text:
    In re Malcolm R. PETAL.
    No. 2007-B-1299.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2008.
   | ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Malcolm R. Petal, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Garland Key was employed by the United States Marine Forces Reserve as a program analyst. In January 2001, Mr. Key filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint against his employer, contending that he was discriminated against based on his age and mental impairment when his request for certain employment-related accommodations was denied. After informal efforts to resolve the complaint were unsuccessful, Mr. Key retained respondent to handle the matter on his behalf. In the legal services agreement signed by Mr. Key on November 1, 2001, he agreed to pay respondent a contingency fee of 1/3 of the gross amount recovered, as well as a “non-refundable advance” fee of $2,500.

On February 25, 2004, respondent confirmed that an offer had been made to settle Mr. Key’s claim for $150,000, payable in five annual installments of $30,000 12each, less attorney’s fees and expenses. Mr. Key replied by letter dated March 1, 2004, in which he stated, “I concur,” then listed a number of exceptions and other issues. Mr. Key died on March 22, 2004, at which time no action had been taken on the settlement.

.On April 26, 2004, Gayle Key, Mr. Key’s widow and the executrix of his estate, met with respondent and directed him to accept the $150,000 offer in settlement of her late husband’s claim. Although respondent assured Mrs. Key that he would attempt to effect the settlement, he was not able to do so. Thereafter, respondent failed or refused to return any telephone calls regarding the matter, whether from Mrs. Key or from others calling on her behalf.

In July 2004, Mrs. Key filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint. On March 29, 2005, some eight months after Mrs. Key filed the complaint, respondent faxed Mrs. Key a letter in which he proposed to settle any liability he had to her for the sum of $25,000. Notably, in his letter respondent failed to advise Mrs. Key that she had the right to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection with the malpractice settlement.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

-In 2006, the ODC filed two counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his: conduct in the Key matter violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and ^promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.8(h) (settling a claim for the lawyer’s malpractice without first advising the client to seek independent counsel), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.4(a) (a lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The ODC also alleged that respondent was then ineligible to practice law for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements, which failure constitutes a violation of Rule 1.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. Thereafter, respondent and the ODC entered into a joint stipulation of facts and rule violations. In this document, respondent stipulated to the facts as alleged by the ODC and admitted that he violated Rules 1.1(b), 1.3, 1.4, 1.8(h), 3.4(a), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In September 2006, the hearing committee conducted a hearing which was limited to the issue of mitigation.

Hearing Committee Report

The hearing committee accepted the stipulated facts and found that the rule violations alleged in the formal charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The committee found that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law. In mitigation, the committee | ¿recognized the absence of a prior disciplinary record, respondent’s inexperience in the practice of law at the time of the misconduct (admitted 1998), the imposition of other penalties and sanctions, and remorse. The committee’s report did not address the existence of any aggravating factors.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for nine months.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the record of this matter, the disciplinary board found the hearing committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. The board clarified that the findings of fact include the joint stipulation of facts by the parties, and also made an additional factual finding based upon the information presented at the formal hearing by the ODC concerning the settlement offer to Mr. Key. The board determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged in the formal charges, with the exception of Rule 1.16(d). The baseline sanction for this misconduct is suspension.

The board found that respondent violated duties owed to his clients and to the profession. His conduct was both negligent and knowing. The amount of actual injury caused by respondent’s misconduct was negligible, as the ODC could never | ^establish that a settlement offer had actually been made by the Marine Corps to Mr. Key.

The board determined that the record supports the aggravating factors of vulnerability of the victim and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency. The record supports the following mitigating factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, inexperience in the practice of law, and remorse.

The board then turned to an analysis of the prior jurisprudence of this court involving misconduct similar to respondent’s. In In re: Thompson, 98-0079 (La.5/8/98), 712 So.2d 72, the attorney allowed his client’s claim to prescribe and then attempted to settle his malpractice liability without advising his client to seek independent legal advice. The court imposed a one-year suspension, fully deferred subject to probation. Likewise, in In re: Dunn, 98-0535 (La.6/5/98), 713 So.2d 461, the attorney allowed his client’s lawsuit to be dismissed on grounds of abandonment and then attempted to settle his malpractice liability without advising his client to seek independent legal advice. The court imposed a six-month suspension, fully deferred subject to probation. Finally, the court has held that when an attorney knowingly and intentionally neglects a client’s case, fails to communicate with a client, fails to account for an unearned fee, and fails to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation, a sanction of a six-month suspension, with three months deferred subject to probation, is warranted. In re: Taylor, 00-2392 (La.10/13/00), 770 So.2d 335. The court has also held that a one year and one day suspension is appropriate for an attorney who neglects a legal matter, misleads his client into believing that the | ficase was being pursued, and fails to inform his client of his ineligibility to practice law. In re: Grady, 99-0440 (La.4/9/99), 731 So.2d 878.

Considering these cases, the board found that the instant matter is similar to Thompson and Dunn in that respondent neglected his client’s case and then attempted to settle his malpractice liability without advising his client to seek independent counsel. It is similar to Taylor in that respondent neglected his client’s case, failed to communicate with Mrs. Key, and failed to cooperate with the ODC. Similar to the respondent in Grady, respondent neglected a legal matter and also failed to inform his client of his ineligibility to practice law. These cases suggest that respondent’s misconduct warrants a suspension in the range of six months to one year and one day, perhaps with some portion deferred. Because the sanction recommended by the hearing committee, a nine-month suspension with no time deferred, falls into this range, the board determined that 'che recommendation is appropriate.

Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for nine months. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs of these proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). 17WhiIe we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The factual findings of the hearing committee, as modified by the disciplinary board, are supported by the record. Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to comply with the minimum requirements of continuing legal education, neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with his client, charging a non-refundable legal fee, improperly attempting to settle his malpractice liability, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. This conduct clearly falls below the standards expected of a lawyer licensed to practice law in this state.

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a discussion of an appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The aggravating factors present are vulnerability of the victim and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency. In mitigation, we recognize that respondent has no prior disciplinary record and has expressed remorse for his misconduct.

As noted by the disciplinary board, in prior cases involving misconduct similar to respondent’s, we have imposed suspensions ranging from six months to one year |8and one day. The recommendation here, a nine-month suspension, falls squarely within this range. Furthermore, we note that respondent, who has been represented by counsel throughout this proceeding, has not objected to the recommendation. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for nine months.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Malcolm R. Petal, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25822, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of nine months. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . The $2,500 fee was intended to compensate respondent "for the time it took to review and research client’s information and documentation, so that a determination could be made as to whether a cause of action existed.” See Joint Stipulation of the Material Facts Not in Dispute, ¶ 1.

      . Respondent and the ODC stipulated to this fact. See Joint Stipulation of the Material Facts Not in Dispute, ¶ 4. Nevertheless, during the formal hearing, the deputy disciplinary counsel stated that she had been unable to "establish that there had, in fact, been an offer from the Marine Corps to settle Mr. Key's case for $150,000.00 or [a] settlement offer at all.” Respondent’s counsel agreed with this statement. For his part, respondent testified that he never saw a written settlement offer from the Marine Corps and simply drafted letters concerning the settlement to pacify Mr. Key.

      . Respondent has been MCLE-ineligible continuously since June 2, 2004. In addition, respondent was declared ineligible to practice law on October 8, 2007 for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.

      . While not charged in the formal charges, respondent also stipulated that he violated Rule 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law) by practicing during a period of ineligibility.

      . The formal charges alleged that respondent refused to return Mrs. Key’s file to her after she terminated the representation. However, the parties stipulated that respondent had twice provided Mrs. Key with a copy of her file, and that when she requested it a third time, he offered to send it to a copying service to have it reproduced at her expense (approximately $1,000). See Joint Stipulation of the Material Facts Not in Dispute, ¶ 11. The board reasoned that respondent had complied with Rule 1.16(d) on two occasions, and that "it seems unreasonable to require that he copy, at his expense, such a large file again.”

      . Although the hearing committee had found in mitigation that other penalties or sanctions were imposed against respondent, the board expressly rejected this mitigating factor, reasoning that no supporting evidence of same is apparent from the record.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re C. Blase McCARTHY, Jr.
    No. 2007-B-1272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2008.
   11 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, C. Blase McCarthy, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent was declared ineligible to practice law between February 4, 2005 and August 26, 2005 because of his failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education (“MCLE”) requirements. Respondent was also declared ineligible to practice law between October 31, 2005 and February 10, 2006 for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. Nevertheless, respondent continued to practice law during these periods of ineligibility. Specifically, respondent filed pleadings on behalf of his client, Leon Gibert, appeared in open court, and contacted and negotiated with third parties on Mr. Gibert’s behalf in three separate legal matters.

| ¡.DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In 2006, the ODC filed three counts of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(b) (failure to comply with the minimum requirements of continuing legal education), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report

Considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following findings of fact and law:

1. Respondent failed to comply with MCLE requirements in 2004.

2. Respondent failed to pay his annual bar dues and disciplinary assessment in 2004.

3. Respondent received proper notice that he was certified ineligible to practice law.

4. Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

5. Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and that activity is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

The committee further found that respondent violated a duty owed to the public, the legal system, and the profession. He clearly acted knowingly when he engaged in the practice of law at a time when he was not compliant with the MCLE ^Requirements. Respondent caused actual injury to the profession and affected other lawyers, courts, and clients. The committee determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a suspension from the practice of law.

The committee recognized the following aggravating factors: a pattern of misconduct and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct. In mitigation, the committee acknowledged that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

Considering these findings, and relying on this court’s decision in In re: Gaines, 02-2454 (La.2/25/03), 838 So.2d 1278, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. The committee further recommended that three months of the suspension be deferred upon the condition that respondent complete his 2007 MCLE requirements, plus eight additional hours of CLE, including one hour of ethics.

Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review of the record, the disciplinary board modified the hearing committee’s findings of fact in two respects. First, the board found that respondent failed to comply with his MCLE requirements in 2001 and 2003, but that the ODC did not establish he failed to comply with these requirements in 2004. Second, the board found that respondent failed to timely pay his annual bar dues and disciplinary assessment in 2005, not in 2004. In all other respects, the board adopted the hearing [ committee’s factual findings. The board also adopted the committee’s finding that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

The board determined that by failing to comply with his MCLE requirements, failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment, and by practicing law while ineligible to do so, respondent violated duties owed to his client, the public, the legal system, and the profession. His actions were knowing and caused actual injury to the profession and to the court system by interfering with the proper function of at least three legal proceedings. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a period of suspension.

In aggravation, the board recognized the following factors: a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct. The sole mitigating factor found by the board was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

In determining a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the board noted that in similar cases this court has generally imposed suspensions in the range of one year and one day. See In re: Hardy, 03-0443 (La.5/2/03), 848 So.2d 511. In Gaines, relied upon by the hearing committee, the attorney did not fulfill his MCLE requirements, but because he did not receive notice of his ineligibility he was not found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The court imposed a fully deferred three-month suspension, subject to conditions. In In re: Jones, 98-0207 (La.3/27/98),R 708 So.2d 413, the attorney knowingly engaged in two instances of the unauthorized practice of law while he was on ineligible status. Considering the numerous aggravating factors present, this court suspended Jones from the practice of law for one year and one day, with six months deferred, subject to a period of probation with conditions.

