author: Putnam, J.

text:
    Stillwell, Admx., Appellant, v. Tudor et al., Appellees. Stillwell et al., Appellees, v. Stillwell et al., Appellants.

      (No. 464
    — Decided October 28, 1946.)

      Mr. Robert L. Carr and Miss Ethel Elder, for appellants. '

      Mr. Jay S'. McDevitt and Mr.' Barton W. Blair,.for appellees.
   Putnam, J.

These two eases were heard together in the court below but they were not consolidated. Separate entries were made in each case. The appeals here are on questions of law and they were heard together. One case, numbered 10333 in the.court below, is an action by an administratrix to s'ell real estate to pay debts. The other case, numbered 10379 in the court below, is an action for a declaratory judgment as to the title to the same real estate. The former case was first filed. These actions present a complication of pleadings, issues and procedure, which, considering the known ability of counsel involved, is unusual to put it mildly. The ultimate question and issue in both cases is the determination of the title of the real estate. The question arose because of the fact that Lot C. Still-well’s first wife, Gertrude Stillwell, who died January 14, 1922, had willed him this property but he, having the will in his possession, never offered The same for probate.

From the pleadings, stipulations and testimony the following pertinent facts appear.

On January 10, 1922, Lot 0. Stillwell and Gertrude Stillwell were husband and wife. They had three children, all of age, viz., Wendell Stillwell, Madeline Maxwell and Ruth Tudor. Lot C. Stillwell was an attorney at law, practicing in Knox and adjacent counties. On that date Gertrude Stillwell was in a hospital and in her last illness. At that time she executed the will in question which devised all her property in fee simple to her husband. Ruth Tudor was one of the witnesses to the will. After its execution the husband took it info his possession and kept it in a safety deposit box until 1939, at which time at his direction his son, Wendell, removed it from the safety deposit box and placed it in a safe in his father’s office. The will remained there until September 15, 1941, at which time the office was discontinued. At that time Wendell took the will into his possession and kept it until March 17, 1945, when he produced it in Probate Court in response to a citation issued at the instigation of Ruth Stillwell, administratrix of the estate of Lot C. Stillwell who died November 6, 1944, without ever having offered the will for probate. Lot C. Stillwell and his second wife, Ruth, were married in 1924. There is-no evidence that Madeline Maxwell ever knew anything about the will until it was produced in court. Ruth Tudor, being a witness to the will, knew of its execution, but she testified that she never read it, never had it in her possession and never saw it again until it was produced in court.

On October 22, 1921, Gertrude ánd Lot C. Stillwell executed a note for $9,500 due in one year and a mortgage securing the same to- one Charles Ewers. The mortgagee is now deceased and Charles B. Ewers is the administrator of his estate. On June 27, 1927, $1,725 was paid on the note and on August 1, 1936, $300 was so paid. These payments appear by endorsements. No other payments were made. The mortgagee in his lifetime paid some $4,000 in taxes on the premises and there is now due on the note-more than $20,000. This appears by the alternative answer filed by Charles B. Ewers, administrator, in cause No. 10333. The mortgagee made no attempt in his lifetime either to foreclose the mortgage or reduce the note to judgment.

On May 2, 1945, the will was admitted to probate and one Creed Jopling Lester was appointed administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of Gertrude Stillwell. On May 7, 1945, cause No. 10333 was instituted but service was not complete until December 10, 1945. In the meantime on July 19, 1945, Charles B. Ewers, administrator, had filed a suit in ejectment against the heirs of Gertrude Stillwell in the Common Pleas Court of Knox county. That suit failed because of the 21-year statute of limitation. (Such cause was heard upon appeal in this court contemporaneously with the instant cases and the judgment affirmed, but the question of the collectibility of the note was not involved nor is it here.) On October 25, 1945, cause No. 10379 was instituted in the Probate Court and on the same date a suit was filed in the Common Pleas Court to contest the will. The contest case is still pending.

It is to be noted that Charles B. Ewers, administrator, is a defendant in cause No. 10333, but is not a party in cause No. 10379. Creed Jopling Lester, administrator, is a defendant in cause No. 10379, but is not a party in cause No. 10333. The answer which Charles B. Ewers filed in cause No. 10333, setting up his note and mortgage, was filed in the alternative to be considered only in the event the court found the plaintiff to be entitled to sell the real estate. Lester filed no answer or other pleadings in cause No. 10379. No replies were filed in either case, but there was a statement by, the court, during the attempt to get an agreed statement of facts, to the effect that replies could be considered filed in the • nature of general denials. This is important as relating to the fourth defense in the answer of Ruth Stillwell in cause No. 10379 because it changes the status of Madeline Maxwell as to her knowledge of the will.

No demurrer was filed in cause No. 10379, but the first and second defenses in the answer of Ruth Still-well allege that the petition does not state a cause of action because case No. 10333 was first filed and all issues could have been resolved in that case. We will first consider this matter. However, in view of the conclusions arrived at herein on other matters, we do not consider this question of vital importance. There can be no question that in a proceeding in the Probate Court to sell real estate to pay debts of the decedent, the court has full power both in law and equity to determine all questions of title to the real estate involved and all other ancillary questions. Issues in cause No. 10333 could have been made up which would have settled the rights of all parties in both cases. However, this was not done and- the fault therefor cannot be attributed to any one party. Service was not completed in cause No. 10333 until December 10, 1945, and then answers in both cases were filed within two weeks thereafter. Then there seems to have been an agreement, after this long delay, to expedite matters and hear both cases together. This was done and the hearing was pretty much informal and the record extremely short. In view of those circumstances and the fact that the parties in these two cases are not the same,' we hold this defense not well taken. In any event, as all proper issues are being considered herein, Ruth Still-well cannot be prejudiced.

Plaintiffs in cause No. 10379 rely in both cases upon the following sections of the General Code and-maintain that by reason thereof Lot C. Stillwell took nothing under the will, which survived him. Section 10542, General Code (50 Ohio Laws, 297), which was in effect when Gertrude Stillwell died, read, as follows:

“No lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall pass to any devisee in a will, who for three years knows of its existence and has it in his power to control it, unle’ss, within that time, he causes it to be offered for, or admitted to, probate. By such neglect, the estate devised to such devisee shall .descend to the heirs of the testator.”

In 1932 that section was repealed and Section 10504-14, General Code, was enacted. The latter section reads:

“No property or right, testate or intestate, shall pass to a beneficiary named in a will, knowing for three years of its existence and having it in his power to control it, who, without reasonable cause, intentionally conceals or withholds it or neglects or refuses within that time to cause it to be offered for or admitted to probate. By such neglect, the estate devised to such devisee shall descend to the heirs of the testator, not including any heir who has concealed or withheld the will as aforesaid.” ,

The defendant Rnth Stillwell takes the position that those statutes are not self-executing; that they are in the nature of a forfeiture, requiring an action to invoke the same, which action is subject to the one-year limitation prescribed in Section 11225, General Code; and that such an action is now barred. She maintains also that all the heirs of Gertrude Still-well had full knowledge of the will; that during the time their father had possession of the same and failed to probate it, they were of full age and sui juris; that they could have caused the same to be produced for probate and refused t'o do so; and that by reason thereof they are estopped from now claiming the benefits afforded by statute as a fraud upon her rights would result. These matters are set up in the third and fourth defenses of her answer in cause No. 10379 but not in cause No. 10333.

There can be no question that Section 10542, General Code, in effect at the time of the death of Gertrude Stillwell, controlled the title and rights of Lot C. Still-well in the property. Was that section self-executing or did it require an action to invoke its provisions? As to such section, the question is not one of first impression. This court has heretofore had the substance thereof under consideration in the case of Loos v. Buffalo-Springfield Rubber Co, 32 C. C. (N. S.), 443, 35 C. D., 809. The first paragraph of the syllabus in that case is:

“Where persons interested in the will of a decedent neglect to cause it to be offered for probate within three years following the death of the decedent or of becoming informed of its existence, the will becomes inoperative so far as vesting title to real estate in such persons is concerned, and realty devised to persons thus in default descends to the heirs of the testator. ’ ’

On page 447 the court, speaking through Judge Shields, said:

“That the statutes already referred to place it in the power of a person interested in a will, known to exist, to compel the person having the custody or control of the same to produce it by process, if necessary, that it may be admitted to probate seems clear, and construing the language used in said Section 10542 to mean what it says, it is equally clear that where a person interested in a will neglects to take such action within three years after the known existence of the will, such will becomes inoperative as to vesting title to real estate, and the real estate devised to such person descends to the heirs of the testator. Here it appears that each and all of the plaintiffs in error knew of the existence of said decedent’s will, if not of its contents, from the time it was first placed in the custody of Henry Behard in the year 1910.”

The same section was under consideration in the case of Barron v. McCann, 25 Ohio App., 520, 159 N. E., 104, where the court approved the reasoning in the Loos case and repudiated the case of Mitchell v. Long, 9 N. P. (N. S.), 113, 20 O. D. (N. P.), 41, upon which the defendant relies.

