author: GAIDRY, J. WELCH, J.,

text:
    Ernestine LEE v. RYAN’S FAMILY STEAK HOUSES, INC.
    No. 2006 CA 1400.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 4, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied June 28, 2007.
    William R. Mustian, III, Metairie, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Ernestine Lee.

      Albert D. Giraud, Karen G. Arena, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   GAIDRY, J.

|¾⅛ this case, defendant, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc. (“Ryan’s”), appeals a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Ernestine Lee, awarding damages for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall accident. We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit arises from a slip-and-fall accident which occurred at Ryan’s on June 28, 2003. The accident was captured on videotape by one of Ryan’s surveillance cameras. The area shown on the video included two parallel food bars with an aisle in between (“parallel food bars”), and a third bar running perpendicular to the other two (“perpendicular food bar”). The video shows a Ryan’s employee discovering some sort of spill in the aisle separating the perpendicular food bar from the parallel food bars. The employee stands watch over the spill while waiting for help. Another employee arrives with a mop bucket and proceeds to mop the area, while a third employee places a warning cone in the middle of the aisle. The cone appears to be about three feet tall and is yellow with two exclamation points and a picture of a person slipping. The employee mopping the floor nudges the cone with the mop while mopping, leaving the cone about a foot or two to the right of its original position. After the employee finishes mopping, he exits the area and leaves the warning cone in place. The video shows Ms. Lee entering the food bar area soon after the mopping is finished, wearing shorts and athletic shoes. She inspects the food on the parallel food bars, then proceeds to the perpendicular food bar. Before reaching the perpendicular food bar, she appears to look down, then she steps up to the bar. After glancing at the food, Ms. Lee turns around and walks back the same way she came, passing the warning cone for the second time. She |sagain appears to look down at the floor and then slips and falls right beside the cone. As Ms. Lee is starting to slip, a Ryan’s employee, later identified as Shabr-iell Nikona McKey, appears in the video standing beside Ms. Lee. After Ms. Lee fell, a crowd began to gather around her. A chair was brought in and she was raised to a standing position, but after a few minutes the chair was removed and Ms. Lee laid back down on the floor in the same spot she fell to wait for emergency assistance. The floor in the area of the fall was re-mopped by what appears to be the same employee who originally mopped it. Customers continued to walk between the three food bars while Ms. Lee laid on the floor. Paramedics eventually arrived and Ms. Lee was placed on a stretcher and removed from the restaurant.

Ms. Lee filed a petition for damages against Ryan’s in which she alleged that as a result of the fall, she suffered injuries to her neck and lower back, an increase in seizure activity, and other injuries. Ms. Lee testified at trial that on the day of the accident, she walked up to the perpendicular bar to look at the food, then noticed that the floor was slippery, and looked down and saw water on the floor. After seeing the water on the floor, she turned and looked at the manager, then started walking back the way she came. She testified that the floor in her path had not felt slippery when she initially walked to the perpendicular bar. She denied seeing any warning signs in the area indicating that the floor was wet. She took about five or six steps and then slipped and fell on the floor, hitting her head. She testified that she began screaming because her head and back hurt. Ms. Lee claims that she had a seizure “a few minutes” after the accident at Ryan’s, and that the |4paramedics treated her' for a seizure on the way to the hospital; however, the EMS Run Report from West Jefferson Medical Center does not contain any mention of a seizure, and specifically states that there was no loss of consciousness. Ms. Lee claimed that the accident caused a five-month-long exacerbation of her pre-existing health problems.

McKey, the cashier and server at Ryan’s who witnessed the accident, testified that prior to the accident, a spill had been mopped up by a Ryan’s employee and two warning cones were placed in the area afterwards. Immediately prior to the accident, McKey was walking to one of the parallel food bars to refill the stack of clean plates and was beside Ms. Lee as she approached the perpendicular food bar. McKey testified that:

As [Ms. Lee] was walking to the [perpendicular food] bar, I said, how are you doing, ma’am? Watch your step. The floor is slippery. Because we had — -we had the signs out, but she was walking to the bar, and I was walking with the plates, but I was just letting her know because he had just mopped up the spill. So she was walking, she turned — she was turning around, you know, because she was just looking. She hadn’t had her plate yet. So she was turning around to go to the [parallel food] bar. And she was like, all right, baby. As soon as she was saying that, it was like she just slipped. And I said, I just told the woman to watch her step. And she just slipped down and she fell as she was turning around.

Dr. Michael Russo, a family practice physician, treated Ms. Lee both before and after the accident at Ryan’s. He testified that she had a history of, among other things: cervical disc disease, tension headaches, and seizure disorder, which he noted may have a “pseudo-seizure component to [it].” |KPr. Russo saw Ms. Lee on June 18, 2003, five days before her accident at Ryan’s. At that visit, she complained of dizziness, chronic headaches, and weight problems. Dr. Russo’s notes from that date also indicate that she “continues to have severe back pain with reduced motion.”

Ms. Lee returned to Dr. Russo on July 2, 2003, approximately ten days after the June 23, 2003 accident. At that visit, she reported that she had recently slipped and hit her head and that she had been taken to the Emergency Room. Her chief complaints on July 2 centered around her headaches, which Dr. Russo opined could have been caused by her pre-existing cervical disc disease, by a sinus infection, or by muscle spasms; dizziness, which Dr. Russo testified could be caused by medication she was taking, a concussion, or middle ear pathology and neck pain. Based on her complaints of pain, Dr. Russo increased the dosage of the pain medication she was taking prior to the accident, gave her a shot of Toradol for pain, and also did trigger-point injections for muscle spasms in the trapezius area. While Dr. Russo admitted that muscle spasms in the trapezius area could be caused by trauma to the neck, he said that it is “fairly nonspecific,” and it did not appear that there was an “acute marked change” in Ms. Lee’s status at the July 2 visit compared with the visit five days prior to her accident. He stated that “Ms. Lee is a very hysterical patient. And it’s ... hard to figure out where her discomfort is coming from .... [S]he did have chronic pathology before the fall, and she continues to have chronic pathology afterwards. It’s hard to say what, if any, impact the fall made on her functional status.” Ms. Lee also complained of right foot pain, which she associated with her fall, at a July 16, 2003 visit.

| ^Regarding whether Ms. Lee suffered an exacerbation of her chronic, untreated pain following the accident, Dr. Russo testified that “the period right after the fall she did have some ... worsening in her status. Now whether or not that’s secondary to the fall or not, that’s very difficult to discern. Ms. Ernestine is someone with a lot of nonspecific complaints the way she presents .... ” When asked whether he noted an increase in Ms. Lee’s seizures during the six-month period following the accident, Dr. Russo stated that given the way they were “juggling her medicines” during that time period, even if she did have an increase, it would be hard to say whether it was directly related to the accident or whether it was secondary to the medications. He testified that pseudo-seizures would not usually be directly related to a head injury, although they could be “secondarily [related] as a result of somati-zation of an anxiety problem.” Dr. Russo also testified that withdrawal seizures and even pseudo-seizures could result when a patient suddenly stops taking certain medications without properly tapering off of them, as his records show Ms. Lee did after the accident.

