text:
    Jarvis Ramon HAYNES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC07-123.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 8, 2007.

      Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Mary G. Jolley and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Haynes v. State, 944 So.2d 417 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), based on express and direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. After further consideration, we have determined that jurisdiction was improvidently granted, and we hereby dismiss review.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rodolfo CASAS, Petitioner, v. SIEMENS ENERGY AND AUTOMATION, INC., Respondent.
    No. SC06-1063.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 15, 2007.
    Philip D. Parrish, Miami, Florida, and Donna B. Michelson, Coconut Grove, Florida, for Petitioner.
    John H. Pelzer of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster and Russell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Casas v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 927 So.2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), in which the Third District Court of Appeal cited with approval its decision in Bombay Co., Inc. v. Bakerman, 891 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), quashed, 961 So.2d 259 (Fla.2007). At the time the Third District Court issued its decision in Casas, Bakerman was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed proceedings in this case pending disposition of Bakerman, in which this Court ultimately quashed the Third District Court’s underlying Bakerman decision. See Bakerman v. Bombay Co., Inc., 961 So.2d 259 (Fla.2007). We accordingly issued an order directing respondent to show cause why we should not accept jurisdiction in the present case, quash the Casas decision, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Bakerman. Upon consideration of respondent’s response, petitioner’s reply thereto, and the parties’ previously filed jurisdictional briefs, we have determined to so proceed.

We accordingly grant the petition for review in the present case. The decision under review is quashed and this matter is remanded to the Third District Court of Appeal for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision in Bakerman.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    Andrew MANOS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC05-586.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 15, 2007.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Dayto-na Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Douglas T. Squire and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Manos v. State, 895 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal cited as authority Franklin v. State, 877 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), quashed, 955 So.2d 564 (Fla.2007). At the time the Fifth District Court issued its decision in Manos, Franklin was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).

We stayed proceedings in this case pending disposition of Franklin. We ultimately quashed the Fourth District Court’s underlying Franklin decision. See State v. Franklin, 955 So.2d 564 (Fla.2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla.2006)). Having disposed of Franklin, we then issued an order directing respondent to show cause why we should not accept jurisdiction in the present case, quash the Manos decision, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Franklin. Upon consideration of respondent’s response and the parties’ previously filed jurisdictional briefs, we have determined to so proceed.

We grant the petition for review in the present case, quash the decision under review, and remand this matter to the Fifth District Court of Appeal for reconsideration upon application of this Court’s decision in Franklin.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE-RULE 9.141 AND RULE 9.142.
    No. SC07-1662.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 15, 2007.
    Steven L. Brannoek, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, of Holland and Knight, Tampa, FL; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Joanna A. Mauer, Bar Staff Liaison, the Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee (Committee) has filed in this Court an out-of-cycle report of proposed rule changes pursuant to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.140(e) and (f). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

First, based on a request from the Court, the Committee proposes an amendment to subdivision (c)(4)(B) of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141, Review Proceedings in Collateral or Postconviction Criminal Cases. The proposal changes the commencement of the time for filing petitions alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in noncapital cases from the time when the conviction becomes final to the time when the judgment and sentence become final. And second, following recent amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f), Dismissal of Postconviction Proceedings, the Committee proposes new rule 9.142(c), Review of Dismissal of Postconviction Proceedings and Discharge of Counsel in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(i) Cases. The proposed new rule sets forth a procedure governing appeals from orders granting motions to dismiss postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel in capital cases. The Committee published the proposed amendments to rules 9.141 and 9.142 in the July 15, 2007, and September 15, 2007, editions of The Florida Bar News, respectively.

AMENDMENTS

As for rule 9.141(c)(4)(B), the proposed amendments provide that the time for filing a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in noncapital cases begins to run when the judgment and sentence become final on direct appeal. The existing rule provides that the time period begins to run when the conviction alone becomes final. The existing rule creates a problem when a conviction is affirmed but the matter is remanded for resentencing; the two-year period would begin to run while resentencing proceedings continued, giving rise to the possibility that the deadline for postconviction relief could run before resentencing is even completed. The proposed rule makes clear that the time does not begin to run until both the judgment and sentence are final.

As for rule 9.142, proposed new subdivision (c) sets forth an expedited procedure for reviewing orders granting motions to dismiss postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel in capital cases. Within ten days of the rendition of such an order, discharged counsel shall file with the clerk of the circuit court two copies of a notice seeking review in this Court. The circuit judge presiding over the case shall order the preparation of a transcript of the- hearing on the motion, and the transcript shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within twenty-five days of rendition of the order granting the motion to dismiss and discharge. Within thirty days of rendition of that order, the clerk of the circuit court shall forward to the clerk of this Court copies of the motion, order, and transcripts of all hearings on the motion. Within twenty days of the filing of the record in this Court, discharged counsel shall serve an initial brief. The State and the prisoner may then file responsive briefs. All briefs must be served and filed as prescribed by rule 9.210.

We adopt the amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure as set forth in the attached appendix. Additions are indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall become effective immediately upon release of this opinion. Because the Court did not publish the amendments prior to their adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 9.141. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS IN COLLATERAL OR POST-CONVICTION CRIMINAL CASES

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) Petitions Seeking Belated Appeal or Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel.

(l)-(3) [No Change]

(4) Time Limits.

(A)[No Change]

(B) A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review shall not be filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence conviction becomes final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel.

(C) [No Change]

(5) [No Change]

Committee Notes

[No Change]

RULE 9.142. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) Review of Dismissal of Postcon-viction Proceedings and Discharge of Counsel in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(i) Cases.

(1) Applicability. This rule applies when the circuit court enters an order dismissing postconviction proceedings and discharging counsel under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(i).

(2) Procedure Following Rendition of Order of Dismissal and Discharge.

(A) Notice to Court. Within 10 days of the rendition of an order granting a prisoner’s motion to discharge counsel and dismiss the motion for postconviction relief, discharged counsel shall file with the clerk of the circuit court 2 copies of a notice seeking review in the supreme court.

(B) Transcription. The circuit judge presiding over any hearing on a motion to dismiss and discharge counsel shall order a transcript of the hearing to be prepared and filed with the clerk of the circuit court no later than 25 days from rendition of the final order.

(C) Record. Within 30 days of the granting of a motion to dismiss and discharge counsel, the clerk of the circuit court shall forward a copy of the motion, order, and transcripts of all hearings held on the motion to the clerk of the supreme court.

(D) Proceedings in Supreme Court. Within 20 days of the filing of the record in the supreme court, discharged counsel shall serve an initial brief. Both the state and the prisoner may serve responsive briefs. All briefs must be served and filed as prescribed by rule 9.210,

      . See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3. 851 & 3. 590, 945 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 2006).

      . An original and nine paper copies of all comments must be filed with the Court on or before January 14, 2008, with a certificate of service verifying that a copy has been served on the Committee Chair, Stephen L. Bran-nock, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Post Office Box 1288, Tampa, Florida 33601-1288, along with a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. The Committee chair has until February 4, 2008, to file a response to any comments filed with the Court. Electronic copies of all comments also must be filed in accordance with In re Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with Clerk, Fla. Sup.Ct.).