The first paragraph of the syllabus of the Barron case is:

“Section 10542, General Code, providing that estate devised to devisee shall descend to heirs of testator, if devisee fails to probate will within three years after knowledge of its existence, does not provide for forfeiture of interest that has vested, but prevents any estate from passing-to negligent devisee.”

Those cases were followed in the case of Lawson v. Thomas, 48 Ohio App., 311, 193 N. E., 655. In that casé as in the instant case there was a sole devisee under a will and he neglected, for more than three years to probate tbe same and tbe court held that he took nothing thereunder.

The reasoning and conclusion reached in those cases are sound and we adhere thereto. It follows that at the end of three years, vis., January 15,1925, any rightswhiph Lot C. Stillwell might have acquired under the-will were extinguished. No action was required and no statute of limitations applied. The estate then vested in Gertrude Stillwell’s heirs, subject to Lot C. Stillwell’s statutory interest which was a life estate-in one-third of the estate. The life estate of course was-extinguished at his death, if not prior thereto, and there were no property lights which his administratrix could sell to pay debts. Even if Ruth Stillwell were-right in her contention as to the law as set forth in the-third and fourth defenses the result would still be the same. Under the evidence herein Madeline Maxwell having had no knowledge of the will until it was offered for probate would be neither estopped nor barred by the statute of limitation from invoking the provisions of Section 10542 or Section 10504-14, General Code,' which she did and seasonably after she became aware of the will.

One other question remains. What effect, if any, did the repeal of Section 10542 and the enactment of' Section 10504-14, in 1932, have upon the right of the-heirs to inherit the real estate involved herein? There can be no question as to Madeline Maxwell. She had no knowledge of the will until it was produced for probate.

Ruth Tudor had knowledge of the will from the .time of its execution, but she did not know its contents, nor did she ever see it thereafter or have .it in her possession, until it was produced for probate in 1945. Under the old statute and tip until 1932, of course, she could inherit. -After 1932 if the new statute applied to-her, her acts of omission or commission were not. such as to bring her within the provisions thereof. Consequently, her inheritance was not affected.

The situation as to Wendell Stillwell is different. As before stated the record shows that his first knowledge of the will was in 1939; that on September 15, 1941, he took it into his possession and control and, kept it until he was compelled to produce it in court three years and six months later. Certainly this was •an intentional withholding and no reasonable cause therefor appears. Indeed, from the indebtedness of the estate and the effect which it would have upon his inheritance if such debt became outlawed, it would seem that he had a vital interest in ■ concealing and withholding the will. Consequently, if Section 10504-14 applies, he clearly could not inherit. We see no' reason why that section should ,not apply. If it be urged that his rights became fixed under the old statute in 1925, the answer is that as to an heir the estate vests immediately upon the death of the testator. This, however, is subject to the proviso that when the will is probated within the limitations of the law, the estate is divested. It is true that under the old statute no act of the heir could prevent his inheriting if the beneficiary did not acquire the estate through the will. The acts of Wendell Stillwell, however, were not committed while the old statute was in force. He voluntarily brought himself within the provisions of the new statute after it became effective.

As far as the devisee or the beneficiary is concerned, the reasoning in support of the first paragraph of the' syllabus in the Barron case, supra, would apply to Section 10504-14 as well as to Section 10542. The failure to probate the will according to the conditions named in Section ■ 10504-14 prevents the estate from ever vesting in the devisee. Consequently, no forfeiture is involved. The devisee takes nothing under a will until it is duly admitted to probate. Now when Section 10504-14 was enacted there was among other changes the addition of the words, “not including any heir who has concealed or withheld the will as aforesaid.” As to an heir such addition provides for a divesting of an estate which has already vested. Such divesting is,, therefore, in the nature of a forfeiture as far as the-heirs are concerned and would be subject to the limitation of one year imposed by Section 11225, General Code. However, even so, it does not aid the position of Wendell Stillwell because the action was brought within six months after the expiration of the three-year period. We hold that Wendell Stillwell cannot inherit. To this extent the judgments of the court, below must be modified.

The judgments in both cases are modified and: affirmed as modified.

Judgments modified and affirmed.

Sherick, P. J., and Montgomery, .J., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Sherick, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Meyer, Appellant, v. Welsbacher et al., Appellees.

      (No. 2246
    — Decided February 5, 1947.)

      Mr. Christian R. Wingercl, for appellant.

      Mr. Willis E. Himebaugh and Mr. Frank J. Menster, for appellees.
   Sherick, J.

This appeal on questions of law from a judgment on a directed verdict in a will contest, rendered at the conclusion of the opening statements in. favor of the proponents of the will, presents a rather startling course of procedure of which the contestant •complains. The facts which display the situation are as follows:

Contestant in his petition, after "pleading the death •of a testatrix, his kinship, dates pertinent to the purported will’s execution, presentation for and admission to probate, and executor’s appointment and qualification, avers “that said paper writing is not the last will and testament of said Ella Meyer,” and prays that it be set aside. It is therefore apparent that plaintiff pursued the direction of Section 12082, General Code. No answer was filed. The cause came on for trial. The jury was impaneled and sworn. Thereupon the court, without proceeding to make up the issue by an order on the journal as the aforesaid statute directs, permitted counsel, first for the propon•ents and next for the contestant, to make their opening statements to the jury. At conclusion of contestant’s statement .the proponents moved for dismissal on the ground that none “of the acts complained of and relied upon as constituting undue influence were wrongful. ’ ’ Those statements to the jury were long and in a number of instances beside the point. Of proponents’ statement, we make but one comment. It contained a reading of the will. Contestant’s statement indicated that he expected to rely upon proof of facts ,that testatrix was unduly influenced by the unrelated sole beneficiary, the executor; and that the purported will is that of the executor rather than that of the testatrix. Contestant stated that the sole beneficiary was a married man; that the testatrix, a spinster, was in ill health and confined to her bed; that the executor and testatrix were associated in school work; that he called upon her frequently, bringing gifts and unaccompanied by his wife; and that his car was parked at those times in positions of concealment. A clandestine love affair was not claimed.

It is rather difficult to ascertain from the court’s .statements as displayed by the record just what prompted the court’s direction of a verdict, other than it was found that insufficient facts had been stated by contestant to create an issue for a jury’s consideration. Whether it was for the reason•advanced. by the proponents is undisclosed. It is observed that contestant in his closing remarks in his opening statement stated: “We claim that when this set of circumstances which I have enumerated to you is wherein that influence that I mentioned to you came, and «this is not the last will of Ella Meyer. This is the will of Mr. Welsbacher.”

Just when should an issue be made by an order on the journal, where an issue is not made by the pleadings? The answer of course, is at the trial’s commencement. It is elemental that a trial is begun when the jury is impaneled and sworn. It is equally long recognized that opening statements of counsel are a part of a trial. If there was no issue before the court nnd jury, then these procedural steps were but the conducting of a moot court. It has long been recognized and followed by the courts in the trial of will contests that the issue must be made by a journal entry at the beginning of the trial in the absence of an answer. ‘This was not done. It was the trial court’s duty, un-v -der the statute, to make up the issue by an order on the journal before the impaneling of a jury, which is to say before trial was commenced, and in failing to do so it erred.

This conclusion engenders a second question. Just what was the court’s duty with respect to the issue at ■this stage of a will contest? It is first observed as ■noted in the well considered case of Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St., 145, 119 N. E., 503, that a will contest is a ■civil action. This, however, does not mean that in all respects a will contest is so tried. It hardly needs ■suggestion that the issues in other civil actions are made by the pleadings and the evidence. In a will nontest the same is true. However, it is the usual ■thing, that such an action is tried upon the general issue made by a journal entry. The order of procedure is directed by statute. It is totally unlike that pursued in other civil actions. Section 12082, General •Code, prescribes what the general issue shall be in all will contests. It therefore must follow that a trial •court may not limit such a trial to any one of the four nr more special issues set forth in the Niemes case ■before the introduction of any evidence in the trial of ■the case. We recognize, of course, that such may be ■done at the conclusion of all the evidence.

This court is admonished by appellees’ counsel that Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St., 469, 189 N. E., 246, changes all this. It did abolish the “scintilla nile,” and held in the second paragraph of the syllabus: “The so-called ‘scintilla rule,’ requiring a trial judge to submit a case to the jury if there is any evidence, however slight, tending to support each .material issue,- no longer obtains in Ohio.” It went further and did say inferentially in its overruling of Clark v. McFarland, 99 Ohio St., 100, 124 N. E., 164, that the scintilla rule should not thereafter apply in will contests. This is exemplified in Westfall v. Notman, 53 Ohio App., 314, 4 N. E. (2d), 932, to which appellees likewise direct our attention. All three of those cases went to a jury. None of them attempted to modify the general issue or the unusual rule of trial procedure prescribed by statute in will contests.

We further recognize that there exists another well recognized rule of civil procedure, i. e., one who has the burden of proof of an issue may have his cause taken from a jury and his action dismissed if he fails in the ^statement of his case to state his expectancy that the evidence will maintain every element of the issue relied upon. The Hamden Lodge, Clark and Westfall cases, supra, in no way deal with this rule. Long before and ever since the Hamden Lodge case, it has been the practice, and recognized as sufficient, to plead and state the general statutory issue in a will contest. Why should this not be so? One must plead his cause of action. This a contestant in a will contest has done, when he pleads the general issue. Must his opening statement embrace a larger field? Must he state the special issues upon which he elects to proceed? Do the will contest statutes require that he must state everything that he expects to prove on a special issue? The answer to each question is a negative one.

