text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Simmons, Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 421-053; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-1021.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488; State ex rel. Degreat v. State, 98-0690 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 205.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph LAWSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Lawson, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 17,439; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 0346.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sam E. THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1676.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Thompson, Sam E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 420-799; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2005-K-0410, 2005-K-0009, 2005-K-0608.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary BROOKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1677.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Brooks, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 99-F1113; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39909-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John CURRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Curry, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court Div. 0, Nos. 40148, 140402; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KA-04-39153.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emile PIERCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Pierce, Emile; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-5283; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-406.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry WARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Ward, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-4697; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KA-1295.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Jones, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-2263; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-430.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John D. PEARSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Pearson, John; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 00-5403; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-468.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Quincy LOYD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Loyd, Quincy; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div.B, No. 37571-1; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40123-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ryan WATSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Watson, Ryan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 01-5026; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-440.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James COOLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1726.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Cooley, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 219-806.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin HARVEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1727.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Harvey, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 165,623; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,-005-KH.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Graylyn JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1728.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Jackson, Graylyn; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-0614; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-405.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald E. BARNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1729.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Barnes, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 402-960; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005 — K-0544.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herman WALLACE.
    No. 2005-KP-1733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 10-73-6820; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 0150.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lenard HICKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Hicks, Lenard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-7491; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-424.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie DIXON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1765.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Dixon, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 361-684; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-0472.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Williams, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 11th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 03-8363; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 38990-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith BYES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Byes, Keith; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 320^103; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 05-K-0399.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald WILLIAMSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1768.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Williamson, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 10-97-199; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 0646.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Courtney PACKNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Packnett, Courtney; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 02-4237; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-479.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wendell THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2005-KH-1770.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Thompson, Wendell; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 02 CR 86388; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 0541.

Denied.


text:
    Debbie L. PYLANT v. JEFFERSON PARISH, State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals.
    No. 2005-C-1992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Pylant, Debbie L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 595-017; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-CA-148.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John BRASHEARS.
    No. 2005-KO-2007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Brashears, John;- — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-6263; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 04-KA-1207.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth Paul ZIMKO and Rochelle Lacourrege Zimko v. AMERICAN CYANAMID, et al.
    No. 2005-C-2102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Zimko, Rochelle LaCourrege et ah; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 01-02532; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-CA-0658.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Benjamin CLARK.
    No. 2005-KO-2119.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Clark, Benjamin; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 02-5545; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KA-61.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark E. HINGLE.
    No. 2005-K-2123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Hingle, Mark E.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-3499; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-K-0893.

Denied.


text:
    Shelly BENOIT v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES, United States Specialty Sports Association and United States National Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-CC-2154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Benoit, Shelly; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2002-4508; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW050-89.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerry JACKSON.
    No. 2005-KP-2157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Jackson, Jerry; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 248-417.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence SHELLEY & Roger Ancar.
    No. 2005-KP-2188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Shelley, Terrence et al.; Anear, Roger; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, Second Parish Court of Jefferson, No. S884329; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-KH-656.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA UNITED BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, SELF INSURERS’ FUND v. Mureal BRIDGES, Individually and on Behalf of her Children, Johnell M. Bridges and Rodney L. Bridges.
    No. 2005-C-2199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Self-Insurers’ Fund, Louisiana United Businesses Association; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 6, No. 03-03119; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 1440.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary HARRALL.
    No. 2005-KP-2206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Harrall, Gary; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 313604; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KW 0930.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles Edward WHITE.
    No. 2005-KP-2228.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re White, Charles Edward; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 13146-01; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 05-00646.

Denied. Application was untimely in court of appeal.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roy HOPKINS.
    No. 2005-K-2253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Hopkins, Roy; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 60396; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,-730-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Tina Etier O’NEAL and Chad O’Neal, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Tres’ O’Neal v. PARISH OF WEST BATON ROUGE Through the WEST BATON ROUGE PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2005-CC-2290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re West Baton Rouge Parish of; West Baton Rouge Parish Police Jury;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 33,967; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1740.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    SORRENTO COMPANIES, INC. d/b/a Louisiana Stone & Aggregate v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Bear Industries, Inc., Barry Moore, II, Meric Daigle, & Moore Testing and Inspection.
    No. 2005-C-2326.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Sorrento Companies Inc. et al.; Louisiana Stone & Aggregate; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 75,880; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 1884.

Denied.


text:
    N.I.D., L.P. v. The PARISH OF WEST BATON ROUGE.
    No. 2005-C-2334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re West Baton Rouge Par. of; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 30,478; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 1599.

Denied.


text:
    Charles V. HANSFORD, and Jada Hansford v. CAPPAERT MANUFACTURED HOUSING and C & W Homes, Inc.
    No. 2005-C-2338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re C & W Homes, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 02-2904; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,-160-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Robert JORDAN v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, et al.
    No. 2005-C-2340.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 470,644 A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,944-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Norah THURMAN v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY & AGRICULTURE & MECHANICAL COLLEGE
    No. 2005-C-2342.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Thurman, Norah;- — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 466,572; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 0891.

Denied.


text:
    Delores DAIGLE v. Gary A. GOLDBARD, M.D.
    No. 2005-CC-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Goldbard, Gary A. M.D.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 80874; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1326.

Denied.


text:
    Loren R. SEAGRAVE v. Robert Joe DEAN, Patrick S. Henry, and the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College.
    No. 2005-C-2349.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Seagrave, Loren R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 352,739; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 CA 2272.

Denied.


text:
    LANCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. MAPP CONSTRUCTION, INC. and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America.
    No. 2005-CC-2350.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Lanco Construction Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 469,944; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1455.

Denied.


text:
    Janice R. VILLAR v. OUR LADY OF THE LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER and Melanie Vines, LPN.
    No. 2005-CC-2352.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center et al.; Vines, Melanie LPN; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 463,997; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 0849.

Denied.


text:
    W.B. HERRING, Jr., et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, INC., et al.
    No. 2005-CC-2354.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re MIC Property & Cas. Ins. Corp.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2001-001044; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1675.

