that an application seeking rehearing of this matter must be filed no later than 12:00 noon on Saturday, August 26, 2006.

      . Executive Order KBB 2005-32, signed on September 6, 2005, provided in pertinent part, that "[a]ll deadlines in legal proceedings, including liberative prescriptive and peremptive periods in all courts, administrative agencies, and boards are hereby suspended until at least September 25, 2005, including, but not limited to, any such deadlines set for in the following:(A) Louisiana Civil Code; (B) Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure; (C) La. R.S. Title 9, Civil Code Ancillaries; (D) La. R.S. Title 13, Courts and Judicial Procedure; (E) La. R.S. Title 23, Chapter 10, Worker’s Compensation; (F) La. R.S. Title 40, Chapter 5 Part XXI-A, Malpractice Liability for State Services; and (G) La. R.S. Title 40, Chapter 5, Part XXIII, Medical Malpractice.” This order applied retroactively from Monday, August 29, 2005 [the date that Hurricane Katrina made landfall], through Sunday, September 25, 2005, "unless amended, modified, terminated, or rescinded by the governor, or terminated by operation of law prior to such time.”
      Executive Order KBB 2005-48, signed on September 23, 2005, extended Executive Order KBB 2005-32 for an additional thirty days and specified that the suspension of laws authorized therein would apply statewide "except to the extent that the suspension of deadlines in legal proceedings may hereafter be shortened or lifted, in whole or in part, by an order issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court acting in accordance with the power vested pursuant to Article V of the Constitution.”
      Executive Order KBB 2005-67, signed on October 19, 2005 [after Hurricane Rita made landfall], suspended liberative prescription and peremptive periods until at least Friday, November 25, 2005. In addition, this order specifically provided for the suspension of deadlines in legal proceedings in the parishes affected by Hurricane Rita and referenced particular types of legal proceedings that were otherwise subject to rules promulgated by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

      . Section 3 of Act 739 provides: "The attorney general is hereby directed to file suit within ten days of the effective date of this Act seeking declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of the provisions of this Act or the constitutionality of Acts 2006, No. - that originated as House Bill 1302 or Acts 2006, No.-that originated as Senate Bill 740, and such suit shall seek to determine the constitutionality of any or all of these Acts.” Similarly, Section 3 of Act 802 provides that any domiciliary in this state may institute a declaratory judgment action in the 19th Judicial District Court to determine the constitutionality of the provisions of these Acts. The legislature specifically found that cumulation of any actions filed pursuit to this Section was permissible and urged the 19th Judicial District Court, the First Circuit Court of Appeal, if applicable, and the Louisiana Supreme Court to minimize all unnecessary delays in determining the issue.

      . The record contains a motion to dismiss defendant insurers from suit filed on July 17, 2006. R., p. 108-109. In addition, the State’s brief asserts that further motions to dismiss were filed on August 17, 2006 and August 22, 2006. Brief of Louisiana Attorney General, p. 2-3. At oral argument, the parties agreed that the only insurers remaining in the action are the three listed above.
      These motions to dismiss were premised upon stipulations filed by the other property and casualty insurance carriers authorized and licensed to do business in the state which provided that they would voluntarily abide by the provisions of the 2006 Acts. These stipulations were provided pursuant to Directive 199 of the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance, which contained a mandatory requirement to extend the prescriptive period for Louisiana insureds to file suit or legal action for recovery of damages caused by Hurricane Katrina and/or Hurricane Rita. See Brief of Louisiana Attorney General, Exhibit 3.

      . This court's order of August 22, 2006 provided as follows:
      Writ Granted. This matter is remanded to the district court, which is ordered to set the case for evidentiary hearing no later than Wednesday, August 23, 2006. The district court is to render a decision on the constitutional issue on that date. Irrespective of the ruling below, any party may apply directly to this court for review of the district court’s decision by 10:00 a.m., Thursday, August 24, 2006. Should this matter return to this court, a hearing shall be held on Friday, August 25, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. The parties should file briefs in this court by 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, August 24, 2006.

      . In its brief to this court, USAA argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s ruling. Since the district court found the Acts at issue to be constitutional, and the review was sought in this court by the Louisiana Attorney General, USAA asserts that any pronouncements in this court would be tantamount to a prohibited advisory opinion. This court assumed jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of these Acts on August 22, 2006, remanding to the district court and ordering that a hearing be held. Irrespective of what the district court ultimately ruled, this court retained its jurisdiction to review the matter, setting forth the expedited briefing schedule and time period for oral argument. The fact that a hearing was ordered in the district court does not negate the fact that the court retained jurisdiction in order to review that ruling.