The trial court’s order directing a verdict did four things that ought never be countenanced so long as the present will-contest statutes endure. The court narrowed the issue that is prescribed by statute. The court assumed that no further proof, might be made upon the special issue which contestant chose to discuss in his opening statement. It proceeded to find as a matter of law that the facts which contestant stated he expected to prove on the special issue were not wrongful or responsive to the special issue of undue influence. The court thereby invaded the jury’s province. The court failed to consider that contestant had pleaded the general issue and had stated in his opening statement that he expected to prove that ‘ ‘ this is not the last will of Ella Meyer. This is the will of Mr. Welsbacher.” This court desires it to be understood that it is not holding that a will contest cannot arise in which a court would not be warranted in doing as was done in this case. It is, however, hardly conceivable that a contestant would in his opening statement so limit his cause that to proceed further would be utter folly. This controversy is not such a case.

There being prejudicial error in the respects noted, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Putnam and Montgomery, JJ., concur.


author: Conn, J.

text:
    Smith, Appellee, v. Weinkoff et al., Appellants.
    (No. 4186
    — Decided' February 3, 1947.)

      Messrs. Ryan <& Ryan and Mr. George R. Effler¡ for appellee.

      Mr. George N. Fell and Mr. George E. Fell, for appellants.
   Conn, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law taken by defendant Charles W. Manzel from a judgment entered by the Common Pleas Court. The action was begun by the plaintiff, Bertha Petersen Smith, praying for an order construing the will of John V. Sanfleet, deceased. • The testator died September 21, 1906, and in his will, after making specific bequests to his brother Aaron V. Sanfleet and his sisters Eva Petersen and Catharine Weinkoff, he devised and bequeathed to his wife, Barbara Sanfleet, his household goods, carriages and horses, absolutely, and the net income from two-thirds of all his personal and real property for life, and to his daughter, Catharine E. Fella, one-third of the net income from such property during the lifetime of the testator’s wife. In the event testatór’s daughter survived his wife, then the daughter was to receive during her lifetime the net income of all testator’s property.

The issue between the defendant Charles W. Manzel (who is the relict of a niece of the testator) and the plaintiff arises by reason of the following provisions of the will:

“But if she is married and has issue at the time of the death of my said wife, or has issue at any time before her death, and said issue survive her, then all of said property, real and personal of every kind and description, shall pass to said child or children absolutely. But if my daughter survive my said wife and die without issue, then at her death all of my property both real and personal of every kind and description, shall pass to my said brother and sisters heretofore mentioned, share and share alike, and if dead, to their heirs, said heirs to take the share that my brothers or sisters would have been entitled to if living.

“If my said daughter should die before my said wife, then my wife to receive during her life, the net income of all of my property, real and personal of every kind and description, and at her death, all of said property I give, devise and bequeath to my said brother and sisters, heretofore mentioned, share and share alike, and in case of the "death of any or all of said brother and sisters, then their respective shares shall pass to and become the property of their heirs.”

The surviving spouse, Barbara Sanfleet, died March 16, 1921, and the daughter, Catharine E. Fella, died October 21, 1945. No issue was born to such daughter. The brother and two sisters of the testator, to whom the remainder "of the estate was devised share and share alike (in the event testator’s daughter died without issue), each passed away prior to the death of the daughter and each left an heir or heirs surviving.

The brother, Aaron Y. Sanfleet, died April 19, 1918, leaving six children, among whom was a daughter, Mary Sanfleet Manzel, who died testate September 5, 1941, prior to the death of testator’s daughter, Catharine E. Fella. The sole devisee under the will oh Mary Sanfleet Manzel was her husband, Charles W. Manzel, appellant herein. o

The trial court determined that' under the terms of the last will and testament of John V. Sanfleet, the defendant . Charles W. Manzel had no interest in the estate.

It is the claim of the plaintiff that by virtue of the terms of the will the testator did not intend the remainder of his estate to vest until the date of the death of his daughter, and that the remainder did not vest until that time. On the other hand, the defendant contends that upon the dfeath of such testator, the brother Aaron V. Sanfleet and his two sisters each became the owner of a vested remainder in one-third of the corpus of the estate.

The issue between .the parties is narrow, the focal point being the moment of time the remainders vested under the provisions of the will. The determination of this question requires that the intent of the testator be ascertained from the provisions of the will, and that, when ascertained, the intent be given effect pursuant to established rules of law.

A vested remainder may be defined as a remainder so created that from the commencement of the particular estate, seisin can be instantly asserted in event the particular estate should be determined. The characteristics of a vested remainder include the following, viz., limitation to a definite person or persons in being capable of taking the estate at the time of the grant, a vesting in ownership of the remainder at such time, subject to divestment, and postponement of pos-' session and enjoyment until the termination of the particular estate.

A contingent remainder is one so created that the particular estate may expire by its own limitation before the remainder can take effect in ownership or possession. In a contingent remainder, the estate vests on the happening of the contingent event. If the particular estate expires before the remainder can take effect, the seisin reverts to the grantor and the remainder fails.

It is a cardinal rule that the law favors the vesting of estates and “that unless the intention of a testator to postpone the vesting of a devise or bequest to some future time is clearly indicated in his will, such devise or bequest vests in the devisee or legatee at the testator’s death.” 18 Ohio Jurisprudence, 476, Section 97.

Although the rule of construction favoring vested remainders will not be applied where its application will defeat the intention of the testator, nevertheless, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention or where the provisions of the will are ambiguous or doubtful, the rule that the law favors vested remainders will be applied. 16 Ohio Jurisprudence, 483, Section 103; Ohio National Bank of Columbus, Trustee, v. Boone, 139 Ohio St., 361, 40 N. E. (2d), 149, 144 A. L. R., 1150.

The pertinent provisions of the 'will in the instant case and the declared purpose of the testator therein expressed have been given careful consideration by counsel for the respective parties. It is urged on the one hand that the words, “then at her death,” refer to the time of the death of the daughter, the life tenant; and that the word, “then,” is an adverb of time and was used by the testator with the intention of fixing the time of the vesting of the remainders.

On the other hand, it is contended that the phrase above mentioned and other language found in the will referred to possession and not to vesting and did not indicate an intention to postpone the vesting of the remainders.

Although the question thus presented is not wholly free from doubt, we have reached the conclusion that the will, taken as a whole, does not disclose or evince an intention of the testator to postpone the vesting of the remainder to the time of the expiration of the prior estate.

It follows, therefore, that, under the will of John V. Sanfleet and the established rules of law applicable in its construction, upon the death of the testator, his brother, Aaron V. Sanfleet, became the owner of a vested remainder in one-third of the residue of the estate, subject to be divested in the' event testator’s daughter died leaving issue surviving her; and that Charles W. Manzel is entitled to the share of the estate as claimed by him.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Carpenter and Stuart, JJ., concur.


author: By the Court.

text:
    Ragland, Appellant, v. Wallace, Registrar, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellee.
    (No. 3724
    — Decided October 4, 1946.)

      Mr. L. P. Henderson, for appellant.

      Mr. Hugh 8. Jenkins, attorney general, and Mr. Richard G. Gerken, for appellee.
   By the Court.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin county, Ohio, which affirmed the order of Cylon W. Wallace, Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the state of Ohio, revoking the license of plaintiff, appellant herein.

A judgment was obtained in the Municipal Court of Columbus against the plaintiff, in the amount of $120, in favor of Roy Little, by' reason, of damages caused in an automobile collision. The judgment was rendered January 20, 1943. The plaintiff having failed to satisfy the judgment or stay the execution, within 30 days after the judgment was rendered, the defendant, appellee herein, on May 8, 1943, under authority of Section 6298-1, General Code, revoked the license of plaintiff to operate a motor vehicle and his certificate of registration. From that order the plaintiff filed a petition in error in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin county, as provided in Section 6298-18, General Code. The Common Pleas Court affirmed the order of the registrar in revoking the license.' From that judgment an appeal was taken to this court.

Plaintiff in his assignments of error claims that the provision in Section 6298-1, General Code, authorizing the registrar to revoke a license, is unconstitutional. That statute is the first section of the act (Section 6298-1 et seq., General Code) commonly referred to as the Financial Responsibility Law. The point made by plaintiff is that that section of the act is unconstitutional as being in violation of the constitutional guarantee of “due process of law.”

' That class of legislation falls within the police power of the state under which the Legislature is given exceedingly broad authority. It lies within the power of the Legislature to control the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways, prescribing who may operate such motor vehicles and under what conditions such right shall be denied. The Legislature is not restricted in the exercise of this power unless the enactment violates some specific constitutional provision or is found to be an unreasonable exorcise of the power.

