author:
PER CURIAM. CALOGERO, Chief Justice, KIMBALL, J.
      VICTORY, J., KNOLL, J.,

text:
    In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings in the Matter Of Stephanie NOE.
    No. 2005-C-2275.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 22, 2007.
    Rehearing Denied June 29, 2007.
    Adams & Reese, Arthur F. Hickham, Jr., Edward J. Rice, Jr., New Orleans, for Applicant.
    Steven M. Spiegel, Metairie, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

| /We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeal erred when it reversed the district court and held the one-year prescriptive period was suspended under the continuous treatment doctrine.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 11, 2001, Stephanie Noe sought treatment from her physician, Dr. Hill, for sinus congestion. As he had on several occasions in the past, Dr. Hill ordered a Celestone injection, which was administered in Ms. Noe’s right buttock by Nurse Hahn, an employee of IMG Healthcare Network. On March 12, 2003, twenty-one months after the injection had been given, Ms. Noe filed a medical malpractice complaint against IMG Healthcare Network and Dr. Hill and later amended the complaint to add Nurse Hahn. The complaint alleged Nurse Hahn administered the injection in an inappropriate location and/or manner causing Ms. Noe continuing back, buttock and leg pain and related problems and further alleged Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare Network were vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat superi- or.

While the complaint was still before the medical review panel, defendants filed an exception of prescription as authorized by La. R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(2)(a). The district court granted the exception of prescription on March 9, 2004.

|2On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed and further held the doctrine of contra non valentem did not apply. Moreover, the court of appeal rejected Ms. Noe’s argument that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint to assert a claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his independent negligence.

This court granted Ms. Noe’s application for writ of certiorari, vacated the ruling of the court of appeal and remanded the case to the court of appeal to reconsider the prescription issue in light of this court’s recent decision in Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646 (La.1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261, involving the third category of contra non valentem.

On remand, the court of appeal, applying the continuous treatment doctrine, reversed the district court and found the claim had not prescribed. Based on the conclusion that Ms. Noe’s claim had not prescribed, the court of appeal pretermitted discussion of whether Ms. Noe should be granted the opportunity to amend her complaint to assert a claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his independent negligence.

This court then granted defendants’ application for writ of certiorari to determine whether the claim had prescribed.

DECREE

After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we hereby find that the claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed. The vicarious liability claim against Dr. Hill arising under the doctrine of respondeat superior is also prescribed. However, we |sfind the introduction of Ms. Noe’s affidavit and deposition at the hearing on the exception of prescription expanded the pleadings to include a claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his own independent negligence. Moreover, we find the claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his own independent negligence remains viable and is not prescribed. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

CALOGERO, C.J., and KIMBALL and VICTORY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part and assign reasons:

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ., dissent in part and concur in part for reasons assigned by CALOGERO, C.J.

TRAYLOR, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by VICTORY, J.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

|¶1 concur in the portion of the majority opinion finding that the medical malpractice claim filed by plaintiff, Stephanie Noe, against defendant, Dr. Michael Hill, arising out of his independent negligence remains viable and is not prescribed. However, I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion finding that Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim against defendant, Nurse Deborah Hahn, as well as her vicarious liability claim against Dr. Hill arising under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is prescribed. For the reasons detailed below, I would affirm the court of appeal’s denial of the defendants’ exception of prescription.

In Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646 (La.1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261, this court found that prescription in a medical malpractice case is suspended pursuant to the third category of contra non valentum so long as the defendant health care provider continuously treats the plaintiff in an effort to improve the plaintiffs condition allegedly caused by negligent treatment. In this case, Ms. Hill timely filed her medical malpractice claim within one year of the date Dr. Hill’s continuous treatment ended, making her claim against Dr. Hill for his independent negligence timely under Carter, as the majority correctly finds.

However, the majority errs when it finds that the suspension of prescription arising from Dr. Hill’s continuous treatment of Ms. Noe does not extend to Ms. Noe’s | gdaim against Dr. Hill’s alleged solidary obligor, Nurse Hahn. The clear purpose of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) is to suspend prescription against all joint and soli-dary obligors when prescription has been suspended against one of them. Proper application of the continuous treatment doctrine, coupled with the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2), results in a finding that Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim against Nurse Hahn, as well as her claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his vicarious liability, was timely filed under the facts of this case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1998, Ms. Noe, who was insured by IMG Healthcare Network, chose Dr. Hill as her primary care physician. Dr. Hill treated Ms. Noe during her pregnancy for twins, and provided other medical treatment, including treatment for Ms. Noe’s on-going sinus problems, between 1998 and 2001. This medical malpractice claim arises out of Ms. Noe’s visit to Dr. Hill on June 11, 2001, when she sought treatment for sinus congestion. As he had on several occasions in the past, Dr. Hill ordered a Celestone injection, which was administered by Nurse Hahn in Ms. Noe’s right buttock.

Ms. Noe testified in her deposition that the injection was very painful, that she felt a “jolt” all the way down her leg, and that the injection did not feel like other Cele-stone injections she had received in the past, both because of the intensity of the pain and because she did not feel the burning sensation that she typically associated with steroid injections. Ms. Noe further testified that the pain continued longer than the two or three days she would have expected, and that her husband, who was a nurse, told her when he removed the band-aid several days later that the injection had not been administered in the upper right quadrant of the buttock, the proper location | ¡¡for administering injections. About a week after the injection, Ms. Noe said, she noticed a “reddish-purple circle, knot type” in the location where Nurse Hahn had given her the injection.

Ms. Noe returned to Dr. Hill on August 6, 2001, complaining of problems in the area where the injection was given. By that time, Ms. Noe said, there was obvious deterioration and atrophy of her right buttock muscle. Dr. Hill noted on that date that Ms. Noe had a two-centimeter discoloration on her right buttock. Ms. Noe stated in her affidavit that her husband accompanied her on the August 6, 2001, visit to Dr. Hill, and that they specifically asked Dr. Hill whether she had suffered nerve damage as a result of the injection. Dr. Hill denied any nerve damage, telling them that the problems were related to an allergic reaction to the Celestone, Ms. Noe stated. At that point, Dr. Hill placed her on a one-year exercise program to strengthen her buttock muscles, she said.

Ms. Noe testified by deposition that her buttock muscle continued to atrophy after her August 6, 2001, visit to Dr. Hill, but that the deterioration “stabilized” within three months of the injection, although the pain continued to get more severe. Ms. Noe testified that she saw Dr. Hill at least four more times with complaints related to the injection site, and that she discussed the problems with him on the telephone on several other occasions.

The IMG Healthcare records indicate that Ms. Noe saw Dr. Hill on December 17, 2001, when she complained about hair loss and fatigue, and again on January 25, 2002, when once again her chief complaint was hair loss. Although the records contain no notations indicating Ms. Noe complained about the injection site at either the December 17, 2001, visit or the January 25, 2002, visit, Ms. Noe stated in her affidavit that Dr. Hill did check the injection site during the December 17, 2001, visit.

|4On March 27, 2002, Ms. Noe consulted one of Dr. Hill’s associates, Dr. Frank Wharton, complaining of on-going leg pain since the injection. Dr. Wharton’s notes indicate that Ms. Noe told him she thought that the injection had injured her sciatic nerve. According to Ms. Noe’s affidavit, Dr. Wharton told her that her symptoms might warrant an MRI, and advised her to see Dr. Hill as soon as he was available. Ms. Noe returned to Dr. Hill on April 3, 2002, complaining of constant leg and back pain, at which time Dr. Hill referred her to a neurologist for EMG and MRI studies. According to Ms. Noe, the test results, which she received sometime in April of 2002, revealed that the injection had damaged her sciatic nerve.

Ms. Noe filed her Medical Malpractice Complaint against IMG Healthcare and Dr. Hill on March 12, 2003, approximately 21 months after the injection had been given on June 11, 2001, but less than a year after the last time she consulted Dr. Hill in April 3, 2002. In her complaint, Ms. Noe asserted that Dr. Hill ordered the injection and that an unidentified member of his staff administered the injection “in an inappropriate location and/or manner causing severe pain.” Ms. Noe’s complaint alleged that she sought treatment from Dr. Hill following the injection, for back and leg pain and eventual atrophy of her buttock, until Dr. Hill recommended that she seek treatment -with a neurologist. Ms. Noe claimed that she was told for the first time in April of 2002 that “the injection was the cause of her continuing back, buttock and leg pain and related problems,” and that she suffered and continues to suffer severe pain, disfigurement, mental anguish and emotional distress. According to Ms. Noe’s complaint, Dr. Hill is responsible for the negligence of the person who administered the injection “[u]n-der the theory of respondeat superior and based on |sthe fact that Dr. Hill was the supervisor of the unidentified employee who administered the injection.”

