author: Ellington, Chief Judge.

text:
    A10A1914.
    MORGAN v. HORTON et al.
    (707 SE2d 144)
   Ellington, Chief Judge.

E. Hilton Morgan appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment on this wrongful death claim, which arose when smoke from a prescribed burn on Morgan’s property combined with fog and significantly reduced the visibility on a nearby highway, allegedly causing or contributing to an accident which resulted in the death of a motorist, Ronnie Horton, Sr. Because we find that the undisputed evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that Morgan was entitled to the protections from liability provided by OCGA § 12-6-148, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand this case with direction to enter judgment in favor of Morgan.

This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court, as follows:

If the undisputed evidence shows that a landowner obtained a permit from the Forestry Commission to conduct a prescribed burn on his property, followed the directions of the ranger in charge of supervising the burn, arranged for the ranger to be onsite to monitor the burn, and, according to the ranger, properly conducted the prescribed burn, is the landowner entitled as a matter of law to the protections of OCGA § 12-6-148, which provides that a landowner who conducts a prescribed burn in compliance with the statute cannot be held liable for damages or injuries caused by fire or smoke, or for creating a nuisance, unless it is proven that he was grossly negligent in starting, controlling or completing the burn?

For the following reasons, we answer in the affirmative.

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in favor of the nonmovant.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) White v. Ga. Power Co., 265 Ga. App. 664, 664-665 (595 SE2d 353) (2004). So viewed, the evidence shows the following undisputed facts.áóú

On December 4, 2001, Morgan, a Brantley County landowner, conducted a prescribed burn of a tract of his land, which is located near a highway. Because Morgan had no experience in conducting a prescribed burn, he contacted the local office of the forestry service in November 2001 to ask for help with the project, and he was assisted by the office’s chief ranger, who had over 30 years of experience with the forestry service and was certified to conduct and supervise prescribed burns. The ranger divided Morgan’s land into four small tracts of about fifteen acres each (to be burned separately to reduce the smoke impact), showed forestry service employees where to plow firebreaks, and monitored the weather reports, looking for a day with suitable conditions for a prescribed burn.

Early on the morning of December 4, the ranger decided that he and Morgan should conduct the prescribed burn that day because there was a “good east wind” and a good smoke dispersion index, they would have favorable weather for the next two days, and the weather conditions were the best the area had had for conducting a prescribed burn since Morgan’s inquiry in November. After telling Morgan that he “should be able to burn without a problem” due to the good weather forecast, the ranger called the forestry service office and obtained a prescribed burning permit, and, at approximately 10:30 a.m., the ranger and Morgan started burning one of the tracts. The fire was started properly, and the men monitored the burn throughout the day. According to the ranger, the burn was complete by 4:25 p.m., and, by the end of the day, the residual smoke was light and blowing away from the highway.

Both men repeatedly checked on the property on December 5 and observed that the property continued to smolder and that some small patches of brush may have continued to burn, but that the light residual smoke was still dispersing and blowing away from the highway. Even so, when the ranger received that day’s weather forecast and learned that the weather conditions were going to change overnight and that smoke might blow toward the highway, combine with fog, and reduce drivers’ visibility, he contacted the Georgia State Patrol to request that warning signs be erected along the highway. An officer with the State Patrol told the ranger that it would monitor the situation and direct the state Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to put out signs if necessary. However, no warning signs were erected.

Then, on the night of December 5, the weather conditions changed, the wind died down, and the residual smoke from the burn began to “hover” in the area. Between 6:00 and 7:15 a.m. on December 6, the smoke combined with heavy fog and severely limited visibility on the highway. During that time, the driver of a tractor-trailer was driving northbound on the highway and, due to the limited visibility, he stopped his tractor-trailer in the northbound lane of the highway. Shortly thereafter, a vehicle driven by Ronnie Horton, Sr., collided with the tractor-trailer, and Horton was killed.

The plaintiffs sued Morgan and the tractor-trailer driver, alleging that their negligence caused Horton’s death. The plaintiffs also claimed that Morgan created a hazardous nuisance. Morgan moved for summary judgment on the basis that no issue of material fact remains for jury determination and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied Morgan’s motion for summary judgment, but issued a certificate of immediate review. Morgan filed his application for appeal to this Court pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). This Court granted the application, and this appeal follows.

In several related enumerations of error, Morgan contends that he was entitled to the protections from liability provided by OCGA § 12-6-148, and, as a result, the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Morgan argues that the undisputed evidence shows that he conducted an authorized prescribed burn in compliance with OCGA § 12-6-148 (a), and that he was not grossly negligent in starting, controlling, or completing the burn. Thus, he contends he was entitled to summary judgment, because OCGA § 12-6-148 (b) prohibits a person who conducts an authorized burn in compliance with subsection (a) from being held “liable for damages or injury caused by fire or resulting smoke unless it is proven that there was gross negligence in starting, controlling, or completing the burn.”

As an initial matter, we must address whether the trial court properly concluded that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan is entitled to the protections of OCGA § 12-6-148. Then, if we determine that the undisputed evidence shows that Morgan is covered by the statute, we will have to determine whether a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan was grossly negligent in starting, controlling or completing the burn. In the alternative, if we determine that the undisputed evidence shows that Morgan is not covered by the statute, then the questions arise of whether there is any evidence to show that Morgan was simply negligent in starting, controlling or completing the burn, or whether there is evidence that Morgan created a nuisance.

1. The plaintiffs claim that Morgan is not protected by OCGA § 12-6-148 because he failed to comply with subsection (a) (1), which requires that “an individual with previous prescribed burning experience or training is in charge of the burn and is present on site until the fire is adequately confined to reasonably prevent escape of the fire from the area intended to be burned.”

(a) The plaintiffs contend that Morgan was “in charge” of the burn and, because he had no previous experience with prescribed burns, he failed to comply with the statutory requirement. This contention, however, is based solely on the ranger’s testimony that the property belonged to Morgan and the permit was in Morgan’s name, so the burn was Morgan’s responsibility. But the ranger further explained that the forestry service never takes actual responsibility — and, thus, is never liable — for prescribed burns. Notwithstanding this statement, though, the evidence shows that the ranger made the critical decisions regarding the timing and method of the burn and that, instead of substituting his own opinions (which may have increased the damage caused by the fire and/or its smoke or stripped Morgan of the protections of the statute), Morgan followed the ranger’s directions. In fact, Morgan testified that it was because he had no experience with conducting prescribed burns that he completely relied on the ranger’s expertise and followed his directions.

Because the evidence shows that the ranger had extensive prescribed burning training and experience, evaluated Morgan’s circumstances and made the critical decisions about the timing, permitting and location of the burn and the methods to be used, and directed and supervised forestry employees and Morgan accordingly, we cannot say that Morgan failed to ensure that “an individual with previous prescribed burning experience or training is in charge of the burn” for the purposes of OCGA § 12-6-148 (a) (1).

(b) The plaintiffs also argue that the ranger was not “continually present” during the burn, because the evidence showed that he briefly left the site a few times on December 4. The statute, however, does not expressly require the individual who is in charge of the burn to be “continually present” at the site or prohibit him from leaving the site for brief periods of time while the burn is under control, and the plaintiffs have cited to no authority to support such a construction.

Moreover, even if the ranger left the burn site for short periods of time on December 4, the undisputed evidence shows that, throughout that day, the fire was “adequately confined to reasonably prevent escape of the fire from the area intended to be burned,” as required by the statute. Indeed, the fire never left the tract or jumped the firebreaks. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ argument presents no basis for finding that Morgan was not entitled to the protections of OCGA § 12-6-148.

2. The plaintiffs claim that Morgan was not protected by OCGA § 12-6-148 because he failed to comply with subsection (a) (4), which requires that the prescribed burn be conducted in accordance with a permit issued pursuant to OCGA § 12-6-90. Specifically, they argue that they presented affidavits from eyewitnesses who saw flames on Morgan’s property on December 5 and that Morgan did not have a permit to conduct an active burn on his property for that date.

The plaintiffs, however, have cited no authority for a construction of OCGA § 12-6-90 (a) that requires a landowner to get a new permit for the day after a prescribed burn just because some intermittent flames flare up that day, especially under the circumstances in this case, when it is undisputed that the fire never left the burn area and that no one was actively setting new fires or otherwise generating the residual fires on December 5.

Further, although the plaintiffs’ expert witness stated in an affidavit that, “[according to the State Forestry Commission Policy and Procedure [Manual], no active flames are permitted outside of the permitted time,” the manual upon which he relied for this conclusion is not a part of the record. Accordingly, the expert’s assertion regarding the manual’s contents is inadmissible hearsay and without probative value. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) (“Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.”); Farrar v. Made, 297 Ga. App. 192, 194 (2) (676 SE2d 840) (2009).

And, the plaintiffs’ reliance on Butler v. McCleskey, 208 Ga. App. 341 (430 SE2d 631) (1993), is misplaced because, in that case, the landowner failed to obtain a permit or to notify the forestry service at all before conducting a burn which resulted in the plaintiffs injuries. This Court concluded that “[t]his evidence and all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom construed in [the plaintiff s] favor show that [the landowner] was negligent per se in not notifying the forest rangers of his intent to set this fire[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 344-345 (1). Such is not the case here.