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR—FLORIDA REGISTERED PARALEGAL PROGRAM.
    No. SC06-1622.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Nov. 15, 2007.
    Ross Goodman, Chair, Special Committee to Study Paralegal Regulation, John F. Harkess, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, Francisco R. Angones, President, The Florida Bar, Miami, FL, and Lori S. Holcomb, UPL Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Howard Rudolph and David Leacock of Rudolph and Leacock, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL; Jane Kady Ross, CP, CFLA, Tallahassee, FL; Judith M. Deary, CAL, CFLA, St. Petersburg, FL; Jane Fletcher Strike of McCarthy, Summers, Bobko, Wood, Sawyer and Perry, P.A., Stuart, FL; Debra Cristello, ACP, CFLA, Venice, FL; Mark Workman, Miami, FL; Mark F. Grant, L. Geoffrey Young, Carol D. Holler and John E. Bibish, IV, of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster and Russell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL; Rabian M. Brook, III, Guy P. Coburn, V. James Dickson, Cary Cash, Justin R. Zinzow, Dara M. van Dijk, and Ricia Jastrow, of Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster and Russell, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL; P. Kevin Seam-on, St. Augustine, FL; Jill S. Greene, and Ivonne Santos of Gunster, Yoakley and Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL; Wendy E. Murnan, CP, LPI, Palm Beach Gardens, FL; Maria Martella, Paralegal, of Holland and Knight, Fort Lauderdale, FL; James E. Messer, Jr., and Claire C. Davis, CP, Fonvielle, Lewis, Foote and Messer, Tallahassee, FL; Paula Albright, CP, Port Saint Lucie, FL; Richard M. Treiser, Susan R. Healy, C. Richard Mancini, Craig A. Goddy, Tracy L. Coghill, Christopher J. Thornton, and Diane L. Tierney, PLS, CP, Treiser, Collins, and Vernon, Naples, FL; Penny W. Bell, ACP, Cocoa, FL; Andrew M. Fussner, American Heart Association, St. Petersburg, FL; Michelle Sanderson, CLA, Miami, FL; Nancy N. Beaty, MA, CP, Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham and Ford, P.A., Naples, FL; Jeannene Cox, CLA, Premier Title of Palm Beach, Palm Beach, FL; Gina Hanel, ACP, Melbourne, FL; Barbara R. Willen, CLA, Miami, FL; Sally Feaman, CP, Boynton Beach, FL; Jaime Stevenson Fernandez, CLA, Palm Beach, FL; Jenny Lawton Seal, Indialantic, FL; James M. Nicholas, Satellite Beach, FL; Hannah L. Wilson, North Miami, FL; Nandra R. Ramnarine, Melbourne, FL; Jennifer A. Hartman, Palm Bay, FL; De~ Ronda Luciano, Naples, FL; Johnna A. Phillips, President, Paralegal Association of Florida, Inc., West Palm Beach, FL; Yudi R. Gonzalez-Smith, Miami Lakes, FL; Timothy P. Shusta and Michael Ashy of Phelps and Dunbar, LLP, Tampa, FL; John D. Spear, Bonita Springs, FL; Patricia Tassinari, CP, CFLA, Tallahassee, FL; Doris Rachles, Chair, Legal Studies, South University, West Palm Beach, FL; Barbara J. Paulson, CP, Tallahassee, FL; Linda Marsh, Jacksonville, FL; Carl L. Griffin, Orlando, FL; Sherry C. Ingram, Royal Palm Beach, FL; Margaret J. Ave-rill, ACP, CFLA, Vero Beach, FL; Denise I. Dimond, CLA, CFLA, Riverview, FL; J.R. Nunn and Joel Cornfeld, CSX Transportation, Jacksonville, FL; Gregg W. McClosky, Ronald E. D’Anna, and Marianne A. Smith of McClosky, D’Anna and Dieterle, LLP, Boca Raton, FL; Jennifer A. Kelley, CP, CFLA, Tampa, FL; Francine Shay, CP, West Palm Beach, FL; Susan L. Priess, CP, CFLA, Palm Beach Gardens, FL; Deborah A. Repass, AACP, RP, Fountain Hills, Arizona; Nancy C. Murphy, CP, Tallahassee, FL; Christine Raymond, CLA, Miami, FL; Mary-Lou George, ACP, CFLA, Seminole, FL; Patricia C. DeRamus, CP, Wellington, FL; Pamela K. Bailey, Tallahassee, FL; Mark Raafat Malek and Christina B. Sutch of The Torpy Group, Melbourne, FL; Norma I. Zengotita, Melbourne, FL; Robert Jason Richards of Aylstock, Witkin and Sas-ser, PLC, Pensacola, FL; Suzanne M. Lo-mascolo, CP, Palm Harbor, FL; Teresa A. Smith, CP, Gulfport, FL; Joni J. Mann, CP, Largo, FL; Priscilla E. Carroll, CP, Indian Rocks Beach, FL; Nancy B. Coats, CP, Dade City, FL; Sandra L. Eckstorm, CP, Pinellas Park, FL; Cynthia G. Stephens, CP, St. Petersburg, FL; Jo M. Flower, CP, Safety Harbor, FL; Chrystal Lunsford, CP, St. Petersburg, FL; Karen A. Caco, International Immigration Services, P.A., Naples, FL; John S. Shaheen, Vice President, American Institute for Paralegal Studies, Inc., Downers Grove, IL; Susan K. Goelz, CP, New Port Richey, FL; James L. Butts, LLC, Satellite Beach, FL; Shelly Guay, CP, Cocoa, FL; Linda H. O’Steen, ACP, Tallahassee, FL; Lisa B. Vessels, CP, Miami, FL; Kenneth J. Kukec, the South Florida Paralegal Association, Miami, FL; Catherine M. Goe, CP, Miami, FL; Bonnie L. Guinter, CP, McCarthy, Summers, Bobko, Wood, Sawyer and Perry, P.A., Stuart, FL; Vivian S. Fusco, CLA, Miami, FL; Vera Long, ACP, Jupiter, FL; Gene Wakefield, CLA, Miami, FL; Connie Schiraldi, ACP, Lake Worth, FL; Mark Workman, CP, Miami, FL; Lisa B. Vessels, CP, Miami, FL; and Mary Katherine Day-Petrano, Clearwater, FL, Responding with comments.
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court on the petition of The Florida Bar proposing that the Court amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by adopting chapter 20, the Florida Registered Paralegal Program. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. We adopt the proposed rules with only minor stylistic changes.

BACKGROUND

The Bar undertook its study of the issue of paralegal certification or registration in 2005 when legislation to institute a regulatory scheme for paralegals was introduced before the Florida Legislature. The Bar opposed the proposed legislation, in part because it believed that any regulation of paralegals should be in the judicial, rather than the legislative, branch. The President of The Florida Bar at the time, Alan Bookman, appointed the Special Committee to Study Paralegal Regulation (Committee), to study the status of paralegals in Florida. The Committee had twenty-four members, including four paralegals, three paralegal educators, Representative Juan Zapata (the proponent of one of the bills), and attorneys from various geographic areas and areas of practice in Florida.

After much study and debate and a complete public airing of the issue, including a public hearing in October 2005, The Florida Bar, on August 15, 2006, filed its “Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to Add Chapter 20 — Florida Registered Paralegal Program” (hereinafter “petition”). The Board of Governors approved the filing of the petition and unanimously approved the petition’s proposed amendments and actions. The Bar published the instant proposals in The Florida Bar News and posted the proposals on its website. The notice directed readers who wished to comment on the proposals to file their comments directly with the Court after the Bar filed its report.

After the Bar filed its petition, the Court received 103 comments. A large majority of the comments, including two received from paralegal organizations, supported adoption of the proposed rules. The paralegal associations that filed comments in support were the Paralegal Association of Florida and the American Alliance of Paralegals, Inc. Most of the positive comments expressed general approval of the proposals, many commenters stating that they believed the proposed rules would help the paralegal profession, would help attorneys, would help the public, or some combination thereof.

Two paralegal organizations were among the fourteen commenters opposing the adoption of the proposed rules. These were the American Institute for Paralegal Studies, Inc. and the South Florida Paralegal Association (SFPA). For the most part, the commenters who opposed the proposed rules did so because they believed that autonomous governance overseen by the Court (rather than The Florida Bar) was the appropriate route to take, the proposed rules presented a conflict of interest, or both.

The Court commends the many members of the paralegal profession and the paralegal organizations who filed comments on both sides of this issue. It is clear from the well-reasoned arguments received that all of the commenters are desirous of establishing high professional standards for the paralegal profession. While we are cognizant that the adoption of chapter 20 does not go as far as some would like, we nevertheless believe this is a first, prudent step toward the desired end. It behooves us to tread with caution in implementing a registration program for professionals who have hitherto been largely self-regulated, so that the efficacy of the program being adopted and its impact on both the legal and paralegal professions can be assessed before any mandatory plan is instituted.

The Court scheduled oral argument and directed the Bar and “any party who filed a timely comment” to submit briefs addressing the issue of whether The Florida Bar and this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over and regulate nonlawyers who are not engaging in the unlicensed practice of law. The Bar and the SFPA filed jurisdictional briefs. Two individual commenters filed “briefs” adopting the arguments of SFPA.

The Court need not address whether it has jurisdiction to “regulate” the paralegal profession because the rules proposed by the Bar that the Court adopts in this opinion do not establish “regulation” of the paralegal profession. Rather, they create a registration program, participation in which is purely voluntary. The Bar urges the Court to approve this voluntary registration plan for members of a profession who perform work that is clearly related to the practice of law. We do so because we believe the program will inure to the benefit of the public in the same way the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators inured to the public’s benefit and we are, therefore, comfortable with approving this program. See Fla. R. Med.; Proposed Stds. of Prof'l Conduct for Cert. & Court Appointed Mediators, 604 So.2d 764 (Fla.1992) (adopting mediator certification rules, mediator standards of professional conduct, and disciplinary rules).

DISCUSSION

The new chapter 20 creates the Florida Registered Paralegal Program. It provides for voluntary registration of paralegals who meet certain minimum educational, certification, or work experience criteria and who agree to abide by an established code of ethics in exchange for the ability to refer to themselves as Florida Registered Paralegals.

SUBCHAPTER 20-1 PREAMBLE. Subchapter 20-1 has one rule. Rule 20-1.1, titled “Purpose,” states the purpose of the chapter. It also makes it clear that the chapter is not intended to set forth the duties a paralegal may perform or be deemed relevant in charging or awarding fees for the services rendered by nonlaw-yer employees.

