author: ROTHENBERG, Judge.

text:
    Gregory JOSEPH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D07-3123.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 27, 2008.

      Gregory Joseph, in proper person.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, Judge.

The defendant, Gregory Joseph (“Joseph”), appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.

On March 31, 2005, Joseph entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of second-degree murder and to aggravated child abuse as a result of a negotiated plea with the State. At the time of the plea, the State summarized the evidence it was prepared to prove, and it explained to the trial court that, while the State had every reason to believe that the defendant would be found guilty of first-degree murder based upon the evidence, the plea had been extended to the defendant to spare the child’s mother the trauma of a trial.

The State announced that it was prepared to prove that the child was in Joseph’s legal custody and care when Joseph committed aggravated child abuse resulting in the child’s death by kicking, striking, punching and stomping the child, practically severing the child’s liver and causing his lungs to turn black from the bruising. When the trial court asked Joseph if he was pleading guilty to committing these acts because he was guilty, he replied in the affirmative.

The trial court also inquired whether Joseph understood the charges to which he was pleading, the sentences he was to receive, and the rights he was giving up, explaining each to Joseph on the record. In each instance Joseph, under oath, answered that he understood. In response to questions from the trial court, Joseph stated that: he had never had any psychological “difficulties,” and did not have any at that time; he was not under the influence of any alcohol or drugs; he had an eleventh-grade education; he had not been promised anything other than what had been announced in open court; he had not been threatened in any way; he was satisfied with the services of his attorney; and his attorney had done everything Joseph had asked of him.

Although Joseph did not appeal his convictions and sentences, he has filed two postconviction motions. The first motion was filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, properly treated by the trial court as a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and denied on the merits. The claims raised were that the indictment was defective and that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance. This Court affirmed the trial court’s order on January 3, 2007. See Joseph v. State, 947 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (table).

On May 7, 2007, Joseph filed a second motion for postconviction relief raising additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion on the merits. It is this order from which Joseph now appeals.

While we agree with the trial court that the plea colloquy clearly refutes Joseph’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel we affirm the denial of his claims on procedural grounds. See Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 205 (Fla.2002) (holding that a successive rule 3.850 motion can be denied as an abuse of process where the defendant failed to raise the issue in his previous motion for postconviction relief without reason); Franklin v. State, 923 So.2d 1199, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding that the claims raised could have been raised in the defendant’s first motion for postconviction relief, and were, therefore, procedurally barred).

Affirmed.

      . Joseph claims his trial counsel was deficient in failing: to file "proper” pre-trial motions; seek appellate review of his admissions; investigate his case; evaluate his state of mind and mental health; and object to the amendment of the indictment. He additionally alleges that his plea was coerced.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Roy KAHN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D08-159.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 27, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied March 20, 2008.
    Roy Kahn, in proper person.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal of an order denying a motion for post conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The motion was filed August 10, 2007, and denied by the trial court September 29, 2007. Because we find the argument made in that motion to be without merit, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Rule 3.850 relief.


text:
    PARAMOUNT COMPANIES OF FLORIDA, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. Freddy PAGUADA, etc., Appellee.
    No. 3D07-3150.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 27, 2008.
    Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O’Dell & Harvey and Donald O’Dell (Orlando), for appellants.

      Koltun & Lazar and Scott A. Lazar, for appellee.
    Before GERSTEN, C.J., and CORTINAS, and LAGOA, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979).


text:
    Anthony MIDDLETON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-0379.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 28, 2008.
    Anthony Middleton, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4)(A).

BARFIELD, WOLF, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


text:
    Orian DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-0220.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 28, 2008.
    Orian Davis, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

BARFIELD, WOLF, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


author: SAWAYA, J.

text:
    John BURLEY, Appellant, v. GELCO CORPORATION, d/b/a G.E. Capital, etc., Appellee.
    No. 5D06-1995.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.

      James N. Charles, Celebration, for Appellant.

      Leo Benitez of Benitez & Associates, Coral Gables, for Appellee.
   SAWAYA, J.