Finally, it is undisputed that the ranger never told Morgan that the fire had to be completely out by 4:00 p.m. on December 4 because the permit would expire, nor did the ranger tell Morgan that he had to stop the burn or put the fire out on December 4 because of the possibility of smoke combining with fog.

Thus, neither the evidence nor the authority relied upon by the plaintiffs supports a finding that Morgan’s failure to obtain a separate permit for the days following December 4 stripped him of the protections provided by OCGA § 12-6-148.

3. Having determined that Morgan was entitled to the statute’s protections from liability for simple negligence or creating a nuisance, we must now consider whether the undisputed evidence creates a jury issue as to whether Morgan exhibited “gross negligence in starting, controlling, or completing the burn.” OCGA § 12-6-148 (b).

“Gross negligence” is defined as “the failure to exercise that degree of care that every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or similar circumstances; or lack of the diligence that even careless men are accustomed to exercise.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept., 274 Ga. App. 704, 707 (2) (618 SE2d 621) (2005). See also OCGA § 51-1-4 (defining “slight diligence” and “gross negligence”). Generally,

[w]hen facts alleged as constituting gross negligence are such that there is room for difference of opinion between reasonable people as to whether or not negligence can be inferred, and[,] if so[,] whether in degree the negligence amounts to gross negligence, the right to draw the inference is within the exclusive province of the jury.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept., 274 Ga. App. at 709 (2). In cases wherein the evidence allegedly supporting the accusations of gross negligence is plain and indisputable, however, the court may resolve the questions of whether the defendant acted with gross negligence as a matter of law. Heard v. City of Villa Rica, 306 Ga. App. 291, 295 (1) (701 SE2d 915) (2010).

(a) In support of their argument that jury questions exist as to whether Morgan was grossly negligent in this case, the plaintiffs rely, in part, on their expert witness’ affidavit. According to the affidavit, the expert’s opinion was that Morgan acted “without exercising the slightest diligence” and “without any concern for public safety.” These are conclusory opinions, however, that clearly invade the province of the jury on the question of whether Morgan was grossly negligent. “A mere conclusory expert opinion with respect to the existence of gross negligence does not create a jury issue; rather, there must be facts sufficient for a jury to find gross negligence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Heard v. City of Villa Rica, 306 Ga. App. at 294 (1). Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs rely on the opinion of their expert to establish Morgan’s gross negligence, they have not met their burden. See id. (Although the plaintiff relied primarily on her expert’s affidavit, in which the expert opined that the defendant “had failed to exercise even the slightest degree of common sense or diligence,” when asserting that a jury issue existed regarding the defendant’s gross negligence, the trial court properly discounted that portion of the affidavit and looked, instead, to whether there were facts to support such a conclusion.) (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).

Moreover, the expert’s criticisms about the location, date and methods used when conducting the burn are aimed directly at decisions made solely by the ranger and simply relied upon by Morgan. In other words, the expert suggests that Morgan is not entitled to rely on the advice and directions of the ranger (or the forestry service) and, if he does so, he is negligent. In fact, the expert suggests that Morgan was required to exercise extraordinary care by, inter alia: instituting safety procedures above and beyond what the ranger or the forestry service recommended; consulting with other professionals and exhausting all options other than burning; ensuring that he had bulldozers, excavators, and other large equipment available onsite to diminish the smoke, if necessary; and advising local and state authorities that they needed to close the roads on December 6. These contentions, however, conflict with the statute’s provision that landowners properly conducting prescribed burns pursuant to a permit will not be liable absent their gross negligence.

Further, in the expert’s opinion, Morgan was grossly negligent for conducting the burn at all due to the land’s proximity to the highway, the city, schools and nursing homes. Thus, according to the expert, Morgan should have ignored the ranger’s recommendations and should not have conducted the burn in order to ensure that the public would be protected from any possibility that smoke would emanate from his property. This argument clearly undermines the express purposes behind Georgia’s Prescribed Burning Act, OCGA § 12-6-145 et seq.

Thus, the plaintiffs’ expert witness affidavit does not create a jury issue on whether Morgan was grossly negligent in this case. It follows that, in order to determine whether a jury issue exists, we must determine whether the plaintiffs’ specific contentions are supported by facts in the record.

(b) The plaintiffs claim that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan was negligent because he should not have been burning at all due to the weather conditions and the forestry service’s determination that, on December 4, the only thing that should be burned was “yard trash.” However, the undisputed evidence shows that the ranger called the district office and the district ranger specifically approved the permit to burn Morgan’s property, notwithstanding the “yard trash” limitation.

(c) The plaintiffs argue that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan negligently failed to consider alternatives to conducting a prescribed burn on his property. Pretermitting whether there was any evidence that Morgan did not consider such alternatives, the ranger testified that the only real alternative methods to reduce the fuel load/root mat of Morgan’s land were shearing or thrashing the vegetation, which cause other problems, such as reducing the topsoil and attracting and providing a habitat for rattlesnakes and other dangerous pests. The ranger testified that, because of these problems, the forestry service no longer recommends those methods. Given such evidence, the jury would not be authorized to find that Morgan was grossly negligent for failing to utilize an alternative to conducting a prescribed burn.

(d) The plaintiffs contend that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan was negligent because he failed to prevent smoke from his property from entering onto the public roadway and, in fact, created a smoke hazard sufficient to cause a total blackout of the vision of drivers. In a related argument, the plaintiffs argue that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan was negligent because he failed to have proper equipment to eliminate the smoke hazard created by the burn or, in the alternative, failed to have the forestry service extinguish the fire completely on December 5.

According to the ranger, however, there is “nothing actually physically that [a landowner] can do” to stop a prescribed burn from smoldering or to prevent the resulting smoke. In fact, when asked if there was anything more that could have been done in this case to minimize the smoke emanating from the fire or the smoldering remains, the ranger testified that he did not think so, because they used more precautions than usual, such as “putting in smaller blocks than what typically would be done. . . . [W]e blocked [the property] from four to five blocks instead of one continuous block. In some cases we may have cut it in half, but it was cut into smaller blocks, burned early, and completed early.” In the ranger’s opinion, this method minimized the amount of smoke generated from the burn.

Further, when asked, “could you tell me what Mr. Morgan could have done to reduce the smoke over his land other than not have burned, period, on December the 5th and the morning of December the 6th?”, the ranger responded as follows:

I think we followed all the guidelines that he could possibly follow. You know, we went above and beyond trying to get it right to keep from having a problem. He contacted me and relied on me to make the decision how to get it set up to burn and when to burn, and that’s exactly what we [did], and we based it on the weather forecast and following the guidelines to get the burn done, but as far as him being able to do anything other than not burning, there was nothing. I mean, ... he basically [did] everything that he could.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The ranger also testified that landowners do not have access to the specialized heavy equipment that would be needed to reduce the smoke that emanated from the smoldering remains of a prescribed burn, because none of the equipment is stored locally — it has to be brought in from other parts of the state. According to the ranger, a “mop up” (using heavy, expensive equipment to eliminate residual smoke from a prescribed burn) is an extraordinary measure that the forestry services use only in emergency circumstances. It is also undisputed that the ranger never told Morgan about the use of heavy equipment to put out the smoldering remains — or gave Morgan the option to use the equipment — until after the accident.

Consequently, the plaintiffs’ allegations are not supported by evidence showing that Morgan was grossly negligent in taking extra precautions prior to the burn to prevent the smoldering remains from releasing smoke or in failing to have specialized equipment at the burn site to address potential smoke-related problems on December 6.

(e) The plaintiffs argue that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan negligently failed to monitor the burn on December 5 and 6. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the ranger gave Morgan instructions to monitor the smoke and fog situation and “to call 911 if the situation became worse so they could have the road closed.” In a related argument, the plaintiffs contend that a jury issue exists as to whether Morgan was negligent because he failed to warn the public and others using the highway regarding the hazard created by the smoke coming from his property. These arguments lack merit for several reasons.

First, this allegation misstates the evidence, which does not show that the ranger gave Morgan clear directions or a specific instruction regarding if and when to call 911, but simply shows that the two men acknowledged that, as Morgan watched over his property that evening, he would call 911 if he observed any problems. Second, Morgan testified that he observed no problems on the evening of December 5 and, when he drove through the area two or three times at around 6:00 a.m. on December 6, there was some reduced visibility on the highway, but he could still see about 100 yards ahead with his headlights on, so he did not think he needed to call the ranger or 911. Third, the undisputed evidence shows that only the Georgia State Patrol is authorized to contact the state DOT and request that warning signs for motorists be erected. Fourth, it is also undisputed that, before the morning of December 6, the ranger specifically told Morgan that he had already notified the State Patrol about the need for warning signs along the highway. In fact, it is undisputed that an officer with the State Patrol told the ranger that it would monitor the situation and would contact the DOT about erecting warning signs.