Upon review of these cases, the board found that respondent’s conduct was more egregious than that seen in Gaines, as respondent did, in fact, receive notice of his ineligibility from the clerk of this court. Consequently, respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while representing Mr. Gibert on several occasions in three different legal matters. Like Mr. Gaines, respondent violated Rule 1.1(b) by failing to fulfill his MCLE requirements.

Similar to the attorney in Jones, respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while ineligible. Also like Mr. Jones, respondent has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, has engaged in a pattern of practicing while ineligible, and has committed multiple offenses. Unlike Mr. Jones, however, respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the board determined that the applicable baseline sanction in this matter is a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law. Because respondent has no history of prior discipline, the board recommended a downward deviation to a six-month suspension, followed by a one-year period of probation, during which time respondent should be required to complete his annual MCLE requirements, plus eight additional hours of CLE, four hours of which must be in the area of ethics and/or professionalism. Finally, the board recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of this proceeding.

| Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992). While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record in this matter supports the factual findings of the hearing committee, as modified by the disciplinary board. Respondent failed to comply with the minimum requirements of continuing legal education, knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. This conduct clearly falls below the standards expected of a lawyer licensed to practice law in this state.

Having found professional misconduct, we now turn to a discussion of an appropriate sanction. In considering that issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends |7upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent filed pleadings, appeared in court, and contacted and negotiated with third parties on behalf of a client when he was ineligible to practice law. Respondent knowingly violated duties owed, and caused harm to his client, the public, the legal system, and the profession. The baseline sanction for this misconduct is a period of suspension.

Several aggravating factors are present in the record, including respondent’s pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. The sole mitigating factor supported by the record is the absence of prior discipline.

Considering all the circumstances, we find the disciplinary board’s recommendation is appropriate, and accordingly we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months, followed by one year of unsupervised probation governed by the conditions recommended by the board.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that C. Blase McCarthy, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 25789, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Following his suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation for a period of one year, during which time he shall complete his annual MCLE requirements, plus eight additional hours of CLE, | ¿four of which must be in the area of ethics and/or professionalism. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . Respondent had previously been declared MCLE-ineligible as of August 3, 2002. In March 2003, respondent attended a CLE seminar to cure this deficiency, but he subsequently stopped payment oh the check he submitted to pay for the course. Respondent honored the check only after the Louisiana State Bar Association intervened and demanded payment be made to the CLE provider. Thereafter, respondent was reinstated to the practice of law effective March 24, 2003.

      . The lawyer in Gaines failed to fulfill his MCLE requirements and misrepresented the number of hours he actually obtained. For his conduct, Gaines was suspended for three months, fully deferred, subject to the condition that he obtain additional hours of CLE.

      . In Hardy, this court held:
      In cases in which an attorney has engaged in the practice of law while ineligible to do so for failing to pay bar dues or failing to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements, this court has imposed suspensions to disbarment, with the baseline sanction generally being a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law.
      03-0443 at p. 8, 848 So.2d at 515 (citations omitted).

      . The one-year probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. See In re: Pepper, 05-2093 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 527.


author: CALOGERO, Chief Justice, KIMBALL, J.,

text:
    BASS, LTD. v. Tim GERALD, et al.
    No. 2007-C-1225
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 25, 2008.
   hON APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Second application for reconsideration granted.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.

KIMBALL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

TRAYLOR, J., dissents for reasons assigned by KIMBALL, J.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

concurring.

hi concur in the granting of Relator’s second application for reconsideration of our initial action dismissing the writ application as untimely filed. Now that the majority has found the writ application to have been timely filed under La. Sup.Ct. Rule X, § 5(d), the merits of the writ application will be considered by the court in due course.

The writ application was received “by mail” from the United States Postal Service (USPS) in this court on Monday, June 11, 2007, the first legal day following the expiration of the 30-day delay for timely filing on Friday, June 8, 2007. Accordingly, the application is entitled to a rebutta-ble presumption of timeliness under Rule X, § 5(d). In our initial action on the writ application, we deemed it not timely filed and, thus, did not consider the merits of the writ application. Our disposition was based on the only indication of mailing retained by our court, the Clerk’s Office having discarded the front of the package. That evidence was an “Express Mail” mailing label from the USPS showing a date of acceptance at the main Pensacola station as June 9, 2007, a Saturday. Assuming the application was actually mailed on that day, the application would not have been timely filed, presumably even in light of the presumption of timeliness set forth in Rule X, § 5(d).

However, in Relator’s application for reconsideration, counsel included |2affidavits from himself and his wife attesting that the postage was purchased at a Pensacola post office on Friday evening, June 8, 2007, the postage was affixed on the package, and the package was placed in a USPS mailbox. We denied the application for reconsideration.

In Relator’s second application for reconsideration, counsel included the Automated Postal Center (APC) receipt that he had inadvertently neglected to include in the first application for reconsideration. This receipt shows that postage was purchased from a Pensacola post office on June 8, 2007, at 10:35 p.m. for $45.25, with a weight of 8 pounds and 8.8 ounces, with delivery to the 70130 zip code, the court’s zip code. This postage amount and weight correlates with the express mail mailing label showing a total postage of $45.25, a weight of 8 pounds and 9 ounces, and delivery to the court in the 70130 zip code. With the inclusion of this postage receipt, along with the affidavits and other evidence, I believe the presumption of timeliness to which the application is entitled by our rule was not sufficiently rebutted. Accordingly, I concur in granting the application for reconsideration, accepting the application as timely filed, and taking up the merits of the writ application in due course.