After trial, the judge ruled in favor of Ms. Lee and against Ryan’s. The trial judge stated that there was no doubt that there was a substance of some sort on the floor and that it was immediately addressed by Ryan’s. He also found that Ms. Lee was looking only at the food on the bars, and not at the floor or the area around her, and he believed that she did not see the warning cone beside her, “even though it’s visible.” The judge also noted that the area where Ms. Lee slipped was the “exact same area she transversed [sic] before.”

In determining whether Ryan’s exercised reasonable care under the circumstances of this case, the judge found that Ryan’s made an effort to remedy the problem and warn its customers immediately upon noticing the | ./problem existed; the floor was immediately mopped in the area of the spill and a warning cone was put out to alert customers to the wet floor. However, the judge also found that the placement of the cone in defeated its intended task, ie., preventing a slip-and-fall, because the placement of the cone could:

give reasonable minds different interpretations. It could either apply to this petitioner from her direction or it could not. It could apply from someone coming from the left direction because it’s in the middle of that aisle or it could come—apply to the person coming up the opposite direction. It could apply to them. So it’s a territorial type of analysis I’m doing.

The trial judge noted that the cone had no words, but only “symbols expressing someone slipping ... which ... suggests], if you can see it and if you’re looking at it, that it’s a dangerous area.” The judge ultimately determined that Ryan’s breached its duty to Ms. Lee because:

The cone has no directional symbols. The cone has no arrows suggesting exactly where to come, where not to come. I find fault with that because, if I’m going to use the aisle where the cone is and there’s apparently the permission of Ryan’s to the customer that you may still migrate this area, you may still use this area in spite of the fact that I’ve warned you it’s wet. That is the nature of what I’m determining. The cone does not say: Do Not Enter. It is not fenced off. It is not prohibited. It is a permissive granting of use of the zone but its purpose is to raise the heighten [sic] alertness to the patron that as you migrate across this area, be upon some higher standard of mobility.

Despite his determination that Ryan’s was liable for Ms. Lee’s accident, the trial judge assigned twenty percent of the liability for the accident to Ms. Lee because:

at least she should have seen or paused when that sign appeared so, so vividly there. It should have heightened her notice to some extent that she couldn’t just go on as usual that either not to traverse or to gather more data before you traverse. Something should have triggered to put [her] on increase [sic] alertness even though [she was] not directly focusing on the sign.

|sThe trial judge found that the accident caused a four-month exacerbation of Ms. Lee’s pre-existing health problems and awarded $2500.00 for each of the first two months and $2000.00 for each of the third and fourth months. Ryan’s appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding Ryan’s liable for Ms. Lee’s injuries and in awarding damages.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.6(B) governs the plaintiffs burden of proof in a slip-and-fall case:

In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person lawfully on the merchant’s premises for damages as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant’s premises, the claimant shall have the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his cause of action, all of the following:
(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, pri- or to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.

The trial judge’s finding that Ryan’s failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances due to the design of the warning cone and its placement is a factual finding subject to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. See Stevens v. Winn-Dixie of Louisiana, 95-0435 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1207. The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). |flThe reviewing court may not disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact when viewed in light of the record in its entirety even though it feels its evaluations are more reasonable.

In this case, however, the trial judge’s oral reasons for judgment were internally inconsistent and we do not believe that his conclusions were reasonable. First, the trial judge found that Ms. Lee was looking only at the food on the bars, and not at the floor or the area around her. However, Ms. Lee’s own testimony contradicted this finding. She testified at trial that as she approached the perpendicular food bar, she noticed that the floor was kind of slippery and she looked down and saw that there was water on the floor. She then looked at a Ryan’s employee, who she believes was a manager, before beginning to walk back though the area and slipping. Ms. Lee also appears twice to be glancing down at the floor on the surveillance video.

Second, Ms. Lee testified, and the trial judge believed, that she did not see the warning cone before she fell. The trial court based its finding of liability on the design of the cone and its placement failing to alert her to the hazardous condition. However, it is clear from Ms. Lee’s own testimony that she noticed that the floor was slippery and saw the water on the floor before she began walking back through the wet area. Therefore, the placement and design of the cone were of no consequence in alerting Ms. Lee.

Finally, we find the trial judge’s findings that the cone should have had “directional symbols” or arrows or language showing exactly where to go and where not to go to be unreasonable. A merchant is not the insurer of the safety of its patrons and has only a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances for the safety of its patrons. Gardner v. Griffin, 97-0379, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/90), 712 So.2d 583, 587. We find that an approximately three-foot-high yellow warning cone containing the universal symbol for a wet floor to be adequate to alert a patron of a hazardous condition. It would be unreasonably burdensome to require a merchant to have a supply of cones with words and arrows explaining the circumstances of every possible hazardous condition to its customers. While it may have been more prudent for Ryan’s to have placed more than one cone in the area after mopping, Ms. Lee’s fall would not have been prevented by the placement of multiple cones. She entered the food bar area from the direction of the parallel food bars, walked within a foot or two of the warning cone on her way to the perpendicular food bar, then discovered the water on the floor for herself before turning and returning the same way she came and falling right alongside the warning cone. Ms. Lee knowingly walked back through an area she knew to be wet and slippery, despite the fact that she saw a Ryan’s employee, possibly a manager, standing nearby, who she could have summoned for help.

Finally, we find that the trial court’s finding that Ms. Lee suffered a four-month exacerbation of her pre-exist-ing problems with her back, neck, and head, and with seizures, to be unsupported by the record. Ms. Lee testified that her problems were worse in the five months following the accident; however, Dr. Russo simply could not conclude, more probably than not, that Ms. Lee suffered a five-month exacerbation due to the accident. Furthermore, the evidence in the record shows that the increase in severity of Ms. Lee’s symptoms seemed to actually start the week before the accident at Ryan’s.

Because we find the factfinder’s conclusions as to liability and damages to be manifestly erroneous, the judgment of the trial court awarding | n damages to Ms. Lee for her accident at Ryan’s is reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Ernestine Lee.

REVERSED.

WELCH, J., concurs with reasons.

WELCH, J.,

concurring.

LI concur with the opinion insofar as it reverses the trial court’s liability determination. The trial court found liability on Ryan’s part based on the placement of the warning cone. While great deference is owed to the trial court’s factual determinations, I find that the placement of the cone did not cause the slip and fall accident. Ms. Lee admitted that she noticed the floor was slippery before she traversed the wet area and acknowledged that she was walking slowly down the path she had just walked through prior to her fall. Under these facts, the trial court’s liability ruling was manifestly erroneous, and the reversal of that ruling makes it unnecessary to address the issue of damages.

      . The cone is about hip-or-waist-high to most adults on the video.

      . It is not clear from the record whether it was truly the manager Ms. Lee looked at after noticing the water or Ryan's employee Shabr-iell McKey.

      . She described the "seizure” as "just like a weird feeling just come over me.”

      . When questioned about the treatment she claimed she received in the ambulance for a seizure, Ms. Lee testified that the paramedics put something in her nose.

      . Ms. Lee has a long history of problems with her back, neck, and head and with chronic seizures. Ms. Lee testified that prior to this accident, she had been involved in eight other accidents wherein she claimed an injury to her neck, back, or head, or an increase in her chronic seizures.

      . Only one warning cone is visible in the surveillance video.

      . Dr. Russo defined a "pseudoseizure” as a "somatization of a seizure ... expressions of anxiety as much as anything else.” In a pseudoseizure, a patient tends to remain conscious and will try not to hurt himself. Dr. Russo testified that he attempted to get Ms. Lee to see a neurologist, Dr. Mohnot, in an attempt to determine whether she was having real seizures or only pseudoseizures, but she was reluctant to go.