      . La. R.S. 22:6(10), (11), (12) and (13) refers to the following classifications of insurance: fire and extended coverage, R.S. 22:6(10); steam boiler and sprinkler leakage, R.S. 22:6(11); crop and live stock, R.S. 22:6(12); and marine and transportation (inland marine), R.S. 22:6(13).

      . Section 4 of Act 739 provides in pertinent part that the Act would become effective upon the governor's signature.

      .Section 4 of Act 802 provides in pertinent part that the Act would be come effective upon the governor's signature.

      . For insurance contracts that provided the minimum allowable twelve month filing period.

      . This court has previously defined these different types of laws as follows:

        Substantive laws establish new rules, rights and duties or change existing ones. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 817 (La.1992); Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 360 So.2d 1331, 1339 (La.1978). Procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws. Graham v. Sequoya Corp., 478 So.2d 1223, 1226 (La. 1985); Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidal Control Levee Dist., 445 So.2d 1221, 1224 (La.1984). Interpretive laws merely establish the meaning the interpreted statute had from the time of its enactment. St. Paul Pire & Marine, 609 So.2d at 817; Ardoin, 360 So.2d at 1339.

        Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 p. 12 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 723.

      . The court is aware that some insurance policies provide for a longer period of time than one year to file a claim. At oral argument, counsel for Allstate theorized that this fact may be one of the reasons that other property and casualty insurance carriers signed the stipulations pursuant to Directive 199. As discussed at oral argument, the court’s determination of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Acts at issue will impact only the three property and casualty insurance carriers presently before the court-all others authorized and licensed to do business in the State of Louisiana have voluntarily agreed to an extension of time in which to file claims.

      . We note that in both brief and oral argument, there was a discussion that the states neighboring Louisiana all have time periods greater than one year in which to file similar claims. Thus, there apparently is no nationwide standard for the time period in which to file a property or casualty insurance claim.

      . The defendants argue that the Acts at issue were unnecessary as Louisiana law already contains the means for persons prevented from filing suit to avoid dismissal of their claims due to prescription. Specifically, the defendants point out that the doctrine of contra non valentem applies to prevent the running of liberative prescription where, in fact and for good cause, a plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues. As was discussed in oral argument, determinations of whether contra non valentem applies generally proceeds on an individual, case-by-case basis. In order to avoid mass confusion and an increase in filings in our courts, the Legislature addressed this significant public concern in an appropriate manner.

      . Insofar as the defendant insurers claim imposition of the extended prescriptive period violates constitutional due process concerns, our conclusion that no unconstitutional violation occurred would be the same because the tests are similar. The Supreme Court has held " '[t]he retroactive aspects of [economic] legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process': a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.” General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992), citing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2718, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984).

      . To the extent that the defendant insurers argue the Louisiana Attorney General does not have standing to seek review of the district court’s ruling in this court, under the argument that the State was the prevailing party in the district court, we reassert that this court retained jurisdiction to determine this matter in its August 22, 2006 order. See Footnote 5, infra.

      . Although not stated in her reasons for judgment, we believe the district court's ruling in this regard was premised on Title 42 U.S.C. U.S.C. § 4053, which provides for the adjustment and payment of claims of flood insurance policies, judicial review, limitations on those actions and the applicable jurisdiction, as follows:

      . La. R.S. 24:175(A) provides: “Unless otherwise specifically provided therein, the provisions of each act of the legislature are sever-able, whether or not a provision to that effect is included in the act. If any provision or item of an act, or the application thereof, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items, or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision, item, or application.”

      . The only substantive detriment mentioned by counsel for Allstate during oral argument in this court was the fact that the insurer had not been able to compile information to support its argument that the rates of their policies were based on the one year prescriptive period for filing claims. However, we have held that the impairment of contract which might occur is justified by the significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 2006 Acts at issue.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Vincent C. COFIELD.
    No. 2006-B-0577.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 1, 2006.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| t This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Vincent C. Cofield, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension. In re: Cofield, 04-0033, 04-0558 (La.3/23/04), 869 So.2d 784.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed three sets of formal charges against respondent. The first set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 02-DB-018, was filed on February 14, 2002 and consists of two counts of misconduct. The second set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 03-DB-056, was filed on August 25, 2003 and consists of one count of misconduct. The third set, bearing the disciplinary board’s docket number 03-DB-083, was filed on December 12, 2003 and consists of two counts of misconduct.

