source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WELLS, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John Anthony RUBIO, et al., Appellees.
    No. SC06-157.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 12, 2007.
    As Revised on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 18, 2007.

      Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General, Louis F. Hubener, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and James A. McKee, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant.
    G. Richard Strafer, Miami, Florida, and Anthony C. Vitale, Miami, FL, for Appel-lees.
   WELLS, J.

This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, State v. Rubio, 917 So.2d. 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), which held a state statute to be invalid. This Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendants were charged in a 130-count information. The counts were: (1) racketeering, in violation of section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002); (2) conspiracy to commit racketeering, in violation of section 895.03(4), Florida Statutes (2002); (3-55) Medicaid provider fraud, in violation of section 409.920(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002); (56-129) split-fee patient brokering, in violation of section 817.505(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2002); and (130) white collar crime, in violation of section 775.0844, Florida Statutes (2002).

The following facts were set out in the Fifth District’s decision. Defendants Sonia Guzman and Anamaria Mendez are Miami dentists who were recruited to provide dental services in Orlando to Medicaid-eligible children. Guzman and Mendez billed Medicaid and then split the fees with defendants John Rubio and Gustavo Fernandez. Rubio and Fernandez solicited Medicaid-eligible children primarily from public housing areas and transported them to and from the clinic. Five Medicaid recipients were examined by a pediatric dentist, who found no evidence to support the claims submitted on their behalf. The defendants were charged with violation of the above statutes on October 27, 2003.

According to the defendants, the fee arrangement was between their corporations. Rubio’s company provided management services for the dentists, including marketing for the dental practice and handling the business aspects of the dental practice. Guzman and Mendez performed the clinical work. In return for getting a turnkey dental office and marketing, Ru-bio’s company was paid between 42% and 43% of the compensation received by the dentists for them services.

The defendants moved to dismiss all charges. On February 1, 2005, following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, dismissing all counts because it determined that the statutes under which the defendants were charged were unconstitutional, that the counts against the defendants were multiplicitous, and that a proper predicate for the racketeering and white collar crime charges was not established.

The State appealed this dismissal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial coui’t’s decision. The Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Medicaid provider fraud statute, § 409.920(2)(a), is unconstitutional. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 392. The Fifth District found that the trial court erred in concluding that the patient brokering statute, § 817.505, is unconstitutional. Id. at 391. However, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the patient brokering charges on the ground that they were multiplicitous. The court found that under the statute, the defendants could only be charged for the arrangement between the defendants to split fees and not for each instance of fee-splitting. Finally, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the racketeering and white collar crime charges. Id. at 399.

This case comes to this Court on the basis of its mandatory jurisdiction to review the Fifth District’s determination that section 409.920(2)(a) is unconstitutional. However, both the State and the defendants have also raised issues in respect to each of the decisions in the Fifth District’s opinion. In our review, we will consider whether (1) the Medicaid provider fraud statute is constitutional; (2) the patient brokering statute is constitutional; (3) the charges under the patient brokering statute were multiplicitous; and (4) there is a sufficient predicate for the charges of racketeering and white collar crime. Because each of these issues concern questions of statutory constitutionality or’ construction, we review each issue de novo. Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Fla.2006); State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1107 (Fla.2004).

ANALYSIS

I. Constitutionality of Medicaid Provider Fraud Statute

In the information alleging violation of section 409.920(2)(a), the defendants were charged with on various dates knowingly making, causing to be made, or aiding and abetting the making of a claim for payment for dental services which were not rendered. The trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that section 409.920(2)(a) is unconstitutional states that the trial court’s ruling is as to the issue of law and not on the basis of findings of fact. State v. Rubio, No. 48-2003-CF-13501-O (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order dated Feb. 1, 2005) (Order). The Fifth District affirmed the motion to dismiss. The case is now presented for our review of whether the granting of the motion to dismiss on the constitutional ground was correct.

Section 409.920(2)(a) provides that it is unlawful to:

Knowingly make, cause to be made, or aid and abet in the making of any false. statement or false representation of a material fact, by commission or omission, in any claim submitted to the agency or its fiscal agent for payment.

At the time that the defendants were charged with violating this provision, “knowingly” was defined in section 409.920(l)(d) to mean that the act is “done by a person who is aware or should be aware of the nature of his or her conduct and that his or her conduct is substantially certain to cause the intended result.”

This issue is similar to the issue of constitutionality of section 409.920(2)(e) that this Court considered in State v. Harden, 938 So.2d 480 (Fla.2006), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2097, 167 L.Ed.2d 812 (2007). In Harden, the defendants were charged with nine counts of conspiracy, racketeering, and Medicaid fraud under section 409.920(2) (e), Florida Statutes (2000). That section states that it is unlawful to:

Knowingly solicit, offer, pay, or receive any remuneration, including any kickback, bribe, or rebate, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made, in whole or in part, under the Medicaid program, or in return for obtaining, purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending, obtaining, purchasing, leasing, or ordering any goods, facility, item, or service, for which payment may be made, in whole or in paid;, under the Medicaid program.

This is known as the anti-kickback provision of the statute. The same definition of “knowingly” in section 409.920(l)(d) applies to both sections 409.920(2)(a) and 409.920(2)(e).

In Harden, the defendants argued that the Florida statute was preempted by the federal Medicaid anti-kickback statute, in part because the Florida statute’s definition of the term “knowingly” conflicted with the federal mens rea requirement that the kickback occur knowingly and willfully. However, the defendants in Harden also based their preemption argument on the federal statute’s twenty-two exceptions or “safe harbors” from the anti-kickback provisions that were not similarly excluded by the state statute. These safe harbor provisions include an exception for patient referrals occurring within a bona fide employment relationship. The defendants in Harden maintained that the alleged kickbacks were part of a bona fide employment relationship and thus could not be prosecuted under the federal statute.

In considering Harden, we reviewed the federal anti-kickback statute, noting that within the legislative history of the federal statute, it was clear that the purpose of the federal anti-kickback provision was to outlaw health care referrals that were unethical or inappropriate. Harden, 938 So.2d at 487-89. The federal statutory language for the anti-kickback provision originally had no mens rea requirement, though it was “primarily concerned with outlawing health care referrals that were considered unethical or inappropriate.” Id. at 487. Subsequent amendments added both a knowing and willful mens rea requirement, as well as the safe harbor provisions. These amendments were made because of health care providers’ concerns that the statute was overbroad and punished conduct that while improper, was inadvertent. Id. at 487-89. We noted that although the federal statute did not provide for explicit preemption of the Florida anti-kickback statute, implied conflict preemption could still exist. We stated that we must “look to the statutory differences between the federal and state laws and determine whether these differences warrant conflict preemption.” Id. at 490. We concluded that Florida’s anti-kickback statute was preempted by the federal statute because it “criminalize[d] conduct that federal law specifically intended to be lawful and shielded from prosecution.” Id. at 492-93. We continued:

There is clear congressional intent to exempt compensation paid by employers to bona fide employees for providing covered items or services from those remunerations that constitute prohibited kickbacks under the federal statute. The heightened mens rea of the federal statute also indicates a clear intent that negligent or inadvertent behavior does not subject an individual to prosecution under the federal statute.
Both the heightened mens rea requirement and the safe harbor provision are key elements in fulfilling the purpose of the federal anti-kickback statute, which is to outlaw health care referrals that are unethical. Accordingly, we agree with the Third District that the Florida anti-kickback statute is preempted because it presents an obstacle to the accomplishments of the purposes of the federal law.