      . Ms. Lee attributed her dizziness to a medication she was taking.

      . Ms. Lee’s medical records reveal that she also suffered from sinus problems.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KUHN, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    LOUISIANA RETAILERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jimmie DERAMUS, Individually, Jimmie DeRamus d/b/a Silver Dollar Pawn and Jewelry Center, and Jimmie DeRamus d/b/a Jimmie DeRamus Properties.
    No. 2006 CA 1427.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 4, 2007.

      Michael J. Taffaro, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Louisiana Retailers Mutual Insurance Company.
    Charles A. Schutte, Jr., Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Jimmie DeRamus, et al.
    James Morgan, III, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendants in Cross Claim Alexander and Bolton, Inc. and Donald Coco.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   KUHN, J.

| ¡Plaintiff-appellant, Louisiana Retailers Mutual Insurance Company (LRMIC) appeals the trial court’s judgment, granting a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing the insurer’s claims against defendant, Jimmie DeRamus, in his capacities as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar Pawn and Jewelry Center and DeRamus Properties. Finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss LRMIC’s appeal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2003, LRMIC filed a petition for damages. According to the allegations of the petition, LRMIC provided a workers’ compensation policy to “Jimmie DeRamus d/b/a Silver Dollar Pawn and Jewelry Center” (Silver Dollar). The insurer averred that Silver Dollar’s principal business activity was conducting a pawn shop and retail store.

The petition states that on March 12, 2002, Lloyd DeRamus-Credeur, DeRa-mus’s son-in-law and employee, sustained severe injuries when, while working, he slipped, fell, and hit his head on a concrete culvert. LRMIC began paying DeRamus-Credeur workers’ compensation benefits. LRMIC avers that while it knew DeRa-mus-Credeur was off the Silver Dollar premises at the time he fell, it was not until June 2, 2003, that it learned DeRa-mus-Credeur was actually a construction supervisor for DeRamus Properties, a separate and distinct business, which is also owned and operated by DeRamus. Stating that it afforded workers’ compensation coverage only to the Silver Dollar, LRMIC’s petition seeks damages from DeRamus for the reimbursement of all past and future workers’ compensation Isbenefits — both medical and indemnity — it has paid or will pay to DeRamus-Credeur, asserting that as of December 8, 2003, the amount was $60,272.21.

LRMIC’s petition specifically alleges:

DeRamus, individually, [and in his capacities as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar and DeRamus Properties] intentionally led LRMIC to believe that [DeRamus-Credeur] was employed by and engaged in certain job classifications for [the Silver Dollar] for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation coverage for the [March 12, 2002 accident]
DeRamus, individually, [and in his capacities as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar and DeRamus Properties] intentionally misrepresented the true nature of [DeRamus-Credeur’s] job and/or duties as being one of the classifications listed in the insurance contract in an effort to obtain and/or maintain lower workers’ compensation indemnification/insurance premiums ....
DeRamus, individually, [and in his capacities as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar and DeRamus Properties] intentionally misrepresented that [DeR-amus-Credeur] worked for [the Silver Dollar], in an attempt to avoid the need and expense for DeRamus to procure workers’ compensation coverage for [DeRamus Properties] or any other entity owned and/or operated by ... DeRa-mus ....
DeRamus, individually, [and in his capacity as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar] failed to notify LRMIC of any change in employees, job classifications, nature of business activity, and/or formation of a new entity....
Further, this failure to notify is a breach of the terms and conditions provided for and outlined in the contract of insurance with LRMIC that provides workers’ compensation coverage to [DeRamus in his capacity as the owner and operator of the Silver Dollar],

DeRamus answered the insurer’s petition, generally denying liability and specifically averring that the workers’ compensation policy issued by LRMIC insures DeRamus “in any capacity.” DeRamus further alleged that LRMIC Rprovided coverage to him individually and as a sole proprietor doing business under various trade names, including Silver Dollar and DeRamus Properties, particularly asserting that LRMIC’s claims were in direct violation of the terms of the policy. In a reconventional demand, DeRamus requests declaratory relief, seeking a determination of DeRamus’s rights and LRMIC’s obligations under the workers’ compensation policy with respect to DeRa-mus-Credeur’s claim.

On September 28, 2005, DeRamus filed a peremptory exception, pleading the objection of prescription in which he noted that the date of the accident was March 12, 2002, but that LRMIC did not file its lawsuit until December 16, 2003. Pointing out that LRMIC’s claims for damages were prescribed on the face of the petition, DeRamus sought dismissal of LRMIC’s demand. After review of evidence introduced at the hearing, the trial court granted the exception and dismissed the principal demand, finding that LRMIC’s claim had prescribed. This appeal by LRMIC followed.

DISCUSSION

LRMIC asserts that the applicable prescriptive period to its cause of action is ten years due to DeRamus’s alleged breach of the contractual terms, i.e., contractual discretion was exercised in bad faith. Therefore, the insurer reasons that its petition for damages is timely. But it assumes arguendo that the one-year period DeRa-mus urges is applicable and contends that under the shorter prescriptive period, its claim is timely, reasoning entitlement to an application of the doctrine of contra non valentem.

A cause of action for intentional-fraudulent misrepresentation as to present or past facts exists in Louisiana. Sun Drilling Products Corp. v. Rayborn, 00-1884, p. 15 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1141, 1152, writ denied, 01-2939 (La.1/25/02), 807 So.2d 840. The Louisiana Civil Code defines fraud in Article 1953.

Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to- cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may result from silence or inaction.

To find fraud from silence or suppression of the truth, there must exist a duty to speak or to disclose information. Pioneer Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Elmwood Partners, L.L.C., 01-453, p. 9 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/17/01), 800 So.2d 932, 937 (quoting Greene v. Gulf Coast Bank, 593 So.2d 630, 632 (La.1992)).

For a plaintiff to recover for a negligent misrepresentation there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to supply correct information, a breach of that duty, and damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach. Osborne v. Ladner, 96-0863, p. 16 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/97), 691 So.2d 1245, 1257.

Reviewing the allegations of LRMIC’s petition, it is evident that any duty DeRa-mus had to either disclose information or to supply correct information is as a result of LRMIC’s issuance of a workers’ compensation policy. In other words, it is only because DeRamus secured workers’ compensation coverage from LRMIC that the insurer may claim DeRamus had a duty to disclose the scope and nature of DeRa-mus-Credeur’s employment or to notify LRMIC of any change in employees, job classifications, nature of business activity, and/or formation of a new entity.

Whether DeRamus owes a duty of disclosure or to supply accurate information to LRMIC necessarily requires examination of the workers’ compensation policy issued by LRMIC. And whether DeRa-mus breached any duty owed will also pivot around an examination of the contents of the policy. Thus, |firesolution of LRMIC’s entitlement to damages for either intentional-fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations by DeRamus necessarily involves interpretation of and a determination of whether the workers’ compensation policy issued by LRMIC provides coverage for DeRamus as employer of DeRamus-Credeur.