Plaintiff was given a remedy under the act and he pursued it. He had his day in court. - We are of the opinion that-Section 6298-1, General Code, and other related sections of the Code, particularly Sections 6298-17 and 6298-18 which provide for a review of the order of the registrar by the Common Pleas Court, are in pari materia and must be construed together. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the provisions of those sections meet the test of due process of law and are not violative of the “due process” clause (Section 1, Article XIY, Amendments) in the United States Constitution or the “due course of law” clause (Section 16, Article I) in the state Constitution.

There being no error disclosed by the record, the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Hornbeck, P. J., Wiseman and Miller, JJ., concur.


author: Ross, J.

text:
    City of Cincinnati et al., Appellees, v. The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., Appellant.

      (No. 6775
    — Decided July 11, 1947.)

      Mr. John D. Ellis, city solicitor, Mr. Ed F. Alexander and Mr. Henry M. Bruestle, for appellees.

      Messrs. Erost S Jacobs, for appellant.
   Ross, J.

This is an appeal on questions of law from -a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton •county in favor of the plaintiffs.

The-trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, 'appellees herein, the parties having, in open ■court, waived a trial by jury. The judgment of the •court in favor of the plaintiffs was for the sum of “$194,793.95, with interest at six.per cent-per annum on $166,474.68 from April 1, 1942; interest at six per ■cent per annum on $231 from October 1, 1942; and interest at six per cent per annum on $28,088.27 from April 1, .1943, together with costs to the plaintiffs.

Pleadings.

In their petition, plaintiffs set forth that the city ■of Cincinnati is a municipal, corporation under the laws of Ohio; that the individual plaintiffs are the •duly appointed and acting members of the Board •of Trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, a municipally owned railroad constructed under authority of the laws of Ohio; and that the defendant is a private corporation under the laws of Ohio engaged in the operation of a railroad, with lines running into and through the city of Cincinnati, state of Ohio, and other states of the United States, carrying passengers and freight- for hire as a common carrier.

The petition recites that. on October 11, 1881, the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway executed an agreement with defendant, whereby they leased to the defendant the entire line of railway known as the Cincinnati Southern Railway, extending from its terminus in Cincinnati to its terminus in Chattanooga, Tennessee, for a period of 25 years; and that the lease is fully set out on pages 3 to 18, inclusive, of the exhibit containing all the agreements between the parties herein, attached thereto and made a part of the' petition as though fully incorporated therein. The petition then recites that clause 2 (p. 4) provides the rentals to be paid under the lease, and clause 3 (p! 5) provides for the payment of all taxes, assessments, duties, imposts and charges whatsoever which may be levied, assessed, or imposed during the lease term by the defendant.

The petition then recites that on June 7, 1902, the parties modified the agreement, providing, among other matters, for an extension of the term of the lease for 60 years, expiring on October 12, 1966, and that the contract of modification and extension of the lease is fully set out on pages 41 and 42 of the exhibit attached thereto.

The petition sets forth further that on August 1, 1928, the parties executed a second modification and extension of the lease under which they are now operating. The agreement is fully set forth on pages 179 to 193, inclusive, of the exhibit attached to the petition. The modification extends the lease to December 31, 2026, A. D.

The petition then sets forth the rentals • required to be paid under the second modification and extension agreement, stating that in addition to the rental, •defendant is required to • pay all sinking fund and interest charges on the terminal facility bonds as provided in the various terminal facility agreements; the expenses of trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway organization; and all taxes, assessments, •duties, imposts and charges as provided for in the lease and the modification and extensions thereof.

The plaintiffs then allege that under the agreements there was due them from the defendant in the calen•dar year of 1942 the sum of $1,752,565.30 exclusive of the expenses of- the Board of Trustees of the ■Cincinnati Southern Railway,' but that the defendant paid them the sum of $1,585,859.62 or $166,705.68 less than the amount payable.

Plaintiffs say further that there was due them from the defendant, exclusive of the trustees’ expenses, in the calendar year of 1943, the sum of :$1,709,611.05, but that the defendant paid them only the sum of $1,681,522.78, or $28,088.27 less than the total amount payable.

Plaintiffs then alleged that demand was made upon the defendant for payment of the sum of $194,793.95, ■but that such payment was declined.

Plaintiffs then .prayed judgment against defendant ■for the sum of $194,793.95 together with interest thereon on $166,474.68 from April 1, 1942; interest ■on $231 from October 1,1942; and interest on $28,088.27 from April 1, 1943, and for such other relief in law •or equity to which, they may be entitled and for their •costs expended.

In its answer, the defendant, appellant herein, admitted the corporate entity of the city of Cincinnati; .admitted that the individual plaintiffs are the duly appointed and acting membfers of the Board of Trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, a municipally owned railroad constructed under authority of the laws of Ohio; admitted that defendant is a private corporation under the laws of Ohio, engaged in the operation of a railroad as set forth in the petition.

Defendant admitted further that the lease set forth in the plaintiffs’ petition was entered into by defendant with the plaintiffs, and that the lease agreement is as set forth in plaintiffs’ petition.

Defendant admitted further the modification and extension of the lease of June 7, 1902, and the second modification and extension of August 1, 1928, set out on pages 179 to 193, inclusive, of the exhibit attached to the plaintiffs’ petition, and that they are operating under the second modification and extension of the lease. Defendant admitted that the second modification extends the lease to December 31, 2026, A. D.

The defendant admitted the second modification extension agreement provides for the payment of the rentals set forth in the plaintiffs’ petition, and that in addition to the rentals the defendant is required to pay the sinking fund interest charges on terminal facility bonds and the expenses of the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway organization to the extent of $12,000 per annum.

The defendant admitted that the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway made demand upon it for the payment of the sum of $194,793.95, and that such payment has not been made by it; and the defendant then denied each and every other allegation contained in the plaintiffs’ petition which was not specifically admitted to be true.

By way of further answer, the defendant then ■set forth that on or about April 30, 1940, there was instituted in Franklin Circuit Court, in the commonwealth of Kentucky, case No. 38Q18, which was an action hy the commonwealth of Kentucky on relation of H. Clyde Reeves, commissioner of revenue, against the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, a municipal corporation, and The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company.

The action had for its purpose the collection from the city of Cincinnati (The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company being a garnishee only) of large sums of money said to be owed by it to the commonwealth of Kentucky as income taxes for the years 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, - together with interest and penalties provided by the statutes of Kentucky for failure to file returns and seasonably pay the income taxes. The income tax claimed due from the city of Cincinnati was based upon that part of rentals (less such deductions as the taxpayer might claim under the statute) paid the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway by The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company pursuant to the aforementioned lease for the years involved-alleged to be allocable to Kentucky sources. The main defendant (the city of Cincinnati) in the action, by answer, denied any liability whatsoever for income taxes to the commonwealth of Kentucky.

The answer 'then set forth that, upon- hearing, the Franklin Circuit Court rendered judgment for the commonwealth of Kentucky in the action, in the amount of $166,474.68 and costs, which amount the defendant, as garnishee, paid to the court on or about April 6, 1942, pursuant to a- resolution passed by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway on March 30, 1942, and then set forth the last paragraph of the resolution, the effect of which was to authorize The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company to deduct such amount of money as it as garnishee may be ordered to pay into court from the quarterly rental under the lease for the railroad, with the understanding and upon the condition that the trustees do not relinquish and specifically reserve all of their rights under the lease to claim and demand from the defendant railway company the payment of the full amount of the judgment, including-interest and penalties in addition to. the rentals provided for in the lease between the trustees and the railway company.

The answer then set forth the amounts that it as garnishee was ordered to pay to the clerk of the court, which amounts consisted of the income taxes adjudged due the state of Kentucky for the years 1936 to 1939, inclusive, interest on the taxes, and then three separate penalties on the-taxes as provided by the statutes of Kentucky, the amounts totaling $166,-. 474.68.

The answer then set forth that pursuant to the resolution and the judgment of the court, the defend-' ant deducted the amount of $166,474.68 from the next quarterly rental payment due from defendant to plaintiffs.

Defendant then set forth in its answer that pursuant to an agreement made between the plaintiff trustees and the defendant, the latter, on' August 14, ■ 1942, paid the costs, aggregating $231 incurred in the action in the Franklin Circuit Court, and deducted that amount from the next quarterly rental payment due to plaintiffs by defendant.

The answer then set- forth that the city of Cincinnati prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which is the court of last resort in the commonwealth of Kentucky, and that court, by opinion of December 11, 1942 (rehearing denied February 12, 1943), affirmed the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court, which case is reported in 292 Ky., 597, 167 S. W. (2d), 709.

The answer then set forth that on or about June 1, 1941, there was instituted in Franklin Circuit Court, Kentucky, as case No. 38580, a similar action brought against the city of Cincinnati and The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, as garnishee, for the recovery of income tax, interest and penalties with respect to the year 1940, and that the parties agreed to hold that litigation in abeyance until the final adjudication of the earlier ease by which they agreed to be bound.

Accordingly, after the decision of the Court of Appeals in case No. 38018, a consent judgment was entered in case No. 38580 in satisfaction of which The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas- Pacific Railway Company, as garnishee, paid to the clerk of the court on or about March 12, 1943, the sum of $28,088.27.

The answer then set forth that such payment was authorized by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway by resolution similar to that herein -above referred to, and that pursuant thereto the payment was made to the clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky. Defendant then set forth in its answer the amount of the tax, interest and the three separate penalties paid, which made up the total amount of $28,088.27.