The three sets of formal charges were considered by separate hearing committees. By order of the disciplinary board dated August 13, 2004, the three matters were consolidated. On March 10, 2006, the board filed in this court a single recommendation of discipline encompassing all three sets of formal charges.

J£2-DB-018

Count I — The Davis Trust Matter

In January 1986, Keith Davis, then a minor, received a substantial monetary award for injuries he sustained in a car accident. Apparently, the money was invested in a brokerage account. Mr. Davis’ mother, Altonette Jones, handled her son’s affairs until he turned eighteen, at which time Mr. Davis took over the handling of his money and apparently began spending an excessive amount.

On February 6, 1998, respondent prepared, and Mr. Davis executed, a full power of attorney giving Ms. Jones power of attorney over the affairs of her “disabled and spendthrift” son. In March 1999, Ms. Jones requested that respondent set up a trust for her son naming her as the trustee. On March 25, 1999, respondent prepared and executed an irrevocable trust designating himself as trustee over Mr. Davis’ property, including $350,756.62 invested in a trust account with Edward Jones Company.

Between August 23, 1999 and September 29, 1999, respondent made cash advances, totaling $4,650, to Mr. Davis from respondent’s personal funds. On September 2, 1999, respondent prepared and executed a line of credit promissory note in the amount of $50,000, listing himself as borrower and Mr. Davis as lender. On October 4,1999, respondent issued a check from Mr. Davis’ trust account made payable to cash in the amount of $14,000, which respondent then endorsed and cashed. Respondent retained $7,000 for himself as a personal loan from Mr. Davis and apparently paid back a portion of this loan by deducting the $4,650 in cash advances he had provided to Mr. Davis. Respondent held the other $7,000 to be Isdistributed to Mr. Davis in the future. Thereafter, he provided Mr. Davis with numerous advances from the $7,000 he was holding.

When Ms. Jones learned of the $14,000 check and failed to obtain an explanation from respondent as to its purpose, she hired attorney William Crews to file a lawsuit against respondent on behalf of herself and her son. Altonette Davis Jones and Keith Glendrell Davis v. Vincent C. Cofield, No. 71829, on the docket of the Tenth Judicial District Court, filed on November 12, 1999. On or about November 7, 1999, just prior to the filing of the lawsuit, respondent prepared, and Mr. Davis executed, a revocation of power of attorney, revoking Ms. Jones’ power of attorney over her son’s affairs. On or about November 14, 1999, respondent prepared, and Mr. Davis executed, a statement to Mr. Crews wherein Mr. Davis terminated the services of Mr. Crews and also directed that the lawsuit against respondent be terminated. On or about November 23, 1999, respondent prepared, and Mr. Davis executed, a joint motion to dismiss the lawsuit against respondent, despite the' fact that Mr. Davis was still represented by Mr. Crews. Thereafter, respondent filed the joint motion to dismiss into the court record. At a hearing on March 8, 2000, the judge denied the joint motion to dismiss, stating the following:

Initially the Court will note that this is an unusual proceeding. There is a Joint Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice that was filed into the suit record on November 23, 1999. This Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed after the Court had ordered Mr. Cofield and other parties to have no contact with and to file no other pleadings in this matter. The Court feels that Mr. Keith Davis has some mental disability resulting from his injuries sustained when he was a small child. The Court spoke with Mr. Davis at a previous hearing at the request of all counsel and Mr. Davis advised the Court that it was not his intent to dismiss | ¿his suit in this matter. The Court will deny the Joint Motion to Dismiss.

By judgment dated April 24, 2000, respondent was removed as trustee of Mr. Davis’ trust and Morris Reid, Sr., Mr. Davis’ grandfather, was appointed trustee. By this time, the trust account had an approximate balance of $91,000.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in this matter violated Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.8 (engaging in prohibited transactions with a client), 1.14 (client under a disability), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16 (declining or terminating a representation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count II — The Stills Matter

In January 2000, Mike and Brenda Stills requested arbitration of a fee dispute with respondent through the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program provided by the Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”). While respondent initially agreed to arbitration, in March 2000, he attempted to withdraw his consent. His request to withdraw was rejected, and arbitration proceeded. On June 21, 2000, the arbitrator awarded respondent $1,000 in fees but found that he owed the Stills $1,200 of the fee they had paid him.

|sOn August 7, 2000, respondent requested that the LSBA provide him an additional 120 days to refund the $1,200 because he was having medical and financial problems. Eventually, the matter was forwarded to the ODC. In May 2001, respondent informed the Stills as well as the ODC that he was unable to pay the $1,200 and would be including the debt in his petition for bankruptcy.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.5(f)(6) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.15(c) (safekeeping property of clients or third parties), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges, denying the allegations of misconduct.