La. R.S. 23:1310.3 E provides:

Except as otherwise provided by R.S. 23:1101(D) and 1378(E), the workers’ compensation judge shall be vested with original, exclusive jurisdiction over all claims or disputes arising out of this Chapter, including but not limited to workers’ compensation insurance coverage disputes, employer demands for recovery for overpayment of benefits, the determination and recognition of employer credits as provided for in this Chapter, and cross-claims between employers or workers’ compensation insurers for indemnification or contribution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based on the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3. It is the duty of the court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants. City of Baton Rouge v. Bernard, 01-2468, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.1/22/03), 840 So.2d 4, 6 writ denied, 03-1005 (La.6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1278.

The Louisiana Constitution establishes the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. The subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts is set forth by La. Const, art. V, § 16(A)(1), which provides:

Except as otherwise authorized by this Constitution or except as heretofore or hereafter provided by law for administrative agency [ 7determinations in worker’s compensation matters, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters.

The original purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act was to set up a court-administered system to aid injured workmen by relatively informal and flexible proceedings that were to be interpreted liberally in favor of the workmen. The Louisiana Constitution and the Workers’ Compensation Act were amended, and district courts were divested of jurisdiction over claims arising out of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Office of Workers’ Compensation was empowered to resolve disputes and issue orders regarding workers’ compensation claims. The purpose of the changes was to provide a speedy resolution to workers’ compensation claims and a swift recourse for injured workers. Phillips v. Lowe’s Home Center, Inc., 03-0660, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/28/04), 879 So.2d 200, 203.

The grant of original exclusive jurisdiction of designated subject matters to an agency results in the removal of those matters from the district court’s jurisdiction. This exclusive jurisdiction can be contrasted with concurrent jurisdiction where the district court maintains original jurisdiction in certain matters at the same time that an agency or other court has been granted the same original jurisdiction. Id. Because the Office of Workers’ Compensation has been granted exclusive jurisdiction by the legislature over workers’ compensation claims or disputes arising out of the workers’ compensation law, such matters have been excluded from the jurisdiction of district courts. Id., 03-0660 at pp. 4-5, 879 So.2d at 203.

If the district court adjudicating a delic-tual claim of intentional-fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation were to determine that DeRamus had a duty to disclose or to supply correct information to LRMIC or that DeRamus had breached the duty | sowed to LRMIC, those findings would necessarily have to be answered by resolving the issue of whether the LRMIC’s workers’ compensation insurance policy provided coverage for DeRa-mus-Credeur’s injuries as a result of the March 12, 2002 accident. But coverage disputes are within the grant of original, exclusive jurisdiction afforded to the Office of Workers’ Compensation.

By asserting the ten-year prescriptive period applicable to contractual disputes, LRMIC acknowledges that its claims are grounded in the workers’ compensation policy it issued to DeRamus. Based on our reading of the allegations of LRMIC’s petition, it is evident the insurer is averring that it does not provide coverage to DeRamus-Credeur for the injuries he sustained on March 12, 2002, because the employer, DeRamus, breached duties he owed to LRMIC to provide the insurer with accurate information so that premiums could be properly calculated and collected from the employer, and it seeks restitution for amounts paid to the employee. As such, LRMIC has alleged claims arising out of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and original, exclusive jurisdiction for the matter has been vested with the Office of Workers’ Compensation under Const. Art. V, § 16(A)(1) and La. R.S. 23:1310.3 E. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on DeRamus’s exception of prescription.

CONCLUSION

Neither the district court nor this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The judgment of the district court is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3. This appeal is dismissed pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2162. Appeal costs are assessed against plaintiff-appellant, Louisiana Retailers Mutual Insurance Company.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

      . DeRamus also filed a cross-claim against Donald Coco, the agent who obtained all his insurance policies for his business operations; Coco's employer, Alexander & Bolton, Inc.; and their insurer.


text:
    Elaine W. FLOWERS v. Gaylord CONTAINER.
    No. 2006 CA 1473.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 4, 2007.
    Carl Perkins, Covington, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Elaine W. Flowers.
    Craig Robichaux, Mandeville, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Gaylord Container Corp.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   KUHN, J.

| ¡.Claimant-appellant, Elaine Hughes Flowers, appeals the ruling of the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC), which granted summary judgment in favor of her former employer, defendant-appellee, Gay-lord Container Corporation (Gaylord), finding that her claim for workers’ compensation benefits was prescribed and dismissed the employee’s claims. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2004, Flowers filed a disputed claim for workers’ compensation (form 1008), averring that on March 26, 1998, ostensibly while on the Gaylord premises, she had an accident that she reported to her supervisor/nurse. In the portion of the disputed-claim form requesting that she “[d]escribe the accident and injury in detail (person/equipment involved, type of injury, etc.),” Flowers stated, “Shelby McKenzie or Walter O’Berry.” No details of the mechanics of the accident or the nature of her injuries were set forth. In that portion of the form entitled, “THE BONA-FIDE DISPUTE,” Flowers checked the following:

1. No wage benefits have been paid
2. No medical treatment has been authorized
6. Medical treatment (Procedure/Prescription) __ recommended by _not authorized.
7. Choice of physician (specialty) _
8. Disability status_
9. Vocational Rehabilitation — specify
10. Offset/Credit_
11. Refusal to authorize/submit to evaluation with choice of physician/independent Medical Examination ....

Flowers did not provide any additional information in any of the blank spaces. In the category “Other,” Flowers indicated “Need additional surgery.”

IsGaylord filed an exception raising the objection of prescription on February 16, 2006, that OWC provisionally denied, deferring a final ruling to the trial on the merits. Thereafter, on July 1, 2005, Gay-lord responded to the disputed claim, denying that Flowers had sustained an injury on March 26, 1998, or that she was performing a service arising out of the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury.

On February 8, 2006, Gaylord filed a motion for summary, urging that Flowers’ claim was prescribed. After a hearing, OWC granted the motion and dismissed Flowers’ disputed claim. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

When a party raises the issue of prescription in a motion for summary judgment, setting forth all the essential allegations for an exception, the court should look to the substance of the pleading rather than its title. See Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge ex rel. Baton Rouge Police Dep’t, 03-2682, p. 3 (La.1/16/04), 863 So.2d 517, 519 (per curiam). Pleadings should be interpreted according to their true meaning and effect in order to do substantial justice, rather than interpreted according to their caption. Id. Thus, the use of the motion for summary judgment is a proper vehicle for raising the issue of prescription. Id.

A party pleading prescription generally has the burden of proving it. Ward v. McDermott, 04-1189, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/10/05), 916 So.2d 246, 249. But when a suit has prescribed on its face, the claimant has the burden of proving that the running of prescription was suspended or interrupted in some manner. Jonise v. Bologna Brothers, 01-3230, p. 6 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 460, 464.

14A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brumfield v. Gafford, 99-1712, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/22/00), 768 So.2d 223, 225.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof. But if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at the trial of the matter, the movant is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim but rather to point out an absence of factual support for one or more essential elements. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to provide factual evidence sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment is properly granted.. La. C.C.P. art. 966 C.