On May 21, 2003, defendants filed a “Petition to Allot a Docket Number” in the district court. Ms. Noe amended her complaint on October 23, 2003, to specifically name Nurse Hahn as the female member of the staff of IMG Healthcare who administered the injection. She filed her first amended and supplemental claim on November 6, 2003, to adopt by reference the allegations in her original complaint against Nurse Hahn.

Defendants filed an Exception of Prescription on January 8, 2004, as allowed by La.Rev.Stat. 23:1299.47(B)(2)(a). At the hearing on the exception, the parties stipulated that the district court should consider documentary evidence in lieu of live testimony and submitted Ms. Noe’s affidavit, Ms. Noe’s deposition, and the IMG Healthcare chart (i.e., Ms. Noe’s medical records). The district court granted the exception of prescription on March 9, 2004, without assigning written reasons. The court of appeal affirmed the district court decision dismissing Ms. Noe’s complaint as prescribed, in an unpublished decision. In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings in Matter of Noe, 04-0760 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/8/04), 888 So.2d 1170. This court granted Ms. Noe’s application for supervisory writs, vacated the court of appeal decision, and remanded the case to the court of appeal for consideration in light of Carter, 04-0646, 892 So.2d 1261. In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings in Matter of Noe, 05-0070 (La.4/8/05), 898 So.2d 1289. On remand, the court of appeal reversed the district court judgment, which had granted the defendants’ exception of prescription. In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings in the Matter of Stephanie Noe, 04-0760 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/3/05), 916 So.2d 1138. The court of appeal found that “Dr. Hill’s consistent relationship coupled with his reassurances of recovery and the implementation of [a] one year treatment program, thwarted Ms. Noe’s inclination to bring suit and prevented the claim from prescribing.” Id. at 7-8, 916 So.2d at 1143. This court granted defendants’ application for supervisory writs. In re Medical Review Panel Proceedings in the Matter of Stephanie Noe, 05-2275 (La.4/17/06), 926 So.2d 497.

SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIPTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

Pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 927(B), prescription must be specifically pled by a defendant and cannot be supplied by the court. The burden of proving prescription ordinarily lies with the party raising the exception, but when prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Carter, 04-0646 at 9, 892 So.2d at 1267. Evidence may be presented at the hearing on the exception. Id.

In this case, prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings. The injection that allegedly caused Ms. Noe’s injuries and damages occurred on June 11, 2001, more than a year prior to March 12, 2003, the date on which she filed her medical malpractice complaint. Thus, Ms. Noe had the burden of proving at the hearing on the defendants’ exception of prescription that the claim had not prescribed.

17However, as a general rule, courts are required to strictly construe prescriptive statutes against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished, and therefore, of two possible constructions, to adopt the one that favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, the action. Id. at 10, 892 So.2d at 1269. Further, this court stated as follows in Guitreau v. Kucharchuk, 99-2570 (La.5/16/00), 763 So.2d 575:

The one-year prescriptive period for a medical malpractice action will not begin to run at the earliest possible indication that a patient may have suffered some wrong. Prescription should not be used to force a person who believes he may have been damaged in some way to rush to file suit against every person who might have caused his damage.

Id. at 6, 763 So.2d at 579-80, citing Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420, 423 (La.1987).

Prescription in medical malpractice actions is governed by La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628(A), which provides as follows:

No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, nurse, licensed midwife practitioner, dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital or nursing home duly licensed under the laws of this state, or community blood center or tissue bank as defined in R.S. 40:1299.41(A), whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.

This court has previously recognized that La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628 is a “tripartite prescription provision” that sets forth two prescriptive periods within which a patient may bring a medical malpractice action: (1) one year from the date of the alleged act, or (2) one year from the date of discovery with a three-year limitation from the date of the alleged act. See Carter, 04-0646 at 10, 892 So.2d at 1268, and cases cited therein.

|sThe reality is that, despite the above statute, which establishes a one-year prescriptive period for filing a medical malpractice action, medical malpractice lawsuits are virtually never actually filed in courts of competent jurisdiction within one year of the alleged act of malpractice. Rather, a medical malpractice plaintiff must first provoke a medical review panel, as his ability to file suit is constrained by the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(1). That statute provides as follows:

All malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review panel established as hereinafter provided for in this Section.

As this court stated in LeBreton v. Rabito, in addition to provoking a review panel, a medical malpractice plaintiff “must ... receive an opinion from it before he can file suit in a court of law.” 97-2221, p. 6 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1226, 1229, quoting Everett v. Goldman 359 So.2d 1256, 1263 (La.1978). Because this requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, for medical malpractice plaintiffs to actually file suit within a year of an alleged act of malpractice, a number of suspension principles have been invoked to extend the one-year prescriptive period set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628. Generally, “prescription is suspended when the law, as a favor to somebody, prevents it from running.” 1 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, No. 2697 (12th ed.1939), reprinted in 1 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 593 (La. St. Law Inst. Trans. 1959). The reasons for the suspension principle were set forth as follows by Planiol and Ripert:

Suspension of prescription is a measure of equity, invented through regard for certain persons who are not in a position to interrupt prescription when it is running against them. The law comes to their help by holding, in derogation to general principles, that all the time they remain in such state does not count. The result is that everybody has the normal prescriptive delay within which to interrupt prescription by asserting his rights.

| Jld. at No. 2698, Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2 at 594.

Two situations that operate to suspend prescription in medical malpractice cases are expressly established by La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until ninety days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. The filing of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and soli-dary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review.

The first sentence of the above provision expressly suspends the one-year prescriptive period for filing a medical malpractice action in a court of competent jurisdiction until 90 days following notification of the issuance of the medical review panel’s opinion. The second sentence expressly suspends prescription against all joint and solidary obligors/tortfeasors “to the same extent” prescription has been suspended against one or more other joint or solidary obligors/tortfeasors when a timely request for review has been filed against that obli-gor/tortfeasor.

In addition to the two statutory provisions that suspend prescription in medical malpractice actions, set forth in La.Rev. Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), Louisiana courts have developed a number of jurisprudential exceptions to offset the sometimes harsh results of prescriptive statutes. Carter, 04-0646 at 11, 892 So.2d at 1269. These exceptions are called contra non valentem non currit praescriptio, which literally |inmeans “prescription does not run against a person who could not bring his suit.” Id. The four categories of contra non valentum recognized by this court are as follows:

(1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs action; (2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though this ignorance is not induced by the defendant.

Id. at 11-12, 892 So.2d at 1268. These jurisprudential exceptions to prescription are designed to allow courts “to weigh the ‘equitable nature of the circumstances in each individual case’ to determine whether prescription will be tolled.” Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269.

The continuous treatment doctrine adopted by this court in Carter is based on the third category of contra non valentum listed above, which applies when “the debt- or himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action.” Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269. In fact, this court noted before Carter in In re Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Moses, 00-2643 (La.5/25/01), 788 So.2d 1173, that a suspension of prescription premised on the continuation of a special relationship is always based on the third category of contra non valentum. Id. The doctrine also applies to “situations where an innocent plaintiff has been lulled into a course of inaction in the enforcement of his right by reason of some concealment or fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant, or ^because of his failure to perform some legal duty whereby plaintiff has been kept in ignorance of his rights.” Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269.

Proper consideration of the prescription issues raised by this case requires consideration of both of the statutory prescription principles set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 47:1299.47(A)(2)(a), as well as the jurisprudential suspension principle embodied in the continuous treatment doctrine. I will apply those principles to the two distinct issues raised by this case. First, I will analyze whether Ms. Noe’s Medical Malpractice Complaint against Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare qualified as a timely “filing of [a] request for review of a claim” such that, pursuant to the first sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), the one-year prescription period for filing a medical malpractice action in a court of competent jurisdiction was suspended until ninety days following notification of the issuance of the medical review panel’s opinion. In order to reach that decision, I will consider whether prescription was suspended pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine. Second, I will analyze whether the prescriptive period during which Ms. Noe could amend her Medical Malpractice Complaint to name Nurse Hahn as a defendant jointly liable with Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare was suspended pursuant to the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), such that her amended complaint was timely filed.

CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE

Prior to Carter, this court had declined to address directly the continuous treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases or to recognize the possibility that a doctor’s continuing professional relationship with a patient might, under some circumstances, operate to suspend prescription in a medical malpractice claim. Id. at 12-13, 892 So.2d at 1269. This court noted in Carter that one reason prescription |12is suspended under the continuous treatment doctrine is the fact that, so long as the plaintiff remains in the care of the defendant physician, “she could reasonably expect [or hope for] a correction of the diagnosis or tortious treatment.” Id. at 13, 892 So.2d at 1269.