Id. at 493.

The defendants in the present case repeat the argument that the charges based on the prohibition against filing a false statement in a claim for payment based upon section 409.920(2)(a) should be dismissed because this statute unconstitutionally conflicts with the federal false statements statute that contains the language “knowingly and willfully.” The federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2000), imposes penalties on whoever:

(1) knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment under a Federal health care program (as defined in subsection (f) of this section),
(2) at any time knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining rights to such benefit or payment.

The defendants maintain that our holding the anti-kickback provision unconstitutional because of the reduced mens rea necessarily should apply to the false statement provision in this case.

The defendants’ argument fails to take into account that we held in Harden that both the mens rea and the safe harbor provisions were “key elements” in fulfilling the purpose of the federal anti-kickback statute. 938 So.2d at 492. No similar safe harbor provisions are “key elements” in fulfilling the purpose of the false statement provisions. The intent of the false statement provisions is to protect Medicaid funds from depletion by paying false claims. There are no bona fide relationships built upon false statements in claims for payment.

As we expressly stated in Harden, for preemption to apply defendants must be able to show that any impediment to the purpose and objectives of the federal statute’s purposes caused by the state statute must be “severe” and not merely “modest.” Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 665, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003). This impediment must “seriously compromise important federal interests.” Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 389, 103 S.Ct. 1905, 76 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). We stated in Harden:

Federal preemption of a state law is “strong medicine,” and is “not casually to be dispensed.” [Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir.2001) ] (quoting Grant’s Dairy [v. Comm’r ], 232 F.3d [8,] 18 [1st Cir.2000]). This is especially true when the federal statute creates a program, such as Medicaid, that utilizes “cooperative federalism.” “Where coordinated state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the ease for federal preemption becomes a less persuasive one.” Id. (quoting Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 549, 557 (9th Cir.1987)); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 665, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (“The presumption against federal preemption of a state statute designed to foster public health has special force when it appears ... that the two governments are pursuing common purposes.”)

Harden, 938 So.2d at 486.

Prior to our decision in Harden, the Third District decided State v. Wolland, 902 So.2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), which involved the issue of the constitutionality of the false statements prohibition of section 409.920(2)(a). In Wolland, the Third District distinguished its earlier decision in State v. Harden, 873 So.2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), aff'd, 938 So.2d 480 (Fla.2006), and found that the false statements prohibition in section 409.920(2)(a) was constitutional. The Third District upheld the false statements provision, reasoning that the mens real concern in Harden was not the same in respect to false statements because “one cannot negligently ‘knowingly make ... [a] false statement ... in [a] claim submitted to the agency ... for payment.’ ” Wolland 902 So.2d at 284 (quoting § 409.920(2)(a)).

The Fifth District, in its opinion in the present case, issued prior to the release of our decision in Harden, acknowledged the decisions of the Third District in Wolland and Harden. The Fifth District disagreed with the Wolland decision and held that under the definition of “knowingly” in the statute, the defendants could be convicted for conduct that may be improper but was inadvertent and found that this definition was not consistent with what Congress intended. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 392.

While we do not agree with the reasoning of the Third District in Wolland that a prosecution of a violation of the false statements provision can proceed upon only proof of a negligent filing of a false statement in a claim for payment, we reject the Fifth District’s conclusion that this means that the false statement provision is unconstitutional in the present case.

As noted earlier, our concern about the reduced mens rea is not combined here with a concern about safe harbor provisions. While the strong medicine of preemption was necessary in Harden because the state statute criminalized activities expressly protected in the federal law, no similar safe harbor provision exists in the statute regarding false statements to induce payments from federal health care programs.

The present case is only at the information stage of the proceedings. The charges are that the defendants filed claims for payment for dental services which were not performed and that, therefore, the claims for payment contained false statements. If the proof is that the defendants “were aware” that the statements in the claims for payment were false, we do not believe that the prohibition in section 409.920(2)(a) is unconstitutional as to such conduct by the defendants.

The constitutionality of the false statement prohibition of section 409.920(2)(a) can and should be saved by severing the “should be aware” language from section 409.920(l)(d) as it pertains to section 409.920(2)(a). We have long recognized that if an unconstitutional provision of a statute can be severed so that the remaining provisions of the statute can be found to be constitutional, there should be a constitutionally saving severance. In State v. Calhoun County, 126 Fla. 376, 170 So. 883, 886 (1936) (citations omitted), we said:

It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that the language of a statute should be so construed as to preserve its constitutionality rather than to defeat it, and that if two apparently contradictory provisions exist in a statute, one being consistent with the limitations of the Constitution and another in violation of them, the latter should not control to strike down the statute; in other words, if a clause in the .statute which is violative of the Constitution may be eliminated and the remaining portion of the act stand as a valid expression of the legislative will the clause violative of constitutional limitations will be eliminated and the act permitted to stand although there is no separability clause in the act.
The authority of the court to eliminate from an act of the Legislature an invalid clause does not flow from legislative authority authorizing the court to do so, but from the inherent power of the court to preserve the constitutionality of the act if it is possible to do so even by the elimination of invalid clauses, where it appears that the elimination of such clauses would not destroy the main and essential features of the act and the portion left is a completed and workable statute and where it cannot be said that the Legislature would not have enacted the remaining portions of the act without the invalid clause which is stricken.

See also Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 415 (Fla.1991) (portion of statute may be severed provided it meets four-part test that (1) unconstitutional provisions can be separated from valid provisions; (2) legislative purpose can be accomplished independently of provisions that are void, (3) good and bad features are not so inseparable that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other; and (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken). We apply this principle in this case in order to fulfill our obligation to preserve the constitutionality of the statute.

In the present case, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss the charges based upon the allegations that the defendants knowingly filed false statements for payment. We reverse the affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal, with directions that the charges be reinstated. In order to prove the charges, the State is required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant was “aware of the nature of his or her conduct and that his or her conduct is substantially certain to cause the intended result.” By this decision we also adhere to the principle of preemption that “state law is displaced only ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.’ ” Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476, 116 S.Ct. 1063, 134 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983)).

We disapprove the decision of the Third District in Wolland, to the extent that it is in conflict with this decision.

II. Constitutionality of Patient Brokering Statute

In this issue, the defendants argue that section 817.505, Florida Statutes (2002), which prohibits “patient brokering,” is unconstitutional because it (1) is vague; (2) lacks a mens rea requirement; and (3) fails to impose a mens rea requirement of willfulness. Counts 56-129 charged the defendants with split-fee patient brokering, in violation of section 817.505(l)(b)-(c).

The trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional, though it did not identify on what basis it reached this conclusion. The Fifth District reversed the trial court’s holding, finding each of the defendants’ arguments meritless, and concluded that the statute is constitutional. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 396. We affirm the Fifth District’s decision holding the statute to be constitutional and adopt the Fifth District’s reasoning on this issue.

III. Multiplicity

In this issue, the State contends that the Fifth District erred in dismissing counts 56-129, the patient brokering-charges, and finding that the charges were multiplicitous. The prosecutor stated at the motion to dismiss hearing that the information was designed so that the defendants were charged with violating the statute “every single time” they did any act in furtherance of the arrangement to refer patients. The defendants, in their motion to strike these charges, argued that the seventy-three counts were multiplici-tous because the Legislature’s use of the words “any” and “arrangement” in section 817.505 meant that charges could only be brought per arrangement and not per act committed in that arrangement. Again, no evidence has yet been presented or considered because this case is an appeal of an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss prior to trial.