Denied.


text:
    Brian K. KINCHEN and Lisa Kinchen v. LOUIE DABDOUB SELL CARS, INC. and Lloyd’s of London Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-C-2356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Kinchen, Brian K et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 578-964; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-CA-218.

Denied.


text:
    A.J. CAPRITTO v. AUDUBON INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2005-CC-2357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Audubon Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying for • Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 04-03001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-C-0516.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Sheriff Greg CHAMPAGNE, Charlene Thigpen, Wife of/and Arthur Thigpen, Jr. v. Randall K. LAMBERT, d/b/a K & L Trucking and Dirt and Underwriters Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-CC-2360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Lambert, Randall K. d/b/a; K & L Trucking & Dirt; Underwriters Insurance Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 53,793, 53,881; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 05-C-778.

Denied.


text:
    Jamie Michele PINEGAR v. Bradley Falcon HARRIS.
    No. 2005-CC-2362.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Pinegar, Jamie Michele; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Family Court Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 145,715; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 0880.

Denied.


text:
    Robert D. ELLIS v. Linda Lael Ramey ELLIS.
    No. 2005-C-2363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Ellis, Linda Lael Ramey; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 475,401-F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,942-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Elaine RODRIGUE v. LAFOURCHE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD & Cigna Property & Casualty Elaine Rodrigue v. Lafourche Parish School Board.
    No. 2005-C-2366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Lafourche Parish School Board;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. #9, Nos. 94-08832, 03-01810,; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2004 CA 1136, 2004 CA 1137.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Skylar A. STUCK v. Dr. Warren LONG, XYZ Insurance Company, European Cars Centre, Inc., Norbert K. Przybilla and ABC Ins. Company.
    No. 2005-C-2367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Long, Warren Dr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 473,424; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,034-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    George LUSK, John Lusk, Zachary Lusk, and Matthew Lusk v. Anthony MORALES, Jr., M.D., and Northshore Cardiovascular Associates.
    No. 2005-CC-2369.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Morales, Anthony Jr. M.D. et al.; Northshore Cardiovascular Associates;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2005-11221; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 CW 1478.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    ANR PIPELINE COMPANY v. LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION, Malcolm B. Price, Jr., Chairman of the Louisiana Tax Commission, Kenneth P. Naquin, Jr., Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission, and Russel R. Gaspard, Member of the Louisiana Tax Commission and All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2005-C-2372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re ANR Pipeline Co.; UT Offshore System L.L.C.; High Island Offshore System L.L.C.; Stingray Pipeline Co.; Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.; Southern Natural Gas Co.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 468,417 & Consolidated Cases; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2005 CA 1142 through 2005 CA 1169.

Denied.


text:
    Charlene TRAHAN v. Kathleen Trahan JOHNSON, et vir.
    No. 2005-C-2379.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Trahan, Charlene;. — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 67747-H; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 05-280.

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy MATHEWS, et al. v. HIXSON BROTHERS, INC., et al.
    No. 2005-CC-2380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Hixson Brothers, Inc., et al.; Hix-son Brothers Funeral Homes, Inc.; — Defendants); Applying for' Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 196,044; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 05-00565.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana, in the Interest of the Minor Child, H.B. v. Raymond BLAIR.
    No. 2005-CJ-2392.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Louisiana State of; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 14,007; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,-140-JAC. ■

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy MATHEWS, et al. v. HIXSON BROTHERS, INC., et al.
    No. 2005-CC-2396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Kilpatrick Life Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 196,044; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 05-00564.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Maple PATTON v. Stevenson STROGEN, II, Stevenson Strogen, Geneva Strogen, Anthony G. Davis, Linden Asset Management Co., Lee Jeter, ABC Insurance Company, DEF Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-CC-2397.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Linden Asset Management Co.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 107,139; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 39,829-CW.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Terry R. REEVES, as District Attorney for the Eighth Judicial District v. WINN PARISH POLICE JURY, Bobby Hutto, Samuel Flowers, Jr., John Garrett, Lowell Hubbard, Earl Lasyone and Morris Leeper, in Their Capacity as Jurors.
    No. 2005-CC-2398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Winn Parish Police Jury et al.; Hutto, Bobby; Flowers, Samuel Jr.; Garrett, John; Hubbard, Lowell; Lasyonne, Earl; Leeper, Morris; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 39-269; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40688-CW.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR the CLAIM OF Mattie MURPHY v. BERNICE COMMUNITY REHABILITATION HOSPITAL, et al.
    No. 2005-C-2399.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Murphy, Mattie In Re: Medical Review Panel for; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lincoln, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 61876; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40,333-CA.

Denied.


text:
    In re MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR the CLAIM OF Yvonne HILL on Behalf of Amanda BYRD, Minor v. LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER-SHREVEPORT.
    No. 2005-CC-2401.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center — Shreveport; Louisiana State of through Board of Supervisors;— Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 486,614-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 40787-CW.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    Crystal Marie THOMPSON v. BGK EQUITIES, INC., Wampold & Company, Inc., the Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2005-C-2405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Thompson, Crystal Marie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 496,083; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 2366.

Denied.


text:
    Chanda Jan Covington SPINOSA v. Joseph Thomas SPINOSA.
    No. 2005-C-2492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Spinosa, Joseph Thomas; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Family Court, No. 134,-704; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 CA 2067.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene F. COSSICH, Jr.
    No. 2005-K-2259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2006.
   In re Cossich, Eugene F. Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 375494; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2005 KA 0021.

Denied.


author: HUGHES, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Angela R. MELANCON.
    No. 2004 CA 1727.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 23, 2005.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 2005.
    Anthony G. Falterman, District Attorney, Donald D. Candell, Assistant District Attorney, Gonzales, Counsel for Plain-tifi/Appellant State of Louisiana.
    Michael D. Singletary, Opelousas, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Safety National Casualty Corporation.
    Before: PARRO, McDONALD, and HUGHES, JJ.
   HUGHES, J.