SUBCHAPTER 20-2 DEFINITIONS. Rule 20-2.1, the only rule under subchap-ter 20-2, is the definition section. It defines a “paralegal” to be someone with education, training, or work experience who works under the direction and supervision of a member of the Bar and who performs specifically delegated substantive legal work for which the Bar member is responsible. A “Florida Registered Paralegal” is someone who meets the definition of a paralegal who also meets the requirements for registration set forth in rules 20-3.1 and 20-4.1. The rule also defines “paralegal work experience” and approved paralegal programs.

SUBCHAPTER 20-8 ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS. Rule 20-3.1, the only rule under subchapter 20-3, establishes three alternative ways to qualify as a Florida Registered Paralegal (FRP): (1) by having the prescribed education and experience; (2) by having the prescribed certifications; or (3) by being grandfathered in. The rule also establishes what each of these routes to registration requires of the applicant.

SUBCHAPTER 20-4 REGISTRATION. Rule 20-4.1, the only rule in the subchapter, provides that the Bar will handle registration of FRPs without Court involvement, will promulgate an application form and make it available on its website, and will issue a certificate of registration to paralegals who meet the requirements and properly apply. It also establishes the renewal process and fees.

SUBCHAPTER 20-5 INELIGIBILITY FOR REGISTRATION OR RENEWAL. This subchapter has two rules — rules 20-5.1 and 20-5.2. Rule 20-5.1 provides that some individuals will be ineligible either to register as an FRP or to renew an already-existing registration. One such category is anyone who is currently suspended or disbarred or who resigned in lieu of discipline from the practice of law in any state or jurisdiction. Persons in the identified categories will still be able to work as unregistered paralegals in the employ of an attorney.

Rule 20-5.2 requires an individual who is applying for registration or already registered to inform the Bar promptly of any fact or circumstance that would render the individual ineligible for registration or renewal.

SUBCHAPTER 20-6 CONTINUING EDUCATION. Subchapter 20-6 has only one rule, rule 20-6.1. The rule establishes the continuing education requirements for FRPs and specifies which courses or seminars will satisfy this requirement.

SUBCHAPTER 20-7 CODE OF ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY. Rule 20-7.1, the only rule in the subchapter, establishes the Code of Ethics and Responsibility governing FRPs. The code does not alter an attorney’s obligation to supervise nonlawyer employees or to follow Florida’s Code of Professional Responsibility.

We strongly emphasize, for the benefit of members of The Florida Bar, that the primary responsibility of monitoring the conduct and activities of all paralegals, whether they are FRPs or not, still rests with the lawyer by whom the individual paralegal is employed and under whose direction the paralegal performs substantive legal work. This responsibility cannot be delegated, and this voluntary registration program does not relieve the lawyer of that critical responsibility. See also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-5.3,10 — 2.1(b).

SUBCHAPTER 20-8 REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION. Subchapter 20-8 is comprised of eight rules that establish the complaint and disciplinary process for violations of the Code of Ethics and Responsibility for FRPs established by sub-chapter 20-7.

RULE 20-8.1. Rule 20-8.1 provides for district paralegal committees, at least one committee for each appellate district. Each committee will have at least three members, including at least one FRP and one Bar member. The rule provides for the appointment, terms of office, and disqualification of committee members, a chair, vice-chair, and secretary.

RULE 20-8.2. Rule 20-8.2 sets out the duties and authority of the district paralegal committees. The committees receive and evaluate complaints against FRPs and have the authority to remove or revoke a FRP’s registration. The registration of a FRP may be suspended or revoked for any of an enumerated list of occurrences.

RULE 20-8.8. Rule 20-8.3 establishes the requisites for complaints against FRPs and the procedures for processing them.

RULE 20-8.L This rule establishes the investigatory powers of the committees. The respondent, who is entitled to be accompanied by counsel, may be required to appear and to produce evidence during the investigation unless the respondent claims a privilege or right properly available under applicable federal or state law.

RULE 20-8.5. Rule 20-8.5 provides that the chair or vice-chair of the committee will have authority to issue subpoenas for preliminary investigations or investigations authorized by the committee.

RULE 20-8.6. Rule 20-8.6 provides the possible outcomes of an investigation into an FRP’s conduct. These range from a finding of no misconduct to revocation of the FRP’s registration.

RULE 20-8.7. Review of the district committee’s actions is limited and does not involve the Court. A revocation or nonre-newal decision goes to the designated reviewer for the committee, who may affirm the decision, ask the committee to reconsider its decision, or refer the matter to the Disciplinary Review Committee (DRC) of The Florida Bar. The DRC may confirm, reject, or amend the designated reviewer’s recommendation, in whole or in part. The DRC reports its findings to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, which may confirm, reject, or amend the DRC’s recommendation, in whole or in part. The board is the last level of review.

RULE 20-8.8. This rule addresses custody and disposition of the complaint files, as well as handling of inquiries concerning such files.

SUBCHAPTER 20-9 IMMUNITY. There is only one rule in this subchapter. Rule 20-9.1 provides immunity from suit for actions taken in the course of their official duties to district committee members, the Board, and Bar staff and counsel assisting a committee.

SUBCHAPTER 20-10 AMENDMENTS. The sole rule in this subchapter provides that the chapter 20 rules are amendable in accordance with the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.

Having considered the petition, the comments filed, and the arguments of the parties at oral argument, we adopt chapter 20 as proposed by the Bar with only minor stylistic changes as indicated in the appendix to this opinion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by adoption of chapter 20 establishing the Florida Registered Paralegal Program as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. These new rules shall become effective on March 1, 2008, at 12:01 a.m.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER 20 FLORIDA REGISTERED PARALEGAL PROGRAM

SUBCHAPTER 20-1 PREAMBLE

RULE 20-1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth a definition that must be met in order to use the title paralegal, to establish the requirements to become a Florida Registered Paralegal, and to establish the requirements to maintain Florida Registered Paralegal status. This chapter is not intended to set forth the duties that a paralegal may perform because those restrictions are set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct and various opinions of the Professional Ethics Committee. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed relevant in charging or awarding fees for legal services rendered by nonlawyers under the supervision of a member of The Florida Bar, such fees being based on the nature of the services rendered and not the title of the person rendering the services.

SUBCHAPTER 20-2 DEFINITIONS

RULE 20-2.1 GENERALLY

For purposes of this chapter, the following terms shall have the following meaning:

(a) Paralegal. A paralegal is a person with education, training, or work experience, who works under the direction and supervision of a member of The Florida Bar and who performs specifically delegated substantive legal work for which a member of The Florida Bar is responsible.

(b) Florida Registered Paralegal. A Florida Registered Paralegal is someone who meets the definition of paralegal and the requirements for registration as set forth elsewhere in these rules.

(c) Paralegal Work and Paralegal Work Experience. Paralegal work and paralegal work experience are specifically delegated substantive legal work performed by a person with education, training, or work experience under the direction and supervision of a member of The Florida Bar for which a member of The Florida Bar is responsible. In order to qualify as paralegal work or paralegal work experience for purposes of meeting the eligibility and renewal requirements set forth herein, the paralegal must primarily perform paralegal work and the work must be continuous and recent. Recent paralegal work for the purposes of meeting the eligibility and renewal requirements set forth herein means work performed during 3 of the previous 5 years in connection with an initial registration, and during the preceding year in the case of a registration renewal. Time spent performing clerical work is specifically excluded.

(d) Approved Paralegal Program. An approved paralegal program is a program approved by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) or a program that is in substantial compliance with the ABA guidelines and accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency approved by the United States Department of Education.

(e) Employing or Supervising Attorney. An employing or supervising attorney is the attorney having direct supervision over the work product of the paralegal or Florida Registered Paralegal.

(f) Board. The board is the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.

(g) Respondent. A respondent is the individual whose conduct is under investigation.

(h) Designated Reviewer. The designated reviewer is a member of the board of governors appointed by the president of The Florida Bar from the district of the district paralegal committee and is responsible for review and other specific duties as assigned by the board of governors with respect to a particular district paralegal committee or matter. If a designated reviewer recuses or is unavailable, another board member from the district may be appointed by the president of The Florida Bar to serve as designated reviewer in that matter.

(i) Probable Cause. A finding of probable cause is a finding that there is cause to believe that a Florida Registered Paralegal is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action.

(j) Bar Counsel. Bar counsel is a member of The Florida Bar representing The Florida Bar in any proceeding under these rules.

SUBCHAPTER 20-3 ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

RULE 20-3.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION

In order to be a Florida Registered Paralegal under this chapter, an individual must meet 1 of the following requirements.

(a) Educational and Work Experience Requirements. A person may become a Florida Registered Paralegal by meeting 1 of the following education and paralegal work experience requirements:

(1) a bachelor’s degree in paralegal studies from an approved paralegal program, plus a minimum of 1 year of paralegal work experience;
(2) a bachelor’s degree from an institution accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency approved by the United States Department of Education or the Florida Department of Education, plus a minimum of 3 years of paralegal work experience;
(3) an associate’s degree in paralegal studies from an approved paralegal program, plus a minimum of 2 years of paralegal work experience;
(4) an associate’s degree from an institution accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency approved by the United States Department of Education or the Florida Department of Education, plus a minimum of 4 years of paralegal work experience; or
(5) a juris doctorate degree from an American Bar Association accredited institution, plus a minimum of 1 year of paralegal work experience.