The trial court dismissed the charges as multiplicitous because the court found that section 817.505(l)(b) makes it a crime to “engage in any split-fee arrangement” regardless of the number of fee-splitting instances which occur; thus, “charging each fee-splitting instance as a separate and distinct crime results in a multiplicitous information.” Order at 10. The Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, finding that the statute was meant to prohibit the agreement to refer patients to the dentists in return for a split of the fees. The Fifth District held that it could “discern no intent by the Legislature to criminalize each and every act done pursuant to the agreement.” Rubio, 917 So.2d at 398. “Where the defendants are charged with multiple violations of the same statute, as is the case here, the courts apply the ‘allowable unit of prosecution’ standard to determine whether a double jeopardy violation has occurred.” Id. at 397. The “allowable unit of prosecution” is defined as “the aspect of criminal activity that the Legislature intended to punish.” McKnight v. State, 906 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

As the Fifth District’s opinion reflects, we have dealt with issues of multiplicity several times, most recently in Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180 (Fla.2003). In Bau-tista, we considered whether the State could charge the defendant with multiple counts of DUI manslaughter when multiple deaths occur in a single DUI incident. The defendant argued that he could not be charged with multiple counts of DUI manslaughter because the statute stated that one who causes “the death of any human being commits DUI manslaughter.” § 316.193(3)(c)(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). Bautista relied upon a test from our case law in arguing that while the use of the article “a” in a statute would indicate the Legislature’s intent to impose punishment for each death, the use of the word “any” rendered the statute ambiguous and thus required the imposition of the rule of lenity, such that the statute should be interpreted to favor the defendant. Id. at 1182.

We rejected Bautista’s claim. Our opinion traced the history of the “a/any” test, noting that several of our previous decisions had indeed relied solely on this test to determine the Legislature’s intended unit of prosecution. However, we noted that in our initial decision on this matter in Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), we had not simply applied the a/any test, but had instead adopted a “common-sense” approach to discerning the intended unit of prosecution. Bautista, 863 So.2d at 1183.

Following this precedent, we concluded:

Applying a common-sense approach to the DUI manslaughter statute leads to one inexorable conclusion. Any reasonable consideration of the language of the statute, the history of its enactment, the uniform statutory treatment of manslaughter offenses, and the case law in existence makes it clear that the legislative intent is that each death caused in a DUI crash is to be charged and punished as a separate offense.

Id. at 1187.

Regarding the a/any test, we stated:

The a/any test does not compel a contrary determination of the Legislature’s intended unit of prosecution for the offense of DUI manslaughter. Bautista’s argument based on the a/any test succeeds only if we were to apply the test as a simple syntactical rule in isolation from the context in which the test arose. However, it would be improper to so isolate this distinction, [n. 8] As discussed earlier, the a/any distinction was used in Grappin as one part of a common sense application of well-established rules of statutory interpretation, including reference to the overall statutory scheme and purpose as well as to related cases. Within this context, the a/any test is a valid linguistic tool that is helpful in establishing the Legislature’s intended unit of prosecution. However, the a/any test is not an infallible or exclusive indicator of legislative intent, [n. 9] Rather, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the a/any test serves as a valuable but nonexclusive means to assist courts in determining the intended unit of prosecution.
[n. 8] In attempting to discern the intent behind a statutory term, courts should not mechanistically rely on a single tool but must use all available tools of interpretation. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562, 60 S.Ct. 1034, 84 L.Ed. 1356 (1940) (stating that “the meaning to be ascribed to [a legislative act] can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction”).
[n. 9] In fact, only if the criminal statute in question uses the article “a” is the legislative intent as to the intended unit of prosecution actually determined by the a/any test. This is because the use of the article “a” is unambiguous. If the adjective “any” is used, an ambiguity of legislative intent arises. Instead of using the traditional tools for determining legislative intent, the a/any test simply applies the rule of lenity to this ambiguity and precludes more than one unit of prosecution. This latter result avoids determining legislative intent rather than ascertaining that intent. We acknowledge that our decision in
[State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985),] while reaching the correct result, might appear to apply the a/any test mechanistically. We applied the a/any test in that case because there was no clear evidence of legislative intent to permit multiple units of prosecution. However, Grappin and its progeny should not be interpreted to suggest that the intended unit of prosecution is automatically rendered ambiguous whenever a statute uses the word “any.” In the DUI manslaughter statute, the intent of the Legislature is clear. And since our purpose in construing a statutory provision is to give effect to legislative intent, the unit of prosecution in DUI manslaughter cases must be the number of victims killed — not the number of DUI traffic violations. The a/any test should not be applied to create an ambiguity where none exists and then to reach a result contrary to clear legislative intent.

Id. at 1187-88.

Thus, in order to determine the intended unit of prosecution for section 817.505, we must look at the overall statutory scheme and language of the statute. While much is made by the parties and the lower court of the a/any test, it seems that the real difference in the State and defense positions is whether the statute prohibits the global arrangement for fee-splitting for patient referrals regardless of the number of times patients are referred or provided or whether the statute prohibits each time the patients are alleged in the information to have been referred or provided.

In looking at the whole subsection, the statute provides that it is unlawful to “[sjolicit or receive any commission, bonus, rebate, kickback, or bribe” or to “engage in any split-fee arrangement,” in return for referring patients. The statute’s express words indicate that it is the engaging in fee-splitting in return for referrals of patients that is prohibited. We conclude that the Fifth District’s analysis misses the word “engage” in focusing on “arrangement” and holding that only one charge can be brought in this ease. Section 817.505 does not simply prohibit split-fee arrangements but prohibits engaging in those arrangements. Black’s Law Dictionary 570 (8th ed.2004) defines “engage” as “[t]o employ or involve oneself; to take part in; to embark on.” Therefore, in accordance with the plain language of the statute, the State is not limited to prosecuting only the arrangement to refer patients. We find that the information bases its charges on the appropriate units of prosecution.

The defendants also argue that the charges brought in this case are multiplici-tous, in violation of the double jeopardy clause, because the use of the term “any” means that only one charge could be brought per fee-splitting arrangement under Bautista and its predecessors. However, those cases to which the defendants cite dealt with determining the number of charges that could be brought as a result of a single event. The issue in Batitista was whether a car crash could result in multiple DUI manslaughter convictions when multiple deaths occurred in that single car crash. Bautista, 863 So.2d at 1185 (holding “that the Legislature clearly intended to permit multiple convictions based on multiple deaths arising from a single DUI incident.”) (emphasis added). In several of the other cases in which the a/any test was employed, the crime was one of possession, and the question was how many charges could be brought for a single instance of possession of multiple items of contraband. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985).

However, the underlying information in the instant case did not charge crimes occurring in a single event. Rather, each count references a different date. These different dates reflect that the State has brought charges for different patient brokering activities. Whether on those dates the defendants actually did take part in a split-fee arrangement in return for the referral of patients is a question for the trier of fact.

We reverse the Fifth District’s decision on this issue and hold that the information charged the correct units of prosecution, in accordance with section 817.505.