The court went on in Carter to find, based on the circumstances of that case, that prescription was suspended by virtue of the continuous treatment doctrine because the plaintiff had reasonably relied on the “repeated assurances and ... continuous efforts” of the defendant dentist to correct the extensive dental problems caused by the alleged malpractice, which “served to effectively prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims against him.” Id. at 19, 892 So.2d at 1273. Prescription was suspended, the court found, until the doctor-patient relationship terminated upon the defendant’s refusal to continue treating the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs suit, filed within one year of that date, was timely. Id. at 19, 892 So.2d at 1273.

The Carter case analogized the continuous treatment doctrine to the continuous representation doctrine that was once applied by Louisiana courts in legal malpractice cases “where the professional’s involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship.” Id. at 16, 892 So.2d at 1271, quoting Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624, 630 (La.1992). This court adopted the continuous representation doctrine in legal malpractice cases in Braud v. New England Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 466, 468 (La.1991), in which it cited with approval a number of Louisiana court of appeal cases that had applied the doctrine, including Newsom v. Boothe, 524 So.2d 923 (La. Ap. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 531 So.2d 479 (La.1988); Malone v. Wright, 525 So.2d 13 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988); and Olivier v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 499 So.2d 1330 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986). In Braud, this court characterized the continuous representation doctrine as follows: “[Djuring the attorney’s continuous representation of the client regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred, prescription will be suspended.” 576 So.2d at 468. See Carter, 04-0646 at 15, quoting Lima, 595 So.2d at 630, quoting Braud.

The continuous representation doctrine in legal malpractice cases was grounded on the premise that an attorney’s decision to continue to represent a client induces the client to continue to depend on the attorney’s expertise to resolve the pending legal issue. In Carter, this court noted the analogous principle that in a medical malpractice case, “[i]t is the continuation of the special relationship that offers the possibility of correction of the injury and thus may postpone the running of prescription.” 04-0646 at 13, 892 So.2d at 1269. Like the continuing representation doctrine in legal malpractice cases, the continuing treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases applies “where the professional’s involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general professional relationship.” Id. at 16, 892 So.2d at 1271, quoting Lima, 595 So.2d at 630.

I agree with the court of appeal that Ms. Noe has carried her burden in this case of proving that prescription was suspended by virtue of the continuous treatment doctrine adopted by this court in Carter. This court adopted two elements in Carter luthat must be established by a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action seeking to avail herself of the benefits of the continuous treatment doctrine to suspend prescription:

(1) a continuing treatment relationship that is more than perfunctory, during which (2) the physician engaged in conduct which served to prevent the patient from availing herself of her cause of action, such as attempting to rectify an alleged act of malpractice.

04-0646 at 16, 892 So.2d at 1271. Ms. Noe established the first of those two elements through her testimony that she had selected Dr. Hill as her personal care physician in 1998 and that he had continued in that capacity between 1998 and 2002. Further, the IMG Healthcare records establish that Ms. Noe sought treatment from Dr. Hill on at least four occasions during the nine-month period following the injection. Obviously, their physician-patient relationship was more than perfunctory.

Defendants’ primary argument is that Ms. Noe failed to establish the second of the two elements — i.e., that Dr. Hill did not engage in conduct that discouraged Ms. Noe from filing suit, such as “attempting to rectify an alleged act of malpractice.” Defendants claim that the continuous treatment doctrine should not apply because the relationship between Ms. Noe and Dr. Hill was “merely continuity of a general professional relationship,” rather than “involvement after the alleged malpractice ... for the performance of the same or related services.” Id. In support of this argument, they point to the fact that the IMG Healthcare record includes only two notations by Dr. Hill indicating that Ms. Noe sought treatment for continuing problems related to the injection site. The first of those two notations appears in Dr. Hill’s note concerning Ms. Noe’s August 6, 2001, visit that occurred approximately six weeks after the injection. The second of those notations appears in Dr. Hill’s note concerning Ms. Noe’s visit on April 3, 2002, ten months after the injection, when he referred her to a neurologist. Because Dr. Hill’s notes concerning Ms. Noe’s December 17, 2001, and her January 25, 2002, visits include no notation that Ms. Noe 11Rcomplained about the injection site, defendants argue that, beyond August 6, 2001, Dr. Hill provided no treatment for that problem.

To the contrary, Ms. Noe directs this court’s attention to her deposition and affidavit, in which she stated that she consulted Dr. Hill with complaints about the injection site on at least four occasions, including the December 17, 2001, visit, when, according to Ms. Noe, Dr. Hill in fact checked the injection site. Furthermore, Ms. Noe stated in her affidavit that she spoke to Dr. Hill by telephone between the August and December visits regarding the injection site, and that Dr. Hill consistently told her that he was confident about his diagnosis that she was suffering from an allergic reaction to the Celestone. Moreover, according to Ms. Noe, Dr. Hill placed her on a one-year exercise program to strengthen her buttock muscles and encouraged her on several occasions to continue with the program when she questioned his diagnosis.

In Blanchard v. Reeves, 469 So.2d 1165 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 347 (La.1985), a case that applied the analogous continuous representation doctrine in a legal malpractice case, the court noted that either the defendant attorney did not know that continuing to represent the plaintiff after the cause had prescribed was a conflict of interest, or the defendant attorney had failed to disclose a conflict of interest that he knew existed. 469 So.2d at 1168. Either way, the court implied, the continuous representation doctrine suspended prescription. If the attorney was unaware of the conflict, “he would have us impose on his client a greater burden of legal knowledge than he possessed,” the court stated Id.

An analogous rule applies here. The defendants would have us find that, because Ms. Noe expressed a suspicion that she might have suffered nerve damage as a result of the injection, her medical malpractice claim prescribed because she did not file her medical malpractice complaint within one year of the date the injection | u;was administered. However, if it were to find that Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice complaint is prescribed, this court would be imposing on Ms. Noe a “greater burden of medical knowledge” than Dr. Hill possessed. Otherwise, Dr. Hill intentionally misled Ms. Noe concerning the nature of her injury, which itself would be sufficient to suspend prescription in this case.

Further, in Braud, 576 So.2d 466, in which this court first adopted the continuing representation doctrine for legal malpractice cases, the court noted that a finding that prescription ran during the existence of an on-going attorney-client relationship “would create a situation where an attorney could effectively defeat a malpractice claim against himself by utilizing the appeals process to continue the attorney-client relationship until such time as prescription has run.” Again, that reasoning applies to this case. A finding that Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim prescribed one year from the date of the injection would create a situation where Dr. Hill could have defeated her medical malpractice claim simply by misdiagnosing her problem, then prescribing a one-year course of treatment during which prescription would run. Such a result would be untenable. Accordingly, the majority has correctly found that prescription in Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim was suspended pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine until the professional relationship between Ms. Noe and Dr. Hill was terminated.

That conclusion leads me to the question of whether Ms. Noe’s claim was timely filed on March 12, 2003. When, as in this case, prescription has been suspended by virtue of the third category of contra non valentum, prescription does not run until the reason for the suspension is removed. The injection that allegedly caused Ms. Noe’s damage was administered on June 11, 2001, but Ms. Noe’s physician-patient relationship with Dr. Hill continued until at least April 3, 2002, the |17last time she saw Dr. Hill, when he referred her to a neurologist. Because Ms. Noe’s relationship with Dr. Noe did not terminate until April 3, 2002, at the earliest, prescription did not begin to run until that date.' Accordingly, her Medical Malpractice Complaint filed on March 12, 2003, within one year of April 3, 2002, was timely.

PRESCRIPTION AGAINST JOINT AND SOLIDARY OBLIGORS

Nurse Hahn has argued in this court that, even if the continuous treatment principle applies in this case to suspend prescription against Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare, Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim against Nurse Hahn is nevertheless barred by prescription because it was not filed within one year of the date of the injection, June 11, 2001, and Ms. Noe has not alleged that Nurse Hahn provided any treatment, continuing or otherwise, to Ms. Noe, after that date. The majority has accepted that argument and found that Ms. Noe’s claims against Nurse Hahn, as well as Ms. Noe’s vicarious liability claims against Dr. Hill, are barred by prescription.

The majority’s finding that Ms. Noe’s claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed, despite the fact that her claim against Dr. Hill has not prescribed, fails to give proper effect to La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), which provides as follows:

The filing of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review.