The defendant then averred that in paying the next installment of rental it deducted the sum of $28,088.27.

The defendant then averred that at no time prior to the filing of the aforementioned actions by the commonwealth of Kentucky was it advised by the trustees - of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, the city of Cincinnati, or anyone else that the commonwealth of Kentucky claimed that a tax was due on the rent received by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway or the city of Cincinnati, nor was any return filed by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway or by the city of Cincinnati- with the commissioner of revenue of Kentucky as required by the laws of Kentucky, showing that there was any income tax due the commonwealth of Kentucky by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway or the city of Cincinnati.

The defendant averred further that at no time prior to the adjudication of the liability of the city of Cincinnati for income taxes due the commonwealth of Kentucky was any demand made upon it by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway or the city of Cincinnati for the payment of the taxes.

The defendant averred further that the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, its lessor, at no. time requested it to file on their behalf an income tax return to Kentucky for any of the years 1936 to 1940, inclusive, and further averred that it had no information or data necessary for the filing of such returns.

The defendant then averred that clause three of the contract of lease made the eleventh day of October, 1881, and copied Verbatim as section 8 of the second modification thereof under date of August 1, 1928, found on pages 4 and 188, respectively, of the exhibit attached to the plain tiff s’ petition, did not and do not contemplate or require the defendant to pay or bear taxes or penalties or interest thereon levied or assessed against the lessor or the city of Cincinnati on the income derived by them, or either of them, as rental from' the defendant, and -further alleges that the defendant is not liable for the taxes or the penalties or the interest which it deducted from the rentals as set forth in its answer.

The defendant averred further that there is no other provision or covenant in the lease contract or the modifications thereof which requires the defendant to pay or bear any taxes, penalties or interest levied or assessed against the plaintiffs based upon . the rentals derived by the lessor, the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, from the defendant.

The defendant then averred that it was, therefore, justified and entitled in law and in equity to deduct from the rentals due the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway the amounts which it was required, as garnishee, to pay to the clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky, as taxes, as interest, as penalties and as costs.

The defendant then set forth in its answer that it had theretofore been agreed between the trustees, the city of Cincinnati and The Cincinnati, New Orleans .& Texas Pacific Railway Company that as between themselves, for the purpose of defending the cases filed in the state of Kentucky and making agreements with respect to matters growing out of them and settling any dispute as to the party ultimately liable under the lease of the Cincinnati Southern Railway for any income taxes, penalties and interest thereon, the city of Cincinnati would be regarded as having fully represented the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway.

The defendant then prayed that having fully answered, the petition of the plaintiffs be dismissed, and that the defendant be allowed to go hence without day and recover its costs expended.

To that answer the plaintiffs filed a reply, in which they admitted the institution of the causes of action in the state of Kentucky as set forth in the defendant’s answer, admitted the passage of 'the resolutions by the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, as set forth in defendant’s answer, and admitted the payment of the judgments by the defendant, as garnishee, and denied each and every other allegation in the defendant’s answer not specifically admitted in its reply or petition to be true.

Facts.

It appears from the admissions in the pleadings, the stipulation of the parties and the evidence that the city of Cincinnati is the owner of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, a railroad extending from Cincinnati, Ohio, through Kentucky, to Chattanooga, Tennessee; that in 1881, such railroad and all its appurtenances and facilities were leased ¿o The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, for a term of 25 years; that in 1902, a contract was entered into between lessor and lessee extending the term of the lease and adopting with some modifications the terms of the original lease; and that in 1928, the terms of the lease were again extended and a rental clause, as hereinafter set forth, adopted by the parties.

The lease and the extensions were cumulative, in that the modification of 1902 contained in effect all unmodified provisions of the original lease of 1881 and the extension of 1928 preserved the unmodified conditions of both the drafts of 1881 and 1902. One unmodified clause so preserved intact throughout the extensions was clause 3 of the lease of 1881, which became clause 8 of the extension of 1928. The extension of 1928 contained the following clauses including such unmodified clause 8:

The Lease. (1928)

“Now this indenture made between the said trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, party of the first part, herein called the trustees, and The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific.Railway Company, party of the second part, hereinafter called the company-, with the approval of the trustees of the sinking fund of said city, pursuant to the provisions and under the authority of the Act' of the General Assembly of Ohio, of April 23, 1898, aforesaid, Witnesseth, and it is mutually-covenanted and agreed by said parties, each for itself, its successors and assigns, as follows:

“Section I. That for and in consideration of the increase of the present current rental of the existing lease and the payment of the further fixed and contingent rentals as provided herein, the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, lessors aforesaid, agree to the modification of the rental of the existing lease and grant tp The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, lessee aforesaid, the extension of the term of the lease petitioned for, to wit, for the full term of sixty years and eighty days from the date of the expiration of the present term; that is to say, until and including the 31st day of December, A. D. 2026. Said party of the second part to have and to hold the, demised premises and all additions and improvements thereon for the term above stated upon the terms and conditions stipulated in said lease, in the first modification and extension thereof, and in this Indenture further modifying and extending the same.

“Section II. Rental according to the terms of the first' modified and extended lease of June 7, 1902, to be paid in cash up to and including December 31, 1927. The rental subsequent to December 31, 1927, coming due under the terms of the extended lease of June 7, 1902, shall be modified, fixed and determined as provided in this indenture, which modified rental and the further rentals provided and payable herein, the party of the second part covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and assigns to pay to the party of the first part, its successors and. assigns, in lawful money of the United States of America at the treasury of the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, and the same are fixed and determined as follows, to. wit:

“First: For the period from January 1, 1928, ,to December 31,1946, a fixed annual rental of one million, two hundred fifty thousand ($1,250,000) dollars, plus the expenses of the trustees’ organization, as provided in the present lease, payable in quartérly installments on April 1, 1928, for the prior quarter, and thereafter on the first days of July, October, January and April in each year during said period, and in addition thereto a contingent annual rental equivalent to two (2) per cent of the net profits derived by the lessee from the operation of the leased property during such period, ascertained and payable as hereinafter set forth.

“Second: For the period from.January 1, 1947, to December 31,1966, a fixed annual rental of one million, three hundred fifty thousand ($1,350,000). dollars, plus the expenses of trustees’ organization, as aforesaid, payable in quarterly installments on the said quarterly due dates of each and every year during said period, and in addition thereto a contingent annual rental equivalent to three (3) per cent of the net profits derived by the lessee from the operation of the leased property during such period., ascertained and payable as hereinafter set forth.

“Third: For the period from January 1, 1967, to December 31,1986, a fixed annual rental of one million, four hundred fifty thousand ($1,450,000) dollars, plus the expenses of trustees’ organization, as aforesaid, payable in quarterly installments on the said quarterly due dates of each and every year during said period, and in addition thereto a contingent annual rental equivalent to four (4) per cent of the net profits derived by the lessee from the operation of the leased property during such period, ascertained and payable as hereinafter set forth. '

“Fourth: For the period from January 1, 1987, to December 31, 2026, a fixed annual rental of one million, six hundred thousand ($1,600,000) dollars, plus the expenses of'trustees’ organization, as aforesaid, payable in quarterly installments on the said quarterly due dates of each and every year during said period, and in addition thereto, a contingent annual rental equivalent to five (5) per cent of the net profits derived by the lessee, from the operation of the leased property during such period, ascertained and payable as hereinafter set forth. ^

“Fifth: For the period from January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2026, a fixed annual rental of one million, seven hundred thousand ($1,700,000) dollars, plus the expenses of trustees’ organization, as aforesaid, payable in quarterly installments on the said quarterly due dates of each and every year during said period, and in addition thereto a contingent annual rental equivalent to six (6) per cent of the net profits derived by the lessee from the operation of the leased property during such period, ascertained and payable as hereinafter set forth.

“The contingent rental, ascertained in the manner hereinafter provided, shall be payable annually on July 1, of the year succeeding the year in which it has been earned'.

“The obligation to make the interest and sinking fund.payments upon the’city bonds heretofore issued for terminal improvements and betterments as provided in the present lease and supplemental contracts shall continue pursuant to said lease and contracts.

“Section III. That'this contract of modification and extension is and is so treated and considered by the parties hereto, as the second modification and extension of the original lease of 1881, and that as such, all terms, conditions, covenants, stipulations, obligations, and agreements therein contained, and in the contract of the first modification and extension agreement of date June 7, 1902, not heretofore by their terms executed and completed, are to remain in full force and effect during the remainder of the term of the said first modification and extension granted thereof and during the modification and extension- thereof hereby granted, except so. far as the same are modified or amended by this indenture, and all such terms and conditions are hereby affirmed and confirmed by the parties hereto as though restated and rewritten herein, and the party of the second part for itself, its successors and assigns, hereby covenants and agrees with the said party of the first part, its successors and assigns that it will observe, keep and perform all the covenants, stipulations, and agreements of said original lease, and of said first modification and extension thereof and of this indenture, and will not evade*or- violate any of the same; both parties hereto, moreover, hereby ratifying, confirming and approving all other supplementary and supplemental agreements and deeds, heretofore made between them, or by either of them to the other.