The prescriptive period for workers’ compensation claims is set forth in La. R.S. 23:1209 as follows:

A. In case of personal injury, including death resulting therefrom, all claims for payments shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or death the parties have agreed upon the payments to be made under this Chapter, or unless within one year after the accident a formal claim has been filed as provided in Subsection B of this Section and in this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in any case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment, except that in cases of benefits payable pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(3) this limitation shall not take effect until three years from the time of making the last payment of benefits pursuant to R.S. 23:1221(1), (2), (3), or (4). Also, when the injury does not result at the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take effect until expiration of one year from the time the injury develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless the proceedings have been begun within two years from the date of the accident.

| ¡¿Pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1209 A, claims are barred unless filed: (1) within one year from the date of the accident; (2) one year from the last compensation payment for total disability or three years from the last payment for partial disability; or (3) one year from the time the injury develops if not immediately manifested, but not more than two years after the accident. Ward, 04-1189 at p. 4, 916 So.2d at 249.

Flowers did not file her claim until November 22, 2004, based on allegations that an accident had occurred on March 26, 1998, for which Gaylord was liable to her. Therefore, her claim was prescribed on its face. Thus, at the trial on the merits, Flowers would bear the burden of proving that the running of prescription was suspended or interrupted in some manner.

In support of its entitlement to summary judgment, Gaylord presented the affidavit of its human resources manager, Ellis Sampson, who attested that the employer first learned of this claim for workers’ compensation benefits in January 2005 at a mediation conference in conjunction with Flowers’ grievance against Gaylord arising from her termination for excessive absenteeism. Based on the human resources manager’s review of Flowers’ personnel file, on March 26, 1998, Flowers reported to the Gaylord plant nurse that her “knee was sore but that the condition had started a week or so previously.” Sampson specifically stated, “There was no mention of an accident.” His affidavit said that Flowers was sent to a doctor, who diagnosed a bone spur. Sampson indicated that Flowers had applied for and received short term disability benefits as a result of the March 26, 1998 complaint and no workers’ compensation benefits were paid to her by Gaylord. Flowers returned to work on May 15, 1998. Gaylord also submitted documentary | ¡¡evidence showing the medical record created as a result of Flowers’ March 26, 1998 report to the nurse, the Cigna Short Term Disability claims form Flowers signed for benefits based on the March 26, 1998 complaint, and a medical release permitting Flowers to return to work commencing on May 15, 1998.

Based on Sampson’s affidavit, Gaylord established that Flowers had not asserted a claim for workers’ compensation benefits within one year of the date of the alleged accident as required to interrupt prescription under § 1209 A. The employer also presented evidence that no compensation payments had ever been made. This was confirmed in Flowers’ disputed claim where she indicated that she had never received wage benefits and that no medical treatment had ever been authorized. Thus, Gaylord carried its initial burden of proving Flowers’ claim was prescribed.

In response to Gaylord’s showing, the only evidence Flowers placed in the record was an opinion-and-award document, denying her relief in an arbitration proceeding based on her grievance of wrongful termination by Gaylord. In that portion of the opinion and award entitled “DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS,” the arbitrator stated, “[Flowers’] undisputed testimony is that the bulk of her absences beginning in 1998 were the result of problems with her knee, and four subsequent knee surgeries, after an on-the-job injury.” After carefully scrutinizing the opinion-and-award document, we do not find anything in it that establishes |7Flowers filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits within either one year of March 26, 1998, the date of the accident; one year from the last compensation payment for total disability or three years from the last payment for partial disability; or one year from the time the injury developed if not immediately manifested, but not more than two years after the accident. Thus, Flowers faded to produce factual support sufficient to establish that she will be able to satisfy her eviden-tiary burden of proof at trial, and there is no genuine issue of material fact. As such, Gaylord is entitled to summary judgment. OWC properly granted the motion and dismissed Flowers’ disputed claim for compensation.

DECREE

OWC’s ruling granting summary judgment and dismissing the disputed claim, arising out of an accident on March 26, 1998, filed by Flowers on November 22, 2004, based on a finding that it is prescribed, is affirmed. Appeal costs are assessed against claimant-appellant, Elaine Hughes Flowers.

AFFIRMED.

      . Flowers was known as "Elaine Williams” at that time.

      . The opinion and award was issued by arbitrator Charles Feigenbaum who noted that by contract, Gaylord management rights included "the right to ... demote, discipline, suspend or discharge employees for proper cause.” Apparently, Flowers maintained that her termination for excessive absenteeism was without proper cause.

      . In conjunction with its motion for summary judgment, Gaylord included an employer's report of occupational injury or disease for Flowers based on an accident that occurred on March 28, 1990. In their appeal briefs, the parties contend that in her deposition testimony, Flowers indicated that the accident really happened on March 28, 1990. But Flowers’ deposition was neither admitted into evidence nor filed into the record. As such, any claim for workers' compensation based on an accident that occurred on a date other than March 26, 1998, is not properly part of our review in this appeal.


author: WELCH, J.

text:
    Joseph D. WEEKLY & Pallet Reefer International, L.L.C. v. LWCC (Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Corporation).
    No. 2006 CA 1249.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 4, 2007.

      Gregory J. Schwab, Houma, for Plaintiffs — Appellees Joseph D. Weekly and Pallet Reefer International, L.L.C.
    Gregory E. Bodin, Deborah E. Lamb, Baton Rouge, for Defendant — Appellant Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corp.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   WELCH, J.

li>In this workers’ compensation dispute, the defendant, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation (“LWCC”), appeals a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Joseph D. Weekly and Pallet Reefer International, L.L.C. (“Pallet Reefer”), Mr. Weekly’s former employer. Finding that the workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) manifestly erred in determining that Mr. Weekly had sustained a work-related accident, we reverse the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 4, 2001, Mr. Weekly, a resident of Tennessee, was hired by Pallet Reefer in Houma, Louisiana, as an outside sales representative to sell cold storage units in a multi-state territory. On September 5, 2001, Mr. Weekly began experiencing back and leg pain while on a business trip in Mississippi. At the time, Mr. Weekly did not seek any medical treatment for his condition. LWCC had issued a policy of insurance providing for workers’ compensation coverage to Pallet Reefer, which was in effect on September 5, 2001.

Several weeks later, in November 2001, Mr. Weekly went on a business trip to Atlanta, Georgia. One morning during this trip, Mr. Weekly woke up in his hotel room with severe pain in his back and legs that rendered him unable to stand or get out of bed. Mr. Weekly contacted Louis Saia, the sole owner of Pallet Reefer, concerning his back and leg pain and, upon returning home to Tennessee, sought medical treatment for his condition. Mr. Weekly was ultimately diagnosed by Dr. Maurice M. Smith, a neurological surgeon, with degenerative disc disease and a herniated disc at the L5-S1 level.

Mr. Weekly’s employment with Pallet Reefer ended on January 31, 2002, and on February 1, 2002, Mr. Weekly commenced working for Employee’s Express, Inc. (“Employee’s Express”). Employee’s Express is also wholly owned by Mr. Saia. Employee’s Express was self-insured and did not have a policy of | ^insurance providing for workers’ compensation coverage to its employees through LWCC nor were its employees covered under Pallet Reefer’s policy of insurance with LWCC.

In June 2002, Pallet Reefer reported the September 5, 2001 incident to LWCC. In July 2002, LWCC sent a letter to Mr. Saia indicating that it would not cover Mr. Weekly’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits on the basis that Mr. Weekly was not a Louisiana resident, and therefore, was not eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under Louisiana law. Thereafter, in October 2002, LWCC retracted its previous position and instead, denied Mr. Weekly’s claim on the basis that his condition was not caused by a work-related “accident” as defined in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (La. R.S. 23:1021).