The issue we must resolve is whether summary final judgment rendered in an action for replevin and breach of vehicle lease agreement is appropriate when material issues of fact exist as to whether the sale of the repossessed vehicles was commercially reasonable as required by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Based on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we reverse the summary final judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Gelco Corporation filed the above referenced action after Mr. Rooter of Central Florida, Inc. and its president, John Bur-ley, defaulted on a vehicle lease agreement under which Mr. Rooter agreed to lease three vehicles owned by Gelco. Mr. Bur-ley also signed a personal guaranty of the payments. The court ordered that Mr. Rooter and Mr. Burley surrender the vehicles upon the posting of a bond by Gelco. An Agreed Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment as to Count I (Replevin) was entered. The vehicles were turned over to Gelco, which subsequently moved for final summary judgment as to damages. In its motion, Gelco alleged that after it recovered the three vehicles, Gelco disposed of them “in a commercially reasonable manner,” obtaining $44,180 from the auction sale and leaving a balance of $55,928.80 due under the lease.

Mr. Burley filed an affidavit in opposition to Gelco’s motion, stating, inter alia, that he was entitled to receive notice of the disposition of the vehicles prior to their sale pursuant to section 679.611, Florida Statutes, but had not been provided with that notice. Had he received the required notice, Mr. Burley would have either objected to the proposed sale or gone to the sale and purchased the vehicles himself because their sale price was less than one-third of the market price. He stated that a commercially reasonable sale would have resulted in a sale of the vehicles for over $40,000 each.

Mr. Burley argued below that his affidavit raised a question of fact whether the sale of the vehicles was commercially reasonable, thus preventing entry of summary final judgment. If the sale was commercially unreasonable, an evidentiary hearing was required in order for Gelco to establish that the fair market value of the vehicles was less than the debt. Nevertheless, the court entered final summary judgment in favor of Gelco, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as follows:

f. [Geleoj’s notice of the proposed sale of the Three Vehicles to JOHN BUR-LEY was insufficient as it did not indicate the specific date, time and place of the sale.
g. Nevertheless, [Gelco] met its burden of proof and established that it disposed of the Three Vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner.

The court awarded Gelco $2,000 in attorney’s fees and $357.75 in costs in addition to the deficit of $55,928.80.

Mr. Burley’s argument is simple: he asserts that Gelco’s failure to provide him with the notice required by section 679.611, Florida Statutes, raised a presumption that the sale of the vehicles was conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner. Therefore, Mr. Burley contends, the trial court erred in proceeding further and finding that Gelco had met its burden of rebutting the presumption because such a determination requires an evidentiary hearing and could not be determined by summary judgment. We believe Mr. Bur-ley is correct.

Article 9 of the U.C.C., codified in chapter 679, Florida Statutes, provides that when the debtor defaults, the secured party can take possession of the secured collateral and can “sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral....” § 679.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). However, the secured party’s sale of the collateral must be made in a “commercially reasonable” manner. § 679.610(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). In fact, “[e]very aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.” Id. The purpose of these rules is, in part, “to protect the debtor, because they help prevent the creditor from acquiring the collateral at less than its true value or unfairly understating its value so as to obtain an excessive deficiency judgment.” Allen v. Coates, 661 So.2d 879, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). If a debtor places the creditor’s compliance with the U.C.C. requirements in issue, it becomes the creditor’s “burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with this part.” § 679.626(2), Fla. Stat. (2005).

Mr. Burley obviously placed Gelco’s compliance at issue; he argued successfully below that Gelco’s notice was inadequate. Section 679.611, formerly section 679.504, provides that unless the collateral “is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,” the secured party disposing of the collateral “shall send to the persons specified in subsection (3) a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition.” § 679.611(2), (4), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 679.613 prescribes the contents and form of the notification for non-consumer goods (such as the business vehicles at issue in this case). Specifically, section 679.613(l)(e) requires that the notice of disposition must include the “time and place of a public disposition or the time after which any other disposition is to be made.” The importance of correct notice cannot be overstated. “Notice is an integral aspect of whether the disposition is ‘commercially reasonable’ under chapter 679.” Landmark First Nat’l Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Gepetto’s Tale O’ The Whale of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 498 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla.1986). Whether the notice was adequate is a question of fact. See § 679.613(2), Fla. Stat (2005).