“Section IY. The lessee company agrees, upon the execution of this agreement of modification and extension, and in consideration thereof, to proceed at its own cost and expense, to construct upon the line of railway and upon the right of way now owned or hereafter acquired by or for the trustees of the railway, a second main or double track from Williamstown, Kentucky, to Danville, Kentucky.

“Section Y. It is agreed by the parties hereto that the term ‘net profit’ as used in ascertaining the amount of the contingent rental herein provided to be paid shall be interpreted to mean the difference between the ‘net railway operating income’ of the leased property in any one year (ascertained under accounting regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission) and the fixed rental (including interest and sinking fund accruals) due in such year under the terms of this lease contract, and it is further stipulated that the provision for contingent rental shall not be interpreted as giving the lessor or its representatives any further voice in operating management or administration of the leased property beyond that heretofore exercised under the terms of the existing lease.

“Section YI. That at the execution and delivery of this indenture, the said party of the second part shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, a deed confirming the mortgage executed and acknowledged on the 11th day of October, 1881, given by The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company to said trustees and extending the lien thereof to all property thereby covered or to be hereaftér acquired as security for the performance of the covenants of said lease and of the first modification and extension agreement of June 7, 1902, and of this indenture and of any supplemental agreements made regarding terminal facilities or permanent betterments.

“Section YII. This contract of modification and extension of said lease, is made subject to the extension of the franchise rights of the trustees under the laws of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee, in the securing of which by the lessor, the lessfie covenants and agrees to co-operaté to the fullest extent, provided, that if the said extension of the said franchise rights is not secured, neither lessor nor lessee shall have any claim against the other for failure thereof; and provided further,'that all payments of rental, fixed and contingent, made or to be made hereunder by the lessee prior to the expiration of the present franchise rights of the trustees, shall remain the property of the lessor and the lessee shall have no right or make any claim to recoup or recover any of said payments from said lessor. Provided further, that the application for such extension shall be made by the lessor at such time as will be acceptable to the lessee, but the same shall not be later than January 1, 1962.

“Section VIII. And the said party of the second part further covenants and agrees to pay and discharge, as often as they shall become due, any and all taxes, assessments, duties, imposts and charges whatsoever which may. be levied, assessed or imposed during the term hereby granted, by any government or lawful authority whatsoever upon the premises hereby leased, or any part thereof, or upon any business or earnings, or income of the same, or by reason of the ownership thereof, it being the true intent and meaning hereof that all governmental charges upon the aforesaid property or income therefrom, which may be imposed by any governmental authority capable of enforcing such charges, through, upon or against said property, or the corporation owning or the party leasing the same, shall be assumed and satisfied by the party of the second part hereto, however the forms thereof may change during the term hereby granted.”

The Lease. (1881)

In clause 6 of the original lease of 1881 appeai-s the following terms:

“Clause 6. And the said party of the second part further covenants and agrees with the party of the ' first part, that the said party of the second part will provide and keep the said line of railway supplied with rolling stock and equipment so that the business of the same shall be preserved, encouraged and developed, and that the same shall at all times be done with safety and expedition, and the public accommodated in respect thereto with all practicable conveniences and facilities, and that all future growth of' such business, as the same may arise or be reasonably anticipated, shall be fully provided for and secured, and that all reasonable efforts shall be used to maintain, -develop and increase the business of said line-of railway, and further that it will pay and save harmless the party of the first part from the payment of any costs, expenses, claim, liabilities, damages and demands whatsoever arising out of the possession,, control, management and operation of said dine of railway and its appendages, or any part thereof, the said party of the second part talcing upon itself the-same duties, liabilities and obligations in respect thereto as if it had become the oioner thereof, and doing-every act and thing that may by law be required of, or be obligatory upon the lessee or said party of the-first part, its successors or assigns.” (Emphasis-added.)

It is not claimed that this latter clause has any direct bearing upon the matter of income tax, but it does indicate the intention of the parties to free the lessor from any charge against the net return on the-operation of the railway.

The Kentucky Tax.

In 1936, the state of Kentucky passed “An Act relating to revenue and taxation, providing for an-income tax, the collection and administration thereof.”'

Both parties to the lease agreement ignored the-provisions of this act as inapplicable to the lessor.

■ In 1940, a suit was filed by the commissioner of revenue of the state of Kentucky against the city of Cincinnati, seeking payment of income taxes and penalties alleged to be due the state of Kentucky by reason of income received by the city of Cincinnati as rentals from the lessee railway for the years 1936, 1937, 1938, and 1939. A later similar. action was filed for the tax upon the rentals of the year 1940.

Those actions were litigated through the several Kentucky courts resulting in final judgment against the city. The validity of the conclusion of the highest court of Kentucky upon the right of that state to tax a political subdivision of a sister state, especially in view of the position of the federal government as to income tax from such political subdivision' to it, is not presented in this appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is reported in 292 Ky., 597, 167'S. W. (2d), 709. Rentals due in the possession of the lessee were attached, subsequently paid to the state of Kentucky and deducted by lessee in its rental accounting with the lessor.

The parties had agreed to try only the first suit filed for the taxes alleged to be due for the years 1936' to 1939, inclusive, and upon the final decision of that case a judgment was entered in the second case (involving taxes for the year 1940) for $28,088.27, which was paid by The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, as garnishqe, on March '12, 1943, under a resolution adopted by the plaintiff trustees, and which resolution is set forth in the stipulation.

Under the arrangement set forth in the stipulation of facts filed herein, these judgments and costs were paid by the railway company, as garnishee, ip the total sum of $194,793.95, without prejudice to the rights of either party.

The sum was deducted by The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company from rentals dne under tlié lease, and the city of Cincinnati and the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway then filed an action in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton, county, Ohio, for the amounts so deducted from the-rentals.

The Issue.

The question thus presented to the trial court and this court upon appeal is whether under the lease and several extensions the lessee railway is required to pay the tax levied by the state of Kentucky upon the net rental income passing from the lessee railway to-the lessor.

The answer to the question seems so clear that were it not for the conscientious effort and able treatment of the problem employed by all counsel involved, it would seem sufficient to state in concise language the-conclusion thereon which is, that the lessee is clearly bound to pay the tax upon the income of the city lessor from the railway lessee. That such was the manifest intention of the parties to the lease as expressed in the original draft and extensions seems clear beyond, any possible doubt. This conclusion is reached not only from a reading of clause 8, but from a careful scrutiny of the several agreements of 1881, 1902 and 1928, and the factual environment of the parties.

It is difficult ‡0 imagine what language could have been used by the parties to definitely express a determination that the income of the city lessor, through the trustees, from the railway lessee should be absolutely net, to the city of Cincinnati. Every possible-type of charge or claim against such income was required to be discharged by the lessee.

The contentions of counsel for the lessee railway will, however, be considered in detail for the reasonshereinbefore stated.

The Defendant’s Contentions.

(1) It is contended that the lease must be construed ■most strongly against the lessor. 32 American'Jurisprudence, 133, cited in support of that contention is more an authority for the proposition that where the lessor has prepared the lease the rule prevails. Assuming such to be the case, the contention may be ■accepted.

(2) It is contended that in the absence of express ■agreement on the part of the tenant to pay taxes, they must be borne by lessor. Certainly, as far as "taxes upon the income to the lessor paid by lessee as rental, such rule would apply.

(3) It is contended lessee is bound to pay only such taxes as it has expressly agreed to pay.

No objection to this contention may be made as far as it involves the instant facts.

(4) It is contended that a general covenant to pay taxes will not be extended beyond its natural or ordinary meaning. This in effect merely means that the parties are bound by the terms of their agreement.

(5) It is contended that it is incumbent upon the landlord, if he would relieve himself of taxes, so to ■provide in the lease and contract.

This but repeats the former contentions.

As its conclusion upon these premises, the defendant contends that “a lessee may expressly covenant for •or against the payment of any income tax assessed .against or exacted from the lessor by virtue of the rent reserved in the lease,” but this lease has not :so expressly provided.

It cannot be admitted, however, that the language hereinbefore set forth, quoted from the several agreements between the parties, can be classified as “a general covenant to pay taxes against demised premises'.”

On the contrary, the tax covenants and agreements to be performed by the lessee are specific and detailed in the extreme. There can be no objection to the contention of defendant that “whether or not an agreement by a lessee to pay the lessee’s (lessor’s?) taxes includes income taxes depends upon the words of the contract, the context in which they occur, and the subject matter to which they are applied.”

The defendant states:

“In endeavoring to arrive at the intention, of the parties as expressed in their contract, we must take into consideration that the' lease in question was entered into on the 11th day of October, 1881. At that time there were, so far as defendant-appellant knows, no income tax laws in effect,” and continuing—

“It is true that during the war of 1812 an attempt was made to adopt an income tax law in the United States. The first income .tax law enacted by the United States was the Act of August 5, 1861, which taxes incomes between $800 and $5,000 at the rate of 3 per cent, incomes not over $10,000 at the rate of iy¿ per cent, and incomes in excess of $10,000 at the rate of 10 per cent. This law remained in effect, with several amendments, until December 31, 1871. See 1947 Prentice-Ilall Federal Tax Service, Vol. 4, page 50,003, History of Income Tax.” The defendant continues—

“We find then that at the time of the entering into of the lease in question, there was no federal income tax law, in effect; and so far as defendant-appellant has been able to ascertain from diligent search, there was no income tax law in effect in the states of Ohio, Kentucky or Tennessee. It would appear clear, therefore, that the parties did not have in mind that the lessee should pay any income tax under the then presently existing laws. ”

Early History of State and Federal Tax on Income.