(b) Certification. A person may become a Florida Registered Paralegal by obtaining 1 of the following certifications:

(1) successful completion of the Paralegal Advanced Competency Exam (PACE certification as offered by the National Federation of Paralegal Associations “NFPA”) and good standing with NFPA; or
(2) successful completion of the Certified Legal Assistant/Certified Paralegal examination (CLA/CP certification as offered by the National Association of Legal Assistants “NALA”) and good standing with NALA.

(c) Grandfathering. A person who does not meet the requirements of (a) or (b) may become a Florida Registered Paralegal by providing attestation from an employing or supervising attorney(s) that the person has paralegal work experience as defined elsewhere in these rules for 5 of the 8 years immediately preceding the date of such attestation. Any such attestation must be received by The Florida Bar not later than 3 years after the effective date of this chapter.

SUBCHAPTER 20-4 REGISTRATION

RULE 20-4.1 GENERALLY

The following shall be filed with The Florida Bar by an individual seeking to be registered as a Florida Registered Paralegal:

(a) Educational, Certification, or Experience Requirement.

(1) evidence that the individual has satisfied the requirements of rule 20-3.1(a) by supplying evidence of the degree and attestation from the employing or supervising attorney(s) showing that the individual has the appropriate paralegal work experience; or
(2) a certificate showing that the individual has obtained 1 of the certifications set forth in rule 20~3.1(b); or
(3) attestation from the employing or supervising attorney(s) that the individual has met the requirements of rule 20-3.1(c).

(b) Statement of Compliance. A sworn statement by the individual that the individual has read and will abide by the Code of Ethics and Responsibility set forth elsewhere in this chapter.

(c) Registration Fee. An appropriate registration fee set by the board.

(d) Review by The Florida Bar. Upon receipt of the items set forth in subdivision 20-4.1(a)-(c), The Florida Bar shall review the items for compliance with this chapter. Any incomplete submissions will be returned. If the individual meets all of the requirements of this chapter, the individual shall be added to the roll of Florida Registered Paralegals and a certificate evidencing such registration shall be issued.

(e) Annual Renewal; Content and Registration Fee. The registration pursuant to this subdivision shall be annual and consistent with that applicable to an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Florida. An annual registration fee shall be set by the board in an amount not more than the annual fees paid by inactive members of The Florida Bar. The renewal shall contain a statement that the individual is primarily performing paralegal work as defined elsewhere in this chapter and a statement that the individual is not ineligible for registration set forth elsewhere in this chapter. A Florida Registered Paralegal who is not primarily performing paralegal work shall not be eligible for renewal of the registration but may reapply for registration.

SUBCHAPTER 20-5 INELIGIBILITY FOR REGISTRATION OR RENEWAL

RULE 20-5.1 GENERALLY

The following individuals are ineligible for registration as a Florida Registered Paralegal or for renewal of a registration that was previously granted:

(a) a person who is currently suspended or disbarred or who has resigned in lieu of discipline from the practice of law in any state or jurisdiction;
(b) a person who has been convicted of a felony in any state or jurisdiction and whose civil rights have not been restored;
(c) a person who has been found to have engaged in the unlicensed (unauthorized) practice of law in any state or jurisdiction;
(d) a person whose registration or license to practice has been terminated or revoked for disciplinary reasons by a professional organization, court, disciplinary board, or agency in any jurisdiction;
(e) a person who is no longer primarily performing paralegal work as defined elsewhere in these rules; or
(f)a person who fails to comply with prescribed continuing education requirements as set forth elsewhere in this chapter.

RULE 20-5.2 DUTY TO UPDATE

An individual applying for registration as a Florida Registered Paralegal or who is registered as a Florida Registered Paralegal has a duty to inform The Florida Bar promptly of any fact or circumstance that would render the individual ineligible for registration or renewal.

SUBCHAPTER 20-6 CONTINUING EDUCATION

RULE 20-6.1 GENERALLY

In order to maintain the status of Florida Registered Paralegal, a Florida Registered Paralegal must complete a minimum of 30 hours of continuing education every 3 years, 5 hours of which shall be in legal ethics or professionalism. Courses approved for credit by The Florida Bar, the National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA), or the National Federation of Paralegal Associations (NFPA) will be deemed acceptable for purposes of this rule.

SUBCHAPTER 20-7 CODE OF ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY

RULE 20-7.1 GENERALLY

A Florida Registered Paralegal shall adhere to the following Code of Ethics and Responsibility:

(a) Disclosure. A Florida Registered Paralegal shall disclose his or her status as a Florida Registered Paralegal at the outset of any professional relationship with a client, attorneys, a court or administrative agency or personnel thereof, and members of the general public.

(b) Confidentiality and Privilege. A Florida Registered Paralegal shall preserve the confidences and secrets of all clients. A Florida Registered Paralegal must protect the confidences of a client, and it shall be unethical for a Florida Registered Paralegal to violate any statute or rule now in effect or hereafter to be enacted controlling privileged communications.

(c) Appearance of Impropriety or Unethical Conduct. A Florida Registered Paralegal should understand the attorney’s Rules of Professional Conduct and this code in order to avoid any action that would involve the attorney in a violation of the rules or give the appearance of professional impropriety. It is the obligation of the Florida Registered Paralegal to avoid conduct that would cause the lawyer to be unethical or even appear to be unethical, and loyalty to the lawyer is incumbent upon the Florida Registered Paralegal.

(d) Prohibited Conduct. A Florida Registered Paralegal should not:

(1) establish attorney-client relationships, accept cases, set legal fees, give legal opinions or advice, or represent a client before a court or other tribunal, unless authorized to do so by the court or tribunal;
(2) engage in, encourage, or contribute to any act that could constitute the unlicensed practice of law;
(3) engage in the practice of law;
(4) perform any of the duties that attorneys only may perform nor do things that attorneys themselves may not do; or
(5) act in matters involving professional legal judgment since the services of an attorney are essential in the public interest whenever the exercise of such judgment is required.

(e) Performance of Services. A Florida Registered Paralegal must act prudently in determining the extent to which a client may be assisted without the presence of an attorney. A Florida Registered Paralegal may perform services for an attorney in the representation of a client, provided:

(1) the services performed by the paralegal do not require the exercise of independent professional legal judgment;
(2) the attorney is responsible for the client, maintains a direct relationship with the client, and maintains control of all client matters;
(3) the attorney supervises the paralegal;
(4) the attorney remains professionally responsible for all work on behalf of the client and assumes full professional responsibility for the work product, including any actions taken or not taken by the paralegal in connection therewith; and
(5) the services performed supplement, merge with, and become the attorney’s work product.

(f) Competence. A Florida Registered Paralegal shall work continually to maintain integrity and a high degree of competency throughout the legal profession.

(g) Conflict of Interest. A Florida Registered Paralegal who was employed by an opposing law firm has a duty not to disclose any information relating to the representation of the former firm’s clients and must disclose the fact of the prior employment to the employing attorney.

(h) Reporting Known Misconduct. A Florida Registered Paralegal having knowledge that another Florida Registered Paralegal has committed a violation of this chapter or code shall inform The Florida Bar of the violation.

SUBCHAPTER 20-8 REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION

The following rules and procedures shall apply to complaints against Florida Registered Paralegals:

RULE 20-8.1 PARALEGAL COMMITTEES

There shall be paralegal committees as are herein provided, each of which shall have the authority and jurisdiction required to perform the functions hereinafter assigned to the paralegal committee and which shall be constituted and appointed as follows:

(a) District Paralegal Committees. There shall be at least 1 paralegal committee for each appellate district of this state and as many more as shall be found desirable by the board. Such committees shall be continuing bodies notwithstanding changes in membership, and they shall have jurisdiction and the power to proceed in all matters properly before them.

(b) Membership, Appointment, and Eligibility. Each district paralegal committee shall consist of not fewer than 3 members, at least 1 of whom is a Florida Registered Paralegal and at least 1 of whom is a member of The Florida Bar. Members of district paralegal committees shall be nominated by the member of the board designated to review the actions of the committee and appointed by the board. All appointees shall be of legal age and shall be residents of the district or have their principal office in the district. For each district paralegal committee there shall be a chair designated by the designated reviewer of that committee. A vice-chair and secretary may be designated by the chair of each district committee.

(c) Terms. The terms of the members shall be for 3 years from the date of administration of the oath of service on the district paralegal committee or until such time as their successors are appointed and qualified. Continuous service of a member shall not exceed 6 years. A member shall not be reappointed for a period of 3 years after the end of the member’s second term provided, however, the expiration of the term of any member shall not disqualify such member from concluding any investigation or participating in the disposition of eases that were pending before the committee when the member’s term expired.