_[¿The state seeks review of the trial court’s judgment relieving and discharging Safety National Casualty Corporation as surety from the judgment of bond forfeiture. The issue for review is whether the defendant’s presentment of herself at the Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office is sufficient under LSA-R.S. 15:85 to provide relief from a judgment of bond forfeiture. After a thorough review of the record and relevant jurisprudence, we adopt the trial court’s reasons for judgment, annexed hereto. We agree with the trial court that an “appearance” as contemplated by LSA-R.S. 15:85(10) does not require that the defendant appear “of record” or “in court.” Therefore, we find that the trial court’s decision was legally correct. Furthermore, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual finding that the defendant presented herself at the sheriffs office resulting in the bench warrant being recalled by the court. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in accordance with Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.2A(5), (6), (7), and (8). All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $894.00, are assessed against the state-appellant.

AFFIRMED.

| .APPENDIX

State of Louisiana v. Angela Melancon.

No. 14,900.

23- JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

Filed Feb. 3, 2004.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Facts and Procedural History

On June 25, 2002, the defendant, Angela Melancon (hereinafter “Melancon”), was arrested and charged under La. R.S. 40:971(B) with Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance By Fraud. After posting a bond in the amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) issued by Safety National Casualty Corporation (hereinafter “Safety National”), Melancon was released from the custody of the Ascension Parish Jail on or about March 8, 2002. For reasons alleged herein, Safety National filed a “Motion for Release and Discharge of a Surety.”

On August 2, 2002, Melancon was formally arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. She was given an open court notice to appear on September 5, 2002 for a motion hearing. The defendant failed to appear before the Court on that date. Accordingly, the Court entered a bench warrant and signed a bond forfeiture judgment against Melancon, as principal, and Safety National, as surety. Notice of the judgment was sent to the defendant (Me-lancon), the surety (Safety National), and the agent (Kirklin Bail Bonds).' On February 19, 2003, Melancon and an officer from Safety National went to the Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office. After being informed that Ms.'Melancon was at the Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office, the Court issued an order in writing to recall the bench warrant previously issued against Melancon. The Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office then issued her a notice for a new court date of March 6, 2003. The defendant did not appear for the March 6th court date. However, on July 10, 2003, Melancon did appear in court to change her, plea to guilty and to be sentenced.

Under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 311, bail is defined as the security given by a person to assure his appearance before the 'proper court whenever required. In this case, the defendant, Angela Melancon, appeared before the court on July 10, 2003 and entered a guilty plea. She was then sentenced to five (5) years in the Department of Corrections and placed on probation. Therefore, she does not have any further responsibility under her bond obligation. J^Code of Criminal Procedure Article 348 states that “the court shall order the bail bond cancelled when there is no further liability thereon.”

The issue now before the court is whether Safety National is entitled to relief from the bond forfeiture judgment previously issued by the court. Safety National claims they are entitled to relief from the bond forfeiture pursuant to La. R.S. 15:85(10). The surety argues that the appearance of Angela Melancon at the Ascension Parish Sheriffs office constituted an “appearance” under the article. . Since the Court recalled the bench warrant and the sheriff served upon Melancon a new court date notice, Safety National argues that it is entitled to be discharged from the bond forfeiture judgment. See Memorandum in Support of Motion For Discharge and Release of Surety, pg.5.

The State argues that the Defendant neither appeared nor was surrendered as required under the bond forfeiture statute La. R.S. 15:85(10). The State also claims that any appearance must be “of record” and in court in accordance with the law, and that because Melancon’s appearance did not constitute an “of record” appearance, the Court cannot allow Safety National to be discharged from the bond forfeiture judgment. See State Post>-Trial Memo, pg.5.

A hearing on the Motion for Discharge and Release of Surety was held before the Court on November 4, 2003. The Court took the matter under advisement allowing all parties time to brief the issues and respond to the brief filed by other party.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The motion filed by Safety National, a commercial surety, is subject to the rules set forth in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Statutes, specifically La.C.Cr.P.arts. 328-343 and La. R.S. 15:81-15:89 See State v. Wheeler, 508 So.2d 1384 (La.1987), rehearing denied (La.9/3/87). In order for the Court to set aside a bond forfeiture judgment against a surety, the defendant must make an appearance or surrender, in accordance with the law, within six months of the mailing of the notice of the judgment of the bond forfeiture State v. Reed, 667 So.2d 586 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/24/96), rehearing denied, writ denied 672 So.2d 907 (La.4/26/96); La. R.S. 15:85(10). The Code of Criminal Procedure, article 345 provides the proper procedures for the surrender of the defendant. La.C.Cr.P.art. 345(A) reads as follows:

A. A surety may surrender the defendant or the defendant may surrender himself, in open court, or to the officer charged with his detention, at any time prior to forfeiture or within the time allowed by law for setting aside a judgment of forfeiture of the bail bond. For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the surety may arrest him. Upon surrender |Rof the defendant, the officer shall detain the defendant in his custody as upon the original commitment and shall acknowledge the surrender by a certificate signed by him and delivered to the surety. Thereafter, the surety shall be fully and finally discharged and relived of any and all obligation under the bond La.C.Cr.P.art.345(A).

Although specific procedures are detailed within the Criminal Code regarding the manner of surrendering a defendant, Louisiana law provides no such legislative requirements for what qualifies as an “appearance” under the bond forfeiture judgment relief statute, La.R.S. 15:85.

At the trial on the motion, an agent from Surety National testified that he personally escorted Melancon to the Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office. Upon notice that the defendant was in the custody of the Ascension Parish Sheriffs Office, the court recalled the bench warrant previously issued and instructed the sheriff to serve the defendant with a new court date. The record also reflects the written order signed by the court recalling the bench warrant. Melancon did not “surrender” herself due to the fact that the surety was still liable on the bond previously issued.