Taxes upon income were known' in Greece' as far •back as 428 B. C. In Rome, about the year 175 B.. C., •a special income tax was imposed in anticipation of war. A continuation of the tax over a long period so ■increased tbe treasury that later an order was made returning such tax to the payers covering previous payments of 25 years.

The ancient origin of taxes upon income is commented upon in State, ex rel. Bolens, v. Frear, 148 Wis., 456, 134 N. W., 673. Taxes on income were known in Italian cities in the fifteenth century, in France in 1697, in England in 1799, in Prussia in 1812.

State tax upon income was known in Massachusetts ■in 1634, in Rhode Island in 1673, in New Jersey in 1684, in Virginia in 1786, in Pennsylvania in 1844. 'Other states' passing income tax laws were Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, and in 1913 state income tax laws were in force in Wisconsin, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Oklahoma. See Income Tax Law, Analysis and History, Harris Forbes & Co. (1913); State Tax Commissions in the United States (1897), James W. Chapman, Cincinnati Law Library Pamphlets, 53. Also, State Income Taxes, National Industrial Conference Board, 1930.

In 1869 Durbin Ward was making an impassioned plea to commissioner Delano to exclude the “Shakers” from the operation of the Federal Income Tax. (See, Cincinnati Law Library, Pamphlets, 80.)

In 1871, the Hon. John Sherman, of Ohio, was speaking before the United States Senate against modification of the then existing Income Tax Law (see •Cincinnati Law Library Pamphlets, 235), and in 1866 the justices of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire wrote their opinion upon the constitutionality of an income tax law to the governor of that state.

Intention of The Parties.

Can it be seriously claimed that merely because no applicable income tax law in 1881 directly then affected the revenue of the city of Cincinnati from the lease that the possibility or even imminence of application of a tax on such revenue was not fully considered by the parties? It can reasonably be inferred that the city of Cincinnati knew through the trustees that one or more of the states through which the railway extended might at any time consider it necessary to replenish their depleted treasuries by recourse to such an expedient, as other states had done. It may also be reasonably inferred that although the federal situation just at that time was satisfactory, it might change to the disadvantage of the city lessor. That possibility is not wholly beyond the scope of imagination now. Certainly, state public employees considered themselves for many years beyond the pale of federal income tax payments, only to be rudely shocked by a decision against them from which there is no appeal.

It is to be remembered also that this agreement was fully bonsidered in 1928, when income tax was certainly a matter of concern to men upon the street.

In 1881, in-1902 and 1928, state and federal income taxes were more than speculative menaces to the income of the city. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the city provided, against every other form of attack upon its income and overlooked this, even if the language used did not negative such'a consideration.

It is true that the covenant against taxes, charges and assessments, and other provisions securing an absolute net return to the trustees, are expressed in all-inclusive terms. The reason for the employment of such general terms rather than a resort to detailed specification of particular taxes, charges and assessments is evident when the effect of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is considered. It was the evident intent of the lessor, acquiesced in by the lessee, to include every form of tax, charge and assessment then known or conceivable. Had specific detailed types of such taxes, charges, or assessments been mentioned in such covenant and other provisions, it can easily be imagined that some form of tax,, charge, or assessment then (in 1881, 1902, or 1928) unknown, might later intervene and the employment of the maxim would result in the exclusion of the protection of the covenants and provisions.

The defendant notes that the enactment of the 16th Amendment caused no change in the terms of the covenant, in the extension of 1928, and argues that it was, therefore, not the intention of the parties to apply the terms of the covenant to income taxes.

The defendant, however, overlooks the later history of the federal income tax law.

Later History, Federal Law, Tax on Income.

The second period of income tax operation was in 1894, being a part of the Wilson Tariff Law of that year. The new law was largely modeled after the Law of 1861 and provided a tax of 2 per cent on all private incomes in excess of $4,000, and also upon the incomes of corporations, companies and business associations not including partnerships. There was no differentiation between incomes, and there was no attempt to collect the tax on the income at its source. The Law of 1894 had no sooner gone into effect than the fight on its constitutionality began to be waged. The test case was that of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S., 429, 39 L. Ed., 759, 821, 15 S. Ct., 673, 158 U. S., 601, 39 L. Ed., 1108, 15 S. Ct., 912, which, after a second trial, by a divided court, declared the law to be unconstitutional. At the first trial, certain very important phases of the question were decided against the act, but because by a division of four to four they were unable to determine the constitutionality of the balance of the statute, the entire subject had to be reopened and argued for the second time, with the result as stated above. The- basis of the successful attack against the law was Section 2, Article I of the federal Constitution, providing that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several ■ states.

The Pollock case had hardly been finally decided before steps 'were taken resulting in the 16th Amendment, which became law in 1913. From that date to the present time there is no indication that income tax was assessed against plaintiffs.

Th'fe operation of the Federal Income Tax Law presented no occasion for modifying the terms of the covenant in the draft of 1881. But there was another reason why the parties, and especially the lessor, felt no fear that the tax covenant and other provisions of the lease and extensions did not secure them a net revenue. •

The covenant in the original lease had been tested by the imposition of a franchise tax by the state of Kentucky, and in 1899 the United States Circuit Court, in an opinion written by Judge William Howard Taft, held that the covenant required the lessee to pay a franchise tax charged by the state of Kentucky against the lessor city. Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 93 F., 587.

If the covenant was held good by the courts against a franchise tax, which tax was not specifically mentioned in the covenant (although income was) why •should the lessor change the terms of the covenant?

The language of Judge Taft (page 591 of the «pinion) seems posthumously pertinent:

“It was evidently the purpose to secure to the city of Cincinnati a net - rent, without any deduction for taxation arising from its ownership of the Cincinnati Southern Railway. By clause 3, the lessee agrees to pay all taxes, assessments, duties, imposts, and charges whatsoever which may be imposed during the term, by any governmental or lawful authority, upon the premises leased, or any part thereof, or upon any business or earnings or income of the same, or by reason of the ownership thereof. And it is recited to be the true intent of this clause that all governmental charges upon the property or the income, imposed by any governmental authority capable of enforcing them, through, upon, or against the property of the corporation owning, or the party leasing, the same, shall be satisfied by the party of the second part, whatever the form in which said charge may be. The tax against the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway is a tax upon its franchise to construct, own, and lease the railway, and is therefore p, tax imposed ‘by reason of the ownership’ of the railway, and so is within the words of clause 3.”

The difference between income and franchise taxes is recognized. However, the point really decided by the Thomas case is that the terms used in the covenant are effective t<j give the lessor an absolute net rental. Had the instant problem been before the Circuit Court, it cannot be conceived that a different result would have followed. It must be considered now that the parties anticipated the imposition of a franchise tax and used language to protect the lessor. The Thomas case makes this conclusion res judicata. Can it be supposed that in view; of the ever present threat of both federal and state income taxes the lessor would not have changed the terms of the covenant, had it not felt secure in the terms then used?

The defendant claims the clause was directed only to an income tax which the lessee might be required •to pay. Defendant states in its brief: “we must bear in mind that when the lease was entered into in 1881 there was no income tax law* and if the parties contemplated the payment of income taxes at all they could not, 'of course, at that time tell what the law would provide, and therefore they desired to make certain that the lessee would have to pay all of the taxes assessed by reason of its operation of the railroad property, and this is the conclusion that the Massachusetts court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to in the cases just above cited.” Why should the lessor ignore the same contingency it applied to it?

The defendant calls attention to a- reference, -in the 1902 extension, to a decision of the United States Circuit Court, holding the lessor was not responsible under the terms of the 1881 lease for rebuilding bridges, but that such duty rested upon the lessee. It is noted that although such,' reference to a construction of the lease was incorporated in an extension, the 1928 extension carried no reference to the Thomas case. Defendant in its brief states:

“We submit that if the city of Cincinnati and the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railway had considered the construction placed by Judge Taft on the •tax covenant found in clause 3 of the lease of 1881, as broad and all-inclusive as they now contend for, they would have, by reference, in the 1902 modification, embodied it as a part of the lease, or certainly ■when they rewrote clause 3 verbatim in the 1928 modification, they would have, in connection therewith, adopted and made part of the lease the construction placed upon the tax covenant by Judge Taft. Their failure to do so, we submit, is strong evideuce of the fact that they did not consider the decision of Judge Taft as broad and all-inclusive as plaintiffs-appellees would have this court believe. Certainly it was of equal, if not of greater, importance to the city and the trustees, if it meant what they say it means, than the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals adopted by reference in the 1902 modification.”