Formal Hearing

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits. Both respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence. The ODC called Ms. Jones, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Crews to testify before the committee. Respondent testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the ODC. The parties also filed a joint stipulation, agreeing to the following facts:

1) Respondent borrowed funds from Mr. Davis’ trust in the amount of $7,000;
2) Between August 23, 1999 and September 29, 1999, respondent made cash advances of approximately $4,650 from his personal funds to Mr. Davis;
|fi3) On October 4, 1999, respondent issued a check from Mr. Davis’ trust account, payable to cash in the amount of $14,000. Thereafter, he endorsed same for cashing, and pursuant to an agreement with Mr. Davis, retained $7,000 as a personal loan and held the rest for regular disbursements to Mr. Davis;
4) Respondent had in his files a line of credit document in the amount of $50,000 in favor of himself;
5) Between October 1, 1999 and November 1, 1999, respondent continued to advance funds to Mr. Davis from Mr. Davis’ funds in respondent’s possession;
6) On or about November 14, 1999, at Mr. Davis’ request, respondent prepared a letter for Mr. Davis that notified Mr. Crews of his desire to terminate the relationship;
7) On or about November 23, 1999, Mr. Davis and respondent filed a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice Mr. Davis’ lawsuit against respondent;
8) By consent of Mr. Davis and respondent, an order was signed by the Tenth Judicial District Court removing respondent as trustee; and
9) Respondent has not paid any funds to the Stills pursuant to an arbitration award arising out of a fee dispute.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee determined that respondent’s testimony was “inconsistent and largely unbelievable.” The committee then made factual findings as follows:

Count I:
1) In 1998, respondent assumed the representation of Mr. Davis in several legal matters.
|72) Mr. Davis has, and at all material times had, a mental impairment that obviously rendered him incapable of participating in the decision-making process regarding his representation.
3) On February 6,1998, respondent prepared and caused to be executed a full power of attorney giving Ms. Jones power of attorney over Mr. Davis’ affairs.
4) On March 25, 1999, respondent prepared and caused to be executed a declaration of irrevocable trust designating himself as trustee of Mr. Davis’ property as well as his assets, which assets consisted of cash deposits with Edward Jones.
5) From August 23, 1999 to September 29, 1999, respondent made cash advances from his personal funds to Mr. Davis of approximately $4,650.
6) On September 2, 1999, respondent prepared and caused to be executed a line of credit promissory note in the amount of $50,000 from Mr. Davis to respondent for respondent’s own use and benefit; however, there is no evidence that any funds were advanced to respondent under this contract.
7) On October 4, 1999, respondent issued a check from Mr. Davis’ trust account payable to cash in the amount of $14,000, which respondent endorsed and cashed, retaining $7,000 as a personal loan from Mr. Davis and retaining $4,650 as reimbursement for the prior cash advances to Mr. Davis; the remaining funds were maintained by respondent to satisfy Mr. Davis’ future requests for cash.
8) There is no evidence that the $7,000 loan has been repaid.
9) On or about November 14, 1999, respondent prepared and caused, to be executed by Mr. Davis a statement wherein Mr. Davis purportedly terminated the services of Mr. Davis’ current attorney, Mr. Crews, in a pending lawsuit against respondent. Respondent never contacted Mr. Crews.
| «10) On or about November 23, 1999, respondent prepared and caused to be executed by Mr. Davis a joint motion to dismiss the pending lawsuit; again, respondent never contacted Mr. Crews.
Count II:
1) On or about January 24, 2000, the Stills, on behalf of Carlton Taylor, sought arbitration of a fee dispute with respondent through the LSBA.
2) By decision dated June 21, 2000, respondent was awarded a total fee of $1,000 and ordered to refund $1,200 to the Stills.
3) Respondent failed to make the refund.
4) Respondent ultimately amended his pending bankruptcy petition to include the $1,200 owed to the Stills; the amount was ultimately discharged by the bankruptcy court.