The issue therefore is whether the action of Ms. Melancon was an appearance in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute 15:85(10) so as to satisfy the bond forfeiture judgment. Louisiana law does not require that an appearance by the defendant be “of record” as the State attempts to argue, nor that such appearance be “in court”. There are many examples in the Code of Criminal Procedure where an appearance does not have to be an “in court” appearance. In Code of Criminal Procedure Article 230.1, an appearance can be “by telephone or audio-video electronic equipment.” Clearly, the appearance of the defendant at the sheriffs office, the communication with the trial judge, the written order to recall the bench warrant and the service of Ms. Me-lancon by the 'sheriff of a new court date constituted an appearance by Ms. Melan-con in accordance with Code of Criminal Procedüre Article[La.R.S.] 15:85(10). This action by the defendant and the surety mandates the Court to relieve and discharge Safety National from the bond forfeiture judgment previously rendered in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute 15:85(10).

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Discharge and Release of Surety filed by Safety National is GRANTED. The said Judgment signed in Gonzales, Louisiana, this 27th day of January, 2004.

/s/ Guy Holdridge Hon. Guy Holdridge Judge, 23rd Judicial District Court


author: PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge.

text:
    Rev. Norwood THOMPSON, Jr., et al. v. BANK ONE OF LOUISIANA, et al.
    No. 2005-C-1101.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Jan. 11, 2006.

      Paul M. Lavelle, Landry & Lavelle, Me-tairie, Louisiana, for Relator (First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans).
    Harry E. Cantrell, Jr., The Cantrell Law Firm, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Respondent (Reverend Norwood Thompson, Jr.)
    (Court composed of Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge TERRI F. LOVE).
   PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge.

pOn July 13, 2005, this court granted certiorari, ordered the record, and stayed proceedings in the district court pending our consideration of the merits of the instant writ application, filed by First Zion Baptist Church [hereinafter “First Zion”]. Having reviewed the entire record as well as the plaintiffs’ opposition to the application, we grant the application and vacate the July 11, 2005 judgment of the district court.

The district court’s judgment, which ordered that the plaintiff, Rev. Norwood Thompson, be reinstated to his former position as pastor of First Zion, is the latest court ruling in a longstanding legal dispute between Rev. Thompson and First Zion that began in 1999. A chronology of the pertinent legal events is as follows:

10/22/99 Rev. Thompson and his wife file petition in civil district court against Bank One and First Zion seeking damages for defamation and injunctive relief, alleging that Reverend Thompson was removed as pastor of First Zion pursuant to an illegal election by an improperly constituted Board of Directors [“Board”].
11/05/99 The district court issues a preliminary injunction, amended on 11/12/99, which orders that: (1) Rev. Thompson be reinstated as pastor pending the election of a new Board to be held December 17, 1999; (2) Prior to the date set for the new election, the parties are to agree upon a roster of current church members eligible to participate in the election of the new Board; and (3) During the interim 45 days, any checks drawn on First Zion’s Bank One account must contain the signatures of two named persons in addition to that of Rev. Thompson to be valid.
| <>1/28/00 The district court issues a “permanent” injunction “to protect [Rev. Thompson’s] right to access and use of First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans as the presiding pastor, pending a full hearing on the merits before this [the districtjCourt.”
2/03/00 First Zion obtains an order appealing the permanent injunction to this Court.
10/03/01 This Court renders an unpublished opinion, which vacates the district Court’s injunction as being vague and pretermits discussion of all other assignments of error, including the alleged absence of subject matter jurisdiction and the allegation that the permanent injunction was invalid because it was issued without the required hearing. Rev. Norwood Thompson v. Bank One, et al, 2000-1085 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01, 798 So.2d 338) (unpublished).
3/07/02 Rev. Thompson’s ex parte motion to enter judgment in accordance with the Nov. 1999 preliminary injunction, which motion had been granted by the district court, is vacated on writ application to this Court because of the ex parte nature of the motion.
4/02/02 First Zion files an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
5/14/02 Rev. Thompson files a second ex parte motion to enforce the Nov. 1999 preliminary injunction.
8/15/02 The district court denies First Zion’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
8/05/03 Rev. Thompson files a motion to set a hearing on the preliminary injunction granted in Nov. 1999, which motion the district court denies as moot.
12/09/03 This Court grants Rev. Thompson’s writ application, reverses the district court’s denial of the motion and orders that court to conduct a hearing to determine what actions First Zion and Bank One are to refrain from and whether any actions already taken by them were in violation of prior trial court rulings.
2/22/05 The original district court judge recuses himself before the hearing (scheduled for 2/23/05) takes place; Rev. Thompson moves to reset the hearing.
3/16/05 The newly assigned district court judge orders a hearing.
5/21/05 A hearing on the merits of the Nov. 1999 preliminary injunction is held in the district court.
7/11/05 The district court renders a written judgment with reasons, ordering |athat: (1) Rev. Thompson be reinstated to his position as pastor of First Zion; (2) Rev. Thompson be given keys to the church and the church office; (3) Rev. Thompson’s personal items be returned to him; (4) Rev. Thompson’s salary be reinstated; and (5) Rev. Thompson has a right to “an election” pursuant to a church membership list approved by the court.
7/13/05 First Zion files the instant writ application seeking reversal of the district court’s 7/11/05 judgment.

In written reasons for judgment, the district court indicated that it had acted in accordance with this Court’s remand and instructions that the district court should “determine whether its prior Order had been complied with” and “clearly state what actions from which the defendant members of First Zion Baptist Church were to refrain.” The district court then interpreted the 1999 ruling as having ordered that the parties submit a joint list of church members for an election to be held in December of 1999, and that in the meantime, the plaintiff, Rev. Thompson, be restored to his position as pastor of the church. Based on the evidence adduced at the May 2005 hearing, the district court found that no joint list was ever filed, nor was there ever a hearing set for the court to determine the membership list. Instead, in 1999 First Zion held an election based on the list it had submitted, and Rev. Thompson left the election meeting in protest. There remains a dispute between the parties as to whether Rev. Thompson verbally resigned his position before leaving the meeting. However, subsequent to his leaving, First Zion sent him a written acceptance of his resignation and changed the locks to the church, thereby preventing Rev. Thompson from' having any access and denying him the opportunity to remove his personal possessions from the premises. The district court further found that although by the time it rendered judgment, a new pastor had been in place at First Zion for over five years, Rev. Thompson had continuously attempted to pursue his rights through the courts during this entire |4time, and it was not due to his fault or lack of diligence that the matter remained unresolved. Therefore, the district court concluded that despite the “inequities for all concerned” created by the passage of time, the Rev. Thompson was entitled to reinstatement of his position as pastor.