With all due deference to that contention, an opposite conclusion seems required. The trustees may have had some doubt as to the obligation as to bridges, they had no doubt as to the tax covenant. A reference to the Thomas case would have weakened rather than strengthened an opinion of confidence in the all-inclusive terms of the tax covenant. It is apparent that the trustees considered the Thomas case merely a vindication of a'construction which to them throughout the years had seemed clear and unambiguous, and needed no modification or re-enforcement from judicial interpretation.

The defendant states that the rental which the lessor received from its lessee “is not income from the property owned by the lessor,” that “rental is paid by the lessee to the lessor by reason of its contractual' obligation to pay rent as set forth in the lease. ’ ’

Again, with full respect to the sincerity and acumen of counsel, the distinction here asserted is not apparent. Of course, there is a distinction between revenue obtained from real estate based upon the sale of crops, or ore, or oil, and revenue which accrues in the shape of money paid for its use. Certainly, however, the real estate in each case is the basis producing the revenue. What other revenue could have been considered by the parties to the lease contracts, but the rental to be paid for the use of the railway facilities, and how can it be claimed that such being the case, the parties did not consider such rental as “income of the same”? To what does “the same” refer? Certainly, to “the premises hereby leased”— “or any part thereof.” The premises are the source of income, and the parties realized the only “income” from such premises could be only rental, and incidentally, there was no “income” until the rental was received by the lessor.

If more i's needed — again, the covenant in effect refers to any income received “by reason of the ownership thereof,” that is, ownership of the premises leased.

This now too extended opinion may not be further enlarged by detailed reference to authorities,, which defendant claims sustains a differentiation in its favor. It must be sufficient to say that .they do not, although they have been examined with care. The authorities in which somewhat similiar provisions to those contained in the instruments under consideration were reviewed, have also been examined in detail. Language noted by the defendant appears in some of these, indicating an adverse conclusion to that reached herein. It must be considered, however, that no situation is involved identical to that here considered. The general principles announced are acknowledged, but those courts did not have before them the three instruments here considered or the factual environment here presented.

Generally speaking, all authorities favorable to the defendant are predicated upon a requirement of specific covenant, which consideration has been treated hereinbefore.

The inescapable conclusion is that, considering the entire history of the relations of the parties as developed by the record, the terms of the lease and its extensions, the menace of laws imposing an income tax, both federal and state, existing before and during the existence of the contracts involved, and the all-inclusive scope and character of the terms used, it must be found that the lessee is bound to pay the income taxes imposed by the state of Kentucky.

In the concluding pages of the defendant’s brief in chief it has considered the several cases holding adversely to a lessor’s claim of covenant against taxes and other clauses which have been construed to place upon the lessee the burden of payment. It is argued that the plaintiffs must have been aware of those holdings and have excluded the lessee from responsibility for any income tax, in that the language of the tax covenant was' not modified in the 1928 extension.

The opposite conclusion seems rather to be the logical inference. The lessor had before it the conclusion in the Thomas case and the more tenable inference is that the lessor considered the terms, continuously employed since 1881, ample for all purposes, including protection against the payment of a state income tax.

Whether there is a difference in application to the provisions of the instrument here considered in the case of/ federal and state income tax it may not be important to consider, the fact remains, however, that the tax involved in the issues presented is a tax imposed by the state of Kentucky upon income produced in that state, or at least so held to be.

The defendant* presents an alternative to ..the denial of any liability, in that it claimed it is at least not liable for the penalties assessed against the lessor. ■If the lessee is liable under the provisions of the instruments considered, as is the' conclusion herein reached, then it was always liable - for the income tax assessed against the lessor, and the neglect.to return ■ and pay such tax was its neglect as well as that of the lessor. If there was any mistake in reference to its responsibility, it was one of law and not of fact.

■ Both the lessor and lessee co-operated in an effort to defeat the tax. They were agreed in their opinion that the tax was not properly assessable against, the lessor. In this, according to the Kentucky courts, they both were in error. That mutual error resulted not only in a requirement that the tax be paid, but also that penalties shall be paid. The burden, therefore, rests upon the lessee to pay such penalties. ,

One final contention of the defendant requires consideration.

It is its contention that payment of the income tax of the lessor by the lessee would increase such income and result in imposition of successive income taxes ad infinitum. The case of Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co. v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 310 Mass., 659, 39 N. E. (2d), 647, 140 A. L. R., 506, is cited in support of that proposition. Counsel for defendant, however, in their brief in chief cite many cases where, in the opinions of courts, terms have been employed which do require payment of lessor’s income tax by lessee. Apparently, the suggested cumulative character, of the provisions did not disturb the ultimate conclusion of such latter courts in enforcing what they considered a binding provision on the lessee.

It is also claimed the defendant has no adequate facilities for determining the proper return of the lessor. Reference to the provisions of the lease and extensions indicate that the parties to the lease are required to maintain the closest of business and office contacts.

Certainly, it would be tbe simplest of matters to ascertain from the lessor what amount was deductible from the rental return of the lessee, and cause such return to be made in the name of lessor.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Matthews, P. J., Ross and Hildebrant, JJ., concur in the syllabus, opinion and judgment.


author: Bv the Court.

text:
    Adams, Appellee, v. Adams, Appellant.
    (No. 3729
    — Decided January 21, 1947.)

      Mr. Marion T. Frederick, for appellee.

      Mr. Leonard P. Henderson, for appellant.
   Bv the Court.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, Franklin county.

Plaintiff, appellee herein, filed his petition-for a divorce January 17,1941, and personal service was made on defendant, appellant herein. No answer was filed and on October 17, 1941, the action was dismissed 'without prejudice to the bringing of a new action. Later the plaintiff filed a new action which was dismissed December 24, 1942.

On June 20, 1942, plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the original action. Notice was served on the defendant of a hearing on the motion. The defendant failed to appear either in person or by attorney. The co,urt withheld its ruliilg on the motion. The plaintiff, being in thp armed services and expecting to be sent over seas, in which event he would not be able to be present at the hearing date on the second petition, pressed for ..a ruling on the motion. Later the plaintiff secured a furlough and returned to Columbus for the trial.

An entry sustaining the motion of plaintiff to reinstate the original action was presented to the defendant, which entry she approved in writing. Trial was had and a decree was granted to the plaintiff on December 24, 1942. On January 28' 1943, the defendant filed her motion to set aside, vacate and hold for naught the decree entered December 24, 1942. That motion was overruled and from such order this appeal is taken.

The defendant in her brief contends that the order •of the court last made was contrary to law. There ■being no bill of exceptions the court cannot consider -one question raised in the brief of defendant, to wit, whether defendant’s approval of the entry was obtained through misrepresentation. In the absence of ■a record showing the contrary, this court is required to adhere to the established rule that the trial court • acted properly and everything was done regularly.

The only vital question raised is whether the trial ■court had jurisdiction to make the order reinstating the •original action. If the court had jurisdiction, it follows that the trial, tfcie granting of the decree and the subsequent order overruling the motion to set aside the decree were proper.

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to revivor of actions have no application to the facts in this cáse. The Common Pleas Court is given statutory authority to set aside its judgments or orders after term. The grounds for vacating a judgment or order and the procedure to be followed are set forth' in Section T1631 et seq., General Code. Conceding the point that one of the grounds for vacating a judgment or order after term as set out in the statute does not appear in the record, the court nevertheless had authority to vacate the dismissal order with the consent of parties.

In National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Overholser, 64 Ohio St., 517, 60 N. E., 628, the jurisdictional question was passed upon by our Supreme Court. The opinion of the court is concise and is quoted in full as follows:

“The Circuit Court acted upon its own motion, and apparently upon the impression that the Court of Common Pleas on March, 25, 1899, was without jurisdiction to set aside the judgment which it had rendered on the 25th of November, 1898, although the parties consented thereto. That view of the subject is erroneous. It roas not an agreement to confer upon the Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction of a subject matter. That court is vested by statute with authority to set aside its judgments after the terms at which they are rendered for specified reasons, and when counsel consented that that jurisdiction should be exercised in this case, they did no more than to waive the allegation of a statutory ground for such action. That judgment having been set aside, the judgment of March 27, 1899, upon the overruling of the motion for a new' trial, is the only , final judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in the ■case, and the petition in error having been filed within four months of the rendition of that judgment it was the duty of the Circuit Court to consider it.” (Italics •ours.)

See, also, 23 Ohio Jurisprudence, 1181, Section 1070; ■31 American Jurisprudence, 276, Section 730.

Applying that principle of law to the facts in this ■case, this court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to vacate the order dismissing the action without prejudice. The aetión being reinstated, it was re-.stored to the same status it had at the time of the dismissal. The trial court having jurisdiction proceeded to trial and issued a decree dated December 24, 1942. 'The decree in the original action and the entry dismissing the second action being entered on .the same, •day, it is presumed the entries in the two cases were filed in the proper order, no showing being made to the contrary. In fact, we are unable to see how the filing of the second action could deprive the court of its jurisdiction to proceed in the original action, once the action was reinstated.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court overruling the motion to set aside and vacate the decree was not ■contrary to law.

There being no error in the record prejudicial to the •defendant, the judgment' of the trial court is affirmed.

J udgment affirmed.

Hornbeck, P. J., Wiseman and Miller, JJ., concur..