Accordingly, given these facts, the plaintiffs have not shown that Morgan’s failure to call 911 constituted gross negligence.

(f) Finally, the plaintiffs contend that jury issues exist as to whether Morgan was negligent because he allowed an excessive amount of property adjacent to a public roadway to be burned, because he failed to ensure that the burning of his property adjacent to the public roadway was extinguished at the time that his permit had expired, and because he failed to properly obtain a permit to allow continued smoldering and burning of his property on December 6. The first argument, however, attacks decisions made solely by the ranger, not Morgan, and all three arguments lack merit for the reasons explained in Divisions 1, 2 and 3 (a), supra.

Accordingly, we find that the evidence in the record before us is plain and indisputable and leads to only one reasonable conclusion. Even assuming there is evidence sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether Morgan was negligent in some way while starting, controlling or completing the prescribed burn, there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Morgan failed to exercise slight diligence and was, therefore, grossly negligent. See generally Heard v. City of Villa Rica, 306 Ga. App. at 295 (1). Consequently, the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for summary judgment.

Decided March 4, 2011

Forbes, Foster & Pool, Morton G. Forbes, Blacknall & Little, Willis H. Blacknall III, Mary K. Durant, for appellant.

Cook, Hall & Lampros, Peter A. Lampros, Gary F. Easom, for appellees.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

Andrews and Doyle, JJ., concur.

       This Court granted Morgan’s application for interlocutory appeal.

       OCGA § 12-6-147 (2) defines “[prescribed burning” as “the controlled application of fire to existing vegetative fuels under specified environmental conditions and following appropriate precautionary measures, which causes the fire to be confined to a predetermined area and accomplishes one or more planned land management objectives or to mitigate catastrophic wildfires. ’ ’

       OCGA § 12-6-148 provides as follows:
      (a) Prescribed burning conducted under the requirements of this part shall:
      (1) Be accomplished only when an individual with previous prescribed burning experience or training is in charge of the burn and is present on site until the fire is adequately confined to reasonably prevent escape of the fire from the area intended to be burned;
      (2) Be considered in the public interest and shall not create a public or private nuisance;
      (3) Be considered a property right of the landowner; and
      (4) Be conducted in accordance with a permit issued under Part 3 of this article.
      (b) No property owner or owner’s agent conducting an authorized prescribed burn under this part shall be liable for damages or injury caused by fire or resulting smoke unless it is proven that there was gross negligence in starting, controlling, or completing the burn.
      See OCGA § 12-6-90 (permit requirements for burning vegetation on property); see also OCGA § 12-6-91 (Unless otherwise prohibited, “the owners of any forest land may accomplish controlled burning over their own land when a permit therefor is obtained pursuant to the requirements of Code Section 12-6-90 and the fire is not allowed to spread onto or over the land of another or others.”).

       There is some confusion about who actually started the fire, but that fact is not significant to the issues on appeal, because the undisputed evidence shows that the fire was started properly and that the ranger was present at that time.

       The plaintiffs subsequently dismissed their suit against the tractor-trailer driver.

       No transcript of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was filed in the lower court.

       Because Morgan, as the appellant in this case, frames his alleged errors in a manner that challenges the plaintiffs’ arguments that were presented in the trial court in opposition to his motion for summary judgment, we will address those arguments directly, as if the plaintiffs were the appellants herein, as a matter of clarity and efficiency. We note that, regardless which party is the appellant, we must still view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as nonmovants in the motion for summary judgment in the trial court. See White v. Ga. Power Co., 265 Ga. App. at 664-665.

       As Morgan argues in his appellate brief,
      If landowners are automatically deemed to be legally “in charge” of [prescribed] burns, no landowner without experience and training in burning could ever have a prescribed burn conducted on his property. This interpretation [of the statute] would make OCGA § 12-6-148 (a) (1) have a nonsensical result, and certainly would discourage — if not eliminate entirely — prescribed burns by citizens of this State, which would go against the stated legislative policy encouraging prescribed burns.

       OCGA § 12-6-90 (a) provides that “any person . . . lawfully entitled to burn any woods, lands, marshes, or any other flammable vegetation . . . shall prior to such burning obtain a permit therefor from the forest ranger of the county wherein such burning is to be made[.]”

       The plaintiffs’ contention that Morgan was actively burning the land on December 5, 2001, is based on 2009 affidavits of alleged eyewitnesses who claim they saw flames on Morgan’s property that day.

       In contrast, OCGA § 51-1-2 defines “ordinary diligence” and “ordinary negligence” as follows:
      In general, ordinary diligence is that degree of care which is exercised by ordinarily prudent persons under the same or similar circumstances. As applied to the preservation of property, the term “ordinary diligence” means that care which every prudent man takes of his own property of a similar nature. The absence of such diligence is termed ordinary negligence.

       OCGA § 12-6-146 states as follows:
      (a) It is declared by the General Assembly that prescribed burning is a resource protection and land management tool which benefits the safety of the public, Georgia’s forest resources, the environment, and the economy of the state. The General Assembly finds that:
      (1) Prescribed burning reduces naturally occurring vegetative fuels within forested areas. Reduction of such fuels by burning reduces the risk and severity of major wildfire, thereby lessening the threat of fire and the resulting loss of life and property;
      (2) Georgia’s ever-increasing population situates urban development directly adjacent to fire prone forest lands. The use of prescribed fire to manage fuels in interface areas would substantially reduce the threat of damaging wildfire in urban communities;
      (3) Forest land constitutes significant economic, biological, and aesthetic resources of state-wide importance. Prescribed burning on forest land serves to reduce hazardous accumulations of fuels, prepare sites for both natural and artificial forest regeneration, improve wildlife habitat, control insects and disease, and perpetuate fire dependent ecosystems;

        (4) State and federally owned public use lands such as state parks, state and national forests, and wildlife refuges receive resource enhancement through use of prescribed burning;
      (5) As Georgia’s population continues to grow, pressures from liability issues and smoke nuisance complaints cause prescribed burn practitioners to limit prescribed burn activity, thus reducing the above-mentioned benefits to the state;
      (6) Public misunderstanding of the benefit of prescribed burning to the ecological and economic welfare of the state exerts unusual pressures that prevent uninhibited use of this valuable forest resource management tool; and
      (7) Fire benefits rare, threatened, and endangered plants, deer, turkey, quail, dove, and other game as well as numerous songbirds and other nongame species by the increased growth and yields of herbs and legumes. It also allows openings for feeding and travel.
      (b) It is the purpose of this part to authorize and promote the continued use of prescribed burning for community protection, silvicultural, environmental, and wildlife management purposes.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BARNES, Presiding Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    A10A2271.
    AAF-MCQUAY, INC. v. WILLIS.
    (707 SE2d 508)
   BARNES, Presiding Judge.

This case involves a dispute over a partnership that originally had three partners: AAF-McQuay, Inc. d/b/a McQuay International (“McQuay”), T. W. Ruskin, and Larry R. Willis. McQuay subsequently transferred its interest in the Partnership to Ruskin and another individual, and Willis ceased having any involvement with the affairs of the partnership. Willis then brought this action against McQuay, alleging, among other things, that McQuay had breached the partnership agreement, had breached its fiduciary duties toward him as a partner, and had exhibited wilful and wanton misconduct that would justify an award of punitive damages. McQuay answered, raised multiple affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed on several grounds, including that Willis had breached a guaranty agreement and was liable for attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. In a detailed order on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted Willis’s motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and denied McQuay’s motion for summary judgment against Willis in its entirety. McQuay now appeals, asserting myriad enumerations of error in the trial court’s summary judgment order. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Willis on his claim that McQuay violated Section 7.08 (b) of the partnership agreement, since a genuine issue of material fact exists over whether Willis waived his right to invoke, or was equitably estopped from invoking, that section. We affirm in all other respects.

1. McQuay contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on Willis’s claims for breach of the partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages. We disagree.

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence. To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

(Footnotes omitted.) Smith v. Gordon, 266 Ga. App. 814 (1) (598 SE2d 92) (2004). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Guided by these principles, we turn to the record in the present case.

Formation and Financing of the Partnership. The record reflects that McQuay is a global corporation that manufactures, sells, and services heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (“HVAC”) products for the commercial market. In its United States operations, McQuay has a business model that varies from state to state. Its sales business is handled primarily through independent representatives who report to regional sales managers who work for McQuay. Likewise, its service business is mostly operated by entities owned by McQuay. However, in a few states, McQuay has formed joint ventures with local partners in the belief that its business would grow more rapidly under local leadership than if it were 100 percent owned by McQuay.

Georgia was one of the markets in which McQuay chose to pursue a partnership model. In May 1998, McQuay entered into a limited liability partnership agreement with Ruskin and Willis to sell and service McQuay HVAC equipment in Georgia (the “Partnership Agreement”), thereby forming McQuay of Georgia, LLP (the “Partnership”). In connection with forming the Partnership, McQuay agreed to transfer to the Partnership its service and warranty work for its HVAC products sold in Georgia (the “Service Business”).

Pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, McQuay held a 50 percent interest in the Partnership, Willis held a 25 percent interest, and Ruskin held a 25 percent interest. At the inception of the Partnership, McQuay made a capital contribution of $250,000 and paid the sum of $75,000 each to Ruskin and Willis. Ruskin and Willis in turn each made capital contributions in the sum of $50,000.

Ruskin was appointed as president and Willis as executive vice president of the Partnership. Ruskin and Willis were the “sweat equity partners” who provided the day-to-day management of the Partnership.

In contrast, McQuay served as the “investment banking partner” that financed the operations of the Partnership through a series of loans, including a $500,000 loan for a working capital line of credit memorialized in a promissory note executed by the Partnership (the “Note”). Willis executed a guaranty agreement for the loan, guaranteeing payment of the loan up to the amount of $125,000 or 25 percent of the unpaid obligations, whichever was less (the “Guaranty”). The loan subsequently was modified twice to increase the original principal sum to $600,000, evidencing additional advances made by McQuay. The modified loan was memorialized in the Second Amended and Restated Promissory Note executed by the Partnership (the “Second Amended Note”). In connection with the Second Amended Note, Willis executed an amended guaranty agreement (the “Amended Guaranty”).

From its inception, the Partnership had difficulty making payments to McQuay for its loan obligations. Throughout 2000 and 2001, the Partnership had cash flow problems, and several large accounts receivable were not fully collected, which had a substantial impact on the financial condition of the Partnership. Ruskin and Willis argued that these problems were caused in part by McQuay, which they alleged had failed to provide the Partnership with the technical and other related support services required by the Partnership Agreement, and had routinely failed to adequately compensate the Partnership for its performance of warranty service work. In addition, the operation of the Partnership suffered as a result of dissension between Ruskin and Willis, and from “internal resistance” that the Partnership experienced from service personnel within McQuay. Ultimately, the Partnership defaulted in the payment of all of its loan obligations to McQuay.

As a result of the Partnership’s default on its loan obligations, McQuay sent letters to the Partnership demanding full payment and threatening to take possession of the collateral. Despite these threats, McQuay did not pursue legal action on the loans or the loan guarantees. According to McQuay, this was because its ultimate goal was to make the Partnership more profitable and to turn it into a viable business. In contrast, Willis alleged that McQuay had developed a long-term plan to get out of the Partnership and to obtain sole ownership of the Service Business, and that it used the demand letters as part of an effort to “hammer” Ruskin and Willis and squeeze them out of the Service Business. The evidence relied upon by Willis in this regard is discussed below.

The 2002 McQuay Strategy Document. Willis relied upon a 2002 internal strategy document produced by McQuay during discovery to show McQuay’s long-term plan regarding the Partnership and Service Business. In the document, McQuay noted that while the Partnership had $17 million in sales, it nonetheless had “negative retained earnings,” was “not generating cash,” and was “limited on further growth without additional cash.” McQuay further noted that the Partnership was overdue on its various loan obligations and that “McQuay does not have operating control.” Consequently, McQuay proposed that it take steps to obtain a majority ownership interest in the Partnership so that it could establish “control of the company.” The document concluded by stating: “Ultimate objective is to divest the sales company and retain ownership of the service business (3-5 years).”

The Service Business Demand Letter. In February 2002, McQuay began having internal discussions about how a demand letter concerning nonpayment of one of several outstanding loans to the Partnership could be used to pressure Ruskin and Willis into accepting a proposed restructuring of the Partnership. The loan at issue was memorialized in the Working Capital Promissory Note, and the collateral for the loan consisted of the assets of the Service Business. In a series of internal e-mails, McQuay discussed hand-delivering the demand letter for maximum effect and using the letter as a “hammer” to put Ruskin and Willis “on their heals [sic] [and] cause them to embrace the proposal.”

Consistent with this internal e-mail discussion, in May 2002, McQuay hand-delivered a demand letter to Ruskin following a dinner meeting in Atlanta. The letter informed Ruskin that the Working Capital Promissory Note was in default and that McQuay would enforce payment, including taking possession of the collateral and collecting attorney fees and other costs, if the entire amount was not paid in ten days. When Willis learned of the demand letter the next day, he was “shocked.” Ultimately, McQuay never pursued legal action regarding the Working Capital Promissory Note, despite the threat contained in the demand letter.

The June and October 2002 Proposals. Approximately one month after the hand-delivery of the demand letter, McQuay made a formal proposal to Ruskin and Willis, dated June 14, 2002, to restructure the Partnership so that it would have a majority ownership interest (the “June Proposal”). A few months later, a second, similar restructuring proposal, dated October 21, 2002, was presented to Ruskin and Willis (the “October Proposal”). According to Willis, several representatives of McQuay warned him that if he did not agree to the proposed restructuring, McQuay would “blow up the business” and sue him to enforce his obligations under the Amended Guaranty.

The December 2002 Partnership Valuation. In conjunction with its restructuring efforts, McQuay hired an outside consultant to calculate the Partnership’s value. The consultant calculated the fair market value of the Partnership, as of December 10, 2002, to be $2.8 million. However, McQuay never informed Ruskin and Willis about this valuation and instead told them that the Partnership was valued between zero and $1 million, with $1 million being a “generous” valuation.

The December 2002 Partnership Meeting and Default Letters. On December 17, 2002, there was a Partnership meeting in which the partners voted on a change in officers and on six resolutions for restructuring the Partnership along the lines of the June and October Proposals. During the meeting, Willis was voted in to replace Ruskin as interim president of the Partnership. The six resolutions proposed by McQuay were not adopted.

McQuay then delivered a letter to Ruskin, dated December 19, 2002, notifying him that several of the outstanding loans were in default, demanding payment of the unpaid balances within 30 days, and threatening to “assume ownership of all of [the Partnership’s] assets in any form, wherever located.” An executive vice president of McQuay informed one of the Partnership’s officers that the purpose of this letter was to “force” Ruskin into accepting a restructuring of the Partnership.

McQuay also delivered a letter to Willis, dated December 19, 2002, notifying him that the $600,000 Second Amended Note was in default. The letter warned that if the Partnership failed to meet its loan obligations under the Second Amended Note, McQuay would look to Willis personally for payment in accordance with the Amended Guaranty.

Later, in a January 20, 2003 letter, McQuay wrote to the Partnership, noting that the Partnership had “failed to cure its defaults on the various promissory notes” and stating that “McQuay must therefore begin to take steps to satisfy those notes.” McQuay went on to request a complete list of the Partnership’s assets. Nevertheless, McQuay never began any actions or collection efforts regarding the various demands it made on the Partnership in December 2002 and January 2003.

The July 2003 Conference Call. Following the failure of the resolutions at the December 2002 Partnership meeting, McQuay abandoned its plan to acquire a controlling ownership interest in the Partnership and instead attempted to have its interest in the Partnership bought out. On July 1, 2003, a conference call took place between Ruskin, Willis, and several representatives of McQuay. During the call, McQuay placed the Partnership on restricted credit, which meant that McQuay would not ship HVAC parts except for emergencies or cash in advance. McQuay also required the Partnership to prepare an action plan to show how it would remedy its default on the loans. Additionally, McQuay announced that it now wanted to sell its ownership interest and would entertain all reasonable offers. According to an internal company e-mail, McQuay hoped that its proposal to sell its ownership interest would “get some competition going” between Ruskin and Willis.

The Buyout Proposals. In August 2003, Willis and Roger Bennett, an officer of the Partnership, presented their joint proposal to purchase McQuay’s interest in the Partnership. At the same time, Ruskin and David Glidden, another officer in the Partnership, presented a competing proposal to purchase McQuay’s interest. At an August 26, 2003 meeting in Atlanta at Holiday Inn, McQuay warned Willis that the partner whose proposal was rejected by McQuay would need to leave the Partnership and have his interest bought out. McQuay provided a list of what the exiting partner would receive in the form of a buyout. Willis was warned that he would be destroyed “personally, professionally, [and] financially” if he did not agree to these terms. According to Willis, he ultimately reached an agreement with Ruskin and McQuay’s representatives during the Holiday Inn meeting that the partner whose proposal was rejected by McQuay would exit the Partnership and be bought out.

Shortly thereafter, McQuay selected the Ruskin/Glidden proposal, subject to the approval of McQuay’s parent company and the negotiation of final contract terms. McQuay sent Willis a right of first refusal letter, notifying him that McQuay intended to sell its interest to Ruskin and Glidden, and Willis did not respond to the letter. McQuay sent Willis a follow-up letter stating that his right of first refusal under the Partnership Agreement had expired, and Willis likewise did not respond to that letter.

Willis’s Termination. On September 24, 2003, Willis e-mailed McQuay with the exact amount he thought he was owed based on the agreement reached at the Holiday Inn about buying out the non-selected partner. On September 26, 2003, at a meeting of the board of directors for the Partnership, Willis was terminated by a 4-1 vote. Willis took steps to transition his customer accounts and began efforts to be paid based on the agreement reached at the Holiday Inn meeting. In a November 5, 2003 e-mail, McQuay’s counsel referred to the Holiday Inn meeting and threatened to get “heavy-handed” with Willis if he tried to get more than was discussed at the meeting.