Not only did the trial court find that the notice was insufficient, but also it went further and addressed whether the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner in accordance with sections 679.627(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. Once a debtor shows that the creditor gave insufficient notice, a presumption arises that the subsequent sale of the collateral was commercially unreasonable, see Gangelhoff v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 611 So.2d 1333, 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); CSI Servs., Ltd. v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 516 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), thus rendering the question of commercial reasonableness a fact issue.

Here, the sole evidence of commercial reasonableness before the trial court was an affidavit by Mr. Hanson submitted by Gelco. In it, Mr. Hanson explains that the vehicles were delivered to an auction service that “sells vehicles for and on behalf of [Gelco] one day per week (usually on Tuesdays), which is known in the industry” and that “prior to the scheduled sale dates, the Auction allows any and all licensed motor vehicle dealerships to inspect the vehicles on its lots on a regular basis.” This statement merely explains what usually occurs; it provides no facts from which it could be determined that the vehicles were disposed of “in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.” § 679.627(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). Accordingly, this affidavit was insufficient to establish a prima facie showing that Gelco disposed of the vehicles in conformity with reasonable commercial practices. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. Hanson would have such knowledge or was otherwise qualified to give information on the resale practices of the auction industry. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(e) requires that affidavits supporting and opposing motions for summary judgment be made on personal knowledge, state admissible facts, and affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters being related in the affidavit. Mr. Hanson’s affidavit does not meet this test. Neither did Gelco produce an affidavit of any expert or other evidence regarding the commercial propriety of the sale of the three vehicles.

We conclude that Mr. Burley’s affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was sufficient to raise the question of whether the sale was commercially reasonable under the statute — Gelco’s failure to give Mr. Burley the requisite notice raises a presumption that the sale was commercially unreasonable. See CSI Servs., Ltd., 516 So.2d at 338 (concluding that according to applicable case law, the “failure to give the requisite notice merely raises the rebuttable presumption that since the sale was commercially unreasonable, the secured party is not entitled to a deficiency judgment. However, if the secured party can overcome that presumption by showing that fair market value was obtained for the collateral and the value received was less than the debt, and if no other defenses are asserted and proven, the secured party is entitled to a deficiency judgment”). Only if Gelco can overcome the presumption that the fair market value of the collateral at the time of repossession was equal to the total secured debt would Gelco be entitled to a deficiency judgment. Weiner v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., Inc., 482 So.2d 1362 (Fla.1986). Thus, genuine issues of material fact surround the commercial reasonableness of the sale, making summary judgment improper.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MONACO and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

      . The lease agreement called for payments of $555.67 per month per vehicle for a period of 60 months; Mr. Rooter and Mr. Burley stopped making payments less than a year after entering into the agreement.

      . Mr. Burley could properly seek the protections afforded by the U.C.C. because a guarantor is a debtor for Article 9 purposes. Tropical Jewelers, Inc. v. Nationsbank, N.A. (South), 781 So.2d 392, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

      . As previously indicated, sections 679.627(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, control the determination of whether disposition of collateral is made in a reasonable commercial manner. Specifically, the concept of "recognized markets,” as used in sections 679.627(2)(a) and (2)(b), is “quite limited” and applies "only to markets in which there are standardized price quotations for property that is essentially fungible, such as stock exchanges.” U.C.C. § 9-627 cmt. 4 (2002). Therefore, only subsection (2)(c) is applicable here.

      . In Weiner, the court adopted the rule set forth in Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966), that
      when it has been determined that a secured party has disposed of collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner, there will arise a presumption that the fair market value of the collateral at the time of repossession was equal to the amount of the total debt that it secured. The burden to prove that the fair market value of the collateral was less than the debt will be upon the secured party. If the secured party meets this burden, he will be allowed to recover a deficiency judgment in an amount equal to the total debt minus the fair market value of the collateral as ultimately determined.