In support of its writ application, First Zion argues that the district court’s judgment is based upon the erroneous legal premise that the 1999 preliminary injunction is still valid and enforceable. First Zion points out that for more than five years, the church has had someone other than Rev. Thompson as pastor, and that during that time, Rev. Thompson has not only ceased all involvement with First Zion (other than as relates to the instant lawsuit), but has founded another church of which he serves as pastor. In addition, considering the amount of time that has passed, First Zion’s current membership is not reflective of its membership in 1999; therefore, as it is no longer feasible for the court to confect a valid membership list for the relevant time, enforcement of the 1999 order is an impossibility. Moreover, in August of 2001, First Zion amended its Articles of Incorporation and adopted a new procedure for the selection of the pastor, which procedure was followed in appointing its current pastor. For all these reasons, First Zion contends that the judgment of the district court should be vacated as moot. Alternatively, First Zion argues that this court should vacate the judgment and remand for a proper hearing, as the district court erroneously limited the May 21, 2005 hearing to matters concerning the original preliminary injunction and refused to allow First Zion to introduce evidence of relevant events that have occurred since the rendition of the 1999 judgment. Finally, first Zion argues that the district court lacked the authority to order that Rev. Thompson be reinstated as pastor of |Bthe church because such an order constitutes unconstitutional interference of the state in an ecclesiastical matter.

We agree with First Zion that because enforcement of the 1999 ruling is no longer possible, the issue is moot’. The 1999 injunction, by its very terms, was conditioned upon the happening of a specific event, which was First Zion’s holding of a new election on December 17, 1999 based upon either a mutually agreed-upon or a court-approved church membership list. According to the undisputed evidence, that event never occurred. All of the orders that were part of the 1999 ruling, including the reinstatement of Rev. Thompson as pastor and the specific rules designating those who had authority to sign checks drawn on First Zion’s account, were expressly stated to be interim measures effective only until the contemplated December 17, 1999 election. We therefore conclude that those orders expired by their own terms when the election did not take place on the specified date. Accordingly, the district court’s reinstatement of Rev. Thompson as pastor permanently in an effort to implement those 1999 orders is erroneous, as his 1999 reinstatement by the court was never intended to have permanent effect. Moreover, the passage of time since the issuance of the 1999 injunction has made it impossible to compile a valid church membership list for the purpose of ordering a new election, which option is now moot.

Finally, we hold that a court-ordered permanent reinstatement of Rev. Thompson as pastor of first Zion under these circumstances would violate the Constitutional principle of separation of church and state found in the First [(Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom. This principle has been consistently interpreted to forbid courts from interfering in the ecclesiastical matters of religious groups, which prohibition extends to the appointment and removal of ministers. See: The Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Glass v. First United Pentecostal Church of DeRidder, 95-1442 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/12/96), 676 So.2d 724, 728. Because of this constitutional prohibition, we hold that specific perform-anee, i.e., the reinstatement of Rev. Thompson as pastor of First Zion, is a remedy unavailable to plaintiffs under the facts of this case. Therefore, should the plaintiffs ultimately prove at trial of this matter that Rev. Thompson was wrongfully removed from his position and/or was defamed through the fault of First Zion, the only redress to which the plaintiffs will be entitled is an award of damages, assuming such are proven.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we grant, the relator’s application, vacate the judgment of the district court, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. By the rendition of this opinion, the stay order is lifted.

WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT VACATED, MATTER REMANDED, STAY LIFTED.

      .The allegations of defamation against Bank One have been resolved, and are not pertinent to the instant writ application. See Rev. Nor-wood Thompson v. Emmis Television Broadcasting, 2004-1020 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/05), 894 So.2d 480, in which this Court affirmed the district court's granting of an exception of no cause of action filed by Bank One and the dismissal of Rev. Thompson’s allegations against Bank One.

      . The amendment did not affect the substance of the preliminary injunction.

      . The judgment stipulated that should the parties be unable to agree, one of them was to file a rule to show cause seeking a hearing from which the district court would determine the membership list to be used for the election.

      . To the extent that our decision herein conflicts with this court’s 12/09/03 ruling granting plaintiffs' writ application and ordering the district court to conduct a hearing, we note that our prior decision to order a hearing was made without benefit of the entire record. We ordered the record in the instant case so that we could discern the proper course of action in light of the confusion presented by the long and complex legal history of this case, which is fraught with numerous seemingly inconsistent court rulings. After careful consideration of the entire record, we now conclude that the hearing ordered by this Court on 12/09/03 was unnecessary.


author: LEON A. CANNIZZARO, JR., Judge.

text:
    Francisco E. JARAMILLO, M.D. v. David L. LOPEZ, Walker Imports, Inc., Mid-Continent Casualty Company and American National Property & Casualty Company.
    No. 2004-CA-2042.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Jan. 18, 2006.