When Willis threatened legal action over the buyout, Ruskin suggested in a February 5, 2004 e-mail to McQuay’s counsel and Glidden that Willis should be terminated before he initiated litigation, this time “for cause,” to prevent having to pay him anything for his ownership interest under the Partnership Agreement. A lengthy conference call was then held that afternoon, after which McQuay announced the following decision: “Terminate [Willis] for cause. We would like to begin that process before he takes any legal action [ ] so it does not appear that we are doing so in retaliation.”

Transfer of Willis’s Interest. Final negotiations over the Ruskin/Glidden proposal broke down, and McQuay again raised the issue of the Partnership’s default on its loan obligations. McQuay also notified the Partnership that it planned to seek an alternative distributor for its HVAC products. Ruskin then filed suit against McQuay on behalf of himself and the Partnership, asserting, among other things, breach of the partnership agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the “Ruskin Lawsuit”). See Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 49 (643 SE2d 333) (2007). Although Willis was not a party to the Ruskin Lawsuit, his attorney attended a hearing conducted on Ruskin’s motion for a temporary restraining order. Ultimately, Ruskin and McQuay reached a settlement, and the trial court in that case entered a final order enforcing its terms. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, McQuay’s 50 percent interest in the Partnership was transferred to Ruskin and Glidden in December 2005. McQuay sent Willis another right of refusal letter containing a copy of the settlement agreement, and Willis did not respond.

Today, the Partnership continues to operate in Georgia, but it is no longer the authorized service provider for McQuay. McQuay now operates its own service business office in Georgia in connection with the settlement agreement reached in the Ruskin lawsuit. According to Willis, this reflects that McQuay succeeded in its long-term goal, as reflected in its 2002 internal strategy document, of “divest[ing] the sales company and retaining] ownership of the service business.”

(a) In Count 1 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleged that McQuay breached Section 7.04 (a) of the Partnership Agreement by not purchasing his Partnership interest after his termination on September 26, 2003. Section 7.04 (a) provides:

Upon the death, Disability, or termination without cause of a Partner, the Partnership shall buy and the Partner, heirs or representatives, as the case may be shall sell all of the Partner’s Partnership interest to the Partnership at the higher of the Book Value Price or the Alternate Price.

McQuay moved for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that Willis was not terminated as a partner and thus the repurchase obligations under Section 7.04 (a) were never triggered. In support of its argument, McQuay pointed out that the minutes from the Partnership board of directors meeting conducted on September 26, 2003 state only that Willis was “removed as Acting President.” McQuay pointed to additional evidence inconsistent with Willis being terminated as a partner, including his continued receipt of an Internal Revenue Service Schedule K-l, “Partner’s Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc.,” every year since his alleged termination from the Partnership. In denying McQuay’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that there was conflicting evidence on the issue of whether Willis was terminated as a partner.

The trial court properly denied summary judgment to McQuay. While the Partnership board minutes reflect that Willis was only terminated as acting president, such minutes are not dispositive. As discussed above, Willis presented evidence that around the time of his September 2003 termination, he had learned that McQuay had rejected his proposal to buy out its 50 percent ownership interest, and he had reached an agreement with McQuay and Ruskin at the Holiday Inn meeting that the nonselected partner would be required to exit the Partnership and be bought out. Willis also pointed to the e-mails surrounding his second termination “for cause” as evidence of McQuay’s attempt to engineer a way around the obligation to pay for his interest as the exiting partner. The trial court correctly recognized that this combined evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to Willis, meant that the issue of whether McQuay breached Section 7.04 (a) was a jury question.

(b) In Count 2 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleged that McQuay breached its fiduciary duty toward him by attempting to terminate him as a partner a second time “for cause” on February 16, 2004 to avoid having to buy him out under Section 7.04 (a) of the Partnership Agreement. McQuay moved for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that Willis was never terminated as a partner, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the evidence on this point was in conflict. The trial court correctly denied summary judgment to McQuay. There was some evidence, interpreted in the light most favorable to Willis, from which a jury could find that Willis had been terminated as a partner, as discussed supra in Division 1 (a).

(c) In Count 3 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleged that McQuay breached its fiduciary duty toward him by using coercive and deceptive tactics in its efforts to restructure the Partnership, with the ultimate goal of obtaining the right to operate the Service Business on its own. Citing to Westminster Properties v. Atlanta Assoc., 250 Ga. 841, 842-843 (1) (301 SE2d 636) (1983), McQuay moved for summary judgment, arguing that a partner who is also a creditor may take actions consistent with its rights as a creditor, and that its actions in this case were consistent with those of any secured creditor. The trial court again denied the motion on the ground that the evidence relating to this claim was conflicting.

The trial court committed no error. Partners owe fiduciary duties to one another to act in the “utmost good faith” and with the “finest loyalty.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774, 783 (2) (a) (650 SE2d 338) (2007). See OCGA § 23-2-58. While it is true that a partner who is also a creditor of the partnership may take actions consistent with her rights as a creditor without breaching her fiduciary duties owed to other partners, see Westminster Properties, 250 Ga. at 842-843 (1), a partner nevertheless can breach those duties if her actions go beyond that of a simple secured creditor. See Natpar Corp. v. E. T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 105-106 (2) (365 SE2d 442) (1988) (partner who was creditor of partnership could be enjoined from foreclosing on the partnership property following default on loan obligation, where the partner wrongfully refused to pay its share of partnership operating expenses, precipitating the default on the loan). Furthermore, the fiduciary duty of good faith prohibits a partner from improperly ousting another partner and appropriating for himself the assets and property of the partnership, and from withholding financial information from other partners for purposes of self-dealing. See Mon Ami Intl. v. Gale, 264 Ga. App. 739, 743 (3) (592 SE2d 83) (2003); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 245 Ga. App. 334, 342 (1) (a) (537 SE2d 397) (2000), vacated and remanded, 534 U. S. 801 (122 SC 24, 151 LE2d 1) (2001), reinstated, 254 Ga. App. 598, 599 (1) (563 SE2d 178) (2002).

Here, Willis presented evidence of actions taken by McQuay that went beyond those of a simple secured creditor in its efforts to restructure the Partnership. For example, as previously discussed, Willis came forward with evidence that McQuay had the secret “ultimate objective” of divesting the Service Business from the Partnership and then retaining ownership of that business for its own benefit; that it used default letters as part of its efforts to coerce Ruskin and Willis into accepting a restructuring favorable to McQuay; that it kept secret the December 2002 Partnership valuation and misled Ruskin and Willis about the value of the Partnership in discussions over a restructuring; and that it coerced Ruskin and Willis into making competing proposals to buy out its 50 percent ownership interest by insisting that the nonselected partner would be required to exit the Partnership. These combined facts created a jury question over whether McQuay breached its fiduciary duty owed to Willis such that the trial court properly concluded that summary judgment on this count was inappropriate.

(d) In Count 9 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleged that McQuay breached Section 9.03 (g) of the Partnership Agreement by failing to provide the Partnership with certain management systems, such as accounting, order entry, and sales tracking. That section provides:

McQuay shall provide the Partnership management systems required by McQuay, including but not necessarily limited to systems of accounting, financial, personnel, order entry, planning, management reporting and control, sales tracking, asset management and control, and such similar or supportive systems and upgrades therefore [sic] as may be mandated by McQuay and which are in addition to or exceed the needs of the Partnership. McQuay shall reimburse the Partnership for all costs incurred by the Partnership in the installation and maintenance of such systems which exceed the costs the Partnership would have incurred but for the installation and maintenance of such additional systems.

McQuay moved for summary judgment, arguing that the language of Section 9.03 (g) was optional, rather than mandatory, and that, in any event, it never required the Partnership to use a particular management system. The trial court disagreed with McQuay and denied summary judgment on this count.

Summary judgment was properly denied. By its plain terms, Section 9.03 (g) mandated that McQuay furnish the Partnership with the management systems that it required the Partnership to use. And Willis presented evidence that McQuay required the Partnership to use the “Dl” accounting system so that McQuay would be able to obtain information from the Partnership that was compatible with its own systems. But there was evidence that the Dl system was never successfully put in place by McQuay, and that without the system, the Partnership could not effectively track its payables, receivables, and accounting functions. Thus, Willis’s claim for breach of Section 9.03 (g) was for the jury to decide, as the trial court correctly decided.

(e) In Count 12 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis sought punitive damages, alleging that McQuay’s actions evidenced wilful and wanton misconduct and that McQuay acted with the specific intent to cause him harm. McQuay moved for summary judgment on this count, and the trial court denied the motion, concluding as follows:

The facts of this case make it impossible for Defendant McQuay to remove the issue of punitive damages prior to trial. Instead, there are numerous facts in the record regarding actions by Defendant McQuay towards Plaintiff that a jury must consider in deciding whether punitive damages should be imposed pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-5.1. Furthermore, the Court also finds that there is enough evidence here for a jury to decide whether Defendant McQuay acted with a specific intent to harm Plaintiff, such that the amount of punitive damages awarded would not be limited to $250,000. . . . Some of the[ ] facts, particularly in the context of a corporate partner dealing with an individual partner, create at a minimum a jury question about whether Defendant McQuay had specific intent to harm Plaintiff, which is why the Court also finds that a jury’s consideration of the amount of punitive damages will not be limited to $250,000.