In December 2002, Dr. Smith performed a right-sided L5-S1 hemilaminotomy, medial facetectomy, and diskectomy through a tubular retractor on Mr. Weekly. Employee’s Express, which has a self-insured health plan, paid all of Mr. Weekly’s medical expenses associated with his back condition and it also paid wages to Mr. Weekly during the time he was not working due to medical appointments and the surgical procedure.

On December 13, 2002, Mr. Weekly, with the help of Mr. Saia, filed a disputed claim for compensation with the Office of Workers’ Compensation alleging that “[o]n September 5, 2001, [he] injured [his] back driving in Mississippi” and described the accident as his “[b]ack began hurting while getting in and out of car on sales trip in Mississippi.” LWCC answered the claim asserting that there was no accident or occupational injury on September 5, 2001, and that Mr. Weekly’s back condition could not be considered an occupational disease. LWCC further contended that if an accident had occurred on September 5, 2001, |4the disputed claim for compensation was filed more than a year after the alleged accident, and therefore, the claim was prescribed. Pallet Reefer intervened in the suit, alleging that it had paid “compensation” and “medical bills” to Mr. Weekly as a result of his claimed injuries, and therefore, was subrogated to the rights of Mr. Weekly against LWCC to the extent of those payments. At trial, Mr. Saia, on behalf of Pallet Reefer and Employee’s Express, waived any conflict of interest, and stated that he was seeking to recover only from LWCC — not from Mr. Weekly.

After a trial on the merits, the WCJ found that Mr. Weekly had sustained his burden of proving that a work-related accident occurred on September 5, 2001, which caused a back injury; that although Mr. Weekly’s disputed claim for compensation was prescribed on its face, Mr. Saia’s actions (through Employee’s Express) in paying Mr. Weekly’s wages (in lieu of workers’ compensation) and medical expenses, as well as the inaction and tardiness of LWCC, “lulled” Mr. Weekly into a false sense of security which caused him to delay filing his workers’ compensation claim until December 2002, and therefore, the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted and Mr. Weekly’s claim was timely filed; that LWCC had no reasonable basis for denying or discontinuing the payment of medical benefits, and therefore, awarded Mr. Weekly a penalty of $2,000 and attorney fees in the amount of $15,000. A written judgment in conformity with the WCJ’s rulings was signed on March 9, 2006, and this judgment further awarded reimbursement to Pallet Reefer for medical expenses paid to Mr. Weekly in the amount of $27,482.68 and reimbursement to Pallet Reefer for wages it paid to Mr. Weekly in |sthe amount of $3,422.80, and assessed costs against LWCC. It is from this judgment that LWCC has appealed.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, LWCC asserts that: (1) the WCJ erred in finding that Mr. Weekly sustained a compensable, work-related “accident,” as that term is defined in La. R.S. 23:1021, and in particular, erred in finding that Mr. Weekly injured himself while unloading his vehicle on September 5, 2001; (2) the WCJ erred in finding that the actions and inactions of Pallet Reefer and LWCC interrupted prescription; (3) the WCJ erred in finding that Pallet Reefer was entitled to be reimbursed by LWCC for medical expenses incurred. by Mr. Weekly in the amount of $27,482.68; (4) the WCJ erred in finding that Pallet Reefer was entitled to be reimbursed by LWCC for wages paid to Mr. Weekly.in the amount of $3,422.80; (5) the WCJ erred in awarding Pallet Reefer and Mr. Weekly the sum of $2,000 in penalties and $15,000 in attorney fees; and (6) the WCJ abused its discretion in assessing costs against LWCC.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a workers’ compensation case, whether a claimant has carried his burden of proof is a question of fact to be determined by the WCJ. Authement v. Wal-Mart, 2002-2434, p. 6 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/26/03), 857 So.2d 564, 570. Factual findings in a workers’ compensation case are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Id. As such, in order for an appellate court to reverse a WCJ’s factual findings, it must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the findings of the WCJ, and that the record establishes that the findings are clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Id.; see also Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987).

|JV. WORK-RELATED ACCIDENT

The Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) provides coverage to an employee for personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. La. R.S. 23:1031(A). An employee must prove the chain of causation required by the workers’ compensation statutory scheme as adopted by the legislature. Harrison v. Baldwin Motors, 2003-2682, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/3/04), 889 So.2d 313, 316, writ denied, 2005-0249 (La.4/1/05), 897 So.2d 609. He must establish that the accident was work-related, the accident caused the injury, and the injury caused the disability. Id.

Initially, a workers’ compensation claimant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that an accident occurred on the job and that he sustained an injury. Harrison, 2003-2682 at p. 4, 889 So.2d at 316. “Accident” is defined in the Act as “an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.” La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

Louisiana courts have consistently interpreted the work-related accident requirement liberally. Authement, 2002-2434 at p. 7, 857 So.2d at 571 (citing Bruno v. Harbert International, Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 360 (La.1992)). However, despite the liberal construction afforded the employee in a workers’ compensation action, the employee’s burden of proof is not relaxed. Hall v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 2002-2648, p. 6 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/7/03), 861 So.2d 224, 228. The employee is still required to identify the event marking the time when one can identify an injury. Id.

A worker’s testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s version of the incident; and (2) the worker’s 17testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Bruno, 593 So.2d at 361. Corroboration of the worker’s testimony may be provided by the testimony of co-workers, spouses, friends, or by medical evidence. Id. Barring circumstances that cast suspicion on the reliability of the worker’s uncontradict-ed testimony, the WCJ should accept the testimony as true when determining whether the worker has discharged his burden. Harrison, 2003-2682 at p. 4, 889 So.2d at 316. However, if the evidence leaves the probabilities of causation equally balanced, the worker has failed to carry his or her burden of proof. Likewise, the plaintiffs case must fail if the evidence shows only a possibility of a causative accident or leaves it to speculation or conjecture. Id.

LWCC contends that the WCJ erred in finding that Mr. Weekly met his burden of proving that he sustained a work-related accident, within the meaning of La. R.S. 23:1021(1), that caused his back condition, so as to warrant the award of workers’ compensation and medical indemnity benefits.

According to the deposition testimony of Dr. Smith, Mr. Weekly’s treating physician, Mr. Weekly presented on May 7, 2002, with back pain, right-sided leg pain, and pain down the superior aspect of his right buttock. Mr. Weekly told Dr. Smith that he could only walk approximately 200 yards before the pain increased down his right leg. An MRI of Mr. Weekly’s lumbar spine performed on March 21, 2002, showed degenerative disc disease and a herniated disc at L5-S1, with slight anterior listhesis of L5 and SI. Dr. Smith explained that Mr. Weekly’s degenerative disc disease would not have caused the symptoms of which he was complaining, but that the disc herniation would have caused such symptoms. Dr. Smith also noted that Mr. Weekly had a disc space collapse at the L5-S1 level, which was more a symptom of his degenerative disc disease. Dr. Smith stated that |swhile degenerative disc disease is not typically associated with an on the job injury, disc herniation can be and is easier to relate to a specific event (such as on the job injury) than to degenerative disc disease. Dr. Smith further explained that disc herniation can develop instantaneously, that typically it is not a condition that develops slowly over time, and that “just about anything” can be associated with causing a disc herniation. However, Dr. Smith stated that Mr. Weekly did not discuss with him or relate to him any sort of occurrence or specific event that may have caused his disc herniation. Dr. Smith indicated that Mr. Weekly’s reported work-related activities on the date of September 5, 2001, may or may not have caused Mr. Weekly’s back condition. Dr. Smith opined that based on his files and the history given to him by Mr. Weekly, there was no evidence of a sudden trauma.