Based on these findings, the committee determined that, in Count I, respondent violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.14, 1.15(a), 1.16, 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, the committee found that respondent’s administration of the trust was grossly inadequate and he failed to comprehend the nature of his fiduciary duties. Respondent also continued to deal directly with Mr. Davis after it was known that he was incapable of handling his affairs and after Ms. Jones was granted power of attorney. Respondent further distributed funds to Mr. Davis from a safe in his office. Finally, respondent continued to act as counsel for Mr. Davis after another attorney was engaged by Mr. Davis to sue respondent; these acts were done in an effort to dismiss the lawsuit against respondent. In Count II, the committee determined that respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

|sThe committee found that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients and as a professional. Relying upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is a period of suspension.

As aggravating factors, the committee recognized respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct in Count I, and vulnerability, of the victim. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years for his misconduct in Count I and be suspended from the practice of law for six months for his misconduct in Count II. The committee also recommended that the suspensions run concurrently and respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

One member of the committee filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the recommended sanction, but with respect to Count II, questioning “whether there is a legal basis to bring charges based on a punitive disciplinary award from a fee arbitration process.” Thereafter, the ODC filed an amendment to the formal charges, withdrawing the allegations set forth in Count II.

Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

03-DB-056

Respondent’s testimony at the formal hearing in 02-DB-018 indicated that he engaged in further misconduct in the Davis Trust matter. Specifically, respondent named himself trustee of Mr. Davis’ funds and undertook trastee responsibilities even |inthough he believed that Mr. Davis was capable of taking care of his own financial affairs. Respondent further advised Ms. Jones and Mr. Davis that the only way to protect Mr. Davis’ funds was for respondent to be the trustee. However, respondent did not possess or acquire training or knowledge in investments, financial management, or trust law.

Respondent retained Mr. Davis’ cash in his office safe and regularly disbursed the cash to Mr. Davis. Respondent also had Mr. Davis execute two promissory notes in the amount of $7,000 each to disguise the $14,000 withdrawal.

Furthermore, respondent advised Mr. Davis that he could get his houses repaired if he set up a line of credit for respondent’s use and benefit. As such, respondent had Mr. Davis execute a line of credit promissory note in the amount of $50,000 and kept the instrument in his file. Respondent also attempted to limit his liability for negligent management of the trust funds by providing for interest at the rate of 8% per annum.

Finally, respondent continued to have direct contact with Mr. Davis after he and his mother filed a lawsuit against respondent because of his actions as trustee. Respondent also had Mr. Davis examined by Dr. John Simoneaux after the lawsuit was filed. Furthermore, shortly before the hearing in 02-DB-018, respondent obtained an affidavit from Mr. Davis wherein respondent attempted to release himself from professional and fiduciary liability.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.2(a)(b) (scope of the representation), 1.5(b) (failure to have a clear fee agreement), 1.7 (engaging in a conflict of interest), 1.15(a), 1.16(a) (declining or terminating a representation), 2.1 (failure to properly advise a client), 2.2 (improperly acting as intermediary with clients), 3.4(b) (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 4.1 In (truthfulness in statements to others), 4.2 (communication with a person represented by counsel), 4.3 (dealings with an unrepresented person), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges, denying the allegations of misconduct and additionally raising the defenses of prescription and res judicata.

Formal Hearing

This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, which was conducted by the hearing committee on December 3, 2003. The ODC introduced documentary evidence and called Ms. Jones, Mr. Davis, and respondent to testify before the committee.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee dismissed respondent’s claim of prescription as without merit and, in regard to respondent’s exception of res judicata, determined that the instant allegations of misconduct are separate acts of misconduct from those in 02-DB-018.

Specifically, the committee found that, by his own admission, respondent was an alcoholic and drug addict and did not practice law between 1986 and approximately 1998. Furthermore, despite having no training, experience, or knowledge in fiscal management of estates, respondent undertook the trustee duties of Mr. Davis’ trust, which was valued at $350,756.62 in April 1999. The committee also found that Mr. Davis had significant physical and mental challenges that “prevented him from recognizing the peril” his trust was in by allowing respondent to act as trustee. Respondent further obtained $14,000 from Mr. Davis’ trust, took approximately $4,000 in reimbursements for unexplained advances to Mr. Davis, then | iaplaced the remaining $10,000 in his office safe. From the $10,000, he borrowed $7,000 and had Mr. Davis execute two promissory notes. The committee determined that Mr. Davis was an “exceptionally” vulnerable client whom respondent took advantage of to obtain funds from Mr. Davis’ trust, which was to Mr. Davis’ disadvantage. Finally, the committee found that respondent had direct contact with Mr. Davis after the lawsuit had been filed against respondent. He never informed his attorney nor Mr. Davis’ attorney of these repeated contacts with Mr. Davis. Respondent also had Mr. Davis examined by Dr. Simoneaux in order for Dr. Simoneaux to testify that Mr. Davis was mentally capable of handling his own affairs and thus capable of dismissing the lawsuit against respondent. Furthermore, respondent had Mr. Davis sign an affidavit in an attempt to release himself from professional and fiduciary liability for his mismanagement of Mr. Davis’ trust.

Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.8, and 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the committee determined that the ODC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations regarding the line of credit. Nevertheless, respondent’s misconduct was intentional.

The committee found the following aggravating factors to be present: prior disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct (repeated contacts with Mr. Davis after he knew Mr. Davis was represented by counsel), refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and indifference to rectifying the consequences of the misconduct. No mitigating factors were found by the committee.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for no less than three years. However, the committee also recognized that the instant misconduct occurred in the same time | iaframe and involved the same victim as the misconduct in 02-DB-018; thus, the sanction should be based on both proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

03-DB-083

Count I — The McClinton Matter

In November 1999, Harold McClinton and his sister, Henri McClinton Smith, retained respondent to handle a legal malpractice matter against attorneys William Dyess and Edward Chevallier, paying him a fee of $3,000 plus 25% of any funds recovered. In October 2001, respondent settled the claim against Mr. Dyess for $20,000. On December 13, 2001, respondent deposited the settlement check into his trust account. On January 4, 2002, he issued a check from his trust account payable to Mr. McClinton in the amount of $7,500; however, the check was returned due to insufficient funds in April 2002.

On April 22, 2002, respondent forwarded Mr. McClinton a cashier’s check in the amount of $6,000. He also promised to pay within two weeks the $1,500 balance and $200 in interest. Respondent did not remit the $1,500 until September 11, 2002 and the $200 until February 7, 2003.

Mr. McClinton and Ms. Smith also paid respondent $350 for a property appraisal, $250 for traveling expenses, $500 for an appeal, and $332 for a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court. However, respondent failed to provide 114Mr. McClin-ton with a requested accounting of these funds or requested copies of his work product or the court decisions.

Furthermore, respondent’s trust account balance fell below the amount owed to Mr. McClinton on various occasions following the deposit of the settlement check. Additionally, respondent issued checks from his trust account payable to “Cash” or to pay for meals, office expenses, travel expenses, and other improper purposes.

Finally, despite being personally served with a subpoena to appear before the ODC in August 2003 and to produce his file in this matter, respondent failed to appear.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4, 1.15(a)(b) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count II — The Smith Matter

In February 2003, Linda Smith hired respondent to handle her bankruptcy, paying him $350 towards a $500 fee. Respondent took little or no action in the matter. Therefore, Ms. Smith terminated the representation on July 13, 2003, requesting her file and the return of the $350. At that time, respondent returned Ms. Smith’s file and refunded $75 of the fee she had paid. He also promised to refund the rest of the unearned fee within thirty days. In response to Ms. Smith’s complaint filed with the ODC on October 3, 2003, respondent informed the ODC that he was entitled to $125 in fees but would refund the $150 unearned fee to Ms. Smith. However, he did not have the money at that time. On April 19, 2004, subsequent to the filing of formal charges, respondent paid Ms. Smith $225, representing the balance of the unearned fee.

hsThe ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent failed to answer or otherwise reply to the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Both parties filed briefs for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Recommendation

After considering the parties’ submissions, the hearing committee determined that the deemed admitted factual allegations were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Based on these deemed admitted facts, the committee found that respondent violated Rules 1.4, 1.15(a)(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to Count I. However, the committee found that the deemed admitted facts did not prove by clear and convincing evidence violations of Rules 1.3, 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). In regard to Count II, the committee determined that respondent violated Rules 1.5(f), 1.16(d), and 8.4(a). However, the committee found that the deemed admitted facts did not prove by clear and convincing evidence violations of Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

Specifically, the committee found that respondent failed to keep Mr. McClinton reasonably informed because he failed to provide his client with the requested accounting and copies of his work product or court decisions. Respondent also commingled Mr. McClinton’s funds with his own when he issued checks payable to “cash.” Mr. McClinton’s $7,500 check was returned for insufficient funds in | ^respondent’s trust account, indicating respondent failed to safeguard Mr. McClin-ton’s funds. Subsequently, respondent failed to promptly pay Mr. McClinton the entire $7,500; nor did he render a full accounting to Mr. McClinton. Respondent further failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the McClinton matter. With respect to Count II, the committee found that respondent failed to immediately refund the unearned fee to Ms. Smith when the representation was terminated and the fee dispute arose.