KIMBALL, J.,

dissenting.

|L dissent from the majority’s grant of defendant’s Second Request for Reconsideration in the instant matter. In my view,

defendant’s writ application was not timely filed, and thus the judgment of the court of appeal is final.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Don S. REEVES.
    No. 2007-KP-2455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 3, 2008.
   In re Reeves, Don S.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 255,006; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43062-KW.

Denied.


text:
    William Daniel LITTLETON and Carolyn Lahonda Littleton v. Dwayne G. ENTERKIN, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut.
    No. 2007-C-1476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 3, 2008.
   In re William Daniel Littleton et al., applying for clarification for of this court’s action dated 10/12/07, from the 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 03-0947; Parish of Ouachita to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,867-CA.

Plaintiffs motion for clarification is granted. On reconsideration, this court’s action on plaintiffs writ application is changed so that plaintiffs application is simply denied.

VICTORY, J., recused.


text:
    Dana R. MCPHERSON v. CINGULAR WIRELESS, LLC.
    No. 2007-C-2147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 7, 2008.
   In re McPherson, Dana R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2006-0084-L; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-0462.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See, Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(d).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alan R. CASE.
    No. 2007-K-1320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 7, 2008.
   In re Case, Alan R.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 03F0912; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-095-KA.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    Bertrand Dwayne DAIGLE v. IMPERIAL FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2007-CC-2112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 7, 2008.
   In re Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.;— Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 07-C-1249-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00892.

Grant and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of its ruling in light of Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 07-1294 (La.10/5/07), 964 So.2d 375.

KIMBALL, J., would deny.

KNOLL, J., would deny.


text:
    Larry and Rosie ADAMS v. RHODIA, INC. and Exxon Mobil Corporation.
    No. 2007-C-2110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 7, 2008.
   In re Adams, Larry et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 483,752; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 1803.

Granted.


text:
    Noah J. ANDRE, et al. v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 8, 2008.
   In re TDY Industries Inc.; Hobart Brothers Co.; BOC Group Inc. f/k/a Aireo, Inc.; ESAB Group Inc.; Lincoln Electric Co.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2003-11573; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1635.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    David BARRAS, et al. v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 8, 2008.
   In re BOC Group Inc. f/k/a Aireo, Inc.; ESAB Group Inc.; Hobart Brothers Company; Lincoln Electric Company; TDY Industries; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, Nos. 2004-873, 2003-11573; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-C-1634

Stay denied. Writ denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    Wallace J. ORDOYNE and Rocio V. Ordoyne v. LOUISVILLE LADDER GROUP, LLC, et al.
    No. 2007-CC-2372.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 9, 2008.
   In re Louisville Ladder Group LLC et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 610-498; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-C-864.

Denied.


text:
    YELLOW ROCK, LLC, et al. v. SASOL NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0055.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 10, 2008.
   In re Sasol North America, Inc., et al.; Fletcher, Thomas J. “Tommy”; — Defendant (s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-3530; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-01611.

Denied.


text:
    YELLOW ROCK, LLC, et al. v. SASOL NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 10, 2008.
   In re Sasol North America, Inc., et al.; Fletcher, Thomas J. “Tommy”; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-3530; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-01610.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph SHER v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY; United Fire & Casualty Company; The United Fire Group; Robert Jones; Wes Swank; Fred Vander-brook; and Property Loss Consulting, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-2441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Co. et al.;— Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 06-9276; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0757.

Granted.


text:
    Joseph SHER v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY; United Fire & Casualty Company; The United Fire Group; Robert Jones; Wes Swank; Fred Vander-brook; And Property Loss Consulting, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-2443.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Sher, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 06-9276; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0757.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Scott LAURENT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Laurent, Scott; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 382629; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2006 KW 1635, 2006 KW 2164.

Writ granted; case remanded to the district court. The district court is ordered to grant relator an out-of-time appeal and appoint counsel to prosecute it. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336, 340 (La.1985).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Thompson, Joshua; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 108605-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2173.

Writ granted; case remanded to the district court. The district court is ordered to grant relator an out-of-time appeal and appoint counsel to prosecute it. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336, 340 (La.1985). In all other respects, the application is denied.


text:
    Brian MONDY v. FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL.
    No. 2007-CI-0338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Mondy, Brian; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 540,632; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No(s). 2004 CW 1939, 2006 CW 1311.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The 19th Judicial District Court is ordered to provide relator with a cost estimate for a copy of his “Motion to Set Hearing Date” from Case No. 427-981. In all other respects, the application is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick HYDE.
    No. 2007-OK-1314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Rehearing of this Courts action dated November 21, 2007; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-05-0080; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0717.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley LINDSEY.
    No. 2007-KO-0454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Lindsey, Stanley; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated October 12, 2007, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G. No. [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA1268.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re Michael J. RILEY, Sr.
    No. 2007-OB-1615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Riley, Michael J. Sr.; — Plaintiff; (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 21, 2007 on Petition For Readmission; Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 05-DB-062.

Reconsideration denied.

JOHNSON, J., would admit with conditions.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bennie WASHINGTON.
    No. 2007-KO-0645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Washington, Bennie; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 454-918; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-KA-1014.

Denied.


text:
    Charles J. TAYLOR v. Warden Venetia MICHAEL, et al.
    No. 2007-CI-0704.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Taylor, Charles J.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 538,830.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrea HALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Hall, Andrea; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 90-1096, 91-1518; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KH 06-01530, KH 07-00019.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lenard STOKES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Stokes, Lenard; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 99-F1160; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42154-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Wayne TONUBBEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0772.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Tonubbee, John Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 80-143.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry WALKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0774.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Walker, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 1983; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KH-863.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wallace WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0776.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Williams, Wallace; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 371-118; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0337.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry KEYS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0777.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Keys, Terry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 32412; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42291-KH.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jessie OFFORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Offord, Jessie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-K-2204; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01478.