IV. Predicate Offenses

The trial court struck counts 1 (racketeering), 2 (conspiracy to commit racketeering), and 130 (white collar crime) from the information, finding that section 817.505 was not a proper predicate on which the State could charge racketeering and white collar crime. The Fifth District affirmed this decision. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 399-400.

A. Racketeering

The defendants were charged with violating section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002) (the “RICO” statute), which provides: “It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.” The defendants were also charged with conspiracy to commit racketeering, which is prohibited by section 895.03(4), Florida Statutes. The relevant definition of racketeering (and point of contention in the instant issue) is found in section 895.02, Florida Statutes (2002), and provides:

(1) “Racketeering activity” means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit:
(a) Any crime which is chargeable by indictment or information under the following provisions of the Florida Statutes:
26. Chapter 817, relating to fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes.

The defendants argue that although the patient brokering statute falls within chapter 817, it is not an appropriate predicate for a racketeering charge because it does not require that the accused have committed fraud in order to be convicted of patient brokering. Thus, the defendants’ argument is that section 895.02(l)(a)(26) limits its predicate offenses to only those sections that include the elements of fraud by including the “relating to fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes” language. The trial court agreed and dismissed counts 1 and 2 against the defendants. The Fifth District affirmed the dismissal, holding that the “relating to” language in section 895.02(l)(a)(26) meant that only those provisions under chapter 817 that required fraud as an element of the crime prohibited were to be considered valid predicate offenses. The court noted: “Construing the ‘relating to’ language as merely referring to the chapter already listed would render that language superfluous.” Rubio, 917 So.2d at 399.

The State argues that the Fifth District misread the plain language of the RICO statute. The State notes that the words following “relating to” in section 895.02 are the titles of the various parts of chapter 817: “Fraudulent Practices; False Pretenses and Frauds, Generally; and Credit Card Crimes.” The State maintains, therefore, that those words are simply used to describe the chapters which the statute references and are not intended to limit the chapters in any way.

Indeed, section 895.02 includes a “relating to” provision for each of its subsections, often either the title of the section or chapter to which it cites. Chapter 817 is entitled Fraudulent Practices and includes three parts: part 1, False Pretenses and Frauds, Generally; part 2, Credit Card Crimes; and part 3, Credit Service Organizations. However, we also consider that section 895.02 uses the “relating to” language in regard to chapters in which there are different crimes set out and it is unclear that the crimes that are not stated are intended to be included in section 895.02. For example, section 895.02(l)(a)(9) sets forth as a predicate offense “[ejhapter 550, relating to jai alai frontons.” The immediately preceding-subsection, section 895.02(l)(a)(8), sets forth “[sjection 550.235, s. 550.3551, or s. 550.3605, relating to dograeing and horse-racing.” If the entirety of chapter 550, which is titled “Pari-Mutuel Wagering,” was to be included by the reference in section 895.02(l)(a)(9), then the specification of particular sections in section 895.02(l)(a)(8) was unnecessary. Another example is section 895.02(l)(a)(18), which sets forth as a predicate offense “[ejhapter 784, relating to assault and battery.” Chapter 784 is titled “Assault and Battery; Culpable Negligence.” From this subsection it is not clear that culpable negligence is to be considered a predicate offense to racketeering.

We agree with the Fifth District and the trial court on this issue and affirm the Fifth District’s decision dismissing the racketeering charges (counts one and two) of the information, which are based on violations of chapter 817, Florida Statutes.

B. White Collar Crime

The defendants raised similar challenges to count 130 in the information, which charged the defendants with violating section 775.0844, the White Collar Crime Victim Protection Act. The defendants argued that section 817.505 was not a proper predicate upon which to base the white collar crime charge. The trial court again agreed and dismissed this count. Section 775.0844(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides:

Due to the frequency with which victims, particularly elderly victims, are deceived and cheated by criminals who commit nonviolent frauds and swindles, frequently through the use of the Internet and other electronic technology and frequently causing the loss of substantial amounts of property, it is the intent of the Legislature to enhance the sanctions imposed for nonviolent frauds and swindles, protect the public’s property, and assist in prosecuting white collar criminals.

Section 775.0844(3)(a)(4) provides that white collar crime means the commission or conspiracy to commit any felony offense specified in “[ejhapter 817, relating to fraudulent practices.”

The Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this charge for the same reasons that it affirmed the dismissal of the racketeering charges. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 400. For the reasons set forth in the analysis in the prior section of this opinion concerning the RICO predicate issue, we affirm the Fifth District’s decision on this issue.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we reverse the Fifth District’s determinations that section 409.920(2)(a) was unconstitutional and that the indictment was multiplicitous. We affirm the remainder of the Fifth District’s decision. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . This definition has since been amended by the legislature and now reads:
      “Knowingly” means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident. As used in this section, the term “knowingly” also includes the word "willfully” or "willful” which, as used in this section, means that an act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something that the law forbids, and that the act was committed with bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law.
      § 409.920(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005).

      . Thus, the State argued that its information charged defendants "every time patients [were] referred, claims submitted, and the fee split.” Brief of Appellant at 25. The State further explained at the motion hearing on October 29, 2004, that the information breaks up the charges in a weekly manner, because the actions of referring patients, submitting claims, and splitting fees — these entire transactions — happened on a weekly basis. For instance, count 56 in the indictment states that defendant Rubio, "on or about between June 27, 2001 and July 3, 2001 ... did refer and/or provide patients to Bonilla's Medical and Dental center, and/or Anamaria Bonilla Mendez and/or Sonia Maria Guzman in exchange for an approximate 50% split-fee, less operating expenses, in violation of Florida Statute 817.505(b).” Count 57 then states that defendant Rubio, "on or about between July 4, 2001 and July 10, 2001 ... did refer and/or provide patients to Bonilla’s Medical and Dental center, and/or Anamaria Bonilla Mendez and/or Sonia Maria Guzman in exchange for an approximate 50% split-fee, less operating expenses, in violation of Florida Statute 817.505(b).”


author: PARIENTE, J.

text:
    GTC, INC., etc., Appellant, v. Lisa Polak EDGAR, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. SC06-1786.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 6, 2007.

      Kenneth A. Hoffman and Marsha E. Rule of Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and Hoffman, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants.
    David E. Smith, Attorney Supervisor, Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, and Harold McLean, Public Counsel and Charles J. Beck, Deputy Public Counsel, Office of Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees.
   PARIENTE, J.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order of the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC order relates to a petition by GTC, Inc., d/b/a GT Com (GTC) to impose a customer surcharge pursuant to section 364.051(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), for costs incurred following Hurricane Dennis in 2005. We have mandatory jurisdiction because the order relates to the rates of a public utility providing telephone service. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.; § 364.381, Fla. Stat. (2005).

BACKGROUND

GTC is a local telecommunications company that served approximately 46,861 lines in seventeen exchanges in the Florida Panhandle/Big Bend area in 2005. Before 1995, incumbent local exchange telephone companies (ILECs), such as GTC, were monopolies subject to extensive rate base, rate of return regulation. In 1995, section 364.051(1), Florida Statutes, was enacted to provide that ILECs electing price-cap regulation would be exempt from rate base, rate of return regulation and from the requirements of several statutes under which the PSC formerly regulated the company’s rates. See ch. 95-403, § 9, Laws of Fla. Instead, an ILEC’s rates would be frozen at 1995 levels with three means for a rate increase: allowance of an inflationary factor beginning in 2000; a general increase where there is a compelling showing of changed circumstances; and certain allowable increases for nonba-sie rates. See § 364.051(2)-(5), Fla. Stat. (1995). GTC elected price-cap regulation under section 364.051 in 1996. See GTC, Inc. v. Garcia, 791 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.2000).