        Weiner, 482 So.2d at 1365.


text:
    RGC GROUP, LLC, formerly d/b/a Healthcare, etc., Appellant, v. AVANT HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS, LLC., Appellee.
    No. 5D06-3637.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
    Jamie Billotte Moses and Patrick H. Willis of Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Dickson, Talley & Dunlap, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Scott E. Damon and Celina E. Contreras of Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Orlando, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellants, Ed Corpus, Jr. and Rachel G. Corpus, challenge a final judgment following a jury verdict awarding Appellee, Avant Healthcare Professionals, LLC, $107,775, plus prejudgment interest, from each of them. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for directed verdict made by Ed Corpus, Jr. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment against Ed Corpus, Jr. The judgment against Rachel G. Corpus is affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

ORFINGER, MONACO and TORPY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Isaac SMITH, a/k/a, Sherome L. Shannon, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D08-0253.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
    Isaac Smith, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to petitioner seeking such relief in the circuit court. See Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla.1999).

ALLEN, KAHN, and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Cathy BIDDLE, Petitioner, v. Scott ELLIS, Clerk of the Court, Brevard County, Respondent.
    No. 5D07-1923.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
    Robert R. Berry, of Eisenmenger & Berry, Viera, for Petitioner.
    Richard E. Stadler, of Stadler & Harris, P.A., Titusville, for Respondent.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We have considered the arguments raised by the petitioner in her motion for rehearing and conclude that the trial court was correct in rejecting her constitutional challenge to section 903.286, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, prohibition is denied.

WRIT DENIED.

GRIFFIN, PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur.


text:
    Steven McGAULEY Appellant, v. Walter A. McNEIL, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
    No. 1D07-6587.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
    Steven McGauley, pro se, Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General and Kathleen Von Hoene, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Ashley v. Moore, 742 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

BROWNING, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


author: DANAHY, PAUL W., Senior Judge.

text:
    Brent R. PARKER, Appellant, v. Robin H. PARKER, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-2818.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 29, 2008.
    Ann T. Frank, Naples, for Appellant.
    Antonio J. Perez-Benitoa, Naples, for Appellee.
   DANAHY, PAUL W., Senior Judge.

We have for review the final judgment dissolving the marriage of Robin and Brent Parker. In his appeal Mr. Parker argues that the trial court erred in its distribution of the parties’ marital assets and in its award of alimony to Mrs. Parker. He also argues that the court erred in denying several motions he presented and argued at trial. We affirm the court’s denial of each motion without further comment, and also affirm the judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage. We do, however, reverse the court’s scheme of distribution of assets and its award of alimony.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2005), governs the equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities. Subsection (1) requires the trial court to “begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal.” Moreover, “[t]he final distribution of marital assets, whether equal or unequal, must be supported by factual findings based on substantial competent evidence.” § 61.075(3); Guida v. Guida, 870 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

In the case before us, the final judgment included an “equitable distribution summary sheet” which identified $1,257,509.79 in total net marital assets and awarded $751,925 to Mrs. Parker and $743,028 to Mr. Parker. Most of the marital assets consist of real estate. Of these, $661,500 is allocated to Mr. Parker and $736,500 to Mrs. Parker. One of the properties listed by the trial court is a “Bonita Duplex” awarded to Mr. Parker. The court valued that asset at $400,000. The problem here is that neither party identified a “Bonita Duplex” in their financial statements or testimony. Mr. Parker listed a Bonita Shores “lot” valued at $150,000 and Mrs. Parker listed a Bonita Shores duplex of “unknown” value. Nor did either party list any property with a value of $400,000. Thus, the trial court’s finding of a “Bonita Duplex” with a value of $400,000 is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Were this the only error it would require us to reverse because it is a substantial portion of the total. There are other errors. Mrs. Parker testified that the “boat condo” listed on the court’s summary sheet is worth $65,000. Mr. Parker, on the other hand, testified that its value was $14,000. The trial court valued the boat condo at $45,000. There is no indication in the record how the trial court arrived at its valuation. Additionally, Mr. Parker testified that his father owed him $190,000. The judgment omits any mention of this debt owed to Mr. Parker, or any reason for its omission. Because of these errors by the trial court in its distribution of assets the judgment is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, it must be reversed. Prest v. Tracy, 749 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

ALIMONY

“The trial court’s award of alimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review ... and where the record does not contain substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings regarding the amount of alimony awarded, the appellate court will reverse the award.” Farley v. Farley, 858 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

This is the evidence the court considered: In her second amended financial affidavit Mrs. Parker listed her net monthly income as $1781.25. In his amended financial affidavit Mr. Parker listed net monthly income as $1918.65. Mr. Parker testified that he has no regular salary and that his income was from his business and some rental income. The trial court accepted Mrs. Parker’s statement of her income but found that Mr. Parker had a net monthly income of $5500. The evidentiary basis for the trial court’s finding of net income by Mr. Parker is absent from the record.