Denied. Untimely and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tommy Lee LINGEFELT, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0804.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Lingefelt, Tommy Lee Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. F-2002059A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42288-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William T. CORBITT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana..
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Corbitt, William T.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 425,068, 422,-418, 423,403; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 1860.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James L. HAMPTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0809.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Hampton, James L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 457-171; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0229.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David E. SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Smith, David E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 02-K-0612-B; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2005-KA-0375.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin PITTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Pitts, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 47,817; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01538.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnie Cleon JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Johnson, Ronnie Cleon; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 270,171; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 06-01644.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby TURNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0818.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Turner, Bobby; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 274151; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KW 2483.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Morris SKIPPER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Skipper, Robert Morris; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 19-644.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark A. CHATTERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0869.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Chatterson, Mark A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 11th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 05012482, 05012483; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 41,444-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur E. PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0870.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Parker, Arthur E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 209-013; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0210.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James L. HAMPTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Hampton, James L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 457-171; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-0374.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Calvin Lee CRADDOCK.
    No. 2007-KO-1466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Craddock, Calvin Lee; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 397650; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 0123.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LANG.
    No. 2007-KO-1469.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Lang, Eddie; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 04-059F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, 'No. 42,125-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Melecia a/k/a Lecia FRANKLIN.
    No. 2007-K-1489.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Franklin, Melecia a/k/a; Franklin, Lecia; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 04-F0078-2; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,055-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. George HUGHES.
    No. 2007-K-1490.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Hughes, George; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 11-04-0609; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 KA 2422.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry FORTUNE.
    No. 2007-KO-1503.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Fortune, Larry; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 445-271; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-KA-1273.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kendrick Dwayne COLEMAN.
    No. 2007-KO-1536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Coleman, Kendrick Dwayne; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,188-F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 0275.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrell A. MCDUFFEY.
    No. 2007-KO-1537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re McDuffey, Darrell A.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 05-F1505; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-167-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy D. LEE.
    No. 2007-KO-1538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Lee, Jeremy D.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 05-854, 05-0855; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 06-941.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth TRAYLOR.
    No. 2007-KO-1561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Traylor, Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 41,405; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,218-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lester SIMTON, Jr.
    No. 2007-KO-1562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Simton, Lester Jr.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 11th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 0613575; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-236-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin BRADLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2007-C-2075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Bradley, Kevin Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, No. 7091; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0794.

Denied.


text:
    Errol WASHINGTON v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE and All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2007-C-2103.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Washington, Errol; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, Nos. 7089, 7104, 7119, 7113, 7099, 7101, 7115, 7272, 7284, 7117, 7118, 7114,; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nb(s). 2006-CA-1647, 2007-CA-0360, 2007-CA-0361, 2007-CA-0364, 2007-CA-0171, 2007-CA-0366, 2006-CA-1498, 2006-CA-1500, 2007-CA-0797, 2007-CA-0367, 2007-CA-0368, 2007-CA-0796.

Denied.


text:
    Gernine MAILHES v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF CALCASIEU.
    No. 2007-C-2170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re District Attorney Calcasieu Parish; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, Office of Workers’ Compensation District #3, No. 03-07715; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-265.

Denied.


text:
    Leander WINFORD v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE and All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2007-C-2181.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Winford, Leander; — Plaintiff; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Civil Service Commission City of New Orleans, Nos. 7089, 7104, 7119, 7113, 7099, 7101, 7115, 7272, 7284, 7117, 7118, 7114,; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2006-CA-1647, 2007-CA-0360, 2007-CA-0361, 2007-CA-0364, 2007-CA-0171, 2007-CA-0366, 2006-CA-1498, 2006-CA-1500, 2007-CA-0797, 2007-CA-0367, 2007-CA-0368, 2007-CA-0796.

Denied.


text:
    Celine Lemeiux WILLIAMSON v. Wayne Glenn WILLIAMSON.
    No. 2007-CC-2186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Williamson, Celine Lemeiux;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 606-506; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-C-689.

Denied.


text:
    Martin WOOLFOLK d/b/a Woolfolk Agency v. Barron RUSH.
    No. 2007-CC-2188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Rush, George Barron Jr.; Rush, Barron a/k/a; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 548,726; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 1606.

Denied.


text:
    Carmelita LAFONTA and Pedro Lafonta, Individually and on Behalf of Iola M. Lafonta v. HOTARD COACHES, INC. and Crescent City Health Care Center, Inc.
    No. 2007-C-2208.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Crescent City Health Care Center Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2006-8036; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0454.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Clarence Richard GRAYSON v. FORERUNNER CORPORATION and Robert C. Lunson.
    No. 2007-CC-2209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Grayson, Clarence Richard;— Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 35,354-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 2004.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    SEQUOIA VENTURE NO. 2, LTD. v. Sonia Peters CASSIDY and Joe Roy Peters.
    No. 2007-C-2210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Cassidy, Sonia Peters et ah; Peters, Joe Roy; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 120,188-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,426-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey HOUSER.
    No. 2007-KK-2211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Houser, Corey; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 471-377; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-K-1297.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Travis BATES.
    No. 2007-KK-2212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Bates, Travis; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, Nos. 20625, 20626, 86699; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 1671.