On appeal, McQuay asserts that the trial court’s order was erroneous because the court removed the statutory cap on punitive damages “as a matter of law.”

We are unpersuaded. Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), punitive damages may be awarded only if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that “the defendant’s actions showed wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” The Code section further limits punitive damages to a maximum of $250,000 for any tort action other than product liability, unless the factfinder concludes that “the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to cause harm.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (f), (g). If there are facts from which a jury could infer specific intent to harm, a trial court is authorized to deny a defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the statutory cap on punitive damages. See Golden Atlanta Site Dev. v. R. Nahai & Sons, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 654, 659-660 (2) (d) (683 SE2d 627) (2009).

The trial court’s order, when read as a whole, did not remove from the jury as a matter of law the issue of whether an award of punitive damages would be capped at $250,000. Rather, the trial court simply held that the evidence created a jury question over whether McQuay acted with the specific intent to cause harm, and thus over whether the statutory cap should apply in this case. Accordingly, McQuay’s assertion of error lacks merit.

2. In Count 1 of its Counterclaim, McQuay alleged that the Second Amended Note was in default and that there was insufficient collateral to cover the total indebtedness owed by the Partnership, rendering Willis personally liable under the Amended Guaranty. Willis moved for summary judgment on this count, contending that the uncontroverted evidence showed that there was sufficient collateral to cover the amount due under the Second Amended Note, such that his obligations under the Amended Guaranty were not triggered. The trial court agreed with Willis and granted his motion.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Willis. As explained above, McQuay initially extended a $500,000 loan to the Partnership, memorialized in the Note. The original Guaranty executed by Willis provided:

Guarantor [Willis] promises to perform his obligations under this Guaranty immediately . . . should Debtor [the Partnership] for any reason fail to pay the Obligations, as such Obligations are evidenced by Creditor’s [McQuay’s] records, the accuracy of which are hereby expressly stipulated to be conclusive upon Guarantor, within ninety (90) days of their due date and the collateral pledged as security for the Obligations is insufficient to satisfy Creditor’s claim in full[.]

“Obligations” was defined as the $500,000 loan made to the Partnership by McQuay pursuant to the terms of the Note. “Collateral,” in turn, was defined broadly to include all machinery, equipment, tools, parts, fixtures, furniture, furnishings, inventory, accounts, bank accounts, accounts receivable, and other general intangibles of the Partnership.

The Note was twice modified to increase the amount advanced to the Partnership by McQuay, resulting in the Second Amended Note. Contemporaneous with the execution of the Second Amended Note, Willis executed the Amended Guaranty, which stated in relevant part:

Guarantor unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees, when due, payment of the Obligations to the Creditor under the Second Amended Note to the same extent to which Guarantor promised to guarantee the Obligations to Creditor under the Note[.]

When the Amended Guaranty and the terms incorporated therein from the Guaranty are read together, it is clear that the Amended Guaranty applied only if there was a default on the Second Amended Note and the Partnership’s collateral was insufficient to cover the amount due under that note. In response to Willis’s motion for summary judgment on the guaranty counterclaim, McQuay presented evidence, through an expert’s affidavit, that the amount owed under the Second Amended Note with interest was $674,060. The same affidavit established that the value of the collateral was $719,032. Accordingly, the uncontroverted evidence of record showed that the value of the collateral exceeded the amount owed under the Second Amended Note, meaning that Willis was not liable under the Amended Guaranty as a matter of law.

Nevertheless, McQuay argues that under the terms of the Amended Guaranty, a default occurred if the collateral was insufficient to cover the entire outstanding sums owed to McQuay by the Partnership on all of its promissory notes, not simply the amount owed on the Second Amended Note. To support this argument, McQuay focuses on the language incorporated from the original Guaranty stating that a default would occur if “the collateral pledged as security for the Obligations is insufficient to satisfy Creditor’s claim in full.” McQuay argues that the term “Obligation” refers to the sums owed under the Second Amended Note, but that the term “claim” refers more broadly to the entire outstanding indebtedness owed to McQuay. Because the total indebtedness owed to McQuay by the Partnership on its various loans was over $1.1 million, McQuay contends that the collateral was insufficient to cover the “claim in full,” rendering Willis personally liable under the Amended Guaranty.

We are unpersuaded. The Amended Guaranty mentions only the Second Amended Note, and we decline to extend a guarantor’s obligations to loans unmentioned in the guaranty itself. “Georgia courts strictly construe guaranty agreements in favor of the guarantor. And the guarantor’s liability cannot be extended by implication or interpretation.” (Footnotes omitted.) Caves v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 264 Ga. App. 107, 114-115 (3) (b) (589 SE2d 670) (2003). See Dabbs v. Key Equip. Finance, 303 Ga. App. 570, 572-573 (694 SE2d 161) (2010). Because “Obligations” is expressly defined as the $500,000 loan memorialized in the Note, it stands to reason that the undefined term “claim” refers to the amount of the “Obligations” that remain unpaid. Any other interpretation would require the terms of the Amended Guaranty to be extended by implication, which the applicable rules of statutory construction forbid. As such, McQuay’s interpretation of the Amended Guaranty is misguided, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Willis on the guaranty counterclaim.

3. In Count 6 of its Counterclaim, McQuay sought attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 based on alleged stubborn litigiousness and unnecessary trouble and expense. Willis moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim, and the trial court granted the motion.

McQuay argues that it was entitled to pursue attorney fees predicated on the successful prosecution of its guaranty counterclaim. But, as explained supra in Division 2, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Willis on the guaranty counterclaim, and “[a] prerequisite to any award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is the award of damages or other relief on the underlying claim.” United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Peacock, 267 Ga. 145, 147 (2) (475 SE2d 601) (1996). As such, attorney fees could not be predicated on the guaranty counterclaim.

McQuay also argues that it may be entitled to pursue attorney fees if it successfully prosecutes its counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. With respect to this counterclaim, the trial court found that “there are conflicting facts that demonstrate a bona fide controversy.” Where, as here, there is no assertion of bad faith by the opposing party, attorney fees are not warranted if a bona fide controversy exists between the parties. See Dimambro Northend Assoc. v. Williams, 169 Ga. App. 219, 224-225 (6) (312 SE2d 386) (1983). McQuay does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding that a bona fide controversy existed as to the breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim. Therefore, McQuay’s attorney fees claim failed as a matter of law, and the trial court was correct in granting Willis summary judgment.

4. In Count 7 of his Second Amended Complaint, Willis alleged that McQuay breached Section 7.08 (b) of the Partnership Agreement by transferring its 50 percent ownership interest in the Partnership to Ruskin and Glidden in December 2005 as part of the settlement in the Ruskin Lawsuit. That section provides that if a partner attempts to transfer his interest in the Partnership,

[t]he transferor remains a Partner of the Partnership with all rights to vote and manage unless and until the non-transferring Partners holding at least sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the percentage interests in the Partnership consent, in their sole and absolute discretion (which can be unreasonably withheld), to make the transferee a Partner.

It is undisputed that under Section 7.08 (b), McQuay needed 66 2/3 percent of the non-transferring partner interests (Ruskin and Willis were the non-transferring partners) for its transfer to be authorized. But Ruskin and Willis together held only 50 percent, which precluded the transfer McQuay made in settlement of the Ruskin Lawsuit, if Section 7.08 (b) remained in effect. However, McQuay argued that Section 7.08 (b) could not be enforced by Willis based upon the affirmative defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, mutual departure, and promissory estoppel. Willis moved for summary judgment on his claim that McQuay breached Section 7.08 (b), and the trial court granted the motion after concluding that the uncon-troverted evidence showed that McQuay could not succeed on its affirmative defenses.

(a) The trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence to support McQuay’s affirmative defense of waiver. “It is well recognized that a party to a contract may waive contractual provisions for his benefit.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) APAC-Ga. v. Dept. of Transp., 221 Ga. App. 604, 607 (2) (472 SE2d 97) (1996). “A waiver may be established even though the acts, conduct or declarations are insufficient to establish an estoppel. Ordinarily, a waiver operates to preclude a subsequent assertion of the right waived or any claim based thereon.” (Emphasis omitted.) Hyre v. Paxson, 214 Ga. App. 552, 554 (3) (449 SE2d 120) (1994). If there is conflicting evidence over whether a waiver occurred, the issue is for a jury to resolve. Oxford Motors Co. v. Niblack, 183 Ga. App. 771, 772 (360 SE2d 23) (1987). A party’s protracted silence, or unreasonable delay in making protest, can raise a fact issue as to whether she has waived a contractual right. See DuPree v. South Atlantic Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 299 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 (683 SE2d 1) (2009); Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 255, 257-258 (3) (381 SE2d 322) (1989); Royal Atlanta Dev. Corp. v. M. D. Hodges Enterprises, 141 Ga. App. 838, 838-839 (1) (234 SE2d 676) (1977). See also John K. Larkins, Jr., Ga. Contracts: Law and Litigation § 10-1.