Shortly before Hurricane Dennis hit Florida in 2005, section 364.051 was amended by the addition of subsection (4)(b). This subsection, effective June 2, 2005, provides that damage resulting from a named tropical system occurring after June 1, 2005, constitutes a “compelling showing of changed circumstances” for which a temporary line-item surcharge may be granted for recovery of those intrastate costs of replacements and repairs caused by the storm. See ch. 2005-132, § 28, at 1230, Laws of Fla. Under the 2005 amendment creating section 364.051(4)(b), an ILEC, such as GTC, may file a petition with the PSC for a line-item surcharge to be included in its billings to recover intrastate costs and expenses related to repairing, restoring, or replacing lines, plants, or facilities damaged by a named tropical system such as Hurricane Dennis.

GTC was the first ILEC to file a petition under the new storm cost recovery procedures, seeking recovery of costs associated with the repair and replacement of its lines, plants, and facilities damaged by Hurricane Dennis. Included in the hurricane costs sought by GTC were capital costs, in-house labor and engineering costs, and normal operating costs and overhead allocated to storm repair. In total, GTC submitted intrastate costs of $312,693 for expenses it attributed to hurricane-related work.

GTC sought PSC approval to add the statutory maximum of $.50 per customer line to billings for one year. GTC took the position that the “costs and expenses” referred to in the statute were all costs and expenses related to the storm replacements and repairs without limitation. Public Counsel for the Citizens of the State of Florida (“Public Counsel”), inter-venor below and an appellee here, took the position that section 364.051(4)(b) confers both broad discretion and a duty on the PSC to determine which costs are reasonable for approval as a storm surcharge.

After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC rejected GTC’s position that it lacked discretion under the statute to prevent a double recovery or to examine whether costs were incurred within or in excess of normal operating costs. The PSC ultimately ruled that GTC could impose only a onetime $.11 line-item surcharge to recover a total of $4,950 in adjusted storm repair costs. GTC now challenges the PSC’s denial of $43,068 for in-house labor and engineering costs, $141,552 in capital costs, and its decision to set off $40,209 against storm costs, which represents federal support reimbursement funds projected to be received by GTC because of GTC’s storm costs and expenses.

On appeal to this Court, GTC asserts that the PSC misconstrued its statutory responsibilities by not allowing GTC to impose the maximum surcharge based on all of the costs incurred to repair its lines and restore service following the hurricane. GTC asserts that by virtue of its status as an ILEC, whose rates are price-capped and not subject to rate base, rate of return regulation, the PSC had no authority to determine whether the costs incurred were in excess of its normal operating costs. Further, GTC asserts that double or even triple recovery should be irrelevant to the PSC inquiry.

ANALYSIS

The issues in this appeal are whether the PSC acted in accord with the legislative mandate of section 364.051(4)(b) and whether there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the PSC’s findings and conclusions. The specific statutory construction question that we must resolve in this ease is whether the PSC correctly interpreted section 364.051(4)(b) as providing the PSC with discretion to deny storm surcharge recovery for costs and expenses that the PSC finds are not in excess of normal operating-costs or normal capital costs, or that are expected to be reimbursed by a federal subsidy.

Standard of Review

Generally speaking, statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). The plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). As explained in Holly and recited many times by the Court:

Florida case law contains a plethora of rules and extrinsic aids to guide courts in their efforts to discern legislative intent from ambiguously worded statutes. However,
[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.

Id. (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). Thus, if the meaning of the statute is clear then this Court’s task goes no further than applying the plain language of the statute. However, when a statutory term is subject to varying interpretations and that statute has been interpreted by the executive agency charged with enforcing the statute, this Court follows a deferential principle of statutory construction:

An agency’s interpretation of the statute that it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference. See BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Johnson, 708 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla.1998). This Court will not depart from the contemporaneous construction of a statute by a state agency charged with its enforcement unless the construction is “clearly unauthorized or erroneous.”

Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Jacobs, 841 So.2d 447, 450 (Fla.2003) (quoting P.W. Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla.1988)).

Statutory Construction of Section 364.051(4)(b)

The agency’s construction of section 364.051(4), as amended in 2005, was a matter of first impression for the PSC. Prior to the 2005 amendment, one of the grounds provided by section 364.051(4) for allowing a price-capped local telecommunications company to request a rate increase was by “a compelling showing of changed circumstances.” § 364.051(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). The 2005 amendment added subsection (4)(b) specifically for tropical storm damage, and expressly provided that damage resulting from a named tropical system would constitute a compelling showing of changed circumstances sufficient for a company to petition for a temporary rate increase. As enacted, section 364.051(4)(b), provides in pertinent part:

(b) For purposes of this section, evidence of damage occurring to the lines, plants, or facilities of a local exchange telecommunications company that is subject to the carrier-of-last-resort obligations, which damage is the result of a tropical system occurring after June 1, 2005, and named by the National Hurricane Center, constitutes a compelling showing of changed circumstances.
1. A company may file a petition to recover its intrastate costs and expenses relating to repairing, restoring, or replacing the lines, plants, or facilities damaged by a named tropical system.
2. The commission shall verify the •intrastate costs and expenses submitted by the company in support of its petition.
3. The company must show and the commission shall determine whether the intrastate costs and expenses are reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system.
4. A company having a storm-reserve fund may recover tropical-system-related costs and expenses from its customers only in excess of any amount available in the storm-reserve fund.
5. The commission may determine the amount of any increase that the company may charge its customers, but the charge per line item may not exceed 50 cents per month per customer line for a period of not more than 12 months.

(Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, under section 364.051(4)(b)(2), the PSC must verify the storm-related intrastate costs and expenses. Furthei’, the company must show and the PSC must determine that the “costs and expenses are reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system.” § 364.051(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat.

Public Counsel and the PSC both rely on the portion of the statute that provides that “[t]he company must show and the [PSC] shall determine whether the intrastate costs and expenses are reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system.” § 364.051(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. The PSC views the plain meaning of section 364.051(4)(b)(3) as authority to exercise broad discretion to allow surcharge recovery of only those costs that it finds are reasonable in relation to the storm, meaning — in the PSC’s view — only those costs and expenses that are in excess of normal operating costs and normal capital costs, and which are not recovered through some other means. The PSC contends that any other statutory interpretation would be unreasonable because it would allow customers to be billed twice for the same costs. Additionally, the PSC and Public Counsel assert that because the PSC is charged with enforcing this statute, its interpretation as to the meaning of reasonableness for purposes of recovery of hurricane costs is entitled to deference and is not clearly unauthorized or erroneous.

GTC, on the other hand, argues that the phrase “reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system” in section 364.051(4)(b)(3) is not authorization for the PSC to engage in a general reasonableness inquiry, but limits its determination of reasonableness only to determining that the costs were expended in repairing damage caused by the named tropical system. GTC further contends that the plain meaning of section 364.051(4)(b)(l), as evidenced by its text, allows surcharge recovery of all “intrastate costs and expenses relating to repairing, restoring, or replacing the lines, plants, or facilities damaged by a named tropical system.” GTC submits that the only limitations which may be imposed are those stated in subsections (4) through (8), none of which expressly disallow recovery of costs on the basis that they involve in-house labor and engineering, prudent replacement practices, normal capital costs, or offsets for federal subsidy funds.