Based on its net income findings, the trial court ordered Mr. Parker to pay Mrs. Parker $1500 monthly permanent alimony. The trial court calculated that Mrs. Parker would then have a net monthly income of $3052.25. We note that this conclusion is mathematically incorrect — $1781.25 plus $1500 equals $3281.25, a difference of $229. Thus, because the trial court’s award of alimony is not supported by competent, substantial evidence we reverse the award.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s scheme of equitable distribution and its award of alimony are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on those issues. Because our reversal will affect other financial aspects of the judgment, the court may reconsider the awards of child support and attorney fees. See Branch v. Branch, 775 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Roylin ROBINSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D06-893.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 5, 2008.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Olga L. Villa and Michael C. Greenberg, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
    Before COPE, GREEN, and RAMIREZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Roylin Robinson, appeals from an order finding that he violated his probation. Because the evidence does not show, and the trial court did not find, that the appellant substantially and willfully violated the conditions of his probation, we reverse. See Arias v. State, 751 So.2d 184, 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(“A violation which triggers a revocation of probation must be both willful and substantial in nature, and must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence.”). See also Dassau v. State, 731 So.2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(“Inept or negligent conduct is insufficient to demonstrate a willful violation.”).

Reversed.


text:
    A.B., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D07-883.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 5, 2008.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Harvey J. Sepler, Assistant Public Defender, and Kristy R. Militello, Certified Legal Intern, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Juliet S. Fattel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ and LAGOA, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

A.B. seeks to reverse an adjudication of delinquency and sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the State’s case was based on direct, not circumstantial, evidence, and conclude that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the judgment. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495 (Fla.2005); F.D. v. State, 927 So.2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); I.M. v. State, 917 So.2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Affirmed.


text:
    Rubin GRIFFIN, a/k/a Ruben Lee Griffin, a/k/a Rubin Lee Griffin, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 3D08-220.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 5, 2008.
    Rubin Griffin, in proper person.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for respondent.
    Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, Judge.

Rubin Griffin, a/k/a Ruben Lee Griffin, a/k/a Rubin Lee Griffin (“Griffin”), seeks a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that this Court reverse his convictions and order his immediate release from custody. In doing so, Griffin urges this Court to “brush aside formal technicalities” in order to grant him the relief he seeks. We decline the invitation and deny the petition.

Griffin’s convictions for burglary of an occupied dwelling, grand theft auto, and resisting an officer without violence, and his thirty-year sentence as an habitual felony offender, were affirmed on appeal by this Court on May 8, 1996. Griffin v. State, 674 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (table). Since his direct appeal, Griffin has filed: (1) a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by this Court on November 12, 1998, Griffin v. State, 721 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (table); (2) a petition for a writ of mandamus, which was denied by this Court on October 19, 2007, Griffin v. State, 967 So.2d 210 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); (3) a motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by this Court on December 5, 2007, Griffin v. State, No. 3D07-2614, 972 So.2d 190, 2007 WL 4249865 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 5, 2007) (unpublished); and (4) the instant petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus.

In the instant petition, Griffin claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Habeas corpus is, however, the improper vehicle to address the merits of an underlying conviction and the performance of trial counsel. The proper vehicle to address Griffin’s claim was either during his direct appeal, see Forget v. State, 782 So.2d 410, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (stating that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the error is apparent on the face of the record), or in a timely filed rule 3.850 motion for postcon-viction relief. A petition for habeas corpus cannot substitute for a rule 3.850 motion, see Nixon v. State, 691 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), nor may it be used to circumvent a rule 3.850 motion barred by the two-year limitations period or the proscription against successive motions. See Mills v. Dugger, 574 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla.1990).

It would appear that Griffin is well-aware of his inability to file a legally sufficient motion under rule 3.850, which is why he has filed the instant petition and has urged us to dispense with the “formal technicalities.”

Petition denied.