Construed in favor of McQuay, the nonmovant in this context, the evidence showed that McQuay informed Willis in September 2003 that he was the nonselected partner and that it had selected the Ruskin/Glidden proposal for buying out its ownership interest, subject to the approval of McQuay’s parent company and the negotiation of final contract terms. Then, in January 2004, McQuay sent Willis a right of first refusal letter, notifying him that McQuay intended to sell its interest to Ruskin and Glidden. After the Ruskin Lawsuit was filed, Willis’s attorney attended a temporary restraining order hearing in September 2004. Subsequently, in accordance with the settlement agreement reached in the Ruskin Lawsuit, McQuay’s 50 percent interest in the Partnership was transferred to Ruskin and Glidden in December 2005. That same month, McQuay sent Willis another right of refusal letter containing a copy of the settlement agreement. Significantly, however, Willis did not protest the transfer of McQuay’s ownership interest as a violation of Section 7.08 (b) until he raised the issue in his Second Amended Complaint filed in June 2008.

Willis’s “protracted silence raises a fact issue as to whether [he] waived the right to object to noncompliance with [Section 7.08 (b)] by [his] inaction.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) DuPree, 299 Ga. App. at 354 (failure to protest noncompliance with payment provision “until more than a year later” in an amended answer raised a fact issue over whether a waiver occurred). See also Kusuma, 191 Ga. App. at 257-258 (3) (18-month delay in enforcing termination option gave rise to jury question over issue of waiver); Royal Atlanta Dev. Corp., 141 Ga. App. at 838-839 (1) (failure to invoke contractual right until “a full year after the right matured and nine months after the commencement of litigation” created a jury question over the issue of waiver). Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error by deciding the waiver issue as a matter of law, and thus in granting summary judgment to Willis on his claim for breach of Section 7.08 (b) of the Partnership Agreement. A jury must resolve whether Willis’s delay in protest resulted in a waiver of his contractual rights.

(b) The trial court likewise erred in concluding that there was no evidence to support McQuay’s affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. A party may be equitably estopped from raising a particular claim or defense “where there is some intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud, by which another has been misled to his injury.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smith v. Direct Media Corp., 247 Ga. App. 771, 773 (1) (544 SE2d 762) (2001). “The existence of estoppel is generally a question for the factfinder to resolve.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Car-ragher v. Potts, 300 Ga. App. 735, 738 (1) (d) (686 SE2d 348) (2009).

Smith, 247 Ga. App. at 773-774 (1), provides guidance for the present case, where we upheld the trial court’s finding in a bench trial that an equitable estoppel had arisen, sufficient to find the defendant liable on an advertising contract, based upon the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant’s conduct. We noted that the defendant had engaged in extensive negotiations and participated in several meetings with the plaintiff over a proposed advertisement without ever indicating to the plaintiff that he did not intend to be bound by the advertising contract because he had never signed the order form. Id. at 774. We found significant the fact that before printing the advertisement, the plaintiff sent the defendant a proof of the advertisement which stated that a failure to return the proof would constitute acceptance. Id. We concluded that in light of the “considerable working relationship” between the parties and the defendant’s “acknowledgment that he received the advertisement proof,” the defendant’s “failure to return the proof, if not intentional, was certainly misleading.” Id.

The instant case is sufficiently similar to Smith to convince us that a jury issue exists over whether Willis is equitably estopped from invoking Section 7.08 (b). Similar to the situation in Smith, Willis engaged in numerous negotiations and participated in several meetings over the buyout of McQuay’s ownership interest and had a considerable working relationship with McQuay based on their years together as partners. Similarly, just as the defendant in Smith was sent an ad proof with the statement that failure to return it would constitute acceptance, Willis was sent two separate right of first refusal letters indicating that the transfer of McQuay’s ownership interest to Ruskin and Glidden would proceed on a date certain absent a response from Willis. Hence, as in Smith, the evidence in this case would authorize a jury to find that Willis’s conduct was tantamount to “such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud.” Id. at 773-774.

Additionally, there was evidence from which a jury could find that McQuay changed its position to its detriment in reliance upon Willis’s conduct, since it entered into an agreement with Ruskin and Glidden to sell its ownership interest, and ultimately transferred that interest, while being misled into believing that Willis would not rely upon Section 7.08 (b) to undermine the transfer. Furthermore, a jury could find that McQuay’s belief was reasonable, in light of Willis’s failure to invoke or even mention Section 7.08 (b) until several years after the intense negotiations and then transfer of McQuay’s ownership interest to Ruskin and Glidden.

Willis nonetheless contends that equitable estoppel is inapplicable because McQuay’s “selling [of] its Partnership interest in a lawsuit that did not include Willis” demonstrated that McQuay was acting in bad faith toward Willis. It is true that because estoppel is a creature of equity, a party who claims the benefit of an estoppel must have acted in good faith and must have been free of fraud in the underlying transaction. See Kothari v. Patel, 262 Ga. App. 168, 175 (4) (585 SE2d 97) (2003). But the present case involves conflicting evidence on the issue of McQuay’s good faith in its dealings with Willis in the Ruskin Lawsuit, since there was evidence that Willis’s counsel attended and spoke at a critical hearing in the Ruskin Lawsuit, and thus evidence from which a jury could infer that Willis was made aware of that litigation, even if he was not included as a party.

For these reasons, a genuine issue of material fact existed over whether Willis was equitably estopped from invoking Section 7.08 (b). Thus, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to Willis on this issue.

(c) In contrast, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no evidence to support McQuay’s affirmative defenses of mutual departure and promissory estoppel. Mutual departure requires the receipt or payment of money or some other sufficient consideration, however slight, to support a departure from the contractual terms. See OCGA § 13-4-4; Turem v. Sinowski & Jones, 195 Ga. App. 829, 829-830 (1) (395 SE2d 60) (1990); Southwest Plaster & Dry wall Co. v. R. S. Armstrong & Bros. Co., 166 Ga. App. 373, 374 (304 SE2d 500) (1983); Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 527 (1) (241 SE2d 633) (1978). McQuay does not contest that consideration is a requirement for a mutual departure, and there is no evidence of record that there was any receipt or payment of money or other consideration provided to Willis for a departure from the terms of the Partnership Agreement. It follows that McQuay’s affirmative defense of mutual departure failed as a matter of law.

To establish promissory estoppel, McQuay must come forward with evidence that Willis made a promise about Section 7.08 (b), see DPLM, Ltd. v. J. H. Harvey Co., 241 Ga. App. 219, 221 (1) (526 SE2d 409) (1999), but there is no evidence that any such promise was made in this case. As such, the trial court correctly concluded that McQuay could not succeed on its affirmative defense of promissory estoppel.

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to McQuay on Willis’s claims for breach of the partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages. We also affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Willis on McQuay’s counterclaims for suit on a guaranty and attorney fees and on McQuay’s affirmative defenses of mutual departure and promissory estoppel. However, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Willis on his claim for breach of Section 7.08 (b) of the Partnership Agreement, since genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to McQuay’s affirmative defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel.

Decided March 4, 2011.

Howick, Westfall, McBryan & Kaplan, Susan L. Howick, Michael C. Kaplan, for appellant.

Beal & Blitch, James D. Blitch IV, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Blackwell and Dillard, JJ., concur.

       In a separate enumeration of error, McQuay makes the generalized assertion that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence and made credibility determinations in ruling on summary judgment instead of treating the evidence as disputed. Rather than independently discuss this enumeration, we will analyze the evidence of record, and the trial court’s handling of that evidence, within the context of our discussion of the specific causes of action at issue on appeal.

       It is clear from the record that McQuay hotly contested Willis’s version of the facts and presented evidence that provided an alternative theory of what transpired in this case. But on appeal from the denial of McQuay’s motion for summary judgment, we are to construe the testimony and documentary evidence in the light most favorable to Willis, with all inferences drawn in his favor. See Smith, 266 Ga. App. at 814 (1).

       McQuay also maintained that in an e-mail dated June 15, 2004, Willis acknowledged that he remained a partner through discussions with Ruskin over a vote proxy. However, in the e-mail, Willis expressly reiterated that he had been terminated without cause as specified in the Partnership Agreement and that his willingness to provide a vote proxy to Ruskin was not intended to remove his claim that he was entitled to payment for his ownership interest. Additionally, McQuay argued that Willis clearly was not terminated as a partner because “a nearly identical situation” occurred in 2002, when Ruskin was removed as president of the Partnership, during which time no one claimed that Section 7.04 (a) had been triggered. But the situation in 2002 arguably was not “nearly identical” to the situation in 2003, since Willis presented evidence that by the time of his termination, the partners had reached an agreement that the nonselected partner would exit the Partnership and be bought out.