      Julian R. Murray, Jr., Chehardy Sherman Ellis Breslin Murray & Recile, L.L.P., Metairie, LA, and Lolis E. Elie, Elie, Jones & Associates, and Romualdo Gonzalez, Braden, Gonzalez & Associates, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Francisco E. Jaramillo, M.D.
    Robert E. Kerrigan, Jr., John Jerry Glas, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee, The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania.
    Morgan J. Wells, Jr., Christopher R. Pennison, Larzelere Picou Wells Simpson Lonero, LLC, Metairie, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Walker Imports, Inc. d/b/a Walker Acura and Oklahoma Surety Company.
    (Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge LEON A. CANNIZZARO, JR.).
   LEON A. CANNIZZARO, JR., Judge.

| ¶ This case was brought by the plaintiff, Francisco E. Jaramillo, M.D., in connection with damages that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The case was tried before a jury, which found that he was not entitled to damages. Dr. Jaramillo is appealing the trial court judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Jaramillo and David Lopez were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Mr. Lopez was driving his mother and daughter to a bus stop on his way to work when the accident happened. Dr. Jaramillo was attempting to make a left turn at the intersection of Bienville and North Genois Streets in New Orleans when his Ford pick-up truck was hit by the car driven by Mr. Lopez, which was owned by Mr. Lopez’s employer, Walker Imports, Inc. Dr. Jaramillo, a professor of urology at LSU Medical Center, was on his way to perform a medical procedure at the Mercy Campus of Memorial Medical Center when the accident occurred. Dr. Jaramillo was attempting to get to the physicians’ parking lot at the hospital when the car driven by Mr. Lopez hit his truck from the rear.

Mr. Lopez and Dr. Jaramillo exited their vehicles after the accident. Mr. Lopez apologized for hitting Dr. Jaramillo’s truck, and he produced an insurance 12card showing that the car he was driving was insured. Mr. Lopez explained that he was driving his employer’s car and that it was insured by his employer.

When Mr. Lopez exited the car he was driving, he was concerned that Dr. Jaram-illo might have been injured in the accident. Mr. Lopez asked Dr. Jaramillo whether he had been injured, and he said that he was not hurt.

Mr. Lopez did not want to call the police to investigate the accident, and Dr. Jaram-illo agreed not to call the police. Mr. Lopez, however, signed a statement saying that he had hit Dr. Jaramillo’s truck from the rear and would take responsibility for the damages resulting from the accident. Dr. Jaramillo. and Mr. Lopez went to the hospital where Dr. Jaramillo had been scheduled to perform a procedure, and a copy of the insurance card produced by Mr. Lopez was made.

After the photocopy was made, Dr. Jar-amillo drove Mr. Lopez to the Bohn Ford Collision Center, which was near the hospital, to get an estimate of what it would cost to repair the damages to Dr- Jaramil-lo’s truck. Mr. Lopez observed; Dr. Jar-amillo rubbing his neck while they were waiting for the estimate. This concerned Mr. Lopez, and he asked Dr. Jaramillo about it. Mr. Lopez testified that Dr. Jaramillo said that his neck was hurting due to a previous injury.

After the estimate was obtained, Dr. Jaramillo drove Mr. Lopez to a bank, where Dr. Jaramillo assumed Mr. Lopez would obtain the money, needed to repair the truck. Mr. Lopez, however, left the bank without the money.

After the trip to the bank, Dr. Jaramillo returned to the hospital where ,he performed the procedure that had been previously scheduled. After he had completed the procedure at the hospital, he went to the LSU Clinic where he began |sto have pain in his cervical spine arms, and back. Dr. Jaramillo described the pain as “very bad pain.” Dr. Jaramillo then spoke with a physician in the orthopedic department at the clinic. The physician examined Dr. Jaramillo very superficially and told him that he had a whiplash injury to his neck. Dr. Jaramillo was given some pain medication and a muscle relaxant from a supply of medicine that was kept in the orthopedic department.

A few days after the accident, Mr. Lopez called Dr. Jaramillo to discuss payment for the repairs to Dr. Jaramillo’s truck. During this conversation, Dr. Jaramillo never mentioned that he had suffered any injuries from the accident.

A few months before the accident, Dr. Jaramillo had made plans to attend a urological conference in Costa Rica. Two days after the accident, he flew to Costa Rica to attend the conference, but he was in so much pain that he was unable to attend any of the meetings. He tried to obtain relief from the pain by spending time in a Jacuzzi, in a swimming pool at the hotel where he was staying in Costa Rica, and in the sea, but the pain persisted.

When Dr. Jaramillo returned to New Orleans from Costa Rica, Dr. Anparo Gutierrez, a neurologist, treated him. Dr. Gutierrez ordered an MRI of Dr. Jaram-illo’s neck, and after reviewing the MRI, she referred Dr. Jaramillo to Dr. Michael Carey, a neurosurgeon at the LSU Medical Center. After Dr. Carey examined Dr. Jaramillo, he recommended that Dr. Jar-amillo have surgery.

Dr. Jaramillo testified that he was terrified at the prospect of having an operation on his neck, because if the spinal cord were injured during surgery, he Lcould be paralyzed. Dr. Jaramillo was faced with the choice of having surgery that presented a risk of paralysis or of living with the pain. If he lived with the pain, however, there was still a risk that he might ultimately be paralyzed from pressure on his spinal cord. Dr. Jaramillo sought a second opinion before having the surgery, and Dr. Joseph M. Epps, from whom the second opinion was obtained, also recommended surgery.

Approximately one month after the accident with Mr. Lopez, Dr. Jaramillo underwent surgery on his spine. Although the surgery was successful, Dr. Jaramillo was left with permanent physical disabilities, including chronic pain. Dr. Jaramillo attempted to return to the practice of urology, but he found that he could no longer perform urological surgery or teach medical residents to perform surgical procedures. He was forced to retire from the practice of urology, even though performing urological surgery and teaching surgical procedures to resident physicians were the focus of his life.

Dr. Jaramillo brought suit against (1) Mr. Lopez, (2) Mr. Lopez’s employer, Walker Imports, Inc. doing business as Walker Acura, which owned the car driven by Mr. Lopez, (3) Walker Imports’ insurers, Oklahoma Surety Company/Mid-Continent Casualty Insurance Company and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, and (5) Dr. Jaramillo’s uninsured motorist carrier, American National Property & Casualty Company. As defenses to Dr. Jaramillo’s claim for damages, Walker Imports and its insurers raised the following arguments: (1) that they were not liable for any damages Dr. Jaramillo may have suffered, because Mr. Lopez did not have permission to use the car involved in the accident; (2) that Mr. Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when the accident happened; and (3) that Walker Imports was not negligent in entrusting the use of |sthe car to Mr. Lopez. Additionally, Mr. Lopez, his employer, and their insurers argued that Dr. Jaramillo was negligent in moving his truck halfway into the right-hand lane when he attempted to turn left, thus causing the accident.