According to Mr. Weekly, during the Mississippi road trip, there was no specific accident, trauma, or incident that happened to him or that caused his back to start hurting. He stated that during the September 5, 2001 business trip in Mississippi, he “started feeling” back pain when he was getting in and out of his car and unloading his files and laptop computer. However, he admitted that he did not “know that [he] did anything or that anything out of the ordinary happened” to cause his back pain, that getting in and out of the car and unloading his files and laptop computer were not necessarily what caused his back to hurt, and that something else could have caused his back to hurt. Mr. Weekly testified that several weeks later, while in Atlanta on a business trip, he went to his hotel room, unloaded his “stuff,” and went to bed. The next morning when he tried to get out of bed, he could not move and had pain all the way down to the heel on his right leg. Mr. Weekly stated that he immediately called Mr. Saia, returned home, and sought medical treatment for his back pain and leg pain.

Mr. Saia testified that Mr. Weekly had called him while he was on the Mississippi trip “complaining about pain.” However, Mr. Saia did not recall |fltalking with or hearing about pain from Mr. Weekly again until a month or two later, when Mr. Weekly called him from Atlanta in “extreme pain” telling him he could not walk.

Based on our review of the record, we find there was no reasonable basis for the WCJ’s determination that Mr. Weekly met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a com-pensable work-related accident, as defined by La. R.S. 23:1021, on September 5, 2001. Although Mr. Weekly’s pain may have begun while he was working, he was unable to identify a single, precipitous event that directly and proximately caused his back condition as required by La. R.S. 23:1021. Mr. Weekly specifically stated that he did not do anything out of the ordinary to injure his back, and he never testified that his injury was related to an accident or a single event. Furthermore, Mr. Weekly never related to his treating physician, Dr. Smith, any specific event that caused his herniated disc, and in Dr. Smith’s opinion, there was no evidence that Mr. Weekly’s condition was induced by sudden trauma. As such, we find Mr. Weekly failed to satisfy his burden of proving a compensa-ble “accident” under La. R.S. 23:1021, and the WCJ was clearly wrong in determining otherwise.

In reaching this conclusion, it follows that Mr. Weekly was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the WCJ erred in awarding reimbursement to Pallet Reefer for medical expenses and wages paid to or on behalf of Mr. Weekly and in awarding Mr. Weekly penalties, attorney fees, and costs. Accordingly, the March 9, 2006 judgment of the WCJ is hereby reversed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we find that the WCJ’s factual determination that Mr. Weekly was injured as the result of an accident while in the | incourse of and arising out of his employment with Pallet Reefer was manifestly erroneous. As such, Mr. Weekly was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, the March 9, 2006 judgment is hereby reversed.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to the intervenor/appellee, Pallet Reefer International, L.L.C.

REVERSED.

GAIDRY, J., concurs.

      . Mr. Saia, as the owner of both Employee’s Express and Pallet Reefer, explained that the payment of Mr. Weekly’s medical expenses and wages were reflected on the corporate ’’books” as a “receivable for Employee[’]s Express” and as a “payable — as money owed— for Pallet Reefer.”

      . The original judgment in this matter was signed on February 8, 2006. However, due to an error in the calculation of the indemnity benefits, an amended judgment was signed on March 9, 2006. See La. C.C.P. art. 1951.

      .The actual wages paid to Mr. Weekly totaled approximately $7,777.76; however, the reimbursement was limited to the maximum compensation rate of $398 per week for 8.6 weeks (or $3,422.80).

      . Mr. Weekly had previously sought treatment on March 4, 2002, with Dr. Samuel E. Mur-rell, III, an orthopedic surgeon. After an epidural steroid injection was unsuccessful in relieving Mr. Weekly’s pain, Dr. Murrell recommended surgery. Mr. Weekly then sought medical treatment with Dr. Smith.

      . Given our conclusion that Mr. Weekly failed to satisfy his burden of proving a compensa-ble work-related "accident” under La. R.S. 23:1021, we pretermit discussion of the appellant’s second assignment of error — that the WCJ erred in finding that the actions and inactions of Pallet Reefer and LWCC interrupted prescription in this matter.


text:
    Mary Kathleen BOSARGE and Delmas Bosarge, Jr. v. LOUISIANA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND.
    No. 2006 CA 1354.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 4, 2007.
    Kevin S. Schoenberger, New Orleans, for Plaintiffs — Appellees Mary Kathleen Bosarge and Delmas Bosarge, Jr.
    David A. Woolridge, Jr., Larry M. Roe-del, Baton Rouge, for Defendants — Appellants The Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board and The Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund.
    Before: KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
   WELCH, J.

IgThis is an appeal by the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund and the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (collectively referred to as “the PCF”) from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Mary Kathleen Bosarge and Delmas Bosarge, Jr., declaring that their medical malpractice complaint against De-Paul-Tulane Behavioral Health Center (“DePaul-Tulane”) be deemed filed on October 22, 2004. For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By letter dated October 19, 2004, the plaintiffs sent a complaint to the Division of Administration requesting the formation of a medical review panel to review a claim against DePaul-Tulane for alleged acts of malpractice occurring on October 24, 2003. Enclosed with the letter and complaint was a check in the amount of $100.00, payable to the PCF. This letter was addressed and mailed to the Division of Administration at an incorrect post office box.

On October 22, 2004, the plaintiffs sent the October 19, 2004 letter and complaint by facsimile transmission to the Division of Administration which “stamped and certified” the complaint “received” on that date. A copy of the request was then forwarded to the PCF and received on October 28, 2004. By letter dated November 12, 2004, but not mailed, until November 16, 2004, the PCF |sconfirmed receipt of the plaintiffs’ request for review and notified the plaintiffs that DePaul-Tulane was a qualified health care provider under the provisions of the MMA. The letter also provided as follows:

In accordance with Act No. 961 of the 2003 Regular Session, which amended LA R.S. 40:1299.47.A.(l)(c), effective August 15, 2003, a filing fee of $100 per qualified defendant is due within 45 days from the date of this notice. Please remit a payment to the [PCF] in the amount of $100.00. This filing fee may only be waived upon receipt of an affidavit from a physician or a district court’s forma pauperis ruling as set forth in LA R.S. 40:1299.47A.(l)(d) as amended by Act No. 961. Failure to comply shall render the request invalid and without effect and the request shall not suspend the time within which suit must be instituted.

By letter dated January 27, 2005, the PCF notified the plaintiffs that they had failed to remit the $100 filing fee within the time allowed by law, and “deelar[ed]” that the plaintiffs’ case against DePaul-Tulane was “no longer considered filed” by its office. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sent a letter dated January 31, 2005, to the PCF disputing its contention that they had failed to remit the $100 filing fee or had failed to comply with the provisions of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(l)(c). The plaintiffs further explained that they had mailed a check for the required fee with the original complaint, and although the original letter and complaint were mailed to an incorrect address, the letter, complaint, and check had not been returned to them, and therefore, they had assumed that the PCF had received and negotiated the check. Additionally, in the January 31, 2005 letter, the plaintiffs enclosed another check (dated January 31, 2005) payable to the PCF in the amount of $100 to replace the previous check.