Pursuant to the express language of La. Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), when a request for review of a medical malpractice claim has been timely filed, that request suspends prescription against all joint and solidary obligors “to the same extent” prescription is suspended against the subject of the request [i.e., the complained of |1smedical provider], even if those joint and solidary obligors are not named in the request.

According to La. Civ.Code art. 2324(B), “liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation.” Under the facts of this case, as alleged by Ms. Noe, Nurse Hahn is clearly a solidary obligor with Dr. Hill. It was allegedly Nurse Hahn’s direct negligence of administering the Celestone injection in the wrong location or in an improper manner that initially caused Ms. Noe’s damages. Thereafter, Ms. Noe consulted Dr. Hill about the problems allegedly caused by the injection, and he allegedly told Ms. Noe that she had experienced an allergic reaction or a muscular injury that could be resolved by undertaking a one-year exercise program. Dr. Hill then continued to treat Ms. Noe for some nine months, seeking to resolve the specific medical problem allegedly caused by the injection that Nurse Hahn had improperly administered. Thus, Ms. Noe’s damages in this case were allegedly caused by two or more persons — Nurse Hahn and Dr. Hill. I would find that Ms. Noe’s allegations outlined above, if proven after trial of this matter, are sufficient to support a judgment that Ms. Noe’s damages were “caused by two or more persons” — i.e., Dr. Hill and Nurse Hahn, and thus that Dr. Hill and Nurse Hahn are jointly liable for those damages.

In order to properly interpret the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), some historical perspective is helpful. The medical malpractice statute has, since the original adoption of the Medical Malpractice Act by the 1975 Louisiana Legislature, included a requirement that all medical malpractice claims be submitted to a medical review panel prior to the filing of suit and has also provided |iafor suspension of prescription until 90 days after issuance of the medical review panel’s opinion. However, the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47 at issue here, which suspends prescription against all joint and solidary obligors when prescription has been suspended against one of them, was not added until 1991. The original 1991 amendment provided only that the filing of a request for review of a medical malpractice claim “shall suspend the running of prescription against all solidary obligors,” and did not mention joint obligors or joint tortfeasors. The provision was then amended by the 1997 Louisiana Legislature to include today’s language that joint obligors/tortfeasors are persons against whom prescription is suspended as a result of the filing of a request for review of a medical malpractice claim. The current language, quoted above, has been in the statute since 1997.

Prior to the 1991 adoption of the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), which includes a specific suspension principle applicable to soli-dary obligors, Louisiana law contained no express provision governing the effect of the timely filing of a medical malpractice claim against a joint or solidary obligor on medical malpractice claims against other joint or solidary obligors. However, the general tort law did contain a number of such provisions governing interruption of prescription against joint or solidary obli-gors by the filing of suit against one or more such joint or solidary obligors. See La. Civ.Code arts. 1799, La. Civ.Code art. 12n2324(C), and La. Civ.Code art. 3503. Prior to the adoption of the suspension principle applicable to solidary obligors in medical malpractice cases, this court held in Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, 486 So.2d 717 (La.1986), that prescription in medical malpractice cases could be interrupted against joint and solidary obligors pursuant to the general tort rules by the filing of a medical malpractice claim against another solidary obligor. See Whitnell v. Menville, 540 So.2d 304, 308 (La.1989).

Further, despite the adoption of the suspension principles relative to solidary and joint obligors/tortfeasors in medical malpractice cases, several Louisiana cases decided since the adoption of those provisions have continued the practice of applying the principles developed by Louisiana courts to interpret the interruption principles set forth in general tort law to determine whether a medical malpractice claim has been timely filed against a joint or solidary obligor with the health care provider named in the original complaint. See, e.g., Geiger v. State ex rel. Dept. of Health & Hosp., 01-2206 (La.4/12/02), 815 So.2d 80; Pfiffner v. Correa, 9102734 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/13/94), 640 So.2d 281. Specifically, in Geiger, this court stated that prescription cannot be suspended after it has run, then cited a case that stated only that prescription cannot be interrupted after it has run. 01-2206 at 5, 815 So.2d at 83. In Pfiffner, the court noted generally that prescription as to one solidary obligor is suspended pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) by the filing of a medical review claim against any other solidary obligor, but then held that as long as a suit was pending prescription was interrupted as to the other solidary obligors. Neither of those cases clearly distinguish between suspension of prescription and interruption of prescription.

The only Louisiana case I have found that directly addresses the effect of the portion of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) that suspends prescription against joint and solidary obligors/tortfeasors is Masters v. Fields, 27924, 27925 (La.App.2d Cir.1/24/96), 666 So.2d 1333. In Masters, the court of appeal addressed both whether prescription had been interrupted against an alleged solidary obligor in a medical malpractice case under the general tort law and whether prescription had been suspended against that solidary obli-gor under La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). First, the court of appeal found that prescription was not interrupted pursuant to general tort law because a “medical malpractice action against one alleged solidary obligor does not have the effect of interrupting prescription that has already run against another alleged solidary obligor.” Id. at 6, 666 So.2d at 1337, citing Whitnell, 540 So.2d 304. The court went on to find that the plaintiffs filing of a medical malpractice complaint against one solidary obligor did not suspend prescription as to another pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). The reason for this finding was summarily stated as follows: “We conclude that LSA-R.S. 40:1299:47(A)(2)(a) cannot save plaintiffs claim because if prescription cannot be interrupted once it has accrued, a fortiori, neither can it be suspended.” Id.

In short, despite the fact the Masters court did distinguish between interruption and suspension of prescription, it ultimately applied a jurisprudential rule developed I apfor cases applying the interruption of prescription principle set forth in general tort law to the suspension of prescription principle set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). Application of that rule was made by the Masters court without citation to any authority and without any analysis of the similarities and differences between interruption of prescription under general tort law and suspension of prescription under La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). For the reasons set forth below, I disagree with the statement of the court of appeal in Masters that, if prescription cannot been interrupted, it cannot be suspended.

First, I note that this court held in LeBreton, 97-2221, 714 So.2d 1226, “that the specific statutory provision providing for the suspension of prescription in the context of medical malpractice [must be] applied alone, not complementary to the more general codal article which addresses interruption of prescription.” Id. at 2, 714 So.2d at 1227 (emphases added). The primary issue in LeBreton did not concern the portion of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) that extends a suspension of prescription against one joint or solidary obligor to all joint and solidary obligors. Rather, the primary issue was whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action could file a premature lawsuit in a court of competent jurisdiction, then file a request for a medical review panel, thereby taking advantage of both the interruption of prescription triggered by the filing of suit and the suspension of prescription triggered by the filing of the request for review of a medical malpractice claim. Nevertheless, this court found in LeBreton that the “more general codal article which addresses interruption of prescription” should not be applied in medical malpractice cases, because such cases are expressly governed by the suspension of prescription rule set forth in La.Rev. Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a). That finding in LeBreton demonstrates that application of principles developed in cases interpreting interruption of | ¡^prescription to this case, which involves suspension of prescription under La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), is inappropriate. It follows that the court of appeal in Masters improperly applied a rule developed to interpret interruption of prescription to decide whether plaintiffs claim against the alleged solidary obligor had been suspended.

A second reason I disagree with the court’s treatment of the suspension issue in Masters is grounded in the fact that important distinctions exist between interruption of prescription and suspension of prescription, despite the fact they are often treated by Louisiana courts as though they were the same. See the above discussion of Geiger, Masters and Pfiffner. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that prescription is interrupted in three ways. Pursuant to La. Civ.Code art. 3462, prescription is interrupted (1) by the filing of suit or (2) by the service of process. Further, La. Civ.Code art. 3464 provides for interruption of prescription, (3), by acknowledgment. Thus, when suit has been filed, when process has been served, or when a right has been acknowledged, prescription is interrupted, “the time that has run is not counted,” and “[prescription commences to run anew from the last day of the interruption.” La. Civ.Code art. 3466. Planiol and Ripert described the effect of interruption of prescription as follows:

where the suit is introduced in time, the court in giving its judgment, should refer back to the beginning of the suit in order to determine the rights of the parties.

1 Planiol and Ripert, No. 2692, reprinted in 1 Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 592.

On the other hand, suspension of prescription is triggered, typically not because of some specific action taken by the plaintiff, as occurs when prescription is interrupted, but because of the existence of a relationship of trust between the plaintiff and defendant. This conclusion is evident in the provisions of La. Civ.Code |¡,4art. 3469, which provides that prescription is suspended “as between: the spouses during marriage, parents and children during minority, tutors and minors during tutorship, [ ] curators and interdicts during interdiction, and caretakers and minors during minority.” According to Planiol and Ripert, “[suspension is a measure of equity, invented through regard for certain persons who are not in a position to interrupt prescription when it is running against them.” 1 Planiol and Ripert, No. 2698, reprinted in 1 Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 594. Further, “the causes of suspension are founded precisely on the same principle as the initial delay ... for the period of prescription: the impossibility to act.” Id. at No. 680, reprinted in 1 Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 368.