Because the phrase “reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system” is subject to differing interpretations, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous as to the scope of the PSC’s authority to disallow expenses and thus statutory interpretation is appropriate. The PSC interprets the statutory provision “reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system” as imposing on it an obligation to scrutinize costs for reasonableness and in a manner that will avoid double recovery, thereby allowing recovery only for costs that exceed normal operating costs and normal capital costs. This interpretation is a reasonable view of the statute and the PSC’s role in administering it. We reject GTC’s contention that this interpretation is “clearly unauthorized or erroneous.” Level 3 Comrmc’ns, 841 So.2d at 450. As explained by the PSC in its order:

We find the phrase “reasonable under the circumstances ” allows us great latitude in determining the methodology and factors that should be taken into consideration when reviewing the petitioner’s request. We also find that this statute was enacted to assist the petitioner in defraying additional costs caused by extraordinary circumstances, specifically tropical storms.
One of the main goals of this statute is to assist the petitioner financially. Accordingly, the reasonable clause implicitly ensures that storm related cost recovery should be based on expenditures incurred over and above normal operating expenditures. It is highly unlikely that the Legislature intended, through Section 364.051(4), Florida Statutes, to reimburse companies for costs that they would have incurred regardless of whether a storm had occurred or not.

Because this is a reasonable construction, we apply the rule of statutory interpretation that requires us to defer to the PSC’s expertise and its interpretation of the provision.

We do not, however, rely only on the principle of deference. We must also consider the principle of construction that parts of a statute are not read in isolation. “It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). The PSC’s interpretation of the scope of its discretion is supported by another provision contained in section 364.051(4)(b). Section 364.051(4)(b)(5) provides that “[t]he commission may determine the amount of any increase that the company may charge its customers, but the charge per line item may not exceed 50 cents per month per customer line for a period of not more than 12 months.” (Emphasis supplied.) The discretionary nature of the phrase, “may determine the amount of any increase,” supplies additional support for the interpretation reached by the PSC — that the PSC is invested with discretion to determine what amount of storm recovery costs are reasonable to be charged to the consumer.

Support for the PSC’s interpretation is also found in a related statutory provision contained in chapter 364. Section 364.01(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), requires the PSC to “[p]rotect the public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring that basic local telecommunications services are available to all consumers in the state at reasonable and affordable prices.” That provision directs the PSC to exercise its jurisdiction in order to protect consumers, in part, by ensuring the availability of telecommunications services at reasonable prices. This Court has previously recognized that the PSC’s authority vis-a-vis ILECs derives in part from the legislative mandate contained in section 364.01(4)(a). See Crist v. Jaber, 908 So.2d 426, 430 (Fla.2005); GTC, 791 So.2d at 457-58. GTC’s reading of section 364.051(4)(b), in a manner that would divest the PSC of any discretion to determine the reasonableness of costs sought, is contrary to the PSC’s authority to ensure the availability of reasonably priced telecommunications services.

GTC has also characterized the PSC’s determination of what costs are reasonable for recovery under section 364.051(4)(b) as an improper rate base, rate of return analysis that is inapplicable to GTC, a price-capped entity. However, that argument was rejected in GTC when GTC previously challenged the extent of the PSC’s authority in matters involving price-capped companies. As we explained in GTC, other provisions in chapter 364 support the conclusion that the Legislature intended for the PSC to retain certain powers with respect to ILECs:

For example, section 361.01 still gives the Commission broad regulatory powers with regard to the telecommunications industry. See § 364.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1995) (“It is the legislative intent to give exclusive jurisdiction in all matters set forth in this chapter to the Florida Public Service Commission in regulating telecommunications companies, and such preemption shall supersede any local or special act or municipal charter where any conflict of authority may exist.”). Additionally, section 364.01(4)(a)-(i) defines the Commission’s scope of authority, including the power to protect the public health,, safety, and 'welfare, the power to promote competition, and the power to “[ejliminate any rules and/or regulations which will delay or impair the transition to competition.” Indeed, the last two jurisdictional provisions (i.e., promoting competition and eliminating anti-competition rules) were added by the 1995 legislature. See ch. 95-403, § 5, Laws of Fla. Importantly, nothing within section 361.051 indicates that price-regulated companies are exempt from the provisions in section 361.01.

Id. at 458 (emphasis supplied).

In this case, reading section 364.01(4)(a) (the PSC shall exercise its jurisdiction to ensure telecommunications services are available at reasonable prices) together with section 364.051(4)(b)(3) (the PSC shall determine whether the costs are reasonable under the circumstances of the storm) and section 364.051(4)(b)(5) (the PSC may determine the amount of any increase), further supports the PSC’s construction of the statute as providing it with discretion to determine what storm costs may reasonably be passed on to the consumer.

The PSC also noted in its order that the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for the 2005 amendment was in accord with its own interpretation of legislative intent for that provision. The Senate staff analysis for section 364.051(4)(b) stated:

The committee substitute requires that the company show, and the commission determine, whether costs and expenses are reasonable under the circumstances. Traditionally, for rate-base-regulated industries, the commission would apply a “prudent and reasonable” test to ensure, for example, that costs are not double recovered, are booked to the appropriate costs accounts, and are necessary for the restoration process. The proposed language implies a similar type of review.

Fla. Senate Commerce & Consumer Services Comm., CS for CS for SB 2232 § 19, Staff Analysis 2 (April 12, 2005). Certainly, while not determinative of final legislative intent, it is “one touchstone of the collective legislative will,” White v. State, 714 So.2d 440, 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998), on which the PSC relied for confirmation of its own interpretation of the statute. In this case, given an ambiguous statute and our utilization of several principles of statutory construction, the staff analysis serves merely as confirmation of the reasonable interpretation employed by the PSC.

GTC contends that the PSC erroneously relied on the staff analysis and then points to section 366.8260(l)(n), Florida Statutes (2005), as support for its argument that the Legislature did not intend for the PSC to apply a reasonableness test under section 364.051(4)(b). Section 366.8260(l)(n) is a storm-recovery cost provision that pertains to investor-owned electric utilities and was enacted during the same 2005 legislative session as was section 364.051(4)(b). See ch. 2005-107, § 1, at 1029, Laws of Fla. Section 366.8260(l)(n) is found within an extensive and detailed regulatory framework and provides for adjustment of storm-recovery costs for rate base, rate of return regulated electric utilities, as follows:

(n) “Storm-recovery costs” means, at the option and request of the electric utility, and as approved by the commission ... costs incurred or to be incurred by an electric utility in undertaking a storm-recovery activity. Such costs shall be net of applicable insurance proceeds and, where determined appropriate by the commission, shall include adjustments for normal capital replacement and operating costs, lost revenues or other potential offsetting adjustments.

(Emphasis supplied.) This provision evidences legislative intent to limit the storm-recovery costs under section 366.8260 for rate base, rate of return regulated electric utilities to those costs and expenses that exceed normal overhead or normal capital replacement.