Denied.


text:
    Willard A. EASTIN, Jr., Henry Monroe, Donald D. Runge, Louis Anthony Frost, Charles K. Ohlmeyer, III, Robert Martin Braniff, Sr., William C. Owens, Jr., and William K. Carney v. ENTERGY CORPORATION, Richard A. Cuicchi, Albert C. King, Ramon Baul-may, William O. Van as, William Brewer, George Bartlett, Ronnie Beam, and Charles Kelly.
    No. 2007-C-2214.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Monroe, Henry; Braniff, Robert Martin Sr.; Carney, William K; Eastin, Willard A. Jr. et al.; Runge, Donald D.; Ohlmeyer, Charles K. III; Owens, William C. Jr.; Frost, Louis Anthony; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 456-981; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-CA-212.

Denied.


text:
    Judy RIDEAU and Kerry Bardell v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2007-C-2228.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Rideau, Judy et al.; Bardell, Kerry; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 59,696; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CA 0894.

Denied.

KIMBALL, J., would grant on issue of damages.


text:
    RAYMOND COUNTY v. The ARC OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS, INC.
    No. 2007-OC-2230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Raymond County; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2006-825; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007 CA 1009.

Denied.


text:
    Timothy M. WILKES, Ann W. Pruett, Mary Jo W. Nix, Karen W. Guillory and Theodore M. Wilkes, Jr. v. OUR LADY OF THE LAKE HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, Dr. Lawrence Messina and Dr. Jeffrey Kahn.
    No. 2007-CC-2235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Guillory, Karen W.; Pruett, Ann W.; Wilkes, Timothy M.; Nix, Mary Jo W.; Wilkes, Theodore M. Jr.; — Plaintiffs); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 537,215; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 0891.

Denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    v. Petr Vladimirovich MAZUR, Fallon B. Naquin, Virginia Truck Center, Inc., Allstate Insurance Company, and Canal Insurance Company. Gloria OWENS
    No. 2007-CC-2236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Canal Insurance Company; Sundown Express Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64,180; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CW 1386.

Denied.


text:
    Donald STELLY v. Wayne MOREIN, Sheriff, et al.
    No. 2007-CP-2240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Stelly, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 68402-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 07-00871.

Denied.


text:
    Sheila ROBIN v. Jason W. WONG, BSCPT, and Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital.
    No. 2007-C-2245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Pendleton Memorial- Methodist Hospital; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2001-09526; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0547.

Denied.


text:
    Rose GUDO, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, and Tony Gudo, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated v. The ADMINISTRATORS OF the TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND d/b/a the Tulane University of Louisiana and d/b/a Tulane University Hospital and d/b/a Tulane University School of Medicine, Mary Bitner Anderson, et al.
    No. 2007-C-1959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund; Anderson, Mary Bitner;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 04-4758; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-1515.

Denied.


text:
    Rose GUDO, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, and Tony Gudo, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated v. The ADMINISTRATORS OF the TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND d/b/a the Tulane University of Louisiana and d/b/a Tulane University Hospital and d/b/a Tulane University School of Medicine, Mary Bitner Anderson, et al.
    No. 2007-C-1992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re National Anatomical Service Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2004-4758; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2006-CA-1515.

Denied.


text:
    Ann Lee Stephens SARPY, Elizabeth Stephens Knowles, Martha Stephens Johnson and Mary Stephens Dillon v. ESAD, INC., the 1927 Partnership, Preferred Hotel Holdings, Ltd., BN Investments II, Ltd., Pledged Holding Company, Inc., and George J. Newton, III.
    No. 2007-C-2056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re 1927 Partnership; BN Investments II LTD; Preferred Hotel Holdings LTD.; Pledged Holding Company Inc.;— Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2004-16595; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-0347.

Denied.


text:
    Noah J. ANDRE, et al. v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, et al. David Barras, et al. v. A.O. Smith Corporation, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re Barras, David et al.; Andre, Noah J. et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, Nos. 2003-11573, 2004-873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No(s). 2008-C-0029, 2008-C-0030.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    Noah J. ANDRE, et al. v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re BOC Group Inc. f/k/a; Aireo Inc.; ESAB Group Inc.; Hobart Brothers Company; Lincoln Electric Company; TDY Industries Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2003-11573; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-0029.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


text:
    David BARRAS, et al. v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2008-CC-0093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 11, 2008.
   In re BOC Group Inc. f/k/a; Aireo Inc.; ESAB Group Inc.; Hobart Brothers Company; Lincoln Electric Company; — Defendants); Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2004-873; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-0030.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., recused.


author: LOLLEY, J.

text:
    JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee v. Hersy JONES, Jr. and Cheynita Delphine Woodson-Jones, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 42,396-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Hersy Jones, Jr., in Proper Person.
    Love, Rigby, Dehan & McDaniel by Hani E. Dehan, Shreveport, for Appellant, Cheynita D. Woodson-Jones.
    Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman, Wood-ley, Byrd & Cromwell, by L. David Cromwell, Joseph S. Woodley, Shreveport, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and LOLLEY, JJ.
   LOLLEY, J.

I,Hersy Jones, Jr., appearing pro se, appeals the judgment of the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, granting summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Facts

On October 26, 2001, Hersy Jones, Jr. and Cheynita Delphine Woodson-Jones executed a promissory note in favor of Premier Bank, National Association, in the original principal sum of $113,192.42. The note had a final maturity of November 10, 2006, and interest prior to default at the rate of seven and one-quarter percent (7.25%) per annum until paid. The note also provided that the Joneses would pay all attorneys’ fees, as well as any court and collections costs actually incurred by the holder. Subsequently, Premier Bank changed its name to Bank One, Louisiana, N.A., which then merged into Bank One, N.A., and which, finally, merged into JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the plaintiff/appellee herein (“Chase Bank”).