In acting as he did, the committee determined that respondent violated duties owed to his clients and as a professional. Respondent caused some actual harm to both clients; however, the harm was not serious or significant. Nevertheless, the potential for serious harm existed. The committee determined that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence as to respondent’s mental state. Thus, it assigned negligence, the lowest level of mental culpability, to each rule violation. The baseline sanction is a reprimand.

The committee found no mitigating factors present but noted the following aggravating factors: prior disciplinary offenses, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1986).

Under these circumstances and considering this court’s prior jurisprudence, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with three months deferred, followed by one year of probation with conditions.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

02-DB-018, 03-DB-056, & 03-DB-083

117After reviewing the three consolidated matters, the disciplinary board made findings as follows:

02-DB-018: In Count I, the board modified the hearing committee’s eighth factual finding to read, “There is no credible evidence to show that the loan was repaid.” In all other respects, the board adopted the factual findings of the hearing committee. Based on those findings, the board determined that respondent violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.4, 1.8, 1.14, 1.16, 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The board adopted the committee’s rationale for the violations of Rules 1.1(a), 1.14, and 1.16. Additionally, the board determined that an attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and Ms. Jones; nonetheless, respondent failed to communicate with Ms. Jones. He also misrepresented to her the purpose of the $14,000 withdrawal. Furthermore, respondent borrowed funds from Mr. Davis’ trust, which the board concluded was unfair and unreasonable to Mr. Davis. Finally, respondent had repeated contact with Mr. Davis after the lawsuit was filed. The board found no violation of Rule 1.15(a) because respondent retained Mr. Davis’ funds in his office safe to accommodate Mr. Davis’ requests.

With respect to Count II, the board rejected the ODC’s amendment to the formal charges withdrawing the Count. The board then adopted the factual findings of the committee. Based on these findings, the board determined that respondent violated only Rules 1.5(f)(5) and 8.4(a) because he failed to deposit the disputed fee into a trust account until resolution of the fee dispute.

03-DB-056: The board determined thát the committee correctly concluded that respondent’s exception of prescription was without merit. The board also agreed with the committee’s denial of respondent’s exception of res judicata.

11sThe board adopted the committee’s factual findings- and conclusions of law. Additionally, the board agreed that the misconduct has “no practical effect” on the recommended sanction for the consolidated matters.

03-DB-083: The board determined that the factual allegations of the formal charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The board also adopted the rule violations found by the committee.

Based on these findings, the board determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client and the legal system in the Davis Trust matter. He negligently violated dutiés owed to his clients and as a professional in the McClin-ton and Smith matters. Respondent’s misconduct also caused serious potential harm to his clients and third parties in the McClinton and Smith matters. According to the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, suspension is the baseline sanction.

In aggravation, the board found prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience in the practice of law, and vulnerability of the victim. The board found no mitigating factors.

Considering the above and this court’s prior jurisprudence, the board recommended that respondent be disbarred, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an 1 ^independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

Our' review indicates the record supports a finding of misconduct in the Davis Trust matter. Respondent acted as the attorney for both Ms. Jones and Mr. Davis. He drew up an irrevocable trust document and named himself as trustee over Mr. Davis’ funds even though he did not have the requisite training or knowledge for such a position. Thereafter, he failed to properly communicate with Ms. Jones. He also requested and obtained a loan from Mr. Davis, who, based on his testimony at both hearings, appears to have some amount of mental disability or deficiency. He also kept Mr. Davis’ cash in his office safe in order to prevent Ms. Jones from learning of her son’s spending habits. When Ms. Jones could get no reasonable explanation from respondent regarding the $14,000 withdrawal, she retained the services of another attorney to sue him on behalf of herself and her son. Despite the lawsuit, respondent continued to have repeated contact with Mr. Davis and took advantage of his deficient mental capacity in an attempt to have the lawsuit dismissed and his liability released. Respondent’s actions violated Rules 1.1(a), 1.4, 1.7, 1.8, 1.14, 1.15(a), 1.16, 2.1, 2.2, 3.4(c), 4.2, 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In the Stills matter, which amounted to a fee dispute, respondent failed to place the disputed funds in a trust account upon first becoming aware of the dispute. When he was ordered to refund $1,200 to the Stills, he did not have the funds available and was unable to do so. His actions in not placing the disputed funds in a trust account violated Rules 1.5(f)(5) and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