(d) Disqualification. No member of a district paralegal committee shall perform any district paralegal committee function when that member:

(1) is related by blood or marriage to the complainant or respondent;
(2) has a financial, business, property, or personal interest in the matter under consideration or with the complainant or respondent;
(3) has a personal interest that could be affected by the outcome of the proceedings or that could affect the outcome; or
(4) is prejudiced or biased toward either the complainant or the respondent.

Upon notice of the above prohibitions, the affected members should recuse themselves from further proceedings. The district paralegal committee chair shall have the power to disqualify any member from any proceeding in which any of the above prohibitions exists and is stated of record or in writing in the file by the chair.

(e) Removal. Any member may be removed from service by the designated reviewer of that committee or by the board.

(f) District Paralegal Committee Meetings. District paralegal committees should meet at regularly scheduled times, not less frequently than quarterly each year, and either the chair or vice-chair may call special meetings.

RULE 20-8.2 DUTIES AND AUTHORITY

It is the duty of the district paralegal committees to receive and evaluate complaints against Florida Registered Paralegals. The district paralegal committees shall have the authority to remove or revoke an individual’s registration as a Florida Registered Paralegal in accordance with the procedures set forth elsewhere in this chapter. A registration certificate issued pursuant to these rules may be suspended or revoked for any of the following reasons:

(a) conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or false statement;

(b) fraud, dishonesty, or corruption that is related to the functions and duties of a Florida Registered Paralegal;

(c) gross incompetence or unprofessional or unethical conduct;

(d) willful, substantial, or repeated violation of any duty imposed by statute, rule, or order of court;

(e) fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining or renewing registration status;

(f) noncompliance with continuing education requirements;

(g) nonpayment of renewal fees; or

(h) violation of the Code of Ethics and Responsibility set forth elsewhere in these rules.

RULE 20-8.3 COMPLAINT PROCESSING

(a) Complaints. All complaints against a Florida Registered Paralegal may be initiated either by a sworn complaint asserting a violation of these rules or by The Florida Bar on its own motion.

(b) Review by Bar Counsel. Bar counsel shall review the complaint and determine whether the alleged conduct, if proven, would constitute a violation of these rules. Bar counsel may conduct a preliminary, informal investigation to aid in this determination and, if necessary, may employ a Florida Bar staff investigator to aid in the preliminary investigation. If bar counsel determines that the facts, if proven, would not constitute a violation, bar counsel may decline to pursue the complaint. The complainant shall be notified of a decision not to pursue a complaint and shall be given the reasons therefor.

(c) Closing by Bar Counsel and Committee Chair. Bar counsel may consult with the appropriate district paralegal committee chair to determine whether the alleged conduct of a complaint, if proven, would constitute a violation of these rules. If bar counsel and the district committee chair concur in a finding that the case should be closed, the complaint may be closed on such finding without referral to the district paralegal committee.

(d) Referral to District Paralegal Committee. Bar counsel may refer a file to the appropriate district paralegal committee for further investigation or action as authorized elsewhere in these rules.

(e) Notification of Violation. If a majority of the district paralegal committee finds probable cause to believe that a violation of these rules has occurred, bar counsel or the chair of the district paralegal committee will send written notice thereof to the Florida Registered Paralegal identifying the alleged violation. The notice shall be sent by certified U.S. mail directed to the last mailing address on file.

(f) Response to Notice of Violation. Within 30 days from the receipt of the notification, the Florida Registered Paralegal shall file a written response. If the Florida Registered Paralegal does not respond, the violations identified in the finding of probable cause shall be deemed admitted.

(g) Committee Review. After the filing of the written response to the finding of probable cause or following the expiration of the time within which to file a response if none is filed, the district paralegal committee shall review the complaint, the finding of probable cause, the response (if any), and any other pertinent materials, and decide whether to dismiss the proceeding or issue a proposed disposition. The committee shall promptly send written notice of its decision to the Florida Registered Paralegal by certified U.S. mail directed to the last mailing address on file.

RULE 20-8.4 INVESTIGATION

(a) Conduct of Proceedings. The proceedings of district paralegal committees when testimony is taken may be informal in nature and the committees shall not be bound by the rules of evidence.

(b) Taking Testimony. Bar counsel, each district paralegal committee, and members thereof conducting investigations are empowered to take and have transcribed the testimony and evidence of witnesses. If the testimony is recorded stenographically or otherwise, the witness shall be sworn by any person authorized by law to administer oaths.

(c) Rights and Responsibilities of Respondent. The respondent may be required to appear and to produce evidence as any other witness unless the respondent claims a privilege or right properly available to the respondent under applicable federal or state law. The respondent may be accompanied by counsel.

(d) Rights of Complaining Witness. The complaining witness is not a party to the investigation. The complainant may be granted the right to be present at any district paralegal committee proceeding when the respondent is present before the committee to give testimony. The complaining witness shall have no right to appeal the finding of the district paralegal committee.

RULE 20-8.5 SUBPOENAS

Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence before a district paralegal committee shall be issued as follows:

(a) District Paralegal Committees. Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence shall be issued by the chair or vice-chair of a district paralegal committee in pursuance of an investigation authorized by the committee.

(b) Bar Counsel Investigations. Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence before bar counsel when bar counsel is conducting an initial investigation shall be issued by the chair or vice-chair of a district paralegal committee to which the matter will be assigned.

(c) Service. Subpoenas may be served by an investigator employed by The Florida Bar or in the manner provided by law for the service of process.

RULE 20-8.6 DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS

Upon concluding its investigation, the district paralegal committee shall determine which of the following action(s) should be taken:

(a) close the matter on a finding of no violation;

(b) require that a specified continuing education course be taken;

(c) accept an affidavit from the Florida Registered Paralegal acknowledging that the conduct surrounding the complaint was a violation of these rules and that the Florida Registered Paralegal will refrain from conduct that would create a violation of these rules;

(d) suspension of the Florida Registered Paralegal’s registration certificate for a period not to exceed 1 year;

(e) revocation of registration certificate; or

(f) denial of request for renewal.

RULE 20-8.7 REVIEW OF DISTRICT PARALEGAL COMMITTEE ACTION

(a) Review by the Designated Reviewer. Notice of district paralegal committee action recommending either revocation or denial of renewal shall be given to the designated reviewer for review. Upon review of the district paralegal committee action, the designated reviewer may affirm the action of the district paralegal committee, request the district paralegal committee to reconsider its action, or refer the district paralegal committee action to the disciplinary review committee of the board of governors for its review. The request for a district paralegal committee reconsideration or referral to the disciplinary review committee shall be in writing and must be made within 30 days of notice of the district paralegal committee action. If the designated reviewer fails to make the request for reconsideration or referral within the time prescribed, the district paralegal committee action shall become final.

(b) Review by Disciplinary Review Committee. The disciplinary review committee shall review those district paralegal committee matters referred to it by a designated reviewer or the district paralegal committee and shall make a report to the board. The disciplinary review committee may confirm, reject, or amend the recommendation of the designated reviewer in whole or in part. The report of the disciplinary review committee shall be final unless overruled by the board.

(c) Board Action on Recommendations of the Disciplinary Review Committee. On review of a report and recommendation of the disciplinary review committee, the board of governors may confirm, reject, or amend the recommendation in whole or in part.

(d) Notice of Board Action. Bar counsel shall give notice of board action to the respondent, complainant, and district paralegal committee.

(e) Filing Service on Board of Governors. All matters to be filed with or served upon the board shall be addressed to the board of governors and filed with the executive director. The executive director shall be the custodian of the official records of the Florida Registered Paralegal Program.

RULE 20-8.8 FILES

(a) Files Are Property of Bar. All matters, including files, preliminary investigation reports, interoffice memoranda, records of investigations, and the records of other proceedings under these rules are property of The Florida Bar.

(b) Investigatory Record. The investigatory record shall consist of the record before a district paralegal committee and any reports, correspondence, papers, and recordings and transcripts of hearings and transcribed testimony furnished to, served on, or received from the respondent or the complainant or a witness before the district paralegal committee. The record before the district paralegal committee shall consist of all reports, correspondence, papers, and recordings furnished to or received from the respondent and the transcript of district paralegal committee meetings or transcribed testimony, if the proceedings were attended by a court reporter; provided, however, that the committee may retire into private session to debate the issues involved and to reach a decision as to the action to be taken.

(c) Limitations on Disclosure. Any material provided to or promulgated by The Florida Bar that is confidential under applicable law shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed except as authorized by the applicable law. If this type of material is made a part of the investigatory record, that portion of the investigatory record may be sealed by the district paralegal committee chair.

(d) Disclosure of Information. Unless otherwise ordered by a court, nothing in these rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent, or any witness from disclosing the existence of proceedings under these rules or from disclosing any documents or correspondence served on or provided to those persons.

(e) Response to Inquiry. Representatives of The Florida Bar, authorized by the board, shall reply to inquiries regarding a pending or closed investigation. The Florida Bar may charge a reasonable fee for copying documents consistent with applicable law.