Reference to the above authorities reveals that the policies underlying the civilian doctrines of interruption of prescription and suspension of prescription are very different. According to Planiol and Ripert, the purpose of interruption of prescription is, in the case of a successful lawsuit, to fix the rights of the parties at the time prescription is interrupted by the filing of suit, the service of process, or acknowledgment of a right. The purpose of suspension, however, is to protect the rights of parties who are unable to take an action that will interrupt prescription. 1 Plainol and Ripert, No. 2698, reprinted in 1 Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 594. Given the vast difference in the policies underlying the two doctrines, the jurisprudential rules applicable to interruption of prescription should not be applied to determine whether prescription has been suspended. For this reason also, the court of appeal’s adoption in Masters of an interruption principle to interpret a statutory suspension provision was improper.

La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) expressly provides for suspension of prescription against all unnamed joint and solidary obli-gors/tortfeasors when | ^prescription has been suspended against at least one joint or solidary obligor by virtue of the timely filing of a medical malpractice review complaint. The majority has found in this case that, despite the fact that Ms. Noe did not file her request for review of her medical malpractice claim against Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare until more than a year after the injection, her request was timely by virtue of the continuous treatment doctrine, the operation of which rendered Ms. Noe “legally unable” to file suit until the doctor-patient relationship terminated. Under the express language of the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), the timely filing of Ms. Noe’s request for review against Dr. Hill suspended the running of prescription against all of his joint obligors/tortfeasors, including Nurse Hahn, “to the same extent” prescription was suspended against Dr. Hill. Thus, I would find that Ms. Noe was free to amend her petition to add Nurse Hahn as an additional defendant, jointly liable with Dr. Hill, at any time within 90 days following notification of the issuance of the medical review panel opinion. Because no medical review panel opinion, had been issued prior to the trial on the exception of prescription in this case, Ms. Noe’s amended Medical Malpractice Complaint naming Nurse Hahn as a defendant for the first time was timely when filed on October 23, 2003, pursuant to the express language of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).

This interpretation of the language of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) fulfills this court’s obligation to strictly construe prescriptive statutes against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished, and to adopt, of two possible constructions, the one that favors main-taming as opposed to barring the action. Carter, 04-0646 at 10, 892 So.2d at 1269. My interpretation of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) also serves the policy considerations underlying suspension of prescription in general. According to Pla-ntel and Ripert, the primary principle ^underlying the suspension doctrine is the same as the principle underlying the initial delay in a period of prescription — i.e., “the impossibility to act.” 1 Planiol and Ripert at No. 680, reprinted in 1 Civil Law Treatise, part 2, 368. Because it is impossible to act, prescription does not run so long as it is suspended. Id. If prescription did not run [or begin to run] during the time Ms. Noe was involved in a continuous treatment relationship with Dr. Hill, her claim against Nurse Hahn cannot be barred by prescription.

From a practical point of view, when two health care providers are alleged to be jointly or solidarity liable for the plaintiffs damages caused by medical malpractice, a finding that prescription was suspended against one, but not the other, as the majority has found in this case, is inequitable and unworkable because it places the plaintiff in an untenable position. In fact, the majority’s finding that Ms. Noe’s claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed necessarily presupposes that Ms. Noe should have had the foresight to file her request for review against Nurse Hahn within one year of the date of the injection. However, for most of that year, Ms. Noe was participating in an on-going relationship of trust with Dr. Hill, who ordered the injection as Nurse Hahn’s supervisor. Because Nurse Hahn was acting on the orders of Dr. Hill when she administered the injection to Ms. Noe, any suit against Nurse Hahn would logically have to include Dr. Hill as a defendant. Thus, the majority’s decision places Ms. Hill in the unenviable position of having to choose whether to risk the loss of her rights against Nurse Hahn or terminate her relationship of trust with Dr. Hill by filing suit against Dr. Hill and Nurse Hahn. And, Ms. Noe is required to make this choice during a period of time when she is considered to be “legally unable” to file her suit against Dr. Hill because of the on-going continuous treatment relationship in which they were involved, a relationship that serves to 1^prevent prescription from running. Thus, the result of the majority’s finding that Ms. Noe’s claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed is that the continuing treatment doctrine has no practical effect in cases where the plaintiffs damages were allegedly caused by the joint or solidary liability of more than one health care provider, only one of whom is providing continuous treatment. I would decline to limit the continuous treatment doctrine in such a way that the plaintiff is placed in that position.

For the reasons stated herein, I would find that the court of appeal correctly denied the exception of prescription filed by Nurse Hahn. Thus, I dissent from the portion of the majority decision that finds that Ms. Noe’s medical malpractice claim against Nurse Hahn and her vicarious liability claims against Dr. Hill are prescribed. I would affirm the court of appeal decision in its entirety.

KIMBALL, J.

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

LWhile I agree that the claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed and that the vicarious liability claim against Dr. Hill arising under the doctrine of respondeat superior is also prescribed, I dissent from the court’s conclusion that the introduction of Ms. Noe’s affidavit and deposition at the hearing on the exception of prescription expanded the pleadings to include a claim against Dr. Hill arising out of his own independent negligence.

VICTORY, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

|H concur in the portion of the per cu-riam opinion finding that the claim against Nurse Hahn is prescribed and the vicarious liability claim against Dr. Hill is prescribed. I dissent from the portion of the opinion which holds that plaintiff has asserted a claim against Dr. Hill for his own independent negligence in treating plaintiff and that such claim has not prescribed. In my view, the “continuous treatment rule” developed and applied in Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646 (La.1/19/95), 892 So.2d 1261, is wrong and does not operate to suspend prescription in this medical malpractice case, filed well after one year from the date of any alleged malpractice.

Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

KNOLL, J.,

dissenting in part and concurring in part.

I dissent, in part, and concur, in part, for the reasons assigned by Calogero, C.J.

      . This court's order addressed its recent ruling in Carter and the application of an incorrect date concerning Ms. Noe's visit to Dr. Frank Wharton, stating:
      Granted; the court of appeal’s ruling is vacated and the case is remanded to the court of appeal to reconsider the prescrip-lion issue (1) in light of this Court’s recent decision in Carter v. Haygood, 892 So.2d 1261 (La.1/19/05) involving the application of the third category of contra non valen-tem, and (2) applying the correct date of March 27, 2002 as the date Ms. Noe visited Dr. Frank Wharton.

      . Ms. Noe's only allegation against Dr. Hill in her medical malpractice complaint was based on his vicarious liability for Nurse Hahn’s actions. However, as the majority finds, Ms. Noe's pleadings were expanded by the introduction of her affidavit and deposition at the hearing on the defendants' exception of prescription to allege independent negligence against Dr. Hill. See La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1154.

      . La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(B)(2)(a) provides as follows:
      A health care provider, against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, may raise any exception or defenses available pursuant to R.S. 9:5628 in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue at any time without need for completion of the review process by the medical review panel.

      . I note that this statement is consistent with La. Civ.Code art. 3469, which provides for suspension of prescription “as between: the spouses during marriage, parents and children during minority, tutors and minors during tutorship, and curators and interdicts during interdiction, and caretakers and minors during minority.” All of the listed situations involve relationships of trust that should not be undermined by a need to “race to the courthouse” to file suit when the problems can perhaps be resolved by continuation of the relationship. In each of the listed situations, and in the continuous treatment situation, a resort to suit becomes necessary only if the relationship breaks down to the point that it terminates.

      . In Reeder v. North, 97-0239 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, this court held that the continuous representation doctrine no longer operates in legal malpractice bases to suspend prescription because the one- and three-year periods of limitation in legal malpractice cases established by La.Rev.Stat. 9:5605 are peremptive in nature and thus “may not be renounced interrupted, or suspended,” and because contra non valentum does not apply to peremption. Nevertheless, this court in Carter, 04-0646, 892 So.2d 1261, analogized the continuous treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases to the continuous representation rule in legal malpractice cases, and applied principles originally developed in continuous representation legal malpractice cases. The Reeder decision was not mentioned in Carter, even by the dissenters. Thus, I would continue the practice began in Carter of applying the principles developed in continuous representation legal malpractice cases by analogy to this continuous treatment medical malpractice case.

      . The only exception to that rule arises when two or more people conspire together to "commit an intentional or willful act,” in which case those two people are "answerable, in solido ..., for the damage caused by such act.” La. Civ.Code art. 2324(A).