       McQuay does not dispute on appeal that Willis presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact over whether it acted with the specific intent to cause harm to him.


author: Andrews, Judge.

text:
    A11A0019, A11A0020.
    TYLER v. THOMPSON (two cases).
    (707 SE2d 137)
   Andrews, Judge.

Kenan S. Thompson sued Herman Tyler and his brother, Ernest Tyler, to recover money Thompson entrusted to Herman Tyler as a financial advisor to manage and invest. Thompson claimed on various grounds, including money had and received, fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, that Herman Tyler unlawfully took the entrusted money. Thompson claimed that Ernest Tyler conspired with Herman Tyler to unlawfully take the entrusted money when a portion of the money was used to buy and sell real property in Ernest Tyler’s name. Herman Tyler (Case No. A11A0019) and Ernest Tyler (Case No. A11A0020) appeal pro se from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Thompson in the amount of $1,224,499.66 of the entrusted money, plus attorney fees and costs pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 in the amount of $47,493.08. As to the grant of summary judgment for $1,224,499.66 of the entrusted money, we affirm the grant of summary judgment against Herman Tyler, and reverse the grant of summary judgment against Ernest Tyler. We reverse the grant of summary judgment against Herman and Ernest Tyler for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $47,493.08.

1. Both Tylers claim that the grant of summary judgment for attorney fees and costs pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 was error, and Thompson concedes this was error. We agree. As set forth in Covington Square Assoc, v. Ingles Markets, 287 Ga. 445 (696 SE2d 649) (2010), awarding summary judgment in favor of a claimant for expenses of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11 is error because the issue is for the trier of fact. Accordingly, we reverse to the extent the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Thompson for attorney fees and costs under OCGA § 13-6-11 in the amount of $47,493.08.

2. As to the grant of summary judgment for the sum of $1,224,499.66, both Tylers claim that procedural errors in the grant of summary judgment require reversal.

(a) There is no merit to the Tylers’ claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. “The trial court is not required to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. DeKalb County, 227 Ga. App. 186, 188 (489 SE2d 58) (1997).

(b) There is no merit to the Tylers’ claims that the trial court erred by refusing to hear and grant a motion to compel discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The record shows that, after the complaint was filed in April 2001 and answers were filed by the Tylers in May 2001, the time for discovery was extended by court order through August 1, 2002. Thompson moved for summary judgment in July 2004. After notice was sent setting the summary judgment motion for hearing in November 2004, the Tylers sent notices stating that they intended to take the depositions of Kenan and Elizabeth Thompson a few days prior to the summary judgment hearing. The parties agreed to delay the November 2004 hearing on the motion for summary judgment to allow completion of this discovery. After a series of e-mails were sent between the parties in November 2004 attempting to agree on a date to schedule the depositions, Herman Tyler’s attorney sent a letter in November 2004 to the Thompsons’ attorney offering a deposition date in December 2004, and stating, “I will await your reply.” The record reflects no further communication regarding the depositions. In May 2007, the trial court entered an order placing the case on the June 2007 “civil peremptory calendar” for “open cases not on the trial ready list in which the discovery has expired.” At a September 2007 hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the Thompsons and Herman Tyler, who was represented by an attorney at that time, appeared before the trial court and agreed to delay the hearing to give Herman Tyler a month to take the Thompsons’ depositions. The Thompsons contend, and the Tylers do not dispute, that no effort was made to schedule the depositions during this period. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was rescheduled for October 2007, but was again delayed when the trial court entered an order in October 2007 allowing Herman Tyler’s attorney to withdraw from the case. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was rescheduled for November 19, 2007. On November 9, 2007, Herman Tyler filed a pro se motion to compel discovery seeking a court order compelling Kenan and Elizabeth Thompson to submit to depositions. The motion referred to the fact that the parties exchanged e-mails in November 2004 regarding the depositions and that Herman Tyler’s attorney then offered a December 2004 deposition date in the letter to the Thompsons’ attorney which stated, “I will await your reply.” The motion seeks an order compelling the depositions because three years passed without a reply. The motion to compel was scheduled to be heard at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, Herman Tyler argued the motion to compel before the trial court and asked the court to grant the motion to compel the depositions before ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

No express order was entered by the trial court denying the motion to compel discovery. Nevertheless, on these facts, we will not presume that the court failed to consider the motion to compel before ruling on summary judgment. Green v. Sun Trust Banks, 197 Ga. App. 804, 807 (399 SE2d 712) (1990). Rather, “[i]t is presumed that the court implicitly denied the motions to compel upon entering summary judgment.” Id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to compel.

“A trial court has wide discretion to shorten, extend, or reopen the time for discovery, and its decision will not be reversed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown.” Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 266 Ga. 472, 473 (467 SE2d 517) (1996). Moreover, under Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1,

[i]n order for a party to utilize the court’s compulsory process to compel discovery, any desired discovery procedures must first be commenced promptly, pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay and within 6 months after the filing of the answer. At any time, the court, in its discretion, may extend, reopen or shorten the time to utilize the court’s compulsory process to compel discovery.

Assuming the trial court properly exercised its discretion at the September 2007 hearing date to delay the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and extend the time allowing Herman Tyler to take the depositions, there is no evidence that Herman Tyler made any effort to schedule the depositions before the court rescheduled the hearing. Although Herman Tyler filed a motion to compel the depositions ten days before the November 2007 hearing on summary judgment, he did not contend in the motion or at the hearing that he attempted to take the Thompsons’ depositions at any time after the discovery period was extended at the September 2007 hearing date. Rather, he simply argued that three years had passed after his attorney exchanged communications with the Thompsons’ attorney in 2004 attempting to schedule the depositions. Given Herman Tyler’s lack of diligence with regard to taking the depositions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to compel discovery and ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Woelper, 266 Ga. at 473; Scott v. LaRosa & LaRosa, Inc., 275 Ga. App. 96, 98-99 (619 SE2d 787) (2005).

3. Ernest Tyler contends that genuine issues of material fact preclude the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against him under OCGA § 9-11-56 for the sum of $1,224,499.66. Thompson’s suit alleged that he entrusted this money to Herman Tyler to manage and invest, and sought to recover the entrusted funds from Herman Tyler on the basis of money had and received, fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. As to Ernest Tyler, Thompson sought summary judgment for the entrusted money on the basis that, after the money was entrusted to Herman Tyler, Ernest Tyler conspired with Herman Tyler as part of an unlawful scheme to defraud Thompson, convert the entrusted money, and breach fiduciary duties. Thompson pointed to evidence that Ernest Tyler joined in the scheme when some of the money entrusted to Herman Tyler was used to purchase and sell real property in the name of Ernest Tyler, and the money used for this purpose was not returned to Thompson. Thompson claims that this evidence established, as a matter of law, that Ernest Tyler knowingly agreed to participate with Herman Tyler in a conspiracy to advance the unlawful scheme.

To recover damages based on a claim of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that two or more persons combined “either to do some act which is a tort, or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort. . . . [T]he conspiracy of itself furnishes no cause of action. The gist of the action ... is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed against the plaintiff and the resulting damage.” (Punctuation omitted.) Savannah College of Art & Design v. School of Visual Arts of Savannah, 219 Ga. App. 296, 297 (464 SE2d 895) (1995). The essential element of the alleged conspiracy is proof of a common design establishing “that two or more persons in any manner, either positively or tacitly, arrive at a mutual understanding as to how they will accomplish an unlawful design.” Parrish v. Jackson W. Jones, PC., 278 Ga. App. 645, 649 (629 SE2d 468) (2006). After the conspiracy is formed, members of the conspiracy are jointly and severally liable for acts of co-conspirators done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 329 (116 SE2d 742) (1960). Even if evidence that property was purchased and sold in Ernest Tyler’s name with money Thompson entrusted to Herman Tyler could support an inference that Ernest Tyler conspired with Herman Tyler to tortiously deprive Thompson of money used for this purpose, we find that whether or not this inference should be drawn is a jury issue. Outside Carpets v. Industrial Rug Co., 228 Ga. 263, 269 (185 SE2d 65) (1971); John D. Stephens, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 175 Ga. App. 379, 386 (333 SE2d 396) (1985). The trial court erred by granting summary judgment against Ernest Tyler for $1,224,499.66.

Decided March 4, 2011.

Herman Tyler, pro se.

Ernest Tyler, pro se.

Taylor, Feil, Harper, Lumsden & Hess, Lisa F. Harper, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No. A11A0019. Judgment reversed in Case No. A11A0020.

Phipps, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur.

       The suit was originally brought by Kenan Thompson and his mother, Elizabeth Thompson. Summary judgment was sought by and granted to Kenan Thompson.

       Herman Tyler asserts only procedural error and does not claim that any genuine issue of material fact precluded award of summary judgment against him for the sum of $1,224,499.66 under OCGA § 9-11-56. Accordingly, Herman Tyler waived any claim of error with respect to the substance of this portion of the summary judgment award. Garner v. Roberts, 238 Ga. App. 738-739 (520 SE2d 255) (1999). As set forth in Division 3, infra, Ernest Tyler also asserts that genuine issues of material fact preclude the award of summary judgment against him for the sum of $1,224,499.66.