(f) Production of Investigatory Records Pursuant to Subpoena. The Florida Bar, pursuant to a valid subpoena issued by a regulatory agency, may provide any documents that are a portion of the investigatory record even if otherwise deemed confidential under these rules. The Florida Bar may charge a reasonable fee for copying the documents consistent with applicable law.

(g) Response to False or Misleading Statements. If public statements that are false and misleading are made about any investigation brought pursuant to this chapter, The Florida Bar may make any disclosure consistent with applicable law necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.

(h)Providing Material to Other Agencies. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit The Florida Bar from providing material to any state or federal law enforcement or regulatory agency, United States Attorney, state attorney, the National Association of Legal Assistants or the National Federation of Paralegal Associations and equivalent organizations, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, paralegal grievance committees and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, and unlicensed practice of law committees and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions.

SUBCHAPTER 20-9 IMMUNITY

RULE 20-9.1 GENERALLY

The members of the district paralegal committees, the board, bar staff and counsel assisting the committees, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts in the course of their official duties.

SUBCHAPTER 20.10 AMENDMENTS

RULE 20-10.1 GENERALLY

Rules governing the Florida Registered Paralegal Program may be amended in accordance with the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.

      . One individual later withdrew her comment in support of the proposed rules.


author: LAGOA, Judge.

text:
    Pamela WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Appellee.
    No. 3D06-2805.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    July 25, 2007.

      Teri Guttman Valdes, Miami, for appellant.
    Murray A. Greenberg, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and William X. Candela, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
    Before COPE and LAGOA, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   LAGOA, Judge.

Pamela Williams (‘Williams”) asks this Court to grant her petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court’s order affirming Miami-Dade County’s (“County” or “the County”) decision to terminate her employment as a corrections officer. We grant the petition and quash the circuit court’s order.

I. Factual History

Williams was employed as a County corrections officer for 16 years. Prior to her termination, Williams lived with Clifford Roberson, her boyfriend of three years, who was a convicted felon on parole. On March 1, 2004, Williams received a Disciplinary Action Report (“DAR”) alleging that Williams had “a close personal relationship and resided with a known felon, Clifford Roberson” in violation of Department Standard Operating Procedures (“DSOP”) 2.2.029 and 11-015 § V(A) and (B). On June 23, 2004, the Department of Corrections (“the Department”) issued a termination letter based on the violations enumerated in the DAR.

DSOP 2.2.029 titled “Associating with Criminal Elements” provides that “No employee, except in the discharge of their lawful duties, may knowingly associate with persons engaged in unlawful activities.”

DSOP 11-015(V)(A), titled “Inmates,” prohibits employees from “maintain[ing] or developing] close, personal, intimate or sexual relationships, with inmates that the employees become acquainted with while the inmates are in the Department’s custody.” See DSOP 11-015(V)(A)(2). DSOP 11-015(V)(A)(5) further requires an employee to notify a supervisor if a personal relationship exists between an inmate and the employee.

DSOP 11-015(V)(B), titled “Ex-Inmates,” states:

Association with ex-inmates (regardless of whether or not they were found guilty, sentenced, served time, etc.) does not automatically constitute a conflict which would require an end to the contact. However, the professional relationship standards applicable to current inmates applies to known or alleged ex-inmates, especially if they are, or appear to be, involved in criminal activity on a full time, part time, or an occasional basis.

In summarizing the provisions of DSOP 11-015, the Department’s manual states:

[Neither] [t]he County nor the Department can tell employees whom they may or may not privately associate with. What the County expects and requires is that the employees’ conduct, whether on-duty or off-duty, does not compromise the integrity of the employees of the Department or County, where that conduct is unbecoming of an employee of the County.

See DSOP 11-015(V)(D).

Pursuant to Section 2-47 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Williams appealed her termination. During the hearing, neither the Department nor the County contended that Roberson was “engaged in unlawful activities” as prohibited by DSOP 2.2029. Following the hearing, the hearing examiner recommended that the Department’s decision to terminate be sustained. The County Manager upheld the hearing examiner’s recommendation, and Williams filed a first-level certiorari proceeding with the circuit court in its appellate capacity. The circuit court affirmed the County Manager’s decision without a written opinion and this second-level cer-tiorari proceeding ensued.

II. Standard of Review on Secondr-Level Certiorari

Review on second-level certiorari is extremely limited, as we are confined to determining whether the lower court provided due process and followed the correct law. A lower tribunal provides due process if the complaining party was given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Additionally, a circuit court’s failure to follow the correct law must be “something more than a simple legal error.” Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000). Indeed, we are bound to affirm the lower tribunal unless “there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 528 (Fla.1995)).

III. Analysis

This petition falls into the rare category of cases in which the lower tribunal demonstrated a violation of a clearly established legal principle that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. It is a well-established principle of law that in order to suspend or terminate “a police or other officer the charge upon which he [or she] is tried must allege jurisdictional grounds for removal and must also allege jurisdictional facts to support the jurisdictional grounds.” City of Daytona Beach v. Layne, 91 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla.1957); See Department of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Marlow, 448 So.2d 1106, 1108-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In simpler terms, the factual charges brought against an officer must be contemplated by the regulations under which she is charged and there must be some record foundation supporting the action taken. See Marlow, 448 So.2d at 1108-09.

The law is equally clear that when an officer is discharged for conduct not precisely written into a departmental rule, the rule must not be of a character which is “so amorphous that men of common intelligence must guess at [its] meaning.” Jones v. City of Hialeah, 294 So.2d 686, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Indeed, while administrative rules unquestionably may form the jurisdictional basis for a termination, such an action is allowable only “where persons of common intelligence are not required to guess at their meaning and where the employee subject to discipline was properly apprised that his [or her] conduct was proscribed by the rule.” City of St. Petersburg v. Pinellas County Police Benevolent Ass’n, 414 So.2d 293, 294-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

Turning first to the charge under DSOP 2.2.029, the record indicates that the County and Department presented no evidence that Roberson was engaged in unlawful activity. Absent any facts in the record to support that charge, we must reverse the lower tribunal’s decision, even under the limited nature of second-level certiorari review.

We turn now to the two other DSOPs. On its face, DSOP 11-015(V)(A) only applies to relationships between employees and “inmates.” The Regulation says nothing about relationships between employees and individuals no longer incarcerated by the Department. Thus, we must conclude that DSOP 11-015(V)(A) does not apply to employees and former felons.

In contrast, while DSOP 11-015(V)(B) could apply to the relationship at issue, we conclude that, based on the facts in the record, no reasonable person could review the provisions at issue and know that coha-bitating with a former felon — especially absent evidence that the employee knew that the former felon was involved in criminal activity — would be a cause for automatic termination. To the contrary, relationships with ex-inmates are envisioned and permitted by this DSOP.

Neither the Department nor the County made any attempt to show that there exists a written rule prohibiting a corrections officer from living with a former felon and that violation of that rule is grounds for termination. In our view, without more than the text of the DSOPs discussed above and without more than the record presented by the City and the Department, Williams was not on adequate notice that merely living with Roberson subjected her to automatic termination.

Accordingly, the lower tribunal thus departed from the essential requirements of law by affirming Williams’ termination. The hearing officer tried Williams as if the Department’s rules prohibited contact with a former felon, and the circuit court’s affirmance gave its imprimatur to such conduct. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[pjolice officers do not give up all their - constitutional rights by putting on a uniform.... [They have] once employed and attaining seniority, an employment status entitling [them] to protection against unjust and unlawful job deprivation.” Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187, 191 (Fla.1983).

Because we find that it was a departure from the essential requirements of law to affirm the termination of Williams on the basis of a non-existent regulation, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, quash the circuit court’s order, and remand with directions to reinstate her employment.

      . The record is silent as to whether Roberson was ever incarcerated in the same facility in which Williams was employed as a corrections officer. The record is clear, however, that Roberson and Williams met for the first time after his incarceration had ended and that Williams ended their relationship and asked Roberson to leave her home upon learning that he had a criminal record.

      . We need not address the other DSOP violations asserted in the DAR as they were not the basis of the hearing examiner’s recommendation to sustain Williams’ termination. .Specifically, the hearing examiner found "that Williams violated the rule against associating with convicted felons."

      . DSOP 11 — 015(V)(A)(5) provides in pertinent part:
      5. Except as prescribed or authorized by this directive, employees shall refrain from any preventable contact with inmates with whom the employee may have a personal relationship (e.g., a family member, friend, sexual partner, etc.). Any employee with such a relationship shall advise their supervisor immediately by use of an Information Incident Report. After an investigation is conducted, the inmate(s) if possible, or the employee if necessary, may be reassigned to avoid the possibility of a conflict of interest between the two parties, or the appearance of such a conflict.