| j>nThe McClinton matter involved respondent’s failure to timely remit settlement funds to his client due .to the fact that there were insufficient funds in Ms client trust account. Arguably, the deficiency was caused by respondent’s improper use of his trust account to pay office expenses, food expenses, travel expenses, and other inappropriate expenses, indicating he converted the funds to his own use. Respondent also failed to provide Mr. McClinton with requested accountings of the fees he had paid for specific services; nor would respondent provide his client with requested copies of the work he had done in the case. When the matter came to the attention of the ODC, respondent failed to cooperate in the investigation. In acting as he did, respondent violated Rules 1.4, 1.15(a)(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(g) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Finally, in the Smith matter, upon being discharged, respondent failed to promptly refund the unearned fee. In doing so, he violated Rules 1.5(f) and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found professional misconduct, the sole issue presented for our consideration is the appropriate sanction. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

1 ¾1 Without diminishing the seriousness of respondent’s actions in the Stills, McClinton and Smith matters, we find the most egregious misconduct committed by respondent occurred in the Davis Trust matter. Respondent failed to competently discharge his fiduciary obligations as trustee. Respondent then engaged in a scheme intended to frustrate the beneficiary’s attempts to remove him as trustee.

Given the unique facts of respondent’s misconduct in the Davis Trust matter, there are no cases directly on point. Nonetheless, we find some guidance from In re: Letellier, 98-2646 (La.9/8/99), 742 So.2d 544, in which we disbarred an attorney who entered' into prohibited business transactions with an elderly client with a history of psychiatric problems. While we recognize that some of the misconduct at issue in Letellier, such as commingling of funds, is not present in the instant case, our opinion emphasized the egregious nature of the attorney’s use of his legal skills to take advantage of “an obviously vulnerable victim.” In the same way, we find respondent intentionally used his legal skills to the disadvantage of Mr. Davis, a mentally-disabled client, by engaging in questionable transactions with him and by seeking to thwart attempts by Mr. Davis and his family to remove respondent as trustee. The baseline sanction for such misconduct is disbarment.

In aggravation, we recognize respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. We are unable to discern any mitigating factors from the record.

Accordingly, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and disbar respondent, retroactive to his March 23, 2004 interim suspension.

DECREE

laaUpon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Vincent C. Co-field, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17514, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive to his March 23, 2004 interim suspension. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . According to respondent's calculations, these advances totaled $6,965.

      . Three days later, Mr. Davis indicated that he did not sign the statement voluntarily, did not agree with the statement, arid wanted Mr. Crews to continue with the lawsuit.

      .When respondent became trustee, Mr. Davis' Edward Jones account contained $350,756.62 in investments and $216,134 in indebtedness to Edward Jones. Because of the volatility and uncertainty of the stock market, on September 17, 1999, respondent directed Edward Jones to liquidate the account and pay off the outstanding debt. The balance of $105,460.37 was placed into a money market fund, from which respondent withdrew the $14,000 in cash. This left a balance of approximately $91,000.

      . The arbitrator’s reasons for the award were as follows:
      1. It should inform Mr. and Mrs. Stills that the award is not being made because of a lack of services performed by the attorney, but for the attorney's failure to keep them advised; and
      2. It may prevent Mr. Cofield from finding himself in a similar case in the future.

      . It appears that this may have been a typographical error as respondent was charged with an 8.4(d) violation and not an 8.4(b) violation.

      . Respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board on November 5, 1999 for neglecting a legal matter.

      . Respondent issued a check to Ms. Smith in the amount of $7,500 on March 19, 2002.

        The check cleared respondent's trust account on March 20, 2002.

      . The $200 payment was forwarded to the ODC along with respondent’s response to Mr. McClinton’s initial complaint.

      . The board reasoned that the ODC failed to cite any authority supporting withdrawal of a portion of the formal charges after the hearing committee determined that respondent's actions violated the Rules of Professional ’Conduct.

      . As stated earlier, the ODC attempted to dismiss this charge after the hearing committee rendered its recommendation. We find no authority in Rule XIX or in our jurisprudence which authorizes the ODC to dismiss formal charges after a hearing committee has determined a rule violation occurred. Rather, we analogize the situation to In re Lieberman, 95-2628 (La.6/7/96), 675 So.2d 272, in which we held the disciplinary board could not reject a petition for consent discipline after the parties stipulated to a professional violation.