      . Even before 1991, La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41(G) provided that the filing of a timely medical malpractice review request suspended prescription in medical malpractice cases with regard to solidary obligors who were non-qualifíed health care providers under the Medical Malpractice Act. That provision was clarified in 1991 and now specifically refers to the suspension principle regarding joint and solidary obligors/tortfeasors set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a).

      . La. Civ.Code art. 1799 provides as follows:
      The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors and their heirs.

      . La. Civ.Code art. 2324(C) provides as follows:
      Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors.

      . La. Civ.Code art. 3503 provides as follows:
      When prescription is interrupted against a solidary obligor, the interruption is effective against all solidary obligors and their successors.
      When prescription is interrupted against a successor of a solidary obligor, the interruption is effective against other successors if the obligation is indivisible. If the obligation is divisible, the interruption is effective against other successors only for the portions for which they are bound.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JOHNSON, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SUPREME SERVICES AND SPECIALTY CO., INC. v. SONNY GREER, INC., et al.
    No. 2006-C-1827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 22, 2007.

      James Ryan III & Associates, Timothy Taney Roniger, Carroll Devillier, Jr., James Ryan, III, New Orleans, for Applicant.
    Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, Cynthia J. Thomas, New Orleans, Melancon & Associates, William Lee Me-lancon, Lafayette, The Law Offices of David Groner, David W. Groner, New Iberia, Voories & Labbe, Richard D. Chap-puis, Jr., Lafayette, for Respondent.
    Laura A. Foggan, John C. Yang, Katherine L. Van Pelt, Kevin Richard Tully, New Orleans, and Howard Carter Marshall, for Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association Amicus Curiae.
   JOHNSON, Justice.

|TWe granted this writ application to address whether the commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy at issue provides coverage to the insured for liability arising out of defective work performed by the insured’s subcontractor at a construction site. AXA Global Risk U.S. Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as “AXA”), the contractor’s insurer, filed this writ to review the court of appeal’s decision in Supreme Services and Specialty Co. Inc. v. Sonny Greer, Inc., 04-1400 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So.2d 1077, which reversed the trial court’s granting of the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that the CGL policy clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage of faulty workmanship performed by, or on behalf of, the contractor. For the following reasons, we reverse the court of appeal’s ruling and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 4, 1996, Supreme Services and Specialty Company, Inc. (“Supreme”) contracted with Sonny Greer, Inc., d/b/a Sonny Greer Construction ^Company, Inc. (“Greer”) for the construction of an Oilfield Service Facility in Iberia Parish. Several subcontractors were involved in the construction project, i.e., clearing the site, compacting the area, delivering and pouring the concrete for the building’s slab and the parking lot. Greer’s President, Bridgette Greer, supervised the subcontractors who poured the concrete at this facility. Shortly after the concrete was poured, Supreme complained of cracks in the concrete in both the building and exterior slabs. Thereafter, Greer cut out the cracked sections and poured a new slab in its place. In an effort to satisfy Supreme, Greer signed an agreement which warranted against defects caused by its workmanship in pouring and finishing the concrete. Greer made several attempts to correct the cracking problem; however, the cracks continued to worsen. After the completion of the construction project, Supreme filed suit against its contractor, Greer, and the architect, Melvin J. Oubre, to recover damages resulting from Greer’s alleged faulty and defective design and construction of the concrete slabs, arguing breach of contract and breach of the warranty agreement. In response, Greer filed an answer and a third party demand against its insurer, AXA, pursuant to the CGL policy issued to Greer.

Thereafter, AXA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the “work product” exclusion section 1, paragraph 2(1) of the policy expressly excluded | ¡¡coverage for improper construction by the insured’s own workers or any of its subcontractors. Greer argued that the language in the policy was identical to the language in the policy in Mike Hooks v. JACO Services, Inc., 674 So.2d 1125 (La.App. 3 Cir.1996), writ denied, 681 So.2d 1264 (La.1996), where the court of appeal found that the CGL policy covered the damages alleged.

The trial court granted AXA’s motion for summary judgment and denied Greer’s motion for summary judgment, explaining that:

The issue before the court is whether the hvork product’ exclusions in the CGL policy exclude coverage to Sonny Greer, Inc. The pertinent exclusion in the policy reads as follows: Property damage to.. [.](6) that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it. 19. “Your work” means: a. work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and b. Material, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.

The trial court concluded that the policy exclusion’s language is clear and unambiguous and allows for no other interpretation but that “... this particular exclusion does exclude the particular work that was incorrectly performed by Sonny Greer on this piece of property.” The trial court rejected Greer’s argument that Paragraph L (under said subsection “Damage to your Work”) creates an ambiguity. Greer appealed from this ruling.

The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling and found that the work performed by Greer and its subcontractors was covered under the CGL policy. Specifically, the court of appeal held that: 1) the “work product” exclusion was inapplicable to the work performed by the subcontractors and 2) the “products-completed operations hazard” (PCOH) provision was ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of coverage. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal ^distinguished Vintage Contracting, L.L.C. v. Dixie Building Material Company, Inc., 03-422 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/16/03), 858 So.2d 22, where the court of appeal found that the CGL policy excluded coverage for the damages alleged. The court of appeal concluded that part “1” of the CGL is inapplicable to subcontractors and constitutes an exception to the “work product” exclusion, and creates a conflict with part “(2)(j)(5),” which purports to exclude coverage for the work-product of subcontractors as well as the insured.

In relying on Mike Hooks, Inc. v. JACO Services, Inc., 95-01485 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 1125, writ denied, 96-1924 (La.11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1264, the court of appeal found that the CGL policy provides coverage under the PCOH provision. It further found that the ambiguity in the “work product” and PCOH exclusions should be interpreted against the insurer. AXA filed a writ application with this Court.

This Court granted AXA’s writ application to review and resolve the conflict among the circuits in applying the “work product” exclusion. Supreme Services and Specialty Co. Inc., v. Sonny Greer, Inc., 06-1827 (La.11/9/06), 941 So.2d 28.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

This Court has determined that the appellate courts must review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773. Initially, the movant bears the burden of proof. LSA— C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the movant successfully meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the other party to present factual support adequate to establish that he/she will be able to satisfy the evidentia-ry burden at trial. Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137. If the other party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id.

In Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750, this Court recognized that:

a “genuine issue” is a “triable issue.” ... “An issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. If ... reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue.” ... [A] “fact is ‘material’ when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.” Id.

According to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B), a motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A court should only grant the motion for summary judgment when the facts are taken into account and it is clear that the provisions of the insurance policy do not afford coverage. Reynolds v. Select, 93-1480 (La.4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183.

An insurance policy is a conventional obligation that constitutes the law between the insured and the insurer, and the agreement governs the nature of their relationship. LSA-C.C. art. 1983. An insurance policy is a contract, which must be | (¡construed employing the general rules of interpretation of contracts. Reynolds, at 634 So.2d at 1183; LSA-C.C. arts. 2045-2057. If the insurance policy’s language clearly expresses the parties’ intent and does not violate a statute or public policy, the policy must be enforced as written. However, if the insurance policy is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, then it is considered ambiguous and must be liberally interpreted in favor of coverage. Reynolds, supra; Newby v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 99-0098 (La.App. 5 Cir.6/1/99), 738 So.2d 93.

Liability insurance policies should be interpreted to effect, rather than to deny coverage. Yount v. Maisano, 627 So.2d 148, 151 (La.1993). However, it is well-settled that unless a statute or public policy dictates otherwise, the insurers may limit liability and impose such reasonable conditions or limitations upon their insureds. Reynolds, 634 So.2d at 1183; Livingston Parish School Board v. Fireman’s Fund American Insurance Company, 282 So.2d 478 (La.1973); Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distributing Company, 292 So.2d 190 (La.1974). In these circumstances, unambiguous provisions limiting liability must be given effect. Jones v. MFA Mutual Insurance Company, 398 So.2d 10 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981); Snell v. Stein, 261 La. 358, 259 So.2d 876 (La.1972); Niles v. American Bankers Insurance Company, 258 So.2d 705 (La.App. 3 Cir.1972). With that stated, we note that the insurer bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion. Blackburn v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 00-2668 (La.4/3/01), 784 So.2d 637, 641.

| ^ANALYSIS

Now, we turn to the language of the subject insurance policy to determine whether the court of appeal erred in finding coverage existed for the damages claimed as a matter of law.

AXA’s CGL policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

SECTION I — COVERAGES
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement.
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies.
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory;” and
(2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs during the policy period.
2. Exclusions.
This insurance does not apply to: ....
j.Damage to Property “Property damage” to:
(1) Property you own, rent or occupy;
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.

Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to “property damage”. included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”

k. Damage to Your Product
| ¿‘Property damage” to “your product” arising out of it or any part of it.
l. Damage to Your Work
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and included in the “products-completed operations hazard.” This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.
SECTION V — DEFINITIONS
14. a. “Products-completed operations hazard” includes all “bodily injury” and “property damage” occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of “your product” or “your work” except:
(1) Products that are still in your physical possession; or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned.
b. “Your work” will be deemed completed at the earliest of the following times:
(1) When all of the work called for in your contract has been completed.
(2) When all of the work to be done at the site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more than one site.
(3) When that part of the work done at a job site has been put to its intended use by any person or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor working on the same project.
Work that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement, but which is otherwise complete, will be treated as completed.
c. This hazard does not include “bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of:
(1) The transportation of property....
(2) The existence of tools....
(3) Products or operations for which the classification in this Coverage Part or in our manual of rules includes products or completed operations.
15. “Property damage” means:
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occurrence” that caused it.
1917. “Your product” means:
a. Any goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, distributed or disposed of by:
(1) You;
(2) Others trading under your name; or
(3) A person or organization whose business or assets you have acquired; and
b. Containers (other than vehicles), materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such goods or products.
“Your product” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of “your product;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.
19. “Your work” means:
a. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.
“Your work” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of “your work;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions.

(Emphasis Added.)

Professors McKenzie and Johnson define both the “work product” exclusion and the “PCOH” provision. See, § 186, pp. 512-521 and § 195, at pp. 554-562 in 15 La. Civil Law Treatise (3d ed.2006). The “work product” exclusion reflects the insurance company’s intent to “avoid the possibility that coverage under a CGL policy will be used to repair and replace the insured’s defective products and faulty workmanship.” A CGL policy is not written to guarantee the quality of the insured’s work or product. McMath Const. Co., Inc. v. Dupuy, 03-1413 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/17/04), 897 So.2d 677, 682, writ denied, 04-3085 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 40. They also explain that exclusions (2)(j)(5) and (6) apply while the insured’s work is in process, i.e., the work is not yet completed. These exclusions apply to any property Lnthat must be restored, repaired, or replaced because of the insured’s or the subcontractor’s faulty workmanship; however, exclusion (j)(6) does not apply to property damages in the PCOH. On the other hand, the PCOH provision, which is outlined in exclusions (2)(k)and (l), applies only to property within that hazard after the work is completed. These provisions apply only to the contractor’s work and not to subcontractors. McKenzie, at pp. 561-62.

In reviewing the policy, we note that “work” is defined as those operations performed by Greer (the contractor) and/or the subcontractors, who performed on behalf of Greer. Here, the “work,” in question, includes all the work associated with laying the concrete slab performed by Greer and its subcontractors. We find that a reading of the exclusionary language in this liability policy makes it clear that damage to the product itself (the concrete slabs) is excluded from coverage.

In Vintage, the court of appeal specifically held that CGL coverage is excluded when the contractor is required to replace a subcontractor’s concrete slab, and damages claimed were consequences of the alleged defective workmanship. The In court of appeal also held that the PCOH provision excluded coverage when the contractor’s work was not completed when the slab was replaced.

We find that the exclusionary clauses in Vintage are parallel to the provisions in AXA’s CGL policy. Similarly, we find that AXA’s CGL policy clearly excludes coverage for the damage to the property on which Greer, and/or its subcontractor, worked. Furthermore, the CGL policy excludes coverage to property (concrete slab) that must be repaired or replaced because the work performed by Greer, or on its behalf, was incorrectly performed. Thus, we find that the court of appeal erred in concluding that the CGL provided coverage for the work performed, and that the “work product” exclusion was inapplicable.

With respect to whether there is an inherent conflict between the PCOH clause and the “work product” exclusions in the CGL policy, we must analyze Hooks, supra, where the court found that the CGL policy was ambiguous as it relates to the PCOH exclusion.

Prior to the Hooks’ decision, the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits of the court of appeal, as well as the federal district courts of Louisiana, consistently held that the PCOH exclusion applied not to the faulty work itself, but to other damage that |iamight arise from the faulty work. It is for that reason that these circuits have criticized the Hooks’ decision.

Hooks can easily be distinguished from the case at hand. Although both cases involve CGL policies which contain somewhat similar provisions, the case sub judice falls squarely within the “work product” exclusion, which precludes coverage for faulty workmanship. In Hooks, JACO’s work product — the installation of bearings — i.e., defective work, fractured the crank shaft, which resulted in additional damages and the use of another dredge. Unlike Hooks, in the present case, there is no evidence of any injured third person or product as a result of the damaged property which would have triggered the protection of the PCOH. Thus, this case does not fall within the latter provision, but falls within the “work product” exclusion.

In Joe Banks Drywall & Acoustics, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins., Co., 32,743 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00), 753 So.2d 980, the court noted that:

Typically, a commercial liability policy divides the hazards to which a commercial enterprise may be exposed into two categories: (1) hazards arising from an enterprise’s operations that are not yet complete and from conditions of the enterprise’s premises; and (2) hazards arising from an enterprise’s completed work that was done away from the enterprise’s premises.... Nothing in the policy, however, limits the exclusions discussed above from application to both categories of hazards; and application of the exclusion for property damage to “your work” does not eliminate all risks covered by the products-completed operations coverage.

Id. at p. 985.

The court rejected the holding in Hooks that a PCOH clause was ambiguous when read in conjunction with the “work-products” exclusions of a CGL policy. Instead, the court held that the CGL policy’s language unambiguously excluded |, ¡¡coverage for construction defects. The court concluded that the CGL policy was not ambiguous, and the policy provided no coverage for the property damage.

Similarly, in Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, L.L.C. v. AmClyde Engineered Products, Inc., 2003 WL 21396773 (E.D.La., 6/11/03), the court rejected the Hooks’ decision and held that there was no ambiguity between the “work product” exclusion and the PCOH provision. The court explained that:

The products hazard definition allows generally for coverage to property damage ‘arising out of the insured product. The work product exclusion precludes recovery for damage to the product itself. Coverage remains for personal injury and ‘other property’ damage. The purpose of any exclusion is to limit the coverage provided elsewhere in the policy; the fact that this exclusion effectively limits some of the coverage provided does not yield an automatic ambiguity. An argument that a policy provision is ‘somewhat confusing’ does not warrant a finding of ambiguity.

Bollinger Shipyards at 5-6.

In sum, the court explained that based on the above mentioned provisions, “repair and replacement costs for faulty work are excluded, whereas, any damage to other property that may result is included.” Id. at 6.

In Iberia Parish School Board v. Sandifer & Son Construction Co., Inc., 98-319 (La.App. 3 Cir.1998), 721 So.2d 1021, the court of appeal held that a “work product” exclusion in a CGL insurance policy did not apply to a leaking roof installed by the insured’s subcontractor. This case is easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Iberia involved a leaking roof, caused by defective materials and poor workmanship, resulting in damages to a school. In other words, the situation in Iberia fell squarely within the PCOH category.

|uWe find that a CGL policy containing the “work product” exclusion does not insure any obligation of the policyholder to repair or replace his own defective product. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s finding that no coverage is provided by AXA for defective work by Greer and its subcontractors, and that the policy’s provisions are unambiguous.

Now, we must determine whether a CGL policy containing a “work product” exclusion and a PCOH provision suffers from inherent ambiguity canceling the work product exclusion when the defective work is performed by a subcontractor, or, whether it creates vagueness or possible room for dual interpretation of the policy.

Louisiana courts have consistently held that the “work product” exclusion eliminates coverage for the cost of repairing or replacing the insured’s own defective work or defective product.

11fiMcKenzie and Johnson, supra at 510, explains the PCOH coverage as follows:

Any insured who manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed goods or products was exposed to the products hazard, which is the risk of liability arising out of products after they have left the hands of the insured. The completed operations hazard refers to the insured’s exposure to liability arising out of completed work performed away from his premises.

This provision can be clearly explained by this example:

Suppose an insured contracted to make and install a sign on a commercial building. After the work was completed, the sign fell due to defective installation, causing damage to the sign, the building’s canopy, a parked car, and also bodily injury to a pedestrian. .The insurer covering the products-completed operations hazard would cover all claims except the contractor’s responsibility to repair and replace the sign, coverage for which would be excluded under the product and work exclusions.

McKenzie and Johnson, fn. 34, p. 521.