      .Section 2-47 provides in pertinent part:
      Any employee who has completed the probationary period may appeal the action to a hearing examiner within fourteen (14) days by requesting the same in writing of the personnel director.... The hearing examiner shall conduct a hearing after notice upon the charges and shall transmit his findings of facts, conclusions, and any recommendations together with a transcript of all evidence taken before him and all exhibits received by him, to the [county] manager who may sustain, reverse or modify the suspension, reduction in grade, or the dismissal .... The county manager shall reach his decision within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the hearing examiner’s recommendations.

      . Indeed, one of the remedies under this DSOP is to transfer the inmate in order to avoid the possibility of a conflict of interest or the appearance of such a conflict. See footnote 3 infra. As such, DSOP 11 — 015(V)(A) could apply only to someone incarcerated with the Department.

      . At a minimum, absent any record evidence relating to past agency conduct, Williams could not have reasonably assumed that her relationship with Roberson fell within the scope of this DSOP.


author: THOMPSON, J.

text:
    STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Jessica LORENZO f/k/a Jessica Dibble, et al., Respondent.
    No. 5D06-3147.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    July 27, 2007.

      Elizabeth K. Russo and Jonathan L. Gaines, of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, and Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller, Katz, Craig, LLP, Tampa, for Petitioner.
    Douglas L. Grose of Douglas L. Grose, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.
   THOMPSON, J.

State Farm Florida Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) seeks certiorari review of a circuit court appellate decision affirming summary judgment for Jessica and Steven Lorenzo. Because the circuit court’s order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law, we grant certiora-ri relief.

A fire occurred at the Lorenzos’ house, which was covered by a State Farm homeowner’s insurance policy, on 10 October 2000. Their policy’s loss settlement provision provided:

Loss Settlement. Covered property losses are settled as follows:
* * *
c. [State Farm] will pay the cost to repair or replace buildings ... subject to the following:
(1) until actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay the actual cash value of the damage to the buildings, up to the policy limit, not to exceed the replacement cost of the damaged part of the buildings for equivalent construction and use on the same premises;
(2) You must make a claim within 180 days after the loss for any additional payment on a replacement cost basis. Any additional payment is limited to the amount you actually and necessarily spend to repair or replace the damaged buildings with equivalent construction and for equivalent use on the same premises.

On 11 October 2000, the Lorenzos entered into a contract with public adjuster Mark Boardman in which Boardman would receive ten percent of the Lorenzos’ recovery under the policy. That day, the Lor-enzos and Boardman met with a State Farm claim specialist (“specialist”). The specialist gave the Lorenzos a $5,000 check as initial payment on their additional living expense coverage and made arrangements to inspect and assess the fire damage.

On 26 October 2000, the specialist sent Boardman State Farm’s repair estimate. The estimate stated the loss’s actual cash value was $78,799.51, and the replacement cost, if repairs were performed, was $84,787.89. Accordingly, State Farm enclosed a check for $78,799.51 and informed the Lorenzos:

You may use any contractor you choose and have him contact us should he have any questions. Any differences between our estimate and your contractor’s estimate should be resolved prior to the work being started.

On 30 October 2000, Boardman provided State Farm a repair estimate from his general contracting company, Genesis Design and Construction (“Genesis”), which explained some differences between Genesis’ and State Farm’s estimates. As a result, State Farm adjusted its estimate to reflect an actual cash value of $93,167.82 and replacement cost of $99,514.11. Accordingly, it issued an additional check for $14,368.31 and explained that the actual case value was paid under the loss settlement provision. At this point, State Farm had paid $93,167.82. The remaining amount for replacement cost — $6,346.29— was to be paid when the repairs were completed or when the Lorenzos presented a signed contract with a general contractor.

State Farm attempted to contact Board-man eight times in December 2000 and January 2001 to determine whether the Lorenzos had retained a general contractor. Their inquiries were unsuccessful, though Boardman possessed their signed contract with a general contractor; on 10 December 2000, the Lorenzos had entered into a repair contract with Genesis. Instead, the Lorenzos filed a complaint on 12 January 2001, asserting a class action based on State Farm’s policy of requiring work to be performed before paying replacement cost. Rather than disclosing the repair contract, the Lorenzos mailed a letter and a copy of the first complaint to State Farm on 26 January 2001. After State Farm learned that Genesis acquired construction permits to repair the Loren-zos’ house — and after the Lorenzos’ suit was filed — State Farm issued a $6,346.29 check for replacement cost.

The Lorenzos’ action was transferred to county court after their class action claims were dismissed. Their fourth amended complaint alleged State Farm breached its insurance contract by excluding depreciation and contractors’ overhead and profit from its initial actual cash value payments. It also alleged that State Farm’s withholding of payment for contractor overhead and profit required Lorenzo to retain counsel.

The county court granted summary judgment for the Lorenzos, holding that, “when [State Farm] paid the claim herein subsequent to the Plaintiffs filing their suit, said payment constituted a confession of judgment.” The court awarded them $278.30 for prejudgment interest on State Farm’s fourth payment and reserved jurisdiction for attorney’s fees and costs. The circuit court affirmed:

[State Farm] allegedly withheld from the amounts paid to the Lorenzos the amounts representing compensation for depreciation and for the contractor’s overhead and profit. State Farm allegedly conditioned payment of these amounts on their compliance with certain conditions not set forth in the insurance contract. The Lorenzos contend that the imposition of the additional conditions is fraudulent ... and a breach of the insurance contract....
... State Farm effected a confession of judgment by its payment of the $6346.29. The conduct of State Farm prior to commencement of the lawsuit reasonably led Plaintiffs to believe that they would not be paid for this amount. Indeed, it was only after the suit had been filed that State Farm provided this payment. “When the insurance company has agreed to settle a disputed case, it has, in effect, declined to defend its position in the pending suit.”

(Citations omitted.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Second-tier certiorari review is appropriate only where the circuit court does not afford procedural due process or departs from the essential requirements of law. Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 948 So.2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla.1995)). A departure from the essential requirements of law is more than mere legal error; courts should grant certiorari review only when a violation of a clearly established principle of law results in a miscarriage of justice. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003)). “A ‘clearly established principle of law* can derive from a number of legal sources, including the constitution, statutes, rules of court and controlling case law.” Id. (citing Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Physician’s Injury Care Ctr., Inc., 906 So.2d 1125, 1126-27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). “A failure to observe the essential requirements of law has been held synonymous with a failure to apply the correct law.” Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty. Chiropractic, 913 So.2d 1281, 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); accord Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Devitis, 924 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

DISCUSSION

We hold that the confession of judgment doctrine is inapplicable here. Section 627.428, Florida Statutes, addresses the award of attorney’s fees to insureds who prevail in litigation with their insurers over policy benefits. Its purpose is to discourage insurers from contesting valid claims and to reimburse successful insureds for attorney’s fees when they must sue to enforce their insurance contracts. Schultz, 948 So.2d at 1029-30 (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lexow, 602 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla.1992)). In Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So.2d 217 (Fla.1983), the Florida Supreme Court deemed an insurer’s pre-trial settlement with the insured to be a “confession of judgment” for purposes of section 627.428:

When the insurance company has agreed to settle a disputed case, it has ... declined to defend its position in the pending suit. Thus, the payment of the claim is ... the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment.... Requiring the plaintiff to continue litigation in spite of an acceptable offer of settlement merely to avoid having to offset attorney’s fees against compensation for the loss puts an unnecessary burden on the judicial system, fails to protect any interest ... [,] and discourages any attempt at settlement. This literal requirement of the statute exalts form over substance to the detriment of public policy, and such a result is clearly absurd.

Wollard, 439 So.2d at 218-19.

The confession of judgment doctrine turns on the policy underlying section 627.428: discouraging insurers from contesting valid claims and reimbursing insureds for attorney’s fees when they must sue to receive the benefits owed to them. Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 850 So.2d 462, 465 (Fla.2003). This doctrine applies where the insurer has denied benefits the insured was entitled to, forcing the insured to file suit, resulting in the insurer’s change of heart and payment before judgment. See, e.g., Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 684 (Fla.2000); Palmer v. Fortune Ins. Co., 776 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); United States Security Ins. Co. v. LaPour, 617 So.2d 347, 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). However, courts generally do not apply the doctrine where the insureds were not forced to sue to receive benefits; applying the doctrine would encourage unnecessary litigation by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney’s fees even where the insurer was complying with its obligations under the policy. Basik Exports & Imports, Inc. v. Preferred Nat’l Ins. Co., 911 So.2d 291, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The reasoning in Tristar Lodging, Inc. v. Arch Speciality Insurance Co., 434 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1297-98 (M.D.Fla.2006) (citations and footnote omitted), is persuasive here:

Plaintiff ... cite[s] [cases applying the confession of judgment doctrine] for the proposition that the Court [must] ... award fees whenever a Plaintiff sues an insurer and money is later paid. The Court declines to read the statute so broadly.... If Plaintiff were correct, then it would behoove every policyholder to sue whenever a claim is contemplated, because, ... whether the claim is eventually adjusted downward or paid in full, attorney’s fees would automatically result. This ... would be contrary to the stated purpose of the statute: discouraging lawsuits and encouraging timely payments of claims. If the insurer knows it will eventually have to pay attorney’s fees regardless, it loses the incentive to pay the claim timely, and this would raise the likelihood that the claim will be contested. Moreover, there is a fundamental due process concern in finding that an insurance company which appropriately pays a valid claim according to the Policy terms must still pay attorney’s fees, because a claimant sued it to do what it was already in the process of doing.... [T]his statute ... ha[s] consistently been interpreted to authorize recovery of attorney’s fees from an insurer only when the insurer has wrongfully withheld payment of the proceeds of the policy.
For similar reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that payments made pursuant to the provisions of the Policy are somehow converted into a confession of judgment if done after suit is prematurely filed. The filing of a lawsuit does not extinguish the insurer’s obligations under the Policy to adjust and pay the claim. While Florida law does hold that payments are treated as confessions of judgment where an insurer first disputes the claim and then settles, the existence of a bona fide dispute and not the mere possibility of a dispute, is a crucial condition precedent to such a holding. Here, as noted above, there has been no such breach shown.