On March 10, 2005, the note went into default due to nonpayment. As of September 19, 2005, the note, after crediting all payments made, had an unpaid balance of $82,851.53 in principal, late fees in the amount of $407.87, other fees of $50.00, and interest accrued through September 19, 2005, in the amount of $3,164.00. Further, interest continued to accrue at the rate of 7.25% per annum or $16.46 per day. As a result of the Joneses’ default, Chase Bank filed suit seeking judgment from the defendants on the unpaid balance of the promissory note, as well as recognition of the pledge Rof a collateral mortgage note also executed by the defendants and its corresponding mortgage of immovable property. The defendants filed separate answers to Chase Bank’s petition— both in the form of a general denial. Subsequently, Chase Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which was supported by an affidavit by John W. Thornton, a vice-president with Chase Bank who was responsible for the loan and had personal knowledge of it. In Thornton’s affidavit, he confirmed that the note was in default and the amount due. Hersy Jones filed an opposition to the motion, but offered no countervailing affidavit or other evidence. The trial court granted Chase Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and this appeal by Hersy Jones ensued.

Discussion

Jones is not appealing the trial court’s ruling that Chase Bank was entitled to judgment on the issue that he was in default on the loan — he accepts that portion of the ruling. However, he disputes the correctness of the judgment regarding the amount due as a result of his default, specifically attacking the sufficiency of Thornton’s affidavit to prove the amount due. Jones maintains that Chase Bank failed to file into the record a statement of account or an amortization schedule showing a history of his loan that would have, he claims, established the correctness of the amount due. According to Jones, the failure to include such necessary proof of the amount owed creates a genuine issue of material fact, making summary judgment on this issue improper. We disagree.

| ¡¡Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Shelton v. Standard/700 Associates, 2001-0587 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2d 60; Fordham v. Nissan North America, 41,987 (La.App.2d Cir.04/04/07), 954 So.2d 346. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). The procedure is favored under Louisiana law and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. Id.

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment remains with the mov-ant, in this case, Chase Bank. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). As provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967(B), Jones may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading in response to a properly made and supported motion for summary judgment; rather his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B).

Here, Jones disputes the suitability of Thornton’s affidavit to prove the amount of his outstanding debt to Chase Bank. Initially, we note that Chase Bank clearly proved in its motion for summary judgment that (1) the |4note was in default, (2) the authenticity of the signatures on the note, and (3) that it was entitled to enforce the note — facts which Jones does not dispute. Next, we observe that supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affi-ant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. La. C.C.P. art. 967(A). We determine that the affidavit offered by Chase Bank to support its motion for summary judgment is sufficient to prove its case against Jones. Here, Thornton stated that as a bank officer with Chase Bank he was responsible for and had knowledge of the Joneses’ loan account. In said capacity, Thornton averred to the amount owed, but Jones argues that his sworn statement is inadequate to prove the amount due. However, Jones fails to offer any specific facts to show that Thornton’s statements as to the amount owed are incorrect or unreliable. Jones simply failed to show that there was indeed a genuine issue for trial on the amount due. Interestingly, Jones does not dispute that he is in default on the loan, which is another fact averred to by Thornton. So considering, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Chase Bank, and this assignment of error is without merit.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Hersy Jones, Jr.

AFFIRMED.

      . Cheynita Delphine Woodson-Jones answered the original petition, but does not appeal the trial court’s judgment.


author: DREW, J.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF Jason BOLDS.
    No. 42,459-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 5, 2007.
    Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, LLP, by Paul Denton Spillers, Monroe, for Appellant William Jason Bolds, Sr.
    Douglas Leon Stokes, Jr., Jonesboro, for Appellee John W. Bolds.
    Before BROWN, STEWART and DREW, JJ.
   DREW, J.

| ,This is a sad family dispute wherein the sole issue for determination is whether the learned trial court was correct in ruling that Jason Bolds was domiciled in Bienville Parish as of the date of his death, April 28, 1998. We are constrained to reverse the ruling below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2007, this matter was converted from a non-appealable interlocutory judgment to a writ application for which certiorari was granted. The matter was docketed for decision.

In the Second Judicial District Court, Bienville Parish, on October 26, 2005, William Jason Bolds, Sr., a resident of Winn Parish, filed a Petition for Notice of Application for Appointment of a Succession Representative for the estate of his father, Jason Bolds, who died on April 28, 1998. The petition alleged the decedent was domiciled in Bienville Parish when he died.

On January 9, 2006, John W. Bolds filed a petition to be appointed administrator of the succession of his father, the decedent. Among his allegations was that his father was domiciled in a nursing home in Bien-ville Parish when he died intestate. John asserted that his father owned no immovable property at the time of his death. An additional allegation was that he and three siblings sued William and Scarletta J. Bolds in Jackson Parish (also in the Second JDC) seeking to set aside two allegedly forged cash sale deeds by which the decedent purportedly transferred two tracts of land to William.

12William filed an objection to John’s petition to be appointed administrator, asserting that John had a conflict of interest due to the Jackson Parish litigation. William offered as alternatives two other persons. On March 9, 2006, the trial judge named John the administrator and denied the opposition of William, who sought a new trial, which was ultimately denied on June 29, 2006.

Thereafter, on August 1, 2006, William filed a declinatory exception as to the court’s lack of jurisdiction, based upon his contention that the decedent was never a domiciliary of Bienville Parish. In his memo supporting' the exception, William contended that his deceased father was a domiciliary of Natchitoches Parish since 1985. The decedent was registered to vote there, obtained utilities there, banked there, and had a driver’s license with that address. He was an active voter there until his health deteriorated. After living with his son in Winn Parish from 1993 until 1995, the decedent began a series of moves to various nursing homes or hospitals in Jackson Parish, Winn Parish, Rap-ides Parish, and finally Bienville Parish. He visited his Natchitoches home when his health permitted and talked of returning home where the house was maintained for him by his son, although it was no longer in decedent’s name. The decedent never executed an affidavit or declaration of domicile.