In Nash v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 So.2d 176 (La.1981), the court found that the damage the homeowners sustained as result of fire caused by the contractor’s installation of the unvented gas space heater was excluded from coverage where the contractor’s CGL policy excluded the PCOH provision. The court noted that the contractor, at the time of fire, had completed his work on the project and did not intend to install vents for the heaters, and the fire occurred about three weeks after the homeowner had given the contractor completion certificate. The court concluded that there was no coverage.

In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Grady White Boats, Inc., 432 So.2d 1082 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983), the court explained that there is no conflict or ambiguity between the PCOH provision and the “work product” exclusion. In that case, the buyers of a vessel sued the sellers for alleged negligence as the vessel sank in the Gulf of Mexico after striking an oil rig. The court held that there was no coverage for the damages provided to the seller for the damages to the vessel caused by the seller’s negligence. The court explained that the definitions portion of the CGL provision was not vague nor ambiguous in defining the “PCOH” provision. The PCOH definition seeks to include protection against bodily injury and property damage liability arising out of operations and also arising out of the named insured’s products. The key words in this provision are “arising out of,” which could mean “but for” the damaged property the resulting incident would not have occurred. Simply stated, the PCOH applies in two instances: 1) when the damage arises out of defective work and 2) if the damage causes injury to a third party. Neither of these instances is found here.

In reviewing both the “work product” exclusion and the PCOH provision, we find no contradiction in their language. Under the “work product” exclusion, the insured or its subcontractor becomes liable for damages to its work or its product caused by its faulty workmanship. Under the PCOH provision, damages, other than the faulty product or work itself, arising out of the faulty workmanship are covered by the policy. Stated differently, if a subcontractor’s faulty electrical work caused the building to burn down before completion, the “work product” exclusion would eliminate coverage for the faulty electrical work performed by the contractor or subcontractor. However, the operations hazard coverage applies not to the faulty 117work, but damages arising out of the faulty work. Damage to real property arising out of the faulty work (fire damage) would not be excluded as it would be covered under the PCOH provision. The case sub judice involves a claim for damages to the work product itself, i.e. the cracked concrete slab, not a claim arising out of the work and covered by the PCOH provision. Thus, the exception for the work performed on the insured’s behalf by a subcontractor under the PCOH damage section of the policy simply is inapplicable to the present case. In other words, the PCOH provision only applies to those injuries which might occur as a result of the damaged product. In the instant case, there is no need to delineate the PCOH provision because there is no other product damaged or third person injured. Here, the only applicable provision is the “work product” exclusion, which applies to work performed by Greer or on its behalf by subcontractors.

For the above reasons, we hold that according to the plain language of the CGL policy, under the “work product” exclusion, there is no coverage for damage to the concrete slab that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because of the defective work or the defective product of Greer and its subcontractors. We find that the PCOH provision is inapplicable in this instance. We further find that there is no inherent ambiguity canceling the “work product” exclusion when the defective work is performed by a subcontractor. We note that the “work product” exclusion applies to both the contractor as well as others acting on his behalf — subcontractors. Therefore, we conclude that the court of appeal erred in granting Greer’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse the court of appeal’s ruling and reinstate the trial court’s ruling.

REVERSED and RENDERED.

KIMBALL and KNOLL, JJ., concur in the result only.

      . The record shows the following subcontractors contributed to this project: l)Louisiana Excavation Co., Inc. — degrassed and compacted the dirt where the building slab was laid; 2) Sea Shell, Inc. — performed the same services as Louisiana Excavation Co., except it constructed the outside parking and work lots; 3) Louisiana Test & Inspection, Inc.,— inspected the compacting work; and 4) Cajun Concrete Services, Inc., — poured and finished the concrete for the building slab, while Greer poured and finished the exterior slabs. An-gelle Concrete supplied the concrete for both the building and the exterior areas.

      . AXA is the successor to Colonial Insurance Company, which insured Sonny Greer Construction Co., Inc., pursuant to a Commercial General Liability policy, number CGL 158493, with the effective dates of July 15, 1996 to July 15, 1997.

      . The court of appeal noted that the Vintage court did not address the language of the CGL policy, which states that the exclusion is inapplicable to subcontractors. The court of appeal relied upon Iberia Parish School Board v. Sandifer & Son Const. Company, Inc., 1998—319 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 1021.

      . In Vintage, Joseph Canizaro contracted with Vintage Contracting to construct a new residence in Jefferson Parish. Vintage was required to comply with the architectural drawings, and in connection with the project, Vintage obtained a CGL policy from Maryland Casualty. Vintage, in turn, contracted with Dixie Building to furnish and pour the concrete for the construction of the slab at Canizaro's residence. Because the Project Architect and Engineer refused to certify the slab based on the failure to comply with the contract specifications, the concrete poured by Dixie was removed and replaced at a substantial cost to Canizaro. Vintage made a demand against Dixie for losses suffered as a result of the replaced concrete, but Dixie refused this demand. Then, Vintage made a claim against its CGL policy, asserting that the policy covered the losses sustained by the removal and replacement of the Dixie concrete. However, Maryland Casualty declined coverage under the policy. Thereafter, suit was filed for damages against Maryland.
      Vintage filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. In response, Maryland filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was no breach of duty by the insurance company, and thus, no liability. The trial court granted Maryland’s motion, finding no coverage. Upon appeal, the court held that the "work product” exclusion in the CGL policy excluded coverage and that the PCOH provision in the policy did not provide coverage for the contractor's losses.

      . In Hook, a dredging company operating along the Gulf Coast hired JACO to repair and install bearings in the engine on the dredge. An inspection of the work revealed that the majority of the main bearing caps (27 of the 32) were not tightened according to the manufacturer's recommendation, i.e., faulty workmanship. The inspector discovered that one of the bearings had opened up and that the crank shaft was fractured. Mike Hooks sued JACO and its insurer under the CGL policy; the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment denying coverage. The trial court found that the "work product” exclusion precluded recovery of damages resulting from JACO’s defective work. However, the court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling. The court held that the CGL policy was ambiguous as to the coverage under the PCOH; thus, the policy was construed in favor of coverage.

      . See footnote n. 4.

      . In Vobill Homes, Inc., v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 179 So.2d 496 (La.App. 3 Cir.1965), writ denied, 248 La. 698, 181 So.2d 398 (La.1966), a homeowner sued a contractor for defects in his home, and the contractor brought a third-party demand against its insurance company under the CGL policy. The court held the "work product” exclusion, contained within the CGL, precluded coverage for defective work performed by the contractor.

        In Swarts v. Woodlawn, Inc., 610 So.2d 888 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), the homeowners sued the builder for the structural damages discovered once they moved in. In that case, the alleged defects included: separation of sheet-rock; cracks in the sheetrock; separation of porch and slab; cracks in the cement; and defects in the doors. After hiring an expert, the homeowners discovered that the residence was built on unstable subsoil, which resulted in severe structural damage to the home. In response to the suit, the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment, where it denied coverage under the work product exclusion. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion, holding that the CGL policy precludes coverage for defective construction. The court of appeal held that the work product exclusion barred recovery for the alleged defect in the home arising out of faulty subsurface soil. Also, in Lewis v. Easley, 614 So.2d 780 (La.App. 2 Cir.1993), the court found that the "work product” exclusion precluded coverage for the roof repairs necessitated by faulty workmanship.
      In Old River Terminal Co-op v. Davco Corporation, 431 So.2d 1068 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983), a contractor built a silo facility; after construction, defects appeared indicating severe structural damage. The owners sued the contractor and engineer under its CGL policy, which contained the "work product” exclusion. The contractor argued that the "work product” exclusion did not apply because the damage resulted from an erroneous subsurface survey prepared by a soils engineer-subcontractor, and that it was their reliance on the defective survey, not the workmanship itself, which caused the structural damage. However, the court of appeal held that the “work product” exclusion precluded coverage, noting that whether the structural damage resulted because of bad cement, faulty design or erroneous soil testing, the suit involved the damages for defective construction.
      Further, in Allen v. Lawton and Moore Builders, Inc., 535 So.2d 779, (La.App. 2d Cir.1988), the court of appeal held that the "work products” exclusion precluded coverage for the damages suffered by purchasers as a result of the defects in the house and the lot caused by negligent, faulty or defective construction or workmanship of the insured.
      See also, Parker v. Dubus Engine Company, 563 So.2d 355, 360 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990); Allen v. Lawton and Moore Builders, Inc., 535 So.2d 779, 781-782, (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Fredeman Shipyard, Inc. v. Weldon Miller Contractors, 497 So.2d 370, 375; Bacon v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 424 So.2d 1155, 1157; Breaux v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 345 So.2d 204 (La.App. 3d Cir.1977).