State Farm promptly paid $93,167.82, the benefits to which the Lorenzos were entitled under the policy. The Lorenzos through their public adjuster concealed the fact they had already performed the act necessary under the policy terms to entitle her to the $6,346.29 final payment for replacement costs. State Farm was abiding by its obligations under the loss settlement provision, and did not withhold benefits or compel the Lorenzos to sue. The circuit court applied the incorrect law by relying on the confession of judgment doctrine.

We conclude that the circuit court’s error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The order awards attorney’s fees to the Lorenzos for bringing a premature suit against State Farm, which was complying with its policy obligations, confounding the role of the attorney’s fee in facilitating the economical, efficient, and expeditious administration of justice. See Schultz, 948 So.2d at 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Miller v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 607 So.2d 483, 485 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). Moreover, we note the error could have a pervasive, widespread effect in other proceedings. See McGrath Cmty. Chiropractic, 913 So.2d at 1286. Here, as Tristar Lodging explains, applying the confession of judgment doctrine undermines the statute’s purpose by simultaneously rewarding unnecessary litigation and discouraging insurers’ prompt compliance with their obligations.

Accordingly, we GRANT the Writ of Certiorari and QUASH the circuit court’s orders affirming summary judgment and deeming the Lorenzos to be the prevailing party for purposes of appellate attorney’s fees.

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, C.J., and MONACO J., concur.

      . Thus, Boardman acted as the Lorenzos' adjuster for a percentage of their recovery, and his company functioned as their general contractor for another percentage. This arrangement is now prohibited by section 26.8795, Florida Statutes (2006).

      . The subsection provides:
      Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree ... against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured ..., the trial court or, in the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary's attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.


text:
    James FRANKLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D06-2062.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 19, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 2007.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Claudine M. LaFranee and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

James Franklin appeals the denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of his rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. Franklin raises three points on appeal. We write to address point two.

Franklin was charged by information in case numbers 93-9323 and 93-10595 with burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. In case numbers 93-10586 and 93-10590, Franklin was charged with four counts of burglary of a dwelling. In case number 93-11618, Franklin was charged with attempted burglary of a dwelling. The state filed notices in each case that it was seeking an enhanced penalty as a habitual violent felony offender or habitual felony offender.

On January 26, 1994, Franklin pled guilty to each offense as charged. Negotiations between the parties permitted the state to seek imposition of a ten-year habitual offender sentence while allowing Franklin to seek admission into the sheriffs drug farm. The sentencing court informed Franklin that if it imposed treatment instead of punishment, he would likely receive a long probation period.

Franklin was sentenced on March 25, 1994. The court orally pronounced the following:

THE COURT: I label you a habitual felony offender, pursuant to Florida law and I sentence you as a habitual felony offender.
In case 93-9323, on Count I, I sentence you to 30 years in prison. That prison term will be suspended, and you’ll be placed on thirty years probation, with special conditions which I will outline in a minute, because they will apply to all of these cases.
In case 93-11618, I sentence you to ten years in prison. Suspend it, and that prison term is consecutive to 93-23.
In case 93-10595, I sentence you on Counts I and II, to 30 years in prison, consecutive to the prior cases, and concurrently with each other. And that will be suspended.
And 10595, I sentence you to 30 years in prison, consecutive to all prior sentences. And that will be suspended.
And in case 93-10586, I sentence you to 30 years in prison concurrently on I and II. Consecutive to all cases.
Each of your probations will have the same special conditions, although they will not be fulfillable at the same time.

The written judgments show that Franklin received consecutive sentences of probation for thirty years each in cases 93-9323, 93-10586, 93-10590, and 93-10595, and ten years probation in case number 93-11618.

In July of 1999, Franklin admitted to two probation violations. His probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to thirty years each in cases 93-9323, 93-10586, 93-10590, and 93-10595, and to ten years in case 93-11618. All sentences were to run concurrently.

In his second point on appeal, Franklin claims that the trial court did not orally pronounce the imposition of probation in case numbers 93-10586, 93-10590, 93-10595, and 93-11618. He cites to Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003), for the proposition that where there is conflict between the written sentencing documents and the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails. Thus, he believes the state does not have the authority to revoke probation in four of his cases because probation was never imposed.

We have previously decided that although an oral pronouncement will certainly prevail where the state concedes that the written sentence was in error, where the state does not concede error, a conflict between the written order and the oral pronouncement requires a factual resolution by the trial court. Ellis v. State, 816 So.2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Tory v. State, 686 So.2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Coleman v. State, 898 So.2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Enchautegui v. State, 749 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We have also stated, “[wjhere the record demonstrates that during the oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial judge made inconsistent statements, the matter must be remanded to the trial court to clarify the sentence imposed and to enter such corrected sentencing orders as may be appropriate.” Tory, 686 So.2d at 691; see also Moreland v. State, 853 So.2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (stating that only where the oral pronouncement is ambiguous is there a need for the trial court to make a factual determination before making the correction).

In the instant matter, the sentencing judge made inconsistent and ambiguous statements during the oral sentencing pronouncement. During the oral pronouncement, the judge indicated that she was imposing several “probations,” but explicitly imposed probation only in case number 93-9323. However, the written sentences show imposed probation periods in all cases. Thus, we remand with directions to resolve the conflict between the written sentencing orders and oral pronouncement in case numbers 93-10586, 93-10590, 93-10595, and 93-11618. We affirm, without discussion, the denial of the remainder of the motion for post-conviction relief.

GUNTHER, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.

      . The transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that Franklin was placed on probation for three years. However, the lower court found that the transcript was erroneous and that the sentencing court actually said it was imposing a thirty year period of probation. Competent, substantial evidence supports the lower court’s findings.


text:
    FLORIDA FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Howard E. DEISSLER, Appellee.
    No. 1D06-6564.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 15, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 2007.
    Mark J. Upton, of Daniell, Upton, Perry & Morris, P.C., Daphne, Alabama, for Appellant.
    Susan A. Woolf, of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

REVERSED and REMANDED. See Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 967 So.2d 815 (Fla. 2007).

BROWNING, C.J., ALLEN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anthony YAWN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D07-4539.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 17, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 2007.
    Anthony Yawn, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

KAHN, PADOVANO, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.


author: STEVENSON, J.

text:
    Shane JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D07-1343.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 17, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 2007.
    Shane Johnson, Immokalee, pro se.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   STEVENSON, J.

Shane Johnson has filed a notice of appeal directed to the trial court’s dismissal of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We dismiss the appeal as the notice was filed more than thirty days after the trial court filed the final order with the clerk and Johnson’s untimely motion for rehearing did not suspend rendition of that final order.

Habeas corpus is a civil remedy and, as such, governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630 (rule governing extraordinary remedies, including writs of habeas corpus); Brigham v. State, 769 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (recognizing writ of habeas corpus is a civil remedy). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) provides that a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed with the clerk of the lower court within thirty days of the date of rendition of the order appealed. An order is rendered on the date that it is filed with the clerk’s office absent “an authorized and timely motion ... for rehearing-” See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h). A timely and authorized motion will serve to suspend rendition of the judgment or order until disposition of the motion. See, e.g., Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. of Conn. v. Sealey, 810 So.2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (filing of motion listed in rule 9.020 suspends rendition only if motion is timely). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.580(b) provides that a motion for rehearing “shall be served not later than 10 days after ... the date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action.” And, finally, under the “mailbox rule,” a prisoner’s pleading is deemed filed the date that it is placed in the hands of prison officials. See, e.g., Earls v. State, 958 So.2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Application of the foregoing rules to the instant case results in the conclusion that the instant notice of appeal (filed on March 20, 2007) was untimely as Johnson’s motion for rehearing (filed on February 8, 2007) was not timely and did not serve to toll rendition of the order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus (filed on January 12, 2007).

Dismissed.

STONE and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.