The PCF received the plaintiffs’ January 31, 2005 letter and check, and deposited the funds. Thereafter, the PCF sent a letter dated February 17, 2005, to the plaintiffs stating that “it continues to be the position of this office that [your] claim is invalid,” that the January 31, 2005 check for the filing fee was received “beyond the time allowed,” and that a “refund” of the filing fee would “be|4processed.”

On March 8, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Judicial Review” against the PCF in the trial court requesting judicial review of the PCF’s determination that their malpractice claim against DePaul-Tulane was “null and void,” and requesting that their medical malpractice complaint be deemed filed as of October 22, 2004. On April 28, 2006, the trial court signed a written judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring their medical malpractice complaint “be and is hereby deemed to have been filed with the PCF on October 22, 2004.” It is from this judgment that the PCF now appeals.

LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 40:1299.47

The proceedings before the medical review panel are governed by La. R.S. 40:1299.47. At the applicable time period herein, La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A) provided, in pertinent part:

A. (l)(a) All malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review panel established as hereinafter provided for in this Section....
(c) A claimant shall have forty-five days from the mailing date of the confirmation of receipt of the request for review in accordance with R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(3)(a) to pay to the board a filing fee in the amount of one hundred dollars per named defendant qualified under this Part.
(e) Failure to comply with the provisions of Subparagraph (A)(1)(c) or
(d) of this Section within the specified time frame shall render the request for review of a malpractice claim invalid and without effect. Such an invalid request for review of a malpractice claim shall not suspend time within which suit must be instituted in R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).
_k * * *
(f) All funds generated by such filing fees shall be private monies and shall be applied to the costs of the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board incurred in the administration of claims.
(2)(a) The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety-days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until sixty days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. The filing of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and soli-dary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review. Filing a request for review of a malpractice claim as required by this Section with any agency or entity other than the division of administration shall not suspend or interrupt the running of prescription....
(b) The request for review of a malpractice claim under this Section shall be deemed filed on the date of receipt of the request stamped and certified by the division of administration or on the date of mailing of the request if mailed to the division of administration by certified or registered mail only upon timely compliance with the provisions of Subpara-graph (A)(1)(c) or (d) of this Section. Upon receipt of the request, the division of administration shall forward a copy of the request to the board within five days of receipt.
(3) It shall be the duty of the board within fifteen days of the receipt of the claim by the board to:
(a) Confirm to the claimant that the filing has been officially received and whether or not the named defendant or defendants have qualified under this Part.
(b) In the confirmation to the claimant pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(3)(a), notify the claimant of the amount of the filing fee due and the time frame within which such fee is due to the board, and that upon failure to comply with the provisions of Subparagraph (A)(1)(c) or (d), the request for review of a malpractice claim is invalid and without effect and that the request shall not suspend the time within which suit must be instituted in R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).
(c) Notify all named defendants, whether or not qualified under | fithe provisions of this Part, that a filing has been made against them and request made for the formation of a medical review panel; and forward a copy of the proposed complaint to each named defendant at his last and usual place of residence or his office.
(4) The board shall notify the claimant and all named defendants be registered or certified mail, return receipt requested of any of the following information:
(a) The date of receipt of the filing fee.
(b) That no filing was due because the claimant timely provided the affidavit set forth in Item (A)(1)(d)© of this Section.
(c) That the claimant has timely complied with the provisions of Item (A)(l)(d)(ii) of this Section.
(d) That the required filing fee was not timely paid pursuant to Subpara-graph (A)(1)(c) of this Section.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs’ petition in this matter was captioned as a “Petition for Judicial Review” and requested, in accordance with La. R.S. 40:964, judicial review of the PCF’s decision that the plaintiffs’ claim filed on October 22, 2004 was considered “null and void” in accordance with La. R.S. 40:1299.47. The plaintiffs’ petition also prayed for a declaration that their complaint be deemed filed on October 22, 2004, and alternatively, a declaration that the PCF waived its right to object to the late payment of the filing fee because it accepted and negotiated the plaintiffs’ second check.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:964 provides that any “person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review” of that decision. (Emphasis added.) However, the duties of the PCF under La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A) are mandatory duties of a clerical or ministerial nature to facilitate the medical review panel process. Golden v. Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 40,801, p. 6 (La.App. 2nd Cir.3/8/06), 924 So.2d 459, 463, writ denied, 2006-0837 (La.6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1261; see also Estate of Nicks v. Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 2005-1624, p. 6 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/06), 939 So.2d 391, 396; In Re Medical Review Panel of Pierson, 2002-1598, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/9/03), 845 So.2d 1275, 1276, writ denied, 2003-1559 (La.10/10/03), 855 So.2d 324. The PCF’s duties under La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A) are not adjudicative in nature, and therefore, the PCF lacks adjudicatory authority over the medical review panel proceeding.

Because the PCF lacks adjudicative authority in the proceeding before the medical review panel, we find that “Petition for Judicial Review” under La. R.S. 40:964 was not an appropriate proceeding to address the PCF’s actions with regard to the plaintiffs’ complaint. Nevertheless, pleadings should be interpreted according to their true meaning and effect in order to do substantial justice, rather than interpreted according to their caption. Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge Police Department, 2003-2682, p. 3 (La.1/16/04), 863 So.2d 517, 519; La. C.C.P. art. 865. Since the plaintiffs’ petition further sought a declaration that their complaint be deemed filed on October 22, 2004, or that the PCF waived its right to object to the late payment of the filing fee, we consider the plaintiffs’ petition as a suit for declaratory judgment.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

A suit for declaratory judgment is an appropriate means to decide the rights and obligations of parties to a controversy. See La. C.C.P. art. 1871. When a declaratory judgment would terminate the uncertainty or controversy, the trial court should render such judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 1876. However, “[wjhen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.”

In this case, although the plaintiffs’ suit seeks a declaration that their medical malpractice complaint against DePaul-Tulane be deemed filed with the PCF on October 22, 2004, it only names as a defendant the PCF. However, as the |8defendant in the underlying medical malpractice action, De-Paul-Tulane had an “interest which would be affected by the [trial court’s] declaration” that the medical malpractice complaint against it was timely filed and should have been made a party to the plaintiffs suit for declaratory judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the April 28, 2006 judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings so that DePaul-Tulane can be made a party to the plaintiffs’ suit.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the April 28, 2006 judgment of the trial court declaring the plaintiffs’ complaint be deemed filed as of October 22, 2004 is hereby vacated and the matter is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

      . The Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Oversight Board is a legislatively created entity that administers the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund, which holds private monies in trust to compensate victims of medical malpractice and to protect qualified health care provider members who may be liable for damages caused by their malpractice. See La. R.S. 40:1299.44.

      . All references to the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act ("the MMA”), La. R.S. 40:1299.41, et seq., are to the content of such provisions during the appropriate time periods herein.

      .A request for the review of a medical malpractice claim is filed with the Division of Administration and then forwarded by the Division of Administration to the PCF within five days of receipt. For all purposes, the complaint is deemed filed "on the date of receipt of the request stamped and certified” by the Division of Administration or "on the date of mailing of the request if mailed” to the Division of Administration by "registered or certified mail” provided that the filing fee is timely paid. See La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(b).

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.47(A) has since been amended by 2005 La. Acts, No. 127, § 1.