In comparison, the 2005 provision for storm cost recovery procedures for ILECs found in section 364.051(4)(b) contains no similar roadmap for calculating the storm recovery costs for price-capped ILECs such as GTC. GTC argues that because the Legislature included no similar limitations in section 364.051, it intended no limitations on the storm costs that can be recovered under that section, other than the expressly stated limitation concerning a storm-reserve fund, which is not applicable here. The PSC contends, on the other hand, that section 364.051(4)(b) provides the PSC greater discretion in the determination of reasonableness of storm cost recovery than does section 366.8260 because it does not limit the exercise of discretion to enumerated factors. We agree with the PSC that the storm cost recovery provisions contained in section 364.051(4)(b) for price-capped companies do not eliminate the ability of the PSC to exercise discretion to determine the reasonableness of claimed costs under the circumstances for the tropical system.

The PSC’s construction of the storm cost recovery provisions of section 364.051(4)(b) that prevents consumers from paying twice — once for all those costs and expenses normally covered by their regular rates and once again for the same costs and expenses in a line-item storm recovery surcharge — falls within the overall goal of section 364.01(4)(a). Further, the PSC’s construction is founded on the text of section 364.051(4)(b), and is a reasonable interpretation of a statute that is within the PSC’s broad regulatory authority. GTC has not carried its burden of showing that the PSC’s construction of section 364.051(4)(b) is clearly unauthorized or erroneous.

Disallowance of Specific Expenses

We next address GTC’s arguments relating to the PSC’s denial of storm surcharge recovery for certain specified costs and expenses: (A) In-House Plant and Engineering Labor Expenses; (B) Capital Costs; and (C) Universal Service Fund Set-off. In so doing, we remain mindful of our standard of review:

[T]he Commission’s factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness.
To overcome these presumptions, a party challenging an order of the Commission on appeal has the burden of showing a departure from the essential requirements of law and the legislation controlling the issue, or that the findings of the Commission are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. “This Court will approve the commission’s findings and conclusions if they are based upon competent, substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.”

Crist, 908 So.2d at 430 (citations omitted) (quoting W. Fla. Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Jacobs, 887 So.2d 1200, 1204 (Fla.2004)). In Verizon Florida, Inc. v. Jaber, 889 So.2d 712, 714 (Fla.2004), this Court stated:

“[0]rders of the Commission come before this Court clothed with the statutory presumption that they have been made within the Commission’s jurisdiction and powers, and that they are reasonable and just and such as ought to have been made.” GTC, Inc. v. Garcia, 791 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2000) (quoting United Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 496 So.2d 116, 118 (Fla.1986)). “...We will approve the Commission’s findings and conclusions if they are based on competent substantial evidence, and if they are not clearly erroneous.” Gulf Coast Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 727 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.1999).

See also Fla. Interexchange Carriers Ass’n v. Clark, 678 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla.1996). “While there may be legitimate disagreements as to the weight and credibility of the evidence presented below, this Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether evidence exists to support the Commission’s findings.” Crist, 908 So.2d at 432. We will not reweigh the evidence or overturn an order of the PSC because the Court might have arrived at a different result. Gulf Power Co. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 453 So.2d 799, 803 (Fla.1984). Therefore, we will approve the specific cost disallowances and set-off by the PSC if they are based upon competent, substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.

(A) In-House Plant and Engineering Labor Expenses

GTC challenges the PSC’s disal-lowance of recovery for storm-related in-house plant and engineering and labor expenses in the amount of $43,068. The testimony of GTC’s regional controller, R. Mark Ellmer, established that GTC’s petition included costs for normal material and labor, costs of construction, wages and benefits, budgeted overtime labor, regular time labor, and overhead. Public Counsel’s expert testified that because GTC submitted invoices of total costs, and not extraordinary costs over and above normal operating costs and normal capital costs, there was no way to verify the extraordinary costs that might be considered recoverable under the PSC’s interpretation of the statute.

The PSC disallowed these in-house labor and engineering expenses because it found that they were included within normal business operations and would have been incurred without the storm. The PSC concluded in its order that

GT Corn’s in-house labor costs should not be included in the amount to be recovered through a storm charge as the Company is already recovering this amount through its normal business operations. Witness Ellmer agreed during cross examination that its in-house labor costs that were included in GT Corn’s storm cost recovery request amount, would have been incurred by the Company regardless of whether Hurricane Dennis had occurred. The cost included for in-house labor, therefore, was not incurred as an extraordinary amount related to Hurricane Dennis. Since the labor costs would have been incurred by GT Com regardless of whether Hurricane Dennis had occurred, it is not reasonable for the Company to recover these costs through the storm charge recovery mechanism.

It should be noted that, although the PSC denied recovery of costs it found were included in normal business operations, it did allow recovery of expenses for contracted labor.

GTC contends that the PSC should not be concerned with whether the costs sought are already covered by normal operating costs and expenses. GTC asserts that the possibility of double recovery is irrelevant under the statute because its rates are not based on rate base, rate of return regulation. We have already rejected this argument in construing the statute. Moreover, GTC presented no evidence that as a result of using in-house labor to make the extensive repairs, it suffered any additional costs or incurred overtime expenses over and above its normal costs. Therefore, in this case GTC failed to carry its statutory burden of establishing that the in-house labor and engineering “costs and expenses are reasonable under the circumstances for the named tropical system.” § 364.051(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat.

Other than advancing its interpretation of the statute as a basis for reversal, GTC has not overcome the presumption of correctness accorded to the PSC order or demonstrated how the PSC erred in disallowing in-house plant and engineering labor expenses that GTC did not show were over and above its normal expenses. The PSC’s decision was based upon application of its construction of the statute to its factual findings, and those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence.

(B) Capital Costs

GTC also sought recovery of intrastate capital costs in the amount of $141,552, contending that the words used in the statute and the fact that GTC is a price-capped entity demonstrate legislative intent to allow full recovery of all actual capital costs of replacing any lines, plants, or facilities damaged by the storm. Mr. Ellmer confirmed that the petition for recovery of storm costs included claims for capitalized material, capitalized building repairs, capital asset costs, and equipment. These capital costs included capital assets that were replaced or added during repairs necessitated by storm damage. Included within the capital equipment costs was $80,405 for a new Alligator Point CXR System, which is a carrier system to provide new voice and data service over fiber optic lines at Alligator Point. The PSC found it unreasonable for GTC to recover from consumers, in one year, the full cost of capital assets that it would normally depreciate over fifteen years, and that replace assets that have been, for the most part, fully depreciated. Specifically, the PSC reasoned:

We question whether it is reasonable to allow the entire capital asset cost to be recovered over a one-year period. GT Com has acknowledged that the economic lives of these assets are greater than one year as it has established a 15-year depreciable life for the capitalized assets addressed in this case. With the exception of 726 feet of cable, all assets that were replaced by GT Com as a result of Hurricane Dennis, were fully depreciated. Allowing recovery of the replacement plant in a one-year period, when GT Corn’s current depreciation policy is to use a fifteen year life, is not reasonable. Businesses operating in a competitive environment do not recoup capital asset costs in a single year — the costs are included in the balance sheet with the goal of earning a return on the assets over time.
Section 364.051(4)(b)(l), Florida Statutes, allows a company to file a petition to recover its intrastate costs and expenses relating to repairing, restoring, or replacing the lines, plants, or facilities damaged by a named tropical system. The statute, however, does not provide a definition of the term “costs.” Costs can logically mean the dollars expended to repair, restore, or replace; or, costs can be defined as the incremental increase in total costs. Many other definitions exist for the term “costs.”
We have consistently applied the principle that when an asset exceeds a minimum threshold level and has a long term life, that asset should be capitalized. With respect to petitions for storm cost recovery, we have consistently applied this capitalization methodology. [] Capitalization of assets is not limited to regulated utilities — it is used by most businesses.