A quick chronology may be helpful here:

• John filed a petition to be appointed administrator;

• William objected, and the matter was tried;

• William lost, requested a new trial, and was denied relief again;

Is* Only then did William file his declinato-ry exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to which John objected as untimely.

The record is silent as to a ruling on this technical issue of untimeliness, but we find that William’s filing for initial relief did not waive his right to object on account of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See La. C.C.P. art 925(C).

The trial court overruled John’s exception to the court’s lack of jurisdiction in a judgment signed November 14, 2006. William then filed an appeal from the unappealable interlocutory judgment. The procedural end result was this court’s conversion of this dispute to a writ and docketing for decision.

William/Appellant’s Argument

William asserts that both he and John simply made an error in their initial pleadings when they referred to Bienville Parish as the decedent’s domicile. William contends that Natchitoches Parish was clearly established as their father’s domicile, although he resided temporarily in nursing homes due to his declining health in his last years.

The appellant cites La. C.C.P. art. 2811, which states that a succession proceeding shall be brought in the district court of the parish where the deceased was domiciled at the time of his death. The venue requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 2811 may not be waived, even by an untimely declinatory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 44(c). An exception to jurisdiction over subject matter may not be waived. La. C.C.P. art. 925(C). In Succ. of McElwee, 276 So.2d 391 (La.App. 2d Cir.1973), the court cited the | foregoing articles and held that in succession proceedings, venue is jurisdictional.

La. C.C. art. 38 defines domicile:

The domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment.
The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected.

La. C.C. art. 41 prescribes that a change of domicile occurs when one resides in another parish with the intention of making that his principal establishment. Absent filing a declaration of domicile in the mortgage records, proof of one’s intention depends upon the circumstances. La. C.C. art. 43. The appellant cites various cases to support his arguments that:

• to change domicile, one must reside in another parish with intention to abandon the former domicile;

• the person seeking to establish a change of domicile has the burden of proof;

• there is a presumption against a change of domicile; and

• a person changing residence for health reasons does not indicate an intent to change domicile.

The appellant concludes by detailing the circumstances surrounding the decedent’s various residences and all the factors indicating there was no intent to change his Natchitoches Parish domicile.

John/Appellee’s Arguments

John states in brief that following the death of his father, he had a handwriting expert examine the deeds purporting to transfer the decedent’s Rtwo tracts of immovable property to his brother William. The expert opined that the deeds were not executed by the decedent. Thereafter, John and three of his brothers filed suit in Jackson Parish against William and his wife seeking to have the deeds declared forgeries. The Bienville Parish succession action was filed when the trial court in Jackson Parish found their deceased father’s succession to be an indispensable party there.

First, John asserts that William’s decli-natory exception of jurisdiction was untimely. John maintains that William (the alleged forger) sought to have one of his own choices named as administrator of his father’s succession in the Bienville Parish proceeding. When he was unsuccessful, he changed his mind and asserted that his father was a Natchitoches Parish domiciliary at death. John relies on the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent “the perversion of the judicial process” and litigants “playing fast and loose with the courts.” This argument has a great deal of appeal, but we find that it is not dispositive.

Second, John asserts that the trial court factually determined that decedent was a Bienville Parish domiciliary at the time of his death with the result that the Bienville Parish court had jurisdiction. John argues that at his death his father had not lived in Natchitoches Parish for many years. In a somewhat contradictory argument, John urges it is undisputed that his father owned no immovable property in Natchi-toches Parish, since the property had been transferred to William (in a transaction John is attacking as a | (¡forgery in the Jackson Parish litigation). According to John, his father slept, ate, established his household in Bienville, and surrounded himself with the comforts of domestic life and his family. The decedent had no home to which he could return in Natchi-toches Parish without first obtaining the permission of William, who was record owner of the Natchitoches Parish property at the time of the father’s death. Therefore, he concludes that the trial court was entirely correct in ruling that the decedent was domiciled in Bienville Parish at the time of his death.

Our Reasoning

The appellant has the better argument. If jurisdiction cannot be waived intentionally, it certainly cannot be waived carelessly and inadvertently. We feel that the learned trial court, quite understandably, gave too much weight to the domiciliary concessions in John’s early filings. The totality of this sparse record, however, compels us to reverse the trial court findings as to domicile.

Clearly, Natchitoches Parish was the decedent’s domicile for the last 13 years of his life, though his health and other needs required multiple and successive residences in his later years. The factual testimony did not come close to overcoming the presumption that Natchitoches was still the decedent’s domicile at his death.

We are aggrieved that William wants it both ways, and that he has wasted the time of many public servants and other family members by not litigating his lack of subject matter claim first. Nonetheless, we are constrained to agree with William that this record does not reflect that the 17decedent ever changed his Natchitoches Parish domicile to Bienville or any other parish.

Accordingly, even though William’s litigious actions don’t pass the “sniff test,” we take his counsel at his word, and reverse the ruling of the trial court on this exception, as we find that this bitter familial nightmare should be tried, if anywhere, in Natchitoches Parish, the domicile of the decedent as of the date of his death.

All court costs relative to the proceedings below are assessed against William, the party who now alleges that he made a mistake in initially seeking relief in Bien-ville Parish. All court costs as to this appeal are to be assessed 80% against William, and 20% against the other parties.

DECREE

The domicile of the decedent at death was Natchitoches. Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court to the contrary is REVERSED. Costs relative to the proceedings below are assessed against William; costs relative to this appeal are assessed 80% against William and 20% against the other parties.

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

      . The inescapable question here, of course, is whether or not William would feel so strongly about domicile had he succeeded in his requests that the Bienville court appoint as administrator one of the people suggested by him, instead of his sibling John.