The case was tried before a jury, which found that Mr. Lopez was at fault in causing the accident. They did not award damages to Dr. Jaramillo, however, because they found that Dr. Jaramillo’s problems with his cervical spine and his disability were not the result of injuries suffered in the accident. Although the jury found that Dr. Jaramillo’s disability was not caused by the accident, the jurors failed to answer the jury interrogatory on the issue of whether any of the defendants were responsible for the property damage to Dr. Jaramillo’s truck.

Dr. Jaramillo filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. The motion was denied except with respect to the issue of the amount of property damage sustained by Dr. Jaramillo’s truck. That issue was resolved by the parties, however, and is not before this Court.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Jaramillo has raised two assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that if they found that he was not suffering neck pain prior to the accident but neck pain appeared after the accident and continuously manifested itself, they should presume that there was a causal connection between the accident and his disabling condition. Second, Dr. Jaramillo claims that because the jury found that Mr. Lopez was negligent in causing the accident, the jury erred in failing to find that the negligence caused his disability.

_J¡¡Jury Instruction

In Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 94-2603, 94-2615 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 757, 759, the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the burden of proof that must be met by a plaintiff in a personal injury case. The Supreme Court stated:

In a personal injury suit, plaintiff bears the burden of proving a causal relationship between the injury sustained and the accident which caused the injury. Plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. The test for determining the causal relationship between the accident and subsequent injury is whether the plaintiff proved through medical testimony that it is more probable than not that the subsequent injuries were caused by the accident.

Id. (citations omitted).

The plaintiff may be assisted in meeting the burden of proof required to establish that an injury was caused by an accident by a legal presumption that was articulated in Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991). The Louisiana Supreme Court, quoting from an earlier case, Lucas v. Insurance Company of North America, 342 So.2d 591, 596 (La.1977), stated:

[a] claimant’s disability is presumed to have resulted from an accident, if before the accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest themselves afterwards, providing that the medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition.

579 So.2d at 980. The legal presumption discussed in the Housley case is known as the Housley presumption.

The Housley presumption is a re-buttable presumption, however. Even if the presumption exists, a defendant may defeat it by showing that an alleged injury 17could have been caused by some other particular incident rather than by the accident that the plaintiff claims was the cause of the injury. Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 94-2603 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 757, 761.

In Juneau v. Strawmyer, 94-0903, 94-2615 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/94), 647 So.2d 1294, this Court stated that for a plaintiff to benefit from the Housley presumption of causation, three things must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the plaintiff must prove that he was in good health prior to the accident allegedly causing the plaintiffs injury. Second, the plaintiff must show that subsequent to the accident, symptoms of the alleged injury appeared and continuously manifested themselves after the accident. Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate through medical evidence, circumstantial evidence, or common knowledge that there was a reasonable possibility of causation between the accident and the alleged injury. 647 So.2d at 1299.

In the instant, case, Dr. Jaramillo testified that a little more than two years prior to the accident, he had problems with his neck. He stated that “I had pain in my back, my neck ... and the pain was radiating down to these three fingers ... the burning sensation in the fingers, and I had some paresthesia [an abnormal sensation of the skin, such as numbness, tingling, pricking or burning, that has no objective cause] in the area of the left shoulder.” Although the pain ultimately resolved itself, according to Dr. Jaramillo’s testimony, the pain recurred about seven months later. Then there was a time period of at least a year prior to the accident when Dr. Jaramillo was pain free. After the accident, however, the pain recurred.

Dr. Jaramillo argues that the pain he had prior to the accident was a result of [¿radiculopathy but that the pain that occurred after the accident was a result of myelopathy. Dr. Jaramillo testified that he had been diagnosed with radiculopathy prior to the accident with Mr. Lopez but that he was diagnosed with myelopathy only after the accident. Nevertheless, when Dr. Jaramillo was asked at trial whether he would agree with a report by Dr. Albert Alexander, a neuroradiologist, that he had a disk herniation at the C3-4 level of his spine with associated spondy-losis based on an MRI taken prior to the accident, Dr. Jaramillo stated that he agreed with the report. Dr. Jaramillo also agreed that the herniated disk was “contacting the spinal cord and causing a flattening of the spinal cord.” Additionally, Dr. Jaramillo affirmed that an MRI taken over two years prior to the accident with Mr. Lopez “showed the same thing” that the MRI taken after the accident showed. Dr. Jaramillo further affirmed that Dr. Alexander’s report indicated that he had two problems with his spine prior to the accident. There was radiculopathy at the C6-7 level, and, additionally, the cervical disks at the C3-4 and the C4-5 levels were touching the spinal cord and, according to Dr. Alexander’s report, causing a flattening of the spinal cord.

Dr. Louis Espinoza, a rheumatologist, affirmed in his testimony at trial that Dr. Jaramillo had “degenerative joint disease” that predated the accident with Mr. Lopez. He also affirmed that an MRI of Dr. Jar-amillo’s cervical spine that was taken over two years prior to the accident showed “severe osteoarthritic changes in 19his neck” as well as “C3-4 level disk herniation, narrowing the spinal cord and spinal cord contact.” Additionally, he agreed that “[a]t the C-45 [sic] level there was disk protrusion and also narrowing of the neuroforaminal canal [an opening in the spine] and suspected nerve route [sic] contact.”

When Dr. Alexander testified, he said that he thought that the disk at the C3-4 level in Dr. Jaramillo’s spine was “pressing on the spinal cord” more than two years prior to the accident. He also affirmed that there was a protrusion or herniation of the disk at the C3-4 level that was “pressing on the spinal cord itself and causing it to flatten somewhat.” Further, Dr. Alexander testified that an MRI of Dr. Jaramillo’s cervical spine that was done more than two years prior to the accident and an MRI that was done on his cervical spine shortly after the accident were essentially the same.