The PSC’s treatment of capital costs is based on its interpretation of the reasonableness requirement of section 364.051(4)(b). Although section 364.051(4)(b) neither provides a definition of storm costs nor expressly discusses adjustments for normal capital costs, as does section 366.8260(l)(n) for electric utilities, section 364.051(4)(b) does expressly require that the company show and the PSC find that the costs to be recovered for replacing lines, plants, or facilities are reasonable under the circumstances of the storm. The PSC’s determination in regard to capital costs, based on its construction of this statute, is not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed. While we are not prepared to state that in all circumstances recovery of 100% of capital expenditures made in one year because of a storm should be disallowed, in this case GTC has not carried its burden of demonstrating error in the PSC’s order disallowing recovery of its capital costs related to Hurricane Dennis.

(C) Universal Service Fund Set-off

The last area of contention is the PSC’s set-off of $40,209 in projected Universal Service Fund reimbursement payments against GTC’s 2005 storm costs. As a rural company, GTC is eligible to receive a “High-Cost Loop Support” payment from the Federal Universal Service Fund (USF), in differing percentages to the extent that its overall cost per loop (line from company to end user customer location) exceeds 115% to 150%, or exceeds 150%, of the national average cost per loop. These payments are administered by the Universal Service Administration Company and approved by the Federal Communications Commission. The support payment is calculated on an after-the-fact basis and is paid over time beginning in 2007 for the year 2005. The evidence established that GTC has received USF subsidy payments since 1986 and would receive a USF subsidy payment for the year 2005 in an additional amount based on increased costs due to storm repairs. Based on this history, the PSC in this case applied a portion of those projected support payments as an offset against GTC’s intrastate storm recovery costs.

The PSC interpreted that part of section 364.051(4)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides that a company “may file a petition to recover its intrastate costs and expenses,” as providing it with discretion to disallow recovery of any cost that has been or will be recouped through other means. GTC argues, however, that the amount of future USF support payments, to be commenced in 2007 for the year 2005, is too speculative to serve as the basis for offsetting any hurricane costs. Mr. Ellmer testified that assuming there is no change in the national average cost per loop, GTC is expected to receive $141,449 in additional USF support payments on account of its 2005 hurricane costs. He qualified that testimony by stating that based on possible changes in cost per loop GTC might only receive $121,317. Mr. Ellmer further testified that GTC had received USF reimbursements since at least 1986. Public Counsel’s expert witness testified that because of the increased cost resulting from items being capitalized and items being expensed as a result of the storm, GTC will receive additional high-cost loop support payments, which should be taken into consideration in approval of storm recovery costs.

The PSC found that because GTC’s average loop costs have exceeded the national average in excess of 150% for the past five years and GTC has received reimbursements since at least 1986, GTC should once again qualify for the maximum level of funding. The PSC further determined that, because the Universal Service Fund is funded through consumer payments in the first instance, increased support payments attributable to 2005 hurricane costs should be offset against those costs and not paid for a second time by the consumer through storm cost surcharge.

The PSC did not, however, reduce GTC’s claim by the full $141,449 projected reimbursement. Instead, the PSC concluded that because there was a downward adjustment in GTC’s allowable storm cost expense, there should be a corresponding downward adjustment in the amount of the USF reimbursement to be applied as an offset. In accord with the adjustments made to GTC’s total claim, the PSC adjusted the total support payment, for purposes of offsetting storm costs, to $40,209. The record further established that GTC will begin receiving USF funds based on its 2005 costs, including storm costs, in January 2007. The PSC took the two-year delay in receipt of the USF payments into account and approved recovery by GTC of carrying costs of $3,886, which were calculated at the commercial paper rate. It is not clearly erroneous for the PSC to consider and give weight to evidence of a long record of increasing subsidy payments and documentary evidence showing projected support payments. Moreover, we agree that in considering recoverable costs, it is not clearly erroneous for the PSC to disallow double recovery.

Because the PSC had before it competent, substantial evidence to support its determination that GTC will receive additional USF funds on account of costs related to Hurricane Dennis, the PSC’s permissible construction of the statute and decision to set off USF funds in the amount of $40,209 against storm costs will not be disturbed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that GTC has not carried its burden of showing that the PSC’s construction of section 364.051(4)(b) is clearly unauthorized or erroneous or that the determinations by the PSC are not based upon competent, substantial evidence. The PSC is required by sections 364.051(4)(b) and 364.01(l)(4)(a) to consider the reasonableness of the cost of services to the consumers when making decisions that relate to rates or services, as it has done in the order under review. The PSC’s decision to disallow storm cost surcharge recovery for plant and engineering labor costs of $43,068 and capital costs of $141,552, and the decision to offset $40,209 in projected USF support payments against storm costs, is based upon competent, substantial evidence and on a reasonable construction of section 364.051(4)(b). Therefore, those decisions will not be disturbed.

Accordingly, Order No. PSC-06-0681FOF-TL of the Public Service Commission is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

      . Section 364.05 l(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), expressly exempts price-cap companies from “rate base, rate of return regulation and the requirements of ss. 364.03, 364.035, 364.037, 364.05, 364.055, 364.14, 364.17 and 364.18." The " 'rate base’ is the amount of investment on which a regulated public utility is entitled to an opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return; it represents the total investment in, or the fair value of, the used and useful property that it necessarily devotes to rendering the regulated services.” 64 Am. Jur.2d Public Utilities § 98 (2001). In rate base, rate of return regulation, the rate of return is to be set at a level that provides an "opportunity to earn a fair or reasonable rate of return on its invested capital.” United Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Mann, 403 So.2d 962, 966 (Fla.1981).

      . Because the statute allows a maximum of $.50 per customer line per month for one year, the maximum GTC could recover based on 46,861 lines would be $281,166.

      . GTC does not challenge on appeal the PSC's denial of recovery for $28,158 in intrastate costs for upgrading damaged copper cable to fiber optic lines in the Alligator Point area which, while prudent, was not necessitated by the hurricane. Further, GTC does not challenge on appeal the PSC's denial of recovery for allocated employee benefits of $38,952 and normal overhead of $19,767 allocated to storm repair activities.

      . This Court is not unified in its view of the use of legislative staff analyses to determine legislative intent. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 375-76 (Fla.2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

      . The PSC refers to orders which have applied this capitalization approach: In re Petition by Fla. Power & Light Co., Order No. PSC-05-0937-FOF-EI (Fla.Pub.Serv.Comm. Sept. 21, 2005); In re Petition by Progress Energy Fla., Inc., Order No. PSC-05-0748FOF-EI (Fla.Pub.Serv.Comm. July 14, 2005); In re Petition by Sprint-Fla., Inc., Order No. PSC-05-0946-FOF-TL (Fla.Pub.Serv.Comm. Oct. 3, 2005). However, it should be noted that the Florida Power and Progress Energy petitions were filed under chapter 366, Florida Statutes, and the Sprint-Florida order, which resulted from a petition filed under chapter 364, Florida Statutes, was based upon a stipulation of the parties.