In declining to give the jury instructions that Dr. Jaramillo requested pursuant to the Housley presumption, the trial court judge stated as follows:

[I]t is the Court’s position that the Howsley [sic] presumption is not meant to be directed towards a pre-existing condition, especially one' as long standing as the one that Dr. Jaramillo had had, and had the type of medical treatment that he had over the years. The Court is of the opinion that it is meant to deal with cases where there is no evidence of any prior problems relative to an injury and there subsequently is an accident and there are questions about whether there is causation, then I think the Howsley [sic] presumption comes into play.

We agree with the trial court judge’s decision that the Housley presumption is inapplicable in the instant case. See, e.g., Juneau v. Strawmyer, 94-0903 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/94), 647 So.2d 1294, where this Court found that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested jury charge on the Housley h presumption where the plaintiff did not succeed in proving that he was in good health prior to his accident. In the instant case, Dr. Jaramil-lo failed to prove that he was in good health prior to his accident. Therefore, we find no merit in Dr. Jaramillo’s first assignment of error.

Jury’s Failure to Find that The Accident Caused Dr. Jaramillo’s Injuries

In his second assignment of error, Dr. Jaramillo contends that because the jury found that Mr. Lopez was negligent in causing the accident, the jury erred in not finding that the accident was the cause of Dr. Jaramillo’s disability. The finding reached by the jury on this issue is a finding of fact. The standard of review for a factual finding by a jury is articulated in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it is well settled that an appellate court may set aside a factual finding of a trial court or a jury only where the finding was based on a “manifest error” or was “clearly wrong.” Id. at 844. Further, where there is a conflict in the testimony, a trial court’s or a jury’s reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on appeal, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable as those of the trial court or the jury. Id. Finally, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court’s or the jury’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Id. See also Harvey v. Cole, 2000-1849 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 808 So.2d 771.

In the instant case, Dr. Jaramillo argues that although he had radiculopathy prior to the accident with Mr. Lopez, he did not have myelopathy. He contends that the myelopathy was caused by the accident and that, therefore, his inability to | npractice urology was caused by the accident. Dr. Gutierrez, the neurologist who treated Dr. Jaramillo, described the distinction between radiculopathy and myelo-pathy. She said that when a disk in the spine moves, it can move posteriorly, laterally, or in both directions. When a disk moves in a lateral direction, a nerve root in the spine may be compressed. That condition is called radiculopathy. When a disk moves in a posterior direction, it may impinge upon the spinal cord itself. When a physician believes that the spinal cord is being compressed, the physician makes the clinical diagnosis of myelopathy, which is a more serious diagnosis than that of radicu-lopathy.

Dr. Gutierrez further explained that with radiculopathy only one nerve root is impinged and there is an area of weakness or pain, whereas with myelopathy there can be loss of control of the arms and legs and certain bodily functions as well as possible paralysis. Dr. Gutierrez testified that it was more likely than not that the accident with Mr. Lopez was the cause of Dr. Jaramillo’s myelopathy, which resulted in his disability.

Nevertheless, there was testimony from which the jury could have concluded that the accident did not cause Dr. Jaramillo’s myelopathy. Dr. Jaramillo’s girlfriend, who accompanied him to the medical conference in Costa Rica two days after the accident, testified that the turbulence on the plane was “rough.” Even Dr. Gutierrez agreed that a turbulent flight could be a triggering event for the worsening of Dr. Jaramillo’s spinal problems. Additionally, there was evidence presented at trial to support a finding that the accident with Mr. Lopez did not involve such force that it would have affected the condition of Dr. Jaramillo’s spine. Mr. Lopez testified that the impact in the accident was so slight that he could not believe that he had been in an accident. Dr. Jaramillo also admitted at h¿trial that he did not even know that his truck had been hit, and he further testified that he did not feel any pain at all from the impact. Thus, we find that the jury could have reasonably concluded either that the event that caused Dr. Jaram-illo’s myelopathy was the turbulent flight to Costa Rica or that the accident with Mr. Lopez was not the cause.

There is also sufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion by the jury that Dr. Jaramillo had myelopathy prior to the accident and that, therefore, the cause of his disability did not result from the accident. As discussed in connection with Dr. Jaramillo’s assignment of error regarding the Housley presumption, Dr. Jar-amillo clearly had problems with his spine prior to the accident. There was conflicting evidence presented concerning whether Dr. Jaramillo’s spinal impairment rose to the level of myelopathy prior to the accident. Clearly, Dr. Gutierrez opined that the myelopathy was more probably than not caused by the accident with Mr. Lopez. The testimony of other physicians, such as Dr. Alexander, could, however, be reasonably construed to support a finding that the myelopathy that resulted in Dr. Jaramillo’s disability was present prior to the accident.

Where, as in the instant case, there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court’s or jury’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong and should not be disturbed on appeal. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). The jury made a determination that one view of the evidence was more credible than the other, and we are not permitted to disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact on appeal. Id. Therefore, we must uphold the jury’s finding of fact in this case.

| ^CONCLUSION

We find Dr. Jaramillo’s assignments of error on appeal to be without merit. The trial court judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . The cervical spine is that part of the spine that is located in the neck.

      . MRI is an acronym for magnetic resonance imaging, which is a procedure in which a magnet linked to a computer is used to create detailed images of areas inside the body.

      . Radiculopathy is the irritation of a nerve root at any level of the spine, and it can be caused by such things as a protrusion of a disk, arthritis of the spine, or compression from a tumor. Radiculopathy can cause pain or neurological deficits.

      . Myelopathy is a disturbance of the spinal cord that results in loss of sensation and mobility.

      . The spine is divided into levels that refer to the location of the spinal cord and of the vertebrae, which are the bones in the spine. The spine in the neck includes the first seven vertebrae in the spine and consists of seven levels that are numbered Cl through C7.

      .Spondylosis refers to the degenerative changes that occur in the spine, including degeneration of the joints, intervertebral disks, ligaments, and connective tissue of the cervical vertebrae.